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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
To: "'James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com'" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "'cfrg@ietf.org'" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Attacker changing tag length in OCB
Thread-Index: AQHOXAYhMmzPOt07Aki0uwqUdA76tJkkLCDA
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2013 16:42:43 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Attacker changing tag length in OCB
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More nuanced versions of my answers below (which doubtless overlap with 
others' answers).  By the way, I think this is a good question, and 
generalizes to beyond OCB.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: cfrg-bounces@irtf.org [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of
> Manger, James H
> Sent: Tuesday, May 28, 2013 8:47 PM
> To: cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: [Cfrg] Attacker changing tag length in OCB
>
> > 	Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
> > 	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-02.txt
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-02
>
> OCB with tag lengths of 64, 96, and 128 bits are defined. 64-bit and
> 96-bit tags are simply truncated 128-bit tags. The tag length is not
> mixed into the ciphertext. It never affects any input to an AES
> operation.

[DB]
Theorem 1 of
http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/ae.pdf
fixes the tag length.

I have not found a proof of security with variable tag lengths.

The most cautious approach would to be fix the tag length (per key).

Variable tag lengths per key may be useful, but it is crucial to state clearly 
the security characteristics of this mode.  If we cannot state them clearly, 
then users will not be able to use it right.  Perhaps countermeasures can 
added to that will probably avoid any mixups, but it is still much more 
important to state what the security characteristics are.

>
> Consequently, given a valid output from the AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN128
> algorithm it is trivial to produce a valid output from the
> AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN64 algorithm -- just drop the last 8 bytes.
>
> Is this ok?

[DB]
On the one hand, informally speaking: Alice did actually send the message, so 
there is no attack, and this is property of OCB is ok.

On the other hand, somebody suggested to me, off-list, an interesting example. 
Suppose that Bob accept both tag lengths, and treats the messages differently 
according to tag length.  If the tag length is 64, then Bob makes the message 
public (or perhaps just protect the message less, e.g. store in the cloud). 
In other words, the tag length itself serves as the associated data, and 
serves as label, as in James' example below, with 64=Public and 
128=Top-secret.

I think it is reasonable in the example above for Bob to differentiate his 
response to a message based on tag length.  But I think that the set of 
allowed actions for longer tags should be larger, not smaller.  Better 
authentication means the message is more trustworthy.  The example above is 
wrong in that a shorter tag allowed more actions (i.e. publish the message). 
In other words, a system using OCB in this way would be reversing the meaning 
of authenticity.  I think the appeal of the example is the confusion between 
authenticity and privacy:  "Shorter tag?  Must be less private.  Okay to make 
public!".

If a system (a user of OCB) works in this way, then there is nothing an 
algorithm like OCB can do to secure it.  Therefore, it is much more important 
to state clearly what authenticity and other security services provided by the 
algorithm mean, to help prevent the system from going awry.  The definitions 
for OCB are probably clear enough for the fixed tag length, but not yet for 
variable tag length.

Personally, I am still quite confused about the conflict between privacy and 
authentication: to preserve privacy, Bob should restrict his actions on the 
received plaintext, but authenticity allows him to take more actions (which 
could leak information about the message).


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From rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu  Mon Jun  3 12:52:16 2013
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
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Hi everyone,

Dan Brown wrote:
> can (or has) somebody formalize(d) the problem here, and
> prove[] that some method actually fixes solve the problem[?]
> ...
> let's not tweak OCB until we're certain of why and how.

To the best of my knowledge, the question that has arisen on this 
mailing list does not correspond to any already formalized security 
notion.  Here's one approach to formalizing the aim. First, the 
syntax for for an encryption algorithm E and decryption algorithm D 
are augmented by a new argument, taglen.  We require that
|E_K(N,A,P,taglen)| = |P|+taglen.  Then game defining security 
is adjusted to:

"Real" oracle pair. Select a random key K.
    Encrypt(N,A,P,taglen): return E_K(N,A,P,taglen)
    Decrypt(N,A,C,taglen): if taglen<TAGLEN return \bot
                           return D_K(N,A,C,taglen)
"Fake" oracle pair.
    Encrypt(N,A,P,taglen): return |P|+taglen random bits.
    Decrypt(N,A,C,taglen): return \bot 
Queries that allow a trivial wins are disallowed.

But the notion above is not without issues.  First, once you countenance 
variable-length tags, it seems good to consider arbitrarily short ones. 
That's not happening above because we effectively "give up" -- the adversary 
wins -- on first forgery.  This motivates the minimum taglen, TAGLEN, used
above.    Relatedly, nowhere above is captured the idea that, say, 
a 128-bit tag is harder to forge than a 32-bit one. These issues can 
be addressed, but only by major definitional changes.

