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http://www.macfergus.com/helix/


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Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2003 11:42:41 -0400
To: cfrg@ietf.org
From: Tim Dierks <tim@dierks.org>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Re: one question about hash
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At 07:18 PM 7/11/2003, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>I am certainly not arguing for an ad hoc change to the algorithm.
>
>However I do believe that in future we should consider vulnerability to
>extension attacks as an unacceptable feature of a digest.

Three months later, a modest proposal from an admitted non-crpytographer: 
wouldn't SHA-1 be protected against extension attacks if it had any 
operation added after the calculation of the final block? For example, 
flipping the last bit in the hash.

I don't see how an extension attack would be possible with this kind of 
modification I'll steer clear of the question as to whether such a simple 
change might be too easy to attack inside of the algorithm of SHA-1; the 
flip-a-single-bit proposal should only be taken as offering the general 
idea that a simple transformation after the final block operation can 
remove this attack. Also, I believe it's clear that any such reversible 
transformation cannot reduce the security of the hash's current properties.

Of course, I concur that it may not be important for a secure hash to 
protect against extensibility; on the other hand, if it's easily possible, 
it's not clear to me that it shouldn't.

Note that this doesn't require a change to SHA-1; if it works, it can be 
implemented in protocols which wish to protect against extensibility. (Of 
course, there are lots of other ways to protect against extension in a 
protocol, so maybe that's not of value.)

  - Tim



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Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 07:36:29 +1000
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] A new cipher -- Please take a look
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At 10:57 AM 10/14/2003 -0400, Russ Housley wrote:

>http://www.macfergus.com/helix/

I've been beating on Helix for a few months now, and am quite impressed. 
There's reference C source code on our web page http://www.qualcomm.com.au 
if anyone wants to look at it. By my benchmarks, SOBER-128 is faster and 
has very similar functionality; there's source code and documents etc for 
that there too.

Greg.

Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C


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Thread-Topic: one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
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From: "Wang, Steve" <wangxx@CISAT.JMU.EDU>
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I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption over a
subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime p and a
generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but another
prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is 160-bit
long?

It sounds to me that the same logic is used in DSS and thus it should be
fine.

Thanks, Steve

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Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 08:08:09 +1000
To: "Wang, Steve" <wangxx@cisat.jmu.edu>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a
  subgroup
Cc: <cfrg@ietf.org>
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At 10:14 AM 9/11/2003 -0400, Wang, Steve wrote:
>I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption over a
>subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime p and a
>generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but another
>prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is 160-bit
>long?

Secure at the equivalent of an 80-bit symmetric key, yes. Well, so long as 
p is big enough (say 1024 bits). For security of similar order to AES-128, 
you probably want p ~4000 bits, and q of 256 bits.

Greg.

Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C


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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?G=E9_Weijers?= <Ge.Weijers@Sun.COM>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
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Wang, Steve wrote:

>I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption over a
>subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime p and a
>generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but another
>prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is 160-bit
>long?
>
>It sounds to me that the same logic is used in DSS and thus it should be=

>fine.
>
Keep in mind the attacks presented in:

http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/boneh00why.html

and mangle your messages....

Ge'

>
>Thanks, Steve
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@ietf.org
>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> =20
>


--=20
G=E9 Weijers                mailto:ge.weijers@sun.com
Sun Linux Security Group  Tel: (877)240-7611 x69536
Sun Microsystems, Inc.    Fax: (877)240-7611



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From: "David Kravitz" <dwk@columbia.sparta.com>
To: "'Wang, Steve'" <wangxx@CISAT.JMU.EDU>, <cfrg@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 12:09:13 -0400
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Steve,

Although ElGamal encryption and DSS signing use similar math, this does
not imply that they are equivalent with respect to security.  In
particular, in ElGamal the factorization of (p-1)/q is relevant and,
depending on the application, small-subgroup attacks by non-compliant
encryption taking advantage of oracles may have to be considered.

