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From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "wajdi.k.feghali@intel.com" <wajdi.k.feghali@intel.com>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Hello CFRG,

Yaron, Paul, Wajdi, and I are interested in your input on the "Usage
Guidance" section in "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
and Authentication Header (AH)".   This is an active standards-track
draft in the IPsec working group, which updates the ESP and AH algorithm
requirements (RFC 4835).  The usage guidance section is new, and it
offers advice on how to use ESP and AH to achieve cryptographic security
goals.  

Quick link:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-ah-reqts/?include_text=1

thanks,

David



From ynir@checkpoint.com  Tue Jul  2 08:18:58 2013
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "wajdi.k.feghali@intel.com" <wajdi.k.feghali@intel.com>, cfrg <cfrg@irtf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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On Jul 2, 2013, at 5:31 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> Hello CFRG,
>=20
> Yaron, Paul, Wajdi, and I are interested in your input on the "Usage
> Guidance" section in "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
> Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
> and Authentication Header (AH)".   This is an active standards-track
> draft in the IPsec working group, which updates the ESP and AH algorithm
> requirements (RFC 4835).  The usage guidance section is new, and it
> offers advice on how to use ESP and AH to achieve cryptographic security
> goals. =20
>=20
> Quick link:
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-ah-reqts/?include_=
text=3D1
>=20
> thanks,
>=20

Hi David.

You've heard these before, but I'll repeat them since you're asking for com=
ments on this list.

- I'm concerned that the only encryption algorithm is AES. Yes, I see that =
TripleDES-CBC as a MAY, but that is by now the past. AES-128-CBC is 9 times=
 the speed of 3DES (on an Intel platform without AES-NI based on "openssl s=
peed"), and with AES-NI the ratio is likely to jump to 20. With GCM it's ev=
en more pronounced. So 3DES cannot be a reasonable alternative to AES. I th=
ink we should have some alternative that is at least at the SHOULD level.

- I'm not sure what the point is of the MAY level. We MAY implement anythin=
g: SEED, Camellia, GOST. That doesn't help with interoperability

- I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a reason why=
 someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC rather than A=
ES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity recently (mea=
ning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs significantly slow=
er than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no longer s=
ecure". Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. So =
I think a document where the goal is interoperability should focus on what =
is becoming the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.

Yoav



From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Tue Jul  2 08:33:21 2013
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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On Jul 2, 2013, at 8:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:

> - I'm concerned that the only encryption algorithm is AES. Yes, I see =
that TripleDES-CBC as a MAY, but that is by now the past. AES-128-CBC is =
9 times the speed of 3DES (on an Intel platform without AES-NI based on =
"openssl speed"), and with AES-NI the ratio is likely to jump to 20. =
With GCM it's even more pronounced. So 3DES cannot be a reasonable =
alternative to AES. I think we should have some alternative that is at =
least at the SHOULD level.

...and yet no alternative seemed reasonable enough for you to suggest. =
:-) Should we either (a) delay this document until there is a =
widely-agreed-on alternative that is better than 3DES or (b) pick =
something now that is not widely-agreed-on and try to promote it? =
Neither seems like a good option to me.

> - I'm not sure what the point is of the MAY level. We MAY implement =
anything: SEED, Camellia, GOST. That doesn't help with interoperability

Documenting at least one MAY-level algorithm shows that an =
implementation must not assume that there is only one code point that it =
will need to ever care about.=20

> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a =
reason why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC =
rather than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained =
popularity recently (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). =
It runs significantly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped =
reading at "SHA-1 is no longer secure". Still, they're not asking for =
GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. So I think a document where the goal =
is interoperability should focus on what is becoming the de-facto =
standard as long as it's secure enough.

Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an HMAC =
would indeed be good.

--Paul Hoffman=

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Tue Jul  2 08:52:13 2013
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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On Jul 2, 2013, at 6:33 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
 wrote:

> On Jul 2, 2013, at 8:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>=20
>> - I'm concerned that the only encryption algorithm is AES. Yes, I see th=
at TripleDES-CBC as a MAY, but that is by now the past. AES-128-CBC is 9 ti=
mes the speed of 3DES (on an Intel platform without AES-NI based on "openss=
l speed"), and with AES-NI the ratio is likely to jump to 20. With GCM it's=
 even more pronounced. So 3DES cannot be a reasonable alternative to AES. I=
 think we should have some alternative that is at least at the SHOULD level=
.
>=20
> ...and yet no alternative seemed reasonable enough for you to suggest. :-=
) Should we either (a) delay this document until there is a widely-agreed-o=
n alternative that is better than 3DES or (b) pick something now that is no=
t widely-agreed-on and try to promote it? Neither seems like a good option =
to me.

"openssl speed" has Camellia at 70% the speed of AES. And while it's not wi=
dely implemented in IPsec, its TLS ciphersuites are implemented and enabled=
 by default in both Chrome and Firefox, as well as in OpenSSL. If I'm not m=
istaken a default Firefox, and an out-of-the-box Apache server with ModSSL =
will use Camellia.

>> - I'm not sure what the point is of the MAY level. We MAY implement anyt=
hing: SEED, Camellia, GOST. That doesn't help with interoperability
>=20
> Documenting at least one MAY-level algorithm shows that an implementation=
 must not assume that there is only one code point that it will need to eve=
r care about.