The immature definitional story aside, I do think there's a simple and 
generic approach that likely achieves what people have in mind, at least 
for OCB: just drop the tag length into the nonce.  This generalizes what
James Manger, who started this discussion, wrote.   Ted has suggested 
to me that, in the context of OCB, we could do it like this:

    (1) Require the nonce N to be 120 or fewer bits (right now,
        we allow up to 127 bits);

    (2) In the definition of OCB, replace the step
          Nonce = zeros(127-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
        by
          Nonce = taglen || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
        where taglen is the 7-bit binary representation of (TAGLEN mod 128)

I think it's a good approach, designed to ensure that there's no change 
to OCB when the tag length is 128 bits (which we think is the the 
customary choice).   And "conventional" AEAD security is trivially 
maintained.

There are arguments both for and against making such a change: 
(+1) I think it does add a measure of robustness to have the 
"ciphertext core" meaningfully vary with the tag length. Folding the 
tag length into the nonce seems like the sort of "crypto engineering" 
choice that has not-well-characterized value beyond what our usual 
definitions speak to. 
(+2) Algorithmically, the change is cheap and easy, and it clearly 
retains "conventional" AEAD security. 
(+3) We suspect that those using OCB are using 128-bit tags, as 
MOSH does.  The change, as described above, wouldn't impact them. 
On the other hand, 
(-1) There are already OCB implementations that handle tags 
of length other than 128 bits. These would have to change. 
(-2) The OCB spec is quite clear that TAGLEN, like the 
underlying blockcipher, is a system parameter; the user has 
no more business letting it vary in the course of a session 
than he has letting the underlying blockcipher vary during a session.
(-3) I worry that trying to engineer things so that one can safely 
use varying tag lengths with a single key might send a message that 
this is an OK thing to do, contradicting the spec.  Someone might 
even think it appropriate to accept a ciphertext with _any_ provided 
tag length, as long as the ciphertext is deemed valid.  For most 
contexts, that would be disastrous. 
(-4) As indicated above, the definitional and provable-security
story that ought to accompany such a change is immature.
(-5) I find it pleasant that, currently, the algorithm of the 
published paper and the spec are exactly the same.

When I weigh the pluses and minuses, I'm of the opinion that it 
is reasonable to go either way.   Ted leans towards making 
the change.   Neither of us feels strongly about it. 
If there is a consensus on this mailing list in favor of 
the change, Ted and I will make it.  For now, I would 
consider this a heuristic measure that appears to buy a 
tiny measure of misuse resistance, and which provably 
does not damage standard AE security.

Rene Struik wrote: 
> The observation that some AEADs have the property [that ciphertexts
> look like C || T where C does not depend on the tag length] ... was 
> brought up by Rogaway and Wagner in their 2003 "Critique on CCM" paper
> (Section 3.4). It is therefore kind of interesting to see that the same
> observation applies to the OCB mode.

I looked back to see what David and I concluded back then --

   Does the attack above mean that the tag length \tau should have been used for
   computing the ciphertext core C?  In our opinion, the answer is: "not necessarily."
   Rather, the attack highlights that the specification [of CCM] has made it unclear
   what the goal is with respect handling a multiplicity of tag lengths.
   We suggest that the tag length parameter \tau should be fixed at key-negotiation time,
   bound securely to the key, and negotiated authentically between both parties. Once a
   session has begun, there should be only a single value \tau that will be accepted
   by the receiver, and this should remain unchanged throughout the lifetime of the
   session. The receiver shouldn't accept a new \tau in the middle of a session
   any more than it would accept a new block cipher E.

I would say that the OCB spec is perfectly in line with this conclusion.



Best,
phil

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
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Hi Phil,

I agree, there is a lack of appropriate definitions, but it seems like
it would be possible to develop them.  This has been a fruitful
discussion.

I do have a comment on the broader security goals.  Using an
authentication scheme that provides two sizes of authentication tag with
a single key makes sense only if there are (at least) two categories of
messages that are being authenticated, one of which requires only the
short authentication tag, another of which needs stronger
authentication.  When this cryptographic scheme is used, both the sender
(tag generator) and the receiver (message/tag verifier) need to
determine the appropriate category for each message, and the receiver
needs to discard messages that are authenticated with a short tag, but
which are in a stronger-authentication category.  If the
post-verification enforcement is omitted, then there is no security
advantage in using the variable-tag-length scheme, as compared to just
using a short tag.  This does not have any bearing on the soundness of
the cryptographic model, but it does have bearing on how such schemes
would be used in practice.  It would be important to ensure that the
users of the scheme understood how it fits into an overall security
system.

Perhaps the best place for us to look for applications of
variable-authentication-strength mechanisms would be low power wireless
devices, where the cost of transmission creates pressure to minimize tag
length, and there is a desire to minimize state (e.g. the number of
keys).  IEEE 802.15.4, for example, defines the use of tag lengths
between 4 and 16 bytes, if I recall correctly.  

An aside: OCB does not seem like the ideal scheme to use with short (or
variable length) authentication tags, because of the property that an
attacker who can cause a single forgery can use information thus learned
to perpetrate other forgeries.  

David

On Mon, 2013-06-03 at 12:41 -0700, Phillip Rogaway wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> 
> Dan Brown wrote:
> > can (or has) somebody formalize(d) the problem here, and
> > prove[] that some method actually fixes solve the problem[?]
> > ...
> > let's not tweak OCB until we're certain of why and how.
> 
> To the best of my knowledge, the question that has arisen on this 
> mailing list does not correspond to any already formalized security 
> notion.  Here's one approach to formalizing the aim. First, the 
> syntax for for an encryption algorithm E and decryption algorithm D 
> are augmented by a new argument, taglen.  We require that
> |E_K(N,A,P,taglen)| = |P|+taglen.  Then game defining security 
> is adjusted to:
> 
> "Real" oracle pair. Select a random key K.
>     Encrypt(N,A,P,taglen): return E_K(N,A,P,taglen)
>     Decrypt(N,A,C,taglen): if taglen<TAGLEN return \bot
>                            return D_K(N,A,C,taglen)
> "Fake" oracle pair.
>     Encrypt(N,A,P,taglen): return |P|+taglen random bits.
>     Decrypt(N,A,C,taglen): return \bot 
> Queries that allow a trivial wins are disallowed.
> 
> But the notion above is not without issues.  First, once you countenance 
> variable-length tags, it seems good to consider arbitrarily short ones. 
> That's not happening above because we effectively "give up" -- the adversary 
> wins -- on first forgery.  This motivates the minimum taglen, TAGLEN, used
> above.    Relatedly, nowhere above is captured the idea that, say, 
> a 128-bit tag is harder to forge than a 32-bit one. These issues can 
> be addressed, but only by major definitional changes.
> 
> The immature definitional story aside, I do think there's a simple and 
> generic approach that likely achieves what people have in mind, at least 
> for OCB: just drop the tag length into the nonce.  This generalizes what
> James Manger, who started this discussion, wrote.   Ted has suggested 
> to me that, in the context of OCB, we could do it like this:
> 
>     (1) Require the nonce N to be 120 or fewer bits (right now,
>         we allow up to 127 bits);
> 
>     (2) In the definition of OCB, replace the step
>           Nonce = zeros(127-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
>         by
>           Nonce = taglen || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
>         where taglen is the 7-bit binary representation of (TAGLEN mod 128)
> 
> I think it's a good approach, designed to ensure that there's no change 
> to OCB when the tag length is 128 bits (which we think is the the 
> customary choice).   And "conventional" AEAD security is trivially 
> maintained.
> 
> There are arguments both for and against making such a change: 
> (+1) I think it does add a measure of robustness to have the 
> "ciphertext core" meaningfully vary with the tag length. Folding the 
> tag length into the nonce seems like the sort of "crypto engineering" 
> choice that has not-well-characterized value beyond what our usual 
> definitions speak to. 
> (+2) Algorithmically, the change is cheap and easy, and it clearly 
> retains "conventional" AEAD security. 
> (+3) We suspect that those using OCB are using 128-bit tags, as 
> MOSH does.  The change, as described above, wouldn't impact them. 
> On the other hand, 
> (-1) There are already OCB implementations that handle tags 
> of length other than 128 bits. These would have to change. 
> (-2) The OCB spec is quite clear that TAGLEN, like the 
> underlying blockcipher, is a system parameter; the user has 
> no more business letting it vary in the course of a session 
> than he has letting the underlying blockcipher vary during a session.
> (-3) I worry that trying to engineer things so that one can safely 
> use varying tag lengths with a single key might send a message that 
> this is an OK thing to do, contradicting the spec.  Someone might 
> even think it appropriate to accept a ciphertext with _any_ provided 
> tag length, as long as the ciphertext is deemed valid.  For most 
> contexts, that would be disastrous. 
> (-4) As indicated above, the definitional and provable-security
> story that ought to accompany such a change is immature.
> (-5) I find it pleasant that, currently, the algorithm of the 
> published paper and the spec are exactly the same.
> 
> When I weigh the pluses and minuses, I'm of the opinion that it 
> is reasonable to go either way.   Ted leans towards making 
> the change.   Neither of us feels strongly about it. 
> If there is a consensus on this mailing list in favor of 
> the change, Ted and I will make it.  For now, I would 
> consider this a heuristic measure that appears to buy a 
> tiny measure of misuse resistance, and which provably 
> does not damage standard AE security.
> 
> Rene Struik wrote: 
> > The observation that some AEADs have the property [that ciphertexts
> > look like C || T where C does not depend on the tag length] ... was 
> > brought up by Rogaway and Wagner in their 2003 "Critique on CCM" paper
> > (Section 3.4). It is therefore kind of interesting to see that the same
> > observation applies to the OCB mode.
> 
> I looked back to see what David and I concluded back then --
> 
>    Does the attack above mean that the tag length \tau should have been used for
>    computing the ciphertext core C?  In our opinion, the answer is: "not necessarily."
>    Rather, the attack highlights that the specification [of CCM] has made it unclear
>    what the goal is with respect handling a multiplicity of tag lengths.
>    We suggest that the tag length parameter \tau should be fixed at key-negotiation time,
>    bound securely to the key, and negotiated authentically between both parties. Once a
>    session has begun, there should be only a single value \tau that will be accepted
>    by the receiver, and this should remain unchanged throughout the lifetime of the
>    session. The receiver shouldn't accept a new \tau in the middle of a session
>    any more than it would accept a new block cipher E.
> 
> I would say that the OCB spec is perfectly in line with this conclusion.
> 
> 
> 
> Best,
> phil
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Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
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> -----Original Message-----
> Phillip Rogaway
> Sent: Monday, June 03, 2013 3:42 PM
> To: cfrg@irtf.org
> (-3) I worry that trying to engineer things so that one can safely
> use varying tag lengths with a single key might send a message that
> this is an OK thing to do, contradicting the spec.  Someone might

[DB] Perhaps mistakenly (*), I interpreted some of the emails on this thread
as saying that the spec allows one to vary tag lengths with a single key.  

If the intent of the OCB spec is not to allow variable tag lengths, then I
think the spec needs greater emphasis, especially in view of some IETF
common practices and viewpoints (**).  So, the spec should somewhere say
that "a single key MUST not be used with multiple parameter sets" and "a
decryptor MUST reject a ciphertext if it uses different parameters than for
the key indicated".  

(*) I may have taken the emails out of context (i.e. without studying the
spec first): maybe the emails meant that somebody might contradict the spec.

(**) For example, TLS allows one public key per multiple different cipher
suites (not sure if it allows pre-shared key with different cipher suites).
For another example, PKIX did not accept proposals that allowed, as
optional, detailed algorithm restrictions in certificates.

> even think it appropriate to accept a ciphertext with _any_ provided
> tag length, as long as the ciphertext is deemed valid.  For most
> contexts, that would be disastrous.

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Phillip Rogaway <rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2013 14:39:44 -0400
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
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I think the change you propose is good, and would enhance security & add
robustness. I vote for making it, and wish such a change would/could be
done to all AEAD modes with variable tag size.

I don't know what to do, or how to answer your points (-3) and (-5).

Tnx!
--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal




On 6/3/13 15:41 , "Phillip Rogaway" <rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu> wrote:

>Hi everyone,
>
>Dan Brown wrote:
>> can (or has) somebody formalize(d) the problem here, and
>> prove[] that some method actually fixes solve the problem[?]
>> ...
>> let's not tweak OCB until we're certain of why and how.
>
>To the best of my knowledge, the question that has arisen on this
>mailing list does not correspond to any already formalized security
>notion.  Here's one approach to formalizing the aim. First, the
>syntax for for an encryption algorithm E and decryption algorithm D
>are augmented by a new argument, taglen.  We require that
>|E_K(N,A,P,taglen)| = |P|+taglen.  Then game defining security
>is adjusted to:
>
>"Real" oracle pair. Select a random key K.
>    Encrypt(N,A,P,taglen): return E_K(N,A,P,taglen)
>    Decrypt(N,A,C,taglen): if taglen<TAGLEN return \bot
>                           return D_K(N,A,C,taglen)
>"Fake" oracle pair.
>    Encrypt(N,A,P,taglen): return |P|+taglen random bits.
>    Decrypt(N,A,C,taglen): return \bot
>Queries that allow a trivial wins are disallowed.
>
>But the notion above is not without issues.  First, once you countenance
>variable-length tags, it seems good to consider arbitrarily short ones.
>That's not happening above because we effectively "give up" -- the
>adversary 
>wins -- on first forgery.  This motivates the minimum taglen, TAGLEN, used
>above.    Relatedly, nowhere above is captured the idea that, say,
>a 128-bit tag is harder to forge than a 32-bit one. These issues can
>be addressed, but only by major definitional changes.
>
>The immature definitional story aside, I do think there's a simple and
>generic approach that likely achieves what people have in mind, at least
>for OCB: just drop the tag length into the nonce.  This generalizes what
>James Manger, who started this discussion, wrote.   Ted has suggested
>to me that, in the context of OCB, we could do it like this:
>
>    (1) Require the nonce N to be 120 or fewer bits (right now,
>        we allow up to 127 bits);
>
>    (2) In the definition of OCB, replace the step
>          Nonce = zeros(127-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
>        by
>          Nonce = taglen || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
>        where taglen is the 7-bit binary representation of (TAGLEN mod
>128)
>
>I think it's a good approach, designed to ensure that there's no change
>to OCB when the tag length is 128 bits (which we think is the the
>customary choice).   And "conventional" AEAD security is trivially
>maintained.
>
>There are arguments both for and against making such a change:
>(+1) I think it does add a measure of robustness to have the
>"ciphertext core" meaningfully vary with the tag length. Folding the
>tag length into the nonce seems like the sort of "crypto engineering"
>choice that has not-well-characterized value beyond what our usual
>definitions speak to.
>(+2) Algorithmically, the change is cheap and easy, and it clearly
>retains "conventional" AEAD security.
>(+3) We suspect that those using OCB are using 128-bit tags, as
>MOSH does.  The change, as described above, wouldn't impact them.
>On the other hand,
>(-1) There are already OCB implementations that handle tags
>of length other than 128 bits. These would have to change.
>(-2) The OCB spec is quite clear that TAGLEN, like the
>underlying blockcipher, is a system parameter; the user has
>no more business letting it vary in the course of a session
>than he has letting the underlying blockcipher vary during a session.
>(-3) I worry that trying to engineer things so that one can safely
>use varying tag lengths with a single key might send a message that
>this is an OK thing to do, contradicting the spec.  Someone might
>even think it appropriate to accept a ciphertext with _any_ provided
>tag length, as long as the ciphertext is deemed valid.  For most
>contexts, that would be disastrous.
>(-4) As indicated above, the definitional and provable-security
>story that ought to accompany such a change is immature.
>(-5) I find it pleasant that, currently, the algorithm of the
>published paper and the spec are exactly the same.
>
>When I weigh the pluses and minuses, I'm of the opinion that it
>is reasonable to go either way.   Ted leans towards making
>the change.   Neither of us feels strongly about it.
>If there is a consensus on this mailing list in favor of
>the change, Ted and I will make it.  For now, I would
>consider this a heuristic measure that appears to buy a
>tiny measure of misuse resistance, and which provably
>does not damage standard AE security.
>
>Rene Struik wrote:
>> The observation that some AEADs have the property [that ciphertexts
>> look like C || T where C does not depend on the tag length] ... was
>> brought up by Rogaway and Wagner in their 2003 "Critique on CCM" paper
>> (Section 3.4). It is therefore kind of interesting to see that the same
>> observation applies to the OCB mode.
>
>I looked back to see what David and I concluded back then --
>
>   Does the attack above mean that the tag length \tau should have been
>used for
>   computing the ciphertext core C?  In our opinion, the answer is: "not
>necessarily."
>   Rather, the attack highlights that the specification [of CCM] has made
>it unclear
>   what the goal is with respect handling a multiplicity of tag lengths.
>   We suggest that the tag length parameter \tau should be fixed at
>key-negotiation time,
>   bound securely to the key, and negotiated authentically between both
>parties. Once a
>   session has begun, there should be only a single value \tau that will
>be accepted
>   by the receiver, and this should remain unchanged throughout the
>lifetime of the
>   session. The receiver shouldn't accept a new \tau in the middle of a
>session
>   any more than it would accept a new block cipher E.
>
>I would say that the OCB spec is perfectly in line with this conclusion.
>
>
>
>Best,
>phil
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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From lloyd@randombit.net  Tue Jun  4 13:02:28 2013
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To: cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
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On Tue, Jun 04, 2013 at 05:49:06PM +0000, Dan Brown wrote:

> If the intent of the OCB spec is not to allow variable tag lengths, then I
> think the spec needs greater emphasis, especially in view of some IETF
> common practices and viewpoints (**).  So, the spec should somewhere say
[...]
> (**) For example, TLS allows one public key per multiple different cipher
> suites (not sure if it allows pre-shared key with different cipher suites).

To address TLS-PSK specifically - using a single PSK with several
different cipher suites is allowed, though as the actual symmetric
keys are derived from both the PSK and the client and server nonces
(and, optionally, a DH/ECDH key exchange), the actual OCB key would
never be reused in a different context, or even in a different session
with the same parameter set.

-Jack

From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Wed Jun 12 06:48:09 2013
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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Subject: [Cfrg] WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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OK, it looks like the debate working the tag length into AEAD
encryption has reached either consensus or exhaustion.
Here is where I think we stand:

1) Working the tag length into either the KDF or encryption
   process is a prudent precaution because, at the very least,
   it simplifies the security analysis and guards against
   implementation errors.  Future AEAD modes should STRONGLY=20
   consider doing this.

2) OCB is too widespread to make such a substantive change at
   this late date.

3) The changes made in the current OCB draft aren't substantive,
   they merely correct errors in the exposition.

Therefore I want to make a RG last call on draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-02.
I'll start of the discussion by putting on the floor a motion that=20
the RG accept draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-02 as it stands. Discussion?
Don't be shy. How do the RG and the authors feel about Dan Brown's=20
suggestion to insert some text explicitly prohibiting using the same=20
key with different OCB lengths?

> -----Original Message-----
> From: cfrg-bounces@irtf.org [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of
> Jack Lloyd
> Sent: Tuesday, June 04, 2013 3:01 PM
> To: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Attacker changing the tag length in OCB
>=20
> On Tue, Jun 04, 2013 at 05:49:06PM +0000, Dan Brown wrote:
>=20
> > If the intent of the OCB spec is not to allow variable tag lengths,
> then I
> > think the spec needs greater emphasis, especially in view of some
> IETF
> > common practices and viewpoints (**).  So, the spec should somewhere
> say
> [...]
> > (**) For example, TLS allows one public key per multiple different
> cipher
> > suites (not sure if it allows pre-shared key with different cipher
> suites).
>=20
> To address TLS-PSK specifically - using a single PSK with several
> different cipher suites is allowed, though as the actual symmetric
> keys are derived from both the PSK and the client and server nonces
> (and, optionally, a DH/ECDH key exchange), the actual OCB key would
> never be reused in a different context, or even in a different session
> with the same parameter set.
>=20
> -Jack
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From ted@krovetz.net  Wed Jun 12 07:08:33 2013
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References: <alpine.WNT.2.00.1306031235280.6196@RogawaySamsung9> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF518BD79@XMB111CNC.rim.net> <20130604190104.GA29597@randombit.net> <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CAB24340B0@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov>
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Cc: Phillip Rogaway <rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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Thanks Kevin for pushing OCB along.

> 2) OCB is too widespread to make such a substantive change at this =
late date.

Actually, Phil and I have decided to make the change. We agree that it =
is a good idea, and since we figured out how to do it without affecting =
existing users of 128-bit tags, we think it's worth the break.

A draft that makes the change will be posted later today or tomorrow. It =
will not need much changing over -02, so hopefully it won't take much =
further review.

-Ted


From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Wed Jun 12 07:14:17 2013
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 14:14:09 +0000
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Subject: [Cfrg] FW: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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Sorry folks, I hit "Reply" vice "Reply To All".  Mea culpa!

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ted Krovetz [mailto:ted@krovetz.net]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2013 10:12 AM
> To: Igoe, Kevin M.
> Subject: Re: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
>=20
> Did you intend that question to go to CFRG? It looks like you
> accidentally sent it to just me.
>=20
>=20
> On Jun 12, 2013, at 7:10 AM, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>=20
> > Excellent!  Does anyone have any other issues they'd like to see
> addressed?
> > I'd like to get this thru RG Last Call within a week or two.
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Ted Krovetz [mailto:ted@krovetz.net]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2013 10:08 AM
> >> To: cfrg@irtf.org
> >> Cc: Phillip Rogaway; Igoe, Kevin M.
> >> Subject: Re: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
> >>
> >> Thanks Kevin for pushing OCB along.
> >>
> >>> 2) OCB is too widespread to make such a substantive change at this
> >> late date.
> >>
> >> Actually, Phil and I have decided to make the change. We agree that
> it
> >> is a good idea, and since we figured out how to do it without
> affecting
> >> existing users of 128-bit tags, we think it's worth the break.
> >>
> >> A draft that makes the change will be posted later today or
> tomorrow.
> >> It will not need much changing over -02, so hopefully it won't take
> >> much further review.
> >>
> >> -Ted
> >


From prvs=98754349b3=uri@ll.mit.edu  Wed Jun 12 08:53:22 2013
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 11:53:09 -0400
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] FW: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] FW: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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--B_3453882789_10516725
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I see no other issue and would like to see this draft advanced.

Tnx!

P.S. Ted and Phil, thanks for making the tag length change!

P.P.S. Ted, could you point me again at where the reference implementation
is? I'd like to play with it a bit.
--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal




On 6/12/13 10:14 , "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:

>Sorry folks, I hit "Reply" vice "Reply To All".  Mea culpa!
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Ted Krovetz [mailto:ted@krovetz.net]
>> Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2013 10:12 AM
>> To: Igoe, Kevin M.
>> Subject: Re: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
>> 
>> Did you intend that question to go to CFRG? It looks like you
>> accidentally sent it to just me.
>> 
>> 
>> On Jun 12, 2013, at 7:10 AM, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>> 
>> > Excellent!  Does anyone have any other issues they'd like to see
>> addressed?
>> > I'd like to get this thru RG Last Call within a week or two.
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Ted Krovetz [mailto:ted@krovetz.net]
>> >> Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2013 10:08 AM
>> >> To: cfrg@irtf.org
>> >> Cc: Phillip Rogaway; Igoe, Kevin M.
>> >> Subject: Re: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
>> >>
>> >> Thanks Kevin for pushing OCB along.
>> >>
>> >>> 2) OCB is too widespread to make such a substantive change at this
>> >> late date.
>> >>
>> >> Actually, Phil and I have decided to make the change. We agree that
>> it
>> >> is a good idea, and since we figured out how to do it without
>> affecting
>> >> existing users of 128-bit tags, we think it's worth the break.
>> >>
>> >> A draft that makes the change will be posted later today or
>> tomorrow.
>> >> It will not need much changing over -02, so hopefully it won't take
>> >> much further review.
>> >>
>> >> -Ted
>> >
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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From ted@krovetz.net  Wed Jun 12 08:57:43 2013
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From: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] FW: WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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Thanks for your support Uri.

> P.P.S. Ted, could you point me again at where the reference =
implementation
> is? I'd like to play with it a bit.

All things OCB can be found at

  http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb

The "News and Code" and "Spec" pages will be updated in the coming days =
to reflect the latest changes.=

From dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net  Wed Jun 12 09:47:03 2013
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Cc: Phillip Rogaway <rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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On 6/12/13 7:08 AM, Ted Krovetz wrote:
> Thanks Kevin for pushing OCB along.
>
>> 2) OCB is too widespread to make such a substantive change at this late date.
> Actually, Phil and I have decided to make the change. We agree that it is a good idea, and since we figured out how to do it without affecting existing users of 128-bit tags, we think it's worth the break.
>
> A draft that makes the change will be posted later today or tomorrow. It will not need much changing over -02, so hopefully it won't take much further review.
>
> -Ted
[snip]

And just an only semi-relevant little point:  The key derivation 
functions in SP 800-108 all include the number of output bits in the 
computation.  So if you use exactly the same key, label, and context, 
and generate a 128 bit key and a 256 bit key, the two keys are 
completely different.  They could have not done that and instead made 
the argument that people should know better than to... .  I think that 
mixing the output length into the computation of both KDFs and 
authentication tags is good.

     --David




From pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz  Wed Jun 12 13:35:40 2013
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David Jacobson <dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net>, Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>, Phillip Rogaway <rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] WG last call on latest OCB draft.
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David Jacobson <dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>And just an only semi-relevant little point:  The key derivation functions=
 in=0A=
>SP 800-108 all include the number of output bits in the computation.  So i=
f=0A=
>you use exactly the same key, label, and context, and generate a 128 bit k=
ey=0A=
>and a 256 bit key, the two keys are completely different.  They could have=
=0A=
>not done that and instead made the argument that people should know better=
=0A=
>than to... .  I think that mixing the output length into the computation o=
f=0A=
>both KDFs and authentication tags is good.=0A=
=0A=
I don't know about SP 800-108, but for PBKDF2 there was a strong argument f=
rom=0A=
one of the contributors that the same input used to produce different-width=
=0A=
outputs should produce completely different output, so an attacker couldn't=
=0A=
leapfrog from one key size (e.g. 40 bits) to another (DES' 56 bits).  So=0A=
PBKDF2 includes a specific design feature to avoid this problem (in the=0A=
context of when it was created rather than today's variable-width MAC tags)=
.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=

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Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 15:50:48 -0700
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group=
 of the IETF.

	Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
	Author(s)       : Ted Krovetz
                          Phillip Rogaway
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2013-06-12

Abstract:
   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
   encryption scheme that provides privacy and authenticity for
   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From ted@krovetz.net  Wed Jun 12 15:56:38 2013
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From: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 15:56:30 -0700
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Subject: [Cfrg] Changes in draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
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I have just posted a revised Internet-Draft for OCB.

  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/>

A nice diff can be seen at

  <http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03>
=20
The most significant changes are:

1. OCB uses an internal 128-bit nonce which is constructed from =
user-supplied nonce N as

 `Nonce =3D num2str(TAGLEN mod 128,7) || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N` =
=20

 This changes all generated tags except those that are 128 bits. The =
macro `num2str` is also new and is now defined in the notation section.


2. The end of Appendix A adds test vectors for each named parameter set. =
All other test vectors are unchanged because they had 128-bit tags.


3. The Security Considerations has a new paragraph on TAGLEN.

 > Normally, a given key should be used to create ciphertexts with a
 > single tag length, TAGLEN, and an application should reject any
 > ciphertext that claims authenticity under the same key but a
 > different tag length.  While the ciphertext core and all of the bits
 > of the tag do depend on the tag length, this is done for added
 > robustness to misuse and should not suggest that receivers accept
 > ciphertexts employing variable tag lengths under a single key.


4. A new paragraph is added to the introduction making it clear that =
byte-oriented implementations are okay. This is in response to an =
implementor who was worried about his byte-oriented implementation being =
out of compliance with the spec.

 > For reasons of generality, OCB is defined to operate on arbitrary
 > bit-strings.  But for reasons of simplicity and efficiency, most
 > implementations will assume that strings operated on are byte-strings
 > (ie, strings that are a multiple of 8 bits).  To promote
 > interoperability, implementations of OCB that communicate with
 > implementations of unknown capabilities should restrict all provided
 > values (nonces, tags, plaintexts, ciphertexts, and associated data)
 > to byte-strings.

Thank you everybody for your help in refining OCB. Phil and I really =
appreciate it.

-Ted=

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Thu Jun 13 10:46:14 2013
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From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
To: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Changes in draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
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On Wed, 2013-06-12 at 15:56 -0700, Ted Krovetz wrote:
> I have just posted a revised Internet-Draft for OCB.
> 
>   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/>
> 
> A nice diff can be seen at
> 
>   <http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03>
>  
> The most significant changes are:
> 
> 1. OCB uses an internal 128-bit nonce which is constructed from user-supplied nonce N as
> 
>  `Nonce = num2str(TAGLEN mod 128,7) || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N`  
> 
>  This changes all generated tags except those that are 128 bits. The macro `num2str` is also new and is now defined in the notation section.
> 
> 
> 2. The end of Appendix A adds test vectors for each named parameter set. All other test vectors are unchanged because they had 128-bit tags.
> 
> 
> 3. The Security Considerations has a new paragraph on TAGLEN.
> 
>  > Normally, a given key should be used to create ciphertexts with a
>  > single tag length, TAGLEN, and an application should reject any
>  > ciphertext that claims authenticity under the same key but a
>  > different tag length.  While the ciphertext core and all of the bits
>  > of the tag do depend on the tag length, this is done for added
>  > robustness to misuse and should not suggest that receivers accept
>  > ciphertexts employing variable tag lengths under a single key.

it is a sound approach to forbid the use of a single key with different
tag lengths, but the requirements language should be firmed up.  This
section should say something like "For each particular key, the value of
TAGLEN MUST be fixed."  

David

> 
> 
> 4. A new paragraph is added to the introduction making it clear that byte-oriented implementations are okay. This is in response to an implementor who was worried about his byte-oriented implementation being out of compliance with the spec.
> 
>  > For reasons of generality, OCB is defined to operate on arbitrary
>  > bit-strings.  But for reasons of simplicity and efficiency, most
>  > implementations will assume that strings operated on are byte-strings
>  > (ie, strings that are a multiple of 8 bits).  To promote
>  > interoperability, implementations of OCB that communicate with
>  > implementations of unknown capabilities should restrict all provided
>  > values (nonces, tags, plaintexts, ciphertexts, and associated data)
>  > to byte-strings.
> 
> Thank you everybody for your help in refining OCB. Phil and I really appreciate it.
> 
> -Ted
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Fri Jun 28 07:42:09 2013
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Subject: [Cfrg] kcipher-2 spec
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Hi,

The ISE is being asked to publish the kcipher-2 spec [1] as
an independent submission track RFC.

I'm handling the RFC 5742 review [2] for the IESG, which means
checking that this document doesn't conflict with IETF work.

I don't believe there is any such conflict, but do yell at
me if you think otherwise. (Before July 11th please.)

If you have comments on the draft (e.g. if you spot an error
or something) please send mail to the authors and the
independent submissions editor (rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org) so
they can consider your comments.

Thanks,
S.


[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kiyomoto-kcipher2/
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5742
