From zooko@zooko.com Mon Oct 8 13:43:06 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4AECC11E80F3 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 13:43:06 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.118 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.118 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.74, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id H6OCZfPlwOn7 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 13:43:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from zim.maski.org (zim.maski.org [173.230.137.215]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F381611E80E6 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 13:43:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-ea0-f182.google.com (mail-ea0-f182.google.com [209.85.215.182]) (using TLSv1 with cipher RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: zooko) by zim.maski.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E3FA323364 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 20:43:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ea0-f182.google.com with SMTP id c10so240981eaa.13 for ; Mon, 08 Oct 2012 13:43:02 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.14.209.129 with SMTP id s1mr24701397eeo.24.1349728982598; Mon, 08 Oct 2012 13:43:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.14.2.194 with HTTP; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 13:43:02 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2012 14:43:02 -0600 Message-ID: From: "Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn" To: cfrg@irtf.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: [Cfrg] general guidance for web programmers? X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 08 Oct 2012 20:43:06 -0000 Dear people of CFRG: I'm participating in the W3C working group on Web Crypto. (By the way, thank you very much to those who replied to my earlier request for feedback on the WebCrypto draft.) An issue facing the W3C working group is how and to what degree we include guidance about which algorithms are recommended or which are known to be flawed. The first issue that we face is what to say about ECB mode. I propose =C2=B9 that the WebCrypto standard include some text warning that ECB mode is *not* an encryption mode, like CBC and CTR modes, which can be used to encrypt arbitrary sensitive plaintext. Others on the WebCrypto Working Group are very reluctant to start writing down advice of this kind =C2=B2 , because where will it end? It can get very complicated. Why should we be the ones who have to explain to programmers to use SHA-2-256 instead of SHA-1, and how to avoid length-extension attacks if they're going to use SHA-2-256, and how to safely use RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, and how to generate nonces, counters, and IVs correctly, and how strong integrity really is almost always necessary in addition to confidentiality, and so on. Anyway, we're not necessarily the experts on all those details, and new attacks are coming along all the time that we would have to scramble to integrate into our advice. So, we have conflicting desires here. On the one hand, we don't want to attempt to explain everything that needs explaining, but on the other hand experience shows that simply providing a bare API without documentation really does lead to the deployment of insecure systems that compromise people's safety. (See my post to the web-crypto mailing list =C2=B9 for an interesting recent example in which the design of the crypto API made the difference between secure and insecure web sessions.) Okay, so here's a good solution: the WebCrypto spec can refer to documents published by some other experts, such as CFRG, which guides programmers on which algorithms are recommended, as well as what are the requirements for the use of a given algorithm to secure. I very much like section 3 of the cipher catalog =C2=B3, and I wonder if it would make sense for the WebCrypto standard to refer to that. The use of ECB mode itself isn't addressed in the cipher catalog. Are there other similar publications from CFRG that would address that issue? (As an aside, I rather like the pithiness of OWASP's take on the subject =E2=81=B4: =E2=80=9CThis mode should not be used under any circumst= ances.=E2=80=9D.) What about the dangers of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5? Or at least, a catalog of public key algorithms which advises one to use safer algorithms in place of that one? Thanks very much for any help you can offer. Regards, Zooko =C2=B9 http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2012Oct/0018.ht= ml =C2=B2 http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2012Sep/0188.ht= ml =C2=B3 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-00 =E2=81=B4 http://owasp.com/index.php/Glossary#Electronic_Code_Book_mode From mcgrew@cisco.com Mon Oct 8 14:47:01 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50E981F0C54 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 14:47:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -109.722 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-109.722 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.876, BAYES_00=-2.599, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id CdT5KWJ8IFW2 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 14:47:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com [173.37.86.75]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 589B21F041F for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 14:47:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=6138; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1349732820; x=1350942420; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:content-id: content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=er6Kpia508It2Er802NZED4Ni+SThbMrmVFgt1vIHgU=; b=TJ8zW42kbG7rLemzgHEPDFhPaJUcLS1/Rat3CS3jBqfzZTwA1mSxttl0 mi61z/5siNq0CKrQEinG5rvnnd0YdC2FrGOJUK8TUldm9YbEp2miEcjbT 0MO3kwZGAB8azVYyEe+J9D2knIim7p7yjKtbUwr0ZTyor7Jv0tNM1Rpc8 8=; X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgEFAFJIc1CtJXG//2dsb2JhbAArGoYRuCJ9gQiCIgEEAQEBDwEhNwMdAQgcBiIEJQEKJQIEARIIARIHh2MLLJoEjRQFkmaBHIpHhGU3YAOTPoNCjTCBaYJtgVo9 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.80,556,1344211200"; d="scan'208";a="129550728" Received: from rcdn-core2-4.cisco.com ([173.37.113.191]) by rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP; 08 Oct 2012 21:46:59 +0000 Received: from xhc-aln-x13.cisco.com (xhc-aln-x13.cisco.com [173.36.12.87]) by rcdn-core2-4.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q98Lkx95013214 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Mon, 8 Oct 2012 21:46:59 GMT Received: from xmb-rcd-x04.cisco.com ([169.254.8.200]) by xhc-aln-x13.cisco.com ([173.36.12.87]) with mapi id 14.02.0318.001; Mon, 8 Oct 2012 16:46:59 -0500 From: "David McGrew (mcgrew)" To: "Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn" , "cfrg@irtf.org" Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] general guidance for web programmers? Thread-Index: AQHNpZWJ0Fd1zjMn5EOOtQSd77Gl2JewAncA Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2012 21:46:59 +0000 Message-ID: <747787E65E3FBD4E93F0EB2F14DB556B0F4FE82A@xmb-rcd-x04.cisco.com> In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.2.1.120420 x-originating-ip: [10.117.10.227] x-tm-as-product-ver: SMEX-10.2.0.1135-7.000.1014-19252.004 x-tm-as-result: No--50.685500-8.000000-31 x-tm-as-user-approved-sender: No x-tm-as-user-blocked-sender: No Content-Type: text/plain; charset="euc-kr" Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Re: [Cfrg] general guidance for web programmers? X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 08 Oct 2012 21:47:01 -0000 SGkgWm9va28sDQoNCk9uIDEwLzgvMTIgNDo0MyBQTSwgIlpvb2tvIFdpbGNveC1PJ0hlYXJuIiA8 em9va29Aem9va28uY29tPiB3cm90ZToNCg0KPkRlYXIgcGVvcGxlIG9mIENGUkc6DQo+DQo+SSdt IHBhcnRpY2lwYXRpbmcgaW4gdGhlIFczQyB3b3JraW5nIGdyb3VwIG9uIFdlYiBDcnlwdG8uIChC eSB0aGUgd2F5LA0KPnRoYW5rIHlvdSB2ZXJ5IG11Y2ggdG8gdGhvc2Ugd2hvIHJlcGxpZWQgdG8g bXkgZWFybGllciByZXF1ZXN0IGZvcg0KPmZlZWRiYWNrIG9uIHRoZSBXZWJDcnlwdG8gZHJhZnQu KQ0KPg0KPkFuIGlzc3VlIGZhY2luZyB0aGUgVzNDIHdvcmtpbmcgZ3JvdXAgaXMgaG93IGFuZCB0 byB3aGF0IGRlZ3JlZSB3ZQ0KPmluY2x1ZGUgZ3VpZGFuY2UgYWJvdXQgd2hpY2ggYWxnb3JpdGht cyBhcmUgcmVjb21tZW5kZWQgb3Igd2hpY2ggYXJlDQo+a25vd24gdG8gYmUgZmxhd2VkLiBUaGUg Zmlyc3QgaXNzdWUgdGhhdCB3ZSBmYWNlIGlzIHdoYXQgdG8gc2F5IGFib3V0DQo+RUNCIG1vZGUu IEkgcHJvcG9zZSCp9iB0aGF0IHRoZSBXZWJDcnlwdG8gc3RhbmRhcmQgaW5jbHVkZSBzb21lIHRl