OK, but this makes "SHOULD NOT+" strange. Am I required to remove it from m=
y library to make it compliant?  Can I still keep the 40-bit variant of CAS=
T that I have there? It's OK to publish a separate die-die-die document for=
 DES like the one for MD5, but in this document?

>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a reason =
why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC rather tha=
n AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity recently (=
meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs significantly s=
lower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no longe=
r secure". Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. =
So I think a document where the goal is interoperability should focus on wh=
at is becoming the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.
>=20
> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an HMAC =
would indeed be good.

I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.

Yoav=

From prvs=0895b2fc78=uri@ll.mit.edu  Tue Jul  2 08:58:04 2013
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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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On 7/2/13 11:33 , "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:


>On Jul 2, 2013, at 8:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>
>> - I'm concerned that the only encryption algorithm is AES. Yes, I see
>>that TripleDES-CBC as a MAY, but that is by now the past. AES-128-CBC is
>>9 times the speed of 3DES (on an Intel platform without AES-NI based on
>>"openssl speed"), and with AES-NI the ratio is likely to jump to 20.
>>With GCM it's even more pronounced. So 3DES cannot be a reasonable
>>alternative to AES. I think we should have some alternative that is at
>>least at the SHOULD level.
>
>...and yet no alternative seemed reasonable enough for you to suggest.
>:-) Should we either (a) delay this document until there is a
>widely-agreed-on alternative that is better than 3DES or (b) pick
>something now that is not widely-agreed-on and try to promote it? Neither
>seems like a good option to me.

IMHO, at this point there's no alternative that is either necessary or
useful. Therefore I propose (c): leave this part alone and go on. If AES
does get broken - we'll have a bigger problem on our hands.

If patent issues aren't of concern - I would consider adding AES-*-OCB
mode as either SHOULD or at least MAY.


>>- I'm not sure what the point is of the MAY level. We MAY implement
>>anything: SEED, Camellia, GOST. That doesn't help with interoperability
>
>Documenting at least one MAY-level algorithm shows that an implementation
>must not assume that there is only one code point that it will need to
>ever care about.

As you pointed out, we MAY implement anything. If you absolutely insist
that an algorithm or two MUST be mentioned in the MAY clause (:-), why not
one or two of the AES competition finalists (those that did not have any
attacks published)?


> 
>>- I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a reason
>>why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC rather
>>than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity
>>recently (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs
>>significantly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped reading at
>>"SHA-1 is no longer secure". Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're
>>asking for SHA-256. So I think a document where the goal is
>>interoperability should focus on what is becoming the de-facto standard
>>as long as it's secure enough.
>
>Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an HMAC
>would indeed be good.

One reason to use AES-GMAC for ESP authentication is that ESP supports all
of the following: (a) don't encrypt but authenticate, (b) authenticate but
don't encrypt, (c) encrypt and authenticate. GMAC fits the (a) case
perfectly. In the past, people unfamiliar with how ESP and AH evolved, had
a misconception that when you need  authentication you use AH, when you
need encryption you use ESP, and when you need both you combine the two
(ESP+AH). IMHO it was mainly because of their ignorance of the main reason
behind creation of AH - the EXPORT CONTROL (of that time!) requirement for
an authentication-only mode that could not have encryption retrofitted in
in.

I see no reason to use GMAC (or any other MAC) over encrypted (e.g., with
AES-CBC) data: if you encrypt - there's no reason not to use AE/AEAD mode.
If you don't encrypt - use GMAC. When given a choice between GMAC and
HMAC-SHA256, the decision should be obvious (and not in favor of SHA :).



More detailed review to follow. :-)

TNX!

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On Jul 2, 2013, at 8:51 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:

> "openssl speed" has Camellia at 70% the speed of AES. And while it's =
not widely implemented in IPsec, its TLS ciphersuites are implemented =
and enabled by default in both Chrome and Firefox, as well as in =
OpenSSL. If I'm not mistaken a default Firefox, and an out-of-the-box =
Apache server with ModSSL will use Camellia.

So you are proposing Camellia as a SHOULD for IPsec instead of =
TripleDES? (Yes, I'm holding your feet to the fire here.)

>>> - I'm not sure what the point is of the MAY level. We MAY implement =
anything: SEED, Camellia, GOST. That doesn't help with interoperability
>>=20
>> Documenting at least one MAY-level algorithm shows that an =
implementation must not assume that there is only one code point that it =
will need to ever care about.
>=20
> OK, but this makes "SHOULD NOT+" strange. Am I required to remove it =
from my library to make it compliant?  Can I still keep the 40-bit =
variant of CAST that I have there? It's OK to publish a separate =
die-die-die document for DES like the one for MD5, but in this document?

Yes to all.

>>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a =
reason why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC =
rather than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained =
popularity recently (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). =
It runs significantly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped =
reading at "SHA-1 is no longer secure". Still, they're not asking for =
GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. So I think a document where the goal =
is interoperability should focus on what is becoming the de-facto =
standard as long as it's secure enough.
>>=20
>> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an =
HMAC would indeed be good.
>=20
> I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.

And saying so in the document would be valuable.

