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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Henrick_Hellstr=F6m?= <henrick@streamsec.se>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Redistribution in Proactive Secret Sharing schemes
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I have a problem with the Pedersen-VSS Discrete Logarithm based secret 
sharing protocol, I hope someone here could help me with. Forgive me and 
blame my ignorance if the problem I describe has already been solved, 
but as far as I could tell it appears to have been overlooked.

Background:

In Pedersen-VSS the shared secret x is never calculated. Instead, each 
of the n share holders Pi, 1 <= i <= n, generates an independent secret 
zi such that the sum of all zi equals x. Each share holder Pi splits zi 
into n shares sij, 1 <= j <= n, and transmits sij secretly to Pj. There 
are various methods for redistribution of the shares sij that leaves the 
values zi unchanged.

The problem:

I am looking for a protocol for "redistribution" of the secrets zi that 
would leave x unchanged. Let z'i denote the secret owned by Pi after the 
redistribution. One requirement is that the redistribution must be done 
in such way that knowledge of t-1 value pairs (zi,z'i) and the value zj, 
will not reveal the value z'j.

The reason for this is that I need a method for dealing with the 
possibility that a share holder Pi might be compromised during the 
reconstruction of zi, and that the adversary thereby obtains the value 
zi and not just the set of sub shares sji given to Pi.

Practically, I am thinking of software implementations that are swapped 
to the hard drive at the critical moment etc. There are also protocols 
that reveals zi by having the share holders broadcasting the secret 
shares sij in the event Pi gets corrupted, such as the DKG protocol 
proposed by Gennaro et al (1999). An adversary that is able to block the 
communication of any share holder and intercept the communication of at 
least two share holders, would only need to launch DoS attacks against 
each of the share holders in order, to obtain all of the values zi.

Citeseer context:
     http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/context/7536/0
     http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/context/1945661/0
     http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/wong01verifiable.html

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 05 May 2003 11:52:34 EDT."
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In message <F6242D340921D5118D1E00508BB9837A0188BF77@tlnmail1.toplayer.com>, js
joberg@toplayer.com writes:
>Hey all,
>
>I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
>integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
>amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.

Let me clarify something, since the phrase "non-repudiation" is often
misused.  Without going into technical definitions, the right meaning is
"A wants to prove to a third party -- the judge -- that B sent certain 
packets, and in particular that A cannot have forged them".  Is that 
what you mean?

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
		http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)


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From mailnull@www1.ietf.org  Mon May  5 12:21:10 2003
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To: smb@research.att.com
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Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions 
Date: Mon, 5 May 2003 12:19:54 -0400 
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Yes, that is what is meant.  I may have mis-used the term "authentication",
let me know if I did.

Thanks,
Jon
-----Original Message-----
From: Steven M. Bellovin [mailto:smb@research.att.com]
Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 12:17 PM
To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions 


In message <F6242D340921D5118D1E00508BB9837A0188BF77@tlnmail1.toplayer.com>,
js
joberg@toplayer.com writes:
>Hey all,
>
>I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
>integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
>amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.

Let me clarify something, since the phrase "non-repudiation" is often
misused.  Without going into technical definitions, the right meaning is
"A wants to prove to a third party -- the judge -- that B sent certain 
packets, and in particular that A cannot have forged them".  Is that 
what you mean?

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
		http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)

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Hey all,

I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
extremely cost sensitive.  

The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU being
tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
(days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's as
well as the authenticity.

The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has
anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better solution.  The
idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the
full strength or the full cost (in processing time).

Thanks in advance for any input,
Jon

Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the data
stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was sent
since the last hash was sent or since startup.

Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a MD5 hash is
generated over all PDU
packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5 hash
is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash
sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.

NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 

Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of that
hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The signed hashes allows
authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied
MD5 hashes.

Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 hash is generated
over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since startup
and that MD5 hash is signed
using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are sent
over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for every
signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the sequence
number of every HashPDU that
was included in the signed hash.

NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.

NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope of
this specification.

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jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
>I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
>integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
>amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
>Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
>extremely cost sensitive.  

Your approach sounds like a reasonable one.  I take it you have
a reliable link?  (Otherwise, if packets can be dropped, you'll
need some extra mechanism: it's hard to verify the signature if
you're missing a packet.)

Since you want non-repudiation, you probably don't want to skimp
on the size of the public key.  Since you're probably CPU-bound,
I'd choose keysizes as large as you can reasonably afford.

I assume signing cost is the only important metric.  (RSA gives
big improvements in verification time, but that sounds irrelevant
to your application.)

Notice that DSA allows precomputation.  You can do most of the
work of the signature ahead of time, before you know the message;
basically, you create a "blank check" that can later be filled in
with the message, and most of the work comes in creating the blank
check (filling in the message is fast).  If you have stretches of
quiet time punctuated by bursts of activity, you might be able to
use the idle time for precomputation.

If speed is still a problem, you might consider faster public-key
systems, like elliptic curves or maybe even NTRU.  The security
of these systems is more uncertain, so DSA is preferable from a
security point of view.  Still, if DSA is too slow and your only
choice is between NTRU or nothing, NTRU is a much better bet than
nothing!  However, beware of patents and other intellectual property
minefields in this area.

I'd use SHA1 rather than MD5.
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Date: Mon, 5 May 2003 19:23:13 +0200
From: Alfonso De Gregorio <adg@com-and.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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Dear Jon,

the mechanism the working group have come up reminds me the method employed
in syslog-sign [1] to add "origin authentication, message integrity,
replay-resistance, message sequencing, and detection of missing messages"
to the BSD syslog protocol [2].

As far as I can tell, in a generic application context (i.e., not in the
message logging one), this mechanism is less than optimal since the 
recipient cannot rely neither upon the integrity, nor upon the 
authenticity of exchanged PDUs until authentication-PDU get received.

Hope it helps.

Cheers,
Alfonso

[1] C. Lonvick, "The BSD syslog Protocol", rfc 3164,
    <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3164.txt>

[2] J. Kelsey, J. Callas, "Syslog-Sign Protocol",
    draft-ietf-syslog-sign-10.txt,
    <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-syslog-sign-10.txt>


On Mon, May 05, 2003 at 11:52:34AM -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
> Hey all,
> 
> I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
> integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
> amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
> Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
> extremely cost sensitive.  
> 
> The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU being
> tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
> (days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's as
> well as the authenticity.
> 
> The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has
> anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better solution.  The
> idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the
> full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
> 
> Thanks in advance for any input,
> Jon
> 
> Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the data
> stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was sent
> since the last hash was sent or since startup.
> 
> Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a MD5 hash is
> generated over all PDU
> packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5 hash
> is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash
> sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
> sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
> 
> NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 
> 
> Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of that
> hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The signed hashes allows
> authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied
> MD5 hashes.
> 
> Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 hash is generated
> over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since startup
> and that MD5 hash is signed
> using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are sent
> over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for every
> signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the sequence
> number of every HashPDU that
> was included in the signed hash.
> 
> NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
> 
> NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope of
> this specification.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
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"David Wagner" <daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu> wrote in message
news:b961s3$g9j$1@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu...

[...]
> Notice that DSA allows precomputation.  You can do most of the
> work of the signature ahead of time, before you know the message;
> basically, you create a "blank check" that can later be filled in
> with the message, and most of the work comes in creating the blank
> check (filling in the message is fast).  If you have stretches of
> quiet time punctuated by bursts of activity, you might be able to
> use the idle time for precomputation.


Is there not a patent on this technique (by Micali maybe)? I remember
something about a patent on DSA precomputation, but I don't remember
the details...

--Anton

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<html>
Jon,<br>
<br>
it seems like you have a viable scheme.&nbsp; You might be interested in
the efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have been
discussed in the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG
(<a href="http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm" eudora="autourl">http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm</a>),
which is now defunct but has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC)
RG and the IETF MSEC WG.&nbsp; There are a bunch of methods that amortize
the work of digital signatures across multiple packets.&nbsp; I think the
following list covers the main methods:<br>
<br>
How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto '97, online at
<a href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html" eudora="autourl">http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html</a>.<br>
<br>
Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong and Simon S.
Lam,<i>Technical Report TR-98-15,</i> May 31, 1998; revised, June 14,
1999, in <i>IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking</i>, August 1999.&nbsp;
<a href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf" eudora="autourl">http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf<br>
<br>
</a>Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random Packet Loss,
Golle and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at<br>
<a href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf" eudora="autourl">http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and Canetti, IIRC,
though I can't find a link for it at present.<br>
<br>
The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt" eudora="autourl">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt</a>.&nbsp;
This method could be used with one of the standard methods for accerating
public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly discussed in
the document.<br>
<br>
A related but probably not applicable work is &quot;TESLA: Multicast
Source Authentication Transform Specification&quot;, Perrig, Canetti,
Whillock,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt" eudora="autourl">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt</a>.<br>
<br>
Which of these solutions is the best for any given application depends on
a bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder of packets,
whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the sender or on the
receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added to each packet.
<br>
<br>
Hope this help,<br>
<br>
David<br>
<br>
<br>
At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite cite>Hey all,<br>
<br>
I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to
provide<br>
integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically
infinite<br>
amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.<br>
Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is<br>
extremely cost sensitive.&nbsp; <br>
<br>
The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU
being<br>
tagged with a sequence number.&nbsp; At some point later in time<br>
(days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's
as<br>
well as the authenticity.<br>
<br>
The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone
has<br>
anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better
solution.&nbsp; The<br>
idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without
the<br>
full strength or the full cost (in processing time).<br>
<br>
Thanks in advance for any input,<br>
Jon<br>
<br>
Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the
data<br>
stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was
sent<br>
since the last hash was sent or since startup.<br>
<br>
Every &lt;n1&gt; PDU packets or when &lt;t1&gt; seconds have passed a MD5
hash is<br>
generated over all PDU<br>
packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5
hash<br>
is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every
hash<br>
sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains
the<br>
sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.<br>
<br>
NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. <br>
<br>
Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of
that<br>
hash, will be inserted into the&nbsp; the data stream. The signed hashes
allows<br>
authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the
recevied<br>
MD5 hashes.<br>
<br>
Every &lt;n2&gt; hashes or when &lt;t2&gt; seconds have passed, a MD5
hash is generated<br>
over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since
startup<br>
and that MD5 hash is signed<br>
using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are
sent<br>
over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for
every<br>
signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
sequence<br>
number of every HashPDU that<br>
was included in the signed hash.<br>
<br>
NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.<br>
<br>
NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope
of<br>
this specification.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
Cfrg@ietf.org<br>
<a href="https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" eudora="autourl">https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</blockquote></html>

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From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?G=E9_Weijers?= <Ge.Weijers@Sun.COM>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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On Mon, 5 May 2003, David Wagner wrote:

> Notice that DSA allows precomputation.  You can do most of the
> work of the signature ahead of time, before you know the message;
> basically, you create a "blank check" that can later be filled in
> with the message, and most of the work comes in creating the blank
> check (filling in the message is fast).  If you have stretches of
> quiet time punctuated by bursts of activity, you might be able to
> use the idle time for precomputation.

A scheme like GPS could be useful if the efficiency constraints are
severe. It requires only one multi-precision multiplication and no modular
arithmetic in the time-critical signing operation if you generate
use-and-throw coupons during processor idle times. DSA still requires
arithmetic modulo a 160-bit prime.

Patent caveats do apply.

Ge'

-- 
Gé Weijers                mailto:ge.weijers@sun.com
Sun Linux Security Group  Tel: (877)240-7611 x69536
Sun Microsystems, Inc.    Fax: (877)240-7611
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Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 22:44:21 -0700
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Hey JS Joberg,

I have been dealing with a very similar problem for the past couple of
years where we are limited to a software driver plugging into a stack.
I'm a bit pressed for time but here is a quick rundown of what I've found.

1. You cannot use any PKI, too slow for 100 Mbps networks, especially
     if you are datagram or transaction oriented with communications
     occurring among N nodes unpredictably.

2. Best to hash per packet, but current hashes are too big, at least
     for Ethernet MTU's.  I don't recommend maintaining a hash state
     across a series of packets, especially if packets can be lost, mixed
     up, or duplicated/retransmitted (true for most protocols).  And unless
     you enjoy debugging complex state machinery.

3. You must specify how manage authentication and encryption keys
     as part of your spec, otherwise it will be a failure.  Not just key
     exchange, the whole thing.  By failure I mean a lack of interoperability
     between vendors that drives costs up, this is the opposite of what
     a standard should achieve.  By whole thing I mean who has the
     authority to hand out authentication keys, how are keys refreshed,
     how do you handle bad or damaged keys, etc.

4. Think through how you will archive hashes.  What happens if a link
     goes down or your archive crashes.  What operations can proceed
     and those that cannot. How can you recover it? All this can be non-
     trivial.

5. Think simple.  Use memory where possible to reduce design/code
     complexity.

6. Last but definitely not least.  How do you manage your nodes
     address or name ID space.  How are authentication keys bound to
     IDs?  Are keys transient or not? I tend to like a number system
     similar to IP addresses (but don't use them directly!), it's simple
     and easy to distribute the address space management.

I'm sure there are dozen more items I've left off the list, and I'm equally
sure that someone, somewhere will object to each one of these items
above.  Ask them to present their own list to you and to us in CFRG.
It will make for interesting reading if nothing else.

Again, be aware that you need to specify the entire system, not just
a set of protocols.  This is because you must manage keys and IDs
besides the secure packets or the authentication handshakes.

Good luck,

- Alex


At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
>Hey all,
>
>I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
>integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
>amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
>Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
>extremely cost sensitive.
>
>The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU being
>tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
>(days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's as
>well as the authenticity.
>
>The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has
>anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better solution.  The
>idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the
>full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
>
>Thanks in advance for any input,
>Jon
>
>Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the data
>stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was sent
>since the last hash was sent or since startup.
>
>Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a MD5 hash is
>generated over all PDU
>packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5 hash
>is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash
>sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
>sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
>
>NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable.
>
>Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of that
>hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The signed hashes allows
>authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied
>MD5 hashes.
>
>Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 hash is generated
>over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since startup
>and that MD5 hash is signed
>using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are sent
>over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for every
>signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the sequence
>number of every HashPDU that
>was included in the signed hash.
>
>NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
>
>NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope of
>this specification.
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@ietf.org
>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
To: alten@attbi.com (Alex Alten)
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 01:59:22 -0700 (PDT)
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it has its warts, but some folks are thinking of trying to leverage
DNSSEC and Oportunistic Encryption as tools.  Still stuck w/ the key mgmt
problems.

--bill
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'David Mcgrew'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, jsjoberg@toplayer.com
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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Is the data stored data or being generated on the fly?
 
If the data is stored you could sign the data as follows:
 
Divide the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K
 
Compute H(n)  the hash of block n,
Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)
and so on
Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)
 
Then sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.
Next send H(1), block 1
H(2), block 2 etc...
 
 
This lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read the chunks, with
the ability to verify each chunk as you read.
 
You cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you have a buffer of
infinite length.
 
 
I have no idea if anyone has thought of this before (probably have it seems
obvious enough) or if it is patented or anything.
 
        Phill
 
 

-----Original Message-----
From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 PM
To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions


Jon,

it seems like you have a viable scheme.  You might be interested in the
efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have been discussed in
the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (
http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm
<http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm> ), which is now defunct but
has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the IETF MSEC WG.
There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of digital signatures
across multiple packets.  I think the following list covers the main
methods:

How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto '97, online at
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
<http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html> .

Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong and Simon S.
Lam,Technical Report TR-98-15, May 31, 1998; revised, June 14, 1999, in
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999.
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf
<http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf> 

Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random Packet Loss, Golle
and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf
<http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf>
Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and Canetti, IIRC,
though I can't find a link for it at present.

The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis,
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt> .
This method could be used with one of the standard methods for accerating
public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly discussed in the
document.

A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA: Multicast Source
Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, Whillock,
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt> .

Which of these solutions is the best for any given application depends on a
bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder of packets,
whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the sender or on the
receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added to each packet. 

Hope this help,

David


At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:


Hey all,

I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
extremely cost sensitive.  

The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU being
tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
(days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's as
well as the authenticity.

The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has
anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better solution.  The
idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the
full strength or the full cost (in processing time).

Thanks in advance for any input,
Jon

Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the data
stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was sent
since the last hash was sent or since startup.

Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a MD5 hash is
generated over all PDU
packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5 hash
is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash
sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.

NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 

Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of that
hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The signed hashes allows
authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied
MD5 hashes.

Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 hash is generated
over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since startup
and that MD5 hash is signed
using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are sent
over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for every
signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the sequence
number of every HashPDU that
was included in the signed hash.

NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.

NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope of
this specification.