eHQNCj53YXJuaW5nIHRoYXQgRUNCIG1vZGUgaXMgKm5vdCogYW4gZW5jcnlwdGlvbiBtb2RlLCBs aWtlIENCQyBhbmQgQ1RSDQo+bW9kZXMsIHdoaWNoIGNhbiBiZSB1c2VkIHRvIGVuY3J5cHQgYXJi aXRyYXJ5IHNlbnNpdGl2ZSBwbGFpbnRleHQuDQoNCkkgc2F3IHlvdXIgcHJvcG9zYWwgaW4gdGhl IFdDIFdHLCBhbmQgSSB0aGluayBpdCBpcyBhIGdvb2QgaWRlYS4NCg0KPg0KPk90aGVycyBvbiB0 aGUgV2ViQ3J5cHRvIFdvcmtpbmcgR3JvdXAgYXJlIHZlcnkgcmVsdWN0YW50IHRvIHN0YXJ0DQo+ d3JpdGluZyBkb3duIGFkdmljZSBvZiB0aGlzIGtpbmQgqfcgLCBiZWNhdXNlIHdoZXJlIHdpbGwg aXQgZW5kPyBJdCBjYW4NCj5nZXQgdmVyeSBjb21wbGljYXRlZC4gV2h5IHNob3VsZCB3ZSBiZSB0 aGUgb25lcyB3aG8gaGF2ZSB0byBleHBsYWluIHRvDQo+cHJvZ3JhbW1lcnMgdG8gdXNlIFNIQS0y LTI1NiBpbnN0ZWFkIG9mIFNIQS0xLCBhbmQgaG93IHRvIGF2b2lkDQo+bGVuZ3RoLWV4dGVuc2lv biBhdHRhY2tzIGlmIHRoZXkncmUgZ29pbmcgdG8gdXNlIFNIQS0yLTI1NiwgYW5kIGhvdyB0bw0K PnNhZmVseSB1c2UgUlNBIFBLQ1MjMSB2MS41LCBhbmQgaG93IHRvIGdlbmVyYXRlIG5vbmNlcywg Y291bnRlcnMsIGFuZA0KPklWcyBjb3JyZWN0bHksIGFuZCBob3cgc3Ryb25nIGludGVncml0eSBy ZWFsbHkgaXMgYWxtb3N0IGFsd2F5cw0KPm5lY2Vzc2FyeSBpbiBhZGRpdGlvbiB0byBjb25maWRl bnRpYWxpdHksIGFuZCBzbyBvbi4NCj4NCj5Bbnl3YXksIHdlJ3JlIG5vdCBuZWNlc3NhcmlseSB0 aGUgZXhwZXJ0cyBvbiBhbGwgdGhvc2UgZGV0YWlscywgYW5kDQo+bmV3IGF0dGFja3MgYXJlIGNv bWluZyBhbG9uZyBhbGwgdGhlIHRpbWUgdGhhdCB3ZSB3b3VsZCBoYXZlIHRvDQo+c2NyYW1ibGUg dG8gaW50ZWdyYXRlIGludG8gb3VyIGFkdmljZS4NCj4NCj5Tbywgd2UgaGF2ZSBjb25mbGljdGlu ZyBkZXNpcmVzIGhlcmUuIE9uIHRoZSBvbmUgaGFuZCwgd2UgZG9uJ3Qgd2FudA0KPnRvIGF0dGVt cHQgdG8gZXhwbGFpbiBldmVyeXRoaW5nIHRoYXQgbmVlZHMgZXhwbGFpbmluZywgYnV0IG9uIHRo ZQ0KPm90aGVyIGhhbmQgZXhwZXJpZW5jZSBzaG93cyB0aGF0IHNpbXBseSBwcm92aWRpbmcgYSBi YXJlIEFQSSB3aXRob3V0DQo+ZG9jdW1lbnRhdGlvbiByZWFsbHkgZG9lcyBsZWFkIHRvIHRoZSBk ZXBsb3ltZW50IG9mIGluc2VjdXJlIHN5c3RlbXMNCj50aGF0IGNvbXByb21pc2UgcGVvcGxlJ3Mg c2FmZXR5LiAoU2VlIG15IHBvc3QgdG8gdGhlIHdlYi1jcnlwdG8NCj5tYWlsaW5nIGxpc3QgqfYg Zm9yIGFuIGludGVyZXN0aW5nIHJlY2VudCBleGFtcGxlIGluIHdoaWNoIHRoZSBkZXNpZ24NCj5v ZiB0aGUgY3J5cHRvIEFQSSBtYWRlIHRoZSBkaWZmZXJlbmNlIGJldHdlZW4gc2VjdXJlIGFuZCBp bnNlY3VyZSB3ZWINCj5zZXNzaW9ucy4pDQo+DQo+T2theSwgc28gaGVyZSdzIGEgZ29vZCBzb2x1 dGlvbjogdGhlIFdlYkNyeXB0byBzcGVjIGNhbiByZWZlciB0bw0KPmRvY3VtZW50cyBwdWJsaXNo ZWQgYnkgc29tZSBvdGhlciBleHBlcnRzLCBzdWNoIGFzIENGUkcsIHdoaWNoIGd1aWRlcw0KPnBy b2dyYW1tZXJzIG9uIHdoaWNoIGFsZ29yaXRobXMgYXJlIHJlY29tbWVuZGVkLCBhcyB3ZWxsIGFz IHdoYXQgYXJlDQo+dGhlIHJlcXVpcmVtZW50cyBmb3IgdGhlIHVzZSBvZiBhIGdpdmVuIGFsZ29y aXRobSB0byBzZWN1cmUuIEkgdmVyeQ0KPm11Y2ggbGlrZSBzZWN0aW9uIDMgb2YgdGhlIGNpcGhl ciBjYXRhbG9nIKn4LCBhbmQgSSB3b25kZXIgaWYgaXQgd291bGQNCj5tYWtlIHNlbnNlIGZvciB0 aGUgV2ViQ3J5cHRvIHN0YW5kYXJkIHRvIHJlZmVyIHRvIHRoYXQuDQo+DQo+VGhlIHVzZSBvZiBF Q0IgbW9kZSBpdHNlbGYgaXNuJ3QgYWRkcmVzc2VkIGluIHRoZSBjaXBoZXIgY2F0YWxvZy4gQXJl DQo+dGhlcmUgb3RoZXIgc2ltaWxhciBwdWJsaWNhdGlvbnMgZnJvbSBDRlJHIHRoYXQgd291bGQg YWRkcmVzcyB0aGF0DQo+aXNzdWU/DQoNCkkgbGlrZSB0aGUgaWRlYSBvZiBwdWJsaXNoaW5nIHdl bGwtcmV2aWV3ZWQgY3J5cHRvIGFkdmljZSBpbiB0aGUgZm9ybSBvZg0KUkZDcyBsaWtlIHRoZSBj aXBoZXIgY2F0YWxvZy4NCg0KVG8gbXkgdGhpbmtpbmcsIHdoYXQgaXMgc3RyaWtpbmcgYWJvdXQg Y2lwaGVyIGNhdGFsb2cgaXMgdGhhdCBpdCBpcyBmYWlybHkNCmxpbWl0ZWQgaW4gc2NvcGUsIHll dCBhdCB0aGUgc2FtZSB0aW1lIGl0IGlzIGZhaXJseSBsYXJnZS4gIFRoYXQgc3VnZ2VzdHMNCnRo YXQgd2UgbmVlZCB0byBjYXJlZnVsbHkgc2NvcGUgdGhpcyB3b3JrIGFuZCBub3QgYml0ZSBvZmYg bW9yZSB0aGFuIHdlDQpjYW4gY2hldy4gICBBIGNvbXBhcmlzb24gb2YgbW9kZXMgb2Ygb3BlcmF0 aW9uIHNlZW1zIGxpa2UgaXQgY291bGQgYmUgaXRzDQpvd24gUkZDLiAgIEkgdGhpbmsgaXQgd291 bGQgYmUgcmVhc29uYWJsZSB0byBpbmNsdWRlIGVuY3J5cHRpb24sDQphdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiwg YW5kIGF1dGhlbnRpY2F0ZWQgZW5jcnlwdGlvbiBtb2RlcyBmb3IgYmxvY2sgY2lwaGVycywgYXMN CndlbGwgaGFzIEhNQUMgKHdoaWNoIGNvdWxkIGJlIHRob3VnaHQgb2YgYXMgYSBtb2RlIG9mIG9w ZXJhdGlvbiBmb3IgYSBoYXNoDQpmdW5jdGlvbiwgYW5kIGF0IGFueSByYXRlIHNlZW1zIHRvIGJl bG9uZyBpbiBhIGNvbXBhcmlzb24gb2YNCmF1dGhlbnRpY2F0aW9uIG1vZGVzKS4gICBJIHdvdWxk IGV2ZW4gb2ZmZXIgdG8gcmV2aWV3IHRoaXMgZG9jdW1lbnQuDQoNCj4NCj4oQXMgYW4gYXNpZGUs IEkgcmF0aGVyIGxpa2UgdGhlIHBpdGhpbmVzcyBvZiBPV0FTUCdzIHRha2Ugb24gdGhlDQo+c3Vi amVjdCCp+TogobBUaGlzIG1vZGUgc2hvdWxkIG5vdCBiZSB1c2VkIHVuZGVyIGFueSBjaXJjdW1z dGFuY2VzLqGxLikNCg0KOi0pDQoNCj4NCj5XaGF0IGFib3V0IHRoZSBkYW5nZXJzIG9mIFJTQSBQ S0NTIzEgdjEuNT8gT3IgYXQgbGVhc3QsIGEgY2F0YWxvZyBvZg0KPnB1YmxpYyBrZXkgYWxnb3Jp dGhtcyB3aGljaCBhZHZpc2VzIG9uZSB0byB1c2Ugc2FmZXIgYWxnb3JpdGhtcyBpbg0KPnBsYWNl IG9mIHRoYXQgb25lPw0KDQpQdWJsaWMga2V5IGFsZ29yaXRobXMgd291bGQgYmUgYW5vdGhlciBn cmVhdCB0b3BpYy4NCg0KU3BlYWtpbmcgYXMgQ0ZSRyBjby1jaGFpciwgSSB3b3VsZCBiZSBpbiBm YXZvciBvZiB0aGVzZSBSRkNzIGFzIGxvbmcgYXMNCmVhY2ggb25lIGhhZCBhIHRlYW0gb2YgYXV0 aG9ycy9jb250cmlidXRvcnMsIGFuZCB3ZSBjYW4gZ2V0IHNvbWUgcGVvcGxlDQpzaWduZWQgdXAg YXMgcmV2aWV3ZXJzLg0KDQo+DQo+VGhhbmtzIHZlcnkgbXVjaCBmb3IgYW55IGhlbHAgeW91IGNh biBvZmZlci4NCg0KVGhhbmtzIGZvciB0aGUgc3VnZ2VzdGlvbiBhbmQgdGhlIGV4cGxhbmF0aW9u IG9mIHRoZSBXZWJDcnlwdG8gV0cgaXNzdWVzLg0KDQpEYXZpZA0KDQo+DQo+UmVnYXJkcywNCj4N Cj5ab29rbw0KPg0KPqn2IGh0dHA6Ly9saXN0cy53My5vcmcvQXJjaGl2ZXMvUHVibGljL3B1Ymxp Yy13ZWJjcnlwdG8vMjAxMk9jdC8wMDE4Lmh0bWwNCj4NCj6p9yBodHRwOi8vbGlzdHMudzMub3Jn L0FyY2hpdmVzL1B1YmxpYy9wdWJsaWMtd2ViY3J5cHRvLzIwMTJTZXAvMDE4OC5odG1sDQo+DQo+ qfggaHR0cDovL3Rvb2xzLmlldGYub3JnL2h0bWwvZHJhZnQtaXJ0Zi1jZnJnLWNpcGhlci1jYXRh bG9nLTAwDQo+DQo+qfkgaHR0cDovL293YXNwLmNvbS9pbmRleC5waHAvR2xvc3NhcnkjRWxlY3Ry b25pY19Db2RlX0Jvb2tfbW9kZQ0KPl9fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19f X19fX19fX19fX19fDQo+Q2ZyZyBtYWlsaW5nIGxpc3QNCj5DZnJnQGlydGYub3JnDQo+aHR0cDov L3d3dy5pcnRmLm9yZy9tYWlsbWFuL2xpc3RpbmZvL2NmcmcNCg0K From kmigoe@nsa.gov Mon Oct 15 10:38:16 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 00B5F21F86CB for ; Mon, 15 Oct 2012 10:38:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -9.646 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.646 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.952, BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hXERhBlkL6TQ for ; Mon, 15 Oct 2012 10:38:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nsa.gov (emvm-gh1-uea09.nsa.gov [63.239.67.10]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A43CF21F86C9 for ; Mon, 15 Oct 2012 10:38:14 -0700 (PDT) X-TM-IMSS-Message-ID: Received: from MSHT-GH1-UEA02.corp.nsa.gov ([10.215.227.181]) by nsa.gov ([63.239.67.10]) with ESMTP (TREND IMSS SMTP Service 7.1; TLSv1/SSLv3 AES128-SHA (128/128)) id e42bf049000426ca ; Mon, 15 Oct 2012 13:41:07 -0400 Received: from MSMR-GH1-UEA08.corp.nsa.gov (10.215.225.3) by MSHT-GH1-UEA02.corp.nsa.gov (10.215.227.181) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.1.289.1; Mon, 15 Oct 2012 13:38:13 -0400 Received: from MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov ([10.215.224.3]) by MSMR-GH1-UEA08.corp.nsa.gov ([10.215.225.3]) with mapi id 14.01.0289.001; Mon, 15 Oct 2012 13:38:13 -0400 From: "Igoe, Kevin M." To: "cfrg@irtf.org" Thread-Topic: Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange Thread-Index: Ac2q+9hTwWphA9CHSbGnATbuqKcjyA== Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2012 17:38:10 +0000 Message-ID: <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [10.215.254.27] Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173MSMRGH1UEA03cor_" MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Cfrg] Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2012 17:38:16 -0000 --_000_3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173MSMRGH1UEA03cor_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I would like to call the list's attention to draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-00, = recently written by Dan Harkins at the request of the CFRG chairs. Please look it over. P.S. We'd welcome suggestions for other algorithms CFRG should take under = its wings. Our goal is to have a single site people can got to and find crypto= graphic primitives either currently being used in the IETF or deemed suitable for I= ETF usage. The ongoing effort to collect the IETF symmetric key algorithms into a sing= le RFC is a core part of this effort, but only covers primitives currently in use,= not primitives that the list feels might have a role to play in future IETF standards. ----------------+-------------------------------------------------- Kevin M. Igoe | "We can't solve problems by using the same kind kmigoe@nsa.gov | of thinking we used when we created them." | - Albert Einstein - ----------------+-------------------------------------------------- --_000_3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173MSMRGH1UEA03cor_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I would like to call the list’s attention to draft-irtf-cfrg-dra= gonfly-00, recently written
by Dan Harkins at the request of the CFRG chairs.  Please look it= over.
 