--- David

David W. Kravitz, Ph.D.
Chief Scientist,
SPARTA, Inc.
5875 Trinity Parkway
Centreville, VA 20120
703.988.8606 (voice)
703.988.8599 (fax)
dwk@sparta.com

-----Original Message-----
From: cfrg-admin@ietf.org [mailto:cfrg-admin@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Wang, Steve
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2003 9:14 AM
To: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup

I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption over a
subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime p and a
generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but another
prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is 160-bit
long?

It sounds to me that the same logic is used in DSS and thus it should be
fine.

Thanks, Steve

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From: "Whyte, William" <WWhyte@ntru.com>
To: "'David Kravitz'" <dwk@columbia.sparta.com>,
        "'Wang, Steve'"
	 <wangxx@CISAT.JMU.EDU>, cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 13:04:32 -0400
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The canonical reference here is

Chae Hoon Lim, Pil Joong Lee, A Key Recovery Attack on Discrete 
Log-based Schemes Using a Prime Order Subgroup (1997)

http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/lim97key.html.

There are similar attacks on ECC key agreement/encryption protocols
in Adrian Antipa, Dan Brown, Alfred Menezes, Rene Struik, Scott 
Vanstone, Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys. The paper isn't
online as far as I know, but a Powerpoint can be obtained from

http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/WorkingGroup/presentations/pkc3-v06.ppt

The ANSI X9F1 working group has considered issues of key validation
very carefully in developing the X9.42 and X9.63 standards for discrete 
log and EC discrete log encryption, respectively. Proper key validation,
either by the encrypter or by a trusted third party, prevents attacks
of these types.

Cheers,

William

===================================
William Whyte
Director, Cryptographic R&D
Chair, IEEE P1363 Working Group
NTRU Cryptosystems
5 Burlington Woods
Burlington, MA 01803
tel:  +1.781.418.2500
fax:  +1.781.418.2532

> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Kravitz [mailto:dwk@columbia.sparta.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:09 PM
> To: 'Wang, Steve'; cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a
> subgroup
> 
> 
> Steve,
> 
> Although ElGamal encryption and DSS signing use similar math, 
> this does
> not imply that they are equivalent with respect to security.  In
> particular, in ElGamal the factorization of (p-1)/q is relevant and,
> depending on the application, small-subgroup attacks by non-compliant
> encryption taking advantage of oracles may have to be considered.
> 
> --- David
> 
> David W. Kravitz, Ph.D.
> Chief Scientist,
> SPARTA, Inc.
> 5875 Trinity Parkway
> Centreville, VA 20120
> 703.988.8606 (voice)
> 703.988.8599 (fax)
> dwk@sparta.com
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: cfrg-admin@ietf.org [mailto:cfrg-admin@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Wang, Steve
> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2003 9:14 AM
> To: cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
> 
> I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption over a
> subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime p and a
> generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but another
> prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is 160-bit
> long?
> 
> It sounds to me that the same logic is used in DSS and thus 
> it should be
> fine.
> 
> Thanks, Steve
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 

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From: "Anton Stiglic" <astiglic@okiok.com>
To: <cfrg@ietf.org>
References: <000801c39336$ae25dd60$4e25b99d@Kravitz>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
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----- Original Message ----- 
From: "David Kravitz" <dwk@columbia.sparta.com>
To: "'Wang, Steve'" <wangxx@CISAT.JMU.EDU>; <cfrg@ietf.org>
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:09 PM
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup


> Steve,
> 
> Although ElGamal encryption and DSS signing use similar math, this does
> not imply that they are equivalent with respect to security.  In
> particular, in ElGamal the factorization of (p-1)/q is relevant and,
> depending on the application, small-subgroup attacks by non-compliant
> encryption taking advantage of oracles may have to be considered.

Another difference is that for encryption it's o.k. to use the generator
g = 2, but for signatures it's very bad.

See
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/bleichenbacher96generating.html

--Anton

_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



From exim@www1.ietf.org  Wed Oct 15 13:36:36 2003
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From: "David Kravitz" <dwk@columbia.sparta.com>
To: "'Anton Stiglic'" <astiglic@okiok.com>, <cfrg@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 13:38:31 -0400
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As Bleichenbacher points out in the cited paper, DSS is not susceptible
to this attack, although ElGamal signing (not to be confused with
ElGamal encryption) is.