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https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
<https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>  

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<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">


<META content="MSHTML 6.00.2800.1141" name=GENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Is the 
data stored data or being generated on the fly?</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>If the 
data is stored you could sign the data as follows:</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Divide 
the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2>Compute H(n)&nbsp; the hash of block n,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2>Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>and so 
on</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2>Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Then 
sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Next 
send H(1), block 1</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>H(2), 
block 2 etc...</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>This 
lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read the chunks, with the 
ability to verify each chunk as you read.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>You 
cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you have a buffer of infinite 
length.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>I have 
no idea if anyone has thought of this before (probably have it seems obvious 
enough) or if it is patented or anything.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
<FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Phill</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=366044911-08052003><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff 
size=2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE 
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid">
  <DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader dir=ltr align=left><FONT face=Tahoma 
  size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> David Mcgrew 
  [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 
  PM<BR><B>To:</B> jsjoberg@toplayer.com<BR><B>Cc:</B> 
  cfrg@ietf.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: [Cfrg] Request For 
  Opinions<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>Jon,<BR><BR>it seems like you have a viable 
  scheme.&nbsp; You might be interested in the efficient methods for signing of 
  packet streams that have been discussed in the IRTF, starting with the Secure 
  Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (<A 
  href="http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm" 
  eudora="autourl">http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm</A>), which is 
  now defunct but has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the 
  IETF MSEC WG.&nbsp; There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of 
  digital signatures across multiple packets.&nbsp; I think the following list 
  covers the main methods:<BR><BR>How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and 
  Rohatgi, Crypto '97, online at <A 
  href="http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html" 
  eudora="autourl">http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html</A>.<BR><BR>Digital 
  Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong and Simon S. 
  Lam,<I>Technical Report TR-98-15,</I> May 31, 1998; revised, June 14, 1999, in 
  <I>IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking</I>, August 1999.&nbsp; <A 
  href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf" 
  eudora="autourl">http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf<BR><BR></A>Authenticating 
  Streamed Data in the Presence of Random Packet Loss, Golle and Modadugu, NDSS 
  '00, online at<BR><A 
  href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf" 
  eudora="autourl">http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf</A>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
  Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and Canetti, IIRC, 
  though I can't find a link for it at present.<BR><BR>The Use of RSA Signatures 
  within ESP and AH, Brian Weis, <A 
  href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt" 
  eudora="autourl">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt</A>.&nbsp; 
  This method could be used with one of the standard methods for accerating 
  public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly discussed in the 
  document.<BR><BR>A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA: 
  Multicast Source Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, 
  Whillock, <A 
  href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt" 
  eudora="autourl">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt</A>.<BR><BR>Which 
  of these solutions is the best for any given application depends on a bunch of 
  factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder of packets, whether or not 
  it is acceptable to buffer packets on the sender or on the receiver, and the 
  amount of data that can safely be added to each packet. <BR><BR>Hope this 
  help,<BR><BR>David<BR><BR><BR>At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, 
  jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:<BR>
  <BLOCKQUOTE cite="" type="cite">Hey all,<BR><BR>I'm in an ETSI working group 
    and we are trying to find a way to provide<BR>integrity checks along with 
    non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite<BR>amount of data delivered over 
    a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.<BR>Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable 
    expectation and the solution is<BR>extremely cost sensitive.&nbsp; 
    <BR><BR>The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each 
    PDU being<BR>tagged with a sequence number.&nbsp; At some point later in 
    time<BR>(days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the 
    PDU's as<BR>well as the authenticity.<BR><BR>The following is what we have 
    come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has<BR>anything to add, remove, or 
    change that would make a better solution.&nbsp; The<BR>idea is to get some 
    of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the<BR>full strength or 
    the full cost (in processing time).<BR><BR>Thanks in advance for any 
    input,<BR>Jon<BR><BR>Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be 
    inserted into the data<BR>stream. A hash will only be created if at least 
    one PDU packet was sent<BR>since the last hash was sent or since 
    startup.<BR><BR>Every &lt;n1&gt; PDU packets or when &lt;t1&gt; seconds have 
    passed a MD5 hash is<BR>generated over all PDU<BR>packets sent since the 
    last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5 hash<BR>is sent in a 
    HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash<BR>sent for this 
    intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the<BR>sequence number 
    of every data PDU that was included in the hash.<BR><BR>NOTE: The values for 
    n1 and t1 are configurable. <BR><BR>Periodically, a hash over the hashes 
    specified above and a signature of that<BR>hash, will be inserted into 
    the&nbsp; the data stream. The signed hashes allows<BR>authentication of the 
    sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied<BR>MD5 
    hashes.<BR><BR>Every &lt;n2&gt; hashes or when &lt;t2&gt; seconds have 
    passed, a MD5 hash is generated<BR>over all hashes sent since the last 
    signed hash was sent or since startup<BR>and that MD5 hash is 
    signed<BR>using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature 
    are sent<BR>over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr 
    increments for every<BR>signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded 
    contains the sequence<BR>number of every HashPDU that<BR>was included in the 
    signed hash.<BR><BR>NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are 
    configurable.<BR><BR>NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is 
    outside the scope of<BR>this 
    specification.<BR><BR>_______________________________________________<BR>Cfrg 
    mailing list<BR>Cfrg@ietf.org<BR><A 
    href="https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" 
    eudora="autourl">https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</A> 
  </BLOCKQUOTE>_______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list 
  Cfrg@ietf.org 
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 14:16:51 +0200
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From: "Scott Cadzow" <Scott.Cadzow@etsi.org>
To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>,
        "David Mcgrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, <jsjoberg@toplayer.com>
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The data is streamed generally, storage is frowned upon.
 
S

	-----Original Message----- 
	From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip [mailto:pbaker@verisign.com] 
	Sent: Thu 08/05/2003 13:56 
	To: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com 
	Cc: cfrg@ietf.org 
	Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
	
	
	Is the data stored data or being generated on the fly?
	 
	If the data is stored you could sign the data as follows:
	 
	Divide the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K
	 
	Compute H(n)  the hash of block n,
	Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)
	and so on
	Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)
	 
	Then sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.
	Next send H(1), block 1
	H(2), block 2 etc...
	 
	 
	This lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read the chunks, with the ability to verify each chunk as you read.
	 
	You cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you have a buffer of infinite length.
	 
	 
	I have no idea if anyone has thought of this before (probably have it seems obvious enough) or if it is patented or anything.
	 
	        Phill
	 
	 

		-----Original Message-----
		From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
		Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 PM
		To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
		Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
		Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
		
		
		Jon,
		
		it seems like you have a viable scheme.  You might be interested in the efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have been discussed in the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm), which is now defunct but has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the IETF MSEC WG.  There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of digital signatures across multiple packets.  I think the following list covers the main methods:
		
		How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto '97, online at http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html.
		
		Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong and Simon S. Lam,Technical Report TR-98-15, May 31, 1998; revised, June 14, 1999, in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999.  http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf
		
		Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random Packet Loss, Golle and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at
		http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf    Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and Canetti, IIRC, though I can't find a link for it at present.
		
		The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis, http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt.  This method could be used with one of the standard methods for accerating public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly discussed in the document.
		
		A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA: Multicast Source Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, Whillock, http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt.
		
		Which of these solutions is the best for any given application depends on a bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder of packets, whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the sender or on the receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added to each packet. 
		
		Hope this help,
		
		David
		
		
		At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
		

			Hey all,
			
			I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
			integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
			amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
			Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
			extremely cost sensitive.  
			
			The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU being
			tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
			(days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's as
			well as the authenticity.
			
			The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has
			anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better solution.  The
			idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the
			full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
			
			Thanks in advance for any input,
			Jon
			
			Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the data
			stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was sent
			since the last hash was sent or since startup.
			
			Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a MD5 hash is
			generated over all PDU
			packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5 hash
			is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash
			sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
			sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
			
			NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 
			
			Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of that
			hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The signed hashes allows
			authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied
			MD5 hashes.
			
			Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 hash is generated
			over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since startup
			and that MD5 hash is signed
			using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are sent
			over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for every
			signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the sequence
			number of every HashPDU that
			was included in the signed hash.
			
			NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
			
			NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope of
			this specification.
			
			_______________________________________________
			Cfrg mailing list
			Cfrg@ietf.org
			https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg 

		_______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list Cfrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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From: canetti <canetti@watson.ibm.com>
To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
cc: "'David Mcgrew'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, jsjoberg@toplayer.com, cfrg@ietf.org
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Phill,
This seems to me reminisent of the Gennaro-Rohatgi stream signatures from
Crypto 97.

Ran


On Thu, 8 May 2003, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:

> Is the data stored data or being generated on the fly?
>  
> If the data is stored you could sign the data as follows:
>  
> Divide the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K
>  
> Compute H(n)  the hash of block n,
> Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)
> and so on
> Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)
>  
> Then sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.
> Next send H(1), block 1
> H(2), block 2 etc...
>  
>  
> This lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read the chunks, with
> the ability to verify each chunk as you read.
>  
> You cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you have a buffer of
> infinite length.
>  
>  
> I have no idea if anyone has thought of this before (probably have it seems
> obvious enough) or if it is patented or anything.
>  
>         Phill
>  
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 PM
> To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
> Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> 
> 
> Jon,
> 
> it seems like you have a viable scheme.  You might be interested in the
> efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have been discussed in
> the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (
> http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm
> <http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm> ), which is now defunct but
> has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the IETF MSEC WG.
> There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of digital signatures
> across multiple packets.  I think the following list covers the main
> methods:
> 
> How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto '97, online at
> http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
> <http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html> .
> 
> Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong and Simon S.
> Lam,Technical Report TR-98-15, May 31, 1998; revised, June 14, 1999, in
> IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999.
> http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf
> <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf> 
> 
> Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random Packet Loss, Golle
> and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at
> http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf
> <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf>
> Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and Canetti, IIRC,
> though I can't find a link for it at present.
> 
> The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis,
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt
> <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt> .
> This method could be used with one of the standard methods for accerating
> public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly discussed in the
> document.
> 
> A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA: Multicast Source
> Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, Whillock,
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt
> <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt> .
> 
> Which of these solutions is the best for any given application depends on a
> bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder of packets,
> whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the sender or on the
> receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added to each packet. 
> 
> Hope this help,
> 
> David
> 
> 
> At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
> 
> 
> Hey all,
> 
> I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
> integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
> amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
> Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
> extremely cost sensitive.  
> 
> The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU being
> tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
> (days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's as
> well as the authenticity.
> 
> The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has
> anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better solution.  The
> idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the
> full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
> 
> Thanks in advance for any input,
> Jon
> 
> Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the data
> stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was sent
> since the last hash was sent or since startup.
> 
> Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a MD5 hash is
> generated over all PDU
> packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5 hash
> is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash
> sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
> sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
> 
> NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 
> 
> Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of that
> hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The signed hashes allows
> authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied
> MD5 hashes.
> 
> Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 hash is generated
> over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since startup
> and that MD5 hash is signed
> using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are sent
> over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for every
> signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the sequence
> number of every HashPDU that
> was included in the signed hash.
> 
> NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
> 
> NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope of
> this specification.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>  
> 
> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> 

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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'canetti'" <canetti@watson.ibm.com>,
        "Hallam-Baker, Phillip"
	 <pbaker@verisign.com>
Cc: "'David Mcgrew'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, jsjoberg@toplayer.com, cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 06:51:57 -0700 
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Ran,

	I think you are probably being unkind to them, they have a solution
for the infinite case, the scheme I suggest is actually a special case of a
scheme they describe in the introduction. They also point to some pretty
good prior art - the java libraries use this technique.

http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html

	The article also proposes a solution to the infinite streams case. 


	One point to consider is that the bar to an acceptable solution is
pretty high since it has to address a problem for which HMAC is not
acceptable (a hard non-repudiation requirement) and for which custom
hardware is not acceptable.

	One issue that I did think of pushing on is the question of whether
true non-repudiation is the objective or whether it suffices to have an
authentication metric that does not depend on a shared key across a
population.


	If I had an order to do streaming video over multicast the way I
would do it is with two independent streams for each user. The first stream
would be the shared multicast stream. The second stream would be a
per-subscriber stream that contained the authentication data.

	I would encapsulate the video feed in something like DIME and put a
message digest (SHA1) at the end of each block.

	Then I would send to each subscriber a UDP packet containing HMAC
(MD, k) where k is the session key established between the user and the
service.

	The advantage of DIME is that you can separate the authentication
channel or do it in band as you choose.

	We really need a replacement for the current video-conference
protocols. the H.3??? scheme stops at every firewall I know. So there is no
way that most corporate users can videoconference from home. So there might
be an opportunity to drop this type of idea into the same scheme.


	Some other thoughts

- could use some sort of scheme that was symmetric key based but each party
only had a subset of the total keying material. Essentially a CDMA type
idea, each party has a unique subset of the keyspace. 

So there are 8 keys

A has the key map  10101010
B has the key map  11001100
C has the key map  11110000

So A can validate the key stream but cannot generate the key stream unless
she colludes with enough other parties to guarantee she has all the keys.


To make the process harder there could be a much larger pool of keys than is
used in each sample. The key maps would change from one step to another so
that the key maps for block n would be different to those for block m.

Anyway back to fighting spam, you know the simple stuff.

		Phill


> -----Original Message-----
> From: canetti [mailto:canetti@watson.ibm.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 9:04 AM
> To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
> Cc: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> 
> 
> 
> Phill,
> This seems to me reminisent of the Gennaro-Rohatgi stream 
> signatures from
> Crypto 97.
> 
> Ran
> 
> 
> On Thu, 8 May 2003, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> 
> > Is the data stored data or being generated on the fly?
> >  
> > If the data is stored you could sign the data as follows:
> >  
> > Divide the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K
> >  
> > Compute H(n)  the hash of block n,
> > Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)
> > and so on
> > Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)
> >  
> > Then sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.
> > Next send H(1), block 1
> > H(2), block 2 etc...
> >  
> >  
> > This lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read 
> the chunks, with
> > the ability to verify each chunk as you read.
> >  
> > You cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you 
> have a buffer of
> > infinite length.
> >  
> >  
> > I have no idea if anyone has thought of this before 
> (probably have it seems
> > obvious enough) or if it is patented or anything.
> >  
> >         Phill
> >  
> >  
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> > Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 PM
> > To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
> > Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> > 
> > 
> > Jon,
> > 
> > it seems like you have a viable scheme.  You might be 
> interested in the
> > efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have 
> been discussed in
> > the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (
> > http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm
> > <http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm> ), which is 
> now defunct but
> > has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the 
> IETF MSEC WG.
> > There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of 
> digital signatures
> > across multiple packets.  I think the following list covers the main
> > methods:
> > 
> > How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto 
> '97, online at
> > http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
> > <http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html> .
> > 
> > Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong 
> and Simon S.
> > Lam,Technical Report TR-98-15, May 31, 1998; revised, June 
> 14, 1999, in
> > IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999.
> > http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf
> > <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf> 
> > 
> > Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random 
> Packet Loss, Golle
> > and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at
> > http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf
> > <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf>
> > Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and 
> Canetti, IIRC,
> > though I can't find a link for it at present.
> > 
> > The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis,
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt
> > 
> <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signature
> s-00.txt> .
> > This method could be used with one of the standard methods 
> for accerating
> > public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly 
> discussed in the
> > document.
> > 
> > A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA: 
> Multicast Source
> > Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, Whillock,
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt
> > 
> <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spe
> c-00.txt> .
> > 
> > Which of these solutions is the best for any given 
> application depends on a
> > bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder 
> of packets,
> > whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the 
> sender or on the
> > receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added 
> to each packet. 
> > 
> > Hope this help,
> > 
> > David
> > 
> > 
> > At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > Hey all,
> > 
> > I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a 
> way to provide
> > integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a 
> theoretically infinite
> > amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
> > Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
> > extremely cost sensitive.  
> > 
> > The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, 
> with each PDU being
> > tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
> > (days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the 
> integrity of the PDU's as
> > well as the authenticity.
> > 
> > The following is what we have come up with and I'm 
> wondering if anyone has
> > anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better 
> solution.  The
> > idea is to get some of the authentication strength of 
> DSS/DSA without the
> > full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
> > 
> > Thanks in advance for any input,
> > Jon
> > 
> > Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted 
> into the data
> > stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU 
> packet was sent
> > since the last hash was sent or since startup.
> > 
> > Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a 
> MD5 hash is
> > generated over all PDU
> > packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since 
> startup. The MD5 hash
> > is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments 
> for every hash
> > sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded 
> contains the
> > sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
> > 
> > NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 
> > 
> > Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a 
> signature of that
> > hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The 
> signed hashes allows
> > authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity 
> of the recevied
> > MD5 hashes.
> > 
> > Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 
> hash is generated
> > over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or 
> since startup
> > and that MD5 hash is signed
> > using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA 
> signature are sent
> > over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr 
> increments for every
> > signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded 
> contains the sequence
> > number of every HashPDU that
> > was included in the signed hash.
> > 
> > NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
> > 
> > NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside 
> the scope of
> > this specification.
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>  
> > 
> > _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > 
> > 
> 
_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



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To: pbaker@verisign.com, canetti@watson.ibm.com
Cc: mcgrew@cisco.com, cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 10:09:25 -0400 
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Non-repudiation is a requirement, and going back to the source to validate
the authentication has been ruled out.

Putting these together with my weak understanding of the Gennaro-Rohatgi
stream method, it seemed that scheme didn't work (had to be able to go back
to the source, or have the stream stored ahead of time).

Also the ruling out of going back to the source of the data for validation
is what keeps us from using a nice fast keyed hash approach :(

I don't think, however, taking the authentication out-of-band has been
considered.  Not sure what it buys, but worth looking into.

Thanks again,
Jon

-----Original Message-----
From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip [mailto:pbaker@verisign.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 9:52 AM
To: 'canetti'; Hallam-Baker, Phillip
Cc: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions


Ran,

	I think you are probably being unkind to them, they have a solution
for the infinite case, the scheme I suggest is actually a special case of a
scheme they describe in the introduction. They also point to some pretty
good prior art - the java libraries use this technique.

http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html

	The article also proposes a solution to the infinite streams case. 


	One point to consider is that the bar to an acceptable solution is
pretty high since it has to address a problem for which HMAC is not
acceptable (a hard non-repudiation requirement) and for which custom
hardware is not acceptable.

	One issue that I did think of pushing on is the question of whether
true non-repudiation is the objective or whether it suffices to have an
authentication metric that does not depend on a shared key across a
population.


	If I had an order to do streaming video over multicast the way I
would do it is with two independent streams for each user. The first stream
would be the shared multicast stream. The second stream would be a
per-subscriber stream that contained the authentication data.

	I would encapsulate the video feed in something like DIME and put a
message digest (SHA1) at the end of each block.

	Then I would send to each subscriber a UDP packet containing HMAC
(MD, k) where k is the session key established between the user and the
service.

	The advantage of DIME is that you can separate the authentication
channel or do it in band as you choose.

	We really need a replacement for the current video-conference
protocols. the H.3??? scheme stops at every firewall I know. So there is no
way that most corporate users can videoconference from home. So there might
be an opportunity to drop this type of idea into the same scheme.


	Some other thoughts

- could use some sort of scheme that was symmetric key based but each party
only had a subset of the total keying material. Essentially a CDMA type
idea, each party has a unique subset of the keyspace. 

So there are 8 keys

A has the key map  10101010
B has the key map  11001100
C has the key map  11110000

So A can validate the key stream but cannot generate the key stream unless
she colludes with enough other parties to guarantee she has all the keys.


To make the process harder there could be a much larger pool of keys than is
used in each sample. The key maps would change from one step to another so
that the key maps for block n would be different to those for block m.

Anyway back to fighting spam, you know the simple stuff.