P.S.  We’d welcome suggestions for other algorithms CFRG sh= ould take under its
wings.  Our goal is to have a single site people can got to and f= ind cryptographic
primitives either currently being used in the IETF or deemed suitable = for IETF usage.
 
The ongoing effort to collect the IETF symmetric key algorithms into a= single RFC
is a core part of this effort, but only covers primitives currently in= use, not primitives
that the list feels might have a role to play in future IETF standards= .
 
 
----------------+------------------------------------= --------------
Kevin M. Igoe   | "We can't solve problems= by using the same kind
kmigoe@nsa.gov  | of thinking we used when we create= d them."
         &nb= sp;      |      &nbs= p;       - Albert Einstein -
----------------+------------------------------------= --------------
 
 
 
 --_000_3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173MSMRGH1UEA03cor_-- From jkatz@cs.umd.edu Tue Oct 16 09:26:06 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A07BE21F87D5 for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 09:26:06 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.976 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.976 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 47PTfGB7Brtn for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 09:26:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bacon.cs.umd.edu (server-nat-6.cs.umd.edu [128.8.127.149]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F212121F86E5 for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 09:26:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-oa0-f54.google.com (mail-oa0-f54.google.com [209.85.219.54]) (Authenticated sender: jkatz) by bacon.cs.umd.edu (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1A9FAB4070A for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 12:25:57 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-oa0-f54.google.com with SMTP id n9so8526777oag.13 for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 09:25:56 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.60.5.129 with SMTP id s1mr12625413oes.85.1350404756583; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 09:25:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.182.78.38 with HTTP; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 09:25:56 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 12:25:56 -0400 Message-ID: From: Jonathan Katz To: cfrg@irtf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=e89a8fb1f1f4d1b46404cc2f9b8f X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.3.8 (bacon.cs.umd.edu [0.0.0.0]); Tue, 16 Oct 2012 12:25:57 -0400 (EDT) X-CSD-MailScanner-ID: 1A9FAB4070A.AE392 X-CSD-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-CSD-MailScanner-SpamCheck: not spam, SpamAssassin (not cached, score=-49.99, required 5, ALL_TRUSTED -50.00, HTML_MESSAGE 0.01) X-CSD-MailScanner-From: jkatz@cs.umd.edu X-CSD-MailScanner-Watermark: 1351009557.51638@syxm6X/x9hJvvYkixcn7ng Cc: dharkins@arubanetworks.com Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Cfrg Digest, Vol 90, Issue 2 X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:26:06 -0000 --e89a8fb1f1f4d1b46404cc2f9b8f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 The draft hints at some sort of security proof, but does not reference where one can find such a proof. Is the protocol based on something published in the literature? On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 3:00 PM, wrote: > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange (Igoe, Kevin M.) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2012 17:38:10 +0000 > From: "Igoe, Kevin M." > To: "cfrg@irtf.org" > Subject: [Cfrg] Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange > Message-ID: > < > 3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > I would like to call the list's attention to draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-00, > recently written > by Dan Harkins at the request of the CFRG chairs. Please look it over. > > P.S. We'd welcome suggestions for other algorithms CFRG should take under > its > wings. Our goal is to have a single site people can got to and find > cryptographic > primitives either currently being used in the IETF or deemed suitable for > IETF usage. > > The ongoing effort to collect the IETF symmetric key algorithms into a > single RFC > is a core part of this effort, but only covers primitives currently in > use, not primitives > that the list feels might have a role to play in future IETF standards. > > > ----------------+-------------------------------------------------- > Kevin M. Igoe | "We can't solve problems by using the same kind > kmigoe@nsa.gov | of thinking we used when we created them." > | - Albert Einstein - > ----------------+-------------------------------------------------- > > > > -------------- next part -------------- > An HTML attachment was scrubbed... > URL: < > http://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/attachments/20121015/6c9e37a3/attachment.htm > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Cfrg mailing list > Cfrg@irtf.org > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > > > End of Cfrg Digest, Vol 90, Issue 2 > *********************************** > > --e89a8fb1f1f4d1b46404cc2f9b8f Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable The draft hints at some sort of security proof, but does not reference wher= e one can find such a proof. Is the protocol based on something published i= n the literature?