--Paul Hoffman=

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Tue Jul  2 11:56:06 2013
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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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On Jul 2, 2013, at 7:12 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
 wrote:

> On Jul 2, 2013, at 8:51 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>=20
>> "openssl speed" has Camellia at 70% the speed of AES. And while it's not=
 widely implemented in IPsec, its TLS ciphersuites are implemented and enab=
led by default in both Chrome and Firefox, as well as in OpenSSL. If I'm no=
t mistaken a default Firefox, and an out-of-the-box Apache server with ModS=
SL will use Camellia.
>=20
> So you are proposing Camellia as a SHOULD for IPsec instead of TripleDES?=
 (Yes, I'm holding your feet to the fire here.)

Yes. The algorithms we've heard about are GOST, SEED, and Camellia. All oth=
ers are too obscure, including the old AES competition contenders. GOST use=
s a 64-bit block, and of the other two Camellia gets more use because of Op=
enSSL and Firefox.

>>>> - I'm not sure what the point is of the MAY level. We MAY implement an=
ything: SEED, Camellia, GOST. That doesn't help with interoperability
>>>=20
>>> Documenting at least one MAY-level algorithm shows that an implementati=
on must not assume that there is only one code point that it will need to e=
ver care about.
>>=20
>> OK, but this makes "SHOULD NOT+" strange. Am I required to remove it fro=
m my library to make it compliant?  Can I still keep the 40-bit variant of =
CAST that I have there? It's OK to publish a separate die-die-die document =
for DES like the one for MD5, but in this document?
>=20
> Yes to all.

I would prefer that the line about DES would be gone completely.

>>>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a reaso=
n why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC rather t=
han AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity recently=
 (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs significantly=
 slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no lon=
ger secure". Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256=
. So I think a document where the goal is interoperability should focus on =
what is becoming the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.
>>>=20
>>> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an HMA=
C would indeed be good.
>>=20
>> I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.
>=20
> And saying so in the document would be valuable.

I'm still looking for the rationale for SHOULD, let alone SHOULD+ for it.


From prvs=0895b2fc78=uri@ll.mit.edu  Tue Jul  2 13:02:00 2013
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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--
Regards,
Uri         <uri@ll.mit.edu>
<Disclaimer>

On Jul 2, 2013, at 14:55 , Yoav Nir wrote:
> On Jul 2, 2013, at 7:12 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> wrote:
>=20
>> On Jul 2, 2013, at 8:51 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> "openssl speed" has Camellia at 70% the speed of AES. And while it's =
not widely implemented in IPsec, its TLS ciphersuites are implemented =
and enabled by default in both Chrome and Firefox, as well as in =
OpenSSL. If I'm not mistaken a default Firefox, and an out-of-the-box =
Apache server with ModSSL will use Camellia.
>>=20
>> So you are proposing Camellia as a SHOULD for IPsec instead of =
TripleDES? (Yes, I'm holding your feet to the fire here.)
>=20
> Yes. The algorithms we've heard about are GOST, SEED, and Camellia. =
All others are too obscure, including the old AES competition =
contenders. GOST uses a 64-bit block, and of the other two Camellia gets =
more use because of OpenSSL and Firefox.

If it has to be one of these three - Camellia would be the best =
candidate.

> I would prefer that the line about DES would be gone completely.

Concur.

>>>>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a =
reason why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC =
rather than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained =
popularity recently (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). =
It runs significantly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped =
reading at "SHA-1 is no longer secure". Still, they're not asking for =
GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. So I think a document where the goal =
is interoperability should focus on what is becoming the de-facto =
standard as long as it's secure enough.
>>>>=20
>>>> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an =
HMAC would indeed be good.
>>>=20
>>> I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.
>>=20
>> And saying so in the document would be valuable.
>=20
> I'm still looking for the rationale for SHOULD, let alone SHOULD+ for =
it.

With AE modes there is no rationale to use separate encryption and =
authentication that I can think of.  The rationale of using GMAC instead =
of HMAC-SHA* is: (a) better performance, and (b) security proofs make =
better (to my taste) assumptions. These two should be sufficient.


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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On Jul 2, 2013, at 11:01 PM, "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.e=
du> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>>>>>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a rea=
son why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC rather=
 than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity recent=
ly (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs significant=
ly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no l=
onger secure". Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-2=
56. So I think a document where the goal is interoperability should focus o=
n what is becoming the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an H=
MAC would indeed be good.
>>>>=20
>>>> I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.
>>>=20
>>> And saying so in the document would be valuable.
>>=20
>> I'm still looking for the rationale for SHOULD, let alone SHOULD+ for it=
.
>=20
> With AE modes there is no rationale to use separate encryption and authen=
tication that I can think of.  The rationale of using GMAC instead of HMAC-=
SHA* is: (a) better performance, and (b) security proofs make better (to my=
 taste) assumptions. These two should be sufficient.

And I'm not objecting to it being a SHOULD with or without + for AH. I'm on=
ly asking about ESP.=

From prvs=0895b2fc78=uri@ll.mit.edu  Tue Jul  2 14:20:12 2013
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To: "'ynir@checkpoint.com'" <ynir@checkpoint.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2013 17:19:58 -0400
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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But Yoav, my whole point was that:

- there is (almost) no reason to use AH now, as ESP handles _authetication-=
only_, encryption-only, encryption+authentication;

- for any use that involves encryption+authentication there is no justifica=
tion (nor reason :) to use anything but one of AE encryption modes such as =
GCM (<b>no</b> reason to use AES-whatever plus HMAC-whatever); this include=
s a na=EFve attempt to do separate AES-CTR + AES-GMAC - just do AES-GCM ins=
tead;

- for any use that involves authentication-only (such as ESP-authenticate, =
or AH - doesn't matter) one SHOULD employ GMAC instead of HMAC, for reasons=
 specified in the previous posting.