		Phill


> -----Original Message-----
> From: canetti [mailto:canetti@watson.ibm.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 9:04 AM
> To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
> Cc: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> 
> 
> 
> Phill,
> This seems to me reminisent of the Gennaro-Rohatgi stream 
> signatures from
> Crypto 97.
> 
> Ran
> 
> 
> On Thu, 8 May 2003, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> 
> > Is the data stored data or being generated on the fly?
> >  
> > If the data is stored you could sign the data as follows:
> >  
> > Divide the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K
> >  
> > Compute H(n)  the hash of block n,
> > Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)
> > and so on
> > Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)
> >  
> > Then sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.
> > Next send H(1), block 1
> > H(2), block 2 etc...
> >  
> >  
> > This lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read 
> the chunks, with
> > the ability to verify each chunk as you read.
> >  
> > You cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you 
> have a buffer of
> > infinite length.
> >  
> >  
> > I have no idea if anyone has thought of this before 
> (probably have it seems
> > obvious enough) or if it is patented or anything.
> >  
> >         Phill
> >  
> >  
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> > Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 PM
> > To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
> > Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> > 
> > 
> > Jon,
> > 
> > it seems like you have a viable scheme.  You might be 
> interested in the
> > efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have 
> been discussed in
> > the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (
> > http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm
> > <http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm> ), which is 
> now defunct but
> > has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the 
> IETF MSEC WG.
> > There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of 
> digital signatures
> > across multiple packets.  I think the following list covers the main
> > methods:
> > 
> > How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto 
> '97, online at
> > http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
> > <http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html> .
> > 
> > Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong 
> and Simon S.
> > Lam,Technical Report TR-98-15, May 31, 1998; revised, June 
> 14, 1999, in
> > IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999.
> > http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf
> > <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf> 
> > 
> > Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random 
> Packet Loss, Golle
> > and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at
> > http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf
> > <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf>
> > Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and 
> Canetti, IIRC,
> > though I can't find a link for it at present.
> > 
> > The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis,
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt
> > 
> <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signature
> s-00.txt> .
> > This method could be used with one of the standard methods 
> for accerating
> > public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly 
> discussed in the
> > document.
> > 
> > A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA: 
> Multicast Source
> > Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, Whillock,
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt
> > 
> <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spe
> c-00.txt> .
> > 
> > Which of these solutions is the best for any given 
> application depends on a
> > bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder 
> of packets,
> > whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the 
> sender or on the
> > receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added 
> to each packet. 
> > 
> > Hope this help,
> > 
> > David
> > 
> > 
> > At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > Hey all,
> > 
> > I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a 
> way to provide
> > integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a 
> theoretically infinite
> > amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
> > Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
> > extremely cost sensitive.  
> > 
> > The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, 
> with each PDU being
> > tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
> > (days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the 
> integrity of the PDU's as
> > well as the authenticity.
> > 
> > The following is what we have come up with and I'm 
> wondering if anyone has
> > anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better 
> solution.  The
> > idea is to get some of the authentication strength of 
> DSS/DSA without the
> > full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
> > 
> > Thanks in advance for any input,
> > Jon
> > 
> > Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted 
> into the data
> > stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU 
> packet was sent
> > since the last hash was sent or since startup.
> > 
> > Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a 
> MD5 hash is
> > generated over all PDU
> > packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since 
> startup. The MD5 hash
> > is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments 
> for every hash
> > sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded 
> contains the
> > sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
> > 
> > NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 
> > 
> > Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a 
> signature of that
> > hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The 
> signed hashes allows
> > authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity 
> of the recevied
> > MD5 hashes.
> > 
> > Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 
> hash is generated
> > over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or 
> since startup
> > and that MD5 hash is signed
> > using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA 
> signature are sent
> > over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr 
> increments for every
> > signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded 
> contains the sequence
> > number of every HashPDU that
> > was included in the signed hash.
> > 
> > NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
> > 
> > NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside 
> the scope of
> > this specification.
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>  
> > 
> > _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > 
> > 
> 
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Alex,

Thanks alot.  These are good points.  The fact that we don't currently have
solid answers to many of them is uncomfortable.  What we have is:
1.)  Given non-repudiation, no forknowledge of the stream, and the desire to
not have to take the data back to the source for validation, I think we are
stuck with some PK solution.  

2.)  I tend to agree here.  The thought, and maybe it is flawed, is to
amoratize the final hash computation over several packets and buy some
efficiency as well as not have the 16 byte overhead on all packets.

3.)  We have no good answer here.

4.)  We have no good answer here.

5.)  Agreed.

6.)  We have no good answere here.

Thanks!
Jon

-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Alten [mailto:alten@attbi.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 1:44 AM
To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions


Hey JS Joberg,

I have been dealing with a very similar problem for the past couple of
years where we are limited to a software driver plugging into a stack.
I'm a bit pressed for time but here is a quick rundown of what I've found.

1. You cannot use any PKI, too slow for 100 Mbps networks, especially
     if you are datagram or transaction oriented with communications
     occurring among N nodes unpredictably.

2. Best to hash per packet, but current hashes are too big, at least
     for Ethernet MTU's.  I don't recommend maintaining a hash state
     across a series of packets, especially if packets can be lost, mixed
     up, or duplicated/retransmitted (true for most protocols).  And unless
     you enjoy debugging complex state machinery.

3. You must specify how manage authentication and encryption keys
     as part of your spec, otherwise it will be a failure.  Not just key
     exchange, the whole thing.  By failure I mean a lack of
interoperability
     between vendors that drives costs up, this is the opposite of what
     a standard should achieve.  By whole thing I mean who has the
     authority to hand out authentication keys, how are keys refreshed,
     how do you handle bad or damaged keys, etc.

4. Think through how you will archive hashes.  What happens if a link
     goes down or your archive crashes.  What operations can proceed
     and those that cannot. How can you recover it? All this can be non-
     trivial.

5. Think simple.  Use memory where possible to reduce design/code
     complexity.

6. Last but definitely not least.  How do you manage your nodes
     address or name ID space.  How are authentication keys bound to
     IDs?  Are keys transient or not? I tend to like a number system
     similar to IP addresses (but don't use them directly!), it's simple
     and easy to distribute the address space management.

I'm sure there are dozen more items I've left off the list, and I'm equally
sure that someone, somewhere will object to each one of these items
above.  Ask them to present their own list to you and to us in CFRG.
It will make for interesting reading if nothing else.

Again, be aware that you need to specify the entire system, not just
a set of protocols.  This is because you must manage keys and IDs
besides the secure packets or the authentication handshakes.

Good luck,

- Alex


At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
>Hey all,
>
>I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to provide
>integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a theoretically infinite
>amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
>Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
>extremely cost sensitive.
>
>The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, with each PDU
being
>tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
>(days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the integrity of the PDU's
as
>well as the authenticity.
>
>The following is what we have come up with and I'm wondering if anyone has
>anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better solution.  The
>idea is to get some of the authentication strength of DSS/DSA without the
>full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
>
>Thanks in advance for any input,
>Jon
>
>Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted into the data
>stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU packet was sent
>since the last hash was sent or since startup.
>
>Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a MD5 hash is
>generated over all PDU
>packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since startup. The MD5
hash
>is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments for every hash
>sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded contains the
>sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
>
>NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable.
>
>Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a signature of
that
>hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The signed hashes allows
>authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity of the recevied
>MD5 hashes.
>
>Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 hash is generated
>over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or since startup
>and that MD5 hash is signed
>using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA signature are sent
>over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr increments for
every
>signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded contains the sequence
>number of every HashPDU that
>was included in the signed hash.
>
>NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
>
>NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside the scope of
>this specification.
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@ietf.org
>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com


_______________________________________________
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
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Jon,

	You might well find that your problem fits into the 5% that does not
get addresses in a 95%/5% split :-(

	I have tried to develop schemes of this type but I have something of
an aversion to anything that looks like mission critical novelty crypto :-)

	I would also see if you could combine an advisory scheme that is
breakable with a non repudiation scheme at regular intervals. In fact I am
recommending that people ALWAYS use HMAC even if they also sign, otherwise
you end up with DoS attacks.

	Note also that chaining blocks may buy you something, if you always
put the hash of the last block in the next the client can choose to validate
as many signatures as it feels it needs to to get NR. Fast clients validate
every one, slow clients validate one a minute.

		Phill



> -----Original Message-----
> From: jsjoberg@toplayer.com [mailto:jsjoberg@toplayer.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 10:09 AM
> To: pbaker@verisign.com; canetti@watson.ibm.com
> Cc: mcgrew@cisco.com; cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> 
> 
> Non-repudiation is a requirement, and going back to the 
> source to validate
> the authentication has been ruled out.
> 
> Putting these together with my weak understanding of the 
> Gennaro-Rohatgi
> stream method, it seemed that scheme didn't work (had to be 
> able to go back
> to the source, or have the stream stored ahead of time).
> 
> Also the ruling out of going back to the source of the data 
> for validation
> is what keeps us from using a nice fast keyed hash approach :(
> 
> I don't think, however, taking the authentication out-of-band has been
> considered.  Not sure what it buys, but worth looking into.
> 
> Thanks again,
> Jon
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip [mailto:pbaker@verisign.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 9:52 AM
> To: 'canetti'; Hallam-Baker, Phillip
> Cc: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> 
> 
> Ran,
> 
> 	I think you are probably being unkind to them, they 
> have a solution
> for the infinite case, the scheme I suggest is actually a 
> special case of a
> scheme they describe in the introduction. They also point to 
> some pretty
> good prior art - the java libraries use this technique.
> 
> http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
> 
> 	The article also proposes a solution to the infinite 
> streams case. 
> 
> 
> 	One point to consider is that the bar to an acceptable 
> solution is
> pretty high since it has to address a problem for which HMAC is not
> acceptable (a hard non-repudiation requirement) and for which custom
> hardware is not acceptable.
> 
> 	One issue that I did think of pushing on is the 
> question of whether
> true non-repudiation is the objective or whether it suffices 
> to have an
> authentication metric that does not depend on a shared key across a
> population.
> 
> 
> 	If I had an order to do streaming video over multicast the way I
> would do it is with two independent streams for each user. 
> The first stream
> would be the shared multicast stream. The second stream would be a
> per-subscriber stream that contained the authentication data.
> 
> 	I would encapsulate the video feed in something like 
> DIME and put a
> message digest (SHA1) at the end of each block.
> 
> 	Then I would send to each subscriber a UDP packet 
> containing HMAC
> (MD, k) where k is the session key established between the 
> user and the
> service.
> 
> 	The advantage of DIME is that you can separate the 
> authentication
> channel or do it in band as you choose.
> 
> 	We really need a replacement for the current video-conference
> protocols. the H.3??? scheme stops at every firewall I know. 
> So there is no
> way that most corporate users can videoconference from home. 
> So there might
> be an opportunity to drop this type of idea into the same scheme.
> 
> 
> 	Some other thoughts
> 
> - could use some sort of scheme that was symmetric key based 
> but each party
> only had a subset of the total keying material. Essentially a 
> CDMA type
> idea, each party has a unique subset of the keyspace. 
> 
> So there are 8 keys
> 
> A has the key map  10101010
> B has the key map  11001100
> C has the key map  11110000
> 
> So A can validate the key stream but cannot generate the key 
> stream unless
> she colludes with enough other parties to guarantee she has 
> all the keys.
> 
> 
> To make the process harder there could be a much larger pool 
> of keys than is
> used in each sample. The key maps would change from one step 
> to another so
> that the key maps for block n would be different to those for block m.
> 
> Anyway back to fighting spam, you know the simple stuff.
> 
> 		Phill
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: canetti [mailto:canetti@watson.ibm.com]
> > Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 9:04 AM
> > To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
> > Cc: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Phill,
> > This seems to me reminisent of the Gennaro-Rohatgi stream 
> > signatures from
> > Crypto 97.
> > 
> > Ran
> > 
> > 
> > On Thu, 8 May 2003, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> > 
> > > Is the data stored data or being generated on the fly?
> > >  
> > > If the data is stored you could sign the data as follows:
> > >  
> > > Divide the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K
> > >  
> > > Compute H(n)  the hash of block n,
> > > Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)
> > > and so on
> > > Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)
> > >  
> > > Then sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.
> > > Next send H(1), block 1
> > > H(2), block 2 etc...
> > >  
> > >  
> > > This lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read 
> > the chunks, with
> > > the ability to verify each chunk as you read.
> > >  
> > > You cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you 
> > have a buffer of
> > > infinite length.
> > >  
> > >  
> > > I have no idea if anyone has thought of this before 
> > (probably have it seems
> > > obvious enough) or if it is patented or anything.
> > >  
> > >         Phill
> > >  
> > >  
> > > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> > > Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 PM
> > > To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
> > > Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Jon,
> > > 
> > > it seems like you have a viable scheme.  You might be 
> > interested in the
> > > efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have 
> > been discussed in
> > > the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (
> > > http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm
> > > <http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm> ), which is 
> > now defunct but
> > > has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the 
> > IETF MSEC WG.
> > > There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of 
> > digital signatures
> > > across multiple packets.  I think the following list 
> covers the main
> > > methods:
> > > 
> > > How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto 
> > '97, online at
> > > http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
> > > <http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html> .
> > > 
> > > Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong 
> > and Simon S.
> > > Lam,Technical Report TR-98-15, May 31, 1998; revised, June 
> > 14, 1999, in
> > > IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999.
> > > http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf
> > > <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf> 
> > > 
> > > Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random 
> > Packet Loss, Golle
> > > and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at
> > > http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf
> > > 
> <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf>
> > > Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and 
> > Canetti, IIRC,
> > > though I can't find a link for it at present.
> > > 
> > > The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis,
> > > 
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt
> > > 
> > <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signature
> > s-00.txt> .
> > > This method could be used with one of the standard methods 
> > for accerating
> > > public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly 
> > discussed in the
> > > document.
> > > 
> > > A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA: 
> > Multicast Source
> > > Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, 
> Whillock,
> > > 
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt
> > > 
> > <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spe
> > c-00.txt> .
> > > 
> > > Which of these solutions is the best for any given 
> > application depends on a
> > > bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder 
> > of packets,
> > > whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the 
> > sender or on the
> > > receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added 
> > to each packet. 
> > > 
> > > Hope this help,
> > > 
> > > David
> > > 
> > > 
> > > At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Hey all,
> > > 
> > > I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a 
> > way to provide
> > > integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a 
> > theoretically infinite
> > > amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
> > > Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the 
> solution is
> > > extremely cost sensitive.  
> > > 
> > > The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis, 
> > with each PDU being
> > > tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
> > > (days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the 
> > integrity of the PDU's as
> > > well as the authenticity.
> > > 
> > > The following is what we have come up with and I'm 
> > wondering if anyone has
> > > anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better 
> > solution.  The
> > > idea is to get some of the authentication strength of 
> > DSS/DSA without the
> > > full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
> > > 
> > > Thanks in advance for any input,
> > > Jon
> > > 
> > > Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted 
> > into the data
> > > stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU 
> > packet was sent
> > > since the last hash was sent or since startup.
> > > 
> > > Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a 
> > MD5 hash is
> > > generated over all PDU
> > > packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since 
> > startup. The MD5 hash
> > > is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments 
> > for every hash
> > > sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded 
> > contains the
> > > sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
> > > 
> > > NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable. 
> > > 
> > > Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a 
> > signature of that
> > > hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The 
> > signed hashes allows
> > > authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity 
> > of the recevied
> > > MD5 hashes.
> > > 
> > > Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5 
> > hash is generated
> > > over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or 
> > since startup
> > > and that MD5 hash is signed
> > > using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA 
> > signature are sent
> > > over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr 
> > increments for every
> > > signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded 
> > contains the sequence
> > > number of every HashPDU that
> > > was included in the signed hash.
> > > 
> > > NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
> > > 
> > > NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside 
> > the scope of
> > > this specification.
> > > 
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Cfrg mailing list
> > > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > > <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>  
> > > 
> > > _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list
> > > Cfrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > > 
> > > 
> > 
> 
_______________________________________________
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https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



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Date: Thu, 08 May 2003 07:48:17 -0700
To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
From: David Mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
Cc: pbaker@verisign.com, canetti@watson.ibm.com, cfrg@ietf.org
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Jon,

thanks for clarifying.  I have a couple of questions.

The work that I'd cited was aimed at asymmetric authentication of packet 
flows.  One of the goals of this work is to limit the amount of data that a 
receiver needs to buffer, for obvious networking reasons.  However, I 
expect that in your case, buffering is not an issue.  Since we expect to be 
able to provide long-term nonrepudiation on the data, we're storing it 
somewhere :-)   So if there were no packet loss, then we could hash all of 
the packets in a flow, then sign it once its over.  You mention that a 
sequence number is associated with the packets in the flow, so I expect 
that there's a well-defined session.  (I'm curious here.  What is the 
protocol, and how is the 'session' defined?)   The sequence number would 
make the order of the packets fed into the hash unambiguous, so it seems to 
me that the packet loss is the only complication.  Thinking out loud, this 
would seem to be a problem if the point in the network where the 
nonrepudiation service were applied was different from the point that did 
the storage.  I expect that this is the case, since otherwise we could just 
use a trusted storage device and go home early that day :-)

David

At 10:09 AM 5/8/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
>Non-repudiation is a requirement, and going back to the source to validate
>the authentication has been ruled out.
>
>Putting these together with my weak understanding of the Gennaro-Rohatgi
>stream method, it seemed that scheme didn't work (had to be able to go back
>to the source, or have the stream stored ahead of time).
>
>Also the ruling out of going back to the source of the data for validation
>is what keeps us from using a nice fast keyed hash approach :(
>
>I don't think, however, taking the authentication out-of-band has been
>considered.  Not sure what it buys, but worth looking into.
>
>Thanks again,
>Jon
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip [mailto:pbaker@verisign.com]
>Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 9:52 AM
>To: 'canetti'; Hallam-Baker, Phillip
>Cc: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
>Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
>
>
>Ran,
>
>         I think you are probably being unkind to them, they have a solution
>for the infinite case, the scheme I suggest is actually a special case of a
>scheme they describe in the introduction. They also point to some pretty
>good prior art - the java libraries use this technique.
>
>http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
>
>         The article also proposes a solution to the infinite streams case.
>
>
>         One point to consider is that the bar to an acceptable solution is
>pretty high since it has to address a problem for which HMAC is not
>acceptable (a hard non-repudiation requirement) and for which custom
>hardware is not acceptable.
>
>         One issue that I did think of pushing on is the question of whether
>true non-repudiation is the objective or whether it suffices to have an
>authentication metric that does not depend on a shared key across a
>population.
>
>
>         If I had an order to do streaming video over multicast the way I
>would do it is with two independent streams for each user. The first stream
>would be the shared multicast stream. The second stream would be a
>per-subscriber stream that contained the authentication data.
>
>         I would encapsulate the video feed in something like DIME and put a
>message digest (SHA1) at the end of each block.
>
>         Then I would send to each subscriber a UDP packet containing HMAC
>(MD, k) where k is the session key established between the user and the
>service.
>
>         The advantage of DIME is that you can separate the authentication
>channel or do it in band as you choose.
>
>         We really need a replacement for the current video-conference
>protocols. the H.3??? scheme stops at every firewall I know. So there is no
>way that most corporate users can videoconference from home. So there might
>be an opportunity to drop this type of idea into the same scheme.
>
>
>         Some other thoughts
>
>- could use some sort of scheme that was symmetric key based but each party
>only had a subset of the total keying material. Essentially a CDMA type
>idea, each party has a unique subset of the keyspace.
>
>So there are 8 keys
>
>A has the key map  10101010
>B has the key map  11001100
>C has the key map  11110000
>
>So A can validate the key stream but cannot generate the key stream unless
>she colludes with enough other parties to guarantee she has all the keys.
>
>
>To make the process harder there could be a much larger pool of keys than is
>used in each sample. The key maps would change from one step to another so
>that the key maps for block n would be different to those for block m.
>
>Anyway back to fighting spam, you know the simple stuff.
>
>                 Phill
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: canetti [mailto:canetti@watson.ibm.com]
> > Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 9:04 AM
> > To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
> > Cc: 'David Mcgrew'; jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> >
> >
> >
> > Phill,
> > This seems to me reminisent of the Gennaro-Rohatgi stream
> > signatures from
> > Crypto 97.
> >
> > Ran
> >
> >
> > On Thu, 8 May 2003, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> >
> > > Is the data stored data or being generated on the fly?
> > >
> > > If the data is stored you could sign the data as follows:
> > >
> > > Divide the stream into n blocks, say 100 blocks of 8K
> > >
> > > Compute H(n)  the hash of block n,
> > > Compute H(n-1) the hash of block n-1 + H(n)
> > > and so on
> > > Compute H(1), the hash of block 1 + H(2)
> > >
> > > Then sign H(1) and put it at the START of the stream.
> > > Next send H(1), block 1
> > > H(2), block 2 etc...
> > >
> > >
> > > This lets you check the integrity of the stream as you read
> > the chunks, with
> > > the ability to verify each chunk as you read.
> > >
> > > You cannot of course sign an infinite stream unless you
> > have a buffer of
> > > infinite length.
> > >
> > >
> > > I have no idea if anyone has thought of this before
> > (probably have it seems
> > > obvious enough) or if it is patented or anything.
> > >
> > >         Phill
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> > > Sent: Monday, May 05, 2003 2:30 PM
> > > To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
> > > Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
> > >
> > >
> > > Jon,
> > >
> > > it seems like you have a viable scheme.  You might be
> > interested in the
> > > efficient methods for signing of packet streams that have
> > been discussed in
> > > the IRTF, starting with the Secure Multicast/Group (SMUG) RG (
> > > http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm
> > > <http://www.securemulticast.org/smug-index.htm> ), which is
> > now defunct but
> > > has spawned both the IRTF Group Security (GSEC) RG and the
> > IETF MSEC WG.
> > > There are a bunch of methods that amortize the work of
> > digital signatures
> > > across multiple packets.  I think the following list covers the main
> > > methods:
> > >
> > > How to Sign Digital Streams, Gennaro and Rohatgi, Crypto
> > '97, online at
> > > http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html
> > > <http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gennaro97how.html> .
> > >
> > > Digital Signatures for Flows and Multicasts, Chung Kei Wong
> > and Simon S.
> > > Lam,Technical Report TR-98-15, May 31, 1998; revised, June
> > 14, 1999, in
> > > IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999.
> > > http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf
> > > <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/lam/Vita/IEEE/WongLam99.pdf>
> > >
> > > Authenticating Streamed Data in the Presence of Random
> > Packet Loss, Golle
> > > and Modadugu, NDSS '00, online at
> > > http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf
> > > <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/StreamAuth/auth.pdf>
> > > Similar but independent work was done by Perrig, Song and
> > Canetti, IIRC,
> > > though I can't find a link for it at present.
> > >
> > > The Use of RSA Signatures within ESP and AH, Brian Weis,
> > >
> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signatures-00.txt
> > >
> > <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-bew-ipsec-signature> s-00.txt> .
> > > This method could be used with one of the standard methods
> > for accerating
> > > public key signing or verifying, though it's not explicitly
> > discussed in the
> > > document.
> > >
> > > A related but probably not applicable work is "TESLA:
> > Multicast Source
> > > Authentication Transform Specification", Perrig, Canetti, Whillock,
> > >
> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spec-00.txt
> > >
> > <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-msec-tesla-spe> c-00.txt> .
> > >
> > > Which of these solutions is the best for any given
> > application depends on a
> > > bunch of factors, such as the possibility loss and reorder
> > of packets,
> > > whether or not it is acceptable to buffer packets on the
> > sender or on the
> > > receiver, and the amount of data that can safely be added
> > to each packet.
> > >
> > > Hope this help,
> > >
> > > David
> > >
> > >
> > > At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Hey all,
> > >
> > > I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a
> > way to provide
> > > integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a
> > theoretically infinite
> > > amount of data delivered over a network at 10's to 100's Mbps.
> > > Crypto-hardware is not a reasonable expectation and the solution is
> > > extremely cost sensitive.
> > >
> > > The data link will be sending PDU's an an as need basis,
> > with each PDU being
> > > tagged with a sequence number.  At some point later in time
> > > (days/weeks/years) we need to be able to prove the
> > integrity of the PDU's as
> > > well as the authenticity.
> > >
> > > The following is what we have come up with and I'm
> > wondering if anyone has
> > > anything to add, remove, or change that would make a better
> > solution.  The
> > > idea is to get some of the authentication strength of
> > DSS/DSA without the
> > > full strength or the full cost (in processing time).
> > >
> > > Thanks in advance for any input,
> > > Jon
> > >
> > > Periodically, hashes over the data PDUs will be inserted
> > into the data
> > > stream. A hash will only be created if at least one PDU
> > packet was sent
> > > since the last hash was sent or since startup.
> > >
> > > Every <n1> PDU packets or when <t1> seconds have passed a
> > MD5 hash is
> > > generated over all PDU
> > > packets sent since the last MD5 hash was sent or since
> > startup. The MD5 hash
> > > is sent in a HashPDU, where the HashSequenceNr increments
> > for every hash
> > > sent for this intercept. The array PDUSequenceNrsIncluded
> > contains the
> > > sequence number of every data PDU that was included in the hash.
> > >
> > > NOTE: The values for n1 and t1 are configurable.
> > >
> > > Periodically, a hash over the hashes specified above and a
> > signature of that
> > > hash, will be inserted into the  the data stream. The
> > signed hashes allows
> > > authentication of the sender and to verfify the integrity
> > of the recevied
> > > MD5 hashes.
> > >
> > > Every <n2> hashes or when <t2> seconds have passed, a MD5
> > hash is generated
> > > over all hashes sent since the last signed hash was sent or
> > since startup
> > > and that MD5 hash is signed
> > > using DSS/DSA. The MD5 hash and corresponding DSS/DSA
> > signature are sent
> > > over in a SignedHashPDU, where the SignedHashSequenceNr
> > increments for every
> > > signed hash sent. The array HashSequenceNrsIncluded
> > contains the sequence
> > > number of every HashPDU that
> > > was included in the signed hash.
> > >
> > > NOTE: The values for n2 and t2 are configurable.
> > >
> > > NOTE: The distribution of the DSS/DSA public key is outside
> > the scope of
> > > this specification.
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Cfrg mailing list
> > > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > > <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list
> > > Cfrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > >
> > >
> >

_______________________________________________
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Date: Fri, 09 May 2003 18:04:21 -0700
To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com, cfrg@ietf.org
From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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Jon,

At 10:18 AM 5/8/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
>Alex,
>
>Thanks alot.  These are good points.  The fact that we don't currently have
>solid answers to many of them is uncomfortable.  What we have is:
>1.)  Given non-repudiation, no forknowledge of the stream, and the desire to
>not have to take the data back to the source for validation, I think we are
>stuck with some PK solution.

Seriously re-examine your decision.  I've built several systems both PKI and
not.  PKI really limits your design options if you want to have 
high-performance.
It's very s-l-o-w cryptography.  There are plenty of fine non-PKI ways of 
doing
the things you would probably want to do.


>2.)  I tend to agree here.  The thought, and maybe it is flawed, is to
>amoratize the final hash computation over several packets and buy some
>efficiency as well as not have the 16 byte overhead on all packets.

Unfortunately this requires queueing on the receiver side at least with the
usual pro's and con's. 16 bytes is a lot of overhead even when using the full
MTU of 1500 bytes/packet. There are two options that I like that are available
to you.

A. Don't use a hash.  The smaller the data payload you are protecting gets the
     less useful it is.  What I like to do in this case is encrypt each 
packet with
     a unique key.  However, key generation & management is much more difficult
     with this approach because of the volume of key material being passed 
around.
     If you need non-repudiation then the key material will need to come 
from a
     trusted 3rd party source.

B. Design a custom hash, say a 4-byte function.  I've done this too, but it is
      not easy to get right, and you will need spend time and treasure 
getting it
      validated properly, unless you are really confident in the hash 
designer's
      skills.  Probably at least $250K and 4-6 months with 2-3 *good* 
cryptanalysts
      (finding them is an art in itself).

- Alex


>-----Original Message-----
>From: Alex Alten [mailto:alten@attbi.com]
>Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 1:44 AM
>To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com; cfrg@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
>
>
>Hey JS Joberg,
>
>I have been dealing with a very similar problem for the past couple of
>years where we are limited to a software driver plugging into a stack.
>I'm a bit pressed for time but here is a quick rundown of what I've found.
>
>1. You cannot use any PKI, too slow for 100 Mbps networks, especially
>      if you are datagram or transaction oriented with communications
>      occurring among N nodes unpredictably.
>
>2. Best to hash per packet, but current hashes are too big, at least
>      for Ethernet MTU's.  I don't recommend maintaining a hash state
>      across a series of packets, especially if packets can be lost, mixed
>      up, or duplicated/retransmitted (true for most protocols).  And unless
>      you enjoy debugging complex state machinery.

--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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Alex Alten  wrote:
>Seriously re-examine your decision.  I've built several systems both PKI and
>not.  PKI really limits your design options if you want to have 
>high-performance.
>It's very s-l-o-w cryptography.  There are plenty of fine non-PKI ways of 
>doing the things you would probably want to do.

This is a huge over-generalization.  SSH, for instance, is quite
adequate for secure remote logsin.  SSL is adequate for e-commerce for
most purposes.  PGP is more than adequate for secure email.  PKI has many
problems, but performance isn't always one of them.  It all depends on
what you want to do and how you use the crypto.

It's tempting to think that public-key crypto is super-expensive and so
we should avoid using it, but this expectation is often not justified.
Go measure, and don't believe your intuition until you've measured.
I believe Knuth once wrote that "premature optimization is the root of
all evil", or something like this, and there's a certain something to
what he said.
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Alex Alten  wrote:
>A. Don't use a hash.  The smaller the data payload you are protecting gets the
>     less useful it is.  What I like to do in this case is encrypt each 
>packet with a unique key.

Maybe I misunderstood your suggestion, but this strikes me as bad
advice.  Encryption without authentication (e.g., a MAC or a signed
hash) often leads to security holes.  Using per-packet keys is no
substitute for authentication.

In any case, I believe the original poster asked for non-repudiation,
not confidentiality, and it would be a mistake to expect encryption to
provide non-repudiation.
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David Wagner wrote:
 > This is a huge over-generalization.  SSH, for instance, is quite
 > adequate for secure remote logsin.  SSL is adequate for e-commerce for
 > most purposes.

Isn't that also a huge over-generalization? I would argue that SSL/TLS 
is more adequate for secure remote logins than it is for e-commerce. 
Plus that SSL/TLS often might be a better choice than SSH (just the 
transport layer protocol as per 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-15.txt) 
for designers of new application protocols with a need for secure remote 
logins, because of the way the server authenticates itself to the client 
as part of the transport protocol handshake. Nothing prevents the SSH 
authentication protocol 
(http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-16.txt) 
from being run over SSL/TLS, in case the client is mobile and can't 
authenticate itself with a client certificate.

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To: daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner), cfrg@ietf.org
From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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At 01:02 AM 5/10/2003 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>Alex Alten  wrote:
> >Seriously re-examine your decision.  I've built several systems both PKI and
> >not.  PKI really limits your design options if you want to have
> >high-performance.
> >It's very s-l-o-w cryptography.  There are plenty of fine non-PKI ways of
> >doing the things you would probably want to do.
>
>This is a huge over-generalization.  SSH, for instance, is quite
>adequate for secure remote logsin.  SSL is adequate for e-commerce for
>most purposes.  PGP is more than adequate for secure email.  PKI has many
>problems, but performance isn't always one of them.  It all depends on
>what you want to do and how you use the crypto.
>
>It's tempting to think that public-key crypto is super-expensive and so
>we should avoid using it, but this expectation is often not justified.
>Go measure, and don't believe your intuition until you've measured.
>I believe Knuth once wrote that "premature optimization is the root of
>all evil", or something like this, and there's a certain something to
>what he said.

David, I think for the most part we agree in principle, not necessarily in the
details. When one designs using PKI you have to bear in mind its severe
performance limitations.  Where with an AES key you might frequently rekey
to encrypt packets you would want to avoid that with RSA as much as
possible.  That's what I meant by limiting design options.

I don't know about SSH, but I don't consider SSL a high-performance design.
Heck the hashing alone eats up 30% of its performance. I seriously doubt a
FTP or NetBIOS file transfer over SSL can go much above 10 Mbps (even
with the RC4 cipher) on a 1 GHz PC across a LAN. PGP is more for large
static files so it is not a model for a secure computer networking protocol
with smaller PDU packets.

- Alex
--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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To: daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner), cfrg@ietf.org
From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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At 01:04 AM 5/10/2003 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>Alex Alten  wrote:
> >A. Don't use a hash.  The smaller the data payload you are protecting 
> gets the
> >     less useful it is.  What I like to do in this case is encrypt each
> >packet with a unique key.
>
>Maybe I misunderstood your suggestion, but this strikes me as bad
>advice.  Encryption without authentication (e.g., a MAC or a signed
>hash) often leads to security holes.  Using per-packet keys is no
>substitute for authentication.
>
>In any case, I believe the original poster asked for non-repudiation,
>not confidentiality, and it would be a mistake to expect encryption to
>provide non-repudiation.


Yes, this is unusual and doesn't fit his requirements.  One design I
worked on was retrofitting an old protocol and I had to give up using a
hash (not enough room in the legacy header and I couldn't change
packet sizes or tunnel). In this case I was more concerned with raw
privacy than anything else. I was thinking that authentication would
come about in some other way. Possibly a 3rd party authenticates
both the sender and receiver before issuing them session keys.

For non-repudiation there are some well known solutions to choose
from.  The trick is not to depend on the trustworthiness of either the
sender or the receiver.

- Alex
--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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Alex Alten wrote:
> David, I think for the most part we agree in principle, not necessarily 
> in the
> details. When one designs using PKI you have to bear in mind its severe
> performance limitations.  Where with an AES key you might frequently rekey
> to encrypt packets you would want to avoid that with RSA as much as
> possible.  That's what I meant by limiting design options.

This is common knowledge. Renegotiation in SSL/TLS involves pseudo 
random number generation and hash based key derivation only. No 
public/private key operations.


> I don't know about SSH, but I don't consider SSL a high-performance design.
> Heck the hashing alone eats up 30% of its performance. I seriously doubt a
> FTP or NetBIOS file transfer over SSL can go much above 10 Mbps (even
> with the RC4 cipher) on a 1 GHz PC across a LAN. 

With a good implementation, RC4_MD5 can go above 100 MBit/s on a 1 GHz 
PC and ~2/3 of the CPU.



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In message <4.3.2.7.1.20030510020259.022d57e0@mail.attbi.com>, Alex Alten write
s:


>
>I don't know about SSH, but I don't consider SSL a high-performance design.
>Heck the hashing alone eats up 30% of its performance. I seriously doubt a
>FTP or NetBIOS file transfer over SSL can go much above 10 Mbps (even
>with the RC4 cipher) on a 1 GHz PC across a LAN. PGP is more for large
>static files so it is not a model for a secure computer networking protocol
>with smaller PDU packets.

For fun, I tried a ttcp over ssh transfer between my laptop (850 Mhz) and my
desktop (750 Mhz), over a 100 Mbps switched hub.  I got 59 Mbps using 
AES encryption.  SSL with RC4 would be much faster.

Sender:
b149$ ttcp -f k -n 20480 -p 5000 -s -t 127.0.0.1
ttcp-t: buflen=8192, nbuf=20480, align=16384/0, port=5000  tcp  -> 127.0.0.1
ttcp-t: socket
ttcp-t: connect
ttcp-t: 167772160 bytes in 22.21 real seconds = 59025.17 Kbit/sec +++
ttcp-t: 20480 I/O calls, msec/call = 1.11, calls/sec = 922.27
ttcp-t: 0.0user 0.9sys 0:22real 4% 0i+0d 0maxrss 0+2pf 10238+83csw


Receiver:
$ ttcp -f k -p 5000 -r -s
ttcp-r: buflen=8192, nbuf=2048, align=16384/0, port=5000  tcp
ttcp-r: socket
ttcp-r: accept from 127.0.0.1
ttcp-r: 167772160 bytes in 22.22 real seconds = 58993.64 Kbit/sec +++
ttcp-r: 20481 I/O calls, msec/call = 1.11, calls/sec = 921.82
ttcp-r: 0.0user 0.3sys 0:22real 1% 0i+0d 0maxrss 0+2pf 10241+36csw

Now, you specified "file transfer", which implies disk I/O, and that 
has nothing to do with over-the-wire crypto speed.  I first ensured 
that a 11 MB file was in the buffer cache.  I then copied it between 
the same two machines using scp (the ssh copy command).  Wire transfer 
time was 31 Mbps -- and that's counting the overhead of the public key 
operations to set up the connection.  To better measure just the 
symmetric encryption, which is what you asked about, I copied a 110 MB 
file -- it went at 55 Mbps.

The test software was OpenSSH 3.4 on NetBSD 1.6.1 and OpenSSH 3.6.1 on
NetBSD-current, using AES-128 for confidentiality, RSA for 
authentication, and DH for perfect forward secrecy.

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
		http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)


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Alex Alten  wrote:
>At 01:04 AM 5/10/2003 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>>Maybe I misunderstood your suggestion, but this strikes me as bad
>>advice.  Encryption without authentication (e.g., a MAC or a signed
>>hash) often leads to security holes.  Using per-packet keys is no
>>substitute for authentication.
>
>Yes, this is unusual and doesn't fit his requirements.  One design I
>worked on was retrofitting an old protocol and I had to give up using a
>hash (not enough room in the legacy header and I couldn't change
>packet sizes or tunnel). In this case I was more concerned with raw
>privacy than anything else.

That still sounds a bad idea.  For anyone else who might be reading
this, let me innoculate you against a popular misconception: contrary to
what intuition might suggest, encryption without authentication doesn't
necessarily provide privacy.  It sounds counter-intuitive, but it's true.
Trust me.  We've been through this with IPSec, with SSH, and with WEP,
and it just keeps become more and more clear.  Even if all you want is
confidentiality, you still want to use *both* encryption and a MAC.
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Alex Alten  wrote:
>David, I think for the most part we agree in principle, not necessarily in the
>details. When one designs using PKI you have to bear in mind its severe
>performance limitations.  Where with an AES key you might frequently rekey
>to encrypt packets you would want to avoid that with RSA as much as
>possible.

I don't think you've thought about this carefully enough.  Use public-key
crypto to exchange a shared AES key, and then you can re-key using that
AES key just as you would if you weren't using public-key crypto.

>I don't know about SSH, but I don't consider SSL a high-performance design.
>Heck the hashing alone eats up 30% of its performance.

Two posts ago, you advised people not to use public-key crypto, because
the overhead is too high.  Now you're saying that SSL is too slow,
not because of the public-key, but because of the hashing.
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'Steven M. Bellovin'" <smb@research.att.com>,
        Alex Alten
	 <alten@attbi.com>
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An interesting corollary to Steve's post is 'XML Accelerator' boxes that
promise to secure Web Service transactions through fast XML Schema
validation.

Just a pity they don't do hardware acceleration of RSA signature generation
and verification, guess what is the bottleneck when you are doing signed
messages of about 4-16K a time?

		Phill

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Steven M. Bellovin [mailto:smb@research.att.com]
> Sent: Saturday, May 10, 2003 8:49 AM
> To: Alex Alten
> Cc: daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu; cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions 
> 
> 
> In message 
> <4.3.2.7.1.20030510020259.022d57e0@mail.attbi.com>, Alex Alten write
> s:
> 
> 
> >
> >I don't know about SSH, but I don't consider SSL a 
> high-performance design.
> >Heck the hashing alone eats up 30% of its performance. I 
> seriously doubt a
> >FTP or NetBIOS file transfer over SSL can go much above 10 Mbps (even
> >with the RC4 cipher) on a 1 GHz PC across a LAN. PGP is more 
> for large
> >static files so it is not a model for a secure computer 
> networking protocol
> >with smaller PDU packets.
> 
> For fun, I tried a ttcp over ssh transfer between my laptop 
> (850 Mhz) and my
> desktop (750 Mhz), over a 100 Mbps switched hub.  I got 59 Mbps using 
> AES encryption.  SSL with RC4 would be much faster.
> 
> Sender:
> b149$ ttcp -f k -n 20480 -p 5000 -s -t 127.0.0.1
> ttcp-t: buflen=8192, nbuf=20480, align=16384/0, port=5000  
> tcp  -> 127.0.0.1
> ttcp-t: socket
> ttcp-t: connect
> ttcp-t: 167772160 bytes in 22.21 real seconds = 59025.17 Kbit/sec +++
> ttcp-t: 20480 I/O calls, msec/call = 1.11, calls/sec = 922.27
> ttcp-t: 0.0user 0.9sys 0:22real 4% 0i+0d 0maxrss 0+2pf 10238+83csw
> 
> 
> Receiver:
> $ ttcp -f k -p 5000 -r -s
> ttcp-r: buflen=8192, nbuf=2048, align=16384/0, port=5000  tcp
> ttcp-r: socket
> ttcp-r: accept from 127.0.0.1
> ttcp-r: 167772160 bytes in 22.22 real seconds = 58993.64 Kbit/sec +++
> ttcp-r: 20481 I/O calls, msec/call = 1.11, calls/sec = 921.82
> ttcp-r: 0.0user 0.3sys 0:22real 1% 0i+0d 0maxrss 0+2pf 10241+36csw
> 
> Now, you specified "file transfer", which implies disk I/O, and that 
> has nothing to do with over-the-wire crypto speed.  I first ensured 
> that a 11 MB file was in the buffer cache.  I then copied it between 
> the same two machines using scp (the ssh copy command).  Wire 
> transfer 
> time was 31 Mbps -- and that's counting the overhead of the 
> public key 
> operations to set up the connection.  To better measure just the 
> symmetric encryption, which is what you asked about, I copied 
> a 110 MB 
> file -- it went at 55 Mbps.
> 
> The test software was OpenSSH 3.4 on NetBSD 1.6.1 and OpenSSH 3.6.1 on
> NetBSD-current, using AES-128 for confidentiality, RSA for 
> authentication, and DH for perfect forward secrecy.
> 
> 		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
> 		http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of 
> "Firewalls" book)
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
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I forgot to cc this to the list.  I bet the NetBios is behaving badly
with the MS VPN underneath it.  - Alex

>Date: Sat, 10 May 2003 03:55:26 -0700
>To: Henrick Hellström <henrick@streamsec.se>
>From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
>Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
>
>At 12:03 PM 5/10/2003 +0200, you wrote:
>
>>>I don't know about SSH, but I don't consider SSL a high-performance design.
>>>Heck the hashing alone eats up 30% of its performance. I seriously doubt a
>>>FTP or NetBIOS file transfer over SSL can go much above 10 Mbps (even
>>>with the RC4 cipher) on a 1 GHz PC across a LAN.
>>
>>With a good implementation, RC4_MD5 can go above 100 MBit/s on a 1 GHz PC 
>>and ~2/3 of the CPU.
>
>Really?  I haven't done direct measurements with SSL lately.  However I 
>just recently
>was trying out the Microsoft VPN (PPTP/CHAPv2).  It uses RC4.  I tried to 
>transfer
>a large file over Fast Ethernet using a 1.7 GHz PC (the other end was 2.4 
>GHz).
>I could only get 12-16 Mbps throughput.  In the clear I got about 90 Mbps.  So
>your results seem rather remarkable.  Did you use ordinary HTTP file 
>transfer or
>something else?
>
>- Alex

--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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At 06:05 PM 5/10/2003 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>Alex Alten  wrote:
> >David, I think for the most part we agree in principle, not necessarily 
> in the
> >details. When one designs using PKI you have to bear in mind its severe
> >performance limitations.  Where with an AES key you might frequently rekey
> >to encrypt packets you would want to avoid that with RSA as much as
> >possible.
>
>I don't think you've thought about this carefully enough.  Use public-key
>crypto to exchange a shared AES key, and then you can re-key using that
>AES key just as you would if you weren't using public-key crypto.

OK, I agree this is a scenario where RSA is used to exchange a single AES
over a long session of packets is fine.  But if I'm doing single packets, and
changing AES keys a lot, it doesn't work very well.  So if you want to use
RSA then this 2nd scenario is not very feasible, performance-wise.  That's
all I'm saying about PK limiting your design options in high-speed designs.

> >I don't know about SSH, but I don't consider SSL a high-performance design.
> >Heck the hashing alone eats up 30% of its performance.
>
>Two posts ago, you advised people not to use public-key crypto, because
>the overhead is too high.  Now you're saying that SSL is too slow,
>not because of the public-key, but because of the hashing.

That's not what I mean't.  SSL has both high PK and hash costs.  Most of
my response was discussing the PK performance penalty limiting high-
performance design choices.  David at least you can admit to the
reasonableness of that statement.  Right?

- Alex

--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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Alex Alten  wrote:
>At 06:05 PM 5/10/2003 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>>I don't think you've thought about this carefully enough.  Use public-key
>>crypto to exchange a shared AES key, and then you can re-key using that
>>AES key just as you would if you weren't using public-key crypto.
>
>OK, I agree this is a scenario where RSA is used to exchange a single AES
>over a long session of packets is fine.  But if I'm doing single packets, and
>changing AES keys a lot, it doesn't work very well.

So don't do that, then.  No one said you need to use RSA on every packet.
Come on.  This is getting really silly!

Patient: "Doctor, doctor, it hurts when I use RSA on every packet."
Doctor:  "Don't do that, then."


>That's not what I mean't.  SSL has both high PK and hash costs.  Most of
>my response was discussing the PK performance penalty limiting high-
>performance design choices.  David at least you can admit to the
>reasonableness of that statement.  Right?

That's ridiculous.  The public-key in SSL has nothing to do with whether
its hash function or MAC primitive is fast or slow.  Again, I don't think
you've thought about this carefully enough.
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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At 09:03 PM 5/10/2003 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>Alex Alten  wrote:
> >At 06:05 PM 5/10/2003 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
> >>I don't think you've thought about this carefully enough.  Use public-key
> >>crypto to exchange a shared AES key, and then you can re-key using that
> >>AES key just as you would if you weren't using public-key crypto.
> >
> >OK, I agree this is a scenario where RSA is used to exchange a single AES
> >over a long session of packets is fine.  But if I'm doing single 
> packets, and
> >changing AES keys a lot, it doesn't work very well.
>
>So don't do that, then.  No one said you need to use RSA on every packet.
>Come on.  This is getting really silly!
>
>Patient: "Doctor, doctor, it hurts when I use RSA on every packet."
>Doctor:  "Don't do that, then."

We both agree that it is silly.  And that's exactly my point.  But one might
reasonably consider using AES instead of RSA.

- Alex

--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
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There is a need for a primitive stream cipher construction that is fast 
(faster than a block cipher in counter mode), easy to use correctly, well 
understood, freely available, and secure. SOBER-128 has been designed to 
meet these requirements, by being based entirely on a well-studied 
primitive in a manner that preserves the existing analyses.

Additionally, SOBER-128 introduces functionality (based on that of Helix, 
another recent stream cipher) to enable simultaneous calculation of a 
Message Authentication Code, and allows full integrity checking of 
partially encrypted messages.

SOBER-128 is a synchronous stream cipher designed for a secret key that is 
up to 128 bits in length. The cipher outputs the key stream in 32-bit 
blocks. SOBER-128 is a software-oriented cipher based on 32-bit operations 
(such as 32-bit XOR and addition modulo 2^32), and references to small 
fixed arrays. Consequently, SOBER-128 is at home in many computing 
environments, from firmware and smart cards to large computers. Source code 
for SOBER-128 is freely available and use of this source code, or 
independent implementations, is allowed free for any purpose.

SOBER-128 was developed from SOBER, proposed by Rose in 1998.  The ciphers 
SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 were submitted to the NESSIE program ; SOBER-t16 as 
a stream cipher for 128-bit key strength and SOBER-t32 as a stream cipher 
with 256-bit key strength. SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 proved to be among the 
strongest stream cipher submissions to NESSIE. However, both ciphers were 
found to fall short of the stringent NESSIE requirements (as were all other 
stream ciphers).

SOBER-128 is an improved version of SOBER-t32. The modifications directly 
address the concerns arising in the analyses of the t-class ciphers. The 
128-bit key strength proposed for SOBER-128 is reduced from the 256-bit key 
strength proposed for SOBER-t32 to ensure that SOBER-128 provides far in 
excess of the stated security level.

In practice, much communication is done in messages, where it is desirable 
to provide message integrity for the whole message, and privacy 
(encryption) for all or part of the message. The same secret key should be 
usable for the entire (multi-message) communication, using an 
Initialisation Vector or Nonce to distinguish individual messages. 
SOBER-128 supports this model of use.

SOBER-128 is intended to provide security under the condition that no IV is 
ever reused, that no more than 2^80 words of data are processed with one 
key, and that no data failing authentication checks will be further 
processed (in particular, that the result of decrypting a message that 
fails authentication will not be revealed). There is no requirement that 
IVs be random, which makes guaranteeing uniqueness much easier. The sender 
and recipient of secure data must agree on which parts of the data are 
encrypted, and which parts are authenticated, for correct operation, as the 
encryption operation is plaintext-aware when message authentication is 
being performed.

A 40-page design document and reference implementations of SOBER-128 may be 
found at QUALCOMM Australia's web site: http://www.qualcomm.com.au . The 
full paper is also available on the IACR eprint server, and a shorter 
version has been submitted to SAC.

-----------------------------
The above text is the basic announcement of SOBER-128, but I wanted to add 
a bit specifically for CFRG.

I'm seriously concerned about ongoing use of RC4 for, basically, anything. 
It's elegant and simple, but very often is used incorrectly, if only to the 
extent that it's often used without message authentication. The problems 
with rekeying as in WEP are devastating, and probably represent the biggest 
single failure of a deployed cryptosystem since Enigma. And lastly, the 
distinguishing attacks, at around 2^32 bytes, verge on real vulnerability 
too. We wanted to provide a credible replacement for RC4 in any of its 
modes of use. That's what SOBER-128 is.

For IETF use, obviously we need to write an RFC. I've never written an RFC 
before (in fact, blush, have never been to an IETF meeting) and could use 
some guidance on just how much information should be put in, and what 
should happen to it then.

regards,
Greg.


Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C

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Date: Sat, 10 May 2003 23:00:28 -0700
To: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
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Hello Greg,

For the public record.

Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done on SOBER-128
that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing it to the wolves
until you can defend it properly.

As we discussed last year, apparently RC4 is not a viable cipher (its key
setup is too weak).  I wish a paper would come out with the proof so that
we can give it a proper burial.

Regards,

- Alex


At 10:25 AM 5/11/2003 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
<snipped>

>-----------------------------
>The above text is the basic announcement of SOBER-128, but I wanted to add 
>a bit specifically for CFRG.
>
>I'm seriously concerned about ongoing use of RC4 for, basically, anything. 
>It's elegant and simple, but very often is used incorrectly, if only to 
>the extent that it's often used without message authentication. The 
>problems with rekeying as in WEP are devastating, and probably represent 
>the biggest single failure of a deployed cryptosystem since Enigma. And 
>lastly, the distinguishing attacks, at around 2^32 bytes, verge on real 
>vulnerability too. We wanted to provide a credible replacement for RC4 in 
>any of its modes of use. That's what SOBER-128 is.
>
>For IETF use, obviously we need to write an RFC. I've never written an RFC 
>before (in fact, blush, have never been to an IETF meeting) and could use 
>some guidance on just how much information should be put in, and what 
>should happen to it then.
>
>regards,
>Greg.
>
>
>Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
>Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
>Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
>Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@ietf.org
>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
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Greg's work is about as well analyzed as any viable stream cipher is, 
which isn't saying that much compared to the kind of scrutiny AES saw.

In all fairness, key setup problems alone aren't enough to make RC4 
non-viable.  That doesn't reflect poorly on the actual encryption 
algorithm, and there are two recommended strategies for mitigating the 
problem... pass the key material through a PRF first, or discard the 
first 256 outputs.  Both thwart the Fluhrer et al. attack.  The paper 
on the attack:

http://www.eyetap.org/~rguerra/toronto2001/rc4_ksaproc.pdf

If that were the only problem, no one would have major reservations 
with RC4 beyond the difficulty of using it securely (which is already a 
problem with most stream ciphers).  However, Fluhrer and McGrew have an 
attack that distinguishes RC4 from random with high probability after 
2^30 outputs.  They also had some other fairly damning observations.  
See:

http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/rc4-03.pdf

That's a bit more worrisome from my perspective, but then again, it's 
only a one-bit information leak after 2^30 outputs, which is not all 
that big a risk in the real world on a 128-bit key.

I do agree that we should be looking at better solutions, such as 
Greg's work.  Particularly, people use RC4 because of it's software 
speed, and there are faster, more secure algorithms for software 
environments out there.  I'm fond of SNOW 2.0, myself:

http://www.it.lth.se/cryptology/snow/

While it is not authenticating, as is Greg's scheme, it is easy to 
combine a stand-alone stream cipher with a MAC that is fast in software 
using a universal hash.  Just hash the ciphertext, then take a few more 
keystream bytes to mix in with the hash value (which needs to be done 
carefully).

Bernstein's hash127 (http://cr.yp.to/hash127.html) runs at impressive 
speeds in software... under 4cpb on a P3, and can be easily integrated 
into such a scheme.  As implemented, hash127 doesn't make it easy to 
build an AEAD scheme that also authenticates non-encrypted data, but a 
slightly different implementation approach for hash127 would allow it 
without that big a speed hit.

The problem with this is that hash127 is not XOR-universal, which 
means, so far as I know, you don't currentlyhave theoretical backing to 
just XOR the hash with with keystream from a stream cipher (even though 
it is probably not a big deal).  If using Bernstein's hash127 
implementation, one would take 128 bits of RC4 keystream and pass it in 
where the nonce goes, which has the desired effect.

John

On Sunday, May 11, 2003, at 02:00  AM, Alex Alten wrote:

> Hello Greg,
>
> For the public record.
>
> Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done on SOBER-128
> that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing it to the 
> wolves
> until you can defend it properly.
>
> As we discussed last year, apparently RC4 is not a viable cipher (its 
> key
> setup is too weak).  I wish a paper would come out with the proof so 
> that
> we can give it a proper burial.
>
> Regards,
>
> - Alex
>
>
> At 10:25 AM 5/11/2003 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
> <snipped>
>
>> -----------------------------
>> The above text is the basic announcement of SOBER-128, but I wanted 
>> to add a bit specifically for CFRG.
>>
>> I'm seriously concerned about ongoing use of RC4 for, basically, 
>> anything. It's elegant and simple, but very often is used 
>> incorrectly, if only to the extent that it's often used without 
>> message authentication. The problems with rekeying as in WEP are 
>> devastating, and probably represent the biggest single failure of a 
>> deployed cryptosystem since Enigma. And lastly, the distinguishing 
>> attacks, at around 2^32 bytes, verge on real vulnerability too. We 
>> wanted to provide a credible replacement for RC4 in any of its modes 
>> of use. That's what SOBER-128 is.
>>
>> For IETF use, obviously we need to write an RFC. I've never written 
>> an RFC before (in fact, blush, have never been to an IETF meeting) 
>> and could use some guidance on just how much information should be 
>> put in, and what should happen to it then.
>>
>> regards,
>> Greg.
>>
>>
>> Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: 
>> ggr@qualcomm.com
>> Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 
>> 5199
>> Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                
>> http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
>> Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 
>> A37C
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@ietf.org
>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
> --
>
> Alex Alten
> Alten@ATTBI.com
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

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Date: Sun, 11 May 2003 01:44:12 -0700
To: John Viega <viega@zork.org>
From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Cc: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>, cfrg@ietf.org
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At 02:46 AM 5/11/2003 -0400, John Viega wrote:
<snipped>
>In all fairness, key setup problems alone aren't enough to make RC4 
>non-viable.  That doesn't reflect poorly on the actual encryption 
>algorithm, and there are two recommended strategies for mitigating the 
>problem... pass the key material through a PRF first, or discard the first 
>256 outputs.  Both thwart the Fluhrer et al. attack.  The paper on the attack:
>
>http://www.eyetap.org/~rguerra/toronto2001/rc4_ksaproc.pdf
>
>If that were the only problem, no one would have major reservations with 
>RC4 beyond the difficulty of using it securely (which is already a problem 
>with most stream ciphers).  However, Fluhrer and McGrew have an attack 
>that distinguishes RC4 from random with high probability after 2^30 
>outputs.  They also had some other fairly damning observations.
>See:
<snipped>

Scott and David should talk with Peter Schweitzer of ISSI.
I suspect with his help they can nail RC4 into its coffin.  I'm
willing to contribute to the funeral and burial expenses.

- Alex


--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128 
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In message <5.1.0.14.2.20030507005709.02b0a988@203.30.171.17>, Greg Rose writes
:

>
>For IETF use, obviously we need to write an RFC. I've never written an RFC 
>before (in fact, blush, have never been to an IETF meeting) and could use 
>some guidance on just how much information should be put in, and what 
>should happen to it then.
>

<chair hat=on>
As a matter of policy, the IETF does not standardize encryption 
algorithms.  We don't have the competence to analyze them, let alone 
develop or modify them.  In general, we pick algorithms that are the 
output of other groups that are qualified, such as NIST, NESSIE, or 
CRYPTOREC.

The IETF has published Informational RFCs describing ciphers and hash 
functions.  At this point, there's a strong preference for not 
publishing ones that aren't standardized by someone reputable, unless 
there's a very good reason.  We do like publishing RFC versions of 
standardized algorithms, because it makes them more accessible to the 
IETF community.

An RFC version should mostly be a precise specification of the 
algorithm, plus (if you want) any useful implementation hints.  It 
probably wouldn't include much of the justification and design 
criteria.  The Security Considerations section should outline what's 
known of the strength against various attacks; it should also give any 
non-obvious cautions and caveats.

The more interesting question is what it takes to incorporate a new 
algorithm into some security standard.  The current Security Area 
policy is to leave that up to the individual working groups; it's quite 
plausible that, say, TLS will standardize some algorithm while IPsec 
will not.  The rationale is simple:  the individual WGs have better 
knowledge of what fits into their frameworks, and what their market 
wants.  We do not require RFC versions of algorithm before using them 
in other standards, though it's helpful.  And an RFC is also useful for 
informing the IETF community of the algorithm and its properties.
</chair>


		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
		http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)


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Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 08:06:40 +1000
To: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Cc: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>, cfrg@ietf.org
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At 11:00 PM 5/10/2003 -0700, Alex Alten wrote:
>Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done on SOBER-128
>that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing it to the wolves
>until you can defend it properly.

Yes. If you read the details, SOBER-t32 has been analysed up the wazoo, and 
was secure at the 128-bit level; just not at the 256-bit level that we 
thought, which ruled it out of NESSIE. Most of this analysis was done on 
the "unstuttered" -t32, and applies directly to SOBER-128.

regards,
Greg.

Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C

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From: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>
To: "'Greg Rose'" <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org, Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 03:50:49 -0700
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I just want to express my concern about trying to make an RFC out of
anything like
this without considerable more time for analysis.  I agree that various
flavors
of SOBER have seen some good amounts of cryptanalysis, though I'm not sure
that
it has had enough yet (I'm simply not sure how many really good folks have
spent
significant time on it).  One concern is that there have simply been too
many SOBER
versions already, which urges some caution from my perspective, although
there may
be very good reasons for the different versions. More importantly, adding a 
very significant new cryptographic "feature" such as a MAC does not in any
way 
constitute a "tweak" that should be assumed to inherit the security
properties of
the original algorithm(s).

I say this as a co-author of Helix, and as someone who belives, like you,
that such
combo algorithms are quite interesting. However, I believe that this entire
concept
needs time for being carefully analyzed by the crypto community before being
put into 
serious use.  We simply are not there yet. The Helix folks would consider it
quite 
inappropriate to start standardizing at this time on any such algorithm,
including Helix,
without quite a bit of time passing, perhaps a few years.  That's roughly
how much time 
AES had, and it had (and continues to have) basically all the best
crpytanalysts looking 
at it very seriously.  Of course, even just the passage of time doesn't
guarantee that a 
new algorithm (class of algorithms) has been propertly vetted; the algorithm
must also 
receive serious scrutiny from several well qualified folks. That is, the
passage of such 
time is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Don't take this as a criticism of SOBER-128 per se. I believe that this
caution should
be applied to all algorithms of this class.

Doug Whiting

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Greg Rose [mailto:ggr@qualcomm.com]
> Sent: Sunday, May 11, 2003 3:07 PM
> To: Alex Alten
> Cc: Greg Rose; cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
> 
> 
> At 11:00 PM 5/10/2003 -0700, Alex Alten wrote:
> >Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done on SOBER-128
> >that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing 
> it to the wolves
> >until you can defend it properly.
> 
> Yes. If you read the details, SOBER-t32 has been analysed up 
> the wazoo, and 
> was secure at the 128-bit level; just not at the 256-bit 
> level that we 
> thought, which ruled it out of NESSIE. Most of this analysis 
> was done on 
> the "unstuttered" -t32, and applies directly to SOBER-128.
> 
> regards,
> Greg.
> 
> Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: 
> ggr@qualcomm.com
> Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: 
> +61-2-9817 5199
> Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                
> http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
> Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF 
> CD2F 1081 A37C
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
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From: "Anton Stiglic" <astiglic@okiok.com>
To: <cfrg@ietf.org>
References: <F6242D340921D5118D1E00508BB9837A0188BF94@tlnmail1.toplayer .com> <4.3.2.7.1.20030509172533.092f1650@mail.attbi.com> <4.3.2.7.1.20030510020259.022d57e0@mail.attbi.com> <4.3.2.7.1.20030510140640.092ed1e0@mail.attbi.com> <4.3.2.7.1.20030510152608.093186f0@mail.attbi.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 10:26:43 -0400
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----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Alex Alten" <alten@attbi.com>

[...]
> > >OK, I agree this is a scenario where RSA is used to exchange a single
AES
> > >over a long session of packets is fine.  But if I'm doing single
> > packets, and
> > >changing AES keys a lot, it doesn't work very well.
> >
> >So don't do that, then.  No one said you need to use RSA on every packet.
> >Come on.  This is getting really silly!
> >
> >Patient: "Doctor, doctor, it hurts when I use RSA on every packet."
> >Doctor:  "Don't do that, then."
>
> We both agree that it is silly.  And that's exactly my point.  But one
might
> reasonably consider using AES instead of RSA.

I don't think you get David's point.

You were suggesting not to use PK crypto when designing protocols,
because you said it's to slow.  Then, to back up your claim you give a
dubious
example (re-keying multiple times when sending single packets).
If you would be a good crypto protocol designer, you would never suggest
such a thing.

Personally I've never seen a situation where the speed of PK crypto was
a problem  (except when the protocols where not well designed).

--Anton

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Date: Tue, 13 May 2003 02:16:19 +1000
To: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Cc: "'Greg Rose'" <ggr@qualcomm.com>, cfrg@ietf.org,
        Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
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I very much agree with the sentiments you express below. The only 
difference between us is that I do know how much cryptanalysis has been 
applied, and who by. This makes me feel much more confident in SOBER-128 
than I have any right to expect others to feel.

Note that I, personally, think that Turing, SNOW 2.0 and Helix are much 
more "interesting" ciphers than SOBER-128. But I, like you, would not 
recommend use of any of them yet.

But the reason we created SOBER-128 is not for cryptographic interest. It's 
because RC4 should be deprecated, but isn't. Perhaps we should have named 
it Chicxulub, which would address your concern about there being too many 
versions of SOBER :-).

Note: there have been 4 "kinds" of SOBER including this latest. By "kinds" 
I mean different word-sizes but same fundamental structure. The first was 
certainly broken (linear key loading). The second "S-class" was marginal 
against guess-and-determine attacks, and presumably has the same 
distinguishing attacks as... The third "t-class" has no known attacks 
except distinguishing attacks with insane (IMHO) amounts of known 
plaintext, but a few rough edges. The fourth is SOBER-128. There will be no 
more.

regards,
Greg.

At 03:50 AM 5/12/2003 -0700, Doug Whiting wrote:
>I just want to express my concern about trying to make an RFC out of
>anything like
>this without considerable more time for analysis.  I agree that various
>flavors
>of SOBER have seen some good amounts of cryptanalysis, though I'm not sure
>that
>it has had enough yet (I'm simply not sure how many really good folks have
>spent
>significant time on it).  One concern is that there have simply been too
>many SOBER
>versions already, which urges some caution from my perspective, although
>there may
>be very good reasons for the different versions. More importantly, adding a
>very significant new cryptographic "feature" such as a MAC does not in any
>way
>constitute a "tweak" that should be assumed to inherit the security
>properties of
>the original algorithm(s).
>
>I say this as a co-author of Helix, and as someone who belives, like you,
>that such
>combo algorithms are quite interesting. However, I believe that this entire
>concept
>needs time for being carefully analyzed by the crypto community before being
>put into
>serious use.  We simply are not there yet. The Helix folks would consider it
>quite
>inappropriate to start standardizing at this time on any such algorithm,
>including Helix,
>without quite a bit of time passing, perhaps a few years.  That's roughly
>how much time
>AES had, and it had (and continues to have) basically all the best
>crpytanalysts looking
>at it very seriously.  Of course, even just the passage of time doesn't
>guarantee that a
>new algorithm (class of algorithms) has been propertly vetted; the algorithm
>must also
>receive serious scrutiny from several well qualified folks. That is, the
>passage of such
>time is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
>
>Don't take this as a criticism of SOBER-128 per se. I believe that this
>caution should
>be applied to all algorithms of this class.
>
>Doug Whiting
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Greg Rose [mailto:ggr@qualcomm.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, May 11, 2003 3:07 PM
> > To: Alex Alten
> > Cc: Greg Rose; cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
> >
> >
> > At 11:00 PM 5/10/2003 -0700, Alex Alten wrote:
> > >Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done on SOBER-128
> > >that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing
> > it to the wolves
> > >until you can defend it properly.
> >
> > Yes. If you read the details, SOBER-t32 has been analysed up
> > the wazoo, and
> > was secure at the 128-bit level; just not at the 256-bit
> > level that we
> > thought, which ruled it out of NESSIE. Most of this analysis
> > was done on
> > the "unstuttered" -t32, and applies directly to SOBER-128.
> >
> > regards,
> > Greg.
> >
> > Greg Rose                                       INTERNET:
> > ggr@qualcomm.com
> > Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX:
> > +61-2-9817 5199
> > Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,
> > http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
> > Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF
> > CD2F 1081 A37C
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >


Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C

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From mailnull@www1.ietf.org  Mon May 12 17:03:07 2003
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Message-ID: <51C7002B020CD411824E009027C469F7F40078@cldxch01.hifn.com>
From: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>
To: "'Greg Rose'" <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org, Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 13:54:50 -0700
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Well, it seems maybe you're mixing metaphors.  

If the goal is to replace RC4, then perhaps SOBER (without MAC) might make
some sense.
First of all, however, I'd like to be convinced that there's a real problem
with RC4, as opposed to how it is misused.  Saying that somebody has an
unpublished attack doesn't do much for me.  For better or worse, RC4 has
had lots of years to be attacked, so far with only a few very avoidable 
or fairly inconsequential dings in its armor (AFAIK), and replacing it with 
something new could end us up in far worse shape in a few years.  You may
know who has looked at it, but the crypto community in general probably
doesn't.
Have they published all their  analyses? Where?  This is the kind of stuff
that 
must be very carefully considered before making a change from "the devil we
know".
I guess basically I'd like some proof that RC4 needs deprecation. I'm not
aware
of any compelling motives for that, thought I certainly may be wrong.

If the goal is a combo encryption+MAC algorithm, then I stand by my
desire for quite a while for open study.  Saying that the possible need for
an RC4 replacement dictates acceptance of a new type of algorithm that does
something that RC4 doesn't even attempt to do seems like a bad argument.

So, which point are you trying to argue?  They're quite separate ones, from
my
perspective.


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Greg Rose [mailto:ggr@qualcomm.com]
> Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 9:16 AM
> To: Doug Whiting
> Cc: 'Greg Rose'; cfrg@ietf.org; Alex Alten
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
> 
> 
> I very much agree with the sentiments you express below. The only 
> difference between us is that I do know how much 
> cryptanalysis has been 
> applied, and who by. This makes me feel much more confident 
> in SOBER-128 
> than I have any right to expect others to feel.
> 
> Note that I, personally, think that Turing, SNOW 2.0 and 
> Helix are much 
> more "interesting" ciphers than SOBER-128. But I, like you, would not 
> recommend use of any of them yet.
> 
> But the reason we created SOBER-128 is not for cryptographic 
> interest. It's 
> because RC4 should be deprecated, but isn't. Perhaps we 
> should have named 
> it Chicxulub, which would address your concern about there 
> being too many 
> versions of SOBER :-).
> 
> Note: there have been 4 "kinds" of SOBER including this 
> latest. By "kinds" 
> I mean different word-sizes but same fundamental structure. 
> The first was 
> certainly broken (linear key loading). The second "S-class" 
> was marginal 
> against guess-and-determine attacks, and presumably has the same 
> distinguishing attacks as... The third "t-class" has no known attacks 
> except distinguishing attacks with insane (IMHO) amounts of known 
> plaintext, but a few rough edges. The fourth is SOBER-128. 
> There will be no 
> more.
> 
> regards,
> Greg.
> 
> At 03:50 AM 5/12/2003 -0700, Doug Whiting wrote:
> >I just want to express my concern about trying to make an RFC out of
> >anything like
> >this without considerable more time for analysis.  I agree 
> that various
> >flavors
> >of SOBER have seen some good amounts of cryptanalysis, 
> though I'm not sure
> >that
> >it has had enough yet (I'm simply not sure how many really 
> good folks have
> >spent
> >significant time on it).  One concern is that there have 
> simply been too
> >many SOBER
> >versions already, which urges some caution from my 
> perspective, although
> >there may
> >be very good reasons for the different versions. More 
> importantly, adding a
> >very significant new cryptographic "feature" such as a MAC 
> does not in any
> >way
> >constitute a "tweak" that should be assumed to inherit the security
> >properties of
> >the original algorithm(s).
> >
> >I say this as a co-author of Helix, and as someone who 
> belives, like you,
> >that such
> >combo algorithms are quite interesting. However, I believe 
> that this entire
> >concept
> >needs time for being carefully analyzed by the crypto 
> community before being
> >put into
> >serious use.  We simply are not there yet. The Helix folks 
> would consider it
> >quite
> >inappropriate to start standardizing at this time on any 
> such algorithm,
> >including Helix,
> >without quite a bit of time passing, perhaps a few years.  
> That's roughly
> >how much time
> >AES had, and it had (and continues to have) basically all the best
> >crpytanalysts looking
> >at it very seriously.  Of course, even just the passage of 
> time doesn't
> >guarantee that a
> >new algorithm (class of algorithms) has been propertly 
> vetted; the algorithm
> >must also
> >receive serious scrutiny from several well qualified folks. 
> That is, the
> >passage of such
> >time is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
> >
> >Don't take this as a criticism of SOBER-128 per se. I 
> believe that this
> >caution should
> >be applied to all algorithms of this class.
> >
> >Doug Whiting
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Greg Rose [mailto:ggr@qualcomm.com]
> > > Sent: Sunday, May 11, 2003 3:07 PM
> > > To: Alex Alten
> > > Cc: Greg Rose; cfrg@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- 
> SOBER-128
> > >
> > >
> > > At 11:00 PM 5/10/2003 -0700, Alex Alten wrote:
> > > >Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done 
> on SOBER-128
> > > >that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing
> > > it to the wolves
> > > >until you can defend it properly.
> > >
> > > Yes. If you read the details, SOBER-t32 has been analysed up
> > > the wazoo, and
> > > was secure at the 128-bit level; just not at the 256-bit
> > > level that we
> > > thought, which ruled it out of NESSIE. Most of this analysis
> > > was done on
> > > the "unstuttered" -t32, and applies directly to SOBER-128.
> > >
> > > regards,
> > > Greg.
> > >
> > > Greg Rose                                       INTERNET:
> > > ggr@qualcomm.com
> > > Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX:
> > > +61-2-9817 5199
> > > Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,
> > > http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
> > > Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF
> > > CD2F 1081 A37C
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Cfrg mailing list
> > > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > >
> 
> 
> Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: 
> ggr@qualcomm.com
> Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: 
> +61-2-9817 5199
> Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                
> http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
> Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF 
> CD2F 1081 A37C
> 
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Date: Tue, 13 May 2003 07:51:17 +1000
To: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Cc: "'Greg Rose'" <ggr@qualcomm.com>, cfrg@ietf.org,
        Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
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At 01:54 PM 5/12/2003 -0700, Doug Whiting wrote:
>Well, it seems maybe you're mixing metaphors.

"To boldly mix metaphors, where no man has gone before..."

>If the goal is to replace RC4, then perhaps SOBER (without MAC) might make
>some sense.
>First of all, however, I'd like to be convinced that there's a real problem
>with RC4, as opposed to how it is misused.  Saying that somebody has an
>unpublished attack doesn't do much for me.

I've never referred to any unpublished attacks, on either cipher? If I was 
aware of any, I might have done so, but I'm not.

The key-bias problems are well known, starting with Kocher and ending (so 
far) with Fluhrer-Mantin-Shamir. The distinguishing attacks against RC4 
with data complexity about 2^32 are, I think, from Golic and Fluhrer (I'm 
not near my references at the moment). Actually, a quick web search shows 
Fluhrer and McGrew as the authors of the most recent (FSE 2000) paper 
talking about bias in RC4.

>   For better or worse, RC4 has
>had lots of years to be attacked, so far with only a few very avoidable
>or fairly inconsequential dings in its armor (AFAIK), and replacing it with
>something new could end us up in far worse shape in a few years.

The keystream bias is, in no sense, avoidable. I'd call it inconsequential 
if it wasn't measurable in a few seconds' worth of high speed ethernet traffic.

>   You may
>know who has looked at it, but the crypto community in general probably
>doesn't.

Sorry to disagree. Regarding SOBER, just look at the proceedings from the 
NESSIE conferences, and the FSE conferences, for the past few years. 
Everything I've referred to about SOBER-128 is published and the references 
are in the SOBER-128 paper.

>Have they published all their  analyses? Where?  This is the kind of stuff
>that
>must be very carefully considered before making a change from "the devil we
>know".
>I guess basically I'd like some proof that RC4 needs deprecation. I'm not
>aware
>of any compelling motives for that, thought I certainly may be wrong.

We may well have different guidelines for deprecation. To me, trying to 
deprecate something without a viable alternative is futile, so we've 
attempted to provide an alternative. But I'm not trying to force it on anyone.

>If the goal is a combo encryption+MAC algorithm, then I stand by my
>desire for quite a while for open study.  Saying that the possible need for
>an RC4 replacement dictates acceptance of a new type of algorithm that does
>something that RC4 doesn't even attempt to do seems like a bad argument.

That's a fair cop. It's certainly the case that our arguments for security 
of the MAC construct are, at best, just plausible arguments. They rely on 
the fact that the mechanisms for the MAC parallel mechanisms that already 
appeared in the cipher, which have been closely studied.

>So, which point are you trying to argue?  They're quite separate ones, from
>my
>perspective.

Yes, I agree that they should be separate arguments. So, here's a claim, 
restated:
Anywhere you can use RC4, you can use SOBER-128 in single-stream mode, and 
be reasonably assured, today, that it will be more secure. It's also faster 
to key, faster to generate output, and uses less RAM. On the downside, you 
can't code it from memory, and you'd better have some ROM for tables; in my 
experience these are rarely limiting factors.

I'm not aware of any other algorithm that can credibly make that claim. I 
don't claim it for Turing, even though I believe that to be a stronger 
algorithm. You don't make it for Helix. Ekdahl and Johansson don't make it 
for SNOW 2.0.

Note: the claim could still be incorrect. C'est la guerre.

Anyway, I'm not trying to force SOBER-128 on anyone, but I, for one, will 
never allow my company to use RC4 in any new development.

Sorry if this sounds argumentative; it's not meant to. "The road to hell is 
paved with good intentions."

Greg.

Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C

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Date: Sat, 10 May 2003 14:40:03 -0700
To: jsjoberg@toplayer.com
From: Carl Ellison <cme@jf.intel.com>
Subject: non-repudiation (was Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions)
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 11:52 AM 5/5/2003 -0400, jsjoberg@toplayer.com wrote:
>Hey all,
>
>I'm in an ETSI working group and we are trying to find a way to
>provide integrity checks along with non-repudiation on a
>theoretically infinite amount of data delivered over a network at
>10's to 100's Mbps.

I wish you would define "non-repudiation" - or not use the term.

The way it is defined in common practice is that a person is held
legally responsible for the actions of some cryptographic key that
signs what is interpreted as a contract.

Are you having a contract containing potentially infinite data?

Then, back to the normal use of non-repudiation, this is not a
cryptographic problem.  It's a full system and encironment problem. 
What mechanisms (rooms, computers, sensors, ...) are you proposing
for observing human behavior and indications of human intent so that
you can make a claim of non-repudiation?

Or, do you have some specialized definition for the term?

 - Carl

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 7.1

iQA/AwUBPr1xs8xqBGb+WvJAEQIL3QCgzIvlnTttJxWGKJphgSU81qs4k3QAn06I
w+hMC153mLi78XcM4odjhjP5
=MWNv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


+--------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl Ellison      Intel R & D       E: cme@jf.intel.com |
|2111 NE 25th Ave                    T: +1-503-264-2900  |
|Hillsboro OR 97124                  F: +1-503-264-6225  |
|PGP Key ID: 0xFE5AF240                                  |
|  1FDB 2770 08D7 8540 E157  AAB4 CC6A 0466 FE5A F240    |
+--------------------------------------------------------+
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From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: IP status of SOBER-128? (Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128)
Message-ID: <20030513022018.A2763191@exeter.ac.uk>
References: <51C7002B020CD411824E009027C469F7F40078@cldxch01.hifn.com> <5.1.0.14.2.20030513070529.02133e98@203.30.171.17>
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Well I for one am very pleased to see work on primitives such as Helix
and SOBER-128 which try to provide authentication as well as
encryption.  It seems that construction flaws typically creep in where
not-so-crypto-savy programmers make up ways to authenticate, and with
AES we have this whole messy scenario where there are multiple
competing modes which provide authentication and confidentiality --
some of the more efficient of which are patented, and most of the less
efficient of which basically amount to no more than just that: MAC the
mesage and encrypt the message (great).

One question about using SOBER-128.  Greg mentioned in his
announcement free use of the source code or other implementations, and
on the web page it says "freely available", but then there is also a
patent section at the bottom of:

	http://www.qualcomm.com.au/publications.html

What is the overall picture: can anyone use the algorithms without
negotiating a license even though there are patents which may be
argued to cover aspects of SOBER-128's design?

Thanks

Adam
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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: cme@jf.intel.com, jsjoberg@toplayer.com
Subject: Re: non-repudiation (was Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions)
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Carl Ellison <cme@jf.intel.com> writes:

>Then, back to the normal use of non-repudiation, this is not a cryptographic
>problem.  It's a full system and encironment problem. What mechanisms (rooms,
>computers, sensors, ...) are you proposing for observing human behavior and
>indications of human intent so that you can make a claim of non-repudiation?
>
>Or, do you have some specialized definition for the term?
 
"When I user a word it means exactly what I want it to mean, nothing more and
 nothing less" - H.Dumpty.

Peter (who's just finished doing a talk explaining the general meaninglessness
       of the term "non-repudiation" in a digital context).
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Subject: [Cfrg] parity bits.
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Hi all,

I'm not much familiar with the internals of cryptography, but have a 
question that
may look to you experts quite silly, but not for me, hence pls answer.
1] I know that in DES or 3DES keys, some bits are designated as parity bits.
     what are these parity bits, what is their significance? and what is 
their use?

Thanks in Advance.
Lokesh

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From: "Anton Stiglic" <astiglic@okiok.com>
To: <cfrg@ietf.org>, "Lokesh" <lokeshnb@intotoinc.com>
References: <5.1.0.14.0.20030513162244.027bf9d0@172.16.1.10>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] parity bits.
Date: Tue, 13 May 2003 10:21:26 -0400
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Refer to the Handbook of Applied Cryptography,
chapter 7, section 7.4.2.  Follow the references
if needed.
The whole book is available online for free:
http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/

The book is excellent and will answer all of your
basic crypto questions.  It's worth buying a
hardcopy version.

--Anton

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Lokesh" <lokeshnb@intotoinc.com>
To: <cfrg@ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 6:57 AM
Subject: [Cfrg] parity bits.


> Hi all,
>
> I'm not much familiar with the internals of cryptography, but have a
> question that
> may look to you experts quite silly, but not for me, hence pls answer.
> 1] I know that in DES or 3DES keys, some bits are designated as parity
bits.
>      what are these parity bits, what is their significance? and what is
> their use?
>
> Thanks in Advance.
> Lokesh
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 01:48:17 +1000
To: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: IP status of SOBER-128? (Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated
  encryption primitive -- SOBER-128)
Cc: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>, cfrg@ietf.org
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At 02:20 AM 5/13/2003 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>Well I for one am very pleased to see work on primitives such as Helix
>and SOBER-128 which try to provide authentication as well as
>encryption.  It seems that construction flaws typically creep in where
>not-so-crypto-savy programmers make up ways to authenticate, and with
>AES we have this whole messy scenario where there are multiple
>competing modes which provide authentication and confidentiality --
>some of the more efficient of which are patented, and most of the less
>efficient of which basically amount to no more than just that: MAC the
>mesage and encrypt the message (great).
>
>One question about using SOBER-128.  Greg mentioned in his
>announcement free use of the source code or other implementations, and
>on the web page it says "freely available", but then there is also a
>patent section at the bottom of:
>
>         http://www.qualcomm.com.au/publications.html
>
>What is the overall picture: can anyone use the algorithms without
>negotiating a license even though there are patents which may be
>argued to cover aspects of SOBER-128's design?

Short answer: yes. There's a license in the source code modules that grants 
a free license to use the source, or to use any of our patents for an 
independent implementation to interoperate. If you want to use your own 
implementation, and want to do it "clean room" (that is, not even *look* at 
our code), there's a separate web page that you can print and file. If 
anyone wants more guarantees than that (like a signable license), I'm sure 
we could work something out.

This is not quite as good as putting our patents in the public domain, but 
Qualcomm is an IPR company, and it took me most of 6 years to get agreement 
to make them free. Note, for example, that the license does *not* grant you 
the ability to use our patents to run a non-SOBER encryption algorithm. 
Like Linus, we want to keep control of the development process. The 
internal agreement actually covers any cipher algorithms we have developed 
or may develop.

I hope that's clear. I'm happy to elaborate.

Greg.

Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C

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To: "Anton Stiglic" <astiglic@okiok.com>, <cfrg@ietf.org>
From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Request For Opinions
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At 10:26 AM 5/12/2003 -0400, Anton Stiglic wrote:

>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Alex Alten" <alten@attbi.com>
>
>[...]
> > > >OK, I agree this is a scenario where RSA is used to exchange a single
>AES
> > > >over a long session of packets is fine.  But if I'm doing single
> > > packets, and
> > > >changing AES keys a lot, it doesn't work very well.
> > >
> > >So don't do that, then.  No one said you need to use RSA on every packet.
> > >Come on.  This is getting really silly!
> > >
> > >Patient: "Doctor, doctor, it hurts when I use RSA on every packet."
> > >Doctor:  "Don't do that, then."
> >
> > We both agree that it is silly.  And that's exactly my point.  But one
>might
> > reasonably consider using AES instead of RSA.
>
>I don't think you get David's point.
>
>You were suggesting not to use PK crypto when designing protocols,
>because you said it's to slow.  Then, to back up your claim you give a
>dubious
>example (re-keying multiple times when sending single packets).
>If you would be a good crypto protocol designer, you would never suggest
>such a thing.
>
>Personally I've never seen a situation where the speed of PK crypto was
>a problem  (except when the protocols where not well designed).

I sincerely believe I understand David's point.  As far as I can tell he has so
deeply ingrained in himself the limitations of various ciphers that he knows
instinctively what design approach to use for a given problem. I suppose my
example above may seem a bit contrived.  But step back and take a good look
at the  fundamental facts about PK (say RSA v.s. AES).

The facts about PK are:
1. Key generation is dog slow
2. Key setup is damn slow.
3. Encryption is like watching grass grow or paint to dry.

Yes, one can design a fast protocol with these limitations, but there are a 
lot of
hoops to jump through, with only a few tried and true ways to do it 
well.  Usually
one gets off to a slow start with PK and then as quickly as possible 
switches to
a block cipher.  Most designs tend to be fairly long lived sessions in 
order to
amortize the costly initial use of PK.

Using only a block cipher like AES, with modern PC's, in a 100 Mbps network
environment, all 3 limitations fall away.  As a result you can reconsider 
or try
new designs one would never hope to use when PK is in the mix.

I hope this clarifies my point, which is that PK hampers high-performance
design choices.

- Alex

--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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On Tue, 13 May 2003, Alex Alten wrote:

> The facts about PK are:
> 1. Key generation is dog slow
> 2. Key setup is damn slow.
> 3. Encryption is like watching grass grow or paint to dry.

4. It's often the only tool that gets the job done.

If we cannot solve a problem satisfactorily using our usual symmetric
primitives like PRPs, PRFs, hash functions, MACs etc. we will have to
resort to more expensive primitives.  They're the cheapest ones that get
the job done.

Some operations are actually quite efficient, for example RSA encryption
using a low exponent (3 or 65537).

I wrote a signature verification routine in portable C about 4-5 years
back, to verify Rabin-based signatures. The large integer routines were
home grown and far from optimized. Verification took about 1 ms on a 200
Mhz pentium clone processor (1024 bit keys). Our hardware is at least 10
times faster now, so we're probably talking about 100us verification
times.

Signature generation (2 512-bit exponentiations and an application of
Garner's algorithm) took 500 ms using a good bignum library, so on current
hardware we're probably getting close to 50 ms. No paint dries this fast.

Some new processors have instruction sets optimized to perform big number
arithmetic efficiently, so this will soon even be less of an issue. And if
you're really in a hurry you can buy accellerators that perform modular
exponentiation in hardware.

Ge'

-- 
Gé Weijers                mailto:ge.weijers@sun.com
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Lincy-
I don't think RFC 3261 prevents SIP calls from riding in a TLS tunnel,
if that is convenient for the users/proxies; what it does do is require
TLS tunnels for SIPS calls all the way to the "domain of the callee"
(see section 4, third paragraph).  Note the language in section 12.1.1,
third paragraph, that states the conditions for "secure": request arrives
over TLS AND (emphasis mine) the Request-URI contains a SIPS URI.
Section 16.6 has some other requirements for Request Forwarding at a
security boundary (e.g., steps 4 and 7).
-Bob
----------------------------------------------------
Bob Gilman       rrg@avaya.com      +1 303 538 3868

Lincy Scaria wrote:

> Jo,
>  
> In my understanding RFC 3261 implies that using the sip URI means the session will not be secured and using the sips URI means the
> session should be secured using TLS.  Are we still in conformance with 3261 if we route regular sip sessions over TLS?  I'm still not sure
> about this.
>  
> I was thinking not.  So the key phrase here was "as detailed in RFC 3261" - my intention was to point out that this (sip means not secure,
> sips means secure) would only happen at the edge proxy.  Thanks for pointing out how this can be misunderstood.  I'll rephrase.
>  
> To answer your questions below: yes to all 4.
>  
> Lincy
> 
>      -----Original Message-----
>      From: Mcmillen, C Joanne (Joanne) 
>      Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 1:15 PM
>      To: Scaria, Lincy (Lincy); Bennett, Russell P (Russell); Boyle, Frank J (Duffy)
>      Cc: Agrawal, Pankaj (Pankaj); Gilman, Robert R (Bob); Freundlich, Glen G (Glen); Mastrogiulio, Joseph (Joseph); Beck,
>      Alexander (Alex); Benoit, Jacques H (Jacques); Balasaygun, Mehmet C (Mehmet)
>      Subject: Re: SIPS issue ?
> 
>      Lincy,
>       
>      My confusion is not about being a proxy requirement in the proxy RFS. It's simply the wording and
>      perhaps it's because I am not familiar enough with your RFS. However, you just confused me 
>      even more with "The requirement that could need to be changed is 96123-070 (see below) to indicate that the 
>      SIPS URI scheme as detailed in RFC 3261 will be used only on the edge proxy for outgoing sessions. "
>       
>      The above says to me that a call placed by an MV user that routes over a  pattern indicating secure sip would
>      not use the SIPS URI scheme when sending the request to its proxy because that scheme is only used
>      by the edge proxy. If the SIPS URI scheme is only used by the proxy, how is the end-to-end TLS preference 
>      from the endpoint communicated to the proxy?
>       
>      Your original proposal for requirement 70 to become a proxy requirement said to me that
>      the edge proxy would now be required to always use the SIPS URI scheme for the first hop out
>      regardless of what scheme the endpoint indicated.
>       
>      Is this what you are actually saying and is the proposed behavior?
>          1) administration is present for both the softphone and gateway to indicate if they do or do not want to attempt
>              end-to-end TLS
>          2) If end-to-end TLS is desired, the SIPS URI scheme is used for the softphone/gateway request to the proxy
>          3) If the edge proxy gets a sips: request, it will require TLS for the first hop out and fail to route if TLS cannot be used
>          4) If the edge proxy gets a sip: request, it will not use TLS for the first hop out
>       
>      Jo
>       
>      ----- Original Message ----- 
>      From: Scaria, Lincy (Lincy) 
>      To: Mcmillen, C Joanne (Joanne) ; Bennett, Russell P (Russell) ; Boyle, Frank J (Duffy) 
>      Cc: Agrawal, Pankaj (Pankaj) ; Gilman, Robert R (Bob) ; Freundlich, Glen G (Glen) ; Mastrogiulio, Joseph (Joseph) ; Beck,
>      Alexander (Alex) ; Benoit, Jacques H (Jacques) ; Balasaygun, Mehmet C (Mehmet) 
>      Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 9:56 AM
>      Subject: RE: SIPS issue ?
> 
>      There are two issues: 
>       
>      1. How to handle incoming sip calls to the Walled Garden.  Do we have to change the incoming URI to sips?  From discussion
>      it seems we shouldn't - it may impact call forwarding and other call handling.
>       
>      2. How to handle outgoing sip calls.  We can use AAR/ARS to handle this as required in Req. 96123-071 for MV users and
>      Softphone users can indicate in the application which URI they want.  
>       
>      The requirement that could need to be changed is 96123-070 (see below) to indicate that the SIPS URI scheme as detailed in
>      RFC 3261 will be used only on the edge proxy for outgoing sessions.    
>       
>      Lincy
>       
>      PS Jo, When I said this should be a Proxy requirement, I meant within 96123, not the Proxy RFS - sorry for the confusion.
> 
>           -----Original Message-----
>           From: Mcmillen, C Joanne (Joanne) 
>           Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 10:43 AM
>           To: Bennett, Russell P (Russell); Boyle, Frank J (Duffy); Scaria, Lincy (Lincy)
>           Cc: Agrawal, Pankaj (Pankaj); Gilman, Robert R (Bob); Freundlich, Glen G (Glen); Mastrogiulio, Joseph (Joseph);
>           Beck, Alexander (Alex); Benoit, Jacques H (Jacques); Balasaygun, Mehmet C (Mehmet)
>           Subject: Re: SIPS issue ?
> 
>           Well, my $.02 is - I'm hopelessly confused by this! Perhaps it's because I do not
>           know what the open issue is that is trying to be resolved.
>            
>           It was my understanding that a sip/sips question is on the route pattern form to determine sip vs. sips so
>           we most certainly can dial sip:digits@domain if the route pattern is set  to do so. In fact, that's
>           requirement 71.
>            
>           I also do not understand the proposal to change the requirement wording
>           and make it a proxy requirement. I most certainly agree that we cannot do this if this requirement
>           stands alone. So, is the hidden thing I'm missing here a proposal to remove
>           requirement 71? If not, what am I missing here?
>            
>           Jo
>            
>           ----- Original Message ----- 
>           From: Bennett, Russell P (Russell) 
>           To: Boyle, Frank J (Duffy) ; Scaria, Lincy (Lincy) 
>           Cc: Agrawal, Pankaj (Pankaj) ; Gilman, Robert R (Bob) ; Freundlich, Glen G (Glen) ; Mcmillen, C Joanne
>           (Joanne) ; Mastrogiulio, Joseph (Joseph) ; Beck, Alexander (Alex) ; Benoit, Jacques H (Jacques) ; Balasaygun,
>           Mehmet C (Mehmet) 
>           Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 7:29 AM
>           Subject: RE: SIPS issue ?
> 
>           Hmmmm....I must have missed this.  Dialing sip:digits@domain is part of the minimun sip user addressing
>           experience and must not be blocked.
>            
>           Russell
> 
>                -----Original Message-----
>                From: Boyle, Frank J (Duffy) 
>                Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 10:19 PM
>                To: Scaria, Lincy (Lincy)
>                Cc: Agrawal, Pankaj (Pankaj); Gilman, Robert R (Bob); Freundlich, Glen G (Glen); Mcmillen, C
>                Joanne (Joanne); Mastrogiulio, Joseph (Joseph); Beck, Alexander (Alex); Benoit, Jacques H
>                (Jacques); Balasaygun, Mehmet C (Mehmet); Bennett, Russell P (Russell)
>                Subject: Re: SIPS issue ?
> 
>                Russell & Jo should make the call on this, but I fear it's too restrictive, in that we couldn't call
>                sip:digits@domain for any domain.  We could, alternately, add the sip/sips question on one of
>                the MV forms (routing pattern, sig group, or more likely trunk group).  Remember that there's
>                no restriction on IP addresses and ports any more, so we could signal sip: and sips: over the
>                same connection with this approach. 
> 
>                Duffy 
> 
>                "Scaria, Lincy (Lincy)" wrote: 
> 
>                  Pankaj, all,Here is a possible solution that was brought up a few weeks ago:For MV end users -
>                  we can stick to what we've already decided upon (depending on AAR/ARS to decide on URI). 
>                  We require that TLS be used within the Walled Garden, now we need to require that it be used
>                  regardless of URI. For Softphone IM users - they will be given the option to select whether each
>                  session is over TLS or not via a check box (this is a requirement in the Softphone R5 RFS).  This
>                  will really only mean anything if the session is addressed to an external user since TLS will be
>                  used within the customer's network regardless. So I propose that we edit requirement 96123-070
>                  to say:The SIPS URI Scheme, as described in RFC 3261, shall be used to require that
>                  TLS be used on the next hop out of the edge proxy.And then make this an IMPress Proxy
>                  requirement (as opposed to an MV requirement, as it currently is).  Refer to MR 41322.Your
>                  thoughts? Lincy 
> 
>                       -----Original Message----- 
>                       From: Agrawal, Pankaj (Pankaj) 
>                       Sent: Wednesday, May 07, 2003 3:46 PM 
>                       To: Scaria, Lincy (Lincy) 
>                       Subject: SIPS issue ?
>                       Hi Lincy, Can you please follow up about the SIPS requirements for the open
>                       issues ? I need to start discussing my design with team members to complete the
>                       development . Thanks,Pankaj
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Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 12:06:23 -0700
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
From: David Mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128 
Cc: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>, cfrg@ietf.org
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Steve,

At 10:30 AM 5/11/2003 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>In message <5.1.0.14.2.20030507005709.02b0a988@203.30.171.17>, Greg Rose 
>writes
>:
>
> >
> >For IETF use, obviously we need to write an RFC. I've never written an RFC
> >before (in fact, blush, have never been to an IETF meeting) and could use
> >some guidance on just how much information should be put in, and what
> >should happen to it then.
> >
>
><chair hat=on>

You mean area director, right?  ;-)

>As a matter of policy, the IETF does not standardize encryption
>algorithms.  We don't have the competence to analyze them, let alone
>develop or modify them.  In general, we pick algorithms that are the
>output of other groups that are qualified, such as NIST, NESSIE, or
>CRYPTOREC.

Yes, but CFRG is an IRTF group, not an IETF group.  As such, we can't 
standardize anything, but we can and should encourage crypto design work 
and its review and discussion.   We should make sure that the 
cryptographers understand the design requirements, facilitate security 
analysis, and make sure that practitioners understand the results of that 
analysis.


>The IETF has published Informational RFCs describing ciphers and hash
>functions.  At this point, there's a strong preference for not
>publishing ones that aren't standardized by someone reputable, unless
>there's a very good reason.  We do like publishing RFC versions of
>standardized algorithms, because it makes them more accessible to the
>IETF community.

We can't expect other groups to standardize crypto algorithms that will be 
useful for the Internet.  NIST has no plans to run another AES-like program 
(which is a shame, since it was well-done) and CRYPTREC and NESSIE are done 
accepting submissions.

Perhaps more importantly, there are requirements that are unmet and aren't 
being addressed.  The example of an RC4 replacement that can be used to 
protect packet-based protocols is an important one.   NESSIE did not 
address this problem in its initial call for submissions, though some of 
the submitted ciphers did.  As Greg points out, the desire of practitioners 
to use RC4 has caused many to use it improperly and thus stumble over its 
related-key weakness.  So while I would not want to take up crypto forum 
time discussing well-solved problems like 128-bit block cipher design, I'm 
happy to use this venue discussion of SOBER-128, its security, and the 
requirements that it aims to meet.


>An RFC version should mostly be a precise specification of the
>algorithm, plus (if you want) any useful implementation hints.  It
>probably wouldn't include much of the justification and design
>criteria.  The Security Considerations section should outline what's
>known of the strength against various attacks; it should also give any
>non-obvious cautions and caveats.

Agreed, and I'd expect that discussion of an ID in CFRG would help to 
develop a strong Security Considerations section.


>The more interesting question is what it takes to incorporate a new
>algorithm into some security standard.  The current Security Area
>policy is to leave that up to the individual working groups; it's quite
>plausible that, say, TLS will standardize some algorithm while IPsec
>will not.  The rationale is simple:  the individual WGs have better
>knowledge of what fits into their frameworks, and what their market
>wants.  We do not require RFC versions of algorithm before using them
>in other standards, though it's helpful.  And an RFC is also useful for
>informing the IETF community of the algorithm and its properties.
></chair>

Agreed, this is a good process.

David



>                 --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
>                 http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)
>
>
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To: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>
From: David Mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
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Doug,

you're right that the keystream-generator based MAC approach needs to have 
more analysis.  At this point, all we have is preprints.  I do think that 
there's plenty of motivation for replacing RC4 with a cipher that has a 
nonce (and can thus protect unreliable packet flows) and that isn't easily 
distinguishable from random.  So to my mind we need to keep both of these 
goals separate; SOBER-128 and/or helix may turn out to be great PRFs but 
junky MACs.

Also, is the helix paper on the web yet?

thanks,

David

At 03:50 AM 5/12/2003 -0700, Doug Whiting wrote:
>I just want to express my concern about trying to make an RFC out of
>anything like
>this without considerable more time for analysis.  I agree that various
>flavors
>of SOBER have seen some good amounts of cryptanalysis, though I'm not sure
>that
>it has had enough yet (I'm simply not sure how many really good folks have
>spent
>significant time on it).  One concern is that there have simply been too
>many SOBER
>versions already, which urges some caution from my perspective, although
>there may
>be very good reasons for the different versions. More importantly, adding a
>very significant new cryptographic "feature" such as a MAC does not in any
>way
>constitute a "tweak" that should be assumed to inherit the security
>properties of
>the original algorithm(s).
>
>I say this as a co-author of Helix, and as someone who belives, like you,
>that such
>combo algorithms are quite interesting. However, I believe that this entire
>concept
>needs time for being carefully analyzed by the crypto community before being
>put into
>serious use.  We simply are not there yet. The Helix folks would consider it
>quite
>inappropriate to start standardizing at this time on any such algorithm,
>including Helix,
>without quite a bit of time passing, perhaps a few years.  That's roughly
>how much time
>AES had, and it had (and continues to have) basically all the best
>crpytanalysts looking
>at it very seriously.  Of course, even just the passage of time doesn't
>guarantee that a
>new algorithm (class of algorithms) has been propertly vetted; the algorithm
>must also
>receive serious scrutiny from several well qualified folks. That is, the
>passage of such
>time is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
>
>Don't take this as a criticism of SOBER-128 per se. I believe that this
>caution should
>be applied to all algorithms of this class.
>
>Doug Whiting
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Greg Rose [mailto:ggr@qualcomm.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, May 11, 2003 3:07 PM
> > To: Alex Alten
> > Cc: Greg Rose; cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
> >
> >
> > At 11:00 PM 5/10/2003 -0700, Alex Alten wrote:
> > >Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done on SOBER-128
> > >that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing
> > it to the wolves
> > >until you can defend it properly.
> >
> > Yes. If you read the details, SOBER-t32 has been analysed up
> > the wazoo, and
> > was secure at the 128-bit level; just not at the 256-bit
> > level that we
> > thought, which ruled it out of NESSIE. Most of this analysis
> > was done on
> > the "unstuttered" -t32, and applies directly to SOBER-128.
> >
> > regards,
> > Greg.
> >
> > Greg Rose                                       INTERNET:
> > ggr@qualcomm.com
> > Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX:
> > +61-2-9817 5199
> > Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,
> > http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
> > Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF
> > CD2F 1081 A37C
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> >
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From: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>
To: "'David Mcgrew'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 13:20:46 -0700
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Yes, I agree on all your points.  The Helix paper is posted on Niels
Ferguson's web site:

http://www.macfergus.com/pub/index.html

It would be great to have a "better" replacement for RC4.  I just want
to make sure that we take our time and do it right, whatever that means.  
The AES process was so good that it's hard to settle for anything less :-)

Clearly, if we can get to a point in time where we're confident in some
"combo"
keystream+MAC algorithm, then that would be an even preferable replacement
for RC4.


> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Mcgrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2003 1:17 PM
> To: Doug Whiting
> Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
> 
> 
> Doug,
> 
> you're right that the keystream-generator based MAC approach 
> needs to have 
> more analysis.  At this point, all we have is preprints.  I 
> do think that 
> there's plenty of motivation for replacing RC4 with a cipher 
> that has a 
> nonce (and can thus protect unreliable packet flows) and that 
> isn't easily 
> distinguishable from random.  So to my mind we need to keep 
> both of these 
> goals separate; SOBER-128 and/or helix may turn out to be 
> great PRFs but 
> junky MACs.
> 
> Also, is the helix paper on the web yet?
> 
> thanks,
> 
> David
> 
> At 03:50 AM 5/12/2003 -0700, Doug Whiting wrote:
> >I just want to express my concern about trying to make an RFC out of
> >anything like
> >this without considerable more time for analysis.  I agree 
> that various
> >flavors
> >of SOBER have seen some good amounts of cryptanalysis, 
> though I'm not sure
> >that
> >it has had enough yet (I'm simply not sure how many really 
> good folks have
> >spent
> >significant time on it).  One concern is that there have 
> simply been too
> >many SOBER
> >versions already, which urges some caution from my 
> perspective, although
> >there may
> >be very good reasons for the different versions. More 
> importantly, adding a
> >very significant new cryptographic "feature" such as a MAC 
> does not in any
> >way
> >constitute a "tweak" that should be assumed to inherit the security
> >properties of
> >the original algorithm(s).
> >
> >I say this as a co-author of Helix, and as someone who 
> belives, like you,
> >that such
> >combo algorithms are quite interesting. However, I believe 
> that this entire
> >concept
> >needs time for being carefully analyzed by the crypto 
> community before being
> >put into
> >serious use.  We simply are not there yet. The Helix folks 
> would consider it
> >quite
> >inappropriate to start standardizing at this time on any 
> such algorithm,
> >including Helix,
> >without quite a bit of time passing, perhaps a few years.  
> That's roughly
> >how much time
> >AES had, and it had (and continues to have) basically all the best
> >crpytanalysts looking
> >at it very seriously.  Of course, even just the passage of 
> time doesn't
> >guarantee that a
> >new algorithm (class of algorithms) has been propertly 
> vetted; the algorithm
> >must also
> >receive serious scrutiny from several well qualified folks. 
> That is, the
> >passage of such
> >time is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
> >
> >Don't take this as a criticism of SOBER-128 per se. I 
> believe that this
> >caution should
> >be applied to all algorithms of this class.
> >
> >Doug Whiting
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Greg Rose [mailto:ggr@qualcomm.com]
> > > Sent: Sunday, May 11, 2003 3:07 PM
> > > To: Alex Alten
> > > Cc: Greg Rose; cfrg@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- 
> SOBER-128
> > >
> > >
> > > At 11:00 PM 5/10/2003 -0700, Alex Alten wrote:
> > > >Have you had any serious independent cryptanalysis done 
> on SOBER-128
> > > >that proves that it is well designed?  It's no good throwing
> > > it to the wolves
> > > >until you can defend it properly.
> > >
> > > Yes. If you read the details, SOBER-t32 has been analysed up
> > > the wazoo, and
> > > was secure at the 128-bit level; just not at the 256-bit
> > > level that we
> > > thought, which ruled it out of NESSIE. Most of this analysis
> > > was done on
> > > the "unstuttered" -t32, and applies directly to SOBER-128.
> > >
> > > regards,
> > > Greg.
> > >
> > > Greg Rose                                       INTERNET:
> > > ggr@qualcomm.com
> > > Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX:
> > > +61-2-9817 5199
> > > Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,
> > > http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
> > > Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF
> > > CD2F 1081 A37C
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Cfrg mailing list
> > > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > >
> >_______________________________________________
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> 
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Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 13:24:35 -0700
To: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
From: David Mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org, ggr@qualcomm.com
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Greg,

At 10:25 AM 5/11/2003 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
>There is a need for a primitive stream cipher construction that is fast 
>(faster than a block cipher in counter mode), easy to use correctly, well 
>understood, freely available, and secure. SOBER-128 has been designed to 
>meet these requirements, by being based entirely on a well-studied 
>primitive in a manner that preserves the existing analyses.
>
>Additionally, SOBER-128 introduces functionality (based on that of Helix, 
>another recent stream cipher) to enable simultaneous calculation of a 
>Message Authentication Code, and allows full integrity checking of 
>partially encrypted messages.
>
>SOBER-128 is a synchronous stream cipher designed for a secret key that is 
>up to 128 bits in length. The cipher outputs the key stream in 32-bit 
>blocks. SOBER-128 is a software-oriented cipher based on 32-bit operations 
>(such as 32-bit XOR and addition modulo 2^32), and references to small 
>fixed arrays. Consequently, SOBER-128 is at home in many computing 
>environments, from firmware and smart cards to large computers. Source 
>code for SOBER-128 is freely available and use of this source code, or 
>independent implementations, is allowed free for any purpose.
>
>SOBER-128 was developed from SOBER, proposed by Rose in 1998.  The ciphers 
>SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 were submitted to the NESSIE program ; SOBER-t16 
>as a stream cipher for 128-bit key strength and SOBER-t32 as a stream 
>cipher with 256-bit key strength. SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 proved to be 
>among the strongest stream cipher submissions to NESSIE. However, both 
>ciphers were found to fall short of the stringent NESSIE requirements (as 
>were all other stream ciphers).

And these requirements aren't met by AES used in any standard encryption 
mode, right?  I recall that you'd written up a critique of these 
requirements.  Is it available on the web?


>SOBER-128 is an improved version of SOBER-t32. The modifications directly 
>address the concerns arising in the analyses of the t-class ciphers. The 
>128-bit key strength proposed for SOBER-128 is reduced from the 256-bit 
>key strength proposed for SOBER-t32 to ensure that SOBER-128 provides far 
>in excess of the stated security level.
>
>In practice, much communication is done in messages, where it is desirable 
>to provide message integrity for the whole message, and privacy 
>(encryption) for all or part of the message. The same secret key should be 
>usable for the entire (multi-message) communication, using an 
>Initialisation Vector or Nonce to distinguish individual messages. 
>SOBER-128 supports this model of use.
>
>SOBER-128 is intended to provide security under the condition that no IV 
>is ever reused, that no more than 2^80 words of data are processed with 
>one key, and that no data failing authentication checks will be further 
>processed (in particular, that the result of decrypting a message that 
>fails authentication will not be revealed). There is no requirement that 
>IVs be random, which makes guaranteeing uniqueness much easier. The sender 
>and recipient of secure data must agree on which parts of the data are 
>encrypted, and which parts are authenticated, for correct operation, as 
>the encryption operation is plaintext-aware when message authentication is 
>being performed.
>
>A 40-page design document and reference implementations of SOBER-128 may 
>be found at QUALCOMM Australia's web site: http://www.qualcomm.com.au . 
>The full paper is also available on the IACR eprint server, and a shorter 
>version has been submitted to SAC.
>
>-----------------------------
>The above text is the basic announcement of SOBER-128, but I wanted to add 
>a bit specifically for CFRG.
>
>I'm seriously concerned about ongoing use of RC4 for, basically, anything. 
>It's elegant and simple, but very often is used incorrectly, if only to 
>the extent that it's often used without message authentication. The 
>problems with rekeying as in WEP are devastating, and probably represent 
>the biggest single failure of a deployed cryptosystem since Enigma. And 
>lastly, the distinguishing attacks, at around 2^32 bytes, verge on real 
>vulnerability too. We wanted to provide a credible replacement for RC4 in 
>any of its modes of use. That's what SOBER-128 is.

Yes, this is a worthwhile goal.   I look forward to reading about SOBER-128.

David


>For IETF use, obviously we need to write an RFC. I've never written an RFC 
>before (in fact, blush, have never been to an IETF meeting) and could use 
>some guidance on just how much information should be put in, and what 
>should happen to it then.
>
>regards,
>Greg.
>
>
>Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
>Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
>Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
>Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C
>
>_______________________________________________
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>Cfrg@ietf.org
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Date: Thu, 15 May 2003 13:05:35 +1000
To: David Mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
Cc: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>, cfrg@ietf.org
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At 01:24 PM 5/14/2003 -0700, David Mcgrew wrote:
>Greg,
>
>At 10:25 AM 5/11/2003 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
>>...
>>SOBER-128 was developed from SOBER, proposed by Rose in 1998.  The 
>>ciphers SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 were submitted to the NESSIE program ; 
>>SOBER-t16 as a stream cipher for 128-bit key strength and SOBER-t32 as a 
>>stream cipher with 256-bit key strength. SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32 proved 
>>to be among the strongest stream cipher submissions to NESSIE. However, 
>>both ciphers were found to fall short of the stringent NESSIE 
>>requirements (as were all other stream ciphers).
>
>And these requirements aren't met by AES used in any standard encryption 
>mode, right?  I recall that you'd written up a critique of these 
>requirements.  Is it available on the web?

That's correct. There's a generic distinguishing attack against block 
ciphers, based on the fact that they produce permutations and not random 
output. This distinguishes AES-CTR from random with about 2^68 bytes, 
whether with 256-bit keys or 128-bit keys; hence we argue that key length 
is not terribly relevant to distinguishing attacks, rather that known 
plaintext requirements should determine.

In the meantime, the strongest distinguishing attack against SOBER-t32 
(IIRC) requires something like 2^150 bytes of output. Note that you can 
build an entire codebook for AES in less data and processing than was 
required for a simple distinguishing attack on t32. We did indeed write a 
paper on this subject, and submitted it to NESSIE; there's also a copy on 
the IACR eprint server: http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/142/ .

Greg.

Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C

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Date: Thu, 15 May 2003 08:56:00 -0700
To: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>, "'David Mcgrew'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
From: Alex Alten <alten@attbi.com>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
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At 01:20 PM 5/14/2003 -0700, Doug Whiting wrote:
<snip>

>It would be great to have a "better" replacement for RC4.  I just want
>to make sure that we take our time and do it right, whatever that means.
>The AES process was so good that it's hard to settle for anything less :-)

So why don't we, as in CRFG, do something like the NIST AES process?
Let's list out our requirements and invite cryptographers to submit design
proposals.  Or is it a question of having enough money to do it?

- Alex
--

Alex Alten
Alten@ATTBI.com



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From: Doug Whiting <DWHITING@hifn.com>
To: "'Alex Alten'" <alten@attbi.com>, "'David Mcgrew'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
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Yes, that would be fun indeed!

I don't think the issue is money as much as it is:
"who gets to make the final decision?"

In AES, it was always clear that NIST would make the decision,
and we were all happy with the final result, so the world went
that way.  That might be very hard to do, as we'd all have to
agree who we trust to do the right thing.  I don't think that
we could count on having a unanimous consensus.  

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alex Alten [mailto:alten@attbi.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 15, 2003 8:56 AM
> To: Doug Whiting; 'David Mcgrew'
> Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive -- SOBER-128
> 
> 
> At 01:20 PM 5/14/2003 -0700, Doug Whiting wrote:
> <snip>
> 
> >It would be great to have a "better" replacement for RC4.  I 
> just want
> >to make sure that we take our time and do it right, whatever 
> that means.
> >The AES process was so good that it's hard to settle for 
> anything less :-)
> 
> So why don't we, as in CRFG, do something like the NIST AES process?
> Let's list out our requirements and invite cryptographers to 
> submit design
> proposals.  Or is it a question of having enough money to do it?
> 
> - Alex
> --
> 
> Alex Alten
> Alten@ATTBI.com
> 
> 
> 
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To: "'Alex Alten'" <alten@attbi.com>
From: David Mcgrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: contest (was: RE: [Cfrg] Authenticated encryption primitive --
  SOBER-128)
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Alex,

I also like the idea of running an AES-like contest - it would be lots of 
fun - but we also need to stay within our charter.  This includes "bringing 
new cryptographic techniques to the Internet community and promoting an 
understanding of the use and applicability of these mechanisms via 
Informational RFCs".    So we can identify the goals for a crypto algorithm 
and discuss the analysis of algorithms (and the right RG process for this 
is to write drafts).  But as Doug points out, it's not appropriate for us 
to select an algorithm for standardization.  As Steve Bellovin pointed out 
yesterday, IETF WGs do the real standardization work.  Of course, IRTF RGs 
are formed in the hope that they will do work that can feed into WGs.

It would be good to agree on a set of goals that are appropriate for SOBER, 
Helix, and similar functions.  If there's sufficient interest, the RG can 
write up a draft describing these goals.   I'd be interested to hear other 
people's thoughts on this.

David

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