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at= 3:00 PM, <cfrg-request@irtf.org> wrote:

Today's Topics:

=A0 =A01. Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange (Igoe, Kevin M.)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2012 17:38:10 +0000
From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmig= oe@nsa.gov>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange
Message-ID:
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173@M= SMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D"us-ascii"

I would like to call the list's attention to draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-= 00, recently written
by Dan Harkins at the request of the CFRG chairs. =A0Please look it over.
P.S. =A0We'd welcome suggestions for other algorithms CFRG should take = under its
wings. =A0Our goal is to have a single site people can got to and find cryp= tographic
primitives either currently being used in the IETF or deemed suitable for I= ETF usage.

The ongoing effort to collect the IETF symmetric key algorithms into a sing= le RFC
is a core part of this effort, but only covers primitives currently in use,= not primitives
that the list feels might have a role to play in future IETF standards.


----------------+--------------------------------------------------
Kevin M. Igoe =A0 | "We can't solve problems by using the same kin= d
kmigoe@nsa.gov =A0| of thinking we us= ed when we created them."
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0- Albert Einst= ein -
----------------+--------------------------------------------------



-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.irtf.org/mail= -archive/web/cfrg/attachments/20121015/6c9e37a3/attachment.htm>

------------------------------

_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
htt= p://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


End of Cfrg Digest, Vol 90, Issue 2
***********************************


--e89a8fb1f1f4d1b46404cc2f9b8f-- From dharkins@lounge.org Tue Oct 16 16:54:24 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C45BE11E80A3 for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:54:24 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.265 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.265 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ljX33+FmKcoe for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:54:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from colo.trepanning.net (colo.trepanning.net [69.55.226.174]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2452111E80A2 for ; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:54:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from www.trepanning.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by colo.trepanning.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8326110224008; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:54:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from 115.125.248.113 (SquirrelMail authenticated user dharkins@lounge.org) by www.trepanning.net with HTTP; Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:54:23 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 16:54:23 -0700 (PDT) From: "Dan Harkins" To: "Jonathan Katz" User-Agent: SquirrelMail/1.4.14 [SVN] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain;charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Importance: Normal Cc: dharkins@arubanetworks.com, cfrg@irtf.org Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Cfrg Digest, Vol 90, Issue 2 X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 23:54:24 -0000 Hello, On Tue, October 16, 2012 9:25 am, Jonathan Katz wrote: > The draft hints at some sort of security proof, but does not reference > where one can find such a proof. Is the protocol based on something > published in the literature? There is no security proof. It can be shown secure against passive attack but I have no proof against active/dictionary attack. In fact, you previously pointed out that in the random oracle model it probably cannot be proven secure. You showed that if one were to remove the key confirmation step, have the adversary perform an active attack against the "commit" exchange and then have the adversary perform the Reveal query to each side that it would be possible to do a dictionary attack. regards, Dan. > On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 3:00 PM, wrote: > >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange (Igoe, Kevin M.) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2012 17:38:10 +0000 >> From: "Igoe, Kevin M." >> To: "cfrg@irtf.org" >> Subject: [Cfrg] Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key Exchange >> Message-ID: >> < >> 3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CA25587173@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >> >> I would like to call the list's attention to >> draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-00, >> recently written >> by Dan Harkins at the request of the CFRG chairs. Please look it over. >> >> P.S. We'd welcome suggestions for other algorithms CFRG should take >> under >> its >> wings. Our goal is to have a single site people can got to and find >> cryptographic >> primitives either currently being used in the IETF or deemed suitable >> for >> IETF usage. >> >> The ongoing effort to collect the IETF symmetric key algorithms into a >> single RFC >> is a core part of this effort, but only covers primitives currently in >> use, not primitives >> that the list feels might have a role to play in future IETF standards. >> >> >> ----------------+-------------------------------------------------- >> Kevin M. Igoe | "We can't solve problems by using the same kind >> kmigoe@nsa.gov | of thinking we used when we created them." >> | - Albert Einstein - >> ----------------+-------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... >> URL: < >> http://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/attachments/20121015/6c9e37a3/attachment.htm >> > >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Cfrg mailing list >> Cfrg@irtf.org >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg >> >> >> End of Cfrg Digest, Vol 90, Issue 2 >> *********************************** >> >> > _______________________________________________ > Cfrg mailing list > Cfrg@irtf.org > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Sun Oct 21 14:08:35 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DBD0321F8A0D for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 14:08:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -102.542 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.542 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.057, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1fYL6ejSjIXH for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 14:08:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from scss.tcd.ie (hermes.scss.tcd.ie [IPv6:2001:770:10:200:889f:cdff:fe8d:ccd2]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA90F21F8992 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 14:08:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hermes.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6231B17147A for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 22:08:27 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; h= content-transfer-encoding:content-type:subject:mime-version :user-agent:from:date:message-id:received:received: x-virus-scanned; s=cs; t=1350853706; bh=roGdenoGfNPgRnXzH+d8LpEP w5e8QX2HsW1AJOQJK38=; b=0x2JUT/ZuQsxJ+5eivo9xA59WafSu2X/l2U2cbAI 2h9fjZZXF39P8O+mFVs2tAaxBcURjRffB/j2WLYFHl1psx4RMvK7IgFOBURY+Njo +UeTY3Z+fNzi8uxor8hHIVSI+miOsiFCV0z6Cz+8MYd0OJ5/nzCQtwTmeFQxJHjR m+QbC1EZXL6oYFkp4fyL/Pfej0RdV7ljXsSkeQNjEOYS8vPPs0mPEmmg94xtrCH1 q+lPXMKFkeBB7lvPDz4vFC4Mao6qWPv6mufSbEtutmqZX33paReh2vOzfBblSnPn 1GY5STNcc9WYwjmK2ykuQV2HfB3saG00h1C9CxACCSyOZw== X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10027) with ESMTP id R-tEHF4P9aWO for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 22:08:26 +0100 (IST) Received: from [10.87.48.4] (unknown [86.44.64.186]) by smtp.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4A729171478 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 22:08:24 +0100 (IST) Message-ID: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 22:08:24 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20121017 Thunderbird/16.0.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "cfrg@irtf.org" X-Enigmail-Version: 1.4.5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: [Cfrg] Any update on GOST or more generally? X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 21:08:35 -0000 Hiya, Someone asked me about [1] and whether the IETF ought make any changes as a result. My initial reaction was that 2^172 is still more than 3DES but its probably worth asking here. Any CFRG thoughts on this development or more generally if there are changes with other cryptographic functions are welcome. No need for an I-D, some mail is fine and we could take it from there if there's something to do. Thanks, S. [1] http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/138 From jon@callas.org Sun Oct 21 16:19:39 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DD9221F8A3C for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:39 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.669 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.669 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.930, BAYES_20=-0.74, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FzIUZ8UBZse7 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.merrymeet.com (merrymeet.com [173.164.244.100]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2DDD21F8A3B for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.merrymeet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07C0A1205A45 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at merrymeet.com Received: from mail.merrymeet.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (merrymeet.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3vWW0sV-fGN6 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from keys.merrymeet.com (keys.merrymeet.com [173.164.244.97]) by mail.merrymeet.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E26921205A2C for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.0.23.14] ([173.164.244.98]) by keys.merrymeet.com (PGP Universal service); Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:35 -0700 X-PGP-Universal: processed; by keys.merrymeet.com on Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:35 -0700 From: Jon Callas Message-Id: <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.2 \(1499\)) Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:19:35 -0700 References: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> To: cfrg@irtf.org In-Reply-To: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1499) X-PGP-Encoding-Format: MIME X-PGP-Encoding-Version: 2.0.2 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="PGP_Universal_01FFBA2B_22CE36A8_5A5E8FEF_D8CE02AE"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha1" Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Any update on GOST or more generally? X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 23:19:39 -0000 --PGP_Universal_01FFBA2B_22CE36A8_5A5E8FEF_D8CE02AE Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_1EDF371A-08E9-499F-9DB1-76F55F4838A7" --Apple-Mail=_1EDF371A-08E9-499F-9DB1-76F55F4838A7 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 On Oct 21, 2012, at 2:08 PM, Stephen Farrell = wrote: >=20 > Hiya, >=20 > Someone asked me about [1] and whether the IETF ought make > any changes as a result. >=20 > My initial reaction was that 2^172 is still more than 3DES > but its probably worth asking here. >=20 > Any CFRG thoughts on this development or more generally if > there are changes with other cryptographic functions > are welcome. >=20 > No need for an I-D, some mail is fine and we could take it > from there if there's something to do. >=20 > Thanks, > S. >=20 > [1] http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/138 What sort of changes? 2^172 on a 256-bit cipher is eyebrow-raising. I feel obligated to say = blah, blah, attacks only get worse, not better, blah, before someone = else does. I think it's a reason to select something other than GOST. But you could = also make the argument that it's as good or better than AES (128 = definitely, discussions of 256 get complex). I'd make the argument that = you should use AES over 3DES, so yeah, GOST is better than 3DES. But that's almost not the point. Many ciphers are used because they're = part of a national system. If you want to be doing things in Japan, you = need to use Camellia. If you're working in Korea, you need to use SEED. = If you're working in Russia, you need to use GOST. Ditto for AES in the = US. If you don't have any national interoperability requirements, then = you use whatever your own opinions take you towards, which could be any = of the previous or something else. The IETF makes standards, but they're *protocol* standards, not *usage* = standards. If the Russians require GOST, it almost doesn't matter what = we say. If the Russians move away from GOST, it similarly doesn't really = matter what we say. Courtois's abstract says: Until 2010 researchers unanimously agreed that: =93despite considerable = cryptanalytic efforts spent in the past 20 years, GOST is still not = broken=94... which isn't strictly true; the OpenPGP working group considered putting = GOST into OpenPGP and couldn't get consensus on it. Thus goes = "unanimous." But lots of people have always worried about GOST because = its S-boxes can be a parameter. Some sets of S-boxes were always = suspect, and the *standard* GOST is the one that the Russian Central = Bank used. Courtois also notes that there's been a lot of cryptanalysis on it since = 2010. If you felt that GOST was dodgy, you now have more reasons. If = you want it as an alternative to AES, you can quote = which has a 2^119 complexity attack = against AES-256, making it arguably weaker than AES-128. (Interestingly, = the same paper gives an attack against AES-192 with 2^176 complexity and = the same reasoning would have it stronger than either GOST or other AES = key sizes). The arguments for using GOST as an alternative to AES still = stand, if that's what floats your boat. And as I noted above, if you are = doing business in Russia, this is all irrelevant as you just have to use = GOST. All of this is reason for us in the IETF to take note and just keep = paying attention. If we're going to use this as a reason to advise for = or against GOST, we really need to consider the BDKKS attack on = large-key AES. None of these attacks are practical, though, and anything = with a real 128 bits of security is likely good for the next = couple-three decades. Most of us pick ciphers by a combination of = security SWAG and fiat. This might change one's SWAG, but it doesn't = change the fiat. Jon --Apple-Mail=_1EDF371A-08E9-499F-9DB1-76F55F4838A7 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>= ; wrote:


Hiya,

Someone asked me about [1] and whether = the IETF ought make
any changes as a result.

My initial = reaction was that 2^172 is still more than 3DES
but its probably = worth asking here.

Any CFRG thoughts on this development or more = generally if
there are changes with other cryptographic = functions
are welcome.

No need for an I-D, some mail is fine = and we could take it
from there if there's something to = do.

Thanks,
S.

[1] http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/138

What sort of = changes?

2^172 on a 256-bit cipher is = eyebrow-raising. I feel obligated to say blah, blah, attacks only get = worse, not better, blah, before someone else = does.

I think it's a reason to select something = other than GOST. But you could also make the argument that it's as good = or better than AES (128 definitely, discussions of 256 get complex). I'd = make the argument that you should use AES over 3DES, so yeah, GOST is = better than 3DES.

But that's almost not the = point. Many ciphers are used because they're part of a national system. = If you want to be doing things in Japan, you need to use Camellia. If = you're working in Korea, you need to use SEED. If you're working in = Russia, you need to use GOST. Ditto for AES in the US. If you don't have = any national interoperability requirements, then you use whatever your = own opinions take you towards, which could be any of the previous or = something else.

The IETF makes standards, but = they're *protocol* standards, not *usage* standards. If the Russians = require GOST, it almost doesn't matter what we say. If the Russians move = away from GOST, it similarly doesn't really matter what we = say.

Courtois's abstract = says:

=09 =09 =09

Until 2010 = researchers unanimously agreed that: = =93despite considerable cryptanalytic efforts spent in the = past 20 years, GOST is still not = broken=94...


which = isn't strictly true; the OpenPGP working group considered putting GOST = into OpenPGP and couldn't get consensus on it. Thus goes "unanimous." = But lots of people have always worried about GOST because its S-boxes = can be a parameter. Some sets of S-boxes were always suspect, and the = *standard* GOST is the one that the Russian Central Bank = used.