This reasoning (GMAC instead of HMAC) applies to ESP as much as to AH.=20

P.S. IMHO the _only_ case when you might want to use AH at all is when you =
both need to authenticate a larger part of the IP header than ESP covers _a=
nd_ you want to use Transport rather than Tunnel mode of IPsec.

--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Lexington, MA  02420-9185      =20

Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/

=20

MIT LL Root CA:=20

 <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>


DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638

----- Original Message -----
From: Yoav Nir [mailto:ynir@checkpoint.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 04:31 PM=0A=
To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>; cfrg <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance


On Jul 2, 2013, at 11:01 PM, "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.e=
du> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>>>>>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a rea=
son why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with AES-GMAC rather=
 than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity recent=
ly (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs significant=
ly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no l=
onger secure". Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-2=
56. So I think a document where the goal is interoperability should focus o=
n what is becoming the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of an H=
MAC would indeed be good.
>>>>=20
>>>> I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.
>>>=20
>>> And saying so in the document would be valuable.
>>=20
>> I'm still looking for the rationale for SHOULD, let alone SHOULD+ for it=
.
>=20
> With AE modes there is no rationale to use separate encryption and authen=
tication that I can think of.  The rationale of using GMAC instead of HMAC-=
SHA* is: (a) better performance, and (b) security proofs make better (to my=
 taste) assumptions. These two should be sufficient.

And I'm not objecting to it being a SHOULD with or without + for AH. I'm on=
ly asking about ESP.=

From yaronf.ietf@gmail.com  Wed Jul  3 13:04:59 2013
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Date: Wed, 03 Jul 2013 23:04:55 +0300
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Or we could (COULD?) mandate both AES-GMAC and HMAC-256 at the SHOULD 
level for ESP-auth-only, to ensure that we have a fallback hash if 
something goes badly wrong with the primary choice.

Thanks,
	Yaron

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--B_3455712907_47302993
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My preference would be "MUST AES-GMAC and SHOULD HMAC-SHA256" for both
ESP-auth-only and AH. (I personally don't think anything would go wrong
with AES-GMAC, but it doesn't hurt to cover our bases :)

Thanks!
--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal




On 7/3/13 16:04 , "Yaron Sheffer" <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>Or we could (COULD?) mandate both AES-GMAC and HMAC-256 at the SHOULD
>level for ESP-auth-only, to ensure that we have a fallback hash if
>something goes badly wrong with the primary choice.
>
>Thanks,
>	Yaron
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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Subject: [Cfrg] CFRG meeting at IETF 87
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Hi,

here is the meeting information for the CFRG meeting at IETF 87:

Date: MONDAY, July 29, 2013    
Time: 1510-1610  Afternoon Session II
Room: Tiergarten 1/2             
http://tools.ietf.org/agenda/87/

We will go over all of the active drafts.  Let us know if you have
anything else that you would like to present or discuss.

David and Kevin


From mcgrew@cisco.com  Wed Jul  3 16:50:57 2013
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From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Hi Yoav,

thanks for sharing your thoughts, more inline:

On Tue, 2013-07-02 at 15:18 +0000, Yoav Nir wrote:
> On Jul 2, 2013, at 5:31 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
> > Hello CFRG,
> > 
> > Yaron, Paul, Wajdi, and I are interested in your input on the "Usage
> > Guidance" section in "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
> > Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload
> (ESP)
> > and Authentication Header (AH)".   This is an active standards-track
> > draft in the IPsec working group, which updates the ESP and AH
> algorithm
> > requirements (RFC 4835).  The usage guidance section is new, and it
> > offers advice on how to use ESP and AH to achieve cryptographic
> security
> > goals.  
> > 
> > Quick link:
> >
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-ah-reqts/?include_text=1
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> 
> Hi David.
> 
> You've heard these before, but I'll repeat them since you're asking
> for comments on this list.
> 
> - I'm concerned that the only encryption algorithm is AES. 

this is a valid concern, but in my opinion, it is a long-term concern,
not a short-term one.   That is, we should think about AES alternatives,
but we likely have enough time that we can use an orderly process like
the one we described in  
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00  

> Yes, I see that TripleDES-CBC as a MAY, but that is by now the past.
> AES-128-CBC is 9 times the speed of 3DES (on an Intel platform without
> AES-NI based on "openssl speed"), and with AES-NI the ratio is likely
> to jump to 20. 

So Triple-AES should be acceptable to everyone.  (Just joking!)

> With GCM it's even more pronounced. So 3DES cannot be a reasonable
> alternative to AES. I think we should have some alternative that is at
> least at the SHOULD level.
> 

So, I agree that thinking about alternatives is a reasonable use of our
time.   

As an aside, I feel like we have been forced into a situation where we
are focusing on block cipher designs (AES vs. Camellia vs. SEED ....)
which is quite out of touch with modern crypto design, where the focus
is on higher-level constructs like authenticated encryption.  For
instance, the current activity in crypto design competitions is the
CAESER authenticated encryption "contest":
http://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-call-3.html     

> - I'm not sure what the point is of the MAY level. We MAY implement
> anything: SEED, Camellia, GOST. That doesn't help with
> interoperability

This is a valid point.   It would be reasonable to strip out all of the
"MAY implement" algorithms.   The reason for including them in the draft
is the fact that RFC 4835 and its predecessors (on which this draft is
based) specified some MAY implement algorithms, and also we felt like it
would be good to describe the status of "demoted" algorithms like
AES-CTR [RFC3686] in the draft, since they were mentioned in the earlier
version.   I am fine with removing the MAYs, as long as it reflects the
consensus of the working group (I don't want to have to change it back
later if there is a chorus of objection ;-)

> 
> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there a
> reason why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with
> AES-GMAC rather than AES-GCM? 

I don't think so.  

> Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has gained popularity recently
> (meaning that a lot of customers are asking for it). It runs
> significantly slower than HMAC-SHA1,

Yeah, and it looks even slower next to GMAC.

>  but people have stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no longer secure".
> Still, they're not asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. So I
> think a document where the goal is interoperability should focus on
> what is becoming the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.

Well, interoperability is one major consideration, but security and
efficiency are others.  My opinion: let's not take something that is
available, but is not needed, and turn it into a requirement.  Probably
others have an opinion, and this would be a topic for ipsecme.   

David

> 
> Yoav
> 
> 



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for review of IPsec ESP and AH Usage Guidance
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Hi Yoav,

On Tue, 2013-07-02 at 20:31 +0000, Yoav Nir wrote:
> On Jul 2, 2013, at 11:01 PM, "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> >>>>>> - I'm not sure about AES-GMAC for ESP authentication. Is there
> a reason why someone would prefer to use AES-CBC or AES-CTR with
> AES-GMAC rather than AES-GCM? Also, the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm has
> gained popularity recently (meaning that a lot of customers are asking
> for it). It runs significantly slower than HMAC-SHA1, but people have
> stopped reading at "SHA-1 is no longer secure". Still, they're not
> asking for GMAC, they're asking for SHA-256. So I think a document
> where the goal is interoperability should focus on what is becoming
> the de-facto standard as long as it's secure enough.
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Having the document list the rationale for using GMAC instead of
> an HMAC would indeed be good.
> >>>> 
> >>>> I know, I know. Because it's faster. But we have GCM for that.
> >>> 
> >>> And saying so in the document would be valuable.
> >> 
> >> I'm still looking for the rationale for SHOULD, let alone SHOULD+
> for it.
> > 
> > With AE modes there is no rationale to use separate encryption and
> authentication that I can think of.  The rationale of using GMAC
> instead of HMAC-SHA* is: (a) better performance, and (b) security
> proofs make better (to my taste) assumptions. These two should be
> sufficient.
> 
> And I'm not objecting to it being a SHOULD with or without + for AH.
> I'm only asking about ESP.

The most important use of an authentication transform in ESP is with
NULL encryption, in which case GMAC is the clear winner because of
adequate security and exceptional performance.  

David


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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: Last call for draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
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Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2013 18:08:14 +0000
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Subject: [Cfrg] Last call for draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
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The latest OCB draft (draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03) was posted on 12
June.  Is everyone satisfied the authors have addressed their
concerns?  It has been a month since the last OCB related posting,
which I take to be a good sign.

----------------+--------------------------------------------------
Kevin M. Igoe   | "We can't solve problems by using the same kind
kmigoe@nsa.gov  | of thinking we used when we created them."
                |              - Albert Einstein -
----------------+--------------------------------------------------




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<div>The latest OCB draft (draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03) was posted on 12 </div>
<div>June.&nbsp; Is everyone satisfied the authors have addressed their </d=
iv>
<div>concerns?&nbsp; It has been a month since the last OCB related posting=
, </div>
<div>which I take to be a good sign.</div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2" color=3D"#333333"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#333333">----------------&#43;-------------------------=
-------------------------</font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#333333">Kevin M. Igoe&nbsp;&nbsp; | &quot;We can't sol=
ve problems by using the same kind</font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#333333">kmigoe@nsa.gov&nbsp; | of thinking we used whe=
n we created them.&quot; </font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#333333">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Albert Einstein -</font=
></div>
<div><font color=3D"#333333">----------------&#43;-------------------------=
-------------------------</font></div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbs=
p;</span></font></div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbs=
p;</span></font></div>
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p;</span></font></div>
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From prvs=09054cf0f7=uri@ll.mit.edu  Fri Jul 12 11:41:44 2013
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2013 14:41:17 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Last call for draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
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No concerns left on my end.

Tnx!
--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal

From:  <Igoe>, "Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
Date:  Friday, July 12, 2013 14:08
To:  "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject:  [Cfrg] Last call for draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03

> The latest OCB draft (draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03) was posted on 12
> June.  Is everyone satisfied the authors have addressed their
> concerns?  It has been a month since the last OCB related posting,
> which I take to be a good sign.
>  
> ----------------+--------------------------------------------------
> Kevin M. Igoe   | "We can't solve problems by using the same kind
> kmigoe@nsa.gov  | of thinking we used when we created them."
>                 |              - Albert Einstein -
> ----------------+--------------------------------------------------
>  
>  
>  



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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div><div><div>No concerns left o=
n my end.</div><div><br></div><div>Tnx!</div><div><div><font class=3D"Apple-st=
yle-span" color=3D"#000000"><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"Calibri">--</=
font></font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"#000000"><font =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"Calibri"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=
=3D"font-size: 14px;">Regards,</span></font></font></div><div><font class=3D"App=
le-style-span" color=3D"#000000"><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"Calibri"=
><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 14px;">Uri Blumenthal</spa=
n></font></font></div></div></div></div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BOD=
Y_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left;=
 color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-=
BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt =
solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight=
:bold">From: </span> &lt;Igoe&gt;, "Kevin M." &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kmigoe@nsa=
.gov">kmigoe@nsa.gov</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span>=
 Friday, July 12, 2013 14:08 <br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> =
"<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@=
irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: <=
/span> [Cfrg] Last call for draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03<br></div><div><br></div><=
blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4=
df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><meta http-equiv=3D"Content=
-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8"><meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Mi=
crosoft Exchange Server"><!-- converted from rtf --><style><!-- .EmailQuote =
{ margin-left: 1pt; padding-left: 4pt; border-left: #800000 2px solid; } -->=
</style><div><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;"=
><div>The latest OCB draft (draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03) was posted on 12 </div><=
div>June.&nbsp; Is everyone satisfied the authors have addressed their </div=
><div>concerns?&nbsp; It has been a month since the last OCB related posting=
, </div><div>which I take to be a good sign.</div><div><font face=3D"Calibri" =
size=3D"2" color=3D"#333333"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font><=
/div><div><font color=3D"#333333">----------------+---------------------------=
-----------------------</font></div><div><font color=3D"#333333">Kevin M. Igoe=
&nbsp;&nbsp; | "We can't solve problems by using the same kind</font></div><=
div><font color=3D"#333333"><a href=3D"mailto:kmigoe@nsa.gov">kmigoe@nsa.gov</a>=
&nbsp; | of thinking we used when we created them."
</font></div><div><font color=3D"#333333">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Albert Einstei=
n -</font></div><div><font color=3D"#333333">----------------+----------------=
----------------------------------</font></div><div><font face=3D"Calibri" siz=
e=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font></div><div><font fac=
e=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font></div=
><div><font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</sp=
an></font></div></span></font></div></div></blockquote></span></body></html>

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--B_3456484877_20223526--

From kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp  Thu Jul 25 02:38:46 2013
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Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 18:37:42 +0900
From: Kohei Kasamatsu <kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp>
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To: Laura Hitt <lhitt@21ct.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] request for comments: ZSS Short Signature Scheme for SS and BN Curves
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Dear L. Hitt


I have a comment.

The security of ZSS-signature depends on k+1 Exponent Problem.
The problem more efficiently can be computed by cheon algorithm [1,2]=20
than Pollard's method. (cheon algorithm is not probabilistic polynomial=20
time algorithm) Hence I think that it is needed that you analyze=20
security against the algorithm.


[1] J.H. Cheon, Security Analysis of the Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem,=20
EUROCRYPT 2006, LNCS 4004, pp. 1-11, Springer, 2006
[2] Y. Sakemi, G. Hanaoka, T. Izu, M. Takenaka, and M. Yasuda, =93Solving=
=20
a discrete logarithm problem with auxiliary input on a 160-bit elliptic=20
curve=94, PKC 2012, LNCS 7293 pp. 595-608, Springer, 2012.

Best regards,
Kohei Kasamatsu




(2013/03/23 2:27), Laura Hitt wrote:
> <my apologies if this was sent twice, I saw strange behavior on my end,=
 so thought I'd try again.>
>
> I have recently submitted (as an Individual) two I-Ds and would greatly=
 appreciate any comments you are able to offer.  They pertain to the ZSS =
short signature scheme from bilinear pairings on supersingular elliptic c=
urves and on Barreto-Naerhig elliptic curves.
>
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-irtf-cfrg-zss-00.txt
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-irtf-cfrg-zssbn-00.txt
>
> Thank you!
> Laura Hitt
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


--=20
Kohei Kasamatsu

NTT Software Corporation
E-mail: kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp


From mcgrew@cisco.com  Fri Jul 26 14:50:22 2013
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Subject: [Cfrg] CFRG meeting at IETF 87
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Hi,

here is the agenda for our upcoming meeting; we are looking forward to
seeing you there.

David and Kevin

---

Crypto Forum Research Group at IETF 87
Monday, July 29, 2013
1510-1610  Afternoon Session II                    
Room: Tiergarten 1/2     

Agenda Bashing

Randomized Hashing (as described in NIST SP-800-106/107) - Quynh Dang

Updates on active drafts

 - OCB Mode of Operation, draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03

 - Dragonfly Key Exchange, draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01

 - Hash-Based Signatures, draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-00

"Selection of Future Cryptographic Standards", Sheffer, Grieco, McGrew.
draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00

Discussion on other crypto work
  Salsa20 
  DTLS In Constrained Environments (DICE)
  CAESER 



From rstruik.ext@gmail.com  Fri Jul 26 16:05:42 2013
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Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2013 19:05:35 -0400
From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] small editorial error in and question on draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01 (was: Re: CFRG meeting at IETF 87)
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Hi Dan:

I just quickly revisited the "password to point" mapping for elliptic 
curves in draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01 (Section 3.2.1) and noticed a 
small error: the seed is recursively defined. Fortunately, this is easy 
to fix, as follows:

was:

    base = H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password | counter)
    seed = KDF-n(seed, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")

suggested change:

    base = H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password | counter)
    seed = KDF-n(base, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")

On a more general note, with the draft rev1 version, the found point Q 
is a function of the password itself and the presumed key sharing 
parties Alice and Bob. In other words, the password-derived generator of 
the curve "PE Element" is fixed throughout the lifetime of the pair 
(password, key sharing parties). With draft-harkins-tls-pwd-03, a 
similar procedure is proposed, but there a "salt" is mixed in as well. 
Just curious: why the difference? 
<http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-harkins-tls-pwd-03.pdf>

Best regards, Rene



On 7/26/2013 5:50 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi,
>
> here is the agenda for our upcoming meeting; we are looking forward to
> seeing you there.
>
> David and Kevin
>
> ---
>
> Crypto Forum Research Group at IETF 87
> Monday, July 29, 2013
> 1510-1610  Afternoon Session II
> Room: Tiergarten 1/2
>
> Agenda Bashing
>
> Randomized Hashing (as described in NIST SP-800-106/107) - Quynh Dang
>
> Updates on active drafts
>
>   - OCB Mode of Operation, draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
>
>   - Dragonfly Key Exchange, draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01
>
>   - Hash-Based Signatures, draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-00
>
> "Selection of Future Cryptographic Standards", Sheffer, Grieco, McGrew.
> draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00
>
> Discussion on other crypto work
>    Salsa20
>    DTLS In Constrained Environments (DICE)
>    CAESER
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363


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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
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  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Dan:<br>
      <br>
      I just quickly revisited the "password to point" mapping for
      elliptic curves in draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01 (Section 3.2.1)
      and noticed a small error: the seed is recursively defined.
      Fortunately, this is easy to fix, as follows:<br>
      <br>
      was:<br>
      <blockquote>base = H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password |
        counter)<br>
        seed = KDF-n(seed, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")<br>
      </blockquote>
      suggested change:<br>
      <blockquote>base = H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password |
        counter)<br>
        seed = KDF-n(base, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")<br>
        <br>
      </blockquote>
      On a more general note, with the draft rev1 version, the found
      point Q is a function of the password itself and the presumed key
      sharing parties Alice and Bob. In other words, the
      password-derived generator of the curve "PE Element" is fixed
      throughout the lifetime of the pair (password, key sharing
      parties). With <a
        href="http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-harkins-tls-pwd-03.pdf">draft-harkins-tls-pwd-03,
        a similar procedure is proposed, but there a "salt" is mixed in
        as well. Just curious: why the difference?</a><br>
      <br>
      Best regards, Rene<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      On 7/26/2013 5:50 PM, David McGrew wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:1374875408.7839.627.camel@darkstar"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Hi,

here is the agenda for our upcoming meeting; we are looking forward to
seeing you there.

David and Kevin

---

Crypto Forum Research Group at IETF 87
Monday, July 29, 2013
1510-1610  Afternoon Session II                    
Room: Tiergarten 1/2     

Agenda Bashing

Randomized Hashing (as described in NIST SP-800-106/107) - Quynh Dang

Updates on active drafts

 - OCB Mode of Operation, draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03

 - Dragonfly Key Exchange, draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01

 - Hash-Based Signatures, draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-00

"Selection of Future Cryptographic Standards", Sheffer, Grieco, McGrew.
draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00

Discussion on other crypto work
  Salsa20 
  DTLS In Constrained Environments (DICE)
  CAESER 


_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <br>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a> | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363</pre>
  </body>
</html>

--------------000802030706070702060207--

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Jul 29 02:29:24 2013
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From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Here is the updated and more detailed agenda.

David and Kevin 

---

Agenda Bashing

Note Well

Randomized Hashing (NIST SP-800-106/107) - Dang

Quick updates on active drafts
   OCB Mode of Operation, draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
   Dragonfly Key Exchange, draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01
   Hash-Based Signatures, draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-00
   Ciphers in Use in the Internet draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01

SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-01 – Shen, Lee

Selection of Future Cryptographic Standards,
draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00 – McGrew, Sheffer, Grieco

Discussion on other crypto work
   DTLS In Constrained Environments (DICE) BoF
   Salsa20 
   CAESER



On Fri, 2013-07-26 at 17:50 -0400, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> here is the agenda for our upcoming meeting; we are looking forward to
> seeing you there.
> 
> David and Kevin
> 
> ---
> 
> Crypto Forum Research Group at IETF 87
> Monday, July 29, 2013
> 1510-1610  Afternoon Session II                    
> Room: Tiergarten 1/2     
> 
> Agenda Bashing
> 
> Randomized Hashing (as described in NIST SP-800-106/107) - Quynh Dang
> 
> Updates on active drafts
> 
>  - OCB Mode of Operation, draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
> 
>  - Dragonfly Key Exchange, draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01
> 
>  - Hash-Based Signatures, draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-00
> 
> "Selection of Future Cryptographic Standards", Sheffer, Grieco, McGrew.
> draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00
> 
> Discussion on other crypto work
>   Salsa20 
>   DTLS In Constrained Environments (DICE)
>   CAESER 
> 



From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Jul 29 05:09:10 2013
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I'd like to call the RG's attention to the DICE birds-of-a-feather
meeting taking place later this week:

https://trac.tools.ietf.org/bof/trac/wiki#DICE

This effort aims to make a working group that addresses the problems
inherent in running Datagram TLS over a constrained network (such as low
power wireless) and in implementing that protocol in constrained
environments (such as 16-bit microprocessors in sensor nodes).

The charter for this WG is not yet established, and it is not clear to
what extent new cryptographic designs will be in scope.   But careful
profiling of DTLS using existing crypto designs is central to the
effort, and this group is already identifying practical issues that are
important, and which might be interesting to the research community.

David




From rstruik.ext@gmail.com  Mon Jul 29 06:40:37 2013
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] small editorial error in and question on draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01 (was: Re: CFRG meeting at IETF 87)
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Hi Dan:

Thanks. Perhaps, it would have some merit generalizing the draft to cover the tls-pwd draft as well (include salt, but also potentially nonces).

Is there any technical benefit for "refreshing" the password-derived base point (PE element) from one password-based scheme invocation to the next? I do not see how, e.g., mixing in nonces or other public parameters would prevent offline dictionary attacks in the event that one somehow learns the ephemeral private key during a protocol run, but perhaps I am missing something or there is another benefit. Down-side is that one has to recompute those base points online, thereby potentially exposing this to side channel attacks.

Best regards, Rene

==

In TLS-pwd the base, which is a function of the salt and the password,
is fixed
throughout the lifetime of the password/parties pair. The nonces passed by
the two
parties are mixed into the "PE element" calculation so that will be
different with
each run of the protocol.

The specification of dragonfly in the draft in question is general and
is intended to also work in a peer-to-peer protocol. It is impossible to
use salt in that case. That said, I think it might be a good idea to add
a section mentioning that if you are instantiating the key exchange in a
protocol that is strictly client-server then the server can salt stored
passwords as long as there's a way in the protocol for the server to tell
the client what the salt is.



On 7/29/2013 3:23 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
>    Hi Rene,
>
> On 7/26/13 4:05 PM, "Rene Struik" <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Dan:
>>
>> I just quickly revisited the "password to point" mapping for elliptic
>> curves in draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01 (Section 3.2.1) and noticed a
>> small error: the seed is recursively defined. Fortunately, this is easy
>> to fix, as follows:
>>
>> was:
>>
>> base = H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password | counter)
>> seed = KDF-n(seed, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")
>>
>>
>> suggested change:
>>
>> base = H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password | counter)
>> seed = KDF-n(base, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")
>    Thank you for catching that! I'll include the fix in the next
> revision of the draft.
>
>> On a more general note, with the draft rev1 version, the found point Q is
>> a function of the password itself and the presumed key sharing parties
>> Alice and Bob. In other words, the password-derived generator of the
>> curve "PE Element" is fixed throughout the
>> lifetime of the pair (password, key sharing parties). With
>> draft-harkins-tls-pwd-03, a similar procedure is proposed, but there a
>> "salt" is mixed in as well. Just curious: why the difference?
>> <http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-harkins-tls-pwd-03.pdf>
>    In TLS-pwd the base, which is a function of the salt and the password,
> is fixed
> throughout the lifetime of the password/parties pair. The nonces passed by
> the two
> parties are mixed into the "PE element" calculation so that will be
> different with
> each run of the protocol.
>
>    The reason salt was added to TLS-pwd is because the TLS is a
> client-server
> protocol and there was consensus in the WG that support should be added to
> support the many deployed password databases that salt the password.
>
>    The specification of dragonfly in the draft in question is general and
> is intended to also work in a peer-to-peer protocol. It is impossible to
> use salt in that case. That said, I think it might be a good idea to add
> a section mentioning that if you are instantiating the key exchange in a
> protocol that is strictly client-server then the server can salt stored
> passwords as long as there's a way in the protocol for the server to tell
> the client what the salt is.
>
>    Thanks for your input.
>
>    regards,
>
>    Dan.
>
>> Best regards, Rene
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7/26/2013 5:50 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> here is the agenda for our upcoming meeting; we are looking forward to
>> seeing you there.
>>
>> David and Kevin
>>
>> ---
>>
>> Crypto Forum Research Group at IETF 87
>> Monday, July 29, 2013
>> 1510-1610  Afternoon Session II
>> Room: Tiergarten 1/2
>>
>> Agenda Bashing
>>
>> Randomized Hashing (as described in NIST SP-800-106/107) - Quynh Dang
>>
>> Updates on active drafts
>>
>> - OCB Mode of Operation, draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-03
>>
>> - Dragonfly Key Exchange, draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01
>>
>> - Hash-Based Signatures, draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-00
>>
>> "Selection of Future Cryptographic Standards", Sheffer, Grieco, McGrew.
>> draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00
>>
>> Discussion on other crypto work
>>   Salsa20
>>   DTLS In Constrained Environments (DICE)
>>   CAESER
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
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>> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
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-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363