--- David

David W. Kravitz, Ph.D.
Chief Scientist,
SPARTA, Inc.
5875 Trinity Parkway
Centreville, VA 20120
703.988.8606 (voice)
703.988.8599 (fax)
dwk@sparta.com

-----Original Message-----
From: cfrg-admin@ietf.org [mailto:cfrg-admin@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Anton Stiglic
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:09 PM
To: cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a
subgroup


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "David Kravitz" <dwk@columbia.sparta.com>
To: "'Wang, Steve'" <wangxx@CISAT.JMU.EDU>; <cfrg@ietf.org>
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:09 PM
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a
subgroup


> Steve,
> 
> Although ElGamal encryption and DSS signing use similar math, this
does
> not imply that they are equivalent with respect to security.  In
> particular, in ElGamal the factorization of (p-1)/q is relevant and,
> depending on the application, small-subgroup attacks by non-compliant
> encryption taking advantage of oracles may have to be considered.

Another difference is that for encryption it's o.k. to use the generator
g = 2, but for signatures it's very bad.

See
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/bleichenbacher96generating.html

--Anton

_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


_______________________________________________
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From exim@www1.ietf.org  Wed Oct 15 14:05:37 2003
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From: "Anton Stiglic" <astiglic@okiok.com>
To: <cfrg@ietf.org>
References: <30F37C4533D8564FB1D58BFDAF6687C1EA73B6@ohthree.jjj-i.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 14:03:27 -0400
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A bunch of these "issues" have been described (with references and all)
in a technical report I wrote that is available here:
http://crypto.cs.mcgill.ca/~stiglic/Papers/dhfull.pdf

The paper concentrated on DH agreement, but allot of the stuff also applies
to ElGamal cryptosystems...

--Anton

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Whyte, William" <WWhyte@ntru.com>
To: "'David Kravitz'" <dwk@columbia.sparta.com>; "'Wang, Steve'"
<wangxx@CISAT.JMU.EDU>; <cfrg@ietf.org>
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 1:04 PM
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup


> The canonical reference here is
>
> Chae Hoon Lim, Pil Joong Lee, A Key Recovery Attack on Discrete
> Log-based Schemes Using a Prime Order Subgroup (1997)
>
> http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/lim97key.html.
>
> There are similar attacks on ECC key agreement/encryption protocols
> in Adrian Antipa, Dan Brown, Alfred Menezes, Rene Struik, Scott
> Vanstone, Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys. The paper isn't
> online as far as I know, but a Powerpoint can be obtained from
>
>
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/WorkingGroup/presentations/pkc3-v06.ppt
>
> The ANSI X9F1 working group has considered issues of key validation
> very carefully in developing the X9.42 and X9.63 standards for discrete
> log and EC discrete log encryption, respectively. Proper key validation,
> either by the encrypter or by a trusted third party, prevents attacks
> of these types.
>
> Cheers,
>
> William
>
> ===================================
> William Whyte
> Director, Cryptographic R&D
> Chair, IEEE P1363 Working Group
> NTRU Cryptosystems
> 5 Burlington Woods
> Burlington, MA 01803
> tel:  +1.781.418.2500
> fax:  +1.781.418.2532
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: David Kravitz [mailto:dwk@columbia.sparta.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:09 PM
> > To: 'Wang, Steve'; cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a
> > subgroup
> >
> >
> > Steve,
> >
> > Although ElGamal encryption and DSS signing use similar math,
> > this does
> > not imply that they are equivalent with respect to security.  In
> > particular, in ElGamal the factorization of (p-1)/q is relevant and,
> > depending on the application, small-subgroup attacks by non-compliant
> > encryption taking advantage of oracles may have to be considered.
> >
> > --- David
> >
> > David W. Kravitz, Ph.D.
> > Chief Scientist,
> > SPARTA, Inc.
> > 5875 Trinity Parkway
> > Centreville, VA 20120
> > 703.988.8606 (voice)
> > 703.988.8599 (fax)
> > dwk@sparta.com
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: cfrg-admin@ietf.org [mailto:cfrg-admin@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> > Wang, Steve
> > Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2003 9:14 AM
> > To: cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
> >
> > I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption over a
> > subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime p and a
> > generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but another
> > prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is 160-bit
> > long?
> >
> > It sounds to me that the same logic is used in DSS and thus
> > it should be
> > fine.
> >
> > Thanks, Steve
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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In-Reply-To: <30F37C4533D8564FB1D58BFDAF6687C1EA73B6@ohthree.jjj-i.com>
To: "Whyte, William" <WWhyte@ntru.com>
Cc: cfrg@ietf.org, cfrg-admin@ietf.org,
        "'David Kravitz'" <dwk@columbia.sparta.com>,
        "'Wang, Steve'" <wangxx@CISAT.JMU.EDU>
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
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From: Daniel Brown <DBrown@certicom.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 15:04:15 -0400
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Just to clarify:

a) Decryptors (not just encryptors) should validate every ephemeral DH=20
public key that they receive. One should check that ephemeral public key=20
is in the right range and has the right order.  In particular, if the=20
group is Zp* and the ephemeral public key is y (=3D g^x), one checks that=20
1<y<p-1 and y^q =3D 1 (mod p). This second check (of the order) helps to=20
avoid small-subgroup attacks that recover potentially harmful information=20
about the decryptor's private key.

b) The current version of ANSI X9.42 requires p to be at least 1024 bits=20
long and q to be at least 160 bits long, which suggests that q smaller=20
than p can be safely used.  X9.42 also includes the following useful=20
table:
Table E.2 ? Approximate Equivalence of Keys In Bits To Known Best General=20
Attacks
Symmetric
 Key Agreement Scheme p
Key Agreement Scheme q
 56/80
1024
=20
160
  112
2048

224
  128
3072
=20
256
  192
7680
=20
384
    256
15360
=20
512

NOTE:  DES uses 56 key bits, TDES using 3 distinct keys has an effective=20
strength of 112 bits, and AES will support 128, 192 and 256 bit keysizes.
c) If "ElGamal encryption" means ephemeral-static (1-Pass) Diffie-Hellman=20
combined with some form of symmetric encryption with a key derived from=20
the DH shared secret, then ElGamal encryption has no integrity protection. =

 Therefore it is "malleable" and (thus) vulnerable to adaptive=20
chosen-ciphertext attacks.   Bellare and Rogaway's DHAES encryption scheme =

extends ElGamal encryption with integrity protection, thereby avoiding=20
these attacks.  In IEEE P1363a, this encryption scheme is being=20
standardized under the name DL/ECIES.

d) ANSI X9.42 specifies various kinds of key agreement, but not encryption =

or key transport, per se.  Key agreement can be used to accomplish a=20
similar goal to public-key encryption.  DHAES, SSL/TLS, SMIME, IPSec, and=20
NIST Draft SP 800-56 all include ways of using basic DH key agreement as a =

stepping stone to encrypting a message.=20

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
Certicom Research
5520 Explorer Drive, Suite 400
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D



William Whyte wrote on 10/15/2003 01:04:32 PM:

> The canonical reference here is
>=20
> Chae Hoon Lim, Pil Joong Lee, A Key Recovery Attack on Discrete=20
> Log-based Schemes Using a Prime Order Subgroup (1997)
>=20
> http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/lim97key.html.
>=20
> There are similar attacks on ECC key agreement/encryption protocols
> in Adrian Antipa, Dan Brown, Alfred Menezes, Rene Struik, Scott=20
> Vanstone, Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys. The paper isn't
> online as far as I know, but a Powerpoint can be obtained from
>=20
>=20
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/WorkingGroup/presentations/pkc3-v06.ppt
>=20
> The ANSI X9F1 working group has considered issues of key validation
> very carefully in developing the X9.42 and X9.63 standards for discrete=20
> log and EC discrete log encryption, respectively. Proper key validation,
> either by the encrypter or by a trusted third party, prevents attacks
> of these types.
>=20
> Cheers,
>=20
> William
>=20
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> William Whyte
> Director, Cryptographic R&D
> Chair, IEEE P1363 Working Group
> NTRU Cryptosystems
> 5 Burlington Woods
> Burlington, MA 01803
> tel:  +1.781.418.2500
> fax:  +1.781.418.2532
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: David Kravitz [mailto:dwk@columbia.sparta.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:09 PM
> > To: 'Wang, Steve'; cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a
> > subgroup
> >=20
> >=20
> > Steve,
> >=20
> > Although ElGamal encryption and DSS signing use similar math,=20
> > this does
> > not imply that they are equivalent with respect to security.  In
> > particular, in ElGamal the factorization of (p-1)/q is relevant and,
> > depending on the application, small-subgroup attacks by non-compliant
> > encryption taking advantage of oracles may have to be considered.
> >=20
> > --- David
> >=20
> > David W. Kravitz, Ph.D.
> > Chief Scientist,
> > SPARTA, Inc.
> > 5875 Trinity Parkway
> > Centreville, VA 20120
> > 703.988.8606 (voice)
> > 703.988.8599 (fax)
> > dwk@sparta.com
> >=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: cfrg-admin@ietf.org [mailto:cfrg-admin@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> > Wang, Steve
> > Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2003 9:14 AM
> > To: cfrg@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a subgroup
> >=20
> > I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption over a
> > subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime p and a
> > generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but another
> > prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is 160-bit
> > long?
> >=20
> > It sounds to me that the same logic is used in DSS and thus=20
> > it should be
> > fine.
> >=20
> > Thanks, Steve
> >=20
> > =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >=20
> >=20
> > =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >=20
>=20
> =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Just to clarify:</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">a) Decryptors (not just encryptors)
should validate every ephemeral DH public key that they receive. One should
check that ephemeral public key is in the right range and has the right
order. &nbsp;In particular, if the group is Zp* and the ephemeral public
key is y (=3D g^x), one checks that 1&lt;y&lt;p-1 and y^q =3D 1 (mod p). Th=
is
second check (of the order) helps to avoid small-subgroup attacks that
recover potentially harmful information about the decryptor's private key.<=
/font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">b) The current version of ANSI X9.42
requires p to be at least 1024 bits long and q to be at least 160 bits
long, which suggests that q smaller than p can be safely used. &nbsp;X9.42
also includes the following useful table:</font>
<div align=3Dcenter>
<br><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><b>Table E.2 &#8211; Approximat=
e Equivalence
of Keys In Bits To Known Best General Attacks</b></font>
<table border>
<tr valign=3Dtop>
<td><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">Symmetric</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp;Key Agreement Scheme <i>p<=
/i></font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">Key Agreement Scheme <i>q</i></f=
ont>
<td><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp;56/80</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">1024</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp;</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">160</font>
<td><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp; 112</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">2048</font>
<p>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">224</font>
<td><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp; 128</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">3072</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp;</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">256</font>
<td><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp; 192</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">7680</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp;</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">384</font>
<td><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp; &nbsp; 256</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">15360</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">&nbsp;</font>
<p><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">512</font></table></div>
<br>
<br><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">NOTE: &nbsp;DES uses 56 key bit=
s,
TDES using 3 distinct keys has an effective strength of 112 bits, and AES
will support 128, 192 and 256 bit keysizes.</font>
<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">c) If &quot;ElGamal encryption&quot;
means ephemeral-static (1-Pass) Diffie-Hellman combined with some form
of symmetric encryption with a key derived from the DH shared secret, then
ElGamal encryption has no integrity protection. &nbsp;Therefore it is &quot=
;malleable&quot;
and (thus) vulnerable to adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. &nbsp; Bellare
and Rogaway's DHAES encryption scheme extends ElGamal encryption with integ=
rity
protection, thereby avoiding these attacks. &nbsp;In IEEE P1363a, this
encryption scheme is being standardized under the name DL/ECIES.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">d) ANSI X9.42 specifies various kinds
of key agreement, but not encryption or key transport, per se. &nbsp;Key
agreement can be used to accomplish a similar goal to public-key encryption.
&nbsp;DHAES, SSL/TLS, SMIME, IPSec, and NIST Draft SP 800-56 all include
ways of using basic DH key agreement as a stepping stone to encrypting
a message. &nbsp;</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br>
Dan Brown<br>
(905) 501-3857<br>
Certicom Research<br>
5520 Explorer Drive, Suite 400<br>
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1<br>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2><tt>William Whyte wrote on 10/15/2003 01:04:32 PM:<br>
<br>
&gt; The canonical reference here is<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Chae Hoon Lim, Pil Joong Lee, A Key Recovery Attack on Discrete <br>
&gt; Log-based Schemes Using a Prime Order Subgroup (1997)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/lim97key.html.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; There are similar attacks on ECC key agreement/encryption protocols<br>
&gt; in Adrian Antipa, Dan Brown, Alfred Menezes, Rene Struik, Scott <br>
&gt; Vanstone, Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys. The paper isn't<br>
&gt; online as far as I know, but a Powerpoint can be obtained from<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/WorkingGroup/presentations/pkc3-v0=
6.ppt<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The ANSI X9F1 working group has considered issues of key validation<br>
&gt; very carefully in developing the X9.42 and X9.63 standards for discrete
<br>
&gt; log and EC discrete log encryption, respectively. Proper key validatio=
n,<br>
&gt; either by the encrypter or by a trusted third party, prevents attacks<=
br>
&gt; of these types.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; William<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br>
&gt; William Whyte<br>
&gt; Director, Cryptographic R&amp;D<br>
&gt; Chair, IEEE P1363 Working Group<br>
&gt; NTRU Cryptosystems<br>
&gt; 5 Burlington Woods<br>
&gt; Burlington, MA 01803<br>
&gt; tel: &nbsp;+1.781.418.2500<br>
&gt; fax: &nbsp;+1.781.418.2532<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; &gt; From: David Kravitz [mailto:dwk@columbia.sparta.com]<br>
&gt; &gt; Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:09 PM<br>
&gt; &gt; To: 'Wang, Steve'; cfrg@ietf.org<br>
&gt; &gt; Subject: RE: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over
a<br>
&gt; &gt; subgroup<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Steve,<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Although ElGamal encryption and DSS signing use similar math,
<br>
&gt; &gt; this does<br>
&gt; &gt; not imply that they are equivalent with respect to security.
&nbsp;In<br>
&gt; &gt; particular, in ElGamal the factorization of (p-1)/q is relevant
and,<br>
&gt; &gt; depending on the application, small-subgroup attacks by non-compl=
iant<br>
&gt; &gt; encryption taking advantage of oracles may have to be considered.=
<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; --- David<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; David W. Kravitz, Ph.D.<br>
&gt; &gt; Chief Scientist,<br>
&gt; &gt; SPARTA, Inc.<br>
&gt; &gt; 5875 Trinity Parkway<br>
&gt; &gt; Centreville, VA 20120<br>
&gt; &gt; 703.988.8606 (voice)<br>
&gt; &gt; 703.988.8599 (fax)<br>
&gt; &gt; dwk@sparta.com<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; &gt; From: cfrg-admin@ietf.org [mailto:cfrg-admin@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of<br>
&gt; &gt; Wang, Steve<br>
&gt; &gt; Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2003 9:14 AM<br>
&gt; &gt; To: cfrg@ietf.org<br>
&gt; &gt; Subject: [Cfrg] one question about ElGamal encryption over a
subgroup<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; I have one question about the security of ElGamal encryption
over a<br>
&gt; &gt; subgroup. The original ElGamal encryption uses a large prime
p and a<br>
&gt; &gt; generator g. What will happen if the order of g is not p-1 but
another<br>
&gt; &gt; prime q, which divides p-1? Is the encryption secure if q is
160-bit<br>
&gt; &gt; long?<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; It sounds to me that the same logic is used in DSS and thus <br>
&gt; &gt; it should be<br>
&gt; &gt; fine.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Thanks, Steve<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F<br>
&gt; &gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; Cfrg@ietf.org<br>
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