= --Apple-Mail=_1EDF371A-08E9-499F-9DB1-76F55F4838A7-- --PGP_Universal_01FFBA2B_22CE36A8_5A5E8FEF_D8CE02AE Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; x-mac-type=70674453; name=PGP.sig Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=PGP.sig -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Universal 3.2.0 (Build 1672) iQA/AwUBUISDB7E3nVmTg94GEQKuwwCeKHIedAuF2vm7PSEvQEKaDsSlGUMAmwc3 mX4pMgb9xiRvFkw5dOd8Mi37 =AKRE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --PGP_Universal_01FFBA2B_22CE36A8_5A5E8FEF_D8CE02AE-- From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Sun Oct 21 16:41:40 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54AE521F8943 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:41:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -102.555 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.555 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.044, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XhJUtFZ4qTRl for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:41:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from scss.tcd.ie (hermes.scss.tcd.ie [IPv6:2001:770:10:200:889f:cdff:fe8d:ccd2]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1524921F88F1 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:41:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hermes.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2FD9017147A; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 00:41:37 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; h= content-transfer-encoding:content-type:in-reply-to:references :subject:mime-version:user-agent:from:date:message-id:received :received:x-virus-scanned; s=cs; t=1350862893; bh=1awN9LK62M1Nxn D51ddHD+w6scnvz80TXauDfCVcVr8=; b=H5wX0Ih6bXAD5Dftsr910XxFX1rWLd y8Nj5Hm95f4p7e/nbEoPEsyqTnegJ2Tx8/EsJZkXHb3vzzJ9SnhrOquSbq3JtZCD RXRvPfMCpDRrWkvHUtKb3cHXqYsd0ApT0n4j4lbBtpH1LvziwTKwgjEGpKl11a1V uYP3TziIibPHl/a21nyis0/HbSitG/e8TrwH+INITKt04FSq6QsUhzWUF7DucB9l b4ESB65HF1d/Ha6kC8dUGy70Kj+UghEwOggXvRKR5LHfA9E0aOLbgWpO7PBWwko0 AwuZz2FxMZJKtHkHAHT2Rpxs7ubMmIzZ6pw7FK8zj/hJGXbrlbD65pcg== X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10027) with ESMTP id qRFZunMGkFOb; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 00:41:33 +0100 (IST) Received: from [10.87.48.4] (unknown [86.44.64.186]) by smtp.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DB53F171478; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 00:41:32 +0100 (IST) Message-ID: <5084882C.3030507@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 00:41:32 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20121017 Thunderbird/16.0.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Jon Callas References: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> In-Reply-To: <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> X-Enigmail-Version: 1.4.5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: cfrg@irtf.org Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Any update on GOST or more generally? X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 23:41:40 -0000 Hi Jon, See below... On 10/22/2012 12:19 AM, Jon Callas wrote: > > On Oct 21, 2012, at 2:08 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > >> >> Hiya, >> >> Someone asked me about [1] and whether the IETF ought make >> any changes as a result. >> >> My initial reaction was that 2^172 is still more than 3DES >> but its probably worth asking here. >> >> Any CFRG thoughts on this development or more generally if >> there are changes with other cryptographic functions >> are welcome. >> >> No need for an I-D, some mail is fine and we could take it >> from there if there's something to do. >> >> Thanks, >> S. >> >> [1] http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/138 > > What sort of changes? Dunno. Depends on what's the right thing to do. I guess that could vary from 'do nothing' up to 'write an I-D saying " considered harmful" that also deprecates some code points in various IANA registries.' [...good stuff snipped, though more is welcome...] > Courtois also notes that there's been a lot of cryptanalysis on it since 2010. If you felt that GOST was dodgy, you now have more reasons. If you want it as an alternative to AES, you can quote which has a 2^119 complexity attack against AES-256, making it arguably weaker than AES-128. (Interestingly, the same paper gives an attack against AES-192 with 2^176 complexity and the same reasoning would have it stronger than either GOST or other AES key sizes). The arguments for using GOST as an alternative to AES still stand, if that's what floats your boat. And as I noted above, if you are doing business in Russia, this is all irrelevant as you just have to use GOST. I'd love to know if someone's actually measured how much these national/vanity ciphersuites are actually used in IETF protocols. S. > All of this is reason for us in the IETF to take note and just keep paying attention. If we're going to use this as a reason to advise for or against GOST, we really need to consider the BDKKS attack on large-key AES. None of these attacks are practical, though, and anything with a real 128 bits of security is likely good for the next couple-three decades. Most of us pick ciphers by a combination of security SWAG and fiat. This might change one's SWAG, but it doesn't change the fiat. > > Jon > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Cfrg mailing list > Cfrg@irtf.org > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org Sun Oct 21 16:57:51 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C618821F8A41 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:57:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -102.597 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.597 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.002, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ottFk42EBnPi for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:57:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from hoffman.proper.com (IPv6.Hoffman.Proper.COM [IPv6:2605:8e00:100:41::81]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 559CF21F8A58 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:57:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.20.30.101] (50-1-50-97.dsl.dynamic.fusionbroadband.com [50.1.50.97]) (authenticated bits=0) by hoffman.proper.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id q9LNviVh079055 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:57:45 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.2 \(1499\)) From: Paul Hoffman In-Reply-To: <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 16:57:44 -0700 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <234CA9F8-BF39-4E23-91F1-138D4032CAD4@vpnc.org> References: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> To: Jon Callas X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1499) Cc: cfrg@irtf.org Subject: [Cfrg] Camellia as an Japanese national cipher X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 23:57:51 -0000 On Oct 21, 2012, at 4:19 PM, Jon Callas wrote: > If you want to be doing things in Japan, you need to use Camellia.=20 Are you sure of that? I ask because a few years ago, I had a discussion = with the Camellia authors about some new work, and their slides made me = question "how much of a national standard is this?" Their answer was = extremely non-commital, and they never followed up. I ask this not to poke at Camellia or the authors, but to find out if = CFRG needs to group Camellia/Japan with GOST/Russia. --Paul Hoffman= From jon@callas.org Sun Oct 21 18:25:00 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B73AF21F8A41 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:25:00 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.134 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.134 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.465, BAYES_00=-2.599] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id enUCdrglb2Aw for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.merrymeet.com (merrymeet.com [173.164.244.100]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34A9621F8A38 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.merrymeet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D1991206AD5 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at merrymeet.com Received: from mail.merrymeet.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (merrymeet.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2rieXUOrq5fN for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from keys.merrymeet.com (keys.merrymeet.com [173.164.244.97]) by mail.merrymeet.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5A4551206AB4 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.0.23.14] ([173.164.244.98]) by keys.merrymeet.com (PGP Universal service); Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:50 -0700 X-PGP-Universal: processed; by keys.merrymeet.com on Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:50 -0700 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.2 \(1499\)) From: Jon Callas In-Reply-To: <234CA9F8-BF39-4E23-91F1-138D4032CAD4@vpnc.org> Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2012 18:24:48 -0700 Message-Id: References: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> <234CA9F8-BF39-4E23-91F1-138D4032CAD4@vpnc.org> To: Paul Hoffman X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1499) X-PGP-Encoding-Format: Partitioned X-PGP-Encoding-Version: 2.0.2 X-Content-PGP-Universal-Saved-Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-PGP-Universal-Saved-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: cfrg@irtf.org, Jon Callas Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Camellia as an Japanese national cipher X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 01:25:00 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Oct 21, 2012, at 4:57 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: > On Oct 21, 2012, at 4:19 PM, Jon Callas wrote: >=20 >> If you want to be doing things in Japan, you need to use Camellia.=20 >=20 > Are you sure of that? I ask because a few years ago, I had a discussion w= ith the Camellia authors about some new work, and their slides made me ques= tion "how much of a national standard is this?" Their answer was extremely = non-commital, and they never followed up. >=20 > I ask this not to poke at Camellia or the authors, but to find out if CFR= G needs to group Camellia/Japan with GOST/Russia. In the case of Japan, they're a lot softer than most countries that push th= eir own national standards. In Russia, you *must* use GOST to work with ban= king, etc. There are places in Korea where you definitely need to use SEED.= In Japan, they have a Cryptographic Module Verification Program (JCMVP) si= milar to the US/Canada CMVP we call FIPS 140. See=20 for details. It was developed with the help of the US and Canada. It has th= e FIPS 140 algorithms with additions of Camellia, CIPHERUNICORN, MISTY, and= others. It's possible to get through JCMVP with only the US/Canada ones, but it's v= ery polite to use some of the Japanese ones. Politeness scores lots of poin= ts in Japan. They feel like that means you're committed to them. They buy y= our stuff if you're committed to them. This is a typical issue in exporting= to Japan that they're bad at saying no and you have to learn the proper le= vel of politeness to be accepted. In crypto, that means you need to use som= e of their ciphers. Jon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Universal 3.2.0 (Build 1672) Charset: windows-1252 wj8DBQFQhKBisTedWZOD3gYRAtQsAKDYCRC4PITRAT9OMt0fC2UvBpPYQQCg2pkV sgFcgaAqRt9dXOUacjNSLrs=3D =3D86oD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ynir@checkpoint.com Sun Oct 21 23:14:18 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E21921F8922 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 23:14:18 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -10.581 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.581 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.018, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id CbixitFBQWlj for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 23:14:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5665721F8890 for ; Sun, 21 Oct 2012 23:14:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.26]) by smtp.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id q9M6E19x013598; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 08:14:06 +0200 X-CheckPoint: {5084E22E-2-1B221DC2-2FFFF} Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([194.29.34.26]) by il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) with mapi; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 08:14:00 +0200 From: Yoav Nir To: Paul Hoffman Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 08:14:01 +0200 Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Camellia as an Japanese national cipher Thread-Index: Ac2wHG0Y4kSoStQeQsmbu08NvNMjXw== Message-ID: References: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> <234CA9F8-BF39-4E23-91F1-138D4032CAD4@vpnc.org> In-Reply-To: <234CA9F8-BF39-4E23-91F1-138D4032CAD4@vpnc.org> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" , Jon Callas Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Camellia as an Japanese national cipher X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 06:14:18 -0000 On Oct 22, 2012, at 1:57 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote: > On Oct 21, 2012, at 4:19 PM, Jon Callas wrote: >=20 >> If you want to be doing things in Japan, you need to use Camellia.=20 >=20 > Are you sure of that? I ask because a few years ago, I had a discussion w= ith the Camellia authors about some new work, and their slides made me ques= tion "how much of a national standard is this?" Their answer was extremely = non-commital, and they never followed up. >=20 > I ask this not to poke at Camellia or the authors, but to find out if CFR= G needs to group Camellia/Japan with GOST/Russia. [vendor hat on] My company sells IPsec and TLS VPN products all over the world, including R= ussia, Japan, Korea, and China. The main version of our product supports "w= estern" ciphers - AES, 3DES, RC4. The only customers who have ever asked fo= r a product that supports their national cipher are from Russia. We've neve= r been asked to implement Camelia or SEED. So our product sells all around the world with just two versions: regular a= nd GOST. Yoav= From hardjono@mit.edu Mon Oct 22 07:40:49 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 612E621F8B7E for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 07:40:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.523 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.523 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.076, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ws2y5MVKDF-Z for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 07:40:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dmz-mailsec-scanner-8.mit.edu (DMZ-MAILSEC-SCANNER-8.MIT.EDU [18.7.68.37]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89D0E21F8B7A for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 07:40:47 -0700 (PDT) X-AuditID: 12074425-b7fcc6d00000091f-52-50855aeef6ae Received: from mailhub-auth-2.mit.edu ( [18.7.62.36]) by dmz-mailsec-scanner-8.mit.edu (Symantec Messaging Gateway) with SMTP id 0F.B7.02335.EEA55805; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 10:40:46 -0400 (EDT) Received: from outgoing-exchange-2.mit.edu (OUTGOING-EXCHANGE-2.MIT.EDU [18.9.28.16]) by mailhub-auth-2.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.9.2) with ESMTP id q9MEejbu005400; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 10:40:46 -0400 Received: from OC11EXEDGE4.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU (OC11EXEDGE4.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU [18.9.3.27]) by outgoing-exchange-2.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.12.4) with ESMTP id q9MEegN7006339; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 10:40:43 -0400 Received: from OC11EXHUB10.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.3.24) by OC11EXEDGE4.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU (18.9.3.27) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.309.2; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 10:40:15 -0400 Received: from OC11EXPO24.exchange.mit.edu ([169.254.1.21]) by OC11EXHUB10.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.3.24]) with mapi id 14.02.0309.002; Mon, 22 Oct 2012 10:40:42 -0400 From: Thomas Hardjono To: Yoav Nir , Paul Hoffman Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Camellia as an Japanese national cipher Thread-Index: AQHNr+fjviEEntYLIEaJRF7jch8aPpfFHBmAgABIyJA= Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 14:40:41 +0000 Message-ID: <5E393DF26B791A428E5F003BB6C5342A10C212C1@OC11EXPO24.exchange.mit.edu> References: <50846448.4030608@cs.tcd.ie> <787855B1-9135-4075-82AC-8FC4DE76B340@callas.org> <234CA9F8-BF39-4E23-91F1-138D4032CAD4@vpnc.org> In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: yes X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [18.111.123.138] Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=SHA1; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0005_01CDB041.AE565A30" MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFlrMJsWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUixG6novsuqjXAYFKXvkX3j4NMFrfWf2G1 eHGql8mB2ePy7OtMHpM3Hmbz+Dz7KnMAcxSXTUpqTmZZapG+XQJXRt+r64wFz7wq2u/sY2pg /OLaxcjJISFgInF/4zUmCFtM4sK99WxdjFwcQgL7GCVmfVzEDuEcYJRYuvAdK4RzlVFix9qT zBDOdkaJL1tnM0I4qxgltnSeYgMZxiagIXHu9152EFtEwENi05wjYHFmAWWJRetPgC0UFrCW uLV/FyNEjY3E6TmHoGwricurVjGD2CwCqhITNuwGs3kFgiQW/X4KddMxRon7PTvBhnIKOEm0 vvvDCmIzAn3x/dQaJohl4hK3nsyH+k5E4uHF02wwn/7b9RDKVpLob2kBe4dZoJdR4ujMl4wQ 2wQlTs58wjIBGBBIZs1CVjcLSd0sRg6ghJ5E20ZGiHp5ie1v5zBD2NYSM34dZIOwFSWmdD9k h7BNJV4f/ci4gJFjFaNsSm6Vbm5iZk5xarJucXJiXl5qka6FXm5miV5qSukmRnD8u6juYJxw SOkQowAHoxIPb8P1lgAh1sSy4srcQ4ySHExKoryLw1sDhPiS8lMqMxKLM+KLSnNSiw8xqgDt erRh9QVGKZa8/LxUJRFe5QCgOt6UxMqq1KJ8mDJpDhYlcd4bKTf9hQTSE0tSs1NTC1KLYLIy HBxKErwnI4EaBYtS01Mr0jJzShDSTBychxglOHiAhl8FqeEtLkjMLc5Mh8ifYlSUEufdDZIQ AElklObB9cLS9itGcaC3hHlvg1TxAFM+XPcroMFMQIPNecAGlyQipKQaGK0SKlQ4ZPWvndny qnzl+U8S0+fde/DN9dHCmYu2+BkbNga9yVleypcza5JhaNKSaz9cgyUv5Lss28I4OayxKsjp 8uQKQRvHmlc64jFrZMIVnR3OH/1ru3Pmtdpl2RpcoRKuficiM55nTHKxnrdXp1/3osDzaZ95 v8fE/zdUTq2sT1t/2TE8XomlOCPRUIu5qDgRAHfuDei2AwAA Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Camellia as an Japanese national cipher X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 14:40:49 -0000 ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01CDB041.AE565A30 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > -----Original Message----- > From: cfrg-bounces@irtf.org [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf > Of > Yoav Nir > Sent: Monday, October 22, 2012 2:14 AM > To: Paul Hoffman > Cc: cfrg@irtf.org; Jon Callas > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Camellia as an Japanese national cipher > > > On Oct 22, 2012, at 1:57 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote: > > > On Oct 21, 2012, at 4:19 PM, Jon Callas wrote: > > > >> If you want to be doing things in Japan, you need to use Camellia. > > > > Are you sure of that? I ask because a few years ago, I had a > discussion with the Camellia authors about some new work, and their > slides made me question "how much of a national standard is this?" > Their answer was extremely non-commital, and they never followed up. > > > > I ask this not to poke at Camellia or the authors, but to find out > > if > CFRG needs to group Camellia/Japan with GOST/Russia. > > [vendor hat on] > > My company sells IPsec and TLS VPN products all over the world, > including Russia, Japan, Korea, and China. The main version of our > product supports "western" ciphers - AES, 3DES, RC4. The only > customers > who have ever asked for a product that supports their national cipher > are from Russia. We've never been asked to implement Camelia or SEED. > > So our product sells all around the world with just two versions: > regular and GOST. > > Yoav +1 Agree with statement about needing Camellia for Japan market. FYI the MIT Kerberos code-base has already implemented Camellia as of Kerberos5 Release 1.9 (a couple of years ago). This was a joint effort with NTT Japan. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me offline. /thomas/ __________________________________________ Thomas Hardjono MIT Kerberos Consortium email: hardjono[at]mit.edu __________________________________________ ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01CDB041.AE565A30 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIIP4DCCBBow ggMCAhEAi1t1VoRUhQsAz684SM6xpDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCByjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAV BgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQLExZWZXJpU2lnbiBUcnVzdCBOZXR3b3JrMTow OAYDVQQLEzEoYykgMTk5OSBWZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLiAtIEZvciBhdXRob3JpemVkIHVzZSBvbmx5 MUUwQwYDVQQDEzxWZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAxIFB1YmxpYyBQcmltYXJ5IENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24g QXV0aG9yaXR5IC0gRzMwHhcNOTkxMDAxMDAwMDAwWhcNMzYwNzE2MjM1OTU5WjCByjELMAkGA1UE BhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQLExZWZXJpU2lnbiBUcnVzdCBO ZXR3b3JrMTowOAYDVQQLEzEoYykgMTk5OSBWZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLiAtIEZvciBhdXRob3JpemVk IHVzZSBvbmx5MUUwQwYDVQQDEzxWZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAxIFB1YmxpYyBQcmltYXJ5IENlcnRp ZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5IC0gRzMwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDd hNS5tPmn2PMEeJzePdxsExbZet0kUWbAxyZZDawGCMKU0TMf8IM1H24byN6qbhVOVCfvxG0a7Avj DvBEpVfHQFgeo0cfcexg9m2UyBg57f5CGFbf5ExJEHhOAXY1YxI23Wa8AQQ2o1Vo1aI2CayrISZU Bq0/yhTgrMqtBh2V4vid8eBg/8J/dStMzNr+h5kh6rr+PlTX0ll42zxuz6ATABq4J6HkvmeWyqDF s5zdyXWe6zCaX6PN2a54GT8j6VzbKb2tVcgbVIxj9uim6sc3ElyjKR4C2dsfO7TXD1ZHgRUESq+D J9HFWIjB3faqp6MY2miqbRFR4b9la5+WdtE9AgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAKtmjdez useatuZV0AXxnzGNWqrZqkYmD3Htpa1TVmIBRypE6f4/dAsTm7n0TRuy0V+yttKIXLOfzcvUp9lg lYQ6+ME3HWHK57DF5ZHaVKasMYGul97NCKy4wJeAf25ypOdpE5VlH8STPP15jwTUPk/q957OzWd8 T2UC/5GFVHPH/zb3hi3s0F5P/xGfcgbWuBrxTA0mZeJEgB7Hn+Pd6Ara7KUggGlooU9+4WvPB0H6 g468ON2wLhGxa7JCzJq8+UgieUoZD7IcPiB02WrDvvIoeBNWeU9tUOobsLVXsTdmWCPz3A/fCofE 74YF1TgUYJmjS94GlnEs8tu2H6TvP+4wggTMMIIDtKADAgECAhB4Uq7mlIth1FJ90gEtCu8wMA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMIHdMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEXMBUGA1UEChMOVmVyaVNpZ24sIEluYy4xHzAd BgNVBAsTFlZlcmlTaWduIFRydXN0IE5ldHdvcmsxOzA5BgNVBAsTMlRlcm1zIG9mIHVzZSBhdCBo dHRwczovL3d3dy52ZXJpc2lnbi5jb20vcnBhIChjKTA5MR4wHAYDVQQLExVQZXJzb25hIE5vdCBW YWxpZGF0ZWQxNzA1BgNVBAMTLlZlcmlTaWduIENsYXNzIDEgSW5kaXZpZHVhbCBTdWJzY3JpYmVy IENBIC0gRzMwHhcNMTIwMzA2MDAwMDAwWhcNMTMwMzA2MjM1OTU5WjCCARMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZl cmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQLExZWZXJpU2lnbiBUcnVzdCBOZXR3b3JrMUYwRAYDVQQLEz13 d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29tL3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvUlBBIEluY29ycC4gYnkgUmVmLixMSUFCLkxURChj KTk4MR4wHAYDVQQLExVQZXJzb25hIE5vdCBWYWxpZGF0ZWQxNDAyBgNVBAsTK0RpZ2l0YWwgSUQg Q2xhc3MgMSAtIE1pY3Jvc29mdCBGdWxsIFNlcnZpY2UxGDAWBgNVBAMUD1Rob21hcyBIYXJkam9u bzEfMB0GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYQaGFyZGpvbm9AbWl0LmVkdTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAw gYkCgYEAmPCe+VCa3OQBiPsHUyh69qmKngwP6dHrXQtHphyr1P9LnMHdF+DletpaSm1b4HXjqbzm Ne/dj5169ZzwMjFdl3cVYGbZTvILmHNXH0kSlYl4NM/59ri+UBnV3oBnXg+g3Vhet6MDWJn/7exV AY4u5SpM7I+b+yQwDlTT90rJbXcCAwEAAaOB0jCBzzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMEQGA1UdIAQ9MDswOQYL YIZIAYb4RQEHFwEwKjAoBggrBgEFBQcCARYcaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29tL3JwYTAL BgNVHQ8EBAMCBaAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwQGCCsGAQUFBwMCMFAGA1UdHwRJMEcwRaBD oEGGP2h0dHA6Ly9pbmRjMWRpZ2l0YWxpZC1nMy1jcmwudmVyaXNpZ24uY29tL0luZEMxRGlnaXRh bElELUczLmNybDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAthQJhe+BCY99zTBcAG73fFOmROKAFQyQLxzV mJLBy8HV2hNXVA8qL87UpbBLcWT3+qDmMYn70X3Hhj+givCw0hLLeEpOWWRtXSuGt7MNrjQR1sNz Zl+NJQN+S9kl1AzYMec19OE8D+5A8WbOna8aWhGmMISqwJ3FBt6VUFIosTUGTHLI9H+LrgENQMif jCrY2PoLZvsgdQRtwhYTMbbeSLWuHILpZn2zEluSU6drzaTBPIA5uOUAtwCPRfocAzTh/mvfJ51y MNoLjFeZaovhhUdeBYJaI78y55A0nBsGyYQvYdESuqJf1UCGIK76M3c37q5YZOvmVA6sIloOcWk1 wzCCBu4wggXWoAMCAQICEHEVZgVK5JEhTem8RPms09wwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwgcoxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjEfMB0GA1UECxMWVmVyaVNpZ24gVHJ1c3Qg TmV0d29yazE6MDgGA1UECxMxKGMpIDE5OTkgVmVyaVNpZ24sIEluYy4gLSBGb3IgYXV0aG9yaXpl ZCB1c2Ugb25seTFFMEMGA1UEAxM8VmVyaVNpZ24gQ2xhc3MgMSBQdWJsaWMgUHJpbWFyeSBDZXJ0 aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eSAtIEczMB4XDTA5MDUwMTAwMDAwMFoXDTE5MDQzMDIzNTk1OVow gd0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjEfMB0GA1UECxMWVmVyaVNp Z24gVHJ1c3QgTmV0d29yazE7MDkGA1UECxMyVGVybXMgb2YgdXNlIGF0IGh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnZl cmlzaWduLmNvbS9ycGEgKGMpMDkxHjAcBgNVBAsTFVBlcnNvbmEgTm90IFZhbGlkYXRlZDE3MDUG A1UEAxMuVmVyaVNpZ24gQ2xhc3MgMSBJbmRpdmlkdWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIgQ0EgLSBHMzCCASIw DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAO3ER98qKB18Bmu71yEyyWwTj+mxjUFONPfaC+Nq +mWIIAsRE+mb4ElOi2/VAdBfDUeRilpMdD4/xpEJu0w0no1uoYJRYvdpdliWB6+eFBgHT1q9n9Ix slQZc0ZqGUIR7BJzIY313DDN5dlWCjHFNm0pFJe9LdqJRxmI2EsEPeu2PGcedAATDdCG2pNn+DMD rho8a2l49sAsjuGDP3f5mf/+n1JawrSHCthsqUfBVCllQz5KwJYfwa33d69ssQRevsG2lC2XkC0n 0rse6YNqhPbEsq4jBmUmpSdYKwcitG+mYkgad/LVUCeaKdOW+yj1uiR2YuOMWev7btVCxL5Bx/UC AwEAAaOCArkwggK1MDQGCCsGAQUFBwEBBCgwJjAkBggrBgEFBQcwAYYYaHR0cDovL29jc3AudmVy aXNpZ24uY29tMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwcAYDVR0gBGkwZzBlBgtghkgBhvhFAQcXATBW MCgGCCsGAQUFBwIBFhxodHRwczovL3d3dy52ZXJpc2lnbi5jb20vY3BzMCoGCCsGAQUFBwICMB4a HGh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9ycGEwNAYDVR0fBC0wKzApoCegJYYjaHR0cDovL2Ny bC52ZXJpc2lnbi5jb20vcGNhMS1nMy5jcmwwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMG4GCCsGAQUFBwEMBGIw YKFeoFwwWjBYMFYWCWltYWdlL2dpZjAhMB8wBwYFKw4DAhoEFEtruSiWBgy70FI4mymsSweLIQUY MCYWJGh0dHA6Ly9sb2dvLnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS92c2xvZ28xLmdpZjAuBgNVHREEJzAlpCMwITEf MB0GA1UEAxMWUHJpdmF0ZUxhYmVsNC0yMDQ4LTExODAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUeUdhCEH9OASiS+e1zPVD 9kkrEfgwgfEGA1UdIwSB6TCB5qGB0KSBzTCByjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlT aWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQLExZWZXJpU2lnbiBUcnVzdCBOZXR3b3JrMTowOAYDVQQLEzEoYykg MTk5OSBWZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLiAtIEZvciBhdXRob3JpemVkIHVzZSBvbmx5MUUwQwYDVQQDEzxW ZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAxIFB1YmxpYyBQcmltYXJ5IENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5IC0g RzOCEQCLW3VWhFSFCwDPrzhIzrGkMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQA5Tc9BmYG1qQW1UjjpOYSJ bOQ0qFrn2GwJTCQaulmkhztzIfGTgc+/aGNaZ/41hSuhw12jSsI6Gd0w1sxN7/HSgZfKVFpDvzeL eo4ZjQ9DqIzyr2CzFYqzlZw84J6zJ5ikNXIX5fwqXYfTig3C0UUq+MD0rCqTOtWuEnAI6/s74nfs 6CtkNXbNutrg0csU1nFYm77VPn222egkxSRmTF2RH3azFz5/DcYhiS+zN7ih/1yybUneZVJC+w6I 0u1KHb9L4/jMcvpIDmWOScjW+JmYO7eUPjFxBof6bFlTLtffK+1fYwCsFe0DuFUWjMZoA+ciqHML sbyg2lJY3QoOf8GCMYIEuDCCBLQCAQEwgfIwgd0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJp U2lnbiwgSW5jLjEfMB0GA1UECxMWVmVyaVNpZ24gVHJ1c3QgTmV0d29yazE7MDkGA1UECxMyVGVy bXMgb2YgdXNlIGF0IGh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9ycGEgKGMpMDkxHjAcBgNVBAsT FVBlcnNvbmEgTm90IFZhbGlkYXRlZDE3MDUGA1UEAxMuVmVyaVNpZ24gQ2xhc3MgMSBJbmRpdmlk dWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIgQ0EgLSBHMwIQeFKu5pSLYdRSfdIBLQrvMDAJBgUrDgMCGgUAoIIDGzAY BgkqhkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0xMjEwMjIxNDQwNDBaMCMG CSqGSIb3DQEJBDEWBBTZ7udf86zmB37dctWH55RUKsZekTCBqwYJKoZIhvcNAQkPMYGdMIGaMAsG CWCGSAFlAwQBKjALBglghkgBZQMEARYwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAECMA4GCCqGSIb3 DQMCAgIAgDAHBgUrDgMCBzANBggqhkiG9w0DAgIBQDANBggqhkiG9w0DAgIBKDAHBgUrDgMCGjAL BglghkgBZQMEAgMwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAICMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCATCCAQMGCSsGAQQBgjcQBDGB9TCB 8jCB3TELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQLExZWZXJp U2lnbiBUcnVzdCBOZXR3b3JrMTswOQYDVQQLEzJUZXJtcyBvZiB1c2UgYXQgaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cu dmVyaXNpZ24uY29tL3JwYSAoYykwOTEeMBwGA1UECxMVUGVyc29uYSBOb3QgVmFsaWRhdGVkMTcw NQYDVQQDEy5WZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAxIEluZGl2aWR1YWwgU3Vic2NyaWJlciBDQSAtIEczAhB4 Uq7mlIth1FJ90gEtCu8wMIIBBQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAgsxgfWggfIwgd0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRcw FQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjEfMB0GA1UECxMWVmVyaVNpZ24gVHJ1c3QgTmV0d29yazE7 MDkGA1UECxMyVGVybXMgb2YgdXNlIGF0IGh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9ycGEgKGMp MDkxHjAcBgNVBAsTFVBlcnNvbmEgTm90IFZhbGlkYXRlZDE3MDUGA1UEAxMuVmVyaVNpZ24gQ2xh c3MgMSBJbmRpdmlkdWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIgQ0EgLSBHMwIQeFKu5pSLYdRSfdIBLQrvMDANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQEFAASBgEbf1mi65UJUGp/jVI8osUE+xpK/IHlcqaRvCICCZYcQcAr22c2pn19X9Rts MjPfV+68EiIXEOBrk3/OLkhRhWArCYzBHd2HNfpaOqQnriL8HPePGL6lu2wtblpMc/KcGmUKoIL/ UuXyCpaFPZEsIiXZYxz0Ci0KKE7wvdBSDT5/AAAAAAAA ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01CDB041.AE565A30-- From smb@cs.columbia.edu Wed Oct 24 06:53:16 2012 Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D19D621F8B46; Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:53:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.599 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4] Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EK0b7hXRGLgI; Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:53:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rambutan.cc.columbia.edu (rambutan.cc.columbia.edu [128.59.29.5]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C126121F8B3D; Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:53:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.9.0.146] (fireball.cs.columbia.edu [128.59.13.10]) (user=smb2132 mech=PLAIN bits=0) by rambutan.cc.columbia.edu (8.14.4/8.14.3) with ESMTP id q9ODpxJq004357 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT); Wed, 24 Oct 2012 09:53:14 -0400 (EDT) From: Steven Bellovin Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 09:53:14 -0400 To: IETF Security Area Advisory Group , "cfrg@irtf.org" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.2 \(1499\)) X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1499) X-No-Spam-Score: Local X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.68 on 128.59.29.5 Subject: [Cfrg] Don't use short keys... X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 13:53:17 -0000 http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/dkim-vulnerability-widespread/all/ --Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb