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Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 10:03:16 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
References: <CAGZ8ZG2f9QHX40RcB8aajWvEfG0Gh_uewu2Rq7bQGHYNx6cOmw@mail.gmail.com> <52C07436.2040709@cs.tcd.ie> <04C32948-02A2-44F4-B4C1-CF29D4146715@vpnc.org> <CEE6FEE3.2B330%paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] misuse-resistant AEAD (was: Re: CFRG and thwarting pervasive montoring)
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Hi Paul,

On 12/30/2013 02:06 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>
> On 12/29/13, 1:12 PM, "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>
>> On Dec 29, 2013, at 11:12 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> . . .
>>> I would love to see ongoing detailed work within
>>> CFRG as to how to counter pervasive monitoring.
>> Wearing your perpass hat, how can CFRG help? I ask this because I have
>> seen little on the perpass mailing list that indicated that an even minor
>> problem has been lack of crypto, or the use of crypto that is thought to
>> be breakable. What type of crypto research or assessment would help
>> perpass?
> In the past I¹ve never considered CFRG a viable discussion forum for
> making an impact by creating or approving new algorithms Š but if it is:
>
> 	We need an Œapproved' nonce-insensitive AEAD algorithm.
>
> I¹m designing multicast communications in a mesh topology and CCM and GCM
> suffer from N^2 complexity (since they require unique nonce/key).  Yes Š
> there are ways that some link proposals like 802.1ae mitigate the issue
> using device addresses as part of the key setup.  The best solution is a
> nonce-insensitive AEAD.
I agree.   The best solution would be an authenticated encryption 
algorithm that did not require a nonce as input.   An alternative which 
is not quite as good would be an algorithm that requires a nonce as 
input, but which has security that suffers only a minimal degradation if 
nonces are repeated.

> We already have an RFC for SIV which is deterministic and a decent
> solution, but it is not ŒNIST¹ approved, so I have problems introducing it
> into consumer equipment.  It¹s also a little slow Š but I¹m not sure that
> efficiency should be the primary evaluation criteria.

All valid points.   SIV shows that it is possible to have a 
misuse-resistant algorithm.  It may not have all of the properties that 
one might want in an algorithm (for instance: more amenable to parallel 
processing), but it shows that we can achieve more robust security than 
nonce-based AEAD.

>
> I¹ve asked NIST in the past and they have expressed no interest in the
> problem.  It used to be very important for algorithms to be NIST approved.
>   Do we need to find/create a new review and approval process for
> algorithms that can be referenced by commercial products?

NIST is responsive when the industry and standards organizations adopt 
new mechanisms that have some clear advantage over previous 
mechanisms.   The problem is that NIST and the industry have gotten into 
a deadlock (or deadly embrace) situation: the industry now hesitates to 
adopt algorithms that are not NIST approved, and NIST hesitates to 
approve algorithms that have not seen any adoption by industry or 
standards.    We can not just blame NIST for being overly conservative 
here; there are many more algorithm proposals than they could reasonably 
incorporate into their processes.   To break the deadlock, we (CFRG and 
the industry) need to be willing to adopt a new algorithm, or at least 
we need to be willing to take further steps towards adoption than we 
have shown in the past. Some things that CFRG could do: write a 
requirements document that demonstrates the need for a new algorithm, 
publish a document specifying the new algorithm, document the fact that 
there is a set of adopters or potential adopters that are interested, 
and lastly, reach out to NIST (for instance, with a question like "do 
you have any particular concerns about this algorithm that would prevent 
you from approving it?").

Going further, it might facilitate adoption if all of the information 
needed to validate an implementation of an algorithm were provided.   
That is, a complete set of test cases in a format suitable for automated 
validation (as done in the NIST Crypto Module Validation Program, or 
CMVP) would make it easier to incorporate the algorithm in an 
implementation-validation process.

The CMVP is run jointly by the U.S. and Canada.   It would be good to 
hear from the rest of the world on this topic.  I suspect that many 
vendors outside of Northa America want to sell into the NA market, and 
thus also would favor NIST approval of new algorithms. What is less 
clear is the role of nation-specific block ciphers (or other 
algorithms), which is a topic unto itself.

David

>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> Note that deprecating the use of crypto that is widely known to be broken
>> is the purview of IETF WGs, not the CFRG. The relevant WGs (particularly
>> TLS) seem to already be doing that.
>>
>> --Paul Hoffman
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan  2 07:31:31 2014
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References: <CAGZ8ZG2f9QHX40RcB8aajWvEfG0Gh_uewu2Rq7bQGHYNx6cOmw@mail.gmail.com> <52C07436.2040709@cs.tcd.ie> <04C32948-02A2-44F4-B4C1-CF29D4146715@vpnc.org> <CEE6FEE3.2B330%paul@marvell.com> <52C57FB4.2050102@cisco.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2014 10:31:20 -0500
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] misuse-resistant AEAD (was: Re: CFRG and thwarting pervasive montoring)
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On Jan 2, 2014 10:03 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Paul,
>
> On 12/30/2013 02:06 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12/29/13, 1:12 PM, "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Dec 29, 2013, at 11:12 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.i=
e
>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> . . .
>>>> I would love to see ongoing detailed work within
>>>> CFRG as to how to counter pervasive monitoring.
>>>
>>> Wearing your perpass hat, how can CFRG help? I ask this because I have
>>> seen little on the perpass mailing list that indicated that an even
minor
>>> problem has been lack of crypto, or the use of crypto that is thought t=
o
>>> be breakable. What type of crypto research or assessment would help
>>> perpass?
>>
>> In the past I=C2=B9ve never considered CFRG a viable discussion forum fo=
r
>> making an impact by creating or approving new algorithms =C5=A0 but if i=
t is:
>>
>>         We need an =C5=92approved' nonce-insensitive AEAD algorithm.
>>
>> I=C2=B9m designing multicast communications in a mesh topology and CCM a=
nd GCM
>> suffer from N^2 complexity (since they require unique nonce/key).  Yes =
=C5=A0
>> there are ways that some link proposals like 802.1ae mitigate the issue
>> using device addresses as part of the key setup.  The best solution is a
>> nonce-insensitive AEAD.
>
> I agree.   The best solution would be an authenticated encryption
algorithm that did not require a nonce as input.   An alternative which is
not quite as good would be an algorithm that requires a nonce as input, but
which has security that suffers only a minimal degradation if nonces are
repeated.

Already exists: it's called CBC mode with HMAC. IVs are random and can
repeat.
>
>> We already have an RFC for SIV which is deterministic and a decent
>> solution, but it is not =C5=92NIST=C2=B9 approved, so I have problems in=
troducing
it
>> into consumer equipment.  It=C2=B9s also a little slow =C5=A0 but I=C2=
=B9m not sure that
>> efficiency should be the primary evaluation criteria.
>
>
> All valid points.   SIV shows that it is possible to have a
misuse-resistant algorithm.  It may not have all of the properties that one
might want in an algorithm (for instance: more amenable to parallel
processing), but it shows that we can achieve more robust security than
nonce-based AEAD.
>

Deterministic encryption leaks considerable information when used on low
entropy messages. Nonce reuse resistant nonce based MAC and encryption
algorithms exist today, namely CBC initialized with the encryption of a
counter and HMAC.

>>
>> I=C2=B9ve asked NIST in the past and they have expressed no interest in =
the
>> problem.  It used to be very important for algorithms to be NIST
approved.
>>   Do we need to find/create a new review and approval process for
>> algorithms that can be referenced by commercial products?
>
>
> NIST is responsive when the industry and standards organizations adopt
new mechanisms that have some clear advantage over previous mechanisms.
The problem is that NIST and the industry have gotten into a deadlock (or
deadly embrace) situation: the industry now hesitates to adopt algorithms
that are not NIST approved, and NIST hesitates to approve algorithms that
have not seen any adoption by industry or standards.    We can not just
blame NIST for being overly conservative here; there are many more
algorithm proposals than they could reasonably incorporate into their
processes.   To break the deadlock, we (CFRG and the industry) need to be
willing to adopt a new algorithm, or at least we need to be willing to take
further steps towards adoption than we have shown in the past. Some things
that CFRG could do: write a requirements document that demonstrates the
need for a new algorithm, publish a document specifying the new algorithm,
document the fact that there is a set of adopters or potential adopters
that are interested, and lastly, reach out to NIST (for instance, with a
question like "do you have any particular concerns about this algorithm
that would prevent you from approving it?").
>

CAESAR is going on right now with regards to AE. If you have requirements
that haven't been in the call, tell us about them.

> Going further, it might facilitate adoption if all of the information
needed to validate an implementation of an algorithm were provided.   That
is, a complete set of test cases in a format suitable for automated
validation (as done in the NIST Crypto Module Validation Program, or CMVP)
would make it easier to incorporate the algorithm in an
implementation-validation process.
>
> The CMVP is run jointly by the U.S. and Canada.   It would be good to
hear from the rest of the world on this topic.  I suspect that many vendors
outside of Northa America want to sell into the NA market, and thus also
would favor NIST approval of new algorithms. What is less clear is the role
of nation-specific block ciphers (or other algorithms), which is a topic
unto itself.
>
> David

Sincerely,
Watson
>
>>
>> Paul
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Note that deprecating the use of crypto that is widely known to be
broken
>>> is the purview of IETF WGs, not the CFRG. The relevant WGs (particularl=
y
>>> TLS) seem to already be doing that.
>>>
>>> --Paul Hoffman
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--001a11c229a23f941704eefe7cb4
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Jan 2, 2014 10:03 AM, &quot;David McGrew&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mcg=
rew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi Paul,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 12/30/2013 02:06 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On 12/29/13, 1:12 PM, &quot;Paul Hoffman&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Dec 29, 2013, at 11:12 AM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; . . .<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I would love to see ongoing detailed work within<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; CFRG as to how to counter pervasive monitoring.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Wearing your perpass hat, how can CFRG help? I ask this becaus=
e I have<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; seen little on the perpass mailing list that indicated that an=
 even minor<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; problem has been lack of crypto, or the use of crypto that is =
thought to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; be breakable. What type of crypto research or assessment would=
 help<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; perpass?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; In the past I=C2=B9ve never considered CFRG a viable discussion fo=
rum for<br>
&gt;&gt; making an impact by creating or approving new algorithms =C5=A0 bu=
t if it is:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 We need an =C5=92approved&#39; nonce-i=
nsensitive AEAD algorithm.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I=C2=B9m designing multicast communications in a mesh topology and=
 CCM and GCM<br>
&gt;&gt; suffer from N^2 complexity (since they require unique nonce/key). =
=C2=A0Yes =C5=A0<br>
&gt;&gt; there are ways that some link proposals like 802.1ae mitigate the =
issue<br>
&gt;&gt; using device addresses as part of the key setup. =C2=A0The best so=
lution is a<br>
&gt;&gt; nonce-insensitive AEAD.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I agree. =C2=A0 The best solution would be an authenticated encryption=
 algorithm that did not require a nonce as input. =C2=A0 An alternative whi=
ch is not quite as good would be an algorithm that requires a nonce as inpu=
t, but which has security that suffers only a minimal degradation if nonces=
 are repeated.</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">Already exists: it&#39;s called CBC mode with HMAC. IVs are =
random and can repeat. <br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; We already have an RFC for SIV which is deterministic and a decent=
<br>
&gt;&gt; solution, but it is not =C5=92NIST=C2=B9 approved, so I have probl=
ems introducing it<br>
&gt;&gt; into consumer equipment. =C2=A0It=C2=B9s also a little slow =C5=A0=
 but I=C2=B9m not sure that<br>
&gt;&gt; efficiency should be the primary evaluation criteria.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; All valid points. =C2=A0 SIV shows that it is possible to have a misus=
e-resistant algorithm. =C2=A0It may not have all of the properties that one=
 might want in an algorithm (for instance: more amenable to parallel proces=
sing), but it shows that we can achieve more robust security than nonce-bas=
ed AEAD.<br>

&gt;</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Deterministic encryption leaks considerable information when=
 used on low entropy messages. Nonce reuse resistant nonce based MAC and en=
cryption algorithms exist today, namely CBC initialized with the encryption=
 of a counter and HMAC.</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I=C2=B9ve asked NIST in the past and they have expressed no intere=
st in the<br>
&gt;&gt; problem. =C2=A0It used to be very important for algorithms to be N=
IST approved.<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 Do we need to find/create a new review and approval process=
 for<br>
&gt;&gt; algorithms that can be referenced by commercial products?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; NIST is responsive when the industry and standards organizations adopt=
 new mechanisms that have some clear advantage over previous mechanisms. =
=C2=A0 The problem is that NIST and the industry have gotten into a deadloc=
k (or deadly embrace) situation: the industry now hesitates to adopt algori=
thms that are not NIST approved, and NIST hesitates to approve algorithms t=
hat have not seen any adoption by industry or standards. =C2=A0 =C2=A0We ca=
n not just blame NIST for being overly conservative here; there are many mo=
re algorithm proposals than they could reasonably incorporate into their pr=
ocesses. =C2=A0 To break the deadlock, we (CFRG and the industry) need to b=
e willing to adopt a new algorithm, or at least we need to be willing to ta=
ke further steps towards adoption than we have shown in the past. Some thin=
gs that CFRG could do: write a requirements document that demonstrates the =
need for a new algorithm, publish a document specifying the new algorithm, =
document the fact that there is a set of adopters or potential adopters tha=
t are interested, and lastly, reach out to NIST (for instance, with a quest=
ion like &quot;do you have any particular concerns about this algorithm tha=
t would prevent you from approving it?&quot;).<br>

&gt;</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">CAESAR is going on right now with regards to AE. If you have=
 requirements that haven&#39;t been in the call, tell us about them.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; Going further, it might facilitate adoption if all of t=
he information needed to validate an implementation of an algorithm were pr=
ovided. =C2=A0 That is, a complete set of test cases in a format suitable f=
or automated validation (as done in the NIST Crypto Module Validation Progr=
am, or CMVP) would make it easier to incorporate the algorithm in an implem=
entation-validation process.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; The CMVP is run jointly by the U.S. and Canada. =C2=A0 It would be goo=
d to hear from the rest of the world on this topic. =C2=A0I suspect that ma=
ny vendors outside of Northa America want to sell into the NA market, and t=
hus also would favor NIST approval of new algorithms. What is less clear is=
 the role of nation-specific block ciphers (or other algorithms), which is =
a topic unto itself.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; David</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Sincerely, <br>
Watson<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Paul<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Note that deprecating the use of crypto that is widely known t=
o be broken<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is the purview of IETF WGs, not the CFRG. The relevant WGs (pa=
rticularly<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; TLS) seem to already be doing that.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; --Paul Hoffman<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://w=
ww.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.i=
rtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</p>

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Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 12:07:08 -0500
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] misuse-resistant AEAD
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On 01/02/2014 10:31 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>
> On Jan 2, 2014 10:03 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com 
> <mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com>> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Paul,
> >
> > On 12/30/2013 02:06 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 12/29/13, 1:12 PM, "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org 
> <mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>> wrote:
> >>
> >>> On Dec 29, 2013, at 11:12 AM, Stephen Farrell 
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie <mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> . . .
> >>>> I would love to see ongoing detailed work within
> >>>> CFRG as to how to counter pervasive monitoring.
> >>>
> >>> Wearing your perpass hat, how can CFRG help? I ask this because I have
> >>> seen little on the perpass mailing list that indicated that an 
> even minor
> >>> problem has been lack of crypto, or the use of crypto that is 
> thought to
> >>> be breakable. What type of crypto research or assessment would help
> >>> perpass?
> >>
> >> In the past I¹ve never considered CFRG a viable discussion forum for
> >> making an impact by creating or approving new algorithms Š but if 
> it is:
> >>
> >>         We need an Œapproved' nonce-insensitive AEAD algorithm.
> >>
> >> I¹m designing multicast communications in a mesh topology and CCM 
> and GCM
> >> suffer from N^2 complexity (since they require unique nonce/key). 
>  Yes Š
> >> there are ways that some link proposals like 802.1ae mitigate the issue
> >> using device addresses as part of the key setup.  The best solution 
> is a
> >> nonce-insensitive AEAD.
> >
> > I agree.   The best solution would be an authenticated encryption 
> algorithm that did not require a nonce as input.   An alternative 
> which is not quite as good would be an algorithm that requires a nonce 
> as input, but which has security that suffers only a minimal 
> degradation if nonces are repeated.
>
> Already exists: it's called CBC mode with HMAC. IVs are random and can 
> repeat.
>

This combination of algorithms doesn't require a distinct nonce, and it 
can be secure if the encoding and IV generation is done correctly, but 
it lacks other desirable properties.   For instance, it uses serialized 
computations, expands the data a lot, is not robust against misuse of 
decrypted data prior to verification.

If you are interested in seeing that combination of algorithms used 
more, you should review draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2 and offer 
your support, or suggestions for improvements.   My opinion of that 
draft: it would be better if the IVs were generated pseudorandomly and 
if ciphertext stealing were used (to avoid side channels on the 
decryption side).    There are better algorithms, so it is not clear how 
much effort the industry should spend on doing the combination of CBC 
and HMAC better.

> >
> >> We already have an RFC for SIV which is deterministic and a decent
> >> solution, but it is not ŒNIST¹ approved, so I have problems 
> introducing it
> >> into consumer equipment.  It¹s also a little slow Š but I¹m not 
> sure that
> >> efficiency should be the primary evaluation criteria.
> >
> >
> > All valid points.   SIV shows that it is possible to have a 
> misuse-resistant algorithm.  It may not have all of the properties 
> that one might want in an algorithm (for instance: more amenable to 
> parallel processing), but it shows that we can achieve more robust 
> security than nonce-based AEAD.
> >
>
> Deterministic encryption leaks considerable information when used on 
> low entropy messages.
>

Right, and I'm not advocating such things.

> Nonce reuse resistant nonce based MAC and encryption algorithms exist 
> today, namely CBC initialized with the encryption of a counter and HMAC.
>
> >>
> >> I¹ve asked NIST in the past and they have expressed no interest in the
> >> problem.  It used to be very important for algorithms to be NIST 
> approved.
> >>   Do we need to find/create a new review and approval process for
> >> algorithms that can be referenced by commercial products?
> >
> >
> > NIST is responsive when the industry and standards organizations 
> adopt new mechanisms that have some clear advantage over previous 
> mechanisms.   The problem is that NIST and the industry have gotten 
> into a deadlock (or deadly embrace) situation: the industry now 
> hesitates to adopt algorithms that are not NIST approved, and NIST 
> hesitates to approve algorithms that have not seen any adoption by 
> industry or standards.    We can not just blame NIST for being overly 
> conservative here; there are many more algorithm proposals than they 
> could reasonably incorporate into their processes.   To break the 
> deadlock, we (CFRG and the industry) need to be willing to adopt a new 
> algorithm, or at least we need to be willing to take further steps 
> towards adoption than we have shown in the past. Some things that CFRG 
> could do: write a requirements document that demonstrates the need for 
> a new algorithm, publish a document specifying the new algorithm, 
> document the fact that there is a set of adopters or potential 
> adopters that are interested, and lastly, reach out to NIST (for 
> instance, with a question like "do you have any particular concerns 
> about this algorithm that would prevent you from approving it?").
> >
>
> CAESAR is going on right now with regards to AE. If you have 
> requirements that haven't been in the call, tell us about them.
>

Yes, I will.   I'm on the CAESAR review committee, and I'm a fan of many 
aspects of the program.   The call for submissions allows a submission 
to use a deterministic nonce, and that might be OK in some situations, 
but there are other situations where it is highly undesirable.   The 
call also allows submissions that don't use a deterministic nonce.   
This inclusiveness is clearly the right thing for CAESAR.   But what the 
world needs more of are algorithms in the latter category, or at least 
algorithms that are more robust against misuse.

David

> > Going further, it might facilitate adoption if all of the 
> information needed to validate an implementation of an algorithm were 
> provided.   That is, a complete set of test cases in a format suitable 
> for automated validation (as done in the NIST Crypto Module Validation 
> Program, or CMVP) would make it easier to incorporate the algorithm in 
> an implementation-validation process.
> >
> > The CMVP is run jointly by the U.S. and Canada.   It would be good 
> to hear from the rest of the world on this topic.  I suspect that many 
> vendors outside of Northa America want to sell into the NA market, and 
> thus also would favor NIST approval of new algorithms. What is less 
> clear is the role of nation-specific block ciphers (or other 
> algorithms), which is a topic unto itself.
> >
> > David
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson
> >
> >>
> >> Paul
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Note that deprecating the use of crypto that is widely known to be 
> broken
> >>> is the purview of IETF WGs, not the CFRG. The relevant WGs 
> (particularly
> >>> TLS) seem to already be doing that.
> >>>
> >>> --Paul Hoffman
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Cfrg mailing list
> >>> Cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
> >>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Cfrg mailing list
> >> Cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
> > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 01/02/2014 10:31 AM, Watson Ladd
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=fykhhwCF3P24CC4gneo8W5NJFE42-dZf2iotQ0Pmfvw@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <p dir="ltr"><br>
        On Jan 2, 2014 10:03 AM, "David McGrew" &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Hi Paul,<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; On 12/30/2013 02:06 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt; On 12/29/13, 1:12 PM, "Paul Hoffman" &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; On Dec 29, 2013, at 11:12 AM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; . . .<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I would love to see ongoing detailed work
        within<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; CFRG as to how to counter pervasive monitoring.<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; Wearing your perpass hat, how can CFRG help? I ask
        this because I have<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; seen little on the perpass mailing list that
        indicated that an even minor<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; problem has been lack of crypto, or the use of
        crypto that is thought to<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; be breakable. What type of crypto research or
        assessment would help<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; perpass?<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt; In the past I¹ve never considered CFRG a viable
        discussion forum for<br>
        &gt;&gt; making an impact by creating or approving new
        algorithms Š but if it is:<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;         We need an Œapproved' nonce-insensitive AEAD
        algorithm.<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt; I¹m designing multicast communications in a mesh
        topology and CCM and GCM<br>
        &gt;&gt; suffer from N^2 complexity (since they require unique
        nonce/key).  Yes Š<br>
        &gt;&gt; there are ways that some link proposals like 802.1ae
        mitigate the issue<br>
        &gt;&gt; using device addresses as part of the key setup.  The
        best solution is a<br>
        &gt;&gt; nonce-insensitive AEAD.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; I agree.   The best solution would be an authenticated
        encryption algorithm that did not require a nonce as input.   An
        alternative which is not quite as good would be an algorithm
        that requires a nonce as input, but which has security that
        suffers only a minimal degradation if nonces are repeated.</p>
      <p dir="ltr">Already exists: it's called CBC mode with HMAC. IVs
        are random and can repeat. <br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This combination of algorithms doesn't require a distinct nonce, and
    it can be secure if the encoding and IV generation is done
    correctly, but it lacks other desirable properties.   For instance,
    it uses serialized computations, expands the data a lot, is not
    robust against misuse of decrypted data prior to verification.  <br>
    <br>
    If you are interested in seeing that combination of algorithms used
    more, you should review draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2 and
    offer your support, or suggestions for improvements.   My opinion of
    that draft: it would be better if the IVs were generated
    pseudorandomly and if ciphertext stealing were used (to avoid side
    channels on the decryption side).    There are better algorithms, so
    it is not clear how much effort the industry should spend on doing
    the combination of CBC and HMAC better.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=fykhhwCF3P24CC4gneo8W5NJFE42-dZf2iotQ0Pmfvw@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <p dir="ltr">
        &gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt; We already have an RFC for SIV which is deterministic
        and a decent<br>
        &gt;&gt; solution, but it is not ŒNIST¹ approved, so I have
        problems introducing it<br>
        &gt;&gt; into consumer equipment.  It¹s also a little slow Š but
        I¹m not sure that<br>
        &gt;&gt; efficiency should be the primary evaluation criteria.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; All valid points.   SIV shows that it is possible to have a
        misuse-resistant algorithm.  It may not have all of the
        properties that one might want in an algorithm (for instance:
        more amenable to parallel processing), but it shows that we can
        achieve more robust security than nonce-based AEAD.<br>
        &gt;</p>
      <p dir="ltr">Deterministic encryption leaks considerable
        information when used on low entropy messages. </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Right, and I'm not advocating such things.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=fykhhwCF3P24CC4gneo8W5NJFE42-dZf2iotQ0Pmfvw@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <p dir="ltr">Nonce reuse resistant nonce based MAC and encryption
        algorithms exist today, namely CBC initialized with the
        encryption of a counter and HMAC.</p>
      <p dir="ltr">&gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt; I¹ve asked NIST in the past and they have expressed no
        interest in the<br>
        &gt;&gt; problem.  It used to be very important for algorithms
        to be NIST approved.<br>
        &gt;&gt;   Do we need to find/create a new review and approval
        process for<br>
        &gt;&gt; algorithms that can be referenced by commercial
        products?<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; NIST is responsive when the industry and standards
        organizations adopt new mechanisms that have some clear
        advantage over previous mechanisms.   The problem is that NIST
        and the industry have gotten into a deadlock (or deadly embrace)
        situation: the industry now hesitates to adopt algorithms that
        are not NIST approved, and NIST hesitates to approve algorithms
        that have not seen any adoption by industry or standards.    We
        can not just blame NIST for being overly conservative here;
        there are many more algorithm proposals than they could
        reasonably incorporate into their processes.   To break the
        deadlock, we (CFRG and the industry) need to be willing to adopt
        a new algorithm, or at least we need to be willing to take
        further steps towards adoption than we have shown in the past.
        Some things that CFRG could do: write a requirements document
        that demonstrates the need for a new algorithm, publish a
        document specifying the new algorithm, document the fact that
        there is a set of adopters or potential adopters that are
        interested, and lastly, reach out to NIST (for instance, with a
        question like "do you have any particular concerns about this
        algorithm that would prevent you from approving it?").<br>
        &gt;</p>
      <p dir="ltr">CAESAR is going on right now with regards to AE. If
        you have requirements that haven't been in the call, tell us
        about them.</p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Yes, I will.   I'm on the CAESAR review committee, and I'm a fan of
    many aspects of the program.   The call for submissions allows a
    submission to use a deterministic nonce, and that might be OK in
    some situations, but there are other situations where it is highly
    undesirable.   The call also allows submissions that don't use a
    deterministic nonce.   This inclusiveness is clearly the right thing
    for CAESAR.   But what the world needs more of are algorithms in the
    latter category, or at least algorithms that are more robust against
    misuse.<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=fykhhwCF3P24CC4gneo8W5NJFE42-dZf2iotQ0Pmfvw@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <p dir="ltr">&gt; Going further, it might facilitate adoption if
        all of the information needed to validate an implementation of
        an algorithm were provided.   That is, a complete set of test
        cases in a format suitable for automated validation (as done in
        the NIST Crypto Module Validation Program, or CMVP) would make
        it easier to incorporate the algorithm in an
        implementation-validation process.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; The CMVP is run jointly by the U.S. and Canada.   It would
        be good to hear from the rest of the world on this topic.  I
        suspect that many vendors outside of Northa America want to sell
        into the NA market, and thus also would favor NIST approval of
        new algorithms. What is less clear is the role of
        nation-specific block ciphers (or other algorithms), which is a
        topic unto itself.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; David</p>
      <p dir="ltr">Sincerely, <br>
        Watson<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt; Paul<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; Note that deprecating the use of crypto that is
        widely known to be broken<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; is the purview of IETF WGs, not the CFRG. The
        relevant WGs (particularly<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; TLS) seem to already be doing that.<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; --Paul Hoffman<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
        &gt;&gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
        &gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
        &gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
        &gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
        &gt;&gt;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
        &gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
        &gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
        &gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Dual_EC_DRBG ... [was RE: Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair]
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Hi Watson,

I think that we are in agreement on all of the main points here, but I 
did want to comment on a tangent:

On 12/30/2013 09:52 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:56 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>>
>> On 12/27/2013 06:34 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins
>> Sent: Friday, December 27, 2013 4:46 PM
>>
>> On Fri, December 27, 2013 1:42 pm, David McGrew wrote:
>>
>> I understand that these topics deserve discussion, but in the long
>> term it might be more fruitful to consider what recommendations should
>> be given to implementers and standards group on the subject of PRNGs.
>>
>> Yes, I just wanted to clarify.
>>
>> Now, since you asked about recommendations ...
>>
>> PRNGs are not needed for interoperability, but the some of the core
>> "schemes" standards that I am familiar with, such as ANSI X9.62 and SEC1,
>> make normative requirements about the PRNGs and entropy used to generate
>> keys.  I think that's reasonable for the sake of security.  In theory, if
>> IETF "protocols" specs reference these core "schemes" standards, then they
>> would inherit the PRNG requirements.  I'd recommend IETF "schemes" specs
>> similarly follow suit, although an alternative is just to require a (secure)
>> randomly generated key, but that could be little risky to ask implementers
>> to do this without sufficient guidance.
>>
>> Maybe I'm biased,
>>
>>
>> I love the pun there ;-)
>>
>>
>> but for a PRNG, I'd recommend Dual_EC_DRBG with
>> alternative P&Q, at least on systems that can afford the extra latency, e.g.
>> high-end user equipment, if only because of the refereed security analysis.
>> Also, considerable attention, because of the potential backdoor, has been
>> paid to Dual_EC_DRBG, yet no major attack since that security analysis has
>> been uncovered.
>>
>>
>> I respectfully disagree.   We need to keep in mind a holistic security model
>> that considers all of the threats to information security, and one such
>> threat is the possibility that the P and Q parameters in a particular
>> implementation might be changed by an untrustworthy software provider
>> (either a vendor or an open-source contributor), hardware provider (in the
>> case that the software is pre-installed on the hardware), a reseller, or
>> someone else in the supply chain.   If those parameters are set correctly by
>> the initial developer, but then changed by someone else, the unwitting end
>> user might be compromised.   It is doubtful that this change would be
>> detected.
> There is a distinguishing attack on Dual_EC_DRBG taking time 2^28 with
> good success probability.
> See http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/190 for details. This alone makes it
> unacceptable.
> Also note that Certicom has IPR. Dan Brown hasn't disclosed this, but
> his name is on the patent
> on the alternate parameters. There isn't a single good reason for
> Dual_EC_DRBG to even be
> considered.
>
>> One could counter-argue that 1) software boot-time integrity can be provided
>> through boot-time signature checking and 2) a malicious actor in the supply
>> chain could undermine the efficacy of any DRBG.   However, boot-time
>> integrity is absent on many systems at this time, it does not address
>> run-time integrity even when it is present, and if a DRBG based on symmetric
>> cryptography is undermined, that fact will be noticeable (at least in
>> principle).
> I don't think this is quite true. Imagine a HMAC-DRBG implementation
> with all but 40 bits of the
> key hardwired to a fixed value. Given an external seed it gets the
> wrong answers, but if the key is
> generated internally you would never know.

If I understand your strawman here, the undermined DRBG would be 
detectable after 2^20 distinct invocations on distinct seeds, it would 
produce repeating values.   A test harness that could invoke the DRBG on 
a million distinct seeds could detect this fact, assuming of course that 
it was actually using different seed values.   Of course, it is not 
clear how the test harness could ensure that the DRBG was not "cheating" 
by e.g. just returning a pseudorandom value, such as the output of HMAC 
in couter mode.   A "cheating" DRBG would not be detectable.

It would be really valuable if there were a testing methodology for 
random sources and DRBGs that enabled a third party (such as the end 
user, or a verification lab that is unaffiliated with the manufacturer) 
to assess the quality of both of those components. This could make a 
significant positive impact IMO - would be interested to hear what other 
people think.

In my experience, most vendors who build random sources are very 
hesitant to provide the raw output of the source that would be needed to 
perform an independent statistical validation of the soundness of the 
source.  From what I can tell, this sometimes reflects a lack of 
confidence in the design.

David

> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>
>> David
>>
>> The three other DRBG algorithms now in SP 800-90 should be much faster, if
>> such speed is needed, and should also be secure, since no major attacks have
>> been published, despite their high profile in NIST specs.  The HMAC_DRBG
>> also has a proof.
>>
>> I'm also aware of other research into comparable alternatives:
>>
>> http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338
>> http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/029
>>
>> but I'm not sure if these have been standardized anywhere.  If I had to
>> summarize these in a few words, I would hazard to say that they provide
>> constructions to build a PRNG from a PRF (where for a PRF, think RC4, or
>> AES-CTR).
>>
>> There's also lots of research into "randomness extractors", but that's
>> something slight different.
>>
>>
>>    Indeed! And might this discussion move to dsfjdssdfsd@ietf.org, the
>>
>> mailing
>>
>> list formed to discuss just this very subject?
>>
>> Thanks. I completely forgot about that mailing list, I saw the announcement
>> but never looked into it.  Is there a WG site?
>>
>> Best regards,
>>
>> Dan
>>
>>
>>
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>
>


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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, irtf-chair@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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Hi Trevor,

On 12/27/2013 10:56 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 9:57 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> [...]
>>>> As far as Kevin's
>>>> competence goes, your complaint needs to be balanced against his
>>>> contributions.
>>> I've looked over his mailing list contributions.
>>>
>>> Kevin seems unfamiliar with sidechannel attacks, RSA padding, provable
>>> security, key agreement protocols, and consulting academic literature.
>>>    I'm sure he's good at math, but I don't see the breadth of knowledge
>>> I'd expect for his position.
>>>
>>> His messages don't reflect a high standard of diligence.  He's made
>>> significant mistakes with Dragonfly.  His tone reminds me of a bemused
>>> hobbyist who doesn't care whether any of this is secure.
>>>
>>> I believe there are people who could do a better job.
>>
>> I respectfully disagree with your characterization.   I would guess that if
>> you could have been present for the discussion at the RG meeting, you might
>> feel differently.
> Which discussion?  The only substantial discussion of Dragonfly at a
> CFRG meeting appears to be at IETF 83.  Is that what you're referring
> to?
>
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>
>
>> Let me make an aside about provable security. In the crypto practice
>> community, it is often regarded as oversold.
> As a member of the "crypto practice community" I disagree.  Key
> agreement protocols are widely understood to be a tricky area where
> formal analysis is crucial.  Dragonfly's lack of such analysis was a
> red flag.  Jonathan Katz, a world-class cryptographer, raised the
> issue repeatedly.  The CFRG chairs ignored him and endorsed Dan
> Harkins' bluster.
>
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03053.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03216.html
>
> Seems like CFRG could use more outreach to the cryptography community
> and less to the intelligence community.

I agree, more outreach to the theory community would be valuable. 
Perhaps you would be interested in helping with that effort?

>
>
>>> You seem to be arguing that intelligence agencies are the only people
>>> who would propose someone for CFRG chair.
>>>
>>> I'm not sure that's true.
>>
>> I agree that it is not true; it is an overstatement.  But it is a fact that
>> intelligence agencies have a lot of the talent that will show up at a venue
>> like this, and that those organizations are able to justify the cost of
>> ongoing professional participation.
> I see.  That's terrifying.
>
>
>>> Perhaps CFRG should follow an actual
>>> process for selecting its chairs.  Kevin or anyone else would be
>>> welcome to participate.
>>
>> Do I understand you correctly to say that you would accept Kevin as a
>> co-chair if he was selected through some sort of official process, other
>> than affirmation by the RG?
> If the IETF/IRTF community endorses Kevin through an open process I'd
> give up participating in IETF/IRTF any further.  That's not
> "acceptance", but you wouldn't have to listen to me any more.

I hope that you stay engaged with CFRG over the long term and help it do 
useful work.

>
>
>>>> What about someone in the role
>>>> of a document author or co-author? Would you ask that Sean Shen step down
>>>> as
>>>> co-author of draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01, for instance? I hope not,
>>>> but these are important questions to consider.
>>> No one proposed that.
>>
>> I didn't mean to suggest that you said that, but I did want to ask. If the
>> IRTF decides to establish a policy that is based on an RG member's employer,
>> as you are advocating, it would be best to establish the entire policy up
>> front, rather than debate each case as it comes up.
> I'm not advocating a formal policy.  I believe the selection (or
> removal) of chairs involves weighing many factors, and is best handled
> on a case-by-case basis.

I think we are in agreement here.

>
>
>> If we really did want to exclude people from intelligence agencies while not
>> setting a formal policy to that effect, we could achieve that goal by
>> crafting a policy that demands more transparency than an intelligence agency
>> would be comfortable with.   For instance, the policy could require the
>> publication of all of the contributor's publications, regardless of whether
>> or not they have been classified, or it could require that the contributor
>> sign a statement regarding transparency that their employer would never
>> agree to.   But note that if we did this, it would not solve any problems,
>> because an intelligence agency could always work through contractors or
>> other people who are on their payroll, but do not admit to being on their
>> payroll.
> I think those are bad ideas which would not prevent sabotage and would
> burden innocent contributors.

I think you are right.   I kind of like the idea of having a statement 
of purpose of CFRG that contributors need to agree to, but it would not 
be addressing any of the problems that people care most about.

>
>
>>>    For the CFRG chairs this has
>>> included handling an important security flaw prior to public
>>> disclosure [2].
>>
>> What do you mean by this?   Are you saying that the CFRG chairs mishandled
>> the Lucky-13 disclosure?
> No.  From what I can tell Kenny Paterson handled it well.
>
> But amongst those defending Kevin, a major theme seems to be that
> trustworthiness and expertise is not important for IETF/IRTF chairs
> since they're presiding over an open process.
>
> I disagree since chairs wield a great deal of power in the IETF/IRTF
> process.  The "Lucky 13" disclosure highlights an additional duty
> which has been entrusted to CFRG chairs and which is hard to audit.

I think that you are overestimating the power of a research group 
chair.  But I do think that trustworthyness and expertise are important.

>
>
>>>> [IGOE_2] ends with the statement "Many thanks to Rene Struik and Scott
>>>> Fluhrer for their insightful comments. Would anyone else on the list like
>>>> to
>>>> join in? We can’t learn from our mistakes until we realize we’ve made
>>>> them."
>>>> I have a hard time seeing this message as steering the RG in an
>>>> unfruitful
>>>> direction.
>>> That's [IGOE_3].  See the paragraph preceding your quote.  "steering
>>> the RG in an unfruitful direction" is exactly how I'd describe it.
>>
>> If I understand you, the paragraph is Kevin's summary of Scott's improvement
>> to Dan's protocol.   To me, that paragraph, followed by the request for
>> review, looks like an RG chair that is seeking to stimulate discussion.
> That's a good description.  But so is your phrase "steering the RG in
> an unfruitful direction".  Kevin's paragraph is below:
>
> """
> Scott Fluhrer proposed an elegant change to DragonFly that fixes this.
>   In the EC case, replace
> the while-loop with a for-loop, say “for t = 1,,,,40”.  On each pass
> through this for-loop generate
> a possible x- coorodinate as in DragonFly,  saving off the first x
> value which corresponds to a
> point on the curve.  The only thing that can go wrong here is doing
> all 40-iterations without
> finding a good x-coordinate.  This is quite unlikely to occur (~
> 10^-12), but when it does occur
> it gives 40 bits of information about the password.  In some VERY high
> volume applications it
> might be prudent to choose a value larger than 40.
> """
>
>
>>>>> He also endorsed an ineffective attempt to avoid
>>>>> timing attacks by adding extra iterations to one of the loops [IGOE_3,
>>>>> IGOE_4].
>>>>
>>>> I think that by "ineffective attempt to avoid timing attacks" you are
>>>> referring to your statement that "within each loop are conditional
>>>> branches
>>>> and Legendre symbol / square-root algorithms, which are hard to implement
>>>> efficiently in constant time ([STRUIK], [ICART], [FIPS186-4])" from
>>>> [REVIEW]. Is this right? There is a significant difference between "hard
>>>> to
>>>> implement" and "ineffective". The statement in [REVIEW] makes it sound
>>>> like
>>>> it is inconvenient for the implementer, while the statement in your email
>>>> makes it sound as though it is impossible.
>>> Not sure I understand this quibble.
>>
>> The important point here is that a Research Group chair reading [REVIEW]
>> could get the impression that the proposed mitigation to timing attacks is
>> "hard to implement" rather than "ineffective", in your opinion.
> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>
> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
> ops.
>
> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
> point a square root is performed.  So:
>   - 1 modular exponentiation
>   - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>     - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>
> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>   - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>     - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>   - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>
> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?

I don't have the time right now to go back to the earlier version of the 
draft and check all of this, and I want to get back to you sooner rather 
than later.   So let me comment here as a chair, rather than a technical 
reviewer.  What would have been most useful is for this analysis to have 
been presented to the CFRG mail list during the discussion of timing 
attacks that initially took place on December 2012, or after Kevin put 
out a Last Call for comments on Dragonfly on April 4, 2013.   For 
perspective: Rene Struik's comments on that draft went out on Nov 29, 
and yous went out on Dec 10, over six months after the last call for 
comments.

David

>
>
>>>>> 4)  Kevin's NSA affiliation raises unpleasant but unavoidable
>>>>> questions regarding these actions.  It's entirely possible these are
>>>>> just mistakes by a novice chair who lacks experience in a particular
>>>>> sort of protocol and is being pressured by IETF participants to
>>>>> endorse something.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I agree: It's entirely possible these are just mistakes by a novice
>>>> chair who lacks experience in a particular sort of protocol and is being
>>>> pressured by IETF participants to endorse something.
>>> I think CFRG deserves a chair who would be informed enough to
>>> understand these areas, and diligent enough not to make the technical
>>> and process mistakes that Kevin did.
>>
>> Of course we need informed and diligent chairs.   But when we are
>> establishing the criteria that we expect from the CFRG chairs, we need to
>> keep in mind that the higher that we set the bar, the fewer the candidates
>> that will be qualified and interested.   It would be wrong to set an
>> expectation that each email that attempts to summarize the on-list
>> discussion must be free from flaws, for instance.
> Sure.  Crypto's hard.  Mistakes happen.  But I'm uncomfortable with
> the volume of mistakes in Kevin's handling of Dragonfly:
>   * Endorsing Dragonfly despite better alternatives in the literature
>   * Twice suggesting a way of deriving the DH generator which makes the
> protocol breakable
>   * Endorsing an ineffective timing-attack countermeasure
>   * Misrepresenting CFRG consensus to TLS WG
>
>
> Trevor
> .
>


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Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2014 14:06:31 -0800 (PST)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] misuse-resistant AEAD (was: Re: CFRG and thwarting pervasive montoring)
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On Thu, January 2, 2014 7:31 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Jan 2, 2014 10:03 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Paul,
>>
>> On 12/30/2013 02:06 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>
>>> In the past I¹ve never considered CFRG a viable discussion forum for
>>> making an impact by creating or approving new algorithms Š but if it
>>> is:
>>>
>>>         We need an Œapproved' nonce-insensitive AEAD algorithm.
>>>
>>> I¹m designing multicast communications in a mesh topology and CCM and
>>> GCM
>>> suffer from N^2 complexity (since they require unique nonce/key).  Yes
>>> Š
>>> there are ways that some link proposals like 802.1ae mitigate the issue
>>> using device addresses as part of the key setup.  The best solution is
>>> a
>>> nonce-insensitive AEAD.
>>
>> I agree.   The best solution would be an authenticated encryption
> algorithm that did not require a nonce as input.   An alternative which is
> not quite as good would be an algorithm that requires a nonce as input,
> but
> which has security that suffers only a minimal degradation if nonces are
> repeated.
>
> Already exists: it's called CBC mode with HMAC. IVs are random and can
> repeat.

  There are still security sensitive requirements on IVs in CBC mode.
Namely, they have to be unpredictable to the attacker. That problem does
not exist with SIV. The nonce is completely arbitrary, it can be a counter,
pseudo-random material, it can be partially derived, it can repeat or not.

  And as a formal AEAD construction SIV avoids the ad hoc nature in which
CBC plus HMAC has been put together in the past. It also has a nice and
fixed API for things like passing AAD as a vector of inputs.

>>> We already have an RFC for SIV which is deterministic and a decent
>>> solution, but it is not ŒNIST¹ approved, so I have problems
>>> introducing
> it
>>> into consumer equipment.  It¹s also a little slow Š but I¹m not sure
>>> that
>>> efficiency should be the primary evaluation criteria.
>>
>>
>> All valid points.   SIV shows that it is possible to have a
> misuse-resistant algorithm.  It may not have all of the properties that
> one
> might want in an algorithm (for instance: more amenable to parallel
> processing), but it shows that we can achieve more robust security than
> nonce-based AEAD.
>>
>
> Deterministic encryption leaks considerable information when used on low
> entropy messages. Nonce reuse resistant nonce based MAC and encryption
> algorithms exist today, namely CBC initialized with the encryption of a
> counter and HMAC.

  With SIV, authenticity remains and the leakage is limited to knowledge
that the plaintext equals a prior plaintext, and that is further constrained
by the fact that it's the same plaintext plus the same AAD, if the AAD
changes (due to a message header that encapsulates the encrypted blob
being different) then there is no leakage.

  It really is the "swiss army knife" of crypto tools-- it slices, it dices,
it provides misuse-resistant AEAD, it does key wrapping with AAD!
(And it has a security proof behind it too).

  regards,

  Dan.




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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] misuse-resistant AEAD (was: Re: CFRG and thwarting pervasive montoring)
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On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 5:06 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, January 2, 2014 7:31 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On Jan 2, 2014 10:03 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Paul,
>>>
>>> On 12/30/2013 02:06 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>>
>>>> In the past I=C2=B9ve never considered CFRG a viable discussion forum =
for
>>>> making an impact by creating or approving new algorithms =C5=A0 but if=
 it
>>>> is:
>>>>
>>>>         We need an =C5=92approved' nonce-insensitive AEAD algorithm.
>>>>
>>>> I=C2=B9m designing multicast communications in a mesh topology and CCM=
 and
>>>> GCM
>>>> suffer from N^2 complexity (since they require unique nonce/key).  Yes
>>>> =C5=A0
>>>> there are ways that some link proposals like 802.1ae mitigate the issu=
e
>>>> using device addresses as part of the key setup.  The best solution is
>>>> a
>>>> nonce-insensitive AEAD.
>>>
>>> I agree.   The best solution would be an authenticated encryption
>> algorithm that did not require a nonce as input.   An alternative which =
is
>> not quite as good would be an algorithm that requires a nonce as input,
>> but
>> which has security that suffers only a minimal degradation if nonces are
>> repeated.
>>
>> Already exists: it's called CBC mode with HMAC. IVs are random and can
>> repeat.
>
>   There are still security sensitive requirements on IVs in CBC mode.
> Namely, they have to be unpredictable to the attacker. That problem does
> not exist with SIV. The nonce is completely arbitrary, it can be a counte=
r,
> pseudo-random material, it can be partially derived, it can repeat or not=
.
>
>   And as a formal AEAD construction SIV avoids the ad hoc nature in which
> CBC plus HMAC has been put together in the past. It also has a nice and
> fixed API for things like passing AAD as a vector of inputs.

CBC+HMAC is an instance of generic composition. So is GCM and
Chacha/Salsa/XSalsa/Poly1305.
What sort of device can encrypt, but not use a PRNG or count?

>
>>>> We already have an RFC for SIV which is deterministic and a decent
>>>> solution, but it is not =C5=92NIST=C2=B9 approved, so I have problems
>>>> introducing
>> it
>>>> into consumer equipment.  It=C2=B9s also a little slow =C5=A0 but I=C2=
=B9m not sure
>>>> that
>>>> efficiency should be the primary evaluation criteria.
>>>
>>>
>>> All valid points.   SIV shows that it is possible to have a
>> misuse-resistant algorithm.  It may not have all of the properties that
>> one
>> might want in an algorithm (for instance: more amenable to parallel
>> processing), but it shows that we can achieve more robust security than
>> nonce-based AEAD.
>>>
>>
>> Deterministic encryption leaks considerable information when used on low
>> entropy messages. Nonce reuse resistant nonce based MAC and encryption
>> algorithms exist today, namely CBC initialized with the encryption of a
>> counter and HMAC.
>
>   With SIV, authenticity remains and the leakage is limited to knowledge
> that the plaintext equals a prior plaintext, and that is further constrai=
ned
> by the fact that it's the same plaintext plus the same AAD, if the AAD
> changes (due to a message header that encapsulates the encrypted blob
> being different) then there is no leakage.
>
>   It really is the "swiss army knife" of crypto tools-- it slices, it dic=
es,
> it provides misuse-resistant AEAD, it does key wrapping with AAD!
> (And it has a security proof behind it too).

It's wonderful, but slow as molasses. 2 AES passes, only 1 of which
can be parallelized.
For the example of mesh networking it certainly has a place, but I
don't know if the security
is really that great for that application.

For example, imagine a simple message format with (sender, dest) as
header and a temperature as
the message. A mesh network passing around temperature measurements
will reveal a lot to a passive attacker:
remember temperatures are continuous, so all you need is the direction
change the same or different as before to
see just about everything.

Add a counter and everything is golden. But you need that counter. And
if you have a counter, nonce-based misuse-resistant
is just fine, and moreover can be done faster than SIV at the cost of
leaking common prefixes.

Authenticity doesn't make sense with repeated nonces. All you get is
the attacker cannot introduce new messages, but
they can still repeat old ones. This can be enough to have some fun.

>
>   regards,
>
>   Dan.
>
>
>
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Thu Jan  2 16:41:01 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] authenticated encryption with replay protection (AERO) - internet draft
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Hi CFRG,

I have a new proposal for authenticated encryption, which is 
particularly well suited for communication security.   An internet draft 
describing the idea has been published at 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aero-00 and I would like to 
request a slot at the upcoming CFRG meeting to present this work. (I am 
assuming that we will be meeting in London in March along with IETF 
89).   I alluded to this work on the thread about misuse resistant 
authenticated encryption earlier today.

 From the draft:

Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO)

    This document describes Authenticated Encryption with Replay
    prOtection (AERO), a cryptographic technique that provides all of the
    essential security services needed for communication security. AERO
    offers several advantages over other methods: it has more compact
    messages, provides stronger misuse resistance, avoids the need to
    manage implicit state, and is simpler to use.  This document defines
    a particular AERO algorithm as well as a registry for such
    algorithms.

Comments are welcome, and I especially encourage discussion about the 
appropriate goals for authenticated encryption.  The draft explains the 
rationale well enough, I believe, though it does not mention decryption 
misuse.   I will send a separate note on that topic.

A formal proof of security has not yet been published, but is believed 
to be possible, and the draft does include a security analysis.

Just for the sake of formality - in requesting this review and a slot at 
the upcoming meeting, I am acting as a CFRG member and not a chair.

David


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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
To: "'akr@akr.io'" <akr@akr.io>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Dual_EC_DRBG
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Happy New Year to all.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alyssa Rowan
> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2013 10:11 AM
>=20
> On 27/12/2013 20:43, Dan Brown wrote:
>=20
> > Repeating myself, nobody showed how the alternative P&Q could be
> > backdoored.
>=20
> Yes, they did. Even with another point, Dual_EC_DRBG still doesn't =
produce
> uniform random numbers (2^28 distinguisher=C2=B9, and a p=3D0.0011 =
consecutive
> bit predictor=C2=B2 - both of which are practical attacks).

1) I too wrote about the same bias in Appendix B of:=20

http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/117=20

At the end of that paper, I try to suggest that the bias does not have =
an impact for nonces or keys. I also try to say that if =
indistinguishability from uniform bit strings is needed, then more bits =
can be truncated from the point, which is consistent with what the =
standards allow. =20

This indistinguishability, under sufficient amounts truncation, say half =
the bits, seems a reasonable conjecture.

To motivate a real-world need for such indistinguishability, my eprint =
cited one-time pads.  Certainly one-time pads (e.g. stream ciphers) do =
need full indistinguishability, but in real cryptographic systems, an =
RNG is not really meant to provide the service of a one-time pad, =
because, for a one-time pad to useful, i.e. to permit decryption, it has =
to be reproducible.  Reproducibility undermines the main service =
provided by an RNG, which is unpredictability, at least in the sense of =
forward secrecy.  So, in retrospect, it seems that I gave a false =
motivation.

Perhaps, a better motivation would have been some information-theoretic =
crypto scheme, such as secret sharing.  This is outside my area of =
expertise.  Also, neither ANSI nor NIST standardize such info-theoretic =
algorithms, so at the time I thought it irrelevant, though I see now =
that to be a too narrow view.

In summary, I agree that there are feasible distinguishers, but I fail =
to see how these particular distinguishers lead to practical attacks =
(see further specifics below "forbid") on uses of the RNG.


2) Though this is not a backdoor in the usual narrow sense (that =
somebody needs to possess a secret key to open), I am sympathetic to =
your concern that this is an intentional weakness.  Maybe somebody on =
this list knows of a better name for such an intentional open weakness?  =



3) S&S [your ref 1] advanced the understanding of the bias by amplifying =
the distinguisher using longer outputs. That kind of amplification is =
fairly well known, and I should have thought about it. =20

S&S also conclude that the Dual_EC_DRBG is insecure, but without giving =
an applied example attacks (see further specifics below "forbid"), and, =
IIRC, without acknowledging that that some truncation parameters seem to =
resist the bias attack.

>=20
> So, if you use it to generate k for (DSA|ECDSA) signatures... or, =
heaven
> forbid, a key...

1) What your does your ellipsis mean? (BTW, an elliptical implication, =
which is a clever, implicit pun.)

2) Your comment on k is a very interesting research question, at least =
to me.  My research on DSA|ECDSA indicates that there is a gap between =
the known necessary and sufficient conditions for the k value used in =
DSA and ECDSA signatures.  An impressive series of research papers, =
leading up to one by Bleichenbacher, shows it necessary that k avoids =
certain types of arithmetic bias.  My theoretical work (see ECC 2001, =
and Advances in ECC, Ch. 2) shows that a certain sets of conditions and =
models, including the k being chosen uniformly, may be sufficient for =
the security of ECDSA, against certain types of forgery.  The gap is =
that it is unknown whether certain other kinds of bias in k affect =
security, because they are not covered by the known attacks or the known =
security proofs. =20

For a contrived example, what if k was chosen such that its SHA-3 digest =
ends in the bits 011.  This is bias that anybody could test, yet would =
not seem to lead to any attack on DSA or ECDSA. =20

More to the point, if k was the output of Dual_EC_DRBG, and this led to =
an attack, then in my view this would be a new, and major result, =
surpassing Bleichenbacher's attack by a long shot because it exploits =
much less bias, and more importantly a much different type of bias.  If =
you are aware of such an attack, then maybe inform the CFRG (or just =
remind me if it is well known).

3) Schnorr has a very interesting result, albeit rather theoretical and =
in the generic group model, that most forms of bias in an ECC key do not =
make the ECDLP any easier.  It is known that some forms of bias, such as =
a small key lead to weaker ECDLP.  So, again there is a gap.  Any =
further closure of this gap would be significant.  Again, I am forced to =
wonder if you know something here that I don't.  I couldn't find such an =
attack in S&S.

4) I am less familiar with other key types, e.g. RSA, AES, and HMAC.  I =
vaguely recall that certain types of bias in RSA and RC4 secret keys =
undermine the security. I feel that this is an important area of =
research.  If it could be shown that the bias from Dual_EC_DRBG =
undermines some similar computational-based crypto scheme, then this =
would be an improvement in research.

5)  Of course, it is always prudent to try to make all keys to uniform, =
if only because that maximizes the min-entropy.  (Also, it makes =
security proofs easier, I think.)  That's why I formulated that TPP in =
the my eprint of the Dual_EC_DRBG, and used the indistinguishability as =
the security definition.  I think now, I would also examine =
unguessability specifically (see next point).

6) I've since wondered a little what the more important threat models, =
i.e. security definitions, for a DRBG would be.  Indistinguishability is =
certainly very nice, especially for information-theoretic crypto, but =
unguessabiltiy is more important.  So, if unguessability can rely one =
weaker assumptions than indistinguishability, then this would be =
worthwhile to understand.  I touched upon the unguessabilty of =
Dual_EC_DRBG in my 2006 eprint, but haven't looked at the problem since =
2007.  Anyway, I don't yet know what the best security definition for a =
DRBG would be.  Maybe the researchers on "randomness extractors" have =
something that could be converted over to DRBG, namely entropy =
condensation.

>=20
> It is thoroughly unsuitable as a CSPRNG, and is obviously broken by =
design, as
> was widely pointed out at the time, even before we knew for sure NSA =
had a
> hand in it.
>=20
> > I would even want them to clearer.
>=20
> I would want it removing from the standard entirely, as thoroughly and
> completely discredited.

1) Just wondering: do you also dispute that benefit of having an RNG =
whose security basis is number-theoretic?  What about just for algorithm =
agility?

I still personally recommend number-theoretic RNGs for security: mainly =
because I feel more confidence in ECC, and other number-theoretic =
algorithms, than in symmetric crypto algorithms.  My feeling here is =
rather vague, and largely based on familiarity, but also philosophically =
based on ECC and RSA being something innate, whereas symmetric key seems =
devised.  But I could easily understand how others have the exact =
opposite feeling.  So, I generally did not expect much adoption of =
number-theoretic RNGs.

There are other number-theoretic algorithms.  If they have been =
standardized and proven secure, then they deserve consideration too.  =
But I doubt that their standards have received as much attention as the =
Dual_EC_DRBG.  Anyway, I haven't studied any of these, so cannot =
recommend them personally.

Have there been any advances in the security analysis of the =
Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm since 2007?  Even though people seem motivated to =
discredit it?  If not, then I would argue that is a good sign, but also =
for other unaffected NIST DRBGs.

I haven't really studied the HMAC_DRBG, Hash_DRBG or CTR_DRBG from NIST =
SP 800-90A.


2) Over the last few days, I've been trying to see things from a wider =
perspective.=20
 =20
My position on the standard has recently changed.

Implementers (and users) may have placed more trust in the standard than =
I thought, and they may have been less informed about the widely =
publicized potential backdoor than I thought. =20

In other words, all the publicity may have been ineffective at =
preventing the alleged backdoor from being exploited, contrary to my =
belief.  The standard should not have included the default P&Q.

That all said, despite the deficiency of the standard, I feel =
implementers still have some responsibility to keep up with the news and =
research about crypto, given that standards need to be stable documents =
for interoperability.

In summary, my position on the standards, and standards process, is not =
well-defined. =20

To clarify my past position, I said "not subverted standard", but I did =
not mean to rule out a backdoor in the default P&Q, just that the =
publicity would render any subversion inoperable, and that there could =
other things than standards enabling such subversion.  But now I see =
that I was wrong.=20

My position on the algorithm Dual_EC_DRBG, with properly random, =
backdoor-free, P&Q is the same as in 2007 (see also bias discussion =
above), which is that it is secure.

>=20
> > Reported, yes.  But AFAIK, not published.
>=20
> Unless you know of another EC-based RNG published by NIST in 2006, all
> doubt has been removed that it is, in the NSA's words, 'enabled'.
>=20

Reports I've seen say "suggest" or "reported", which leaves doubt.  =
Please send me the links to the correct reports.

Personally, I still don't know for sure if the default P&Q are =
backdoored, but it would be prudent for implementers and users to assume =
that they are.

> Moreover, the internal NSA memo discussed by NYT might literally name
> you, given your name is on the patent=C2=B3 along with Vanstone, so I =
would
> understand why you might have a vested interest in its publication.
> You'd have to ask NYT for that, I suppose.
>=20
> I'm going to ask you directly, Dan: Have you had any contact with the  =
SIGINT
> Enabling Project that you know of? I mean, you even talk specifically =
about
> "escrow keys" in that patent. That seems directly relevant to their =
work.

1) No contact that I know of.  I never heard of "SIGINT Enabling =
Project" until the recent news.

2) At some point, I clued into the possibility of a backdoor, and, among =
other things, tried to make sure the possibility was at least publicly =
known, at first quietly: with a patent, and with a comment within my =
March 2006 eprint.  Later, others raised much more publicity, which =
seemed sufficient to me.  I had expected such publicity to cause the =
proposers, X9F1 and NIST to withdraw the default P&Q from the standard.

>=20
> ___
> 1. Shoenmakers & Sidorenko [2006] =
<http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/190.pdf>
> 2. Gj=C3=B8steen [2005], comments to draft NIST SP 800-90A=20
> 3. <http://patents.justia.com/patent/8396213>


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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan  2 18:26:14 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] authenticated encryption with replay protection (AERO) - internet draft
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On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 7:40 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi CFRG,
>
> I have a new proposal for authenticated encryption, which is particularly
> well suited for communication security.   An internet draft describing the
> idea has been published at http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aero-00
> and I would like to request a slot at the upcoming CFRG meeting to present
> this work. (I am assuming that we will be meeting in London in March along
> with IETF 89).   I alluded to this work on the thread about misuse resistant
> authenticated encryption earlier today.
>
> From the draft:
>
> Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO)
>
>    This document describes Authenticated Encryption with Replay
>    prOtection (AERO), a cryptographic technique that provides all of the
>    essential security services needed for communication security. AERO
>    offers several advantages over other methods: it has more compact
>    messages, provides stronger misuse resistance, avoids the need to
>    manage implicit state, and is simpler to use.  This document defines
>    a particular AERO algorithm as well as a registry for such
>    algorithms.
>
> Comments are welcome, and I especially encourage discussion about the
> appropriate goals for authenticated encryption.  The draft explains the
> rationale well enough, I believe, though it does not mention decryption
> misuse.   I will send a separate note on that topic.

INT-PTXT+IND-CPA is pretty much expected.

My one question is why not submit to CAESER? Yes, you are judging it,
but it would bring more eyes
and perspective.

The big weakness of this proposal is speed. It requires one pass of
AES-CTR followed by several passes of a
GCM calculation. On commodity hardware this is very slow. SIV with the
nonce as AAD would get equivalent anti-replay
properties with greater speed, namely two AES passes.

>
> A formal proof of security has not yet been published, but is believed to be
> possible, and the draft does include a security analysis.

It's straightforward, if tedious: use the lemma of Bernstein on PRP vs
PRF, then argue that the messages emerging from
an attacker's insertion are indistinguishable from random, so the
forgery probability is low. For privacy argue that IND-* is
satisfied. Then use the fact that forgery is hard to get that IND-CCA
is satisfied. I haven't actually done this so there might be
a nontrivial obstacle.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
> Just for the sake of formality - in requesting this review and a slot at the
> upcoming meeting, I am acting as a CFRG member and not a chair.
>
> David
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan  2 18:34:54 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Dual_EC_DRBG
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On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 8:06 PM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> wrote:
> Happy New Year to all.
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Alyssa Rowan
>> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2013 10:11 AM
>>
>> On 27/12/2013 20:43, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>> > Repeating myself, nobody showed how the alternative P&Q could be
>> > backdoored.
>>
>> Yes, they did. Even with another point, Dual_EC_DRBG still doesn't produ=
ce
>> uniform random numbers (2^28 distinguisher=C2=B9, and a p=3D0.0011 conse=
cutive
>> bit predictor=C2=B2 - both of which are practical attacks).
>
> 1) I too wrote about the same bias in Appendix B of:
>
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/117
>
> At the end of that paper, I try to suggest that the bias does not have an=
 impact for nonces or keys. I also try to say that if indistinguishability =
from uniform bit strings is needed, then more bits can be truncated from th=
e point, which is consistent with what the standards allow.
>
> This indistinguishability, under sufficient amounts truncation, say half =
the bits, seems a reasonable conjecture.

The standard actually says that for efficiency only 16 bits should be
removed. Tanja Lange points out that at the time "everyone" knew that
much more truncation was required.

>
> To motivate a real-world need for such indistinguishability, my eprint ci=
ted one-time pads.  Certainly one-time pads (e.g. stream ciphers) do need f=
ull indistinguishability, but in real cryptographic systems, an RNG is not =
really meant to provide the service of a one-time pad, because, for a one-t=
ime pad to useful, i.e. to permit decryption, it has to be reproducible.  R=
eproducibility undermines the main service provided by an RNG, which is unp=
redictability, at least in the sense of forward secrecy.  So, in retrospect=
, it seems that I gave a false motivation.

You do realize this is about expanding a short seed to a longer
sequence indistinguishable from random and not constantly feeding in
data?

>
> Perhaps, a better motivation would have been some information-theoretic c=
rypto scheme, such as secret sharing.  This is outside my area of expertise=
.  Also, neither ANSI nor NIST standardize such info-theoretic algorithms, =
so at the time I thought it irrelevant, though I see now that to be a too n=
arrow view.
>
> In summary, I agree that there are feasible distinguishers, but I fail to=
 see how these particular distinguishers lead to practical attacks (see fur=
ther specifics below "forbid") on uses of the RNG.
>
>
> 2) Though this is not a backdoor in the usual narrow sense (that somebody=
 needs to possess a secret key to open), I am sympathetic to your concern t=
hat this is an intentional weakness.  Maybe somebody on this list knows of =
a better name for such an intentional open weakness?
>
>
> 3) S&S [your ref 1] advanced the understanding of the bias by amplifying =
the distinguisher using longer outputs. That kind of amplification is fairl=
y well known, and I should have thought about it.
>
> S&S also conclude that the Dual_EC_DRBG is insecure, but without giving a=
n applied example attacks (see further specifics below "forbid"), and, IIRC=
, without acknowledging that that some truncation parameters seem to resist=
 the bias attack.
>
>>
>> So, if you use it to generate k for (DSA|ECDSA) signatures... or, heaven
>> forbid, a key...
>
> 1) What your does your ellipsis mean? (BTW, an elliptical implication, wh=
ich is a clever, implicit pun.)
>
> 2) Your comment on k is a very interesting research question, at least to=
 me.  My research on DSA|ECDSA indicates that there is a gap between the kn=
own necessary and sufficient conditions for the k value used in DSA and ECD=
SA signatures.  An impressive series of research papers, leading up to one =
by Bleichenbacher, shows it necessary that k avoids certain types of arithm=
etic bias.  My theoretical work (see ECC 2001, and Advances in ECC, Ch. 2) =
shows that a certain sets of conditions and models, including the k being c=
hosen uniformly, may be sufficient for the security of ECDSA, against certa=
in types of forgery.  The gap is that it is unknown whether certain other k=
inds of bias in k affect security, because they are not covered by the know=
n attacks or the known security proofs.
>
> For a contrived example, what if k was chosen such that its SHA-3 digest =
ends in the bits 011.  This is bias that anybody could test, yet would not =
seem to lead to any attack on DSA or ECDSA.
>
> More to the point, if k was the output of Dual_EC_DRBG, and this led to a=
n attack, then in my view this would be a new, and major result, surpassing=
 Bleichenbacher's attack by a long shot because it exploits much less bias,=
 and more importantly a much different type of bias.  If you are aware of s=
uch an attack, then maybe inform the CFRG (or just remind me if it is well =
known).

I don't trust schemes because they haven't been attacked, but because
they have reductions.

>
> 3) Schnorr has a very interesting result, albeit rather theoretical and i=
n the generic group model, that most forms of bias in an ECC key do not mak=
e the ECDLP any easier.  It is known that some forms of bias, such as a sma=
ll key lead to weaker ECDLP.  So, again there is a gap.  Any further closur=
e of this gap would be significant.  Again, I am forced to wonder if you kn=
ow something here that I don't.  I couldn't find such an attack in S&S.
>
> 4) I am less familiar with other key types, e.g. RSA, AES, and HMAC.  I v=
aguely recall that certain types of bias in RSA and RC4 secret keys undermi=
ne the security. I feel that this is an important area of research.  If it =
could be shown that the bias from Dual_EC_DRBG undermines some similar comp=
utational-based crypto scheme, then this would be an improvement in researc=
h.

Why bother when we can use something that doesn't have these issues
like HMAC_DRBG?

>
> 5)  Of course, it is always prudent to try to make all keys to uniform, i=
f only because that maximizes the min-entropy.  (Also, it makes security pr=
oofs easier, I think.)  That's why I formulated that TPP in the my eprint o=
f the Dual_EC_DRBG, and used the indistinguishability as the security defin=
ition.  I think now, I would also examine unguessability specifically (see =
next point).
>
> 6) I've since wondered a little what the more important threat models, i.=
e. security definitions, for a DRBG would be.  Indistinguishability is cert=
ainly very nice, especially for information-theoretic crypto, but unguessab=
iltiy is more important.  So, if unguessability can rely one weaker assumpt=
ions than indistinguishability, then this would be worthwhile to understand=
.  I touched upon the unguessabilty of Dual_EC_DRBG in my 2006 eprint, but =
haven't looked at the problem since 2007.  Anyway, I don't yet know what th=
e best security definition for a DRBG would be.  Maybe the researchers on "=
randomness extractors" have something that could be converted over to DRBG,=
 namely entropy condensation.

Do you understand how cryptographic proofs work? At each step two
games are shown equivalent, with some success probability reduction.
Most of the equivalences depend on indistinguishability from random.
Replace with unguessability and the whole edifice drops apart. The
whole game is based on each piece fitting into the slot carved out
from it. What does the weaker notion of "unguessability" let you do?
Unguessability is also equivalent to indistinguishability: if a
polynomial-time algorithm cannot predict a sequence of bits with
greater than .5 probability at each bit, it cannot distinguish it from
random.

By contrast, the ROM is a nicer model to work in than the standard
model: some schemes get slower to make them work in the standard
model. This is worth having the ROM.
>
>>
>> It is thoroughly unsuitable as a CSPRNG, and is obviously broken by desi=
gn, as
>> was widely pointed out at the time, even before we knew for sure NSA had=
 a
>> hand in it.
>>
>> > I would even want them to clearer.
>>
>> I would want it removing from the standard entirely, as thoroughly and
>> completely discredited.
>
> 1) Just wondering: do you also dispute that benefit of having an RNG whos=
e security basis is number-theoretic?  What about just for algorithm agilit=
y?
>
> I still personally recommend number-theoretic RNGs for security: mainly b=
ecause I feel more confidence in ECC, and other number-theoretic algorithms=
, than in symmetric crypto algorithms.  My feeling here is rather vague, an=
d largely based on familiarity, but also philosophically based on ECC and R=
SA being something innate, whereas symmetric key seems devised.  But I coul=
d easily understand how others have the exact opposite feeling.  So, I gene=
rally did not expect much adoption of number-theoretic RNGs.

If AES breaks a number-theoretic RNG doesn't help us here. In for a
penny, in for a pound.

>
> There are other number-theoretic algorithms.  If they have been standardi=
zed and proven secure, then they deserve consideration too.  But I doubt th=
at their standards have received as much attention as the Dual_EC_DRBG.  An=
yway, I haven't studied any of these, so cannot recommend them personally.
>
> Have there been any advances in the security analysis of the Dual_EC_DRBG=
 algorithm since 2007?  Even though people seem motivated to discredit it? =
 If not, then I would argue that is a good sign, but also for other unaffec=
ted NIST DRBGs.
>
> I haven't really studied the HMAC_DRBG, Hash_DRBG or CTR_DRBG from NIST S=
P 800-90A.
>
>
> 2) Over the last few days, I've been trying to see things from a wider pe=
rspective.
>
> My position on the standard has recently changed.
>
> Implementers (and users) may have placed more trust in the standard than =
I thought, and they may have been less informed about the widely publicized=
 potential backdoor than I thought.
>
> In other words, all the publicity may have been ineffective at preventing=
 the alleged backdoor from being exploited, contrary to my belief.  The sta=
ndard should not have included the default P&Q.
>
> That all said, despite the deficiency of the standard, I feel implementer=
s still have some responsibility to keep up with the news and research abou=
t crypto, given that standards need to be stable documents for interoperabi=
lity.

A major vendor of cryptographic software was paid $10 million to make
it the default, and didn't change it until this year. And you call
that unexploited? What on earth was that $10 million for? The CMPV
process was insisting implementors use the default P&Q.

>
> In summary, my position on the standards, and standards process, is not w=
ell-defined.
>
> To clarify my past position, I said "not subverted standard", but I did n=
ot mean to rule out a backdoor in the default P&Q, just that the publicity =
would render any subversion inoperable, and that there could other things t=
han standards enabling such subversion.  But now I see that I was wrong.
>
> My position on the algorithm Dual_EC_DRBG, with properly random, backdoor=
-free, P&Q is the same as in 2007 (see also bias discussion above), which i=
s that it is secure.

And of course your employer has the patent on it.

>
>>
>> > Reported, yes.  But AFAIK, not published.
>>
>> Unless you know of another EC-based RNG published by NIST in 2006, all
>> doubt has been removed that it is, in the NSA's words, 'enabled'.
>>
>
> Reports I've seen say "suggest" or "reported", which leaves doubt.  Pleas=
e send me the links to the correct reports.
>
> Personally, I still don't know for sure if the default P&Q are backdoored=
, but it would be prudent for implementers and users to assume that they ar=
e.
>
>> Moreover, the internal NSA memo discussed by NYT might literally name
>> you, given your name is on the patent=C2=B3 along with Vanstone, so I wo=
uld
>> understand why you might have a vested interest in its publication.
>> You'd have to ask NYT for that, I suppose.
>>
>> I'm going to ask you directly, Dan: Have you had any contact with the  S=
IGINT
>> Enabling Project that you know of? I mean, you even talk specifically ab=
out
>> "escrow keys" in that patent. That seems directly relevant to their work=
.
>
> 1) No contact that I know of.  I never heard of "SIGINT Enabling Project"=
 until the recent news.

So you discover this backdoor in a NIST standard, and then do what?

>
> 2) At some point, I clued into the possibility of a backdoor, and, among =
other things, tried to make sure the possibility was at least publicly know=
n, at first quietly: with a patent, and with a comment within my March 2006=
 eprint.  Later, others raised much more publicity, which seemed sufficient=
 to me.  I had expected such publicity to cause the proposers, X9F1 and NIS=
T to withdraw the default P&Q from the standard.

And you didn't submit a public comment to NIST or a letter to CRYPTO?
You had a footnote in your March 2006 paper, not a note explaining
that the backdoor was real as your patent indicates you knew. The
discovery by S&F in 2007 got publication: why not a two-for-one in
2006? In 2005 you filed for a patent instead of telling everyone this
was broken. These actions don't seem like the actions of someone
trying to promote strong cryptography in an open process: they seem
like the actions of someone trying to set up then an excuse that
"well, I told you but you didn't listen" when the truth finally
emerged.

This is really a big tangent from the work of the CFRG, but it
illustrates that we should be very conservative in what we do and not
accept a few member's word as gospel. Well-known implementors and
cryptographers have been known to make big blunders, and if they do
not say they know of an attack, they might be lying. By contrast, if
they have a proof or an attack, you can always ask them to show it.

Sincerely,
Watson

>
>>
>> ___
>> 1. Shoenmakers & Sidorenko [2006] <http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/190.pdf>
>> 2. Gj=C3=B8steen [2005], comments to draft NIST SP 800-90A
>> 3. <http://patents.justia.com/patent/8396213>
>
>
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--=20
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From dharkins@lounge.org  Thu Jan  2 23:06:24 2014
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Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2014 23:06:15 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] misuse-resistant AEAD (was: Re: CFRG and thwarting pervasive montoring)
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On Thu, January 2, 2014 2:26 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 5:06 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thu, January 2, 2014 7:31 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>> On Jan 2, 2014 10:03 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>>> I agree.   The best solution would be an authenticated encryption
>>> algorithm that did not require a nonce as input.   An alternative which
>>> is
>>> not quite as good would be an algorithm that requires a nonce as input,
>>> but
>>> which has security that suffers only a minimal degradation if nonces
>>> are
>>> repeated.
>>>
>>> Already exists: it's called CBC mode with HMAC. IVs are random and can
>>> repeat.
>>
>>   There are still security sensitive requirements on IVs in CBC mode.
>> Namely, they have to be unpredictable to the attacker. That problem does
>> not exist with SIV. The nonce is completely arbitrary, it can be a
>> counter,
>> pseudo-random material, it can be partially derived, it can repeat or
>> not.
>>
>>   And as a formal AEAD construction SIV avoids the ad hoc nature in
>> which
>> CBC plus HMAC has been put together in the past. It also has a nice and
>> fixed API for things like passing AAD as a vector of inputs.
>
> CBC+HMAC is an instance of generic composition. So is GCM and
> Chacha/Salsa/XSalsa/Poly1305.
> What sort of device can encrypt, but not use a PRNG or count?

  It's not that the device is incapable of using a PRNG or counting, it's
that the device is using a generic composition that provides security
in a tight boundary that falls apart outside that boundary. That is
coupled with knowledge that such a device will be used and configured
and managed by humans, many of whom do not understand the
boundary, or worse they think they understand it when they don't.

  Dan.




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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] misuse-resistant AEAD
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On 01/02/2014 05:26 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
> CBC+HMAC is an instance of generic composition. So is GCM and
> Chacha/Salsa/XSalsa/Poly1305.

A minor correction: GCM isn't a generic composition in the original 
sense of Bellare and Namprempre.   The same block cipher key is used 
both for encryption and authentication, and the particulars about what 
counter block is used during the encryption of the GHASH value matter, 
and are "coordinated" with the encryption operation.

David


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From: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>
To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "David McGrew (mcgrew)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Trevor Perrin
> Sent: Friday, December 27, 2013 10:57 AM
> To: David McGrew (mcgrew)
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org; irtf-chair@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
>=20
>=20
> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>=20
> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
> ops.
>=20
> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
> point a square root is performed.  So:
>  - 1 modular exponentiation
>  - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>    - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>=20
> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>  - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>    - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>  - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>=20
> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?

I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.  However, =
I believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy elsewhere, and di=
d not review the draft).

I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution; the che=
cking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in random time =
via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is easier).

Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did he end=
orse Dan's implementation?'



For the record, a better implementation of my suggestion in dragonfly would=
 be:

       found =3D 0
       counter =3D 1
       n =3D len(p) + 64
       do {
         base =3D H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password | counter)
         temp =3D KDF-n(seed, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")
         seed =3D (temp mod (p - 1)) + 1
         if (seed < p)
         then
           x =3D seed
           if ( (x^3 + ax + b) is a quadratic residue mod p)
           then
             found_x =3D x
             found =3D 1
           fi
       } while((found =3D=3D 0) || (counter < k))

       x =3D found_x
       y =3D sqrt(x^3 + ax + b)
       if (lsb(y) =3D=3D lsb(base))
       then
         PE =3D (x,y)
       else
         PE =3D (x,p-y)
       fi

(this stops on the last acceptable 'x' value found; you could try to select=
 the 'middle-value'; I picked the last because it was the easiest to specif=
y).

As for determining if a value is a QR, the easiest way to do it without lea=
king any information in the time taken would be to blind the value randomly=
, as in:

    temp =3D (x^3 + ax + b mod p)
    r =3D 1 + random(p-2)      /* Random value between 1 and p-1) */
    temp =3D (temp * r * r) mod p
    if random(2)                   /* 0.5 chance */
        temp =3D  (temp * qr) mod p
        bit =3D 0
    else
        temp =3D  (temp *qnr) mod p
        bit =3D 1
    fi
    /* At this point, temp takes on all values between 1 and p-1 with equal=
 probability */
    output =3D bit ^ legendre_symbol(temp, p)

where qr, qnr are fixed values which are respectively a quadric residue, an=
d quadratic nonresidue mod p, and are the same size (and so the multiplicat=
ions take the same amount of time).


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Comments on draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01
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On Dec 27, 2013, at 17:01, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> Hi Watson,
>=20
> thanks for your comments.
>=20
> On 12/24/2013 09:45 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> Dear all,
>> David McGrew invited us to comment on these, and since they cover
>> similar ground I decided to take them both on at once.
>>=20
>> The basic problem I see is one is a bibliography and the other is a
>> wishlist. I don't see them
>> as being useful to someone simply asking the questions "what should I
>> use?" and "how do I
>> ensure algorithm agility is useful?"
>>=20
>> The cipher catalog needs to be kept up to date, and I don't really =
see
>> a reasonable mechanism for doing it in the form of an internet draft.
>> Something along the lines of the X lounge, where X is hash function,
>> pairing, block cipher, stream cipher, or ala EFD/Safecurves is
>> probably a better format.
>=20
> Agreed.  There is preliminary work in the direction of a 'cipher =
lounge' at http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/ic/about.html  .   It is =
important to also have an RFC on this topic, even if it won't be =
completely up-to-date, because RFCs are the official record, so to =
speak.

Note that Kevin (with some help from Henrik) also set up a wiki:

http://trac.tools.ietf.org/group/irtf/trac/wiki/cfrg

It=E2=80=99s unpopulated at this point but anybody with a datatracker =
login (http://tools.ietf.org/newlogin) can edit it.

>> It also needs a summary of the best attacks:
>> I should see something like "chosen ciphertext 2^36 texts, 2^192.5
>> time" for all ciphers, not just some. It's also missing Salsa20 and
>> ChaCha20.
>=20
> Agreed.

This seems like an excellent suggestion.  Interestingly enough when I =
was working on [0]-[4] with Lily a couple of the authors of the =
=E2=80=9Cattack=E2=80=9D papers actually provided input so it would be =
great as people found/learned weakness they could update the list.  =
There=E2=80=99s already some of this out there on wikipedia.

I was actually hoping that we could use this draft/wiki as a way to =
encourage/shame folks in to supporting algorithm agility. But maybe =
that=E2=80=99s just me.

The thing though is no matter what we write down isn=E2=80=99t =
necessarily going to affect implementations.  I=E2=80=99d like to think =
that folks read them and then implement them but then there=E2=80=99s =
the real world full of implementation/upgrade schedules/cost etc.  But, =
I do think it=E2=80=99s worth at least getting on record of saying hey =
you that thing you=E2=80=99ve been doing for years we said years ago was =
not the the thing to be doing.

>> The standby cipher document is a wishlist. It lists desirable
>> features, but doesn't propose any block cipher that can meet those
>> requirements. Instead it hopes that someone, somewhere will propose a
>> cipher that works.
>=20
> There is less agreement on the standby cipher document.   Perhaps you =
and I agree, since you see the list of desirable features as the =
important thing, and I do to.   (Of course, CFRG has not yet agreed on =
the criteria.)   There was a comment from a gentleman whose name escapes =
me right now who strenuously disagreed with the requirement of "design =
diversity".   He felt that the "standby" idea is wrong, and that the =
next cipher design should just be chosen on its merits, regardless of =
any design similarity to or independence from AES.   I would love to see =
more discussion on this point.

I=E2=80=99m not against design diversity (and I=E2=80=99m all for the =
discussion) but I guess I=E2=80=99m skeptical whether the criteria for =
selection will end up being different.  Few users pick algorithms they =
just get the ones implemented by whatever application (and I use that =
term loosely) they=E2=80=99re using and all they might know is that =
it=E2=80=99s considered =E2=80=9Csecure=E2=80=9D.

>> That said these are the sorts of documents we need to see more of. I
>> personally think we should make a document "How to use a short shared
>> secret to protect a stream of messages", so as not to expose WGs to
>> the complexity of modes of operation.
>=20
> That's an interesting challenge, and I have a proposal that I would =
like to make in this space.

I=E2=80=99m all about having the CFRG publish all kinds of documents =
related to cryptographic algorithms, but what this really comes down to =
is people writing those documents.  And the best thing here =E2=80=A6 =
there=E2=80=99s *nothing, nada, zilch, null, z=C3=A9ro, =D8=B5=D9=81=D8=B1=
, =E9=9B=B6* stopping you from writing a draft on your favorite topic.

Seriously, if there=E2=80=99s anybody out there wondering how to =
contribute I will (or will find somebody to) help you navigate the =
process.

>> It's a very solved problem, lots of protocols try to solve it, and
>> many get it wrong. Before I write a draft I'ld like to see if anyone
>> has strong objections to AES-GCM with counters for
>> nonces/XSalsa20+Poly1305 with counters for nonces. This is what is
>> deployed in Chrome, and both are fast on commodity chips and have
>> explicit security guarantees.
>>=20
>> If possible both should be options: AES-GCM for speed on new Intel
>> chips, XSalsa20+Poly1305 on all other 32-bit chips with side channel
>> security.
>=20
> A question: would this draft build on top of RFC 5116 and =
draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-03, or would it do something different?   (I'd like =
to see an AEAD algorithm based on salsa20 with poly1305, assuming that =
the consensus is that salsa20 is OK, and does not need to be swapped =
with chacha.)
>=20
> My opinion: whatever application is making use of the cryptography =
should *not* have to deal with nonces.   Even if the algorithm requires =
distinct nonces, if we have a single encrypter per key, then it is =
trivial to have nonces generated inside of the crypto implementation, =
and have all of that complexity hidden from the calling application.   =
Of course, there are also algorithms that are robust against nonce =
misuse, and those which do not use nonces at all, and those are the =
algorithms that deserve attention from the research community and the RG =
in my opinion.
>=20
> David
>=20

spt

[0] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6149/
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6150/
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6151/
[3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6194/

>=20

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Subject: [Cfrg] changes to hunt-and-peck algorithm (Re: Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair)
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Hi Trevor,

On 12/27/2013 10:56 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>
> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>
> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
> ops.
>
> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
> point a square root is performed.  So:
>   - 1 modular exponentiation
>   - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>     - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>
> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>   - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>     - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>   - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>
> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?
>

I compared version 00 against version 01 using the IETF diff tool:

http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-00&difftype=--html&submit=Go!&url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01

The only change in the algorithm that you cite (Sections 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2.) is the change in the conditional statement that you mention.

If  the condition "((x^3 + ax + b) is a quadratic residue mod p)" is 
checked using an efficient method such as the legendre/jacobi symbol, 
which takes significantly less time than the execution of the branch "y 
= sqrt(x^3 + ax + b)", then the number of times that the branch executes 
will be detectable to an attacker.   This will give an attacker 
information about the password.   So in this case, I agree, versions 01 
and 02 seem more vulnerable than version 00 to timing attacks.

But an alternative way to implement the algorithm would be to use Shanks 
method for computing square roots mod p, or an algorithm like it, which 
upon termination either outputs the square root or an indication that 
the number that was input is not a quadratic residue.   In this case, 
version 01 could be less vulnerable to timing attacks than version 00.   
(I would guess this is what Dan had in mind.)

Clearly, this algorithm is not specified well enough in the draft to 
ensure that it will be implemented in a way that resists timing 
attacks.   Additionally, the most efficient way to implement the 
algorithm in the draft (using the legendre symbol) would lead to 
vulnerabilities.   These are significant problems.

On the subject of Kevin's influence, here is the timeline:

Dec 13 2012.   Kevin summarizes the Dragonfly status, asks for input, 
and is the first person to describe the need for Dragonfly to resist 
timing attacks.   He proposed a solution.   Scott Fluhrer pointed out a 
problem with the proposal, and suggests instead the "40 loop" fix.

Dec 17.   Kevin again summarizes the Dragonfly status, suggests adopting 
Scott's fix, and calls for feedback.   Dan Harkins responds that 
draft-tls-pwd (a different specification of Dragonfly) already has an 
equivalent fix.

Dec 18 2012.   Scott points out that the Dragonfly spec needs to be more 
clear on its use of the fix, and suggests computing the legendre/jacobi 
symbol instead of computing an actual square root.

However, Scott's suggestions were not picked up in 
draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly.   In retrospect, it seems that Dan did not 
understand the points that Scott was trying to make, and there was no 
follow up from anyone in the RG to make sure that the changes had been 
done, quite possibly because people assumed that the fix actually was 
equivalent.    Scott has clarified on the list recently, with the 
essential point being that the square root computation can be moved 
outside of the while loop.  (As a side note: it would simplify this 
computation if p = 3 (mod 4).)

I suspect that Dan is assuming that something like Shank's method will 
be used.   Your analysis assumes that the Legendre/Jacobi symbol will be 
used.    Note, however, that the suggestion to use that computational 
method came after Kevin's suggestion to use the "40 loop" fix.

Having participated in some of the off list conversations about 
Dragonfly, and having recently reviewed the discussions on the mail 
list, it seems to me that Kevin's input was an effort to promote 
positive changes, review, and discussion, and not an attempt to subvert 
the protocol.    I note that Kevin was the first to point out that 
resisting timing attacks was a goal, and he called for review 
repeatedly.   If he had wanted to influence the protocol without 
arousing suspicion, a far more effective way to have done that would 
have been to send private emails to Dan asking for changes to the draft.

If you have more questions about what Kevin did and why, please direct 
them to him.

regards,

David


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Date: Fri, 03 Jan 2014 17:26:50 -0500
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Hi,

Lars, who chairs the IRTF, asked me to go over the events related to 
Dragonfly and let him know what I thought about the possibility of undue 
influence.   For the sake of transparency, I want to my observations and 
conclusions with you, starting out with a summary of the timeline.

I hope that in the new year we have an opportunity to re-focus on the 
task of improving security and privacy in the Internet through more & 
better crypto.

best regards,

David


---

CFRG Dragonfly Timeline, Observations, and Conclusions
David McGrew
January 3, 2014

Timeline

   Oct 15 2012. (Subject: Dragonfly Password Authenticated Key
   Exchange).  Kevin Igoe asks for review on dragonfly and for
   submissions of other algorithms.

   Oct 16 2012. (Subject: Cfrg Digest, Vol 90, Issue 2).  Jonathan Katz
   asks: is there a security proof?  Dan Harkins says no, and
   references an earlier discussion with Jonathan.

   Dec 13 2012.  (Subject: Status of DragonFly).  Kevin summarizes the
   status of Dragonfly, provides an analysis, and describes for the
   first time the importance of resisting timing attacks, and proposes
   a solution.  Scott Fluhrer points out problem with proposed
   solution, and suggests a fix.  Independently, Rene Struik points out
   a problem with proposed solution.  Kevin acknowledges the problems.

   Dec 17 2012.  (Subject: Status of DragonFly).  Kevin re-summarizes
   status, suggests adopting Scott's fix.  Dan says that the latest
   version of Dragonfly already does the equivalent of Scott's fix, and
   asks if it is sufficient.

   Dec 18 2012.  (Subject: Status of DragonFly).  Scott points out that
   the Dragonfly spec needs to be more clear on its use of the fix, and
   suggests computing the Legendre/Jacobi symbol instead of computing
   an actual square root.  Kevin does a simple calculation suggesting
   the number of iterations of the suggested fix are adequate.

   Feb 24 2013.  (Subject: I-D Action:
   draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01.txt).  New version of draft posted.

   Apr 04 2013. (Subject: Dragonfly) Kevin posts a request for comments
   and initiates Last Call.

   Jul 26 2013. (Subject: small editorial error in and question on
   draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01 (was: Re: CFRG meeting at IETF 87)).
   Rene points out small error and proposes a fix, and asks what
   motivated a design change.

   Jul 29 2013.  (Subject: small editorial error in and question on
   draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01 (was: Re: CFRG meeting at IETF 87)).
   Rene asks about motivation for the use of nonces and a potential
   side channel.

   Aug 27 2013.  (Subject: I-D Action:
   draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-02.txt).  New version of draft posted.

   Nov 3-8 2013.  IETF 88 meeting in Vancouver.  Kevin reports to TLS
   WG chairs that CFRG did not find any problems with Dragonfly.

   Nov 29 2013.  (Subject: review of draft-irtf-dragonfly-02 (triggered
   by [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-pwd)).  Rene
   provides a detailed review of the draft, finds several problems and
   suggests fixes.  His summary: "While the proposed protocol could
   probably be made to work, it would require more work to get there,
   including removal of security weaknesses".

   Nov 30 2013.  (Subject: review of draft-irtf-dragonfly-02 (triggered
   by [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-pwd)).  Feng Hao
   provides a link to a published security analysis showing problems
   with some versions of Dragonfly.

   Dec 03 2013.  (Subject: review of draft-irtf-dragonfly-02 (triggered
   by [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-pwd)).  Dan
   responds to many of Rene's points, and disagrees with many of his
   conclusions.

   Dec 03 2013.  (Subject: review of draft-irtf-dragonfly-02 (triggered
   by [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-pwd)).  Watson
   Ladd says that there can be no security proof for Dragonfly.

   Dec 10 2013.  (Subject: Review of Dragonfly PAKE). Trevor Perrin
   reviews Dragonfly and concludes that it is inferior to other PAKE
   schemes.

   Dec 11 2013.  Dan challenges Trevor's conclusions, and Dan responds,
   over several message exchanges.



Observations:

   Trevor is right that there seems to be a timing channel in Dragonfly as
   it is specified in the current draft.

   Kevin was the first person to observe that resisting timing attacks
   should be a goal for the protocol.  It would be odd to blame him for
   endorsing a less-than-perfect description of how to achieve that goal.

   Kevin requested feedback on both Dragonfly and the comments provided
   on list many times.  This is what a Research Group chair should be
   doing, and it seems inconsistent with the claim that Kevin was
   trying to steer the protocol in a particular direction.   If he had 
wanted to
   influence the protocol without arousing suspicion, a far more effective
   way to have done that would have been to send private emails to Dan
   asking for changes to the draft.

   One of the considerations in Password Authenticated Key Exchange
   protocols (such as Dragonfly) is the desire to avoid patent
   infringement.  It is likely that some potential adopters of
   Dragonfly are motivated by that consideration, and they may feel
   that it trumps any consideration of provable security.

   There was no requirements analysis regarding PAKE protocols; it
   would have been useful to have surveyed the security, performance,
   and intellectual property status of PAKE protocols as a group.
   (Note that it is often difficult to get accurate public analysis on
   patent infringement, because business considerations discourage
   public statements on patent scope.)

   Over six months elapsed between the Last Call on
   draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly and the most substantial and most negative
   reviews on that protocol.  Those reviews followed the feedback that
   Kevin gave to the TLS WG.

   It is not clear what question CFRG was being asked regarding
   Dragonfly, "can you find a problem with it?" or "would you recommend
   it for use in TLS?"  The latter question would have been more
   appropriate.

   Once Dragonfly became a CFRG draft, the natural inclination of an RG
   chair is to ensure that the draft becomes useful.   Kevin was the chair
   managing Dragonfly, because his co-chair is lukewarm on the utility
   PAKE protocols in general.

   There is no formal record of either the TLS WG request to CFRG (I
   was in the TLS WG meeting when it was made, but I do not recall any
   specific well defined ask) or the CFRG statement to the TLS WG.

   Scott Fluhrer and Rene Struik both provided suggested multiple
   improvements to the Dragonfly protocol and specification.  This
   suggests that they did not oppose the protocol.  (This is in
   contrast to the suggestion that everyone besides Dan and Kevin were
   negative on Dragonfly.)

   An RG chair cannot be expected to fully vet all proposals made to
   the RG.  The main responsibility for the correctness of a CFRG draft
   should be the authors of that draft.  It may be the case that Kevin
   made or endorsed a suggestion on the list that would have reduced
   rather than improved security, but if true, it does not appear to be
   intentional.

   Kevin's use of an NSA email address is good for transparency, but it
   seems to be bad for communication, because it seems that he cannot
   access that email account when traveling or on vacation, and
   communication is slow.


Conclusions:

   The process was imperfect.  The TLS WG should have given CFRG a
   written request specifying what question they needed to be answered
   by CFRG.  The RG should have taken on the question only if it could
   have found a sufficient number of people who would commit in advance
   to review the work in a timely manner.  Finally, CFRG should have
   provided a response in writing.  In retrospect, a better response to
   the TLS WG would have been "The response to the Last Call was too
   weak, we can't give you an answer."

   It is essential that CFRG processes be transparent.

   CFRG chairs need to coordinate better to prevent communication lapses.

   The main challenge for CFRG, in taking on long-term tasks, is the
   engagement with a sufficient number of participants.  The protracted
   silence following the Last Call on Dragonfly shows this well. There
   is a risk that, in increasing the level of process, CFRG makes
   engagement more difficult.  When adding process, every attempt
   should be made to do it in a way that is accessible, inclusive, and
   encouraging to broad participation.

   CFRG should identify work that is compelling to its membership and
   is useful to the Internet community, and identify authors and
   reviewers to carry that work forward.  A call for new work should be
   issued, with the aim of addressing new concerns regarding crypto
   designs, goals, and implementation security.


From mcgrew@cisco.com  Fri Jan  3 16:47:02 2014
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
Subject: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Hi,

recently, Stephen and others suggested some topics that seem worth 
considering as future work for this research group.   I want to expand 
on those suggestions, and solicit your input.  If there is sufficiently 
broad interest, and people willing to contribute, than we can consider 
taking it on.   The goal of this note is to gauge interest in some 
topics that I have heard others talk about, and some that I think are 
worthwhile.  Recall that CFRG is a bridge between theory and practice, 
and traffic can go in both directions. The practice community can 
identify unsolved problems and new issues that aren't dealt with in 
theory.   Conversely, the theory community can introduce new results.

Stephen, Sean, please do let us know what work would be most useful to 
the IETF Security Area, and what work would be less useful or would 
conflict with IETF chartered work.   Thanks!

Useful topics on side channel attacks:

- Documenting ways of implementing existing algorithms that resist 
side-channel attacks, especially timing attacks.   This could include 
documentation of naive implementation methods that are vulnerable, or 
experimental work quantifying vulnerabilities.

- The development of testing methodologies for crypto implementations 
that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test 
harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts with a 
target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics, which 
could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are crypto 
module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why don't 
we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would identify 
timing vulnerabilities?

- The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that 
resist side channel attacks.

- The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that 
lack subliminal channels; that is, algorithms that would be hard to 
implement in a way that subverted the privacy of the user without their 
knowledge.   Also interesting would be testing methodologies that detect 
such channels, possibly including static analysis of source code, or 
statistical analysis of random or pseudorandom sources.


Useful topics in crypto algorithm design:

- Authenticated encryption that does not require an application to 
manage nonces and/or is robust against nonce misuse.

- Simplicity of design as a way to achieve robust crypto implementations.

- Recommendations on algorithms that should be used.   This could 
include recommendations on DRBGs.


Useful topics in provable security:

- A document describing the hierarchy of goals for security proofs, and 
recommendations on what IETF WG expectations should be regarding such 
proofs.   It would also be useful to describe the important security 
models, and to provide referenceable common definitions.

- Provably secure designs for complex protocols.   For instance: can 
there be a provably secure protocol that provides the same level of 
critical functionality as TLS, yet at the same time has been proven 
secure using techniques and/or tools that are accessible to many reviewers?


Useful topics in privacy

- Analyzing and documenting the limitations on privacy/anonymity 
technologies in the Internet protocols.   For example: if your MAC 
address and/or IPv6 address are traceable, then cryptography is not 
going to get you strong anonymity, no matter what crypto you use. 
Additionally, analysis of packet lengths and timings can reveal a lot of 
information.   Existing IETF security protocols have message-length 
hiding mechanisms, but these are not very effective.   If we are wiling 
to add latency and consume extra bandwidth, we could improve security in 
this area.   Is it worth it?

No doubt this is not an exhaustive list, and if you have other topics to 
put forward, please send them to the list and keep "considering new 
topics" in the subject line to make it easier to keep track.

One topic that I didn't list above, because it is somewhat outside of 
CFRG's traditional scope, is security in Cloud environments.  To my 
thinking, the industry trend towards putting all the data one can get a 
hold of into multi-tenant, virtualized environments is one of the 
biggest threats to information security and privacy.   Maybe I trust the 
Cloud provider to be well intentioned, but can I actually trust them to 
maintain data security?    I didn't try to craft a topic along this line 
because it goes beyond the scope of communication security.

regards,

David

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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David,

I=92ve got some thoughts about the process question that I=92ll put in =
another email to not muddy up the more interesting technical thread.

spt

On Jan 03, 2014, at 19:28, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>=20
> recently, Stephen and others suggested some topics that seem worth =
considering as future work for this research group.   I want to expand =
on those suggestions, and solicit your input.  If there is sufficiently =
broad interest, and people willing to contribute, than we can consider =
taking it on.   The goal of this note is to gauge interest in some =
topics that I have heard others talk about, and some that I think are =
worthwhile.  Recall that CFRG is a bridge between theory and practice, =
and traffic can go in both directions. The practice community can =
identify unsolved problems and new issues that aren't dealt with in =
theory.   Conversely, the theory community can introduce new results.
>=20
> Stephen, Sean, please do let us know what work would be most useful to =
the IETF Security Area, and what work would be less useful or would =
conflict with IETF chartered work.   Thanks!
>=20
> Useful topics on side channel attacks:
>=20
> - Documenting ways of implementing existing algorithms that resist =
side-channel attacks, especially timing attacks.   This could include =
documentation of naive implementation methods that are vulnerable, or =
experimental work quantifying vulnerabilities.
>=20
> - The development of testing methodologies for crypto implementations =
that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test =
harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts with a =
target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics, which =
could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are crypto =
module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why don't =
we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would identify =
timing vulnerabilities?
>=20
> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that =
resist side channel attacks.
>=20
> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that =
lack subliminal channels; that is, algorithms that would be hard to =
implement in a way that subverted the privacy of the user without their =
knowledge.   Also interesting would be testing methodologies that detect =
such channels, possibly including static analysis of source code, or =
statistical analysis of random or pseudorandom sources.
>=20
>=20
> Useful topics in crypto algorithm design:
>=20
> - Authenticated encryption that does not require an application to =
manage nonces and/or is robust against nonce misuse.
>=20
> - Simplicity of design as a way to achieve robust crypto =
implementations.
>=20
> - Recommendations on algorithms that should be used.   This could =
include recommendations on DRBGs.
>=20
>=20
> Useful topics in provable security:
>=20
> - A document describing the hierarchy of goals for security proofs, =
and recommendations on what IETF WG expectations should be regarding =
such proofs.   It would also be useful to describe the important =
security models, and to provide referenceable common definitions.
>=20
> - Provably secure designs for complex protocols.   For instance: can =
there be a provably secure protocol that provides the same level of =
critical functionality as TLS, yet at the same time has been proven =
secure using techniques and/or tools that are accessible to many =
reviewers?
>=20
>=20
> Useful topics in privacy
>=20
> - Analyzing and documenting the limitations on privacy/anonymity =
technologies in the Internet protocols.   For example: if your MAC =
address and/or IPv6 address are traceable, then cryptography is not =
going to get you strong anonymity, no matter what crypto you use. =
Additionally, analysis of packet lengths and timings can reveal a lot of =
information.   Existing IETF security protocols have message-length =
hiding mechanisms, but these are not very effective.   If we are wiling =
to add latency and consume extra bandwidth, we could improve security in =
this area.   Is it worth it?
>=20
> No doubt this is not an exhaustive list, and if you have other topics =
to put forward, please send them to the list and keep "considering new =
topics" in the subject line to make it easier to keep track.
>=20
> One topic that I didn't list above, because it is somewhat outside of =
CFRG's traditional scope, is security in Cloud environments.  To my =
thinking, the industry trend towards putting all the data one can get a =
hold of into multi-tenant, virtualized environments is one of the =
biggest threats to information security and privacy.   Maybe I trust the =
Cloud provider to be well intentioned, but can I actually trust them to =
maintain data security?    I didn't try to craft a topic along this line =
because it goes beyond the scope of communication security.
>=20
> regards,
>=20
> David
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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From henrick@streamsec.se  Fri Jan  3 18:20:49 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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On 2014-01-04 01:28, David McGrew wrote:
> - Documenting ways of implementing existing algorithms that resist
> side-channel attacks, especially timing attacks.   This could include
> documentation of naive implementation methods that are vulnerable, or
> experimental work quantifying vulnerabilities.

I find this very interesting, in particular considering that things like 
arithmetics often get implemented using either an input dependent number 
of instructions, or if with a constant number of instructions, with 
branches, or if not, with branch-less pointer swapping, instead of 
branch-less memory swapping.

Hence, potentially vulnerable implementations have either of the 
following features:

- branches, except loops with a number of iterations that must only 
depend on public parameter values (such as "bit sizes"),
- value dependent memory access, including branch-less pointer swapping

Conversely, any algorithm that can be implemented in such way that the 
number of instructions performed, and the memory addresses accessed, *do 
not* depend of the value of the arguments, can only be vulnerable if the 
CPU itself does not execute individual instructions in constant time.

From daw@cs.berkeley.edu  Fri Jan  3 18:41:53 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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On Fri, Jan 3, 2014, at 04:28 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Useful topics on side channel attacks:
> 
> - The development of testing methodologies for crypto implementations 
> that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test 
> harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts with a 
> target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics, which 
> could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are crypto 
> module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why don't 
> we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would identify 
> timing vulnerabilities?

Back in 2005, David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz,
and I proposed a simple method for testing for side channel
vulnerabilities.  You instrument the program with gcov, then run it
many times with many different randomly chosen keys (but with
all other inputs held fixed), using gcov to gather a set of statement
coverage statistics separately for each different key.  Then, you
look at the statement coverage statistics that gcov produced.
If you find any line in the code that was executed more times
for some keys than for others, you have found a potential
side channel vulnerability, as you've found some evidence that
whether or not that line will be executed depends upon the value
of the key.

We did a few small-scale experiments, and it seems to work
surprisingly well at finding vulnerabilities.  It's not perfect, but
the main advantage is that it is very easy to implement and try.
You can read more about our experiments with it in Section 4
of the following paper:

The Program Counter Security Model: Automatic Detection and
Removal of Control-Flow Side Channel Attacks.
David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz, and David Wagner.
ICISC 2005, December 1, 2005.
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/pcmodel-long.pdf

As far as I know, the main limitations are that it is oriented
primarily at deterministic algorithms (rather than ones that
internally flip random coins and use them), and it relies upon
gcov for coverage statistics, and gcov isn't always great
when the code is compiled with optimization.

-- David

From trevp@trevp.net  Fri Jan  3 18:43:27 2014
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 12:53 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Let me make an aside about provable security. In the crypto practice
>>> community, it is often regarded as oversold.
>>
>> As a member of the "crypto practice community" I disagree.  Key
>> agreement protocols are widely understood to be a tricky area where
>> formal analysis is crucial.  Dragonfly's lack of such analysis was a
>> red flag.  Jonathan Katz, a world-class cryptographer, raised the
>> issue repeatedly.  The CFRG chairs ignored him and endorsed Dan
>> Harkins' bluster.
>>
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03053.html
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03216.html
>>
>> Seems like CFRG could use more outreach to the cryptography community
>> and less to the intelligence community.
>
>
> I agree, more outreach to the theory community would be valuable. Perhaps
> you would be interested in helping with that effort?

Sure, my advice:  There's a wealth of knowledge in academia that CFRG
is not tapping.  Having a CFRG co-chair who could serve as ambassador
to that community and a translator of its knowledge would be very
valuable.

I'd recommend talking to some of the academic cryptographers who've
engaged with TLS and CFRG (Jonathan Katz, Kenny Paterson, Douglas
Stebila, David Wagner, etc), and see where that leads you.

Also, this would be a good discussion to pursue at Real World Crypto
(NYC, shortly).


>>>>>> He also endorsed an ineffective attempt to avoid
>>>>>> timing attacks by adding extra iterations to one of the loops [IGOE_3,
>>>>>> IGOE_4].
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that by "ineffective attempt to avoid timing attacks" you are
>>>>> referring to your statement that "within each loop are conditional
>>>>> branches
>>>>> and Legendre symbol / square-root algorithms, which are hard to
>>>>> implement
>>>>> efficiently in constant time ([STRUIK], [ICART], [FIPS186-4])" from
>>>>> [REVIEW]. Is this right? There is a significant difference between
>>>>> "hard
>>>>> to
>>>>> implement" and "ineffective". The statement in [REVIEW] makes it sound
>>>>> like
>>>>> it is inconvenient for the implementer, while the statement in your
>>>>> email
>>>>> makes it sound as though it is impossible.
>>>>
>>>> Not sure I understand this quibble.
>>>
>>>
>>> The important point here is that a Research Group chair reading [REVIEW]
>>> could get the impression that the proposed mitigation to timing attacks
>>> is
>>> "hard to implement" rather than "ineffective", in your opinion.
>>
>> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
>> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
>> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>>
>> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
>> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
>> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
>> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
>> ops.
>>
>> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
>> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
>> point a square root is performed.  So:
>>   - 1 modular exponentiation
>>   - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>>     - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>>
>> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
>> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
>> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>>   - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>>     - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>>   - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>>
>> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
>> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
>> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?
>
>
> I don't have the time right now to go back to the earlier version of the
> draft and check all of this, and I want to get back to you sooner rather
> than later.   So let me comment here as a chair, rather than a technical
> reviewer.  What would have been most useful is for this analysis to have
> been presented to the CFRG mail list during the discussion of timing attacks
> that initially took place on December 2012, or after Kevin put out a Last
> Call for comments on Dragonfly on April 4, 2013.   For perspective: Rene
> Struik's comments on that draft went out on Nov 29, and yous went out on Dec
> 10, over six months after the last call for comments.

Rene brought up the sidechannel issue again in July 2013, with no response:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03489.html

But there's a bigger picture:  Regardless of timing attacks, Dragonfly
is inferior to alternatives already standardized or found in the
literature.

This opinion was well-expressed on the TLS and CFRG mailing lists when
Dragonfly was proposed.  This opinion was probably shared by many more
people than expressed it (like me), and was never adequately
addressed.  By Dec 2012, I assume most people had tuned-out a
discussion about an non-useful protocol that was proceeding without
regard to group opinion.


Trevor

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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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On Fri, Jan 3, 2014 at 9:01 AM, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
<sfluhrer@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Trevor Perrin
>> Sent: Friday, December 27, 2013 10:57 AM
>> To: David McGrew (mcgrew)
>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org; irtf-chair@irtf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
>>
>>
>> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
>> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
>> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>>
>> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
>> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
>> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
>> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
>> ops.
>>
>> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
>> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
>> point a square root is performed.  So:
>>  - 1 modular exponentiation
>>  - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>>    - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>>
>> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
>> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
>> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>>  - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>>    - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>>  - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>>
>> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
>> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
>> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?
>
> I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.  However, I believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy elsewhere, and did not review the draft).

Hi Scott,

In 2012 I can imagine you were thinking of something like your below
pseudocode.  However, Dan seems to have understood your 2012 messages
as saying that simply performing 40 loops of the draft-00 algorithm
was a sufficient timing-attack countermeasure.  I don't think we can
blame Dan entirely for that - your messages weren't as clear and
detailed as your current pseudocode.

In any case, I think everyone now agrees Dan's understanding, embodied
in CFRG drafts 01 and 02, is incorrect.  Work still needs to be done
to ensure individual loop iterations don't leak secret info.


> I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution; the checking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in random time via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is easier).
>
> Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did he endorse Dan's implementation?'

Kevin seems to have shared Dan's understanding.  Or at least: he
considered the issue resolved in drafts 01 and 02, and made no effort
to look more deeply into the timing question.


Scott's proposals:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03260.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03265.html

Dan and Kevin's reception:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03262.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03263.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03264.html


Kevin's endorsement of draft-01 and draft-02:

"The design looks mature, it addresses a real need, and no one has
raised any issues."
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03383.html

"Kevin reports to TLS WG chairs that CFRG did not find any problems
with Dragonfly."
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03707.html


Trevor

From henrick@streamsec.se  Fri Jan  3 19:02:33 2014
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On 2014-01-04 03:41, David Wagner wrote:
> Back in 2005, David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz,
> and I proposed a simple method for testing for side channel
> vulnerabilities.  You instrument the program with gcov, then run it
> many times with many different randomly chosen keys (but with
> all other inputs held fixed), using gcov to gather a set of statement
> coverage statistics separately for each different key.  Then, you
> look at the statement coverage statistics that gcov produced.
> If you find any line in the code that was executed more times
> for some keys than for others, you have found a potential
> side channel vulnerability, as you've found some evidence that
> whether or not that line will be executed depends upon the value
> of the key.

This method will not detect timing differences caused by cache misses. 
(Think table look-ups, or branch-less pointer swapping.)


From trevp@trevp.net  Fri Jan  3 22:05:26 2014
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On Fri, Jan 3, 2014 at 7:02 PM, Henrick Hellstr=F6m <henrick@streamsec.se> =
wrote:
> On 2014-01-04 03:41, David Wagner wrote:
>>
>> Back in 2005, David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz,
>> and I proposed a simple method for testing for side channel
>> vulnerabilities.
[...]
>
> This method will not detect timing differences caused by cache misses.
> (Think table look-ups, or branch-less pointer swapping.)

The "transcript" idea from David's paper is a nice way to think about
sidechannel security.

For another tool, check out Adam Langley's "ctgrind":

https://github.com/agl/ctgrind


Trevor

From dharkins@lounge.org  Sat Jan  4 00:24:24 2014
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Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2014 00:24:15 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Trevor Perrin" <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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  Trevor,

On Fri, December 27, 2013 7:56 am, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>
> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
> ops.
>
> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
> point a square root is performed.  So:
>  - 1 modular exponentiation
>  - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>    - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>
> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>  - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>    - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>  - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>
> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?

  That is a good description of a problem. I now see how poor the
text is that describes the hunting-and-pecking loop. I wish you
would have put it in the form of a constructive comment, or at least
separated this signal from the general noise of your posts. But
nevertheless, I see that that section is poorly worded, I understand
your comment, and will address it in a subsequent version of the
draft.

  A sincere thank you for this comment!

  Dan.





From dharkins@lounge.org  Sat Jan  4 00:27:13 2014
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Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2014 00:26:58 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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  Scott,

  Thank you for this very constructive comment. I appreciate the
suggestion on improving the draft. I will look at it closely. Your
help is most appreciated.

  regards,

  Dan.

On Fri, January 3, 2014 9:01 am, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Trevor Perrin
>> Sent: Friday, December 27, 2013 10:57 AM
>> To: David McGrew (mcgrew)
>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org; irtf-chair@irtf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
>>
>>
>> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
>> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
>> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>>
>> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
>> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
>> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
>> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
>> ops.
>>
>> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
>> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
>> point a square root is performed.  So:
>>  - 1 modular exponentiation
>>  - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>>    - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>>
>> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
>> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
>> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>>  - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>>    - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>>  - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>>
>> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
>> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
>> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?
>
> I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.  However,
> I believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy elsewhere, and
> did not review the draft).
>
> I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution; the
> checking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in random
> time via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is easier).
>
> Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did he
> endorse Dan's implementation?'
>
>
>
> For the record, a better implementation of my suggestion in dragonfly
> would be:
>
>        found = 0
>        counter = 1
>        n = len(p) + 64
>        do {
>          base = H(max(Alice,Bob) | min(Alice,Bob) | password | counter)
>          temp = KDF-n(seed, "Dragonfly Hunting And Pecking")
>          seed = (temp mod (p - 1)) + 1
>          if (seed < p)
>          then
>            x = seed
>            if ( (x^3 + ax + b) is a quadratic residue mod p)
>            then
>              found_x = x
>              found = 1
>            fi
>        } while((found == 0) || (counter < k))
>
>        x = found_x
>        y = sqrt(x^3 + ax + b)
>        if (lsb(y) == lsb(base))
>        then
>          PE = (x,y)
>        else
>          PE = (x,p-y)
>        fi
>
> (this stops on the last acceptable 'x' value found; you could try to
> select the 'middle-value'; I picked the last because it was the easiest to
> specify).
>
> As for determining if a value is a QR, the easiest way to do it without
> leaking any information in the time taken would be to blind the value
> randomly, as in:
>
>     temp = (x^3 + ax + b mod p)
>     r = 1 + random(p-2)      /* Random value between 1 and p-1) */
>     temp = (temp * r * r) mod p
>     if random(2)                   /* 0.5 chance */
>         temp =  (temp * qr) mod p
>         bit = 0
>     else
>         temp =  (temp *qnr) mod p
>         bit = 1
>     fi
>     /* At this point, temp takes on all values between 1 and p-1 with
> equal probability */
>     output = bit ^ legendre_symbol(temp, p)
>
> where qr, qnr are fixed values which are respectively a quadric residue,
> and quadratic nonresidue mod p, and are the same size (and so the
> multiplications take the same amount of time).
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From henrick@streamsec.se  Sat Jan  4 02:49:10 2014
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On 2014-01-04 07:05, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 3, 2014 at 7:02 PM, Henrick Hellström <henrick@streamsec.se> wrote:
>> On 2014-01-04 03:41, David Wagner wrote:
>>>
>>> Back in 2005, David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz,
>>> and I proposed a simple method for testing for side channel
>>> vulnerabilities.
> [...]
>>
>> This method will not detect timing differences caused by cache misses.
>> (Think table look-ups, or branch-less pointer swapping.)
>
> The "transcript" idea from David's paper is a nice way to think about
> sidechannel security.

Don't get me wrong, it is necessary for your code to pass the test 
outlined in the paper, but in light of more recently published side 
channel attacks, it is not sufficient.


> For another tool, check out Adam Langley's "ctgrind":
>
> https://github.com/agl/ctgrind

Thanks, but considering that relevant code might not be implemented in 
C/C++, is there any specification of the abstract requirements for such 
testing, or perhaps a tool for a language agnostic profiler?


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To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2014 02:52:52 -0800
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On 1/3/14, 6:43 PM, "Trevor Perrin" <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:

Trevor,

>
>But there's a bigger picture:  Regardless of timing attacks, Dragonfly
>is inferior to alternatives already standardized

>=20
No. The Dragonfly proposal was submitted by Dan as an IPR free
contribution.
This has considerable value and makes it implementable in consumer
products.

It is also closely related to other work adopted in commercial sytems and
should be pursued as an RFC to ensure it=B9s continued vetting.

The discussion has resulted in mitigating risks.  To date I have not seen
any indication that the protocol is =8Cbroken=B9.

I agree that it has more complexity and message exchanges that other
approaches.  These other protocols have NOT been viable to ship in the
products I build.

>or found in the
>literature.
Please write an RFC then.

>
>This opinion was well-expressed on the TLS and CFRG mailing lists when
>Dragonfly was proposed.  This opinion was probably shared by many more
>people than expressed it (like me),

I believe that you have expressed your opinion 12 to 15 times on this
mailing=20
list about Dragonfly based on comments and analysis made by other
knowledgeable individuals.

Please let others speak for themselves.


Paul





> and was never adequately
>addressed.  By Dec 2012, I assume most people had tuned-out a
>discussion about an non-useful protocol that was proceeding without
>regard to group opinion.
>
>
>Trevor
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
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From paul@marvell.com  Sat Jan  4 03:20:52 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2014 03:20:36 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
Thread-Index: Ac8JPv1rE8nF6jpQTNmsGtEZTlZ5ng==
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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My wish list for 2014:

 - A public key based =B9trust=B9 architecture to
   determine =B3who can do what=B2 (not based on X.509 or PGP)
 - Public key based methods that can be readily be used
   to both sign data and be used to develop encryption keys
 - Nonce insensitive or deterministic encryption modes
   to support group multicast in a mesh topology
 - Elliptic curves for cryptographic use that are developed
   in a transparent manner that dispels any possible mistrust
 - Algorithm modes that have infinite error extension
   (verus CCM, 1 bit plaintext change -> 1 bit ciphertext)
 - Secure time stamps
 - A 'setup process' based on public keys to enable
   the secure configuration of consumer products
 - Strong P2P authentication for Wi-Fi devices
 - Ephemeral MAC Addresses
 - Deprecation and abolishment of known bad algorithms:
   in a manner that impacts real products
   (e.g. TKIP, WEP, DES, RC4)


Paul





On 1/3/14, 4:28 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>Hi,
>
>recently, Stephen and others suggested some topics that seem worth
>considering as future work for this research group.   I want to expand
>on those suggestions, and solicit your input.  If there is sufficiently
>broad interest, and people willing to contribute, than we can consider
>taking it on.   The goal of this note is to gauge interest in some
>topics that I have heard others talk about, and some that I think are
>worthwhile.  Recall that CFRG is a bridge between theory and practice,
>and traffic can go in both directions. The practice community can
>identify unsolved problems and new issues that aren't dealt with in
>theory.   Conversely, the theory community can introduce new results.
>
>Stephen, Sean, please do let us know what work would be most useful to
>the IETF Security Area, and what work would be less useful or would
>conflict with IETF chartered work.   Thanks!
>
>Useful topics on side channel attacks:
>
>- Documenting ways of implementing existing algorithms that resist
>side-channel attacks, especially timing attacks.   This could include
>documentation of naive implementation methods that are vulnerable, or
>experimental work quantifying vulnerabilities.
>
>- The development of testing methodologies for crypto implementations
>that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test
>harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts with a
>target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics, which
>could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are crypto
>module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why don't
>we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would identify
>timing vulnerabilities?
>
>- The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that
>resist side channel attacks.
>
>- The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that
>lack subliminal channels; that is, algorithms that would be hard to
>implement in a way that subverted the privacy of the user without their
>knowledge.   Also interesting would be testing methodologies that detect
>such channels, possibly including static analysis of source code, or
>statistical analysis of random or pseudorandom sources.
>
>
>Useful topics in crypto algorithm design:
>
>- Authenticated encryption that does not require an application to
>manage nonces and/or is robust against nonce misuse.
>
>- Simplicity of design as a way to achieve robust crypto implementations.
>
>- Recommendations on algorithms that should be used.   This could
>include recommendations on DRBGs.
>
>
>Useful topics in provable security:
>
>- A document describing the hierarchy of goals for security proofs, and
>recommendations on what IETF WG expectations should be regarding such
>proofs.   It would also be useful to describe the important security
>models, and to provide referenceable common definitions.
>
>- Provably secure designs for complex protocols.   For instance: can
>there be a provably secure protocol that provides the same level of
>critical functionality as TLS, yet at the same time has been proven
>secure using techniques and/or tools that are accessible to many
>reviewers?
>
>
>Useful topics in privacy
>
>- Analyzing and documenting the limitations on privacy/anonymity
>technologies in the Internet protocols.   For example: if your MAC
>address and/or IPv6 address are traceable, then cryptography is not
>going to get you strong anonymity, no matter what crypto you use.
>Additionally, analysis of packet lengths and timings can reveal a lot of
>information.   Existing IETF security protocols have message-length
>hiding mechanisms, but these are not very effective.   If we are wiling
>to add latency and consume extra bandwidth, we could improve security in
>this area.   Is it worth it?
>
>No doubt this is not an exhaustive list, and if you have other topics to
>put forward, please send them to the list and keep "considering new
>topics" in the subject line to make it easier to keep track.
>
>One topic that I didn't list above, because it is somewhat outside of
>CFRG's traditional scope, is security in Cloud environments.  To my
>thinking, the industry trend towards putting all the data one can get a
>hold of into multi-tenant, virtualized environments is one of the
>biggest threats to information security and privacy.   Maybe I trust the
>Cloud provider to be well intentioned, but can I actually trust them to
>maintain data security?    I didn't try to craft a topic along this line
>because it goes beyond the scope of communication security.
>
>regards,
>
>David
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk  Sat Jan  4 07:24:11 2014
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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages
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From feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk  Sat Jan  4 07:28:27 2014
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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages -> was Re: Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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>I agree that it has more complexity and message exchanges that other
>approaches.  These other protocols have NOT been viable to ship in the
>products I build.

Have you looked at J-PAKE? It's a balanced PAKE, same as Dragonfly.

http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/05/29/j-pake/

In the update of "2013-12-30", you can find a prototype implementation of
J-PAKE using the elliptic curve group setting.

Cheers,
Feng


From mcgrew@cisco.com  Sat Jan  4 08:42:11 2014
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: Dragonfly has advantages
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Hi Feng,

thanks for your suggestion and comments.   A quick response to your 
suggestion:

On 01/04/2014 10:23 AM, Feng Hao wrote:
>
> It will be very helpful to have an open competition among the contemporary
> PAKEs to choose those that are secure, efficient and patent/loyal-free.
> That should include both balanced and augmented PAKEs to suit for
> different application requirements.
>
> It will be timely and nice if IETF/CFRG can help coordinate such.
>

It would be a good idea for the RG to author an RFC describing the 
requirements of PAKE protocols and surveying the existing protocols.   
The RFC could also record the consensus of the RG, if there is one, and 
describe the diversity of opinion otherwise. This is not quite the same 
as a competition, but it would fit easily into the IRTF process.   I 
would expect that there would be multiple authors, probably including 
multiple PAKE protocol authors.   We should also line up some reviewers 
as well.  What do you think?

As a side note, I personally would also like to see 
guidance/documentation on how PAKEs can best be used, and I agree with 
your comment about bootstrapping authentication.  Replacing a raw 
username/password exchange inside of TLS with a PAKE would be good, and 
using a PAKE for password-based certificate enrollment would be good.   
Replacing certificate based authentication with a PAKE would be not so 
good.

David

From trevp@trevp.net  Sat Jan  4 08:44:21 2014
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Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2014 08:44:08 -0800
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] changes to hunt-and-peck algorithm (Re: Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair)
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On Fri, Jan 3, 2014 at 2:26 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi Trevor,
>
> On 12/27/2013 10:56 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>
>>
>> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
>> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
>> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>>
>> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
>> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
>> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
>> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
>> ops.
>>
>> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
>> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
>> point a square root is performed.  So:
>>   - 1 modular exponentiation
>>   - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>>     - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>>
>> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
>> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
>> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>>   - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>>     - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>>   - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>>
>> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
>> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
>> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?
>>
>
> I compared version 00 against version 01 using the IETF diff tool:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-00&difftype=--html&submit=Go!&url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-01
>
> The only change in the algorithm that you cite (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.)
> is the change in the conditional statement that you mention.
>
> If  the condition "((x^3 + ax + b) is a quadratic residue mod p)" is checked
> using an efficient method such as the legendre/jacobi symbol, which takes
> significantly less time than the execution of the branch "y = sqrt(x^3 + ax
> + b)", then the number of times that the branch executes will be detectable
> to an attacker.   This will give an attacker information about the password.

You're understating the problem:  a timing-attack risk exists in
draft-01 3.2.1 if the computation performed for quadratic residues
take a different amount of time than the computation for non-residues,
or quadratic residuosity testing takes variable time based on its
input.

Even a small timing difference might be exploitable via statistical
tests (it's not necessary that the timing difference be obvious in a
single run of the protocol).

It's also not necessary for quadratic residuosity testing to take
"significantly less time" than square-root finding.


> So in this case, I agree, versions 01 and 02 seem more vulnerable than
> version 00 to timing attacks.
>
> But an alternative way to implement the algorithm would be to use Shanks
> method for computing square roots mod p, or an algorithm like it, which upon
> termination either outputs the square root or an indication that the number
> that was input is not a quadratic residue.   In this case, version 01 could
> be less vulnerable to timing attacks than version 00.   (I would guess this
> is what Dan had in mind.)

I think the Tonelli/Shanks algorithm takes variable time based on its
input, so while it might reduce the problem I doubt it eliminates it.

Also, while I haven't considered this in detail, I'd be worried the
Tonelli/Shanks algorithm would be inefficient enough for some primes
(such as P-224) that it would eliminate the speed advantage which is
the reason to use elliptic curve crypto.

Dan Bernstein has a paper on square-root algorithms that might be relevant here:

http://cr.yp.to/papers/sqroot.pdf


> Clearly, this algorithm is not specified well enough in the draft to ensure
> that it will be implemented in a way that resists timing attacks.
> Additionally, the most efficient way to implement the algorithm in the draft
> (using the legendre symbol) would lead to vulnerabilities.   These are
> significant problems.
>
> On the subject of Kevin's influence, here is the timeline:
>
> Dec 13 2012.   Kevin summarizes the Dragonfly status, asks for input, and is
> the first person to describe the need for Dragonfly to resist timing
> attacks.   He proposed a solution.   Scott Fluhrer pointed out a problem
> with the proposal, and suggests instead the "40 loop" fix.

Kevin was not the first person to observe that.  It was observed by
the IPsec WG and TLS WG.

IPsec, 2010:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg06321.html

TLS, 2011:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg08182.html


> Dec 17.   Kevin again summarizes the Dragonfly status, suggests adopting
> Scott's fix, and calls for feedback.   Dan Harkins responds that
> draft-tls-pwd (a different specification of Dragonfly) already has an
> equivalent fix.
>
> Dec 18 2012.   Scott points out that the Dragonfly spec needs to be more
> clear on its use of the fix, and suggests computing the legendre/jacobi
> symbol instead of computing an actual square root.
>
> However, Scott's suggestions were not picked up in
> draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly.   In retrospect, it seems that Dan did not
> understand the points that Scott was trying to make, and there was no follow
> up from anyone in the RG to make sure that the changes had been done, quite
> possibly because people assumed that the fix actually was equivalent.
> Scott has clarified on the list recently, with the essential point being
> that the square root computation can be moved outside of the while loop.
> (As a side note: it would simplify this computation if p = 3 (mod 4).)

Scott also recently suggested blinding the Legendre symbol
calculation, which is a clever idea that was not proposed earlier.


> I suspect that Dan is assuming that something like Shank's method will be
> used.   Your analysis assumes that the Legendre/Jacobi symbol will be used.
> Note, however, that the suggestion to use that computational method came
> after Kevin's suggestion to use the "40 loop" fix.

Avoiding the Legendre/Jacobi symbol calculation would have a
significant performance impact, and would not, by itself, necessarily
fix the problem.


> Having participated in some of the off list conversations about Dragonfly,
> and having recently reviewed the discussions on the mail list, it seems to
> me that Kevin's input was an effort to promote positive changes, review, and
> discussion, and not an attempt to subvert the protocol.    I note that Kevin
> was the first to point out that resisting timing attacks was a goal, and he
> called for review repeatedly.   If he had wanted to influence the protocol
> without arousing suspicion, a far more effective way to have done that would
> have been to send private emails to Dan asking for changes to the draft.

I doubt the Dec 2012 discussion was Kevin trying to plant a backdoor
in the protocol.  I do think his analysis there was sloppy and
unserious.


Trevor

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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages -> was Re: Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 2:52 AM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 1/3/14, 6:43 PM, "Trevor Perrin" <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:
>
> Trevor,
>
>>
>>But there's a bigger picture:  Regardless of timing attacks, Dragonfly
>>is inferior to alternatives already standardized
>
>>
> No. The Dragonfly proposal was submitted by Dan as an IPR free
> contribution.
> This has considerable value and makes it implementable in consumer
> products.
>
> It is also closely related to other work adopted in commercial sytems and
> should be pursued as an RFC to ensure it=B9s continued vetting.
>
> The discussion has resulted in mitigating risks.  To date I have not seen
> any indication that the protocol is =8Cbroken=B9.
>
> I agree that it has more complexity and message exchanges that other
> approaches.  These other protocols have NOT been viable to ship in the
> products I build.

Hi Paul,

SPAKE2 has no current patents I'm aware of.  SRP has royalty-free licensing=
.

Both have been deployed in commercial products.  Why aren't they viable for=
 you?

  http://www.di.ens.fr/~abdalla/papers/AbPo05a-letter.pdf
  http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5054

(Of course, there are other promising alternatives - e.g. AugPAKE,
J-PAKE, or an Elligator-based PAKE).


Trevor

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On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 7:23 AM, Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> In summary, if the password element derivation in Dragonfly can be done
> securely and efficiently, that would be a good contribution in my view.
> That would even resolve an issue that SPEKE can't. The way that SPEKE
> works is by requiring the use of a safe prime, but then for 1024-bit p,
> the exponent will be 1023 bits - one modular exponentiation will be
> equivalent to about 6 times of the exponentiation with a 160-bit exponent.

Hi Feng,

Minor comments:  I don't agree that Dragonfly could "resolve an issue
that SPEKE can't".

It's true that SPEKE is generally described in terms of safe primes to
avoid the problems Dragonfly is running into.

But any password element derivation that works for Dragonfly would of
course work for SPEKE.


> (Some people compare PAKEs by merely counting the number of modular
> exponentiations, but they should also look at if the protocol readily
> accommodates short exponents. The length of the exponent has a direct
> impact on the cost of exponentiation.)

Another important issue, particularly for EC protocols, is to
distinguish operations with a fixed base (or fixed point) from
operations with a random base / point.

The fixed operations can be optimized to be several times faster
(perhaps ~4x is a rule of thumb I've heard).


Trevor

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: Dragonfly has advantages
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Hi David,

On 04/01/2014 16:42, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>Hi Feng,
>
>thanks for your suggestion and comments.   A quick response to your
>suggestion:
>
>On 01/04/2014 10:23 AM, Feng Hao wrote:
>>
>> It will be very helpful to have an open competition among the
>>contemporary
>> PAKEs to choose those that are secure, efficient and patent/loyal-free.
>> That should include both balanced and augmented PAKEs to suit for
>> different application requirements.
>>
>> It will be timely and nice if IETF/CFRG can help coordinate such.
>>
>
>It would be a good idea for the RG to author an RFC describing the
>requirements of PAKE protocols and surveying the existing protocols.
>The RFC could also record the consensus of the RG, if there is one, and
>describe the diversity of opinion otherwise. This is not quite the same
>as a competition, but it would fit easily into the IRTF process.   I
>would expect that there would be multiple authors, probably including
>multiple PAKE protocol authors.   We should also line up some reviewers
>as well.  What do you think?

I think that's an excellent idea. I expect the most difficult part would
be to kick-start the process, so if it can easily fit into the IRTF
process, that will help. In the end, I think some form of competition
between existing PAKEs would be unavoidable, but if we keep the process
open and transparent, the competition should be healthy and beneficial to
everyone.=20

>
>As a side note, I personally would also like to see
>guidance/documentation on how PAKEs can best be used, and I agree with
>your comment about bootstrapping authentication.  Replacing a raw
>username/password exchange inside of TLS with a PAKE would be good, and
>using a PAKE for password-based certificate enrollment would be good.
>Replacing certificate based authentication with a PAKE would be not so
>good.

Password-based AKE and PKI-based AKE (e.g., TLS/SSL) are two different
types of key exchange protocols. The former is not meant to replace the
latter, but the two can complement each other.

For the same reason, a balanced PAKE and an augmented PAKE are two types
of PAKEs. They can co-exist as well, suitable for different applications.

I think providing a suite of different types of "secure and efficient" key
agreement protocols is important, so people will have a choice to decide
which one suits their needs.

>
>David


From feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk  Sat Jan  4 11:05:45 2014
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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
Thread-Topic: Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages
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Hi Trevor,

On 04/01/2014 17:18, "Trevor Perrin" <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:

>On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 7:23 AM, Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
>>
>> In summary, if the password element derivation in Dragonfly can be done
>> securely and efficiently, that would be a good contribution in my view.
>> That would even resolve an issue that SPEKE can't. The way that SPEKE
>> works is by requiring the use of a safe prime, but then for 1024-bit p,
>> the exponent will be 1023 bits - one modular exponentiation will be
>> equivalent to about 6 times of the exponentiation with a 160-bit
>>exponent.
>
>Hi Feng,
>
>Minor comments:  I don't agree that Dragonfly could "resolve an issue
>that SPEKE can't".
>
>It's true that SPEKE is generally described in terms of safe primes to
>avoid the problems Dragonfly is running into.
>
>But any password element derivation that works for Dragonfly would of
>course work for SPEKE.


Actually, I don't see disagreement here, but maybe I didn't express myself
clearly.

I mean if Dan manages to work out a way to derive the PE "securely and
efficiently" for Dragonfly, the same technique would also work for SPEKE.
Of course, that is a big "IF" at the moment, but I hope Dan will continue
to work on it.=20


>
>
>> (Some people compare PAKEs by merely counting the number of modular
>> exponentiations, but they should also look at if the protocol readily
>> accommodates short exponents. The length of the exponent has a direct
>> impact on the cost of exponentiation.)
>
>Another important issue, particularly for EC protocols, is to
>distinguish operations with a fixed base (or fixed point) from
>operations with a random base / point.
>
>The fixed operations can be optimized to be several times faster
>(perhaps ~4x is a rule of thumb I've heard).

I guess you mean optimizing by caching the intermediate terms or saving
them in a look-up table? The amount of speed-up is not surprising. It also
applies to the exponential operation in a prime field, where one can
pre-compute all the square terms for a fixed base.

There are all sorts of similar optimizing tricks (generally involving
memory/speed trade-off and off-line pre-computation) that people can play
to make the cost in the protocol look as small as possible. But that often
raises a lot of confusion. For fairness, one should compare protocols
side-by-side under the same levels of optimization.

>
>
>Trevor


From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Sat Jan  4 12:56:00 2014
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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Hashing to EC group elements
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For any odd-characteristic elliptic curve with a rational point of
order 2, the =E2=80=98Elligator 2=E2=80=99 injective map described in
<http://elligator.cr.yp.to/elligator-20130828.pdf> can be used to map
an element of the coordinate field to a point on the curve.

If a curve in short-Weierstrass form (y^2 =3D x^3 + ax + b) has no
rational points of order 2, then x^3 + ax + b is irreducible and the
curve has full 2-torsion over the degree-3 extension of its coordinate
field.  It's straightforward to modify the Elligator 2 formulas to map
to a curve in short-Weierstrass form *given the x coordinate of a
point of order 2*; once one has hashed to a point P over the extension
field, P + f(P) + f(f(P)) (where f is the Frobenius automorphism of
the extension field holding the base field fixed) is a point over the
base field.  (If the input to the Elligator map is in the base field,
an equivalent formulation is to use the Elligator 2 formulas with each
of the three 2-torsion points, and add the resulting points.)


Robert Ransom

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Sat Jan  4 13:28:20 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: Dragonfly has advantages
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The IPsecME WG tried something like this, and it ended with bloody =
stumps all around. This isn't to say that it would fail in the CFRG, but =
many of the same people are in both groups.

--Paul Hoffman=

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On 1/4/14 9:18 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> Another important issue, particularly for EC protocols, is to 
> distinguish operations with a fixed base (or fixed point) from 
> operations with a random base / point. The fixed operations can be 
> optimized to be several times faster (perhaps ~4x is a rule of thumb 
> I've heard).
This seems strange to me, and I've implemented ECC several times over 
the last decade.   I think you might have meant that implementations 
using special modulii that can be written as  the sum of  +/- 1 at 
selected word boundaries or as 2^n - k for some small k are several 
times faster than implementations written to support arbitrary moduli.

     --David



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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: Dragonfly has advantages
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On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 4:47 PM, David Jacobson <dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> On 1/4/14 9:18 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>
>> Another important issue, particularly for EC protocols, is to distinguish
>> operations with a fixed base (or fixed point) from operations with a random
>> base / point. The fixed operations can be optimized to be several times
>> faster (perhaps ~4x is a rule of thumb I've heard).
>
> This seems strange to me, and I've implemented ECC several times over the
> last decade.   I think you might have meant that implementations using
> special modulii that can be written as  the sum of  +/- 1 at selected word
> boundaries or as 2^n - k for some small k are several times faster than
> implementations written to support arbitrary moduli.

This isn't that strange: you simply use a larger, precomputed table
for a higher-radix or sliding window method.
>
>     --David
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: Dragonfly has advantages
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On 04-01-2014 21:47, David Jacobson wrote:
> On 1/4/14 9:18 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> Another important issue, particularly for EC protocols, is to
>> distinguish operations with a fixed base (or fixed point) from
>> operations with a random base / point. The fixed operations can be
>> optimized to be several times faster (perhaps ~4x is a rule of thumb
>> I've heard).
> This seems strange to me, and I've implemented ECC several times over
> the last decade.   I think you might have meant that implementations
> using special modulii that can be written as  the sum of  +/- 1 at
> selected word boundaries or as 2^n - k for some small k are several
> times faster than implementations written to support arbitrary moduli.

Fixed base lets you precompute arbitrary multiples of G offline. For
example, if you compute {0..16} G, 2^4 * {0..16} G, 2^(4i) {0..16} G,
..., you only need to perform around log2(exponent)/4 online group
operations. Doing this safely against side-channel attacks requires some
care, of  course.

From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Sat Jan  4 17:41:38 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: 40 bit loop and DragonFly
Thread-Index: Ac8Jtz8QHBqZuWIRSrC0AhG0eZjDKg==
Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2014 01:41:25 +0000
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Subject: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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Scott Fluhrer wrote:

I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.  However, =
I believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy elsewhere, and di=
d not review the draft).

I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution; the che=
cking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in random time =
via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is easier).

Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did he end=
orse Dan's implementation?'
---------------------------------

Actually I had something more like the process outlined below in mind. =20

First an elementary (and somewhat obscure)fact:

  For any prime p =3D 3 mod 4 and any non-zero f in Z/p, let=20
            r =3D f**((p+1)/4).
  If f is a quadratic residue mod p (i.e. has a square root mod p),
  then r**2 =3D f, otherwise r**2 =3D -f.

(This is easy to see since=20
             r**2 =3D f**((p+1)/2) mod p
                  =3D f * f**((p-1)/2) mod p
and f**((p-1)/2) =3D 1 mod p if f has a square root mod p and is=20
-1 otherwise). =20

Aside from cases of vanishingly small probability (e.g f =3D 0, 1 or -1),
the time to do this exponentiation  depends upon two publicly known=20
values, the modulus p and the exponent ((p+1)/4), and not upon the secret=20
values x and f.  I'd advise using Montgomery arithmetic as this is=20
a very efficient and methodical technique for doing mod p arithmetic.

So what had I envisioned is something like this (in pythonese):

Bad =3D []
Good =3D []
for t in range(40):
    x  =3D one_way_update(x)
    f  =3D x**3 + a*x + b mod p
    r  =3D f**((p+1)/4)
    f1 =3D r**2
    if f1 =3D=3D f:
        Good.append( (x,r) )
    else:
        Bad.append( (x,r) )

if len(Good) =3D=3D 0:
    raise ValueError
else:
    return Good[0]


Observations:
 - This should be consant in time and memory usage.
 - Prob of hitting the error condition is 2**-40 ~=3D 10**-12.
 - The 40 could be increased if the RG deems that to be prudent.
 =20

Potential IPR issues:
Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves,=20
and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p =3D 3 mod 4.  Not=20
being a patent lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents=20
have on the use of newer families of curves, such as Edwards curves. =20
RFC 6090 outlines elliptic curve technology which predates the Certicom
patents.

From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Sat Jan  4 17:48:23 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: 40 long loop, not 40 bit loop
Thread-Index: AQHPCbgxwT9LWRjbJE2posWREnpjhQ==
Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2014 01:48:12 +0000
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Subject: [Cfrg] 40 long loop, not 40 bit loop
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Make that 40 long loop, not 40 bit loop.

(Proofreading on a Blackberry is a torturous task.  I'm not sure why Pres. =
Obama is so addicted to these things!)


----- Original Message -----
From: Igoe, Kevin M.
Sent: Saturday, January 04, 2014 08:41 PM Eastern Standard Time=0A=
To: 'cfrg@irtf.org' <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: 40 bit loop and DragonFly

Scott Fluhrer wrote:

I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.  However, =
I believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy elsewhere, and di=
d not review the draft).

I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution; the che=
cking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in random time =
via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is easier).

Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did he end=
orse Dan's implementation?'
---------------------------------

Actually I had something more like the process outlined below in mind. =20

First an elementary (and somewhat obscure)fact:

  For any prime p =3D 3 mod 4 and any non-zero f in Z/p, let=20
            r =3D f**((p+1)/4).
  If f is a quadratic residue mod p (i.e. has a square root mod p),
  then r**2 =3D f, otherwise r**2 =3D -f.

(This is easy to see since=20
             r**2 =3D f**((p+1)/2) mod p
                  =3D f * f**((p-1)/2) mod p
and f**((p-1)/2) =3D 1 mod p if f has a square root mod p and is=20
-1 otherwise). =20

Aside from cases of vanishingly small probability (e.g f =3D 0, 1 or -1),
the time to do this exponentiation  depends upon two publicly known=20
values, the modulus p and the exponent ((p+1)/4), and not upon the secret=20
values x and f.  I'd advise using Montgomery arithmetic as this is=20
a very efficient and methodical technique for doing mod p arithmetic.

So what had I envisioned is something like this (in pythonese):

Bad =3D []
Good =3D []
for t in range(40):
    x  =3D one_way_update(x)
    f  =3D x**3 + a*x + b mod p
    r  =3D f**((p+1)/4)
    f1 =3D r**2
    if f1 =3D=3D f:
        Good.append( (x,r) )
    else:
        Bad.append( (x,r) )

if len(Good) =3D=3D 0:
    raise ValueError
else:
    return Good[0]


Observations:
 - This should be consant in time and memory usage.
 - Prob of hitting the error condition is 2**-40 ~=3D 10**-12.
 - The 40 could be increased if the RG deems that to be prudent.
 =20

Potential IPR issues:
Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves,=20
and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p =3D 3 mod 4.  Not=20
being a patent lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents=20
have on the use of newer families of curves, such as Edwards curves. =20
RFC 6090 outlines elliptic curve technology which predates the Certicom
patents.

From lars@netapp.com  Sat Jan  4 23:49:24 2014
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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2014 07:49:04 +0000
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Subject: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Hi,

on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role as =
IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the co-chairs =
of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request stated =
several reasons for the removal:
=20
(1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the =
"Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
=20
(2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have weakened =
the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
=20
(3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" to =
the IETF's TLS working group.
=20
(4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
=20
I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails that =
were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your feedback.
=20
David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a detailed =
timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded that the =
research group process has been followed imperfectly. I share this =
conclusion. However, while unfortunate, the mistakes made were not of a =
severity that would warrant an immediate dismissal of Kevin Igoe as =
co-chair. It is also the first such occurrence that I am aware of.
=20
As mentioned above, the final point in Trevor Perrin's request pointed =
out Kevin Igoe's NSA employment and questions whether he can therefore =
be trusted to co-chair the group. This is an important question, with =
two aspects to it. First, whether a co-chair of a research group has the =
ability to unduly influence or subvert the technical work of the group. =
Second, whether having Kevin Igoe serve as a co-chair otherwise affects =
the ability of the research group to perform its duties.
=20
I would like to discuss these two aspects in a bit more detail.
=20
On the first point, RFC2014 details guidelines and procedures for IRTF =
research groups, and it is important to understand the IRTF and its mode =
of working. RFC2014 prominently states in Section 1 that IRTF =
"participation is by individual contributors, rather than by =
representatives of organizations". This applies to participation in any =
role, including as co-chair of a research group.
=20
RFC2014 goes on to describe that research group co-chairs "perform the =
administrative functions of the group", and details those in Section =
5.3, including process and content management, mailing list moderation, =
meeting organization and follow-up, community building, and document =
development and publication.
=20
So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other =
organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group secretaries. =
Their ability to influence the technical work of the group is little =
different from that of any other group participant.
=20
Research groups typically have multiple co-chairs from different =
organizations, and all currently chartered research groups have open =
membership, so all IRTF business is conducted in the open, on public =
mailing lists and in public meetings. Any participant suspecting =
misconduct can raise any issue either in the group or to the IRTF chair, =
as Trevor Perrin has done in this case. This is how our process should =
work, and this is why any individual participant - co-chair or not - is =
unlikely to be able to subvert ongoing research group work.
=20
The second aspect of Trevor Perrin's last point - whether having Kevin =
Igoe serve as a co-chair otherwise impacts the ability of the research =
group to perform its duties - is one of public perception more than =
anything else.
=20
"NSA agent co-chairing key crypto standards body" makes a catchy, albeit =
factually incorrect, news headline, and publicity like this may deter =
new people from participating in the CFRG, which may limit the amount of =
technical work it can take on, and may limit the body of expertise in =
the group. That is obviously of concern.
=20
However, would removing Kevin Igoe as a co-chair address this issue? =
Co-chairs do not wield more power over the content of the ongoing work =
than other research group participants. Should we then eliminate all =
individuals affiliated with the NSA from participating? We may be able =
to identify those that choose to participate openly under that =
affiliation, but what about consultants or academics that fund their =
participation partially or fully through NSA contracts, now or in the =
past? What about participants from or funded by intelligence agencies in =
other countries that may or may not have collaborated with the NSA?
=20
It is a very slippery slope, and we run the serious danger of =
eliminating valuable contributions to our work by preventing individuals =
with certain affiliations to participate. That of course also affects =
the ability of the research group to perform its duties. In the end, it =
is a trade-off.
=20
The IRTF and IETF have always welcomed participation by all, and the =
open processes that both organizations employ have been our safeguard =
against any group of participants that attempted to subvert our =
technical work, in any field we're active in. Widespread wiretapping by =
nation-state adversaries is a threat unlike any other in the history of =
the Internet, but I do not believe that preventing interested people =
from participating in the IRTF or IETF based solely on their affiliation =
will help us combat that threat.
=20
I hope the above explains why I am declining Trevor Perrin's request to =
remove Kevin Igoe as a co-chair of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research =
Group (CFRG).
=20
I realize this has been a controversial discussion, and this is likely a =
controversial decision. Let me therefore outline what I believe the next =
level of escalation is, should research group participants want to go =
that route.
=20
RFC2014 does not define an appeals process for the IRTF, other than in =
the case when the IRTF Chair closes a research group that disagrees with =
that decision. However, the IRTF Chair is appointed by the Internet =
Architecture Board and serves at its discretion. Ultimately, any =
disagreement with the actions of the IRTF Chair should therefore be =
raised with the IAB. (Note that I am an ex officio member of the IAB and =
will receive any email sent to the normal iab@iab.org email address. If =
that is of concern, my suggestion would be to email the IAB Chair, Russ =
Housley, and the IAB Executive Director, Mary Barnes, directly at =
iab-chair@iab.org and execd@iab.org, respectively.)
=20
Finally, I want to thank Trevor Perrin to have raised the concerns he =
had with the situation in the CFRG. Our open process works best when any =
concerns are brought forward for public discussion, as was the case =
here.
=20
Lars Eggert
IRTF Chair

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From dharkins@lounge.org  Sun Jan  5 00:12:33 2014
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Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2014 00:12:23 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Suggestion for open competition on PAKE -> Was Re: Dragonfly has advantages
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  Hi David,

On Sat, January 4, 2014 8:42 am, David McGrew wrote:
> As a side note, I personally would also like to see
> guidance/documentation on how PAKEs can best be used, and I agree with
> your comment about bootstrapping authentication.  Replacing a raw
> username/password exchange inside of TLS with a PAKE would be good, and
> using a PAKE for password-based certificate enrollment would be good.
> Replacing certificate based authentication with a PAKE would be not so
> good.

  I agree with everything above.

  PAKEs are useful because they provide a certain amount of security even
in the presence of weak, low-entropy passwords. And passwords are easy
and simple to use for people who are not computer savvy much less crypto
clueful, they are intuitive to use. So PAKEs can provide a kind of misuse
resistance.

  PAKEs are also useful for bootstrapping and for things like certificate
enrollment. In fact, it is securing an RFC 7030 exchange that prompted
me to push so hard for TLS-pwd. The fact is that if someone does not
have a certificate then he probably also lacks a suitable trust anchor
database with which to properly secure a certificate-based TLS exchange
to enroll with a CA (any step that populates the trust anchor database
can be used to just give the user a certificate and be done with it). And
in that case they will do is accept an unverified self-signed certificate
and use HTTP digest authentication right before they say "give me the
CA's certificate that I will trust from now on". I know this because I've
seen people deploy this nonsense.

  In addition, when someone is requesting certification of a public
key it makes sense to authenticate using a PAKE with the same group--
384 bit prime ECC for a certified public key, then 384 bit prime ECC with
the PAKE. The group used in the PAKE can't be fixed to the password.

  So we need ECC support in a balanced PAKE. And we needed it a
few months ago when RFC 7030 got published.

  No one should ever use a PAKE in lieu of a certificate-based
authentication scheme provided that the certificate can be, and is,
properly validated. I certainly was not suggesting dragonfly for that
use.

  regards,

  Dan.




From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Sun Jan  5 02:34:07 2014
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Date: Sun, 05 Jan 2014 10:33:42 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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Kevin,

On 01/05/2014 01:41 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
> Potential IPR issues:
> Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves, 
> and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p = 3 mod 4.  

I'm not sure what exactly you mean there. From my POV, Certicom
have declared [1] that they consider that some of their IPR is somehow
required in order to implement the most excellent RFC 6090 [2] which
only references things published at least a year before Certicom's
first filing. I also seem to recall that some of their IPR
declarations do include restrictions on things like CAs issuing
certs.

So "granted permission" is not quite so clear. At least not
without either being a lawyer, or having whatever time machine
Certicom's lawyers seem to possess. I doubt we'll clarify the
IPR situation around ECC here, nor around PAKEs unfortunately.

But I think we can conclude that the Dragonfly goal of designing
around existing IPR remains a valid design goal. Whether or not
Dan has succeeded in that is another matter, participants who
care about IPR need to evaluate that for themselves.

S.

[1]
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?option=rfc_search&rfc_search=6090
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6090

> Not 
> being a patent lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents 
> have on the use of newer families of curves, such as Edwards curves.  
> RFC 6090 outlines elliptic curve technology which predates the Certicom
> patents.

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Sun Jan  5 08:18:57 2014
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
Thread-Index: AQHPCjHEk17DdD0mQkqxUhltboUzxw==
Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2014 16:18:28 +0000
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Cc: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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Hi

Recently there has been some activity in trying to find alternative ciphers=
. In TLS the issue was RC4, which is now deemed insecure. Adam's draft ([1]=
) proposes to use another stream cipher, ChaCha20, in its place. Poly1305 i=
s used in that draft as a faster (when compared with HMAC-SHA1) message aut=
hentication algorithm.=20

For IPsec, RC4 was never used because it always produces the same keystream=
, so we cannot produce per-packet streams. What we have today is that the o=
nly widely-deployed algorithm other than AES is 3DES, and on modern hardwar=
e AES is 4x to 10x as fast as 3DES. That means that if ever an issue is fou=
nd in AES, users will not be able to switch to 3DES - the performance is no=
t even close, so much of the deployed hardware will not be able to handle t=
he load. This sorry state is described in [2].

Unlike RC4, ChaCha20 has a 64-bit nonce, so different packets could use dif=
ferent keystreams, much like block ciphers in counter mode. Unlike 3DES, Ch=
aCha20 has performance that is close to that of AES.

So my question is whether there is any reason not to use ChaCha20 (with or =
without the AEAD construction from Adam's draft) for IKE and/or IPsec. Coul=
d this be the standby algorithm that we have been looking for?

Yoav

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00=

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Sun Jan  5 08:24:28 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] On interpreting IPR in the IETF
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On Jan 4, 2014, at 5:41 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:

> Potential IPR issues:
> Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves,=20

This is completely wrong on many different axes.

- Certicom's IPR statements are for implementers, not the IETF.

- Certicom did not "grant permission" to anyone.

- Certicom's IPR statements do not mention "the NIST curves".

Certicom/RIM/Blackberry has spread a great deal of FUD in its IRP =
claims; it harms the crypto community when people parrot it, and makes =
it even worse when they parrot it badly.

> and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p =3D 3 mod 4.  Not=20
> being a patent lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents=20=

> have on the use of newer families of curves, such as Edwards curves. =20=


Just to be clear: you also have no idea what impact the Certicom patents =
have on any family of curves. None of us do.

> RFC 6090 outlines elliptic curve technology which predates the =
Certicom
> patents.

Correct. It would have been *way* better to leave out the rest of that =
paragraph.

--Paul Hoffman=

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] authenticated encryption with replay protection (AERO) - internet draft
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On 1/2/14, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi CFRG,
>
> I have a new proposal for authenticated encryption, which is
> particularly well suited for communication security.   An internet draft
> describing the idea has been published at
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aero-00 and I would like to
> request a slot at the upcoming CFRG meeting to present this work. (I am
> assuming that we will be meeting in London in March along with IETF
> 89).   I alluded to this work on the thread about misuse resistant
> authenticated encryption earlier today.
>
>  From the draft:
>
> Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO)
>
>     This document describes Authenticated Encryption with Replay
>     prOtection (AERO), a cryptographic technique that provides all of the
>     essential security services needed for communication security. AERO
>     offers several advantages over other methods: it has more compact
>     messages, provides stronger misuse resistance, avoids the need to
>     manage implicit state, and is simpler to use.  This document defines
>     a particular AERO algorithm as well as a registry for such
>     algorithms.
>
> Comments are welcome, and I especially encourage discussion about the
> appropriate goals for authenticated encryption.  The draft explains the
> rationale well enough, I believe, though it does not mention decryption
> misuse.   I will send a separate note on that topic.
>
> A formal proof of security has not yet been published, but is believed
> to be possible, and the draft does include a security analysis.

Since AERO uses a large-block block cipher, I believe that the
folklore approach (=E2=80=98count the bits=E2=80=99) used in the draft is a=
dequate, as
long as it is used with care.  (It can be abused: section 4 (PDF page
6) of <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/robustness.pdf> gives
the example of a standardized protocol which relies on a
replay-prevention counter for part of its message redundancy
(i.e. authentication), but obtains only one bit of redundancy due to
poor design of the replay-prevention mechanism.  Fortunately, the
standard replay-prevention practice in modern protocols would not have
introduced that weakness, and AERO uses the modern standard practice.)

(In other constructions, simply =E2=80=98counting the bits=E2=80=99 may req=
uire some
theoretical justification, and/or may produce the wrong result.  For
example, in Poly1305-AES, verification is equivalent to recovering s
from the MAC, decrypting it, and checking the result for equality to
the nonce; if w nonces are to be accepted when verifying a single
message, that is equivalent to allowing the attacker to try w times as
many forgery attempts; and the security bounds published for
Poly1305-AES turn out to have a term linear in the number of forgery
attempts (denoted D in the paper).  But the other term (probability of
distinguishing AES from a uniform random permutation after C + D
queries) is also a function of D, and is not necessarily linear in D.)


I noticed that there are IPR disclosures for AERO, with rather nasty
terms.  Exactly what parts of AERO are claimed by the patent and
patent application listed there?


Robert Ransom

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From: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>
To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>, "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Igoe, Kevin M.
> Sent: Saturday, January 04, 2014 8:41 PM
> To: 'cfrg@irtf.org'
> Subject: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
>=20
> Scott Fluhrer wrote:
>=20
> I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.  However=
, I
> believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy elsewhere, and di=
d
> not review the draft).
>=20
> I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution; the
> checking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in random
> time via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is easier).
>=20
> Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did he
> endorse Dan's implementation?'
> ---------------------------------
>=20
> Actually I had something more like the process outlined below in mind.

Both your procedure and mine look good.

The only thing (and I think we ought to be explicit about it) is that the v=
arious operations need to run in constant time; we need to explicitly state=
 that the modular additions and multiplications need to be run in time inde=
pendent of the values being added and multiplied.  The only exception in ei=
ther of our proposals is the Legendre symbol computation, and that's true I=
F you are using blinding like I suggested; that's safe because the time it =
takes is not correlated with any value we need to keep secret.

This might be fairly obvious; however I don't know if we want to omit obvio=
us precautions.

>=20
> First an elementary (and somewhat obscure)fact:
>=20
>   For any prime p =3D 3 mod 4 and any non-zero f in Z/p, let
>             r =3D f**((p+1)/4).
>   If f is a quadratic residue mod p (i.e. has a square root mod p),
>   then r**2 =3D f, otherwise r**2 =3D -f.
>=20
> (This is easy to see since
>              r**2 =3D f**((p+1)/2) mod p
>                   =3D f * f**((p-1)/2) mod p and f**((p-1)/2) =3D 1 mod p=
 if f has a square
> root mod p and is
> -1 otherwise).
>=20
> Aside from cases of vanishingly small probability (e.g f =3D 0, 1 or -1),=
 the time
> to do this exponentiation  depends upon two publicly known values, the
> modulus p and the exponent ((p+1)/4), and not upon the secret values x an=
d
> f.  I'd advise using Montgomery arithmetic as this is a very efficient an=
d
> methodical technique for doing mod p arithmetic.
>=20
> So what had I envisioned is something like this (in pythonese):
>=20
> Bad =3D []
> Good =3D []
> for t in range(40):
>     x  =3D one_way_update(x)
>     f  =3D x**3 + a*x + b mod p
>     r  =3D f**((p+1)/4)
>     f1 =3D r**2
>     if f1 =3D=3D f:
>         Good.append( (x,r) )
>     else:
>         Bad.append( (x,r) )
>=20
> if len(Good) =3D=3D 0:
>     raise ValueError
> else:
>     return Good[0]
>=20
>=20
> Observations:
>  - This should be consant in time and memory usage.
>  - Prob of hitting the error condition is 2**-40 ~=3D 10**-12.
>  - The 40 could be increased if the RG deems that to be prudent.
>=20
>=20
> Potential IPR issues:
> Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves, and a=
t
> least two of these, P256 and P384, have p =3D 3 mod 4.  Not being a paten=
t
> lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents have on the use o=
f
> newer families of curves, such as Edwards curves.
> RFC 6090 outlines elliptic curve technology which predates the Certicom
> patents.
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Sun Jan  5 14:46:22 2014
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Cc: "John Foley \(foleyj\)" <foleyj@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] authenticated encryption with replay protection (AERO) - internet draft
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Hi Robert,

On 01/05/2014 12:24 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 1/2/14, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>> Hi CFRG,
>>
>> I have a new proposal for authenticated encryption, which is
>> particularly well suited for communication security.   An internet draft
>> describing the idea has been published at
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aero-00 and I would like to
>> request a slot at the upcoming CFRG meeting to present this work. (I am
>> assuming that we will be meeting in London in March along with IETF
>> 89).   I alluded to this work on the thread about misuse resistant
>> authenticated encryption earlier today.
>>
>>   From the draft:
>>
>> Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO)
>>
>>      This document describes Authenticated Encryption with Replay
>>      prOtection (AERO), a cryptographic technique that provides all of the
>>      essential security services needed for communication security. AERO
>>      offers several advantages over other methods: it has more compact
>>      messages, provides stronger misuse resistance, avoids the need to
>>      manage implicit state, and is simpler to use.  This document defines
>>      a particular AERO algorithm as well as a registry for such
>>      algorithms.
>>
>> Comments are welcome, and I especially encourage discussion about the
>> appropriate goals for authenticated encryption.  The draft explains the
>> rationale well enough, I believe, though it does not mention decryption
>> misuse.   I will send a separate note on that topic.
>>
>> A formal proof of security has not yet been published, but is believed
>> to be possible, and the draft does include a security analysis.
> Since AERO uses a large-block block cipher, I believe that the
> folklore approach (‘count the bits’) used in the draft is adequate, as
> long as it is used with care.  (It can be abused: section 4 (PDF page
> 6) of <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/robustness.pdf> gives
> the example of a standardized protocol which relies on a
> replay-prevention counter for part of its message redundancy
> (i.e. authentication), but obtains only one bit of redundancy due to
> poor design of the replay-prevention mechanism.  Fortunately, the
> standard replay-prevention practice in modern protocols would not have
> introduced that weakness, and AERO uses the modern standard practice.)

Agreed.   Well, with AERO, it is not quite counting the number of bits, 
but rather counting the number of sequence numbers that the replay 
checking algorithm would accept.

> (In other constructions, simply ‘counting the bits’ may require some
> theoretical justification, and/or may produce the wrong result.  For
> example, in Poly1305-AES, verification is equivalent to recovering s
> from the MAC, decrypting it, and checking the result for equality to
> the nonce; if w nonces are to be accepted when verifying a single
> message, that is equivalent to allowing the attacker to try w times as
> many forgery attempts; and the security bounds published for
> Poly1305-AES turn out to have a term linear in the number of forgery
> attempts (denoted D in the paper).  But the other term (probability of
> distinguishing AES from a uniform random permutation after C + D
> queries) is also a function of D, and is not necessarily linear in D.)
>
>
> I noticed that there are IPR disclosures for AERO, with rather nasty
> terms.  Exactly what parts of AERO are claimed by the patent and
> patent application listed there?

I do not agree that the terms are "rather nasty"; an IPR specialist 
would likely describe them as "defensive", in the sense of [1]. They 
say: " ... Cisco will not assert any patents owned or controlled by 
Cisco against any party for making, using, selling, importing or 
offering for sale a product that implements the standard, provided, 
however that Cisco retains the right to assert its patents (including 
the right to claim past royalties) against any party that asserts a 
patent it owns or controls (either directly or indirectly) against Cisco 
... " [2]   If you or your employer have suggestions on how the details 
of the terms can be tweaked in a way that makes the technology more 
accessible to other companies (that don't sue us), I encourage you to 
email the contact address in the IETF IPR disclosure (which is 
standards-ipr@cisco.com).

Like most employers, mine asks that I not make public statements or 
speculations about the scope of patent claims.

thanks,

David

[1]  The Defensive Patent License and Other Ways to Beat the Patent 
System, Julie Samuels, EFF, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/06/defensive-patent-license-and-other-ways-beat-patent-system

[2] Cisco's Statement about IPR related to draft-mcgrew-aero-00, 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2219/

>
> Robert Ransom
> .
>


From paul@marvell.com  Sun Jan  5 16:04:28 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2014 16:04:36 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages 
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Feng Hao [mailto:feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk]
=20

Hi Feng,

> >I agree that it has more complexity and message exchanges that other
> >approaches.  These other protocols have NOT been viable to ship in the
> >products I build.
>=20
> Have you looked at J-PAKE? It's a balanced PAKE, same as Dragonfly.
No, not in too much detail, yet ... looks of similar complexity.

>=20
> http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/05/29/j-pake/=09
Interesting, thanks for the reference.

I assume this is a related better spec for this forum: http://tools.ietf.or=
g/search/draft-hao-jpake-00

Seems like the identical problem space as Dragonfly, but a later attempt. L=
ess critical review so far ...=20

Note - a nearly identical version of Dragonfly	 is baked into mesh networki=
ng ... so I still want to see Dragonfly progress to ensure the side-channel=
 implementation details and the like are clarified to fully address the com=
ments.=20

Regards,

Paul

>=20
> In the update of "2013-12-30", you can find a prototype implementation
> of J-PAKE using the elliptic curve group setting.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Feng


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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Hi Paul,

thanks for your suggestions.

On 01/04/2014 06:20 AM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>
> My wish list for 2014:
>
>   - A public key based ¹trust¹ architecture to
>     determine ³who can do what² (not based on X.509 or PGP)

This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for 
CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)

>   - Public key based methods that can be readily be used
>     to both sign data and be used to develop encryption keys
>   - Nonce insensitive or deterministic encryption modes
>     to support group multicast in a mesh topology

I'm with you on that one.

>   - Elliptic curves for cryptographic use that are developed
>     in a transparent manner that dispels any possible mistrust

Yes, this is a good one.  I think there is sufficient interest in this 
topic in the IETF to warrant this work.

>   - Algorithm modes that have infinite error extension
>     (verus CCM, 1 bit plaintext change -> 1 bit ciphertext)

This seems in scope.

>   - Secure time stamps
>   - A 'setup process' based on public keys to enable
>     the secure configuration of consumer products
>   - Strong P2P authentication for Wi-Fi devices
>   - Ephemeral MAC Addresses

Would be interesting.   Probably not in our RG scope, I would guess.

>   - Deprecation and abolishment of known bad algorithms:
>     in a manner that impacts real products
>     (e.g. TKIP, WEP, DES, RC4)
>

CFRG can't initiate the standards that deprecate algorithms, but there 
are probably things that we can do to hilight the need for that 
deprecation (in practice as well as in standards).   One thing I'd like 
to see is the cipher-catalog get completed, with some clear guidance in 
it on what is recommended and what is not.   It would be great to see 
that RFC get referenced in open source, for example.

David


> Paul
>
>
>
>
>
> On 1/3/14, 4:28 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> recently, Stephen and others suggested some topics that seem worth
>> considering as future work for this research group.   I want to expand
>> on those suggestions, and solicit your input.  If there is sufficiently
>> broad interest, and people willing to contribute, than we can consider
>> taking it on.   The goal of this note is to gauge interest in some
>> topics that I have heard others talk about, and some that I think are
>> worthwhile.  Recall that CFRG is a bridge between theory and practice,
>> and traffic can go in both directions. The practice community can
>> identify unsolved problems and new issues that aren't dealt with in
>> theory.   Conversely, the theory community can introduce new results.
>>
>> Stephen, Sean, please do let us know what work would be most useful to
>> the IETF Security Area, and what work would be less useful or would
>> conflict with IETF chartered work.   Thanks!
>>
>> Useful topics on side channel attacks:
>>
>> - Documenting ways of implementing existing algorithms that resist
>> side-channel attacks, especially timing attacks.   This could include
>> documentation of naive implementation methods that are vulnerable, or
>> experimental work quantifying vulnerabilities.
>>
>> - The development of testing methodologies for crypto implementations
>> that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test
>> harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts with a
>> target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics, which
>> could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are crypto
>> module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why don't
>> we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would identify
>> timing vulnerabilities?
>>
>> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that
>> resist side channel attacks.
>>
>> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms that
>> lack subliminal channels; that is, algorithms that would be hard to
>> implement in a way that subverted the privacy of the user without their
>> knowledge.   Also interesting would be testing methodologies that detect
>> such channels, possibly including static analysis of source code, or
>> statistical analysis of random or pseudorandom sources.
>>
>>
>> Useful topics in crypto algorithm design:
>>
>> - Authenticated encryption that does not require an application to
>> manage nonces and/or is robust against nonce misuse.
>>
>> - Simplicity of design as a way to achieve robust crypto implementations.
>>
>> - Recommendations on algorithms that should be used.   This could
>> include recommendations on DRBGs.
>>
>>
>> Useful topics in provable security:
>>
>> - A document describing the hierarchy of goals for security proofs, and
>> recommendations on what IETF WG expectations should be regarding such
>> proofs.   It would also be useful to describe the important security
>> models, and to provide referenceable common definitions.
>>
>> - Provably secure designs for complex protocols.   For instance: can
>> there be a provably secure protocol that provides the same level of
>> critical functionality as TLS, yet at the same time has been proven
>> secure using techniques and/or tools that are accessible to many
>> reviewers?
>>
>>
>> Useful topics in privacy
>>
>> - Analyzing and documenting the limitations on privacy/anonymity
>> technologies in the Internet protocols.   For example: if your MAC
>> address and/or IPv6 address are traceable, then cryptography is not
>> going to get you strong anonymity, no matter what crypto you use.
>> Additionally, analysis of packet lengths and timings can reveal a lot of
>> information.   Existing IETF security protocols have message-length
>> hiding mechanisms, but these are not very effective.   If we are wiling
>> to add latency and consume extra bandwidth, we could improve security in
>> this area.   Is it worth it?
>>
>> No doubt this is not an exhaustive list, and if you have other topics to
>> put forward, please send them to the list and keep "considering new
>> topics" in the subject line to make it easier to keep track.
>>
>> One topic that I didn't list above, because it is somewhat outside of
>> CFRG's traditional scope, is security in Cloud environments.  To my
>> thinking, the industry trend towards putting all the data one can get a
>> hold of into multi-tenant, virtualized environments is one of the
>> biggest threats to information security and privacy.   Maybe I trust the
>> Cloud provider to be well intentioned, but can I actually trust them to
>> maintain data security?    I didn't try to craft a topic along this line
>> because it goes beyond the scope of communication security.
>>
>> regards,
>>
>> David
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>


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I had forgotten an important topic from my list:

- Postquantum cryptography.   Signing algorithms based on hash functions 
(based on the work of Merkle and Hulsing) will not be too hard.  
Encryption based on codes would need more review, but should be 
possible; Bernstein and others have done good work in this area 
recently.   Other encryption and signature schemes could be considered 
as well.  Also useful would be parameter and algorithm guidance for 
postquantum security.

David

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Hi David,

On 01/03/2014 09:41 PM, David Wagner wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 3, 2014, at 04:28 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Useful topics on side channel attacks:
>>
>> - The development of testing methodologies for crypto implementations
>> that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test
>> harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts with a
>> target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics, which
>> could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are crypto
>> module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why don't
>> we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would identify
>> timing vulnerabilities?
> Back in 2005, David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz,
> and I proposed a simple method for testing for side channel
> vulnerabilities.  You instrument the program with gcov, then run it
> many times with many different randomly chosen keys (but with
> all other inputs held fixed), using gcov to gather a set of statement
> coverage statistics separately for each different key.  Then, you
> look at the statement coverage statistics that gcov produced.
> If you find any line in the code that was executed more times
> for some keys than for others, you have found a potential
> side channel vulnerability, as you've found some evidence that
> whether or not that line will be executed depends upon the value
> of the key.
>
> We did a few small-scale experiments, and it seems to work
> surprisingly well at finding vulnerabilities.  It's not perfect, but
> the main advantage is that it is very easy to implement and try.
> You can read more about our experiments with it in Section 4
> of the following paper:
>
> The Program Counter Security Model: Automatic Detection and
> Removal of Control-Flow Side Channel Attacks.
> David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz, and David Wagner.
> ICISC 2005, December 1, 2005.
> http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/pcmodel-long.pdf
>
> As far as I know, the main limitations are that it is oriented
> primarily at deterministic algorithms (rather than ones that
> internally flip random coins and use them), and it relies upon
> gcov for coverage statistics, and gcov isn't always great
> when the code is compiled with optimization.

Thanks for reminding the group about this work, it is a good set of 
ideas.   I especially like that it uses a dynamic rather than purely 
static analysis.  Was there ever follow-up research on how to better 
deal with optimized code?

These ideas can be used during software development.   That's definitely 
a good thing.   But what I meant to suggest above was something a little 
different: a test harness that gathers statistics that are usable to 
check for timing attacks, which can be run on a software library or 
hardware module provided by someone else.   My goal here is providing a 
level of third-party validation on the crypto implementation.    This 
would enable a somone who uses a crypto implementation to test it (or to 
rely on a test result from a third party that they trust), and it would 
give a vendor a way to showcase the absence of side channels (and a good 
motivation to be diligent in eliminating them).   Now, a run-time check 
like this will likely have less statistical power than than a 
development-time check like you describe, but there is a lot of value in 
allowing anyone to run the test.

David

>
> -- David
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
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Hi Trevor,

On 01/03/2014 09:43 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 12:53 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>>> Let me make an aside about provable security. In the crypto practice
>>>> community, it is often regarded as oversold.
>>> As a member of the "crypto practice community" I disagree.  Key
>>> agreement protocols are widely understood to be a tricky area where
>>> formal analysis is crucial.  Dragonfly's lack of such analysis was a
>>> red flag.  Jonathan Katz, a world-class cryptographer, raised the
>>> issue repeatedly.  The CFRG chairs ignored him and endorsed Dan
>>> Harkins' bluster.
>>>
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03053.html
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03216.html
>>>
>>> Seems like CFRG could use more outreach to the cryptography community
>>> and less to the intelligence community.
>>
>> I agree, more outreach to the theory community would be valuable. Perhaps
>> you would be interested in helping with that effort?
> Sure, my advice:  There's a wealth of knowledge in academia that CFRG
> is not tapping.  Having a CFRG co-chair who could serve as ambassador
> to that community and a translator of its knowledge would be very
> valuable.

It would be great to have an ambassador, and that person need not be a 
chair.

>
> I'd recommend talking to some of the academic cryptographers who've
> engaged with TLS and CFRG (Jonathan Katz, Kenny Paterson, Douglas
> Stebila, David Wagner, etc), and see where that leads you.
>
> Also, this would be a good discussion to pursue at Real World Crypto
> (NYC, shortly).

Agreed.  Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend due to other 
travel.  If there is someone in the RG who can attend, it would be great 
to hear a report from them on topics that they think the list should 
know about.   (An aside: I'd like to hear or read about /Provable 
security of advanced properties of TLS and SSH/, which I would guess is 
similar http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/813.pdf) Also, if there is an 
opportunity to present a plug for CFRG at the event, say during a rump 
session, I offer to help to prepare a short presentation on CFRG to 
anyone willing to give it.

I think it would be good to have an actual CFRG meeting adjunct to an 
IACR venue, such as Crypto in Santa Barbara.   Probably there are not 
many people who regularly attend both the IETF and crypto conferences, 
but I think that such a meeting would help to build a stronger online 
community, if nothing else.

thanks,

David

>
>>>>>>> He also endorsed an ineffective attempt to avoid
>>>>>>> timing attacks by adding extra iterations to one of the loops [IGOE_3,
>>>>>>> IGOE_4].
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think that by "ineffective attempt to avoid timing attacks" you are
>>>>>> referring to your statement that "within each loop are conditional
>>>>>> branches
>>>>>> and Legendre symbol / square-root algorithms, which are hard to
>>>>>> implement
>>>>>> efficiently in constant time ([STRUIK], [ICART], [FIPS186-4])" from
>>>>>> [REVIEW]. Is this right? There is a significant difference between
>>>>>> "hard
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> implement" and "ineffective". The statement in [REVIEW] makes it sound
>>>>>> like
>>>>>> it is inconvenient for the implementer, while the statement in your
>>>>>> email
>>>>>> makes it sound as though it is impossible.
>>>>> Not sure I understand this quibble.
>>>>
>>>> The important point here is that a Research Group chair reading [REVIEW]
>>>> could get the impression that the proposed mitigation to timing attacks
>>>> is
>>>> "hard to implement" rather than "ineffective", in your opinion.
>>> I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
>>> analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
>>> CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.
>>>
>>> Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
>>> exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
>>> Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
>>> calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
>>> ops.
>>>
>>> In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
>>> calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
>>> point a square root is performed.  So:
>>>    - 1 modular exponentiation
>>>    - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
>>>      - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2
>>>
>>> In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
>>> completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
>>> exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
>>>    - Variable number of modular exponentiations
>>>      - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
>>>    - 40 Legendre symbol calculations
>>>
>>> The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
>>> instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
>>> think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?
>>
>> I don't have the time right now to go back to the earlier version of the
>> draft and check all of this, and I want to get back to you sooner rather
>> than later.   So let me comment here as a chair, rather than a technical
>> reviewer.  What would have been most useful is for this analysis to have
>> been presented to the CFRG mail list during the discussion of timing attacks
>> that initially took place on December 2012, or after Kevin put out a Last
>> Call for comments on Dragonfly on April 4, 2013.   For perspective: Rene
>> Struik's comments on that draft went out on Nov 29, and yous went out on Dec
>> 10, over six months after the last call for comments.
> Rene brought up the sidechannel issue again in July 2013, with no response:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03489.html
>
> But there's a bigger picture:  Regardless of timing attacks, Dragonfly
> is inferior to alternatives already standardized or found in the
> literature.
>
> This opinion was well-expressed on the TLS and CFRG mailing lists when
> Dragonfly was proposed.  This opinion was probably shared by many more
> people than expressed it (like me), and was never adequately
> addressed.  By Dec 2012, I assume most people had tuned-out a
> discussion about an non-useful protocol that was proceeding without
> regard to group opinion.
>
>
> Trevor
> .
>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Trevor,<br>
      <br>
      On 01/03/2014 09:43 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAGZ8ZG2C=NH-NOsVteinBZxpovfGd55ksm4kSxpx3yD4+UO+6Q@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 12:53 PM, David McGrew <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">&lt;mcgrew@cisco.com&gt;</a> wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap="">
</pre>
          <blockquote type="cite">
            <pre wrap="">Let me make an aside about provable security. In the crypto practice
community, it is often regarded as oversold.
</pre>
          </blockquote>
          <pre wrap="">
As a member of the "crypto practice community" I disagree.  Key
agreement protocols are widely understood to be a tricky area where
formal analysis is crucial.  Dragonfly's lack of such analysis was a
red flag.  Jonathan Katz, a world-class cryptographer, raised the
issue repeatedly.  The CFRG chairs ignored him and endorsed Dan
Harkins' bluster.

<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03053.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03053.html</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03216.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03216.html</a>

Seems like CFRG could use more outreach to the cryptography community
and less to the intelligence community.
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap="">

I agree, more outreach to the theory community would be valuable. Perhaps
you would be interested in helping with that effort?
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
Sure, my advice:  There's a wealth of knowledge in academia that CFRG
is not tapping.  Having a CFRG co-chair who could serve as ambassador
to that community and a translator of its knowledge would be very
valuable.</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    It would be great to have an ambassador, and that person need not be
    a chair.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAGZ8ZG2C=NH-NOsVteinBZxpovfGd55ksm4kSxpx3yD4+UO+6Q@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">

I'd recommend talking to some of the academic cryptographers who've
engaged with TLS and CFRG (Jonathan Katz, Kenny Paterson, Douglas
Stebila, David Wagner, etc), and see where that leads you.

Also, this would be a good discussion to pursue at Real World Crypto
(NYC, shortly).
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Agreed.&nbsp; Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend due to other
    travel.&nbsp; If there is someone in the RG who can attend, it would be
    great to hear a report from them on topics that they think the list
    should know about.&nbsp;&nbsp; (An aside: I'd like to hear or read about
    <em>Provable security of advanced properties of TLS and SSH</em>,
    which I would guess is similar <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/813.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/813.pdf</a>)&nbsp;
    Also, if there is an opportunity to present a plug for CFRG at the
    event, say during a rump session, I offer to help to prepare a short
    presentation on CFRG to anyone willing to give it.<br>
    <br>
    I think it would be good to have an actual CFRG meeting adjunct to
    an IACR venue, such as Crypto in Santa Barbara.&nbsp;&nbsp; Probably there are
    not many people who regularly attend both the IETF and crypto
    conferences, but I think that such a meeting would help to build a
    stronger online community, if nothing else.<br>
    <br>
    thanks,<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAGZ8ZG2C=NH-NOsVteinBZxpovfGd55ksm4kSxpx3yD4+UO+6Q@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <blockquote type="cite">
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <blockquote type="cite">
                <blockquote type="cite">
                  <pre wrap="">He also endorsed an ineffective attempt to avoid
timing attacks by adding extra iterations to one of the loops [IGOE_3,
IGOE_4].
</pre>
                </blockquote>
                <pre wrap="">

I think that by "ineffective attempt to avoid timing attacks" you are
referring to your statement that "within each loop are conditional
branches
and Legendre symbol / square-root algorithms, which are hard to
implement
efficiently in constant time ([STRUIK], [ICART], [FIPS186-4])" from
[REVIEW]. Is this right? There is a significant difference between
"hard
to
implement" and "ineffective". The statement in [REVIEW] makes it sound
like
it is inconvenient for the implementer, while the statement in your
email
makes it sound as though it is impossible.
</pre>
              </blockquote>
              <pre wrap="">
Not sure I understand this quibble.
</pre>
            </blockquote>
            <pre wrap="">

The important point here is that a Research Group chair reading [REVIEW]
could get the impression that the proposed mitigation to timing attacks
is
"hard to implement" rather than "ineffective", in your opinion.
</pre>
          </blockquote>
          <pre wrap="">
I'm still not sure what you're asking.  Let's just look at a crude
analysis of the "40-loops" countermeasure Kevin endorsed, comparing
CFRG draft-00 vs draft-01/draft-02.

Let's assume that modular square roots are calculated via modular
exponentiation, and that Legendre symbol calculations take less time.
Let's also ignore the variable time taken by a Legendre symbol
calculation and other conditional logic, and just count the number of
ops.

In draft-00, the hunt-and-peck loop in 3.2.1 performs Legendre symbol
calculations until it finds a square (probability ~1/2), at which
point a square root is performed.  So:
  - 1 modular exponentiation
  - Variable number of Legendre symbol calculations
    - geometric distribution with mean ~2, variance ~2

In draft-01 and draft-02, the hunt-and-peck loop continues until it
completes 40 loops, with a probability ~1/2 of performing a modular
exponentiation on each iteration.  So:
  - Variable number of modular exponentiations
    - binomial distribution with mean ~20, variance ~10
  - 40 Legendre symbol calculations

The 40-loops algorithm was intended to reduce timing variance but
instead increases it, and increases computation cost as well.  So I
think "ineffective" is a fair description.  Do you agree?
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap="">

I don't have the time right now to go back to the earlier version of the
draft and check all of this, and I want to get back to you sooner rather
than later.   So let me comment here as a chair, rather than a technical
reviewer.  What would have been most useful is for this analysis to have
been presented to the CFRG mail list during the discussion of timing attacks
that initially took place on December 2012, or after Kevin put out a Last
Call for comments on Dragonfly on April 4, 2013.   For perspective: Rene
Struik's comments on that draft went out on Nov 29, and yous went out on Dec
10, over six months after the last call for comments.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
Rene brought up the sidechannel issue again in July 2013, with no response:

<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03489.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03489.html</a>

But there's a bigger picture:  Regardless of timing attacks, Dragonfly
is inferior to alternatives already standardized or found in the
literature.

This opinion was well-expressed on the TLS and CFRG mailing lists when
Dragonfly was proposed.  This opinion was probably shared by many more
people than expressed it (like me), and was never adequately
addressed.  By Dec 2012, I assume most people had tuned-out a
discussion about an non-useful protocol that was proceeding without
regard to group opinion.


Trevor
.

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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On 01/05/2014 08:05 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> On 01/03/2014 09:43 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> Also, this would be a good discussion to pursue at Real World Crypto
>> (NYC, shortly).
>=20
> Agreed.  Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend due to other
> travel.  If there is someone in the RG who can attend, it would be grea=
t
> to hear a report from them on topics that they think the list should
> know about.

I'll be at RWC.  If i can assemble a reasonable summary of the event,
i'll try to post it to this list.

> Also, if there is an
> opportunity to present a plug for CFRG at the event, say during a rump
> session, I offer to help to prepare a short presentation on CFRG to
> anyone willing to give it.

there is, actually!  here's the form so you can see what they're asking f=
or:

  https://crypto.di.uoa.gr/rwc2014srtk/

I'd be willing to present a couple-minute short talk encouraging
participation in the CFRG if folks think that would be useful.  David,
if you want to contact me (on-list or off) to go over what you think
such a presentation would look like, i'd be happy to discuss it.

Regards,

	--dkg


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From feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk  Mon Jan  6 05:01:45 2014
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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages 
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Hi Paul,

On 06/01/2014 00:04, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:

>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Feng Hao [mailto:feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk]
>=20
>
>Hi Feng,
>
>> >I agree that it has more complexity and message exchanges that other
>> >approaches.  These other protocols have NOT been viable to ship in the
>> >products I build.
>>=20
>> Have you looked at J-PAKE? It's a balanced PAKE, same as Dragonfly.
>No, not in too much detail, yet ... looks of similar complexity.


Well, if you look into the protocol and the proofs, you may realize that
J-PAKE is designed for "simplicity" rather than "complexity".

It is my belief that keeping things simple (which should include the
protocol specification, security proofs and implementation) should be the
the most important consideration in the design of security protocols. Some
people may not realize it, but the hardest task in designing a security
protocol is actually to "keep it as simple as possible".
=20

>>=20
>> http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/05/29/j-pake/=09
>Interesting, thanks for the reference.
>
>I assume this is a related better spec for this forum:
>http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-hao-jpake-00

Yes. Also note that the protocol has remained unchanged from its initial
publication in 2008.

>
>Seems like the identical problem space as Dragonfly, but a later attempt.
>Less critical review so far ...


Not sure if it's a later attempt, but J-PAKE was first published in 2008.
It may not be obvious to some, but the protocol has actually been
extensively analyzed by researchers in the security community and the
industry in the past 5 years. We patiently waited for 5 years to give the
public ample time to scrutinise the protocol and the proofs, and so far no
attacks has been found.

But as always, I welcome most critical reviews from people on this list.
Feel free to post your comments on the lightbluetouchpaper blog, which is
open to everyone to comment.

>
>Note - a nearly identical version of Dragonfly	 is baked into mesh
>networking ... so I still want to see Dragonfly progress to ensure the
>side-channel implementation details and the like are clarified to fully
>address the comments.

Of course. I think a prototype implementation of Dragonfly (in c or Java
etc) would help clarify a lot of things.

>
>Regards,
>
>Paul
>
>>=20
>> In the update of "2013-12-30", you can find a prototype implementation
>> of J-PAKE using the elliptic curve group setting.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> Feng
>


From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Jan  6 06:16:32 2014
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On 01/05/2014 08:23 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 01/05/2014 08:05 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> On 01/03/2014 09:43 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>> Also, this would be a good discussion to pursue at Real World Crypto
>>> (NYC, shortly).
>> Agreed.  Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend due to other
>> travel.  If there is someone in the RG who can attend, it would be great
>> to hear a report from them on topics that they think the list should
>> know about.
> I'll be at RWC.  If i can assemble a reasonable summary of the event,
> i'll try to post it to this list.
>
>> Also, if there is an
>> opportunity to present a plug for CFRG at the event, say during a rump
>> session, I offer to help to prepare a short presentation on CFRG to
>> anyone willing to give it.
> there is, actually!  here's the form so you can see what they're asking for:
>
>    https://crypto.di.uoa.gr/rwc2014srtk/
>
> I'd be willing to present a couple-minute short talk encouraging
> participation in the CFRG if folks think that would be useful.  David,
> if you want to contact me (on-list or off) to go over what you think
> such a presentation would look like, i'd be happy to discuss it.

Thanks!   I drafted up a short overview of the RG, which ends with a 
"why should you participate?" slide, and sent it to you off-list.

David

>
> Regards,
>
> 	--dkg
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


--------------060208020106060504060407
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 01/05/2014 08:23 PM, Daniel Kahn
      Gillmor wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52CA0598.4050705@fifthhorseman.net"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">On 01/05/2014 08:05 PM, David McGrew wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">On 01/03/2014 09:43 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap="">Also, this would be a good discussion to pursue at Real World Crypto
(NYC, shortly).
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap="">
Agreed.  Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend due to other
travel.  If there is someone in the RG who can attend, it would be great
to hear a report from them on topics that they think the list should
know about.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
I'll be at RWC.  If i can assemble a reasonable summary of the event,
i'll try to post it to this list.

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">Also, if there is an
opportunity to present a plug for CFRG at the event, say during a rump
session, I offer to help to prepare a short presentation on CFRG to
anyone willing to give it.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
there is, actually!  here's the form so you can see what they're asking for:

  <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://crypto.di.uoa.gr/rwc2014srtk/">https://crypto.di.uoa.gr/rwc2014srtk/</a>

I'd be willing to present a couple-minute short talk encouraging
participation in the CFRG if folks think that would be useful.  David,
if you want to contact me (on-list or off) to go over what you think
such a presentation would look like, i'd be happy to discuss it.</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Thanks!&nbsp;&nbsp; I drafted up a short overview of the RG, which ends with a
    "why should you participate?" slide, and sent it to you off-list.&nbsp;&nbsp;
    <br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52CA0598.4050705@fifthhorseman.net"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">

Regards,

	--dkg

</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------060208020106060504060407--

From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Mon Jan  6 08:47:00 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: "'Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)'" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>, "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: 40 bit loop and DragonFly
Thread-Index: Ac8Jtz8QHBqZuWIRSrC0AhG0eZjDKgAnaYVwACaLG2A=
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:46:46 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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For the record, some observations:

1) We will often need to try more than one x until we find=20
one where f =3D x**3+a*x*b is a quadratic residue mod p (probability=20
(1/2)**k that it takes k tries).  Requiring that we always pass=20
through the loop
     { update x;=20
       calculate f;=20
      check if f is a quadratic residue; }=20
a fixed number of times (I suggested 40) masks how many steps=20
were actually need to find an x for which f is a QR.

2) Since computing a Jacobi symbol is faster than exponentiation,=20
I like your idea of blinded calculation of the Jacobi symbol. =20
to see whether or not a given f is a QR. It's nice that the client=20
and server can use independent blinding factors and still arrive=20
at the same result.

3) When 2^k | p-1 for k>1, some square root calculations are=20
faster than others, but taking the square root of the blinded
f should mask that just fine.=20

4) That just leaves multiplying sqrt((r**2)*f ) =3D r*sqrt(f)
by (1/r) =3D> need to calculate 1/r, which can be done either=20
by an exponentiation or by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Since the extended Euclidean algorithm is variable time, it=20
might leak information about r, so exponentiating by p-2 is=20
the safer alternative.  Fortunately, this only has to be done
once, not "40" times.

------------------------------------------------------------

I believe there aren't any insurmountable issues associated=20
with DragonFly, but that doesn't mean Dan and the RG don't=20
have some work to do. =20


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) [mailto:sfluhrer@cisco.com]
> Sent: Sunday, January 05, 2014 3:36 PM
> To: Igoe, Kevin M.; 'cfrg@irtf.org'
> Subject: RE: 40 bit loop and DragonFly
>=20
>=20
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Igoe, Kevin M.
> > Sent: Saturday, January 04, 2014 8:41 PM
> > To: 'cfrg@irtf.org'
> > Subject: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
> >
> > Scott Fluhrer wrote:
> >
> > I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.
> > However, I believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy
> > elsewhere, and did not review the draft).
> >
> > I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution;
> > the checking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in
> > random time via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is
> easier).
> >
> > Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did
> > he endorse Dan's implementation?'
> > ---------------------------------
> >
> > Actually I had something more like the process outlined below in
> mind.
>=20
> Both your procedure and mine look good.
>=20
> The only thing (and I think we ought to be explicit about it) is that
> the various operations need to run in constant time; we need to
> explicitly state that the modular additions and multiplications need to
> be run in time independent of the values being added and multiplied.
> The only exception in either of our proposals is the Legendre symbol
> computation, and that's true IF you are using blinding like I
> suggested; that's safe because the time it takes is not correlated with
> any value we need to keep secret.
>=20
> This might be fairly obvious; however I don't know if we want to omit
> obvious precautions.
>=20
> >
> > First an elementary (and somewhat obscure)fact:
> >
> >   For any prime p =3D 3 mod 4 and any non-zero f in Z/p, let
> >             r =3D f**((p+1)/4).
> >   If f is a quadratic residue mod p (i.e. has a square root mod p),
> >   then r**2 =3D f, otherwise r**2 =3D -f.
> >
> > (This is easy to see since
> >              r**2 =3D f**((p+1)/2) mod p
> >                   =3D f * f**((p-1)/2) mod p and f**((p-1)/2) =3D 1 mod=
 p
> > if f has a square root mod p and is
> > -1 otherwise).
> >
> > Aside from cases of vanishingly small probability (e.g f =3D 0, 1 or
> > -1), the time to do this exponentiation  depends upon two publicly
> > known values, the modulus p and the exponent ((p+1)/4), and not upon
> > the secret values x and f.  I'd advise using Montgomery arithmetic as
> > this is a very efficient and methodical technique for doing mod p
> arithmetic.
> >
> > So what had I envisioned is something like this (in pythonese):
> >
> > Bad =3D []
> > Good =3D []
> > for t in range(40):
> >     x  =3D one_way_update(x)
> >     f  =3D x**3 + a*x + b mod p
> >     r  =3D f**((p+1)/4)
> >     f1 =3D r**2
> >     if f1 =3D=3D f:
> >         Good.append( (x,r) )
> >     else:
> >         Bad.append( (x,r) )
> >
> > if len(Good) =3D=3D 0:
> >     raise ValueError
> > else:
> >     return Good[0]
> >
> >
> > Observations:
> >  - This should be consant in time and memory usage.
> >  - Prob of hitting the error condition is 2**-40 ~=3D 10**-12.
> >  - The 40 could be increased if the RG deems that to be prudent.
> >
> >
> > Potential IPR issues:
> > Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves,
> > and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p =3D 3 mod 4.  Not
> being
> > a patent lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents have
> > on the use of newer families of curves, such as Edwards curves.
> > RFC 6090 outlines elliptic curve technology which predates the
> > Certicom patents.
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@irtf.org
> > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan  6 09:18:18 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "Scott Fluhrer \(sfluhrer\)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 8:46 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
> For the record, some observations:
>
> 1) We will often need to try more than one x until we find
> one where f = x**3+a*x*b is a quadratic residue mod p (probability
> (1/2)**k that it takes k tries).  Requiring that we always pass
> through the loop
>      { update x;
>        calculate f;
>       check if f is a quadratic residue; }
> a fixed number of times (I suggested 40) masks how many steps
> were actually need to find an x for which f is a QR.
>
> 2) Since computing a Jacobi symbol is faster than exponentiation,
> I like your idea of blinded calculation of the Jacobi symbol.
> to see whether or not a given f is a QR. It's nice that the client
> and server can use independent blinding factors and still arrive
> at the same result.
>
> 3) When 2^k | p-1 for k>1, some square root calculations are
> faster than others, but taking the square root of the blinded
> f should mask that just fine.
>
> 4) That just leaves multiplying sqrt((r**2)*f ) = r*sqrt(f)
> by (1/r) => need to calculate 1/r, which can be done either
> by an exponentiation or by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
> Since the extended Euclidean algorithm is variable time, it
> might leak information about r, so exponentiating by p-2 is
> the safer alternative.  Fortunately, this only has to be done
> once, not "40" times.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
>
> I believe there aren't any insurmountable issues associated
> with DragonFly, but that doesn't mean Dan and the RG don't
> have some work to do.

What about that 2^{-40} failure probability? Why aren't we using
Elligator to fix it?

I still haven't found a formal security claim that is true about Dragonfly.

There also are possible issues over F_{p}^{\times}: in particular
multitarget variations
of index-calculus get an improvement. This needs to be analyzed, and I
really don't feel
like doing it, because we have J-PAKE.

Why are we still trying to fix Dragonfly? We've got alternatives that
don't have the
significant theoretical issues, don't have the implementation issues,
don't have the IPR issues
(pith and marrow makes me think Dragonfly is covered by SPEKE patent),
and have been
vetted far more extensively.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) [mailto:sfluhrer@cisco.com]
>> Sent: Sunday, January 05, 2014 3:36 PM
>> To: Igoe, Kevin M.; 'cfrg@irtf.org'
>> Subject: RE: 40 bit loop and DragonFly
>>
>>
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Igoe, Kevin M.
>> > Sent: Saturday, January 04, 2014 8:41 PM
>> > To: 'cfrg@irtf.org'
>> > Subject: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
>> >
>> > Scott Fluhrer wrote:
>> >
>> > I think we agree that what Dan specified in the draft is broken.
>> > However, I believe that's because Dan got it wrong (and I was busy
>> > elsewhere, and did not review the draft).
>> >
>> > I believe my suggestion is an improvement (but still needs caution;
>> > the checking if x^3+ax+b is a QR must be done in constant time, or in
>> > random time via blinding; I believe that in this case blinding is
>> easier).
>> >
>> > Now, I believe the issue is 'did Kevin endorse my suggestion, or did
>> > he endorse Dan's implementation?'
>> > ---------------------------------
>> >
>> > Actually I had something more like the process outlined below in
>> mind.
>>
>> Both your procedure and mine look good.
>>
>> The only thing (and I think we ought to be explicit about it) is that
>> the various operations need to run in constant time; we need to
>> explicitly state that the modular additions and multiplications need to
>> be run in time independent of the values being added and multiplied.
>> The only exception in either of our proposals is the Legendre symbol
>> computation, and that's true IF you are using blinding like I
>> suggested; that's safe because the time it takes is not correlated with
>> any value we need to keep secret.
>>
>> This might be fairly obvious; however I don't know if we want to omit
>> obvious precautions.
>>
>> >
>> > First an elementary (and somewhat obscure)fact:
>> >
>> >   For any prime p = 3 mod 4 and any non-zero f in Z/p, let
>> >             r = f**((p+1)/4).
>> >   If f is a quadratic residue mod p (i.e. has a square root mod p),
>> >   then r**2 = f, otherwise r**2 = -f.
>> >
>> > (This is easy to see since
>> >              r**2 = f**((p+1)/2) mod p
>> >                   = f * f**((p-1)/2) mod p and f**((p-1)/2) = 1 mod p
>> > if f has a square root mod p and is
>> > -1 otherwise).
>> >
>> > Aside from cases of vanishingly small probability (e.g f = 0, 1 or
>> > -1), the time to do this exponentiation  depends upon two publicly
>> > known values, the modulus p and the exponent ((p+1)/4), and not upon
>> > the secret values x and f.  I'd advise using Montgomery arithmetic as
>> > this is a very efficient and methodical technique for doing mod p
>> arithmetic.
>> >
>> > So what had I envisioned is something like this (in pythonese):
>> >
>> > Bad = []
>> > Good = []
>> > for t in range(40):
>> >     x  = one_way_update(x)
>> >     f  = x**3 + a*x + b mod p
>> >     r  = f**((p+1)/4)
>> >     f1 = r**2
>> >     if f1 == f:
>> >         Good.append( (x,r) )
>> >     else:
>> >         Bad.append( (x,r) )
>> >
>> > if len(Good) == 0:
>> >     raise ValueError
>> > else:
>> >     return Good[0]
>> >
>> >
>> > Observations:
>> >  - This should be consant in time and memory usage.
>> >  - Prob of hitting the error condition is 2**-40 ~= 10**-12.
>> >  - The 40 could be increased if the RG deems that to be prudent.
>> >
>> >
>> > Potential IPR issues:
>> > Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves,
>> > and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p = 3 mod 4.  Not
>> being
>> > a patent lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents have
>> > on the use of newer families of curves, such as Edwards curves.
>> > RFC 6090 outlines elliptic curve technology which predates the
>> > Certicom patents.
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Cfrg mailing list
>> > Cfrg@irtf.org
>> > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From paul@marvell.com  Mon Jan  6 09:27:36 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 09:27:26 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages 
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages
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Hi Feng,

Thank you for the discussion.

>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Feng Hao [mailto:feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk]
>>=20
>>
>>Hi Feng,
>>
>>> >I agree that it has more complexity and message exchanges that other
>>> >approaches.  These other protocols have NOT been viable to ship in the
>>> >products I build.
>>>=20
>>> Have you looked at J-PAKE? It's a balanced PAKE, same as Dragonfly.
>>No, not in too much detail, yet ... looks of similar complexity.
>
>
>Well, if you look into the protocol and the proofs, you may realize that
>J-PAKE is designed for "simplicity" rather than "complexity".
>
>It is my belief that keeping things simple (which should include the
>protocol specification, security proofs and implementation) should be the
>the most important consideration in the design of security protocols. Some
>people may not realize it, but the hardest task in designing a security
>protocol is actually to "keep it as simple as possible".
>=20
>
>>>=20
>>> http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/05/29/j-pake/=09
>>Interesting, thanks for the reference.
>>
>>I assume this is a related better spec for this forum:
>>http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-hao-jpake-00
>
>Yes. Also note that the protocol has remained unchanged from its initial
>publication in 2008.

There seems to be an ongoing disconnect between academic analysis, RFC
publications and real-world applications.

Perhaps clarity in the documentation of use cases, analysis, comparisons
and recommendations is something we can work on within this community.

Paul



>
>>
>>Seems like the identical problem space as Dragonfly, but a later attempt.
>>Less critical review so far ...
>
>
>Not sure if it's a later attempt, but J-PAKE was first published in 2008.
>It may not be obvious to some, but the protocol has actually been
>extensively analyzed by researchers in the security community and the
>industry in the past 5 years. We patiently waited for 5 years to give the
>public ample time to scrutinise the protocol and the proofs, and so far no
>attacks has been found.
>
>But as always, I welcome most critical reviews from people on this list.
>Feel free to post your comments on the lightbluetouchpaper blog, which is
>open to everyone to comment.
>
>>
>>Note - a nearly identical version of Dragonfly	 is baked into mesh
>>networking ... so I still want to see Dragonfly progress to ensure the
>>side-channel implementation details and the like are clarified to fully
>>address the comments.
>
>Of course. I think a prototype implementation of Dragonfly (in c or Java
>etc) would help clarify a lot of things.
>
>>
>>Regards,
>>
>>Paul
>>
>>>=20
>>> In the update of "2013-12-30", you can find a prototype implementation
>>> of J-PAKE using the elliptic curve group setting.
>>>=20
>>> Cheers,
>>> Feng
>>
>


From feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk  Mon Jan  6 09:46:07 2014
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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Dragonfly has advantages 
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Hi Paul,

On 06/01/2014 17:27, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:

>Hi Feng,
>
>Thank you for the discussion.
>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Feng Hao [mailto:feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk]
>>>=20
>>>
>>>Hi Feng,
>>>
>>>> >I agree that it has more complexity and message exchanges that other
>>>> >approaches.  These other protocols have NOT been viable to ship in
>>>>the
>>>> >products I build.
>>>>=20
>>>> Have you looked at J-PAKE? It's a balanced PAKE, same as Dragonfly.
>>>No, not in too much detail, yet ... looks of similar complexity.
>>
>>
>>Well, if you look into the protocol and the proofs, you may realize that
>>J-PAKE is designed for "simplicity" rather than "complexity".
>>
>>It is my belief that keeping things simple (which should include the
>>protocol specification, security proofs and implementation) should be the
>>the most important consideration in the design of security protocols.
>>Some
>>people may not realize it, but the hardest task in designing a security
>>protocol is actually to "keep it as simple as possible".
>>=20
>>
>>>>=20
>>>> http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/05/29/j-pake/=09
>>>Interesting, thanks for the reference.
>>>
>>>I assume this is a related better spec for this forum:
>>>http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-hao-jpake-00
>>
>>Yes. Also note that the protocol has remained unchanged from its initial
>>publication in 2008.
>
>There seems to be an ongoing disconnect between academic analysis, RFC
>publications and real-world applications.
>
>Perhaps clarity in the documentation of use cases, analysis, comparisons
>and recommendations is something we can work on within this community.
>
>Paul


Agreed. What you recommend is also in line with what David suggested
earlier.

I've been liking the openness of the CFRG forum and the diversity of
backgrounds that its participants are from. I feel it is in a unique
position to bridge that disconnect.

Feng


>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>Seems like the identical problem space as Dragonfly, but a later
>>>attempt.
>>>Less critical review so far ...
>>
>>
>>Not sure if it's a later attempt, but J-PAKE was first published in 2008.
>>It may not be obvious to some, but the protocol has actually been
>>extensively analyzed by researchers in the security community and the
>>industry in the past 5 years. We patiently waited for 5 years to give the
>>public ample time to scrutinise the protocol and the proofs, and so far
>>no
>>attacks has been found.
>>
>>But as always, I welcome most critical reviews from people on this list.
>>Feel free to post your comments on the lightbluetouchpaper blog, which is
>>open to everyone to comment.
>>
>>>
>>>Note - a nearly identical version of Dragonfly	 is baked into mesh
>>>networking ... so I still want to see Dragonfly progress to ensure the
>>>side-channel implementation details and the like are clarified to fully
>>>address the comments.
>>
>>Of course. I think a prototype implementation of Dragonfly (in c or Java
>>etc) would help clarify a lot of things.
>>
>>>
>>>Regards,
>>>
>>>Paul
>>>
>>>>=20
>>>> In the update of "2013-12-30", you can find a prototype implementation
>>>> of J-PAKE using the elliptic curve group setting.
>>>>=20
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Feng
>>>
>>
>


From akr@akr.io  Mon Jan  6 11:46:33 2014
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 05/01/2014 07:49, Eggert, Lars wrote:

> […] The IRTF and IETF have always welcomed participation by all, 
> and the open processes that both organizations employ have been our
> safeguard against any group of participants that attempted to 
> subvert our technical work, in any field we're active in. 
> Widespread wiretapping by nation-state adversaries is a threat 
> unlike any other in the history of the Internet, but I do not 
> believe that preventing interested people from participating in the
> IRTF or IETF based solely on their affiliation will help us combat
> that threat.

> I hope the above explains why I am declining Trevor Perrin's 
> request to remove Kevin Igoe as a co-chair of the IRTF's Crypto 
> Forum Research Group (CFRG). […]

Lars: Thank you kindly for considering the request. I can see it has
been considered with careful gravity and balance. I note the outcome,
and particularly your concern regarding the potential for
precedent-setting, which I also do not think would be helpful.

David McGrew also noted the importance of trustworthiness in the
duties of a research group co-chair - despite their secretarial nature.

I submit trustworthiness is particularly vital here: in a research
group which, though not a ‘key crypto standards body’ exactly,
is tasked with discussing, reviewing and ultimately providing expert
guidance to IETF Working Groups on the correct practical application of
cryptographic techniques in standard protocols for worldwide use
across the internet.


Kevin: Meaning no disrespect, I remain concerned as to the impact of
your remaining as co-chair upon the wider perception that this
research group would be a useful and trustworthy venue for such
discussion and advice.

I therefore respectfully ask, Kevin, that you please personally
consider my request that, though not forcibly removed, you should at
least reconsider whether in all of the circumstances and the wider
position, you wish to remain as co-chair of the CFRG, or would prefer
to participate as a non-chairing member of the forum instead.

Thank-you.

- -- 
/akr
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> > My wish list for 2014:
> >
> >   - A public key based =B9trust=B9 architecture to
> >     determine =B3who can do what=B2 (not based on X.509 or PGP)
>=20
> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for
> CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)

There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.=20
This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
for such a topic.

> >   - Public key based methods that can be readily be used
> >     to both sign data and be used to develop encryption keys
> >   - Nonce insensitive or deterministic encryption modes
> >     to support group multicast in a mesh topology
>=20
> I'm with you on that one.
This came out of my personal requirements for the above framework.
Having a public key for encryption versus one for signing greatly
complicated our frameworks for security.

>=20
> >   - Elliptic curves for cryptographic use that are developed
> >     in a transparent manner that dispels any possible mistrust
>=20
> Yes, this is a good one.  I think there is sufficient interest in this
> topic in the IETF to warrant this work.
This could be addressed quite quickly by simply regenerating seed values
for a few of the small Weistrass based curves.

I'd suggest that we could define a seed entropy process that would allow
multiple individuals/groups to contribute seed values that would be combine=
d
in a three phase process. Phase 1 - send a Commit
  commit_i =3D h(nonce_i, seed_i)
After some deadline, Phase 2 - send Reveal
  Reveal_i =3D nonce_i, seed_i

Phase 3 - combine submitted seeds.
  def seed(seed_list):=20
    hash =3D h()
    for s in seed_list:=20
       hash.update(s)
    return hash.digest()

A distributed community based process for creating trusted random values wo=
uld be valueable.

>=20
> >   - Algorithm modes that have infinite error extension
> >     (verus CCM, 1 bit plaintext change -> 1 bit ciphertext)
>=20
> This seems in scope.
>=20
> >   - Secure time stamps
> >   - A 'setup process' based on public keys to enable
> >     the secure configuration of consumer products
> >   - Strong P2P authentication for Wi-Fi devices
> >   - Ephemeral MAC Addresses
>=20
> Would be interesting.   Probably not in our RG scope, I would guess.
Yes ... unfortunately.  The actual application of crypto in protocols
is generally more interesting and useful than raw math functions (IMO :-).
Applications also creates new requirements for algorithms and their usage

>=20
> >   - Deprecation and abolishment of known bad algorithms:
> >     in a manner that impacts real products
> >     (e.g. TKIP, WEP, DES, RC4)
> >
>=20
> CFRG can't initiate the standards that deprecate algorithms, but there
> are probably things that we can do to hilight the need for that
> deprecation (in practice as well as in standards).   One thing I'd like
> to see is the cipher-catalog get completed, with some clear guidance in
> it on what is recommended and what is not.   It would be great to see
> that RFC get referenced in open source, for example.
A catalog with very clear and strong recommendations would help solve this =
problem.

Paul

>=20
> David
>=20
>=20
> > Paul
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/3/14, 4:28 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> recently, Stephen and others suggested some topics that seem worth
> >> considering as future work for this research group.   I want to
> expand
> >> on those suggestions, and solicit your input.  If there is
> >> sufficiently broad interest, and people willing to contribute, than
> we can consider
> >> taking it on.   The goal of this note is to gauge interest in some
> >> topics that I have heard others talk about, and some that I think
> are
> >> worthwhile.  Recall that CFRG is a bridge between theory and
> >> practice, and traffic can go in both directions. The practice
> >> community can identify unsolved problems and new issues that aren't
> dealt with in
> >> theory.   Conversely, the theory community can introduce new
> results.
> >>
> >> Stephen, Sean, please do let us know what work would be most useful
> >> to the IETF Security Area, and what work would be less useful or
> would
> >> conflict with IETF chartered work.   Thanks!
> >>
> >> Useful topics on side channel attacks:
> >>
> >> - Documenting ways of implementing existing algorithms that resist
> >> side-channel attacks, especially timing attacks.   This could
> include
> >> documentation of naive implementation methods that are vulnerable,
> or
> >> experimental work quantifying vulnerabilities.
> >>
> >> - The development of testing methodologies for crypto
> implementations
> >> that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test
> >> harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts
> >> with a target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics,
> which
> >> could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are
> crypto
> >> module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why
> don't
> >> we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would
> identify
> >> timing vulnerabilities?
> >>
> >> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms
> that
> >> resist side channel attacks.
> >>
> >> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms
> that
> >> lack subliminal channels; that is, algorithms that would be hard to
> >> implement in a way that subverted the privacy of the user without
> their
> >> knowledge.   Also interesting would be testing methodologies that
> detect
> >> such channels, possibly including static analysis of source code, or
> >> statistical analysis of random or pseudorandom sources.
> >>
> >>
> >> Useful topics in crypto algorithm design:
> >>
> >> - Authenticated encryption that does not require an application to
> >> manage nonces and/or is robust against nonce misuse.
> >>
> >> - Simplicity of design as a way to achieve robust crypto
> implementations.
> >>
> >> - Recommendations on algorithms that should be used.   This could
> >> include recommendations on DRBGs.
> >>
> >>
> >> Useful topics in provable security:
> >>
> >> - A document describing the hierarchy of goals for security proofs,
> >> and recommendations on what IETF WG expectations should be regarding
> such
> >> proofs.   It would also be useful to describe the important security
> >> models, and to provide referenceable common definitions.
> >>
> >> - Provably secure designs for complex protocols.   For instance: can
> >> there be a provably secure protocol that provides the same level of
> >> critical functionality as TLS, yet at the same time has been proven
> >> secure using techniques and/or tools that are accessible to many
> >> reviewers?
> >>
> >>
> >> Useful topics in privacy
> >>
> >> - Analyzing and documenting the limitations on privacy/anonymity
> >> technologies in the Internet protocols.   For example: if your MAC
> >> address and/or IPv6 address are traceable, then cryptography is not
> >> going to get you strong anonymity, no matter what crypto you use.
> >> Additionally, analysis of packet lengths and timings can reveal a
> lot of
> >> information.   Existing IETF security protocols have message-length
> >> hiding mechanisms, but these are not very effective.   If we are
> wiling
> >> to add latency and consume extra bandwidth, we could improve
> security in
> >> this area.   Is it worth it?
> >>
> >> No doubt this is not an exhaustive list, and if you have other
> topics
> >> to put forward, please send them to the list and keep "considering
> >> new topics" in the subject line to make it easier to keep track.
> >>
> >> One topic that I didn't list above, because it is somewhat outside
> of
> >> CFRG's traditional scope, is security in Cloud environments.  To my
> >> thinking, the industry trend towards putting all the data one can
> get
> >> a hold of into multi-tenant, virtualized environments is one of the
> >> biggest threats to information security and privacy.   Maybe I trust
> the
> >> Cloud provider to be well intentioned, but can I actually trust them
> to
> >> maintain data security?    I didn't try to craft a topic along this
> line
> >> because it goes beyond the scope of communication security.
> >>
> >> regards,
> >>
> >> David
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Cfrg mailing list
> >> Cfrg@irtf.org
> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> > .
> >


From paul@marvell.com  Mon Jan  6 12:48:10 2014
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To: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 12:47:57 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Hashing to EC group elements
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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan  6 13:03:26 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Comments on side channel draft
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What I would like is some rather compelling references. I wrote this
on a plane ride, so it probably has typos galore.

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ladd-sidechannel/

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Jan  6 13:37:06 2014
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Hi Watson,

On 01/06/2014 04:03 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> What I would like is some rather compelling references. I wrote this
> on a plane ride, so it probably has typos galore.
>
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ladd-sidechannel/

thanks for starting this work!   I will send you some comments and 
references offline.

David

> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From akr@akr.io  Mon Jan  6 13:50:15 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] UTA: Request for advice on ciphersuite recommendations
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

In light of the events of last year, and weaknesses in common
configurations of TLS, the new UTA¹ Working Group is currently
considering draft Best Current Practice recommendations for practical,
secure configurations of TLS clients and servers.

In practice, this is a careful balancing act, particularly in the
ciphersuite and version recommendations, between security and
interoperability (particularly given known and suspected application
of cryptanalytic advances, protocol-related and trust-model attacks,
and the complex behaviour of legacy clients, servers and intermediaries).


I would like to raise the following questions for comment, in the hope
that this might assist the process:


1. Where AES-128 and AES-256 are both candidates for the block cipher
   in use: which is preferable, and to what actual degree?

   The current top preference is TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.

   Do you have any comments as to preference, given their relative
   performance and security, and given the relative strength of other
   common TLS elements (key sizes/formats, block cipher mode, etc)?


2. For continued interoperability with legacy SSLv3 clients/servers,
   some implementers and configurations may still want a 'fallback' for
   unfortunate situations where even TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
   is not mutually-available.

   The few remaining options available are, unfortunately, both awful:

   • TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
   • TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA

   Advice is sought on which is the least awful out of these two, given
   the known and speculated attacks (particularly the potential for
   active 'BEAST', etc attacks, versus passive pervasive surveillance).

   (Current opinion² is that RC4 should be entirely prohibited if it
    is at all practical to do so, as it has a number of known flaws now.

    Unfortunately, due to legacy advice favouring avoidance of the
    BEAST attack, keeping RC4 around may cause legacy configurations to
    choose RC4 even when AES is available.)


3. We may need to provide specific advice in the BCP about the actual
   risks of choosing to allow any such 'fallback', given that an active
   adversary could, at present, force a protocol/ciphersuite downgrade.
   (The TLS WG is drafting a potential remedy to this, but that of
   course awaits deployment.)

   How bad are the 'fallback' ciphersuites above thought to be,
   versus TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA?


4. ECDHE suites are being considered as first preference for providing
   forward security (and for potential ECDSA certificate support,
   although this appears extremely rarely in the wild at present).

   The common subset of curves which are very widely-implemented is
   small, and currently appears to be two of the NIST/SEC curves:

   • secp256r1 (aka prime256v1); and,
   • secp384r1.

   Does anyone have any comments regarding these? Are both thought to
   be suitable for this use, as widely implemented, for the time being,
   given current knowledge, or are either thought to be unsuitable?

   Similarly, are there any comments regarding brainpoolp256r1?


6. For certificates, the current draft recommends 2048-bit RSA with
   SHA-256 signatures³, and, similarly, 2048-bit Diffie-Hellman key
   exchange where practical and where ECDHE is not available. Are there
   any comments on these recommendations?


Both qualitative and quantitative advice is welcomed, based on the
current known state-of-the-art, known or speculated nation state
adversary capabilities, and being as forward-looking as it is possible
to be - although, of course, I appreciate no-one has a crystal ball!

Your input would be warmly appreciated.


___
1. Using TLS in Applications
   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/uta/charter/>

2. <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01>

3. As in CAB-Baseline <https://www.cabforum.org/documents.html>

- -- 
/akr
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From dan@geer.org  Mon Jan  6 14:17:23 2014
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It is a FEATURE (not a bug) that mutually distrustful people
are in a position to engage in a common arena.

Why, for example, do you want poll watchers from opposing
parties to be in the same room at the same time?  Why, for
example, does everyone quote Sun Tzu "Keep your friends close
but your enemies closer?"  Why do you want Red Teams *and*
Black Teams to both be looking at bonuses for beating the
snot out of the other?  Why does capitalism always win?

God bless worthy opponents.

--dan


From ynir@checkpoint.com  Mon Jan  6 14:23:45 2014
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thread-Topic: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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Thanks. Proposing this seems so obvious, that I thought I must be missing s=
omething that makes it unsuitable.

On Jan 6, 2014, at 8:05 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>> Unlike RC4, ChaCha20 has a 64-bit nonce, so different packets could use =
different keystreams, much like block ciphers in counter mode. Unlike 3DES,=
 ChaCha20 has performance that is close to that of AES.
>>=20
>> So my question is whether there is any reason not to use ChaCha20 (with =
or without the AEAD construction from Adam's draft) for IKE and/or IPsec. C=
ould this be the standby algorithm that we have been looking for?
>=20
> I don't know of any problems with this. If IPsec has the concept of a
> counter than can be used as an nonce then I think the AEAD
> construction would be fine, as is.

IPsec has a 32- or 64-bit packet counter, but for some reason it has never =
been used as a nonce. Both AES-CTR and AES-GCM have explicit 64-bit IVs in =
IPsec, so I think a ChaCha implementation should do the same - have an expl=
icit IV that's used as a nonce, with a MUST requirement for uniqueness of I=
V/key combination.

> If one needs to pick the nonces
> randomly, however, then a 64-bit space is too small and XChaCha (which
> has a 192-bit nonce) would be more suitable.

It would work, but IPsec requires re-keying when the 32-bit or 64-bit count=
er reaches 2^n-1, so that seems like overkill.

Thanks again

Yoav


From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Mon Jan  6 14:40:06 2014
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On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>> > This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for
>> > CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>
> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results. 

That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers
nor a sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested
in a nextgen thing.

> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
> for such a topic.

We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or
not to start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.

There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the
web PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
security/crypto researcher though probably).

The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to
talk about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non
X.509 based PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's
very much evolutionary and starts from X.509.

And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security
topics if none of the above fit.

So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and
propose stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try
help PKI nextgen stuff progress in the IETF should there
be credible proposals.

However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no
matter how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main
reasons IMO are that replacements are likely to suffer a lot
of the same (or equivalent) complexity since its a complex
problem, and that any credible replacement will take at least
a few years to work out and them 5-10 to get deployed which
seems to be beyond the horizon for researchers (speaking as
one who chases funding;-). One could argue that that's why
of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches, only CT
seems to be left standing.

One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI
is not likely to be a useful place to start. We know those,
and any credible approach would start with a fairly well
worked out proposal, including consideration of that 5-10
year overlap period. Its not easy;-)

Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of
concept that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be
a runner, and we have learned a lot about the wrinkles in
X.509 based PKI over the years so there is hope maybe.

S.

PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before
diving in, or ask someone who might be familiar, which
could include me.

[1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/
[3] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
[4] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag




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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 17:45:08 -0500
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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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--047d7bb043b0015c4b04ef550336
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Hi all,


> - Postquantum cryptography.   Signing algorithms based on hash functions

> (based on the work of Merkle and Hulsing) will not be too hard.

> Encryption based on codes would need more review, but should be possible;
Bernstein and

> others have done good work in this area

> recently.   Other encryption and signature schemes could be considered

> as well.  Also useful would be parameter and algorithm guidance for
postquantum security.


(full disclosure: my company, Security Innovation, holds the patents for
the NTRU cryptosystems, which are among the leading candidates for use as
post quantum algorithms. We've recently made the patents available to use
under GPL or a range of other FOSS licenses -- see
https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LICENSE.md,
https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/FOSS%20Exception.md
).


I agree that postquantum crypto is important and CFRG has a valuable role
to play in recommending algorithms for use.


However, I'd also like to see the internet community move away from using a
single public key algorithm per message or session. Any data that's
encrypted with a single public key algorithm is vulnerable to a single
cryptographic breakthrough, whether that's a classical or quantum
algorithm. An adversary who stores a large amount of historical traffic may
well be able to decrypt it in the future. This is particularly the case
with ECC and RSA-based ciphersuites because of the known threat from
quantum computing, but any algorithm is potentially vulnerable.


I'd like to see some thought given to how different public key algorithms
can be used in parallel so that a session has the strength of at least the
strongest of them. For TLS this is in principle pretty easy -- split the
master secret into two or more XORed strings, encrypt each with a different
public key algorithm, XOR the decrypted results together (or use a key
exchange algorithm to derive one or more of the XOR strings) -- but the
details may be tricky and CFRG can help here.


Combined public key algorithms would help give improved protection to users
against attacks yet to be discovered. It might also help with migration --
service providers might be unwilling to migrate directly to a newer
algorithm like for example NTRU from a more widely understood one like for
example ECDH, but using both in parallel gives the assurance associated
with ECDH plus the (assumed) quantum resistance of NTRU.


In general, solutions based on a single public key algorithm run the risk
of baking in a single point of failure. Migration from one solution to
another will be hard; migrating from one single point of failure to another
runs the risk that we'll have to migrate again, which would be extremely
hard. Much better for the internet community to think about how to put in
place a system that we can change parameters in (such as choice of
algorithm) without having to change the underlying framework. This would
fit in with the catalog of clear and strong recommendations that Paul
Lambert mentioned in another mail: the catalog could contain different
algorithms with different properties, allowing implementers to select a
combination that gave the properties they want.


When potential new work areas are raised on CFRG, it's fair to ask who's
going to actually do the work, so let me state for the record that Security
Innovation is willing to commit resources to help get this work done within
the CFRG in 2014 and onwards. We obviously have an interest in that we
think it'll make adoption of NTRU easier, but it also seems like the right
thing to do.


Cheers,


William

--047d7bb043b0015c4b04ef550336
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><p class=3D"">Hi all,</p><p cla=
ss=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">&gt; - Postquantum cryptography. =A0 Signing =
algorithms based on hash functions</p><p class=3D"">&gt; (based on the work=
 of Merkle and Hulsing) will not be too hard.=A0</p>
<p class=3D"">&gt; Encryption based on codes would need more review, but sh=
ould be possible; Bernstein and</p><p class=3D"">&gt; others have done good=
 work in this area</p><p class=3D"">&gt; recently. =A0 Other encryption and=
 signature schemes could be considered</p>
<p class=3D"">&gt; as well. =A0Also useful would be parameter and algorithm=
 guidance for postquantum security.</p><p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">=
(full disclosure: my company, Security Innovation, holds the patents for th=
e NTRU cryptosystems, which are among the leading candidates for use as pos=
t quantum algorithms. We&#39;ve recently made the patents available to use =
under GPL or a range of other FOSS licenses -- see <a href=3D"https://githu=
b.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LICENSE.md">https://git=
hub.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LICENSE.md</a>, <a hr=
ef=3D"https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/FOSS=
%20Exception.md">https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/=
master/FOSS%20Exception.md</a>).</p>
<p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">I agree that postquantum crypto is impo=
rtant and CFRG has a valuable role to play in recommending algorithms for u=
se.</p><p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">However, I&#39;d also like to se=
e the internet community move away from using a single public key algorithm=
 per message or session. Any data that&#39;s encrypted with a single public=
 key algorithm is vulnerable to a single cryptographic breakthrough, whethe=
r that&#39;s a classical or quantum algorithm. An adversary who stores a la=
rge amount of historical traffic may well be able to decrypt it in the futu=
re. This is particularly the case with ECC and RSA-based ciphersuites becau=
se of the known threat from quantum computing, but any algorithm is potenti=
ally vulnerable.</p>
<p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">I&#39;d like to see some thought given =
to how different public key algorithms can be used in parallel so that a se=
ssion has the strength of at least the strongest of them. For TLS this is i=
n principle pretty easy -- split the master secret into two or more XORed s=
trings, encrypt each with a different public key algorithm, XOR the decrypt=
ed results together (or use a key exchange algorithm to derive one or more =
of the XOR strings) -- but the details may be tricky and CFRG can help here=
.</p>
<p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">Combined public key algorithms would he=
lp give improved protection to users against attacks yet to be discovered. =
It might also help with migration -- service providers might be unwilling t=
o migrate directly to a newer algorithm like for example NTRU from a more w=
idely understood one like for example ECDH, but using both in parallel give=
s the assurance associated with ECDH plus the (assumed) quantum resistance =
of NTRU.</p>
<p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">In general, solutions based on a single=
 public key algorithm run the risk of baking in a single point of failure. =
Migration from one solution to another will be hard; migrating from one sin=
gle point of failure to another runs the risk that we&#39;ll have to migrat=
e again, which would be extremely hard. Much better for the internet commun=
ity to think about how to put in place a system that we can change paramete=
rs in (such as choice of algorithm) without having to change the underlying=
 framework. This would fit in with the catalog of clear and strong recommen=
dations that Paul Lambert mentioned in another mail: the catalog could cont=
ain different algorithms with different properties, allowing implementers t=
o select a combination that gave the properties they want.</p>
<p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">When potential new work areas are raise=
d on CFRG, it&#39;s fair to ask who&#39;s going to actually do the work, so=
 let me state for the record that Security Innovation is willing to commit =
resources to help get this work done within the CFRG in 2014 and onwards. W=
e obviously have an interest in that we think it&#39;ll make adoption of NT=
RU easier, but it also seems like the right thing to do.</p>
<p class=3D""><br></p><p class=3D"">Cheers,</p><p class=3D""><br></p><p cla=
ss=3D"">William</p><div><br></div></div></div>

--047d7bb043b0015c4b04ef550336--

From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Mon Jan  6 14:51:13 2014
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Oops - and I forgot one of my own WGs:-) The DANE WG [0]
has developed PKI based on DNS and depending on DNSSEC
and is doing work on a few extensions still.

S.

[0] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/dane/


On 01/06/2014 10:39 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> 
> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for
>>>> CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>>
>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results. 
> 
> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers
> nor a sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested
> in a nextgen thing.
> 
>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
>> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
>> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
>> for such a topic.
> 
> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or
> not to start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
> 
> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the
> web PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
> security/crypto researcher though probably).
> 
> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to
> talk about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non
> X.509 based PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's
> very much evolutionary and starts from X.509.
> 
> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security
> topics if none of the above fit.
> 
> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and
> propose stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try
> help PKI nextgen stuff progress in the IETF should there
> be credible proposals.
> 
> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no
> matter how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main
> reasons IMO are that replacements are likely to suffer a lot
> of the same (or equivalent) complexity since its a complex
> problem, and that any credible replacement will take at least
> a few years to work out and them 5-10 to get deployed which
> seems to be beyond the horizon for researchers (speaking as
> one who chases funding;-). One could argue that that's why
> of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches, only CT
> seems to be left standing.
> 
> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI
> is not likely to be a useful place to start. We know those,
> and any credible approach would start with a fairly well
> worked out proposal, including consideration of that 5-10
> year overlap period. Its not easy;-)
> 
> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of
> concept that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be
> a runner, and we have learned a lot about the wrinkles in
> X.509 based PKI over the years so there is hope maybe.
> 
> S.
> 
> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before
> diving in, or ask someone who might be familiar, which
> could include me.
> 
> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/
> [3] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> [4] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> 

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Jan  6 15:00:41 2014
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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Hi Yoav,

On 01/06/2014 05:23 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> Thanks. Proposing this seems so obvious, that I thought I must be missing something that makes it unsuitable.
>
> On Jan 6, 2014, at 8:05 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>> Unlike RC4, ChaCha20 has a 64-bit nonce, so different packets could use different keystreams, much like block ciphers in counter mode. Unlike 3DES, ChaCha20 has performance that is close to that of AES.
>>>
>>> So my question is whether there is any reason not to use ChaCha20 (with or without the AEAD construction from Adam's draft) for IKE and/or IPsec. Could this be the standby algorithm that we have been looking for?
>> I don't know of any problems with this. If IPsec has the concept of a
>> counter than can be used as an nonce then I think the AEAD
>> construction would be fine, as is.
> IPsec has a 32- or 64-bit packet counter, but for some reason it has never been used as a nonce. Both AES-CTR and AES-GCM have explicit 64-bit IVs in IPsec, so I think a ChaCha implementation should do the same - have an explicit IV that's used as a nonce, with a MUST requirement for uniqueness of IV/key combination.

the reason that the ESP sequence number isn't used as a cryptographic 
nonce is that it was not regarded as reliable enough.   That is, the ESP 
standard does not insist that the sequence number never wrap, and many 
implementations are not careful about maintaining the uniqueness of the 
sequence number.  This situation is not ideal, but it does seem to be 
the case.

>
>> If one needs to pick the nonces
>> randomly, however, then a 64-bit space is too small and XChaCha (which
>> has a 192-bit nonce) would be more suitable.
> It would work, but IPsec requires re-keying when the 32-bit or 64-bit counter reaches 2^n-1, so that seems like overkill.

Agreed that a 192-bit nonce sounds a bit big.

ESP supports multipoint security associations, in which case it is 
essential to coordinate nonces across all of the encrypters, to make 
sure that they are all distinct.   The requirements and a simple 
approach is outlined in rfc6054, and those requirements are followed in 
the latest version of the Group Domain of Interpretation rfc6407.  The 
nonce management is a bit ugly, but there is precedent for it.

We could do a lot worse than ChaCha as a cipher.   An AEAD construction 
could be used in a way that mirrors GCM/CCM, though if I recall right, 
Adam defined an 8-byte nonce rather than a 12-byte nonce for the ChaCha 
AEAD algorithm, which makes it incompatible with almost all of the other 
AEAD algorithms (see Table 1 of draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-02).   A 12-byte 
nonce would enable ESP implementations to use the same nonce generation 
techniques, including rfc6407 ones.

My biggest concern with ChaCha is: will it have the global credibility 
that we need?    If we think that it does, we should go about 
documenting the work that has been done analyzing it.  The record of the 
analysis will become extremely important once the cipher gets picked up 
by the semi-technical press and the user community.

Since so much of ESP is point to point and works at a high data rate, it 
makes sense to think about counter-based nonces and throughput-optimized 
algorithms, like ChaCha.   Algorithms that are misuse-resistant would be 
useful in scenarios other than point-to-point ones, and in my opinion 
are also worth considering as future work for ESP.

David

>
> Thanks again
>
> Yoav
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 12:32 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
>> > My wish list for 2014:
>> >
>> >   - A public key based =C2=B9trust=C2=B9 architecture to
>> >     determine =C2=B3who can do what=C2=B2 (not based on X.509 or PGP)
>>
>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for
>> CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>
> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.
> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
> for such a topic.
>
>> >   - Public key based methods that can be readily be used
>> >     to both sign data and be used to develop encryption keys
>> >   - Nonce insensitive or deterministic encryption modes
>> >     to support group multicast in a mesh topology
>>
>> I'm with you on that one.
> This came out of my personal requirements for the above framework.
> Having a public key for encryption versus one for signing greatly
> complicated our frameworks for security.

Why not have the primary master signing key sign individual keys for each r=
ole?

This is an interesting problem, but one that is quite nasty: you need
to show that
solving a problem with access to some oracles is still reducible to a
hard problem.
For some commonly deployed schemes (RSA, I'm looking at you) this separatio=
n is
necessary.

Public key encryption isn't actually necessary: hybrid encryption is
much, much nicer to live with
and implement. Look up the history of OAEP for a reminder of just how
tough it is. By contrast if
RSA based key agreement is needed, H(C, P) for ciphertext C and
plaintext P does an excellent job.
Look ma, no padding!

In the ROM I think you can show that exposing that oracle doesn't hurt
the security of signing, but I
can't remember what exactly RSA signing looks like. I do DH based
schemes almost exclusively.

The reason we use one key for each job is it makes life easy in the
land of proofs: everything composes.
The instant things become dependent on each other, life gets unfun.

>
>>
>> >   - Elliptic curves for cryptographic use that are developed
>> >     in a transparent manner that dispels any possible mistrust
>>
>> Yes, this is a good one.  I think there is sufficient interest in this
>> topic in the IETF to warrant this work.
> This could be addressed quite quickly by simply regenerating seed values
> for a few of the small Weistrass based curves.

What is wrong with Curve25519 or the bigger variants?
>
> I'd suggest that we could define a seed entropy process that would allow
> multiple individuals/groups to contribute seed values that would be combi=
ned
> in a three phase process. Phase 1 - send a Commit
>   commit_i =3D h(nonce_i, seed_i)
> After some deadline, Phase 2 - send Reveal
>   Reveal_i =3D nonce_i, seed_i
>
> Phase 3 - combine submitted seeds.
>   def seed(seed_list):
>     hash =3D h()
>     for s in seed_list:
>        hash.update(s)
>     return hash.digest()

As has been pointed ad nauseam, this only works if you are one of the
seed producers.
We don't need seeds to pick good curves: just some MAGMA scripts (or
PARI, or SAGE).
DJB and Paulo Barrato have already done this: I don't see CFRG as
having a comparative advantage
in this area.

>
> A distributed community based process for creating trusted random values =
would be valueable.
>
>>
>> >   - Algorithm modes that have infinite error extension
>> >     (verus CCM, 1 bit plaintext change -> 1 bit ciphertext)
>>
>> This seems in scope.

I really don't like this at all. Error extension has a terrible
history of being used as a heuristic
for the security of protocols that were later busted wide open,
because attackers are smart.
Infinite-garble extension in Kerberos is the example that comes to mind.

There is a notion of wide-block PRP that actually does what you are
looking for, I think. AERO relies
on that. Yes, it's inefficient, but it exists. What sort of
requirement do you want this new mode
to meet, and why should we care about meeting it? What gains does it
get over existing
modes and notions of security?

>>
>> >   - Secure time stamps
>> >   - A 'setup process' based on public keys to enable
>> >     the secure configuration of consumer products
>> >   - Strong P2P authentication for Wi-Fi devices
>> >   - Ephemeral MAC Addresses
>>
>> Would be interesting.   Probably not in our RG scope, I would guess.
> Yes ... unfortunately.  The actual application of crypto in protocols
> is generally more interesting and useful than raw math functions (IMO :-)=
.
> Applications also creates new requirements for algorithms and their usage

I would actually like this to be in scope. If we can discuss what the
commercial needs are
that current solutions aren't meeting, we have a chance at drumming up
interest in good
solutions. Although I feel that hardwired configuration ports are
usually decent enough for the specific
case mentioned by grandparent.

Most applications require secure point to point communication with
authentication. Multiparty computation
has been used exactly once in the real world, namely for a sugar beet
auction on an island in Denmark.
I don't really see new requirements on core algorithms coming from the
sort of people who care about
the I(E|R)TF standardization status of whatever they use.

>>
>> >   - Deprecation and abolishment of known bad algorithms:
>> >     in a manner that impacts real products
>> >     (e.g. TKIP, WEP, DES, RC4)
>> >
>>
>> CFRG can't initiate the standards that deprecate algorithms, but there
>> are probably things that we can do to hilight the need for that
>> deprecation (in practice as well as in standards).   One thing I'd like
>> to see is the cipher-catalog get completed, with some clear guidance in
>> it on what is recommended and what is not.   It would be great to see
>> that RFC get referenced in open source, for example.
> A catalog with very clear and strong recommendations would help solve thi=
s problem.

I think this is an excellent idea.
Time for me to put in some grunt work.

>
> Paul
>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>> > Paul
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On 1/3/14, 4:28 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Hi,
>> >>
>> >> recently, Stephen and others suggested some topics that seem worth
>> >> considering as future work for this research group.   I want to
>> expand
>> >> on those suggestions, and solicit your input.  If there is
>> >> sufficiently broad interest, and people willing to contribute, than
>> we can consider
>> >> taking it on.   The goal of this note is to gauge interest in some
>> >> topics that I have heard others talk about, and some that I think
>> are
>> >> worthwhile.  Recall that CFRG is a bridge between theory and
>> >> practice, and traffic can go in both directions. The practice
>> >> community can identify unsolved problems and new issues that aren't
>> dealt with in
>> >> theory.   Conversely, the theory community can introduce new
>> results.
>> >>
>> >> Stephen, Sean, please do let us know what work would be most useful
>> >> to the IETF Security Area, and what work would be less useful or
>> would
>> >> conflict with IETF chartered work.   Thanks!
>> >>
>> >> Useful topics on side channel attacks:
>> >>
>> >> - Documenting ways of implementing existing algorithms that resist
>> >> side-channel attacks, especially timing attacks.   This could
>> include
>> >> documentation of naive implementation methods that are vulnerable,
>> or
>> >> experimental work quantifying vulnerabilities.
>> >>
>> >> - The development of testing methodologies for crypto
>> implementations
>> >> that can identify vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks.  A test
>> >> harness that runs in separate software or hardware that interacts
>> >> with a target crypto implementation could collect timing statistics,
>> which
>> >> could then be analyzed to check for vulnerabilities.   There are
>> crypto
>> >> module validation schemes such as CMVP that are widely used.   Why
>> don't
>> >> we develop a testing methodology for such schemes that would
>> identify
>> >> timing vulnerabilities?
>> >>
>> >> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms
>> that
>> >> resist side channel attacks.
>> >>
>> >> - The design, identification, and/or specification of algorithms
>> that
>> >> lack subliminal channels; that is, algorithms that would be hard to
>> >> implement in a way that subverted the privacy of the user without
>> their
>> >> knowledge.   Also interesting would be testing methodologies that
>> detect
>> >> such channels, possibly including static analysis of source code, or
>> >> statistical analysis of random or pseudorandom sources.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Useful topics in crypto algorithm design:
>> >>
>> >> - Authenticated encryption that does not require an application to
>> >> manage nonces and/or is robust against nonce misuse.
>> >>
>> >> - Simplicity of design as a way to achieve robust crypto
>> implementations.
>> >>
>> >> - Recommendations on algorithms that should be used.   This could
>> >> include recommendations on DRBGs.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Useful topics in provable security:
>> >>
>> >> - A document describing the hierarchy of goals for security proofs,
>> >> and recommendations on what IETF WG expectations should be regarding
>> such
>> >> proofs.   It would also be useful to describe the important security
>> >> models, and to provide referenceable common definitions.
>> >>
>> >> - Provably secure designs for complex protocols.   For instance: can
>> >> there be a provably secure protocol that provides the same level of
>> >> critical functionality as TLS, yet at the same time has been proven
>> >> secure using techniques and/or tools that are accessible to many
>> >> reviewers?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Useful topics in privacy
>> >>
>> >> - Analyzing and documenting the limitations on privacy/anonymity
>> >> technologies in the Internet protocols.   For example: if your MAC
>> >> address and/or IPv6 address are traceable, then cryptography is not
>> >> going to get you strong anonymity, no matter what crypto you use.
>> >> Additionally, analysis of packet lengths and timings can reveal a
>> lot of
>> >> information.   Existing IETF security protocols have message-length
>> >> hiding mechanisms, but these are not very effective.   If we are
>> wiling
>> >> to add latency and consume extra bandwidth, we could improve
>> security in
>> >> this area.   Is it worth it?
>> >>
>> >> No doubt this is not an exhaustive list, and if you have other
>> topics
>> >> to put forward, please send them to the list and keep "considering
>> >> new topics" in the subject line to make it easier to keep track.
>> >>
>> >> One topic that I didn't list above, because it is somewhat outside
>> of
>> >> CFRG's traditional scope, is security in Cloud environments.  To my
>> >> thinking, the industry trend towards putting all the data one can
>> get
>> >> a hold of into multi-tenant, virtualized environments is one of the
>> >> biggest threats to information security and privacy.   Maybe I trust
>> the
>> >> Cloud provider to be well intentioned, but can I actually trust them
>> to
>> >> maintain data security?    I didn't try to craft a topic along this
>> line
>> >> because it goes beyond the scope of communication security.
>> >>
>> >> regards,
>> >>
>> >> David
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> Cfrg mailing list
>> >> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>> > .
>> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
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Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On Jan 7, 2014, at 1:00 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
 wrote:

> Hi Yoav,
>=20
> On 01/06/2014 05:23 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> Thanks. Proposing this seems so obvious, that I thought I must be missin=
g something that makes it unsuitable.
>>=20
>> On Jan 6, 2014, at 8:05 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>>> Unlike RC4, ChaCha20 has a 64-bit nonce, so different packets could us=
e different keystreams, much like block ciphers in counter mode. Unlike 3DE=
S, ChaCha20 has performance that is close to that of AES.
>>>>=20
>>>> So my question is whether there is any reason not to use ChaCha20 (wit=
h or without the AEAD construction from Adam's draft) for IKE and/or IPsec.=
 Could this be the standby algorithm that we have been looking for?
>>> I don't know of any problems with this. If IPsec has the concept of a
>>> counter than can be used as an nonce then I think the AEAD
>>> construction would be fine, as is.
>> IPsec has a 32- or 64-bit packet counter, but for some reason it has nev=
er been used as a nonce. Both AES-CTR and AES-GCM have explicit 64-bit IVs =
in IPsec, so I think a ChaCha implementation should do the same - have an e=
xplicit IV that's used as a nonce, with a MUST requirement for uniqueness o=
f IV/key combination.
>=20
> the reason that the ESP sequence number isn't used as a cryptographic non=
ce is that it was not regarded as reliable enough.   That is, the ESP stand=
ard does not insist that the sequence number never wrap, and many implement=
ations are not careful about maintaining the uniqueness of the sequence num=
ber.  This situation is not ideal, but it does seem to be the case.

I agree that the text could use some more RFC2119 language, but allowing th=
e sequence to wrap is not allowed:

                                              If anti-replay is enabled
   (the default), the transmitted Sequence Number must never be allowed
   to cycle.  Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST
   be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the
   transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA.

>>> If one needs to pick the nonces
>>> randomly, however, then a 64-bit space is too small and XChaCha (which
>>> has a 192-bit nonce) would be more suitable.
>> It would work, but IPsec requires re-keying when the 32-bit or 64-bit co=
unter reaches 2^n-1, so that seems like overkill.
>=20
> Agreed that a 192-bit nonce sounds a bit big.
>=20
> ESP supports multipoint security associations, in which case it is essent=
ial to coordinate nonces across all of the encrypters, to make sure that th=
ey are all distinct.   The requirements and a simple approach is outlined i=
n rfc6054, and those requirements are followed in the latest version of the=
 Group Domain of Interpretation rfc6407.  The nonce management is a bit ugl=
y, but there is precedent for it.
>=20
> We could do a lot worse than ChaCha as a cipher.   An AEAD construction c=
ould be used in a way that mirrors GCM/CCM, though if I recall right, Adam =
defined an 8-byte nonce rather than a 12-byte nonce for the ChaCha AEAD alg=
orithm, which makes it incompatible with almost all of the other AEAD algor=
ithms (see Table 1 of draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-02).   A 12-byte nonce would enab=
le ESP implementations to use the same nonce generation techniques, includi=
ng rfc6407 ones.

An 8-byte nonce is part of ChaCha. This is different from counter mode wher=
e the initial counter could be anything up to block size. I don't claim to =
understand why ChaCha has a 64-bit nonce and a 64-bit block counter instead=
 of, say, a 96-bit nonce and a 32-bit block counter (good for 256 GB - plen=
ty for an IP packet). Would ChaCha modified like that retain its security p=
roperties?

> My biggest concern with ChaCha is: will it have the global credibility th=
at we need?    If we think that it does, we should go about documenting the=
 work that has been done analyzing it.  The record of the analysis will bec=
ome extremely important once the cipher gets picked up by the semi-technica=
l press and the user community.

That sounds like a good task for CFRG. As some have mentioned in previous t=
hreads, we can't trust NIST for all our crypto needs. This is not that they=
're evil, but more in that they're reluctant to endorse something that didn=
't originate with them (GCM was a fluke). So we have to rely on other sourc=
es.

> Since so much of ESP is point to point and works at a high data rate, it =
makes sense to think about counter-based nonces and throughput-optimized al=
gorithms, like ChaCha.   Algorithms that are misuse-resistant would be usef=
ul in scenarios other than point-to-point ones, and in my opinion are also =
worth considering as future work for ESP.
>=20
> David


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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> An 8-byte nonce is part of ChaCha. This is different from counter mode =
where the initial counter could be anything up to block size. I don't =
claim to understand why ChaCha has a 64-bit nonce and a 64-bit block =
counter instead of, say, a 96-bit nonce and a 32-bit block counter (good =
for 256 GB - plenty for an IP packet). Would ChaCha modified like that =
retain its security properties?

Indeed it would. The Chacha core maps 48 bytes to 64 bytes and is called =
repeatedly on (32-byte key) || (8-byte IV) || (8-byte counter) to =
produce the output stream. Each distinct (8-byte IV) || (8-byte counter) =
will produce a pseudorandom 64-byte output. So, (n-byte IV) || =
(16-n-byte counter) should be just fine (so long as n is fixed for the =
life of the key).

-Ted=

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Jan  6 16:20:12 2014
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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Hi Yoav,

On 01/06/2014 06:43 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> On Jan 7, 2014, at 1:00 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
>   wrote:
>
>> Hi Yoav,
>>
>> On 01/06/2014 05:23 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> Thanks. Proposing this seems so obvious, that I thought I must be missing something that makes it unsuitable.
>>>
>>> On Jan 6, 2014, at 8:05 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>>>> Unlike RC4, ChaCha20 has a 64-bit nonce, so different packets could use different keystreams, much like block ciphers in counter mode. Unlike 3DES, ChaCha20 has performance that is close to that of AES.
>>>>>
>>>>> So my question is whether there is any reason not to use ChaCha20 (with or without the AEAD construction from Adam's draft) for IKE and/or IPsec. Could this be the standby algorithm that we have been looking for?
>>>> I don't know of any problems with this. If IPsec has the concept of a
>>>> counter than can be used as an nonce then I think the AEAD
>>>> construction would be fine, as is.
>>> IPsec has a 32- or 64-bit packet counter, but for some reason it has never been used as a nonce. Both AES-CTR and AES-GCM have explicit 64-bit IVs in IPsec, so I think a ChaCha implementation should do the same - have an explicit IV that's used as a nonce, with a MUST requirement for uniqueness of IV/key combination.
>> the reason that the ESP sequence number isn't used as a cryptographic nonce is that it was not regarded as reliable enough.   That is, the ESP standard does not insist that the sequence number never wrap, and many implementations are not careful about maintaining the uniqueness of the sequence number.  This situation is not ideal, but it does seem to be the case.
> I agree that the text could use some more RFC2119 language, but allowing the sequence to wrap is not allowed:
>
>                                                If anti-replay is enabled
>     (the default), the transmitted Sequence Number must never be allowed
>     to cycle.  Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST
>     be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the
>     transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA.
>
>>>> If one needs to pick the nonces
>>>> randomly, however, then a 64-bit space is too small and XChaCha (which
>>>> has a 192-bit nonce) would be more suitable.
>>> It would work, but IPsec requires re-keying when the 32-bit or 64-bit counter reaches 2^n-1, so that seems like overkill.
>> Agreed that a 192-bit nonce sounds a bit big.
>>
>> ESP supports multipoint security associations, in which case it is essential to coordinate nonces across all of the encrypters, to make sure that they are all distinct.   The requirements and a simple approach is outlined in rfc6054, and those requirements are followed in the latest version of the Group Domain of Interpretation rfc6407.  The nonce management is a bit ugly, but there is precedent for it.
>>
>> We could do a lot worse than ChaCha as a cipher.   An AEAD construction could be used in a way that mirrors GCM/CCM, though if I recall right, Adam defined an 8-byte nonce rather than a 12-byte nonce for the ChaCha AEAD algorithm, which makes it incompatible with almost all of the other AEAD algorithms (see Table 1 of draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-02).   A 12-byte nonce would enable ESP implementations to use the same nonce generation techniques, including rfc6407 ones.
> An 8-byte nonce is part of ChaCha.

  - faceplam -  Yes, of course.

> This is different from counter mode where the initial counter could be anything up to block size. I don't claim to understand why ChaCha has a 64-bit nonce and a 64-bit block counter instead of, say, a 96-bit nonce and a 32-bit block counter (good for 256 GB - plenty for an IP packet). Would ChaCha modified like that retain its security properties?

I think so - I would be surprised if it didn't retain its security 
properties.   But it might be best to avoid tweaking the design.

>
>> My biggest concern with ChaCha is: will it have the global credibility that we need?    If we think that it does, we should go about documenting the work that has been done analyzing it.  The record of the analysis will become extremely important once the cipher gets picked up by the semi-technical press and the user community.
> That sounds like a good task for CFRG. As some have mentioned in previous threads, we can't trust NIST for all our crypto needs.

That makes sense to me, but I would also much like to hear other opinions.

David

> This is not that they're evil, but more in that they're reluctant to endorse something that didn't originate with them (GCM was a fluke). So we have to rely on other sources.
>
>> Since so much of ESP is point to point and works at a high data rate, it makes sense to think about counter-based nonces and throughput-optimized algorithms, like ChaCha.   Algorithms that are misuse-resistant would be useful in scenarios other than point-to-point ones, and in my opinion are also worth considering as future work for ESP.
>>
>> David
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>


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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:33:34 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi Yoav,
>
>
> On 01/06/2014 06:43 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2014, at 1:00 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
>>   wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Yoav,
>>>
>>> On 01/06/2014 05:23 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Thanks. Proposing this seems so obvious, that I thought I must be
>>>> missing something that makes it unsuitable.
>>>>
>>>> On Jan 6, 2014, at 8:05 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unlike RC4, ChaCha20 has a 64-bit nonce, so different packets could
>>>>>> use different keystreams, much like block ciphers in counter mode. Unlike
>>>>>> 3DES, ChaCha20 has performance that is close to that of AES.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So my question is whether there is any reason not to use ChaCha20
>>>>>> (with or without the AEAD construction from Adam's draft) for IKE and/or
>>>>>> IPsec. Could this be the standby algorithm that we have been looking for?
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't know of any problems with this. If IPsec has the concept of a
>>>>> counter than can be used as an nonce then I think the AEAD
>>>>> construction would be fine, as is.
>>>>
>>>> IPsec has a 32- or 64-bit packet counter, but for some reason it has
>>>> never been used as a nonce. Both AES-CTR and AES-GCM have explicit 64-bit
>>>> IVs in IPsec, so I think a ChaCha implementation should do the same - have
>>>> an explicit IV that's used as a nonce, with a MUST requirement for
>>>> uniqueness of IV/key combination.
>>>
>>> the reason that the ESP sequence number isn't used as a cryptographic
>>> nonce is that it was not regarded as reliable enough.   That is, the ESP
>>> standard does not insist that the sequence number never wrap, and many
>>> implementations are not careful about maintaining the uniqueness of the
>>> sequence number.  This situation is not ideal, but it does seem to be the
>>> case.
>>
>> I agree that the text could use some more RFC2119 language, but allowing
>> the sequence to wrap is not allowed:
>>
>>                                                If anti-replay is enabled
>>     (the default), the transmitted Sequence Number must never be allowed
>>     to cycle.  Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST
>>     be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the
>>     transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA.
>>
>>>>> If one needs to pick the nonces
>>>>> randomly, however, then a 64-bit space is too small and XChaCha (which
>>>>> has a 192-bit nonce) would be more suitable.
>>>>
>>>> It would work, but IPsec requires re-keying when the 32-bit or 64-bit
>>>> counter reaches 2^n-1, so that seems like overkill.
>>>
>>> Agreed that a 192-bit nonce sounds a bit big.
>>>
>>> ESP supports multipoint security associations, in which case it is
>>> essential to coordinate nonces across all of the encrypters, to make sure
>>> that they are all distinct.   The requirements and a simple approach is
>>> outlined in rfc6054, and those requirements are followed in the latest
>>> version of the Group Domain of Interpretation rfc6407.  The nonce management
>>> is a bit ugly, but there is precedent for it.
>>>
>>> We could do a lot worse than ChaCha as a cipher.   An AEAD construction
>>> could be used in a way that mirrors GCM/CCM, though if I recall right, Adam
>>> defined an 8-byte nonce rather than a 12-byte nonce for the ChaCha AEAD
>>> algorithm, which makes it incompatible with almost all of the other AEAD
>>> algorithms (see Table 1 of draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-02).   A 12-byte nonce would
>>> enable ESP implementations to use the same nonce generation techniques,
>>> including rfc6407 ones.
>>
>> An 8-byte nonce is part of ChaCha.
>
>
>  - faceplam -  Yes, of course.
>
>
>> This is different from counter mode where the initial counter could be
>> anything up to block size. I don't claim to understand why ChaCha has a
>> 64-bit nonce and a 64-bit block counter instead of, say, a 96-bit nonce and
>> a 32-bit block counter (good for 256 GB - plenty for an IP packet). Would
>> ChaCha modified like that retain its security properties?
>
>
> I think so - I would be surprised if it didn't retain its security
> properties.   But it might be best to avoid tweaking the design.
>
>
>>
>>> My biggest concern with ChaCha is: will it have the global credibility
>>> that we need?    If we think that it does, we should go about documenting
>>> the work that has been done analyzing it.  The record of the analysis will
>>> become extremely important once the cipher gets picked up by the
>>> semi-technical press and the user community.
>>
>> That sounds like a good task for CFRG. As some have mentioned in previous
>> threads, we can't trust NIST for all our crypto needs.
>
>
> That makes sense to me, but I would also much like to hear other opinions.

I don't think anything new has really been found, despite a lot of
kicking the tires
with BLAKE and Salsa20. However, DJB did use XSalsa20 instead of
XChaCha20 (a hypothetical
longer nonce variant) in NaCl, so maybe the performance benefit is
gone with new CPUs?

As for the nonce/block counter size adjustment, 96 bits still can't be
picked at random, but
32 bit objects are occasionally encrypted. If I can fit in memory, I
should be able to deal with it
is the philosophy. But for the security of ChaCha it doesn't matter:
the nonce and block counter
are treated alike, and both are public.
Sincerely,
Watson

>
> David
>
>
>> This is not that they're evil, but more in that they're reluctant to
>> endorse something that didn't originate with them (GCM was a fluke). So we
>> have to rely on other sources.
>>
>>> Since so much of ESP is point to point and works at a high data rate, it
>>> makes sense to think about counter-based nonces and throughput-optimized
>>> algorithms, like ChaCha.   Algorithms that are misuse-resistant would be
>>> useful in scenarios other than point-to-point ones, and in my opinion are
>>> also worth considering as future work for ESP.
>>>
>>> David
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>> .
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
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Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:46:27 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Mon Jan  6 16:54:23 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group=
 of the IETF.

        Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
        Authors         : Ted Krovetz
                          Phillip Rogaway
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2014-01-06

Abstract:
   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
   encryption scheme that provides privacy and authenticity for
   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From ted@krovetz.net  Mon Jan  6 16:57:27 2014
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From: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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This revision of the OCB Internet-Draft has nothing new. I simply had to =
repost it because it had expired. Sorry for the extra traffic.

-Ted



On Jan 6, 2014, at 4:54 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working =
Group of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
>        Authors         : Ted Krovetz
>                          Phillip Rogaway
> 	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04.txt
> 	Pages           : 18
> 	Date            : 2014-01-06
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
>   encryption scheme that provides privacy and authenticity for
>   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
>   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
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Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2014 20:18:14 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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To: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04.txt
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On 01/06/2014 07:57 PM, Ted Krovetz wrote:
> This revision of the OCB Internet-Draft has nothing new. I simply had to repost it because it had expired. Sorry for the extra traffic.

Thanks Ted, it will make the IRSG and IANA reviewers happy to have a 
non-expired draft.

David

>
> -Ted
>
>
>
> On Jan 6, 2014, at 4:54 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group of the IETF.
>>
>>         Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
>>         Authors         : Ted Krovetz
>>                           Phillip Rogaway
>> 	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04.txt
>> 	Pages           : 18
>> 	Date            : 2014-01-06
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
>>    encryption scheme that provides privacy and authenticity for
>>    plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
>>    product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/
>>
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04
>>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-04
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan  6 17:37:55 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Curve25519 (and Safecurves more generally)
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Paul Lambert has stated that industry doesn't have the guts to take
responsibility for using this in products and would like to blame us
if it goes bad, since they can't blame NIST. (In what other industry
does "we don't stand behind our products, because we don't have the
expertise to determine how good they are" count as acceptable?)

The question to be answered is as follows: is the curve
y^2=x^3+486662x^2+x over the prime field 2^{255}-19 an elliptic curve on
which the DDH is believed to be acceptably hard to provide 128-bit security?

My firm belief is that the answer is yes. There is no known reason why
this curve
could be weak and 486662 is the smallest integer for which this curve
shape is strong.
This curve shape is not particularly special. The only specialness is
the prime, but
that isn't known to do anything.

I would also like to ask this for each curve in Safecurves claimed to
be safe. Note that some numbers in the above question need to be
changed: I leave this as an exercise to the reader.

Is an RFC required to express this opinion? If so I'll write up the
shortest ID on record to define the model of each curve, and provide
the canonical basepoints on each. Would anything more be required for
these curves to count as appropriately blessed?

Lastly, there is a long tradition of providing challenges with
monetary rewards for cracking parameter choices. Bitcoin makes this a
bit redundant, so I will refrain from putting my own money as a prize
for ECC breaking.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From trevp@trevp.net  Mon Jan  6 17:49:03 2014
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Hi Lars,

Thanks for considering this request.

Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.

--

I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single "occurrence",
and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
that would warrant an immediate dismissal".

I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the benefit
of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead review
of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
debacle it has become.

--

I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
 (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
 (B) the impact on RG participation.

Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
the ongoing work than other research group participants".

That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when and
how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
steering a group's work.

You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.  I'm
not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy widely;
or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.


Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
"affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
participating.

Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
from participating.

But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.

--

Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
consider.

You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.

You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.

We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
message that it's no big deal.

This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but it
needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.

--

I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are of
great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
perspective IAB possesses.

I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue and
expressing its judgement.


Trevor


(a couple comments below)


On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request stated several reasons for the removal:
>
> (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>
> (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>
> (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" to the IETF's TLS working group.
>
> (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>
> I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your feedback.
>
> David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I share this conclusion.

Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
begins in October 2012, skipping:
 * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
 * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security [2]
 * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]

[1]
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt

[2]
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html

[3]
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls


[...]
> So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group secretaries.

The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section 5.3 states:
"""
The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress in
the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the conduct
of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate responsibility
for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
"""

From trevp@trevp.net  Mon Jan  6 18:02:12 2014
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "Scott Fluhrer \(sfluhrer\)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 9:18 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 8:46 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>>
>> I believe there aren't any insurmountable issues associated
>> with DragonFly, but that doesn't mean Dan and the RG don't
>> have some work to do.
[...]
> Why are we still trying to fix Dragonfly? We've got alternatives that
> don't have the
> significant theoretical issues, don't have the implementation issues,
> don't have the IPR issues
> (pith and marrow makes me think Dragonfly is covered by SPEKE patent),
> and have been
> vetted far more extensively.

I share Watson's incredulity that Kevin expects further work on
Dragonfly.  As Watson states, there are better alternatives (SPAKE2,
J-PAKE, SRP, AugPAKE, and Elligator-based variants).

Dan insists that he wants a balanced EC PAKE without patents, so let's
talk about SPAKE2 and J-PAKE.  Both have been around for years, have
formal security analysis, and are easily implemented without
side-channels.

Kevin and Dan: please explain why you prefer Dragonfly to these protocols.


Trevor

From adam@cypherspace.org  Mon Jan  6 18:31:07 2014
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Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2014 03:30:40 +0100
From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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I want to add my full public support to what Trevor said below.  I expressed
my concerns publicly and also offlist to Lars following his request for
comments.

I will not repeat the arguments as Trevor did a very eloquent job of
summarizing.

For the record (some people were rudely claiming anyone disagreeing with
them must be a "newbie" who just signed up to complain about a "fashionable
issue"), I am not a newcomer to IETF participated back to probably around
1996, have been on this IRTF list for some years, wrote a few IDs, invented
crypto concepts in day to day use in Tor, Bitcoin and other places, wrote
crypto code that is in use by many people and companies.  I have a comp sci
PhD.  I have been working in the cyrpto/security industry for > 20 years.

It pains me that I have to say any of that, but discussion on here became a
bit non-linear recently and I am not sure what is going on exactly.  Maybe
several parties with different slants and motives countervailing the public
interest.  Or just rude "pragmatists" (an exceedingly dangerous species of
engineer in crypto or privacy areas in my experience).

Adam

On Mon, Jan 06, 2014 at 05:48:51PM -0800, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>Hi Lars,
>
>Thanks for considering this request.
>
>Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>
>--
>
>I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
>mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
>handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single "occurrence",
>and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
>that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>
>I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the benefit
>of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
>CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead review
>of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
>debacle it has become.
>
>--
>
>I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
>employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
> (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
> (B) the impact on RG participation.
>
>Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
>group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
>the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>
>That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
>responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when and
>how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
>with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
>steering a group's work.
>
>You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
>adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.  I'm
>not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
>Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy widely;
>or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
>these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
>not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>
>
>Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
>not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
>"affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
>participating.
>
>Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
>from participating.
>
>But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
>responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
>support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
>sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>
>--
>
>Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
>of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
>consider.
>
>You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
>NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>
>You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
>organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
>statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>
>We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
>standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
>organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
>message that it's no big deal.
>
>This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but it
>needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>
>--
>
>I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are of
>great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
>perspective IAB possesses.
>
>I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue and
>expressing its judgement.
>
>
>Trevor
>
>
>(a couple comments below)
>
>
>On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request stated several reasons for the removal:
>>
>> (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>>
>> (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>>
>> (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" to the IETF's TLS working group.
>>
>> (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>>
>> I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your feedback.
>>
>> David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I share this conclusion.
>
>Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
>begins in October 2012, skipping:
> * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
> * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security [2]
> * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
>alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>
>[1]
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
>http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>
>[2]
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>
>[3]
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
>
>
>[...]
>> So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group secretaries.
>
>The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section 5.3 states:
>"""
>The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress in
>the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the conduct
>of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate responsibility
>for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
>"""
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From dbrown@certicom.com  Mon Jan  6 18:51:07 2014
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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
To: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Hi William,

I agree with your multiple PK algs suggestion, for parties who can afford i=
t.

What about sym key algs? Maybe too costly for now?

By the way, this kind of idea goes back at least as far as 1999 from Johnso=
n and Vanstone under the name of resilient cryptographic schemes.

Best regards,

Dan

From: William Whyte
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2014 5:45 PM
To: David McGrew
Cc: Sean Turner; cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG



Hi all,


> - Postquantum cryptography.   Signing algorithms based on hash functions

> (based on the work of Merkle and Hulsing) will not be too hard.

> Encryption based on codes would need more review, but should be possible;=
 Bernstein and

> others have done good work in this area

> recently.   Other encryption and signature schemes could be considered

> as well.  Also useful would be parameter and algorithm guidance for postq=
uantum security.


(full disclosure: my company, Security Innovation, holds the patents for th=
e NTRU cryptosystems, which are among the leading candidates for use as pos=
t quantum algorithms. We've recently made the patents available to use unde=
r GPL or a range of other FOSS licenses -- see https://github.com/NTRUOpenS=
ourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LICENSE.md, https://github.com/NTRUOpe=
nSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/FOSS%20Exception.md).


I agree that postquantum crypto is important and CFRG has a valuable role t=
o play in recommending algorithms for use.


However, I'd also like to see the internet community move away from using a=
 single public key algorithm per message or session. Any data that's encryp=
ted with a single public key algorithm is vulnerable to a single cryptograp=
hic breakthrough, whether that's a classical or quantum algorithm. An adver=
sary who stores a large amount of historical traffic may well be able to de=
crypt it in the future. This is particularly the case with ECC and RSA-base=
d ciphersuites because of the known threat from quantum computing, but any =
algorithm is potentially vulnerable.


I'd like to see some thought given to how different public key algorithms c=
an be used in parallel so that a session has the strength of at least the s=
trongest of them. For TLS this is in principle pretty easy -- split the mas=
ter secret into two or more XORed strings, encrypt each with a different pu=
blic key algorithm, XOR the decrypted results together (or use a key exchan=
ge algorithm to derive one or more of the XOR strings) -- but the details m=
ay be tricky and CFRG can help here.


Combined public key algorithms would help give improved protection to users=
 against attacks yet to be discovered. It might also help with migration --=
 service providers might be unwilling to migrate directly to a newer algori=
thm like for example NTRU from a more widely understood one like for exampl=
e ECDH, but using both in parallel gives the assurance associated with ECDH=
 plus the (assumed) quantum resistance of NTRU.


In general, solutions based on a single public key algorithm run the risk o=
f baking in a single point of failure. Migration from one solution to anoth=
er will be hard; migrating from one single point of failure to another runs=
 the risk that we'll have to migrate again, which would be extremely hard. =
Much better for the internet community to think about how to put in place a=
 system that we can change parameters in (such as choice of algorithm) with=
out having to change the underlying framework. This would fit in with the c=
atalog of clear and strong recommendations that Paul Lambert mentioned in a=
nother mail: the catalog could contain different algorithms with different =
properties, allowing implementers to select a combination that gave the pro=
perties they want.


When potential new work areas are raised on CFRG, it's fair to ask who's go=
ing to actually do the work, so let me state for the record that Security I=
nnovation is willing to commit resources to help get this work done within =
the CFRG in 2014 and onwards. We obviously have an interest in that we thin=
k it'll make adoption of NTRU easier, but it also seems like the right thin=
g to do.


Cheers,


William


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From dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net  Mon Jan  6 19:00:04 2014
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Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2014 18:59:51 -0800
From: David Jacobson <dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net>
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To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>,  "'Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)'" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>, "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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On 1/6/14 8:46 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
> [snip]
> 4) That just leaves multiplying sqrt((r**2)*f ) = r*sqrt(f)
> by (1/r) => need to calculate 1/r, which can be done either
> by an exponentiation or by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
> Since the extended Euclidean algorithm is variable time, it
> might leak information about r, so exponentiating by p-2 is
> the safer alternative.  Fortunately, this only has to be done
> once, not "40" times.
>
>

Isn't this easy?  Choose a random non-zero b from the same field as r.  
Compute b*(r*sqrt(f)) and b*r.  Compute 1/(b*r).  Since all values of b 
are equally likely and the attacker does not know b, any leakage from 
the inverse that makes some values of b*r more likely gives no 
information at all about r.  Now compute (b*(r*sqrt(f)) * (1/(b*r))  = 
sqrt(f).

      --David


From prvs=608497cfae=uri@ll.mit.edu  Mon Jan  6 19:50:15 2014
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To: "'stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie'" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "'paul@marvell.com'" <paul@marvell.com>, "'mcgrew@cisco.com'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Next Gen PKI is of interest to me, and I'd be happy to contribute. I've pub=
lished a paper in 2010, mentioning the directions I thought beneficial, and=
 am working on a new revision. I think it would be directly applicable, and=
 hopefully useful.

Caveat: if my current employer decides that for whatever reason I should no=
t participate, they can stop me.

--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Lexington, MA  02420-9185      =20

Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/

=20

MIT LL Root CA:=20

 <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>


DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638

----- Original Message -----
From: Stephen Farrell [mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie]
Sent: Tuesday, January 07, 2014 04:09 AM=0A=
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>; David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>; cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG



On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>> > This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for
>> > CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>
> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.=20

That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers
nor a sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested
in a nextgen thing.

> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
> for such a topic.

We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or
not to start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.

There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the
web PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
security/crypto researcher though probably).

The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to
talk about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non
X.509 based PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's
very much evolutionary and starts from X.509.

And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security
topics if none of the above fit.

So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and
propose stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try
help PKI nextgen stuff progress in the IETF should there
be credible proposals.

However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no
matter how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main
reasons IMO are that replacements are likely to suffer a lot
of the same (or equivalent) complexity since its a complex
problem, and that any credible replacement will take at least
a few years to work out and them 5-10 to get deployed which
seems to be beyond the horizon for researchers (speaking as
one who chases funding;-). One could argue that that's why
of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches, only CT
seems to be left standing.

One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI
is not likely to be a useful place to start. We know those,
and any credible approach would start with a fairly well
worked out proposal, including consideration of that 5-10
year overlap period. Its not easy;-)

Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of
concept that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be
a runner, and we have learned a lot about the wrinkles in
X.509 based PKI over the years so there is hope maybe.

S.

PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before
diving in, or ask someone who might be familiar, which
could include me.

[1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/
[3] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
[4] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag



_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
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On Jan 6, 2014, at 17:48 , Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:

> Hi Lars,
>=20
> Thanks for considering this request.
>=20
> Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.

[snip]

Having left my day job, I now feel free to comment on this subject, =
which I didn't feel able to do last week.

I think it is at best a myth, and at worst willful ignorance, to believe =
that all IETF participants are acting only as individuals. As such, and =
because appearances can sometimes be as important as the underlying =
reality, I would prefer that Kevin voluntarily step down from this =
position. Of course if he chooses not to, I don't see that he can or =
should be forced to.

(with apologies for re-kindling the debate)
Greg.


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From dkg@fifthhorseman.net  Mon Jan  6 21:23:26 2014
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On 01/06/2014 05:17 PM, dan@geer.org wrote:
> It is a FEATURE (not a bug) that mutually distrustful people
> are in a position to engage in a common arena.

Yes, there are competitors here, including some people who distrust each
other.  But the IETF and the IRTF are not gladiatorial sports or
marketplace proving grounds.  They are places where commercial,
industrial, academic, governmental and civil society actors can can come
together to collaboratively develop interoperable standards and
mechanisms, to improve the internet for everyone.

This assumes a baseline of common goals, such as those expressed by our
community after IETF 88:

https://www.ietf.org/media/2013-11-07-internet-privacy-and-security.html

Organizations who do not share these common goals, and especially those
who are actively working to subvert them, do not fit into this
forum-of-competitors model that you're touting.

> Why, for example, do you want poll watchers from opposing
> parties to be in the same room at the same time?

Members of the political parties may compete with each other, but they
all have an interest in the continued functioning of the electoral system=
=2E

How do you feel about a poll watcher from an organization whose stated
goals include actively damaging the electoral system itself?  What about
a member of such an organization who offers to help with the thankless
task of coordinating the poll watching?  What if that volunteer has had
ample opportunity to explicitly disavow and reject their organization's
goal of damaging the electoral system, but has not done so publicly?

What does this situation do to motivate people who want to see the
electoral system function better, and who are considering volunteering
to help watch the polls?

I understand that WG and RG co-chairs are not dictators, and that they
cannot single-handedly mandate results.  But I don't buy the argument
that they have no special influence over the process.  Anyone with a
history of working in groups can tell you that even the most thankless
coordinating/facilitating work holds implicit power.  That's power to
shape agendas, to highlight certain decisions over others, to
magnify certain views and minimize others, and to craft the public
messages that reach beyond the group.  RFC 2014 itself calls this
"wide discretion in the conduct of Research Group business".

The IETF does not (and should not) exclude individuals from
participation based on their organizational affiliation.  And certainly
organizations aligned in opposition to the goals of the IETF may attempt
to covertly damage the IETF process no matter what.

But it does not follow from these facts that the IETF should accept or
endorse leadership from people who have explicit, public affiliations
with groups opposed to the goals of the IETF.

One of the counterclaims here is that the IETF has open process where
concerns can be brought up and dealt with.  Well, they're being brought
up, but it doesn't feel that they've been dealt with.

-----

I plan to call for more participation in the CFRG at the Real World
Crypto conference in New York next week.  Since the Snowden leaks, there
is renewed interest and energy around the topics that the CFRG is
chartered to investigate.   It should be easier to encourage
participation than it would have been previously, because people are
more aware of the scope of the issues now, and it is clear that there is
a strong ethical case to defend users from pervasive monitoring and
surveillance.

Unfortunately, I expect it to be significantly harder to effectively
advocate for additional participation in the research group given that
one of the co-chairs continues to work for a known adversary.

	--dkg


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From dharkins@lounge.org  Tue Jan  7 00:36:32 2014
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Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2014 00:36:17 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Trevor Perrin" <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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  Hi Trevor,

  I guess it was just an idle threat then for you to say you would "give
up participating in IETF/IRTF any further" if Kevin was endorsed through
an open process (note: he actually was, and that decision has been
confirmed by the IRTF chair). Oh well….

On Mon, January 6, 2014 6:02 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 9:18 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 8:46 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>>>
>>> I believe there aren't any insurmountable issues associated
>>> with DragonFly, but that doesn't mean Dan and the RG don't
>>> have some work to do.
> [...]
>> Why are we still trying to fix Dragonfly? We've got alternatives that
>> don't have the
>> significant theoretical issues, don't have the implementation issues,
>> don't have the IPR issues
>> (pith and marrow makes me think Dragonfly is covered by SPEKE patent),
>> and have been
>> vetted far more extensively.
>
> I share Watson's incredulity that Kevin expects further work on
> Dragonfly.  As Watson states, there are better alternatives (SPAKE2,
> J-PAKE, SRP, AugPAKE, and Elligator-based variants).
>
> Dan insists that he wants a balanced EC PAKE without patents, so let's
> talk about SPAKE2 and J-PAKE.  Both have been around for years, have
> formal security analysis, and are easily implemented without
> side-channels.
>
> Kevin and Dan: please explain why you prefer Dragonfly to these protocols.

  Where did you divine Kevin's preferences from? I have not heard
or read any statements from him that he prefers dragonfly as a PAKE
over any other protocol.

  I think SPAKE2 and j-PAKE are great. But for the uses I'm interested in
right now they are not the best choice. I'm looking for something to
protect an EST exchange where the group used for the PAKE is the same
as the group in which the key-to-be-certified was generated in, and I'm
also looking for something also to allow for small, constrained devices
in a home network setting to be provisioned by people with no security
clue so they can securely connect to a local server-- this means ECC
and it means as simple and idiot-proof a configuration as possible.

  SPAKE2 requires establishment of additional elements in the group that
are assigned to the players. This increases provisioning cost and requires
a certain amount of security clue on the part of the person doing the
provisioning. Dragonfly does not; just configure a simple password on each
end and voila. In addition, SPAKE2 cannot support different groups on the
fly so it won't work with the EST need. SPAKE2 does not work for either of
my two primary uses of Dragonfly.

  J-PAKE does not fit into TLS very well. It has an additional round of
message exchanging. Dragonfly fits in perfectly, key establishment
is done entirely in the client/server key exchange messages and
key confirmation fits into the finished message.

  But even if those were not the case and J-PAKE and/or SPAKE2
were acceptable, it's because there are no alternatives ready RIGHT
NOW. As I have explained numerous times to you, this is already late.
EST was already published and implementations exist. The need for a
certificate-less TLS cipher suite that supports ECC and does not bind
a single group to a password is already several months past due.

  Also, I have stated to you earlier that I think EKE with elligator curves
would be perfect. But such a draft doesn't exist. Even if you had a -00
draft written today we're still looking at 2+ years before it's published
as an RFC. So that doesn't work.

  Of course, you are more than welcome to write a draft specifying
any other kind of PAKE you want. You have previously stated that
you see no need for another PAKE in TLS so doing so would be,
according to you, a pointless endeavor. But, as we have seen, your
statements (e.g. "I will give up participating in IETF/IRTF") seem to
be made primarily for effect. So hopefully your statement against
any other PAKEs in TLS besides SRP was similarly made just for
effect and you will be advancing a PAKE draft really soon now.

  I await your draft of J-PAKE or SPAKE2 or anything else you think
is more appropriate. But, unfortunately, it is not of any use to me
right now.

  Dan.




From mpg@elzevir.fr  Tue Jan  7 05:07:32 2014
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Hi Watson,

On 06/01/2014 22:03, Watson Ladd wrote:
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ladd-sidechannel/
> 
A few comments:

1. Concerning the attack model:

   In certain scenarios the power generated by individual operations can
   be effectively measured. This is a very difficult setting to work in,
   and will not be considered further in this document. But if someone
   leaves a multimeter in your machine room, watch out!

I think the draft might mention that sometimes (smartcards, etc.) the
attacker may also be able to inject faults at specific times, which is
also a very difficult setting to work in, and will not be considered
further in this document. For example, the counter-measure you mention
later:

           Alternatively one uses a standard radix-k multiplication, but
   to load an entry from the table one reads through the entire table,
   using the following conditional load code:

      c=c*bit+a*(1-bit)

   or some varation thereof.

is susceptible to a fault attack: if the attacker causes a corruption
when we're reading one entry, the result of the operation will be
incorrect if and only if it was the entry we're actually using, which
reveals bits of the exponents. Of course, in most circumstances the
attackers doesn't have this level of physical access, so this
counter-measure is indeed useful as it protects against attacks that
require a lesser level of access.

2. Concerning modular inverses:

                                      Modular inverses should always be
   computed through exponentiation: if this is not possible the binary
   Euclidean algorithm should be run for a constant number of steps,
   calculated as the number for the worst case. (For reference, the
   worst case is two consecutive Fibonacci numbers)

Do you mean to imply that blinding isn't an option here? I may be
mistaken, but I think the following should be OK for computing x^{-1}
mod n:

    r = random(1.. n-1);
    xb = x * r;
    xib = inv_mov(xb, n); // using non-constant time Euclidean algorithm
    xi = xib * r;

(Well, that's assuming n is prime. Otherwise the first line should be
replaced with "pick r uniformly at random in (Z/nZ)*" obviously.) This
is particularly convenient if x happens to be already randomized.

3. Concerning ladders, it might seem obvious, but it is probably useful
to mention explicitly that the number of iterations must be fixed
(that is, it must not depend on the most significant bit of the scalar).

4. A totally minor point:

                             Freely usable implementations taking these
   precautions exist for P224, P256, Curve25519, Curve3617, and some
   GLS/GLV curves with endomorphisms.

I didn't look at it very closely, but it seems to me that the 64-bits
implementation of P521 in Openssl (crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c) qualifies
too.

5. A more general question: I wonder if it could be appropriate to add,
in an appendix, examples of real code in C and/or other languages for
a reliable constant-time way to implement some common operations, as it
is not always clear what is constant-time.

For example, see the discussion in section 4 of this blog article [1].
The author basically argues that C code such as 'a = (b == c);' hides a
branch. According to my experiments, this is not true with recent
compilers for the x86 plaftorm (they will use the SETcc instruction
rather than a conditional jump, probably because conditional jumps are
bad for performance, but in this case it happens to be good for us).

[1]: http://rdist.root.org/2010/01/07/timing-independent-array-comparison/

I did not test (yet) on other platforms and/or with other compilers, so it
might indeed be true that 'a = (b == c);' hides a branch on some
platforms with some compilers. It would be great for developpers to have
a central, reliable source of information about such things, rather than
having to test themselves, and maybe an appendix in this draft could be
a good place for that.

Manuel.

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 12:36 AM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
>   Hi Trevor,
>
>   I guess it was just an idle threat then for you to say you would "give
> up participating in IETF/IRTF any further" if Kevin was endorsed through
> an open process (note: he actually was, and that decision has been
> confirmed by the IRTF chair). Oh well=E2=80=A6.
>
> On Mon, January 6, 2014 6:02 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 9:18 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>>> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 8:46 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I believe there aren't any insurmountable issues associated
>>>> with DragonFly, but that doesn't mean Dan and the RG don't
>>>> have some work to do.
>> [...]
>>> Why are we still trying to fix Dragonfly? We've got alternatives that
>>> don't have the
>>> significant theoretical issues, don't have the implementation issues,
>>> don't have the IPR issues
>>> (pith and marrow makes me think Dragonfly is covered by SPEKE patent),
>>> and have been
>>> vetted far more extensively.
>>
>> I share Watson's incredulity that Kevin expects further work on
>> Dragonfly.  As Watson states, there are better alternatives (SPAKE2,
>> J-PAKE, SRP, AugPAKE, and Elligator-based variants).
>>
>> Dan insists that he wants a balanced EC PAKE without patents, so let's
>> talk about SPAKE2 and J-PAKE.  Both have been around for years, have
>> formal security analysis, and are easily implemented without
>> side-channels.
>>
>> Kevin and Dan: please explain why you prefer Dragonfly to these protocol=
s.
>
>   Where did you divine Kevin's preferences from? I have not heard
> or read any statements from him that he prefers dragonfly as a PAKE
> over any other protocol.
>
>   I think SPAKE2 and j-PAKE are great. But for the uses I'm interested in
> right now they are not the best choice. I'm looking for something to
> protect an EST exchange where the group used for the PAKE is the same
> as the group in which the key-to-be-certified was generated in, and I'm
> also looking for something also to allow for small, constrained devices
> in a home network setting to be provisioned by people with no security
> clue so they can securely connect to a local server-- this means ECC
> and it means as simple and idiot-proof a configuration as possible.

Why "the same?". Why not more secure?

128-bits can be represented as 26 elements of a 32 character alphabet.
Divide it into 4 groups of 6, and you have something that a major consumer
product has people type in.

PAKE is likely to be less secure than this: it also will permit a break
in one of the devices to be extended to a break in all of them.

You can also use TOFU, or a distance-bounded initial connection. Some
of these are significantly better from a UI perspective then passwords.

>
>   SPAKE2 requires establishment of additional elements in the group that
> are assigned to the players. This increases provisioning cost and require=
s
> a certain amount of security clue on the part of the person doing the
> provisioning. Dragonfly does not; just configure a simple password on eac=
h
> end and voila. In addition, SPAKE2 cannot support different groups on the
> fly so it won't work with the EST need. SPAKE2 does not work for either o=
f
> my two primary uses of Dragonfly.

Why can't M&N be global: one for the client, one for the server?
I agree with you this means picking one group, but M-511 exists.
AGL has this working for Pond.

>
>   J-PAKE does not fit into TLS very well. It has an additional round of
> message exchanging. Dragonfly fits in perfectly, key establishment
> is done entirely in the client/server key exchange messages and
> key confirmation fits into the finished message.

Why do you care how well it fits? If we can shoehorn it in, it will work.

>
>   But even if those were not the case and J-PAKE and/or SPAKE2
> were acceptable, it's because there are no alternatives ready RIGHT
> NOW. As I have explained numerous times to you, this is already late.
> EST was already published and implementations exist. The need for a
> certificate-less TLS cipher suite that supports ECC and does not bind
> a single group to a password is already several months past due.
>
>   Also, I have stated to you earlier that I think EKE with elligator curv=
es
> would be perfect. But such a draft doesn't exist. Even if you had a -00
> draft written today we're still looking at 2+ years before it's published
> as an RFC. So that doesn't work.

I think you are ignoring the fact that the TLS WG will not consider dragonf=
ly
for the foreseeable future. You are also ignoring the fact that the 2+ year=
s
are primarily a function of very avoidable process delays: a last call take=
s
4 weeks. Try writing up SPAKE2, submit it, and see how long it takes to
get a good standard through.

Dragonfly has unfixable flaws relating to its provable security that will
prevent me from endorsing it for any protocol, ever. I am not alone in
thinking that we should expect more from the protocols we standardize.

Also, is this implemented in OpenSSL or NSS or PolarSSL? Not yet.
So the vaunted readiness is really overstated. Granted, SPAKE2 would
take a while, but we already have an implementation to use living at
https://github.com/agl/panda.

Lastly, if this was needed for EST to work, they should have noticed
this dependency, and tackled it head on. That they punted on
this problem does not mean it is our responsibility to fix it.

>
>   Of course, you are more than welcome to write a draft specifying
> any other kind of PAKE you want. You have previously stated that
> you see no need for another PAKE in TLS so doing so would be,
> according to you, a pointless endeavor. But, as we have seen, your
> statements (e.g. "I will give up participating in IETF/IRTF") seem to
> be made primarily for effect. So hopefully your statement against
> any other PAKEs in TLS besides SRP was similarly made just for
> effect and you will be advancing a PAKE draft really soon now.
>
>   I await your draft of J-PAKE or SPAKE2 or anything else you think
> is more appropriate. But, unfortunately, it is not of any use to me
> right now.

Dan, if this is such a need, why haven't you used TLS-SRP while
waiting for something better?
Even if this is standardized, you still need the browser makers to follow s=
uite.
Besides, you can also turn a paper into a draft: why you didn't do
this instead of come up
with Dragonfly n years ago is beyond me.

Of course, there are drafts for J-PAKE and AugPAKE sitting around, one for =
TLS.
I still haven't figured out why AugPAKE couldn't be used for the
example use case.

>
>   Dan.
>
>
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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> However, DJB did use XSalsa20 instead of XChaCha20 (a hypothetical longer nonce variant) in NaCl

ChaCha was published in January 2008, NaCl was published in March
2009. So I'd guess Salsa20 was chosen over ChaCha because it had seen
more analysis in the eStream contest whereas ChaCha was pretty new at
the time.

I think that's less of a concern now, most attacks were applied
against both Salsa20 and ChaCha, with ChaCha resisting them slightly
better.

The biggest difference in analysis I'm aware of is that there is a
proof of security against differential cryptoanalysis for Salsa20, but
not for ChaCha. This proof relies on the alternation of xor and
addition in Salsa20, it doesn't seem trivial to port it to ChaCha.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/328

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On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 9:34 AM, Mary Barnes <mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Trevor,
>
> I am the IAB Executive Director and we have a question as to whether you
> would like the IAB to consider your response below as an official appeal
> request?

Hi Mary,

Yes, if that's an option (I wasn't sure it was).

Thanks for being on top of this.


Trevor

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Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2014 09:47:17 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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On Tue, January 7, 2014 5:47 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Try writing up SPAKE2, submit it, and see how long it takes to
> get a good standard through.

  You're the one proposing it, why don't you? In fact, since you have
previously stated it really only takes 30 minutes to write an
interoperable standard why don't you do it during your lunch hour?

> Dragonfly has unfixable flaws relating to its provable security that will
> prevent me from endorsing it for any protocol, ever. I am not alone in
> thinking that we should expect more from the protocols we standardize.
>
> Also, is this implemented in OpenSSL or NSS or PolarSSL? Not yet.

  ZZzzzztt! Wrong. I implemented it in OpenSSL. That's where Appendix
A of draft-ietf-tls-pwd came from. In fact, the sample exchange was
from my EST client talking to my EST server being authenticated with
TLS-pwd.

> Lastly, if this was needed for EST to work, they should have noticed
> this dependency, and tackled it head on. That they punted on
> this problem does not mean it is our responsibility to fix it.

  You use pronouns very loosely. And you exaggerate a bit too much.
Nobody said it was necessary for EST to work. It's needed for EST to
be deployed properly in many situations where there is no trust
anchor database established before the EST exchange is initiated.
There is a chicken-and-egg problem with needing a certificate to
get a certificate. Understand?

  Dan.





From feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk  Tue Jan  7 10:01:49 2014
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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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Hi Dan,

On 07/01/2014 08:36, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:

>
>  Hi Trevor,
>
>  I guess it was just an idle threat then for you to say you would "give
>up participating in IETF/IRTF any further" if Kevin was endorsed through
>an open process (note: he actually was, and that decision has been
>confirmed by the IRTF chair). Oh well..


I am afraid this kind of comment is not helpful; it only creates tension
and animosity. Please, can we limit ourselves to strictly technical
arguments only?

>
>On Mon, January 6, 2014 6:02 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 9:18 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>>wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 8:46 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I believe there aren't any insurmountable issues associated
>>>> with DragonFly, but that doesn't mean Dan and the RG don't
>>>> have some work to do.
>> [...]
>>> Why are we still trying to fix Dragonfly? We've got alternatives that
>>> don't have the
>>> significant theoretical issues, don't have the implementation issues,
>>> don't have the IPR issues
>>> (pith and marrow makes me think Dragonfly is covered by SPEKE patent),
>>> and have been
>>> vetted far more extensively.
>>
>> I share Watson's incredulity that Kevin expects further work on
>> Dragonfly.  As Watson states, there are better alternatives (SPAKE2,
>> J-PAKE, SRP, AugPAKE, and Elligator-based variants).
>>
>> Dan insists that he wants a balanced EC PAKE without patents, so let's
>> talk about SPAKE2 and J-PAKE.  Both have been around for years, have
>> formal security analysis, and are easily implemented without
>> side-channels.
>>
>> Kevin and Dan: please explain why you prefer Dragonfly to these
>>protocols.
>
>  Where did you divine Kevin's preferences from? I have not heard
>or read any statements from him that he prefers dragonfly as a PAKE
>over any other protocol.
>
>  I think SPAKE2 and j-PAKE are great. But for the uses I'm interested in
>right now they are not the best choice. I'm looking for something to
>protect an EST exchange where the group used for the PAKE is the same
>as the group in which the key-to-be-certified was generated in, and I'm
>also looking for something also to allow for small, constrained devices
>in a home network setting to be provisioned by people with no security
>clue so they can securely connect to a local server-- this means ECC
>and it means as simple and idiot-proof a configuration as possible.
>
>  SPAKE2 requires establishment of additional elements in the group that
>are assigned to the players. This increases provisioning cost and requires
>a certain amount of security clue on the part of the person doing the
>provisioning. Dragonfly does not; just configure a simple password on each
>end and voila. In addition, SPAKE2 cannot support different groups on the
>fly so it won't work with the EST need. SPAKE2 does not work for either of
>my two primary uses of Dragonfly.
>
>  J-PAKE does not fit into TLS very well. It has an additional round of
>message exchanging. Dragonfly fits in perfectly, key establishment
>is done entirely in the client/server key exchange messages and
>key confirmation fits into the finished message.


You're correct that J-PAKE needs an extra round. I am not too familiar
with TLS, but I am inclined to think if SRP can be fit into TLS, so can
J-PAKE. From the SRP-6 protocol description, SRP needs 6 passes to
complete the key agreement with explicit key confirmation. For J-PAKE, it
actually only needs 4 passes to do the same. So it looks that fitting
J-PAKE into TLS shouldn't be impossible.

To me, the biggest question is if the TLS community perceives a need for
TLS-JPAKE (or similar).

If not, let us not bother. If yes, I am more than happy to spend time
working it up to an RFC, and I sincerely welcome TLS experts and other
interested parties to contact me (online or offline), so we can write the
document together.

I could see three arguments against TLS-JPAKE: 1) there is already
TLS-SRP; 2) an augmented PAKE should be preferred; 3) TLS-SRP is rarely
used in practice.=20

For 1) I don't think the existence of TLS-SRP must exclude other entries.
At the moment, SRP doesn't readily support ECC, which is a practical
limitation. J-PAKE doesn't have this limitation.

For 2) There is one practical advantage with an augmented PAKE (SRP) that
if the server database is compromised, the stolen password verifiers can't
be directly used to allow the thief to authenticate back to the
(compromised) server without first doing an offline password search. (The
scenario is a bit artificial but anyway...) The advantage is actually
limited, as it merely slows down the attack rather than prevents it.
Furthermore, an augmented PAKE is inherently more complex than a balanced
PAKE. One may wonder if the limited advantage justifies the extra
complexity. This is not to argue which one is better, but as you can see,
a balanced and augmented PAKEs present different trade-offs. I think
TLS-SRP and TLS-JPAKE can co-exist, to suit different application
requirements.

For 3), this concerns me most. I can see the benefits of including PAKE
(balanced/augmented) into TLS, but I don't understand why in reality few
people use TLS-SRP. Something is amiss somewhere and it's not clear to me
exactly what and why. This is an important question, as otherwise, we will
be wasting time to work on something no one cares.

In my opinion, a potentially major advantage of TLS-JPAKE is protection
against "phishing attacks", which are currently a big industry problem.
However, that would require a trusted user interface for the user to enter
the password; if the user enters the password in the wrong place, the
security promise of TLS-JPAKE is gone. If the user uses a web browser,
then the log in interface should be tightly built within the web browser
(not the web page), which will be impossible without the active
participation from browser vendors. Not sure if that caused the low-uptake
of TLS-SRP.

Regards,
Feng


>  But even if those were not the case and J-PAKE and/or SPAKE2
>were acceptable, it's because there are no alternatives ready RIGHT
>NOW. As I have explained numerous times to you, this is already late.
>EST was already published and implementations exist. The need for a
>certificate-less TLS cipher suite that supports ECC and does not bind
>a single group to a password is already several months past due.
>
>  Also, I have stated to you earlier that I think EKE with elligator
>curves
>would be perfect. But such a draft doesn't exist. Even if you had a -00
>draft written today we're still looking at 2+ years before it's published
>as an RFC. So that doesn't work.
>
>  Of course, you are more than welcome to write a draft specifying
>any other kind of PAKE you want. You have previously stated that
>you see no need for another PAKE in TLS so doing so would be,
>according to you, a pointless endeavor. But, as we have seen, your
>statements (e.g. "I will give up participating in IETF/IRTF") seem to
>be made primarily for effect. So hopefully your statement against
>any other PAKEs in TLS besides SRP was similarly made just for
>effect and you will be advancing a PAKE draft really soon now.
>
>  I await your draft of J-PAKE or SPAKE2 or anything else you think
>is more appropriate. But, unfortunately, it is not of any use to me
>right now.
>
>  Dan.
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 40 bit loop and DragonFly
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On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 9:47 AM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, January 7, 2014 5:47 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> Try writing up SPAKE2, submit it, and see how long it takes to
>> get a good standard through.
>
>   You're the one proposing it, why don't you? In fact, since you have
> previously stated it really only takes 30 minutes to write an
> interoperable standard why don't you do it during your lunch hour?

Because http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shin-tls-augpake-01 exists already.
In fact, AugPAKE is necessary to avoid an attacker breaking into my coffee pot
from changing my alarm clock as well. These are critical systems you are
talking about!

Why don't we move this over to TLS, get augpake through, and be done with it.
It satisfies everyone's needs.
>
>> Dragonfly has unfixable flaws relating to its provable security that will
>> prevent me from endorsing it for any protocol, ever. I am not alone in
>> thinking that we should expect more from the protocols we standardize.
>>
>> Also, is this implemented in OpenSSL or NSS or PolarSSL? Not yet.
>
>   ZZzzzztt! Wrong. I implemented it in OpenSSL. That's where Appendix
> A of draft-ietf-tls-pwd came from. In fact, the sample exchange was
> from my EST client talking to my EST server being authenticated with
> TLS-pwd.
>
>> Lastly, if this was needed for EST to work, they should have noticed
>> this dependency, and tackled it head on. That they punted on
>> this problem does not mean it is our responsibility to fix it.
>
>   You use pronouns very loosely. And you exaggerate a bit too much.
> Nobody said it was necessary for EST to work. It's needed for EST to
> be deployed properly in many situations where there is no trust
> anchor database established before the EST exchange is initiated.
> There is a chicken-and-egg problem with needing a certificate to
> get a certificate. Understand?
>
>   Dan.
>
>
>
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Thread-Topic: Talk at Real-World Crypto (was Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair)
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Subject: [Cfrg] Talk at Real-World Crypto (was Re: Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair)
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On Jan 5, 2014, at 8:05 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> (An aside: I'd like to hear or read about Provable security of advanced p=
roperties of TLS and SSH, which I would guess is similar http://eprint.iacr=
.org/2013/813.pdf)

I'll post a link to the slides on the mailing list after the talk.

But as a preview: I'll talk about two recent related papers, one of which i=
s the one you identified on multi-ciphersuite security and SSH (http://epri=
nt.iacr.org/2013/813), and the other of which is on TLS renegotiation (http=
://eprint.iacr.org/2012/630).

Starting in 2012, there's been a series of papers aiming to prove the secur=
ity of various TLS ciphersuites without alteration.  The original paper by =
Jager et al. at CRYPTO 2012 defined an appropriate security model (called A=
uthenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE)) and proved that=
 signed-Diffie-Hellman ciphersuites are secure ACCE protocols, assuming tha=
t all of the individual building blocks are suitably secure.  Since then, t=
here have been more papers aiming to analyze the other categories of cipher=
suites, including the Krawczyk et al. paper at CRYTPO 2013 that Hoeteck Wee=
 will present at Real World Crypto and Kohlar et al.'s 2013 eprint, both of=
 which analyze RSA key transport and static DH; and there will be a paper a=
t PKC 2014 on pre-shared key ciphersuites.

So from that line of work, we are learning that most TLS ciphersuites combi=
ne their primitives in acceptable ways.

My talk will discuss what happens when we look beyond individual ciphersuit=
es in isolation.  For example, we know from the renegotiation attack of Ray=
 and Dispensa in 2009 that some TLS-reliant applications are vulnerable to =
injection attacks due to how TLS originally did renegotiation.  Similarly, =
there was a paper by Mavrogiannopolous et al. at ACM CCS 2012 that did a cr=
oss-ciphersuite attack on TLS, showing how signed ECDH parameters could be =
reinterpreted as valid signed DH parameters.  Both of these attacks work de=
spite the above proofs of ACCE security of the corresponding TLS ciphersuit=
es, because the ACCE security model focuses on the ciphersuites used in iso=
lation.

In the first part of the talk, I'll talk about our work on TLS renegotiatio=
n (http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/630).  Starting from the perspective of the =
formal ACCE security model, we wanted to understand why the model didn't ca=
tch the renegotiation attack.  We then extended the model to cover renegoti=
ation, and proved that the SCSV/RIE (Signalling Ciphersuite Value / Renegot=
iation Indication Extension) fixes that were standardized do provide securi=
ty in our renegotiation model.  (We have an even stronger model of renegoti=
ation security that the SCSV/RIE fixes don't satisfy, but this model is onl=
y relevant if you want to detect injection attacks when renegotiating even =
if the current session key has been compromised, which is admittedly a corn=
er case).

In the second part of the talk, I'll talk about our work on multi-ciphersui=
te security (http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/813).  We know from the ACCE line =
of work that various TLS ciphersuites are individually secure.  But we also=
 know from the Mavrogiannopolous attack that there are attacks when multipl=
e ciphersuites use the same long-term authentication keys, as is very commo=
n in practice.  Therefore ACCE security of individual ciphersuites doesn't =
generically imply simultaneous security of many ciphersuites re-using long-=
term authentication keys; under what conditions can we get multi-ciphersuit=
e security?  We construct a composition framework for ACCE-like ciphersuite=
s and identify conditions under which they are secure even with long-term k=
ey re-use.  Intuitively, if the thing that is signed uniquely identifies th=
e ciphersuite that it's intended for, then it is safe to re-use that long-t=
erm key.  This isn't surprising; protocol designers have known this for a w=
hile.  But we can formalize this and use it to prove a composition theorem.=
  Since multi-ciphersuite security of signed-DH ciphersuites in TLS is rule=
d out by the Mavrogiannopolous attack, we instead look at SSH.  It turns ou=
t that the thing that is signed in SSH does indeed uniquely identify the ci=
phersuite it's for, and we can apply the composition theorem.  As part of t=
his, we give the first proof of ACCE security of individual SSH ciphersuite=
s (again under the assumption that the cryptographic primitives are secure)=
, and then the composition theorem says that these ciphersuites are simulta=
neously secure, even when long-term keys are re-used across ciphersuites.

Douglas=

From paul@marvell.com  Tue Jan  7 13:05:59 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2014 13:05:31 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
Thread-Index: Ac8L7DPlSNyDTq1RSV6NQ9KNvyIusg==
Message-ID: <CEF1A5BF.2BBC6%paul@marvell.com>
References: <52C755AA.70200@cisco.com> <CEED2882.2B867%paul@marvell.com> <52C9F739.1020301@cisco.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7D6E094@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <52CB30B4.9090206@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2014 17:04:08 -0500
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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
To: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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--047d7bb043b03d1ba204ef688e1d
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Hi all,

(sorry for top-posting, hard to avoid with gmail web interface)

Dan Bernstein posted the following on the cryptography@randombits list
(edited):

>>Of course, the idea of using multiple cryptographic algorithms ... has
very little use, for several obvious reasons:

   * We have enough problems even getting _one_ algorithm deployed.

   * For applications with larger cost limits, we obtain much more

     security by pumping up the key size, rounds, etc. of a single

     algorithm rather than by combining algorithms.
<<

I'm not sure if this was in response to Dan Brown's suggestion of combining
symmetric key algorithms or mine of combining public key algorithms. On
combining symmetric key algorithms, I think I agree that there's unlikely
to be significant value. Symmetric algorithms are less likely to fail
catastrophically, and more importantly, your choice of symmetric algorithm
isn't locked in beforehand through your choice of certificate. (The fact
that AES has an algebraic structure gives me some cause for concern that a
catastrophic attack might be possible, but it's a very remote concern).

In case the comment was meant to be about combining public key systems, I
don't agree.

"We have problems getting one algorithm deployed": This is an argument for
architecting the system now to support flexbility. The worst time to start
deploying post-quantum crypto is when you need it; we should be thinking
now about making that transition as easy as possible, and a framework that
supports multiple algorithms is a framework that makes that transition easy.

"For applications with larger cost limits, we obtain much more security by
pumping up the key size, rounds, etc. ": This is true for symmetric crypto,
with a tip of the hat to AES's structure, but for public key crypto we gain
much more security against unforeseen advances in mathematics by combining
algorithms.

BTW, Dan Bernstein is having trouble posting to CFRG. I asked his
permission before posting this extract and hope it represents his views
fairly.

The rest of his cryptography@randombits mail noted that Certicom has
patents such as US7797539 on combining algorithms. I hadn't realised these
patents on such an obvious technique existed and hope that their existence
doesn't prove a barrier to moving ahead with this work.

Cheers,

William


On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 9:50 PM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> wrote:

> Hi William,
>
> I agree with your multiple PK algs suggestion, for parties who can afford
> it.
>
> What about sym key algs? Maybe too costly for now?
>
> By the way, this kind of idea goes back at least as far as 1999 from
> Johnson and Vanstone under the name of resilient cryptographic schemes.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Dan
>
> From: William Whyte
> Sent: Monday, January 6, 2014 5:45 PM
> To: David McGrew
> Cc: Sean Turner; cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
>
>
>
> Hi all,
>
>
> > - Postquantum cryptography.   Signing algorithms based on hash functions
>
> > (based on the work of Merkle and Hulsing) will not be too hard.
>
> > Encryption based on codes would need more review, but should be
> possible; Bernstein and
>
> > others have done good work in this area
>
> > recently.   Other encryption and signature schemes could be considered
>
> > as well.  Also useful would be parameter and algorithm guidance for
> postquantum security.
>
>
> (full disclosure: my company, Security Innovation, holds the patents for
> the NTRU cryptosystems, which are among the leading candidates for use as
> post quantum algorithms. We've recently made the patents available to use
> under GPL or a range of other FOSS licenses -- see
> https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LICENSE.md,
>
> https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/FOSS%20Exception.md
> ).
>
>
> I agree that postquantum crypto is important and CFRG has a valuable role
> to play in recommending algorithms for use.
>
>
> However, I'd also like to see the internet community move away from using
> a single public key algorithm per message or session. Any data that's
> encrypted with a single public key algorithm is vulnerable to a single
> cryptographic breakthrough, whether that's a classical or quantum
> algorithm. An adversary who stores a large amount of historical traffic may
> well be able to decrypt it in the future. This is particularly the case
> with ECC and RSA-based ciphersuites because of the known threat from
> quantum computing, but any algorithm is potentially vulnerable.
>
>
> I'd like to see some thought given to how different public key algorithms
> can be used in parallel so that a session has the strength of at least the
> strongest of them. For TLS this is in principle pretty easy -- split the
> master secret into two or more XORed strings, encrypt each with a different
> public key algorithm, XOR the decrypted results together (or use a key
> exchange algorithm to derive one or more of the XOR strings) -- but the
> details may be tricky and CFRG can help here.
>
>
> Combined public key algorithms would help give improved protection to
> users against attacks yet to be discovered. It might also help with
> migration -- service providers might be unwilling to migrate directly to a
> newer algorithm like for example NTRU from a more widely understood one
> like for example ECDH, but using both in parallel gives the assurance
> associated with ECDH plus the (assumed) quantum resistance of NTRU.
>
>
> In general, solutions based on a single public key algorithm run the risk
> of baking in a single point of failure. Migration from one solution to
> another will be hard; migrating from one single point of failure to another
> runs the risk that we'll have to migrate again, which would be extremely
> hard. Much better for the internet community to think about how to put in
> place a system that we can change parameters in (such as choice of
> algorithm) without having to change the underlying framework. This would
> fit in with the catalog of clear and strong recommendations that Paul
> Lambert mentioned in another mail: the catalog could contain different
> algorithms with different properties, allowing implementers to select a
> combination that gave the properties they want.
>
>
> When potential new work areas are raised on CFRG, it's fair to ask who's
> going to actually do the work, so let me state for the record that Security
> Innovation is willing to commit resources to help get this work done within
> the CFRG in 2014 and onwards. We obviously have an interest in that we
> think it'll make adoption of NTRU easier, but it also seems like the right
> thing to do.
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> William
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential
> information, privileged material (including material protected by the
> solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-public
> information. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intended
> recipient is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error,
> please immediately reply to the sender and delete this information from
> your system. Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this
> transmission by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.
>
>

--047d7bb043b03d1ba204ef688e1d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi all,<div><br></div><div>(sorry for top-posting, hard to=
 avoid with gmail web interface)</div><div><br></div><div>Dan Bernstein pos=
ted the following on the cryptography@randombits list (edited):</div><div>
<p class=3D"">&gt;&gt;Of course, the idea of using multiple cryptographic
algorithms ...=A0has very little use, for several obvious reasons:</p>

<p class=3D"">=A0=A0 * We have enough
problems even getting _one_ algorithm deployed.</p>

<p class=3D"">=A0=A0 * For
applications with larger cost limits, we obtain much more</p><p class=3D"">=
=A0=A0 =A0=A0security by
pumping up the key size, rounds, etc. of a single</p><p class=3D""></p>

<p class=3D"">=A0=A0=A0=A0 algorithm
rather than by combining algorithms.</p></div><div>&lt;&lt;</div><div><br><=
/div><div>I&#39;m not sure if this was in response to Dan Brown&#39;s sugge=
stion of combining symmetric key algorithms or mine of combining public key=
 algorithms. On combining symmetric key algorithms, I think I agree that th=
ere&#39;s unlikely to be significant value. Symmetric algorithms are less l=
ikely to fail catastrophically, and more importantly, your choice of symmet=
ric algorithm isn&#39;t locked in beforehand through your choice of certifi=
cate. (The fact that AES has an algebraic structure gives me some cause for=
 concern that a catastrophic attack might be possible, but it&#39;s a very =
remote concern).</div>
<div><br></div><div>In case the comment was meant to be about combining pub=
lic key systems, I don&#39;t agree.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;We ha=
ve problems getting one algorithm deployed&quot;: This is an argument for a=
rchitecting the system now to support flexbility. The worst time to start d=
eploying post-quantum crypto is when you need it; we should be thinking now=
 about making that transition as easy as possible, and a framework that sup=
ports multiple algorithms is a framework that makes that transition easy.</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>&quot;For applications with larger cost limits, we obta=
in much more security by pumping up the key size, rounds, etc. &quot;: This=
 is true for symmetric crypto, with a tip of the hat to AES&#39;s structure=
, but for public key crypto we gain much more security against unforeseen a=
dvances in mathematics by combining algorithms.</div>
<div><br></div><div>BTW, Dan Bernstein is having trouble posting to CFRG. I=
 asked his permission before posting this extract and hope it represents hi=
s views fairly.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>The rest of his cryptography@ra=
ndombits mail noted that Certicom has patents such as US7797539 on combinin=
g algorithms. I hadn&#39;t realised these patents on such an obvious techni=
que existed and hope that their existence doesn&#39;t prove a barrier to mo=
ving ahead with this work.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div><br></div><div>William<br><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at =
9:50 PM, Dan Brown <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dbrown@certicom.=
com" target=3D"_blank">dbrown@certicom.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">Hi William,<br>
<br>
I agree with your multiple PK algs suggestion, for parties who can afford i=
t.<br>
<br>
What about sym key algs? Maybe too costly for now?<br>
<br>
By the way, this kind of idea goes back at least as far as 1999 from Johnso=
n and Vanstone under the name of resilient cryptographic schemes.<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
<br>
Dan<br>
<br>
From: William Whyte<br>
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2014 5:45 PM<br>
To: David McGrew<br>
Cc: Sean Turner; <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<div class=3D"im">Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div><div><div class=3D"h5">Hi all,<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; - Postquantum cryptography. =A0 Signing algorithms based on hash funct=
ions<br>
<br>
&gt; (based on the work of Merkle and Hulsing) will not be too hard.<br>
<br>
&gt; Encryption based on codes would need more review, but should be possib=
le; Bernstein and<br>
<br>
&gt; others have done good work in this area<br>
<br>
&gt; recently. =A0 Other encryption and signature schemes could be consider=
ed<br>
<br>
&gt; as well. =A0Also useful would be parameter and algorithm guidance for =
postquantum security.<br>
<br>
<br>
(full disclosure: my company, Security Innovation, holds the patents for th=
e NTRU cryptosystems, which are among the leading candidates for use as pos=
t quantum algorithms. We&#39;ve recently made the patents available to use =
under GPL or a range of other FOSS licenses -- see <a href=3D"https://githu=
b.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LICENSE.md" target=3D"_=
blank">https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LIC=
ENSE.md</a>, <a href=3D"https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypt=
o/blob/master/FOSS%20Exception.md" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/NTR=
UOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/FOSS%20Exception.md</a>).<br>

<br>
<br>
I agree that postquantum crypto is important and CFRG has a valuable role t=
o play in recommending algorithms for use.<br>
<br>
<br>
However, I&#39;d also like to see the internet community move away from usi=
ng a single public key algorithm per message or session. Any data that&#39;=
s encrypted with a single public key algorithm is vulnerable to a single cr=
yptographic breakthrough, whether that&#39;s a classical or quantum algorit=
hm. An adversary who stores a large amount of historical traffic may well b=
e able to decrypt it in the future. This is particularly the case with ECC =
and RSA-based ciphersuites because of the known threat from quantum computi=
ng, but any algorithm is potentially vulnerable.<br>

<br>
<br>
I&#39;d like to see some thought given to how different public key algorith=
ms can be used in parallel so that a session has the strength of at least t=
he strongest of them. For TLS this is in principle pretty easy -- split the=
 master secret into two or more XORed strings, encrypt each with a differen=
t public key algorithm, XOR the decrypted results together (or use a key ex=
change algorithm to derive one or more of the XOR strings) -- but the detai=
ls may be tricky and CFRG can help here.<br>

<br>
<br>
Combined public key algorithms would help give improved protection to users=
 against attacks yet to be discovered. It might also help with migration --=
 service providers might be unwilling to migrate directly to a newer algori=
thm like for example NTRU from a more widely understood one like for exampl=
e ECDH, but using both in parallel gives the assurance associated with ECDH=
 plus the (assumed) quantum resistance of NTRU.<br>

<br>
<br>
In general, solutions based on a single public key algorithm run the risk o=
f baking in a single point of failure. Migration from one solution to anoth=
er will be hard; migrating from one single point of failure to another runs=
 the risk that we&#39;ll have to migrate again, which would be extremely ha=
rd. Much better for the internet community to think about how to put in pla=
ce a system that we can change parameters in (such as choice of algorithm) =
without having to change the underlying framework. This would fit in with t=
he catalog of clear and strong recommendations that Paul Lambert mentioned =
in another mail: the catalog could contain different algorithms with differ=
ent properties, allowing implementers to select a combination that gave the=
 properties they want.<br>

<br>
<br>
When potential new work areas are raised on CFRG, it&#39;s fair to ask who&=
#39;s going to actually do the work, so let me state for the record that Se=
curity Innovation is willing to commit resources to help get this work done=
 within the CFRG in 2014 and onwards. We obviously have an interest in that=
 we think it&#39;ll make adoption of NTRU easier, but it also seems like th=
e right thing to do.<br>

<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
<br>
<br>
William<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div>---------------------------------------------------------------=
------<br>
This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential info=
rmation, privileged material (including material protected by the solicitor=
-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-public informati=
on. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intended recipient=
 is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please imm=
ediately reply to the sender and delete this information from your system. =
Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this transmission by u=
nintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.<br>

<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--047d7bb043b03d1ba204ef688e1d--

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On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 2:41 PM, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elze=
vir.fr> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Since I received a notification from gmail that my email was rejected due=
 to
> being considered spam, and I know mailman is sometimes configured to avoi=
d
> sending copies of messages when people are cc'ed, I'm now re-sending this=
 (using
> a different SMTP server) in case you didn't receive the first copy.
>
> If this is a duplicate, please ignore it.
>
> Manuel.

Sorry to everyone whose threading gets busted because of this gmail issue.

>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Comments on side channel draft
> Date: Tue, 07 Jan 2014 14:07:11 +0100
> From: Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr>
> To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
>
> Hi Watson,
>
> On 06/01/2014 22:03, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ladd-sidechannel/
>>
> A few comments:
>
> 1. Concerning the attack model:
>
>    In certain scenarios the power generated by individual operations can
>    be effectively measured. This is a very difficult setting to work in,
>    and will not be considered further in this document. But if someone
>    leaves a multimeter in your machine room, watch out!
>
> I think the draft might mention that sometimes (smartcards, etc.) the
> attacker may also be able to inject faults at specific times, which is
> also a very difficult setting to work in, and will not be considered
> further in this document. For example, the counter-measure you mention
> later:

Good idea!

>
>            Alternatively one uses a standard radix-k multiplication, but
>    to load an entry from the table one reads through the entire table,
>    using the following conditional load code:
>
>       c=3Dc*bit+a*(1-bit)
>
>    or some varation thereof.
>
> is susceptible to a fault attack: if the attacker causes a corruption
> when we're reading one entry, the result of the operation will be
> incorrect if and only if it was the entry we're actually using, which
> reveals bits of the exponents. Of course, in most circumstances the
> attackers doesn't have this level of physical access, so this
> counter-measure is indeed useful as it protects against attacks that
> require a lesser level of access.
>
> 2. Concerning modular inverses:
>
>                                       Modular inverses should always be
>    computed through exponentiation: if this is not possible the binary
>    Euclidean algorithm should be run for a constant number of steps,
>    calculated as the number for the worst case. (For reference, the
>    worst case is two consecutive Fibonacci numbers)
>
> Do you mean to imply that blinding isn't an option here? I may be
> mistaken, but I think the following should be OK for computing x^{-1}
> mod n:
>
>     r =3D random(1.. n-1);
>     xb =3D x * r;
>     xib =3D inv_mov(xb, n); // using non-constant time Euclidean algorith=
m
>     xi =3D xib * r;
>
> (Well, that's assuming n is prime. Otherwise the first line should be
> replaced with "pick r uniformly at random in (Z/nZ)*" obviously.) This
> is particularly convenient if x happens to be already randomized.

Blinding is my second choice compared to constant time. The reason is
that blinding might not work perfectly, whereas circuit-like programs have
no timing sidechannels by definition.

>
> 3. Concerning ladders, it might seem obvious, but it is probably useful
> to mention explicitly that the number of iterations must be fixed
> (that is, it must not depend on the most significant bit of the scalar).

Another good point.
>
> 4. A totally minor point:
>
>                              Freely usable implementations taking these
>    precautions exist for P224, P256, Curve25519, Curve3617, and some
>    GLS/GLV curves with endomorphisms.
>
> I didn't look at it very closely, but it seems to me that the 64-bits
> implementation of P521 in Openssl (crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c) qualifies
> too.

Thanks for the pointer.

>
> 5. A more general question: I wonder if it could be appropriate to add,
> in an appendix, examples of real code in C and/or other languages for
> a reliable constant-time way to implement some common operations, as it
> is not always clear what is constant-time.
>
> For example, see the discussion in section 4 of this blog article [1].
> The author basically argues that C code such as 'a =3D (b =3D=3D c);' hid=
es a
> branch. According to my experiments, this is not true with recent
> compilers for the x86 plaftorm (they will use the SETcc instruction
> rather than a conditional jump, probably because conditional jumps are
> bad for performance, but in this case it happens to be good for us).
>
> [1]: http://rdist.root.org/2010/01/07/timing-independent-array-comparison=
/
>
> I did not test (yet) on other platforms and/or with other compilers, so i=
t
> might indeed be true that 'a =3D (b =3D=3D c);' hides a branch on some
> platforms with some compilers. It would be great for developpers to have
> a central, reliable source of information about such things, rather than
> having to test themselves, and maybe an appendix in this draft could be
> a good place for that.

The problem is that one really cannot tell what does and does not
contain jumps without looking
at the assembler output. Mix in the different compilers,
architectures, and compiler options, and this
is far, far too much work for me to reasonably do.

Even integer division is not constant time on some CPU families.

I'll wait two weeks for more comments, and then post an updated draft.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> Manuel.
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From pritikin@cisco.com  Tue Jan  7 18:31:55 2014
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From: "Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <pritikin@cisco.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "David McGrew \(mcgrew\)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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With the advent of DICE (DTLS in Constrained Environments), and similar att=
empts to discuss optimizations, it would seem that any discussion of "next =
generation" PKI discussions should include discussion on how to optimize th=
e X.509 certificate/chain format. That appears to be missing in this conver=
sation so far.

I agree that any replacement for our current PKI is going to run into the s=
ame complexities. So, rather than assume they don't exist, would it be reas=
onable to look at how to optimize the existing work?=20

Some off the cuff examples to frame what I mean:
- Define a specific lightweight trust anchor format (yes, we can all use X.=
509 certs. But what about a canonical smaller format?)=20
- Optimized version of the X.509 cert itself:
	Perhaps a compressed format similar to the (old, abandoned and incomplete)=
  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-comp-x509-00 draft for compress=
ed certs?
	Perhaps a v4 format that is restructured to provide easier/quicker parsing
	Or if a non-ASN1 format is truly preferred then such a format could be def=
ined that is can carry the same semantics as the existing PKI (namely, if t=
he problem is ASN1 then we can fix that without also re-inventing all the r=
est)=20
=09
Approaching the questions from this angle leads me to ask what _exactly_ th=
e concerns with the current PKI are. Is it the ASN1, the CA infrastructure,=
 the certificate chains, the cruft in each individual certificate, or?=20

Thanks,

- max



On Jan 6, 2014, at 3:39 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wro=
te:

>=20
>=20
> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for
>>>> CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>>=20
>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.=20
>=20
> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers
> nor a sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested
> in a nextgen thing.
>=20
>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
>> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
>> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
>> for such a topic.
>=20
> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or
> not to start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
>=20
> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the
> web PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
> security/crypto researcher though probably).
>=20
> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to
> talk about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non
> X.509 based PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's
> very much evolutionary and starts from X.509.
>=20
> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security
> topics if none of the above fit.
>=20
> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and
> propose stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try
> help PKI nextgen stuff progress in the IETF should there
> be credible proposals.
>=20
> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no
> matter how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main
> reasons IMO are that replacements are likely to suffer a lot
> of the same (or equivalent) complexity since its a complex
> problem, and that any credible replacement will take at least
> a few years to work out and them 5-10 to get deployed which
> seems to be beyond the horizon for researchers (speaking as
> one who chases funding;-). One could argue that that's why
> of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches, only CT
> seems to be left standing.
>=20
> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI
> is not likely to be a useful place to start. We know those,
> and any credible approach would start with a fairly well
> worked out proposal, including consideration of that 5-10
> year overlap period. Its not easy;-)
>=20
> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of
> concept that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be
> a runner, and we have learned a lot about the wrinkles in
> X.509 based PKI over the years so there is hope maybe.
>=20
> S.
>=20
> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before
> diving in, or ask someone who might be familiar, which
> could include me.
>=20
> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/
> [3] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> [4] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Jan  7 20:18:23 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "David McGrew \(mcgrew\)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Max Pritikin (pritikin)
<pritikin@cisco.com> wrote:
>
> With the advent of DICE (DTLS in Constrained Environments), and similar a=
ttempts to discuss optimizations, it would seem that any discussion of "nex=
t generation" PKI discussions should include discussion on how to optimize =
the X.509 certificate/chain format. That appears to be missing in this conv=
ersation so far.
>
> I agree that any replacement for our current PKI is going to run into the=
 same complexities. So, rather than assume they don't exist, would it be re=
asonable to look at how to optimize the existing work?

For the PKI WG yes. For us no.
>
> Some off the cuff examples to frame what I mean:
> - Define a specific lightweight trust anchor format (yes, we can all use =
X.509 certs. But what about a canonical smaller format?)
> - Optimized version of the X.509 cert itself:
>         Perhaps a compressed format similar to the (old, abandoned and in=
complete)  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-comp-x509-00 draft for=
 compressed certs?
>         Perhaps a v4 format that is restructured to provide easier/quicke=
r parsing
>         Or if a non-ASN1 format is truly preferred then such a format cou=
ld be defined that is can carry the same semantics as the existing PKI (nam=
ely, if the problem is ASN1 then we can fix that without also re-inventing =
all the rest)
>
> Approaching the questions from this angle leads me to ask what _exactly_ =
the concerns with the current PKI are. Is it the ASN1, the CA infrastructur=
e, the certificate chains, the cruft in each individual certificate, or?

>From my perspective, it's a long and sad story about the semantics,
rather than the cruft.

First off, X.509 is as the name indicates part of a larger standard of
X.500 directory services, of which LDAP is a component.
LDAP was designed for hierarchical organizations: hence things like OU
etc. It works very well for this: the DOD uses it for access control
across a massive organization.

The problem is that this doesn't apply cleanly to the internet: PayPal
isn't part of Verisign in any meaningful sense, so why is Verisign
signing its certificate? (I just made this up: don't quibble) It gets
worse: with subdomains the idea of an intermediate certificate was
invented, but it took a while for the powers of the intermediate
certificate to be reined in with name restrictions.

The story gets worse when it comes to processing revocations. The DOD
has a CRL that is truly a wonder to behold, and OCSP doesn't work in
certain environments. The result is OCSP stapling, but it requires
cooperation from website admins, who I believe would refuse to pour
water on a burning man if it required a configuration change to a
webserver.

All of this annoyance and ugliness would be fine, if it wasn't for the
invisible hand. To the people paying for certs one CA is as good as
another, and the cheapest one wins. But that means extensive
verification and security measures aren't taken: commercial CAs will
meet the bare minimum to stay in the browser maker's good graces.
Anything more cuts into profits. Now, they aren't all like this, but a
lot of them are. End users have no idea what is really going on, and
can't make informed decisions. Heck, I don't know which CA's do a good
job and which don't.

Mix the three of these up, and we get things like Diginotar,
Turktrust, the recent flap over the French intermediate certificate
being stolen. Each one of these broke the security of the web for
everyone.

Lastly, X509 is good at expressing authenticity, bad at expressing
authority. It's not the only one with this problem: tracing who can
log in to what with SSH can be a real problem when transitivity is
noticed. Certificate transparency and pinning are ways around this,
but CT opposed by enough CAs to make it hard, and pinning requires
some work.

The net effect is Gmail has more security for me than Vanguard because
Gmail pins their certificate in Chrome, but Vanguard hasn't. Needless
to say this is very, very, subideal.  Furthermore, a huge number of
people can invisibly hijack any site they want.

None of this is that tied to what mistakes the standard groups made in
designing the mechanism, but rather the semantics they expressed
aren't a good fit for what we want. DANE is somewhat better, but won't
stop c1t1bank and related phishing fun.

Anyway, I think CFRG has very little role to play here. The issues are
mainly semantic, and there are several WGs addressing these issues.
Without a clear demand for our input I don't see why we need to spend
time on this.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> Thanks,
>
> - max
>
>
>
> On Jan 6, 2014, at 3:39 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> w=
rote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope fo=
r
>>>>> CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>>>
>>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.
>>
>> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers
>> nor a sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested
>> in a nextgen thing.
>>
>>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
>>> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
>>> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
>>> for such a topic.
>>
>> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
>> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or
>> not to start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
>>
>> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the
>> web PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
>> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
>> security/crypto researcher though probably).
>>
>> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to
>> talk about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non
>> X.509 based PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's
>> very much evolutionary and starts from X.509.
>>
>> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security
>> topics if none of the above fit.
>>
>> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and
>> propose stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try
>> help PKI nextgen stuff progress in the IETF should there
>> be credible proposals.
>>
>> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no
>> matter how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main
>> reasons IMO are that replacements are likely to suffer a lot
>> of the same (or equivalent) complexity since its a complex
>> problem, and that any credible replacement will take at least
>> a few years to work out and them 5-10 to get deployed which
>> seems to be beyond the horizon for researchers (speaking as
>> one who chases funding;-). One could argue that that's why
>> of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches, only CT
>> seems to be left standing.
>>
>> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI
>> is not likely to be a useful place to start. We know those,
>> and any credible approach would start with a fairly well
>> worked out proposal, including consideration of that 5-10
>> year overlap period. Its not easy;-)
>>
>> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of
>> concept that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be
>> a runner, and we have learned a lot about the wrinkles in
>> X.509 based PKI over the years so there is hope maybe.
>>
>> S.
>>
>> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before
>> diving in, or ask someone who might be familiar, which
>> could include me.
>>
>> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
>> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/
>> [3] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> [4] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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On Jan 07, 2014, at 21:31, Max Pritikin (pritikin) <pritikin@cisco.com> =
wrote:

>=20
> With the advent of DICE (DTLS in Constrained Environments), and =
similar attempts to discuss optimizations, it would seem that any =
discussion of "next generation" PKI discussions should include =
discussion on how to optimize the X.509 certificate/chain format. That =
appears to be missing in this conversation so far.

Agreed but not sure the CFRG is the place to move the PKI' debates.

> I agree that any replacement for our current PKI is going to run into =
the same complexities. So, rather than assume they don't exist, would it =
be reasonable to look at how to optimize the existing work?=20
>=20
> Some off the cuff examples to frame what I mean:
> - Define a specific lightweight trust anchor format (yes, we can all =
use X.509 certs. But what about a canonical smaller format?)=20

There is the TAI in RFC 5914.

> - Optimized version of the X.509 cert itself:
> 	Perhaps a compressed format similar to the (old, abandoned and =
incomplete)  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-comp-x509-00 =
draft for compressed certs?
> 	Perhaps a v4 format that is restructured to provide =
easier/quicker parsing

This was exactly what I was planning on doing with my free time after =
March ;) I was hoping to get some folks together that want to run an =
experiment doing just this but with a twist.  Note I was specifically =
targeting experimental and folks who actually wanted to produce open =
source encoders and parsers - no interest in a compiler.

I was thinking we should ditch the X.509 baggage completely and not =
bother with =93v4".  ITU-T is still defining extensions and additions to =
X.509 and I=92d rather not get in the whole argument about a =93v4" =
squatting on their numbers.  And, the changes I think we should propose =
are pretty radical and it wouldn=92t like anything like v3.  Further, =
many protocols support an =93other=94 certificate format including TLS, =
SMIME, and IKE so there=92s really no need to stick with the X.509 =
baggage including the name - I=92d not even call it a Certificate - call =
it an IKC (IRTF Key Container - while we=92re experimenting).

My short list:

1. Define another Name choice or just don=92t use Name :)  It could be =
the following purposely avoiding anything to do with SETs:

IRTFName ::=3D SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue

AttributeTypeAndValue ::=3D SEQUENCE {
   type     AttributeType,
   value    AttributeValue }

Name ::=3D CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now --
     rdnSequence  RDNSequence }

Or we add a new Name Choice:

Name ::=3D CHOICE {
 rdnSequence RDNSequence, =97 never to be used in this new format
 internetName InternetName }

InternetName ::=3D SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue

AttributeTypeAndValue ::=3D SEQUENCE {
   type     AttributeType,
   value    AttributeValue }

and prohibit the rdnSequence choice

2. Character Sets: The battle is over UTC8 won - we should just use it =
and use it everywhere therefore DirectoryString essentially becomes:

DirectoryString ::=3D UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))

You can profile it down or define a new structure I guess I=92d go for =
new and a clean break.

3. Drop everything related to X.400.

4. Time - just use GeneralizedTime.

5. drop issuer & subject unique identifier

6. Some extension ranting:

AKI - does anybody actually use anything other than the keyIdentifier =
choice.  If the consensus is to use the keyIdentifier drop the other two =
field.

KU - drop NR :)

Simplify wherever possible.

> 	Or if a non-ASN1 format is truly preferred then such a format =
could be defined that is can carry the same semantics as the existing =
PKI (namely, if the problem is ASN1 then we can fix that without also =
re-inventing all the rest)=20

I hope to avoid the religious war because I think ASN.1 is just fine but =
*WOW* it could do with a good hair cut.  I was hoping we could do an =
ASN.1 profile for the IETF: iASN, ASN.l (l for light), or something like =
that and then do a quick survey of the RFCs we=92ve defined and =
explicitly say they need not be supported.  A couple of things to =
experiment with:

1. Can we pick one rule with which to encode: KER (KISS Encoding Rules =
;)

2. Could we get away with just primitive types for those that can now be =
either primitive or constructed?  E.g., do general purpose protocols =
need constructed bit/octet/character string encodings?

3. Can we do without indefinite length?=20

4. Can we produce open source encoders/decoders to easy deployment?

5. Any reason we couldn't:

a. Use just two values for Boolean: 0x0 (false) and 0xff (true).

b. Can we do without: REAL, SET, SET OF, RELATIVE-OID, EMBEDDED PDV, =
EXTERNAL, CHARACTER STRING (Teletex, Videotext, Graphic, General, =
Universal, and finally BMP strings?), INSTANCE OF, and did I forget any?

6. Could we get away with just one tagging type (e.g., explicit so you =
might not have to guess so much)?

> Approaching the questions from this angle leads me to ask what =
_exactly_ the concerns with the current PKI are. Is it the ASN1, the CA =
infrastructure, the certificate chains, the cruft in each individual =
certificate, or?=20
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> - max
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Jan 6, 2014, at 3:39 PM, Stephen Farrell =
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope =
for
>>>>> CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>>>=20
>>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.=20
>>=20
>> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers
>> nor a sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested
>> in a nextgen thing.
>>=20
>>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
>>> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
>>> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in =
IETF
>>> for such a topic.
>>=20
>> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
>> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or
>> not to start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
>>=20
>> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the
>> web PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
>> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
>> security/crypto researcher though probably).
>>=20
>> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to
>> talk about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non
>> X.509 based PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's
>> very much evolutionary and starts from X.509.
>>=20
>> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security
>> topics if none of the above fit.
>>=20
>> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and
>> propose stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try
>> help PKI nextgen stuff progress in the IETF should there
>> be credible proposals.
>>=20
>> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no
>> matter how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main
>> reasons IMO are that replacements are likely to suffer a lot
>> of the same (or equivalent) complexity since its a complex
>> problem, and that any credible replacement will take at least
>> a few years to work out and them 5-10 to get deployed which
>> seems to be beyond the horizon for researchers (speaking as
>> one who chases funding;-). One could argue that that's why
>> of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches, only CT
>> seems to be left standing.
>>=20
>> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI
>> is not likely to be a useful place to start. We know those,
>> and any credible approach would start with a fairly well
>> worked out proposal, including consideration of that 5-10
>> year overlap period. Its not easy;-)
>>=20
>> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of
>> concept that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be
>> a runner, and we have learned a lot about the wrinkles in
>> X.509 based PKI over the years so there is hope maybe.
>>=20
>> S.
>>=20
>> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before
>> diving in, or ask someone who might be familiar, which
>> could include me.
>>=20
>> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
>> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/
>> [3] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> [4] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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My list is kind of short:

0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS or =
not:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html

If so, let=92s do a draft!

1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we=92re moving towards EC (am =
I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about =
(e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in =
fear):
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/

2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt

spt=

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Subject: [Cfrg] process for cfrg blessing of [insert algorithm name here]
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I=E2=80=99d like to get to the thread that I think Waton/David are after =
[0]/[1].

I=E2=80=99ve got a hat but I=E2=80=99m not wearing it here (and my hat =
goes away in two months anyway).  I guess I=E2=80=99d like to add that =
I=E2=80=99m not a cryptographer, but I don=E2=80=99t know why I need to =
say that because it=E2=80=99s not like anybody has to take a test to =
contribute to the CFRG.  And anyway you=E2=80=99d figure it out right =
quick when I responded =E2=80=9Cdo I get an egg roll with that=E2=80=9D =
when quizzed about the Chinese remainder theorem.  (it=E2=80=99s a long =
email I thought I=E2=80=99d lead with a joke)

Because the "IRTF does not set standards=E2=80=9D [2], remember there =
are RFCs that are on standards track and some not [3], it kind of =
follows that the =E2=80=9CThe Research Group input carries no more =
weight than other community input=E2=80=9D [2].  But, I kind of find it =
hard to believe that if the CFRG publishes "[insert cryptographic =
algorithm's name] is rubbish=E2=80=9D that the IETF would produce a =
standard around said algorithm.  On the flip side, just because the CFRG =
publishes "[insert cryptographic algorithm's name] is fabulous=E2=80=9D =
I wouldn't expect every IETF WG to fall over themselves changing their =
MTI (Mandatory To Implement) algorithm.

The current practice that the Security ADs have been using is here [4], =
which resulted from input from the IETF community as a result of push =
back from implementers on what I called =E2=80=9Ccrypto proliferation". =
(yes the email referenced says TLS but that=E2=80=99s because folks with =
algorithms want to do that one first as most bang for buck and then move =
on to other WGs)  You=E2=80=99ll note the CFRG isn=E2=80=99t listed =
there and I don=E2=80=99t think I=E2=80=99d require it be there, but =
what=E2=80=99s not documented there is what happens before authors go =
for code points.  Before authors are going to get a code point, they =
need to document their algorithm (in English) someplace.  A lot of times =
that=E2=80=99s ended up being an internet-draft that goes through the =
ISE process and gets published as an Informational RFC; examples =
include: GOST [5], Camellia [6], SEED [7], ARIA [8], Rabbit [9], =
Brainpool [10], CLEFIA [11], and Kcipher-2 [12].  To get through the ISE =
process they need to show some kind of review, here=E2=80=99s where =
everybody says go to the CFRG and see what they say they=E2=80=99re the =
cryptographers.  To be honest most of the time it=E2=80=99s pretty =
quiet.  Maybe that=E2=80=99s to do with the fact that many of the =
requests for review are for national algorithms.

In any event, I think we should consider the following (there might be =
more):

0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the =E2=80=9Cprocess=
=E2=80=9D?

I use the term process her pretty loosely but it=E2=80=99ll address the =
CFRG impact on IETF adoption of cryptography.

Here=E2=80=99s what I think:

0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?

I say no for a couple of reasons:

a) I think it=E2=80=99s not necessary unless we=E2=80=99re going to =
start standardizing cryptographic algorithms.   I don=E2=80=99t think =
the IETF has ever published a cryptographic algorithm on standards track =
(more examples include [13][14][15][16]) instead what=E2=80=99s done is =
a standards track RFC that documents the "use of cryptographic algorithm =
x in protocol y=E2=80=9D (e.g., [17][18][19]).  (yes there was one BCP =
that deprecate the use of well-known weak algorithms [20]).  I think =
many of the successes of the IETF actually come from protocols that were =
partially developed outside of the process and then finished off (for =
some value of finished off) and I suspect the same will be true of any =
cryptographic algorithm published by the IRTF or through the individual =
stream (more on this distinction later).

b) I can=E2=80=99t see having a WG or RG that has the =E2=80=9Cpower=E2=80=
=9D to enforce =E2=80=9Ccryptogoodness=E2=80=9D.  It would be perceived =
as a hammer with which to beat up draft authors, wg chains, and other =
ADs and if you=E2=80=99re following the thread on the IETF discuss list =
about Stephen=E2=80=99s perpass-attack draft you=E2=80=99ll note that =
seems to be a fear shared by more than a couple of people.  Rechartering =
to enforce =E2=80=9Ccryptogoodness=E2=80=9D, I bet, will no doubt be =
challenging and I=E2=80=99d submit an unnecessary waste of time.

c) I really think the CFRG should look out past the IETF's time horizon. =
 You=E2=80=99ll note the word =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D in the CFRG=E2=80=99s =
charter and from what I=E2=80=99ve seen adopting =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D =
crypto is not really done it=E2=80=99s usually got to marinate for a =
while.  So having something we=E2=80=99d been thinking about for a while =
to replace say RC4 would have been well nice.  Now some of this is water =
under the bridge but maybe we should be thinking two steps ahead to the =
next curve beyond say 25519, cha cha, etc.  I=E2=80=99d be cool if we =
actually did stuff like provide a venue for folks to exchange test =
vectors etc when developing (preferably) open source crypto.

1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?

I know what the fox says [21]: Hell yeah!

There's *nothing, nada, zilch, null, z=C3=A9ro, =D8=B5=D9=81=D8=B1, =E9=9B=
=B6* stopping anybody from writing an individual draft and then asking =
for it to be adopted by the RG.

     Chairs: Do you prefer RG adoption emails come from
     you (initiated by authors) or a more free-for-all approach
     when authors ask that it be adopted from the RG?

I wanted to put the final IETF nail in the coffin for MD2, MD4, and MD5 =
(certain uses) [22][23][24] and got some input from CFRG  participants.  =
If there=E2=80=99s more like this that need to be done, just do =E2=80=98e=
m and then we can use it them to deter folks from making bad choices.

If you=E2=80=99re really keen, then I=E2=80=99d also like to suggest =
that you volunteer with the ISE (Independent Stream Editor) to help =
review the cryptographic protocols that come through their stream.  =
There=E2=80=99s a couple on call, but more would certainly be welcome.  =
Mail to: rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org.

2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the =E2=80=9Cprocess=
=E2=80=9D?

I think it kind of depends on the definition of =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D =
is, the type of algorithm, the type of registry from which you=E2=80=99re =
requesting a code point [25], and what the WG requires.  Let=E2=80=99s =
explore some of these:

Based on what happened in the past, should the CFRG and not the ISE be =
the stream where algorithms get published?  For those not in the know, =
the stream dictates what kind of review the draft gets and what =
=E2=80=9Ckind=E2=80=9D of RFC can pop out at the end.

I suspect that authors care little about the stream.  They just want to =
get published.  If the algorithm:

a) Is a national algorithm - I=E2=80=99ve no doubt it=E2=80=99ll get =
reviewed like every draft progressing through the process and possibly =
even some errors will be uncovered (it=E2=80=99s happened).  Somebody =
who works for the newly formed national gov't of Bitcoinlandia shows up =
with Cesar's Cipher - would =E2=80=9CBitcoinlandia=E2=80=99s Ceasar=E2=80=99=
s Cipher=E2=80=9D be blocked from publication?  I suspect that it =
wouldn=E2=80=99t as long as it was clear that it was a national =
algorithm or one of a suite of national algorithms.  In any event, if =
changes were offered and not accepted I=E2=80=99m thinking the ISE is =
likely to let it go probably based on the grounds that the changes would =
make the published RFC differ from the already published national =
standard.  Would the CFRG do something different?

b) Has properly marinated over time and not been shown to have weakened =
considerably and there was a security proof - I suspect that the =
grilling would be procedural in that the authors would just need to have =
the intestinal fortitude to make it through the process.  I guess the =
same question from a applies though.

c) Is like b but it doesn=E2=80=99t have a security proof - If an author =
brings a draft to the CFRG is progression through the IRTF going to =
require one?  If the an author goes to the ISE is the CFRG going to =
block progression based on a lack of security proof?

d) Is =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D with no security proof - I=E2=80=99ve no =
doubt it=E2=80=99d get raked over the coals (i.e., given rough =
treatment), but =E2=80=A6 I guess the 800lbs Gorilla is on what grounds =
is it okay to stop a draft in its tracks?

- How long must crypto marinate?

- If it=E2=80=99s similar to something that=E2=80=99s already available =
should it be stopped?  Maybe the existing algorithm won=E2=80=99t work =
for whatever reason or the consumers (I=E2=80=99m assuming there is =
somebody who wants to use it it=E2=80=99s not just about getting an RFC =
published) are somehow sold on the =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D way.

- If there=E2=80=99s no security proof, then how does an author get one =
(wait, pay, beg)?  Seriously: I know some cryptographers but they have =
day jobs and I know some researchers but I think they=E2=80=99re maybe =
more motivated by publishing a new attack on a well-known and widely =
deployed protocol am I just supposed to know my role and not try to =
develop a cryptographic protocol.

- What if the authors are actually engaging and making changes but there =
is a point at which there is an impasse - can they document the known =
vulnerability/weakness in the security considerations and move on? =20

There are also registries that only require expert review and there is =
no requirement for them to consult with the CFRG on the goodness of =
algorithms before choosing to give a code point.  I can=E2=80=99t think =
of a time when this happened and I=E2=80=99m pretty sure an expert =
wouldn=E2=80=99t do that, but I'm also unsure whether the process would =
be changed to give the CFRG veto power.

After getting here and re-reading what I wrote it all sounds like doom =
and gloom but remember what the fox said!

spt

[0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03595.html
[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03685.html
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2014/
[3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/
[4] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06470.html
[5] GOST:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5830/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5831/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5832/
[6] Camellia
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3713/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5528/
[7] SEED
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4269/
[8] ARIA
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5794/
[9] Rabbit
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4503/
[10] Brainpool
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5639/
[11] CLEIFA
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6114/
[12] Kcipher-2
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7008/
[13] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2104/
[14] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/=20
[15] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3447/
[16] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3610/
[17] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4056/=20
[18] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/
[19] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp/
[20] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6649/=20
[21] =
http://www.google.com/url?sa=3Dt&rct=3Dj&q=3D&esrc=3Ds&source=3Dweb&cd=3D1=
&ved=3D0CCsQtwIwAA&url=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DjofNR_=
WkoCE&ei=3D5q_EUsv0MbSqsAT1-oDYDQ&usg=3DAFQjCNE9-Z1oW5gVjc6rJg_-KAhmjY_Qfg=
&bvm=3Dbv.58187178,d.cWc
[22] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6149/
[23] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6150/
[24] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6151/
[25] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5226/ and updates
(actually check out =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-leiba-cotton-iana-5226bis/)=

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From adam@cypherspace.org  Wed Jan  8 00:54:34 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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That is a good idea.  Without engaging in any hyperbole, most of the
complexity problems with actually coding TLS and the LoC of it come from the
cert format X509 including ASN.1 and X500 naming by reference.  TLS
specification itself is simple & clean, where it fails format complexity is
by abandoning that cleaness and referring to X509 which imports ASN.1 and
the multiple encoding, security risk of a complex compiled format language,
multiple encodings CER/DER/BER and X500 by reference.  Some of the X509
imported choices and level of flexibility in there are the antithesis of
KISS for a wire format and a security protocol.  (Complexity is the enemy of
security).

Even OpenPGP has a lot of bit-twiddling, such that if you try to implement
it, it becomes complex.  I found it took me 5x longer to match the format on
that after coding the obvious canonical TLS like format.  There is some
superfluous complexity & bit-twiddling in the OpenPGP format.

I would go further therefore and not try to work-around the ASN.1, X509,
X500 complexity with profile and special case parser hacks.

The best choice I argue would be make a simple format using TLS existing BNF
format that is extremely clean and simple, reboot the format from scratch
and do it the way it should have been done in a TLS BNF native format with
narrow focus on the job at hand to avoid even OpenPGP levels of mission
creep.

Adam

On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 02:31:39AM +0000, Max Pritikin (pritikin) wrote:
>
>With the advent of DICE (DTLS in Constrained Environments), and similar attempts to discuss optimizations, it would seem that any discussion of "next generation" PKI discussions should include discussion on how to optimize the X.509 certificate/chain format. That appears to be missing in this conversation so far.
>
>I agree that any replacement for our current PKI is going to run into the same complexities. So, rather than assume they don't exist, would it be reasonable to look at how to optimize the existing work?
>
>Some off the cuff examples to frame what I mean:
>- Define a specific lightweight trust anchor format (yes, we can all use X.509 certs. But what about a canonical smaller format?)
>- Optimized version of the X.509 cert itself:
>	Perhaps a compressed format similar to the (old, abandoned and incomplete)  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-comp-x509-00 draft for compressed certs?
>	Perhaps a v4 format that is restructured to provide easier/quicker parsing
>	Or if a non-ASN1 format is truly preferred then such a format could be defined that is can carry the same semantics as the existing PKI (namely, if the problem is ASN1 then we can fix that without also re-inventing all the rest)
>	
>Approaching the questions from this angle leads me to ask what _exactly_ the concerns with the current PKI are. Is it the ASN1, the CA infrastructure, the certificate chains, the cruft in each individual certificate, or?
>
>Thanks,
>
>- max
>
>
>
>On Jan 6, 2014, at 3:39 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of scope for
>>>>> CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I understand you right.)
>>>
>>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.
>>
>> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers
>> nor a sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested
>> in a nextgen thing.
>>
>>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or mired
>>> in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish list ...
>>> Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable forums in IETF
>>> for such a topic.
>>
>> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
>> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or
>> not to start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
>>
>> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the
>> web PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
>> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
>> security/crypto researcher though probably).
>>
>> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to
>> talk about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non
>> X.509 based PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's
>> very much evolutionary and starts from X.509.
>>
>> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security
>> topics if none of the above fit.
>>
>> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and
>> propose stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try
>> help PKI nextgen stuff progress in the IETF should there
>> be credible proposals.
>>
>> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no
>> matter how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main
>> reasons IMO are that replacements are likely to suffer a lot
>> of the same (or equivalent) complexity since its a complex
>> problem, and that any credible replacement will take at least
>> a few years to work out and them 5-10 to get deployed which
>> seems to be beyond the horizon for researchers (speaking as
>> one who chases funding;-). One could argue that that's why
>> of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches, only CT
>> seems to be left standing.
>>
>> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI
>> is not likely to be a useful place to start. We know those,
>> and any credible approach would start with a fairly well
>> worked out proposal, including consideration of that 5-10
>> year overlap period. Its not easy;-)
>>
>> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of
>> concept that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be
>> a runner, and we have learned a lot about the wrinkles in
>> X.509 based PKI over the years so there is hope maybe.
>>
>> S.
>>
>> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before
>> diving in, or ask someone who might be familiar, which
>> could include me.
>>
>> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
>> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/
>> [3] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> [4] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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Subject: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Hi Sean,

On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> My list is kind of short:

thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize 
work.

>
> 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS or not:
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
>
> If so, let’s do a draft!
>
> 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we’re moving towards EC (am I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in fear):
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
>
> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt

#0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment on #2.

Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem that 
we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for 
extensive use in the Internet.

The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational 
assumptions for security.   However, it relies on physical assumptions 
for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer.   
This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any 
point between the encrypter and decrypter.   In addition, QKD requires 
large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder problem 
in the real world than pseudorandomnes.   (In other words: a QKD system 
could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable 
elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that 
algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?)

QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very 
severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support.   
The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit 
per second at 20 KM range.   Using that technology, we need 10,000 
repeaters to get global scale communication.   This would require the 
pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along 
the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be 
trusted.  There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not 
need to be trusted,

The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a 
conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea.  
It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as 
whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has.   It is *more* 
vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same 
cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution.

QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons, and 
thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as 4G 
and 802.11.   The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy 
than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not 
geometrically point to point.   So even if QKD didn't suffer from the 
problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion 
cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users.

QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in 
information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend, 
Could, virtualization, and collaboration.

I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium 
Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum 
key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim 
in the title.   The important observation here is that the classical 
Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable 
storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure 
communication, is quantifiably better than QKD.   Vernam does not have 
any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range 
limitations, and it can be used over wireless.   Its data rate will 
depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a 
trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a courier 
need not travel that often to match its data rate.   The important 
inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that 
all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we 
would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and 
not QKD.   The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest in 
QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of 
what would be useful in information security.

My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived 
http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we need 
to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something 
on it.

David

>
> spt


From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Wed Jan  8 03:09:57 2014
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "David McGrew \(mcgrew\)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Hi Max,

On 01/08/2014 02:31 AM, Max Pritikin (pritikin) wrote:
> 
> With the advent of DICE (DTLS in Constrained Environments), and
> similar attempts to discuss optimizations, it would seem that any
> discussion of "next generation" PKI discussions should include
> discussion on how to optimize the X.509 certificate/chain format.
> That appears to be missing in this conversation so far.

True. OTOH, DICE is definitely predicated on DTLS so any
discussion on cert formats for that would fit into the TLS
WG discussion on 1.3. I've not however seen that listed on
any 1.3 wish-list so far so it seems unlikely to me at
least that DICE will push things along here.

> I agree that any replacement for our current PKI is going to run into
> the same complexities. So, rather than assume they don't exist, would
> it be reasonable to look at how to optimize the existing work?

I'm not sure. I think that might run the risk of inheriting
all the warts (e.g. policy mapping, the N-R bit) without
providing much incentive to change. When we were working on
RFC3280bis (which became 5280) we did try to do as much of
that as we could, but very few simplifications turned out
to be possible. It is fair to say though that a lot of the
real practical problems had not really bitten folks at
that stage though, so I guess its possible that the same
exercise done now might pay off.

> Some off the cuff examples to frame what I mean: - Define a specific
> lightweight trust anchor format (yes, we can all use X.509 certs. But
> what about a canonical smaller format?) - Optimized version of the
> X.509 cert itself: Perhaps a compressed format similar to the (old,
> abandoned and incomplete)
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-comp-x509-00 draft for
> compressed certs? Perhaps a v4 format that is restructured to provide
> easier/quicker parsing Or if a non-ASN1 format is truly preferred
> then such a format could be defined that is can carry the same
> semantics as the existing PKI (namely, if the problem is ASN1 then we
> can fix that without also re-inventing all the rest)  Approaching the
> questions from this angle leads me to ask what _exactly_ the concerns
> with the current PKI are. Is it the ASN1, the CA infrastructure, the
> certificate chains, the cruft in each individual certificate, or?

Personally, I think the main problems with X.509 PKI to date
have been around (the need for, and absence of widely supported
standard for) enrollment and (particularly name) constraints
when there are many CAs. Dealing with ASN.1 is a PITA, but a
well-known one, so that'd be low down on my list anyway. I
know you've spent a lot of effort trying to help with the
enrollment problem with EST and I do hope that works out,
but we don't know yet.

Again though, I don't think thrashing out the pros and cons
of X.509 on this list is a good plan. Better would be for a
bunch of really-interested parties to go into a huddle and
come up with a worked out proposal. (But if a bunch of
semi-interested parties ask for a new list to talk about
this, I've no problem helping that happen, though wouldn't
be very hopeful of a useful outcome.)

S.

> 
> Thanks,
> 
> - max
> 
> 
> 
> On Jan 6, 2014, at 3:39 PM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of
>>>>> scope for CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I
>>>>> understand you right.)
>>> 
>>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.
>> 
>> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers nor a
>> sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested in a
>> nextgen thing.
>> 
>>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or
>>> mired in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish
>>> list ... Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable
>>> forums in IETF for such a topic.
>> 
>> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but 
>> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or not to
>> start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
>> 
>> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the web
>> PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do 
>> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a 
>> security/crypto researcher though probably).
>> 
>> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to talk
>> about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non X.509 based
>> PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's very much
>> evolutionary and starts from X.509.
>> 
>> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security topics
>> if none of the above fit.
>> 
>> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and propose
>> stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try help PKI nextgen
>> stuff progress in the IETF should there be credible proposals.
>> 
>> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no matter
>> how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main reasons IMO are
>> that replacements are likely to suffer a lot of the same (or
>> equivalent) complexity since its a complex problem, and that any
>> credible replacement will take at least a few years to work out and
>> them 5-10 to get deployed which seems to be beyond the horizon for
>> researchers (speaking as one who chases funding;-). One could argue
>> that that's why of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches,
>> only CT seems to be left standing.
>> 
>> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI is not
>> likely to be a useful place to start. We know those, and any
>> credible approach would start with a fairly well worked out
>> proposal, including consideration of that 5-10 year overlap period.
>> Its not easy;-)
>> 
>> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of concept
>> that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be a runner, and we
>> have learned a lot about the wrinkles in X.509 based PKI over the
>> years so there is hope maybe.
>> 
>> S.
>> 
>> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before diving in,
>> or ask someone who might be familiar, which could include me.
>> 
>> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey [2]
>> http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/ [3]
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix [4]
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list 
>> Cfrg@irtf.org http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 

From Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk  Wed Jan  8 04:21:07 2014
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From: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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On 08/01/2014 12:06, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>Hi Sean,
>
>On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>> My list is kind of short:
>
>thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize
>work.
>
>>
>> 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS or
>>not:
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
>>
>> If so, let=B9s do a draft!
>>
>> 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we=B9re moving towards EC (am =
I
>>wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about
>>(e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in fear):
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
>>
>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>
>#0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment on #2.
>
>Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem that
>we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
>extensive use in the Internet.

<excellent explanation of the shortcomings of QKD excised>

>
>My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
>http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we need
>to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something
>on it.

Thanks for the reminder about this talk, which I very much enjoyed at the
time.

A few years back, we wrote a paper [1] explaining why we believed that QKD
is not commercially interesting. Some of the points are orthogonal to
yours, some overlap.

[1] Quantum cryptography: a practical information security perspective.
Kenneth G. Paterson, Fred Piper, Ruediger Schack
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0406147

Cheers

Kenny





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Cc: IAB IAB <iab@iab.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, irtf-chair@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Hi Trevor,

I recognize and support your right to raise the question of a conflict 
of interest between the NSA and CFRG.  I am confident that the IRTF 
chair and IAB will give it due consideration.

However, I am concerned that your efforts to find evidence in the CFRG 
email archive that support the idea that Kevin is incompetent are 
unwarranted and counterproductive.   While many people agree with you 
about the conflict of interest, many disagree with you on the subject of 
competence.  It is not hard to go through the email archive and find 
examples where someone misstated something, or did not explain something 
completely, but doing so does not advance the security or privacy on the 
Internet, which is the goal that you and I share for CFRG.  That goal 
would best be served by focusing the valuable time of the research group 
members (a scarce resource that we need to manage well) on addressing 
technical issues.   Therefore, I respectfully ask that, in your request 
to the IAB, you focus on the key issue of the conflict of interest.

David

On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> Hi Lars,
>
> Thanks for considering this request.
>
> Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>
> --
>
> I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
> mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
> handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single "occurrence",
> and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
> that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>
> I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the benefit
> of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
> CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead review
> of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
> debacle it has become.
>
> --
>
> I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
> employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
>   (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
>   (B) the impact on RG participation.
>
> Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
> group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
> the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>
> That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
> responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when and
> how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
> with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
> steering a group's work.
>
> You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
> adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.  I'm
> not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
> Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy widely;
> or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
> these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
> not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>
>
> Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
> not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
> "affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
> participating.
>
> Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
> from participating.
>
> But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
> responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
> support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
> sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>
> --
>
> Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
> of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
> consider.
>
> You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
> NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>
> You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
> organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
> statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>
> We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
> standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
> organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
> message that it's no big deal.
>
> This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but it
> needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>
> --
>
> I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are of
> great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
> perspective IAB possesses.
>
> I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue and
> expressing its judgement.
>
>
> Trevor
>
>
> (a couple comments below)
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request stated several reasons for the removal:
>>
>> (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>>
>> (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>>
>> (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" to the IETF's TLS working group.
>>
>> (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>>
>> I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your feedback.
>>
>> David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I share this conclusion.
> Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
> begins in October 2012, skipping:
>   * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
>   * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security [2]
>   * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
> alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>
> [1]
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>
> [2]
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>
> [3]
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
>
>
> [...]
>> So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group secretaries.
> The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section 5.3 states:
> """
> The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress in
> the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the conduct
> of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate responsibility
> for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
> """
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>


From adam@cypherspace.org  Wed Jan  8 05:42:42 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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I support Trevor in raising the conflict of interest, its pretty egregious
and Kevin should in my view resign gracefully to end this mess.  If hes
clean and works for IA as he says its a nice way out.  If hes not and is
actually part of the sabotage side its still a quieter way out than being
pushed.  It probably doesnt look as clean either way if he is pushed.  If he
is not pushed it just creates bad impression of the impartiality of IRTF. 
Sort of like the justice system closing ranks and supporting Hoover after
the scandal and him staying in office with immunity by analogy.  I am not
sure of the game theory from NSA sabotage side, if they would prefer Kevin
(whether on their budget or not) to let the noise continue and be pushed or
skip the noise and resign, or noise continue, plus fail to push him and
continue with the resentment and reputation loss to IRTF.

There is some validity in what David said below also.  Some of Kevins stuff
looks suspicious to others also, its certainly not just Trevor, but of
course its not provable - the worst parts are either innocuously
ill-considered/sub-optimal suggestions, as with the next guy prone to human
failure (which is somewhat plausible) or designed to be unprovable. 
$250m/year managed with military intent can achieve that you know, its not
hard.  There are unclassified military intelligence double agent sabotge
manuals that Ian Grigg posts quotes from now and then that show the basic
ideas.  Most of them still seem quite relevant.

Anyway the point I wanted to draw from David's comment is we cant and wont
be able to prove it.  BUT I think anyone is certainly within their right to
comment on things that look suspicious, or insecure.  See I think for
comparison the RNG bias Bleichenbacher found in DSA RNG leading to key
recovery are fair game.  As is Ferguson et al's comments about EC_DRBG.  Or
Trevors about some of the decisions relating to Dragonfly.  Or Prof
Bernstein's comments about Kevin's recent post here about certicom patents
pushing towards less secure curves (see the crypto list).

Its called peer review.  If anyone cant stand their thoughts and public
statements being peer reviewed, probably participating in IRTF/IETF or
uncensored internet discussion in general is not for them.  As we have
pretty incontrovertible proof that NSA has been sabotaging standards,
unfortunately that opens up review of input to the standards influenced by
any NSA participants.  Its ugly but we didnt create the problem, Kevin's
employer did.  Sorry.

So unfortunately it is probably relevant that apart from conflict of
interest, the public record is not suspicionless.  Imagine NSA / NIST
communications about EC DRBG were public.  There'd be a pretty clear public
interest to go over the history of it, see who was supporting it or aware of
it within NIST.  Its really not that dissimilar.

We may in the longer term have to review and even deprecate existing
standards as a result of this militarized sabotage of its own and global
civilian infrastructure.

ps I support Trevor in rejecting Lars assertion that IRTF co-chair has no
influence.

Adam

(IETF participant since 1996).

On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:36:07AM -0500, David McGrew wrote:
>Hi Trevor,
>
>I recognize and support your right to raise the question of a 
>conflict of interest between the NSA and CFRG.  I am confident that 
>the IRTF chair and IAB will give it due consideration.
>
>However, I am concerned that your efforts to find evidence in the 
>CFRG email archive that support the idea that Kevin is incompetent 
>are unwarranted and counterproductive.   While many people agree with 
>you about the conflict of interest, many disagree with you on the 
>subject of competence.  It is not hard to go through the email 
>archive and find examples where someone misstated something, or did 
>not explain something completely, but doing so does not advance the 
>security or privacy on the Internet, which is the goal that you and I 
>share for CFRG.  That goal would best be served by focusing the 
>valuable time of the research group members (a scarce resource that 
>we need to manage well) on addressing technical issues.   Therefore, 
>I respectfully ask that, in your request to the IAB, you focus on the 
>key issue of the conflict of interest.
>
>David
>
>On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>Hi Lars,
>>
>>Thanks for considering this request.
>>
>>Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>>
>>--
>>
>>I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
>>mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
>>handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single "occurrence",
>>and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
>>that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>>
>>I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the benefit
>>of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
>>CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead review
>>of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
>>debacle it has become.
>>
>>--
>>
>>I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
>>employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
>>  (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
>>  (B) the impact on RG participation.
>>
>>Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
>>group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
>>the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>>
>>That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
>>responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when and
>>how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
>>with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
>>steering a group's work.
>>
>>You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
>>adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.  I'm
>>not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
>>Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy widely;
>>or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
>>these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
>>not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>>
>>
>>Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
>>not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
>>"affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
>>participating.
>>
>>Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
>>from participating.
>>
>>But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
>>responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
>>support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
>>sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>>
>>--
>>
>>Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
>>of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
>>consider.
>>
>>You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
>>NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>>
>>You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
>>organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
>>statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>>
>>We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
>>standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
>>organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
>>message that it's no big deal.
>>
>>This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but it
>>needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>>
>>--
>>
>>I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are of
>>great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
>>perspective IAB possesses.
>>
>>I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue and
>>expressing its judgement.
>>
>>
>>Trevor
>>
>>
>>(a couple comments below)
>>
>>
>>On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
>>>Hi,
>>>
>>>on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request stated several reasons for the removal:
>>>
>>>(1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>>>
>>>(2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>>>
>>>(3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" to the IETF's TLS working group.
>>>
>>>(4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>>>
>>>I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your feedback.
>>>
>>>David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I share this conclusion.
>>Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
>>begins in October 2012, skipping:
>>  * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
>>  * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security [2]
>>  * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
>>alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>>
>>[1]
>>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
>>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
>>http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>>
>>[2]
>>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>>
>>[3]
>>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>>http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
>>
>>
>>[...]
>>>So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group secretaries.
>>The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section 5.3 states:
>>"""
>>The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress in
>>the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the conduct
>>of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate responsibility
>>for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
>>"""
>>_______________________________________________
>>Cfrg mailing list
>>Cfrg@irtf.org
>>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>.
>>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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From: John Viega <john@viega.org>
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Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 09:37:36 -0500
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To: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, irtf-chair@irtf.org, IAB IAB <iab@iab.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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I agree with David that competence doesn=92t factor into it. =20

Conflict of interest is an issue here.  But again, even before recent =
NSA revelations, there would often be participants with a conflict=97 =
good of the participant=92s company vs. good of the world.  Even now, =
where NSA is part of the threat model, we shouldn=92t expect every actor =
with a conflict is going to walk in with an NSA badge.=20

I don=92t think conflict of interest is a good enough basis for removing =
a chair.  The IETF/IRTF needs to be able to design standards when many =
actors have conflicts, and should be able to give confidence in what =
they produce.

The most important thing from my perspective is making sure the =
IETF/IRTF has the public trust.  I think it=92s possible to do this =
without removing Kevin, especially if the IETF/IRTF can clearly =
communicate how it prevents subversion.

That is, if the world cares enough.  I suspect that very few people are =
going to boycott IETF/IRTF-driven standards if no further action is =
taken.

John=20


John Viega | cel +1 212-321-0902

On Jan 8, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:

> I support Trevor in raising the conflict of interest, its pretty =
egregious
> and Kevin should in my view resign gracefully to end this mess.  If =
hes
> clean and works for IA as he says its a nice way out.  If hes not and =
is
> actually part of the sabotage side its still a quieter way out than =
being
> pushed.  It probably doesnt look as clean either way if he is pushed.  =
If he
> is not pushed it just creates bad impression of the impartiality of =
IRTF. Sort of like the justice system closing ranks and supporting =
Hoover after
> the scandal and him staying in office with immunity by analogy.  I am =
not
> sure of the game theory from NSA sabotage side, if they would prefer =
Kevin
> (whether on their budget or not) to let the noise continue and be =
pushed or
> skip the noise and resign, or noise continue, plus fail to push him =
and
> continue with the resentment and reputation loss to IRTF.
>=20
> There is some validity in what David said below also.  Some of Kevins =
stuff
> looks suspicious to others also, its certainly not just Trevor, but of
> course its not provable - the worst parts are either innocuously
> ill-considered/sub-optimal suggestions, as with the next guy prone to =
human
> failure (which is somewhat plausible) or designed to be unprovable. =
$250m/year managed with military intent can achieve that you know, its =
not
> hard.  There are unclassified military intelligence double agent =
sabotge
> manuals that Ian Grigg posts quotes from now and then that show the =
basic
> ideas.  Most of them still seem quite relevant.
>=20
> Anyway the point I wanted to draw from David's comment is we cant and =
wont
> be able to prove it.  BUT I think anyone is certainly within their =
right to
> comment on things that look suspicious, or insecure.  See I think for
> comparison the RNG bias Bleichenbacher found in DSA RNG leading to key
> recovery are fair game.  As is Ferguson et al's comments about =
EC_DRBG.  Or
> Trevors about some of the decisions relating to Dragonfly.  Or Prof
> Bernstein's comments about Kevin's recent post here about certicom =
patents
> pushing towards less secure curves (see the crypto list).
>=20
> Its called peer review.  If anyone cant stand their thoughts and =
public
> statements being peer reviewed, probably participating in IRTF/IETF or
> uncensored internet discussion in general is not for them.  As we have
> pretty incontrovertible proof that NSA has been sabotaging standards,
> unfortunately that opens up review of input to the standards =
influenced by
> any NSA participants.  Its ugly but we didnt create the problem, =
Kevin's
> employer did.  Sorry.
>=20
> So unfortunately it is probably relevant that apart from conflict of
> interest, the public record is not suspicionless.  Imagine NSA / NIST
> communications about EC DRBG were public.  There'd be a pretty clear =
public
> interest to go over the history of it, see who was supporting it or =
aware of
> it within NIST.  Its really not that dissimilar.
>=20
> We may in the longer term have to review and even deprecate existing
> standards as a result of this militarized sabotage of its own and =
global
> civilian infrastructure.
>=20
> ps I support Trevor in rejecting Lars assertion that IRTF co-chair has =
no
> influence.
>=20
> Adam
>=20
> (IETF participant since 1996).
>=20
> On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:36:07AM -0500, David McGrew wrote:
>> Hi Trevor,
>>=20
>> I recognize and support your right to raise the question of a =
conflict of interest between the NSA and CFRG.  I am confident that the =
IRTF chair and IAB will give it due consideration.
>>=20
>> However, I am concerned that your efforts to find evidence in the =
CFRG email archive that support the idea that Kevin is incompetent are =
unwarranted and counterproductive.   While many people agree with you =
about the conflict of interest, many disagree with you on the subject of =
competence.  It is not hard to go through the email archive and find =
examples where someone misstated something, or did not explain something =
completely, but doing so does not advance the security or privacy on the =
Internet, which is the goal that you and I share for CFRG.  That goal =
would best be served by focusing the valuable time of the research group =
members (a scarce resource that we need to manage well) on addressing =
technical issues.   Therefore, I respectfully ask that, in your request =
to the IAB, you focus on the key issue of the conflict of interest.
>>=20
>> David
>>=20
>> On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>> Hi Lars,
>>>=20
>>> Thanks for considering this request.
>>>=20
>>> Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>>>=20
>>> --
>>>=20
>>> I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
>>> mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
>>> handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single =
"occurrence",
>>> and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
>>> that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>>>=20
>>> I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the =
benefit
>>> of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
>>> CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead =
review
>>> of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
>>> debacle it has become.
>>>=20
>>> --
>>>=20
>>> I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
>>> employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
>>> (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
>>> (B) the impact on RG participation.
>>>=20
>>> Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
>>> group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
>>> the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>>>=20
>>> That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
>>> responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when =
and
>>> how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
>>> with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
>>> steering a group's work.
>>>=20
>>> You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
>>> adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.  =
I'm
>>> not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
>>> Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy =
widely;
>>> or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
>>> these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
>>> not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
>>> not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
>>> "affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
>>> participating.
>>>=20
>>> Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
>>> from participating.
>>>=20
>>> But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
>>> responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
>>> support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
>>> sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>>>=20
>>> --
>>>=20
>>> Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
>>> of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
>>> consider.
>>>=20
>>> You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
>>> NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>>>=20
>>> You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
>>> organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
>>> statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>>>=20
>>> We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
>>> standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
>>> organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
>>> message that it's no big deal.
>>>=20
>>> This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but =
it
>>> needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>>>=20
>>> --
>>>=20
>>> I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are =
of
>>> great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
>>> perspective IAB possesses.
>>>=20
>>> I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue =
and
>>> expressing its judgement.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Trevor
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> (a couple comments below)
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> =
wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>=20
>>>> on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role =
as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the =
co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request =
stated several reasons for the removal:
>>>>=20
>>>> (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the =
"Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>>>>=20
>>>> (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have =
weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>>>>=20
>>>> (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" =
to the IETF's TLS working group.
>>>>=20
>>>> (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>>>>=20
>>>> I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails =
that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your =
feedback.
>>>>=20
>>>> David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a =
detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded that =
the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I share this =
conclusion.
>>> Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
>>> begins in October 2012, skipping:
>>> * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
>>> * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security =
[2]
>>> * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
>>> alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>>>=20
>>> [1]
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
>>> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>>>=20
>>> [2]
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>>>=20
>>> [3]
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>>> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> [...]
>>>> So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many =
other organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group =
secretaries.
>>> The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section =
5.3 states:
>>> """
>>> The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress =
in
>>> the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the =
conduct
>>> of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate =
responsibility
>>> for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
>>> """
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>> .
>>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">I =
agree with David that competence doesn=92t factor into it. =
&nbsp;<div><br></div><div>Conflict of interest is an issue here. =
&nbsp;But again, even before recent NSA revelations, there would often =
be participants with a conflict=97 good of the participant=92s company =
vs. good of the world. &nbsp;Even now, where NSA is part of the threat =
model, we shouldn=92t expect every actor with a conflict is going to =
walk in with an NSA badge.&nbsp;<div><br></div><div>I don=92t think =
conflict of interest is a good enough basis for removing a chair. =
&nbsp;The IETF/IRTF needs to be able to design standards when many =
actors have conflicts, and should be able to give confidence in what =
they produce.<br><div><br></div><div>The most important thing from my =
perspective is making sure the IETF/IRTF has the public trust. &nbsp;I =
think it=92s possible to do this without removing Kevin, especially if =
the IETF/IRTF can clearly communicate how it prevents =
subversion.</div><div><br></div><div>That is, if the world cares enough. =
&nbsp;I suspect that very few people are going to boycott =
IETF/IRTF-driven standards if no further action is =
taken.</div><div><br></div><div>John&nbsp;<br><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true">
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica;  font-style: =
normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; =
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class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-style: normal; font-variant: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: =
normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; =
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border-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;  =
"><b><span lang=3D"en-us"><font color=3D"#000000" size=3D"1" =
face=3D"Arial"><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">John =
Viega&nbsp;</font></span></b><span lang=3D"en-us"><font color=3D"#808080" =
size=3D"1" face=3D"Arial">|</font></span><span lang=3D"en-us"></span><span=
 lang=3D"en-us"></span><span lang=3D"en-us"></span><span =
lang=3D"en-us">&nbsp;</span><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"color: rgb(128, 128, 128); font-family: Arial; font-size: =
x-small; ">cel +1 212-321-0902</span></span></div>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Jan 8, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Adam Back &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:adam@cypherspace.org">adam@cypherspace.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">I support Trevor in raising the conflict of interest, its =
pretty egregious<br>and Kevin should in my view resign gracefully to end =
this mess. &nbsp;If hes<br>clean and works for IA as he says its a nice =
way out. &nbsp;If hes not and is<br>actually part of the sabotage side =
its still a quieter way out than being<br>pushed. &nbsp;It probably =
doesnt look as clean either way if he is pushed. &nbsp;If he<br>is not =
pushed it just creates bad impression of the impartiality of IRTF. Sort =
of like the justice system closing ranks and supporting Hoover =
after<br>the scandal and him staying in office with immunity by analogy. =
&nbsp;I am not<br>sure of the game theory from NSA sabotage side, if =
they would prefer Kevin<br>(whether on their budget or not) to let the =
noise continue and be pushed or<br>skip the noise and resign, or noise =
continue, plus fail to push him and<br>continue with the resentment and =
reputation loss to IRTF.<br><br>There is some validity in what David =
said below also. &nbsp;Some of Kevins stuff<br>looks suspicious to =
others also, its certainly not just Trevor, but of<br>course its not =
provable - the worst parts are either =
innocuously<br>ill-considered/sub-optimal suggestions, as with the next =
guy prone to human<br>failure (which is somewhat plausible) or designed =
to be unprovable. $250m/year managed with military intent can achieve =
that you know, its not<br>hard. &nbsp;There are unclassified military =
intelligence double agent sabotge<br>manuals that Ian Grigg posts quotes =
from now and then that show the basic<br>ideas. &nbsp;Most of them still =
seem quite relevant.<br><br>Anyway the point I wanted to draw from =
David's comment is we cant and wont<br>be able to prove it. &nbsp;BUT I =
think anyone is certainly within their right to<br>comment on things =
that look suspicious, or insecure. &nbsp;See I think for<br>comparison =
the RNG bias Bleichenbacher found in DSA RNG leading to key<br>recovery =
are fair game. &nbsp;As is Ferguson et al's comments about EC_DRBG. =
&nbsp;Or<br>Trevors about some of the decisions relating to Dragonfly. =
&nbsp;Or Prof<br>Bernstein's comments about Kevin's recent post here =
about certicom patents<br>pushing towards less secure curves (see the =
crypto list).<br><br>Its called peer review. &nbsp;If anyone cant stand =
their thoughts and public<br>statements being peer reviewed, probably =
participating in IRTF/IETF or<br>uncensored internet discussion in =
general is not for them. &nbsp;As we have<br>pretty incontrovertible =
proof that NSA has been sabotaging standards,<br>unfortunately that =
opens up review of input to the standards influenced by<br>any NSA =
participants. &nbsp;Its ugly but we didnt create the problem, =
Kevin's<br>employer did. &nbsp;Sorry.<br><br>So unfortunately it is =
probably relevant that apart from conflict of<br>interest, the public =
record is not suspicionless. &nbsp;Imagine NSA / NIST<br>communications =
about EC DRBG were public. &nbsp;There'd be a pretty clear =
public<br>interest to go over the history of it, see who was supporting =
it or aware of<br>it within NIST. &nbsp;Its really not that =
dissimilar.<br><br>We may in the longer term have to review and even =
deprecate existing<br>standards as a result of this militarized sabotage =
of its own and global<br>civilian infrastructure.<br><br>ps I support =
Trevor in rejecting Lars assertion that IRTF co-chair has =
no<br>influence.<br><br>Adam<br><br>(IETF participant since =
1996).<br><br>On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:36:07AM -0500, David McGrew =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Hi Trevor,<br><br>I recognize and =
support your right to raise the question of a conflict of interest =
between the NSA and CFRG. &nbsp;I am confident that the IRTF chair and =
IAB will give it due consideration.<br><br>However, I am concerned that =
your efforts to find evidence in the CFRG email archive that support the =
idea that Kevin is incompetent are unwarranted and counterproductive. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;While many people agree with you about the conflict of =
interest, many disagree with you on the subject of competence. &nbsp;It =
is not hard to go through the email archive and find examples where =
someone misstated something, or did not explain something completely, =
but doing so does not advance the security or privacy on the Internet, =
which is the goal that you and I share for CFRG. &nbsp;That goal would =
best be served by focusing the valuable time of the research group =
members (a scarce resource that we need to manage well) on addressing =
technical issues. &nbsp;&nbsp;Therefore, I respectfully ask that, in =
your request to the IAB, you focus on the key issue of the conflict of =
interest.<br><br>David<br><br>On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Hi Lars,<br><br>Thanks for =
considering this request.<br><br>Of course, I'm disappointed with the =
response.<br><br>--<br><br>I brought to your attention Kevin's record of =
technical mistakes and<br>mismanagement over a two year period, on the =
major issue he has<br>handled as CFRG co-chair. &nbsp;You counted this =
as a single "occurrence",<br>and considered only the narrow question =
whether it is "of a severity<br>that would warrant an immediate =
dismissal".<br><br>I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give =
him the benefit<br>of the doubt. &nbsp;But it would be better to =
consider what's best for<br>CFRG. &nbsp;CFRG needs a competent and =
diligent chair who could lead review<br>of something like Dragonfly to a =
successful outcome, instead of the<br>debacle it has =
become.<br><br>--<br><br>I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern =
regarding Kevin's NSA<br>employment. &nbsp;You considered this from the =
perspectives of:<br> (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, =
and<br> (B) the impact on RG participation.<br><br>Regarding (A), you =
assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than<br>group secretaries" =
who "do not wield more power over the content of<br>the ongoing work =
than other research group participants".<br><br>That's a noble ideal, =
but in practice it's untrue. &nbsp;Chairs are<br>responsible for =
creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when and<br>how to call for =
consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising<br>with other =
parties. &nbsp;All this gives them a great deal of power in<br>steering =
a group's work.<br><br>You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open =
processes" are an<br>adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by =
a group chair. &nbsp;I'm<br>not sure of that. &nbsp;I worry about soft =
forms of sabotage like making<br>Internet crypto hard to implement =
securely, and hard to deploy widely;<br>or tipping groups towards =
dysfunction and ineffectiveness. &nbsp;Since<br>these are common failure =
modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm<br>not convinced IETF/IRTF =
process would adequately detect this.<br><br><br>Regarding (B), you =
judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would<br>not participate in =
an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those<br>"affiliated with NSA" =
whom you presume we would "eliminate" from<br>participating.<br><br>Of =
course, that's a bogeyman. &nbsp;No-one wants to prevent anyone =
else<br>from participating.<br><br>But the chair role is not a right =
given to every participant, it's a<br>responsibility given to those we =
trust. &nbsp;The IETF/IRTF should not<br>support a chair for any =
activity X that has a strong interest in<br>sabotaging X. &nbsp;This =
isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.<br><br>--<br><br>Finally, I =
think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations<br>of NSA =
sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did =
not<br>consider.<br><br>You did not consider the cloud of distrust which =
will hang over an<br>NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it =
endorses.<br><br>You also did not consider that as the premier Internet =
standards<br>organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an =
unavoidable<br>statement regarding the acceptability of such =
sabotage.<br><br>We have the opportunity to send a message that =
sabotaging crypto<br>standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust =
in those<br>organizations in a way that has real consequences. &nbsp;Or =
we send a<br>message that it's no big deal.<br><br>This is a political =
consideration rather than a technical one, but it<br>needs to be =
considered. &nbsp;We're sending a message either way.<br><br>--<br><br>I =
understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are =
of<br>great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from =
the<br>perspective IAB possesses.<br><br>I would appreciate if the IAB =
would consider reviewing this issue and<br>expressing its =
judgement.<br><br><br>Trevor<br><br><br>(a couple comments =
below)<br><br><br>On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:lars@netapp.com">lars@netapp.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Hi,<br><br>on Dec 20, 2013, I =
received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role as IRTF Chair to =
consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the co-chairs of the IRTF's =
Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request stated several reasons =
for the removal:<br><br>(1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive =
feedback on the "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.<br><br>(2) That Kevin =
Igoe made technical suggestions that would have weakened the =
cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".<br><br>(3) That Kevin Igoe =
misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" to the IETF's TLS working =
group.<br><br>(4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.<br><br>I have =
reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails that were =
sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your =
feedback.<br><br>David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already =
posted a detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and =
concluded that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. =
I share this conclusion.<br></blockquote>Dragonfly discussions started =
in December 2011. &nbsp;David's timeline<br>begins in October 2012, =
skipping:<br> * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]<br> =
* Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security =
[2]<br> * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases =
and<br>alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]<br><br>[1]<br><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html">h=
ttp://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html</a><br>http=
://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html<br>http://www.=
ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt<br><br>[2]<br>http://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html<br><br>[3]<br>http=
://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html<br>http://www.=
ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls<br><br><br>[...]<br><blockq=
uote type=3D"cite">So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and =
unlike in many other organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than =
group secretaries.<br></blockquote>The chair is far more than a "group =
secretary". &nbsp;As RFC 2014 section 5.3 states:<br>"""<br>The Research =
Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress in<br>the areas =
under investigation, and has wide discretion in the conduct<br>of =
Research Group business. &nbsp;[...] The Chair has ultimate =
responsibility<br>for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward =
progress.<br>"""<br>_______________________________________________<br>Cfr=
g mailing =
list<br>Cfrg@irtf.org<br>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg<br>.<br=
><br></blockquote><br>_______________________________________________<br>C=
frg mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>http://www.irtf.org/mai=
lman/listinfo/cfrg<br></blockquote>_______________________________________=
________<br>Cfrg mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>http://www.irtf.org/mai=
lman/listinfo/cfrg<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></body></ht=
ml>=

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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "irtf-chair@irtf.org" <irtf-chair@irtf.org>, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, IAB IAB <iab@iab.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 6:37 AM, John Viega <john@viega.org> wrote:
> I agree with David that competence doesn=E2=80=99t factor into it.
>
> Conflict of interest is an issue here.  But again, even before recent NSA
> revelations, there would often be participants with a conflict=E2=80=94 g=
ood of the
> participant=E2=80=99s company vs. good of the world.  Even now, where NSA=
 is part of
> the threat model, we shouldn=E2=80=99t expect every actor with a conflict=
 is going
> to walk in with an NSA badge.

The solution is tighter standards about our standards. The conflict of inte=
rest
with IPR isn't as bad as not having candor about known weaknesses. We will
need to talk about Certicom IPR at some point: I've seen many emails in whi=
ch
Certicom employees don't mention patents they have authorship on related
to the ideas they are flogging, as well as some patent FUD related to Montg=
omery
curves. But that's secondary to weak standards getting pushed through
the process
by chairs, even when the customer WG doesn't want it any more (TLS will not
consider Dragonfly again).

>
> I don=E2=80=99t think conflict of interest is a good enough basis for rem=
oving a
> chair.  The IETF/IRTF needs to be able to design standards when many acto=
rs
> have conflicts, and should be able to give confidence in what they produc=
e.
>
> The most important thing from my perspective is making sure the IETF/IRTF
> has the public trust.  I think it=E2=80=99s possible to do this without r=
emoving
> Kevin, especially if the IETF/IRTF can clearly communicate how it prevent=
s
> subversion.

And as I've documented extensively, the CFRG process that was actually bein=
g
followed did not prevent subversion. Kevin's misrepresentation of Dragonfly=
 was
harmless only because Rene Struik and others smelled a rat. Imagine if this
was heading into a WG without any cryptographers, and they had taken
Kevin's suggestion
of exponentiation seriously. That could easily have happened. There
need to be changes
made to the process to harden it against this sort of thing: either
following the process we have
or designing new measures.

>
> That is, if the world cares enough.  I suspect that very few people are
> going to boycott IETF/IRTF-driven standards if no further action is taken=
.

They already have: DJB doesn't send CurveCP to the IETF, he publishes
it online. Safecurves is seeing large
adoption outside the IETF framework. OpenSSH has pushed a bunch of new
ciphers into production: I don't know how far ahead
of the standard they are.

IETF standardization needs to catch up here: people see a need for
using non-NIST curves and ciphers
(in some cases due to attacks based on implementation properties), and
we aren't helping people with that
need. We also haven't dealt with a lot of terrible, terrible issues in
TLS validation code or lack thereof. Outside
IETF projects exist for this, but I feel that an IETF imprimatur does
matter especially to bodies like PCI DSS
that don't have cryptographers of their own.

What do we do instead? Rehash what the CRYPTO'13 rump session did much
more elegantly [1]. It's easy to
pontificate about how bad the NSA is, but when it comes to protecting
the Internet, we've known for years what
is required, and our job is to find the problems that exist with that
goal, and fix them.

[1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DcVUIk6nXVcw
>
> John
>
>
> John Viega | cel +1 212-321-0902
>
> On Jan 8, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
>
> I support Trevor in raising the conflict of interest, its pretty egregiou=
s
> and Kevin should in my view resign gracefully to end this mess.  If hes
> clean and works for IA as he says its a nice way out.  If hes not and is
> actually part of the sabotage side its still a quieter way out than being
> pushed.  It probably doesnt look as clean either way if he is pushed.  If=
 he
> is not pushed it just creates bad impression of the impartiality of IRTF.
> Sort of like the justice system closing ranks and supporting Hoover after
> the scandal and him staying in office with immunity by analogy.  I am not
> sure of the game theory from NSA sabotage side, if they would prefer Kevi=
n
> (whether on their budget or not) to let the noise continue and be pushed =
or
> skip the noise and resign, or noise continue, plus fail to push him and
> continue with the resentment and reputation loss to IRTF.
>
> There is some validity in what David said below also.  Some of Kevins stu=
ff
> looks suspicious to others also, its certainly not just Trevor, but of
> course its not provable - the worst parts are either innocuously
> ill-considered/sub-optimal suggestions, as with the next guy prone to hum=
an
> failure (which is somewhat plausible) or designed to be unprovable.
> $250m/year managed with military intent can achieve that you know, its no=
t
> hard.  There are unclassified military intelligence double agent sabotge
> manuals that Ian Grigg posts quotes from now and then that show the basic
> ideas.  Most of them still seem quite relevant.
>
> Anyway the point I wanted to draw from David's comment is we cant and won=
t
> be able to prove it.  BUT I think anyone is certainly within their right =
to
> comment on things that look suspicious, or insecure.  See I think for
> comparison the RNG bias Bleichenbacher found in DSA RNG leading to key
> recovery are fair game.  As is Ferguson et al's comments about EC_DRBG.  =
Or
> Trevors about some of the decisions relating to Dragonfly.  Or Prof
> Bernstein's comments about Kevin's recent post here about certicom patent=
s
> pushing towards less secure curves (see the crypto list).
>
> Its called peer review.  If anyone cant stand their thoughts and public
> statements being peer reviewed, probably participating in IRTF/IETF or
> uncensored internet discussion in general is not for them.  As we have
> pretty incontrovertible proof that NSA has been sabotaging standards,
> unfortunately that opens up review of input to the standards influenced b=
y
> any NSA participants.  Its ugly but we didnt create the problem, Kevin's
> employer did.  Sorry.
>
> So unfortunately it is probably relevant that apart from conflict of
> interest, the public record is not suspicionless.  Imagine NSA / NIST
> communications about EC DRBG were public.  There'd be a pretty clear publ=
ic
> interest to go over the history of it, see who was supporting it or aware=
 of
> it within NIST.  Its really not that dissimilar.
>
> We may in the longer term have to review and even deprecate existing
> standards as a result of this militarized sabotage of its own and global
> civilian infrastructure.
>
> ps I support Trevor in rejecting Lars assertion that IRTF co-chair has no
> influence.
>
> Adam
>
> (IETF participant since 1996).
>
> On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:36:07AM -0500, David McGrew wrote:
>
> Hi Trevor,
>
> I recognize and support your right to raise the question of a conflict of
> interest between the NSA and CFRG.  I am confident that the IRTF chair an=
d
> IAB will give it due consideration.
>
> However, I am concerned that your efforts to find evidence in the CFRG em=
ail
> archive that support the idea that Kevin is incompetent are unwarranted a=
nd
> counterproductive.   While many people agree with you about the conflict =
of
> interest, many disagree with you on the subject of competence.  It is not
> hard to go through the email archive and find examples where someone
> misstated something, or did not explain something completely, but doing s=
o
> does not advance the security or privacy on the Internet, which is the go=
al
> that you and I share for CFRG.  That goal would best be served by focusin=
g
> the valuable time of the research group members (a scarce resource that w=
e
> need to manage well) on addressing technical issues.   Therefore, I
> respectfully ask that, in your request to the IAB, you focus on the key
> issue of the conflict of interest.
>
> David
>
> On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>
> Hi Lars,
>
> Thanks for considering this request.
>
> Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>
> --
>
> I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
> mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
> handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single "occurrence",
> and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
> that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>
> I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the benefit
> of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
> CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead review
> of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
> debacle it has become.
>
> --
>
> I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
> employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
> (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
> (B) the impact on RG participation.
>
> Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
> group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
> the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>
> That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
> responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when and
> how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
> with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
> steering a group's work.
>
> You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
> adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.  I'm
> not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
> Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy widely;
> or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
> these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
> not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>
>
> Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
> not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
> "affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
> participating.
>
> Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
> from participating.
>
> But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
> responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
> support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
> sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>
> --
>
> Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
> of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
> consider.
>
> You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
> NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>
> You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
> organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
> statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>
> We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
> standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
> organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
> message that it's no big deal.
>
> This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but it
> needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>
> --
>
> I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are of
> great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
> perspective IAB possesses.
>
> I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue and
> expressing its judgement.
>
>
> Trevor
>
>
> (a couple comments below)
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role as IR=
TF
> Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the co-chairs of th=
e
> IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The request stated several
> reasons for the removal:
>
> (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the "Dragonfly=
"
> key exchange protocol.
>
> (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have weakened t=
he
> cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>
> (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly" to the
> IETF's TLS working group.
>
> (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>
> I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails that w=
ere
> sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your feedback.
>
> David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a detailed
> timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded that the resea=
rch
> group process has been followed imperfectly. I share this conclusion.
>
> Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
> begins in October 2012, skipping:
> * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
> * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security [2]
> * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
> alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>
> [1]
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>
> [2]
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>
> [3]
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
>
>
> [...]
>
> So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other
> organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group secretaries.
>
> The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section 5.3
> states:
> """
> The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress in
> the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the conduct
> of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate responsibility
> for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
> """
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] process for cfrg blessing of [insert algorithm name here]
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 12:16 AM, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com> wrote:
> I=E2=80=99d like to get to the thread that I think Waton/David are after =
[0]/[1].

Thank you very much for writing the email that I wanted to have
written, but wasn't able to write.

>
> I=E2=80=99ve got a hat but I=E2=80=99m not wearing it here (and my hat go=
es away in two months anyway).  I guess I=E2=80=99d like to add that I=E2=
=80=99m not a cryptographer, but I don=E2=80=99t know why I need to say tha=
t because it=E2=80=99s not like anybody has to take a test to contribute to=
 the CFRG.  And anyway you=E2=80=99d figure it out right quick when I respo=
nded =E2=80=9Cdo I get an egg roll with that=E2=80=9D when quizzed about th=
e Chinese remainder theorem.  (it=E2=80=99s a long email I thought I=E2=80=
=99d lead with a joke)
>
> Because the "IRTF does not set standards=E2=80=9D [2], remember there are=
 RFCs that are on standards track and some not [3], it kind of follows that=
 the =E2=80=9CThe Research Group input carries no more weight than other co=
mmunity input=E2=80=9D [2].  But, I kind of find it hard to believe that if=
 the CFRG publishes "[insert cryptographic algorithm's name] is rubbish=E2=
=80=9D that the IETF would produce a standard around said algorithm.  On th=
e flip side, just because the CFRG publishes "[insert cryptographic algorit=
hm's name] is fabulous=E2=80=9D I wouldn't expect every IETF WG to fall ove=
r themselves changing their MTI (Mandatory To Implement) algorithm.

I think this is unduly optimistic about the ability of IETF WGs to vet
their use of cryptography. The TLS WG has a long and ignominious
history of failure in the form of unforced errors, and that is merely
the most visible and researched one. These mistakes mostly aren't
algorithmic, but rather
how the algorithms fit together to form a protocol.

>
> The current practice that the Security ADs have been using is here [4], w=
hich resulted from input from the IETF community as a result of push back f=
rom implementers on what I called =E2=80=9Ccrypto proliferation". (yes the =
email referenced says TLS but that=E2=80=99s because folks with algorithms =
want to do that one first as most bang for buck and then move on to other W=
Gs)  You=E2=80=99ll note the CFRG isn=E2=80=99t listed there and I don=E2=
=80=99t think I=E2=80=99d require it be there, but what=E2=80=99s not docum=
ented there is what happens before authors go for code points.  Before auth=
ors are going to get a code point, they need to document their algorithm (i=
n English) someplace.  A lot of times that=E2=80=99s ended up being an inte=
rnet-draft that goes through the ISE process and gets published as an Infor=
mational RFC; examples include: GOST [5], Camellia [6], SEED [7], ARIA [8],=
 Rabbit [9], Brainpool [10], CLEFIA [11], and Kcipher-2 [12].  To get throu=
gh the ISE process they need to show some kind of review, here=E2=80=99s wh=
ere everybody says go to the CFRG and see what they say they=E2=80=99re the=
 cryptographers.  To be honest most of the time it=E2=80=99s pretty quiet. =
 Maybe that=E2=80=99s to do with the fact that many of the requests for rev=
iew are for national algorithms.
>
> In any event, I think we should consider the following (there might be mo=
re):
>
> 0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
> 1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
> 2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the =E2=80=9Cproces=
s=E2=80=9D?
>
> I use the term process her pretty loosely but it=E2=80=99ll address the C=
FRG impact on IETF adoption of cryptography.
>
> Here=E2=80=99s what I think:
>
> 0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
>
> I say no for a couple of reasons:
>
> a) I think it=E2=80=99s not necessary unless we=E2=80=99re going to start=
 standardizing cryptographic algorithms.   I don=E2=80=99t think the IETF h=
as ever published a cryptographic algorithm on standards track (more exampl=
es include [13][14][15][16]) instead what=E2=80=99s done is a standards tra=
ck RFC that documents the "use of cryptographic algorithm x in protocol y=
=E2=80=9D (e.g., [17][18][19]).  (yes there was one BCP that deprecate the =
use of well-known weak algorithms [20]).  I think many of the successes of =
the IETF actually come from protocols that were partially developed outside=
 of the process and then finished off (for some value of finished off) and =
I suspect the same will be true of any cryptographic algorithm published by=
 the IRTF or through the individual stream (more on this distinction later)=
.
>
> b) I can=E2=80=99t see having a WG or RG that has the =E2=80=9Cpower=E2=
=80=9D to enforce =E2=80=9Ccryptogoodness=E2=80=9D.  It would be perceived =
as a hammer with which to beat up draft authors, wg chains, and other ADs a=
nd if you=E2=80=99re following the thread on the IETF discuss list about St=
ephen=E2=80=99s perpass-attack draft you=E2=80=99ll note that seems to be a=
 fear shared by more than a couple of people.  Rechartering to enforce =E2=
=80=9Ccryptogoodness=E2=80=9D, I bet, will no doubt be challenging and I=E2=
=80=99d submit an unnecessary waste of time.

Do you think that if someone had beaten the TLS 1.0 authors over the
head about EtM vs MtE, that this would have been a bad thing? The
issue of the disconnect between what an engineer knows about crypto
and what they need to know about crypto is very far reaching: every
single WG that considers a cryptographic protocol faces it. The best
way I think to handle this is provide a central resource to ask: "hey,
we are doing X, is it a good idea?" and tell people they should
seriously consider it. That means having a very fast process, and
having a reputation for giving good answers.

>
> c) I really think the CFRG should look out past the IETF's time horizon. =
 You=E2=80=99ll note the word =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D in the CFRG=E2=80=99s c=
harter and from what I=E2=80=99ve seen adopting =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D crypt=
o is not really done it=E2=80=99s usually got to marinate for a while.  So =
having something we=E2=80=99d been thinking about for a while to replace sa=
y RC4 would have been well nice.  Now some of this is water under the bridg=
e but maybe we should be thinking two steps ahead to the next curve beyond =
say 25519, cha cha, etc.  I=E2=80=99d be cool if we actually did stuff like=
 provide a venue for folks to exchange test vectors etc when developing (pr=
eferably) open source crypto.

How many implementations does the world need?

Once again the distinction between primitives and protocols comes
back. A new block cipher definitely needs to marinate: we don't have a
comprehensive idea of what could be possible. But a new ECC parameter
set can be validated in a few minutes with GP/PARI: compute certain
invariants, and see that they avoid known bad choices. A new key
agreement protocol should require a solid proof and automatic
verification.
The process we follow needs to take this into account.

Post-Quantum Crypto is something we will need, and is going to need a
lot of development. NTRU is I think mature from a design perspective,
but patented, while McBits involves giant keys. (Not necessarily that
bad). The situation with post-quantum signatures is annoying: we have
Merkel signatures, but HFE variants are nicer to use, but a lot have
fallen, or it's unclear what parameters are needed. Anyway, we have
some urgent issues to deal with first.

>
> 1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
>
> I know what the fox says [21]: Hell yeah!
>
> There's *nothing, nada, zilch, null, z=C3=A9ro, =D8=B5=D9=81=D8=B1, =E9=
=9B=B6* stopping anybody from writing an individual draft and then asking f=
or it to be adopted by the RG.
>
>      Chairs: Do you prefer RG adoption emails come from
>      you (initiated by authors) or a more free-for-all approach
>      when authors ask that it be adopted from the RG?
>
> I wanted to put the final IETF nail in the coffin for MD2, MD4, and MD5 (=
certain uses) [22][23][24] and got some input from CFRG  participants.  If =
there=E2=80=99s more like this that need to be done, just do =E2=80=98em an=
d then we can use it them to deter folks from making bad choices.
>
> If you=E2=80=99re really keen, then I=E2=80=99d also like to suggest that=
 you volunteer with the ISE (Independent Stream Editor) to help review the =
cryptographic protocols that come through their stream.  There=E2=80=99s a =
couple on call, but more would certainly be welcome.  Mail to: rfc-ise@rfc-=
editor.org.
>
> 2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the =E2=80=9Cproces=
s=E2=80=9D?
>
> I think it kind of depends on the definition of =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D is,=
 the type of algorithm, the type of registry from which you=E2=80=99re requ=
esting a code point [25], and what the WG requires.  Let=E2=80=99s explore =
some of these:
>
> Based on what happened in the past, should the CFRG and not the ISE be th=
e stream where algorithms get published?  For those not in the know, the st=
ream dictates what kind of review the draft gets and what =E2=80=9Ckind=E2=
=80=9D of RFC can pop out at the end.

As an author, how do I determine what streams my drafts are going
into, and how do I push them to active consideration?
A lot of good crypto drafts sit around in limbo: I'm sure this is true
for all drafts, but for some of the crypto ones it's causing
actively exploited problems to linger unfixed for years.

>
> I suspect that authors care little about the stream.  They just want to g=
et published.  If the algorithm:
>
> a) Is a national algorithm - I=E2=80=99ve no doubt it=E2=80=99ll get revi=
ewed like every draft progressing through the process and possibly even som=
e errors will be uncovered (it=E2=80=99s happened).  Somebody who works for=
 the newly formed national gov't of Bitcoinlandia shows up with Cesar's Cip=
her - would =E2=80=9CBitcoinlandia=E2=80=99s Ceasar=E2=80=99s Cipher=E2=80=
=9D be blocked from publication?  I suspect that it wouldn=E2=80=99t as lon=
g as it was clear that it was a national algorithm or one of a suite of nat=
ional algorithms.  In any event, if changes were offered and not accepted I=
=E2=80=99m thinking the ISE is likely to let it go probably based on the gr=
ounds that the changes would make the published RFC differ from the already=
 published national standard.  Would the CFRG do something different?
>
> b) Has properly marinated over time and not been shown to have weakened c=
onsiderably and there was a security proof - I suspect that the grilling wo=
uld be procedural in that the authors would just need to have the intestina=
l fortitude to make it through the process.  I guess the same question from=
 a applies though.
>
> c) Is like b but it doesn=E2=80=99t have a security proof - If an author =
brings a draft to the CFRG is progression through the IRTF going to require=
 one?  If the an author goes to the ISE is the CFRG going to block progress=
ion based on a lack of security proof?
>
> d) Is =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D with no security proof - I=E2=80=99ve no doub=
t it=E2=80=99d get raked over the coals (i.e., given rough treatment), but =
=E2=80=A6 I guess the 800lbs Gorilla is on what grounds is it okay to stop =
a draft in its tracks?
>
> - How long must crypto marinate?
>
> - If it=E2=80=99s similar to something that=E2=80=99s already available s=
hould it be stopped?  Maybe the existing algorithm won=E2=80=99t work for w=
hatever reason or the consumers (I=E2=80=99m assuming there is somebody who=
 wants to use it it=E2=80=99s not just about getting an RFC published) are =
somehow sold on the =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D way.

I think if the already available protocol has stronger security
properties, and there isn't a compelling need for the new one, than we
should avoid giving people the choice.

>
> - If there=E2=80=99s no security proof, then how does an author get one (=
wait, pay, beg)?  Seriously: I know some cryptographers but they have day j=
obs and I know some researchers but I think they=E2=80=99re maybe more moti=
vated by publishing a new attack on a well-known and widely deployed protoc=
ol am I just supposed to know my role and not try to develop a cryptographi=
c protocol.

The way you do this is by looking in IACR for an eprint solving your
problem, and adapt that to your situation. I've never seen or heard of
an IETF protocol requiring a new primitive. If you are not a
cryptographer, you shouldn't be doing cryptography, any more than
someone who isn't a structural engineer should design a bridge. And
just as most bridges can be ordered from a catalogue, most protocols
don't require new crypto.

>
> - What if the authors are actually engaging and making changes but there =
is a point at which there is an impasse - can they document the known vulne=
rability/weakness in the security considerations and move on?

No. There is never a compelling reason to approve or use an algorithm
with a known weakness when a better one is available. If there is a
new
need that existing algorithms don't fill, then an effort should be
made to fill it with the best algorithm possible.

>
> There are also registries that only require expert review and there is no=
 requirement for them to consult with the CFRG on the goodness of algorithm=
s before choosing to give a code point.  I can=E2=80=99t think of a time wh=
en this happened and I=E2=80=99m pretty sure an expert wouldn=E2=80=99t do =
that, but I'm also unsure whether the process would be changed to give the =
CFRG veto power.

Depends on who the expert is. If you ask DJB or Tanja Lange about an
elliptic curve, you are asking the right people. Ask Knudsen about
block
ciphers. But if you ask Knudsen about curves, or DJB about block
ciphers, they won't know much more than you do. The best solution is
to have a
body of people, maybe a "Crypto Forum Group" who when asked can find
out what is known and document it.
>
> After getting here and re-reading what I wrote it all sounds like doom an=
d gloom but remember what the fox said!
>
> spt
>
> [0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03595.html
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03685.html
> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2014/
> [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/
> [4] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06470.html
> [5] GOST:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5830/
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5831/
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5832/
> [6] Camellia
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3713/
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5528/
> [7] SEED
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4269/
> [8] ARIA
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5794/
> [9] Rabbit
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4503/
> [10] Brainpool
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5639/
> [11] CLEIFA
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6114/
> [12] Kcipher-2
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7008/
> [13] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2104/
> [14] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/
> [15] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3447/
> [16] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3610/
> [17] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4056/
> [18] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/
> [19] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp/
> [20] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6649/
> [21] http://www.google.com/url?sa=3Dt&rct=3Dj&q=3D&esrc=3Ds&source=3Dweb&=
cd=3D1&ved=3D0CCsQtwIwAA&url=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dj=
ofNR_WkoCE&ei=3D5q_EUsv0MbSqsAT1-oDYDQ&usg=3DAFQjCNE9-Z1oW5gVjc6rJg_-KAhmjY=
_Qfg&bvm=3Dbv.58187178,d.cWc
> [22] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6149/
> [23] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6150/
> [24] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6151/
> [25] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5226/ and updates
> (actually check out https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-leiba-cotton-i=
ana-5226bis/)
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From adam@cypherspace.org  Wed Jan  8 07:17:56 2014
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From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: John Viega <john@viega.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Hi John

I've seen several people putting forward a similar argument.  There is so=
me
logic but its I think an incorrect conclusion.

I understand the conflict of interest when people are somewhat pushing th=
eir
companies approach, related to their product or implementtion choices the=
y
have some investment in, but generally tempered by reasonableness.  All t=
he
companies that care can put their voice in also.  IPR disclosures are als=
o
there.  Loose consensus and running code copes with that ok.

I think NSA sabotage is a significantly different and its unrealistic to
just assume a chair has no influence.  A non-NSA chair would strive for
impartiality with regard to their employers interests.  If certicom wants=
 to
push something and cisco something else they are both pushing for somethi=
ng
reasonably secure as a fundamental assumption and trying to make secure
systems so their customers will buy them.  Forward secrecy is good,
architectural weaknesses bad etc.

The NSA is NOT in that boat.  They are explicitly sabotaging security on =
a
grand and systematic scale at all levels including standardization.  They
dislike forward secrecy, and like architectural weakness and architectura=
l
tap points and sabotaged RNGs, and fragile hard to implement correctly
standards with traps.  There were numerous news articles by Greenwald and
others backed by NSA docs about these strategies.

I suppose I need to go find the declassified military sabotage manual tha=
t I
mentioned Ian Grigg quotes from.  You, and others making this argument,
should read and extrapolate (the part is a very short, one page).  "OSS's
Simple Sabotage Field Manual, a 1944 document"

http://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/CAcert_Inc/Board/oss/oss_sabotage.html

No I am not being paranoid, the journalists have the docs, and they are
publishing the summaries and some of the actual docs, and their technical
analysts supporting them are Schneier & Applebaum.

So again I do not find it acceptable to have an agent of a now known
industrial scale sabateur in a chair position.  Maybe you would feel
different if it were Chinese military intelligence and they were shown vi=
a
leaks to have succeeded in backdooring a protocol the world is using, bas=
ed
on abused good faith in open standards, and say used it to exfiltrate inf=
o
from US defense contractors and military, and an openly Chinese MI
affiliated guy was co-chair.  Not sure what triggers people to get it.  I=
ts
ridiculously and egregiously inappropriate from where I am sitting.

Adam

(IETF participant since 1996)

On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 09:37:36AM -0500, John Viega wrote:
>   I agree with David that competence doesn=E2=80=99t factor into it.
>
>   Conflict of interest is an issue here.  But again, even before recent
>   NSA revelations, there would often be participants with a conflict=E2=
=80=94
>   good of the participant=E2=80=99s company vs. good of the world.  Eve=
n now,
>   where NSA is part of the threat model, we shouldn=E2=80=99t expect ev=
ery actor
>   with a conflict is going to walk in with an NSA badge.
>   I don=E2=80=99t think conflict of interest is a good enough basis for=
 removing
>   a chair.  The IETF/IRTF needs to be able to design standards when man=
y
>   actors have conflicts, and should be able to give confidence in what
>   they produce.
>   The most important thing from my perspective is making sure the
>   IETF/IRTF has the public trust.  I think it=E2=80=99s possible to do =
this
>   without removing Kevin, especially if the IETF/IRTF can clearly
>   communicate how it prevents subversion.
>   That is, if the world cares enough.  I suspect that very few people a=
re
>   going to boycott IETF/IRTF-driven standards if no further action is
>   taken.
>   John
>   John Viega | cel +1 212-321-0902
>   On Jan 8, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Adam Back <[1]adam@cypherspace.org> wrote=
:
>
>     I support Trevor in raising the conflict of interest, its pretty
>     egregious
>     and Kevin should in my view resign gracefully to end this mess.  If
>     hes
>     clean and works for IA as he says its a nice way out.  If hes not
>     and is
>     actually part of the sabotage side its still a quieter way out than
>     being
>     pushed.  It probably doesnt look as clean either way if he is
>     pushed.  If he
>     is not pushed it just creates bad impression of the impartiality of
>     IRTF. Sort of like the justice system closing ranks and supporting
>     Hoover after
>     the scandal and him staying in office with immunity by analogy.  I
>     am not
>     sure of the game theory from NSA sabotage side, if they would prefe=
r
>     Kevin
>     (whether on their budget or not) to let the noise continue and be
>     pushed or
>     skip the noise and resign, or noise continue, plus fail to push him
>     and
>     continue with the resentment and reputation loss to IRTF.
>     There is some validity in what David said below also.  Some of
>     Kevins stuff
>     looks suspicious to others also, its certainly not just Trevor, but
>     of
>     course its not provable - the worst parts are either innocuously
>     ill-considered/sub-optimal suggestions, as with the next guy prone
>     to human
>     failure (which is somewhat plausible) or designed to be unprovable.
>     $250m/year managed with military intent can achieve that you know,
>     its not
>     hard.  There are unclassified military intelligence double agent
>     sabotge
>     manuals that Ian Grigg posts quotes from now and then that show the
>     basic
>     ideas.  Most of them still seem quite relevant.
>     Anyway the point I wanted to draw from David's comment is we cant
>     and wont
>     be able to prove it.  BUT I think anyone is certainly within their
>     right to
>     comment on things that look suspicious, or insecure.  See I think
>     for
>     comparison the RNG bias Bleichenbacher found in DSA RNG leading to
>     key
>     recovery are fair game.  As is Ferguson et al's comments about
>     EC_DRBG.  Or
>     Trevors about some of the decisions relating to Dragonfly.  Or Prof
>     Bernstein's comments about Kevin's recent post here about certicom
>     patents
>     pushing towards less secure curves (see the crypto list).
>     Its called peer review.  If anyone cant stand their thoughts and
>     public
>     statements being peer reviewed, probably participating in IRTF/IETF
>     or
>     uncensored internet discussion in general is not for them.  As we
>     have
>     pretty incontrovertible proof that NSA has been sabotaging
>     standards,
>     unfortunately that opens up review of input to the standards
>     influenced by
>     any NSA participants.  Its ugly but we didnt create the problem,
>     Kevin's
>     employer did.  Sorry.
>     So unfortunately it is probably relevant that apart from conflict o=
f
>     interest, the public record is not suspicionless.  Imagine NSA /
>     NIST
>     communications about EC DRBG were public.  There'd be a pretty clea=
r
>     public
>     interest to go over the history of it, see who was supporting it or
>     aware of
>     it within NIST.  Its really not that dissimilar.
>     We may in the longer term have to review and even deprecate existin=
g
>     standards as a result of this militarized sabotage of its own and
>     global
>     civilian infrastructure.
>     ps I support Trevor in rejecting Lars assertion that IRTF co-chair
>     has no
>     influence.
>     Adam
>     (IETF participant since 1996).
>     On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:36:07AM -0500, David McGrew wrote:
>
>     Hi Trevor,
>     I recognize and support your right to raise the question of a
>     conflict of interest between the NSA and CFRG.  I am confident that
>     the IRTF chair and IAB will give it due consideration.
>     However, I am concerned that your efforts to find evidence in the
>     CFRG email archive that support the idea that Kevin is incompetent
>     are unwarranted and counterproductive.   While many people agree
>     with you about the conflict of interest, many disagree with you on
>     the subject of competence.  It is not hard to go through the email
>     archive and find examples where someone misstated something, or did
>     not explain something completely, but doing so does not advance the
>     security or privacy on the Internet, which is the goal that you and
>     I share for CFRG.  That goal would best be served by focusing the
>     valuable time of the research group members (a scarce resource that
>     we need to manage well) on addressing technical issues.   Therefore=
,
>     I respectfully ask that, in your request to the IAB, you focus on
>     the key issue of the conflict of interest.
>     David
>     On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>
>     Hi Lars,
>     Thanks for considering this request.
>     Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>     --
>     I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes an=
d
>     mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
>     handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single
>     "occurrence",
>     and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severit=
y
>     that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>     I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the
>     benefit
>     of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
>     CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead
>     review
>     of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
>     debacle it has become.
>     --
>     I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
>     employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
>     (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
>     (B) the impact on RG participation.
>     Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
>     group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
>     the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>     That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
>     responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when
>     and
>     how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
>     with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
>     steering a group's work.
>     You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
>     adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.
>     I'm
>     not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
>     Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy
>     widely;
>     or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
>     these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
>     not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>     Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
>     not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
>     "affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
>     participating.
>     Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
>     from participating.
>     But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's =
a
>     responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
>     support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
>     sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>     --
>     Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelation=
s
>     of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
>     consider.
>     You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
>     NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>     You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
>     organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
>     statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>     We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
>     standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
>     organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
>     message that it's no big deal.
>     This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but
>     it
>     needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>     --
>     I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are
>     of
>     great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
>     perspective IAB possesses.
>     I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue
>     and
>     expressing its judgement.
>     Trevor
>     (a couple comments below)
>     On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <[2]lars@netapp.com>
>     wrote:
>
>     Hi,
>     on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role
>     as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the
>     co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The
>     request stated several reasons for the removal:
>     (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the
>     "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>     (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have
>     weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>     (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly"
>     to the IETF's TLS working group.
>     (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>     I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails
>     that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your
>     feedback.
>     David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a
>     detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded
>     that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I
>     share this conclusion.
>
>     Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
>     begins in October 2012, skipping:
>     * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
>     * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security
>     [2]
>     * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
>     alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>     [1]
>     [3]http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
>     http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
>     http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>     [2]
>     http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>     [3]
>     http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>     http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
>     [...]
>
>     So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many othe=
r
>     organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group
>     secretaries.
>
>     The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 sectio=
n
>     5.3 states:
>     """
>     The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress
>     in
>     the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the
>     conduct
>     of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate
>     responsibility
>     for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
>     """
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     Cfrg@irtf.org
>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>     .
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     [4]Cfrg@irtf.org
>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     [5]Cfrg@irtf.org
>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>References
>
>   1. mailto:adam@cypherspace.org
>   2. mailto:lars@netapp.com
>   3. http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
>   4. mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org
>   5. mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org

>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From TurnerS@ieca.com  Wed Jan  8 07:27:33 2014
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On Jan 08, 2014, at 07:20, Paterson, Kenny <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk> =
wrote:

>=20
>=20
> On 08/01/2014 12:06, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Hi Sean,
>>=20
>> On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>> My list is kind of short:
>>=20
>> thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to =
prioritize
>> work.
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS =
or
>>> not:
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
>>>=20
>>> If so, let=B9s do a draft!
>>>=20
>>> 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we=B9re moving towards EC =
(am I
>>> wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more =
about
>>> (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in =
fear):
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
>>>=20
>>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>>=20
>> #0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment =
on #2.
>>=20
>> Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem =
that
>> we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
>> extensive use in the Internet.
>=20
> <excellent explanation of the shortcomings of QKD excised>
>=20
>>=20
>> My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
>> http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we =
need
>> to get these points understood more widely, we could publish =
something
>> on it.
>=20
> Thanks for the reminder about this talk, which I very much enjoyed at =
the
> time.
>=20
> A few years back, we wrote a paper [1] explaining why we believed that =
QKD
> is not commercially interesting. Some of the points are orthogonal to
> yours, some overlap.
>=20
> [1] Quantum cryptography: a practical information security =
perspective.
> Kenneth G. Paterson, Fred Piper, Ruediger Schack
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0406147
>=20
> Cheers
>=20
> Kenny

I love instant gratification!=20

spt=

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On Jan 08, 2014, at 06:09, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> =
wrote:

>=20
> Hi Max,
>=20
> On 01/08/2014 02:31 AM, Max Pritikin (pritikin) wrote:
>>=20
>> With the advent of DICE (DTLS in Constrained Environments), and
>> similar attempts to discuss optimizations, it would seem that any
>> discussion of "next generation" PKI discussions should include
>> discussion on how to optimize the X.509 certificate/chain format.
>> That appears to be missing in this conversation so far.
>=20
> True. OTOH, DICE is definitely predicated on DTLS so any
> discussion on cert formats for that would fit into the TLS
> WG discussion on 1.3. I've not however seen that listed on
> any 1.3 wish-list so far so it seems unlikely to me at
> least that DICE will push things along here.
>=20
>> I agree that any replacement for our current PKI is going to run into
>> the same complexities. So, rather than assume they don't exist, would
>> it be reasonable to look at how to optimize the existing work?
>=20
> I'm not sure. I think that might run the risk of inheriting
> all the warts (e.g. policy mapping, the N-R bit) without
> providing much incentive to change. When we were working on
> RFC3280bis (which became 5280) we did try to do as much of
> that as we could, but very few simplifications turned out
> to be possible. It is fair to say though that a lot of the
> real practical problems had not really bitten folks at
> that stage though, so I guess its possible that the same
> exercise done now might pay off.
>=20
>> Some off the cuff examples to frame what I mean: - Define a specific
>> lightweight trust anchor format (yes, we can all use X.509 certs. But
>> what about a canonical smaller format?) - Optimized version of the
>> X.509 cert itself: Perhaps a compressed format similar to the (old,
>> abandoned and incomplete)
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-comp-x509-00 draft for
>> compressed certs? Perhaps a v4 format that is restructured to provide
>> easier/quicker parsing Or if a non-ASN1 format is truly preferred
>> then such a format could be defined that is can carry the same
>> semantics as the existing PKI (namely, if the problem is ASN1 then we
>> can fix that without also re-inventing all the rest)  Approaching the
>> questions from this angle leads me to ask what _exactly_ the concerns
>> with the current PKI are. Is it the ASN1, the CA infrastructure, the
>> certificate chains, the cruft in each individual certificate, or?
>=20
> Personally, I think the main problems with X.509 PKI to date
> have been around (the need for, and absence of widely supported
> standard for) enrollment and (particularly name) constraints
> when there are many CAs. Dealing with ASN.1 is a PITA, but a
> well-known one, so that'd be low down on my list anyway. I
> know you've spent a lot of effort trying to help with the
> enrollment problem with EST and I do hope that works out,
> but we don't know yet.
>=20
> Again though, I don't think thrashing out the pros and cons
> of X.509 on this list is a good plan. Better would be for a
> bunch of really-interested parties to go into a huddle and
> come up with a worked out proposal. (But if a bunch of
> semi-interested parties ask for a new list to talk about
> this, I've no problem helping that happen, though wouldn't
> be very hopeful of a useful outcome.)

I=92m keeping  list now :)

spt

> S.
>=20
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>>=20
>> - max
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Jan 6, 2014, at 3:39 PM, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of
>>>>>> scope for CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I
>>>>>> understand you right.)
>>>>=20
>>>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.
>>>=20
>>> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers nor a
>>> sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested in a
>>> nextgen thing.
>>>=20
>>>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or
>>>> mired in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish
>>>> list ... Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable
>>>> forums in IETF for such a topic.
>>>=20
>>> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but=20
>>> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or not to
>>> start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
>>>=20
>>> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the web
>>> PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do=20
>>> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a=20
>>> security/crypto researcher though probably).
>>>=20
>>> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to talk
>>> about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non X.509 based
>>> PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's very much
>>> evolutionary and starts from X.509.
>>>=20
>>> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security topics
>>> if none of the above fit.
>>>=20
>>> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and propose
>>> stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try help PKI nextgen
>>> stuff progress in the IETF should there be credible proposals.
>>>=20
>>> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no matter
>>> how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main reasons IMO are
>>> that replacements are likely to suffer a lot of the same (or
>>> equivalent) complexity since its a complex problem, and that any
>>> credible replacement will take at least a few years to work out and
>>> them 5-10 to get deployed which seems to be beyond the horizon for
>>> researchers (speaking as one who chases funding;-). One could argue
>>> that that's why of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches,
>>> only CT seems to be left standing.
>>>=20
>>> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI is not
>>> likely to be a useful place to start. We know those, and any
>>> credible approach would start with a fairly well worked out
>>> proposal, including consideration of that 5-10 year overlap period.
>>> Its not easy;-)
>>>=20
>>> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of concept
>>> that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be a runner, and we
>>> have learned a lot about the wrinkles in X.509 based PKI over the
>>> years so there is hope maybe.
>>>=20
>>> S.
>>>=20
>>> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before diving in,
>>> or ask someone who might be familiar, which could include me.
>>>=20
>>> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey [2]
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/ [3]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix [4]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list=20
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>=20


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Hi Adam,

On 01/08/2014 03:17 PM, Adam Back wrote:
> Hi John
> 
> I've seen several people putting forward a similar argument.  There is some
> logic but its I think an incorrect conclusion.

I think there's a bit more subtlety to the conflict of interest
issue than maybe some folks appreciate. (If this is old-news
for you, sorry for wasting the bytes:-)

Within the IETF its not that uncommon to have conflicts of
interest where a company would like to sabotage a piece of
standards work, in ways that seem quite similar to the current
situation and that do not involve IPR, nor the misbehaviour
of an individual chair.

Say company-x have a product doing some proprietary thing
that has significant market share. Then others propose to
standardise that function, which company-x might consider
would lessen their advantage with their product. It would not
at all be a surprise to see people acting for company-x
(employed, as consultants or business partners) trying to
bugger up the standards process by e.g. trying to make the
standard take ages, be over-complex or omit some crucial
functionality. And if company-x aren't dumb then that can
be attempted without any obvious evidence being left about.

Now if company-x are of any size, then its quite likely
that employees of theirs are chairing other WGs. And for
a long-lived WG with a generic charter, it'd not be at
all unusual if someone working for company-X co-chairs
the WG in question.

So - what's different here? Are we saying that if a
company-x marketing department memo leaks that says "let's
bugger up <foo>" then we should fire the person who's
co-chairing that WG?

I do agree that NSA's US$250M/yr for messing up Internet
security is just horrendous, and we should be (and some of
us are) working hard to make that wasted-effort to the
extent we can, but what I'm not seeing is the difference
between the NSA situation and the company-x situation as
it affects a sitting chair in the absence of a smoking
gun that directly implicates the chair involved.

And if Lars or the IAB fire Kevin for his affiliation then
I'd be quite worried about the precedent that'd set especially
since there will be a lot of company-y folks who might in
future see that going down the same route could benefit
company-y and damage company-x, even if the accusations were
baseless. We could be creating a significant DoS vector
that way.

To be clear about the above - I don't think that either
NSA nor company-x are doing the right thing, but we do
need to do our best to make the processes work well and
fairly even if they are bad-actors.

A couple of other points below, but those are maybe less
interesting.

> I understand the conflict of interest when people are somewhat
> pushing their companies approach, related to their product or
> implementtion choices they have some investment in, but generally
> tempered by reasonableness.  All the companies that care can put
> their voice in also.  IPR disclosures are also there.  Loose
> consensus and running code copes with that ok.

I think you left out a critical part of that, at least as its
done in the IETF and IRTF - the participants ideally act as
individuals and not on behalf of their employers and are treated
that way. There is a serious danger of going down the slippery
slope to paid membership if we deviate from that, with what I
think would be overall worse outcomes. And there's a constant
pressure to take that slippery slope for other reasons, e.g.
to "better" handle IPR, or to recognise the reality that it
costs a lot to fully participate, so we do need to be very
careful about anything related to affiliation alone lest we
damage the openness that allows an idiot in an Irish university
to end up as a sec AD:-)

> I think NSA sabotage is a significantly different and its unrealistic to
> just assume a chair has no influence.  A non-NSA chair would strive for
> impartiality with regard to their employers interests.  If certicom
> wants to
> push something and cisco something else they are both pushing for something
> reasonably secure as a fundamental assumption and trying to make secure
> systems so their customers will buy them.  Forward secrecy is good,
> architectural weaknesses bad etc.
> 
> The NSA is NOT in that boat.  They are explicitly sabotaging security on a
> grand and systematic scale at all levels including standardization.  They
> dislike forward secrecy, and like architectural weakness and architectural
> tap points and sabotaged RNGs, and fragile hard to implement correctly
> standards with traps.  There were numerous news articles by Greenwald and
> others backed by NSA docs about these strategies.

Other than the headline 250/yr I think I've only seen
convincing evidence related to the RNG stuff though. The
rest afaik is speculation. If I missed more that's been
published, I'd appreciate pointers. Or if the folks with
access to the materials have more evidence on that aspect, I
really hope they manage to publish that sooner rather than
later.

But there's IMO a far more likely explanation for why we end up
with stuff that fits this particular speculation - a lot of
standards work ends up being dominated by people with more
complex requirements and its always hard to keep stuff simple.
In the case of security protocols, the US DoD requirements, as a
customer (e.g. for PKI) are about as complicated as it gets and they
can afford to pay folks to work on that. So we've ended up with
PKI that's over complex for many other use-cases. A sort of
similar thing happened with oauth, where the (non-govt) enterprise
use-cases dominated for similar reasons.

And I think the security folks within the IETF (including
me) also need to take some blame for putting too much
emphasis on "purity" (for want of a better word) and not
enough on deployability and simplicity. I hope (but also
think) we have learned that lesson.

> I suppose I need to go find the declassified military sabotage manual
> that I
> mentioned Ian Grigg quotes from.  You, and others making this argument,
> should read and extrapolate (the part is a very short, one page).  "OSS's
> Simple Sabotage Field Manual, a 1944 document"
> 
> http://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/CAcert_Inc/Board/oss/oss_sabotage.html
> 
> No I am not being paranoid, the journalists have the docs, and they are
> publishing the summaries and some of the actual docs, and their technical
> analysts supporting them are Schneier & Applebaum.

I'm not saying you're paranoid, nor that Bruce of Jake are
wrong, but I'm not convinced by that part of the argument, as
of now.

Cheers,
S.

> 
> So again I do not find it acceptable to have an agent of a now known
> industrial scale sabateur in a chair position.  Maybe you would feel
> different if it were Chinese military intelligence and they were shown via
> leaks to have succeeded in backdooring a protocol the world is using, based
> on abused good faith in open standards, and say used it to exfiltrate info
> from US defense contractors and military, and an openly Chinese MI
> affiliated guy was co-chair.  Not sure what triggers people to get it.  Its
> ridiculously and egregiously inappropriate from where I am sitting.
> 
> Adam
> 
> (IETF participant since 1996)
> 
> On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 09:37:36AM -0500, John Viega wrote:
>>   I agree with David that competence doesn’t factor into it.
>>
>>   Conflict of interest is an issue here.  But again, even before recent
>>   NSA revelations, there would often be participants with a conflict—
>>   good of the participant’s company vs. good of the world.  Even now,
>>   where NSA is part of the threat model, we shouldn’t expect every actor
>>   with a conflict is going to walk in with an NSA badge.
>>   I don’t think conflict of interest is a good enough basis for removing
>>   a chair.  The IETF/IRTF needs to be able to design standards when many
>>   actors have conflicts, and should be able to give confidence in what
>>   they produce.
>>   The most important thing from my perspective is making sure the
>>   IETF/IRTF has the public trust.  I think it’s possible to do this
>>   without removing Kevin, especially if the IETF/IRTF can clearly
>>   communicate how it prevents subversion.
>>   That is, if the world cares enough.  I suspect that very few people are
>>   going to boycott IETF/IRTF-driven standards if no further action is
>>   taken.
>>   John
>>   John Viega | cel +1 212-321-0902
>>   On Jan 8, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Adam Back <[1]adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
>>
>>     I support Trevor in raising the conflict of interest, its pretty
>>     egregious
>>     and Kevin should in my view resign gracefully to end this mess.  If
>>     hes
>>     clean and works for IA as he says its a nice way out.  If hes not
>>     and is
>>     actually part of the sabotage side its still a quieter way out than
>>     being
>>     pushed.  It probably doesnt look as clean either way if he is
>>     pushed.  If he
>>     is not pushed it just creates bad impression of the impartiality of
>>     IRTF. Sort of like the justice system closing ranks and supporting
>>     Hoover after
>>     the scandal and him staying in office with immunity by analogy.  I
>>     am not
>>     sure of the game theory from NSA sabotage side, if they would prefer
>>     Kevin
>>     (whether on their budget or not) to let the noise continue and be
>>     pushed or
>>     skip the noise and resign, or noise continue, plus fail to push him
>>     and
>>     continue with the resentment and reputation loss to IRTF.
>>     There is some validity in what David said below also.  Some of
>>     Kevins stuff
>>     looks suspicious to others also, its certainly not just Trevor, but
>>     of
>>     course its not provable - the worst parts are either innocuously
>>     ill-considered/sub-optimal suggestions, as with the next guy prone
>>     to human
>>     failure (which is somewhat plausible) or designed to be unprovable.
>>     $250m/year managed with military intent can achieve that you know,
>>     its not
>>     hard.  There are unclassified military intelligence double agent
>>     sabotge
>>     manuals that Ian Grigg posts quotes from now and then that show the
>>     basic
>>     ideas.  Most of them still seem quite relevant.
>>     Anyway the point I wanted to draw from David's comment is we cant
>>     and wont
>>     be able to prove it.  BUT I think anyone is certainly within their
>>     right to
>>     comment on things that look suspicious, or insecure.  See I think
>>     for
>>     comparison the RNG bias Bleichenbacher found in DSA RNG leading to
>>     key
>>     recovery are fair game.  As is Ferguson et al's comments about
>>     EC_DRBG.  Or
>>     Trevors about some of the decisions relating to Dragonfly.  Or Prof
>>     Bernstein's comments about Kevin's recent post here about certicom
>>     patents
>>     pushing towards less secure curves (see the crypto list).
>>     Its called peer review.  If anyone cant stand their thoughts and
>>     public
>>     statements being peer reviewed, probably participating in IRTF/IETF
>>     or
>>     uncensored internet discussion in general is not for them.  As we
>>     have
>>     pretty incontrovertible proof that NSA has been sabotaging
>>     standards,
>>     unfortunately that opens up review of input to the standards
>>     influenced by
>>     any NSA participants.  Its ugly but we didnt create the problem,
>>     Kevin's
>>     employer did.  Sorry.
>>     So unfortunately it is probably relevant that apart from conflict of
>>     interest, the public record is not suspicionless.  Imagine NSA /
>>     NIST
>>     communications about EC DRBG were public.  There'd be a pretty clear
>>     public
>>     interest to go over the history of it, see who was supporting it or
>>     aware of
>>     it within NIST.  Its really not that dissimilar.
>>     We may in the longer term have to review and even deprecate existing
>>     standards as a result of this militarized sabotage of its own and
>>     global
>>     civilian infrastructure.
>>     ps I support Trevor in rejecting Lars assertion that IRTF co-chair
>>     has no
>>     influence.
>>     Adam
>>     (IETF participant since 1996).
>>     On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:36:07AM -0500, David McGrew wrote:
>>
>>     Hi Trevor,
>>     I recognize and support your right to raise the question of a
>>     conflict of interest between the NSA and CFRG.  I am confident that
>>     the IRTF chair and IAB will give it due consideration.
>>     However, I am concerned that your efforts to find evidence in the
>>     CFRG email archive that support the idea that Kevin is incompetent
>>     are unwarranted and counterproductive.   While many people agree
>>     with you about the conflict of interest, many disagree with you on
>>     the subject of competence.  It is not hard to go through the email
>>     archive and find examples where someone misstated something, or did
>>     not explain something completely, but doing so does not advance the
>>     security or privacy on the Internet, which is the goal that you and
>>     I share for CFRG.  That goal would best be served by focusing the
>>     valuable time of the research group members (a scarce resource that
>>     we need to manage well) on addressing technical issues.   Therefore,
>>     I respectfully ask that, in your request to the IAB, you focus on
>>     the key issue of the conflict of interest.
>>     David
>>     On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>
>>     Hi Lars,
>>     Thanks for considering this request.
>>     Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>>     --
>>     I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
>>     mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
>>     handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single
>>     "occurrence",
>>     and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
>>     that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>>     I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the
>>     benefit
>>     of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
>>     CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead
>>     review
>>     of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
>>     debacle it has become.
>>     --
>>     I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
>>     employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
>>     (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
>>     (B) the impact on RG participation.
>>     Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
>>     group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
>>     the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>>     That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
>>     responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when
>>     and
>>     how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
>>     with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
>>     steering a group's work.
>>     You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
>>     adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.
>>     I'm
>>     not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
>>     Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy
>>     widely;
>>     or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
>>     these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
>>     not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>>     Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
>>     not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
>>     "affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
>>     participating.
>>     Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
>>     from participating.
>>     But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
>>     responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
>>     support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
>>     sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>>     --
>>     Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
>>     of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
>>     consider.
>>     You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
>>     NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>>     You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
>>     organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
>>     statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>>     We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
>>     standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
>>     organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
>>     message that it's no big deal.
>>     This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but
>>     it
>>     needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>>     --
>>     I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are
>>     of
>>     great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
>>     perspective IAB possesses.
>>     I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue
>>     and
>>     expressing its judgement.
>>     Trevor
>>     (a couple comments below)
>>     On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <[2]lars@netapp.com>
>>     wrote:
>>
>>     Hi,
>>     on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role
>>     as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the
>>     co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The
>>     request stated several reasons for the removal:
>>     (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the
>>     "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>>     (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have
>>     weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>>     (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly"
>>     to the IETF's TLS working group.
>>     (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>>     I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails
>>     that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your
>>     feedback.
>>     David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a
>>     detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded
>>     that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I
>>     share this conclusion.
>>
>>     Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
>>     begins in October 2012, skipping:
>>     * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
>>     * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security
>>     [2]
>>     * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
>>     alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>>     [1]
>>     [3]http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
>>     http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03052.html
>>     http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/83/minutes/minutes-83-cfrg.txt
>>     [2]
>>     http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>>     [3]
>>     http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
>>     http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
>>     [...]
>>
>>     So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other
>>     organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group
>>     secretaries.
>>
>>     The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section
>>     5.3 states:
>>     """
>>     The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress
>>     in
>>     the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the
>>     conduct
>>     of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate
>>     responsibility
>>     for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
>>     """
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     Cfrg mailing list
>>     Cfrg@irtf.org
>>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>     .
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     Cfrg mailing list
>>     [4]Cfrg@irtf.org
>>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     Cfrg mailing list
>>     [5]Cfrg@irtf.org
>>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>> References
>>
>>   1. mailto:adam@cypherspace.org
>>   2. mailto:lars@netapp.com
>>   3. http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03046.html
>>   4. mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org
>>   5. mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org
> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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From: "Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <pritikin@cisco.com>
To: Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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re: X509 PKI update discussion

We can (and probably will) quibble about the details in an other forum than=
 CFRG. I'll watch for the conversation and am pleased to know Sean is keepi=
ng a list.=20

On Jan 8, 2014, at 8:29 AM, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>
 wrote:

>>=20
>> Again though, I don't think thrashing out the pros and cons
>> of X.509 on this list is a good plan.

Fair enough, the conversation steered that way but I'm happy to move to an =
alternate location.

The discussion started here is a good one. With DICE requiring DTLS and w T=
LS 1.3 ongoing the timing might be right. =20

>> Better would be for a
>> bunch of really-interested parties to go into a huddle and
>> come up with a worked out proposal. (But if a bunch of
>> semi-interested parties ask for a new list to talk about
>> this, I've no problem helping that happen, though wouldn't
>> be very hopeful of a useful outcome.)
>=20
> I=92m keeping  list now :)
>=20
> spt

I'm tentatively in agreement with much of the discussion so far. Particular=
ly regarding the various and multiple principle name issues.

I'd like to add though that "PKI" includes more than just the "global inter=
net" use case that has been much discussed. A valid use case we also need t=
o consider involves enterprise specific key infrastructures.

I'll watch for the continued conversation elsewhere. Cheers,

- max=

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Subject: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Dear all,
draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
2^255+\epsilon and higher.
I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
conversation.

Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
body use/typos/general nastiness?
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Wed Jan  8 09:22:05 2014
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On 01/08/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
> conversation.
> 
> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
> body use/typos/general nastiness?

No objection, but there's maybe some checking to be done
before we're ready to push the button.

One thing though is that rfc 3526 [1] is standards track
so if there's a reason for that (and there may or may not
be;-) then we might want these to be the same which'd
mean not doing 'em in cfrg. That can be figured out later
though.

S.


[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526

> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> 

From dbrown@certicom.com  Wed Jan  8 09:32:47 2014
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sean Turner
> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 12:26 AM
> 
> 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS or
not:
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
>

Maybe CFRG should compare RSA-KEM to RSA-OAEP?  

Is there a signature analogue to RSA-KEM?

KEM is ISO 18033-2, but not in PKCS#1 (last I checked, which was long ago).

RSA-KEM looks cleaner and simpler, at least to me, though is perhaps less
efficient?

Since some in CFRG are interested in provable security, how do these two
compare on that front?  Especially, in the standard model?  A while back
several people (including) me found some theoretical impossibility results
against security proofs about RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS in the standard model,
but since then I have mostly forgotten about that topic. These results
mostly concerned IND-CCA2 security.  I forget if these results apply to
RSA-KEM.  I vaguely recall some positive research results.


 
> 
> 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am I
wrong
> here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about (e.g., in
the
> next version of the protocol use this or run away in fear):
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/

Seems good.  In my own security analyses, one of the security arguments for
ECDSA needed the ephemeral keys to be message-constant to make the ROM work.
Maybe that was just a deficiency in my proof techniques.   I haven't
reviewed the specific algorithm in 6979, but I would be inclined to give a
slight edge to deterministic algs for ECDSA ephemeral keys.


> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/

Seems good.  I had no idea the existing IETF POP excluded using ECDSA
signatures for ECDH keys. 

> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/

I don't see a security problem.  Indeed, SEC1 permits similar filtering in
the key generation algorithm to facilitate accelerated verification of ECDSA
signatures.

The SEC1 encoding is really meant to be inserted wherever a definite octet
string is needed, mainly in ASN.1.  I believe the header byte was meant to
serve a dual tag-length role (that provided what was missing from the curve
id).  Maybe this I-D could propose something more specific to ASN.1.

I wonder if this compact representation might conflict with other proposals,
in that it becomes an untagged integer. 

> 
> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt

I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor's
algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
area, but am interested.

Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just begs
pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is perfectly
reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
pointless.  

But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even try to boldly
quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some well-defined claim,
calculated via a series of estimates.  The status quo is to just claim that
algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit security, whatever that means,
perhaps adding the exclusion against quantum computers.  Adding an estimated
likelihood of a quantum computer gives a more meaning of what kind of
security is being claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already have
made such an estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to
postquantum.  

I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for CFRG.  If
so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an alternative forum.

An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a large
nation.  If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn't have to resort to
any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the latter.  Well, the
chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or more realistically, maybe
the quantum computer is kept on reserve, and more mundane cryptanalysis is
used on a daily basis, maybe because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just lay
little lower, if a QC is available? Anyway, the loose inference I'm drawing
is that a quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most
likely parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in the
near future.  Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified
likelihood. If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I'd make a wildly
different number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
unfortunately.  

I wonder if others have more substantial arguments. 



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From mpg@elzevir.fr  Wed Jan  8 09:34:25 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Comments on side channel draft
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On 08/01/2014 01:21, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Blinding is my second choice compared to constant time. The reason is
> that blinding might not work perfectly, whereas circuit-like programs have
> no timing sidechannels by definition.
> 
Maybe the draft should go into more details about he possible shortcomings of
blinding then.

I feel like, for existing implementations, it's often easier to add blinding at
some well-chosen places than to rewrite their whole arithmetic from scratch to
be constant-time. So, used properly, it can be an interesting way to gradually
enhance the resistance of existing implementations.

> The problem is that one really cannot tell what does and does not contain
> jumps without looking at the assembler output.

Agreed. However, there seems to be ways to code things that are commonly
accepted as producing no hidden branches on common platforms with common compilers.

> Mix in the different compilers, architectures, and compiler options, and
> this is far, far too much work for me to reasonably do.
> 
Sure, but by the same reasoning it's too much work for any implementer wanting
to write portable code (so that assembly isn't an option). IMO this is precisely
in such situations that it is useful to share the collective knowledge of the
CFRG in a document that can then be relied upon by others, even if it's not
exhaustive.

If providing reliable solutions is too hard, then at least the draft could warn
about constructs that may look constant-time but are actually not of some common
platforms. Examples could include integer division (see below), and the "hidden
branch in 'c = (a == b)'" issue if it's still an issue with common compilers on
common platforms.

> Even integer division is not constant time on some CPU families.
> 
Well, it's not just some exotic CPUs, it includes common Intel, AMD, ARM and Via
CPUs at least, according to [1] (which focuses on floating point but also tests
integer operation).

[1]: https://wiki.mozilla.org/User:Bjacob/ArithmeticTimingDifferences

Manuel.

From paul@marvell.com  Wed Jan  8 09:38:40 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <pritikin@cisco.com>, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 09:38:21 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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On 1/8/14, 3:09 AM, "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:

>
>Hi Max,
>
>On 01/08/2014 02:31 AM, Max Pritikin (pritikin) wrote:
>>=20
>> With the advent of DICE (DTLS in Constrained Environments), and
>> similar attempts to discuss optimizations, it would seem that any
>> discussion of "next generation" PKI discussions should include
>> discussion on how to optimize the X.509 certificate/chain format.
>> That appears to be missing in this conversation so far.
>
>True. OTOH, DICE is definitely predicated on DTLS so any
>discussion on cert formats for that would fit into the TLS
>WG discussion on 1.3. I've not however seen that listed on
>any 1.3 wish-list so far so it seems unlikely to me at
>least that DICE will push things along here.
>
>> I agree that any replacement for our current PKI is going to run into
>> the same complexities. So, rather than assume they don't exist, would
>> it be reasonable to look at how to optimize the existing work?

I think it could be much simpler.  If you start with just
keys and key hashes as identity, then you do not need CAs
or other naming authorities.

Of course =8A as you then assign attributes to keys (that might include
names) and support delegation complexity arises, but you still
maintain a simple model for simple devices.

Note - assigning 'names to key=B9s versus 'keys to names' are
two very different architectures.  It is not easy
to tweak 509 to be key centric.

So .. This thread may imply to different paths of work.

On CFRG work.

A key centric architecture would benefit from CFRG
recommendations for:
 1) recommendations for =B3suitable" EC curves
   and associated methods
   (e.g. Brainpool or Ed25519)
 2 recommendations for how to use the same public
   key for signatures and key establishment
   (current architectures are complicated by this split)
 3) a canonical definition of public key representation
    for identification (e.g. Key hash) that provides
   - ind=E9pendance of representation to underlying
     Public key or hashing algorithms
   - considerations and options
     for human and machine readability and reliability
   - mutability of ID to support anonymity of visible
     Id binding to key
   - extensibility of cipher suites
   - optional opacity of cipher suite support
   - variable length of identification to support
     short forms that might be ambiguous when not viewed in context

Hummm =8A maybe only the first two are CFRG items.

>
>I'm not sure. I think that might run the risk of inheriting
>all the warts (e.g. policy mapping, the N-R bit) without
>providing much incentive to change. When we were working on
>RFC3280bis (which became 5280) we did try to do as much of
>that as we could, but very few simplifications turned out
>to be possible. It is fair to say though that a lot of the
>real practical problems had not really bitten folks at
>that stage though, so I guess its possible that the same
>exercise done now might pay off.
>
>> Some off the cuff examples to frame what I mean: - Define a specific
>> lightweight trust anchor format (yes, we can all use X.509 certs. But
>> what about a canonical smaller format?) - Optimized version of the
>> X.509 cert itself: Perhaps a compressed format similar to the (old,
>> abandoned and incomplete)

There are completely different trust anchor models from X.509 and we
Should work to make a better distributed model for name spaces and
Trust delegation. Improvements are required in the:
 - semantics of the signatures, attributes and delegation
 - clear definition of useable constraints for extensible attributes
 - redefinition of name spaces to be anchored by keys
 - etc.


>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-comp-x509-00 draft for
>> compressed certs? Perhaps a v4 format that is restructured to provide
>> easier/quicker parsing Or if a non-ASN1 format is truly preferred
>> then such a format could be defined that is can carry the same
>> semantics as the existing PKI (namely, if the problem is ASN1 then we
>> can fix that without also re-inventing all the rest)  Approaching the
>> questions from this angle leads me to ask what _exactly_ the concerns
>> with the current PKI are. Is it the ASN1, the CA infrastructure, the
>> certificate chains, the cruft in each individual certificate, or?
>
>Personally, I think the main problems with X.509 PKI to date
>have been around (the need for, and absence of widely supported
>standard for) enrollment and (particularly name) constraints
>when there are many CAs. Dealing with ASN.1 is a PITA, but a
>well-known one, so that'd be low down on my list anyway. I
>know you've spent a lot of effort trying to help with the
>enrollment problem with EST and I do hope that works out,
>but we don't know yet.
>
>Again though, I don't think thrashing out the pros and cons
>of X.509 on this list is a good plan. Better would be for a
>bunch of really-interested parties to go into a huddle and
>come up with a worked out proposal. (But if a bunch of
>semi-interested parties ask for a new list to talk about
>this, I've no problem helping that happen, though wouldn't
>be very hopeful of a useful outcome.)

Let me know =8A I am interested and have some ideas on directions and
perhaps some code.

Paul

>
>S.
>
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>>=20
>> - max
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Jan 6, 2014, at 3:39 PM, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On 01/06/2014 08:32 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>>>>>> This is an intriguing thought, but probably something out of
>>>>>> scope for CFRG.   (Seems more like a PKNG thing if I
>>>>>> understand you right.)
>>>>=20
>>>> There was an IETF PKNG that died with no visible results.
>>>=20
>>> That was an IRTF RG. IMO it never had a cadre of researchers nor a
>>> sufficient set of IETF participants who were interested in a
>>> nextgen thing.
>>>=20
>>>> This is an area where the IETF seems either too unfocused or
>>>> mired in existing PKI to make progress.  Hence it's on my wish
>>>> list ... Let me know if you have any suggestion for other viable
>>>> forums in IETF for such a topic.
>>>=20
>>> We have a list where we discussed certificate transparency but
>>> which has a broader remit. [1] That's discussing whether or not to
>>> start a new CT WG in the IETF at the moment.
>>>=20
>>> There's the wpkops WG for operational issues related to the web
>>> PKI. [2] They could do with help in terms of cycles to do
>>> already-identified work (not hugely interesting for a
>>> security/crypto researcher though probably).
>>>=20
>>> The PKIX list [3] is still open, and would be a good place to talk
>>> about any X.509-related PKI stuff. Not so good for non X.509 based
>>> PKI though maybe unless for an approach that's very much
>>> evolutionary and starts from X.509.
>>>=20
>>> And there's the saag list [4] which is for general security topics
>>> if none of the above fit.
>>>=20
>>> So stuff is happening and there are places to discuss and propose
>>> stuff. And Sean and I would be quite happy to try help PKI nextgen
>>> stuff progress in the IETF should there be credible proposals.
>>>=20
>>> However, current PKI is not an easy thing to displace, no matter
>>> how much you dislike parts or all of it. The main reasons IMO are
>>> that replacements are likely to suffer a lot of the same (or
>>> equivalent) complexity since its a complex problem, and that any
>>> credible replacement will take at least a few years to work out and
>>> them 5-10 to get deployed which seems to be beyond the horizon for
>>> researchers (speaking as one who chases funding;-). One could argue
>>> that that's why of all the "large DB of public keys" approaches,
>>> only CT seems to be left standing.
>>>=20
>>> One other thing - listing the problems with the current PKI is not
>>> likely to be a useful place to start. We know those, and any
>>> credible approach would start with a fairly well worked out
>>> proposal, including consideration of that 5-10 year overlap period.
>>> Its not easy;-)
>>>=20
>>> Having said all that though, CT is I think a good proof of concept
>>> that the large-DB-of-public-keys thing could be a runner, and we
>>> have learned a lot about the wrinkles in X.509 based PKI over the
>>> years so there is hope maybe.
>>>=20
>>> S.
>>>=20
>>> PS: For any of [1]-[4] please check the archives before diving in,
>>> or ask someone who might be familiar, which could include me.
>>>=20
>>> [1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey [2]
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/wg/wpkops/ [3]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix [4]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>=20


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Jan  8 09:58:28 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>
> On 01/08/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> Dear all,
>> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
>> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
>> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
>> conversation.
>>
>> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
>> body use/typos/general nastiness?
>
> No objection, but there's maybe some checking to be done
> before we're ready to push the button.

Absolutely! Please double check I didn't make any typos, and if you have
MAGMA access, redo the verifications. This goes for everyone. The more eyeballs
on this, the less chance we make a bad mistake. safecurves.cr.yp.to comes with
a script to redo everything.

Also, if anyone knows something that DJB and Tanja Lange do not, please tell us!

>
> One thing though is that rfc 3526 [1] is standards track
> so if there's a reason for that (and there may or may not
> be;-) then we might want these to be the same which'd
> mean not doing 'em in cfrg. That can be figured out later
> though.

I have no opinions about how this gets to from draft to RFC. I
understand there are many channels, and
someone will have to pick one.
>
> S.
>
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526
>
>> Sincerely,
>> Watson Ladd
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Wed Jan  8 10:06:56 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'David McGrew' <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>
Thread-Topic: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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We really need to make sure at least some of the mailing list
has some expertise in a given area before we commit ourselves
to working in that area, and anything with "quantum" in the name
requires expertise I expect very few (if any) of the maining list
possess.  I suggest before committing to a topic we poll the
mailing list to see who has both expertise on a given topic and=20
an employer who is willing to donate the time and resources=20
needed to follow through.


> -----Original Message-----
> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM
> To: Sean Turner
> Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
>=20
> Hi Sean,
>=20
> On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> > My list is kind of short:
>=20
> thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize
> work.
>=20
> >
> > 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS
> or not:
> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
> >
> > If so, let's do a draft!
> >
> > 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am
> I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about
> (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in
> fear):
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
> >
> > 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>=20
> #0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment on
> #2.
>=20
> Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem
> that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
> extensive use in the Internet.
>=20
> The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational
> assumptions for security.   However, it relies on physical assumptions
> for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer.
> This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any
> point between the encrypter and decrypter.   In addition, QKD requires
> large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder
> problem
> in the real world than pseudorandomnes.   (In other words: a QKD system
> could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable
> elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that
> algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?)
>=20
> QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very
> severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support.
> The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit
> per second at 20 KM range.   Using that technology, we need 10,000
> repeaters to get global scale communication.   This would require the
> pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along
> the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be
> trusted.  There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not
> need to be trusted,
>=20
> The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a
> conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea.
> It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as
> whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has.   It is *more*
> vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same
> cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution.
>=20
> QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons,
> and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as
> 4G
> and 802.11.   The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy
> than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not
> geometrically point to point.   So even if QKD didn't suffer from the
> problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion
> cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users.
>=20
> QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in
> information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend,
> Could, virtualization, and collaboration.
>=20
> I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium
> Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum
> key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim
> in the title.   The important observation here is that the classical
> Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable
> storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure
> communication, is quantifiably better than QKD.   Vernam does not have
> any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range
> limitations, and it can be used over wireless.   Its data rate will
> depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a
> trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a
> courier
> need not travel that often to match its data rate.   The important
> inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that
> all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we
> would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and
> not QKD.   The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest
> in
> QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of
> what would be useful in information security.
>=20
> My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
> http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we need
> to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something
> on it.
>=20
> David
>=20
> >
> > spt


From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Wed Jan  8 10:15:44 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'David McGrew' <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>
Thread-Topic: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 18:15:29 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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I'd like to see the CFRG investigate how far the DANE paradigm
can be pushed w/o bringing the system to a screeching halt.
For example, there is a group an NIST looking at the possibility
of leveraging DANE for use with e-mail.  Who else is out there=20
hoping to piggy bank on DANE?  Can DANE be the new PKI?  If not,
what features does it lack & can it be "patched"?


> -----Original Message-----
> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM
> To: Sean Turner
> Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
>=20
> Hi Sean,
>=20
> On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> > My list is kind of short:
>=20
> thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize
> work.
>=20
> >
> > 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS
> or not:
> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
> >
> > If so, let's do a draft!
> >
> > 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am
> I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about
> (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in
> fear):
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
> >
> > 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>=20
> #0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment on
> #2.
>=20
> Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem
> that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
> extensive use in the Internet.
>=20
> The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational
> assumptions for security.   However, it relies on physical assumptions
> for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer.
> This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any
> point between the encrypter and decrypter.   In addition, QKD requires
> large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder
> problem
> in the real world than pseudorandomnes.   (In other words: a QKD system
> could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable
> elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that
> algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?)
>=20
> QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very
> severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support.
> The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit
> per second at 20 KM range.   Using that technology, we need 10,000
> repeaters to get global scale communication.   This would require the
> pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along
> the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be
> trusted.  There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not
> need to be trusted,
>=20
> The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a
> conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea.
> It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as
> whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has.   It is *more*
> vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same
> cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution.
>=20
> QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons,
> and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as
> 4G
> and 802.11.   The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy
> than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not
> geometrically point to point.   So even if QKD didn't suffer from the
> problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion
> cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users.
>=20
> QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in
> information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend,
> Could, virtualization, and collaboration.
>=20
> I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium
> Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum
> key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim
> in the title.   The important observation here is that the classical
> Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable
> storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure
> communication, is quantifiably better than QKD.   Vernam does not have
> any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range
> limitations, and it can be used over wireless.   Its data rate will
> depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a
> trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a
> courier
> need not travel that often to match its data rate.   The important
> inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that
> all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we
> would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and
> not QKD.   The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest
> in
> QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of
> what would be useful in information security.
>=20
> My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
> http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we need
> to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something
> on it.
>=20
> David
>=20
> >
> > spt


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Jan  8 10:18:45 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 10:06 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
> We really need to make sure at least some of the mailing list
> has some expertise in a given area before we commit ourselves
> to working in that area, and anything with "quantum" in the name
> requires expertise I expect very few (if any) of the maining list
> possess.  I suggest before committing to a topic we poll the
> mailing list to see who has both expertise on a given topic and
> an employer who is willing to donate the time and resources
> needed to follow through.

My job is simple: do math. Granted, there is some other math/coding I
should be doing at the moment,
but I certainly can devote resources to this.
What does Post-Quantum Crypto require beyond some coding theory for
McEliece-Nedermeyer and some
algebraic geometry for Multivariate-Quadratic systems?

QKD is a different kettle of fish.

>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM
>> To: Sean Turner
>> Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org
>> Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
>>
>> Hi Sean,
>>
>> On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>> > My list is kind of short:
>>
>> thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize
>> work.
>>
>> >
>> > 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS
>> or not:
>> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
>> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
>> >
>> > If so, let's do a draft!
>> >
>> > 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am
>> I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about
>> (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in
>> fear):
>> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
>> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
>> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
>> >
>> > 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>>
>> #0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment on
>> #2.
>>
>> Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem
>> that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
>> extensive use in the Internet.
>>
>> The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational
>> assumptions for security.   However, it relies on physical assumptions
>> for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer.
>> This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any
>> point between the encrypter and decrypter.   In addition, QKD requires
>> large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder
>> problem
>> in the real world than pseudorandomnes.   (In other words: a QKD system
>> could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable
>> elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that
>> algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?)
>>
>> QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very
>> severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support.
>> The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit
>> per second at 20 KM range.   Using that technology, we need 10,000
>> repeaters to get global scale communication.   This would require the
>> pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along
>> the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be
>> trusted.  There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not
>> need to be trusted,
>>
>> The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a
>> conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea.
>> It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as
>> whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has.   It is *more*
>> vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same
>> cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution.
>>
>> QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons,
>> and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as
>> 4G
>> and 802.11.   The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy
>> than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not
>> geometrically point to point.   So even if QKD didn't suffer from the
>> problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion
>> cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users.
>>
>> QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in
>> information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend,
>> Could, virtualization, and collaboration.
>>
>> I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium
>> Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum
>> key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim
>> in the title.   The important observation here is that the classical
>> Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable
>> storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure
>> communication, is quantifiably better than QKD.   Vernam does not have
>> any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range
>> limitations, and it can be used over wireless.   Its data rate will
>> depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a
>> trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a
>> courier
>> need not travel that often to match its data rate.   The important
>> inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that
>> all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we
>> would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and
>> not QKD.   The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest
>> in
>> QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of
>> what would be useful in information security.
>>
>> My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
>> http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we need
>> to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something
>> on it.
>>
>> David
>>
>> >
>> > spt
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: "Dang, Quynh" <quynh.dang@nist.gov>
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Thread-Topic: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for  CFRG) (Igoe, Kevin M.)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG) (Igoe, Kevin M.)
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=0A=
NIST is interested in post-quantum cryptography research and standardizatio=
n efforts. NIST would consider to help the IETF in these areas depending on=
 specific topics.=0A=
=0A=
Quynh.  =

From mpg@elzevir.fr  Wed Jan  8 10:40:40 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On 08/01/2014 18:11, Watson Ladd wrote:
> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
> conversation.
> 
> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
> body use/typos/general nastiness?

I'm in favour of these curves being approved for IETF use.

I think the draft itself, however, should be expanded to go into some details
about the advantages of the curves and the differences with existing curves.

I have one question about the curves themselves: why are there two Montgomery
curves over GF(2^383-187)? I thought the curves were chosen by a deterministic
process, and the smallest 'a' coefficient giving the desired properties was
always used.

Also, is it on purpose that you didn't include E-521 in your draft?

Manuel.


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Jan  8 11:07:36 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 10:40 AM, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elz=
evir.fr> wrote:
> On 08/01/2014 18:11, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
>> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
>> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
>> conversation.
>>
>> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
>> body use/typos/general nastiness?
>
> I'm in favour of these curves being approved for IETF use.
>
> I think the draft itself, however, should be expanded to go into some det=
ails
> about the advantages of the curves and the differences with existing curv=
es.
>
> I have one question about the curves themselves: why are there two Montgo=
mery
> curves over GF(2^383-187)? I thought the curves were chosen by a determin=
istic
> process, and the smallest 'a' coefficient giving the desired properties w=
as
> always used.

It's because one has an Elligator map and the other does not. Some
applications require
it, but not all.

>
> Also, is it on purpose that you didn't include E-521 in your draft?

I simply copied the safecurves.cr.yp.to list starting at Curve25519.
There is no E-521 on that list.

>
> Manuel.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Jan  8 11:22:03 2014
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To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
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Subject: [Cfrg] DANE in the IETF (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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On Jan 8, 2014, at 10:15 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:

> I'd like to see the CFRG investigate how far the DANE paradigm
> can be pushed w/o bringing the system to a screeching halt.
> For example, there is a group an NIST looking at the possibility
> of leveraging DANE for use with e-mail.

You mean like with draft-ietf-dane-smime and =
draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane, both of which are already being =
discussed in the DANE WG? :-)

>  Who else is out there=20
> hoping to piggy bank on DANE? =20

And shouldn't those people tell the DANE folks about it?

> Can DANE be the new PKI?  If not,
> what features does it lack & can it be "patched"?

The discussion of "could DANE or something like it be a new PKI" could =
happen here, but folks wanting to do so should read the archives of the =
DANE WG.

Any communications medium that has cryptographic protection and proof of =
origin can be a new PKI, or it can be part of the delivery for the old =
PKI. Keys-over-DNS is nothing new, as is keys-over-TLS, keys-over-IPsec, =
keys-over-CMS, and so on.

--Paul Hoffman=

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On 08/01/2014 20:07, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 10:40 AM, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
>> I have one question about the curves themselves: why are there two Montgomery
>> curves over GF(2^383-187)? I thought the curves were chosen by a deterministic
>> process, and the smallest 'a' coefficient giving the desired properties was
>> always used.
> 
> It's because one has an Elligator map and the other does not. Some
> applications require
> it, but not all.
> 
Ok, thanks for the info.

Since their respective 'a' coefficients are of comparable sizes (18 vs 21 bits),
I expect their performances will be very comparable, so I wonder if it's worth
standardizing both of them, rather than just the one with the Elligator map.

> I simply copied the safecurves.cr.yp.to list starting at Curve25519.
> There is no E-521 on that list.
> 
IMHO there should be :) See http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647

Manuel.

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To: 'Robert Ransom' <rransom.8774@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Hashing to EC group elements
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From dharkins@lounge.org  Wed Jan  8 12:29:41 2014
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From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Wed, January 8, 2014 9:58 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01/08/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>> Dear all,
>>> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
>>> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
>>> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
>>> conversation.
>>>
>>> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
>>> body use/typos/general nastiness?
>>
>> No objection, but there's maybe some checking to be done
>> before we're ready to push the button.
>
> Absolutely! Please double check I didn't make any typos, and if you have
> MAGMA access, redo the verifications. This goes for everyone. The more
> eyeballs
> on this, the less chance we make a bad mistake. safecurves.cr.yp.to comes
> with
> a script to redo everything.
>
> Also, if anyone knows something that DJB and Tanja Lange do not, please
> tell us!
>
>>
>> One thing though is that rfc 3526 [1] is standards track
>> so if there's a reason for that (and there may or may not
>> be;-) then we might want these to be the same which'd
>> mean not doing 'em in cfrg. That can be figured out later
>> though.
>
> I have no opinions about how this gets to from draft to RFC.

  Which is good because the process from draft to RFC is already
well-defined. It's on the IETF web site, check it out!

> I understand there are many channels, and
> someone will have to pick one.

  And that someone would be you!

  While it's certainly useful to get these curves defined in an IETF
document, getting them used by any protocol will require some
more work from you. You should get OIDs defined for each of
them if they don't exist already. You should write up separate
drafts for inclusion of these curves into the protocols' various
IANA-managed repositories-- yes, sadly there are many. And
for protocols which allow for in-line passing of complete
domain parameter sets (like TLS) you'll need to modify the
data structure used (doesn't look like these could be used with
the "explicit_prime" ECCurveType, for instance).

  On the plus side, for the most part you can just follow the path
blazed by the brainpool folks, just follow what they did.

  Welcome to the tedious world of sausage making, don't mind
the blood on your hands, you get used to it.

  Dan.




From mpg@elzevir.fr  Wed Jan  8 12:48:27 2014
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On 08/01/2014 21:29, Dan Harkins wrote:
>   While it's certainly useful to get these curves defined in an IETF
> document, getting them used by any protocol will require some
> more work from you.

And/or from others :) For example, Simon Josefsson and I are already working on
a draft for using the Montgomery curves in TLS (for ECDHE at least).

> You should get OIDs defined for each of
> them if they don't exist already. You should write up separate
> drafts for inclusion of these curves into the protocols' various
> IANA-managed repositories-- yes, sadly there are many. And
> for protocols which allow for in-line passing of complete
> domain parameter sets (like TLS) you'll need to modify the
> data structure used (doesn't look like these could be used with
> the "explicit_prime" ECCurveType, for instance).
> 
Concerning TLS, it's probably not useful to allow online passing of the complete
domain parameters, since the NamedCurve way is used by (almost?)
everyone.

But yes, there is some per-protocol work to be done, obviously.

Manuel.

From paul@marvell.com  Wed Jan  8 12:51:03 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 12:50:47 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Dan Harkins
...
> On Wed, January 8, 2014 9:58 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell
> > <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 01/08/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> >>> Dear all,
> >>> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
> >>> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
> >>> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
> >>> conversation.
> >>>
> >>> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
> >>> body use/typos/general nastiness?
> >>
> >> No objection, but there's maybe some checking to be done before
> we're
> >> ready to push the button.
> >
> > Absolutely! Please double check I didn't make any typos, and if you
> > have MAGMA access, redo the verifications. This goes for everyone.
> The
> > more eyeballs on this, the less chance we make a bad mistake.
> > safecurves.cr.yp.to comes with a script to redo everything.
> >
> > Also, if anyone knows something that DJB and Tanja Lange do not,
> > please tell us!
> >
> >>
> >> One thing though is that rfc 3526 [1] is standards track so if
> >> there's a reason for that (and there may or may not
> >> be;-) then we might want these to be the same which'd mean not doing
> >> 'em in cfrg. That can be figured out later though.
> >
> > I have no opinions about how this gets to from draft to RFC.
>=20
>   Which is good because the process from draft to RFC is already well-
> defined. It's on the IETF web site, check it out!
>=20
> > I understand there are many channels, and someone will have to pick
> > one.
>=20
>   And that someone would be you!
>=20
>   While it's certainly useful to get these curves defined in an IETF
> document, getting them used by any protocol will require some more work
> from you. You should get OIDs defined for each of them if they don't
> exist already. You should write up separate drafts for inclusion of
> these curves into the protocols' various IANA-managed repositories--
> yes, sadly there are many. And for protocols which allow for in-line
> passing of complete domain parameter sets (like TLS) you'll need to
> modify the data structure used (doesn't look like these could be used
> with the "explicit_prime" ECCurveType, for instance).
>=20
>   On the plus side, for the most part you can just follow the path
> blazed by the brainpool folks, just follow what they did.
You should also look at: RFC 6090
The math for Small Wierstrass curves is defined well - you need the equival=
ent of
6090 for Edwards curves.  Do note the authors of this excellent RFC
Include both chairs of this list.


>=20
>   Welcome to the tedious world of sausage making, don't mind the blood
> on your hands, you get used to it.
>=20
>   Dan.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From paul@marvell.com  Wed Jan  8 12:53:21 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 12:53:07 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Curve25519 (and Safecurves more generally)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Curve25519 (and Safecurves more generally)
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On 1/6/14, 5:37 PM, "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>Paul Lambert has stated that industry doesn't have the guts to take
>responsibility for using this in products and would like to blame us
Not quite what I stated =8A I=B9ll assume it=B9s humor.


>if it goes bad, since they can't blame NIST. (In what other industry
>does "we don't stand behind our products, because we don't have the
>expertise to determine how good they are" count as acceptable?)

Clarity in the documentation of the review and diligence associated
with the selection of algorithms is critical for =8Creal=B9 products.
It needs to be something that can be referenced for both it=B9s review
and recommendations and for implementation details and guidelines

>
>The question to be answered is as follows: is the curve
>y^2=3Dx^3+486662x^2+x over the prime field 2^{255}-19 an elliptic curve on
>which the DDH is believed to be acceptably hard to provide 128-bit
>security?
>
>My firm belief is that the answer is yes. There is no known reason why
>this curve
>could be weak and 486662 is the smallest integer for which this curve
>shape is strong.
>This curve shape is not particularly special. The only specialness is
>the prime, but
>that isn't known to do anything.

I am supportive of the curve, but the change in curve shape does
impact the underlying code for the point operations.
Clarity in the definition of these functions would be vey valuable.

One worked example of defining curves is:
http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=3Dsecg,docs_secg

I believe these specifications could have been simpler looking at
the algorithms from an implementation perspective versus the math.

RFC 6090 is another good example of the required work.

Paul


>
>I would also like to ask this for each curve in Safecurves claimed to
>be safe. Note that some numbers in the above question need to be
>changed: I leave this as an exercise to the reader.
>
>Is an RFC required to express this opinion? If so I'll write up the
>shortest ID on record to define the model of each curve, and provide
>the canonical basepoints on each. Would anything more be required for
>these curves to count as appropriately blessed?


>
>Lastly, there is a long tradition of providing challenges with
>monetary rewards for cracking parameter choices. Bitcoin makes this a
>bit redundant, so I will refrain from putting my own money as a prize
>for ECC breaking.
>
>Sincerely,
>Watson Ladd
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Jan  8 13:08:57 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Dan Harkins
> ...
>> On Wed, January 8, 2014 9:58 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> > On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell
>> > <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 01/08/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> >>> Dear all,
>> >>> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
>> >>> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
>> >>> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
>> >>> conversation.
>> >>>
>> >>> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
>> >>> body use/typos/general nastiness?
>> >>
>> >> No objection, but there's maybe some checking to be done before
>> we're
>> >> ready to push the button.
>> >
>> > Absolutely! Please double check I didn't make any typos, and if you
>> > have MAGMA access, redo the verifications. This goes for everyone.
>> The
>> > more eyeballs on this, the less chance we make a bad mistake.
>> > safecurves.cr.yp.to comes with a script to redo everything.
>> >
>> > Also, if anyone knows something that DJB and Tanja Lange do not,
>> > please tell us!
>> >
>> >>
>> >> One thing though is that rfc 3526 [1] is standards track so if
>> >> there's a reason for that (and there may or may not
>> >> be;-) then we might want these to be the same which'd mean not doing
>> >> 'em in cfrg. That can be figured out later though.
>> >
>> > I have no opinions about how this gets to from draft to RFC.
>>
>>   Which is good because the process from draft to RFC is already well-
>> defined. It's on the IETF web site, check it out!
>>
>> > I understand there are many channels, and someone will have to pick
>> > one.
>>
>>   And that someone would be you!
>>
>>   While it's certainly useful to get these curves defined in an IETF
>> document, getting them used by any protocol will require some more work
>> from you. You should get OIDs defined for each of them if they don't
>> exist already. You should write up separate drafts for inclusion of
>> these curves into the protocols' various IANA-managed repositories--
>> yes, sadly there are many. And for protocols which allow for in-line
>> passing of complete domain parameter sets (like TLS) you'll need to
>> modify the data structure used (doesn't look like these could be used
>> with the "explicit_prime" ECCurveType, for instance).
>>
>>   On the plus side, for the most part you can just follow the path
>> blazed by the brainpool folks, just follow what they did.
> You should also look at: RFC 6090
> The math for Small Wierstrass curves is defined well - you need the equivalent of
> 6090 for Edwards curves.  Do note the authors of this excellent RFC
> Include both chairs of this list.

First, is this advising me on next steps, or is it an objection to the draft?
The group is [l]Jac(E(F_q)). There, done. In fact, this is in the introduction.
The equivalent to RFC 6090 is the Bernstein paper on addition on
Edwards (and twisted Edwards curves).
It's readily available. If you want to reformat it as an I-D, go right ahead.

Is it really that bad to have the EFD get cited for the formulas, or
to advise implementers
to read Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography?
>
>
>>
>>   Welcome to the tedious world of sausage making, don't mind the blood
>> on your hands, you get used to it.
>>
>>   Dan.
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Hello CFRG,

It might be time to unlurk here.  Trevor Perrin asked my opinion of this =
topic, and since I was a co-author on Elligator, I=92ve studied the =
matter.

Kevin Igoe wrote:
> Robert:
>=20
>   Thanks for the pointer to the paper, I'm enjoying working through it
> in more detail.
>=20
>    One of my coworkers reminded me of the Cardano's algorithm for =
solving
> cubic equations (published in 1545). I'd long ago consigned this to my
> ever growing list of interesting but basically useless mathematics. =20=

> It is a deterministic algorithm for solving cubic equations, only
> requiring the ability to solve quadratic equations and take cube =
roots.
> At first look this seems to be constant time, might have to stray into
> GF(q^6) arithmetic.  We're looking to see if the following idea would =
work:
>=20
> 	1) Pick an arbitrary y0 on GF(q).
> 	2) Use Cardano to find a root x0 \in GF(q^3) of x^3 + a*x + b =3D =
y0^2.
>       3) Apply your I + \phi + \phi(\phi) map to drive (x0,y0) back
>          to a point on (x1,y1) \in E/GF(q).
>=20
> Doesn't give indistinguishability, but it would avoid DragonFly's hunt =
& peck.
> At first glance it looks like it works, but I've learned the hard way =
to never=20
> trust anything like this until I've actually programmed it up.
Unfortunately, this doesn=92t work.  I recalled analyzing it before =
during the Elligator work, but anyway I just tested it in Sage to be =
sure.  If x0 isn=92t in GF(q), you=92ll end up on a cubic twist of E.  =
When you frob from that twist back to the base field, you=92ll just get =
the identity.

I believe that the Elligator version of this, proposed by Robert, does =
work at least if the input to Elligator is chosen uniformly from the =
extension field.  However, it would be pretty horrible to implement.  =
Fortunately, there=92s a better solution, outlined in a series of =
papers, most notably BCIMRT =9209:

http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/340.pdf

This paper outlines how to hash deterministically to an elliptic curve, =
while maintaining the ability to model the hash as a random oracle.  =
This property is called =93indifferentiability=94.

I believe that full indifferentiability isn=92t needed for Dragonfly, =
though I=92m not sure of it.  In this case, a good candidate would be =
the SWU maps, of which some simple variants are in the BCIMRT paper.  =
These maps map a field element to any curve over that field, =
deterministically but not indifferentiably, uniformly or injectively.  =
However, they are at most 8-to-1 or something like that, and that might =
be good enough for Dragonfly.

If this isn=92t good enough, then setting (r1,r2) =3D hash(password) and =
running either

Encode(password) :=3D SWU(r1) + SWU(r2)
or
Encode(password) :=3D SWU(r1) + r2 * G

is indifferentiable from a random oracle, and is therefore suitable for =
use anywhere that you=92d use one.  The SWU maps are comparable to =
Elligator, but not 1:1.  In fact, Elligator 2 at least can be seen as a =
simplified SWU variant that only works on curves of even order.  So =
these techniques shouldn=92t be that horrible to implement.

Cheers,
=97 Mike Hamburg=

--Apple-Mail=_52957CD7-8990-4E7C-835B-FC347C5BCC7E
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Hello =
CFRG,<div><br></div><div>It might be time to unlurk here. &nbsp;Trevor =
Perrin asked my opinion of this topic, and since I was a co-author on =
Elligator, I=92ve studied the matter.</div><div><br></div><div>Kevin =
Igoe wrote:</div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><pre>Robert:

  Thanks for the pointer to the paper, I'm enjoying working through it
in more detail.

   One of my coworkers reminded me of the Cardano's algorithm for =
solving
cubic equations (published in 1545). I'd long ago consigned this to my
ever growing list of interesting but basically useless mathematics. =20
It is a deterministic algorithm for solving cubic equations, only
requiring the ability to solve quadratic equations and take cube roots.
At first look this seems to be constant time, might have to stray into
GF(q^6) arithmetic.  We're looking to see if the following idea would =
work:

	1) Pick an arbitrary y0 on GF(q).
	2) Use Cardano to find a root x0 \in GF(q^3) of x^3 + a*x + b =3D =
y0^2.
      3) Apply your I + \phi + \phi(\phi) map to drive (x0,y0) back
         to a point on (x1,y1) \in E/GF(q).

Doesn't give indistinguishability, but it would avoid DragonFly's hunt =
&amp; peck.
At first glance it looks like it works, but I've learned the hard way to =
never=20
trust anything like this until I've actually programmed it =
up.</pre></blockquote><div>Unfortunately, this doesn=92t work. &nbsp;I =
recalled analyzing it before during the Elligator work, but anyway I =
just tested it in Sage to be sure. &nbsp;If x0 isn=92t in GF(q), you=92ll =
end up on a cubic twist of E. &nbsp;When you frob from that twist back =
to the base field, you=92ll just get the =
identity.</div></div><div><br></div><div>I believe that the Elligator =
version of this, proposed by Robert, does work at least if the input to =
Elligator is chosen uniformly from the extension field. &nbsp;However, =
it would be pretty horrible to implement. &nbsp;Fortunately, there=92s a =
better solution, outlined in a series of papers, most notably BCIMRT =
=9209:</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/340.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/3=
40.pdf</a></div><div><br></div><div>This paper outlines how to hash =
deterministically to an elliptic curve, while maintaining the ability to =
model the hash as a random oracle. &nbsp;This property is called =
=93indifferentiability=94.</div><div><br></div><div>I believe that full =
indifferentiability isn=92t needed for Dragonfly, though I=92m not sure =
of it. &nbsp;In this case, a good candidate would be the SWU maps, of =
which some simple variants are in the BCIMRT paper. &nbsp;These maps map =
a field element to any curve over that field, deterministically but not =
indifferentiably, uniformly or injectively. &nbsp;However, they are at =
most 8-to-1 or something like that, and that might be good enough for =
Dragonfly.</div><div><br></div><div>If this isn=92t good enough, then =
setting (r1,r2) =3D hash(password) and running =
either</div><div><br></div><div>Encode(password) :=3D SWU(r1) + =
SWU(r2)</div><div>or</div><div>Encode(password) :=3D SWU(r1) + r2 * =
G</div><div><br></div><div>is indifferentiable from a random oracle, and =
is therefore suitable for use anywhere that you=92d use one. &nbsp;The =
SWU maps are comparable to Elligator, but not 1:1. &nbsp;In fact, =
Elligator 2 at least can be seen as a simplified SWU variant that only =
works on curves of even order. &nbsp;So these techniques shouldn=92t be =
that horrible to implement.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>=97=
 Mike Hamburg</div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_52957CD7-8990-4E7C-835B-FC347C5BCC7E--

From akr@akr.io  Wed Jan  8 15:10:30 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Glad to see this one get under way.

I'm strongly in favour of the meat of the proposal.

I have a couple of comments (mostly typographical and/or clarity).

Maybe we should give an estimate of security (bitwise). [SAFECURVES]
calculates that and otherwise it isn't crystal-clear from the names
which curves would be about suitable for which security level.

Any particular reason why Curve1174 wasn't included, as it's in the
same strength category as Curve25519? (See below, for roughly how it
would look if I think we did go for it?)

>> Also, is it on purpose that you didn't include E-521 in your 
>> draft?
> I simply copied the safecurves.cr.yp.to list starting at 
> Curve25519. There is no E-521 on that list.

E-521 is in the revised reference in [2013 Aranha-Barreto-Pereira-
Ricardini] <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647.pdf>. It looks like djb
and Tanja Lange haven't finished putting it through all their own
checks yet; at present it's on some pages (fields, rho, transfers,
discriminants) but not others (base points, rigidity).

It looks like they're mid-way through checking it. It'll very probably
pass (identical design criteria; all its peers in the same paper did).
Put it in the draft, take it out if for some reason it doesn't?

>> why are there two Montgomery curves over GF(2^383-187)?
> It's because one has an Elligator map and the other does not.

You mean, an Elligator-1 map? (They all have Elligator-2 maps.)

[2013 Aranha-Barreto-Pereira-Ricardini] version 20131031:234129
replaces Curve383187 with an M-383 prototype with the following comment:
    "Replaced the curve over the 383-bit field by a more
     implementation-friendly curve."

A's a little higher in that exact revision, but it appears they found
a lower suitable one in November. The final M-383 is the one
SafeCurves reviewed, although the older Curve383187 also passed.

> Some applications require it, but not all.

Not sure if there's a lot of point in having two Monty curves of the
exact same field?

[Typographical notes]

The parameters for E-382 seem to be are miscopied in -00. Should be
2^382-105, and x²+y²=1-67254x²y² (not 2^382-15 and x²+y²=1-6725254x²y²).

I suggest considering taking the dashes out of the canonical names
People are going to refer to these in config files and command lines
and heaven knows where else, so avoiding punctuation may be convenient
(which I guess may be why none of the other curve names I can see used
in IETF standards have any).

For consistency, perhaps Curve1174, Curve25519, and Curve3617
could be called in the standard after the formula and prime size (as in
[2013 ABPR]), which would make them M255, E251, and E414 respectively?
I've done that below; how does it look?

I have honestly little idea about formatting of these things (other
than that the canonical version is ASCII, like this email), but the
way the basepoint and order are formatted is a little bit confusing as
it is in draft-00.

With the above in mind, how about something broadly like this?

==========================================================================

2. The Curves

   Each curve is given by an equation and a basepoint, together with an
   order. All curves are elliptic. Validation information is given at
   [SAFECURVES]. The names given in this document indicate the family:
   safecurveExxx for Edwards curves over a prime field GF(p), and
   safecurveMxxx for Montgomery curves over a prime field GF(p).

   * safecurveE251 (also known as Curve1174) [[ Do we want this one? ]]
     p: 2^251-9
     formula: x^2+y^2 = 1-1174x^2y^2
     basepoint:
        x: 1582619097725911541954547006453739763381091388846394833492
           296309729998839514
           (0x037FBB0C EA308C47 9343AEE7 C029A190
              C021D96A 492ECD65 16123F27 BCE29EDA)
        y: 3037538013604154504764115728651437646519513534305223422754
           827055689195992590
           (0x06B72F82 D47FB7CC 66568411 69840E0C
              4FE2DEE2 AF3F976B A4CCB1BF 9B46360E)
     [[ Rigidity note: This is the Edwards mapping of the Montgomery
        point x=4, y=192257776421116702304087124422055147834030127084
        09058383774613284963344096.
        <http://cr.yp.to/elligator/elligator-20130527.pdf> ]]
     Security versus rho: 2^124.3; twist: 2^124.3; combined: 2^123.3
     order: 2^249 - 11332719920821432534773113288178349711

   * safecurveM255 (also known as Curve25519)
     p: 2^255-19
     formula: y^2 = x^3+486662x^2+x
     basepoint:
        x: 9 (0x9)
        y: 1478161944758954479102059356840998688726460613461647528896
           4881837755586237401
           (0x20AE19A1 B8A086B4 E01EDD2C 7748D14C
              923D4D7E 6D7C61B2 29E9C5A2 7ECED3D9)
     Security versus rho: 2^125.8; twist: 2^126.3; combined: 2^124.3
     order: 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493

   * safecurveE382
     p: 2^382-105
     formula: x^2+y^2 = 1-67254x^2y^2
     basepoint:
        x: 3914921414754292646847594472454013487047137431784830634731
           377862923477302047857640522480241298429278603678181725699
           (0x196F8DD0 EAB20391 E5F05BE9 6E8D20AE
              68F84003 2B0B6435 2923BAB8 53648411
              93517DBC E8105398 EBC0CC94 70F79603)
        y: 17 (0x11)
     [[ Note: <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647.pdf> has different
        basepoint y=13. Check: is that just a different mapping i.e.
        Monty vs Eddie, or has the basepoint changed? If so, why? ]]
     Security versus rho: 2^189.8; twist: 2^189.8; combined: 2^188.8
     order: 2^380 - 1030303207694556153926491950732314247062623204330
                    168346855

   * safecurveM383
     p: 2^383-187
     formula: y^2 = x^3+2065150x^2+x
     basepoint:
        x: 12 (0xC)
        y: 4737623401891753997660546300375902576839617167257703725630
           389791524463565757299203154901655432096558642117242906494
           (0x1EC7ED04 AAF834AF 310E304B 2DA0F328
              E7C165F0 E8988ABD 39928612 90F617AA
              1F1B2E7D 0B6E332E 969991B6 2555E77E)
     Security versus rho: 2^189.8; twist: 2^190.3; combined: 2^188.3
     order: 2^380 + 1662362759313735161052197949355421533080392344557
                    61613271

   * safecurveE414 (also known as Curve3617)
     p: 2^414-17
     formula: x^2+y^2 = 1+3617x^2y^2
     basepoint:
        x: 1731988647712118917771920249882261544355695730760434081525
           6226171904769976866975908866528699294134494857887698432266
           169206165
           (0x1A334905 14144330 0218C063 1C326E5F
              CD46369F 44C03EC7 F57FF354 98A4AB4D
              6D6BA111 301A73FA A8537C64 C4FD3812
              F3CBC595)
        y: 34 (0x22)
     Security versus rho: 2^205.3; twist: 2^205.3; combined: 2^203.8
     order: 2^411 - 3336414086375514252081017769409838517898472720041
                    1208589594759

   * safecurveM511
     p: 2^511-187
     formula: y^2 = x^3+530438x^2+x
     basepoint:
        x: 5 (0x5)
        y: 2500410645565072423368981149139213252211568685173608590070
           9792642482752286038997069505181278171765918786677842475821
           24505430745177116625808811349787373477
           (0x2FBDC0AD 8530803D 28FDBAD3 54BB488D
              32399AC1 CF8F6E01 EE3F9638 9B90C809
              422B9429 E8A43DBF 49308AC4 455940AB
              E9F1DBCA 542093A8 95E30A64 AF056FA5)
     Security versus rho: 2^253.8; twist: 2^254.3; combined: 2^252.3
     order: 2^508 + 1072475475963574762404453151406812184207075662743
                    4833028965540808827675062043

   * safecurveE521 [[ currently awaiting Safecurves approval ]]
     p: 2^521-1
     formula: x^2+y^2 = 1+376014x^2y^2
     basepoint:
        x: 2500410645565072423368981149139213252211568685173608590070
           9792642482752286038997069505181278171765918786677842475821
           24505430745177116625808811349787373477
           (0x2FBDC0AD 8530803D 28FDBAD3 54BB488D
              32399AC1 CF8F6E01 EE3F9638 9B90C809
              422B9429 E8A43DBF 49308AC4 455940AB
              E9F1DBCA 542093A8 95E30A64 AF056FA5)
        y: 6 (0x6)
     Security versus rho: 2^259.3; twist: 2^259.3; combined: 2^258.3
     order: 2^519 - 3375547632585017057891076304187826360719049612140
                    51226618635150085779108655765

==========================================================================

Thoughts?

(_Please_ cross-check the data thoroughly; I may well have made a
typographical or calculation error of my own, and of course, extra
checking is a good thing! Apologies in advance if I have; thanks for
any extra pairs of eyes.)

- -- 
/akr
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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In case it helps with formatting. A trick some people have
done from time to time is to include a shell script as an
appendix to a draft/RFC so that when you extract the script
and run it with the draft/RFC as input it pulls out the
examples/numbers and feeds them into a checker.

Can't think of an example right now, but someone here will
if you like the idea.

S.

On 01/08/2014 11:10 PM, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
> Glad to see this one get under way.
> 
> I'm strongly in favour of the meat of the proposal.
> 
> I have a couple of comments (mostly typographical and/or clarity).
> 
> Maybe we should give an estimate of security (bitwise).
> [SAFECURVES] calculates that and otherwise it isn't crystal-clear
> from the names which curves would be about suitable for which
> security level.
> 
> Any particular reason why Curve1174 wasn't included, as it's in
> the same strength category as Curve25519? (See below, for roughly
> how it would look if I think we did go for it?)
> 
>>> Also, is it on purpose that you didn't include E-521 in your 
>>> draft?
>> I simply copied the safecurves.cr.yp.to list starting at 
>> Curve25519. There is no E-521 on that list.
> 
> E-521 is in the revised reference in [2013 Aranha-Barreto-Pereira- 
> Ricardini] <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647.pdf>. It looks like
> djb and Tanja Lange haven't finished putting it through all their
> own checks yet; at present it's on some pages (fields, rho,
> transfers, discriminants) but not others (base points, rigidity).
> 
> It looks like they're mid-way through checking it. It'll very
> probably pass (identical design criteria; all its peers in the same
> paper did). Put it in the draft, take it out if for some reason it
> doesn't?
> 
>>> why are there two Montgomery curves over GF(2^383-187)?
>> It's because one has an Elligator map and the other does not.
> 
> You mean, an Elligator-1 map? (They all have Elligator-2 maps.)
> 
> [2013 Aranha-Barreto-Pereira-Ricardini] version 20131031:234129 
> replaces Curve383187 with an M-383 prototype with the following
> comment: "Replaced the curve over the 383-bit field by a more 
> implementation-friendly curve."
> 
> A's a little higher in that exact revision, but it appears they
> found a lower suitable one in November. The final M-383 is the one 
> SafeCurves reviewed, although the older Curve383187 also passed.
> 
>> Some applications require it, but not all.
> 
> Not sure if there's a lot of point in having two Monty curves of
> the exact same field?
> 
> [Typographical notes]
> 
> The parameters for E-382 seem to be are miscopied in -00. Should
> be 2^382-105, and x²+y²=1-67254x²y² (not 2^382-15 and
> x²+y²=1-6725254x²y²).
> 
> I suggest considering taking the dashes out of the canonical names 
> People are going to refer to these in config files and command
> lines and heaven knows where else, so avoiding punctuation may be
> convenient (which I guess may be why none of the other curve names
> I can see used in IETF standards have any).
> 
> For consistency, perhaps Curve1174, Curve25519, and Curve3617 could
> be called in the standard after the formula and prime size (as in 
> [2013 ABPR]), which would make them M255, E251, and E414
> respectively? I've done that below; how does it look?
> 
> I have honestly little idea about formatting of these things
> (other than that the canonical version is ASCII, like this email),
> but the way the basepoint and order are formatted is a little bit
> confusing as it is in draft-00.
> 
> With the above in mind, how about something broadly like this?
> 
> ==========================================================================
>
>  2. The Curves
> 
> Each curve is given by an equation and a basepoint, together with
> an order. All curves are elliptic. Validation information is given
> at [SAFECURVES]. The names given in this document indicate the
> family: safecurveExxx for Edwards curves over a prime field GF(p),
> and safecurveMxxx for Montgomery curves over a prime field GF(p).
> 
> * safecurveE251 (also known as Curve1174) [[ Do we want this one?
> ]] p: 2^251-9 formula: x^2+y^2 = 1-1174x^2y^2 basepoint: x:
> 1582619097725911541954547006453739763381091388846394833492 
> 296309729998839514 (0x037FBB0C EA308C47 9343AEE7 C029A190 C021D96A
> 492ECD65 16123F27 BCE29EDA) y:
> 3037538013604154504764115728651437646519513534305223422754 
> 827055689195992590 (0x06B72F82 D47FB7CC 66568411 69840E0C 4FE2DEE2
> AF3F976B A4CCB1BF 9B46360E) [[ Rigidity note: This is the Edwards
> mapping of the Montgomery point x=4,
> y=192257776421116702304087124422055147834030127084 
> 09058383774613284963344096. 
> <http://cr.yp.to/elligator/elligator-20130527.pdf> ]] Security
> versus rho: 2^124.3; twist: 2^124.3; combined: 2^123.3 order: 2^249
> - 11332719920821432534773113288178349711
> 
> * safecurveM255 (also known as Curve25519) p: 2^255-19 formula: y^2
> = x^3+486662x^2+x basepoint: x: 9 (0x9) y:
> 1478161944758954479102059356840998688726460613461647528896 
> 4881837755586237401 (0x20AE19A1 B8A086B4 E01EDD2C 7748D14C 923D4D7E
> 6D7C61B2 29E9C5A2 7ECED3D9) Security versus rho: 2^125.8; twist:
> 2^126.3; combined: 2^124.3 order: 2^252 +
> 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
> 
> * safecurveE382 p: 2^382-105 formula: x^2+y^2 = 1-67254x^2y^2 
> basepoint: x:
> 3914921414754292646847594472454013487047137431784830634731 
> 377862923477302047857640522480241298429278603678181725699 
> (0x196F8DD0 EAB20391 E5F05BE9 6E8D20AE 68F84003 2B0B6435 2923BAB8
> 53648411 93517DBC E8105398 EBC0CC94 70F79603) y: 17 (0x11) [[ Note:
> <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647.pdf> has different basepoint y=13.
> Check: is that just a different mapping i.e. Monty vs Eddie, or has
> the basepoint changed? If so, why? ]] Security versus rho: 2^189.8;
> twist: 2^189.8; combined: 2^188.8 order: 2^380 -
> 1030303207694556153926491950732314247062623204330 168346855
> 
> * safecurveM383 p: 2^383-187 formula: y^2 = x^3+2065150x^2+x 
> basepoint: x: 12 (0xC) y:
> 4737623401891753997660546300375902576839617167257703725630 
> 389791524463565757299203154901655432096558642117242906494 
> (0x1EC7ED04 AAF834AF 310E304B 2DA0F328 E7C165F0 E8988ABD 39928612
> 90F617AA 1F1B2E7D 0B6E332E 969991B6 2555E77E) Security versus rho:
> 2^189.8; twist: 2^190.3; combined: 2^188.3 order: 2^380 +
> 1662362759313735161052197949355421533080392344557 61613271
> 
> * safecurveE414 (also known as Curve3617) p: 2^414-17 formula:
> x^2+y^2 = 1+3617x^2y^2 basepoint: x:
> 1731988647712118917771920249882261544355695730760434081525 
> 6226171904769976866975908866528699294134494857887698432266 
> 169206165 (0x1A334905 14144330 0218C063 1C326E5F CD46369F 44C03EC7
> F57FF354 98A4AB4D 6D6BA111 301A73FA A8537C64 C4FD3812 F3CBC595) y:
> 34 (0x22) Security versus rho: 2^205.3; twist: 2^205.3; combined:
> 2^203.8 order: 2^411 -
> 3336414086375514252081017769409838517898472720041 1208589594759
> 
> * safecurveM511 p: 2^511-187 formula: y^2 = x^3+530438x^2+x 
> basepoint: x: 5 (0x5) y:
> 2500410645565072423368981149139213252211568685173608590070 
> 9792642482752286038997069505181278171765918786677842475821 
> 24505430745177116625808811349787373477 (0x2FBDC0AD 8530803D
> 28FDBAD3 54BB488D 32399AC1 CF8F6E01 EE3F9638 9B90C809 422B9429
> E8A43DBF 49308AC4 455940AB E9F1DBCA 542093A8 95E30A64 AF056FA5) 
> Security versus rho: 2^253.8; twist: 2^254.3; combined: 2^252.3 
> order: 2^508 + 1072475475963574762404453151406812184207075662743 
> 4833028965540808827675062043
> 
> * safecurveE521 [[ currently awaiting Safecurves approval ]] p:
> 2^521-1 formula: x^2+y^2 = 1+376014x^2y^2 basepoint: x:
> 2500410645565072423368981149139213252211568685173608590070 
> 9792642482752286038997069505181278171765918786677842475821 
> 24505430745177116625808811349787373477 (0x2FBDC0AD 8530803D
> 28FDBAD3 54BB488D 32399AC1 CF8F6E01 EE3F9638 9B90C809 422B9429
> E8A43DBF 49308AC4 455940AB E9F1DBCA 542093A8 95E30A64 AF056FA5) y:
> 6 (0x6) Security versus rho: 2^259.3; twist: 2^259.3; combined:
> 2^258.3 order: 2^519 -
> 3375547632585017057891076304187826360719049612140 
> 51226618635150085779108655765
> 
> ==========================================================================
>
>  Thoughts?
> 
> (_Please_ cross-check the data thoroughly; I may well have made a 
> typographical or calculation error of my own, and of course, extra 
> checking is a good thing! Apologies in advance if I have; thanks
> for any extra pairs of eyes.)
> 
> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list 
> Cfrg@irtf.org http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
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From mike@shiftleft.org  Wed Jan  8 15:19:41 2014
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From: Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Removing the magic constants from SPAKE2
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Hello CFRG,

There=92s been a lot of discussion of PAKE here, and one of the =
contenders is SPAKE2.  The goal of this post is to suggest that a SPAKE2 =
variant might be a suitable standardized PAKE now that SPAKE2 itself is =
out of patent.  I believe that it can be as fast as Dragonfly, but with =
smaller messages, a security proof, and fewer flames from Trevor Perrin. =
 As a reminder, at a high level SPAKE2 uses 3 independent generators =
g,M,N on the curve, and does:

c->s: X =3D g^x M^h(password)
s->c: Y =3D g^y N^h(password), serverValidator(K)
c->s: clientValidator(K).

Here the session key K is h(password,X,Y,g^xy).  If there=92s extra =
information that both sides understand from the connection (eg, user =
name, server domain, etc), it should be thrown into the hash as well, or =
salted into the password, to prevent rebinding.  This PAKE also supports =
a Dragonfly-style flow, where the client and server exchange X,Y, and =
then exchange their validators in a second round.

However, the protocol is considered problematic (and is out of favor =
with CFRG) in large part because of the magic curve points M,N.  The =
discrete logs of these points would be a backdoor in SPAKE2, so care =
must be taken to ensure that M,N are generated at random.

However, there=92s another way to do SPAKE2, which doesn=92t need magic =
curve points.  Instead, M^hash(password) and N^hash(password) can be =
replaced with Elligator(hash(=93M to the=94, password)) and =
Elligator(hash(=93N to the", password)).  This obviously achieves the =
same bounds in the ROM.

Furthermore, if a completely symmetric PAKE is desired, there=92s =
nothing really wrong with setting these two blinding factors to the same =
value.  That is, they can both be M^hash(password) or Elligator(hash(=93M =
to the=94, password)).  The disadvantage is in the proof: the proof will =
now be based on =93CDH squaring=94 instead of regular CDH, i.e. =
computing g^(x^2) from (g,g^x).  Because of quarter-squares the two =
problems are equivalent, but it changes the epsilon^2 in SPAKE to an =
epsilon^4.  This isn=92t a huge deal, and if you prefer stronger proof =
frameworks like Kudla-Patterson=92s GapDH trick, then it doesn=92t =
change the bounds at all.

One more important note!  Because Elligator only works on curves with a =
cofactor, care must be taken not to leak bits from the cofactor.  That =
is, either g needs to generate the whole group and not just the =
q-torsion, or else the parties should send (g^x Elligator(=85))^4.  This =
could also be avoided by using a prime-order curve and SWU/BCIMRT =
instead of Elligator.

Does anyone on CFRG find this approach interesting?  If there=92s enough =
interest, I=92m willing to spec it, though I=92d like to understand =
CFRG=92s preference on the various options here:
* Which curve(s)?  Ed25519?  Safecurves?  Is NIST curve compatibility a =
requirement?
* How much metadata should be present (ASN.1 or fixed curves?)
* Is the completely symmetric PAKE desirable?
* Is SRP-style augmentation desirable?  Should it be optional?
* Are the flows being integrated into TLS or something?
* Should false start be in the spec?

Cheers,
=97 Mike Hamburg=

From akr@akr.io  Wed Jan  8 15:21:18 2014
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Hash: SHA512

On 08/01/2014 23:17, Stephen Farrell wrote:

> In case it helps with formatting. A trick some people have done
> from time to time is to include a shell script as an appendix to a
> draft/RFC so that when you extract the script and run it with the
> draft/RFC as input it pulls out the examples/numbers and feeds them
> into a checker.

...or (this time) we could just link to <http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/>,
as the source of these?

- -- 
/akr
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q/TRzhNXHhThAey/F347sfsLdc3f1/ydFkjbN1ChLRYMtSgV/VIByh7rMDE+5NBl
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9cn52tR7cvBGBJLIGhQS
=MoAL
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From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Wed Jan  8 15:23:49 2014
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On 01/08/2014 11:21 PM, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
> On 08/01/2014 23:17, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
>> In case it helps with formatting. A trick some people have done 
>> from time to time is to include a shell script as an appendix to
>> a draft/RFC so that when you extract the script and run it with
>> the draft/RFC as input it pulls out the examples/numbers and
>> feeds them into a checker.
> 
> ...or (this time) we could just link to
> <http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/>, as the source of these?

Probably not - the RFC editor doesn't like recent URLs like that
for anything normative. Its fine for a draft but RFCs last a looong
time.

But my suggestion was more about ensuring that you don't get
errors when copying stuff into the draft and not about referencing.

S.

> 
> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list 
> Cfrg@irtf.org http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> 
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I asked Tanja about the two curves. The answer is that (A-2)/4 should
be small, but this is an efficiency problem with one of them, not
a security issue. My elligator belief was based on a misreading of a table.
I'll take out the bad one in the next version.
I'll add E521 and copy the formatting in the 01 draft, which I'll post
as soon as a few days go by the fix
Thanks for spotting the typos.

I don't want to rename curves because that induces consistency issues.
Removing dashes is a good idea.

The EFD formulas will go in appendix to address the URL problem, and
to address some people's desire for explicit formulas.
For validation I give you a point on the curve and a claimed order:
the Hasse-Weil bound plus a quick multiply does the rest. Validation
isn't normative, so I think we can refer people to safecurves.

On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 3:10 PM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> Glad to see this one get under way.
>
> I'm strongly in favour of the meat of the proposal.
>
> I have a couple of comments (mostly typographical and/or clarity).
>
> Maybe we should give an estimate of security (bitwise). [SAFECURVES]
> calculates that and otherwise it isn't crystal-clear from the names
> which curves would be about suitable for which security level.
>
> Any particular reason why Curve1174 wasn't included, as it's in the
> same strength category as Curve25519? (See below, for roughly how it
> would look if I think we did go for it?)
>
>>> Also, is it on purpose that you didn't include E-521 in your
>>> draft?
>> I simply copied the safecurves.cr.yp.to list starting at
>> Curve25519. There is no E-521 on that list.
>
> E-521 is in the revised reference in [2013 Aranha-Barreto-Pereira-
> Ricardini] <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647.pdf>. It looks like djb
> and Tanja Lange haven't finished putting it through all their own
> checks yet; at present it's on some pages (fields, rho, transfers,
> discriminants) but not others (base points, rigidity).
>
> It looks like they're mid-way through checking it. It'll very probably
> pass (identical design criteria; all its peers in the same paper did).
> Put it in the draft, take it out if for some reason it doesn't?
>
>>> why are there two Montgomery curves over GF(2^383-187)?
>> It's because one has an Elligator map and the other does not.
>
> You mean, an Elligator-1 map? (They all have Elligator-2 maps.)
>
> [2013 Aranha-Barreto-Pereira-Ricardini] version 20131031:234129
> replaces Curve383187 with an M-383 prototype with the following comment:
>     "Replaced the curve over the 383-bit field by a more
>      implementation-friendly curve."
>
> A's a little higher in that exact revision, but it appears they found
> a lower suitable one in November. The final M-383 is the one
> SafeCurves reviewed, although the older Curve383187 also passed.
>
>> Some applications require it, but not all.
>
> Not sure if there's a lot of point in having two Monty curves of the
> exact same field?
>
> [Typographical notes]
>
> The parameters for E-382 seem to be are miscopied in -00. Should be
> 2^382-105, and x=C2=B2+y=C2=B2=3D1-67254x=C2=B2y=C2=B2 (not 2^382-15 and =
x=C2=B2+y=C2=B2=3D1-6725254x=C2=B2y=C2=B2).
>
> I suggest considering taking the dashes out of the canonical names
> People are going to refer to these in config files and command lines
> and heaven knows where else, so avoiding punctuation may be convenient
> (which I guess may be why none of the other curve names I can see used
> in IETF standards have any).
>
> For consistency, perhaps Curve1174, Curve25519, and Curve3617
> could be called in the standard after the formula and prime size (as in
> [2013 ABPR]), which would make them M255, E251, and E414 respectively?
> I've done that below; how does it look?
>
> I have honestly little idea about formatting of these things (other
> than that the canonical version is ASCII, like this email), but the
> way the basepoint and order are formatted is a little bit confusing as
> it is in draft-00.
>
> With the above in mind, how about something broadly like this?
>
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>
> 2. The Curves
>
>    Each curve is given by an equation and a basepoint, together with an
>    order. All curves are elliptic. Validation information is given at
>    [SAFECURVES]. The names given in this document indicate the family:
>    safecurveExxx for Edwards curves over a prime field GF(p), and
>    safecurveMxxx for Montgomery curves over a prime field GF(p).
>
>    * safecurveE251 (also known as Curve1174) [[ Do we want this one? ]]
>      p: 2^251-9
>      formula: x^2+y^2 =3D 1-1174x^2y^2
>      basepoint:
>         x: 1582619097725911541954547006453739763381091388846394833492
>            296309729998839514
>            (0x037FBB0C EA308C47 9343AEE7 C029A190
>               C021D96A 492ECD65 16123F27 BCE29EDA)
>         y: 3037538013604154504764115728651437646519513534305223422754
>            827055689195992590
>            (0x06B72F82 D47FB7CC 66568411 69840E0C
>               4FE2DEE2 AF3F976B A4CCB1BF 9B46360E)
>      [[ Rigidity note: This is the Edwards mapping of the Montgomery
>         point x=3D4, y=3D192257776421116702304087124422055147834030127084
>         09058383774613284963344096.
>         <http://cr.yp.to/elligator/elligator-20130527.pdf> ]]
>      Security versus rho: 2^124.3; twist: 2^124.3; combined: 2^123.3
>      order: 2^249 - 11332719920821432534773113288178349711
>
>    * safecurveM255 (also known as Curve25519)
>      p: 2^255-19
>      formula: y^2 =3D x^3+486662x^2+x
>      basepoint:
>         x: 9 (0x9)
>         y: 1478161944758954479102059356840998688726460613461647528896
>            4881837755586237401
>            (0x20AE19A1 B8A086B4 E01EDD2C 7748D14C
>               923D4D7E 6D7C61B2 29E9C5A2 7ECED3D9)
>      Security versus rho: 2^125.8; twist: 2^126.3; combined: 2^124.3
>      order: 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
>
>    * safecurveE382
>      p: 2^382-105
>      formula: x^2+y^2 =3D 1-67254x^2y^2
>      basepoint:
>         x: 3914921414754292646847594472454013487047137431784830634731
>            377862923477302047857640522480241298429278603678181725699
>            (0x196F8DD0 EAB20391 E5F05BE9 6E8D20AE
>               68F84003 2B0B6435 2923BAB8 53648411
>               93517DBC E8105398 EBC0CC94 70F79603)
>         y: 17 (0x11)
>      [[ Note: <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647.pdf> has different
>         basepoint y=3D13. Check: is that just a different mapping i.e.
>         Monty vs Eddie, or has the basepoint changed? If so, why? ]]
>      Security versus rho: 2^189.8; twist: 2^189.8; combined: 2^188.8
>      order: 2^380 - 1030303207694556153926491950732314247062623204330
>                     168346855
>
>    * safecurveM383
>      p: 2^383-187
>      formula: y^2 =3D x^3+2065150x^2+x
>      basepoint:
>         x: 12 (0xC)
>         y: 4737623401891753997660546300375902576839617167257703725630
>            389791524463565757299203154901655432096558642117242906494
>            (0x1EC7ED04 AAF834AF 310E304B 2DA0F328
>               E7C165F0 E8988ABD 39928612 90F617AA
>               1F1B2E7D 0B6E332E 969991B6 2555E77E)
>      Security versus rho: 2^189.8; twist: 2^190.3; combined: 2^188.3
>      order: 2^380 + 1662362759313735161052197949355421533080392344557
>                     61613271
>
>    * safecurveE414 (also known as Curve3617)
>      p: 2^414-17
>      formula: x^2+y^2 =3D 1+3617x^2y^2
>      basepoint:
>         x: 1731988647712118917771920249882261544355695730760434081525
>            6226171904769976866975908866528699294134494857887698432266
>            169206165
>            (0x1A334905 14144330 0218C063 1C326E5F
>               CD46369F 44C03EC7 F57FF354 98A4AB4D
>               6D6BA111 301A73FA A8537C64 C4FD3812
>               F3CBC595)
>         y: 34 (0x22)
>      Security versus rho: 2^205.3; twist: 2^205.3; combined: 2^203.8
>      order: 2^411 - 3336414086375514252081017769409838517898472720041
>                     1208589594759
>
>    * safecurveM511
>      p: 2^511-187
>      formula: y^2 =3D x^3+530438x^2+x
>      basepoint:
>         x: 5 (0x5)
>         y: 2500410645565072423368981149139213252211568685173608590070
>            9792642482752286038997069505181278171765918786677842475821
>            24505430745177116625808811349787373477
>            (0x2FBDC0AD 8530803D 28FDBAD3 54BB488D
>               32399AC1 CF8F6E01 EE3F9638 9B90C809
>               422B9429 E8A43DBF 49308AC4 455940AB
>               E9F1DBCA 542093A8 95E30A64 AF056FA5)
>      Security versus rho: 2^253.8; twist: 2^254.3; combined: 2^252.3
>      order: 2^508 + 1072475475963574762404453151406812184207075662743
>                     4833028965540808827675062043
>
>    * safecurveE521 [[ currently awaiting Safecurves approval ]]
>      p: 2^521-1
>      formula: x^2+y^2 =3D 1+376014x^2y^2
>      basepoint:
>         x: 2500410645565072423368981149139213252211568685173608590070
>            9792642482752286038997069505181278171765918786677842475821
>            24505430745177116625808811349787373477
>            (0x2FBDC0AD 8530803D 28FDBAD3 54BB488D
>               32399AC1 CF8F6E01 EE3F9638 9B90C809
>               422B9429 E8A43DBF 49308AC4 455940AB
>               E9F1DBCA 542093A8 95E30A64 AF056FA5)
>         y: 6 (0x6)
>      Security versus rho: 2^259.3; twist: 2^259.3; combined: 2^258.3
>      order: 2^519 - 3375547632585017057891076304187826360719049612140
>                     51226618635150085779108655765
>
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>
> Thoughts?
>
> (_Please_ cross-check the data thoroughly; I may well have made a
> typographical or calculation error of my own, and of course, extra
> checking is a good thing! Apologies in advance if I have; thanks for
> any extra pairs of eyes.)
>
> - --
> /akr
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 4:30 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>> > You should also look at: RFC 6090
>> > The math for Small Wierstrass curves is defined well - you need the
>> > equivalent of
>> > 6090 for Edwards curves.  Do note the authors of this excellent RFC
>> > Include both chairs of this list.
>>
>> First, is this advising me on next steps, or is it an objection to the
>> draft?
> Next steps.  I'm very supportive of the inclusion of these curves into the main stream.
>
>> The group is [l]Jac(E(F_q)). There, done. In fact, this is in the
>> introduction.
>> The equivalent to RFC 6090 is the Bernstein paper on addition on
>> Edwards (and twisted Edwards curves).
>> It's readily available. If you want to reformat it as an I-D, go right
>> ahead.
> Academic papers are not appropriate directly.  Clear and concise algorithm
> descriptions and guidelines are required.

But the explicit formulas aren't actually required for intereop. I'll
put them as informational because it took me a few minutes to
write them down in the draft, and I don't mind that much.
 We don't define how TCP clients should maintain the buffer of sent
information efficiently, or how
routers should maintain the routing tables. OSPF doesn't explain how
to maintain a binomial heap.
This sort of information might belong in an RFC. But its lack doesn't
make a standard insufficient.

Anyway, this is totally immaterial: the next version, which fixes some
typos, adds E-521, and removes a badly designed
curve (secure but slow), adds in a section explaining the formulas
will hit the RFC editor some time next week: I want to collect
more comments and resolve them.

Take a good look for typos: that's what can really mess this whole thing up.

Anyway, once I get the next version up, I think we'll pretty much be
ready on this, assuming no major dealbreakers appear.

>
>
>>
>> Is it really that bad to have the EFD get cited for the formulas, or to
>> advise implementers to read Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic
>> Curve Cryptography?
> Yes.  They are not standards.  They are not always precise and subject to
> Interpretation and bad implementation.
> They are not complete ... Dan's point about OIDs and the like required
> to actually use the curves.

One of the big obstacles to the curves you mentioned was the lack of
vetting. That's gone now: you can point to it in an RFC when this gets
published. As a result when it comes to designing or revising old
standards, it won't be harder than putting any other curve now.

I'm very much against protocol design that involves lots of options: I
like these curves because they have great implementations with
liberal licensing available now. You can use these curves today with
just a choice of big or little endian, and software that sets speed
records.

Adding in the apparatus in each protocol is obviously going to take
longer, depending on how bad the protocol is to work with. But
I don't think CFRG is the right place for that.
>
>
>
> Paul



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 17:09:42 -0800
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 17:32:54 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On 1/8/14, 4:58 PM, "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 4:30 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>>> > You should also look at: RFC 6090
>>> > The math for Small Wierstrass curves is defined well - you need the
>>> > equivalent of
>>> > 6090 for Edwards curves.  Do note the authors of this excellent RFC
>>> > Include both chairs of this list.
>>>
>>> First, is this advising me on next steps, or is it an objection to the
>>> draft?
>> Next steps.  I'm very supportive of the inclusion of these curves into
>>the main stream.
>>
>>> The group is [l]Jac(E(F_q)). There, done. In fact, this is in the
>>> introduction.

??=20
>>> The equivalent to RFC 6090 is the Bernstein paper on addition on
>>> Edwards (and twisted Edwards curves).
>>> It's readily available. If you want to reformat it as an I-D, go right
>>> ahead.
>> Academic papers are not appropriate directly.  Clear and concise
>>algorithm
>> descriptions and guidelines are required.
>
>But the explicit formulas aren't actually required for intereop. I'll
>put them as informational because it took me a few minutes to
>write them down in the draft, and I don't mind that much.
> We don't define how TCP clients should maintain the buffer of sent
>information efficiently, or how
>routers should maintain the routing tables. OSPF doesn't explain how
>to maintain a binomial heap.
>This sort of information might belong in an RFC. But its lack doesn't
>make a standard insufficient.
>
>Anyway, this is totally immaterial: the next version, which fixes some
>typos, adds E-521, and removes a badly designed
>curve (secure but slow), adds in a section explaining the formulas
>will hit the RFC editor some time next week: I want to collect
>more comments and resolve them.
Comment:=20
 -too terse
 - no clear mapping of numbers to variables
 - no documentation of Edwards point addition
   Which is different from durrent ECC drafts
 - no indication of security concerns and
  need or lack of checking public key values
=20

Here=B9s how I=B9d document curve parameters:

class Curve3617(EdwardsCurveFp):
    curveId  =3D 'curve3716'
    strength =3D 207
    oid =3D None
    p  =3D 2**414 - 17
    d  =3D 3617
    xG =3D 0x1a334905141443300218c0631c326e5fcd46369f44c03ec7f5\
         7ff35498a4ab4d6d6ba111301a73faa8537c64c4fd3812f3cbc595
    yG =3D 0x22
    n  =3D 2**411 -=20
33364140863755142520810177694098385178984727200411208589594759


=20


Paul

PS - above parameters are directly executable Python code
     Why use pseudo code when you can use real code :-)



>
>Take a good look for typos: that's what can really mess this whole thing
>up.
>
>Anyway, once I get the next version up, I think we'll pretty much be
>ready on this, assuming no major dealbreakers appear.
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Is it really that bad to have the EFD get cited for the formulas, or to
>>> advise implementers to read Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic
>>> Curve Cryptography?
>> Yes.  They are not standards.  They are not always precise and subject
>>to
>> Interpretation and bad implementation.
>> They are not complete ... Dan's point about OIDs and the like required
>> to actually use the curves.
>
>One of the big obstacles to the curves you mentioned was the lack of
>vetting. That's gone now: you can point to it in an RFC when this gets
>published. As a result when it comes to designing or revising old
>standards, it won't be harder than putting any other curve now.
>
>I'm very much against protocol design that involves lots of options: I
>like these curves because they have great implementations with
>liberal licensing available now. You can use these curves today with
>just a choice of big or little endian, and software that sets speed
>records.
>
>Adding in the apparatus in each protocol is obviously going to take
>longer, depending on how bad the protocol is to work with. But
>I don't think CFRG is the right place for that.
>>
>>
>>
>> Paul
>
>
>
>--=20
>"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>-- Benjamin Franklin


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From: "Isaac Chua" <isaac@isaacchua.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Dear Watson,

Great initiative. I think the doc should include a summary on the criteria
DJB and Lange use (the parameter and security requirements) similar to the
Brainpool one (RFC5639).

I do wonder, should this doc comment/make recommendations on the use of
unsafe curves according to these criteria?

Regards,
Isaac

-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell
Sent: Thursday, 9 January, 2014 01:22
To: Watson Ladd; cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft



On 01/08/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders 
> 2^255+\epsilon and higher.
> I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive 
> conversation.
> 
> Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard 
> body use/typos/general nastiness?

No objection, but there's maybe some checking to be done before we're ready
to push the button.

One thing though is that rfc 3526 [1] is standards track so if there's a
reason for that (and there may or may not
be;-) then we might want these to be the same which'd mean not doing 'em in
cfrg. That can be figured out later though.

S.


[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526

> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> 
_______________________________________________
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Igoe, Kevin M.
> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 10:15 AM
> To: 'David McGrew'; Sean Turner
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics
> for CFRG)
>=20
> I'd like to see the CFRG investigate how far the DANE paradigm can be
> pushed w/o bringing the system to a screeching halt.
> For example, there is a group an NIST looking at the possibility of
> leveraging DANE for use with e-mail.  Who else is out there hoping to
> piggy bank on DANE?  Can DANE be the new PKI? =20
No.=20

Nice hack, but lacking adequate semantics and constraint based
architecture to extend well beyond DNS based naming (email could work).

>If not, what features
> does it lack & can it be "patched"?
Anything could be patched ... but the core hierarchy structure
of DNS would be maintained and would always be of that flavor=20
of that solution space.=20

I'd like to see something that would work for mobile phones without
central servers ...

Paul

>=20
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM
> > To: Sean Turner
> > Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org
> > Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
> >
> > Hi Sean,
> >
> > On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> > > My list is kind of short:
> >
> > thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to
> prioritize
> > work.
> >
> > >
> > > 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS
> > or not:
> > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
> > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
> > >
> > > If so, let's do a draft!
> > >
> > > 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC
> (am
> > I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more
> about
> > (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in
> > fear):
> > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
> > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
> > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
> > >
> > > 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
> > > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-
> 00.txt
> > > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
> >
> > #0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment
> on
> > #2.
> >
> > Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem
> > that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
> > extensive use in the Internet.
> >
> > The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational
> > assumptions for security.   However, it relies on physical
> assumptions
> > for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer.
> > This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at
> any
> > point between the encrypter and decrypter.   In addition, QKD
> requires
> > large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder
> > problem
> > in the real world than pseudorandomnes.   (In other words: a QKD
> system
> > could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable
> > elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use
> that
> > algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?)
> >
> > QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and
> very
> > severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support.
> > The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit
> > per second at 20 KM range.   Using that technology, we need 10,000
> > repeaters to get global scale communication.   This would require the
> > pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters
> along
> > the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to
> be
> > trusted.  There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not
> > need to be trusted,
> >
> > The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for
> a
> > conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad
> idea.
> > It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as
> > whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has.   It is
> *more*
> > vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same
> > cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution.
> >
> > QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons,
> > and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such
> as
> > 4G
> > and 802.11.   The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy
> > than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not
> > geometrically point to point.   So even if QKD didn't suffer from the
> > problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6
> billion
> > cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users.
> >
> > QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in
> > information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend,
> > Could, virtualization, and collaboration.
> >
> > I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium
> > Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than
> quantum
> > key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the
> claim
> > in the title.   The important observation here is that the classical
> > Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable
> > storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure
> > communication, is quantifiably better than QKD.   Vernam does not
> have
> > any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range
> > limitations, and it can be used over wireless.   Its data rate will
> > depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a
> > trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a
> > courier
> > need not travel that often to match its data rate.   The important
> > inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility
> that
> > all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we
> > would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems,
> and
> > not QKD.   The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest
> > in
> > QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of
> > what would be useful in information security.
> >
> > My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
> > http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we
> need
> > to get these points understood more widely, we could publish
> something
> > on it.
> >
> > David
> >
> > >
> > > spt
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Removing the magic constants from SPAKE2
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
> Hello CFRG,
>
><snip>

> However, the protocol is considered problematic (and is out of favor with=
 CFRG) in large part because of the magic curve points M,N.  The discrete l=
ogs of these points would be a backdoor in SPAKE2, so care must be taken to=
 ensure that M,N are generated at random.
>
> However, there=E2=80=99s another way to do SPAKE2, which doesn=E2=80=99t =
need magic curve points.  Instead, M^hash(password) and N^hash(password) ca=
n be replaced with Elligator(hash(=E2=80=9CM to the=E2=80=9D, password)) an=
d Elligator(hash(=E2=80=9CN to the", password)).  This obviously achieves t=
he same bounds in the ROM.

But it unfortunately falls apart in the standard model, because I can
cook the hash. The obvious choice for original SPAKE2 is the M and N
with smallest x or y coordinates that are on the curve besides the
generator. I don't think M&N are the issue here.

Basically, I think derandomization is better than SHA3 being like a
random oracle in all the ways that matter as an assumption.

>
><snip>
> Cheers,
> =E2=80=94 Mike Hamburg
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 8:20 AM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Hi Adam,
>
> On 01/08/2014 03:17 PM, Adam Back wrote:
>> Hi John
>>
>> I've seen several people putting forward a similar argument.  There is some
>> logic but its I think an incorrect conclusion.
>
> I think there's a bit more subtlety to the conflict of interest
> issue than maybe some folks appreciate.

Hi Stephen,

I'd like to understand the subtlety better.  The IETF/IRTF leadership
seems terrified that considering an egregious conflict of interest in
a chair is a "slippery slope" to membership fees, loyalty oaths, and
purges.

I don't understand this.  Chairs are appointed (I assume) by weighing
many factors:  are they smart?  Fair?  Good communicators?
Trustworthy?  Easy to work with?  Knowledgeable both technically and
of IETF/IRTF process?  I would think being clear of severe
conflicts-of-interest is also good.

No-one wants to make these criteria for excluding participants.  But
if a chair's lack of these qualities threatens a group's performance,
surely it's appropriate to consider a replacement?


> Within the IETF its not that uncommon to have conflicts of
> interest where a company would like to sabotage a piece of
> standards work, in ways that seem quite similar to the current
> situation and that do not involve IPR, nor the misbehaviour
> of an individual chair.
>
> Say company-x have a product doing some proprietary thing
> that has significant market share. Then others propose to
> standardise that function, which company-x might consider
> would lessen their advantage with their product. It would not
> at all be a surprise to see people acting for company-x
> (employed, as consultants or business partners) trying to
> bugger up the standards process by e.g. trying to make the
> standard take ages, be over-complex or omit some crucial
> functionality. And if company-x aren't dumb then that can
> be attempted without any obvious evidence being left about.

And this is just totally acceptable, day-to-day life at the IETF?


> Now if company-x are of any size, then its quite likely
> that employees of theirs are chairing other WGs. And for
> a long-lived WG with a generic charter, it'd not be at
> all unusual if someone working for company-X co-chairs
> the WG in question.
>
> So - what's different here? Are we saying that if a
> company-x marketing department memo leaks that says "let's
> bugger up <foo>" then we should fire the person who's
> co-chairing that WG?

Depending on the credibility of the memo and the consequences of the
buggering, I would think that's reasonable to consider.

I disagree that this needs to be framed as "fire the person".  That
implies this is some exceptional and insulting process to inflict on
someone.

But there is no other process to replace an RG chair except for having
the IRTF chair replace them.  Kevin has no term limit.  We can't just
wait 6 months and then quietly ease him out, or something.

Perhaps there should be some process for selecting new chairs
periodically that is less confrontational, but unless I'm missing
something, there is not.


>> I understand the conflict of interest when people are somewhat
>> pushing their companies approach, related to their product or
>> implementtion choices they have some investment in, but generally
>> tempered by reasonableness.  All the companies that care can put
>> their voice in also.  IPR disclosures are also there.  Loose
>> consensus and running code copes with that ok.
>
> I think you left out a critical part of that, at least as its
> done in the IETF and IRTF - the participants ideally act as
> individuals and not on behalf of their employers and are treated
> that way. There is a serious danger of going down the slippery
> slope to paid membership if we deviate from that, with what I
> think would be overall worse outcomes.

You lost me - what does "paid membership" have to do with this?


>> I think NSA sabotage is a significantly different and its unrealistic to
>> just assume a chair has no influence.  A non-NSA chair would strive for
>> impartiality with regard to their employers interests.  If certicom
>> wants to
>> push something and cisco something else they are both pushing for something
>> reasonably secure as a fundamental assumption and trying to make secure
>> systems so their customers will buy them.  Forward secrecy is good,
>> architectural weaknesses bad etc.
>>
>> The NSA is NOT in that boat.  They are explicitly sabotaging security on a
>> grand and systematic scale at all levels including standardization.  They
>> dislike forward secrecy, and like architectural weakness and architectural
>> tap points and sabotaged RNGs, and fragile hard to implement correctly
>> standards with traps.  There were numerous news articles by Greenwald and
>> others backed by NSA docs about these strategies.
>
> Other than the headline 250/yr I think I've only seen
> convincing evidence related to the RNG stuff though. The
> rest afaik is speculation. If I missed more that's been
> published, I'd appreciate pointers.

See the BULLRUN reporting and documents:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html?ref=us

Adam's speculations strike me as plausible and consistent with the
documents we have.  I think acting on "risk avoidance" grounds is
prudent here, instead of demanding absolute proof of what would of
course be covert and "deniable" activities by sneaky people.


> But there's IMO a far more likely explanation for why we end up
> with stuff that fits this particular speculation - a lot of
> standards work ends up being dominated by people with more
> complex requirements and its always hard to keep stuff simple.
> In the case of security protocols, the US DoD requirements, as a
> customer (e.g. for PKI) are about as complicated as it gets and they
> can afford to pay folks to work on that. So we've ended up with
> PKI that's over complex for many other use-cases.

Huh.  That's not all that different from the fears Adam has, or my
concern about "softer forms" of sabotage.  At least, the line between
"sabotage" and "not quite working in the Internet's best interest" is
a blurry one.

For example:  It's interesting how NIST tends to standardize
algorithms that work well in hardware but are tricky in software.  And
how DoD's steering of PKI worked for DoD, I suppose, but has not
resulted in working key management for the Internet.


Trevor

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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I don't object to these curves.

Still, could we please call these curves something more specific and neutra=
l than just "safe"?

Aren't many other curves safe so far as we know?

For example, take the Brainpool curves, use a Montgomery (Brier-Joye?) ladd=
er, and an extra careful implementation, and do ECDHE, with some other kind=
 of safe auth. Is that not safe?

Indeed, what about the NIST curves?

Implying them to be unsafe in the sense of a weak DLP implies a hypotheses =
that mildly reduces the conventional notion of security for all ECC.

Anyway, I debated all this already with Bernstein over at the TLS list, wit=
h virtually no  agreement confirmed. For now, I'll try to focus on the nami=
ng issue.

Is it that "safe" means something less than "secure" in the conventional se=
nse above? And safe is the best that can be hoped for in ECC, and maybe all=
 PKC? That's just too strong to say.

To be constructive, I suggest a name: "minimal - coefficient Montgomery" cu=
rves. Implicit in this name is that minimality is subject avoiding known DL=
P attacks, though the Monty should tip one of the crypto app. The short nam=
e could be "mini Monty".

From: Watson Ladd
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:11 PM
To: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft


Dear all,
draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
2^255+\epsilon and higher.
I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
conversation.

Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
body use/typos/general nastiness?
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
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From mike@shiftleft.org  Wed Jan  8 19:39:44 2014
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Removing the magic constants from SPAKE2
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On Jan 8, 2014, at 6:23 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> =
wrote:
>> Hello CFRG,
>>=20
>> <snip>
>=20
>> However, the protocol is considered problematic (and is out of favor =
with CFRG) in large part because of the magic curve points M,N.  The =
discrete logs of these points would be a backdoor in SPAKE2, so care =
must be taken to ensure that M,N are generated at random.
>>=20
>> However, there=92s another way to do SPAKE2, which doesn=92t need =
magic curve points.  Instead, M^hash(password) and N^hash(password) can =
be replaced with Elligator(hash(=93M to the=94, password)) and =
Elligator(hash(=93N to the", password)).  This obviously achieves the =
same bounds in the ROM.
>=20
> But it unfortunately falls apart in the standard model, because I can
> cook the hash. The obvious choice for original SPAKE2 is the M and N
> with smallest x or y coordinates that are on the curve besides the
> generator. I don't think M&N are the issue here.
>=20
> Basically, I think derandomization is better than SHA3 being like a
> random oracle in all the ways that matter as an assumption.

I believe we discussed this at BaySec.  SPAKE2 uses the random oracle =
model anyway, as does every fast-ish PAKE including J-PAKE (depending on =
the signature scheme used by J-PAKE, but the default is Schnorr IIRC).

But regardless, I don=92t agree with your intuition here.  The =
derandomized case is probably impossible to break in real life, but once =
an attacker solves the discrete logs of M and N once, she can hack =
everyone forever.  It=92s a class break.

For the Elligator version, for the attacker to try (p1,p2) with only one =
login attempt, she has to solve a CDH challenge derived from SHA3(p1) =
and SHA3(p2), ideally salted with the username and the server domain.  =
And then she still has to test all other passwords sequentially.  And =
this only works for one user and domain.  For there to be a practical =
attack, somehow points of the form Elligator(SHA3(password)) have to =
have easily computable relations a significant fraction of the time.  =
With non-pathologically-chosen hash functions (eg, SHA2 or SHA3), this =
seems extremely unlikely.

In other words, while an attacker could get a few free guesses with a =
cleverly =93cooked" hash function, the hash function has to be truly =
pathologically related to the elliptic curve for it to actually break =
things.

So while the Elligator construction uses the ROM more pervasively, I =
think it=92s theoretically more sound than the original SPAKE2.

Cheers,
=97 Mike


From ynir@checkpoint.com  Wed Jan  8 22:09:50 2014
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: Another PAKE question
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Hi

I almost feel like I'm asking for trouble after the roast that Dan went thr=
ough, but some on this list might want to consider another PAKE going throu=
gh an IETF working group.

HTTP-Auth is making experimental authentication mechanisms for the HTTP lay=
er. One of those is a PAKE. If people here on the CFRG list would like to c=
omment on it, that would be great. We can have some discussion here, but ul=
timately, comments criticisms and suggestions should go to the HTTP-auth li=
st (details below).

The draft in question is called "Mutual Authentication Protocol for HTTP".

Link: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-mutual-01

Yoav
co-chair of HTTP-Auth

Mailing list details:
 * http-auth List Information: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-a=
uth
 * http-auth List Archives: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-auth/=
current/maillist.html
 * http-auth Posting Address (requires registration): http-auth@ietf.org=

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Wed Jan  8 23:17:19 2014
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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References: <180998C7-B6E5-489E-9C79-80D9CAC0DE68@checkpoint.com> <CAL9PXLy9hrq+i_neP96FbTJRvRLbLEXnMYdBdwSeHunFAwF+jQ@mail.gmail.com> <A867BB8E-4556-44B1-A0AF-16771626BF5C@checkpoint.com> <52CB358D.3050603@cisco.com> <A6BDE08D-1F7D-4813-A9C4-61AF8C14412B@checkpoint.com> <52CB482D.6090807@cisco.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On Jan 7, 2014, at 2:19 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> Hi Yoav,
>=20
> On 01/06/2014 06:43 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> On Jan 7, 2014, at 1:00 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
>> wrote:
>>=20
>>> Hi Yoav,
>>>=20
>>> On 01/06/2014 05:23 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>>> Thanks. Proposing this seems so obvious, that I thought I must be miss=
ing something that makes it unsuitable.
>>>>=20
>>>> On Jan 6, 2014, at 8:05 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote=
:
>>>>>> Unlike RC4, ChaCha20 has a 64-bit nonce, so different packets could =
use different keystreams, much like block ciphers in counter mode. Unlike 3=
DES, ChaCha20 has performance that is close to that of AES.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> So my question is whether there is any reason not to use ChaCha20 (w=
ith or without the AEAD construction from Adam's draft) for IKE and/or IPse=
c. Could this be the standby algorithm that we have been looking for?
>>>>> I don't know of any problems with this. If IPsec has the concept of a
>>>>> counter than can be used as an nonce then I think the AEAD
>>>>> construction would be fine, as is.
>>>> IPsec has a 32- or 64-bit packet counter, but for some reason it has n=
ever been used as a nonce. Both AES-CTR and AES-GCM have explicit 64-bit IV=
s in IPsec, so I think a ChaCha implementation should do the same - have an=
 explicit IV that's used as a nonce, with a MUST requirement for uniqueness=
 of IV/key combination.
>>> the reason that the ESP sequence number isn't used as a cryptographic n=
once is that it was not regarded as reliable enough.   That is, the ESP sta=
ndard does not insist that the sequence number never wrap, and many impleme=
ntations are not careful about maintaining the uniqueness of the sequence n=
umber.  This situation is not ideal, but it does seem to be the case.
>> I agree that the text could use some more RFC2119 language, but allowing=
 the sequence to wrap is not allowed:
>>=20
>>                                              If anti-replay is enabled
>>   (the default), the transmitted Sequence Number must never be allowed
>>   to cycle.  Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST
>>   be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the
>>   transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA.
>>=20
>>>>> If one needs to pick the nonces
>>>>> randomly, however, then a 64-bit space is too small and XChaCha (whic=
h
>>>>> has a 192-bit nonce) would be more suitable.
>>>> It would work, but IPsec requires re-keying when the 32-bit or 64-bit =
counter reaches 2^n-1, so that seems like overkill.
>>> Agreed that a 192-bit nonce sounds a bit big.
>>>=20
>>> ESP supports multipoint security associations, in which case it is esse=
ntial to coordinate nonces across all of the encrypters, to make sure that =
they are all distinct.   The requirements and a simple approach is outlined=
 in rfc6054, and those requirements are followed in the latest version of t=
he Group Domain of Interpretation rfc6407.  The nonce management is a bit u=
gly, but there is precedent for it.
>>>=20
>>> We could do a lot worse than ChaCha as a cipher.   An AEAD construction=
 could be used in a way that mirrors GCM/CCM, though if I recall right, Ada=
m defined an 8-byte nonce rather than a 12-byte nonce for the ChaCha AEAD a=
lgorithm, which makes it incompatible with almost all of the other AEAD alg=
orithms (see Table 1 of draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-02).   A 12-byte nonce would en=
able ESP implementations to use the same nonce generation techniques, inclu=
ding rfc6407 ones.
>> An 8-byte nonce is part of ChaCha.
>=20
> - faceplam -  Yes, of course.
>=20
>> This is different from counter mode where the initial counter could be a=
nything up to block size. I don't claim to understand why ChaCha has a 64-b=
it nonce and a 64-bit block counter instead of, say, a 96-bit nonce and a 3=
2-bit block counter (good for 256 GB - plenty for an IP packet). Would ChaC=
ha modified like that retain its security properties?
>=20
> I think so - I would be surprised if it didn't retain its security proper=
ties.   But it might be best to avoid tweaking the design.

Thinking it over, I think so too. While ChaCha20 can handle 64 TB messages,=
 256 GB is more than good enough for an IPsec packet (currently limited to =
64KB). So we could reduce the block counter to 10 bits, but since everythin=
g else id ChaCha is 32-bit, I'll leave it at 32-bit. So the nonce could be =
expanded to 96-bit, but as long as an implementation makes sure that it *is=
* a nonce (only used once), 64-bit is plenty for a single SA. I will use th=
e extra 32-bit word as sender-id. So it can be set to zero for regular ESP,=
 and set to non-zero for GDOI with multiple senders.

Yoav


From dharkins@lounge.org  Wed Jan  8 23:25:28 2014
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From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Yoav Nir" <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Another PAKE question
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  Hi Yoav,

On Wed, January 8, 2014 10:09 pm, Yoav Nir wrote:
> Hi
>
> I almost feel like I'm asking for trouble after the roast that Dan went
> through, but some on this list might want to consider another PAKE going
> through an IETF working group.

  While I think you are definitely asking for trouble, it's good that you do.
Trying to fly under the radar would not be a good thing.

> HTTP-Auth is making experimental authentication mechanisms for the HTTP
> layer. One of those is a PAKE. If people here on the CFRG list would like
> to comment on it, that would be great. We can have some discussion here,
> but ultimately, comments criticisms and suggestions should go to the
> HTTP-auth list (details below).
>
> The draft in question is called "Mutual Authentication Protocol for HTTP".
>
> Link: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-mutual-01

  It doesn't look like that draft specifies a PAKE. It seems to specify the
exchange of data that can be used by a PAKE, but not necessarily. Section
11 states:

    Cryptographic authentication algorithms which are used with this
    protocol will be defined separately….

    All algorithm used with this protocol SHOULD provide secure mutual
    authentication between client and servers, and generate a
    cryptographically strong shared secret value z, equivalently strong
    to or stronger than the hash function H. If any passwords (or pass-
    phrases or any equivalents, i.e. weak secrets) are involved, these
    SHOULD NOT be guessable from any data transmitted in the protocol,
    even if an attacker (either an eavesdropper or an active server)
    knows the possible thoroughly-searchable candidate list of the
    passwords.

That SHOULD and SHOULD NOT mean that it could actually use an
authentication algorithm that doesn't provide mutual authentication
and that is susceptible to an off-line dictionary attack. You might
want to make those a MUST and MUST NOT.

  So where is the separately defined protocol that this draft uses?

  Also, figure 5 seems almost like a joke. Is this protocol _really_
that complicated? A security protocol that complicated seems like
a recipe for disaster.

  regards,

  Dan.

> Yoav
> co-chair of HTTP-Auth
>
> Mailing list details:
>  * http-auth List Information:
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>  * http-auth List Archives:
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-auth/current/maillist.html
>  * http-auth Posting Address (requires registration): http-auth@ietf.org
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From ynir@checkpoint.com  Thu Jan  9 00:00:37 2014
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To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Another PAKE question
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Another PAKE question
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On Jan 9, 2014, at 9:25 AM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
 wrote:

>=20
>  Hi Yoav,
>=20
> On Wed, January 8, 2014 10:09 pm, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> Hi
>>=20
>> I almost feel like I'm asking for trouble after the roast that Dan went
>> through, but some on this list might want to consider another PAKE going
>> through an IETF working group.
>=20
>  While I think you are definitely asking for trouble, it's good that you =
do.
> Trying to fly under the radar would not be a good thing.
>=20
>> HTTP-Auth is making experimental authentication mechanisms for the HTTP
>> layer. One of those is a PAKE. If people here on the CFRG list would lik=
e
>> to comment on it, that would be great. We can have some discussion here,
>> but ultimately, comments criticisms and suggestions should go to the
>> HTTP-auth list (details below).
>>=20
>> The draft in question is called "Mutual Authentication Protocol for HTTP=
".
>>=20
>> Link: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-mutual-01
>=20
>  It doesn't look like that draft specifies a PAKE. It seems to specify th=
e
> exchange of data that can be used by a PAKE, but not necessarily.

Right. I forgot to link to the auxiliary algorithm draft:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-oiwa-httpauth-mutual-algo-01


> Section
> 11 states:
>=20
>    Cryptographic authentication algorithms which are used with this
>    protocol will be defined separately..
>=20
>    All algorithm used with this protocol SHOULD provide secure mutual
>    authentication between client and servers, and generate a
>    cryptographically strong shared secret value z, equivalently strong
>    to or stronger than the hash function H. If any passwords (or pass-
>    phrases or any equivalents, i.e. weak secrets) are involved, these
>    SHOULD NOT be guessable from any data transmitted in the protocol,
>    even if an attacker (either an eavesdropper or an active server)
>    knows the possible thoroughly-searchable candidate list of the
>    passwords.
>=20
> That SHOULD and SHOULD NOT mean that it could actually use an
> authentication algorithm that doesn't provide mutual authentication
> and that is susceptible to an off-line dictionary attack. You might
> want to make those a MUST and MUST NOT.
>=20
>  So where is the separately defined protocol that this draft uses?
>=20
>  Also, figure 5 seems almost like a joke. Is this protocol _really_
> that complicated? A security protocol that complicated seems like
> a recipe for disaster.
>=20
>  regards,
>=20
>  Dan.
>=20
>> Yoav
>> co-chair of HTTP-Auth
>>=20
>> Mailing list details:
>> * http-auth List Information:
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>> * http-auth List Archives:
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-auth/current/maillist.html
>> * http-auth Posting Address (requires registration): http-auth@ietf.org
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>=20
>=20
>=20
> Email secured by Check Point


From mpg@elzevir.fr  Thu Jan  9 00:08:39 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On 09/01/2014 00:50, Watson Ladd wrote:
> The EFD formulas will go in appendix to address the URL problem, and
> to address some people's desire for explicit formulas.

When copying the EFD formulas in the appendix, please don't forget to define the
meaning of the variables. For example, for Montgomery curves [1] use X1, X2, ...
X5 without mentioning explicitly (unless I missed something) that the formulas give

	(X4, Z4) = 2 (X2, Z2)
	(X5, Z5) = (X2, Z2) + (X3, Z3)

for inputs such that (X1, 1) = (X2, Z2) - (X3, Z3). Reminding readers about
Montgomery ladders (so that this last condition makes sense) cannot hurt. By the
way, it might be worth pointing out that the formulas in the EFD use (A+2)/4, as
opposed to the formulas in the Curve25519 paper, that use (A-2)/4. (I may be
dense, but I got bitten by this.)

[1]: http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-montgom-xz.html#ladder-mladd-1987-m

This was for Montgomery curves since that's the kind I'm the most familiar with
right now, but similar remarks probably apply for twisted Edwards curves.

By the way, it might be good to insert a word of warning about the fact that the
design of the curves themselves doesn't automatically protect from all
side-channels, and some points are still the responsibility of implementers:
avoid branches and data-dependant memory accesses in the ladder, and either use
constant-time field arithmetic or randomize projective coordinates.

Manuel.

From akr@akr.io  Thu Jan  9 00:12:36 2014
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On 08/01/2014 23:50, Watson Ladd wrote:

> I don't want to rename curves because that induces consistency 
> issues.

Entirely accepted: I raised it merely as a question. People are
already beginning to adopt these curves of their own volition, so
changing the names of them could be confusing, yes.

As other have raised, putting the ladders in the appendix would
definitely be a good idea, and we need to explain the criteria under
which they were designed, which is what makes them so useful.

And yes, we should definitely get some OIDs. (However you actually
_do_ that. I've no idea.)


On 09/01/2014 01:32, Paul Lambert wrote:

> Comment: -too terse

It's an early draft. There's some fleshing-out still to go.

> - no clear mapping of numbers to variables - no documentation of 
> Edwards point addition Which is different from durrent ECC drafts

See above. Agreed.

> - no indication of security concerns and need or lack of checking 
> public key values

Important advantages. We should cover this, I think.

> Here¹s how I¹d document curve parameters: […python…]

> PS - above parameters are directly executable Python code Why use 
> pseudo code when you can use real code :-)

Advantage: People can copy-and-paste it into their implementations.
Disadvantage: People will copy-and-paste it into their implementations.

I honestly don't know which practice is preferable.

Naïve Python implementations directly using the bignums rather than
the good addition ladders probably wouldn't be constant-time - would they?


On 09/01/2014 03:11, Dan Brown wrote:

> I don't object to these curves.

Cool.

> […several objections to the name ‘safe’, implying other curves 
> aren’t, raising the NIST curves…]

As the SafeCurves criteria clearly explains:

• Their design criteria are transparent, and rigid, with few
  opportunities for an attacker to secretly select cryptanalytically-
  useful choices¹.

• They support simple, fast, complete, constant-time single-coordinate
  single-scalar and multi-scalar multiplication techniques which work
  in every case.

• These can be implemented using relatively-simple (compared to short
  Weierstrass) ladders which are both constant-time, and extremely
  efficent.

• They have large complex-multiplication field discriminants; are safe
  against additive and multiplicative transfer; and have secure twists.

Compared to the curves we've got at the moment (most of which don't
even have clearly-explained design criteria, and the ones that do are
unfortunately inefficient), the choice of name seems entirely apt to me.

Besides, it's what they're already widely known and referenced as:
people are already in the process of implementing these. As above,
changing it probably wouldn't be helpful and would just confuse people.

___
1. Contrast, say, the NIST/SEC curves generated by Certicom, whose
   design criteria are what I can only describe as “opaque” —
   mysterious black-box values which SHA-1 hash out to “provably
   random” parameters, but which are not in fact random themselves:
   the design team minted those values via repeated iteration to
   deliberately and secretly ensure they would meet some set of
   criteria (and then even listed the prime order in decimal to
   disguise the structure).

  (Sources are under the impression that was actually a set of
   criteria to ensure the curves would be efficiently implemented via
   Certicom-patented methods, but unfortunately, cannot state for sure
   that the criteria didn't also include cryptanalytically-useful
   weaknesses, and of course, that's what people are worried about,
   given the news. They didn't actually _see_ any attempt to actually
   weaken the NIST curves, they can at least say that much — phew —
   but that's little help in positively assuring it didn't happen.)

   These have no such concern.

- -- 
/akr
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From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Removing the magic constants from SPAKE2
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--e89a8f503bb26aabd404ef85ffaa
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>
>
> However, the protocol is considered problematic (and is out of favor with
> CFRG) in large part because of the magic curve points M,N.  The discrete
> logs of these points would be a backdoor in SPAKE2, so care must be taken
> to ensure that M,N are generated at random.
>
> However, there=92s another way to do SPAKE2, which doesn=92t need magic c=
urve
> points.  Instead, M^hash(password) and N^hash(password) can be replaced
> with Elligator(hash(=93M to the=94, password)) and Elligator(hash(=93N to=
 the",
> password)).  This obviously achieves the same bounds in the ROM.
>

I like this idea.

For purposes of standardization, instead of generating those "magic" SPAKE2
base points randomly using unbiased US dollar coins in some other agency's
back room, I'd expect you'd be using "verifiably pseudorandom" points based
on some seed (which shouldn't be an unacceptable leap of faith if you're
already relying on the Random Oracle Model for your security proofs), but
using Elligator to obtain proper mask values more directly seems like a
good alternative.


Furthermore, if a completely symmetric PAKE is desired, there=92s nothing
> really wrong with setting these two blinding factors to the same value.
>  That is, they can both be M^hash(password) or Elligator(hash(=93M to the=
=94,
> password)).  The disadvantage is in the proof: the proof will now be base=
d
> on =93CDH squaring=94 instead of regular CDH, i.e. computing g^(x^2) from
> (g,g^x).  Because of quarter-squares the two problems are equivalent, but
> it changes the epsilon^2 in SPAKE to an epsilon^4.  This isn=92t a huge d=
eal,
> and if you prefer stronger proof frameworks like Kudla-Patterson=92s GapD=
H
> trick, then it doesn=92t change the bounds at all.
>

Note that there's also a SPAKE variant called SOKE, which only masks one of
the DH shares in the first place (
http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/soke-asiaccs2006.pdf; this was *meant* for TLS,
but due to patent concerns at the time was soon replaced by a thoroughly
gimmicky protocol that you don't really want to know about, and hence the
I-D was never completed).



> * Is the completely symmetric PAKE desirable?
> * Is SRP-style augmentation desirable?  Should it be optional?


By "SRP-style" augmentation I think you mean a verifier-based PAKE in
general, right?  ("Verifier-based" =3D the password information as held by
the server cannot be used to impersonate the client to other server
instances, and is rather merely a verifier to check that the client holds
such information.  I don't like the term "augmented" for this because it
appear to refer to an implementation detail of certain solutions, notably
the original Bellovin-Merrit Augmented EKE.)

I think having a verifier-based protocol is highly desirable, but that this
can be optional if that's sufficiently justified by efficiency advantages.

Bodo

--e89a8f503bb26aabd404ef85ffaa
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;paddi=
ng-left:1ex">
<br>
However, the protocol is considered problematic (and is out of favor with C=
FRG) in large part because of the magic curve points M,N. =A0The discrete l=
ogs of these points would be a backdoor in SPAKE2, so care must be taken to=
 ensure that M,N are generated at random.<br>

<br>
However, there=92s another way to do SPAKE2, which doesn=92t need magic cur=
ve points. =A0Instead, M^hash(password) and N^hash(password) can be replace=
d with Elligator(hash(=93M to the=94, password)) and Elligator(hash(=93N to=
 the&quot;, password)). =A0This obviously achieves the same bounds in the R=
OM.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I like this idea.</div><div><br></div><div=
>For purposes of standardization, instead of generating those &quot;magic&q=
uot; SPAKE2 base points randomly using unbiased US dollar coins in some oth=
er agency&#39;s back room, I&#39;d expect you&#39;d be using &quot;verifiab=
ly pseudorandom&quot; points based on some seed (which shouldn&#39;t be an =
unacceptable leap of faith if you&#39;re already relying on the Random Orac=
le Model for your security proofs), but using Elligator to obtain proper ma=
sk values more directly seems like a good alternative.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,=
204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Furthermore, if a completely symmetric PAKE is desired, there=92s nothing r=
eally wrong with setting these two blinding factors to the same value. =A0T=
hat is, they can both be M^hash(password) or Elligator(hash(=93M to the=94,=
 password)). =A0The disadvantage is in the proof: the proof will now be bas=
ed on =93CDH squaring=94 instead of regular CDH, i.e. computing g^(x^2) fro=
m (g,g^x). =A0Because of quarter-squares the two problems are equivalent, b=
ut it changes the epsilon^2 in SPAKE to an epsilon^4. =A0This isn=92t a hug=
e deal, and if you prefer stronger proof frameworks like Kudla-Patterson=92=
s GapDH trick, then it doesn=92t change the bounds at all.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Note that there&#39;s also a SPAKE variant=
 called SOKE, which only masks one of the DH shares in the first place (<a =
href=3D"http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/soke-asiaccs2006.pdf">http://www.bmoelle=
r.de/pdf/soke-asiaccs2006.pdf</a>; this was *meant* for TLS, but due to pat=
ent concerns at the time was soon replaced by a thoroughly gimmicky protoco=
l that you don&#39;t really want to know about, and hence the I-D was never=
 completed).</div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,2=
04);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
* Is the completely symmetric PAKE desirable?<br>
* Is SRP-style augmentation desirable? =A0Should it be optional?</blockquot=
e><div><br></div><div>By &quot;SRP-style&quot; augmentation I think you mea=
n a verifier-based PAKE in general, right? =A0(&quot;Verifier-based&quot; =
=3D the password information as held by the server cannot be used to impers=
onate the client to other server instances, and is rather merely a verifier=
 to check that the client holds such information. =A0I don&#39;t like the t=
erm &quot;augmented&quot; for this because it appear to refer to an impleme=
ntation detail of certain solutions, notably the original Bellovin-Merrit A=
ugmented EKE.)</div>
<div><br></div><div>I think having a verifier-based protocol is highly desi=
rable, but that this can be optional if that&#39;s sufficiently justified b=
y efficiency advantages.</div><div><br></div><div>Bodo</div><div><br></div>
</div></div></div>

--e89a8f503bb26aabd404ef85ffaa--

From mpg@elzevir.fr  Thu Jan  9 01:28:02 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: Re:  Safecurves draft
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On 09/01/2014 09:12, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
> On 08/01/2014 23:50, Watson Ladd wrote:
> 
>> I don't want to rename curves because that induces consistency
>> issues.
> 
> Entirely accepted: I raised it merely as a question. People are
> already beginning to adopt these curves of their own volition, so
> changing the names of them could be confusing, yes.
> 
About names, I'd really like the names to reflect the type of the curve
(Montgomery or Edwards). This is already the case for other curve families, by
the way. So, Mxxx and Exxx seem great to me. I'd even go so far as to rename
Curve25519 as M255, but I'm sure there are good reasons to disagree on this point.

While at it, I also think the document should define the curves for each type in
distinct sections. Overall, the goal is that it should be easy for other
document to define the of just the Montgomery (or just the Edwards) curves for
use in a protocol, and refer to the appropriate section of this draft.

>> - no indication of security concerns and need or lack of checking
>> public key values
> 
> Important advantages. We should cover this, I think.
> 
While at it, we should also document the requirements for private keys, which
are different from the way they are usually chosen for short Weierstrass curves.

>> […several objections to the name ‘safe’, implying other curves
>> aren’t, raising the NIST curves…]
> 
> As the SafeCurves criteria clearly explains:
> [...]
> 
I think this kind of thing should go in the draft :)

> Compared to the curves we've got at the moment (most of which don't
> even have clearly-explained design criteria, and the ones that do are
> unfortunately inefficient), the choice of name seems entirely apt to me.
> 
I tend to disagree on this point. Don't take me wrong, I think these curves are
a useful tool in making security better, for all of the reasons mentioned above.
However, they're not some kind of magic security pill either, and IMO it would
be bad for security to give this impression. This goes both sides:
- people shouldn't think any implementation of the "safe" Montgomery/Edwards
curves is automatically flawless;
- people shouldn't think the NIST/Brainpool curves are so impossibly hard to
implement right that they don't even try.

Take the points list on the frontpage of the safecurves site, for instance
(numbered by me for convenience).

1. Your implementation produces incorrect results for some rare curve points.
2. Your implementation leaks secret data when the input isn't a curve point.
3. Your implementation leaks secret data through branch timing.
4. Your implementation leaks secret data through cache timing.

Point 3 and 4 are entirely a property of the implementation, not of the curve.
Point 2 can (and must) be addressed by telling everyone to validate points. I
mean, the idea of validating inputs shouldn't be new to anyone implementing
crypto! About point 1, it probably depends on the reference used, but Hankerson
& al's "Guide to ECC", which looks like a classic to me, gives formulas that are
correct in all cases (but have data-dependant branches). Besides, this problem
can be completely avoided by using a well-chosen multiplication algorithm,
ensuring that the special cases will never be hit.

Overall, of course it's nice that issues 1 and 2 are completely annihilated by
Montgomery and Edwards curves, and to be fair point 4 is a bit easier to address
with these curves too. But I wouldn't go as far as to say that they are
inherently safer than the Brainpool curves. They are easier to implement
correctly, have excellent performance, and reduce the conflicts between security
and efficiency/ease of implementation, which is great. But I'm still a bit
uncomfortable with calling them "safe" and implying all other curves aren't.

Manuel.

PS: besides, there's a practical advantage in being more specific than "safe":
when/if someone comes with other curves which have arguably nicer
security/implementation properties, a neutral and specific term will remain
appropriate, while "safe" will sound odd. (It's like calling things "modern".)

From adam@cypherspace.org  Thu Jan  9 01:47:55 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Erm I guess Bernstein, Lange et al already got  to name the curves because
they *generated them*?

You could certainly put a descriptive sub-heading in an RFC.

They are actually significantly better designed in their security,
performance, and demonstrable non-cooked status and several other highly
implementation security related factors.  They are actually scientifically
better curves on multiple factors and they have made strong arguments to
prove it.  Safe is in fact a reasonable name.  Clearly its partly marketing,
but so what I dont see how a third party can go rename
*their* curves.

Adam

On Thu, Jan 09, 2014 at 03:11:45AM +0000, Dan Brown wrote:
>I don't object to these curves.
>
>Still, could we please call these curves something more specific and neutral than just "safe"?
>
>Aren't many other curves safe so far as we know?
>
>For example, take the Brainpool curves, use a Montgomery (Brier-Joye?) ladder, and an extra careful implementation, and do ECDHE, with some other kind of safe auth. Is that not safe?
>
>Indeed, what about the NIST curves?
>
>Implying them to be unsafe in the sense of a weak DLP implies a hypotheses that mildly reduces the conventional notion of security for all ECC.
>
>Anyway, I debated all this already with Bernstein over at the TLS list, with virtually no  agreement confirmed. For now, I'll try to focus on the naming issue.
>
>Is it that "safe" means something less than "secure" in the conventional sense above? And safe is the best that can be hoped for in ECC, and maybe all PKC? That's just too strong to say.
>
>To be constructive, I suggest a name: "minimal - coefficient Montgomery" curves. Implicit in this name is that minimality is subject avoiding known DLP attacks, though the Monty should tip one of the crypto app. The short name could be "mini Monty".
>
>From: Watson Ladd
>Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:11 PM
>To: cfrg@irtf.org
>Subject: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
>
>
>Dear all,
>draft-ladd-safecurves contains the Safecurves with orders
>2^255+\epsilon and higher.
>I forgot to update the TOC, but that shouldn't stop the substantive
>conversation.
>
>Does anyone object to these curves being approved for IETF standard
>body use/typos/general nastiness?
>Sincerely,
>Watson Ladd
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From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Thu Jan  9 01:50:59 2014
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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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On 1/9/14, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
> On 09/01/2014 09:12, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
>> On 08/01/2014 23:50, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>
>>> I don't want to rename curves because that induces consistency
>>> issues.
>>
>> Entirely accepted: I raised it merely as a question. People are
>> already beginning to adopt these curves of their own volition, so
>> changing the names of them could be confusing, yes.
>>
> About names, I'd really like the names to reflect the type of the curve
> (Montgomery or Edwards). This is already the case for other curve familie=
s,
> by
> the way. So, Mxxx and Exxx seem great to me. I'd even go so far as to ren=
ame
> Curve25519 as M255, but I'm sure there are good reasons to disagree on th=
is
> point.

Remember that Curve25519's parameter is *not* minimal subject to the
constraint of twist security with minimal cofactors -- Dr. Bernstein
considered a slightly more subtle criterion regarding the group orders
too.  Keep that in mind if you try to establish a systematic name for
Curve25519.

> While at it, I also think the document should define the curves for each
> type in
> distinct sections. Overall, the goal is that it should be easy for other
> document to define the of just the Montgomery (or just the Edwards) curve=
s
> for
> use in a protocol, and refer to the appropriate section of this draft.

I don't see the benefit of defining both a =E2=80=98safe=E2=80=99 Montgomer=
y curve
(for the present definition of =E2=80=9Csafe=E2=80=9D) and a =E2=80=98safe=
=E2=80=99 Edwards curve over
the same coordinate field -- every Edwards curve with minimal
parameter can be used efficiently with Montgomery's formulas.  (The
Montgomery-form parameter becomes the reciprocal of a small integer,
which can be handled as efficiently as a small integer itself.)

(For that matter, I would suggest replacing Curve25519 with the
twisted Edwards curve a=3D-1, d=3D121665 over the same field in any new
application or standard.)


I would also recommend highlighting the most efficient curves --
Curve25519 and Curve3617 have especially nice coordinate fields; even
2^521 - 1 is less convenient (the limb arrangement is less regular).


> Take the points list on the frontpage of the safecurves site, for instanc=
e
> (numbered by me for convenience).
>
> 1. Your implementation produces incorrect results for some rare curve
> points.
> 2. Your implementation leaks secret data when the input isn't a curve poi=
nt.
> 3. Your implementation leaks secret data through branch timing.
> 4. Your implementation leaks secret data through cache timing.

> Overall, of course it's nice that issues 1 and 2 are completely annihilat=
ed
> by
> Montgomery and Edwards curves,

Issue 2 is obviated by twist security for single-scalar multiplication
of a Montgomery-form x coordinate.  It remains relevant for any
application which operates on full points (whether transmitted
uncompressed or compressed).

> and to be fair point 4 is a bit easier to
> address
> with these curves too.

Why 4?  The benefit of complete addition formulas is that
implementations don't need to switch to a doubling routine when two
points are equal.  Nothing about SafeCurves makes constant-time table
lookups any easier.


Robert Ransom

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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, irtf-chair@irtf.org, IAB IAB <iab@iab.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Hi Trevor,

On 01/09/2014 02:46 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 8:20 AM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Adam,
>>
>> On 01/08/2014 03:17 PM, Adam Back wrote:
>>> Hi John
>>>
>>> I've seen several people putting forward a similar argument.  There is some
>>> logic but its I think an incorrect conclusion.
>>
>> I think there's a bit more subtlety to the conflict of interest
>> issue than maybe some folks appreciate.
> 
> Hi Stephen,
> 
> I'd like to understand the subtlety better.  The IETF/IRTF leadership
> seems terrified that considering an egregious conflict of interest in
> a chair is a "slippery slope" to membership fees, loyalty oaths, and
> purges.

Terrified, egregious, loyalty oaths and purges is just irritating
overblown rhetoric and wrong. Do you think such language helps
something or someone? It doesn't. However, the rest of you mail
deserves a response, so I'll skip over that.

BTW, just to be clear, I'm not part of the decision process nor
the appeal process, which is why I feel free to respond. Others who
are in the appeal chain may well not, so please don't misinterpret
their silence.

> I don't understand this.  Chairs are appointed (I assume) by weighing
> many factors:  are they smart?  Fair?  Good communicators?
> Trustworthy?  Easy to work with?  Knowledgeable both technically and
> of IETF/IRTF process?  I would think being clear of severe
> conflicts-of-interest is also good.

Yes. Appointment is not the same as firing though, at least IMO.
I figure its right for someone appointing someone to take many
informal factors into account, but its not the same firing someone.

I know that you don't agree that the only issue here is Kevin's
affiliation, but that is what I think, as I said before.

> No-one wants to make these criteria for excluding participants.  But
> if a chair's lack of these qualities threatens a group's performance,
> surely it's appropriate to consider a replacement?

That's probably true in general, and Lars I assume considered all
that as will the IAB. I'm ok with that process.

>> Within the IETF its not that uncommon to have conflicts of
>> interest where a company would like to sabotage a piece of
>> standards work, in ways that seem quite similar to the current
>> situation and that do not involve IPR, nor the misbehaviour
>> of an individual chair.
>>
>> Say company-x have a product doing some proprietary thing
>> that has significant market share. Then others propose to
>> standardise that function, which company-x might consider
>> would lessen their advantage with their product. It would not
>> at all be a surprise to see people acting for company-x
>> (employed, as consultants or business partners) trying to
>> bugger up the standards process by e.g. trying to make the
>> standard take ages, be over-complex or omit some crucial
>> functionality. And if company-x aren't dumb then that can
>> be attempted without any obvious evidence being left about.
> 
> And this is just totally acceptable, day-to-day life at the IETF?

No, and I didn't say it was. Do machinations happen in an
organisation involving thousands of people like the IETF?
Of course they do. Analogous things happen in academia as
well of course. The point is not that its acceptable
behaviour (it isn't) but that our processes need to be
designed to counter it, while at the same time enabling
the sausage-making to happen.

My point though was to question the assertion that the
NSA situation is new in this respect.

I do think snowdonia is new in other respects and that
we need to respond to those.

>> Now if company-x are of any size, then its quite likely
>> that employees of theirs are chairing other WGs. And for
>> a long-lived WG with a generic charter, it'd not be at
>> all unusual if someone working for company-X co-chairs
>> the WG in question.
>>
>> So - what's different here? Are we saying that if a
>> company-x marketing department memo leaks that says "let's
>> bugger up <foo>" then we should fire the person who's
>> co-chairing that WG?
> 
> Depending on the credibility of the memo and the consequences of the
> buggering, I would think that's reasonable to consider.

Fair enough that you think that. I think it'd be wrong if
the firing is solely based on affiliation.

> I disagree that this needs to be framed as "fire the person".  That
> implies this is some exceptional and insulting process to inflict on
> someone.

But it is that. Reading some of the comments on the ars articles
about this kerfuffle, the phrase "exceptional and insulting" does
seem accurate. I'm not saying that's your fault, but it has
happened.

> But there is no other process to replace an RG chair except for having
> the IRTF chair replace them.  Kevin has no term limit.  We can't just
> wait 6 months and then quietly ease him out, or something.
> 
> Perhaps there should be some process for selecting new chairs
> periodically that is less confrontational, but unless I'm missing
> something, there is not.

There is not. That kind of thing has been discussed, and it is
generally a fine thing to rotate chairs now and then, but in a
volunteer organisation that's hard - chairing a contentious WG
can take 20% of your week and finding capable willing chairs is
hard. I don't think I've seen any credible proposal for term
limits for chairs in either the IETF nor IRTF.

>>> I understand the conflict of interest when people are somewhat
>>> pushing their companies approach, related to their product or
>>> implementtion choices they have some investment in, but generally
>>> tempered by reasonableness.  All the companies that care can put
>>> their voice in also.  IPR disclosures are also there.  Loose
>>> consensus and running code copes with that ok.
>>
>> I think you left out a critical part of that, at least as its
>> done in the IETF and IRTF - the participants ideally act as
>> individuals and not on behalf of their employers and are treated
>> that way. There is a serious danger of going down the slippery
>> slope to paid membership if we deviate from that, with what I
>> think would be overall worse outcomes.
> 
> You lost me - what does "paid membership" have to do with this?

Once you start to recognise affiliation in the way that is implied
in the last part of your request, then you need processes that
deal with the organisations and not the individuals and that very
quickly tends to turn into a discussion about membership which
then also quickly turns into one about paid membership and voting.
You can believe me on this or not, but do bear in mind its far too
boring an argument to want to deal with all the ins and outs;-)

>>> I think NSA sabotage is a significantly different and its unrealistic to
>>> just assume a chair has no influence.  A non-NSA chair would strive for
>>> impartiality with regard to their employers interests.  If certicom
>>> wants to
>>> push something and cisco something else they are both pushing for something
>>> reasonably secure as a fundamental assumption and trying to make secure
>>> systems so their customers will buy them.  Forward secrecy is good,
>>> architectural weaknesses bad etc.
>>>
>>> The NSA is NOT in that boat.  They are explicitly sabotaging security on a
>>> grand and systematic scale at all levels including standardization.  They
>>> dislike forward secrecy, and like architectural weakness and architectural
>>> tap points and sabotaged RNGs, and fragile hard to implement correctly
>>> standards with traps.  There were numerous news articles by Greenwald and
>>> others backed by NSA docs about these strategies.
>>
>> Other than the headline 250/yr I think I've only seen
>> convincing evidence related to the RNG stuff though. The
>> rest afaik is speculation. If I missed more that's been
>> published, I'd appreciate pointers.
> 
> See the BULLRUN reporting and documents:
> 
> http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html
> http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html?ref=us

Well since those are NYT and I don't have a subscription I
can't follow those URLs:-)

But I'm pretty sure I've seen that material already.

> Adam's speculations strike me as plausible and consistent with the
> documents we have.  I think acting on "risk avoidance" grounds is
> prudent here, instead of demanding absolute proof of what would of
> course be covert and "deniable" activities by sneaky people.

I don't think his speculations are convincing on this point, as
I said. Its not surprising that reasonable people differ on how
to interpret partial information like this though.

>> But there's IMO a far more likely explanation for why we end up
>> with stuff that fits this particular speculation - a lot of
>> standards work ends up being dominated by people with more
>> complex requirements and its always hard to keep stuff simple.
>> In the case of security protocols, the US DoD requirements, as a
>> customer (e.g. for PKI) are about as complicated as it gets and they
>> can afford to pay folks to work on that. So we've ended up with
>> PKI that's over complex for many other use-cases.
> 
> Huh.  That's not all that different from the fears Adam has, or my
> concern about "softer forms" of sabotage.  At least, the line between
> "sabotage" and "not quite working in the Internet's best interest" is
> a blurry one.

Yes. In the latter case, I assert that the motivation is far
more commonly "prioritising one's own set of requirements" and
not "wanting the Internet to work less well."

> For example:  It's interesting how NIST tends to standardize
> algorithms that work well in hardware but are tricky in software.  

That I think is something where we can make improvements all
right, without having to agree on whether or not the current
situation is a result of sabotage or not. I'm delighted to
see CFRG starting down that road (partly spurred by your
request I think).

> And
> how DoD's steering of PKI worked for DoD, I suppose, but has not
> resulted in working key management for the Internet.

Actually, I'd argue that someone wanting pervasive monitoring
would be more likely to prefer that a DoD style PKI had been
widely deployed in the Internet, so I really don't think that
the NSA-driven sabotage argument holds water there. That's on
the basis that if everyone had to go to a CA to do stuff then
it'd be easier to track everyone and also to get at their long
term decryption keys, e.g. because they'd often be centrally
generated for mobility reasons.

And like I said there are non-govt examples as well, oauth
as I quoted before, but also SIP and probably others.

Regards,
S.


> 
> 
> Trevor
> 

From mpg@elzevir.fr  Thu Jan  9 02:22:01 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: Re: Safecurves draft
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On 09/01/2014 10:50, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> About names, I'd really like the names to reflect the type of the curve
>> (Montgomery or Edwards). This is already the case for other curve families,
>> by
>> the way. So, Mxxx and Exxx seem great to me. I'd even go so far as to rename
>> Curve25519 as M255, but I'm sure there are good reasons to disagree on this
>> point.
> 
> Remember that Curve25519's parameter is *not* minimal subject to the
> constraint of twist security with minimal cofactors -- Dr. Bernstein
> considered a slightly more subtle criterion regarding the group orders
> too.  Keep that in mind if you try to establish a systematic name for
> Curve25519.
> 
I'm not sure it goes against my argument that the name should reflect the type
of the curve. Or did I miss something?

> I don't see the benefit of defining both a ‘safe’ Montgomery curve
> (for the present definition of “safe”) and a ‘safe’ Edwards curve over
> the same coordinate field -- every Edwards curve with minimal
> parameter can be used efficiently with Montgomery's formulas.  (The
> Montgomery-form parameter becomes the reciprocal of a small integer,
> which can be handled as efficiently as a small integer itself.)
> 
> (For that matter, I would suggest replacing Curve25519 with the
> twisted Edwards curve a=-1, d=121665 over the same field in any new
> application or standard.)
> 
An interesting point.

> Issue 2 is obviated by twist security for single-scalar multiplication
> of a Montgomery-form x coordinate.  It remains relevant for any
> application which operates on full points (whether transmitted
> uncompressed or compressed).
> 
Absolutely. There was a hidden assumption that only the x coordinate be used in
my statement. Actually, I think it reinforces my point that the curves aren't
"magically" safe regardless of the how they are implemented or used in a
protocol: indeed, the fact that no public key validation is needed depends not
only on the curve (twist security), but also on the protocol (x coordinate only).

>> and to be fair point 4 is a bit easier to
>> address
>> with these curves too.
> 
> Why 4?  The benefit of complete addition formulas is that
> implementations don't need to switch to a doubling routine when two
> points are equal.  Nothing about SafeCurves makes constant-time table
> lookups any easier.
> 
Right, I was making an unstated assumption again, sorry for that. The assumption
was that other curves are more likely to use a larger table for performance,
while a Curve25519 implementation will generally use a ladder with no
precomputed table, so it will only have to safely swap two points, which is less
expensive than doing a constant-time lookup in a larger (say 16 or 32 points)
table. So it lessens the performance vs security conflict.

Manuel.

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Dan Brown schrieb am 09.01.2014 04:11:
> I don't object to these curves.
> 

I also support the draft. Diversity in available EC parameters is important as a safeguard to potential future
improvements in cryptoanalysis. And I acknowledge that certain applications may require particular efficient ECC
implementations for which the Brainpool curves may not be eligible.


> Still, could we please call these curves something more specific and neutral than just "safe"?
> 
> Aren't many other curves safe so far as we know?
> 
> For example, take the Brainpool curves, use a Montgomery (Brier-Joye?) ladder, and an extra careful implementation, and do ECDHE, with some other kind of safe auth. Is that not safe?
> 
> Indeed, what about the NIST curves?
> 

I share Dan's concerns with the naming as "safe curves". Not only is this name misleading w.r.t the potential security /
safety of other curves (well, for the NIST curves we simply don't know), but it may also turn out to be extremely
unfortunate in the (unlikely) event that the "safe curves" become vulnerable to a new (currently unforeseen) attack. In
this case, the name "safe curve" will turn out to be fatally misleading.

Johannes


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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--089e013a10467a4ec604ef88bc2c
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Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>:

Clearly its partly marketing,
> but so what I dont see how a third party can go rename
> *their* curves.


Well, of course you *can*; the question is whether you *should*.  (For
example, NIST P-192 is also known as secp192r1 in Certicom's SECG
specification, and ANSI X9.62 calls it prime192v1.)

That said, http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ doesn't appear to use "SafeCurves"
as part of the name of *curves*, but rather for selection criteria.  The
curves meeting all current criteria have names such as "Curve25519" or
"M-221", and the latter name isn't Dan's or Tanja's (because the curve is
from other researchers): if you want to include a "namespace indicator"
along with the curve name from the literature, it's not clear that all of
these should be bundled under the same prefix.

I certainly think "Curve25519" is sufficiently unique without a further
namespace prefix, to describe the curve as such in the cryptographic
context.  What we need to standardize is not just names for curves, but
also further details such as OIDs and clearly specified ways to encode
elements and keys -- names should denote that entire bundle, such that if
someone else encodes values for SafeCurves's Curve25519 differently, there
won't be confusion.  For example, note that the name "Curve25519" also
refers to a particular DH scheme *using* that curve, and "Ed25519" refers
to using the "EdDSA" scheme with an equivalent Edwards curve.  As far as
Safecurves is concerned, I don't think a distinction is made between the
two representations of the curve, but that distinction obviously is crucial
for interoperable implementations.  In that context, given that the name
"Curve25519" is already overloaded, and that we probably should make the
Edwards representation available for DH too (in addition to EdDSA), maybe
we *should* make up new name variants to avoid further possibilities for
confusion?

Bodo

--089e013a10467a4ec604ef88bc2c
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Adam=
 Back <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:adam@cypherspace.org" target=
=3D"_blank">adam@cypherspace.org</a>&gt;:</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote"><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-sty=
le:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Clearly its partly marketing,<br>
but so what I dont see how a third party can go rename<br>
*their* curves.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, of course you *can*; =
the question is whether you *should*. =A0(For example, NIST P-192 is also k=
nown as=A0secp192r1 in Certicom&#39;s SECG specification, and=A0ANSI X9.62 =
calls it=A0prime192v1.)</div>
<div><br></div><div>That said,=A0<a href=3D"http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/">ht=
tp://safecurves.cr.yp.to/</a> doesn&#39;t appear to use &quot;SafeCurves&qu=
ot; as part of the name of *curves*, but rather for selection criteria. =A0=
The curves meeting all current criteria have names such as &quot;Curve25519=
&quot; or &quot;M-221&quot;, and the latter name isn&#39;t Dan&#39;s or Tan=
ja&#39;s (because the curve is from other researchers): if you want to incl=
ude a &quot;namespace indicator&quot; along with the curve name from the li=
terature, it&#39;s not clear that all of these should be bundled under the =
same prefix.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I certainly think &quot;Curve25519&quot; is sufficientl=
y unique without a further namespace prefix, to describe the curve as such =
in the cryptographic context. =A0What we need to standardize is not just na=
mes for curves, but also further details such as OIDs and clearly specified=
 ways to encode elements and keys -- names should denote that entire bundle=
, such that if someone else encodes values for SafeCurves&#39;s Curve25519 =
differently, there won&#39;t be confusion. =A0For example, note that the na=
me &quot;Curve25519&quot; also refers to a particular DH scheme *using* tha=
t curve, and &quot;Ed25519&quot; refers to using the &quot;EdDSA&quot; sche=
me with an equivalent Edwards curve. =A0As far as Safecurves is concerned, =
I don&#39;t think a distinction is made between the two representations of =
the curve, but that distinction obviously is crucial for interoperable impl=
ementations. =A0In that context, given that the name &quot;Curve25519&quot;=
 is already overloaded, and that we probably should make the Edwards repres=
entation available for DH too (in addition to EdDSA), maybe we *should* mak=
e up new name variants to avoid further possibilities for confusion?</div>
<div><br></div><div>Bodo</div></div></div></div>

--089e013a10467a4ec604ef88bc2c--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On 1/9/14, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
> In that context, given that the name
> "Curve25519" is already overloaded, and that we probably should make the
> Edwards representation available for DH too (in addition to EdDSA),

No.  Montgomery-form variable-base single-scalar multiplication takes
5M+4S per scalar bit; Edwards-form doublings alone (in =E2=80=98extended
coordinates with a=3D-1=E2=80=99) are 4M+4S (or 3M+4S if the output will on=
ly be
used as input to another doubling).  There is no reason to use an
Edwards-form y coordinate in a Curve25519 point representation that
will be used for DH.  (But there's also no reason to use a
Montgomery-form y coordinate in a Curve25519 point representation;
even if the point will need to be compatible with use in ECDH, use the
Edwards-form x coordinate or its sign bit instead.)

(For some other curves over large (at least 8-limb) coordinate fields,
e.g. s=3D2170 over the Curve3617 coordinate field, the 3M+6S formulas
shown at <http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-edwards-yzsquared.html>
are faster, but Dr. Bernstein wouldn't consider those curves to be
=E2=80=98safe=E2=80=99.  (The differential addition formulas on that page h=
ave an
exceptional case at Y1=3D0.))


Robert Ransom

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--089e0160c35e0f0a9204ef8a6109
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Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>:

> On 1/9/14, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
> > In that context, given that the name
> > "Curve25519" is already overloaded, and that we probably should make th=
e
> > Edwards representation available for DH too (in addition to EdDSA),
>
> No.  Montgomery-form variable-base single-scalar multiplication takes
> 5M+4S per scalar bit; Edwards-form doublings alone (in =91extended
> coordinates with a=3D-1=92) are 4M+4S (or 3M+4S if the output will only b=
e
> used as input to another doubling).


As pointed out by Section 6 in http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/286.pdf,
sliding-window multiplication using the Edwards form can be faster than
5M+4S per scalar bit for this curve (although that's probably no longer
true if you want a constant-time implementation -- while the non-sliding
window approach in Section 8 doesn't seem optimal because it's not making
use of signed windows, I don't think the extra savings are sufficient to
beat the Montgomery ladder).  More importantly, if you have a *fixed* base
(which is very relevant for ephemeral ECDH), with appropriate fixed
precomputation you won't need any double operations at all: so the total
time for one fixed-base single-scalar multiplication and one variable-base
signal-scalar multiplication as used in ECDH can be less than with the
Montgomery ladder, even if you want constant time with no secret-dependent
branches.  If you have severe space constraints, then an approach that
involves a few hundred precomputed points is not for you, but in many
typical scenarios this is not an issue at all.

So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has its use, allowing
applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would be beneficial.

Bodo

--089e0160c35e0f0a9204ef8a6109
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Robe=
rt Ransom <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rransom.8774@gmail.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">rransom.8774@gmail.com</a>&gt;:</span><br><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;b=
order-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"=
>
<div class=3D"im">On 1/9/14, Bodo Moeller &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bmoeller@ac=
m.org">bmoeller@acm.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; In that context, given that the name<br>
&gt; &quot;Curve25519&quot; is already overloaded, and that we probably sho=
uld make the<br>
&gt; Edwards representation available for DH too (in addition to EdDSA),<br=
>
<br>
</div>No. =A0Montgomery-form variable-base single-scalar multiplication tak=
es<br>
5M+4S per scalar bit; Edwards-form doublings alone (in =91extended<br>
coordinates with a=3D-1=92) are 4M+4S (or 3M+4S if the output will only be<=
br>
used as input to another doubling).</blockquote><div><br></div><div>As poin=
ted out by Section 6 in <a href=3D"http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/286.pdf">htt=
p://eprint.iacr.org/2007/286.pdf</a>, sliding-window multiplication using t=
he Edwards form can be faster than 5M+4S per scalar bit for this curve (alt=
hough that&#39;s probably no longer true if you want a constant-time implem=
entation -- while the non-sliding window approach in Section 8 doesn&#39;t =
seem optimal because it&#39;s not making use of signed windows, I don&#39;t=
 think the extra savings are sufficient to beat the Montgomery ladder). =A0=
More importantly, if you have a *fixed* base (which is very relevant for ep=
hemeral ECDH), with appropriate fixed precomputation you won&#39;t need any=
 double operations at all: so the total time for one fixed-base single-scal=
ar multiplication and one variable-base signal-scalar multiplication as use=
d in ECDH can be less than with the Montgomery ladder, even if you want con=
stant time with no secret-dependent branches. =A0If you have severe space c=
onstraints, then an approach that involves a few hundred precomputed points=
 is not for you, but in many typical scenarios this is not an issue at all.=
</div>
<div><br></div><div>So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has i=
ts use, allowing applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would =
be beneficial.</div><div><br></div><div>Bodo</div><div><br></div></div>
</div></div>

--089e0160c35e0f0a9204ef8a6109--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On 1/9/14, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
> Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>:
>
>> On 1/9/14, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
>> > In that context, given that the name
>> > "Curve25519" is already overloaded, and that we probably should make
>> > the
>> > Edwards representation available for DH too (in addition to EdDSA),
>>
>> No.  Montgomery-form variable-base single-scalar multiplication takes
>> 5M+4S per scalar bit; Edwards-form doublings alone (in =E2=80=98extended
>> coordinates with a=3D-1=E2=80=99) are 4M+4S (or 3M+4S if the output will=
 only be
>> used as input to another doubling).
>
>
> As pointed out by Section 6 in http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/286.pdf,
> sliding-window multiplication using the Edwards form can be faster than
> 5M+4S per scalar bit for this curve (although that's probably no longer
> true if you want a constant-time implementation -- while the non-sliding
> window approach in Section 8 doesn't seem optimal because it's not making
> use of signed windows, I don't think the extra savings are sufficient to
> beat the Montgomery ladder).  More importantly, if you have a *fixed* bas=
e
> (which is very relevant for ephemeral ECDH), with appropriate fixed
> precomputation you won't need any double operations at all: so the total
> time for one fixed-base single-scalar multiplication and one variable-bas=
e
> signal-scalar multiplication as used in ECDH can be less than with the
> Montgomery ladder, even if you want constant time with no secret-dependen=
t
> branches.  If you have severe space constraints, then an approach that
> involves a few hundred precomputed points is not for you, but in many
> typical scenarios this is not an issue at all.
>
> So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has its use, allowing
> applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would be beneficial.

Even if the party which generates a public key uses Edwards-form
points internally for that operation, whoever generates the key can
put it into Montgomery form for free before scaling, whereas whoever
receives it would need to perform an extra coordinate inversion in
order to convert from Edwards form to affine Montgomery form.  (Over
an implementation-friendly coordinate field, projective-base
Montgomery-form point multiplication is always slower than scaling
followed by affine-base Montgomery-form point multiplication.)

I really don't see any benefit to transmitting an Edwards-form point for EC=
DH.


Robert Ransom

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Dear all,
The email thread about the draft exploded and I had a lot of points to
respond to all over the place.

First off, I am including explicit formulas in the draft. It costs
nothing, and people seem to want it. I'm also explaining the benefits
of Montgomery form for x-coordinate only ECDH. I'll upload it as soon
as I'm happy with some editing I need to do.

The naming issue is fine: we can say "the safecurve Mxxx has been
found to be unsafe" without risk of being misunderstood. If there is
consensus that we should call the IANA registry something else, say
"Chicago curves", I'm not opposed to it.

But as for efficiency, pontification about what is fast and what isn't
will always be behind the drive of implementors to accelerate
everything. What seems like an awkward limb placement can be fixed by
some clever use of fractional radix arithmetic.

Lastly, just because a protocol suggests a form to go on the wire does
not mean that the calculations an implementation does need to resemble
it. Robert Ransom has made this point, and I agree with it. Good
standards specify observed behavior, not how it is attained.

As a metacomment: we shouldn't let our desire for "The Idiots Guide to
ECC" in RFC form get in the way of standardizing these curves. I don't
think our job is done with putting these curve formulas in an RFC, but
it does substantially help anyone who wants to use these curves in
another IETF protocol.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

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From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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--089e013a10468ea63404ef8b3ce3
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>:

> So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has its use, allowing
> > applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would be beneficial.
>
>

> Even if the party which generates a public key uses Edwards-form
> points internally for that operation, whoever generates the key can
> put it into Montgomery form for free before scaling, whereas whoever
> receives it would need to perform an extra coordinate inversion in
> order to convert from Edwards form to affine Montgomery form.


That's a good point.  As I've pointed out (or tried to point out, anyway),
the receiver might want to do the computations in Edwards form too, but
there's not that much to be gained from that, so it may not be worth the
extra complexity.

Bodo

--089e013a10468ea63404ef8b3ce3
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Robe=
rt Ransom <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rransom.8774@gmail.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">rransom.8774@gmail.com</a>&gt;:</span></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote">
<span dir=3D"ltr"><br></span></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">
&gt; So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has its use, allowin=
g<br>
&gt; applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would be beneficia=
l.<br>
<br></div></div></blockquote><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><=
div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">
</div></div>Even if the party which generates a public key uses Edwards-for=
m<br>
points internally for that operation, whoever generates the key can<br>
put it into Montgomery form for free before scaling, whereas whoever<br>
receives it would need to perform an extra coordinate inversion in<br>
order to convert from Edwards form to affine Montgomery form.</blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>That&#39;s a good point. =A0As I&#39;ve pointed out (or =
tried to point out, anyway), the receiver might want to do the computations=
 in Edwards form too, but there&#39;s not that much to be gained from that,=
 so it may not be worth the extra complexity.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Bodo</div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

--089e013a10468ea63404ef8b3ce3--

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu Jan  9 07:37:43 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft redux
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On Jan 9, 2014, at 6:42 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> The naming issue is fine: we can say "the safecurve Mxxx has been
> found to be unsafe" without risk of being misunderstood.

Not at all. Having "safecurve Mxxx" be found unsafe will make many =
people think that all the other curves are unsafe.

The IETF has a long history of naming coming back to bite us in the =
butt. Please strongly consider getting rid of the "safecurve" name and =
just using the actual names that Dan an Tanja use.

--Paul Hoffman=

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Thu Jan  9 07:41:28 2014
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On 1/9/14, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> But as for efficiency, pontification about what is fast and what isn't
> will always be behind the drive of implementors to accelerate
> everything. What seems like an awkward limb placement can be fixed by
> some clever use of fractional radix arithmetic.

There is a limit to how much =E2=80=98fractional-radix arithmetic=E2=80=99 =
can help.
2^255 - k has a nice regular (vectorizable) pattern of 10 limbs ([26,
25]*5); no other pattern works as well.  2^414 - k can be split into
18 or 9 equal-size limbs, or a vectorizable pattern of 16 or 8 limbs.
None of the other curves' coordinate fields (with the possible
exception of M-221) have both a good arrangement of limbs and a
sufficiently small k to postpone carrying after multiplication until
after modular reduction.

> Lastly, just because a protocol suggests a form to go on the wire does
> not mean that the calculations an implementation does need to resemble
> it. Robert Ransom has made this point, and I agree with it.

And I also made the exact opposite point: twist security is only
useful because implementations will be free to use Montgomery's ladder
formulas.

> Good
> standards specify observed behavior, not how it is attained.

Good standards specify *both* the intended observable behaviour *and*
how to attain it.  The whole point of SafeCurves is to assist in
*implementing* ECC both safely and efficiently.

> As a metacomment: we shouldn't let our desire for "The Idiots Guide to
> ECC" in RFC form get in the way of standardizing these curves. I don't
> think our job is done with putting these curve formulas in an RFC, but
> it does substantially help anyone who wants to use these curves in
> another IETF protocol.

Shoveling this pile of curve equations into an I-D or RFC accomplishes
nothing.  What matters is specifying how to use curves of this class
in protocols, and that requires not only specifying point formats and
curve-operation formulas, but choosing the right set of point formats
to support in each case, and documenting how to assemble the primitive
curve operations into the exact procedures that the protocol requires.
 It's a matter of systems engineering, not mathematics or cryptography
alone.


Robert Ransom

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Thu Jan  9 08:38:12 2014
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On 1/9/14, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
> On 09/01/2014 10:50, Robert Ransom wrote:
>>> About names, I'd really like the names to reflect the type of the curve
>>> (Montgomery or Edwards). This is already the case for other curve
>>> families,
>>> by
>>> the way. So, Mxxx and Exxx seem great to me. I'd even go so far as to
>>> rename
>>> Curve25519 as M255, but I'm sure there are good reasons to disagree on
>>> this
>>> point.
>>
>> Remember that Curve25519's parameter is *not* minimal subject to the
>> constraint of twist security with minimal cofactors -- Dr. Bernstein
>> considered a slightly more subtle criterion regarding the group orders
>> too.  Keep that in mind if you try to establish a systematic name for
>> Curve25519.
>>
> I'm not sure it goes against my argument that the name should reflect the
> type
> of the curve. Or did I miss something?

That's an argument against making curve names appear systematic (e.g.
=E2=80=9CM255=E2=80=9D) when they may not be.  (I particularly dislike the =
naming
schemes used in the various versions of 2013/647.)

I guess I have more of a problem with the idea that Montgomery and
Edwards are two different types of curves at all.  The important fact
to convey for a SafeCurve is which *part* of the curve one is talking
about:

* the Montgomery line (i.e. the subset of a curve over the quadratic
extension field whose Montgomery-form x coordinates are =E2=80=98rational=
=E2=80=99);
* the Edwards curve (i.e. the subgroup of a curve whose coordinates
are both =E2=80=98rational=E2=80=99); or
* the non-trivial quadratic twist of the Edwards curve (which I'm
pretty sure no one uses).

Curve25519 is a Montgomery line; Ed25519 is an Edwards curve which is
part of Curve25519.  Curve1174 and Curve3617 are Edwards curves.  (I
implemented Curve1174 for 64-bit processors, and called my
Montgomery-form routines =E2=80=9Cmont1174=E2=80=9D, but don't treat that a=
s
normative.)

All of this makes good nomenclature for the various curves and
subcurves and subgroups and subsets both more difficult and more
important to define properly.


>>> and to be fair point 4 is a bit easier to
>>> address
>>> with these curves too.
>>
>> Why 4?  The benefit of complete addition formulas is that
>> implementations don't need to switch to a doubling routine when two
>> points are equal.  Nothing about SafeCurves makes constant-time table
>> lookups any easier.
>>
> Right, I was making an unstated assumption again, sorry for that. The
> assumption
> was that other curves are more likely to use a larger table for performan=
ce,
> while a Curve25519 implementation will generally use a ladder with no
> precomputed table, so it will only have to safely swap two points, which =
is
> less
> expensive than doing a constant-time lookup in a larger (say 16 or 32
> points)
> table. So it lessens the performance vs security conflict.

A Curve25519 (Montgomery-line ECDH) implementation will generally use
a ladder with no precomputed table because Montgomery's formulas are
so much faster that way.

An Ed25519 (Edwards curve, typically signature-related) implementation
will generally use either (a) the variable-time Bos-Coster algorithm
(for batch verification of signatures), (b) the potentially
constant-time Brauer and/or Straus algorithm (for constant-time
signature verification or weird protocols like Ace), or (c) fixed-base
single-scalar multiplication using a huge precomputed table (for key
generation, which had better be done in constant time).


Robert Ransom

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu Jan  9 09:47:04 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] ReL DANE in the IETF (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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On Jan 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Igoe, Kevin M.
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 10:15 AM
>> To: 'David McGrew'; Sean Turner
>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics
>> for CFRG)
>>=20
>> I'd like to see the CFRG investigate how far the DANE paradigm can be
>> pushed w/o bringing the system to a screeching halt.
>> For example, there is a group an NIST looking at the possibility of
>> leveraging DANE for use with e-mail.  Who else is out there hoping to
>> piggy bank on DANE?  Can DANE be the new PKI? =20
> No.=20

Actually, yes it can, if you change your assumptions about what you want =
"the PKI" to be. The current "the PKI" assumes many things about how =
many trust anchors there should be and what names each of those trust =
anchors can vouch for. DANE, as a new "the PKI" makes different =
assumptions. There are operational advantages to each choice.

> Nice hack, but lacking adequate semantics and constraint based
> architecture to extend well beyond DNS based naming (email could =
work).

Right: that's exactly the point of DANE. The semantics are purposely =
limited to the naming scheme people care most about on the Internet. =
What other names do you think are important for a new "the PKI" that =
can't be associated with the DNS?

>> If not, what features
>> does it lack & can it be "patched"?
> Anything could be patched ... but the core hierarchy structure
> of DNS would be maintained and would always be of that flavor=20
> of that solution space.=20

Quite right. That's considered a feature by many.

> I'd like to see something that would work for mobile phones without
> central servers ...

Please say more. Are you assuming a mobile phone not connected to the =
Internet?

--Paul Hoffman=

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On Jan 9, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:

> Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>:
>=20
> > So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has its use, =
allowing
> > applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would be =
beneficial.
>=20
> =20
> Even if the party which generates a public key uses Edwards-form
> points internally for that operation, whoever generates the key can
> put it into Montgomery form for free before scaling, whereas whoever
> receives it would need to perform an extra coordinate inversion in
> order to convert from Edwards form to affine Montgomery form.
>=20
> That's a good point.  As I've pointed out (or tried to point out, =
anyway), the receiver might want to do the computations in Edwards form =
too, but there's not that much to be gained from that, so it may not be =
worth the extra complexity.
>=20
> Bodo

I agree.  The sender might well use Edwards internally -- it's about 3x =
faster -- but the point should be sent in Montgomery form.

I wonder, though, if the standard encoding of the spec should have the =
sign of the y-coordinate.  That way if we want to use the format for =
something other than ECDH -- signatures or PAKE or whatever -- we won't =
have to specify a new encoding.

An overly-complicated but cute solution is 1/sqrt(x) chosen with the =
same sign as y.  (x is always square if you're in the q-torsion; 1/x =
works just as well as x in the ladder; 1/x lets you encode the =
identity.)  But we probably don't actually want to spec that.  Maybe =
just a bit for sign(y)?

-- Mike=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=iso-8859-1"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div>On Jan 9, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Bodo Moeller &lt;<a href="mailto:bmoeller@acm.org">bmoeller@acm.org</a>&gt; wrote:</div><div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">Robert Ransom <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:rransom.8774@gmail.com" target="_blank">rransom.8774@gmail.com</a>&gt;:</span></div><div class="gmail_quote">
<span dir="ltr"><br></span></div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5">
&gt; So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has its use, allowing<br>
&gt; applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would be beneficial.<br>
<br></div></div></blockquote><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5">
</div></div>Even if the party which generates a public key uses Edwards-form<br>
points internally for that operation, whoever generates the key can<br>
put it into Montgomery form for free before scaling, whereas whoever<br>
receives it would need to perform an extra coordinate inversion in<br>
order to convert from Edwards form to affine Montgomery form.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>That's a good point. &nbsp;As I've pointed out (or tried to point out, anyway), the receiver might want to do the computations in Edwards form too, but there's not that much to be gained from that, so it may not be worth the extra complexity.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Bodo</div></div></div></div></blockquote><br></div><div>I agree. &nbsp;The sender might well use Edwards internally -- it's about 3x faster -- but the point should be sent in Montgomery form.</div><div><br></div><div>I wonder, though, if the standard encoding of the spec should have the sign of the y-coordinate. &nbsp;That way if we want to use the format for something other than ECDH -- signatures or PAKE or whatever -- we won't have to specify a new encoding.</div><div><br></div><div>An overly-complicated but cute solution is 1/sqrt(x) chosen with the same sign as y. &nbsp;(x is always square if you're in the q-torsion; 1/x works just as well as x in the ladder; 1/x lets you encode the identity.) &nbsp;But we probably don't actually want to spec that. &nbsp;Maybe just a bit for sign(y)?</div><div><br></div><div>-- Mike</div></body></html>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 10:07 AM, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
> On Jan 9, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
>
> Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>:
>
>> > So while the Montgomery-form Curve25519 certainly has its use, allowing
>> > applications to negotiate a different form for ECDH would be beneficial.
>>
>
>>
>> Even if the party which generates a public key uses Edwards-form
>> points internally for that operation, whoever generates the key can
>> put it into Montgomery form for free before scaling, whereas whoever
>> receives it would need to perform an extra coordinate inversion in
>> order to convert from Edwards form to affine Montgomery form.
>
>
> That's a good point.  As I've pointed out (or tried to point out, anyway),
> the receiver might want to do the computations in Edwards form too, but
> there's not that much to be gained from that, so it may not be worth the
> extra complexity.
>
> Bodo
>
>
> I agree.  The sender might well use Edwards internally -- it's about 3x
> faster -- but the point should be sent in Montgomery form.
>
> I wonder, though, if the standard encoding of the spec should have the sign
> of the y-coordinate.  That way if we want to use the format for something
> other than ECDH -- signatures or PAKE or whatever -- we won't have to
> specify a new encoding.
>
> An overly-complicated but cute solution is 1/sqrt(x) chosen with the same
> sign as y.  (x is always square if you're in the q-torsion; 1/x works just
> as well as x in the ladder; 1/x lets you encode the identity.)  But we
> probably don't actually want to spec that.  Maybe just a bit for sign(y)?

This draft doesn't specify an encoding: it's up to whichever standard
uses this draft
to pick one.

Specifying an encoding of an x coordinate, or x coordinate plus sign
is easy enough.

You could upload a draft to specify it in more detail if you want.

I've uploaded a new version.
>
> -- Mike
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

I concur that we shouldn't call it "safecurves" or anything like that. I th=
ink that definitely this needs to heed Paul Hoffman's advice on names comin=
g back to bite us.

All crypto parameter sets have a lifespan where they're new and shiny, olde=
r and trusted, then kinda dodgy but accepted, and then outmoded or insecure=
. Each phase might be there for years or perhaps minutes. I've seen things =
go the entire lifecycle in an hour. We don't want the premature aging of on=
e to tarnish the whole thing. Think about what you'd say when the Buzzfeed =
reporter calls you up for comment or background on their article "Ten Shock=
ing Reasons Why SafeCurves are The Spawn of Satan" after a Eurocrypt paper =
has a new banana attack that shows a curve has ten fewer bits of security w=
ith 2^300 memory.

I also think there should be a quick set of names where we specify what's a=
 Montgomery and what's Edwards. This is already needed and the reason why t=
here's 25519 and Ed25519 in current parlance. If we *don't* do it here, the=
n someone else will. It's too useful not to have it.=20

You can have a table with common names and extended names and have the exte=
nded names have something simple like a suffix of M or E. It's easy to fit =
25519 and Ed25519 into this as well.

	Jon






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From paul@marvell.com  Thu Jan  9 11:56:34 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 11:56:12 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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+1 on a different name =8A

Other comments:

1) Curve definitions really badly need clear parameterization.  Cutting
and pasting the referenced web site does provide all the right numbers,
but no context to implement. For the parameterization =8A the curve math is
different so merging old and new in some fashion might make for
interesting comparison of the differences.

2) Is there any provenance on the generator selection for the curves?  I
hear critical comments on the NIST seeds, if we add new curves, should we
also document the process used for the selection of the =8Carbitrary=B9 val=
ues?

3) test vectors ..

Paul


On 1/9/14, 10:43 AM, "Jon Callas" <jon@callas.org> wrote:

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>
>I concur that we shouldn't call it "safecurves" or anything like that. I
>think that definitely this needs to heed Paul Hoffman's advice on names
>coming back to bite us.
>
>All crypto parameter sets have a lifespan where they're new and shiny,
>older and trusted, then kinda dodgy but accepted, and then outmoded or
>insecure. Each phase might be there for years or perhaps minutes. I've
>seen things go the entire lifecycle in an hour. We don't want the
>premature aging of one to tarnish the whole thing. Think about what you'd
>say when the Buzzfeed reporter calls you up for comment or background on
>their article "Ten Shocking Reasons Why SafeCurves are The Spawn of
>Satan" after a Eurocrypt paper has a new banana attack that shows a curve
>has ten fewer bits of security with 2^300 memory.
>
>I also think there should be a quick set of names where we specify what's
>a Montgomery and what's Edwards. This is already needed and the reason
>why there's 25519 and Ed25519 in current parlance. If we *don't* do it
>here, then someone else will. It's too useful not to have it.
>
>You can have a table with common names and extended names and have the
>extended names have something simple like a suffix of M or E. It's easy
>to fit 25519 and Ed25519 into this as well.
>
>	Jon
>
>
>
>
>
>
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 12:01:15 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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>> I agree.  The sender might well use Edwards internally -- it's about 3x
>> faster -- but the point should be sent in Montgomery form.
Totally undefined in the draft.  Critical for interoperability.


>
>This draft doesn't specify an encoding: it's up to whichever standard
>uses this draft
>to pick one.
Wrong answer =8A  we need interoperability of public key representation
Since a key may be used in multiple applications.


Paul


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:01 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>>> I agree.  The sender might well use Edwards internally -- it's about 3x
>>> faster -- but the point should be sent in Montgomery form.
> Totally undefined in the draft.  Critical for interoperability.

Whether or not Montgomery or Edwards form is used depends on what the proto=
col
is doing with the points. Montgomery form does not support addition,
but has advantages
in ECDH representations because it eliminates some validations without
point compression issues.

>
>
>>
>>This draft doesn't specify an encoding: it's up to whichever standard
>>uses this draft
>>to pick one.
> Wrong answer =C5=A0  we need interoperability of public key representatio=
n
> Since a key may be used in multiple applications.

Most reasonable representations can be interconverted. However, there
are popular implementations
of these curves that make strange representation choices: a format
switch might not be popular if everyone
implementing a protocol wants to use NaCl.

Furthermore, some people (like me) want fixed length encodings sized
to cover the necessary range exactly, while
others like ASN.1 (for inexplicable reasons). The fewer choices we
make here, the faster this can get through. The new version explains
what
representations should do, while leaving it up to the end user
protocols to decide what makes sense.

>
>
> Paul
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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--001a11c362e66b53be04ef904e5b
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Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>:

Furthermore, some people (like me) want fixed length encodings sized
> to cover the necessary range exactly, while
> others like ASN.1 (for inexplicable reasons).


With ASN.1, you'd normally see a fixed-length OCTET STRING for this.  I
doubt that anyone seriously prefers variable-length encodings here.



> The fewer choices we
> make here, the faster this can get through.


What's gained, though?  The same decisions would have to be made, instead,
for each protocol that is going to use one of these curves.

Bodo

--001a11c362e66b53be04ef904e5b
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Wats=
on Ladd <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">watsonbladd@gmail.com</a>&gt;:</span></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><span dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Furthermore, some people (like me) want fixed length encodings sized<br>
to cover the necessary range exactly, while<br>
others like ASN.1 (for inexplicable reasons).</blockquote><div><br></div><d=
iv>With ASN.1, you&#39;d normally see a fixed-length OCTET STRING for this.=
 =A0I doubt that anyone seriously prefers variable-length encodings here.</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> The fewer choi=
ces we<br>
make here, the faster this can get through.</blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>What&#39;s gained, though? =A0The same decisions would have to be made, in=
stead, for each protocol that is going to use one of these curves.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Bodo</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div></div></d=
iv>

--001a11c362e66b53be04ef904e5b--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On 09/01/2014 14:42, Watson Ladd wrote:
> The naming issue is fine: we can say "the safecurve Mxxx has been 
> found to be unsafe" without risk of being misunderstood.

I have to say, on reflection I'm definitely leaning more towards
calling the group of curves/IANA registry something else myself.

"SafeCurves" is the set of criteria and verifiable vetting process by
which djb and Tanja are trying to define safe curves to use: fair
enough, keep the reference under that name, they picked it.

As Bodo points out, it's _not_ really a collective name for the curves
that made it through that process. (Although it's tempting to use it
as one, there really isn't one.) As Jon and Paul and Johannes Merkle
and others have pointed out, if we did name the registry/RFC that,
we're risk looking a bit naïve (and dangerously misleading) at least
in a decade, or two, or whenever, when QC eventually bears fruit or
something similar happens.

If “SafeCurves” risks being confusing, we need another name. …I have
no idea. They're next-generation elliptic curves (NGEC?), now that
we've found better curve forms than short Weierstrass, but I think
"Next-Generation" always sounds a bit silly when it's the current one,
or especially when it's the previous one. We may just as well use a
catchy, arbitrary name… “Ellipsis”, maybe?


As far as the names of the individual curves: while a systematic
naming scheme is tempting, which is why I raised it, counterbalancing
that are that people are actually using these curves _right now_ in
the wild: adding new names for them might just serve to confuse
everyone. Not everyone's waiting for our informational RFC, after all:
people need fast strong crypto badly right now, the routines are
already available, and they're getting used. All we're really doing,
perhaps, is documenting it consistently as a starting point for their
adoption in internet standard protocols like TLS, DNSSEC, IPsec, PKIX
and so on.

So maybe just stick with the names their respective creators gave them
(dropping the caps and dashes as I suggested so command lines and
config files don't hate us forever): curve1174, curve25519, curve3617,
e511, m521, …


On 09/01/2014 09:27, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard wrote:
> While at it, we should also document the requirements for private 
> keys, which are different from the way they are usually chosen for 
> short Weierstrass curves.

Good call.


On 09/01/2014 20:01, Paul Lambert wrote:
>> [draft doesn't specify encoding]
> Wrong answer — we need interoperability of public key 
> representation Since a key may be used in multiple applications.

As above, given they're already in-the-wild, and we're just
documenting them, I'm inclined to just say, use the representation
specified in the papers already in the wild, and implemented in the
software already in the wild. Done. Time for tea.

I note [draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519-02] goes with big-endian
instead of little-endian, essentially because TLS usually uses
big-endian for bignums. I'm probably going to go and comment against
that decision, because the paper and every implementation already out
there uses little-endian: in a sense, that decision's been made for us
(and big-endian lost the commonness fight some time ago)?

- -- 
/akr
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 14:10:26 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
> Hi Alyssa,
>
>> On 09/01/2014 14:42, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> > The naming issue is fine: we can say "the safecurve Mxxx has been
>> > found to be unsafe" without risk of being misunderstood.
>>
>> I have to say, on reflection I'm definitely leaning more towards
>> calling the group of curves/IANA registry something else myself.
>>
>> "SafeCurves" is the set of criteria and verifiable vetting process by
>> which djb and Tanja are trying to define safe curves to use: fair
>> enough, keep the reference under that name, they picked it.
>>
>> As Bodo points out, it's _not_ really a collective name for the curves
>> that made it through that process. (Although it's tempting to use it as
>> one, there really isn't one.) As Jon and Paul and Johannes Merkle and
>> others have pointed out, if we did name the registry/RFC that, we're
>> risk looking a bit na=C3=AFve (and dangerously misleading) at least in a
>> decade, or two, or whenever, when QC eventually bears fruit or
>> something similar happens.
>>
>> If =E2=80=9CSafeCurves=E2=80=9D risks being confusing, we need another n=
ame. =E2=80=A6I have no
>> idea. They're next-generation elliptic curves (NGEC?), now that we've
>> found better curve forms than short Weierstrass, but I think "Next-
>> Generation" always sounds a bit silly when it's the current one, or
>> especially when it's the previous one. We may just as well use a
>> catchy, arbitrary name=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CEllipsis=E2=80=9D, maybe?
>
> Good points.
> Perhaps if we look at the full collection of curves as a curve catalog,
> we are simply adding two more classes of curves.
>
> There would be some value in comparing the attributes of all curves if
> we treat them as a full set versus old and new.
>
> It also happens that the new curves are using Edwards and Montgomery
> equations.  For an RFC for just these new curves we could just refer
> To these terms - "Edwards and Montgomery Curves for Elliptic Curve Crypto=
graphy"
> or something similar ...

RTFD: It is titled simply "Additional Curves for IETF Protocols" and
has been since the beginning.
Safecurves is simply part of the filename with minimal semantic
import. I changed the registry name
in version 01.

Anyway, I'll upload a third revision sometime that addresses some of
the more substantive issues that have been
raised, such as a desire for canonical representations.

A lot of the issues that have been raised are readily resolvable with
additional drafts, should they be necessary, such
as a systemic catalog of all curves. If this really is the worst
problem you have with the draft, I think we're done.

>
>> As far as the names of the individual curves: while a systematic naming
>> scheme is tempting, which is why I raised it, counterbalancing that are
>> that people are actually using these curves _right now_ in the wild:
>> adding new names for them might just serve to confuse everyone. Not
>> everyone's waiting for our informational RFC, after all:
>> people need fast strong crypto badly right now, the routines are
>> already available, and they're getting used. All we're really doing,
>> perhaps, is documenting it consistently as a starting point for their
>> adoption in internet standard protocols like TLS, DNSSEC, IPsec, PKIX
>> and so on.
> This need not be an issue if the new names are clearly distinguishable
> and mapped to the old names.  For example: 'secp256r1' is identical to
> the later 'nistP521'
>
> I suggest that we reuse a similar nomenclature.  It would make the new cu=
rves
> look like equals in notation, provide a consistent nomenclature,
> And the postfix 'r1', 'r2' notation is handy for new parameters or genera=
tor
> points in the same curve/field.
>
> Proposal:
>  - first four characters define the curve type/equation/math/etc
>  - next 3 or more numbers are the field size
>  - next characters carry an 'r' followed by a revision indication
>
> curve3617 -> edwp414r1
>
>
>>
>> So maybe just stick with the names their respective creators gave them
>> (dropping the caps and dashes as I suggested so command lines and
>> config files don't hate us forever): curve1174, curve25519, curve3617,
>> e511, m521, =E2=80=A6
>>
>>
>> On 09/01/2014 09:27, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard wrote:
>> > While at it, we should also document the requirements for private
>> > keys, which are different from the way they are usually chosen for
>> > short Weierstrass curves.
>>
>> Good call.
>>
>>
>> On 09/01/2014 20:01, Paul Lambert wrote:
>> >> [draft doesn't specify encoding]
>> > Wrong answer =E2=80=94 we need interoperability of public key represen=
tation
>> > Since a key may be used in multiple applications.
>>
>> As above, given they're already in-the-wild, and we're just documenting
>> them, I'm inclined to just say, use the representation specified in the
>> papers already in the wild, and implemented in the software already in
>> the wild. Done. Time for tea.
> Better answer ... but the representation needs to be documented.
>
> Paul
>>
>> I note [draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519-02] goes with big-endian instead
>> of little-endian, essentially because TLS usually uses big-endian for
>> bignums. I'm probably going to go and comment against that decision,
>> because the paper and every implementation already out there uses
>> little-endian: in a sense, that decision's been made for us (and big-
>> endian lost the commonness fight some time ago)?
>>
>> - --
>> /akr
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>>
>> iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJSzxYzAAoJEOyEjtkWi2t6HfUP/iS0t44KYkNVJIooNhTOztZr
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>> dKIzgXN+z6t3t6xeA04C3TN/wTKpMJeUL+zau+HFti4Yd5bfIy7YpfGc7moiUC4K
>> RcPxBHS56ebYPNKEi9FncRDUts8OgT8nFsiUt+0MjN+Wz9vdgG5KB9tsDGhTBGnR
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>> cbtmmLqAzgIAassFudKN
>> =3DAvz3
>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> _______________________________________________
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--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>:


> This need not be an issue if the new names are clearly distinguishable
> and mapped to the old names.  For example: 'secp256r1' is identical to
> the later 'nistP521'
>
> I suggest that we reuse a similar nomenclature.  It would make the new
> curves
> look like equals in notation, provide a consistent nomenclature,
> And the postfix 'r1', 'r2' notation is handy for new parameters or
> generator
> points in the same curve/field.
>
> Proposal:
>  - first four characters define the curve type/equation/math/etc
>  - next 3 or more numbers are the field size
>  - next characters carry an 'r' followed by a revision indication
>
> curve3617 -> edwp414r1
>

"r1" in SECG curves indicates that it's "random" curve number 1 (as opposed
to "k1", which would be a Koblitz curve).  Of course the new names don't
have to look anything like SECG curve names, but if they do, that very
different meaning for a very similar postfix could end up causing some
confusion.  So I think you might want to adjust the proposal to
give curve3617 a name of the form "...p414ed1" instead.

Bodo

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Paul=
 Lambert <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@marvell.com" target=
=3D"_blank">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt;:</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><div>=A0</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im">
</div>This need not be an issue if the new names are clearly distinguishabl=
e<br>
and mapped to the old names. =A0For example: &#39;secp256r1&#39; is identic=
al to<br>
the later &#39;nistP521&#39;<br>
<br>
I suggest that we reuse a similar nomenclature. =A0It would make the new cu=
rves<br>
look like equals in notation, provide a consistent nomenclature,<br>
And the postfix &#39;r1&#39;, &#39;r2&#39; notation is handy for new parame=
ters or generator<br>
points in the same curve/field.<br>
<br>
Proposal:<br>
=A0- first four characters define the curve type/equation/math/etc<br>
=A0- next 3 or more numbers are the field size<br>
=A0- next characters carry an &#39;r&#39; followed by a revision indication=
<br>
<br>
curve3617 -&gt; edwp414r1<br>
<div class=3D"im"></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>&quot;r1&quot; in =
SECG curves indicates that it&#39;s &quot;random&quot; curve number 1 (as o=
pposed to &quot;k1&quot;, which would be a Koblitz curve). =A0Of course the=
 new names don&#39;t have to look anything like SECG curve names, but if th=
ey do, that very different meaning for a very similar postfix could end up =
causing some confusion. =A0So I think you might want to adjust the proposal=
 to give=A0curve3617=A0a name of the form &quot;...p414ed1&quot; instead.</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>Bodo</div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

--047d7b41ccbc06a96d04ef915894--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: Re: Safecurves draft
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On 09/01/2014 17:38, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 1/9/14, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
>> I'm not sure it goes against my argument that the name should reflect the
>> type
>> of the curve. Or did I miss something?
> 
> That's an argument against making curve names appear systematic (e.g.
> “M255”) when they may not be.  (I particularly dislike the naming
> schemes used in the various versions of 2013/647.)
> 
Oh, yes, fair point. Sorry for missing it the first time.

> I guess I have more of a problem with the idea that Montgomery and
> Edwards are two different types of curves at all.  The important fact
> to convey for a SafeCurve is which *part* of the curve one is talking
> about: [...]
> All of this makes good nomenclature for the various curves and
> subcurves and subgroups and subsets both more difficult and more
> important to define properly.
> 
100% agreed.

> A Curve25519 (Montgomery-line ECDH) implementation will generally use
> a ladder with no precomputed table because Montgomery's formulas are
> so much faster that way.
> 
> An Ed25519 (Edwards curve, typically signature-related) implementation
> will generally use either [...]
> 
Right. Since I only implemented the Montgomery version so far, I've got the
nasty habit of thinking mainly about that form.

But, unless I'm mistaken, it seems to me we agree on the main point here: "no
data-dependant branches or memory access" is a property of the implementation,
not of the curves. (And I take back my comment that the curves from safecurves
make the "no data-dependant memory access" part easier.)

Manuel.

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Thu Jan  9 16:07:43 2014
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Cc: Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless
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Hi Kevin,

On 01/08/2014 01:06 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
> We really need to make sure at least some of the mailing list
> has some expertise in a given area before we commit ourselves
> to working in that area,

I completely agree, the RG needs to be cautious about making sure that 
it does not overcommit to work.

> and anything with "quantum" in the name
> requires expertise I expect very few (if any) of the maining list
> possess.  I suggest before committing to a topic we poll the
> mailing list to see who has both expertise on a given topic and
> an employer who is willing to donate the time and resources
> needed to follow through.

I think I was not clear in what I meant, please see inline below:

>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM
>> To: Sean Turner
>> Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org
>> Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
>>
>> Hi Sean,
>>
>> On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>> My list is kind of short:
>> thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize
>> work.
>>
>>> 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS
>> or not:
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
>>>
>>> If so, let's do a draft!
>>>
>>> 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am
>> I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about
>> (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in
>> fear):
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
>>>
>>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>> #0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment on
>> #2.
>>
>> Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem
>> that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
>> extensive use in the Internet.
>>
>> The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational
>> assumptions for security.   However, it relies on physical assumptions
>> for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer.
>> This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any
>> point between the encrypter and decrypter.   In addition, QKD requires
>> large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder
>> problem
>> in the real world than pseudorandomnes.   (In other words: a QKD system
>> could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable
>> elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that
>> algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?)
>>
>> QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very
>> severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support.
>> The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit
>> per second at 20 KM range.   Using that technology, we need 10,000
>> repeaters to get global scale communication.   This would require the
>> pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along
>> the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be
>> trusted.  There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not
>> need to be trusted,
>>
>> The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a
>> conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea.
>> It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as
>> whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has.   It is *more*
>> vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same
>> cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution.
>>
>> QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons,
>> and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as
>> 4G
>> and 802.11.   The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy
>> than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not
>> geometrically point to point.   So even if QKD didn't suffer from the
>> problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion
>> cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users.
>>
>> QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in
>> information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend,
>> Could, virtualization, and collaboration.
>>
>> I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium
>> Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum
>> key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim
>> in the title.   The important observation here is that the classical
>> Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable
>> storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure
>> communication, is quantifiably better than QKD.   Vernam does not have
>> any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range
>> limitations, and it can be used over wireless.   Its data rate will
>> depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a
>> trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a
>> courier
>> need not travel that often to match its data rate.   The important
>> inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that
>> all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we
>> would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and
>> not QKD.   The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest
>> in
>> QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of
>> what would be useful in information security.
>>
>> My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
>> http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we need
>> to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something
>> on it.

Instead of the last sentence, what I should have said is: if there is a 
need to better explain and/or defend the points outlined above, I 
personally would be willing to spend the time to write them up.

Speaking as an individual here: I don't think QKD is something worth the 
RG's time.   Post-quantum crypto, on the other hand, is something I 
would be very glad to see work on.

David

>>
>> David
>>
>>> spt
> .
>


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Subject: [Cfrg] post-quantum cryptography
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Hi Quynh,

On 01/08/2014 01:39 PM, Dang, Quynh wrote:
> NIST is interested in post-quantum cryptography research and standardization efforts. NIST would consider to help the IETF in these areas depending on specific topics.

That would be great.  Many IETF participants closely track NIST 
standards and guidelines, and input or coordination from NIST would be 
very positive in establishing the viability and role for post-quantum 
standards.    My guess is that there is substantial interest in the 
post-quantum work, but it will also take a good bit of effort, so let's 
let other people chime in on what work they would prioritize.

As far as post-quantum work goes, I think hash-based signatures will be 
easiest to realize, because they are fairly well understood, and it 
should not be too hard to get a signature system about which people have 
good confidence.   So it would make sense to do signatures first.   My 
$0.02 anyway.

David

> Quynh.
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 17:52:45 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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Hi Bodo,

>>Proposal:
>> - first four characters define the curve type/equation/math/etc
>> - next 3 or more numbers are the field size
>> - next characters carry an 'r' followed by a revision indication
>>
>>curve3617 -> edwp414r1
>
>"r1" in SECG curves indicates that it's "random" curve number 1 (as oppose=
d to "k1", which would
>be a Koblitz curve).

Thanks ... my mistake..  putting the 'type' and changing the 'r' meaning in=
 the front was confusing

>Of course the new names don't have to look anything like SECG curve names,
Yes ...
>but if they do, that very different meaning for a very similar postfix cou=
ld end up causing some
>confusion.  So I think you might want to adjust the proposal to give curve=
3617 a name of the
>form "...p414ed1" instead.

Much better.

I assume ... needs filling as origin of name space. Since we're on this lis=
t it could be:
   'cfrgp414ed1'
or just
  'p414ed1' or 'fp414ed1'

So far, a curve ontology -
  'r' -> Short Weierstrass (current usage always has a =3D p-3)
  'k' -> Koblitz (subclass of Short Weierstrass with optional optimizations=
)
  'ed' -> Edwards
I assume we need:
  'mo' -> Montgomery
   Others??

Brainpool curves specifically call out 't' for twisted versions of their ra=
ndom
Curves that are 'r' curves.  The twists have a=3Dp-3 ... confusing when
comparing to SEC/NIST. The provenance of the numbers
seems less important the clearly identifying the curve type and applicable
math routines.


Paul




From: Bodo Moeller [mailto:bmoeller@acm.org]
Sent: Thursday, January 09, 2014 2:44 PM
To: Paul Lambert
Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft

Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com<mailto:paul@marvell.com>>:

This need not be an issue if the new names are clearly distinguishable
and mapped to the old names.  For example: 'secp256r1' is identical to
the later 'nistP521'

I suggest that we reuse a similar nomenclature.  It would make the new curv=
es
look like equals in notation, provide a consistent nomenclature,
And the postfix 'r1', 'r2' notation is handy for new parameters or generato=
r
points in the same curve/field.

Proposal:
 - first four characters define the curve type/equation/math/etc
 - next 3 or more numbers are the field size
 - next characters carry an 'r' followed by a revision indication

curve3617 -> edwp414r1

"r1" in SECG curves indicates that it's "random" curve number 1 (as opposed=
 to "k1", which would be a Koblitz curve).  Of course the new names don't h=
ave to look anything like SECG curve names, but if they do, that very diffe=
rent meaning for a very similar postfix could end up causing some confusion=
.  So I think you might want to adjust the proposal to give curve3617 a nam=
e of the form "...p414ed1" instead.

Bodo


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Hi Bodo,<o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&gt;&gt;Proposal:<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans=
-serif";color:black'>&gt;&gt; - first four characters define the curve type=
/equation/math/etc<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D=
'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&gt;&gt; - next 3 or more =
numbers are the field size<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&gt;&gt; - next ch=
aracters carry an 'r' followed by a revision indication<o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>&gt;&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&gt;&gt;curve3617 -=
&gt; edwp414r1<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fon=
t-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>&gt;</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'>&quot;r1&quot; in SECG curves indicates that it's &quot;random&qu=
ot; curve number 1 (as opposed to &quot;k1&quot;, which would <o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:black'>&gt;be a Koblitz curve). &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Thanks &#8230; my mistake..&nbsp;=
 putting the &#8216;type&#8217; and changing the &#8216;r&#8217; meaning in=
 the front was confusing <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:black'>&gt;Of course the new names don't have to look anything l=
ike SECG curve names, <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Yes &#8230; <o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans=
-serif";color:black'>&gt;but if they do, that very different meaning for a =
very similar postfix could end up causing some <o:p></o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:blac=
k'>&gt;confusion. &nbsp;So I think you might want to adjust the proposal to=
 give&nbsp;curve3617&nbsp;a name of the <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&gt;=
form &quot;...p414ed1&quot; instead.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>Much better.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bla=
ck'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-fa=
mily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I assume &#8230; needs filling as =
origin of name space. Since we&#8217;re on this list it could be:<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans=
-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; &#8216;cfrgp414ed1&#8217;<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif=
";color:black'>or just<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp; &#8216;p414ed1&=
#8217; or &#8216;fp414ed1&#8217;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'>So far, a curve ontology &#8211; <o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8216;r&#8217; -&gt; Short Weierstrass (current =
usage always has a =3D p-3)<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp; &#8216;k&#=
8217; -&gt; Koblitz (subclass of Short Weierstrass with optional optimizati=
ons)<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp; &#8216;ed&#8217; -&gt; Edwards <o=
:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>I assume we need:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black=
'>&nbsp; &#8216;mo&#8217; -&gt; Montgomery<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&n=
bsp;&nbsp; Others??<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>Brainpool curves specifically call out &#8216;t&#8217; for tw=
isted versions of their random <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Curves that a=
re &#8216;r&#8217; curves.&nbsp; The twists have a=3Dp-3 &#8230; confusing =
when <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:=
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>comparing to SEC/NIST. The provenance o=
f the numbers<br>seems less important the clearly identifying the curve typ=
e and applicable<br>math routines.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"C=
alibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Paul=
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";colo=
r:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-lef=
t:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:non=
e;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'=
>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans=
-serif"'> Bodo Moeller [mailto:bmoeller@acm.org] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday,=
 January 09, 2014 2:44 PM<br><b>To:</b> Paul Lambert<br><b>Cc:</b> cfrg@irt=
f.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
/div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal>Paul Lambert &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@marvell.com" target=
=3D"_blank">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt;:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;b=
order-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;=
margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal=
>This need not be an issue if the new names are clearly distinguishable<br>=
and mapped to the old names. &nbsp;For example: 'secp256r1' is identical to=
<br>the later 'nistP521'<br><br>I suggest that we reuse a similar nomenclat=
ure. &nbsp;It would make the new curves<br>look like equals in notation, pr=
ovide a consistent nomenclature,<br>And the postfix 'r1', 'r2' notation is =
handy for new parameters or generator<br>points in the same curve/field.<br=
><br>Proposal:<br>&nbsp;- first four characters define the curve type/equat=
ion/math/etc<br>&nbsp;- next 3 or more numbers are the field size<br>&nbsp;=
- next characters carry an 'r' followed by a revision indication<br><br>cur=
ve3617 -&gt; edwp414r1<o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;r1&quot; in SEC=
G curves indicates that it's &quot;random&quot; curve number 1 (as opposed =
to &quot;k1&quot;, which would be a Koblitz curve). &nbsp;Of course the new=
 names don't have to look anything like SECG curve names, but if they do, t=
hat very different meaning for a very similar postfix could end up causing =
some confusion. &nbsp;So I think you might want to adjust the proposal to g=
ive&nbsp;curve3617&nbsp;a name of the form &quot;...p414ed1&quot; instead.<=
o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal>Bodo<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7ED731CSCVEXCH2marve_--

From hilarie@purplestreak.com  Thu Jan  9 18:17:13 2014
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Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 19:16:46 -0700
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From: "Hilarie Orman" <ho@alum.mit.edu>
To: mcgrew@cisco.com
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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless
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QKD married to Internet encryption protocols has been demonstrated, and
the physics is in flux (PI).  You may well see regional, multihop QKD
networks in the near future, as well as satellite communication secured
with it.  It seems a valid topic for the CFRG.

Hilarie

From paul@marvell.com  Thu Jan  9 18:26:45 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: "Dang, Quynh" <quynh.dang@nist.gov>
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 18:26:31 -0800
Thread-Topic: post-1999 ECC      ->          was RE: [Cfrg] post-quantum cryptography
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References: <mailman.3090.1389205127.2658.cfrg@irtf.org> <eccf0c7ace414027919f2ecaeffe0428@BLUPR09MB039.namprd09.prod.outlook.com> <52CF3E8A.70709@cisco.com>
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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] post-1999 ECC -> was RE: post-quantum cryptography
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Hi Quynh,

On a related topic of getting assistance and review=20
by NIST:=20

  Would NIST help this group evaluate and document
  proposals for additional ECC curves beyond those=20
  recommended by NIST in 1999?

It seems that some progress may have been made in the
practice of ECC in 15 years that should be reviewed
and considered.

Is there a specific process for adding new=20
cryptographic algorithms in FIPs recommendations
that should be followed?

Thanks in advance,

Paul


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of David McGrew
> Sent: Thursday, January 09, 2014 4:28 PM
> To: Dang, Quynh
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: [Cfrg] post-quantum cryptography
>=20
> Hi Quynh,
>=20
> On 01/08/2014 01:39 PM, Dang, Quynh wrote:
> > NIST is interested in post-quantum cryptography research and
> standardization efforts. NIST would consider to help the IETF in these
> areas depending on specific topics.
>=20
> That would be great.  Many IETF participants closely track NIST
> standards and guidelines, and input or coordination from NIST would be
> very positive in establishing the viability and role for post-quantum
> standards.    My guess is that there is substantial interest in the
> post-quantum work, but it will also take a good bit of effort, so let's
> let other people chime in on what work they would prioritize.
>=20
> As far as post-quantum work goes, I think hash-based signatures will be
> easiest to realize, because they are fairly well understood, and it
> should not be too hard to get a signature system about which people
> have
> good confidence.   So it would make sense to do signatures first.   My
> $0.02 anyway.
>=20
> David
>=20
> > Quynh.
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@irtf.org
> > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft
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On 1/9/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:

> I wonder, though, if the standard encoding of the spec should have the sign
> of the y-coordinate.  That way if we want to use the format for something
> other than ECDH -- signatures or PAKE or whatever -- we won't have to
> specify a new encoding.

I've implemented some routines that generate and use Curve25519 keys
represented as the Montgomery-form x coordinate, with the high bit
used to transmit the sign bit of the Edwards-form x coordinate.

I would still recommend distinguishing the case where the party who
generated the key did not compute the sign bit from the case where
that party did compute the sign bit, and the sign bit was 0.  That
calls for two point formats (or three if anyone wants an uncompressed
point with the whole Edwards-form x coordinate).


Robert Ransom

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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, irtf-chair@irtf.org, IAB IAB <iab@iab.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:17 AM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Hi Trevor,
>
> On 01/09/2014 02:46 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 8:20 AM, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Adam,
>>>
>>> On 01/08/2014 03:17 PM, Adam Back wrote:
>>>> Hi John
>>>>
>>>> I've seen several people putting forward a similar argument.  There is=
 some
>>>> logic but its I think an incorrect conclusion.
>>>
>>> I think there's a bit more subtlety to the conflict of interest
>>> issue than maybe some folks appreciate.
>>
>> Hi Stephen,
>>
>> I'd like to understand the subtlety better.  The IETF/IRTF leadership
>> seems terrified that considering an egregious conflict of interest in
>> a chair is a "slippery slope" to membership fees, loyalty oaths, and
>> purges.
>
> Terrified, egregious, loyalty oaths and purges is just irritating
> overblown rhetoric and wrong. Do you think such language helps
> something or someone? It doesn't. However, the rest of you mail
> deserves a response, so I'll skip over that.

"Terrified" was too strong.  But BULLRUN was 4 months ago.  It's time
for our leadership to summon their courage and take a stand.

As for the rest - David McGrew indeed mused about "a statement of
purpose of CFRG that contributors need to agree to".

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03695.html

And Lars indeed worried we'd have to "eliminate all individuals
affiliated with the NSA".

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03736.html

I think these are implausible fears which our leadership seems more
interested in spreading than explaining.


> BTW, just to be clear, I'm not part of the decision process nor
> the appeal process, which is why I feel free to respond. Others who
> are in the appeal chain may well not, so please don't misinterpret
> their silence.
>
>> I don't understand this.  Chairs are appointed (I assume) by weighing
>> many factors:  are they smart?  Fair?  Good communicators?
>> Trustworthy?  Easy to work with?  Knowledgeable both technically and
>> of IETF/IRTF process?  I would think being clear of severe
>> conflicts-of-interest is also good.
>
> Yes. Appointment is not the same as firing though, at least IMO.
> I figure its right for someone appointing someone to take many
> informal factors into account, but its not the same firing someone.

If those qualities are important at time of "hiring", they're
important 2 years later.

If the IRTF doesn't have a better policy for rotating the chair, then
"firing" (your term) is how it has to be done.


> I know that you don't agree that the only issue here is Kevin's
> affiliation, but that is what I think, as I said before.
>
>> No-one wants to make these criteria for excluding participants.  But
>> if a chair's lack of these qualities threatens a group's performance,
>> surely it's appropriate to consider a replacement?
>
> That's probably true in general, and Lars I assume considered all
> that as will the IAB. I'm ok with that process.
>
>>> Within the IETF its not that uncommon to have conflicts of
>>> interest where a company would like to sabotage a piece of
>>> standards work, in ways that seem quite similar to the current
>>> situation and that do not involve IPR, nor the misbehaviour
>>> of an individual chair.
>>>
>>> Say company-x have a product doing some proprietary thing
>>> that has significant market share. Then others propose to
>>> standardise that function, which company-x might consider
>>> would lessen their advantage with their product. It would not
>>> at all be a surprise to see people acting for company-x
>>> (employed, as consultants or business partners) trying to
>>> bugger up the standards process by e.g. trying to make the
>>> standard take ages, be over-complex or omit some crucial
>>> functionality. And if company-x aren't dumb then that can
>>> be attempted without any obvious evidence being left about.
>>
>> And this is just totally acceptable, day-to-day life at the IETF?
>
> No, and I didn't say it was. Do machinations happen in an
> organisation involving thousands of people like the IETF?
> Of course they do. Analogous things happen in academia as
> well of course. The point is not that its acceptable
> behaviour (it isn't) but that our processes need to be
> designed to counter it, while at the same time enabling
> the sausage-making to happen.

Yes, and countering an unacceptable conflict-of-interest in a
leadership position by removing the individual from that position is
an appropriate policy.


> My point though was to question the assertion that the
> NSA situation is new in this respect.
>
> I do think snowdonia is new in other respects and that
> we need to respond to those.
>
>>> Now if company-x are of any size, then its quite likely
>>> that employees of theirs are chairing other WGs. And for
>>> a long-lived WG with a generic charter, it'd not be at
>>> all unusual if someone working for company-X co-chairs
>>> the WG in question.
>>>
>>> So - what's different here? Are we saying that if a
>>> company-x marketing department memo leaks that says "let's
>>> bugger up <foo>" then we should fire the person who's
>>> co-chairing that WG?
>>
>> Depending on the credibility of the memo and the consequences of the
>> buggering, I would think that's reasonable to consider.
>
> Fair enough that you think that. I think it'd be wrong if
> the firing is solely based on affiliation.

So you would never remove a chair based on an affiliation that poses a
conflict-of-interest?

You also don't seem to care about competence or mismanagement.  What
would be grounds for replacing a chair, in your opinion?


>> I disagree that this needs to be framed as "fire the person".  That
>> implies this is some exceptional and insulting process to inflict on
>> someone.
>
> But it is that. Reading some of the comments on the ars articles
> about this kerfuffle, the phrase "exceptional and insulting" does
> seem accurate. I'm not saying that's your fault, but it has
> happened.

I don't think message board comments are relevant here.

The IAB could frame a chair replacement however they want.

I do think Kevin's removal should be a rebuke to the NSA.  We should
make a statement that weakening standards is unacceptable and damages
their ability to work with us, and that there's been a loss of trust
the NSA needs to repair.


>> But there is no other process to replace an RG chair except for having
>> the IRTF chair replace them.  Kevin has no term limit.  We can't just
>> wait 6 months and then quietly ease him out, or something.
>>
>> Perhaps there should be some process for selecting new chairs
>> periodically that is less confrontational, but unless I'm missing
>> something, there is not.
>
> There is not. That kind of thing has been discussed, and it is
> generally a fine thing to rotate chairs now and then, but in a
> volunteer organisation that's hard - chairing a contentious WG
> can take 20% of your week and finding capable willing chairs is
> hard. I don't think I've seen any credible proposal for term
> limits for chairs in either the IETF nor IRTF.
>
>>>> I understand the conflict of interest when people are somewhat
>>>> pushing their companies approach, related to their product or
>>>> implementtion choices they have some investment in, but generally
>>>> tempered by reasonableness.  All the companies that care can put
>>>> their voice in also.  IPR disclosures are also there.  Loose
>>>> consensus and running code copes with that ok.
>>>
>>> I think you left out a critical part of that, at least as its
>>> done in the IETF and IRTF - the participants ideally act as
>>> individuals and not on behalf of their employers and are treated
>>> that way. There is a serious danger of going down the slippery
>>> slope to paid membership if we deviate from that, with what I
>>> think would be overall worse outcomes.
>>
>> You lost me - what does "paid membership" have to do with this?
>
> Once you start to recognise affiliation in the way that is implied
> in the last part of your request, then you need processes that
> deal with the organisations and not the individuals and that very
> quickly tends to turn into a discussion about membership which
> then also quickly turns into one about paid membership and voting.
> You can believe me on this or not, but do bear in mind its far too
> boring an argument to want to deal with all the ins and outs;-)

In what way have I "implied" recognizing affiliation, beyond common
sense?  What new processes would we need to "deal with organizations"?

Please explain.  This is a major objection that's been raised to the
request.  You can't just handwave that we need to believe you, or that
it's too "boring" to get into.

If this is a serious objection it needs to be explained seriously.


>>>> I think NSA sabotage is a significantly different and its unrealistic =
to
>>>> just assume a chair has no influence.  A non-NSA chair would strive fo=
r
>>>> impartiality with regard to their employers interests.  If certicom
>>>> wants to
>>>> push something and cisco something else they are both pushing for some=
thing
>>>> reasonably secure as a fundamental assumption and trying to make secur=
e
>>>> systems so their customers will buy them.  Forward secrecy is good,
>>>> architectural weaknesses bad etc.
>>>>
>>>> The NSA is NOT in that boat.  They are explicitly sabotaging security =
on a
>>>> grand and systematic scale at all levels including standardization.  T=
hey
>>>> dislike forward secrecy, and like architectural weakness and architect=
ural
>>>> tap points and sabotaged RNGs, and fragile hard to implement correctly
>>>> standards with traps.  There were numerous news articles by Greenwald =
and
>>>> others backed by NSA docs about these strategies.
>>>
>>> Other than the headline 250/yr I think I've only seen
>>> convincing evidence related to the RNG stuff though. The
>>> rest afaik is speculation. If I missed more that's been
>>> published, I'd appreciate pointers.
>>
>> See the BULLRUN reporting and documents:
>>
>> http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.=
html
>> http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-ca=
mpaign-against-encryption.html?ref=3Dus
>
> Well since those are NYT and I don't have a subscription I
> can't follow those URLs:-)
>
> But I'm pretty sure I've seen that material already.

Sorry, see the Pro Publica story (and memos):

http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermi=
ne-internet-encryption
http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/784280-sigint-enabling-project
http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/784284-bullrun-briefing-sheet-from=
-gchq.html

And the Guardian story:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-secu=
rity

I'm sure you and most people have seen these.  But if the shock has
worn off for anyone they're worth revisiting.

The Pro Publica article is almost (though not quite) identical with
the NYT article.  The Guardian article has additional information.

The NYT memos have more commentary and annotations, which provide a
good summary:

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campa=
ign-against-encryption.html

"Documents show that the N.S.A. has been waging a war against
encryption using a battery of methods that include working with
industry to weaken encryption standards, making design changes to
cryptographic software, and pushing international encryption standards
it knows it can break."

"The N.S.A.'s Sigint Enabling Project is a $250 million-a-year program
that works with Internet companies to weaken privacy by inserting back
doors into encryption products."

"One responsibility of the agency is to safeguard United States
communications by promoting encryption standards, and the other is to
break codes protecting foreign communications. Part of the Sigint
Enabling Project's goal is to influence these standards =97 which are
often used by American companies =97 and weaken them."


>> Adam's speculations strike me as plausible and consistent with the
>> documents we have.  I think acting on "risk avoidance" grounds is
>> prudent here, instead of demanding absolute proof of what would of
>> course be covert and "deniable" activities by sneaky people.
>
> I don't think his speculations are convincing on this point, as
> I said. Its not surprising that reasonable people differ on how
> to interpret partial information like this though.

Certainly this would be easier if there was more information.


>>> But there's IMO a far more likely explanation for why we end up
>>> with stuff that fits this particular speculation - a lot of
>>> standards work ends up being dominated by people with more
>>> complex requirements and its always hard to keep stuff simple.
>>> In the case of security protocols, the US DoD requirements, as a
>>> customer (e.g. for PKI) are about as complicated as it gets and they
>>> can afford to pay folks to work on that. So we've ended up with
>>> PKI that's over complex for many other use-cases.
>>
>> Huh.  That's not all that different from the fears Adam has, or my
>> concern about "softer forms" of sabotage.  At least, the line between
>> "sabotage" and "not quite working in the Internet's best interest" is
>> a blurry one.
>
> Yes. In the latter case, I assert that the motivation is far
> more commonly "prioritising one's own set of requirements" and
> not "wanting the Internet to work less well."

Those aren't mutually exclusive.  In fact, the needs of military
"COMSEC" are probably different enough from public Internet crypto
that simply prioritizing the former goes some way towards
accomplishing the latter (as you note for PKI).

And I would expect the mindset isn't "wanting the Internet to work
less well", but simply "wanting the Internet to remain an easy target
for collection".

Kevin's main involvement with the IETF has been to "ensure various
internet security protocols supported configurations which would be
suitable for use in classified networks".

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03644.html

Nothing wrong with that.  But does he care about widespread, strong
crypto on the public Internet?  Is he going to aggressively tackle
end-to-end encrypted messaging; ubiquitous and strongly-authenticated
HTTPS; or improving the deployment of TLS forward secrecy and better
ciphers / curves?

Those are real challenges this group could be contributing to.  Do you
want NSA at the helm?


>> For example:  It's interesting how NIST tends to standardize
>> algorithms that work well in hardware but are tricky in software.
>
> That I think is something where we can make improvements all
> right, without having to agree on whether or not the current
> situation is a result of sabotage or not. I'm delighted to
> see CFRG starting down that road (partly spurred by your
> request I think).

Other people have wondered about this, FWIW:

https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/10/21/nist.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03599.html


>> And
>> how DoD's steering of PKI worked for DoD, I suppose, but has not
>> resulted in working key management for the Internet.
>
> Actually, I'd argue that someone wanting pervasive monitoring
> would be more likely to prefer that a DoD style PKI had been
> widely deployed in the Internet, so I really don't think that
> the NSA-driven sabotage argument holds water there. That's on
> the basis that if everyone had to go to a CA to do stuff then
> it'd be easier to track everyone and also to get at their long
> term decryption keys, e.g. because they'd often be centrally
> generated for mobility reasons.

Someone wanting pervasive monitoring would prefer plaintext.  It's
already easy to track everyone.

But the more I think about it, the more interesting your above observation =
is:

>> In the case of security protocols, the US DoD requirements, as a
>> customer (e.g. for PKI) are about as complicated as it gets and they
>> can afford to pay folks to work on that. So we've ended up with
>> PKI that's over complex for many other use-cases.

Some military gear is designed to be hard to use by outsiders - you
can't load keys into comm gear, things disable themselves, etc.

Maybe that strategy applies at a higher level, too?  Maybe we're the outsid=
ers.

NSA is here participating so we build things for them.  But do we
trust them to build things for us?


Trevor

From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Fri Jan 10 08:19:08 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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Trevor,

Some responses below but I honestly think this exchange has
otherwise run its course.

On 01/10/2014 03:35 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> It's time
> for our leadership to summon their courage and take a stand.

Taking a stand sounds lovely, but ineffective. I prefer that
we try to improve the Internet and harden it against pervasive
monitoring. If you think the IETF hasn't been working on that
then perhaps you need to pay more attention, for example, I
didn't notice any comment from you on the IETF LC for [1], nor
on the perpass list [2] since October, nor on the UTA list [3]
nor have I seen a submission from you for the upcoming IAB/W3C
workshop [4] on this topic that'll happen before IETF-89 (but
you do still have time for that last so why not shoot one in:-).

   [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-farrell-perpass-attack
   [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
   [3] https://tools.ietf.org/wg/uta/charters
   [4] https://www.w3.org/2014/strint/

Its entirely reasonable that you do none of the above and just
focus on e.g. CFRG or TLS but its neither reasonable nor helpful
to ignore everything else that's going on *and* make grandiose,
calls for "taking a stand" such as the above.

> I do think Kevin's removal should be a rebuke to the NSA.  

I think that would be an inappropriate action. IMO neither the
IRTF nor IETF are the business of "rebuking" NSA or anyone else.
Its fine that you disagree.

>> Once you start to recognise affiliation in the way that is implied
>> in the last part of your request, then you need processes that
>> deal with the organisations and not the individuals and that very
>> quickly tends to turn into a discussion about membership which
>> then also quickly turns into one about paid membership and voting.
>> You can believe me on this or not, but do bear in mind its far too
>> boring an argument to want to deal with all the ins and outs;-)
> 
> In what way have I "implied" recognizing affiliation, beyond common
> sense?  What new processes would we need to "deal with organizations"?
> 
> Please explain.  This is a major objection that's been raised to the
> request.  You can't just handwave that we need to believe you, or that
> it's too "boring" to get into.
> 
> If this is a serious objection it needs to be explained seriously.

As I've said before, I do not believe Kevin's actions warrant
replacing him as chair and therefore the only basis left on which
he would be fired is purely his affiliation. Doing so would mean
recognising participant affiliation in a new and quite damaging
way. Again, its fine that you don't agree.

Were the IRTF or IETF to do that for chairing in an automatic
manner (e.g. "no NSA personnel are acceptable as chair") then
to be consistent and fair we would have to start doing that
for other cases too, e.g. when considering last calls, which
leads quickly to voting, and membership. If you want an example
of how that would go, please see e.g. the giant thread that
starts at [5] and the even bigger discussion in the rtcweb
working group. Or spend a bit of time reading the archives
of IPR list [6] and you'll see how most kinds of increased
recognition of affiliation lead towards membership. (And when
you're done, then tell me its not boring:-)

  [5] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/current/msg84566.html
  [6] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipr-wg/current/maillist.html

What is done now is that we trust other individuals to handle
such matters, we do stuff openly allowing anyone who turns up
on the list to have their say, we have appeal processes, and (in
the IETF) recall and nomcom processes for leadership. In this
case the IRTF chair handled your request, with a result with
which I agreed and you disagreed, and the IAB will handle your
appeal of that I guess, and I think that's the right thing
to happen.

S.

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Fri Jan 10 08:33:16 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Trevor,
>
> Some responses below but I honestly think this exchange has
> otherwise run its course.
>
> On 01/10/2014 03:35 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> It's time
>> for our leadership to summon their courage and take a stand.
>
> Taking a stand sounds lovely, but ineffective. I prefer that
> we try to improve the Internet and harden it against pervasive
> monitoring. If you think the IETF hasn't been working on that
> then perhaps you need to pay more attention, for example, I
> didn't notice any comment from you on the IETF LC for [1], nor
> on the perpass list [2] since October, nor on the UTA list [3]
> nor have I seen a submission from you for the upcoming IAB/W3C
> workshop [4] on this topic that'll happen before IETF-89 (but
> you do still have time for that last so why not shoot one in:-).
>
>    [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-farrell-perpass-attack
>    [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
>    [3] https://tools.ietf.org/wg/uta/charters
>    [4] https://www.w3.org/2014/strint/

And this has made mass surveillance harder how?
This has had about as much effect as the CRYPTO '13 rump session.
In fact, one summary of perpass is that it is entirely taking a stand.
I've only seen one proposal (point to point encryption of optical
lines) come out
that would make life tricker for the NSA, and that one has been kicked to
CFRG.

>
> Its entirely reasonable that you do none of the above and just
> focus on e.g. CFRG or TLS but its neither reasonable nor helpful
> to ignore everything else that's going on *and* make grandiose,
> calls for "taking a stand" such as the above.
>
>> I do think Kevin's removal should be a rebuke to the NSA.
>
> I think that would be an inappropriate action. IMO neither the
> IRTF nor IETF are the business of "rebuking" NSA or anyone else.
> Its fine that you disagree.

And draft-farrell-perpass-attack isn't a rebuke?

>
>>> Once you start to recognise affiliation in the way that is implied
>>> in the last part of your request, then you need processes that
>>> deal with the organisations and not the individuals and that very
>>> quickly tends to turn into a discussion about membership which
>>> then also quickly turns into one about paid membership and voting.
>>> You can believe me on this or not, but do bear in mind its far too
>>> boring an argument to want to deal with all the ins and outs;-)
>>
>> In what way have I "implied" recognizing affiliation, beyond common
>> sense?  What new processes would we need to "deal with organizations"?
>>
>> Please explain.  This is a major objection that's been raised to the
>> request.  You can't just handwave that we need to believe you, or that
>> it's too "boring" to get into.
>>
>> If this is a serious objection it needs to be explained seriously.
>
> As I've said before, I do not believe Kevin's actions warrant
> replacing him as chair and therefore the only basis left on which
> he would be fired is purely his affiliation. Doing so would mean
> recognising participant affiliation in a new and quite damaging
> way. Again, its fine that you don't agree.

It's the combination of the actions and affiliations. Imagine Dragonfly
had more than just a certificational flaw, and the TLS WG accepted the
CFRG response. Would you still considert hat an innocent mistake?

Kevin has also carried water for Certicom to shed doubt on Montgomery curves,
reiterating baseless summaries of IPR disclosures. This has happened more
recently, but deserves consideration.

>
> Were the IRTF or IETF to do that for chairing in an automatic
> manner (e.g. "no NSA personnel are acceptable as chair") then
> to be consistent and fair we would have to start doing that
> for other cases too, e.g. when considering last calls, which
> leads quickly to voting, and membership. If you want an example
> of how that would go, please see e.g. the giant thread that
> starts at [5] and the even bigger discussion in the rtcweb
> working group. Or spend a bit of time reading the archives
> of IPR list [6] and you'll see how most kinds of increased
> recognition of affiliation lead towards membership. (And when
> you're done, then tell me its not boring:-)

This argument starts off by saying that last calls are like being a chair.
And that isn't true. The chair has a lot more power than anyone in a last
call. I feel as though the argument for keeping Kevin has taken the arguments
against in the weakest possible form, rather than the strongest.

>
>   [5] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/current/msg84566.html
>   [6] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipr-wg/current/maillist.html
>
> What is done now is that we trust other individuals to handle
> such matters, we do stuff openly allowing anyone who turns up
> on the list to have their say, we have appeal processes, and (in
> the IETF) recall and nomcom processes for leadership. In this
> case the IRTF chair handled your request, with a result with
> which I agreed and you disagreed, and the IAB will handle your
> appeal of that I guess, and I think that's the right thing
> to happen.
>
> S.
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From dan@geer.org  Fri Jan 10 09:10:11 2014
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From: dan@geer.org
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 07 Jan 2014 13:05:31 PST." <CEF1A5BF.2BBC6%paul@marvell.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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 > A useful mechanism, but it would be better to start with reexamining and
 > redefining our usage of public keys.  Specifically - I'm an advocate of
 > keys as the primary identifiers.  A "key centric" approach is a dual model
 > to Kohnfelder/X.509   The SDSI/SPKI work did progress work in this
 > direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.

Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is it not?

I rather doubt that the Administration's push for the NSTIC is
likely to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborate
on your preference for it?  I'm sympathetic to it on the grounds
that it directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentation.

If I'm being obtuse, feel free to say so.

--dan


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References: <492D56BD-6F33-480D-877E-02D907C5F4AA@netapp.com> <CAGZ8ZG37MoEMaPwjJynCceGpjoPASXd5CC9AG1bzdm8ZFPpDtA@mail.gmail.com> <52CD4637.2070207@cisco.com> <20140108134213.GA26603@netbook.cypherspace.org> <853B0E5F-E5AC-4CE0-BCBC-602828D4AEE7@viega.org> <20140108151722.GA4441@netbook.cypherspace.org> <52CD7ACC.4060305@cs.tcd.ie> <CAGZ8ZG3ARN0AzPcRTKdnCJ0ndhxRUV6aVy2nrVWm-wGH20gsFA@mail.gmail.com> <52CE7744.7010904@cs.tcd.ie> <CAGZ8ZG3S-rtsu-Kgwkb_XVPbvS0HGzzsc6hwcs2xqeThHcbg5Q@mail.gmail.com> <52D01D6B.6040008@cs.tcd.ie> <CACsn0cnMuon3h8uHGVWLraF8wu1x=K-vKdQQeW-6uAfz4F6psA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2014 10:30:42 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "irtf-chair@irtf.org" <irtf-chair@irtf.org>, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, IAB IAB <iab@iab.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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On Fri, January 10, 2014 8:33 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>
>> Trevor,
>>
>> Some responses below but I honestly think this exchange has
>> otherwise run its course.
>>
>> On 01/10/2014 03:35 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>> It's time
>>> for our leadership to summon their courage and take a stand.
>>
>> Taking a stand sounds lovely, but ineffective. I prefer that
>> we try to improve the Internet and harden it against pervasive
>> monitoring. If you think the IETF hasn't been working on that
>> then perhaps you need to pay more attention, for example, I
>> didn't notice any comment from you on the IETF LC for [1], nor
>> on the perpass list [2] since October, nor on the UTA list [3]
>> nor have I seen a submission from you for the upcoming IAB/W3C
>> workshop [4] on this topic that'll happen before IETF-89 (but
>> you do still have time for that last so why not shoot one in:-).
>>
>>    [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-farrell-perpass-attack
>>    [2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
>>    [3] https://tools.ietf.org/wg/uta/charters
>>    [4] https://www.w3.org/2014/strint/
>
> And this has made mass surveillance harder how?

  It will; it is work in that direction. Defining the problem and getting
people to think about various solutions are the first step towards
actually reaching that goal.

  You should note that Lao-tzu didn't say that the journey of a
thousand miles begins by taking a fashionable stand or by rebuking
something. It starts with a step. That step has been made.

  Dan.



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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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Added: explicit formulas and a point format (big endian with a bit for
the missing coordinate).
The name is now the Chicago curves.

I'ld like the conversation to focus on moving this through the
process, rather than on bikeshedding names or formats. Ambiguity and
errors should be the focus, as well as complaints that "well, there is
this paper of Diem..."

Sincerely,
Watson

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On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> Added: explicit formulas and a point format (big endian with a bit for
> the missing coordinate).

I don't see the draft yet, but if you're including point formats, any
thoughts on Jivsov's trick?

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact-03


Trevor

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Fri Jan 10 11:25:45 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Added: explicit formulas and a point format (big endian with a bit for
>> the missing coordinate).
>
> I don't see the draft yet, but if you're including point formats, any
> thoughts on Jivsov's trick?
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact-03

Assumes short Weierstrass form. I did put in x coordinate only for
Montgomery, but it's not the same thing.

>
>
> Trevor



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From akr@akr.io  Fri Jan 10 11:48:22 2014
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 10/01/2014 19:11, Watson Ladd wrote:

> Added: explicit formulas and a point format (big endian with a bit
> for the missing coordinate).

Fair enough. (Cofactors were also added, by the way.)

> The name is now the Chicago curves.

As good as any other.

Comments:
• Typo in end of section one: Weierstrass, not Weierstrauss.
• I think it'd be a little more helpful if section 2 were split into
  two sections: the Montgomery curves, and the Edwards curves. That'd
  make it much more apparent which curves are applicable to which
  sections in 3 and 4.
• Pretty please can we have Curve1174 as well?

Other than that, no more comments.

E-521's passed all tests, by the way, as expected (and it seems was
obviously rigid enough that three groups actually came up with the
exact same curve!).

I see no particular reason to hold this up.

- -- 
/akr
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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On Jan 10, 2014, at 11:25 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> =
wrote:
>> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>> Added: explicit formulas and a point format (big endian with a bit =
for
>>> the missing coordinate).
>>=20
>> I don't see the draft yet, but if you're including point formats, any
>> thoughts on Jivsov's trick?
>>=20
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact-03
>=20
> Assumes short Weierstrass form. I did put in x coordinate only for
> Montgomery, but it's not the same thing.

Well, you can do it in any coordinate system where negating one =
coordinate negates the point.  You just have to change section 4.3 to =
use the curve=92s formula instead of the short Weierstrass formula.  For =
example, you can do it with Edwards curves and negate x instead of y.

This trick is neat, but it saves only one bit, and restricts to a subset =
of EC points.  You can do the same thing with some other subset, =
particularly with Edwards curves.  For example, you could restrict to =
only q-torsion or only 2q-torsion points, or only Elligator-encodable =
points.

I think the fastest way to do this is the one I posted with the inverse =
square root on the isomorphic Montgomery curve, but there are other =
options which basically accomplish the same thing.

=97 Mike=

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On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> On 10/01/2014 19:11, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>> Added: explicit formulas and a point format (big endian with a bit
>> for the missing coordinate).
>
> Fair enough. (Cofactors were also added, by the way.)
>
>> The name is now the Chicago curves.
>
> As good as any other.
>
> Comments:
> =E2=80=A2 Typo in end of section one: Weierstrass, not Weierstrauss.

Fixed

> =E2=80=A2 I think it'd be a little more helpful if section 2 were split i=
nto
>   two sections: the Montgomery curves, and the Edwards curves. That'd
>   make it much more apparent which curves are applicable to which
>   sections in 3 and 4.

I'll think about a clean way to do this. Of course, you can use
isogenies to convert
between all of these forms.

> =E2=80=A2 Pretty please can we have Curve1174 as well?

Included.

Anymore suggestions? This next one it would be nice to get Last Call on.
>
> Other than that, no more comments.
>
> E-521's passed all tests, by the way, as expected (and it seems was
> obviously rigid enough that three groups actually came up with the
> exact same curve!).
>
> I see no particular reason to hold this up.
>
> - --
> /akr
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> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
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> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2014 17:01:01 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> wrote:
> I didn't agree with all the arguments on the Safecurves URL, at least whe=
n I last read it a few months ago. Nor did I agree with all DJB said on the=
 TLS WG list.
>
> I'm going to try to write up to CFRG my disagreements soon.

Do you believe these curves are insecure? Because people want to use
them. They pass every known criterion for ECC security.
Just because you don't like the rationale vs. P256 (massively higher
performance in software, better twist security) doesn't mean that
they aren't a valuable option to have, particularly if the suspicions
about the random seeds are verified.

Furthermore, are you objecting to the draft, or to DJB? Because one of
those is under discussion here.

>
> Maybe I'm old school, but I'd expect references to be stable and dated. E=
ven if CFRG consensus (eg all minus me) fully agrees with the site today, t=
he site could change, in a way not expected.

The rationale for picking a curve is not a normative feature of a
specification. However, validating that these numbers are prime
doesn't take that long. The twist order is the order of the curve with
a known adjustment, and so can be validated given only that the
cofactor and prime order are correct. The Hasse-Weil bound makes this
validation easy if you know what it is supposed to be. Safecurves only
contains a proof of primality open
to human verification. If you want, run RUNDOWN and stick the results
in here. But that would be a bit ridiculous.

If DJB and Tanja Lange publish Safecurves in a more stable form, we
could cite that. Or we could base64 the verification script and ram it
in an appendix. Or we could assume that everyone that paranoid has
PARI to do the work.

>
> The CFRG consensus may also be to move ahead with these curves, without a=
greeing fully with the site.

How is the current text in any way an endorsement of a website? This
concern is specious.

>
> So it might help for the spec to state the CFRG's rationale for accepting=
 these curves.

Why would the CFRG have a shared rationale? Some people might like
efficiency, others the compact form of points, others the
non-NISTiness.

>
> More practically, ideal would be to advise users of the advantages and di=
sadvantages of these curves, over others.

More than the security considerations does now? Efficiency is
constantly changing as people optimize the heck out of one or another
thing, and so I don't feel like it belongs here. Security
considerations are I think well covered: the cofactor tradeoff is a
well-studied one, and can't bite that hard.

What advantages and disadvantages do you feel require additional
coverage? Why do you think this material belongs in this I-D?
>
>
>
>
> From: Watson Ladd
> Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 6:31 PM
> To: Alyssa Rowan
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> Hash: SHA512
>>
>> On 10/01/2014 19:11, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>
>>> Added: explicit formulas and a point format (big endian with a bit
>>> for the missing coordinate).
>>
>> Fair enough. (Cofactors were also added, by the way.)
>>
>>> The name is now the Chicago curves.
>>
>> As good as any other.
>>
>> Comments:
>> =E2=80=A2 Typo in end of section one: Weierstrass, not Weierstrauss.
>
> Fixed
>
>> =E2=80=A2 I think it'd be a little more helpful if section 2 were split =
into
>> two sections: the Montgomery curves, and the Edwards curves. That'd
>> make it much more apparent which curves are applicable to which
>> sections in 3 and 4.
>
> I'll think about a clean way to do this. Of course, you can use
> isogenies to convert
> between all of these forms.
>
>> =E2=80=A2 Pretty please can we have Curve1174 as well?
>
> Included.
>
> Anymore suggestions? This next one it would be nice to get Last Call on.
>>
>> Other than that, no more comments.
>>
>> E-521's passed all tests, by the way, as expected (and it seems was
>> obviously rigid enough that three groups actually came up with the
>> exact same curve!).
>>
>> I see no particular reason to hold this up.
>>
>> - --
>> /akr
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>
>
> --
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential in=
formation, privileged material (including material protected by the solicit=
or-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-public informa=
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--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, irtf-chair@irtf.org, IAB IAB <iab@iab.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
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On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>> I do think Kevin's removal should be a rebuke to the NSA.
>
> I think that would be an inappropriate action. IMO neither the
> IRTF nor IETF are the business of "rebuking" NSA or anyone else.

As an organization which has relied on NIST crypto standards for many
years we are gravely threatened by NSA's subversion of crypto
standards and the distrust that's been sown in our community.

As the premier Internet standards body we have a voice and moral
authority on the issue that no-one else has.

It's imperative we send the message that subversion of crypto
standards is unacceptable.


Trevor

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Trevor,

On 01/11/2014 05:07 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> It's imperative we send the message that subversion of crypto
> standards is unacceptable.

Imperative? Sigh. (Due to rhetoric-overload:-)

I don't agree as it happens, I think any statement of principle
along those lines is either included in the URLs I sent before,
or [1-4] below, or would likely be stating the obvious. Brian
Carpenter's presentation at the Vancouver tech plenary might also
be useful background. [5]

If there were a non-targetted (i.e. not directly dissing NSA or
GCHQ or whoever) statement of principle along those lines that
usefully added to the stuff I've referenced then I'd be interested
in that but I don't see what it might be to be honest.

S.


[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1984
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3365
[3] http://www.ietf.org/media/2013-11-07-internet-privacy-and-security.html
[4] http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
[5]
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/88/slides/slides-88-iab-techplenary-7.pdf



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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On 11/01/2014 01:37, Dan Brown wrote:
> I'm going to try to write up to CFRG my disagreements soon.
> 
I'm looking forward to reading them.

FWIW, I don't agree with every argument as stated on the site (eg, I don't
believe it's fair to quote "no data-dependant branches or memory access
patterns" as properties of the curves), but I still think those curves are an
interesting addition to the current set of curves mainly for the following reasons:

* no unexplained constants as opposed to the NIST "random" prime curves (and
better performance than the Brainpool curves). Even if NIST curves turn out not
to be weak, we currently don't know, and doubt is an issue in itself.
* ease of (correct) implementation
* performance.

> Maybe I'm old school, but I'd expect references to be stable and dated.
> 
Agreed.

Manuel.

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Sat Jan 11 08:10:53 2014
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On 1/9/14, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
> On 09/01/2014 17:38, Robert Ransom wrote:

>> A Curve25519 (Montgomery-line ECDH) implementation will generally use
>> a ladder with no precomputed table because Montgomery's formulas are
>> so much faster that way.
>>
>> An Ed25519 (Edwards curve, typically signature-related) implementation
>> will generally use either [...]
>>
> Right. Since I only implemented the Montgomery version so far, I've got t=
he
> nasty habit of thinking mainly about that form.
>
> But, unless I'm mistaken, it seems to me we agree on the main point here:
> "no
> data-dependant branches or memory access" is a property of the
> implementation,
> not of the curves.

Yes.


Robert Ransom

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On 1/10/14, Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:

> Well, you can do it in any coordinate system where negating one coordinat=
e
> negates the point.  You just have to change section 4.3 to use the curve=
=E2=80=99s
> formula instead of the short Weierstrass formula.  For example, you can d=
o
> it with Edwards curves and negate x instead of y.

Or, in any application where (a) points should be transmitted or
stored in Edwards form, and (b) points can or will be doubled at least
once before use, one can negate the Edwards y coordinate iff the
Edwards x coordinate is =E2=80=98negative=E2=80=99.  (This corresponds to a=
dding (0,
-1) (the point of order 2) in order to fix the sign of x.)

If one can also discard the point's sign or modify the secret key, one
can combine the above trick with Jivsov's suggestion: negate the
Edwards y coordinate to fix its sign bit, and discard it.  (This could
be useful for applications where public keys must be transmitted in
base 32 or base 64 and the coordinate field has one extra bit, e.g.
using points on the minimal-Edwards-parameter curve mod 2^206 - 5 as
DHT addresses.)


Robert Ransom

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 11/01/2014 00:37, Dan Brown wrote:

> I'm going to try to write up to CFRG my disagreements soon.

I am quite sure I shall find them interesting.

> Maybe I'm old school, but I'd expect references to be stable and
> dated.

Agreed there. That's a temporary slot, there for the draft, I believe,
but the final reference should I think be more like:

7. References

   [SAFECURVES] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. SafeCurves:
   choosing safe curves for elliptic-curve cryptography.
   <http://safecurves.cr.yp.to>, accessed 11 November 2014.

   [EFD] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. Explict-Formulas
   Database, Genus-1 curves over large-characteristic fields.
   <http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/>, accessed
   11 November 2014.

Oddly, archive.org hasn't saved the most recent version. I don't
expect it to disappear, but this RFC is of course going to be around
for a long time.

If anyone knows of a better way to formally cite a webpage in an
informational RFC, please say so; there's very likely already a
process for that which I'm unfamiliar with?

> […] it might help for the spec to state the CFRG's rationale for
> accepting these curves. More practically, ideal would be to advise
> users of the advantages and disadvantages of these curves, over
> others.

Section 1 of the draft would appear to meet that need quite well
already. I'm comfortable with it as it stands.

- -- 
/akr
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From simon@josefsson.org  Sat Jan 11 08:39:16 2014
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Dear WG,

The TLS document draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519 has been updated in -03
to refer to the document draft-ladd-safecurves-02 that has been
discussed here.  My thinking is that the list of curves that
draft-ladd-safecurves recommends, and potentially/eventually the CFRG
can recommend, is a good list of curves for the TLS WG to consider.
Feedback from this group whether that thinking a good idea or not is
appreciated.

Another aspect came up when doing this.  Our draft includes details on
public/private key representation, shared secret computation, and test
vectors.  Would it make sense to move this to draft-ladd-safecurves
instead?  It seems any IETF protocol would have similar requirements.  I
cannot tell if there are per-protocol specific considerations that may
influence this, making a generic specification difficult.  Thoughts on
this is also appreciated.

Thanks,
/Simon

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Sat Jan 11 08:40:12 2014
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On Jan 11, 2014, at 8:24 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:

> Agreed there. That's a temporary slot, there for the draft, I believe,
> but the final reference should I think be more like:
>=20
> 7. References
>=20
>    [SAFECURVES] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. SafeCurves:
>    choosing safe curves for elliptic-curve cryptography.
>    <http://safecurves.cr.yp.to>, accessed 11 November 2014.
>=20
>    [EFD] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. Explict-Formulas
>    Database, Genus-1 curves over large-characteristic fields.
>    <http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/>, accessed
>    11 November 2014.

Published academic papers would be *much* more useful than web sites =
that can change.

References in RFCs are not there to prove that the RFC authors did their =
homework; they are there to help readers assess the validity of =
statements in the document. When someone reads this RFC 15 years from =
now, the contents of http://safecurves.cr.yp.to will very likely be more =
up to date, possibly in a way that negates some of what is said in the =
document. A reader of the RFC at that point should decide not to =
implement because of the disagreement between the RFC and the reference; =
that would be bad.

For crypto documents, references to books (specific editions) and IACR =
papers seem to work just fine.

--Paul Hoffman=

From mpg@elzevir.fr  Sat Jan 11 08:45:18 2014
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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Manuel_P=E9gouri=E9-Gonnard?= <mpg@elzevir.fr>
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Hi,

Notes taken while reading -02 (in order of reading, so mixing typos with more
important comments).

- abstract: why mention the Jacobian rather than say "elliptic curves" (as you
do in the intro)? Maybe say that DDH is *believed* to be hard, too.

- end of the intro: "then short Weierstrass curves": then -> than

- section 2 "Validation information is given at [SAFECURVES]." What do you mean
exactly? Is it a repeat of "Proofs of all properties claimed exist in
[SAFECURVES]." in the intro, or do you mean something else?

- as an implementer, I'd have a preference for constants in hex. Also, I don't
like the formatting very much. Starting each constant on a new line might help.

- I second Alyssa's suggestion to split the content in two sections, too.

- formulas for Montgomery curves: I think "P_i = [i] P_1" is not what you want
to say. Also, I'm not sure the reference to the Kummer curve is of any help.

- why give the formulas for Edwards with common sub-expressions already
eliminated, but not for Montgomery?

- point encoding "GF_p point on E(GF_p)" isn't that a bit redundant?

- "Formulas for decompression are left as an exercise to the reader." You can't
be serious. The goal should be to actually help people write correct
implementations, which this kind of funny (?) non-reference does not.

- security considerations: "some checks in some protocols": which and which?
"certain attacks": which ones? Again, please, this should be a technical
document giving precise, actionable information.

- IANA: sorry if this is a dumb question, but I'm not sure I see the need for a
IANA register here (an would it be only for the "chicago" curves or all known
curves)? So far, there are protocol-specific registries (eg, TLS Named Curves)
and it seems to me it has been enough.

- OTOH, it would probably be good to have OIDs for the curves here, since they
could be used by many protocols.

Manuel.

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Sat Jan 11 10:06:51 2014
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On 1/11/14, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Notes taken while reading -02 (in order of reading, so mixing typos with
> more
> important comments).
>
> - abstract: why mention the Jacobian rather than say "elliptic curves" (a=
s
> you
> do in the intro)? Maybe say that DDH is *believed* to be hard, too.
>
> - end of the intro: "then short Weierstrass curves": then -> than
>
> - section 2 "Validation information is given at [SAFECURVES]." What do yo=
u
> mean
> exactly? Is it a repeat of "Proofs of all properties claimed exist in
> [SAFECURVES]." in the intro, or do you mean something else?
>
> - as an implementer, I'd have a preference for constants in hex. Also, I
> don't
> like the formatting very much. Starting each constant on a new line might
> help.

The basepoints should be specified by the value of the primary
coordinate and the sign bit of the other coordinate, not specified as
a pair of integers where one is too huge to be useful.

> - I second Alyssa's suggestion to split the content in two sections, too.

I strongly oppose separating the curves which happen to have been
first specified in Montgomery form from the curves first specified in
Edwards form.  Every Edwards curve is isomorphic to a corresponding
Montgomery curve and vice versa.  (That is the reason (the *only*
reason) that Dr. Bernstein advocates twist security for Edwards curves
-- twist security is only important for curves used in Montgomery
form.)

The document should also specify the equivalences.

> - formulas for Montgomery curves: I think "P_i =3D [i] P_1" is not what y=
ou
> want
> to say.

I don't currently remember how the inputs and outputs for those
formulas are arranged, but it's possible that =E2=80=9CP_i =3D [i] P_1=E2=
=80=9D may be a
useful mnemonic to give *after* explaining that the inputs are P, Q,
P-Q (in some order) and the outputs are 2P and P+Q (in some order).

> Also, I'm not sure the reference to the Kummer curve is of any
> help.

I agree that that reference in the current draft (-02) is not helpful,
but the fact that a Montgomery line is something other than a group is
absolutely critical, and it needs to be both stated and clearly
explained.  The fact that such a near-group for a genus-1 curve is
called a =E2=80=9CKummer line=E2=80=9D should be part of the explanation.

> - why give the formulas for Edwards with common sub-expressions already
> eliminated, but not for Montgomery?

Presumably because the formulas he copied from EFD happened to be that way.

More importantly:

* The addition formula given for Edwards curves uses the additional
curve parameter c, but with no indication of what that parameter is.

* The addition formula given for Edwards curves uses =E2=80=98inverted=E2=
=80=99
coordinates.  No one should use those in any new implementation --
they cannot represent the point at identity, and so cannot be used in
constant-time multiplication procedures.

* The document gives one addition formula, but no guidance as to how
to use it in a multiplication routine that achieves the =E2=80=98security a=
nd
performance advantages=E2=80=99 mentioned in the introduction.

> - point encoding "GF_p point on E(GF_p)" isn't that a bit redundant?
>
> - "Formulas for decompression are left as an exercise to the reader." You
> can't
> be serious. The goal should be to actually help people write correct
> implementations, which this kind of funny (?) non-reference does not.

Indeed.  Dr. Bernstein had the good sense and decency to give the
exact algorithm for Edwards-form point decompression in coordinate
fields where q \in 5 + 8\ZZ in his Ed25519 signature scheme paper.

> - security considerations: "some checks in some protocols": which and
> which?
> "certain attacks": which ones? Again, please, this should be a technical
> document giving precise, actionable information.

I agree.  But I think Watson Ladd really believes that a good standard
should not specify how to implement it.

> - IANA: sorry if this is a dumb question, but I'm not sure I see the need
> for a
> IANA register here (an would it be only for the "chicago" curves or all
> known
> curves)? So far, there are protocol-specific registries (eg, TLS Named
> Curves)
> and it seems to me it has been enough.

I see no reason to have IANA try to maintain an out-of-date copy of
the list on the SafeCurves web site.  (If there is a good reason to
create an IANA registry for these, the draft will need to specify how
the registry should be managed.)

> - OTOH, it would probably be good to have OIDs for the curves here, since
> they
> could be used by many protocols.


I strongly oppose publication of this draft as an RFC.  In its current
state, it will lead readers to produce defective implementations with
most of the security flaws that =E2=80=98SafeCurves=E2=80=99 are meant to a=
void.

I also do not believe that Watson Ladd is willing to make the changes
needed to make this document useful.  I am not willing to contribute
to this document further.


Robert Ransom

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02 and draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519-03
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On 1/11/14, Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> wrote:
> Dear WG,
>
> The TLS document draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519 has been updated in -03
> to refer to the document draft-ladd-safecurves-02 that has been
> discussed here.  My thinking is that the list of curves that
> draft-ladd-safecurves recommends, and potentially/eventually the CFRG
> can recommend, is a good list of curves for the TLS WG to consider.
> Feedback from this group whether that thinking a good idea or not is
> appreciated.
>
> Another aspect came up when doing this.  Our draft includes details on
> public/private key representation, shared secret computation, and test
> vectors.  Would it make sense to move this to draft-ladd-safecurves
> instead?

I would put a general description of Montgomery and Edwards curves and
how to use them, along with one or two sample curves, in one document,
a description of how to use the curves in Montgomery form for ECDH in
another document, and a description of how to use the curves in
Edwards form for everything else (e.g. signatures) in a third
document.

The general-description document should contain:

* an explanation of what a Montgomery line is, and why twist security
makes it safe to use;
* point formats;
* point decompression and validation routines;
* an explanation of how to handle the power-of-2 cofactor (mainly Dr.
Bernstein's trick of generating secret keys divisible by the cofactor,
or equivalently doubling onto the odd-order subgroup);
* a secret key format;
* formulas for converting between Montgomery and Edwards form;
* an explanation of how to operate on the quadratic twist of an
Edwards-form curve, at least with non-square d; and
* presumably other things that I'm forgetting.

A Schnorr signature scheme draft should be completely independent of
Montgomery and Edwards curve documents, and e.g. compatible with the
NSA and BND curves.

>  It seems any IETF protocol would have similar requirements.  I
> cannot tell if there are per-protocol specific considerations that may
> influence this, making a generic specification difficult.  Thoughts on
> this is also appreciated.

There are many considerations specific to each cryptographic protocol
(ECDH, Schnorr signature, J-PAKE, Pedersen commitment, etc.).  These
considerations are independent of which networking protocol the
cryptographic protocol is being used in (TLS, IKE, etc.).


Robert Ransom

From akr@akr.io  Sat Jan 11 10:35:47 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] Thoughts on a Next-Generation Elliptic Curve Signature Scheme?
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

At some point, clearly we're going to need a signature scheme for
these "Chicago curves" specified in SafeCurves, for later use to
replace ECDSA with something which is a more convenient fit for them
and doesn't want random numbers for each signature, for future use in
certificates, authentication, and the like.

I feel like now would be a good point, hence this request for ideas.

On 11/01/2014 17:40, Robert Ransom wrote:
> Dr. Bernstein's EdDSA is even worse: it prohibits every curve that
>  Dr. Bernstein himself has specified since Curve25519.

EdDSA seem like a pretty good start for a new signature scheme to me,
even if as it stands I think it's closely tied to Ed25519 itself
(basically, due to the size and construction?).

Schnorr-type signatures using an Edwards representation would be the
obvious natural candidate.

Either the Edwards curves or the Edwards isomorphism of one of the
Montgomery curves would do, although the ones specified as Edwards
curves would likely be cleaner, particularly Curve1174, Curve3617 and
E521: in fact, those would be the three I'd plump for, as I think they
provide three pretty good security/efficiency points.

We're going to need a hash, too. I suggest that we should use one of
the new hash algorithms that came out of the SHA-3 competition. All
the finalists have something to recommend them (I really like Skein
and BLAKE myself): but the least controversial in my eyes, and so the
one I'd on consideration suggest, is Keccak, given it was the winner
and thus has the additional backing of being SHA-3. (I can see ways
its particular attributes might prove helpful, too.)

Do you have any thoughts?

- -- 
/akr
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Thoughts on a Next-Generation Elliptic Curve Signature Scheme?
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On 1/11/14, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> At some point, clearly we're going to need a signature scheme for
> these "Chicago curves" specified in SafeCurves, for later use to
> replace ECDSA with something which is a more convenient fit for them
> and doesn't want random numbers for each signature, for future use in
> certificates, authentication, and the like.
>
> I feel like now would be a good point, hence this request for ideas.
>
> On 11/01/2014 17:40, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> Dr. Bernstein's EdDSA is even worse: it prohibits every curve that
>>  Dr. Bernstein himself has specified since Curve25519.
>
> EdDSA seem like a pretty good start for a new signature scheme to me,
> even if as it stands I think it's closely tied to Ed25519 itself
> (basically, due to the size and construction?).

EdDSA specifies some details that are irrelevant to how the signature
scheme works: it specifies that the coordinate field's order must be
congruent to 5 mod 8, and it specifies that the curve group must have
cofactor 8 (cofactor 4 is possible even mod 2^255 - 19, e.g. a=3D-1,
d=3D446 if I'm retyping it correctly).


> Either the Edwards curves or the Edwards isomorphism of one of the
> Montgomery curves would do, although the ones specified as Edwards
> curves would likely be cleaner, particularly Curve1174, Curve3617 and
> E521: in fact, those would be the three I'd plump for, as I think they
> provide three pretty good security/efficiency points.

Please, not Curve1174.  If you don't like Curve25519's awkward
fractional value of Edwards-form d, use the isogenous curve with
a=3D-1,d=3D121665 over the same field.


> We're going to need a hash, too. I suggest that we should use one of
> the new hash algorithms that came out of the SHA-3 competition. All
> the finalists have something to recommend them (I really like Skein
> and BLAKE myself):

BLAKE2 is better than BLAKE.

> but the least controversial in my eyes, and so the
> one I'd on consideration suggest, is Keccak, given it was the winner
> and thus has the additional backing of being SHA-3. (I can see ways
> its particular attributes might prove helpful, too.)

Because NSA wants other people to rely on Keccak?  Really?

I can see advantages to using a sponge, but =E2=80=9CNSA wants us to eat it=
=E2=80=9D
has never been a good argument.


Robert Ransom

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Subject: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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Dear all,
To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
do the wordsmithing on github. Emails to me are still excellent ways
of communicating issues, but for those inclined to do typo work and
other valuable (and underappreciated) editing efforts, feel free to
examine an up-to-date copy at github.com/wbl/safecurvesdraft.

Quite a few people have argued that I need to explain the
double-and-add algorithm, even though it is standard. Then again I
have no idea what sort of implementation details are generally
considered necessary in a draft, especially when they are completely
unnecessary to specify the "what" of the behavior. This seems to me to
be the biggest issue of contention with regards to the draft: some
people want something ala RFC 6090, while I want to avoid massive
bloat with implementation details that anyone implementing this draft
probably knows anyway. This isn't a strongly principled stand on my
part, but I would like to see this move through swiftly.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From akr@akr.io  Sun Jan 12 04:58:11 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement
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Hash: SHA512

On 12/01/2014 06:29, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
>> One problem with defining EdDSA for larger curves is that the 
>> needed hashes are large.

On 12/01/2014 06:40, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Are they? [...]

EdDSA uses a hash to generate deterministic secret random exponents, to
avoid eating entropy when signing (like ECDSA does in its natural
habitat). That will need to be a big enough hash to cover the size we
need: 512 bits covers 2^255 - 19, but to cover Curve3617 or E521, we're
going to need a bigger boat.


On 12/01/2014 06:29, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> [...] And there are very few hashes with serious analysis that can 
> do >512 bits.

That's why I observed in the OP that Keccak (the eventual SHA-3) may
have some useful properties in this arena: the sponge function's
flexible output size, I think, makes it a natural fit.

However, there may be disagreement in the wider arena as to whether
NIST's endorsement of it counts as a positive, a NOP, or a negative,
in light of the wider situation.

I recognise that, and empathise with it: it deserves careful, open
consideration, and a discussion weighing up which hash we use, why, and
how, I think. Bullet tree time, to explore my thoughts on the matter:

• Suitability:
  - Keccak's output size (and parameters) are flexible.
    · This is _very_ handy for the curves bigger than 25519!
    · We could even if we wished set our own parameters to suit.
    · Of course, if we did that, it wouldn't be SHA-3, but we might be
      able to hardware-accelerate it anyway.
    · Possible suitable parameter selections? Positives & negatives.
  - This is less true of some other competitors.

• NIST wanted to reduce the capacity after the competition.
  - Keccak authors defended that choice as safe.
    · Many SHA-3 entries were deliberately conservative.
    · It does reduce the margin of safety against second-preimage.
    · But we _wanted_ SHA-3 very conservative, 'just in case'.
    · BLAKE team reduced rounds of BLAKE2 for speed => still OK.
    · Is it an issue if it's still better than ρ?
  - Well, that escalated quickly. They couldn't have timed it worse.
    · Snowden revelations.
    · Coinciding with NIST proposing safety margin reduction in SHA-3.
    · Looked bad! Much grumbling.
    · NIST quickly backed down: didn't want to be seen poisoning the
      well.
  - SHA-3 will be Keccak, as submitted in final round, no changes,
    no nasty surprises, apparently.
    · Except the padding [10…1] might be swapped for Sakura's.
    · Which also seems sensible: pretty straightforward Merkle root.

• Why did NIST (and/or NSA, therefore) like it?
  - Stated reason: because it's nothing like SHA-2.
    · An attack weakening Merkle-Dåmgard constructs is unlikely to be
      directly relevant to sponge functions.
    · Fair enough. Seems legit.
  - Either they like strong, or they like secretly weak.
    · We aren't mindreaders, and have no way of knowing which.
    · C'est la vie!
  - Its software performance is... okay. It's not great.
    · Skein and BLAKE were twice the speed, and left it in the dust.
    · BLAKE2 is even faster!
    · Keccak lies around the middle of the pack, a little slower than
      SHA-2.
  - It's very fast in hardware.
    · Now _this_ is a _very_ consistent thing NIST/NSA like: because
      basically all their crypto implementations are hardware.
    · This is therefore fairly likely to have been a dominant factor.
    · Fast hardware performance is a negative in a PBKDF or a Hashcash,
      which we actually want to be slow to measure out workfactor of
      brute-force.
    · But it's a positive in a signature scheme, as long as the hash is
      strong enough to resist any plausible second-preimage attack.
    · And it is.
    · A collision would not suffice here.

• Is there anything wrong with Keccak?
  - As far as we know: nope.
  - It looked very strong during the competition: it still does.
  - I don't know anything to suggest it's weak. Theoretically it
    looks pretty good.
  - None of the other SHA-3 final round candidates look bad either.
  - Even SHA-2 still doesn't look bad, exactly.
    · Except for the length-extension, which isn't a threat here.
    · I do not think we want to use an NSA-designed algorithm in a new
      signature scheme, when we have new ones that were designed as
      part of an open competition and have been widely discussed.

• Speed?
  - As above, software: ...okay, but not great; hardware: excellent.
  - Will we get hardware?
    · Crystal ball time!
    · Eventually, probably yes, due to it being SHA-3. NIST pulls a lot
      of weight in that area.
    · If we use it in this signature scheme, that actually may make a
      small difference. TLS, etc, certainly wouldn't hurt adoption.
    · Would we be able to use any such hardware?
    · Without doubt, if the hardware exposes the sponge function
      itself. Otherwise, most probably; depends on what we choose.
  - How does hash performance impact?
    · Probably relatively little. Signatures usually cover small
      things; key exchanges, etc, and the EC code will dominate time.
    · The case where it does: signing larger files. Code signing, etc.
    · If that's a problem, there's a tried-and-true solution already:
      a detached signature covering a manifest of hashes, which could
      be anything we like, e.g., tree hash mode of Skein, whatever.
    · I/O however remains the firm bottleneck on anything big.
    · Keccak isn't _that_ slow.

So. Thoughts?

- -- 
/akr
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Cc: "'TurnerS@ieca.com'" <TurnerS@ieca.com>, "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Hi Dan,

some further thoughts on things quantum:

On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>
>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
> I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor's
> algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
> area, but am interested.

this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the following 
description is accurate: quantum computing is an active area of 
research, and those working in the area believe that it can become a 
viable technology in the not-to-distant future, though there are also 
skeptics who feel that quantum decoherence may make it impossible to 
ever build a quantum computer that would be able to solve problems of 
cryptographic interest.   (An important side note: the D-Wave computer 
is not a real quantum computer in the Peter Shor sense; it does 
something more like simulated annealing).

> Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
> postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
> question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just begs
> pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
> QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
> thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
> expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is perfectly
> reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
> pointless.

This is my thinking, more or less.   I would put it more positively as: 
let's figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice, 
because if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush 
will be ugly, and besides, we don't really know what capabilities our 
adversaries have now, or will have in a decade.

> But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even try to boldly
> quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some well-defined claim,
> calculated via a series of estimates.  The status quo is to just claim that
> algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit security, whatever that means,
> perhaps adding the exclusion against quantum computers.  Adding an estimated
> likelihood of a quantum computer gives a more meaning of what kind of
> security is being claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already have
> made such an estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to
> postquantum.

I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the 
probability that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try 
to make such an estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt 
that I would trust it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances 
cannot reliably be estimated.   The scenario here recalls that of the 
prominent physicists in the 1920s and 1930s who scorned H.G. Wells' 
predictions about nuclear power.  It is unlikely that those physicists 
would have done a better job with their prognostications if they had 
attempted to use a formal model for Bayesian inference, or some other 
framework for computing an exact probability.   (The model would just 
mathematically formalize their beliefs, which turned out to be wrong.)

As an aside, if it were possible to come up with accurate estimates for 
the likelihood of scientific advances, it would be reasonable to apply 
that methodology to other cryptographic questions.   By way of example, 
one could ask: are we more likely to see advances in the cryptanalysis 
of lattice-based cryptography, or code-based cryptography?    It is 
interesting to think about, but it does not seem like we should expect 
this sort of analysis to provide us with much concrete guidance on 
future standards.

Lenstra did consider the possibility of progress in cryptanalytic 
capabilities in his very thorough study of key lengths, and he noted 
that one must model advances for different cryptosystems differently.   
But he does not attempt anything as detailed as a probability estimate 
for a quantum computer; he says that "a clearly discernable and 
well-established past pattern in practical cryptanalytic progress is no 
guarantee that the future pattern will be the same or that there will 
not be any surprising breakthroughs with immediate practical 
consequences."   (The quote is from the handbook contribution online at 
http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security_-_Keylength.pdf)

> I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for CFRG.  If
> so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an alternative forum.
>
> An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
> following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a large
> nation.

Agreed.

> If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
> crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn't have to resort to
> any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the latter.  Well, the
> chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or more realistically, maybe
> the quantum computer is kept on reserve, and more mundane cryptanalysis is
> used on a daily basis, maybe because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just lay
> little lower, if a QC is available? Anyway, the loose inference I'm drawing
> is that a quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most
> likely parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in the
> near future.

I agree with some of the logic, but not the conclusion, because 
intelligence agencies for large nations are likely to pursue all avenues 
that are available to them.   To continue the nuclear analogy from 
above, the vast arsenal of conventional bombs that the U.S. built in 
1944 should not have been taken as evidence that there was not an active 
and successful effort to build a nuclear weapon that was proceeding 
concurrently.

Thanks for the interesting discussion!

David

> Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified
> likelihood. If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I'd make a wildly
> different number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
> unfortunately.
>
> I wonder if others have more substantial arguments.
>
>
>
>
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Dan,<br>
      <br>
      some further thoughts on things quantum:<br>
      <br>
      On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt">http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt">http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor's
algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
area, but am interested.</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the
    following description is accurate: quantum computing is an active
    area of research, and those working in the area believe that it can
    become a viable technology in the not-to-distant future, though
    there are also skeptics who feel that quantum decoherence may make
    it impossible to ever build a quantum computer that would be able to
    solve problems of cryptographic interest.   (An important side note:
    the D-Wave computer is not a real quantum computer in the Peter Shor
    sense; it does something more like simulated annealing).<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">
Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just begs
pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is perfectly
reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
pointless.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This is my thinking, more or less.   I would put it more positively
    as: let's figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in
    practice, because if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing,
    the mad rush will be ugly, and besides, we don't really know what
    capabilities our adversaries have now, or will have in a decade.  <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">
But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even try to boldly
quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some well-defined claim,
calculated via a series of estimates.  The status quo is to just claim that
algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit security, whatever that means,
perhaps adding the exclusion against quantum computers.  Adding an estimated
likelihood of a quantum computer gives a more meaning of what kind of
security is being claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already have
made such an estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to
postquantum.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the
    probability that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did
    try to make such an estimate, it would make interesting reading, but
    I doubt that I would trust it, because the likelihood of new
    scientific advances cannot reliably be estimated.   The scenario
    here recalls that of the prominent physicists in the 1920s and 1930s
    who scorned H.G. Wells' predictions about nuclear power.  It is
    unlikely that those physicists would have done a better job with
    their prognostications if they had attempted to use a formal model
    for Bayesian inference, or some other framework for computing an
    exact probability.   (The model would just mathematically formalize
    their beliefs, which turned out to be wrong.)<br>
    <br>
    As an aside, if it were possible to come up with accurate estimates
    for the likelihood of scientific advances, it would be reasonable to
    apply that methodology to other cryptographic questions.   By way of
    example, one could ask: are we more likely to see advances in the
    cryptanalysis of lattice-based cryptography, or code-based
    cryptography?    It is interesting to think about, but it does not
    seem like we should expect this sort of analysis to provide us with
    much concrete guidance on future standards.   <br>
    <br>
    Lenstra did consider the possibility of progress in cryptanalytic
    capabilities in his very thorough study of key lengths, and he noted
    that one must model advances for different cryptosystems
    differently.   But he does not attempt anything as detailed as a
    probability estimate for a quantum computer; he says that "a clearly
    discernable and well-established past pattern in practical
    cryptanalytic progress is no guarantee that the future pattern will
    be the same or that there will not be any surprising breakthroughs
    with immediate practical consequences."   (The quote is from the
    handbook contribution online at
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security_-_Keylength.pdf">http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security_-_Keylength.pdf</a>)<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">
I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for CFRG.  If
so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an alternative forum.

An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a large
nation.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Agreed.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn't have to resort to
any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the latter.  Well, the
chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or more realistically, maybe
the quantum computer is kept on reserve, and more mundane cryptanalysis is
used on a daily basis, maybe because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just lay
little lower, if a QC is available? Anyway, the loose inference I'm drawing
is that a quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most
likely parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in the
near future.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I agree with some of the logic, but not the conclusion, because
    intelligence agencies for large nations are likely to pursue all
    avenues that are available to them.   To continue the nuclear
    analogy from above, the vast arsenal of conventional bombs that the
    U.S. built in 1944 should not have been taken as evidence that there
    was not an active and successful effort to build a nuclear weapon
    that was proceeding concurrently.  <br>
    <br>
    Thanks for the interesting discussion!<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified
likelihood. If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I'd make a wildly
different number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
unfortunately.  

I wonder if others have more substantial arguments. 


</pre>
      <br>
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      <br>
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From adam@cypherspace.org  Sun Jan 12 06:29:50 2014
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Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2014 15:29:23 +0100
From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
Message-ID: <20140112142923.GA19922@netbook.cypherspace.org>
References: <87eh4e7a2y.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <52D18475.10709@akr.io> <20140112062942.GA32437@LK-Perkele-VII> <52D29153.7000301@akr.io>
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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: [Cfrg] EdDSA and > 512 curve & hash (Re: [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement)
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You know EdDSA is actually an EC Schnorr signature over an Edwards curve.=
=20
In the original Schnorr setting it was proposed that you could even secur=
ely
truncate the hash to half the subgroup size, to make a signature which is
1.5x the subgroup size rather than 2x.  Recalling that a Schnorr sig is p=
ub
key y=3Dg^x, sig (r,s) r=3Dg^k, s=3Dk+H(r,m) and as verify is g^s =3D?  r=
*y^H(r,m)
there is an alternate and security equivalent verification labeling
c=3DH(r,m), signature (c,s), adapted verification c=3D?H(g^s*y^c,m) and s=
o if H
is truncated then c can be half sub-group size.  That all works in EC
Schnorr also.

However there are some security arguments that truncated hash is not quit=
e
as conservative, particularly for more advanced Schnorr related mechanism=
s,
like the DL variant of Brands representation problem based blind
certificates which can provide ZKPs of boolean forumlae involving blind
certified attributes, beyond simple signatures.

So actually Bernstein went in the opposite direction, not only using
sub-group size, but double sub-group size hash, basically because he coul=
d
without increasing the signature size, and thereby slightly even further
reducing the dependency on hash security and hash properties.  I do not
consider its necessary, just its because he could, slightly more security
almost for free.  But I think an EdDSA variant that used a 512-bit curve
could safely use a 512-bit hash, because even the double width hash is
over-engineering.  As far as that goes even sub-group sized hash in vanil=
la
Schnorr has security provability and over Schnorr/EC Schnorr hash propert=
y
advantages over DSA.

EdDSA also uses the deterministic DSA k trick (computed from m and x the
private key).

Adam

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 12:57:55PM +0000, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA512
>
>On 12/01/2014 06:29, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
>>> One problem with defining EdDSA for larger curves is that the
>>> needed hashes are large.
>
>On 12/01/2014 06:40, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> Are they? [...]
>
>EdDSA uses a hash to generate deterministic secret random exponents, to
>avoid eating entropy when signing (like ECDSA does in its natural
>habitat). That will need to be a big enough hash to cover the size we
>need: 512 bits covers 2^255 - 19, but to cover Curve3617 or E521, we're
>going to need a bigger boat.
>
>
>On 12/01/2014 06:29, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
>> [...] And there are very few hashes with serious analysis that can
>> do >512 bits.
>
>That's why I observed in the OP that Keccak (the eventual SHA-3) may
>have some useful properties in this arena: the sponge function's
>flexible output size, I think, makes it a natural fit.
>
>However, there may be disagreement in the wider arena as to whether
>NIST's endorsement of it counts as a positive, a NOP, or a negative,
>in light of the wider situation.
>
>I recognise that, and empathise with it: it deserves careful, open
>consideration, and a discussion weighing up which hash we use, why, and
>how, I think. Bullet tree time, to explore my thoughts on the matter:
>
>=E2=80=A2 Suitability:
>  - Keccak's output size (and parameters) are flexible.
>    =C2=B7 This is _very_ handy for the curves bigger than 25519!
>    =C2=B7 We could even if we wished set our own parameters to suit.
>    =C2=B7 Of course, if we did that, it wouldn't be SHA-3, but we might=
 be
>      able to hardware-accelerate it anyway.
>    =C2=B7 Possible suitable parameter selections? Positives & negatives=
.
>  - This is less true of some other competitors.
>
>=E2=80=A2 NIST wanted to reduce the capacity after the competition.
>  - Keccak authors defended that choice as safe.
>    =C2=B7 Many SHA-3 entries were deliberately conservative.
>    =C2=B7 It does reduce the margin of safety against second-preimage.
>    =C2=B7 But we _wanted_ SHA-3 very conservative, 'just in case'.
>    =C2=B7 BLAKE team reduced rounds of BLAKE2 for speed =3D> still OK.
>    =C2=B7 Is it an issue if it's still better than =CF=81?
>  - Well, that escalated quickly. They couldn't have timed it worse.
>    =C2=B7 Snowden revelations.
>    =C2=B7 Coinciding with NIST proposing safety margin reduction in SHA=
-3.
>    =C2=B7 Looked bad! Much grumbling.
>    =C2=B7 NIST quickly backed down: didn't want to be seen poisoning th=
e
>      well.
>  - SHA-3 will be Keccak, as submitted in final round, no changes,
>    no nasty surprises, apparently.
>    =C2=B7 Except the padding [10=E2=80=A61] might be swapped for Sakura=
's.
>    =C2=B7 Which also seems sensible: pretty straightforward Merkle root=
.
>
>=E2=80=A2 Why did NIST (and/or NSA, therefore) like it?
>  - Stated reason: because it's nothing like SHA-2.
>    =C2=B7 An attack weakening Merkle-D=C3=A5mgard constructs is unlikel=
y to be
>      directly relevant to sponge functions.
>    =C2=B7 Fair enough. Seems legit.
>  - Either they like strong, or they like secretly weak.
>    =C2=B7 We aren't mindreaders, and have no way of knowing which.
>    =C2=B7 C'est la vie!
>  - Its software performance is... okay. It's not great.
>    =C2=B7 Skein and BLAKE were twice the speed, and left it in the dust=
.
>    =C2=B7 BLAKE2 is even faster!
>    =C2=B7 Keccak lies around the middle of the pack, a little slower th=
an
>      SHA-2.
>  - It's very fast in hardware.
>    =C2=B7 Now _this_ is a _very_ consistent thing NIST/NSA like: becaus=
e
>      basically all their crypto implementations are hardware.
>    =C2=B7 This is therefore fairly likely to have been a dominant facto=
r.
>    =C2=B7 Fast hardware performance is a negative in a PBKDF or a Hashc=
ash,
>      which we actually want to be slow to measure out workfactor of
>      brute-force.
>    =C2=B7 But it's a positive in a signature scheme, as long as the has=
h is
>      strong enough to resist any plausible second-preimage attack.
>    =C2=B7 And it is.
>    =C2=B7 A collision would not suffice here.
>
>=E2=80=A2 Is there anything wrong with Keccak?
>  - As far as we know: nope.
>  - It looked very strong during the competition: it still does.
>  - I don't know anything to suggest it's weak. Theoretically it
>    looks pretty good.
>  - None of the other SHA-3 final round candidates look bad either.
>  - Even SHA-2 still doesn't look bad, exactly.
>    =C2=B7 Except for the length-extension, which isn't a threat here.
>    =C2=B7 I do not think we want to use an NSA-designed algorithm in a =
new
>      signature scheme, when we have new ones that were designed as
>      part of an open competition and have been widely discussed.
>
>=E2=80=A2 Speed?
>  - As above, software: ...okay, but not great; hardware: excellent.
>  - Will we get hardware?
>    =C2=B7 Crystal ball time!
>    =C2=B7 Eventually, probably yes, due to it being SHA-3. NIST pulls a=
 lot
>      of weight in that area.
>    =C2=B7 If we use it in this signature scheme, that actually may make=
 a
>      small difference. TLS, etc, certainly wouldn't hurt adoption.
>    =C2=B7 Would we be able to use any such hardware?
>    =C2=B7 Without doubt, if the hardware exposes the sponge function
>      itself. Otherwise, most probably; depends on what we choose.
>  - How does hash performance impact?
>    =C2=B7 Probably relatively little. Signatures usually cover small
>      things; key exchanges, etc, and the EC code will dominate time.
>    =C2=B7 The case where it does: signing larger files. Code signing, e=
tc.
>    =C2=B7 If that's a problem, there's a tried-and-true solution alread=
y:
>      a detached signature covering a manifest of hashes, which could
>      be anything we like, e.g., tree hash mode of Skein, whatever.
>    =C2=B7 I/O however remains the firm bottleneck on anything big.
>    =C2=B7 Keccak isn't _that_ slow.
>
>So. Thoughts?
>
>- --
>/akr
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>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
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From dkg@fifthhorseman.net  Sun Jan 12 06:45:57 2014
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Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2014 09:45:37 -0500
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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References: <87eh4e7a2y.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <52D18475.10709@akr.io> <20140112062942.GA32437@LK-Perkele-VII> <52D29153.7000301@akr.io>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement
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On 01/12/2014 07:57 AM, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
>     =C2=B7 Fast hardware performance is a negative in a PBKDF or a Hash=
cash,
>       which we actually want to be slow to measure out workfactor of
>       brute-force.
>     =C2=B7 But it's a positive in a signature scheme, as long as the ha=
sh is
>       strong enough to resist any plausible second-preimage attack.
>     =C2=B7 And it [keccak] is.
>     =C2=B7 A collision would not suffice here.

What makes you say that a collision attack isn't relevant against a
signature scheme?  The classic collision attack against a signature
scheme is:

 * attacker generates A, B, such that H(A) =3D H(B)
 * attacker asks victim to sign A
 * victim signs A over digest H
 * attacker applies signature to B

This is how the hashclash/rogue-CA project did its work [0], and it's a
conceivable attack against anything from OpenPGP certifications to
document signatures to revision control [1].

Or am i misunderstanding the context in which you're saying that a
collision would not suffice?

Regards,

	--dkg

[0] http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/
[1]
http://joeyh.name/blog/entry/size_of_the_git_sha1_collision_attack_surfac=
e/


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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Sun Jan 12 06:49:28 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: [Cfrg] A note on PRF
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Let H(k, m) be a PRF with output length n and input all strings. Then
I claim that
H(H(k, m), "0"), H(H(k,m),"1") is a PRF of output length 2n.

A proof of this, together with evaluating the loss of security
resulting from such composite,
is left as an exercise for the reader.

In other words, don't worry about the length of the hash function we
adopt for our new Schnorr style signature scheme: it can be extended
by classical techniques easily.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Sun Jan 12 07:04:12 2014
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To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement
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On 1/12/14, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> On 01/12/2014 07:57 AM, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
>>     =C2=B7 Fast hardware performance is a negative in a PBKDF or a Hashc=
ash,
>>       which we actually want to be slow to measure out workfactor of
>>       brute-force.
>>     =C2=B7 But it's a positive in a signature scheme, as long as the has=
h is
>>       strong enough to resist any plausible second-preimage attack.
>>     =C2=B7 And it [keccak] is.
>>     =C2=B7 A collision would not suffice here.
>
> What makes you say that a collision attack isn't relevant against a
> signature scheme?  The classic collision attack against a signature
> scheme is:
>
>  * attacker generates A, B, such that H(A) =3D H(B)
>  * attacker asks victim to sign A
>  * victim signs A over digest H
>  * attacker applies signature to B
>
> This is how the hashclash/rogue-CA project did its work [0], and it's a
> conceivable attack against anything from OpenPGP certifications to
> document signatures to revision control [1].
>
> Or am i misunderstanding the context in which you're saying that a
> collision would not suffice?

In the specific case of an EdDSA-like Schnorr signature scheme, the
*beginning* of the input to the message hash function would be
unpredictable to the attacker (thus achieving =E2=80=98randomized hashing=
=E2=80=99 for
free).  This makes collision attacks harder with any reasonable hash
function.

(Note that Schnorr's original signature scheme put R at the *end* of
the hash input; that would not mitigate collision attacks.)


Robert Ransom

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] EdDSA and > 512 curve & hash (Re: [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement)
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On 1/12/14, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:

> So actually Bernstein went in the opposite direction, not only using
> sub-group size, but double sub-group size hash, basically because he could
> without increasing the signature size, and thereby slightly even further
> reducing the dependency on hash security and hash properties.  I do not
> consider its necessary, just its because he could, slightly more security
> almost for free.  But I think an EdDSA variant that used a 512-bit curve
> could safely use a 512-bit hash, because even the double width hash is
> over-engineering.

It can for the hash of the message.

> EdDSA also uses the deterministic DSA k trick (computed from m and x the
> private key).

Deterministic generation of message keys is the primary reason that
EdDSA requires a double-length hash function.

EdDSA relies on the hash function having double-length output in two ways:

* Message key generation relies on the output being noticeably longer
than the group order in order to generate *uniform* exponents.

* EdDSA also uses the hash function to expand the secret-key bitstring
into (a) the secret exponent of the public key and (b) a secret
bitstring used to key the message key generation hash function.


I'm quite sure that I've said all of this before quite recently.


Robert Ransom

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement
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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 07:04:00AM -0800, Robert Ransom wrote:
>In the specific case of an EdDSA-like Schnorr signature scheme, the
>*beginning* of the input to the message hash function would be
>unpredictable to the attacker (thus achieving =E2=80=98randomized hashin=
g=E2=80=99 for
>free).  This makes collision attacks harder with any reasonable hash
>function.

Actually that is a signature security threat-model artificiality.  While =
it
is true that it makes birthday collision harder for an attacker using a
signing oracle, if the attacker is the signer, its still the same.  And i=
n
real life we care about that just as much.

Also Alyssa mentioned applications in PBKDF2 and hashcash which are like =
key
stretching and proof-of-work relying on 2nd-preimage respectively.

Adam

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Cc: "'TurnerS@ieca.com'" <TurnerS@ieca.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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On 1/12/14 5:39 AM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> some further thoughts on things quantum:
>
> On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>> I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor's
>> algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
>> area, but am interested.
>
> this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the following 
> description is accurate: quantum computing is an active area of 
> research, and those working in the area believe that it can become a 
> viable technology in the not-to-distant future, though there are also 
> skeptics who feel that quantum decoherence may make it impossible to 
> ever build a quantum computer that would be able to solve problems of 
> cryptographic interest.   (An important side note: the D-Wave computer 
> is not a real quantum computer in the Peter Shor sense; it does 
> something more like simulated annealing).
>
>> Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
>> postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
>> question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just begs
>> pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
>> QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
>> thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
>> expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is perfectly
>> reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
>> pointless.
>
> This is my thinking, more or less.   I would put it more positively 
> as: let's figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice, 
> because if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush 
> will be ugly, and besides, we don't really know what capabilities our 
> adversaries have now, or will have in a decade.

[snip]

This is a volunteer group, and the energy that can be summoned depends 
on interest, excitement, fear, etc.  (Just note how CFRG has gone from a 
sleepy group with 2 or 3 messages per month to many messages a day since 
last summer.)  So, if we want to study post quantum computing, find 
promising algorithms, and evaluate them, we can do that if we have a 
sufficient set people with interest and expertise.  And I think we do.  
It is not like we are at a big company and we have to get some executive 
to give us a budget.

    --David Jacobson



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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/12/14 5:39 AM, David McGrew wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52D29B10.4030401@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
        http-equiv="Content-Type">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Dan,<br>
        <br>
        some further thoughts on things quantum:<br>
        <br>
        On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote
        cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
        type="cite"><br>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap="">2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt">http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt">http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt</a>
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap="">I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor's
algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
area, but am interested.</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the
      following description is accurate: quantum computing is an active
      area of research, and those working in the area believe that it
      can become a viable technology in the not-to-distant future,
      though there are also skeptics who feel that quantum decoherence
      may make it impossible to ever build a quantum computer that would
      be able to solve problems of cryptographic interest.&nbsp;&nbsp; (An
      important side note: the D-Wave computer is not a real quantum
      computer in the Peter Shor sense; it does something more like
      simulated annealing).<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote
        cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
        type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just begs
pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is perfectly
reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
pointless.  </pre>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This is my thinking, more or less.&nbsp;&nbsp; I would put it more
      positively as: let's figure out how to use post-quantum
      cryptography in practice, because if there is a breakthrough in
      quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly, and besides, we
      don't really know what capabilities our adversaries have now, or
      will have in a decade.&nbsp; <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    [snip]<br>
    <br>
    This is a volunteer group, and the energy that can be summoned
    depends on interest, excitement, fear, etc.&nbsp; (Just note how CFRG has
    gone from a sleepy group with 2 or 3 messages per month to many
    messages a day since last summer.)&nbsp; So, if we want to study post
    quantum computing, find promising algorithms, and evaluate them, we
    can do that if we have a sufficient set people with interest and
    expertise.&nbsp; And I think we do.&nbsp; It is not like we are at a big
    company and we have to get some executive to give us a budget.<br>
    <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; --David Jacobson<br>
    <br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------070407000600020002020400--

From adam@cypherspace.org  Sun Jan 12 07:54:12 2014
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From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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References: <87eh4e7a2y.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <52D18475.10709@akr.io> <20140112062942.GA32437@LK-Perkele-VII> <52D29153.7000301@akr.io> <20140112142923.GA19922@netbook.cypherspace.org> <CABqy+srUUiFcniM404uPcqDChW3xkcTcAjqTejG=Q_pEQMaTsg@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] EdDSA and > 512 curve & hash (Re: [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement)
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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 07:13:16AM -0800, Robert Ransom wrote:
>Deterministic generation of message keys is the primary reason that
>EdDSA requires a double-length hash function.
>
>EdDSA relies on the hash function having double-length output in two ways:
>
>* Message key generation relies on the output being noticeably longer
>than the group order in order to generate *uniform* exponents.
>
>* EdDSA also uses the hash function to expand the secret-key bitstring
>into (a) the secret exponent of the public key and (b) a secret
>bitstring used to key the message key generation hash function.

My point is compared to the deterministic CRNG that eg DSA specifies for k
generation, follow that pattern, but using SHA3-512 as the building
block, seeded with d, the private key, is certainly doable to scale EdDSA to
512-bit curve without needing a 1024-bit hash function.

Some KDF functions are designed to provide the needed one-way security
beyond the hash input size of the underlying hash or MAC function.  So I was
suggesting this as an alternative method than using a not-widely-used hash
or hash-parameterization (Keccak).

Adam

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Sun Jan 12 08:19:01 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: =?UTF-8?Q?Manuel_P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9=2DGonnard?= <mpg@elzevir.fr>,  "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elz=
evir.fr> wrote:
> Dear Watson
>
> [off-list]
>
> On 12/01/2014 00:28, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
>> do the wordsmithing on github.
>
> To be clear, I'm afraid wordsmithing isn't what the draft needs right now=
. I
> understand your haste to see the curves adopted in IETF protocols, but I =
really
> feel like pushing the draft isn't the best or even the quickest way forwa=
rd.
>
> Others on list have expressed concerns about its contents, mainly
> 1. Security analysis and careful comparison with the other curves;
> 2. Helping implementers actually get the implementation right;
> which are important goals currently not covered by the draft.

What sort of analysis do we need here? I think the claim that the DDH is ha=
rd
and takes square root of curve time/space complexity, and also that these a=
re
resistant to certain twist attacks, is a sufficient analysis. A review
of the relevant
attack literature might be nice: but no one has asked for it until you did.

Salesmanship of the curves could be useful, but would take far longer
to write then
the time I care to spend.

Feel free to contribute appropriate language: It will be mentioned in
the Acknowledgements
as "XYZ contributed section A.B.C".

>
> Concerning point 2, you'll probably agree that one of the most prominent
> benefits of the curves is that they're designed so that the probability o=
f
> implementers not screwing things up is higher than for other curves. I th=
ink if
> we want to reap the full benefits of this, the document specifying these =
curves
> should provide step-by-step guidance to implementers in a way they can ac=
tually
> use (remember implementers don't all have a solid math background on the
> relevant topics).

The new version (on github) explains what double and add and the
Montgomery ladder are, as well
as containing explicit formulas for the curves. What more do you need
to implement these?

>
> Concerning point 1, as you probably have noticed, Eric Rescorla, chair of=
 the
> TLS group, has recently made it clear that the curves need a detailed  an=
d
> thoroughly documented security discussion representing consensus from the=
 CFRG
> and/or any other relevant part (SAAG) of the IETF to move forward in TLS.=
 I
> think he's right, and even if I didn't, it's probably a good idea to list=
en to
> him anyway.

What exactly could this discussion possibly consist of? "ECDH on each
of the curves has complexity sqrt size of curve"
The problem is that we know the attacks and the safeguards so well,
that the validation is mechanized.
What does he want that the safecurves site doesn't already have.

>
> My opinion is, if you want your work on the draft to be effective, it wou=
ld
> probably be better to first clarify the goals with the rest of the RG (an=
d/or
> other interested WG) and only then work on the redaction, paying attentio=
n to
> the stated goals.

The goal is simple: describe these curves and their properties, in a manner=
 that
is unambiguous and usable in IETF protocols. It's the same as for the
Brainpool draft,
which you will note, does not contain the algorithms.

If you have a better way to get these curves into use, feel free to
help. But so far
I've noticed nothing has been happening until I do it. Some people
have been quite
helpful with this.

>
>
> Of course I'm not in any way in a better position than you to judge what =
the
> best course of action is, so I won't be offended if you choose to disrega=
rd my
> advice :) Maybe taking advice from other, more experienced, people in the=
 IETF,
> about how to best use your enthusiasm, knowledge and willingness to help,=
 would
> be a good idea.
>
> Sincerely,
> Manuel.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com  Sun Jan 12 09:01:09 2014
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From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves - References
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Watson Ladd wrote..
 >
 > Quite a few people have argued that I need to explain the
 > double-and-add algorithm, even though it is standard

perhaps cites of..

Silverman, Joseph H. The arithmetic of elliptic curves. Vol. 106. Springer, 
2009.
http://ivanych.net/doc/TheArithmeticOfEllipticCurves.pdf

Eisentraeger, Kirsten, Kristin Lauter, and Peter L. Montgomery. "An 
Efficient Procedure to Double and Add Points on an Elliptic Curve."
http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/112.ps

..would address (most of) those concerns?


 > some
 > people want something ala RFC 6090, while I want to avoid massive
 > bloat with implementation details that anyone implementing this draft
 > probably knows anyway.

Perhaps citing RFC 6090 as appropriate would allay those concerns?


Also, I ran across this which might be of related interest..

Walter, Colin D. "Simple power analysis of unified code for ECC double and 
add." Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2004. Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2004. 191-204.
http://www.iacr.org/archive/ches2004/31560191/31560191.pdf


HTH,

=JeffH



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To: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] EdDSA and > 512 curve & hash (Re: [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement)
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On Jan 12, 2014, at 7:53 AM, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 07:13:16AM -0800, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> Deterministic generation of message keys is the primary reason that
>> EdDSA requires a double-length hash function.
>>=20
>> EdDSA relies on the hash function having double-length output in two =
ways:
>>=20
>> * Message key generation relies on the output being noticeably longer
>> than the group order in order to generate *uniform* exponents.
>>=20
>> * EdDSA also uses the hash function to expand the secret-key =
bitstring
>> into (a) the secret exponent of the public key and (b) a secret
>> bitstring used to key the message key generation hash function.
>=20
> My point is compared to the deterministic CRNG that eg DSA specifies =
for k
> generation, follow that pattern, but using SHA3-512 as the building
> block, seeded with d, the private key, is certainly doable to scale =
EdDSA to
> 512-bit curve without needing a 1024-bit hash function.
>=20
> Some KDF functions are designed to provide the needed one-way security
> beyond the hash input size of the underlying hash or MAC function.  So =
I was
> suggesting this as an alternative method than using a not-widely-used =
hash
> or hash-parameterization (Keccak).
>=20
> Adam

My personal preference here is for either SHA512 or SHA3, in that order. =
 But is SHA3 defined yet?

I don't care that SHA2 was designed by NSA.  The SHA2 functions are =
widely deployed and have survived more than a dozen years of public =
analysis.  Their performance is good enough that they won't be the =
bottleneck in an EC signature implementation.  SHA512 has a wide enough =
output and a high enough security level to be suitable for many of these =
curves, though for some curves it will need to be evaluated twice in =
order to be wide enough.

BLAKE2 is probably fine.  But it hasn't had as much time in the =
spotlight as SHA2 or Keccak.

The SHA3 finalists are also fine.  But we should test timings to see =
whether their extreme performance is a gain in an EC hash setting.

Using a widely-deployed and widely-respected hash function will ease =
implementation and improve acceptance and deployment of any new standard =
we might make.

I also wonder if a new signature scheme should support hash-and-sign, or =
just signing where you have the full message.  Hash-and-sign is less =
secure because of collision attacks, but the API is much nicer =
especially for deterministic hashes, and that matters.

Cheers,
-- Mike


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On Jan 08, 2014, at 10:03, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 12:16 AM, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com> wrote:
>> I=E2=80=99d like to get to the thread that I think Waton/David are =
after [0]/[1].
>=20
> Thank you very much for writing the email that I wanted to have
> written, but wasn't able to write.
>=20
>>=20
>> I=E2=80=99ve got a hat but I=E2=80=99m not wearing it here (and my =
hat goes away in two months anyway).  I guess I=E2=80=99d like to add =
that I=E2=80=99m not a cryptographer, but I don=E2=80=99t know why I =
need to say that because it=E2=80=99s not like anybody has to take a =
test to contribute to the CFRG.  And anyway you=E2=80=99d figure it out =
right quick when I responded =E2=80=9Cdo I get an egg roll with that=E2=80=
=9D when quizzed about the Chinese remainder theorem.  (it=E2=80=99s a =
long email I thought I=E2=80=99d lead with a joke)
>>=20
>> Because the "IRTF does not set standards=E2=80=9D [2], remember there =
are RFCs that are on standards track and some not [3], it kind of =
follows that the =E2=80=9CThe Research Group input carries no more =
weight than other community input=E2=80=9D [2].  But, I kind of find it =
hard to believe that if the CFRG publishes "[insert cryptographic =
algorithm's name] is rubbish=E2=80=9D that the IETF would produce a =
standard around said algorithm.  On the flip side, just because the CFRG =
publishes "[insert cryptographic algorithm's name] is fabulous=E2=80=9D =
I wouldn't expect every IETF WG to fall over themselves changing their =
MTI (Mandatory To Implement) algorithm.
>=20
> I think this is unduly optimistic about the ability of IETF WGs to vet
> their use of cryptography. The TLS WG has a long and ignominious
> history of failure in the form of unforced errors, and that is merely
> the most visible and researched one. These mistakes mostly aren't
> algorithmic, but rather
> how the algorithms fit together to form a protocol.

There are very few WGs that roll their own crypto mostly they just point =
to other work in protocols that are similar.  For example, in many of =
the routing protocols just do the HMAC, but what they sometimes do is =
re-write what=E2=80=99s in RFC 2104 using the terms from their protocol. =
 We often try to discourage them from doing this, but copying text =
isn=E2=80=99t grounds for stopping work progressing.

When a draft rolls its own crypto, we generally try to see what the cfrg =
things about it.

>> The current practice that the Security ADs have been using is here =
[4], which resulted from input from the IETF community as a result of =
push back from implementers on what I called =E2=80=9Ccrypto =
proliferation". (yes the email referenced says TLS but that=E2=80=99s =
because folks with algorithms want to do that one first as most bang for =
buck and then move on to other WGs)  You=E2=80=99ll note the CFRG =
isn=E2=80=99t listed there and I don=E2=80=99t think I=E2=80=99d require =
it be there, but what=E2=80=99s not documented there is what happens =
before authors go for code points.  Before authors are going to get a =
code point, they need to document their algorithm (in English) =
someplace.  A lot of times that=E2=80=99s ended up being an =
internet-draft that goes through the ISE process and gets published as =
an Informational RFC; examples include: GOST [5], Camellia [6], SEED =
[7], ARIA [8], Rabbit [9], Brainpool [10], CLEFIA [11], and Kcipher-2 =
[12].  To get through the ISE process they need to show some kind of =
review, here=E2=80=99s where everybody says go to the CFRG and see what =
they say they=E2=80=99re the cryptographers.  To be honest most of the =
time it=E2=80=99s pretty quiet.  Maybe that=E2=80=99s to do with the =
fact that many of the requests for review are for national algorithms.
>>=20
>> In any event, I think we should consider the following (there might =
be more):
>>=20
>> 0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
>> 1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
>> 2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the =
=E2=80=9Cprocess=E2=80=9D?
>>=20
>> I use the term process her pretty loosely but it=E2=80=99ll address =
the CFRG impact on IETF adoption of cryptography.
>>=20
>> Here=E2=80=99s what I think:
>>=20
>> 0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
>>=20
>> I say no for a couple of reasons:
>>=20
>> a) I think it=E2=80=99s not necessary unless we=E2=80=99re going to =
start standardizing cryptographic algorithms.   I don=E2=80=99t think =
the IETF has ever published a cryptographic algorithm on standards track =
(more examples include [13][14][15][16]) instead what=E2=80=99s done is =
a standards track RFC that documents the "use of cryptographic algorithm =
x in protocol y=E2=80=9D (e.g., [17][18][19]).  (yes there was one BCP =
that deprecate the use of well-known weak algorithms [20]).  I think =
many of the successes of the IETF actually come from protocols that were =
partially developed outside of the process and then finished off (for =
some value of finished off) and I suspect the same will be true of any =
cryptographic algorithm published by the IRTF or through the individual =
stream (more on this distinction later).
>>=20
>> b) I can=E2=80=99t see having a WG or RG that has the =E2=80=9Cpower=E2=
=80=9D to enforce =E2=80=9Ccryptogoodness=E2=80=9D.  It would be =
perceived as a hammer with which to beat up draft authors, wg chains, =
and other ADs and if you=E2=80=99re following the thread on the IETF =
discuss list about Stephen=E2=80=99s perpass-attack draft you=E2=80=99ll =
note that seems to be a fear shared by more than a couple of people.  =
Rechartering to enforce =E2=80=9Ccryptogoodness=E2=80=9D, I bet, will no =
doubt be challenging and I=E2=80=99d submit an unnecessary waste of =
time.
>=20
> Do you think that if someone had beaten the TLS 1.0 authors over the
> head about EtM vs MtE, that this would have been a bad thing? The
> issue of the disconnect between what an engineer knows about crypto
> and what they need to know about crypto is very far reaching: every
> single WG that considers a cryptographic protocol faces it. The best
> way I think to handle this is provide a central resource to ask: "hey,
> we are doing X, is it a good idea?" and tell people they should
> seriously consider it. That means having a very fast process, and
> having a reputation for giving good answers.

No I don=E2=80=99t think it would have been a bad thing, but I'm sure =
there is history about why it didn=E2=80=99t get changed that was before =
my time.

I agree that having a central resource would be a good idea I just =
don=E2=80=99t think that the central repository gets veto power.  I also =
want to avoid the "bring me a rock" game and get something documented =
that explains what=E2=80=99s primitives etc are good for what, which I =
guess is scattered around at this point but it might be good to =
centralize (I might even be able to do this draft :).

>> c) I really think the CFRG should look out past the IETF's time =
horizon.  You=E2=80=99ll note the word =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D in the =
CFRG=E2=80=99s charter and from what I=E2=80=99ve seen adopting =
=E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D crypto is not really done it=E2=80=99s usually got =
to marinate for a while.  So having something we=E2=80=99d been thinking =
about for a while to replace say RC4 would have been well nice.  Now =
some of this is water under the bridge but maybe we should be thinking =
two steps ahead to the next curve beyond say 25519, cha cha, etc.  I=E2=80=
=99d be cool if we actually did stuff like provide a venue for folks to =
exchange test vectors etc when developing (preferably) open source =
crypto.
>=20
> How many implementations does the world need?

If I were kind for a day - three: one primary, one backup, and one in =
the wings.

> Once again the distinction between primitives and protocols comes
> back. A new block cipher definitely needs to marinate: we don't have a
> comprehensive idea of what could be possible. But a new ECC parameter
> set can be validated in a few minutes with GP/PARI: compute certain
> invariants, and see that they avoid known bad choices. A new key
> agreement protocol should require a solid proof and automatic
> verification.
> The process we follow needs to take this into account.

What this highlights to me is that we need to maybe not lump every =
single cryptographic =E2=80=9Cthing=E2=80=9D together.  I=E2=80=99m =
pretty sure I mixed =E2=80=98em all up in this message.

> Post-Quantum Crypto is something we will need, and is going to need a
> lot of development. NTRU is I think mature from a design perspective,
> but patented, while McBits involves giant keys. (Not necessarily that
> bad). The situation with post-quantum signatures is annoying: we have
> Merkel signatures, but HFE variants are nicer to use, but a lot have
> fallen, or it's unclear what parameters are needed. Anyway, we have
> some urgent issues to deal with first.
>=20
>>=20
>> 1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
>>=20
>> I know what the fox says [21]: Hell yeah!
>>=20
>> There's *nothing, nada, zilch, null, z=C3=A9ro, =D8=B5=D9=81=D8=B1, =
=E9=9B=B6* stopping anybody from writing an individual draft and then =
asking for it to be adopted by the RG.
>>=20
>>     Chairs: Do you prefer RG adoption emails come from
>>     you (initiated by authors) or a more free-for-all approach
>>     when authors ask that it be adopted from the RG?
>>=20
>> I wanted to put the final IETF nail in the coffin for MD2, MD4, and =
MD5 (certain uses) [22][23][24] and got some input from CFRG  =
participants.  If there=E2=80=99s more like this that need to be done, =
just do =E2=80=98em and then we can use it them to deter folks from =
making bad choices.
>>=20
>> If you=E2=80=99re really keen, then I=E2=80=99d also like to suggest =
that you volunteer with the ISE (Independent Stream Editor) to help =
review the cryptographic protocols that come through their stream.  =
There=E2=80=99s a couple on call, but more would certainly be welcome.  =
Mail to: rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org.
>>=20
>> 2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the =
=E2=80=9Cprocess=E2=80=9D?
>>=20
>> I think it kind of depends on the definition of =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D =
is, the type of algorithm, the type of registry from which you=E2=80=99re =
requesting a code point [25], and what the WG requires.  Let=E2=80=99s =
explore some of these:
>>=20
>> Based on what happened in the past, should the CFRG and not the ISE =
be the stream where algorithms get published?  For those not in the =
know, the stream dictates what kind of review the draft gets and what =
=E2=80=9Ckind=E2=80=9D of RFC can pop out at the end.
>=20
> As an author, how do I determine what streams my drafts are going
> into, and how do I push them to active consideration?
> A lot of good crypto drafts sit around in limbo: I'm sure this is true
> for all drafts, but for some of the crypto ones it's causing
> actively exploited problems to linger unfixed for years.

Streams are defined in RFC 4844 (http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc4844).  =
As an author, it=E2=80=99s up to you to pick which stream you want your =
draft to go through.  The catch is the RFC 5742 review, which is the =
=E2=80=9Cend-run=E2=80=9D check, so if there=E2=80=99s an IETF WG in =
that space then it=E2=80=99s pretty much got to go through that WG =
unless the WG decides to take a pass at it.

For strict crypto internet drafts (and by this I mean something like AES =
in some new mode and not AES in some new mode used with protocol x), =
there isn=E2=80=99t an IETF WG so really three of the streams are =
available: through the IETF stream as an AD sponsored internet-draft, =
CFRG, or Independent.  In the past, the =E2=80=9Ccrypto=E2=80=9D =
internet-drafts have gone through the Independent stream intended for =
informational status.

I=E2=80=99m probably okay with the Independent stream publishing =
informational RFCs for algorithms, the CFRG then saying yeah these =
algorithms would be appropriate for use here, and then the IETF WG =
actually standardizing it.  And, yes this seems like a horrific amount =
of paper work, but I think it makes the most sense given what we=E2=80=99v=
e got now.

Alternatively, I could see the CFRG publishing crypto drafts instead of =
the Independent stream.  Because the CFRG might work on things that =
aren=E2=80=99t ready for prime time though if this path gets taken then =
maybe we need some boiler plate that says =E2=80=9Cready for prime =
time=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cnot ready for prime time.=E2=80=9D

>> I suspect that authors care little about the stream.  They just want =
to get published.  If the algorithm:
>>=20
>> a) Is a national algorithm - I=E2=80=99ve no doubt it=E2=80=99ll get =
reviewed like every draft progressing through the process and possibly =
even some errors will be uncovered (it=E2=80=99s happened).  Somebody =
who works for the newly formed national gov't of Bitcoinlandia shows up =
with Cesar's Cipher - would =E2=80=9CBitcoinlandia=E2=80=99s Ceasar=E2=80=99=
s Cipher=E2=80=9D be blocked from publication?  I suspect that it =
wouldn=E2=80=99t as long as it was clear that it was a national =
algorithm or one of a suite of national algorithms.  In any event, if =
changes were offered and not accepted I=E2=80=99m thinking the ISE is =
likely to let it go probably based on the grounds that the changes would =
make the published RFC differ from the already published national =
standard.  Would the CFRG do something different?
>>=20
>> b) Has properly marinated over time and not been shown to have =
weakened considerably and there was a security proof - I suspect that =
the grilling would be procedural in that the authors would just need to =
have the intestinal fortitude to make it through the process.  I guess =
the same question from a applies though.
>>=20
>> c) Is like b but it doesn=E2=80=99t have a security proof - If an =
author brings a draft to the CFRG is progression through the IRTF going =
to require one?  If the an author goes to the ISE is the CFRG going to =
block progression based on a lack of security proof?
>>=20
>> d) Is =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D with no security proof - I=E2=80=99ve no =
doubt it=E2=80=99d get raked over the coals (i.e., given rough =
treatment), but =E2=80=A6 I guess the 800lbs Gorilla is on what grounds =
is it okay to stop a draft in its tracks?
>>=20
>> - How long must crypto marinate?
>>=20
>> - If it=E2=80=99s similar to something that=E2=80=99s already =
available should it be stopped?  Maybe the existing algorithm won=E2=80=99=
t work for whatever reason or the consumers (I=E2=80=99m assuming there =
is somebody who wants to use it it=E2=80=99s not just about getting an =
RFC published) are somehow sold on the =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D way.
>=20
> I think if the already available protocol has stronger security
> properties, and there isn't a compelling need for the new one, than we
> should avoid giving people the choice.

I guess I tend to agree, and I guess it depends on the definition of =
compelling because we=E2=80=99ve definitely published multiple ways to =
do one thing.

>> - If there=E2=80=99s no security proof, then how does an author get =
one (wait, pay, beg)?  Seriously: I know some cryptographers but they =
have day jobs and I know some researchers but I think they=E2=80=99re =
maybe more motivated by publishing a new attack on a well-known and =
widely deployed protocol am I just supposed to know my role and not try =
to develop a cryptographic protocol.
>=20
> The way you do this is by looking in IACR for an eprint solving your
> problem, and adapt that to your situation. I've never seen or heard of
> an IETF protocol requiring a new primitive. If you are not a
> cryptographer, you shouldn't be doing cryptography, any more than
> someone who isn't a structural engineer should design a bridge. And
> just as most bridges can be ordered from a catalogue, most protocols
> don't require new crypto.
>=20
>>=20
>> - What if the authors are actually engaging and making changes but =
there is a point at which there is an impasse - can they document the =
known vulnerability/weakness in the security considerations and move on?
>=20
> No. There is never a compelling reason to approve or use an algorithm
> with a known weakness when a better one is available. If there is a
> new
> need that existing algorithms don't fill, then an effort should be
> made to fill it with the best algorithm possible.

Generally, I guess I agree with you but there=E2=80=99s algorithms like =
AES-CCM that were published stating restrictions on the amount of data =
to be encrypted with a single key and AES-GCM that requires counters =
never be reused. =20

>> There are also registries that only require expert review and there =
is no requirement for them to consult with the CFRG on the goodness of =
algorithms before choosing to give a code point.  I can=E2=80=99t think =
of a time when this happened and I=E2=80=99m pretty sure an expert =
wouldn=E2=80=99t do that, but I'm also unsure whether the process would =
be changed to give the CFRG veto power.
>=20
> Depends on who the expert is. If you ask DJB or Tanja Lange about an
> elliptic curve, you are asking the right people. Ask Knudsen about
> block
> ciphers. But if you ask Knudsen about curves, or DJB about block
> ciphers, they won't know much more than you do. The best solution is
> to have a
> body of people, maybe a "Crypto Forum Group" who when asked can find
> out what is known and document it.

I=E2=80=99m perfectly fine with a group of different SME (subject matter =
experts).

spt

>> After getting here and re-reading what I wrote it all sounds like =
doom and gloom but remember what the fox said!
>>=20
>> spt
>>=20
>> [0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03595.html
>> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03685.html
>> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2014/
>> [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/
>> [4] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06470.html
>> [5] GOST:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5830/
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5831/
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5832/
>> [6] Camellia
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3713/
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5528/
>> [7] SEED
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4269/
>> [8] ARIA
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5794/
>> [9] Rabbit
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4503/
>> [10] Brainpool
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5639/
>> [11] CLEIFA
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6114/
>> [12] Kcipher-2
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7008/
>> [13] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2104/
>> [14] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/
>> [15] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3447/
>> [16] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3610/
>> [17] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4056/
>> [18] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/
>> [19] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp/
>> [20] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6649/
>> [21] =
http://www.google.com/url?sa=3Dt&rct=3Dj&q=3D&esrc=3Ds&source=3Dweb&cd=3D1=
&ved=3D0CCsQtwIwAA&url=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DjofNR_=
WkoCE&ei=3D5q_EUsv0MbSqsAT1-oDYDQ&usg=3DAFQjCNE9-Z1oW5gVjc6rJg_-KAhmjY_Qfg=
&bvm=3Dbv.58187178,d.cWc
>> [22] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6149/
>> [23] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6150/
>> [24] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6151/
>> [25] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5226/ and updates
>> (actually check out =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-leiba-cotton-iana-5226bis/)
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin


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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 07:13:16AM -0800, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 1/12/14, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
> 
> > So actually Bernstein went in the opposite direction, not only using
> > sub-group size, but double sub-group size hash, basically because he could
> > without increasing the signature size, and thereby slightly even further
> > reducing the dependency on hash security and hash properties.  I do not
> > consider its necessary, just its because he could, slightly more security
> > almost for free.  But I think an EdDSA variant that used a 512-bit curve
> > could safely use a 512-bit hash, because even the double width hash is
> > over-engineering.
> 
> It can for the hash of the message.
> 
> > EdDSA also uses the deterministic DSA k trick (computed from m and x the
> > private key).
> 
> Deterministic generation of message keys is the primary reason that
> EdDSA requires a double-length hash function.
> 
> EdDSA relies on the hash function having double-length output in two ways:
> 
> * Message key generation relies on the output being noticeably longer
> than the group order in order to generate *uniform* exponents.

Choosing a message key (an initial random in interactive system)
from a large interval is a well-known idea for a group of a hidden order.
For a group of known order, reducing almost anything modulo group order
would likely result in quite a non-uniform distribution.
It is non-trivial to see how/whether hash of roughly twice-bitlength of group order 
would be better than hash smaller than group order.

Hash bitlength is rather non-critical while choosing a challenge,
that should be just a large enough set.

Vadym Fedyukovych


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Sun Jan 12 14:39:56 2014
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References: <87eh4e7a2y.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <52D18475.10709@akr.io> <20140112062942.GA32437@LK-Perkele-VII> <52D29153.7000301@akr.io> <20140112142923.GA19922@netbook.cypherspace.org> <CABqy+srUUiFcniM404uPcqDChW3xkcTcAjqTejG=Q_pEQMaTsg@mail.gmail.com> <20140112222944.GB29131@vc.unity.net>
Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2014 14:39:42 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Vadym Fedyukovych <vf@unity.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] EdDSA and > 512 curve & hash (Re: [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement)
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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 2:29 PM, Vadym Fedyukovych <vf@unity.net> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 07:13:16AM -0800, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> On 1/12/14, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
>>
>> > So actually Bernstein went in the opposite direction, not only using
>> > sub-group size, but double sub-group size hash, basically because he could
>> > without increasing the signature size, and thereby slightly even further
>> > reducing the dependency on hash security and hash properties.  I do not
>> > consider its necessary, just its because he could, slightly more security
>> > almost for free.  But I think an EdDSA variant that used a 512-bit curve
>> > could safely use a 512-bit hash, because even the double width hash is
>> > over-engineering.
>>
>> It can for the hash of the message.
>>
>> > EdDSA also uses the deterministic DSA k trick (computed from m and x the
>> > private key).
>>
>> Deterministic generation of message keys is the primary reason that
>> EdDSA requires a double-length hash function.
>>
>> EdDSA relies on the hash function having double-length output in two ways:
>>
>> * Message key generation relies on the output being noticeably longer
>> than the group order in order to generate *uniform* exponents.
>
> Choosing a message key (an initial random in interactive system)
> from a large interval is a well-known idea for a group of a hidden order.
> For a group of known order, reducing almost anything modulo group order
> would likely result in quite a non-uniform distribution.
> It is non-trivial to see how/whether hash of roughly twice-bitlength of group order
> would be better than hash smaller than group order.

Completely wrong for trivial reasons. Let's say we are picking a
random number up to k by taking one up to n and reducing.
Write n=kq+r, with r the remainder. Then the bias is exactly r/n,
which for n the square of k is at most 1/k, and hence negligible if
k is big enough. This is clearly better than if the hash length is
smaller than the group order, in which case a significant number of
group elements will never be picked.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
> Hash bitlength is rather non-critical while choosing a challenge,
> that should be just a large enough set.
>
> Vadym Fedyukovych
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Manuel_P=E9gouri=E9-Gonnard?= <mpg@elzevir.fr>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves - References
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On 12/01/2014 18:00, =JeffH wrote:
>  > some
>  > people want something ala RFC 6090, while I want to avoid massive
>  > bloat with implementation details that anyone implementing this draft
>  > probably knows anyway.
> 
> Perhaps citing RFC 6090 as appropriate would allay those concerns?
> 
RFC 6090 is about curves in short Weierstrass form, which the curve from the
draft are not. (Of course you could convert them to short Weierstrass, but that
would not be a good idea.)

Manuel.

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves - References
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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 3:47 PM, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@elz=
evir.fr> wrote:
> On 12/01/2014 18:00, =3DJeffH wrote:
>>  > some
>>  > people want something ala RFC 6090, while I want to avoid massive
>>  > bloat with implementation details that anyone implementing this draft
>>  > probably knows anyway.
>>
>> Perhaps citing RFC 6090 as appropriate would allay those concerns?
>>
> RFC 6090 is about curves in short Weierstrass form, which the curve from =
the
> draft are not. (Of course you could convert them to short Weierstrass, bu=
t that
> would not be a good idea.)

I'm sure someone out there will do it, even though I've given them all
the details of better
multiplication algorithms in the github draft. It would be a clever
way to reintroduce weaknesses
that the current curve shapes avoid, and if you don't give your
customers the source, they would
never know.

RFC6090 was also published to avoid Certicom IPR and document
algorithms that were unpatented.
But with Montgomery curves there is none of that:
the necessary formulas appear in a paper published in 1985.

Anyway, if you think we need more implementor guidance, feel free to
send me a diff. In about a week this should
stabilize enough to be the basis for more IETF/IRTF actions, like
getting the OIDs.

Sincerely,
Watson


>
> Manuel.
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: Vadym Fedyukovych <vf@unity.net>
To: cfrg@irtf.org
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References: <87eh4e7a2y.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <52D18475.10709@akr.io> <20140112062942.GA32437@LK-Perkele-VII> <52D29153.7000301@akr.io> <20140112142923.GA19922@netbook.cypherspace.org> <CABqy+srUUiFcniM404uPcqDChW3xkcTcAjqTejG=Q_pEQMaTsg@mail.gmail.com> <20140112222944.GB29131@vc.unity.net> <CACsn0cmYbRBe_pSxdVqvfWGFqwjS_Lh0wrgFNZ_xs=6Baa3OtQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] EdDSA and > 512 curve & hash (Re: [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement)
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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 02:39:42PM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 2:29 PM, Vadym Fedyukovych <vf@unity.net> wrote:
> > On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 07:13:16AM -0800, Robert Ransom wrote:
> >> On 1/12/14, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> > So actually Bernstein went in the opposite direction, not only using
> >> > sub-group size, but double sub-group size hash, basically because he could
> >> > without increasing the signature size, and thereby slightly even further
> >> > reducing the dependency on hash security and hash properties.  I do not
> >> > consider its necessary, just its because he could, slightly more security
> >> > almost for free.  But I think an EdDSA variant that used a 512-bit curve
> >> > could safely use a 512-bit hash, because even the double width hash is
> >> > over-engineering.
> >>
> >> It can for the hash of the message.
> >>
> >> > EdDSA also uses the deterministic DSA k trick (computed from m and x the
> >> > private key).
> >>
> >> Deterministic generation of message keys is the primary reason that
> >> EdDSA requires a double-length hash function.
> >>
> >> EdDSA relies on the hash function having double-length output in two ways:
> >>
> >> * Message key generation relies on the output being noticeably longer
> >> than the group order in order to generate *uniform* exponents.
> >
> > Choosing a message key (an initial random in interactive system)
> > from a large interval is a well-known idea for a group of a hidden order.
> > For a group of known order, reducing almost anything modulo group order
> > would likely result in quite a non-uniform distribution.
> > It is non-trivial to see how/whether hash of roughly twice-bitlength of group order
> > would be better than hash smaller than group order.
> 
> Completely wrong for trivial reasons. Let's say we are picking a
> random number up to k by taking one up to n and reducing.
> Write n=kq+r, with r the remainder. Then the bias is exactly r/n,
> which for n the square of k is at most 1/k, and hence negligible if
> k is big enough. This is clearly better than if the hash length is
> smaller than the group order, in which case a significant number of
> group elements will never be picked.

Wrong conclusion starting from irrelevant definition.

Observable S (response in Schnorr protocol) is from ring modulo group order.
For a non-uniform probability distribution of S,
one would consider bias like max_{i,j} | p(S(H_i)) - p(S(H_j)) |,
for uniform distribution of H (hash function samples).
No chance to reduce such a bias by increasing hash bitlength.

Additional consideration may be helpful
to decide whether bias is small enough.

Vadym Fedyukovych


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement
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Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>EdDSA uses a hash to generate deterministic secret random exponents, to av=
oid=0A=
>eating entropy when signing (like ECDSA does in its natural habitat). That=
=0A=
>will need to be a big enough hash to cover the size we need: 512 bits cove=
rs=0A=
>2^255 - 19, but to cover Curve3617 or E521, we're going to need a bigger b=
oat.=0A=
=0A=
That assumes you need a single application of a hash function to do the job=
,=0A=
which as several people have pointed out is going to bite you at some point=
=0A=
when you run out of appropriately-sized hash functions.  Why not use HKDF, =
RFC=0A=
5869, which works with any hash function you like?=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=

From wwhyte@securityinnovation.com  Sun Jan 12 20:16:50 2014
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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "TurnerS@ieca.com" <TurnerS@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Hi all,

Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.

> I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a breakthrough
in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.

As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is to
figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm in any
context, because all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerable to
technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So combining public key
algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know there are Certicom patents
on this but it seems that this shouldn't be insuperable.

> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probability
that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such an
estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would trust
it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot reliably be
estimated.

I would say the question isn't so much "can a quantum computer be built?"
as "what size quantum computer can be built?" There's an interesting 2011
blog post on that subject that tries to derive a Moore's law for quantum
computer size:
http://www.quantenblog.net/physics/moores-law-quantum-computer. I don't
know how well reviewed this has been, but it's a start: key lines are "The
blue line is a fit to the data, indicating a doubling of the number of
qubits every 5.7=B10.4 years." and "If you are bold enough to believe that
the same scaling continues even further, 2048-bit RSA keys would come under
attack somewhere between 2052 and 2059."

Cheers,

William


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:39 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>  Hi Dan,
>
> some further thoughts on things quantum:
>
> On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>
>
>  2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:http://tools.ietf.org/i=
d/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txthttp://tools.ietf.org/id/draf=
t-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>
>  I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor=
's
> algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
> area, but am interested.
>
>
> this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the following
> description is accurate: quantum computing is an active area of research,
> and those working in the area believe that it can become a viable
> technology in the not-to-distant future, though there are also skeptics w=
ho
> feel that quantum decoherence may make it impossible to ever build a
> quantum computer that would be able to solve problems of cryptographic
> interest.   (An important side note: the D-Wave computer is not a real
> quantum computer in the Peter Shor sense; it does something more like
> simulated annealing).
>
>  Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
> postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
> question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just be=
gs
> pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
> QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
> thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
> expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is perfec=
tly
> reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
> pointless.
>
>
> This is my thinking, more or less.   I would put it more positively as:
> let's figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice, becaus=
e
> if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugl=
y,
> and besides, we don't really know what capabilities our adversaries have
> now, or will have in a decade.
>
>  But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even try to bo=
ldly
> quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some well-defined claim,
> calculated via a series of estimates.  The status quo is to just claim th=
at
> algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit security, whatever that means,
> perhaps adding the exclusion against quantum computers.  Adding an estima=
ted
> likelihood of a quantum computer gives a more meaning of what kind of
> security is being claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already hav=
e
> made such an estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to
> postquantum.
>
>
> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probability
> that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such a=
n
> estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would tru=
st
> it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot reliably be
> estimated.   The scenario here recalls that of the prominent physicists i=
n
> the 1920s and 1930s who scorned H.G. Wells' predictions about nuclear
> power.  It is unlikely that those physicists would have done a better job
> with their prognostications if they had attempted to use a formal model f=
or
> Bayesian inference, or some other framework for computing an exact
> probability.   (The model would just mathematically formalize their
> beliefs, which turned out to be wrong.)
>
> As an aside, if it were possible to come up with accurate estimates for
> the likelihood of scientific advances, it would be reasonable to apply th=
at
> methodology to other cryptographic questions.   By way of example, one
> could ask: are we more likely to see advances in the cryptanalysis of
> lattice-based cryptography, or code-based cryptography?    It is
> interesting to think about, but it does not seem like we should expect th=
is
> sort of analysis to provide us with much concrete guidance on future
> standards.
>
> Lenstra did consider the possibility of progress in cryptanalytic
> capabilities in his very thorough study of key lengths, and he noted that
> one must model advances for different cryptosystems differently.   But he
> does not attempt anything as detailed as a probability estimate for a
> quantum computer; he says that "a clearly discernable and well-establishe=
d
> past pattern in practical cryptanalytic progress is no guarantee that the
> future pattern will be the same or that there will not be any surprising
> breakthroughs with immediate practical consequences."   (The quote is fro=
m
> the handbook contribution online at
> http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security_-_Keylen=
gth.pdf
> )
>
>  I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for CFRG.  =
If
> so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an alternative foru=
m.
>
> An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
> following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a large
> nation.
>
>
> Agreed.
>
>  If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
> crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn't have to resort to
> any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the latter.  Well, t=
he
> chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or more realistically, mayb=
e
> the quantum computer is kept on reserve, and more mundane cryptanalysis i=
s
> used on a daily basis, maybe because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just =
lay
> little lower, if a QC is available? Anyway, the loose inference I'm drawi=
ng
> is that a quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most
> likely parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in th=
e
> near future.
>
>
> I agree with some of the logic, but not the conclusion, because
> intelligence agencies for large nations are likely to pursue all avenues
> that are available to them.   To continue the nuclear analogy from above,
> the vast arsenal of conventional bombs that the U.S. built in 1944 should
> not have been taken as evidence that there was not an active and successf=
ul
> effort to build a nuclear weapon that was proceeding concurrently.
>
> Thanks for the interesting discussion!
>
> David
>
>  Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified
> likelihood. If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I'd make a wildly
> different number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
> unfortunately.
>
> I wonder if others have more substantial arguments.
>
>
>
>
>
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>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi all,<div><br></div><div>Sorry again for top-posting, th=
at&#39;s gmail for you.</div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"font-family=
:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">&gt; I would put it more positively as: l=
et&#39;s figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice, becau=
se if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ug=
ly.</span><br>

</div><div><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br>=
</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13p=
x">As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is to=
 figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm in any =
context, because all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerable to te=
chnological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So combining public key algorith=
ms seems like a prudent approach. I know there are Certicom patents on this=
 but it seems that this shouldn&#39;t be insuperable.</span></div>

<div><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br></span=
></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">&gt=
;=A0</span>I don&#39;t think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate th=
e probability that a quantum computer can be built. =A0 If someone did try =
to make such an estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt th=
at I would trust it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cann=
ot reliably be estimated. =A0</div>

<div><br></div><div>I would say the question isn&#39;t so much &quot;can a =
quantum computer be built?&quot; as &quot;what size quantum computer can be=
 built?&quot; There&#39;s an interesting 2011 blog post on that subject tha=
t tries to derive a Moore&#39;s law for quantum computer size:=A0<a href=3D=
"http://www.quantenblog.net/physics/moores-law-quantum-computer" target=3D"=
_blank">http://www.quantenblog.net/physics/moores-law-quantum-computer</a>.=
 I don&#39;t know how well reviewed this has been, but it&#39;s a start: ke=
y lines are &quot;The blue line is a fit to the data, indicating a doubling=
 of the number of qubits every 5.7=B10.4 years.&quot; and &quot;If you are =
bold enough to believe that the same scaling continues even further, 2048-b=
it RSA keys would come under attack somewhere between 2052 and 2059.&quot;<=
/div>

<div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div><br></div><div>William</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 a=
t 8:39 AM, David McGrew <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mcgrew@cisc=
o.com" target=3D"_blank">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    <div>Hi Dan,<br>
      <br>
      some further thoughts on things quantum:<br>
      <br>
      On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"><br>
      <blockquote type=3D"cite">
        <pre>2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-0=
0.txt" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ip=
sec-with-qkd-00.txt</a>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-0=
0.txt</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre>I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (=
for Shor&#39;s
algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
area, but am interested.</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the
    following description is accurate: quantum computing is an active
    area of research, and those working in the area believe that it can
    become a viable technology in the not-to-distant future, though
    there are also skeptics who feel that quantum decoherence may make
    it impossible to ever build a quantum computer that would be able to
    solve problems of cryptographic interest.=A0=A0 (An important side note=
:
    the D-Wave computer is not a real quantum computer in the Peter Shor
    sense; it does something more like simulated annealing).<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <pre>Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals =
for
postquantum algs.  That&#39;s great to do, but still doesn&#39;t address th=
e
question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just begs
pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I&#39;m
expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is perfectl=
y
reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
pointless.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This is my thinking, more or less.=A0=A0 I would put it more positively
    as: let&#39;s figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in
    practice, because if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing,
    the mad rush will be ugly, and besides, we don&#39;t really know what
    capabilities our adversaries have now, or will have in a decade.=A0 <br=
>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <pre>But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even t=
ry to boldly
quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some well-defined claim,
calculated via a series of estimates.  The status quo is to just claim that
algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit security, whatever that means,
perhaps adding the exclusion against quantum computers.  Adding an estimate=
d
likelihood of a quantum computer gives a more meaning of what kind of
security is being claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already have
made such an estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to
postquantum.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>I don&#39;t think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the p=
robability that a quantum computer can be built. =A0 If someone did try to =
make such an estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that =
I would trust it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot =
reliably be estimated. =A0=A0The scenario
    here recalls that of the prominent physicists in the 1920s and 1930s
    who scorned H.G. Wells&#39; predictions about nuclear power.=A0 It is
    unlikely that those physicists would have done a better job with
    their prognostications if they had attempted to use a formal model
    for Bayesian inference, or some other framework for computing an
    exact probability.=A0=A0 (The model would just mathematically formalize
    their beliefs, which turned out to be wrong.)<br>
    <br>
    As an aside, if it were possible to come up with accurate estimates
    for the likelihood of scientific advances, it would be reasonable to
    apply that methodology to other cryptographic questions.=A0=A0 By way o=
f
    example, one could ask: are we more likely to see advances in the
    cryptanalysis of lattice-based cryptography, or code-based
    cryptography?=A0=A0=A0 It is interesting to think about, but it does no=
t
    seem like we should expect this sort of analysis to provide us with
    much concrete guidance on future standards.=A0=A0 <br>
    <br>
    Lenstra did consider the possibility of progress in cryptanalytic
    capabilities in his very thorough study of key lengths, and he noted
    that one must model advances for different cryptosystems
    differently.=A0=A0 But he does not attempt anything as detailed as a
    probability estimate for a quantum computer; he says that &quot;a clear=
ly
    discernable and well-established past pattern in practical
    cryptanalytic progress is no guarantee that the future pattern will
    be the same or that there will not be any surprising breakthroughs
    with immediate practical consequences.&quot;=A0=A0 (The quote is from t=
he
    handbook contribution online at
<a href=3D"http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security=
_-_Keylength.pdf" target=3D"_blank">http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handboo=
k_of_Information_Security_-_Keylength.pdf</a>)<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <pre>I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for=
 CFRG.  If
so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an alternative forum.

An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a large
nation.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Agreed.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <pre>If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn&#39;t have to resort =
to
any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the latter.  Well, the
chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or more realistically, maybe
the quantum computer is kept on reserve, and more mundane cryptanalysis is
used on a daily basis, maybe because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just la=
y
little lower, if a QC is available? Anyway, the loose inference I&#39;m dra=
wing
is that a quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most
likely parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in the
near future.  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I agree with some of the logic, but not the conclusion, because
    intelligence agencies for large nations are likely to pursue all
    avenues that are available to them.=A0=A0 To continue the nuclear
    analogy from above, the vast arsenal of conventional bombs that the
    U.S. built in 1944 should not have been taken as evidence that there
    was not an active and successful effort to build a nuclear weapon
    that was proceeding concurrently.=A0 <br>
    <br>
    Thanks for the interesting discussion!<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <pre>Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified
likelihood. If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I&#39;d make a wildly
different number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
unfortunately. =20

I wonder if others have more substantial arguments.=20


</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre>----------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential info=
rmation, privileged material (including material protected by the solicitor=
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 is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please imm=
ediately reply to the sender and delete this information from your system. =
Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this transmission by u=
nintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.</pre>


    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
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<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "TurnerS@ieca.com" <TurnerS@ieca.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:16 PM, William Whyte
<wwhyte@securityinnovation.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.
>
>> I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
>> post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a breakthroug=
h in
>> quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.
>
> As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is to
> figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm in any
> context, because all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerable to
> technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So combining public key
> algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know there are Certicom paten=
ts
> on this but it seems that this shouldn't be insuperable.

But that depends on at least one algorithm being postquantum secure,
and historically
we've not had any real surprises in the public key world.
Algorithms exist that do this, we just need to be ahead of the game in
specifying them. I'll see if McBits is amenable to standardization. Worst
case we wait for NTRU patents to expire, and adopt it. Yeah, we lose some
nice stuff in the post-quantum world, but most IETF protocols will survive
no problem. Signatures are a bit nasty in the present state of knowledge,
and there is protocol review work to do. Key sizes get massively bigger:
a lot of hardcoded limits will have to be revised.

However, McBits is slightly faster than existing techniques including ECC,
so the big issue is really size, not speed.

>
>> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probabilit=
y
>> that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such =
an
>> estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would tr=
ust
>> it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot reliably be
>> estimated.
>
> I would say the question isn't so much "can a quantum computer be built?"=
 as
> "what size quantum computer can be built?" There's an interesting 2011 bl=
og
> post on that subject that tries to derive a Moore's law for quantum compu=
ter
> size: http://www.quantenblog.net/physics/moores-law-quantum-computer. I
> don't know how well reviewed this has been, but it's a start: key lines a=
re
> "The blue line is a fit to the data, indicating a doubling of the number =
of
> qubits every 5.7=C2=B10.4 years." and "If you are bold enough to believe =
that the
> same scaling continues even further, 2048-bit RSA keys would come under
> attack somewhere between 2052 and 2059."

That's a serious underestimate because it ignores the possibility of a
breakthrough
in making qubits. Once you get a method that scales up, it is likely
to be a large jump
rather than incremental increase.

>
> Cheers,
>
> William
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:39 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>> some further thoughts on things quantum:
>>
>> On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>>
>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>>
>> I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor=
's
>> algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
>> area, but am interested.
>>
>>
>> this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the following
>> description is accurate: quantum computing is an active area of research=
,
>> and those working in the area believe that it can become a viable techno=
logy
>> in the not-to-distant future, though there are also skeptics who feel th=
at
>> quantum decoherence may make it impossible to ever build a quantum compu=
ter
>> that would be able to solve problems of cryptographic interest.   (An
>> important side note: the D-Wave computer is not a real quantum computer =
in
>> the Peter Shor sense; it does something more like simulated annealing).
>>
>> Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
>> postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
>> question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just
>> begs
>> pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has =
a
>> QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
>> thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
>> expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is
>> perfectly
>> reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
>> pointless.
>>
>>
>> This is my thinking, more or less.   I would put it more positively as:
>> let's figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice, becau=
se
>> if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ug=
ly,
>> and besides, we don't really know what capabilities our adversaries have
>> now, or will have in a decade.
>>
>> But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even try to
>> boldly
>> quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some well-defined claim,
>> calculated via a series of estimates.  The status quo is to just claim
>> that
>> algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit security, whatever that means=
,
>> perhaps adding the exclusion against quantum computers.  Adding an
>> estimated
>> likelihood of a quantum computer gives a more meaning of what kind of
>> security is being claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already ha=
ve
>> made such an estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to
>> postquantum.
>>
>>
>> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probabilit=
y
>> that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such =
an
>> estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would tr=
ust
>> it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot reliably be
>> estimated.   The scenario here recalls that of the prominent physicists =
in
>> the 1920s and 1930s who scorned H.G. Wells' predictions about nuclear po=
wer.
>> It is unlikely that those physicists would have done a better job with t=
heir
>> prognostications if they had attempted to use a formal model for Bayesia=
n
>> inference, or some other framework for computing an exact probability.
>> (The model would just mathematically formalize their beliefs, which turn=
ed
>> out to be wrong.)
>>
>> As an aside, if it were possible to come up with accurate estimates for
>> the likelihood of scientific advances, it would be reasonable to apply t=
hat
>> methodology to other cryptographic questions.   By way of example, one c=
ould
>> ask: are we more likely to see advances in the cryptanalysis of
>> lattice-based cryptography, or code-based cryptography?    It is interes=
ting
>> to think about, but it does not seem like we should expect this sort of
>> analysis to provide us with much concrete guidance on future standards.
>>
>> Lenstra did consider the possibility of progress in cryptanalytic
>> capabilities in his very thorough study of key lengths, and he noted tha=
t
>> one must model advances for different cryptosystems differently.   But h=
e
>> does not attempt anything as detailed as a probability estimate for a
>> quantum computer; he says that "a clearly discernable and well-establish=
ed
>> past pattern in practical cryptanalytic progress is no guarantee that th=
e
>> future pattern will be the same or that there will not be any surprising
>> breakthroughs with immediate practical consequences."   (The quote is fr=
om
>> the handbook contribution online at
>> http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security_-_Keyle=
ngth.pdf)
>>
>> I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for CFRG.  =
If
>> so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an alternative
>> forum.
>>
>> An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
>> following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a large
>> nation.
>>
>>
>> Agreed.
>>
>> If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
>> crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn't have to resort t=
o
>> any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the latter.  Well,
>> the
>> chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or more realistically, may=
be
>> the quantum computer is kept on reserve, and more mundane cryptanalysis =
is
>> used on a daily basis, maybe because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just
>> lay
>> little lower, if a QC is available? Anyway, the loose inference I'm
>> drawing
>> is that a quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most
>> likely parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in t=
he
>> near future.
>>
>>
>> I agree with some of the logic, but not the conclusion, because
>> intelligence agencies for large nations are likely to pursue all avenues
>> that are available to them.   To continue the nuclear analogy from above=
,
>> the vast arsenal of conventional bombs that the U.S. built in 1944 shoul=
d
>> not have been taken as evidence that there was not an active and success=
ful
>> effort to build a nuclear weapon that was proceeding concurrently.
>>
>> Thanks for the interesting discussion!
>>
>> David
>>
>> Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified
>> likelihood. If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I'd make a wildly
>> different number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
>> unfortunately.
>>
>> I wonder if others have more substantial arguments.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential
>> information, privileged material (including material protected by the
>> solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-publ=
ic
>> information. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intend=
ed
>> recipient is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error=
,
>> please immediately reply to the sender and delete this information from =
your
>> system. Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this
>> transmission by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlaw=
ful.
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>>
>
>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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On Jan 13, 2014, at 6:49 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
 wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:16 PM, William Whyte
> <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com> wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>=20
>> Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.
>>=20
>>> I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
>>> post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a breakthrou=
gh in
>>> quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.
>>=20
>> As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is to
>> figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm in an=
y
>> context, because all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerable to
>> technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So combining public key
>> algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know there are Certicom pate=
nts
>> on this but it seems that this shouldn't be insuperable.
>=20
> But that depends on at least one algorithm being postquantum secure,
> and historically
> we've not had any real surprises in the public key world.
> Algorithms exist that do this, we just need to be ahead of the game in
> specifying them. I'll see if McBits is amenable to standardization. Worst
> case we wait for NTRU patents to expire, and adopt it.=20

Just as a procedural note, we don't have to wait for any patents to expire.=
 We can specify standards that use these patents, as long as those patents =
are disclosed. As in https://ietf.org/ipr/231/ .

There is a general attitude in the IETF that standardizing patented technol=
ogy is bad, because it discourages open source implementations, but with su=
ch old patents (they were issued in '97, no?) that is far less a concern.

When we do standardize patented technology, implementers have four choices:
 1. Get a license
 2. Decide that the patent is bogus, and fight it in court.
 3. Wait for the patent to expire.
 4. Ignore the technology.

All implementers have lawyers, and all implementers hate paying for IPR, so=
 #1 and #2 hardly ever happen (with notable exceptions such as RSA years ag=
o and some codecs).

Considering that we have no proof of any adversary having a quantum compute=
r just yet, #3 and #4 are more likely, but that's a choice for implementers=
 to make. We can lead a horse to water and all that.

Yoav



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Additional Elliptic Curves (Curve25519 etc) for TLS ECDH key agreement
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On Jan 12, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrot=
e:

> That assumes you need a single application of a hash function to do the j=
ob,
> which as several people have pointed out is going to bite you at some poi=
nt
> when you run out of appropriately-sized hash functions.  Why not use HKDF=
, RFC
> 5869, which works with any hash function you like?

Or use a hash function that has variable output, like Skein or SHA-512/z or=
 others.

	Jon


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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On 01/13/2014 06:23 AM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> When we do standardize patented technology, implementers have four
> choices: 
> 1. Get a license
> 2. Decide that the patent is bogus, and fight it in court.
> 3. Wait for the patent to expire.
> 4. Ignore the technology.
> 
> All implementers have lawyers, and all implementers hate paying for
> IPR, so #1 and #2 hardly ever happen (with notable exceptions such as
> RSA years ago and some codecs).
> 
> Considering that we have no proof of any adversary having a quantum
> computer just yet, #3 and #4 are more likely, but that's a choice for
> implementers to make. We can lead a horse to water and all that.

And its also worth noting that the IETF at least also doesn't
tend to want to take on work where #3 or #4 are likely to
apply - there's enough pressing work to be done that that'd be
seen as a waste of effort by many, given the short term nature
of much IETF work. I think the non-deployment of EKE and similar
protocols is really good evidence that patents in this space
are quite effective at blocking deployment of potentially
useful technology.

But I think work on crypto for a world that contains a real
general purpose quantum computer might fit very well for CFRG
if there're enough interested and capable folks. Just don't
expect that to translate into IETF work very quickly in the
absence of a pressing demand.

S



From wwhyte@securityinnovation.com  Mon Jan 13 02:32:29 2014
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References: <52C755AA.70200@cisco.com> <33E0BF53-A331-4646-B080-FD4F6E13916E@ieca.com> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D29B10.4030401@cisco.com> <CACz1E9rsLRwqpA0fS2RNOcpsn7DMqaN=7dcJDQqEi8HDMKKonQ@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0c=mYv7v3fGCHCe9D5w2j+gRWWsmoUA7NQ=AsczTMP1rDw@mail.gmail.com> <76A03B60-E798-4DBB-8E3B-1865CD2F8E14@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Hi Yoav,

> There is a general attitude in the IETF that standardizing patented
technology is bad, because it
> discourages open source implementations, but with such old patents (they
were issued in '97, no?)

The original NTRU patents were applied for in 1997, so expire in 2017.
There are a number of improvements which are also patented and expire
later.

Note that if the concern with patents is that they discourage open source
implementations, the NTRU patents are free to implement under GPL and a
number of other FOSS licenses, and this grant of rights to use the patents
is permanent and irrevocable.

https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/LICENSE.m
d
https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/FOSS%20Ex
ception.md

Cheers,

William


-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Yoav Nir
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 1:23 AM
To: Watson Ladd
Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was:
Re: considering new topics for CFRG)


On Jan 13, 2014, at 6:49 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
 wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:16 PM, William Whyte
> <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com> wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.
>>
>>> I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
>>> post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a
>>> breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.
>>
>> As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is
>> to figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm
>> in any context, because all public key algorithms are potentially
>> vulnerable to technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So
>> combining public key algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know
>> there are Certicom patents on this but it seems that this shouldn't be
insuperable.
>
> But that depends on at least one algorithm being postquantum secure,
> and historically we've not had any real surprises in the public key
> world.
> Algorithms exist that do this, we just need to be ahead of the game in
> specifying them. I'll see if McBits is amenable to standardization.
> Worst case we wait for NTRU patents to expire, and adopt it.

Just as a procedural note, we don't have to wait for any patents to
expire. We can specify standards that use these patents, as long as those
patents are disclosed. As in https://ietf.org/ipr/231/ .

There is a general attitude in the IETF that standardizing patented
technology is bad, because it discourages open source implementations, but
with such old patents (they were issued in '97, no?) that is far less a
concern.

When we do standardize patented technology, implementers have four
choices:
 1. Get a license
 2. Decide that the patent is bogus, and fight it in court.
 3. Wait for the patent to expire.
 4. Ignore the technology.

All implementers have lawyers, and all implementers hate paying for IPR,
so #1 and #2 hardly ever happen (with notable exceptions such as RSA years
ago and some codecs).

Considering that we have no proof of any adversary having a quantum
computer just yet, #3 and #4 are more likely, but that's a choice for
implementers to make. We can lead a horse to water and all that.

Yoav


_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Jan 13 04:03:20 2014
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "TurnerS@ieca.com" <TurnerS@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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Hi Watson,

On 01/12/2014 11:49 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:16 PM, William Whyte
> <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com> wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.
>>
>>> I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
>>> post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a breakthrough in
>>> quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.
>> As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is to
>> figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm in any
>> context, because all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerable to
>> technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So combining public key
>> algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know there are Certicom patents
>> on this but it seems that this shouldn't be insuperable.
> But that depends on at least one algorithm being postquantum secure,
> and historically
> we've not had any real surprises in the public key world.
> Algorithms exist that do this, we just need to be ahead of the game in
> specifying them. I'll see if McBits is amenable to standardization. Worst
> case we wait for NTRU patents to expire, and adopt it. Yeah, we lose some
> nice stuff in the post-quantum world, but most IETF protocols will survive
> no problem. Signatures are a bit nasty in the present state of knowledge,
> and there is protocol review work to do. Key sizes get massively bigger:
> a lot of hardcoded limits will have to be revised.
>
> However, McBits is slightly faster than existing techniques including ECC,
> so the big issue is really size, not speed.

Agreed; hash based signatures and code based encryption seem to be good 
candidates for post-quantum crypto standards, and the main issues with 
the use of those technologies will be in the amount of data that needs 
to be transported, rather than the computational cost.   I would guess 
that a key size of 100KB or so could be usable in many Internet 
applications, but not constrained devices of the Internet of Things 
variety.

David

>
>>> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probability
>>> that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such an
>>> estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would trust
>>> it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot reliably be
>>> estimated.
>> I would say the question isn't so much "can a quantum computer be built?" as
>> "what size quantum computer can be built?" There's an interesting 2011 blog
>> post on that subject that tries to derive a Moore's law for quantum computer
>> size: http://www.quantenblog.net/physics/moores-law-quantum-computer. I
>> don't know how well reviewed this has been, but it's a start: key lines are
>> "The blue line is a fit to the data, indicating a doubling of the number of
>> qubits every 5.7±0.4 years." and "If you are bold enough to believe that the
>> same scaling continues even further, 2048-bit RSA keys would come under
>> attack somewhere between 2052 and 2059."
> That's a serious underestimate because it ignores the possibility of a
> breakthrough
> in making qubits. Once you get a method that scales up, it is likely
> to be a large jump
> rather than incremental increase.
>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> William
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:39 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>> Hi Dan,
>>>
>>> some further thoughts on things quantum:
>>>
>>> On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>>>
>>> I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for Shor's
>>> algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in the
>>> area, but am interested.
>>>
>>>
>>> this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the following
>>> description is accurate: quantum computing is an active area of research,
>>> and those working in the area believe that it can become a viable technology
>>> in the not-to-distant future, though there are also skeptics who feel that
>>> quantum decoherence may make it impossible to ever build a quantum computer
>>> that would be able to solve problems of cryptographic interest.   (An
>>> important side note: the D-Wave computer is not a real quantum computer in
>>> the Peter Shor sense; it does something more like simulated annealing).
>>>
>>> Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
>>> postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
>>> question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question just
>>> begs
>>> pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your adversary (soon) has a
>>> QC, then you should have spent your time switching to PQ rather than
>>> thinking about whether the adversary had a QC.  In other words, I'm
>>> expecting some may say that consideration of postquantum crypto is
>>> perfectly
>>> reasonable, but asking about the existence of a quantum computer is
>>> pointless.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is my thinking, more or less.   I would put it more positively as:
>>> let's figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice, because
>>> if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly,
>>> and besides, we don't really know what capabilities our adversaries have
>>> now, or will have in a decade.
>>>
>>> But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even try to
>>> boldly
>>> quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some well-defined claim,
>>> calculated via a series of estimates.  The status quo is to just claim
>>> that
>>> algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit security, whatever that means,
>>> perhaps adding the exclusion against quantum computers.  Adding an
>>> estimated
>>> likelihood of a quantum computer gives a more meaning of what kind of
>>> security is being claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already have
>>> made such an estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to
>>> postquantum.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probability
>>> that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such an
>>> estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would trust
>>> it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot reliably be
>>> estimated.   The scenario here recalls that of the prominent physicists in
>>> the 1920s and 1930s who scorned H.G. Wells' predictions about nuclear power.
>>> It is unlikely that those physicists would have done a better job with their
>>> prognostications if they had attempted to use a formal model for Bayesian
>>> inference, or some other framework for computing an exact probability.
>>> (The model would just mathematically formalize their beliefs, which turned
>>> out to be wrong.)
>>>
>>> As an aside, if it were possible to come up with accurate estimates for
>>> the likelihood of scientific advances, it would be reasonable to apply that
>>> methodology to other cryptographic questions.   By way of example, one could
>>> ask: are we more likely to see advances in the cryptanalysis of
>>> lattice-based cryptography, or code-based cryptography?    It is interesting
>>> to think about, but it does not seem like we should expect this sort of
>>> analysis to provide us with much concrete guidance on future standards.
>>>
>>> Lenstra did consider the possibility of progress in cryptanalytic
>>> capabilities in his very thorough study of key lengths, and he noted that
>>> one must model advances for different cryptosystems differently.   But he
>>> does not attempt anything as detailed as a probability estimate for a
>>> quantum computer; he says that "a clearly discernable and well-established
>>> past pattern in practical cryptanalytic progress is no guarantee that the
>>> future pattern will be the same or that there will not be any surprising
>>> breakthroughs with immediate practical consequences."   (The quote is from
>>> the handbook contribution online at
>>> http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security_-_Keylength.pdf)
>>>
>>> I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for CFRG.  If
>>> so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an alternative
>>> forum.
>>>
>>> An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
>>> following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a large
>>> nation.
>>>
>>>
>>> Agreed.
>>>
>>> If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
>>> crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn't have to resort to
>>> any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the latter.  Well,
>>> the
>>> chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or more realistically, maybe
>>> the quantum computer is kept on reserve, and more mundane cryptanalysis is
>>> used on a daily basis, maybe because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just
>>> lay
>>> little lower, if a QC is available? Anyway, the loose inference I'm
>>> drawing
>>> is that a quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most
>>> likely parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in the
>>> near future.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree with some of the logic, but not the conclusion, because
>>> intelligence agencies for large nations are likely to pursue all avenues
>>> that are available to them.   To continue the nuclear analogy from above,
>>> the vast arsenal of conventional bombs that the U.S. built in 1944 should
>>> not have been taken as evidence that there was not an active and successful
>>> effort to build a nuclear weapon that was proceeding concurrently.
>>>
>>> Thanks for the interesting discussion!
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>> Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified
>>> likelihood. If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I'd make a wildly
>>> different number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
>>> unfortunately.
>>>
>>> I wonder if others have more substantial arguments.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
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>


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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "TurnerS@ieca.com" <TurnerS@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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Hi William,

On 01/12/2014 11:16 PM, William Whyte wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.
>
> > I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use 
> post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a 
> breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.
>
> As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is 
> to figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm 
> in any context, because all public key algorithms are potentially 
> vulnerable to technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So 
> combining public key algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know 
> there are Certicom patents on this but it seems that this shouldn't be 
> insuperable.

I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple public key 
algorithms, especially for postquantum algorithms.  This is partly 
because of the complexity of the specification and the implementation, 
but also because it would require double the amount of work from 
authors, reviewers, and implementers in order to be successful.   
Patents could also be a significant issue, as you note.

David

--------------060100050003050304070907
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi William,<br>
      <br>
      On 01/12/2014 11:16 PM, William Whyte wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACz1E9rsLRwqpA0fS2RNOcpsn7DMqaN=7dcJDQqEi8HDMKKonQ@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=ISO-8859-1">
      <div dir="ltr">Hi all,
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div><big><big><big><big><span
                    style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">&gt;
                    I would put it more positively as: let's figure out
                    how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice,
                    because if there is a breakthrough in quantum
                    computing, the mad rush will be ugly.</span><br>
                </big></big></big></big></div>
        <div><big><big><big><big><span
                    style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br>
                  </span></big></big></big></big></div>
        <div><big><big><big><big><span
                    style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">As
                    I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way
                    to do this is to figure out how to avoid depending
                    on a single public key algorithm in any context,
                    because all public key algorithms are potentially
                    vulnerable to technological and algorithmic
                    breakthroughs. So combining public key algorithms
                    seems like a prudent approach. I know there are
                    Certicom patents on this but it seems that this
                    shouldn't be insuperable.</span></big></big></big></big></div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple public key
    algorithms, especially for postquantum algorithms.&nbsp; This is partly
    because of the complexity of the specification and the
    implementation, but also because it would require double the amount
    of work from authors, reviewers, and implementers in order to be
    successful.&nbsp;&nbsp; Patents could also be a significant issue, as you
    note.<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 05:48:48 -0500
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, TurnerS@ieca.com, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Hi Watson,

>> combining public key algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know
>> there are Certicom patents on this but it seems that this shouldn't be
>> insuperable.

> But that depends on at least one algorithm being postquantum secure, and
> historically we've
> not had any real surprises in the public key world.

I wouldn't say it "depends" on it. I would say that we know that ECC and RS=
A
aren't postquantum
secure and that other algorithms may be, and that using two algorithms in
parallel allows us to
deploy systems that use a newer algorithm without having to rely on it 100%=
.
That allows
us to start making a transition before we absolutely have to, which is
always the best time to
make it.

I don't think you can say that just because there have been few
discontinuities in the
security of algorithms there will be no discontinuities in the future. Ther=
e
might be,
and if it does happen unexpectedly it'll be a big problem. It's not a
problem we need
to work on right now, but, again, that makes this a really good time to
address it.

>> Moore's law for quantum computer
>> size: http://www.quantenblog.net/physics/moores-law-quantum-computer.

> That's a serious underestimate because it ignores the possibility of a
> breakthrough in making
> qubits. Once you get a method that scales up, it is likely to be a large
> jump rather than
> incremental increase.

I think you're probably right and wasn't endorsing that particular page's
results, just
putting it forward as the only estimate of its type that I've seen. I agree
that it seems
more likely to be a no-later-than than a no-earlier-than estimate, but this
isn't
really my area of expertise.

Cheers,

William


-----Original Message-----
From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, January 12, 2014 11:50 PM
To: William Whyte
Cc: David McGrew; Dan Brown; TurnerS@ieca.com; cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer (was: Re=
:
considering new topics for CFRG)

On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:16 PM, William Whyte
<wwhyte@securityinnovation.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.
>
>> I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
>> post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a
>> breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.
>
> As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is
> to figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm
> in any context, because all public key algorithms are potentially
> vulnerable to technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So
> combining public key algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know
> there are Certicom patents on this but it seems that this shouldn't be
> insuperable.

But that depends on at least one algorithm being postquantum secure, and
historically we've not had any real surprises in the public key world.
Algorithms exist that do this, we just need to be ahead of the game in
specifying them. I'll see if McBits is amenable to standardization. Worst
case we wait for NTRU patents to expire, and adopt it. Yeah, we lose some
nice stuff in the post-quantum world, but most IETF protocols will survive
no problem. Signatures are a bit nasty in the present state of knowledge,
and there is protocol review work to do. Key sizes get massively bigger:
a lot of hardcoded limits will have to be revised.

However, McBits is slightly faster than existing techniques including ECC,
so the big issue is really size, not speed.

>
>> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probabilit=
y
>> that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such
>> an
>> estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would
>> trust it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot
>> reliably be estimated.
>
> I would say the question isn't so much "can a quantum computer be
> built?" as "what size quantum computer can be built?" There's an
> interesting 2011 blog post on that subject that tries to derive a
> Moore's law for quantum computer
> size: http://www.quantenblog.net/physics/moores-law-quantum-computer.
> I don't know how well reviewed this has been, but it's a start: key
> lines are "The blue line is a fit to the data, indicating a doubling
> of the number of qubits every 5.7=B10.4 years." and "If you are bold
> enough to believe that the same scaling continues even further,
> 2048-bit RSA keys would come under attack somewhere between 2052 and
> 2059."

That's a serious underestimate because it ignores the possibility of a
breakthrough in making qubits. Once you get a method that scales up, it is
likely to be a large jump rather than incremental increase.

>
> Cheers,
>
> William
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 8:39 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>> some further thoughts on things quantum:
>>
>> On 01/08/2014 12:32 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>>
>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
>>
>> I am more interested in the issue of whether quantum computing (for
>> Shor's
>> algorithm) will, or even has, become feasible? I am not an expert in
>> the area, but am interested.
>>
>>
>> this is not an area that I actively follow, but I think the following
>> description is accurate: quantum computing is an active area of
>> research, and those working in the area believe that it can become a
>> viable technology in the not-to-distant future, though there are also
>> skeptics who feel that quantum decoherence may make it impossible to eve=
r
>> build a quantum computer
>> that would be able to solve problems of cryptographic interest.   (An
>> important side note: the D-Wave computer is not a real quantum
>> computer in the Peter Shor sense; it does something more like simulated
>> annealing).
>>
>> Of course, we can just go ahead and get prepared with proposals for
>> postquantum algs.  That's great to do, but still doesn't address the
>> question. I expect some may argue that asking this whole question
>> just begs pointless speculation, on the grounds that if your
>> adversary (soon) has a QC, then you should have spent your time
>> switching to PQ rather than thinking about whether the adversary had
>> a QC.  In other words, I'm expecting some may say that consideration
>> of postquantum crypto is perfectly reasonable, but asking about the
>> existence of a quantum computer is pointless.
>>
>>
>> This is my thinking, more or less.   I would put it more positively as:
>> let's figure out how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice,
>> because if there is a breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush
>> will be ugly, and besides, we don't really know what capabilities our
>> adversaries have now, or will have in a decade.
>>
>> But I think it is okay for CFRG to consider it, and, nay, even try to
>> boldly quantify these, say with likelihood 2^(-64) of some
>> well-defined claim, calculated via a series of estimates.  The status
>> quo is to just claim that algorithm X with key size provides 128 bit
>> security, whatever that means, perhaps adding the exclusion against
>> quantum computers.  Adding an estimated likelihood of a quantum
>> computer gives a more meaning of what kind of security is being
>> claimed.  Maybe the postquantum researchers already have made such an
>> estimate, as part of an effort to justify a switch to postquantum.
>>
>>
>> I don't think it would be fruitful to attempt to estimate the probabilit=
y
>> that a quantum computer can be built.   If someone did try to make such
>> an
>> estimate, it would make interesting reading, but I doubt that I would
>> trust it, because the likelihood of new scientific advances cannot
>> reliably be
>> estimated.   The scenario here recalls that of the prominent physicists
>> in
>> the 1920s and 1930s who scorned H.G. Wells' predictions about nuclear
>> power.
>> It is unlikely that those physicists would have done a better job
>> with their prognostications if they had attempted to use a formal
>> model for Bayesian inference, or some other framework for computing an
>> exact probability.
>> (The model would just mathematically formalize their beliefs, which
>> turned out to be wrong.)
>>
>> As an aside, if it were possible to come up with accurate estimates
>> for the likelihood of scientific advances, it would be reasonable to
>> apply that
>> methodology to other cryptographic questions.   By way of example, one
>> could
>> ask: are we more likely to see advances in the cryptanalysis of
>> lattice-based cryptography, or code-based cryptography?    It is
>> interesting
>> to think about, but it does not seem like we should expect this sort
>> of analysis to provide us with much concrete guidance on future
>> standards.
>>
>> Lenstra did consider the possibility of progress in cryptanalytic
>> capabilities in his very thorough study of key lengths, and he noted tha=
t
>> one must model advances for different cryptosystems differently.   But h=
e
>> does not attempt anything as detailed as a probability estimate for a
>> quantum computer; he says that "a clearly discernable and
>> well-established past pattern in practical cryptanalytic progress is
>> no guarantee that the future pattern will be the same or that there will
>> not be any surprising
>> breakthroughs with immediate practical consequences."   (The quote is
>> from
>> the handbook contribution online at
>> http://www.keylength.com/biblio/Handbook_of_Information_Security_-_Ke
>> ylength.pdf)
>>
>> I would understand if the CFRG chairs deem this out of scope for
>> CFRG.  If so, I hope that somebody could suggest to me off-list an
>> alternative forum.
>>
>> An informal, perhaps dubious, argument that comes to my mind is the
>> following.  The most likely party to have a quantum computer is a
>> large nation.
>>
>>
>> Agreed.
>>
>> If they had such a thing, then they could break almost all IETF
>> crypto, except pre-shared key based stuff, and wouldn't have to
>> resort to any other chicanery.  But reports are now suggesting the
>> latter.  Well, the chicanery could all be just a cover-up ruse.  Or
>> more realistically, maybe the quantum computer is kept on reserve,
>> and more mundane cryptanalysis is used on a daily basis, maybe
>> because it is cheaper.  Still, why not just lay little lower, if a QC
>> is available? Anyway, the loose inference I'm drawing is that a
>> quantum computer does not yet exist, and further that the most likely
>> parties to have one do not anticipate being able to have one in the
>> near future.
>>
>>
>> I agree with some of the logic, but not the conclusion, because
>> intelligence agencies for large nations are likely to pursue all avenues
>> that are available to them.   To continue the nuclear analogy from above=
,
>> the vast arsenal of conventional bombs that the U.S. built in 1944
>> should not have been taken as evidence that there was not an active
>> and successful effort to build a nuclear weapon that was proceeding
>> concurrently.
>>
>> Thanks for the interesting discussion!
>>
>> David
>>
>> Well, this argument does not give any kind of quantified likelihood.
>> If I had to dead-reckon a likelihood, I'd make a wildly different
>> number every time, but most of them would be above 2^(-128),
>> unfortunately.
>>
>> I wonder if others have more substantial arguments.
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
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On 13/01/14 11:48, William Whyte wrote:
> I don't think you can say that just because there have been few
> discontinuities in the
> security of algorithms there will be no discontinuities in the
> future. There might be,
> and if it does happen unexpectedly it'll be a big problem. It's not a
> problem we need
> to work on right now, but, again, that makes this a really good time >
to address it.

It makes sense to have a fallback algorithm set, as ETSI has done with
the 3GPP algorithms:

http://www.etsi.org/services/security-algorithms/3gpp-algorithms

They standardised both KASUMI and SNOW 3G with the requirements for SNOW
3G as fallback algorithm being:
* maximizing "cryptographic distance" from KASUMI
* minimizing potential vulnerability to algebraic attacks
See:
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ecrypt/courses/end/slides-28/8-gilbert.pdf

Cheers,
arne

--
Arne Renkema-Padmos
@hcisec, secuso.org
Doctoral researcher
CASED, TU Darmstadt

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Last week I wrote that I would soon write up my disagreements with the safe
curves site.  

 

My first disagreement is written up below, but first two editorial issues:

 

-        My last email was in the context of Watson's draft spec for the
Chicago (Bernstein?) curves, but I would like to detach the issue from the
I-D.  My comment about the reference in Watson's I-D to a website was just
an editorial comment.    

 

-        These technical issues that I hope CFRG discusses just might be
resolved and written into a CFRG I-D cataloging of elliptic curves and their
relative merits and so on, which should be independent of Watson's spec for
the Chicago curves.  For now, I opted to discuss via email list, rather than
placing these arguments into my own one-sided individual I-D.  Please advise
me if such an I-D is preferred to email.

 

Today, I checked that

 

http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html

 

characterizes Curve25519 as "fully rigid", and brainpoolP256t1 as "somewhat
rigid", and more critically, implies the latter to be at greater risk to a
secret attack on the ECLDP.  (Am I misinterpreting?)

 

On November 4, 2013, I wrote the following email to the TLS list

 

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10393.html

 

which claims that BrainpoolP256t1 has a lower risk than Curve25519 of resist
a hypothetical secret attack on a maliciously generated NIST P256.  These
seems to an opposite conclusion from that implied by the safecurves.  Hence
my disagreement.

 

The gist of my argument was that pseudorandomness can avoid a class of
unknown weak curves, with a certain probability related to the density of
the weak class from the pool of curves which it is drawn.  

 

Yes, rigidity helps more to prevent malicious generation of the curve.  I am
not disagreeing with the safecurves site on that point.  

 

I am saying that for an honest generator of a new curve, who is thoroughly
worried about some secret attack that could affect a maliciously-generated
P256, using a random curve is her best recourse, followed by pseudorandom
curve (as in brainpool). Rigidity is on par with arbitrary regeneration for
convincing oneself that one's chosen curve resists this secret attack, but
rigidity is better for convincing other parties.

 

In the terms of the safecurves site, I'd say that, first, it omits this
important argument, that is okay in the sense that the site serves to put
the best foot forward. Second it implies wrong conclusions, which is a
slight mistake and ought to be corrected. Anyway, I hope that CFRG and IETF
will consider a more balanced argument, and the users of Curve25519 are
adequately informed.  That is, I hope that CFRG can provide peer review.

 

Is it fair to say that the possibility of P256 being malicious is one of the
main reasons for the recent rise in popularity of Curve25519?  Or is the
pattern between recent news and standards adoption just a coincidence?  If
this is the main reason, then we should look into it carefully.

 

Not to lose focus: I hope to start other emails threads on other less
important issues, e.g. how much risk is there that P256 is weak and the
impact on the rest of ECC, random v special, how special are safecurves,
relative importance of side-channel resistance v DLP, risks of parameters v
keys, do attacks target curves, random v pseudorandom, and so on.  So, I
hope that that this thread can be kept focussed on this one issue.  

 

To summarize my position, and divide into candidate pieces for discusssion: 

 

1.      Pseudorandomness protects effectively (as possible for ECC) against
the spectral weakness necessary to hypothesize a malicious NIST P256.

2.      Rigidity protects against the spectral weakness only by invoking
assumptions about spectral weakness (*).

3.      Protecting against attacks, such as the hypothetical spectral
weakness, is more important than (subsumes?) protecting against malicious
generation.

 

Regarding (*), the assumptions about the spectral weakness, I may wish to
start a separate thread to discuss.  It seems that the safecurves site does
not say too much about it, but there was some pertinent email discussion on
the TLS list, that I think merits some consideration for the CFRG.

 

Best regards,

 


Daniel Brown


Research In Motion Limited 

 

	

 




	

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>Last week I wrote that I would soon write up my =
disagreements with the safe curves site.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>My first disagreement is written up =
below, but first two editorial issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span lang=3DEN-CA><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>-<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-CA>My last email was in =
the context of Watson&#8217;s draft spec for the Chicago (Bernstein?) =
curves, but I would like to detach the issue from the I-D.&nbsp; My =
comment about the reference in Watson&#8217;s I-D to a website was just =
an editorial comment.&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span lang=3DEN-CA><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>-<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-CA>These technical issues =
that I hope CFRG discusses just might be resolved and written into a =
CFRG I-D cataloging of elliptic curves and their relative merits and so =
on, which should be independent of Watson&#8217;s spec for the Chicago =
curves.&nbsp; For now, I opted to discuss via email list, rather than =
placing these arguments into my own one-sided individual I-D.&nbsp; =
Please advise me if such an I-D is preferred to =
email.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>Today, I checked that<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><a =
href=3D"http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html">http://safecurves.cr.yp.to=
/rigid.html</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>characterizes Curve25519 as &#8220;fully rigid&#8221;, and =
brainpoolP256t1 as &#8220;somewhat rigid&#8221;, and more critically, =
implies the latter to be at greater risk to a secret attack on the =
ECLDP.&nbsp; (Am I misinterpreting?)<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>On November 4, 2013, I wrote the =
following email to the TLS list<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10393.html">h=
ttp://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10393.html</a><o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>which claims that BrainpoolP256t1 has a lower risk than =
Curve25519 of resist a hypothetical secret attack on a maliciously =
generated NIST P256. &nbsp;These seems to an opposite conclusion from =
that implied by the safecurves.&nbsp; Hence my =
disagreement.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>The gist of my argument was that pseudorandomness can avoid =
a class of unknown weak curves, with a certain probability related to =
the density of the weak class from the pool of curves which it is =
drawn.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>Yes, rigidity helps more to prevent malicious generation of =
the curve.&nbsp; I am not disagreeing with the safecurves site on that =
point.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>I am saying that for an honest generator of a new curve, =
who is thoroughly worried about some secret attack that could affect a =
maliciously-generated P256, using a random curve is her best recourse, =
followed by pseudorandom curve (as in brainpool). Rigidity is on par =
with arbitrary regeneration for convincing oneself that one&#8217;s =
chosen curve resists this secret attack, but rigidity is better for =
convincing other parties.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>In the terms of the safecurves =
site, I&#8217;d say that, first, it omits this important argument, that =
is okay in the sense that the site serves to put the best foot forward. =
Second it implies wrong conclusions, which is a slight mistake and ought =
to be corrected. Anyway, I hope that CFRG and IETF will consider a more =
balanced argument, and the users of Curve25519 are adequately =
informed.&nbsp; That is, I hope that CFRG can provide peer =
review.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>Is it fair to say that the possibility of P256 being =
malicious is one of the main reasons for the recent rise in popularity =
of Curve25519?&nbsp; Or is the pattern between recent news and standards =
adoption just a coincidence?&nbsp; If this is the main reason, then we =
should look into it carefully.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>Not to lose focus: I hope to start =
other emails threads on other less important issues, e.g. how much risk =
is there that P256 is weak and the impact on the rest of ECC, random v =
special, how special are safecurves, relative importance of side-channel =
resistance v DLP, risks of parameters v keys, do attacks target curves, =
random v pseudorandom, and so on.&nbsp; So, I hope that that this thread =
can be kept focussed on this one issue.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>To summarize my position, and =
divide into candidate pieces for discusssion: <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span lang=3DEN-CA><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-CA>Pseudorandomness =
protects effectively (as possible for ECC) against the spectral weakness =
necessary to hypothesize a malicious NIST P256.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span lang=3DEN-CA><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-CA>Rigidity protects =
against the spectral weakness only by invoking assumptions about =
spectral weakness (*).<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span lang=3DEN-CA><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-CA>Protecting against =
attacks, such as the hypothetical spectral weakness, is more important =
than (subsumes?) protecting against malicious =
generation.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA>Regarding (*), the assumptions about the spectral weakness, =
I may wish to start a separate thread to discuss.&nbsp; It seems that =
the safecurves site does not say too much about it, but there was some =
pertinent email discussion on the TLS list, that I think merits some =
consideration for the CFRG.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>Best =
regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><table class=3DMsoNormalTable =
border=3D0 cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 width=3D750 =
style=3D'width:6.25in'><tr><td style=3D'padding:0in 0in 3.0pt 0in'><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'line-height:11.25pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black'>Da=
niel Brown<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=3D'padding:0in =
0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-top:3.75pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#0073BC'>=
Research In Motion Limited</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black'> =
<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr></table><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif";display:none'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><table =
class=3DMsoNormalTable border=3D0 cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 =
width=3D750 style=3D'width:6.25in'><tr><td style=3D'padding:0in 0in 0in =
0in'></td></tr></table><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif";display:none'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><table =
class=3DMsoNormalTable border=3D0 cellspacing=3D3 cellpadding=3D0 =
width=3D750 style=3D'width:6.25in'><tr><td style=3D'padding:9.75pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'><img =
border=3D0 width=3D176 height=3D43 id=3D"_x0000_i1025" =
src=3D"cid:image001.jpg@01CF1056.53B95340"></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td width=3D750 =
style=3D'width:6.25in;padding:9.75pt 0in 0in 0in'></td></tr></table><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></body></html>
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From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Mon Jan 13 10:25:29 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'arne renkema-padmos' <arne.renkema-padmos@cased.de>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 18:25:07 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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I believe there is a consensus on the mailing list for the RG to commit
to identifying public key algorithms suitable for use should advances in=20
quantum computing make Shor's algorithm a viable threat. I agree with=20
William that the transition should start before we are forced to do so.=20
As JFK said, "The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining".

Volunteers for authors greatly appreciated. No need to limit ourselves
to a single technology/draft this early in the process.

Any dissenting voices out there should speak up now.

-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of arne renkema-padmos
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 9:57 AM
To: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer

On 13/01/14 11:48, William Whyte wrote:
> I don't think you can say that just because there have been few=20
> discontinuities in the security of algorithms there will be no=20
> discontinuities in the future. There might be, and if it does happen=20
> unexpectedly it'll be a big problem. It's not a problem we need to=20
> work on right now, but, again, that makes this a really good time >
to address it.

It makes sense to have a fallback algorithm set, as ETSI has done with the =
3GPP algorithms:

http://www.etsi.org/services/security-algorithms/3gpp-algorithms

They standardised both KASUMI and SNOW 3G with the requirements for SNOW 3G=
 as fallback algorithm being:
* maximizing "cryptographic distance" from KASUMI
* minimizing potential vulnerability to algebraic attacks
See:
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ecrypt/courses/end/slides-28/8-gilbert.p=
df

Cheers,
arne

--
Arne Renkema-Padmos
@hcisec, secuso.org
Doctoral researcher
CASED, TU Darmstadt
_______________________________________________
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Cfrg@irtf.org
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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan 13 13:26:24 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 8:55 AM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> wrote:
>
> Last week I wrote that I would soon write up my disagreements with the sa=
fe curves site.
>
>
>
> My first disagreement is written up below, but first two editorial issues=
:
>
>
>
> -        My last email was in the context of Watson=E2=80=99s draft spec =
for the Chicago (Bernstein?) curves, but I would like to detach the issue f=
rom the I-D.  My comment about the reference in Watson=E2=80=99s I-D to a w=
ebsite was just an editorial comment.
>
>
>
> -        These technical issues that I hope CFRG discusses just might be =
resolved and written into a CFRG I-D cataloging of elliptic curves and thei=
r relative merits and so on, which should be independent of Watson=E2=80=99=
s spec for the Chicago curves.  For now, I opted to discuss via email list,=
 rather than placing these arguments into my own one-sided individual I-D. =
 Please advise me if such an I-D is preferred to email.


I think this is an excellent idea (the catalogue of good curves).

>
>
>
> Today, I checked that
>
>
>
> http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html
>
>  <snip>

Rather then engage a peripheral argument, let me lay out the case for
the Chicago curves (named after the city in which Bernstein resides,
and in a long IETF tradition starting with TCP Reno, Oakley key
agreement protocol, and fundamentally of no import: see Shakespeare,
Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2, or Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations for more information) in the fairest light.

First efficiency: point addition on an Edwards curve costs 11
multiplications, doubling 7 multiplications. This is for a complete,
strongly unified addition formula, which requires no work for special
cases. By contrast on a short Weierstrass curve addition costs 16
multiplications, doubling 8.
This is with no assumptions on Z, which if we impose reduce the cost
of addition on a short Weierstrass curve to 11 multiplications. But if
we impose the same condition on the Edwards curve, the cost is 10
multiplications.

However, I've forced the Edwards curve to represent the identity,
which if we are willing to drop, slices off two more multiplications.
By contrast the
Weierstrass curve has special cases that need additional work to
handle in a secure manner. Most people just don't bother. I also let
the Weierstrass form be special with a=3D-3, while keeping the Edwards
curve fully general.

So given the same prime Edwards has short Weierstrass beat. This is
true no matter what algorithm for exponentiation is used. And I even
gave short Weierstrass curves a handicap by letting them avoid
representing the entire curve and having exceptional cases, and fix
some parameters.

Montgomery form is even better: differential addition costs 10M, and
calculates a doubling for free. Sadly the differential part makes
radix-k algorithms tough, but in memory constrained environments (like
hardware) Montgomery form can't be beat. (And we haven't even used
nonuniform differential addition chains yet.. I'm still hopeful).

Then there is the prime shape: Brainpool uses a random prime, which is
a terrible idea from an efficiency perspective. NIST primes are sized
for 32 bit machines, and have some hiccups on 64 bit machines. But the
Chicago primes are primes for all seasons: 2^k-c with small c is nice
no matter what radix you adopt. Unsaturated arithmetic makes addition
faster because reductions aren't necessary at all times, and the
Chicago primes are good from that perspective.

Now security: having an efficient complete addition formula makes
writing timing, cache, and branch side channel free code a piece of
cake. By contrast short Weierstrass curves have all sorts of wrong
curve, or invalid point, or somewhere the calculation messes up
issues. Usually the defense is a final check on the result being on
the code, but that isn't the same as knowing that no attack is
possible because your code always generates the right answer.

Lastly, many websites want to deploy PFS ciphersuites but are deterred
by the computation expense involved. Minimizing that expense is
essential. In the wider IETF context we are catering to devices from
the lowly MSP430, to the latest and greatest supercomputer. What does
Brainpool let us do? We should stick to the NIST and Chicago curves:
NIST for those who require it, and Chicago for those who require the
extra speed.

I would like to hear good arguments against this position. Robert
Ransom I understand wants twisted Edwards curves for an extra bit of
speed, using isogenies to keep them the same as the Chicago curves,
but selecting only those with small parameters and particularly nice
prime shapes.
Dan Brown believes that the Brainpool primes are less special in a way
that has to do with ECC security, despite this never affecting ECC
before.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From dbrown@certicom.com  Mon Jan 13 15:08:13 2014
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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless
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I agree 100% with David McGrew's message and
recommendations for the group.  I agree with his
assessment of QKD; QKD is pointless.  At present
it doesn't solve any real-world problem we actually
have.  Also, all considered, I agree that it is not a
good use of CFRG's time to develop QKD protocols
or I-D's describing how to do QKD.

Basically, I second everything David McGrew wrote.

-- David

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014, at 04:02 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi Kevin,
> 
> On 01/08/2014 01:06 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
> > We really need to make sure at least some of the mailing list
> > has some expertise in a given area before we commit ourselves
> > to working in that area,
> 
> I completely agree, the RG needs to be cautious about making sure that 
> it does not overcommit to work.
> 
> > and anything with "quantum" in the name
> > requires expertise I expect very few (if any) of the maining list
> > possess.  I suggest before committing to a topic we poll the
> > mailing list to see who has both expertise on a given topic and
> > an employer who is willing to donate the time and resources
> > needed to follow through.
> 
> I think I was not clear in what I meant, please see inline below:
> 
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM
> >> To: Sean Turner
> >> Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org
> >> Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
> >>
> >> Hi Sean,
> >>
> >> On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> >>> My list is kind of short:
> >> thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize
> >> work.
> >>
> >>> 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS
> >> or not:
> >>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html
> >>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html
> >>>
> >>> If so, let's do a draft!
> >>>
> >>> 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am
> >> I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about
> >> (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in
> >> fear):
> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/
> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/
> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/
> >>>
> >>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering:
> >>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt
> >>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt
> >> #0 and #1 are well worth discussion.   For now, I will only comment on
> >> #2.
> >>
> >> Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem
> >> that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for
> >> extensive use in the Internet.
> >>
> >> The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational
> >> assumptions for security.   However, it relies on physical assumptions
> >> for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer.
> >> This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any
> >> point between the encrypter and decrypter.   In addition, QKD requires
> >> large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder
> >> problem
> >> in the real world than pseudorandomnes.   (In other words: a QKD system
> >> could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable
> >> elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that
> >> algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?)
> >>
> >> QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very
> >> severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support.
> >> The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit
> >> per second at 20 KM range.   Using that technology, we need 10,000
> >> repeaters to get global scale communication.   This would require the
> >> pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along
> >> the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be
> >> trusted.  There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not
> >> need to be trusted,
> >>
> >> The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a
> >> conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea.
> >> It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as
> >> whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has.   It is *more*
> >> vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same
> >> cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution.
> >>
> >> QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons,
> >> and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as
> >> 4G
> >> and 802.11.   The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy
> >> than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not
> >> geometrically point to point.   So even if QKD didn't suffer from the
> >> problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion
> >> cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users.
> >>
> >> QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in
> >> information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend,
> >> Could, virtualization, and collaboration.
> >>
> >> I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium
> >> Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum
> >> key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim
> >> in the title.   The important observation here is that the classical
> >> Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable
> >> storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure
> >> communication, is quantifiably better than QKD.   Vernam does not have
> >> any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range
> >> limitations, and it can be used over wireless.   Its data rate will
> >> depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a
> >> trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a
> >> courier
> >> need not travel that often to match its data rate.   The important
> >> inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that
> >> all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we
> >> would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and
> >> not QKD.   The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest
> >> in
> >> QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of
> >> what would be useful in information security.
> >>
> >> My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived
> >> http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html)   If we need
> >> to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something
> >> on it.
> 
> Instead of the last sentence, what I should have said is: if there is a 
> need to better explain and/or defend the points outlined above, I 
> personally would be willing to spend the time to write them up.
> 
> Speaking as an individual here: I don't think QKD is something worth the 
> RG's time.   Post-quantum crypto, on the other hand, is something I 
> would be very glad to see work on.
> 
> David
> 
> >>
> >> David
> >>
> >>> spt
> > .
> >
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Mon Jan 13 15:35:14 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [irsg] IRSG review of draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb
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Hi David,

On 01/13/2014 07:48 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> So you don't need to look for it: the ticket for draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/group/irtf/trac/ticket/55
> 
> Stephen, thanks for offering to do the review.

No problem. My review below. My points are all nits. This is
ready.

- I think s/privacy/confidentiality/g would be a good change.
Privacy involves more than confidentiality and crypto only
provides the latter. But this draft is by no means the only
sinner in this respect.

- "As with most modes of operation, security degrades in the
square of the number of blocks of texts divided by two to the
blocklength." That could do with a reference or being expanded a
bit. The CFRG reader should be ok with it but if/when OCB gets
some IETF adoption, or when this is read by less crypto-aware
folk, that will be too terse I think. (The same point is made in
the security considerations more clearly so maybe could be
deleted from the earlier section. But maybe its now in twice
because of someone else's comment;-)

- I didn't check the algorithm description nor examples in
detail as IRSG review assumes the RG did that.

Process crapology below. CFRG can ignore.

- Section 6 - Its normal to actually ask IANA to do stuff so
they know what to do when reviewing the draft. And then the text
is changed by the RFC editor to say that IANA has added etc. No
big deal because they'll figure it out.

- Not related to this draft: RFC 5116 says AEAD registrations
SHOULD be reviewed by CFRG. What if CFRG ceases to exist? Be no
harm to sometime say who'd inherit that role maybe. I guess if
the IRTF don't say, and if/when CFRG passes away, then IANA will
ask the IAB/IRSG/IESG probably and there'll be a minor fuss when
someone gets the wrong end of the stick. That's one for Lars
really - what should happen in general with IANA registries
depending on expired RGs for review? (My take - IRTF chair
appoints an expert reviewer or two when killing an RG with
registries and use IRSG list for discussion of requests until
that gets to be a PITA. But before Lars asks, no, I won't
write a draft describing that just now:-)

- I note that the IETF tools page doesn't list the IPR for this
but does for draft-krovetz-ocb. The datatracker page does show
the IPR correctly. I thought that had been fixed since the
replaced-by stuff seems right here. Ah well.

Cheers,
S.


From wwhyte@securityinnovation.com  Mon Jan 13 16:05:29 2014
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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
References: <52C755AA.70200@cisco.com> <33E0BF53-A331-4646-B080-FD4F6E13916E@ieca.com> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D29B10.4030401@cisco.com> <CACz1E9rsLRwqpA0fS2RNOcpsn7DMqaN=7dcJDQqEi8HDMKKonQ@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0c=mYv7v3fGCHCe9D5w2j+gRWWsmoUA7NQ=AsczTMP1rDw@mail.gmail.com> <d4d82e7c3988ce4908202185921ed7bb@mail.gmail.com> <52D3FEC2.4080602@cased.de> <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CABA9A1B1B@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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We can write an I-D on NTRUEncrypt and other NTRU algorithms, though this
won't happen until the end of this quarter.

I'm also still interested in combining public-key algorithms, see separate
thread.

William

-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Igoe, Kevin M.
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 1:25 PM
To: 'arne renkema-padmos'; cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer

I believe there is a consensus on the mailing list for the RG to commit to
identifying public key algorithms suitable for use should advances in
quantum computing make Shor's algorithm a viable threat. I agree with
William that the transition should start before we are forced to do so.
As JFK said, "The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining".

Volunteers for authors greatly appreciated. No need to limit ourselves to
a single technology/draft this early in the process.

Any dissenting voices out there should speak up now.

-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of arne renkema-padmos
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 9:57 AM
To: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer

On 13/01/14 11:48, William Whyte wrote:
> I don't think you can say that just because there have been few
> discontinuities in the security of algorithms there will be no
> discontinuities in the future. There might be, and if it does happen
> unexpectedly it'll be a big problem. It's not a problem we need to
> work on right now, but, again, that makes this a really good time >
to address it.

It makes sense to have a fallback algorithm set, as ETSI has done with the
3GPP algorithms:

http://www.etsi.org/services/security-algorithms/3gpp-algorithms

They standardised both KASUMI and SNOW 3G with the requirements for SNOW
3G as fallback algorithm being:
* maximizing "cryptographic distance" from KASUMI
* minimizing potential vulnerability to algebraic attacks
See:
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ecrypt/courses/end/slides-28/8-gilbert.
pdf

Cheers,
arne

--
Arne Renkema-Padmos
@hcisec, secuso.org
Doctoral researcher
CASED, TU Darmstadt
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From akr@akr.io  Mon Jan 13 16:27:08 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 13/01/2014 23:07, Dan Brown wrote:

> For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret
> attacks than rigidity.

With respect, I disagree.

With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero knowledge
about what may, or may not, be affected by it.


A point to note here: brainpoolP256r1 has a _very_ weak twist
(ρ @ 2^44) - a practical problem only in a flawed implementation that
doesn't check for invalid points. But here nevertheless, we actually
have a curve generated in a documented pseudorandom manner, yet has at
least one desirable property distinctly less secure than all of its
tested peers.

Why? Bad luck, it seems.


I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable curve
design which resists all known attacks, to rolling the dice and hoping
it resists a hypothetical attack that we know nothing about.

Hence my preference for the "Safecurves" approach, and thus the
"Chicago" curves.

That some of them can be (and have been) implemented in an extremely
efficient way, and thus are exceptionally well-suited for the
important task of accelerating wide adoption of forward security in
internet protocols, I also find a highly desirable point in their
favour - as, it seems, do many others.

I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.

- -- 
/akr
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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan 13 16:36:25 2014
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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 16:36:10 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 3:07 PM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> wrote:
> Watson,
>
> I had requested to keep this thread focused, specifically in the impact p=
seudorandom v rigid on security, but you declined to engage. Is it that you=
 think this security issue unimportant, even though you concede with my nar=
row point?

I think it's completely bogus. People aren't primarily interested in
the Chicago curves because of unknown attacks, but NSA cookery over
NIST+the efficiency and security benefits they offer.

>
> Instead, you mostly repeated the general speed and side channel benefits =
of Chicago, which I was not yet disputing.

You know, when it comes to speed there is a way to decide which is
faster: eBATS. And what eBATS says about P256 vs Curve25519 is not
good.
Want to argue about speed? Submit code. Want to argue about
multiplications? Get formulas into EFD.

Furthermore, what is your position on the question of ECC choices?
Instead of going around in circles of increasing irrelevance, let's
have it between these options:

0: Nothing
1: NIST
2: Brainpool
3: Chicago
4: NIST+Brainpool
5: Brainpool+Chicago
6: NIST+Chicago
7:NIST+Brainpool+Chicago

Each of these options has costs. Each has advantages. And I've not
even scratched the surface: maybe P256 stays, along with
Ed448-Goldilocks,
and P521. So far I think that 2 alone is terrible, 1 alone okay, 3
alone superior (but anything sans NIST is a nonstarter for DOD), so 6
seems good,
because no one will pick brainpool from 7.

>
> Also, you suggested that I was referring to the field choices. I did not =
intend to, but I should clarify.
>
> For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks than =
rigidity.

What about the known attacks which Brainpool implementations suffer
from? There still isn't a side-channel clean one
that gets correct answers all the time. Contrast with NIST and the new
curves. (Yes, we need to churn out some code, but
it's clear it can be done). I admire your persistence in
necroequoflagellation,  but as DJB observed the previous time
this came up, you've simply declared 486662 special, with no evidence
that the curve is actually special.
If you noticed a particularly unusual endomorphism, or an interesting
map to some other scheme, or the Q-lift having unusually
large rank, or an infinite Tate-Sharavich group, that would be reason
to worry or consider it special. But the coefficient being small?
What's so special about that?

>
> Field size would on my list of issues, but way, way down on my ranking of=
 importance.
>
> A couple people have suggested to me (off list) to generate new curves wi=
th explainable seeds but the same fields as NIST curves.

These people should not be listened to: the world does not need more
short Weierstrass curves. Pick rigid Edwards curves over the same
field, and make a small for speed. I understand the field
proliferation concern, particularly for hardware, but that's where a
lot of speed comes from: ask AGL or Rich Salz how much speed they want
to give up. We have Rich Salz on record as saying that Akamai is held
back from PFS by the CPU demand, and with Curve25519 that will be
solved. In software additional fields cost little.

>
> The result would seem to be intermediate between Brainpool and Chicago.
>
> My main reluctance with that would further babble, and yet more difficult=
y with interoperability.

Interop solution: MTI. Odds are people will pick a hardness, and the
fastest thing that delivers that hardness will win out. Also,
make clear standards can exclude curves, even to the extent of picking
one and saying "This is it!". I think the majority of protocols where
performance in software is a concern and correctness of implementation
an issue should consider Curve25519 carefully, but I am not going to
argue that I know better than the communities around these protocols
what is appropriate for the hardware they are looking at running on
and the constraints they face. Some protocols will need to dispense
with choices because of these limitations I am going to argue that I
know cryptography better than they do in most cases, and that's how I
see this question: making a catalog of curves, where you can reach in
and go "Oh, this one has high software performance, acceptable
hardware performance, good security, useful for ECDH" or "This one is
great in hardware, ok in software, moderate security (and some
gotchas), all protocols" and make a choice easily.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
>
> From: Watson Ladd
> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 4:26 PM
> To: Dan Brown
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 8:55 AM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> wrote:
>>
>> Last week I wrote that I would soon write up my disagreements with the s=
afe curves site.
>>
>>
>>
>> My first disagreement is written up below, but first two editorial issue=
s:
>>
>>
>>
>> - My last email was in the context of Watson=E2=80=99s draft spec for th=
e Chicago (Bernstein?) curves, but I would like to detach the issue from th=
e I-D. My comment about the reference in Watson=E2=80=99s I-D to a website =
was just an editorial comment.
>>
>>
>>
>> - These technical issues that I hope CFRG discusses just might be resolv=
ed and written into a CFRG I-D cataloging of elliptic curves and their rela=
tive merits and so on, which should be independent of Watson=E2=80=99s spec=
 for the Chicago curves. For now, I opted to discuss via email list, rather=
 than placing these arguments into my own one-sided individual I-D. Please =
advise me if such an I-D is preferred to email.
>
>
> I think this is an excellent idea (the catalogue of good curves).
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Today, I checked that
>>
>>
>>
>> http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html
>>
>> <snip>
>
> Rather then engage a peripheral argument, let me lay out the case for
> the Chicago curves (named after the city in which Bernstein resides,
> and in a long IETF tradition starting with TCP Reno, Oakley key
> agreement protocol, and fundamentally of no import: see Shakespeare,
> Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2, or Wittgenstein, Philosophical
> Investigations for more information) in the fairest light.
>
> First efficiency: point addition on an Edwards curve costs 11
> multiplications, doubling 7 multiplications. This is for a complete,
> strongly unified addition formula, which requires no work for special
> cases. By contrast on a short Weierstrass curve addition costs 16
> multiplications, doubling 8.
> This is with no assumptions on Z, which if we impose reduce the cost
> of addition on a short Weierstrass curve to 11 multiplications. But if
> we impose the same condition on the Edwards curve, the cost is 10
> multiplications.
>
> However, I've forced the Edwards curve to represent the identity,
> which if we are willing to drop, slices off two more multiplications.
> By contrast the
> Weierstrass curve has special cases that need additional work to
> handle in a secure manner. Most people just don't bother. I also let
> the Weierstrass form be special with a=3D-3, while keeping the Edwards
> curve fully general.
>
> So given the same prime Edwards has short Weierstrass beat. This is
> true no matter what algorithm for exponentiation is used. And I even
> gave short Weierstrass curves a handicap by letting them avoid
> representing the entire curve and having exceptional cases, and fix
> some parameters.
>
> Montgomery form is even better: differential addition costs 10M, and
> calculates a doubling for free. Sadly the differential part makes
> radix-k algorithms tough, but in memory constrained environments (like
> hardware) Montgomery form can't be beat. (And we haven't even used
> nonuniform differential addition chains yet.. I'm still hopeful).
>
> Then there is the prime shape: Brainpool uses a random prime, which is
> a terrible idea from an efficiency perspective. NIST primes are sized
> for 32 bit machines, and have some hiccups on 64 bit machines. But the
> Chicago primes are primes for all seasons: 2^k-c with small c is nice
> no matter what radix you adopt. Unsaturated arithmetic makes addition
> faster because reductions aren't necessary at all times, and the
> Chicago primes are good from that perspective.
>
> Now security: having an efficient complete addition formula makes
> writing timing, cache, and branch side channel free code a piece of
> cake. By contrast short Weierstrass curves have all sorts of wrong
> curve, or invalid point, or somewhere the calculation messes up
> issues. Usually the defense is a final check on the result being on
> the code, but that isn't the same as knowing that no attack is
> possible because your code always generates the right answer.
>
> Lastly, many websites want to deploy PFS ciphersuites but are deterred
> by the computation expense involved. Minimizing that expense is
> essential. In the wider IETF context we are catering to devices from
> the lowly MSP430, to the latest and greatest supercomputer. What does
> Brainpool let us do? We should stick to the NIST and Chicago curves:
> NIST for those who require it, and Chicago for those who require the
> extra speed.
>
> I would like to hear good arguments against this position. Robert
> Ransom I understand wants twisted Edwards curves for an extra bit of
> speed, using isogenies to keep them the same as the Chicago curves,
> but selecting only those with small parameters and particularly nice
> prime shapes.
> Dan Brown believes that the Brainpool primes are less special in a way
> that has to do with ECC security, despite this never affecting ECC
> before.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential in=
formation, privileged material (including material protected by the solicit=
or-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-public informa=
tion. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intended recipie=
nt is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please i=
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 unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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On Jan 13, 2014, at 4:36 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 3:07 PM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> =
wrote:
>> Watson,
>>=20
>> I had requested to keep this thread focused, specifically in the =
impact pseudorandom v rigid on security, but you declined to engage. Is =
it that you think this security issue unimportant, even though you =
concede with my narrow point?
>=20
> I think it's completely bogus. People aren't primarily interested in
> the Chicago curves because of unknown attacks, but NSA cookery over
> NIST+the efficiency and security benefits they offer.

Speak for yourself.  I=92m interested in a standard which has a better =
chance of resisting unknown attacks, and I=92m not as concerned about =
NSA cookery as you are.

I agree that random (or pseudorandom) curves are preferable to rigid =
ones, so long as they are generated with the rest of the Safecurves =
properties.  The problem is, they are much harder to generate.  Maybe =
shake up some dice or Boggle boards at the CRYPTO rump session?  Or make =
a Bitcoin donation to EFF annotated with the hash of your software, and =
use the hash of its block?  Dunno.  The Brainpool method has too many =
degrees of freedom to convince everyone.

Either way, I feel that the highest practical ECC security level would =
come from a verifiably pseudorandom curve over a verifiably pseudorandom =
field.  This is because it will take either a significant mathematical =
breakthrough or a quantum computer to break existing 120s-ish-bit-secure =
curves such as Curve25519, anytime in the foreseeable future.  If it=92s =
a quantum computer or a breakthrough that kills all curves, we=92re =
screwed.

So that leaves a breakthrough which kills only curves with special =
properties, or only improves speed somewhat (eg, p^1/4 instead of =
p^1/2).  Given that, should we choose curves with known special =
properties that aren=92t required for security?  (Small d, special =
fields?)  Or should we try to be as random as possible, constrained only =
by properties that have a good security argument?

The downsides are difficulty of generation, and speed: a random field =
would be at least twice as slow.  So if I had to take 3 next-gen curves =
to a desert island, I=92d go for:

* Ed25519.  It=92s deployed, it=92s implemented, it=92s significantly =
faster and easier to make secure than NIST P256.  There are other =
options, but this one works.  Once again, probably nobody is going to =
break this with a rho attack in the next couple of decades.

* Something with a bigger fast field.  Ed448-Goldilocks is my entry for =
that, but the others are also fine.  A pseudorandom $d$ value would =
probably improve things, if you could get confidence that it=92s not =
rigged.  Whichever way this goes, ops on such a curve will take about 4x =
as long as Ed25519 in software.

* A pseudorandom curve over a pseudorandom 512-bit field.  Operations on =
such a curve will probably take at least 12x as long as Ed25519, and at =
least 16x if it=92s a short Weierstrass curve.

In any case, if we list any pseudorandom curves, they should have most =
of the Safecurves properties except rigidity.  Some of the properties =
really aren=92t necessary (eg, Elligator), and basically end up just =
requiring Edwards curves.  There=92s a decent case that Edwards is a =
better shape than short Weierstrass anyway though, and in that case we =
should go for all the properties except rigidity.

Cheers,
=97 Mike=

--Apple-Mail=_687856FA-F007-425C-8625-AFB4D24E6C1C
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=windows-1252

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><br><div><div>On Jan 13, 2014, at 4:36 PM, Watson =
Ladd &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com">watsonbladd@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 3:07 PM, =
Dan Brown &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dbrown@certicom.com">dbrown@certicom.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Watson,<br><br>I had requested to =
keep this thread focused, specifically in the impact pseudorandom v =
rigid on security, but you declined to engage. Is it that you think this =
security issue unimportant, even though you concede with my narrow =
point?<br></blockquote><br>I think it's completely bogus. People aren't =
primarily interested in<br>the Chicago curves because of unknown =
attacks, but NSA cookery over<br>NIST+the efficiency and security =
benefits they offer.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Speak for =
yourself. &nbsp;I=92m interested in a standard which has a better chance =
of resisting unknown attacks, and I=92m not as concerned about NSA =
cookery as you are.</div><div><div><br></div><div>I agree that random =
(or pseudorandom) curves are preferable to rigid ones, so long as they =
are generated with the rest of the Safecurves properties. &nbsp;The =
problem is, they are much harder to generate. &nbsp;Maybe shake up some =
dice or Boggle boards at the CRYPTO rump session? &nbsp;Or make a =
Bitcoin donation to EFF annotated with the hash of your software, and =
use the hash of its block? &nbsp;Dunno. &nbsp;The Brainpool method has =
too many degrees of freedom to convince =
everyone.</div><div><br></div><div>Either way, I feel that the highest =
practical ECC security level would come from a verifiably pseudorandom =
curve over a verifiably pseudorandom field. &nbsp;This is because it =
will take either a significant mathematical breakthrough or a quantum =
computer to break existing 120s-ish-bit-secure curves such as =
Curve25519, anytime in the foreseeable future. &nbsp;If it=92s a quantum =
computer or a breakthrough that kills all curves, we=92re =
screwed.</div><div><br></div><div>So that leaves a breakthrough which =
kills only curves with special properties, or only improves speed =
somewhat (eg, p^1/4 instead of p^1/2). &nbsp;Given that, should we =
choose curves with known special properties that aren=92t required for =
security? &nbsp;(Small d, special fields?) &nbsp;Or should we try to be =
as random as possible, constrained only by properties that have a good =
security argument?</div><div><br></div><div>The downsides are difficulty =
of generation, and speed: a random field would be at least twice as =
slow. &nbsp;So if I had to take 3 next-gen curves to a desert island, =
I=92d go for:</div><div><br></div><div>* Ed25519. &nbsp;It=92s deployed, =
it=92s implemented, it=92s significantly faster and easier to make =
secure than NIST P256. &nbsp;There are other options, but this one =
works. &nbsp;Once again, probably nobody is going to break this with a =
rho attack in the next couple of decades.</div><div><br></div><div>* =
Something with a bigger fast field. &nbsp;Ed448-Goldilocks is my entry =
for that, but the others are also fine. &nbsp;A pseudorandom $d$ value =
would probably improve things, if you could get confidence that it=92s =
not rigged. &nbsp;Whichever way this goes, ops on such a curve will take =
about 4x as long as Ed25519 in software.</div><div><br></div><div>* A =
pseudorandom curve over a pseudorandom 512-bit field. &nbsp;Operations =
on such a curve will probably take at least 12x as long as Ed25519, and =
at least 16x if it=92s a short Weierstrass =
curve.</div><div><br></div><div>In any case, if we list any pseudorandom =
curves, they should have most of the Safecurves properties except =
rigidity. &nbsp;Some of the properties really aren=92t necessary (eg, =
Elligator), and basically end up just requiring Edwards curves. =
&nbsp;There=92s a decent case that Edwards is a better shape than short =
Weierstrass anyway though, and in that case we should go for all the =
properties except rigidity.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>=97=
 Mike</div></div></div></body></html>=

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 17:21:51 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 5:21 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>> Furthermore, what is your position on the question of ECC choices?
>> Instead of going around in circles of increasing irrelevance, let's
>> have it between these options:
>>
>> 0: Nothing
>> 1: NIST
>> 2: Brainpool
>> 3: Chicago
>> 4: NIST+Brainpool
>> 5: Brainpool+Chicago
>> 6: NIST+Chicago
>> 7: NIST+Brainpool+Chicago
>>
>> Each of these options has costs. Each has advantages. And I've not even
>> scratched the surface: maybe P256 stays, along with Ed448-Goldilocks,
>> and P521. So far I think that 2 alone is terrible, 1 alone okay, 3
>> alone superior (but anything sans NIST is a nonstarter for DOD), so 6
>> seems good, because no one will pick brainpool from 7.
>
> It's na=C3=AFve to think that we can make 'choices' here in the CFRG or I=
ETF.
> I am not sure of your prior experience in the standards
> making process, but it is a consensus building effort that builds on
> clear documentation.  The best we can do is to clearly document new
> options and fairly show the potential benefits.
>
> Individual products, industry consortiums, Governments may mandate
> specific choices.  Even then, it is impossible to rapidly remove
> any type of standard once fielded - even if there are clear security
> problems (SHA-1, WEP, etc.)
>
> There are no known significant attacks against the NIST/SECG curves,
> only a fashionable suspicion of NIST and the NSA.  They will
> be in use for a long time.  Fashion does have its place and
> we do need to consider and document the real level of confidence
> that we have as an industry in any algorithm.
>
> Curves based on 'new ECC math' for Edwards curves shows significant
> potential for more efficient and easier implementations (I include
> side channel protection under easier implementations).  A major
> challenge we have is to provide clarity that we are introducing new
> math ways to make calculations on elliptic curves.  The Small
> Weierstrass curves have been so dominate in literature and
> standards that they are described as 'the' elliptic curve.

'New'. I'm sorry, but Montgomery form is from 1985.
Granted that's a century after Weierstrass form, but it actually
is contemporaneous with ECC being invented.

If the fact that the equations look different doesn't tip someone off
to the difference, I'm not sure what will. Do we need great big flashing
lights *this is not in short Weierstrass form*? And what does it say
about our implementors that they do not know the basics of the algorithms
they are asked to implement?

>
> I am very supportive of our introduction of these families of
> new curves.  Speed and ease of correct/secure implementation
> are significant benefits of the 'new math'.
>
> So ... on choices, we can strongly recommend based on the benefits.
> Suite B will live on for a long time based on the slow pace
> of Government initiatives.
>
> Brainpool, the previous fashionable alternative seems less fashionable to=
day.
>
> Edwards based curves seem an optimal choice where new
> curves are able to be introduced. They are both fashionable (not NIST)
> and have demonstrable benefits.
>
>
> Now ... the current draft does seem confusing to me in this context on
> benefits and clear curve recommendations.  There are a few too many and
> we could trim or clarify when each would be used.

Feel free to make suggestions offlist. In fact, you can even submit diffs.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> Paul
>
>> >
>> > Also, you suggested that I was referring to the field choices. I did
>> not intend to, but I should clarify.
>> >
>> > For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
>> than rigidity.
>
>
>>
>> What about the known attacks which Brainpool implementations suffer
>> from? There still isn't a side-channel clean one that gets correct
>> answers all the time. Contrast with NIST and the new curves. (Yes, we
>> need to churn out some code, but it's clear it can be done). I admire
>> your persistence in necroequoflagellation,  but as DJB observed the
>> previous time this came up, you've simply declared 486662 special, with
>> no evidence that the curve is actually special.
>> If you noticed a particularly unusual endomorphism, or an interesting
>> map to some other scheme, or the Q-lift having unusually large rank, or
>> an infinite Tate-Sharavich group, that would be reason to worry or
>> consider it special. But the coefficient being small?
>> What's so special about that?
>>
>> >
>> > Field size would on my list of issues, but way, way down on my
>> ranking of importance.
>> >
>> > A couple people have suggested to me (off list) to generate new
>> curves with explainable seeds but the same fields as NIST curves.
>>
>> These people should not be listened to: the world does not need more
>> short Weierstrass curves. Pick rigid Edwards curves over the same
>> field, and make a small for speed. I understand the field proliferation
>> concern, particularly for hardware, but that's where a lot of speed
>> comes from: ask AGL or Rich Salz how much speed they want to give up.
>> We have Rich Salz on record as saying that Akamai is held back from PFS
>> by the CPU demand, and with Curve25519 that will be solved. In software
>> additional fields cost little.
>>
>> >
>> > The result would seem to be intermediate between Brainpool and
>> Chicago.
>> >
>> > My main reluctance with that would further babble, and yet more
>> difficulty with interoperability.
>>
>> Interop solution: MTI. Odds are people will pick a hardness, and the
>> fastest thing that delivers that hardness will win out. Also, make
>> clear standards can exclude curves, even to the extent of picking one
>> and saying "This is it!". I think the majority of protocols where
>> performance in software is a concern and correctness of implementation
>> an issue should consider Curve25519 carefully, but I am not going to
>> argue that I know better than the communities around these protocols
>> what is appropriate for the hardware they are looking at running on and
>> the constraints they face. Some protocols will need to dispense with
>> choices because of these limitations I am going to argue that I know
>> cryptography better than they do in most cases, and that's how I see
>> this question: making a catalog of curves, where you can reach in and
>> go "Oh, this one has high software performance, acceptable hardware
>> performance, good security, useful for ECDH" or "This one is great in
>> hardware, ok in software, moderate security (and some gotchas), all
>> protocols" and make a choice easily.
>>
>> Sincerely,
>> Watson Ladd
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > From: Watson Ladd
>> > Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 4:26 PM
>> > To: Dan Brown
>> > Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
>> > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v
>> > Pseudorandom
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 8:55 AM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Last week I wrote that I would soon write up my disagreements with
>> the safe curves site.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> My first disagreement is written up below, but first two editorial
>> issues:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> - My last email was in the context of Watson=E2=80=99s draft spec for=
 the
>> Chicago (Bernstein?) curves, but I would like to detach the issue from
>> the I-D. My comment about the reference in Watson=E2=80=99s I-D to a web=
site
>> was just an editorial comment.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> - These technical issues that I hope CFRG discusses just might be
>> resolved and written into a CFRG I-D cataloging of elliptic curves and
>> their relative merits and so on, which should be independent of
>> Watson=E2=80=99s spec for the Chicago curves. For now, I opted to discus=
s via
>> email list, rather than placing these arguments into my own one-sided
>> individual I-D. Please advise me if such an I-D is preferred to email.
>> >
>> >
>> > I think this is an excellent idea (the catalogue of good curves).
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Today, I checked that
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html
>> >>
>> >> <snip>
>> >
>> > Rather then engage a peripheral argument, let me lay out the case for
>> > the Chicago curves (named after the city in which Bernstein resides,
>> > and in a long IETF tradition starting with TCP Reno, Oakley key
>> > agreement protocol, and fundamentally of no import: see Shakespeare,
>> > Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2, or Wittgenstein, Philosophical
>> > Investigations for more information) in the fairest light.
>> >
>> > First efficiency: point addition on an Edwards curve costs 11
>> > multiplications, doubling 7 multiplications. This is for a complete,
>> > strongly unified addition formula, which requires no work for special
>> > cases. By contrast on a short Weierstrass curve addition costs 16
>> > multiplications, doubling 8.
>> > This is with no assumptions on Z, which if we impose reduce the cost
>> > of addition on a short Weierstrass curve to 11 multiplications. But
>> if
>> > we impose the same condition on the Edwards curve, the cost is 10
>> > multiplications.
>> >
>> > However, I've forced the Edwards curve to represent the identity,
>> > which if we are willing to drop, slices off two more multiplications.
>> > By contrast the
>> > Weierstrass curve has special cases that need additional work to
>> > handle in a secure manner. Most people just don't bother. I also let
>> > the Weierstrass form be special with a=3D-3, while keeping the Edwards
>> > curve fully general.
>> >
>> > So given the same prime Edwards has short Weierstrass beat. This is
>> > true no matter what algorithm for exponentiation is used. And I even
>> > gave short Weierstrass curves a handicap by letting them avoid
>> > representing the entire curve and having exceptional cases, and fix
>> > some parameters.
>> >
>> > Montgomery form is even better: differential addition costs 10M, and
>> > calculates a doubling for free. Sadly the differential part makes
>> > radix-k algorithms tough, but in memory constrained environments
>> (like
>> > hardware) Montgomery form can't be beat. (And we haven't even used
>> > nonuniform differential addition chains yet.. I'm still hopeful).
>> >
>> > Then there is the prime shape: Brainpool uses a random prime, which
>> is
>> > a terrible idea from an efficiency perspective. NIST primes are sized
>> > for 32 bit machines, and have some hiccups on 64 bit machines. But
>> the
>> > Chicago primes are primes for all seasons: 2^k-c with small c is nice
>> > no matter what radix you adopt. Unsaturated arithmetic makes addition
>> > faster because reductions aren't necessary at all times, and the
>> > Chicago primes are good from that perspective.
>> >
>> > Now security: having an efficient complete addition formula makes
>> > writing timing, cache, and branch side channel free code a piece of
>> > cake. By contrast short Weierstrass curves have all sorts of wrong
>> > curve, or invalid point, or somewhere the calculation messes up
>> > issues. Usually the defense is a final check on the result being on
>> > the code, but that isn't the same as knowing that no attack is
>> > possible because your code always generates the right answer.
>> >
>> > Lastly, many websites want to deploy PFS ciphersuites but are
>> deterred
>> > by the computation expense involved. Minimizing that expense is
>> > essential. In the wider IETF context we are catering to devices from
>> > the lowly MSP430, to the latest and greatest supercomputer. What does
>> > Brainpool let us do? We should stick to the NIST and Chicago curves:
>> > NIST for those who require it, and Chicago for those who require the
>> > extra speed.
>> >
>> > I would like to hear good arguments against this position. Robert
>> > Ransom I understand wants twisted Edwards curves for an extra bit of
>> > speed, using isogenies to keep them the same as the Chicago curves,
>> > but selecting only those with small parameters and particularly nice
>> > prime shapes.
>> > Dan Brown believes that the Brainpool primes are less special in a
>> way
>> > that has to do with ECC security, despite this never affecting ECC
>> > before.
>> >
>> > Sincerely,
>> > Watson Ladd
>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> > This transmission (including any attachments) may contain
>> confidential information, privileged material (including material
>> protected by the solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or
>> constitute non-public information. Any use of this information by
>> anyone other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you have
>> received this transmission in error, please immediately reply to the
>> sender and delete this information from your system. Use,
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>> unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@securityinnovation.com>
References: <52C755AA.70200@cisco.com>	<33E0BF53-A331-4646-B080-FD4F6E13916E@ieca.com> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D29B10.4030401@cisco.com>	<CACz1E9rsLRwqpA0fS2RNOcpsn7DMqaN=7dcJDQqEi8HDMKKonQ@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0c=mYv7v3fGCHCe9D5w2j+gRWWsmoUA7NQ=AsczTMP1rDw@mail.gmail.com> <d4d82e7c3988ce4908202185921ed7bb@mail.gmail.com> <52D3FEC2.4080602@cased.de>
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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 21:04:12 -0500
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To: arne renkema-padmos <arne.renkema-padmos@cased.de>, cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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Hi Arne,

So is the idea that all devices have to implement both algorithms? Is
there a mechanism in place for declaring one broken and requiring that the
other is used at all times?

TBH I'm less concerned about catastrophic failure of symmetric algorithms
than public-key algorithms, but I'm very interested in processes to
replace algorithms.

Cheers,

William

-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of arne renkema-padmos
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 9:57 AM
To: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer

On 13/01/14 11:48, William Whyte wrote:
> I don't think you can say that just because there have been few
> discontinuities in the security of algorithms there will be no
> discontinuities in the future. There might be, and if it does happen
> unexpectedly it'll be a big problem. It's not a problem we need to
> work on right now, but, again, that makes this a really good time >
to address it.

It makes sense to have a fallback algorithm set, as ETSI has done with the
3GPP algorithms:

http://www.etsi.org/services/security-algorithms/3gpp-algorithms

They standardised both KASUMI and SNOW 3G with the requirements for SNOW
3G as fallback algorithm being:
* maximizing "cryptographic distance" from KASUMI
* minimizing potential vulnerability to algebraic attacks
See:
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ecrypt/courses/end/slides-28/8-gilbert.
pdf

Cheers,
arne

--
Arne Renkema-Padmos
@hcisec, secuso.org
Doctoral researcher
CASED, TU Darmstadt
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References: <52C755AA.70200@cisco.com> <33E0BF53-A331-4646-B080-FD4F6E13916E@ieca.com> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1BF54@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D29B10.4030401@cisco.com> <CACz1E9rsLRwqpA0fS2RNOcpsn7DMqaN=7dcJDQqEi8HDMKKonQ@mail.gmail.com> <52D3D95C.5040902@cisco.com>
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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 21:15:57 -0500
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Hi David,



>> I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple public key
algorithms, especially for postquantum algorithms.  This is partly because
of the complexity of the specification and the implementation, but also
because it would require double the amount of work from authors, reviewers,
and implementers in order to be successful.



I=92m not sure it=92s necessarily that complex. If we have an asymmetric ke=
y
transport mechanism KT that transports key material k and is semantically
secure, and we have a secure KDF, it seems that



Transport: KT1(k1), KT2(k2), KT3(k3), =85

Secret k =3D KDF(k1, k2, k3, =85)



..will also be semantically secure. Obviously this would need to be
demonstrated rigorously, but rather than seeing =93double the amount of wor=
k=94
from the standardization point of view, I see one task to define a secure
combination mechanism, and then a series of tasks to standardize individual
key transport mechanisms, where this series of tasks would have to be done
anyway by people who wanted their algorithms adopted.



For signatures, assuming we=92re looking only at diversity in public key
algorithms and not hash algorithms, it=92s the same: the message simply tak=
es
two signatures, one from each algorithm.  Again, this would have to be
specified rigorously. I think diversity in signatures is less urgent than
for encryption algorithms, because of the risk of an attacker storing
messages for a long time and decrypting them when possible, but it=92s wort=
h
considering.



Similarly, implementations have one additional task rather than double the
amount of tasks. Testing may be more complicated if all pairwise
combinations of algorithms are to be tested, but I expect the total number
of algorithms will never be too big.



Finally, authenticating the public keys may require building support for
new algorithms into CAs, which could be laborious (though again, I would
argue that you should do this when you don=92t have to).



> Patents could also be a significant issue, as you note.



Yes, agreed. This would need to be looked into.



Cheers,



William



*From:* David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
*Sent:* Monday, January 13, 2014 7:18 AM
*To:* William Whyte
*Cc:* Dan Brown; TurnerS@ieca.com; cfrg@irtf.org
*Subject:* Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer



Hi William,

On 01/12/2014 11:16 PM, William Whyte wrote:

Hi all,



Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.



> I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a breakthrough
in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.



As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this is to
figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm in any
context, because all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerable to
technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So combining public key
algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know there are Certicom patents
on this but it seems that this shouldn't be insuperable.


I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple public key
algorithms, especially for postquantum algorithms.  This is partly because
of the complexity of the specification and the implementation, but also
because it would require double the amount of work from authors, reviewers,
and implementers in order to be successful.   Patents could also be a
significant issue, as you note.

David

--047d7bdc0c22f701ac04efe4c53a
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--></style></head><body bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlin=
k=3D"purple"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;color:#1f497d">Hi David,</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">&gt;&gt; I am skeptical about the ap=
proach of combining multiple public key algorithms, especially for postquan=
tum algorithms.=A0 This is partly because of the complexity of the specific=
ation and the implementation, but also because it would require double the =
amount of work from authors, reviewers, and implementers in order to be suc=
cessful.=A0=A0 </span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I=92m not sure it=92s necessarily th=
at complex. If we have an asymmetric key transport mechanism KT that transp=
orts key material k and is semantically secure, and we have a secure KDF, i=
t seems that </span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Transport: KT1(k1), KT2(k2), KT3(k3)=
, =85</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Secret k =3D KDF(k1, k2, =
k3, =85)</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;f=
ont-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">..will also be semantical=
ly secure. Obviously this would need to be demonstrated rigorously, but rat=
her than seeing =93double the amount of work=94 from the standardization po=
int of view, I see one task to define a secure combination mechanism, and t=
hen a series of tasks to standardize individual key transport mechanisms, w=
here this series of tasks would have to be done anyway by people who wanted=
 their algorithms adopted.</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">For signatures, assuming we=92re loo=
king only at diversity in public key algorithms and not hash algorithms, it=
=92s the same: the message simply takes two signatures, one from each algor=
ithm. =A0Again, this would have to be specified rigorously. I think diversi=
ty in signatures is less urgent than for encryption algorithms, because of =
the risk of an attacker storing messages for a long time and decrypting the=
m when possible, but it=92s worth considering.</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Similarly, implementations have one =
additional task rather than double the amount of tasks. Testing may be more=
 complicated if all pairwise combinations of algorithms are to be tested, b=
ut I expect the total number of algorithms will never be too big.</span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Finally, authenticating the public k=
eys may require building support for new algorithms into CAs, which could b=
e laborious (though again, I would argue that you should do this when you d=
on=92t have to).</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">&gt; Patents could also be a signifi=
cant issue, as you note.</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Yes, agreed. This would need to be l=
ooked into.</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Cheers,</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">William</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span></p><div><div s=
tyle=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0i=
n"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">
<b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;san=
s-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10=
.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext=
"> David McGrew [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.co=
m</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, January 13, 2014 7:18 AM<br><b>To:</b> William Whyte<b=
r><b>Cc:</b> Dan Brown; <a href=3D"mailto:TurnerS@ieca.com">TurnerS@ieca.co=
m</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b=
> Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer</span></p>
</div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0</p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Wi=
lliam,<br><br>On 01/12/2014 11:16 PM, William Whyte wrote:</p></div><blockq=
uote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt"><div><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">Hi all, </p>
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Sorry =
again for top-posting, that&#39;s gmail for you.</p></div><div><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal">=A0</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&gt; I would=
 put it more positively as: let&#39;s figure out how to use post-quantum cr=
yptography in practice, because if there is a breakthrough in quantum compu=
ting, the mad rush will be ugly.</span></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-se=
rif&quot;">As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do th=
is is to figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key algorithm=
 in any context, because all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerab=
le to technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So combining public key =
algorithms seems like a prudent approach. I know there are Certicom patents=
 on this but it seems that this shouldn&#39;t be insuperable.</span></p>
</div></div></blockquote><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>I am skeptical about th=
e approach of combining multiple public key algorithms, especially for post=
quantum algorithms.=A0 This is partly because of the complexity of the spec=
ification and the implementation, but also because it would require double =
the amount of work from authors, reviewers, and implementers in order to be=
 successful.=A0=A0 Patents could also be a significant issue, as you note.<=
br>
<br>David</p></div></body></html>

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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 18:37:56 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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From mpg@elzevir.fr  Tue Jan 14 04:48:20 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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On 14/01/2014 02:38, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Do we need great big flashing
> lights *this is not in short Weierstrass form*?

As a matter of fact, yes, I think it couldn't hurt.

Historical matters are of not practical importance. What matters is the current
state of the ECC literature. And I can only agree with Paul here: for most
existing (practical) documentation, an elliptic curve is *by definition* an
elliptic curve in short Weierstrass form.

> And what does it say
> about our implementors that they do not know the basics of the algorithms
> they are asked to implement?
> 
I'm not sure despising implementers will actually help improving the quality of
implementations. Clear documentation, however, might help. (Though not everyone
reads the (right) documentation, unfortunately.)

Manuel.

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Tue Jan 14 06:43:05 2014
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, TurnerS@ieca.com, cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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Hi William,

On 01/13/2014 09:15 PM, William Whyte wrote:
>
> Hi David,
>
> >> I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple public key 
> algorithms, especially for postquantum algorithms.  This is partly 
> because of the complexity of the specification and the implementation, 
> but also because it would require double the amount of work from 
> authors, reviewers, and implementers in order to be successful.
>
> I’m not sure it’s necessarily that complex. If we have an asymmetric 
> key transport mechanism KT that transports key material k and is 
> semantically secure, and we have a secure KDF, it seems that
>
> Transport: KT1(k1), KT2(k2), KT3(k3), …
>
> Secret k = KDF(k1, k2, k3, …)
>
> ..will also be semantically secure. Obviously this would need to be 
> demonstrated rigorously, but rather than seeing “double the amount of 
> work” from the standardization point of view, I see one task to define 
> a secure combination mechanism, and then a series of tasks to 
> standardize individual key transport mechanisms, where this series of 
> tasks would have to be done anyway by people who wanted their 
> algorithms adopted.
>

Let me explain my skepticism by pointing out some places where 
complexity could arise in this scenario.  What you describe would work 
for key transport, but not for key exchange, which excludes DH and 
ECDH.   For a protocol that negotiates algorithms, how would this 
combination be negotiated?   In TLS, for instance, would there need to 
be a ciphersuite for each possible combination of public key 
algorithms?    Or would there need to be two parallel negotiations, with 
an assurance that any possible combination of algorithms that might 
result from the negotiation can be used together?   If the protocol 
aimed to provide identity hiding, would it be expected that both KT 
algorithms would be run twice, once anonymously and once otherwise?  
Would the algorithms use the same nonces?   If so, what if the number of 
messages exchanged in the KT protocols are different?

It is important to establish what the goals would be in using two 
different algorithms.  One goal that some users have is to protect 
traffic with two completely independent crypto implementations, e.g. 
sourced from two different vendors, and thus designed, implemented, and 
tested by two independent teams.   This is done today to provide a 
higher level of assurance using commercial cryptography, by running two 
products that implement standards like IPsec, TLS, or SRTP so that the 
encrypted traffic from one implementation is treated as the plaintext 
traffic by the other implementation. Using two layers protects against 
the possibility that one of the implementations contains an exploitable 
vulnerability or a significant flaw.  This idea is used by the US govt 
information assurance program (see for instance Section 4.4 of 
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/VPN_CP_v2.pdf ) and other nations as well 
(though I can't point to public information for the other cases that I 
know of).   An important property of a two-layer scheme is the 
independence of the two crypto implementations, and it seems that this 
property would be lost in the parallel key transport idea that you 
outlined above.

> For signatures, assuming we’re looking only at diversity in public key 
> algorithms and not hash algorithms, it’s the same: the message simply 
> takes two signatures, one from each algorithm.  Again, this would have 
> to be specified rigorously. I think diversity in signatures is less 
> urgent than for encryption algorithms, because of the risk of an 
> attacker storing messages for a long time and decrypting them when 
> possible, but it’s worth considering.
>

It seems that signatures would be easier to do, since signing could be 
done in parallel.  But what is not clear is that we would want or need a 
new signature standard to do this. A CA could create two certificates, 
one with each algorithm, using existing standards. (Probably the 
standards could be improved to better allow the selection of appropriate 
certificates by applications.)

Speaking as an individual member of the RG: I am not opposed work on the 
use of multiple algorithms, but I do not see it as a high priority right 
now, and I feel strongly that such work would be most impactful and 
beneficial if it enabled the use of two completely independent crypto 
implementations.

regards,

David

> Similarly, implementations have one additional task rather than double 
> the amount of tasks. Testing may be more complicated if all pairwise 
> combinations of algorithms are to be tested, but I expect the total 
> number of algorithms will never be too big.
>
> Finally, authenticating the public keys may require building support 
> for new algorithms into CAs, which could be laborious (though again, I 
> would argue that you should do this when you don’t have to).
>
> > Patents could also be a significant issue, as you note.
>
> Yes, agreed. This would need to be looked into.
>
> Cheers,
>
> William
>
> *From:*David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com <mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com>]
> *Sent:* Monday, January 13, 2014 7:18 AM
> *To:* William Whyte
> *Cc:* Dan Brown; TurnerS@ieca.com <mailto:TurnerS@ieca.com>; 
> cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:cfrg@irtf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
>
> Hi William,
>
> On 01/12/2014 11:16 PM, William Whyte wrote:
>
>     Hi all,
>
>     Sorry again for top-posting, that's gmail for you.
>
>     > I would put it more positively as: let's figure out how to use
>     post-quantum cryptography in practice, because if there is a
>     breakthrough in quantum computing, the mad rush will be ugly.
>
>     As I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way to do this
>     is to figure out how to avoid depending on a single public key
>     algorithm in any context, because all public key algorithms are
>     potentially vulnerable to technological and algorithmic
>     breakthroughs. So combining public key algorithms seems like a
>     prudent approach. I know there are Certicom patents on this but it
>     seems that this shouldn't be insuperable.
>
>
> I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple public key 
> algorithms, especially for postquantum algorithms.  This is partly 
> because of the complexity of the specification and the implementation, 
> but also because it would require double the amount of work from 
> authors, reviewers, and implementers in order to be successful.   
> Patents could also be a significant issue, as you note.
>
> David
>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi William,<br>
      <br>
      On 01/13/2014 09:15 PM, William Whyte wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:73702d62c620d7ecfd9d4f924c24d1ab@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Hi
            David,</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">&gt;&gt;
            I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple
            public key algorithms, especially for postquantum
            algorithms.  This is partly because of the complexity of the
            specification and the implementation, but also because it
            would require double the amount of work from authors,
            reviewers, and implementers in order to be successful.   </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I’m
            not sure it’s necessarily that complex. If we have an
            asymmetric key transport mechanism KT that transports key
            material k and is semantically secure, and we have a secure
            KDF, it seems that </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Transport:
            KT1(k1), KT2(k2), KT3(k3), …</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Secret
            k = KDF(k1, k2, k3, …)</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">..will
            also be semantically secure. Obviously this would need to be
            demonstrated rigorously, but rather than seeing “double the
            amount of work” from the standardization point of view, I
            see one task to define a secure combination mechanism, and
            then a series of tasks to standardize individual key
            transport mechanisms, where this series of tasks would have
            to be done anyway by people who wanted their algorithms
            adopted.</span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Let me explain my skepticism by pointing out some places where
    complexity could arise in this scenario.  What you describe would
    work for key transport, but not for key exchange, which excludes DH
    and ECDH.   For a protocol that negotiates algorithms, how would
    this combination be negotiated?   In TLS, for instance, would there
    need to be a ciphersuite for each possible combination of public key
    algorithms?    Or would there need to be two parallel negotiations,
    with an assurance that any possible combination of algorithms that
    might result from the negotiation can be used together?   If the
    protocol aimed to provide identity hiding, would it be expected that
    both KT algorithms would be run twice, once anonymously and once
    otherwise?  Would the algorithms use the same nonces?   If so, what
    if the number of messages exchanged in the KT protocols are
    different?<br>
    <br>
    It is important to establish what the goals would be in using two
    different algorithms.  One goal that some users have is to protect
    traffic with two completely independent crypto implementations, e.g.
    sourced from two different vendors, and thus designed, implemented,
    and tested by two independent teams.   This is done today to provide
    a higher level of assurance using commercial cryptography, by
    running two products that implement standards like IPsec, TLS, or
    SRTP so that the encrypted traffic from one implementation is
    treated as the plaintext traffic by the other implementation.  
    Using two layers protects against the possibility that one of the
    implementations contains an exploitable vulnerability or a
    significant flaw.  This idea is used by the US govt information
    assurance program (see for instance Section 4.4 of
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/VPN_CP_v2.pdf">http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/VPN_CP_v2.pdf</a> ) and other nations as
    well (though I can't point to public information for the other cases
    that I know of).   An important property of a two-layer scheme is
    the independence of the two crypto implementations, and it seems
    that this property would be lost in the parallel key transport idea
    that you outlined above.   <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:73702d62c620d7ecfd9d4f924c24d1ab@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">For
            signatures, assuming we’re looking only at diversity in
            public key algorithms and not hash algorithms, it’s the
            same: the message simply takes two signatures, one from each
            algorithm.  Again, this would have to be specified
            rigorously. I think diversity in signatures is less urgent
            than for encryption algorithms, because of the risk of an
            attacker storing messages for a long time and decrypting
            them when possible, but it’s worth considering.</span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    It seems that signatures would be easier to do, since signing could
    be done in parallel.  But what is not clear is that we would want or
    need a new signature standard to do this. A CA could create two
    certificates, one with each algorithm, using existing standards.  
    (Probably the standards could be improved to better allow the
    selection of appropriate certificates by applications.)<br>
    <br>
    Speaking as an individual member of the RG: I am not opposed work on
    the use of multiple algorithms, but I do not see it as a high
    priority right now, and I feel strongly that such work would be most
    impactful and beneficial if it enabled the use of two completely
    independent crypto implementations.<br>
    <br>
    regards,<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:73702d62c620d7ecfd9d4f924c24d1ab@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Similarly,
            implementations have one additional task rather than double
            the amount of tasks. Testing may be more complicated if all
            pairwise combinations of algorithms are to be tested, but I
            expect the total number of algorithms will never be too big.</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Finally,
            authenticating the public keys may require building support
            for new algorithms into CAs, which could be laborious
            (though again, I would argue that you should do this when
            you don’t have to).</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">&gt;
            Patents could also be a significant issue, as you note.</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Yes,
            agreed. This would need to be looked into.</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Cheers,</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">William</span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"> </span></p>
        <div>
          <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df
            1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
            <p class="MsoNormal">
              <b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">
                David McGrew [mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>] <br>
                <b>Sent:</b> Monday, January 13, 2014 7:18 AM<br>
                <b>To:</b> William Whyte<br>
                <b>Cc:</b> Dan Brown; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="mailto:TurnerS@ieca.com">TurnerS@ieca.com</a>; <a
                  moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
                <b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a
                quantum computer</span></p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal">Hi William,<br>
            <br>
            On 01/12/2014 11:16 PM, William Whyte wrote:</p>
        </div>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal">Hi all, </p>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">Sorry again for top-posting, that's
                gmail for you.</p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&gt;
                  I would put it more positively as: let's figure out
                  how to use post-quantum cryptography in practice,
                  because if there is a breakthrough in quantum
                  computing, the mad rush will be ugly.</span></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">As
                  I mentioned in a previous mail, I think the best way
                  to do this is to figure out how to avoid depending on
                  a single public key algorithm in any context, because
                  all public key algorithms are potentially vulnerable
                  to technological and algorithmic breakthroughs. So
                  combining public key algorithms seems like a prudent
                  approach. I know there are Certicom patents on this
                  but it seems that this shouldn't be insuperable.</span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
          I am skeptical about the approach of combining multiple public
          key algorithms, especially for postquantum algorithms.  This
          is partly because of the complexity of the specification and
          the implementation, but also because it would require double
          the amount of work from authors, reviewers, and implementers
          in order to be successful.   Patents could also be a
          significant issue, as you note.<br>
          <br>
          David</p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
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Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alyssa Rowan
> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 7:27 PM
>=20
> On 13/01/2014 23:07, Dan Brown wrote:
>=20
> > For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
> > than rigidity.
>=20
> With respect, I disagree.
>=20
> With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero knowledge =
about
> what may, or may not, be affected by it.
>=20

We have zero knowledge that Curve25519 resists the hypothetical attack =
for which P256 has hypothetically been manipulated to be affected by. =
[Sorry to grammarians!]

So, what is rigidity is claiming to resist, under your reasoning?

Under my reasoning, I assume that there is a set of curves, partitioned =
into two subsets: curves vulnerable to a secret attack known the =
generator (NIST/NSA) and those not..

It's possible that trial and error was used for P256 until landed in the =
vulnerable subset.  I think that is implicit in the safecurves ... =
rigidity page.  No?

Now, suppose I were tasked to find my own curve to minimize the chance =
of landing in the vulnerable set?

Choose a curve with small coefficients?  Since I do not know what the =
vulnerable set is, and rightly want to assume zero knowledge about it, I =
cannot presume that small coefficients protect me from the hypothetical =
secret attack, unless presume nonzero knowledge the vulnerable set.  =
[Sorry for the tedious redundancy.]=20

Granted: small coefficients would help my persuade others that I did not =
select the curve maliciously by exhaustive search. =20

What about a pseudorandom curve? More precisely, where the coefficients =
are derived from PRF(rigid-seed). =20

Assuming independence of the vulnerable set from the PRF and rigid-seed, =
and the pseudorandomness of the PRF, then it seems that the pseudorandom =
curve lands in the vulnerable subset with probability p, where p is the =
density of the vulnerable subset within the larger set of curves from =
which one draws the curve from.

Under this hypothesis, the manipulation of P256 would have been expected =
to take on the order of 1/p trials. =20

One can plug in any value for p, based on whatever assumptions one =
thinks is reasonable.

For example, my personal belief had been p =3D 2^(-128), perhaps because =
I was super biased toward, and committed to, ECC.  In that case, the =
manipulation phase for NIST P256 would be infeasible, and I could =
dismiss this whole issue rigidity v pseudorandom as didactic, =
distraction, irrelevant, baseless, stalling, bogus, moot, FUD, or =
whatever.

But I recognize that maybe I am too optimistic.  Others have suggested p =
=3D2^(-30), and I am listening to them.  Then a malicious NIST P256 =
would be very feasible.  In my view, the resulting assurance provided by =
pseudorandom, probability of 2^(-30) seems a little low, but then maybe =
I am just not yet used to thinking this way.  Others could say that any =
public key algorithm always has a similar risk of new attacks being =
discovered, and therefore that this risk, if not actually acceptable, is =
unavoidable.

What about small coefficient curves?  They don't have the argument of =
probability p of avoiding the vulnerable set, but they do have some =
legitimate security arguments: (1, resp.) no attacks are known, and (2, =
resp.) known attacks do not seem related to coefficient size. As I see =
it, these arguments assume more about the hypothetical secret attacks =
than the NIST curves: (1, resp.) either they do not exist (but that puts =
back to negligible p), or (2, resp.) the hypothetical secret attack is =
similar to existing known attacks to the extent that it cannot =
possibility depend on coefficient size.  The latter argument has =
tremendous merit in that it is a very plausible assumption, but =
pseudorandom curves do not rely on this assumption.  Again, it presumes =
virtually nonzero knowledge about the secret attack (other than the =
partition of the set of curves into vulnerable and non-vulnerable).  No? =
=20

It's certainly possible to vilify me for suggesting the possibility of a =
small coefficient attack, call it baseless, etc., but what I'm saying is =
that pseudorandom curves do not rely this.  Instead they rely on more =
falsifiable assumptions, e.g. the effective of the PRF, etc. =20

This general strategy of reasoning to avoid unknown attacks is used in =
the field of "provable security" and also seems to be used in the =
"rigidity" page of the safecurves strategy.

I've a tried to explain this before on the TLS.  In so doing, I =
reconsidering, or setting aside, my own beliefs and preferences, to try =
to engage the rigidity arguments.

>=20
> A point to note here: brainpoolP256r1 has a _very_ weak twist (=CF=81 =
@ 2^44) - a
> practical problem only in a flawed implementation that doesn't check =
for invalid
> points. But here nevertheless, we actually have a curve generated in a
> documented pseudorandom manner, yet has at least one desirable =
property
> distinctly less secure than all of its tested peers.
>=20
> Why? Bad luck, it seems.

Thanks for the pointing this out, I hadn't noticed it before.=20

>=20
>=20
> I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable curve =
design
> which resists all known attacks, to rolling the dice and hoping it =
resists a
> hypothetical attack that we know nothing about.

Don't quite follow, based on my understanding above.

Also, publishing a seed and curve-PRF, is verifiable, and reproducible.

I guess that you refer to the NIST seeds being not well-explained.=20

Brainpool certainly seeds seem to be.

>=20
> Hence my preference for the "Safecurves" approach, and thus the =
"Chicago"
> curves.
>=20
> That some of them can be (and have been) implemented in an extremely
> efficient way, and thus are exceptionally well-suited for the =
important task of
> accelerating wide adoption of forward security in internet protocols, =
I also find
> a highly desirable point in their favour - as, it seems, do many =
others.
>=20
> I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.
=20
People really want fast, because it reduces cost. =20

But they also want secure.

Fast and secure are both important, but orthogonal.

People need to balance both sides.

I had wanted to focus on the security side, to get a thorough =
understanding of that side.

Granted, I may be taking a too narrow focus, from an engineering =
viewpoint, where action is the order of the day, not reflection.  I was =
hoping CFRG to be more receptive to a (hypothetical) security-focus.

Anyway, once one has a thorough understanding on both sides, one can =
make a balanced decision.
  =20


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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'Dan Brown' <dbrown@certicom.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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From: Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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My two cents:

The goal of rigidity is to constrain the curves without giving them any =
extra properties that might be relevant to an attacker.  It seems to me =
that for this purpose, CM is worse than small coefficients.  As a =
result, Bernstein's Safecurves criteria ban curves with small CM =
discriminant, despite no attacks being known.

However, the endomorphisms on such curves can speed up implementation, =
and I could definitely see a use for CM curves or GF(p^2) curves with a =
256-ish-bit prime, a la GLS/GLV.  It reduces the computation required =
for perfect forward secrecy, right?  But in terms of protecting against =
hypothetical unknown attacks, I don't think it makes sense to use CM =
curves at high security levels.

I'd be very interested to hear the opinion of someone who is more versed =
in the subject.

Cheers,
-- Mike

On Jan 14, 2014, at 9:24 AM, Igoe, Kevin M. <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:

> It has been a long time since I've looked at the complex =
multiplication=20
> method for generating elliptic curve, but I believe that with some =
care
> the CM method might satisfy your criterion for being rigid.
>=20
> Should use of the CM method be encouraged, tolerated, or prohibited?
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Dan Brown
>> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 6:08 PM
>> To: Watson Ladd
>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v
>> Pseudorandom
>>=20
>> Watson,
>>=20
>> I had requested to keep this thread focused, specifically in the =
impact
>> pseudorandom v rigid on security, but you declined to engage. Is it
>> that you think this security issue unimportant, even though you =
concede
>> with my narrow point?
>>=20
>> Instead, you mostly repeated the general speed and side channel
>> benefits of Chicago, which I was not yet disputing.
>>=20
>> Also, you suggested that I was referring to the field choices. I did
>> not intend to, but I should clarify.
>>=20
>> For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
>> than rigidity.
>>=20
>> Field size would on my list of issues, but way, way down on my =
ranking
>> of importance.
>>=20
>> A couple people have suggested to me (off list) to generate new =
curves
>> with explainable seeds but the same fields as NIST curves.
>>=20
>> The result would seem to be intermediate between Brainpool and =
Chicago.
>>=20
>> My main reluctance with that would further babble, and yet more
>> difficulty with interoperability.
>>=20
>>=20
>> From: Watson Ladd
>> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 4:26 PM
>> To: Dan Brown
>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v
>> Pseudorandom
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 8:55 AM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Last week I wrote that I would soon write up my disagreements with
>> the safe curves site.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> My first disagreement is written up below, but first two editorial
>> issues:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> - My last email was in the context of Watson=92s draft spec for the
>> Chicago (Bernstein?) curves, but I would like to detach the issue =
from
>> the I-D. My comment about the reference in Watson=92s I-D to a =
website
>> was just an editorial comment.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> - These technical issues that I hope CFRG discusses just might be
>> resolved and written into a CFRG I-D cataloging of elliptic curves =
and
>> their relative merits and so on, which should be independent of
>> Watson=92s spec for the Chicago curves. For now, I opted to discuss =
via
>> email list, rather than placing these arguments into my own one-sided
>> individual I-D. Please advise me if such an I-D is preferred to =
email.
>>=20
>>=20
>> I think this is an excellent idea (the catalogue of good curves).
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Today, I checked that
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html
>>>=20
>>> <snip>
>>=20
>> Rather then engage a peripheral argument, let me lay out the case for
>> the Chicago curves (named after the city in which Bernstein resides,
>> and in a long IETF tradition starting with TCP Reno, Oakley key
>> agreement protocol, and fundamentally of no import: see Shakespeare,
>> Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2, or Wittgenstein, Philosophical
>> Investigations for more information) in the fairest light.
>>=20
>> First efficiency: point addition on an Edwards curve costs 11
>> multiplications, doubling 7 multiplications. This is for a complete,
>> strongly unified addition formula, which requires no work for special
>> cases. By contrast on a short Weierstrass curve addition costs 16
>> multiplications, doubling 8.
>> This is with no assumptions on Z, which if we impose reduce the cost =
of
>> addition on a short Weierstrass curve to 11 multiplications. But if =
we
>> impose the same condition on the Edwards curve, the cost is 10
>> multiplications.
>>=20
>> However, I've forced the Edwards curve to represent the identity, =
which
>> if we are willing to drop, slices off two more multiplications.
>> By contrast the
>> Weierstrass curve has special cases that need additional work to =
handle
>> in a secure manner. Most people just don't bother. I also let the
>> Weierstrass form be special with a=3D-3, while keeping the Edwards =
curve
>> fully general.
>>=20
>> So given the same prime Edwards has short Weierstrass beat. This is
>> true no matter what algorithm for exponentiation is used. And I even
>> gave short Weierstrass curves a handicap by letting them avoid
>> representing the entire curve and having exceptional cases, and fix
>> some parameters.
>>=20
>> Montgomery form is even better: differential addition costs 10M, and
>> calculates a doubling for free. Sadly the differential part makes
>> radix-k algorithms tough, but in memory constrained environments =
(like
>> hardware) Montgomery form can't be beat. (And we haven't even used
>> nonuniform differential addition chains yet.. I'm still hopeful).
>>=20
>> Then there is the prime shape: Brainpool uses a random prime, which =
is
>> a terrible idea from an efficiency perspective. NIST primes are sized
>> for 32 bit machines, and have some hiccups on 64 bit machines. But =
the
>> Chicago primes are primes for all seasons: 2^k-c with small c is nice
>> no matter what radix you adopt. Unsaturated arithmetic makes addition
>> faster because reductions aren't necessary at all times, and the
>> Chicago primes are good from that perspective.
>>=20
>> Now security: having an efficient complete addition formula makes
>> writing timing, cache, and branch side channel free code a piece of
>> cake. By contrast short Weierstrass curves have all sorts of wrong
>> curve, or invalid point, or somewhere the calculation messes up =
issues.
>> Usually the defense is a final check on the result being on the code,
>> but that isn't the same as knowing that no attack is possible because
>> your code always generates the right answer.
>>=20
>> Lastly, many websites want to deploy PFS ciphersuites but are =
deterred
>> by the computation expense involved. Minimizing that expense is
>> essential. In the wider IETF context we are catering to devices from
>> the lowly MSP430, to the latest and greatest supercomputer. What does
>> Brainpool let us do? We should stick to the NIST and Chicago curves:
>> NIST for those who require it, and Chicago for those who require the
>> extra speed.
>>=20
>> I would like to hear good arguments against this position. Robert
>> Ransom I understand wants twisted Edwards curves for an extra bit of
>> speed, using isogenies to keep them the same as the Chicago curves, =
but
>> selecting only those with small parameters and particularly nice =
prime
>> shapes.
>> Dan Brown believes that the Brainpool primes are less special in a =
way
>> that has to do with ECC security, despite this never affecting ECC
>> before.
>>=20
>> Sincerely,
>> Watson Ladd
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> This transmission (including any attachments) may contain =
confidential
>> information, privileged material (including material protected by the
>> solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-
>> public information. Any use of this information by anyone other than
>> the intended recipient is prohibited. If you have received this
>> transmission in error, please immediately reply to the sender and
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>> recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.
>> _______________________________________________
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>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> _______________________________________________
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> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
To: "'mike@shiftleft.org'" <mike@shiftleft.org>, "'watsonbladd@gmail.com'" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Hi Mike,

Further to your suggestion below, why not consider a modified version of Cu=
rve25519, with same underlying field, (Montgomery) equation y^2 =3D x^3 + Z=
x^2 + x, where

Z =3D PRF("Chicago"||counter)

Where PRF is some reasonable pseudorandom function mapping into the field o=
f definition of Curve25519, and counter is some unambiguously encoded bit s=
tring representation of an integer is value is the minimal among these meet=
ing as many as possible of the various criteria used for selection of the A=
 coefficient in Curve25519, in particular resistance to known attacks, e.g.=
 twist security, MOV resistance, and SASS.  (Hey, why not throw in other cr=
iteria too, strong DHP safety, high discriminant, and that other thing rela=
ted to isogenies that Brainpool considers (is it endomorphism class number =
or something?).)

Given that Z would be larger than A, the resulting curve would certainly be=
 slower than Curve25519.  But how much slower?  Surely it would be almost a=
s easy to implement, and have similar side channel resistance, unless I hav=
e a severe misunderstanding.

I think one could then make a formal (if heuristic) argument that if an adv=
ersary knows of a secret weak class of some small, but non-negligible densi=
ty subset of curves (over the given field), that this curve is drawn from a=
 sample space of sufficient size such that it inherits the small fraction p=
roperty.  My algebraic geometry is a little weak, but I assume that varying=
 this single coefficient in the equation walks through a good fraction of t=
he isomorphism classes (J-invariants).  This security argument may assume t=
he attack works across birational equivalence, if one is concerned about an=
 attack specifically on NIST P256.

Just to be clear, the gain here would only to be not rely on the plausible =
presumption a secret attack is independent of coefficient size.

Just to be extra clear, the claim is not the some particular size of Z resi=
sts attacks better, but the fact that Z is random is pseudorandomly selecte=
d.

Best regards,

Dan


From: Michael Hamburg [mailto:mike@shiftleft.org]
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 7:57 PM
To: Watson Ladd
Cc: Dan Brown; cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom


On Jan 13, 2014, at 4:36 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com<mailto:wats=
onbladd@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 3:07 PM, Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com<mailto:dbro=
wn@certicom.com>> wrote:

Watson,

I had requested to keep this thread focused, specifically in the impact pse=
udorandom v rigid on security, but you declined to engage. Is it that you t=
hink this security issue unimportant, even though you concede with my narro=
w point?

I think it's completely bogus. People aren't primarily interested in
the Chicago curves because of unknown attacks, but NSA cookery over
NIST+the efficiency and security benefits they offer.

Speak for yourself.  I'm interested in a standard which has a better chance=
 of resisting unknown attacks, and I'm not as concerned about NSA cookery a=
s you are.

I agree that random (or pseudorandom) curves are preferable to rigid ones, =
so long as they are generated with the rest of the Safecurves properties.  =
The problem is, they are much harder to generate.  Maybe shake up some dice=
 or Boggle boards at the CRYPTO rump session?  Or make a Bitcoin donation t=
o EFF annotated with the hash of your software, and use the hash of its blo=
ck?  Dunno.  The Brainpool method has too many degrees of freedom to convin=
ce everyone.

Either way, I feel that the highest practical ECC security level would come=
 from a verifiably pseudorandom curve over a verifiably pseudorandom field.=
  This is because it will take either a significant mathematical breakthrou=
gh or a quantum computer to break existing 120s-ish-bit-secure curves such =
as Curve25519, anytime in the foreseeable future.  If it's a quantum comput=
er or a breakthrough that kills all curves, we're screwed.

So that leaves a breakthrough which kills only curves with special properti=
es, or only improves speed somewhat (eg, p^1/4 instead of p^1/2).  Given th=
at, should we choose curves with known special properties that aren't requi=
red for security?  (Small d, special fields?)  Or should we try to be as ra=
ndom as possible, constrained only by properties that have a good security =
argument?

The downsides are difficulty of generation, and speed: a random field would=
 be at least twice as slow.  So if I had to take 3 next-gen curves to a des=
ert island, I'd go for:

* Ed25519.  It's deployed, it's implemented, it's significantly faster and =
easier to make secure than NIST P256.  There are other options, but this on=
e works.  Once again, probably nobody is going to break this with a rho att=
ack in the next couple of decades.

* Something with a bigger fast field.  Ed448-Goldilocks is my entry for tha=
t, but the others are also fine.  A pseudorandom $d$ value would probably i=
mprove things, if you could get confidence that it's not rigged.  Whichever=
 way this goes, ops on such a curve will take about 4x as long as Ed25519 i=
n software.

* A pseudorandom curve over a pseudorandom 512-bit field.  Operations on su=
ch a curve will probably take at least 12x as long as Ed25519, and at least=
 16x if it's a short Weierstrass curve.

In any case, if we list any pseudorandom curves, they should have most of t=
he Safecurves properties except rigidity.  Some of the properties really ar=
en't necessary (eg, Elligator), and basically end up just requiring Edwards=
 curves.  There's a decent case that Edwards is a better shape than short W=
eierstrass anyway though, and in that case we should go for all the propert=
ies except rigidity.

Cheers,
- Mike
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Hi Mike,<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Further to your suggestio=
n below, why not consider a modified version of Curve25519, with same under=
lying field, (Montgomery) equation y^2 =3D x^3 &#43; Zx^2 &#43; x,
 where <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Z =3D PRF(&#8220;Chicago&=
#8221;||counter) &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Where PRF is some reasona=
ble pseudorandom function mapping into the field of definition of Curve2551=
9, and counter is some unambiguously encoded bit string
 representation of an integer is value is the minimal among these meeting a=
s many as possible of the various criteria used for selection of the A coef=
ficient in Curve25519, in particular resistance to known attacks, e.g. twis=
t security, MOV resistance, and
 SASS.&nbsp; (Hey, why not throw in other criteria too, strong DHP safety, =
high discriminant, and that other thing related to isogenies that Brainpool=
 considers (is it endomorphism class number or something?).)<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Given that Z would be lar=
ger than A, the resulting curve would certainly be slower than Curve25519.&=
nbsp; But how much slower?&nbsp; Surely it would be almost as easy
 to implement, and have similar side channel resistance, unless I have a se=
vere misunderstanding.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I think one could then ma=
ke a formal (if heuristic) argument that if an adversary knows of a secret =
weak class of some small, but non-negligible density subset
 of curves (over the given field), that this curve is drawn from a sample s=
pace of sufficient size such that it inherits the small fraction property.&=
nbsp; My algebraic geometry is a little weak, but I assume that varying thi=
s single coefficient in the equation
 walks through a good fraction of the isomorphism classes (J-invariants).&n=
bsp; This security argument may assume the attack works across birational e=
quivalence, if one is concerned about an attack specifically on NIST P256.&=
nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Just to be clear, the gai=
n here would only to be not rely on the plausible presumption a secret atta=
ck is independent of coefficient size.&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Just to be extra clear, t=
he claim is not the some particular size of Z resists attacks better, but t=
he fact that Z is random is pseudorandomly selected.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Best regards,<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Dan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt">
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Michael =
Hamburg [mailto:mike@shiftleft.org]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, January 13, 2014 7:57 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Watson Ladd<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Dan Brown; cfrg@irtf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudora=
ndom<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Jan 13, 2014, at 4:36 PM, Watson Ladd &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com">watsonbladd@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt">On Mon, Jan 13, 2014=
 at 3:07 PM, Dan Brown &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dbrown@certicom.com">dbrown@ce=
rticom.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt">Watson,<br>
<br>
I had requested to keep this thread focused, specifically in the impact pse=
udorandom v rigid on security, but you declined to engage. Is it that you t=
hink this security issue unimportant, even though you concede with my narro=
w point?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt"><br>
I think it's completely bogus. People aren't primarily interested in<br>
the Chicago curves because of unknown attacks, but NSA cookery over<br>
NIST&#43;the efficiency and security benefits they offer.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Speak for yourself. &nbsp;I&#8217;m interested in a =
standard which has a better chance of resisting unknown attacks, and I&#821=
7;m not as concerned about NSA cookery as you are.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I agree that random (or pseudorandom) curves are pre=
ferable to rigid ones, so long as they are generated with the rest of the S=
afecurves properties. &nbsp;The problem is, they are much harder to generat=
e. &nbsp;Maybe shake up some dice or Boggle
 boards at the CRYPTO rump session? &nbsp;Or make a Bitcoin donation to EFF=
 annotated with the hash of your software, and use the hash of its block? &=
nbsp;Dunno. &nbsp;The Brainpool method has too many degrees of freedom to c=
onvince everyone.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Either way, I feel that the highest practical ECC se=
curity level would come from a verifiably pseudorandom curve over a verifia=
bly pseudorandom field. &nbsp;This is because it will take either a signifi=
cant mathematical breakthrough or a quantum
 computer to break existing 120s-ish-bit-secure curves such as Curve25519, =
anytime in the foreseeable future. &nbsp;If it&#8217;s a quantum computer o=
r a breakthrough that kills all curves, we&#8217;re screwed.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So that leaves a breakthrough which kills only curve=
s with special properties, or only improves speed somewhat (eg, p^1/4 inste=
ad of p^1/2). &nbsp;Given that, should we choose curves with known special =
properties that aren&#8217;t required for security?
 &nbsp;(Small d, special fields?) &nbsp;Or should we try to be as random as=
 possible, constrained only by properties that have a good security argumen=
t?<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The downsides are difficulty of generation, and spee=
d: a random field would be at least twice as slow. &nbsp;So if I had to tak=
e 3 next-gen curves to a desert island, I&#8217;d go for:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Ed25519. &nbsp;It&#8217;s deployed, it&#8217;s imp=
lemented, it&#8217;s significantly faster and easier to make secure than NI=
ST P256. &nbsp;There are other options, but this one works. &nbsp;Once agai=
n, probably nobody is going to break this with a rho attack in the
 next couple of decades.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Something with a bigger fast field. &nbsp;Ed448-Go=
ldilocks is my entry for that, but the others are also fine. &nbsp;A pseudo=
random $d$ value would probably improve things, if you could get confidence=
 that it&#8217;s not rigged. &nbsp;Whichever way this goes,
 ops on such a curve will take about 4x as long as Ed25519 in software.<o:p=
></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* A pseudorandom curve over a pseudorandom 512-bit f=
ield. &nbsp;Operations on such a curve will probably take at least 12x as l=
ong as Ed25519, and at least 16x if it&#8217;s a short Weierstrass curve.<o=
:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">In any case, if we list any pseudorandom curves, the=
y should have most of the Safecurves properties except rigidity. &nbsp;Some=
 of the properties really aren&#8217;t necessary (eg, Elligator), and basic=
ally end up just requiring Edwards curves. &nbsp;There&#8217;s
 a decent case that Edwards is a better shape than short Weierstrass anyway=
 though, and in that case we should go for all the properties except rigidi=
ty.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&#8212; Mike<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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Cc: "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Hi Dan,

thanks for sharing your thoughts.  It seems to me that the arguments in=20
favor of rigid curves comes down to the "nothing up my sleeve" argument: =

if there are no free parameters to be chosen when constructing an=20
elliptic curve group, then there is no need to trust the person doing=20
the construction.

There is another consideration: the cost of attacking multiple instances =

of the EC discrete log problem can be amortized across multiple such=20
instances, using techniques such as Kuhn and Struik's "Random Walks=20
Revisited: Extensions of Pollard's Rho Algorithm for Computing Multiple=20
Discrete Logarithms", or a time-memory tradeoff like Shanks' baby step - =

giant step method, in which the number of stored elements exceeds the=20
square root of the group size.   Some users may be motivated by the=20
logic that by avoiding a particular well-known curve, they prevent=20
potential attackers from amortizing the cost of finding their private=20
within a batch of other attacks.    If the cost of solving a single=20
discrete logarithm problem are within the attacker's budget, then these=20
considerations would come into play.   It would then be valuable to have =

a way to generate multiple curves, which could be pseudorandom and=20
verifiable, or perhaps could be sequential and based on the "smallest=20
number greater than p" sort of logic.

In any case, the suggestion to document the rationale behind elliptic=20
curve parameter choices is a good one!

David

On 01/14/2014 11:51 AM, Dan Brown wrote:
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Alyssa Rowan
>> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 7:27 PM
>>
>> On 13/01/2014 23:07, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>>> For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
>>> than rigidity.
>> With respect, I disagree.
>>
>> With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero knowledge a=
bout
>> what may, or may not, be affected by it.
>>
> We have zero knowledge that Curve25519 resists the hypothetical attack =
for which P256 has hypothetically been manipulated to be affected by. [So=
rry to grammarians!]
>
> So, what is rigidity is claiming to resist, under your reasoning?
>
> Under my reasoning, I assume that there is a set of curves, partitioned=
 into two subsets: curves vulnerable to a secret attack known the generat=
or (NIST/NSA) and those not..
>
> It's possible that trial and error was used for P256 until landed in th=
e vulnerable subset.  I think that is implicit in the safecurves ... rigi=
dity page.  No?
>
> Now, suppose I were tasked to find my own curve to minimize the chance =
of landing in the vulnerable set?
>
> Choose a curve with small coefficients?  Since I do not know what the v=
ulnerable set is, and rightly want to assume zero knowledge about it, I c=
annot presume that small coefficients protect me from the hypothetical se=
cret attack, unless presume nonzero knowledge the vulnerable set.  [Sorry=
 for the tedious redundancy.]
>
> Granted: small coefficients would help my persuade others that I did no=
t select the curve maliciously by exhaustive search.
>
> What about a pseudorandom curve? More precisely, where the coefficients=
 are derived from PRF(rigid-seed).
>
> Assuming independence of the vulnerable set from the PRF and rigid-seed=
, and the pseudorandomness of the PRF, then it seems that the pseudorando=
m curve lands in the vulnerable subset with probability p, where p is the=
 density of the vulnerable subset within the larger set of curves from wh=
ich one draws the curve from.
>
> Under this hypothesis, the manipulation of P256 would have been expecte=
d to take on the order of 1/p trials.
>
> One can plug in any value for p, based on whatever assumptions one thin=
ks is reasonable.
>
> For example, my personal belief had been p =3D 2^(-128), perhaps becaus=
e I was super biased toward, and committed to, ECC.  In that case, the ma=
nipulation phase for NIST P256 would be infeasible, and I could dismiss t=
his whole issue rigidity v pseudorandom as didactic, distraction, irrelev=
ant, baseless, stalling, bogus, moot, FUD, or whatever.
>
> But I recognize that maybe I am too optimistic.  Others have suggested =
p =3D2^(-30), and I am listening to them.  Then a malicious NIST P256 wou=
ld be very feasible.  In my view, the resulting assurance provided by pse=
udorandom, probability of 2^(-30) seems a little low, but then maybe I am=
 just not yet used to thinking this way.  Others could say that any publi=
c key algorithm always has a similar risk of new attacks being discovered=
, and therefore that this risk, if not actually acceptable, is unavoidabl=
e.
>
> What about small coefficient curves?  They don't have the argument of p=
robability p of avoiding the vulnerable set, but they do have some legiti=
mate security arguments: (1, resp.) no attacks are known, and (2, resp.) =
known attacks do not seem related to coefficient size. As I see it, these=
 arguments assume more about the hypothetical secret attacks than the NIS=
T curves: (1, resp.) either they do not exist (but that puts back to negl=
igible p), or (2, resp.) the hypothetical secret attack is similar to exi=
sting known attacks to the extent that it cannot possibility depend on co=
efficient size.  The latter argument has tremendous merit in that it is a=
 very plausible assumption, but pseudorandom curves do not rely on this a=
ssumption.  Again, it presumes virtually nonzero knowledge about the secr=
et attack (other than the partition of the set of curves into vulnerable =
and non-vulnerable).  No?
>
> It's certainly possible to vilify me for suggesting the possibility of =
a small coefficient attack, call it baseless, etc., but what I'm saying i=
s that pseudorandom curves do not rely this.  Instead they rely on more f=
alsifiable assumptions, e.g. the effective of the PRF, etc.
>
> This general strategy of reasoning to avoid unknown attacks is used in =
the field of "provable security" and also seems to be used in the "rigidi=
ty" page of the safecurves strategy.
>
> I've a tried to explain this before on the TLS.  In so doing, I reconsi=
dering, or setting aside, my own beliefs and preferences, to try to engag=
e the rigidity arguments.
>
>> A point to note here: brainpoolP256r1 has a _very_ weak twist (? @ 2^4=
4) - a
>> practical problem only in a flawed implementation that doesn't check f=
or invalid
>> points. But here nevertheless, we actually have a curve generated in a=

>> documented pseudorandom manner, yet has at least one desirable propert=
y
>> distinctly less secure than all of its tested peers.
>>
>> Why? Bad luck, it seems.
> Thanks for the pointing this out, I hadn't noticed it before.
>
>>
>> I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable curve =
design
>> which resists all known attacks, to rolling the dice and hoping it res=
ists a
>> hypothetical attack that we know nothing about.
> Don't quite follow, based on my understanding above.
>
> Also, publishing a seed and curve-PRF, is verifiable, and reproducible.=

>
> I guess that you refer to the NIST seeds being not well-explained.
>
> Brainpool certainly seeds seem to be.
>
>> Hence my preference for the "Safecurves" approach, and thus the "Chica=
go"
>> curves.
>>
>> That some of them can be (and have been) implemented in an extremely
>> efficient way, and thus are exceptionally well-suited for the importan=
t task of
>> accelerating wide adoption of forward security in internet protocols, =
I also find
>> a highly desirable point in their favour - as, it seems, do many other=
s.
>>
>> I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.
>  =20
> People really want fast, because it reduces cost.
>
> But they also want secure.
>
> Fast and secure are both important, but orthogonal.
>
> People need to balance both sides.
>
> I had wanted to focus on the security side, to get a thorough understan=
ding of that side.
>
> Granted, I may be taking a too narrow focus, from an engineering viewpo=
int, where action is the order of the day, not reflection.  I was hoping =
CFRG to be more receptive to a (hypothetical) security-focus.
>
> Anyway, once one has a thorough understanding on both sides, one can ma=
ke a balanced decision.
>    =20
>
>
>
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Dan,<br>
      <br>
      thanks for sharing your thoughts.&nbsp; It seems to me that the
      arguments in favor of rigid curves comes down to the "nothing up
      my sleeve" argument: if there are no free parameters to be chosen
      when constructing an elliptic curve group, then there is no need
      to trust the person doing the construction.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
      <br>
      There is another consideration: the cost of attacking multiple
      instances of the EC discrete log problem can be amortized across
      multiple such instances, using techniques such as Kuhn and
      Struik's "Random Walks Revisited: Extensions of Pollard&#8217;s Rho
      Algorithm for Computing Multiple Discrete Logarithms", or a
      time-memory tradeoff like Shanks' baby step - giant step method,
      in which the number of stored elements exceeds the square root of
      the group size.&nbsp;&nbsp; Some users may be motivated by the logic that by
      avoiding a particular well-known curve, they prevent potential
      attackers from amortizing the cost of finding their private within
      a batch of other attacks.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If the cost of solving a single
      discrete logarithm problem are within the attacker's budget, then
      these considerations would come into play.&nbsp;&nbsp; It would then be
      valuable to have a way to generate multiple curves, which could be
      pseudorandom and verifiable, or perhaps could be sequential and
      based on the "smallest number greater than p" sort of logic.&nbsp; <br>
      <br>
      In any case, the suggestion to document the rationale behind
      elliptic curve parameter choices is a good one!&nbsp; <br>
      <br>
      David<br>
      <br>
      On 01/14/2014 11:51 AM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1F190@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">-----Original Message-----
From: Alyssa Rowan
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 7:27 PM

On 13/01/2014 23:07, Dan Brown wrote:

</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap="">For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
than rigidity.
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap="">
With respect, I disagree.

With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero knowledge about
what may, or may not, be affected by it.

</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
We have zero knowledge that Curve25519 resists the hypothetical attack for which P256 has hypothetically been manipulated to be affected by. [Sorry to grammarians!]

So, what is rigidity is claiming to resist, under your reasoning?

Under my reasoning, I assume that there is a set of curves, partitioned into two subsets: curves vulnerable to a secret attack known the generator (NIST/NSA) and those not..

It's possible that trial and error was used for P256 until landed in the vulnerable subset.  I think that is implicit in the safecurves ... rigidity page.  No?

Now, suppose I were tasked to find my own curve to minimize the chance of landing in the vulnerable set?

Choose a curve with small coefficients?  Since I do not know what the vulnerable set is, and rightly want to assume zero knowledge about it, I cannot presume that small coefficients protect me from the hypothetical secret attack, unless presume nonzero knowledge the vulnerable set.  [Sorry for the tedious redundancy.] 

Granted: small coefficients would help my persuade others that I did not select the curve maliciously by exhaustive search.  

What about a pseudorandom curve? More precisely, where the coefficients are derived from PRF(rigid-seed).  

Assuming independence of the vulnerable set from the PRF and rigid-seed, and the pseudorandomness of the PRF, then it seems that the pseudorandom curve lands in the vulnerable subset with probability p, where p is the density of the vulnerable subset within the larger set of curves from which one draws the curve from.

Under this hypothesis, the manipulation of P256 would have been expected to take on the order of 1/p trials.  

One can plug in any value for p, based on whatever assumptions one thinks is reasonable.

For example, my personal belief had been p = 2^(-128), perhaps because I was super biased toward, and committed to, ECC.  In that case, the manipulation phase for NIST P256 would be infeasible, and I could dismiss this whole issue rigidity v pseudorandom as didactic, distraction, irrelevant, baseless, stalling, bogus, moot, FUD, or whatever.

But I recognize that maybe I am too optimistic.  Others have suggested p =2^(-30), and I am listening to them.  Then a malicious NIST P256 would be very feasible.  In my view, the resulting assurance provided by pseudorandom, probability of 2^(-30) seems a little low, but then maybe I am just not yet used to thinking this way.  Others could say that any public key algorithm always has a similar risk of new attacks being discovered, and therefore that this risk, if not actually acceptable, is unavoidable.

What about small coefficient curves?  They don't have the argument of probability p of avoiding the vulnerable set, but they do have some legitimate security arguments: (1, resp.) no attacks are known, and (2, resp.) known attacks do not seem related to coefficient size. As I see it, these arguments assume more about the hypothetical secret attacks than the NIST curves: (1, resp.) either they do not exist (but that puts back to negligible p), or (2, resp.) the hypothetical secret attack is similar to existing known attacks to the extent that it cannot possibility depend on coefficient size.  The latter argument has tremendous merit in that it is a very plausible assumption, but pseudorandom curves do not rely on this assumption.  Again, it presumes virtually nonzero knowledge about the secret attack (other than the partition of the set of curves into vulnerable and non-vulnerable).  No?  

It's certainly possible to vilify me for suggesting the possibility of a small coefficient attack, call it baseless, etc., but what I'm saying is that pseudorandom curves do not rely this.  Instead they rely on more falsifiable assumptions, e.g. the effective of the PRF, etc.  

This general strategy of reasoning to avoid unknown attacks is used in the field of "provable security" and also seems to be used in the "rigidity" page of the safecurves strategy.

I've a tried to explain this before on the TLS.  In so doing, I reconsidering, or setting aside, my own beliefs and preferences, to try to engage the rigidity arguments.

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">
A point to note here: brainpoolP256r1 has a _very_ weak twist (&#961; @ 2^44) - a
practical problem only in a flawed implementation that doesn't check for invalid
points. But here nevertheless, we actually have a curve generated in a
documented pseudorandom manner, yet has at least one desirable property
distinctly less secure than all of its tested peers.

Why? Bad luck, it seems.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
Thanks for the pointing this out, I hadn't noticed it before. 

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">

I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable curve design
which resists all known attacks, to rolling the dice and hoping it resists a
hypothetical attack that we know nothing about.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
Don't quite follow, based on my understanding above.

Also, publishing a seed and curve-PRF, is verifiable, and reproducible.

I guess that you refer to the NIST seeds being not well-explained. 

Brainpool certainly seeds seem to be.

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">
Hence my preference for the "Safecurves" approach, and thus the "Chicago"
curves.

That some of them can be (and have been) implemented in an extremely
efficient way, and thus are exceptionally well-suited for the important task of
accelerating wide adoption of forward security in internet protocols, I also find
a highly desirable point in their favour - as, it seems, do many others.

I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""> 
People really want fast, because it reduces cost.  

But they also want secure.

Fast and secure are both important, but orthogonal.

People need to balance both sides.

I had wanted to focus on the security side, to get a thorough understanding of that side.

Granted, I may be taking a too narrow focus, from an engineering viewpoint, where action is the order of the day, not reflection.  I was hoping CFRG to be more receptive to a (hypothetical) security-focus.

Anyway, once one has a thorough understanding on both sides, one can make a balanced decision.
   

</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">---------------------------------------------------------------------
This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential information, privileged material (including material protected by the solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-public information. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately reply to the sender and delete this information from your system. Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this transmission by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
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Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 15:56:37 -0500
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Hi Dan,

thanks for sharing your thoughts, more inline:

On 01/13/2014 11:55 AM, Dan Brown wrote:
>
> Last week I wrote that I would soon write up my disagreements with the 
> safe curves site.
>
> My first disagreement is written up below, but first two editorial issues:
>
> -My last email was in the context of Watson's draft spec for the 
> Chicago (Bernstein?) curves, but I would like to detach the issue from 
> the I-D.  My comment about the reference in Watson's I-D to a website 
> was just an editorial comment.
>
> -These technical issues that I hope CFRG discusses just might be 
> resolved and written into a CFRG I-D cataloging of elliptic curves and 
> their relative merits and so on, which should be independent of 
> Watson's spec for the Chicago curves.  For now, I opted to discuss via 
> email list, rather than placing these arguments into my own one-sided 
> individual I-D.  Please advise me if such an I-D is preferred to email.
>

This is an important question, so let me take a step back before I 
answer it.

You and others are welcome as individuals to contribute individual 
submission Internet drafts and call them to the attention of CFRG. If 
you want to provide a more formal document, then an I-D seems more 
appropriate, but I am personally fine with an email such as this one, 
when there is no need for a permanent record.

Technically, I-Ds are not permanent documents; they expire by design.  
Some I-Ds progress to become RFCs.   Progressing an I-D to an RFC takes 
a bit of work and patience, so ideally, we should minimize the number of 
documents we progress to RFC.

The research group can choose to take on an I-D, because it wants to 
endorse the work and make sure that it gets published.   However, it is 
not necessary to do that.   Alternatively, I-Ds that are individual 
submissions can get progressed to RFC, and can be reviewed in CFRG.    
This has been done before with CFRG, with RFCs 5116 and 6090 for 
instance.  The process for progressing drafts to RFCs is described in 
http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5742    If CFRG takes on a draft, then 
the CFRG chairs are responsible for performing or orchestrating the work 
that needs to be done to get it published as an RFC.   If someone wants 
to publish a draft as an individual submission RFC, rather than going 
through the CFRG process, then they will need to convince a Security 
Area Director (Sean or Stephen) to publish their draft.  Of course, one 
of the differences of authoring an individual submission instead of an 
RG draft is that, in the latter case, the author is accountable for a 
work product of the entire group (that is, the draft needs to reflect 
input from other RG members).

We need to be conscious of the limited resources that we have for 
reviewing and shepherding documents within CFRG, and make sure that we 
take on work that we can complete.   We are fortunate to have the 
participation of a lot of very talented people (including you), but we 
all have a finite amount of time.   So I think CFRG needs to figure out 
what topics to prioritize, and get people to volunteer as authors and 
reviewers (which could include implementers, in the case of specifications).

There clearly is interest, within IETF and CFRG, regarding ECC 
alternatives.  It would be good to have a discussion on what sort of 
RFCs would be most useful, which could include security analysis or 
separate recommendations as well as specifications.   Speaking as an RG 
member, not a chair, I personally like the idea of an RFC describing 
Montgomery or Edwards curves that provides the same sort of information 
as RFC6090: definitions, implementation guidance, references on 
security, and so forth.

I hope that this makes sense - I took a detailed question and gave a 
broad answer :-)

regards,

David

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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Dan,<br>
      <br>
      thanks for sharing your thoughts, more inline:<br>
      <br>
      On 01/13/2014 11:55 AM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
    </div>
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--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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<o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1" />
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA">Last week I wrote that I
            would soon write up my disagreements with the safe curves
            site.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA">My first disagreement is
            written up below, but first two editorial issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"
          style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
            lang="EN-CA"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">-<span
                style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
            lang="EN-CA">My last email was in the context of Watson&#8217;s
            draft spec for the Chicago (Bernstein?) curves, but I would
            like to detach the issue from the I-D.&nbsp; My comment about the
            reference in Watson&#8217;s I-D to a website was just an editorial
            comment.&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"
          style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
            lang="EN-CA"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">-<span
                style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
            lang="EN-CA">These technical issues that I hope CFRG
            discusses just might be resolved and written into a CFRG I-D
            cataloging of elliptic curves and their relative merits and
            so on, which should be independent of Watson&#8217;s spec for the
            Chicago curves.&nbsp; For now, I opted to discuss via email list,
            rather than placing these arguments into my own one-sided
            individual I-D.&nbsp; Please advise me if such an I-D is
            preferred to email.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This is an important question, so let me take a step back before I
    answer it.<br>
    <br>
    You and others are welcome as individuals to contribute individual
    submission Internet drafts and call them to the attention of CFRG.&nbsp;&nbsp;
    If you want to provide a more formal document, then an I-D seems
    more appropriate, but I am personally fine with an email such as
    this one, when there is no need for a permanent record.<br>
    <br>
    Technically, I-Ds are not permanent documents; they expire by
    design.&nbsp; Some I-Ds progress to become RFCs.&nbsp;&nbsp; Progressing an I-D to
    an RFC takes a bit of work and patience, so ideally, we should
    minimize the number of documents we progress to RFC.<br>
    <br>
    The research group can choose to take on an I-D, because it wants to
    endorse the work and make sure that it gets published.&nbsp;&nbsp; However, it
    is not necessary to do that.&nbsp;&nbsp; Alternatively, I-Ds that are
    individual submissions can get progressed to RFC, and can be
    reviewed in CFRG.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This has been done before with CFRG, with RFCs
    5116 and 6090 for instance.&nbsp; The process for progressing drafts to
    RFCs is described in <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5742">http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5742</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If CFRG
    takes on a draft, then the CFRG chairs are responsible for
    performing or orchestrating the work that needs to be done to get it
    published as an RFC.&nbsp;&nbsp; If someone wants to publish a draft as an
    individual submission RFC, rather than going through the CFRG
    process, then they will need to convince a Security Area Director
    (Sean or Stephen) to publish their draft.&nbsp; Of course, one of the
    differences of authoring an individual submission instead of an RG
    draft is that, in the latter case, the author is accountable for a
    work product of the entire group (that is, the draft needs to
    reflect input from other RG members).&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    We need to be conscious of the limited resources that we have for
    reviewing and shepherding documents within CFRG, and make sure that
    we take on work that we can complete.&nbsp;&nbsp; We are fortunate to have the
    participation of a lot of very talented people (including you), but
    we all have a finite amount of time.&nbsp;&nbsp; So I think CFRG needs to
    figure out what topics to prioritize, and get people to volunteer as
    authors and reviewers (which could include implementers, in the case
    of specifications).<br>
    <br>
    There clearly is interest, within IETF and CFRG, regarding ECC
    alternatives.&nbsp; It would be good to have a discussion on what sort of
    RFCs would be most useful, which could include security analysis or
    separate recommendations as well as specifications.&nbsp;&nbsp; Speaking as an
    RG member, not a chair, I personally like the idea of an RFC
    describing Montgomery or Edwards curves that provides the same sort
    of information as RFC6090: definitions, implementation guidance,
    references on security, and so forth.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    I hope that this makes sense - I took a detailed question and gave a
    broad answer :-)<br>
    <br>
    regards,<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------050703090903060200040500--

From akr@akr.io  Tue Jan 14 13:01:12 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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On 14/01/2014 16:51, Dan Brown wrote:

>> With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero 
>> knowledge about what may, or may not, be affected by it.
> We have zero knowledge that Curve25519 resists the hypothetical 
> attack for which P256 has hypothetically been manipulated to be 
> affected by. [Sorry to grammarians!]

Of course, in truth, we have zero actual knowledge about any such
attack, full stop - including whether it actually exists, or whether
P256 was actually manipulated to be affected by it.

> So, what is rigidity is claiming to resist, under your reasoning?

Simply put, rigidity assures "nothing up my sleeve".

For example, using the Safecurves criteria, three separate groups of
people independently came up with the exact same parameters for E-521.

> It's possible that trial and error was used for P256 until landed 
> in the vulnerable subset.

I gather that the SEC team at Certicom at the time _did_ perform a
trial-and-error search of SHA-1 seeds so that the resulting outputs
would meet certain criteria.

My information suggests that the criteria for selection were the
applicability of Certicom-patented techniques for fast arithmetic over
the curves so generated.

I have not been able to uncover any evidence that they were
intentionally weakened - although sadly, due to the breathtakingly
exceptional opacity of the process, I am unable to comprehensively
rule it out.

We do know they were working closely with NSA during the affected time
(we don't know to which end). We definitely know the NSA have had a
line item on their SIGINT Enabling Project's budget specifically about
influencing public-key standards in a way which makes them amenable to
attacks (although we don't know whether it did at the relevant time,
or what that precisely referred to).

The rest, sadly, is probably lost in some file somewhere. You may very
well be in a better position to uncover their precise provenance than
I (in the absence of nothing-up-my-sleeve numbers, I am not sure to
what degree it would actually assure anyone, but it would still be
nice to have some idea).


Happily, the "Chicago" curves have no such shadow, are faster and
easier to implement well, it is possible to make them extremely fast -
which will strongly aid the requirements of many parties wanting to
deploy forward secrecy (an important defence against nation state
adversaries performing mass surveillance). They make a pretty damn
good replacement.

> Now, suppose I were tasked to find my own curve to minimize the 
> chance of landing in the vulnerable set?

With no knowledge of the vulnerable set, any such choice is, sadly, blind.

We can, of course guess. We may or may not be right.

If we guess that such an attack perhaps resembles an existing attack
but with a new twist (if you'll pardon the pun!), then probably the
best we can do to avoid it is to avoid existing attacks in a
conservative manner, and thoroughly explain any such heuristic.

The question is simply whether our heuristic guesses are better than
random at avoiding an unknown attack, worse, or equivalent.

Obviously, we don't know which. But the strategy seems sensible.

>> [brainpoolP256r1 weak twist] Why? Bad luck, it seems.
> Thanks for the pointing this out, I hadn't noticed it before.

It's simply bad luck. brainpoolP384r1 doesn't have the same issue.
Neither, actually, does secp256r1, although secp224r1 does.

I presume it simply wasn't considered under the selection criteria or
thought of as relevant at the time.

That feeds into my point, however: with no thought that such a thing
might be relevant, psuedorandomness in fact did not protect
brainpoolP256r1 against such a flaw.

>> I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable 
>> curve design which resists all known attacks, to rolling the
>> dice and hoping it resists a hypothetical attack that we know
>> nothing about.
> Don't quite follow, based on my understanding above. Also, 
> publishing a seed and curve-PRF, is verifiable, and reproducible.

Naturally, provided the seeds are chosen in a verifiable manner.


I think if we start rolling the dice repeatedly until we get numbers
we'd like, we may as well just use what we know to pick good ones via
defined criteria.

But it seems like we simply disagree on that point - you prefer a
random approach, others including me prefer a solidly-explained
heuristic approach.

We are probably unlikely to reach consensus on that point, although
there's nothing stopping us having it both ways.

> I guess that you refer to the NIST seeds being not well-explained. 
> Brainpool certainly seeds seem to be.

I don't dispute that. It's a slightly odd process, but it's explained,
and seems to have been done that way to mirror the SECP process.

>> I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.
> People really want fast, because it reduces cost. But they also 
> want secure. Fast and secure are both important, but orthogonal. 
> People need to balance both sides.

Orthogonal, but not necessarily always _opposites_. Slow things are
not necessarily insecure; fast things not necessarily weak; not all
secure things are slow; not all insecure things are fast.

They are both separate, desirable criteria. I am familiar with a
number of primitives which have the unenviable properties of being
weak _and_ slow, as I am sure are you.

The only areas where they clearly fall into direct conflict are for
example where more rounds would make a function slower but more
secure, or where all other things being equal, a larger field or key
size would be more resistant to an attack than a smaller one. (Hence
the specification of multiple curves, to trade off performance and
size for estimated security margin.)

Here, we appear to have the rare and treasured opportunity of a useful
set of primitives which are both secure against all known and
reasonably conjectured attacks over the foreseeable future _and_ fast
- - when we need it most. I think we should take that opportunity:
because quite honestly, many aren't going to wait any longer than they
have to, and these curves are in fact already being used in the wild
in several applications.

> I had wanted to focus on the security side, to get a thorough 
> understanding of that side. Granted, I may be taking a too narrow 
> focus, from an engineering viewpoint, where action is the order of 
> the day, not reflection.  I was hoping CFRG to be more receptive
> to a (hypothetical) security-focus. Anyway, once one has a
> thorough understanding on both sides, one can make a balanced
> decision.

You are of course entirely welcome to come up with your own open
criteria and/or generate pseudorandom curves according to those
criteria; it appears that you may wish to do this. From the sounds of
it so far, it would end up broadly like Brainpool - pseudorandom
Edwards curves, not optimised for efficient implementation, but
selected to avoid known attacks, with the hope of avoiding unknown
attacks.

Any such draft can of course be discussed separately, should you wish
to put it forward. Whether anyone would wish to use them is up to
implementers.

- -- 
/akr
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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On 01/11/2014 11:39 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Jan 11, 2014, at 8:24 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
>
>> Agreed there. That's a temporary slot, there for the draft, I believe,
>> but the final reference should I think be more like:
>>
>> 7. References
>>
>>     [SAFECURVES] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. SafeCurves:
>>     choosing safe curves for elliptic-curve cryptography.
>>     <http://safecurves.cr.yp.to>, accessed 11 November 2014.
>>
>>     [EFD] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. Explict-Formulas
>>     Database, Genus-1 curves over large-characteristic fields.
>>     <http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/>, accessed
>>     11 November 2014.
> Published academic papers would be *much* more useful than web sites that can change.
>
> References in RFCs are not there to prove that the RFC authors did their homework; they are there to help readers assess the validity of statements in the document. When someone reads this RFC 15 years from now, the contents of http://safecurves.cr.yp.to will very likely be more up to date, possibly in a way that negates some of what is said in the document. A reader of the RFC at that point should decide not to implement because of the disagreement between the RFC and the reference; that would be bad.

Plus one; this is an important point.

David

> For crypto documents, references to books (specific editions) and IACR papers seem to work just fine.
>
> --Paul Hoffman
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
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>


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 1:05 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> On 01/11/2014 11:39 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>
>> On Jan 11, 2014, at 8:24 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
>>
>>> Agreed there. That's a temporary slot, there for the draft, I believe,
>>> but the final reference should I think be more like:
>>>
>>> 7. References
>>>
>>>     [SAFECURVES] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. SafeCurves:
>>>     choosing safe curves for elliptic-curve cryptography.
>>>     <http://safecurves.cr.yp.to>, accessed 11 November 2014.
>>>
>>>     [EFD] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. Explict-Formulas
>>>     Database, Genus-1 curves over large-characteristic fields.
>>>     <http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/>, accessed
>>>     11 November 2014.
>>
>> Published academic papers would be *much* more useful than web sites that
>> can change.
>>
>> References in RFCs are not there to prove that the RFC authors did their
>> homework; they are there to help readers assess the validity of statements
>> in the document. When someone reads this RFC 15 years from now, the contents
>> of http://safecurves.cr.yp.to will very likely be more up to date, possibly
>> in a way that negates some of what is said in the document. A reader of the
>> RFC at that point should decide not to implement because of the disagreement
>> between the RFC and the reference; that would be bad.

Possibly not: if a new attack is discovered that safecurves.cr.yp.to
tells the world about
before we catch up, it would be great if someone doesn't implement
because of that.

>
>
> Plus one; this is an important point.

And is addressed in the latest draft. (Not yet posted)

Much more substantive is the desire for material on the lines of RFC
6090 to be added: that will take considerably
longer than anticipated. But we have to wait for OIDs anyway.

>
> David
>
>
>> For crypto documents, references to books (specific editions) and IACR
>> papers seem to work just fine.
>>
>> --Paul Hoffman
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Tue Jan 14 13:46:37 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] comments on safecurves draft and goals
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Hi Watson,

I am glad that you started the process of generating an RFC that 
introduces some improved ECC techniques; thanks for doing this.   I want 
to get you some high level feedback, speaking as an RG member, not an RG 
chair.

I think that CFRG should support this work, either by having it become 
an RG draft, or through ongoing review and coordination with the IETF 
Securiy Area.

What would have the most positive impact is a draft that is something 
like RFC609 for Montgomery and/or Edwards curves, which includes:

- complete descriptions for all relevant algorithms (including things 
like octet/integer conversions), and guidance about implementation 
techniques (especially important considering resistance to side channel 
attacks),

- stable normative references for all algorithms,

- definitions and references for mathematical things that a typical 
software or hardware engineer would not know about,

- a description of what interoperability is possible,

- a rationale that explains the design choices, and summarizes the 
security and provides references to appropriate security analyses, and

- a section on intellectual property, which describes what is known 
about the IPR situation.   Of course, the IETF IPR disclosure rules 
apply, so the IETF process for patents will apply.

It might make sense to borrow some of the structure (and perhaps even 
text, such as octet conversions and ECDH) from RFC6090.   I can provide 
you with the source XML if you want.

Ideally, there should be a section on "implementation experience", which 
provides feedback from multiple implementers.

I would guess that this work is something that Dan and Tanja are willing 
to contribute to, say by allowing us to use some of the text (including 
the excellent list of references) on the safecurves site.

A good way to think about this work is: it should provide enough 
information that someone can implement the primitives, and will be 
guaranteed interoperability with someone else's independent 
implementation.   It should provide such a good a self-contained 
rationale for the design and its security that someone who works for a 
vendor or an end-user could use it to justify adopting this 
technology.   And t should enable an implementer to understand the IPR 
landscape surrounding their implementation.

I hope that it doesn't seem like I am raising the bar to make your work 
harder; that is certainly not my goal.   What I am going for is: having 
this work make the biggest and most positive impact.

I saw from your recent note that you have a new version in the works; 
that's great.

David

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-ladd-safecurves-02
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On Tue, January 14, 2014 1:24 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 1:05 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>> On 01/11/2014 11:39 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>>
>>> On Jan 11, 2014, at 8:24 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Agreed there. That's a temporary slot, there for the draft, I believe,
>>>> but the final reference should I think be more like:
>>>>
>>>> 7. References
>>>>
>>>>     [SAFECURVES] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. SafeCurves:
>>>>     choosing safe curves for elliptic-curve cryptography.
>>>>     <http://safecurves.cr.yp.to>, accessed 11 November 2014.
>>>>
>>>>     [EFD] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange. Explict-Formulas
>>>>     Database, Genus-1 curves over large-characteristic fields.
>>>>     <http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/>, accessed
>>>>     11 November 2014.
>>>
>>> Published academic papers would be *much* more useful than web sites
>>> that
>>> can change.
>>>
>>> References in RFCs are not there to prove that the RFC authors did
>>> their
>>> homework; they are there to help readers assess the validity of
>>> statements
>>> in the document. When someone reads this RFC 15 years from now, the
>>> contents
>>> of http://safecurves.cr.yp.to will very likely be more up to date,
>>> possibly
>>> in a way that negates some of what is said in the document. A reader of
>>> the
>>> RFC at that point should decide not to implement because of the
>>> disagreement
>>> between the RFC and the reference; that would be bad.
>
> Possibly not: if a new attack is discovered that safecurves.cr.yp.to
> tells the world about
> before we catch up, it would be great if someone doesn't implement
> because of that.

  There are a number of reasons (left unsaid to prevent this thread from
derailing) that safecurves.cr.yp.to might not even exist as a website
in 15 years. An reference that says a web page was "accessed on"  some
date is not acceptable.

>>
>> Plus one; this is an important point.
>
> And is addressed in the latest draft. (Not yet posted)
>
> Much more substantive is the desire for material on the lines of RFC
> 6090 to be added: that will take considerably
> longer than anticipated. But we have to wait for OIDs anyway.

  Your draft is really part RFC 6090 and part RFC 5639. You need to
explain the math background (which is different than that in RFC 6090),
the requirements that resulted in the groups being generated, and the
parameters that define the groups. Then you need to define the complete
domain parameter sets, list the OIDs that refer to them, and a set of test
vectors for each group-- suggest just doing an Alice and Bob ECDH
exchange.

  A section on why Joe Random should select these curves for his
implementation would be most helpful.

  Dan.




From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Tue Jan 14 14:37:30 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group=
 of the IETF.

        Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
        Authors         : Ted Krovetz
                          Phillip Rogaway
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2014-01-14

Abstract:
   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
   encryption scheme that provides confidentiality and authenticity for
   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From ted@krovetz.net  Tue Jan 14 14:48:01 2014
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From: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05.txt
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This submission updates the OCB draft to reflect Stephen Farrell's =
suggestions directed at the draft. (Thank you Stephen!)

- Changed all uses of the word "privacy" to "confidentiality".

- Changed sentence in the introduction from

  As with most modes of operation, security degrades in the
  square of the number of blocks of texts divided by two to the
  blocklength.

to

  As with most modes of operation, security degrades as the
  number of blocks processed gets large (see Section 5 for details).

Thank you,
Ted


On Jan 14, 2014, at 2:37 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working =
Group of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
>        Authors         : Ted Krovetz
>                          Phillip Rogaway
> 	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05.txt
> 	Pages           : 18
> 	Date            : 2014-01-14
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
>   encryption scheme that provides confidentiality and authenticity for
>   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
>   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
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From arne.renkema-padmos@cased.de  Tue Jan 14 14:49:06 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer
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On 14/01/14 03:04, William Whyte wrote:
> So is the idea that all devices have to implement both algorithms? Is
> there a mechanism in place for declaring one broken and requiring that the
> other is used at all times?

>From what I could find KASUMI (UEA1,UIA1) and SNOW 3G (UEA2,UIA2) are
the "preferable HW [hardware] profile for UMTS", whatever that means:

http://docbox.etsi.org/workshop/2008/2008_securityworkshop/s8_2_taizo_shirai.pdf

I'm not sure what mechanism is in place for fallback and would
appreciate if others could chime in.

> TBH I'm less concerned about catastrophic failure of symmetric algorithms
> than public-key algorithms, but I'm very interested in processes to
> replace algorithms.

I agree that this is more of a general problem that is not algorithm
bound. It's not even a problem bound to cryptography, although I guess
we might be able to identify best practices (or whatever you'd like to
call them) specific to cryptography in informing algorithm roll-out.

Cheers,
arne

-- 
Arne Renkema-Padmos
@hcisec, secuso.org
Doctoral researcher
CASED, TU Darmstadt

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Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 17:40:45 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of David McGrew
> Sent: Tuesday, January 14, 2014 12:21 PM
>
>
> To: Dan Brown
> Cc: 'cfrg@irtf.org'
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
>
>
>
> Hi Dan,
>
>
>
> thanks for sharing your thoughts.  It seems to me that the arguments in
> favor of rigid curves comes down to the "nothing up my sleeve" argument: =
if
> there are no free parameters to be chosen when constructing an elliptic
> curve group, then there is no need to trust the person doing the
> construction.
>
> There is another consideration: the cost of attacking multiple instances =
of
> the EC discrete log problem can be amortized across multiple such instanc=
es,
> using techniques such as Kuhn and Struik's "Random Walks Revisited:
> Extensions of Pollard=E2=80=99s Rho Algorithm for Computing Multiple Disc=
rete
> Logarithms", or a time-memory tradeoff like Shanks' baby step - giant ste=
p
> method, in which the number of stored elements exceeds the square root of
> the group size.   Some users may be motivated by the logic that by avoidi=
ng
> a particular well-known curve, they prevent potential attackers from
> amortizing the cost of finding their private within a batch of other
> attacks.    If the cost of solving a single discrete logarithm problem ar=
e
> within the attacker's budget, then these considerations would come into
> play.   It would then be valuable to have a way to generate multiple curv=
es,
> which could be pseudorandom and verifiable, or perhaps could be sequentia=
l
> and based on the "smallest number greater than p" sort of logic.

No one uses time-memory tradeoff: why have silicon store data it can work o=
n?
This also misstates the issue. Parallel search for AES-128 keys cuts
the work by the number of keys,
and the time to the first key falls linearly with the number of keys.
Parallel rho isn't any faster for the first answer: the remaining
answers come out fast, but getting the first
one still takes the same time. The fact that this is stated clearly in
the paper cited makes me doubt whether
the person citing the paper bothered to read it.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> [ =E2=A8=B3]  Interesting =E2=80=A6 so we could have a curve of the day s=
ite.  Order is hard
> to create, but could be generated and used by many.
>
> Paul
>
>
>
> In any case, the suggestion to document the rationale behind elliptic cur=
ve
> parameter choices is a good one!
>
> David
>
> On 01/14/2014 11:51 AM, Dan Brown wrote:
>
> -----Original Message-----
>
> From: Alyssa Rowan
>
> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 7:27 PM
>
>
>
> On 13/01/2014 23:07, Dan Brown wrote:
>
>
>
> For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
>
> than rigidity.
>
>
>
> With respect, I disagree.
>
>
>
> With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero knowledge abou=
t
>
> what may, or may not, be affected by it.
>
>
>
>
>
> We have zero knowledge that Curve25519 resists the hypothetical attack fo=
r
> which P256 has hypothetically been manipulated to be affected by. [Sorry =
to
> grammarians!]
>
>
>
> So, what is rigidity is claiming to resist, under your reasoning?
>
>
>
> Under my reasoning, I assume that there is a set of curves, partitioned i=
nto
> two subsets: curves vulnerable to a secret attack known the generator
> (NIST/NSA) and those not..
>
>
>
> It's possible that trial and error was used for P256 until landed in the
> vulnerable subset.  I think that is implicit in the safecurves ... rigidi=
ty
> page.  No?
>
>
>
> Now, suppose I were tasked to find my own curve to minimize the chance of
> landing in the vulnerable set?
>
>
>
> Choose a curve with small coefficients?  Since I do not know what the
> vulnerable set is, and rightly want to assume zero knowledge about it, I
> cannot presume that small coefficients protect me from the hypothetical
> secret attack, unless presume nonzero knowledge the vulnerable set.  [Sor=
ry
> for the tedious redundancy.]
>
>
>
> Granted: small coefficients would help my persuade others that I did not
> select the curve maliciously by exhaustive search.
>
>
>
> What about a pseudorandom curve? More precisely, where the coefficients a=
re
> derived from PRF(rigid-seed).
>
>
>
> Assuming independence of the vulnerable set from the PRF and rigid-seed, =
and
> the pseudorandomness of the PRF, then it seems that the pseudorandom curv=
e
> lands in the vulnerable subset with probability p, where p is the density=
 of
> the vulnerable subset within the larger set of curves from which one draw=
s
> the curve from.
>
>
>
> Under this hypothesis, the manipulation of P256 would have been expected =
to
> take on the order of 1/p trials.
>
>
>
> One can plug in any value for p, based on whatever assumptions one thinks=
 is
> reasonable.
>
>
>
> For example, my personal belief had been p =3D 2^(-128), perhaps because =
I was
> super biased toward, and committed to, ECC.  In that case, the manipulati=
on
> phase for NIST P256 would be infeasible, and I could dismiss this whole
> issue rigidity v pseudorandom as didactic, distraction, irrelevant,
> baseless, stalling, bogus, moot, FUD, or whatever.
>
>
>
> But I recognize that maybe I am too optimistic.  Others have suggested p
> =3D2^(-30), and I am listening to them.  Then a malicious NIST P256 would=
 be
> very feasible.  In my view, the resulting assurance provided by
> pseudorandom, probability of 2^(-30) seems a little low, but then maybe I=
 am
> just not yet used to thinking this way.  Others could say that any public
> key algorithm always has a similar risk of new attacks being discovered, =
and
> therefore that this risk, if not actually acceptable, is unavoidable.
>
>
>
> What about small coefficient curves?  They don't have the argument of
> probability p of avoiding the vulnerable set, but they do have some
> legitimate security arguments: (1, resp.) no attacks are known, and (2,
> resp.) known attacks do not seem related to coefficient size. As I see it=
,
> these arguments assume more about the hypothetical secret attacks than th=
e
> NIST curves: (1, resp.) either they do not exist (but that puts back to
> negligible p), or (2, resp.) the hypothetical secret attack is similar to
> existing known attacks to the extent that it cannot possibility depend on
> coefficient size.  The latter argument has tremendous merit in that it is=
 a
> very plausible assumption, but pseudorandom curves do not rely on this
> assumption.  Again, it presumes virtually nonzero knowledge about the sec=
ret
> attack (other than the partition of the set of curves into vulnerable and
> non-vulnerable).  No?
>
>
>
> It's certainly possible to vilify me for suggesting the possibility of a
> small coefficient attack, call it baseless, etc., but what I'm saying is
> that pseudorandom curves do not rely this.  Instead they rely on more
> falsifiable assumptions, e.g. the effective of the PRF, etc.
>
>
>
> This general strategy of reasoning to avoid unknown attacks is used in th=
e
> field of "provable security" and also seems to be used in the "rigidity"
> page of the safecurves strategy.
>
>
>
> I've a tried to explain this before on the TLS.  In so doing, I
> reconsidering, or setting aside, my own beliefs and preferences, to try t=
o
> engage the rigidity arguments.
>
>
>
>
>
> A point to note here: brainpoolP256r1 has a _very_ weak twist (=CF=81 @ 2=
^44) - a
>
> practical problem only in a flawed implementation that doesn't check for
> invalid
>
> points. But here nevertheless, we actually have a curve generated in a
>
> documented pseudorandom manner, yet has at least one desirable property
>
> distinctly less secure than all of its tested peers.
>
>
>
> Why? Bad luck, it seems.
>
>
>
> Thanks for the pointing this out, I hadn't noticed it before.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable curve des=
ign
>
> which resists all known attacks, to rolling the dice and hoping it resist=
s a
>
> hypothetical attack that we know nothing about.
>
>
>
> Don't quite follow, based on my understanding above.
>
>
>
> Also, publishing a seed and curve-PRF, is verifiable, and reproducible.
>
>
>
> I guess that you refer to the NIST seeds being not well-explained.
>
>
>
> Brainpool certainly seeds seem to be.
>
>
>
>
>
> Hence my preference for the "Safecurves" approach, and thus the "Chicago"
>
> curves.
>
>
>
> That some of them can be (and have been) implemented in an extremely
>
> efficient way, and thus are exceptionally well-suited for the important t=
ask
> of
>
> accelerating wide adoption of forward security in internet protocols, I a=
lso
> find
>
> a highly desirable point in their favour - as, it seems, do many others.
>
>
>
> I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.
>
>
>
> People really want fast, because it reduces cost.
>
>
>
> But they also want secure.
>
>
>
> Fast and secure are both important, but orthogonal.
>
>
>
> People need to balance both sides.
>
>
>
> I had wanted to focus on the security side, to get a thorough understandi=
ng
> of that side.
>
>
>
> Granted, I may be taking a too narrow focus, from an engineering viewpoin=
t,
> where action is the order of the day, not reflection.  I was hoping CFRG =
to
> be more receptive to a (hypothetical) security-focus.
>
>
>
> Anyway, once one has a thorough understanding on both sides, one can make=
 a
> balanced decision.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>
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>
> _______________________________________________
>
> Cfrg mailing list
>
> Cfrg@irtf.org
>
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>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From yaronf.ietf@gmail.com  Wed Jan 15 00:25:32 2014
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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 10:25:16 +0200
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Hi David,

Somewhere down the Safe Curves thread you mention that you expect a CFRG 
draft to contain "stable normative references" to definitions of crypto 
mechanisms. I share this wish in part, in particular I would appreciate 
"stable" references (e.g., to academic papers). However many/most crypto 
publications are not aimed at implementors. Often they are not 
well-specified enough to implement. And we don't want to wait a few 
years for NIST to create normative versions. So I would actually expect 
the new CFRG document to become the "normative" reference.

Thanks,
	Yaron


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On 01/15/2014 03:25 AM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> Somewhere down the Safe Curves thread you mention that you expect a 
> CFRG draft to contain "stable normative references" to definitions of 
> crypto mechanisms. I share this wish in part, in particular I would 
> appreciate "stable" references (e.g., to academic papers). However 
> many/most crypto publications are not aimed at implementors. Often 
> they are not well-specified enough to implement. And we don't want to 
> wait a few years for NIST to create normative versions. So I would 
> actually expect the new CFRG document to become the "normative" 
> reference.

This is a good point, Yaron.

David

>
> Thanks,
>     Yaron
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 08:18:33 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
References: <20140113230750.6111382.6841.8590@certicom.com> <52D48450.3070701@akr.io> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1F190@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D59C35.10807@cisco.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7ED7B6F@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CACsn0ckvQGGG9Fvif25DGVYvseaB1WHC27UoTs2Xpv4hncf8gw@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Hi Watson,

On 01/14/2014 08:40 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of David McGrew
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 14, 2014 12:21 PM
>>
>>
>> To: Dan Brown
>> Cc: 'cfrg@irtf.org'
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>>
>>
>> thanks for sharing your thoughts.  It seems to me that the arguments in
>> favor of rigid curves comes down to the "nothing up my sleeve" argument: if
>> there are no free parameters to be chosen when constructing an elliptic
>> curve group, then there is no need to trust the person doing the
>> construction.
>>
>> There is another consideration: the cost of attacking multiple instances of
>> the EC discrete log problem can be amortized across multiple such instances,
>> using techniques such as Kuhn and Struik's "Random Walks Revisited:
>> Extensions of Pollard’s Rho Algorithm for Computing Multiple Discrete
>> Logarithms", or a time-memory tradeoff like Shanks' baby step - giant step
>> method, in which the number of stored elements exceeds the square root of
>> the group size.   Some users may be motivated by the logic that by avoiding
>> a particular well-known curve, they prevent potential attackers from
>> amortizing the cost of finding their private within a batch of other
>> attacks.    If the cost of solving a single discrete logarithm problem are
>> within the attacker's budget, then these considerations would come into
>> play.   It would then be valuable to have a way to generate multiple curves,
>> which could be pseudorandom and verifiable, or perhaps could be sequential
>> and based on the "smallest number greater than p" sort of logic.
> No one uses time-memory tradeoff: why have silicon store data it can work on?
> This also misstates the issue. Parallel search for AES-128 keys cuts
> the work by the number of keys,
> and the time to the first key falls linearly with the number of keys.
> Parallel rho isn't any faster for the first answer: the remaining
> answers come out fast, but getting the first
> one still takes the same time.

Right, which is why I said "If the cost of solving a single discrete 
logarithm problem are within the attacker's budget, then these 
considerations would come into play. "    So these considerations would 
be more valid at an 80-bit security level than a 256-bit security level, 
say.

> The fact that this is stated clearly in
> the paper cited makes me doubt whether
> the person citing the paper bothered to read it.

Comments like this run the risk of making the environment on this list 
less friendly.

regards,

David

>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>> [ ⨳]  Interesting … so we could have a curve of the day site.  Order is hard
>> to create, but could be generated and used by many.
>>
>> Paul
>>
>>
>>
>> In any case, the suggestion to document the rationale behind elliptic curve
>> parameter choices is a good one!
>>
>> David
>>
>> On 01/14/2014 11:51 AM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> From: Alyssa Rowan
>>
>> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 7:27 PM
>>
>>
>>
>> On 13/01/2014 23:07, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
>>
>> than rigidity.
>>
>>
>>
>> With respect, I disagree.
>>
>>
>>
>> With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero knowledge about
>>
>> what may, or may not, be affected by it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> We have zero knowledge that Curve25519 resists the hypothetical attack for
>> which P256 has hypothetically been manipulated to be affected by. [Sorry to
>> grammarians!]
>>
>>
>>
>> So, what is rigidity is claiming to resist, under your reasoning?
>>
>>
>>
>> Under my reasoning, I assume that there is a set of curves, partitioned into
>> two subsets: curves vulnerable to a secret attack known the generator
>> (NIST/NSA) and those not..
>>
>>
>>
>> It's possible that trial and error was used for P256 until landed in the
>> vulnerable subset.  I think that is implicit in the safecurves ... rigidity
>> page.  No?
>>
>>
>>
>> Now, suppose I were tasked to find my own curve to minimize the chance of
>> landing in the vulnerable set?
>>
>>
>>
>> Choose a curve with small coefficients?  Since I do not know what the
>> vulnerable set is, and rightly want to assume zero knowledge about it, I
>> cannot presume that small coefficients protect me from the hypothetical
>> secret attack, unless presume nonzero knowledge the vulnerable set.  [Sorry
>> for the tedious redundancy.]
>>
>>
>>
>> Granted: small coefficients would help my persuade others that I did not
>> select the curve maliciously by exhaustive search.
>>
>>
>>
>> What about a pseudorandom curve? More precisely, where the coefficients are
>> derived from PRF(rigid-seed).
>>
>>
>>
>> Assuming independence of the vulnerable set from the PRF and rigid-seed, and
>> the pseudorandomness of the PRF, then it seems that the pseudorandom curve
>> lands in the vulnerable subset with probability p, where p is the density of
>> the vulnerable subset within the larger set of curves from which one draws
>> the curve from.
>>
>>
>>
>> Under this hypothesis, the manipulation of P256 would have been expected to
>> take on the order of 1/p trials.
>>
>>
>>
>> One can plug in any value for p, based on whatever assumptions one thinks is
>> reasonable.
>>
>>
>>
>> For example, my personal belief had been p = 2^(-128), perhaps because I was
>> super biased toward, and committed to, ECC.  In that case, the manipulation
>> phase for NIST P256 would be infeasible, and I could dismiss this whole
>> issue rigidity v pseudorandom as didactic, distraction, irrelevant,
>> baseless, stalling, bogus, moot, FUD, or whatever.
>>
>>
>>
>> But I recognize that maybe I am too optimistic.  Others have suggested p
>> =2^(-30), and I am listening to them.  Then a malicious NIST P256 would be
>> very feasible.  In my view, the resulting assurance provided by
>> pseudorandom, probability of 2^(-30) seems a little low, but then maybe I am
>> just not yet used to thinking this way.  Others could say that any public
>> key algorithm always has a similar risk of new attacks being discovered, and
>> therefore that this risk, if not actually acceptable, is unavoidable.
>>
>>
>>
>> What about small coefficient curves?  They don't have the argument of
>> probability p of avoiding the vulnerable set, but they do have some
>> legitimate security arguments: (1, resp.) no attacks are known, and (2,
>> resp.) known attacks do not seem related to coefficient size. As I see it,
>> these arguments assume more about the hypothetical secret attacks than the
>> NIST curves: (1, resp.) either they do not exist (but that puts back to
>> negligible p), or (2, resp.) the hypothetical secret attack is similar to
>> existing known attacks to the extent that it cannot possibility depend on
>> coefficient size.  The latter argument has tremendous merit in that it is a
>> very plausible assumption, but pseudorandom curves do not rely on this
>> assumption.  Again, it presumes virtually nonzero knowledge about the secret
>> attack (other than the partition of the set of curves into vulnerable and
>> non-vulnerable).  No?
>>
>>
>>
>> It's certainly possible to vilify me for suggesting the possibility of a
>> small coefficient attack, call it baseless, etc., but what I'm saying is
>> that pseudorandom curves do not rely this.  Instead they rely on more
>> falsifiable assumptions, e.g. the effective of the PRF, etc.
>>
>>
>>
>> This general strategy of reasoning to avoid unknown attacks is used in the
>> field of "provable security" and also seems to be used in the "rigidity"
>> page of the safecurves strategy.
>>
>>
>>
>> I've a tried to explain this before on the TLS.  In so doing, I
>> reconsidering, or setting aside, my own beliefs and preferences, to try to
>> engage the rigidity arguments.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A point to note here: brainpoolP256r1 has a _very_ weak twist (ρ @ 2^44) - a
>>
>> practical problem only in a flawed implementation that doesn't check for
>> invalid
>>
>> points. But here nevertheless, we actually have a curve generated in a
>>
>> documented pseudorandom manner, yet has at least one desirable property
>>
>> distinctly less secure than all of its tested peers.
>>
>>
>>
>> Why? Bad luck, it seems.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for the pointing this out, I hadn't noticed it before.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable curve design
>>
>> which resists all known attacks, to rolling the dice and hoping it resists a
>>
>> hypothetical attack that we know nothing about.
>>
>>
>>
>> Don't quite follow, based on my understanding above.
>>
>>
>>
>> Also, publishing a seed and curve-PRF, is verifiable, and reproducible.
>>
>>
>>
>> I guess that you refer to the NIST seeds being not well-explained.
>>
>>
>>
>> Brainpool certainly seeds seem to be.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Hence my preference for the "Safecurves" approach, and thus the "Chicago"
>>
>> curves.
>>
>>
>>
>> That some of them can be (and have been) implemented in an extremely
>>
>> efficient way, and thus are exceptionally well-suited for the important task
>> of
>>
>> accelerating wide adoption of forward security in internet protocols, I also
>> find
>>
>> a highly desirable point in their favour - as, it seems, do many others.
>>
>>
>>
>> I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.
>>
>>
>>
>> People really want fast, because it reduces cost.
>>
>>
>>
>> But they also want secure.
>>
>>
>>
>> Fast and secure are both important, but orthogonal.
>>
>>
>>
>> People need to balance both sides.
>>
>>
>>
>> I had wanted to focus on the security side, to get a thorough understanding
>> of that side.
>>
>>
>>
>> Granted, I may be taking a too narrow focus, from an engineering viewpoint,
>> where action is the order of the day, not reflection.  I was hoping CFRG to
>> be more receptive to a (hypothetical) security-focus.
>>
>>
>>
>> Anyway, once one has a thorough understanding on both sides, one can make a
>> balanced decision.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>> _______________________________________________
>>
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>>
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>>
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>>
>>
>>
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>


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Jan 15 08:19:53 2014
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References: <20140113230750.6111382.6841.8590@certicom.com> <52D48450.3070701@akr.io> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1F190@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D59C35.10807@cisco.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7ED7B6F@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CACsn0ckvQGGG9Fvif25DGVYvseaB1WHC27UoTs2Xpv4hncf8gw@mail.gmail.com> <52D68AA9.1020509@cisco.com>
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 5:18 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi Watson,
>
>
> On 01/14/2014 08:40 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of David McGrew
>>> Sent: Tuesday, January 14, 2014 12:21 PM
>>>
>>>
>>> To: Dan Brown
>>> Cc: 'cfrg@irtf.org'
>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorando=
m
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Dan,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> thanks for sharing your thoughts.  It seems to me that the arguments in
>>> favor of rigid curves comes down to the "nothing up my sleeve" argument=
:
>>> if
>>> there are no free parameters to be chosen when constructing an elliptic
>>> curve group, then there is no need to trust the person doing the
>>> construction.
>>>
>>> There is another consideration: the cost of attacking multiple instance=
s
>>> of
>>> the EC discrete log problem can be amortized across multiple such
>>> instances,
>>> using techniques such as Kuhn and Struik's "Random Walks Revisited:
>>> Extensions of Pollard=E2=80=99s Rho Algorithm for Computing Multiple Di=
screte
>>> Logarithms", or a time-memory tradeoff like Shanks' baby step - giant
>>> step
>>> method, in which the number of stored elements exceeds the square root =
of
>>> the group size.   Some users may be motivated by the logic that by
>>> avoiding
>>> a particular well-known curve, they prevent potential attackers from
>>> amortizing the cost of finding their private within a batch of other
>>> attacks.    If the cost of solving a single discrete logarithm problem
>>> are
>>> within the attacker's budget, then these considerations would come into
>>> play.   It would then be valuable to have a way to generate multiple
>>> curves,
>>> which could be pseudorandom and verifiable, or perhaps could be
>>> sequential
>>> and based on the "smallest number greater than p" sort of logic.
>>
>> No one uses time-memory tradeoff: why have silicon store data it can wor=
k
>> on?
>> This also misstates the issue. Parallel search for AES-128 keys cuts
>> the work by the number of keys,
>> and the time to the first key falls linearly with the number of keys.
>> Parallel rho isn't any faster for the first answer: the remaining
>> answers come out fast, but getting the first
>> one still takes the same time.
>
>
> Right, which is why I said "If the cost of solving a single discrete
> logarithm problem are within the attacker's budget, then these
> considerations would come into play. "    So these considerations would b=
e
> more valid at an 80-bit security level than a 256-bit security level, say=
.

Well, the only reason to use an 80-bit security level is performance,
and really a marginal amount
at that: TLS doesn't have 80-bit ECC for example, and the existing 80
bit asymmetric algorithms are slower
then Curve25519.

But when you send someone a curve and ask them to use it they have to
make the following verifications
1) They have to check that the modulus is prime.
2) They have to check the order is what you say it is, or find it.
Finding it involves a gigantic table, checking an expoentation
which will test some exceptional cases.
3) They have to check for additive and multiplicative embeddings,
which involves a lot of modular exponentiation.
4) They have to check the order is prime

Put all of this together, and the performance gain is gone.
Furthermore, batch calculations don't work anymore.
Per system parameters don't give the anti-attackability gain.

Sincerely,
Watson
>
>
>> The fact that this is stated clearly in
>> the paper cited makes me doubt whether
>> the person citing the paper bothered to read it.
>
>
> Comments like this run the risk of making the environment on this list le=
ss
> friendly.
>
> regards,
>
> David
>
>
>>
>> Sincerely,
>> Watson Ladd
>>>
>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]  Interesting =E2=80=A6 so we could have a curve of the day=
 site.  Order is
>>> hard
>>> to create, but could be generated and used by many.
>>>
>>> Paul
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In any case, the suggestion to document the rationale behind elliptic
>>> curve
>>> parameter choices is a good one!
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>> On 01/14/2014 11:51 AM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>
>>> From: Alyssa Rowan
>>>
>>> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 7:27 PM
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13/01/2014 23:07, Dan Brown wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For a given field, pseudorandom curve better resists secret attacks
>>>
>>> than rigidity.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With respect, I disagree.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With zero knowledge of a hypothetical attack, we have zero knowledge
>>> about
>>>
>>> what may, or may not, be affected by it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We have zero knowledge that Curve25519 resists the hypothetical attack
>>> for
>>> which P256 has hypothetically been manipulated to be affected by. [Sorr=
y
>>> to
>>> grammarians!]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So, what is rigidity is claiming to resist, under your reasoning?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Under my reasoning, I assume that there is a set of curves, partitioned
>>> into
>>> two subsets: curves vulnerable to a secret attack known the generator
>>> (NIST/NSA) and those not..
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It's possible that trial and error was used for P256 until landed in th=
e
>>> vulnerable subset.  I think that is implicit in the safecurves ...
>>> rigidity
>>> page.  No?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Now, suppose I were tasked to find my own curve to minimize the chance =
of
>>> landing in the vulnerable set?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Choose a curve with small coefficients?  Since I do not know what the
>>> vulnerable set is, and rightly want to assume zero knowledge about it, =
I
>>> cannot presume that small coefficients protect me from the hypothetical
>>> secret attack, unless presume nonzero knowledge the vulnerable set.
>>> [Sorry
>>> for the tedious redundancy.]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Granted: small coefficients would help my persuade others that I did no=
t
>>> select the curve maliciously by exhaustive search.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What about a pseudorandom curve? More precisely, where the coefficients
>>> are
>>> derived from PRF(rigid-seed).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Assuming independence of the vulnerable set from the PRF and rigid-seed=
,
>>> and
>>> the pseudorandomness of the PRF, then it seems that the pseudorandom
>>> curve
>>> lands in the vulnerable subset with probability p, where p is the densi=
ty
>>> of
>>> the vulnerable subset within the larger set of curves from which one
>>> draws
>>> the curve from.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Under this hypothesis, the manipulation of P256 would have been expecte=
d
>>> to
>>> take on the order of 1/p trials.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One can plug in any value for p, based on whatever assumptions one thin=
ks
>>> is
>>> reasonable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For example, my personal belief had been p =3D 2^(-128), perhaps becaus=
e I
>>> was
>>> super biased toward, and committed to, ECC.  In that case, the
>>> manipulation
>>> phase for NIST P256 would be infeasible, and I could dismiss this whole
>>> issue rigidity v pseudorandom as didactic, distraction, irrelevant,
>>> baseless, stalling, bogus, moot, FUD, or whatever.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But I recognize that maybe I am too optimistic.  Others have suggested =
p
>>> =3D2^(-30), and I am listening to them.  Then a malicious NIST P256 wou=
ld
>>> be
>>> very feasible.  In my view, the resulting assurance provided by
>>> pseudorandom, probability of 2^(-30) seems a little low, but then maybe=
 I
>>> am
>>> just not yet used to thinking this way.  Others could say that any publ=
ic
>>> key algorithm always has a similar risk of new attacks being discovered=
,
>>> and
>>> therefore that this risk, if not actually acceptable, is unavoidable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What about small coefficient curves?  They don't have the argument of
>>> probability p of avoiding the vulnerable set, but they do have some
>>> legitimate security arguments: (1, resp.) no attacks are known, and (2,
>>> resp.) known attacks do not seem related to coefficient size. As I see
>>> it,
>>> these arguments assume more about the hypothetical secret attacks than
>>> the
>>> NIST curves: (1, resp.) either they do not exist (but that puts back to
>>> negligible p), or (2, resp.) the hypothetical secret attack is similar =
to
>>> existing known attacks to the extent that it cannot possibility depend =
on
>>> coefficient size.  The latter argument has tremendous merit in that it =
is
>>> a
>>> very plausible assumption, but pseudorandom curves do not rely on this
>>> assumption.  Again, it presumes virtually nonzero knowledge about the
>>> secret
>>> attack (other than the partition of the set of curves into vulnerable a=
nd
>>> non-vulnerable).  No?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It's certainly possible to vilify me for suggesting the possibility of =
a
>>> small coefficient attack, call it baseless, etc., but what I'm saying i=
s
>>> that pseudorandom curves do not rely this.  Instead they rely on more
>>> falsifiable assumptions, e.g. the effective of the PRF, etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This general strategy of reasoning to avoid unknown attacks is used in
>>> the
>>> field of "provable security" and also seems to be used in the "rigidity=
"
>>> page of the safecurves strategy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I've a tried to explain this before on the TLS.  In so doing, I
>>> reconsidering, or setting aside, my own beliefs and preferences, to try
>>> to
>>> engage the rigidity arguments.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A point to note here: brainpoolP256r1 has a _very_ weak twist (=CF=81 @=
 2^44)
>>> - a
>>>
>>> practical problem only in a flawed implementation that doesn't check fo=
r
>>> invalid
>>>
>>> points. But here nevertheless, we actually have a curve generated in a
>>>
>>> documented pseudorandom manner, yet has at least one desirable property
>>>
>>> distinctly less secure than all of its tested peers.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why? Bad luck, it seems.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks for the pointing this out, I hadn't noticed it before.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I for one prefer sound, well-explained, reproducibly verifiable curve
>>> design
>>>
>>> which resists all known attacks, to rolling the dice and hoping it
>>> resists a
>>>
>>> hypothetical attack that we know nothing about.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Don't quite follow, based on my understanding above.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Also, publishing a seed and curve-PRF, is verifiable, and reproducible.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess that you refer to the NIST seeds being not well-explained.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Brainpool certainly seeds seem to be.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hence my preference for the "Safecurves" approach, and thus the "Chicag=
o"
>>>
>>> curves.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That some of them can be (and have been) implemented in an extremely
>>>
>>> efficient way, and thus are exceptionally well-suited for the important
>>> task
>>> of
>>>
>>> accelerating wide adoption of forward security in internet protocols, I
>>> also
>>> find
>>>
>>> a highly desirable point in their favour - as, it seems, do many others=
.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I can find no remotely compelling argument against them.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> People really want fast, because it reduces cost.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But they also want secure.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Fast and secure are both important, but orthogonal.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> People need to balance both sides.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I had wanted to focus on the security side, to get a thorough
>>> understanding
>>> of that side.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Granted, I may be taking a too narrow focus, from an engineering
>>> viewpoint,
>>> where action is the order of the day, not reflection.  I was hoping CFR=
G
>>> to
>>> be more receptive to a (hypothetical) security-focus.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Anyway, once one has a thorough understanding on both sides, one can ma=
ke
>>> a
>>> balanced decision.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
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r,
>>> please immediately reply to the sender and delete this information from
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>>> transmission by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
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>>>
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'Watson Ladd' <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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From dbrown@certicom.com  Wed Jan 15 09:02:36 2014
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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
To: "'mcgrew@cisco.com'" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 17:02:03 +0000
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References: <20140113230750.6111382.6841.8590@certicom.com> <52D48450.3070701@akr.io> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1F190@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D59C35.10807@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Hi David,

Good point about the "nothing up my sleeve" (NUMS) property.  That's what I=
 meant when I earlier wrote the paragraph "Yes, rigidity helps more to prev=
ent malicious generation of the curve.  I am not disagreeing with the safec=
urves site on that point. ".

I re-read the safecurves rigidity page today. The safecurves rigidity page =
does not use the NUMS term, but, in its strictest, to-the-letter interpreta=
tion, I think it coincides with the meaning of NUMS.  I.e. rigid =3D=3D NUM=
S.

I did ask earlier in this thread if I was misinterpreting the rigidity page=
. Specifically, I was trying to ask if it was claiming something stronger t=
han NUMS.  Apparently I was indeed misinterpreting, at least in to-the-lett=
er sense, because I was construing the page to say something more than NUMS=
.  Furthermore, in previous discussion with Bernstein on the TLS mailing li=
st, I had thought Bernstein was making stronger claims than just NUMS, whic=
h may have reinforced my misinterpretation above.  In retrospect, the TLS e=
mail exchange may also have been mutual misunderstanding.

David, your email and others are consistent with my rambling prose being in=
effective to explain my main point to a wider audience, so I'll now try out=
 some more emphatic language.

Consider a "nothing up their sleeves" (NUTS) property.  What it means: if X=
 has the NUTS property, then X is not affected by some attack that "they" m=
ight know. Just to be clear, NUTS is an orthogonal property to NUMS (i.e. t=
hey vs me).  For a potential example, perhaps P256 has the NUTS property bu=
t not the NUMS property.  Also, achieving the NUMS and NUTS properties are =
tasks, for which various tools can be used, and arguments present as to whe=
ther, or to what extent, they are achieved.

Next, consider a "nothing up nobody's sleeve" (NUNS) property.  [Please for=
give the double negative used to make this mnemonic acronym.  Think additiv=
e negation, instead of standard English grammar's multiplicative negation. =
 Think additive notation for ECC, as an additional mnemonic.] It seems to m=
e that NUMS+NUTS=3D=3DNUNS.

It seems to me that NUNS is not only formally stronger than NUMS, but is al=
so preferable to just NUMS only, because we usually define algorithm securi=
ty independently who the attacker is (not to be confused with the capabilit=
ies they have, where we might make distinctions.)

If I understand Watson and Alyssa correctly (although I am not too confiden=
t of my understanding), they think NUTS is irrelevant and unachievable, res=
pectively.

If I understand Dan Bernstein's emails from the TLS list correctly, he thin=
ks NUTS is much less important than NUMS, because of the quantities involve=
d (and I agree), but nevertheless, that there are arguments that the safe c=
urves provide the NUTS property, namely the all known attacks are independe=
nt of coefficient size (and I agree).  So, it is reasonable to argue the NU=
TS property to the safe curves (and I agree).

My primary point in this thread was meant to be that PRF(NUMS) =3D> NUNS (s=
ummarizing the Brainpool curve selection process), without relying about th=
e assumption on attacks being independent of coefficient size, so that rand=
om curve selection, as in Brainpool, provides better NUNS than the curve se=
lection process outlined in the safe curves site.   Unfortunately, I did us=
e Brainpool in the subject, which may have undermined my own point, opening=
 the door to speed comparisons, field size issues, etc.

I was really expecting, to no avail, somebody to finally concede this point=
, but contend that the improvement was just very slight, because of the rea=
sonableness of the coefficient-size-independence assumption.  Oh well.

My secondary point was that some people may be confusing NUMS and NUNS. Wel=
l, that's an ad hominem point, so my confidence is very low there. Also, it=
 is clearly nearly impossible to argue, since a person's thoughts can chang=
e quickly.  I'm pretty Watson and Alyssa disagree on this secondary point.

Best regards,

Dan


From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 14, 2014 3:21 PM
To: Dan Brown
Cc: 'akr@akr.io'; 'cfrg@irtf.org'
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom

Hi Dan,

thanks for sharing your thoughts.  It seems to me that the arguments in fav=
or of rigid curves comes down to the "nothing up my sleeve" argument: if th=
ere are no free parameters to be chosen when constructing an elliptic curve=
 group, then there is no need to trust the person doing the construction.


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Hi David,<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Good point about the &#82=
20;nothing up my sleeve&#8221; (NUMS) property.&nbsp; That&#8217;s what I m=
eant when I earlier wrote the paragraph &#8220;</span><span lang=3D"EN-CA">=
Yes, rigidity
 helps more to prevent malicious generation of the curve.&nbsp; I am not di=
sagreeing with the safecurves site on that point.&nbsp;</span><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;color:#1F497D">&#8221;. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I re-read the safecurves =
rigidity page today. The safecurves rigidity page does not use the NUMS ter=
m, but, in its strictest, to-the-letter interpretation,
 I think it coincides with the meaning of NUMS.&nbsp; I.e. rigid =3D=3D NUM=
S.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I did ask earlier in this=
 thread if I was misinterpreting the rigidity page. Specifically, I was try=
ing to ask if it was claiming something stronger than NUMS.
 &nbsp;Apparently I was indeed misinterpreting, at least in to-the-letter s=
ense, because I was construing the page to say something more than NUMS.&nb=
sp; Furthermore, in previous discussion with Bernstein on the TLS mailing l=
ist, I had thought Bernstein was making stronger
 claims than just NUMS, which may have reinforced my misinterpretation abov=
e.&nbsp; In retrospect, the TLS email exchange may also have been mutual mi=
sunderstanding.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">David, your email and oth=
ers are consistent with my rambling prose being ineffective to explain my m=
ain point to a wider audience, so I&#8217;ll now try out some
 more emphatic language.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Consider a &#8220;nothing=
 up their sleeves&#8221; (NUTS) property.&nbsp; What it means: if X has the=
 NUTS property, then X is not affected by some attack that &#8220;they&#822=
1; might know.
 Just to be clear, NUTS is an orthogonal property to NUMS (i.e. they vs me)=
.&nbsp; For a potential example, perhaps P256 has the NUTS property but not=
 the NUMS property.&nbsp; Also, achieving the NUMS and NUTS properties are =
tasks, for which various tools can be used,
 and arguments present as to whether, or to what extent, they are achieved.=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Next, consider a &#8220;n=
othing up nobody&#8217;s sleeve&#8221; (NUNS) property.&nbsp; [Please forgi=
ve the double negative used to make this mnemonic acronym.&nbsp; Think addi=
tive negation,
 instead of standard English grammar&#8217;s multiplicative negation.&nbsp;=
 Think additive notation for ECC, as an additional mnemonic.] It seems to m=
e that NUMS&#43;NUTS=3D=3DNUNS.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">It seems to me that NUNS =
is not only formally stronger than NUMS, but is also preferable to just NUM=
S only, because we usually define algorithm security independently
 who the attacker is (not to be confused with the capabilities they have, w=
here we might make distinctions.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">If I understand Watson an=
d Alyssa correctly (although I am not too confident of my understanding), t=
hey think NUTS is irrelevant and unachievable, respectively.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">If I understand Dan Berns=
tein&#8217;s emails from the TLS list correctly, he thinks NUTS is much les=
s important than NUMS, because of the quantities involved (and
 I agree), but nevertheless, that there are arguments that the safe curves =
provide the NUTS property, namely the all known attacks are independent of =
coefficient size (and I agree).&nbsp; So, it is reasonable to argue the NUT=
S property to the safe curves (and I
 agree).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">My primary point in this =
thread was meant to be that PRF(NUMS) =3D&gt; NUNS (summarizing the Brainpo=
ol curve selection process), without relying about the assumption
 on attacks being independent of coefficient size, so that random curve sel=
ection, as in Brainpool, provides better NUNS than the curve selection proc=
ess outlined in the safe curves site.&nbsp; &nbsp;Unfortunately, I did use =
Brainpool in the subject, which may have undermined
 my own point, opening the door to speed comparisons, field size issues, et=
c.&nbsp; <o:p>
</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I was really expecting, t=
o no avail, somebody to finally concede this point, but contend that the im=
provement was just very slight, because of the reasonableness
 of the coefficient-size-independence assumption.&nbsp; Oh well.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">My secondary point was th=
at some people may be confusing NUMS and NUNS. Well, that&#8217;s an ad hom=
inem point, so my confidence is very low there. Also, it is clearly
 nearly impossible to argue, since a person&#8217;s thoughts can change qui=
ckly.&nbsp; I&#8217;m pretty Watson and Alyssa disagree on this secondary p=
oint.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Best regards,<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Dan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt">
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:windowtext"> David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, January 14, 2014 3:21 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Dan Brown<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'akr@akr.io'; 'cfrg@irtf.org'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudora=
ndom<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:4.8pt">Hi Dan,<br>
<br>
thanks for sharing your thoughts.&nbsp; It seems to me that the arguments i=
n favor of rigid curves comes down to the &quot;nothing up my sleeve&quot; =
argument: if there are no free parameters to be chosen when constructing an=
 elliptic curve group, then there is no need to
 trust the person doing the construction.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
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From paul@marvell.com  Wed Jan 15 10:02:19 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 10:02:01 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] normative references
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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On 1/15/14, 4:54 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>On 01/15/2014 03:25 AM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> Somewhere down the Safe Curves thread you mention that you expect a
>> CFRG draft to contain "stable normative references" to definitions of
>> crypto mechanisms. I share this wish in part, in particular I would
>> appreciate "stable" references (e.g., to academic papers). However
>> many/most crypto publications are not aimed at implementors. Often
>> they are not well-specified enough to implement. And we don't want to
>> wait a few years for NIST to create normative versions. So I would
>> actually expect the new CFRG document to become the "normative"
>> reference.
>
>This is a good point, Yaron.
Yes!!!

I=B9ve just been through the web sites and many/most references and find it
extremely frustrating to find any clear and consistent implementation
details.

Example issues include:
 - changes in notation and terminology
   E.g. For Edwards point addition , is it:
        y3 =3D (y1*y2   +    x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
      or is it:
        y3 =3D (y1*y2   -    x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
   =8A It depends on the way the curve class is named, it=B9s actually
        y3 =3D (y1*y2  +  a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
        and usually a=3D1

 - unclear guidelines on important security topics
    E.g.=20
      ed25519 has restrictions on the secret key structure for ECDH
      Does this extend to other curves?
    =20
 - references describe the poofs, but hand wave the actual way
   you would send and receive and process as data
   E.g.  Hand waving of when and if to use projective coordinates

 - Lack of clarity on edge conditions (small subgroups, special points)

 - Unclear algorithm selection guidelines
   E.g. Scalar multiplication and point addition
     - fastest algorithms no longer have all the =8Csafe=B9 properties

 - unclear implications of use of the cofactor (since it is not =3D1)

 - no guidelines on use of different EC algorithms with the curve types
   E.g.  ECDSA with Montgomery curve using just x-coordinate math ???
    Do we use cofactor DH since  cofactor >1?

 - Terms in the references are used in papers in an inconsistent manner
   With respect to an implementation
   E.g. =B3Twist=B2

 - math is represented inconsistently and imprecisely for an implementation
    E.g.  + versus * for   ECDH
          ^  versus **  on curve equationss
          =8Cmod=B9  imply all math is in field versus as an operation at a
specific operation

 - no test vectors or example calculations readily available
     =20
It appears that much of the interest and ability to use some of these
curves comes from their availability in a few specific C libraries.  These
might be used as a reference, but are curve specific and it=B9s unclear how
to extract generic guidelines for more than the implemented curve.

There is a significant body of work on implementing Weierstrass curves
(ANSI, IEEE, NIST, NSA, etc.).  Edwards, Twisted Edwards and Montgomery
need the same level of documentation to progress.

So =8A. lot=B9s of issues, but they could be solved by a clear specificatio=
n.

Initial Recommendations:
 1) Always use the most general form of any of the representations
     Replace any algorithms for Edwards with Twisted Edwards (more general)
     E.g.  Curve as:
          (a*y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D (1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
           and=20
            y3 =3D (y1**2  +  a*x1**2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)

     One question here =8A I also see alternate form with =8Cc'
            (y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p

                or
            (y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c**4*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p

         Not sure if any advantages versus =8Ca=B9 or both =8Ca=B9 and =8Cc=
'
            (a*y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
    =20
  2) reuse where possible terminology and variables from Weierstrass ECC
     E.g.  P for prime defining Fp,  n for order, h for cofactor
         This would allow all classes of curves to viewed equally in
         an implementation catalog
          E.g.

        curveId =3D 'curve25519'
        strength =3D 127
        oid =3D None
        p  =3D 2**255-19
        a  =3D 486662
        xG =3D 9
        yG =3D=20
147816194475895447910205935684099868872646061346164752889648818377555862374
01
        n  =3D 2**252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
        h  =3D 8
    Also =8A long numbers should be consistently represented hex versus
decimal
    Note also - Weierstrass =8Ca=B9 is not the same as Edwards =8Ca=B9, but
    can be written around =8A and we should keep Edwards equations consiste=
nt
    where possible with literature


  3) Use math representation in RFCs that maps directly to a computer
     language notation - Python would be a good choice for
     readability. =20
     E.g. Twisted Edwards point addition definition

       x3 =3D ((x1*y2+x2*y1) * inv(1+d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p
       y3 =3D ((y1*y2-a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p

   4) curve names need consolidation and should clearly indicate curve type




Paul



>
>David
>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>     Yaron
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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On Jan 15, 2014 10:02 AM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/15/14, 4:54 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>
> >On 01/15/2014 03:25 AM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> >> Hi David,
> >>
> >> Somewhere down the Safe Curves thread you mention that you expect a
> >> CFRG draft to contain "stable normative references" to definitions of
> >> crypto mechanisms. I share this wish in part, in particular I would
> >> appreciate "stable" references (e.g., to academic papers). However
> >> many/most crypto publications are not aimed at implementors. Often
> >> they are not well-specified enough to implement. And we don't want to
> >> wait a few years for NIST to create normative versions. So I would
> >> actually expect the new CFRG document to become the "normative"
> >> reference.
> >
> >This is a good point, Yaron.
> Yes!!!
>
> I=C2=B9ve just been through the web sites and many/most references and fi=
nd it
> extremely frustrating to find any clear and consistent implementation
> details.

(sidenote: I got mojobake in this email. Check your encodings are set
correctly. And please, can we ban rich text from this list?)

I think it is important to remember that normative references specify
what, not how. How would be informative,
as it doesn't affect compliance.

>
> Example issues include:
>  - changes in notation and terminology
>    E.g. For Edwards point addition , is it:
>         y3 =3D (y1*y2   +    x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
>       or is it:
>         y3 =3D (y1*y2   -    x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
>    =C5=A0 It depends on the way the curve class is named, it=C2=B9s actua=
lly
>         y3 =3D (y1*y2  +  a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
>         and usually a=3D1

>
>  - unclear guidelines on important security topics
>     E.g.
>       ed25519 has restrictions on the secret key structure for ECDH
>       Does this extend to other curves?
>
>  - references describe the poofs, but hand wave the actual way
>    you would send and receive and process as data
>    E.g.  Hand waving of when and if to use projective coordinates

Affine of course: the same is true for Weierstrass form. One uses
projective form for intermediate calculations.
I'll make this clear in the draft if it isn't already. The security
issues cofactors present I will be sure to discuss: I thought
they were well known because over F_p^{\times} you always have a cofactor.

>
>  - Lack of clarity on edge conditions (small subgroups, special points)

This is important and I will definitely try to address it.

>
>  - Unclear algorithm selection guidelines
>    E.g. Scalar multiplication and point addition
>      - fastest algorithms no longer have all the =C5=92safe=C2=B9 propert=
ies
>
>  - unclear implications of use of the cofactor (since it is not =3D1)

I'll explain the group structure and the necessary changes to DH.
For algorithms, you can get away with the fast ones
if you are careful to show that the problems won't matter. For
instance if I have a point that
isn't of small order, I can multiply using the 2008 algorithms if I
take care never to add two points that
might be the same in my multiplication algorithm.

The safe method is still pretty fast. If you use an unsafe method,
it's your responsibility to check that it
will work, and not mine.

>
>  - no guidelines on use of different EC algorithms with the curve types
>    E.g.  ECDSA with Montgomery curve using just x-coordinate math ???
>     Do we use cofactor DH since  cofactor >1?

I'm not sure what you mean by cofactor DH, but yes, the implication of
the cofactor is you need to represent your
private keys as coercive, forcing points into the large subgroup, or
you leak a few bits. (Basically the same from a security standpoint).

>
>  - Terms in the references are used in papers in an inconsistent manner
>    With respect to an implementation
>    E.g. =C2=B3Twist=C2=B2

I'm going to avoid discussing math on the quadratic or cubic twist of
a curve, because it isn't necessary for implementions.
Just plug in the formulas and the algorithms, and it will all work.

>
>  - math is represented inconsistently and imprecisely for an implementati=
on
>     E.g.  + versus * for   ECDH
>           ^  versus **  on curve equationss
>           =C5=92mod=C2=B9  imply all math is in field versus as an operat=
ion at a
> specific operation

The notation issue won't get fixed anytime soon. I'll be consistent in
the draft, but that means
being inconsistent with half of everyone else. The operations issue is
the sort of thing where a little bit
of reading comprehension goes a long way: spelling out what exactly +
means at any given time is annoying,
especially when it is always obvious.

>
>  - no test vectors or example calculations readily available

This cannot be said about Curve25519: "Cryptography in NaCL" contains a Pyt=
hon
test program together with an example DH exchange, but in little-endian.

For the other curves I agree this is an issue. I'll do a black-box
interop test with you and other
interested people before we publish.

>
> It appears that much of the interest and ability to use some of these
> curves comes from their availability in a few specific C libraries.  Thes=
e
> might be used as a reference, but are curve specific and it=C2=B9s unclea=
r how
> to extract generic guidelines for more than the implemented curve.

> There is a significant body of work on implementing Weierstrass curves
> (ANSI, IEEE, NIST, NSA, etc.).  Edwards, Twisted Edwards and Montgomery
> need the same level of documentation to progress.

Or the same level of C library support. I'd much rather have everyone copy =
a
well-made library then write their own bugs we have to deal with down
the line/that
the SIGINT people exploit. But yes, better documentation about how to
implement is necessary.

>
> So =C5=A0. lot=C2=B9s of issues, but they could be solved by a clear spec=
ification.
>
> Initial Recommendations:
>  1) Always use the most general form of any of the representations
>      Replace any algorithms for Edwards with Twisted Edwards (more genera=
l)
>      E.g.  Curve as:
>           (a*y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D (1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
>            and
>             y3 =3D (y1**2  +  a*x1**2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
>
>      One question here =C5=A0 I also see alternate form with =C5=92c'
>             (y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
>
>                 or
>             (y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c**4*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
>
>          Not sure if any advantages versus =C5=92a=C2=B9 or both =C5=92a=
=C2=B9 and =C5=92c'
>             (a*y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p

If we aren't specifying any twisted Edwards curves, why would we
define the formulas?
I suppose for use with Montgomery form, ala Ransom's suggestion.

>
>   2) reuse where possible terminology and variables from Weierstrass ECC
>      E.g.  P for prime defining Fp,  n for order, h for cofactor
>          This would allow all classes of curves to viewed equally in
>          an implementation catalog
>           E.g.
>
>         curveId =3D 'curve25519'
>         strength =3D 127
>         oid =3D None
>         p  =3D 2**255-19
>         a  =3D 486662
>         xG =3D 9
>         yG =3D
> 1478161944758954479102059356840998688726460613461647528896488183775558623=
74
> 01
>         n  =3D 2**252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
>         h  =3D 8

Strength is the base 2 log of the operations to break, right?
Also, different things should be written differently.

>     Also =C5=A0 long numbers should be consistently represented hex versu=
s
> decimal

Why hex? Most math papers use decimal, and more importantly GP/PARI
doesn't accept hex.
MAGMA, PARI and Sage are going to be used for test vector validation.

>     Note also - Weierstrass =C5=92a=C2=B9 is not the same as Edwards =C5=
=92a=C2=B9, but
>     can be written around =C5=A0 and we should keep Edwards equations con=
sistent
>     where possible with literature.

When we define DH exchange on a group yes. With setting the parameters
like you did we're tempting
fate.

>
>
>   3) Use math representation in RFCs that maps directly to a computer
>      language notation - Python would be a good choice for
>      readability.
>      E.g. Twisted Edwards point addition definition
>
>        x3 =3D ((x1*y2+x2*y1) * inv(1+d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p
>        y3 =3D ((y1*y2-a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p

The math notation I am using maps directly to that of most CAS
systems. Anyway, at some point I will be done with
the major revision, and kick it around for comments.

>
>    4) curve names need consolidation and should clearly indicate curve ty=
pe

Blame Tanja. I really do not like the idea of changing existing names
especially when referring people to papers with them. SEC/NIST has
already caused enough confusing as it is.

>
>
>
>
> Paul
>
>
>
> >
> >David
> >
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >>     Yaron
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Cfrg mailing list
> >> Cfrg@irtf.org
> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >>
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >Cfrg mailing list
> >Cfrg@irtf.org
> >http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From adam@cypherspace.org  Wed Jan 15 12:07:01 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] EdDSA private key restrictions & composability (Re: normative references)
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On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 10:02:01AM -0800, Paul Lambert wrote:
> - unclear guidelines on important security topics
>    E.g.
>      ed25519 has restrictions on the secret key structure for ECDH
>      Does this extend to other curves?

Actually on this narrow topic re Ed25519 curve for EdDSA uses, I noticed
this also.  I think bit 254 being 1 could be optional so (Curve25519 has the
same private key restrictions for ECDH) so long as constant time montgomery
addition starts from bit 254 regardless.  And the remaining hard code is the
lowest 3 bits 000 but that which I presume is precomputed multiplication by
the cofactor, as seen in the verification relation 8sG=8R+8H(R,Q,m)Q. 
(Using ECDSA labelling G is base, Q=dG pub key).

The paper seems quite unclear and hard to pick apart and maybe the algorithm
just a little too much speed hacked.  The above seems to break
composability.  Ie derived public keys (Q_i = Q+M(c,i)G) where c is a
shared-secret, i is a counter; bitcoin uses this for backup and offline
security reasons.  Similar examples abound: threshold signatures, blind
signatures; one of the exciting thing to me about seeing EdDSA adopted is
that it is a Schnorr variant, and Schnorr has much simpler multiparty,
threshold and even blinding.  ECDSA has no blinding and DSA blinding is a
monstrosity involving Damgard-Jurik's generalized variant of Paillier as a
substep!  But some of these things are lost or complicated by the unusual
private key restrictions, which I think if I'm not mistaken are just related
to tiny optimizations or otherise redundant defenses against variable time
execution which can be otherwise restated.

These kind of questions might or might not be in scope for the draft,
depending on your point of view.  (But anyway if anyone feels like
expounding on the above, on list or offlist, I would quite practically
interested :)

Adam

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 12:50:57 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] normative references
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 16:01:26 -0500
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] EdDSA private key restrictions & composability (Re: normative references)
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On 01/15/2014 03:06 PM, Adam Back wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 10:02:01AM -0800, Paul Lambert wrote:
>> - unclear guidelines on important security topics
>>    E.g.
>>      ed25519 has restrictions on the secret key structure for ECDH
>>      Does this extend to other curves?
>
> Actually on this narrow topic re Ed25519 curve for EdDSA uses, I noticed
> this also.  I think bit 254 being 1 could be optional so (Curve25519 
> has the
> same private key restrictions for ECDH) so long as constant time 
> montgomery
> addition starts from bit 254 regardless.  And the remaining hard code 
> is the
> lowest 3 bits 000 but that which I presume is precomputed 
> multiplication by
> the cofactor, as seen in the verification relation 8sG=8R+8H(R,Q,m)Q. 
> (Using ECDSA labelling G is base, Q=dG pub key).
>
> The paper seems quite unclear and hard to pick apart and maybe the 
> algorithm
> just a little too much speed hacked. 

That's my impression too.

I think that one of the goals of this work is to follow US patent 
4,995,082 (Schnorr's signature scheme, which includes elliptic curve 
groups in its claims and which is expired).   In that case, it would 
make a lot of sense for a standard based on this work to cite that 
patent explicitly, and follow it closely.   Hopefully the good "speed 
hacks" are consistent with this approach, but I am not yet sure.

David

> The above seems to break
> composability.  Ie derived public keys (Q_i = Q+M(c,i)G) where c is a
> shared-secret, i is a counter; bitcoin uses this for backup and offline
> security reasons.  Similar examples abound: threshold signatures, blind
> signatures; one of the exciting thing to me about seeing EdDSA adopted is
> that it is a Schnorr variant, and Schnorr has much simpler multiparty,
> threshold and even blinding.  ECDSA has no blinding and DSA blinding is a
> monstrosity involving Damgard-Jurik's generalized variant of Paillier 
> as a
> substep!  But some of these things are lost or complicated by the unusual
> private key restrictions, which I think if I'm not mistaken are just 
> related
> to tiny optimizations or otherise redundant defenses against variable 
> time
> execution which can be otherwise restated.
>
> These kind of questions might or might not be in scope for the draft,
> depending on your point of view.  (But anyway if anyone feels like
> expounding on the above, on list or offlist, I would quite practically
> interested :)
>
> Adam
> .
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>  =E2=A8=B3|-----Original Message-----
>  =E2=A8=B3|From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>  =E2=A8=B3|Sent: Wednesday, January 15, 2014 12:05 PM
>  =E2=A8=B3|To: Paul Lambert
>  =E2=A8=B3|Cc: David McGrew; Yaron Sheffer; cfrg@irtf.org
>  =E2=A8=B3|Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|On Jan 15, 2014 10:02 AM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wr=
ote:
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> On 1/15/14, 4:54 AM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote=
:
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >On 01/15/2014 03:25 AM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Hi David,
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Somewhere down the Safe Curves thread you mention that yo=
u expect
>  =E2=A8=B3|a
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> CFRG draft to contain "stable normative references" to
>  =E2=A8=B3|definitions
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> of crypto mechanisms. I share this wish in part, in parti=
cular I
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> would appreciate "stable" references (e.g., to academic p=
apers).
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> However many/most crypto publications are not aimed at
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> implementors. Often they are not well-specified enough to
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> implement. And we don't want to wait a few years for NIST=
 to
>  =E2=A8=B3|create
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> normative versions. So I would actually expect the new CF=
RG
>  =E2=A8=B3|document to become the "normative"
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> reference.
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >This is a good point, Yaron.
>  =E2=A8=B3|> Yes!!!
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> I=C2=B9ve just been through the web sites and many/most refe=
rences and
>  =E2=A8=B3|find
>  =E2=A8=B3|> it extremely frustrating to find any clear and consistent
>  =E2=A8=B3|> implementation details.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|(sidenote: I got mojobake in this email. Check your encodings =
are set
>  =E2=A8=B3|correctly. And please, can we ban rich text from this list?)
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|I think it is important to remember that normative references =
specify
>  =E2=A8=B3|what, not how. How would be informative, as it doesn't affect
>  =E2=A8=B3|compliance.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> Example issues include:
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - changes in notation and terminology
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    E.g. For Edwards point addition , is it:
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         y3 =3D (y1*y2   +    x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
>  =E2=A8=B3|>       or is it:
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         y3 =3D (y1*y2   -    x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    =C5=A0 It depends on the way the curve class is named, it=
=C2=B9s actually
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         y3 =3D (y1*y2  +  a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         and usually a=3D1
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - unclear guidelines on important security topics
>  =E2=A8=B3|>     E.g.
>  =E2=A8=B3|>       ed25519 has restrictions on the secret key structure f=
or ECDH
>  =E2=A8=B3|>       Does this extend to other curves?
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - references describe the poofs, but hand wave the actual w=
ay
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    you would send and receive and process as data
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    E.g.  Hand waving of when and if to use projective coordi=
nates
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|Affine of course: the same is true for Weierstrass form. One u=
ses
>  =E2=A8=B3|projective form for intermediate calculations.
>  =E2=A8=B3|I'll make this clear in the draft if it isn't already. The sec=
urity
>  =E2=A8=B3|issues cofactors present I will be sure to discuss: I thought =
they
>  =E2=A8=B3|were well known because over F_p^{\times} you always have a co=
factor.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - Lack of clarity on edge conditions (small subgroups, spec=
ial
>  =E2=A8=B3|> points)
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|This is important and I will definitely try to address it.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - Unclear algorithm selection guidelines
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    E.g. Scalar multiplication and point addition
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      - fastest algorithms no longer have all the =C5=92safe=
=C2=B9 properties
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - unclear implications of use of the cofactor (since it is =
not =3D1)
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|I'll explain the group structure and the necessary changes to =
DH.
>  =E2=A8=B3|For algorithms, you can get away with the fast ones if you are=
 careful
>  =E2=A8=B3|to show that the problems won't matter. For instance if I have=
 a point
>  =E2=A8=B3|that isn't of small order, I can multiply using the 2008 algor=
ithms if
>  =E2=A8=B3|I take care never to add two points that might be the same in =
my
>  =E2=A8=B3|multiplication algorithm.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|The safe method is still pretty fast. If you use an unsafe met=
hod,
>  =E2=A8=B3|it's your responsibility to check that it will work, and not m=
ine.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - no guidelines on use of different EC algorithms with the =
curve
>  =E2=A8=B3|types
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    E.g.  ECDSA with Montgomery curve using just x-coordinate=
 math
>  =E2=A8=B3|???
>  =E2=A8=B3|>     Do we use cofactor DH since  cofactor >1?
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|I'm not sure what you mean by cofactor DH, but yes, the implic=
ation of
>  =E2=A8=B3|the cofactor is you need to represent your private keys as coe=
rcive,
>  =E2=A8=B3|forcing points into the large subgroup, or you leak a few bits=
.
>  =E2=A8=B3|(Basically the same from a security standpoint).
> NIST defined ...
>
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - Terms in the references are used in papers in an inconsis=
tent
>  =E2=A8=B3|manner
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    With respect to an implementation
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    E.g. =C2=B3Twist=C2=B2
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|I'm going to avoid discussing math on the quadratic or cubic t=
wist of
>  =E2=A8=B3|a curve, because it isn't necessary for implementions.
>  =E2=A8=B3|Just plug in the formulas and the algorithms, and it will all =
work.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - math is represented inconsistently and imprecisely for an
>  =E2=A8=B3|implementation
>  =E2=A8=B3|>     E.g.  + versus * for   ECDH
>  =E2=A8=B3|>           ^  versus **  on curve equationss
>  =E2=A8=B3|>           =C5=92mod=C2=B9  imply all math is in field versus=
 as an operation
>  =E2=A8=B3|at
>  =E2=A8=B3|> a specific operation
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|The notation issue won't get fixed anytime soon. I'll be consi=
stent in
>  =E2=A8=B3|the draft, but that means being inconsistent with half of ever=
yone
>  =E2=A8=B3|else. The operations issue is the sort of thing where a little=
 bit of
>  =E2=A8=B3|reading comprehension goes a long way: spelling out what exact=
ly +
>  =E2=A8=B3|means at any given time is annoying, especially when it is alw=
ays
>  =E2=A8=B3|obvious.
> On plus ... no need to define every operator, I was referring to
> to EC notation conventions of point addition versus multiplication
> e.g.  s*G   versus G**s
> I'm partial to the notation based on scalar multiplies of points for DH

Of course I'm going to use additive notation for an abelian group! The
multiplicative
notation is a legacy from F_{p}^{\times} crypto where it really was
multiplication.

>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  - no test vectors or example calculations readily available
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|This cannot be said about Curve25519: "Cryptography in NaCL" c=
ontains
>  =E2=A8=B3|a Python test program together with an example DH exchange, bu=
t in
>  =E2=A8=B3|little-endian.
> Badly represented. Vectors could be extracted from the C code examples.
>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|For the other curves I agree this is an issue. I'll do a black=
-box
>  =E2=A8=B3|interop test with you and other interested people before we pu=
blish.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> It appears that much of the interest and ability to use some=
 of
>  =E2=A8=B3|these
>  =E2=A8=B3|> curves comes from their availability in a few specific C lib=
raries.
>  =E2=A8=B3|> These might be used as a reference, but are curve specific a=
nd it=C2=B9s
>  =E2=A8=B3|> unclear how to extract generic guidelines for more than the
>  =E2=A8=B3|implemented curve.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|> There is a significant body of work on implementing Weierstr=
ass
>  =E2=A8=B3|curves
>  =E2=A8=B3|> (ANSI, IEEE, NIST, NSA, etc.).  Edwards, Twisted Edwards and
>  =E2=A8=B3|> Montgomery need the same level of documentation to progress.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|Or the same level of C library support. I'd much rather have e=
veryone
>  =E2=A8=B3|copy a well-made library then write their own bugs we have to =
deal
>  =E2=A8=B3|with down the line/that the SIGINT people exploit. But yes, be=
tter
>  =E2=A8=B3|documentation about how to implement is necessary.
> We're in the documentation business here - not code libraries. Plus we're
> supposed to have multiple interoperable different implementations.

Do you really think everyone implementing P256 does it themselves? Or do th=
ey
take example code from the Internet?

>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> So =C5=A0. lot=C2=B9s of issues, but they could be solved by=
 a clear
>  =E2=A8=B3|specification.
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> Initial Recommendations:
>  =E2=A8=B3|>  1) Always use the most general form of any of the represent=
ations
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      Replace any algorithms for Edwards with Twisted Edwards=
 (more
>  =E2=A8=B3|general)
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      E.g.  Curve as:
>  =E2=A8=B3|>           (a*y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D (1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
>  =E2=A8=B3|>            and
>  =E2=A8=B3|>             y3 =3D (y1**2  +  a*x1**2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2=
)
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      One question here =C5=A0 I also see alternate form with=
 =C5=92c'
>  =E2=A8=B3|>             (y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>                 or
>  =E2=A8=B3|>             (y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c**4*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % =
p
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>          Not sure if any advantages versus =C5=92a=C2=B9 or =
both =C5=92a=C2=B9 and =C5=92c'
>  =E2=A8=B3|>             (a*y**2+x**2) % p =3D=3D c*(1 + d*x**2*y**2) % p
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|If we aren't specifying any twisted Edwards curves, why would =
we
>  =E2=A8=B3|define the formulas?
>  =E2=A8=B3|I suppose for use with Montgomery form, ala Ransom's suggestio=
n.
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
> Yes ... and why did you leave out Ed25519?       It's being used and shou=
ld at least be discussed/reviewed/

It's the same as Curve25519, and not in safecurves. Let's be real
clear: isogenies don't change anything substantial.
If you want to discuss it separately, go ahead: plenty of people have
been discussing alternatives on this list already.

I'm also going to explain the Montgomery ladder and double-and-add on
Edwards and that's it. RFC 6090 doesn't talk about
radix-k either, nor does it explain Shamir's trick, or fun with the
Brier-Joyce ladder, or w-NAF, etc.
>
>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>   2) reuse where possible terminology and variables from Wei=
erstrass
>  =E2=A8=B3|ECC
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      E.g.  P for prime defining Fp,  n for order, h for cofa=
ctor
>  =E2=A8=B3|>          This would allow all classes of curves to viewed eq=
ually in
>  =E2=A8=B3|>          an implementation catalog
>  =E2=A8=B3|>           E.g.
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         curveId =3D 'curve25519'
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         strength =3D 127
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         oid =3D None
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         p  =3D 2**255-19
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         a  =3D 486662
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         xG =3D 9
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         yG =3D
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|14781619447589544791020593568409986887264606134616475288964881=
83775558
>  =E2=A8=B3|> 62374
>  =E2=A8=B3|> 01
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         n  =3D 2**252 + 277423177773723535358519377908836484=
93
>  =E2=A8=B3|>         h  =3D 8
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|Strength is the base 2 log of the operations to break, right?
> Yes

I still don't see why this form is much better than a paragraph
listing these things.

>  =E2=A8=B3|Also, different things should be written differently.
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>
> On the Edwards curves with cofactors >1 I believe the strength estimate m=
ay be a little less
> than simply taking the bit length of the size / 2
>
> Advice on this small adjustment would be appreciated.

Size of the group generated by g, not the size of the curve.

>
>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>     Also =C5=A0 long numbers should be consistently represen=
ted hex
>  =E2=A8=B3|versus
>  =E2=A8=B3|> decimal
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|Why hex? Most math papers use decimal, and more importantly GP=
/PARI
>  =E2=A8=B3|doesn't accept hex.
>  =E2=A8=B3|MAGMA, PARI and Sage are going to be used for test vector vali=
dation.
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
> By you maybe ...
>
> Hex fits better in an RFC ...  decimal would be fine also.

Six of one, half-dozen of the other.

>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>     Note also - Weierstrass =C5=92a=C2=B9 is not the same as=
 Edwards =C5=92a=C2=B9, but
>  =E2=A8=B3|>     can be written around =C5=A0 and we should keep Edwards =
equations
>  =E2=A8=B3|consistent
>  =E2=A8=B3|>     where possible with literature.
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|When we define DH exchange on a group yes. With setting the pa=
rameters
>  =E2=A8=B3|like you did we're tempting fate.
> Not really ... just another area for clear specification, eg:
>
> Suggested RFC text:
>
>     The ECC definitions include three classes of curves defined over the =
field
>     of integers modulo a prime p (Fp).  Each class of curve has an equati=
on and
>     assoicated parameters unique to the class type.  Three classes of cur=
ves
>     are described:
>
>       SmallWeierstrassCurveFp       y**2 =3D x**3 + a*x + b  mod p
>       EdwardsCurveFp         x**2 + y**2 =3D c*(1 + d*x**2 * y**2)  mod p
>       MontgomeryCurveFp             y**2 =3D x**3 + a*x**2 + x  mod p
>
>     The defintions include for each curve type:
>
>       curveId - An ASCII string used to identify the curve parameters
>       strength - an integer providing the estimated cryptographic strengt=
h
>                  of the curve as a power of 2
>       oid - a list of integers that correspond to the associated ASN.1 ob=
ject
>             identifier. The oid is listed as 'None' if there is no assign=
ed oid
>       p - The prime modulus of the group (Fp). Often p is a Mersenne prim=
e
>           to facilitate more efficient modular inversion
>       xG - the x-coordinate of a generator point G for the curve
>       yG - the y-coordinate of a generator point G for the curve
>       n  - the order of the generator point G
>       seed - included for reference when available
>       h - the cofactor of the curve
>
>     Each curve type has the following unique parameters
>
>       Small Wierstrass      y**2 =3D x**3 + a*x + b  mod p
>         a - often set to p-3 for efficiency
>         b - elected for the security properties of the curve shape
>         z - used by 'twisted' Brainpool curves for isogenous transform
>             of untwisted curve to a curve with a =3D p-3
>
>       Montgomery            y**2 =3D x**3 + c*x**2 + x  mod p
>         a - selected for the security properties of the curve shape
>
>       Edwards               x**2 + y**2 =3D c*(1 + d*x**2 * y**2) mod p
>         c - typically set to 1 so the equation is reduced to:
>                             x**2 + y**2 =3D 1 + d*x**2 * y**2  mod p
>         d - selected for the security properties of the curve shape
>
> Hummm .. could add Twisted Edwards to the above

But none of the curves in safecurves are presented in twisted Edwards form,
I'm not going to rehash short Weierstrass here, (RFC 6090 already exists).

Anyway, I think this conversation would be far more productive when I
finish the revisions and put it before
the group again. You can follow on github in between.

>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>   3) Use math representation in RFCs that maps directly to a
>  =E2=A8=B3|computer
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      language notation - Python would be a good choice for
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      readability.
>  =E2=A8=B3|>      E.g. Twisted Edwards point addition definition
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>        x3 =3D ((x1*y2+x2*y1) * inv(1+d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p
>  =E2=A8=B3|>        y3 =3D ((y1*y2-a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|The math notation I am using maps directly to that of most CAS
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
> No - for example:
> " On Montgomery curves, curves of the form y^2=3Dx^3+Ax^2+x, the typical"
> is Ax a variable 'Ax' or A*x ... this is sloppy non-parseable notation

>  =E2=A8=B3|systems. Anyway, at some point I will be done with the major r=
evision,
>  =E2=A8=B3|and kick it around for comments.
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
> CAS???
> I prefer running code useable for a protocol implementation.

So I can just copy the relevant parts of tweetnacl.c and be done with it?

>
> Paul
>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>    4) curve names need consolidation and should clearly indi=
cate
>  =E2=A8=B3|curve
>  =E2=A8=B3|> type
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|Blame Tanja. I really do not like the idea of changing existin=
g names
>  =E2=A8=B3|especially when referring people to papers with them. SEC/NIST=
 has
>  =E2=A8=B3|already caused enough confusing as it is.
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
> No need to blame, just make the change but  include reference to original=
 author and curve name.
> NIST did not add confusion ... just branded the results.
> CFRG branding would be valuable.  More curves will happen and  a consiste=
nt notation is a good thing.

What do you propose for the name scheme? E,M with prime in the expc
format is my best proposal, but this might not be unique all the time.
>
> Paul
>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> Paul
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >David
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Thanks,
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>     Yaron
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> _______________________________________________
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Cfrg mailing list
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Cfrg@irtf.org
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >_______________________________________________
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >Cfrg mailing list
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >Cfrg@irtf.org
>  =E2=A8=B3|> >http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|> _______________________________________________
>  =E2=A8=B3|> Cfrg mailing list
>  =E2=A8=B3|> Cfrg@irtf.org
>  =E2=A8=B3|> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From mpg@elzevir.fr  Wed Jan 15 13:36:52 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Hi Dan,

On 15/01/2014 18:02, Dan Brown wrote:
> I did ask earlier in this thread if I was misinterpreting the rigidity
> page. Specifically, I was trying to ask if it was claiming something
> stronger than NUMS.  Apparently I was indeed misinterpreting, at least
> in to-the-letter sense, because I was construing the page to say
> something more than NUMS.

We can probably take this as an indication that the document should be
very clear on that point (like, clearer that the safecurves pages).

> It seems to me that NUNS is not only formally stronger than NUMS, but
> is also preferable to just NUMS only, because we usually define
> algorithm security independently who the attacker is (not to be
> confused with the capabilities they have, where we might make
> distinctions.)
> 
I think we can agree that NUNS is a very desirable property, but that
almost by definition we can't produce a curve for which it holds with
absolute certainty: all we can do it try to maximise the probability,
under reasonable assumptions, that the curve has this property.

> I was really expecting, to no avail, somebody to finally concede this
> point, but contend that the improvement was just very slight, because
> of the reasonableness of the coefficient-size-independence assumption.
> Oh well.
> 
For what it's worth, my current understanding is that, for a
Brainpool-like construction to maximise the NUNS probability, the only
necessary assumption is that the PRF and the "NUMS" seed have no special
relationship with the potential attacks on curves, which certainly looks
like a very reasonable assumption to make. OTOH, for a Curve25519-like
"rigid" selection to provide NUNS (with high probability), a necessary
assumption is that the upcoming (or currently known only to a few)
attacks don't have a higher probability to apply on a curve with small
coefficients than on the set of all curves (resisting known attacks).

IIRC the discussions on the TLS list, Daniel Bernstein quite strongly
holds the opinion that this assumption is reasonable, and if I
understand your last email correctly, you're not claiming it's an
unreasonable assumption to make.

Obviously, a point in favour of the "PRF(NUMS seed)" construction is
that it's probably easier to believe in it without any particular
knowledge of the attacks on ECDLOG and the deeper properties that make them
work or not.

But my very humble opinion, mostly based on comments by people with more
knowledge than me on this topic, is that both assumptions are
reasonable enough to give us confidence in the security of the curves (both
Brainpool and "rigid" ones) against upcoming attacks.

Manuel.

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Jan 15 13:51:22 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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In general: RFCs are used by different people for wildly different =
reasons. If you make a statement in an RFC that could use some deeper =
explanation and you leave that explanation out, you can rest assured =
that someone will implement (or try to correct a working implementation) =
and not understand what you left out. We have 40 years of experience =
with this problem.

It is fine for you to create an RFC that just lists curves and does not =
show how to implement them interoperably. However, if you do, you need =
to say that is what you are doing right up front *and* resist the =
temptation to help on implementation at all. Also, you then need to deal =
with the fact that there will be five other RFCs afterwards that will =
show how to implement for TLS / IPsec / S/MIME / PGP ..., and they may =
or may not all line up. Again, there are plenty of people here with =
tooth marks on our asses from this.

And: this is a volunteer effort on everyone's part. We all want =
everything so that we don't have to deal with the inevitable problems =
later. But none of us did this before you, even though the data has been =
there. So: thank you and we have more requests. :-) :-(

> Do you really think everyone implementing P256 does it themselves? Or =
do they
> take example code from the Internet?

"Or" is unfortunately the wrong conjunction. Plenty of people take =
sample code from the Internet *and* then tweak it because they think =
they're smart. If you don't warn about things that they can do wrong but =
still be interoperable, someone is likely to do it. A fair amount of =
practical cryptography is hand-holding (and trying to move the most =
dangerous choices further out of reach...).

>> Hex fits better in an RFC ...  decimal would be fine also.
>=20
> Six of one, half-dozen of the other.

You would think, until you see a "10" and don't get that is in hex. If =
you use hex anywhere (and you will), you should try to use it everywhere =
except for one-digit values less than 0xa.

> What do you propose for the name scheme? E,M with prime in the expc
> format is my best proposal, but this might not be unique all the time.

With respect to naming: given enough elapsed time, your name system will =
*always* fail. Pick something that fill all of your needs now and has a =
hopefully-reasonable extension mechanism and hope for the best.

--Paul Hoffman=

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On 15/01/2014 22:30, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>>
>> We're in the documentation business here - not code libraries. Plus we're
>> supposed to have multiple interoperable different implementations.
> 
> Do you really think everyone implementing P256 does it themselves? Or do they
> take example code from the Internet?
> 
It seems to me that the whole goals of standards is to allow multiple
interoperable implementations, as Paul says. (Besides, they often give much more
information than existing code if you want to modify/extend anything, make
different trade-offs, etc.)

>> Yes ... and why did you leave out Ed25519?       It's being used and should at least be discussed/reviewed/
> 
> It's the same as Curve25519, and not in safecurves. Let's be real
> clear: isogenies don't change anything substantial.

Of course they don't change anything to the DLOG security. But they change
everything on actual computations and representations.

My opinion is you should explain how to compute the isogeny or (inclusive)
include Ed25519 as a "different" curve and explain which formulas to use with
it. I honestly don't know which is the more helpful.

> I'm also going to explain the Montgomery ladder and double-and-add on
> Edwards and that's it. RFC 6090 doesn't talk about
> radix-k either, nor does it explain Shamir's trick, or fun with the
> Brier-Joyce ladder, or w-NAF, etc.

I fully agree that the document should only discuss the most "basic" (and safe)
algorithms for computing the necessary operations. However, if other algorithms
are know that have (potential) security issues (like, not being constant-time,
having special cases) it would be great if the document could point out these
dangers.

> I still don't see why this form is much better than a paragraph
> listing these things.
> 
Much easier to access each piece of information. Almost like an array compared
to a linked list (at least in my opinion).

>> Hex fits better in an RFC ...  decimal would be fine also.
> 
> Six of one, half-dozen of the other.
> 
I'm not sure I understand you comment. Anyway, in my experience, I feel like
I've seen much more (large) constants in hex than in decimal in RFCs.

On the very down-to-earth practical side, hex is more compact, so it means less
line breaks, so easier copy-pasting (yeah, I know, gory details).

Manuel.

From Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com  Wed Jan 15 14:14:32 2014
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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 14:14:41 -0800
From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] wrt providing guidance to implementors (was: Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom)
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Watson Ladd wondered..
 >
 > And what does it say
 > about our implementors that they do not know the basics of the algorit=
hms
 > they are asked to implement?

unfortunately, there are many examples of implementors not exactly=20
understanding the stuff they're implementing and/or lacking diligence in =

ensuring all the myriad parameters are set correctly & meaningfully, etc.=
, etc.

Here's a recent survey wrt ECC in particular..

Bos, Joppe W., et al. "Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice." Microsof=
t=20
Research. November (2013).
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/ecc-practice.pdf


Thus, "implementation advice/guidance" is often an important part of=20
specifications.

HTH,

=3DJeffH

ps: there's also this classic bare-fisted rant..

Mark Pilgrim: Why Specs Matter
<http://web.archive.org/web/20051016203842/http://diveintomark.org/archiv=
es/2004/08/16/specs>

[ unfortunately, diveintomark.org itself is AWOL:
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Pilgrim#.22Disappearance.22_from_the_=
Internet>=20
]


conclusion (reprinted without permission, sorry):

Why specs matter

If your spec isn=92t good enough, morons have no chance of ever getting t=
hings
right. For everyone who complains that their software is broken, there wi=
ll
be two assholes who claim that it=92s not. The spec, whose primary purpos=
e is
to arbitrate disputes between morons and assholes, will fail to resolve
anything, and the arguments will smolder for years.

If your spec is good enough, morons have a fighting chance of getting thi=
ngs
right the second time around, without being besieged by assholes.
Meanwhile, the assholes who have nothing better to do than look for
loopholes won=92t find any, and they=92ll eventually get bored and wander=
off in
search of someone else to harass.


---
end





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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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On Wed, January 15, 2014 1:30 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>>
>>  ⨳|
>>  ⨳|Or the same level of C library support. I'd much rather have
>> everyone
>>  ⨳|copy a well-made library then write their own bugs we have to deal
>>  ⨳|with down the line/that the SIGINT people exploit. But yes, better
>>  ⨳|documentation about how to implement is necessary.
>> We're in the documentation business here - not code libraries. Plus
>> we're
>> supposed to have multiple interoperable different implementations.
>
> Do you really think everyone implementing P256 does it themselves? Or do
> they
> take example code from the Internet?

  The number of libraries is not equal to the number of people that use
them (i.e. no, "everyone" is not implementing it themselves) but the number
of libraries is also much greater than 1 (i.e. everyone is not using the
same "well-made" library).

  You're writing a document that must be implemented by _multiple_
people _independently_. If there was just going to be one implementation
that everyone used there would be no need for the document you're
writing-- the code would be the document.

>>  ⨳|
>>  ⨳|>     Also Š long numbers should be consistently represented hex
>>  ⨳|versus
>>  ⨳|> decimal
>>  ⨳|
>>  ⨳|Why hex? Most math papers use decimal, and more importantly GP/PARI
>>  ⨳|doesn't accept hex.
>>  ⨳|MAGMA, PARI and Sage are going to be used for test vector
>> validation.
>> [ ⨳]
>> By you maybe ...
>>
>> Hex fits better in an RFC ...  decimal would be fine also.
>
> Six of one, half-dozen of the other.

  Let me express a strong preference for hex. It's more natural when
dealing with bit strings.

  Dan.




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References: <mailman.4685.1389738617.2658.cfrg@irtf.org> <52D645EC.4000408@gmail.com> <52D684EE.9050304@cisco.com> <CEFBFBE5.2C52B%paul@marvell.com> <CACsn0cmegQ8_CjCFx7VN30yQ=P=Neb8kLr-i+wgj680E16V1rQ@mail.gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7FB9B37@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CACsn0cnw8MydqSxL0fEjM+jzB+UUfqwMoMVqG2Df99pU30Tr5A@mail.gmail.com> <CEFC467B.2C628%paul@marvell.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 15:33:56 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 3:05 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
> Watson,
>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> There is a significant body of work on implementing Weiers=
trass
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|curves
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> (ANSI, IEEE, NIST, NSA, etc.).  Edwards, Twisted Edwards a=
nd
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> Montgomery need the same level of documentation to progres=
s.
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|Or the same level of C library support. I'd much rather have=
 everyone
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|copy a well-made library then write their own bugs we have t=
o deal
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|with down the line/that the SIGINT people exploit. But yes, =
better
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|documentation about how to implement is necessary.
>>> We're in the documentation business here - not code libraries. Plus
>>>we're
>>> supposed to have multiple interoperable different implementations.
>>
>>Do you really think everyone implementing P256 does it themselves? Or do
>>they
>>take example code from the Internet?
> I have seen a large number of P256 implementations =E2=80=A6 few if any f=
rom the
> public domain.
>
> Existence of an open source library is not an excuse for a sloppy RFC.  I=
f
> this is the direction you are going, we would just need to write a
> one-line pointer to the source code.
>
> Real products implement in hardware, on multiple processor types =E2=80=
=A6 etc.
>
> I=E2=80=99ve been trying to be helpful, but your arguments against well i=
ntended
> suggestions is frustrating.   It=E2=80=99s difficult to contribute if you=
=E2=80=99re
> arguing for a sloppy RFC because the code is the reference.

I'm arguing for a precise statement of what needs to be calculated,
and nothing else. That's not sloppy. And in fact I'm supplying
what has been requested in terms of implementation details, against my
preference for black-box standards. The next
version is almost done in fact.

>
> I was pointing to specific examples that we could emulate in a perhaps
> more simple manner.  The next step would be get a summary of the relevant
> details required and emulate one or more of these documents.
>
>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|If we aren't specifying any twisted Edwards curves, why woul=
d we
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|define the formulas?
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|I suppose for use with Montgomery form, ala Ransom's suggest=
ion.
>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>> Yes ... and why did you leave out Ed25519?       It's being used and
>>>should at least be discussed/reviewed/
>>
>>It's the same as Curve25519, and not in safecurves. Let's be real
>>clear: isogenies don't change anything substantial.
> Substantial???
> Curve22519 is not interoperable with Ed25519. What could be more
> substantial.  A point on one curve would have a different x and y value
> than a curve on the other.

If I transmit to you a Curve25519 point, you can treat it as an
Ed25519 point (after appropriate transformations) and I
will never know the difference. Again, implementations are different
from the results
they calculate.

> This is one of my core issues with having mathematicians write protocols =
=E2=80=A6
> the apparent mathematical precision make the implementations very fuzzy.
>
>
>>If you want to discuss it separately, go ahead: plenty of people have
>>been discussing alternatives on this list already.
> Discuss =E2=80=A6  no, let me be clear and rephrase.  Please add Ed25519 =
to the
> RFC.

By Ed25519 do you mean the twisted Edwards curve, or the Edwards curve? Bec=
uase
the Ed25519 paper uses the Edwards curve, which has a giant parameter,
and the twisted
Edwards curve is going to be a unique form in the RFC. Either way
there is a lot of revising to do, also
to the explanation of why the curves were chosen.

Do you want to basepoint that corresponds to the choice of basepoint
9, or should I pick one?

>>
>>I'm also going to explain the Montgomery ladder and double-and-add on
>>Edwards and that's it. RFC 6090 doesn't talk about
>>radix-k either, nor does it explain Shamir's trick, or fun with the
>>Brier-Joyce ladder, or w-NAF, etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>   2) reuse where possible terminology and variables from
>>>Weierstrass
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|ECC
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>      E.g.  P for prime defining Fp,  n for order, h for co=
factor
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>          This would allow all classes of curves to viewed =
equally
>>>in
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>          an implementation catalog
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>           E.g.
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>         curveId =3D 'curve25519'
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>         strength =3D 127
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>         oid =3D None
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>         p  =3D 2**255-19
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>         a  =3D 486662
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>         xG =3D 9
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>         yG =3D
>>>...
>
> ...
>>
>>I still don't see why this form is much better than a paragraph
>>listing these things.
>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|Also, different things should be written differently.
>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>>
>>> On the Edwards curves with cofactors >1 I believe the strength estimate
>>>may be a little less
>>> than simply taking the bit length of the size / 2
>>>
>>> Advice on this small adjustment would be appreciated.
>>
>>Size of the group generated by g, not the size of the curve.
> Oh =E2=80=A6 of course, thanks.
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>     Also =C5=A0 long numbers should be consistently repres=
ented hex
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|versus
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> decimal
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|Why hex? Most math papers use decimal, and more importantly =
GP/PARI
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|doesn't accept hex.
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|MAGMA, PARI and Sage are going to be used for test vector va=
lidation.
>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>> By you maybe ...
>>>
>>> Hex fits better in an RFC ...  decimal would be fine also.
>>
>>Six of one, half-dozen of the other.
>>
>>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>     Note also - Weierstrass =C5=92a=C2=B9 is not the same =
as Edwards =C5=92a=C2=B9, but
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>     can be written around =C5=A0 and we should keep Edward=
s equations
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|consistent
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>     where possible with literature.
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|When we define DH exchange on a group yes. With setting the
>>>parameters
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|like you did we're tempting fate.
>>> Not really ... just another area for clear specification, eg:
>>>
>>> Suggested RFC text:
>>>
>>>     The ECC definitions include three classes of curves defined over
>>>the field
>>>     of integers modulo a prime p (Fp).  Each class of curve has an
>>>equation and
>>>     assoicated parameters unique to the class type.  Three classes of
>>>curves
>>>     are described:
>>>
>>>       SmallWeierstrassCurveFp       y**2 =3D x**3 + a*x + b  mod p
>>>       EdwardsCurveFp         x**2 + y**2 =3D c*(1 + d*x**2 * y**2)  mod=
 p
>>>       MontgomeryCurveFp             y**2 =3D x**3 + a*x**2 + x  mod p
>>>
>>>     The defintions include for each curve type:
>>>
>>>       curveId - An ASCII string used to identify the curve parameters
>>>       strength - an integer providing the estimated cryptographic
>>>strength
>>>                  of the curve as a power of 2
>>>       oid - a list of integers that correspond to the associated ASN.1
>>>object
>>>             identifier. The oid is listed as 'None' if there is no
>>>assigned oid
>>>       p - The prime modulus of the group (Fp). Often p is a Mersenne
>>>prime
>>>           to facilitate more efficient modular inversion
>>>       xG - the x-coordinate of a generator point G for the curve
>>>       yG - the y-coordinate of a generator point G for the curve
>>>       n  - the order of the generator point G
>>>       seed - included for reference when available
>>>       h - the cofactor of the curve
>>>
>>>     Each curve type has the following unique parameters
>>>
>>>       Small Wierstrass      y**2 =3D x**3 + a*x + b  mod p
>>>         a - often set to p-3 for efficiency
>>>         b - elected for the security properties of the curve shape
>>>         z - used by 'twisted' Brainpool curves for isogenous transform
>>>             of untwisted curve to a curve with a =3D p-3
>>>
>>>       Montgomery            y**2 =3D x**3 + c*x**2 + x  mod p
>>>         a - selected for the security properties of the curve shape
>>>
>>>       Edwards               x**2 + y**2 =3D c*(1 + d*x**2 * y**2) mod p
>>>         c - typically set to 1 so the equation is reduced to:
>>>                             x**2 + y**2 =3D 1 + d*x**2 * y**2  mod p
>>>         d - selected for the security properties of the curve shape
>>>
>>> Hummm .. could add Twisted Edwards to the above
>>
>>But none of the curves in safecurves are presented in twisted Edwards
>>form,
>>I'm not going to rehash short Weierstrass here, (RFC 6090 already exists)=
.
>
> Ok =E2=80=A6 but introducing Weierstrass allows comparisons and clarity o=
f
> specification.
> No eed to fully define Weierstrass =E2=80=A6 it=E2=80=99s just easier to =
have a complete
> view
> of all options.

Unless I include operation counts and real timings from optimized code, tha=
t
won't be a complete guide to the choice to make. Look at eBATS for performa=
nce
info.

RFC's are standards, not how to guides for the terminally lazy.
>
> Paul
>
>
>>
>>Anyway, I think this conversation would be far more productive when I
>>finish the revisions and put it before
>>the group again. You can follow on github in between.
>>
>>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>   3) Use math representation in RFCs that maps directly to=
 a
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|computer
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>      language notation - Python would be a good choice for
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>      readability.
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>      E.g. Twisted Edwards point addition definition
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>        x3 =3D ((x1*y2+x2*y1) * inv(1+d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>        y3 =3D ((y1*y2-a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|The math notation I am using maps directly to that of most C=
AS
>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>> No - for example:
>>> " On Montgomery curves, curves of the form y^2=3Dx^3+Ax^2+x, the typica=
l"
>>> is Ax a variable 'Ax' or A*x ... this is sloppy non-parseable notation
>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|systems. Anyway, at some point I will be done with the major
>>>revision,
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|and kick it around for comments.
>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>> CAS???
>>> I prefer running code useable for a protocol implementation.
>>
>>So I can just copy the relevant parts of tweetnacl.c and be done with it?
>>
>>>
>>> Paul
>>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>    4) curve names need consolidation and should clearly in=
dicate
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|curve
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> type
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|Blame Tanja. I really do not like the idea of changing exist=
ing names
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|especially when referring people to papers with them. SEC/NI=
ST has
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|already caused enough confusing as it is.
>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>> No need to blame, just make the change but  include reference to
>>>original author and curve name.
>>> NIST did not add confusion ... just branded the results.
>>> CFRG branding would be valuable.  More curves will happen and  a
>>>consistent notation is a good thing.
>>
>>What do you propose for the name scheme? E,M with prime in the expc
>>format is my best proposal, but this might not be unique all the time.
>>>
>>> Paul
>>>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> Paul
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >David
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Thanks,
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>     Yaron
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> _______________________________________________
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Cfrg mailing list
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >_______________________________________________
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >Cfrg mailing list
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> >http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> _______________________________________________
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> Cfrg mailing list
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>  =E2=A8=B3|> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>>
>>
>>--
>>"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>-- Benjamin Franklin
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Hi Dan,

On 01/15/2014 12:02 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
>
> Hi David,
>
> Good point about the "nothing up my sleeve" (NUMS) property. That's 
> what I meant when I earlier wrote the paragraph "Yes, rigidity helps 
> more to prevent malicious generation of the curve.  I am not 
> disagreeing with the safecurves site on that point. ".
>
> I re-read the safecurves rigidity page today. The safecurves rigidity 
> page does not use the NUMS term, but, in its strictest, to-the-letter 
> interpretation, I think it coincides with the meaning of NUMS.  I.e. 
> rigid == NUMS.
>
> I did ask earlier in this thread if I was misinterpreting the rigidity 
> page. Specifically, I was trying to ask if it was claiming something 
> stronger than NUMS.  Apparently I was indeed misinterpreting, at least 
> in to-the-letter sense, because I was construing the page to say 
> something more than NUMS.  Furthermore, in previous discussion with 
> Bernstein on the TLS mailing list, I had thought Bernstein was making 
> stronger claims than just NUMS, which may have reinforced my 
> misinterpretation above.  In retrospect, the TLS email exchange may 
> also have been mutual misunderstanding.
>
> David, your email and others are consistent with my rambling prose 
> being ineffective to explain my main point to a wider audience, so 
> I'll now try out some more emphatic language.
>

Sure.  I think that I did follow most of your previous post, but I was 
not sure that I could add more illumination on the subject, so I 
refrained from commenting.

> Consider a "nothing up their sleeves" (NUTS) property.  What it means: 
> if X has the NUTS property, then X is not affected by some attack that 
> "they" might know. Just to be clear, NUTS is an orthogonal property to 
> NUMS (i.e. they vs me).  For a potential example, perhaps P256 has the 
> NUTS property but not the NUMS property.  Also, achieving the NUMS and 
> NUTS properties are tasks, for which various tools can be used, and 
> arguments present as to whether, or to what extent, they are achieved.
>

I am sorry, I am not sure that I follow you.  My own thinking has been 
that NUMS would apply to the process used to generate the curve, rather 
than a curve itself.   I can see that some processes might generate 
trustworthy curves no matter who runs the process (which seems to be the 
NUTS case) and other processes might generate curves that I trust only 
if I run the process (which seems to be the NUMS case).

> Next, consider a "nothing up nobody's sleeve" (NUNS) property. [Please 
> forgive the double negative used to make this mnemonic acronym.  Think 
> additive negation, instead of standard English grammar's 
> multiplicative negation.  Think additive notation for ECC, as an 
> additional mnemonic.] It seems to me that NUMS+NUTS==NUNS.
>
> It seems to me that NUNS is not only formally stronger than NUMS, but 
> is also preferable to just NUMS only, because we usually define 
> algorithm security independently who the attacker is (not to be 
> confused with the capabilities they have, where we might make 
> distinctions.)
>
> If I understand Watson and Alyssa correctly (although I am not too 
> confident of my understanding), they think NUTS is irrelevant and 
> unachievable, respectively.
>
> If I understand Dan Bernstein's emails from the TLS list correctly, he 
> thinks NUTS is much less important than NUMS, because of the 
> quantities involved (and I agree), but nevertheless, that there are 
> arguments that the safe curves provide the NUTS property, namely the 
> all known attacks are independent of coefficient size (and I agree).  
> So, it is reasonable to argue the NUTS property to the safe curves 
> (and I agree).
>
> My primary point in this thread was meant to be that PRF(NUMS) => NUNS
>

I think the advocates of "rigid" curves mean to highlight the fact that 
the rigid process can generate only a small number of curves. In 
contrast, when we are presented by a verifiably pseudorandom curve that 
was generated with an input seed of unknown provenance, it might be the 
case that many seeds were tested and rejected until one was found that 
generated a curve on which the DL problem could be solved more easily.   
(Your model of "each curve has some probability of being vulnerable to 
an unknown attack" I think captures the concern, though one could 
generalize to a situation in which the expected running time of the DLP 
varied with the parameters.)

Now, it would be possible to make a "rigid" process out of a 
pseudorandom process by using a seed value that nobody can control (say, 
the sha512 hash of SP500 prices on a given future date). Perhaps this is 
what you mean by PRF(NUMS) -> NUNS?

regards,

David

> (summarizing the Brainpool curve selection process), without relying 
> about the assumption on attacks being independent of coefficient size, 
> so that random curve selection, as in Brainpool, provides better NUNS 
> than the curve selection process outlined in the safe curves site.  
>  Unfortunately, I did use Brainpool in the subject, which may have 
> undermined my own point, opening the door to speed comparisons, field 
> size issues, etc.
>
> I was really expecting, to no avail, somebody to finally concede this 
> point, but contend that the improvement was just very slight, because 
> of the reasonableness of the coefficient-size-independence 
> assumption.  Oh well.
>
> My secondary point was that some people may be confusing NUMS and 
> NUNS. Well, that's an ad hominem point, so my confidence is very low 
> there. Also, it is clearly nearly impossible to argue, since a 
> person's thoughts can change quickly.  I'm pretty Watson and Alyssa 
> disagree on this secondary point.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Dan
>
> *From:*David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 14, 2014 3:21 PM
> *To:* Dan Brown
> *Cc:* 'akr@akr.io'; 'cfrg@irtf.org'
> *Subject:* Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
>
> Hi Dan,
>
> thanks for sharing your thoughts.  It seems to me that the arguments 
> in favor of rigid curves comes down to the "nothing up my sleeve" 
> argument: if there are no free parameters to be chosen when 
> constructing an elliptic curve group, then there is no need to trust 
> the person doing the construction.
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential 
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> solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute 
> non-public information. Any use of this information by anyone other 
> than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you have received this 
> transmission in error, please immediately reply to the sender and 
> delete this information from your system. Use, dissemination, 
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Dan,<br>
      <br>
      On 01/15/2014 12:02 PM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C2217A@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Hi
            David,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Good
            point about the &#8220;nothing up my sleeve&#8221; (NUMS) property.&nbsp;
            That&#8217;s what I meant when I earlier wrote the paragraph &#8220;</span><span
            lang="EN-CA">Yes, rigidity helps more to prevent malicious
            generation of the curve.&nbsp; I am not disagreeing with the
            safecurves site on that point.&nbsp;</span><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#8221;.
            &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I
            re-read the safecurves rigidity page today. The safecurves
            rigidity page does not use the NUMS term, but, in its
            strictest, to-the-letter interpretation, I think it
            coincides with the meaning of NUMS.&nbsp; I.e. rigid == NUMS.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I
            did ask earlier in this thread if I was misinterpreting the
            rigidity page. Specifically, I was trying to ask if it was
            claiming something stronger than NUMS. &nbsp;Apparently I was
            indeed misinterpreting, at least in to-the-letter sense,
            because I was construing the page to say something more than
            NUMS.&nbsp; Furthermore, in previous discussion with Bernstein on
            the TLS mailing list, I had thought Bernstein was making
            stronger claims than just NUMS, which may have reinforced my
            misinterpretation above.&nbsp; In retrospect, the TLS email
            exchange may also have been mutual misunderstanding.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">David,
            your email and others are consistent with my rambling prose
            being ineffective to explain my main point to a wider
            audience, so I&#8217;ll now try out some more emphatic language.</span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Sure.&nbsp; I think that I did follow most of your previous post, but I
    was not sure that I could add more illumination on the subject, so I
    refrained from commenting.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C2217A@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Consider
            a &#8220;nothing up their sleeves&#8221; (NUTS) property.&nbsp; What it
            means: if X has the NUTS property, then X is not affected by
            some attack that &#8220;they&#8221; might know. Just to be clear, NUTS
            is an orthogonal property to NUMS (i.e. they vs me).&nbsp; For a
            potential example, perhaps P256 has the NUTS property but
            not the NUMS property.&nbsp; Also, achieving the NUMS and NUTS
            properties are tasks, for which various tools can be used,
            and arguments present as to whether, or to what extent, they
            are achieved.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I am sorry, I am not sure that I follow you.&nbsp; My own thinking has
    been that NUMS would apply to the process used to generate the
    curve, rather than a curve itself.&nbsp;&nbsp; I can see that some processes
    might generate trustworthy curves no matter who runs the process
    (which seems to be the NUTS case) and other processes might generate
    curves that I trust only if I run the process (which seems to be the
    NUMS case). <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C2217A@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Next,
            consider a &#8220;nothing up nobody&#8217;s sleeve&#8221; (NUNS) property.&nbsp;
            [Please forgive the double negative used to make this
            mnemonic acronym.&nbsp; Think additive negation, instead of
            standard English grammar&#8217;s multiplicative negation.&nbsp; Think
            additive notation for ECC, as an additional mnemonic.] It
            seems to me that NUMS+NUTS==NUNS.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">It
            seems to me that NUNS is not only formally stronger than
            NUMS, but is also preferable to just NUMS only, because we
            usually define algorithm security independently who the
            attacker is (not to be confused with the capabilities they
            have, where we might make distinctions.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">If
            I understand Watson and Alyssa correctly (although I am not
            too confident of my understanding), they think NUTS is
            irrelevant and unachievable, respectively.
            <o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">If
            I understand Dan Bernstein&#8217;s emails from the TLS list
            correctly, he thinks NUTS is much less important than NUMS,
            because of the quantities involved (and I agree), but
            nevertheless, that there are arguments that the safe curves
            provide the NUTS property, namely the all known attacks are
            independent of coefficient size (and I agree).&nbsp; So, it is
            reasonable to argue the NUTS property to the safe curves
            (and I agree).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">My
            primary point in this thread was meant to be that PRF(NUMS)
            =&gt; NUNS </span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I think the advocates of "rigid" curves mean to highlight the fact
    that the rigid process can generate only a small number of curves.&nbsp;&nbsp;
    In contrast, when we are presented by a verifiably pseudorandom
    curve that was generated with an input seed of unknown provenance,
    it might be the case that many seeds were tested and rejected until
    one was found that generated a curve on which the DL problem could
    be solved more easily.&nbsp;&nbsp; (Your model of "each curve has some
    probability of being vulnerable to an unknown attack" I think
    captures the concern, though one could generalize to a situation in
    which the expected running time of the DLP varied with the
    parameters.)<br>
    <br>
    Now, it would be possible to make a "rigid" process out of a
    pseudorandom process by using a seed value that nobody can control
    (say, the sha512 hash of SP500 prices on a given future date).&nbsp;&nbsp;
    Perhaps this is what you mean by PRF(NUMS) -&gt; NUNS?<br>
    <br>
    regards,<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C2217A@XMB116CNC.rim.net"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">(summarizing
            the Brainpool curve selection process), without relying
            about the assumption on attacks being independent of
            coefficient size, so that random curve selection, as in
            Brainpool, provides better NUNS than the curve selection
            process outlined in the safe curves site.&nbsp; &nbsp;Unfortunately, I
            did use Brainpool in the subject, which may have undermined
            my own point, opening the door to speed comparisons, field
            size issues, etc.&nbsp; <o:p>
            </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I
            was really expecting, to no avail, somebody to finally
            concede this point, but contend that the improvement was
            just very slight, because of the reasonableness of the
            coefficient-size-independence assumption.&nbsp; Oh well.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">My
            secondary point was that some people may be confusing NUMS
            and NUNS. Well, that&#8217;s an ad hominem point, so my confidence
            is very low there. Also, it is clearly nearly impossible to
            argue, since a person&#8217;s thoughts can change quickly.&nbsp; I&#8217;m
            pretty Watson and Alyssa disagree on this secondary point.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Best
            regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Dan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <div style="border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in
          0in 0in 4.0pt">
          <div>
            <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
              1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
              <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">
                  David McGrew [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com</a>]
                  <br>
                  <b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, January 14, 2014 3:21 PM<br>
                  <b>To:</b> Dan Brown<br>
                  <b>Cc:</b> '<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:akr@akr.io">akr@akr.io</a>'; '<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a>'<br>
                  <b>Subject:</b> Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v
                  Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:4.8pt">Hi Dan,<br>
              <br>
              thanks for sharing your thoughts.&nbsp; It seems to me that the
              arguments in favor of rigid curves comes down to the
              "nothing up my sleeve" argument: if there are no free
              parameters to be chosen when constructing an elliptic
              curve group, then there is no need to trust the person
              doing the construction.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
              <br>
              <o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
        </div>
      </div>
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] New draft
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Large expansions on algorithms for use by implementers, additional
references, enlarged Acknowledgements section, and contains T25519, a
twisted Edwards curve isomorphic to Curve25519.

There is a lot of double-checking that needs to happen. In particular
while I generated a point on T25519, it haven't validated its order
yet. Significant additions of text have happened, and while I ran
ispell, grammatical failures are quite possible.

Thanks to all of you who looked over the draft and offered comments:
they have been useful in preparing this revision.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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Hi Watson,

let me ask that you track the contributions made to the draft and make 
sure that the contributors understand that we need for them to grant 
rights of use to their text to the IETF Trust (see the section "Rights 
Granted by Contributors to the IETF Trust" in RFC 5378).

If the contributors are just fixing typos, then this is unlikely to be a 
big deal.   But copyright is an important issue for the IETF, and I just 
want to make sure that contributions are tracked, so that we can head 
off any potential future concerns that might prevent RFC publication.

thanks,

David

On 01/11/2014 06:28 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
> do the wordsmithing on github. Emails to me are still excellent ways
> of communicating issues, but for those inclined to do typo work and
> other valuable (and underappreciated) editing efforts, feel free to
> examine an up-to-date copy at github.com/wbl/safecurvesdraft.
>
> Quite a few people have argued that I need to explain the
> double-and-add algorithm, even though it is standard. Then again I
> have no idea what sort of implementation details are generally
> considered necessary in a draft, especially when they are completely
> unnecessary to specify the "what" of the behavior. This seems to me to
> be the biggest issue of contention with regards to the draft: some
> people want something ala RFC 6090, while I want to avoid massive
> bloat with implementation details that anyone implementing this draft
> probably knows anyway. This isn't a strongly principled stand on my
> part, but I would like to see this move through swiftly.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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Hi Watson,

On 01/12/2014 11:18 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
>> Dear Watson
>>
>> [off-list]
>>
>> On 12/01/2014 00:28, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>> To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
>>> do the wordsmithing on github.
>> To be clear, I'm afraid wordsmithing isn't what the draft needs right now. I
>> understand your haste to see the curves adopted in IETF protocols, but I really
>> feel like pushing the draft isn't the best or even the quickest way forward.
>>
>> Others on list have expressed concerns about its contents, mainly
>> 1. Security analysis and careful comparison with the other curves;
>> 2. Helping implementers actually get the implementation right;
>> which are important goals currently not covered by the draft.
> What sort of analysis do we need here? I think the claim that the DDH is hard
> and takes square root of curve time/space complexity, and also that these are
> resistant to certain twist attacks, is a sufficient analysis. A review
> of the relevant
> attack literature might be nice: but no one has asked for it until you did.
>
> Salesmanship of the curves could be useful, but would take far longer
> to write then
> the time I care to spend.

A good solution to the above problem, and one commonly used in the IETF, 
is to bring other co-authors aboard to help to achieve the work that 
they want to see get done.

David


> Feel free to contribute appropriate language: It will be mentioned in
> the Acknowledgements
> as "XYZ contributed section A.B.C".
>
>> Concerning point 2, you'll probably agree that one of the most prominent
>> benefits of the curves is that they're designed so that the probability of
>> implementers not screwing things up is higher than for other curves. I think if
>> we want to reap the full benefits of this, the document specifying these curves
>> should provide step-by-step guidance to implementers in a way they can actually
>> use (remember implementers don't all have a solid math background on the
>> relevant topics).
> The new version (on github) explains what double and add and the
> Montgomery ladder are, as well
> as containing explicit formulas for the curves. What more do you need
> to implement these?
>
>> Concerning point 1, as you probably have noticed, Eric Rescorla, chair of the
>> TLS group, has recently made it clear that the curves need a detailed  and
>> thoroughly documented security discussion representing consensus from the CFRG
>> and/or any other relevant part (SAAG) of the IETF to move forward in TLS. I
>> think he's right, and even if I didn't, it's probably a good idea to listen to
>> him anyway.
> What exactly could this discussion possibly consist of? "ECDH on each
> of the curves has complexity sqrt size of curve"
> The problem is that we know the attacks and the safeguards so well,
> that the validation is mechanized.
> What does he want that the safecurves site doesn't already have.
>
>> My opinion is, if you want your work on the draft to be effective, it would
>> probably be better to first clarify the goals with the rest of the RG (and/or
>> other interested WG) and only then work on the redaction, paying attention to
>> the stated goals.
> The goal is simple: describe these curves and their properties, in a manner that
> is unambiguous and usable in IETF protocols. It's the same as for the
> Brainpool draft,
> which you will note, does not contain the algorithms.
>
> If you have a better way to get these curves into use, feel free to
> help. But so far
> I've noticed nothing has been happening until I do it. Some people
> have been quite
> helpful with this.
>
>>
>> Of course I'm not in any way in a better position than you to judge what the
>> best course of action is, so I won't be offended if you choose to disregard my
>> advice :) Maybe taking advice from other, more experienced, people in the IETF,
>> about how to best use your enthusiasm, knowledge and willingness to help, would
>> be a good idea.
>>
>> Sincerely,
>> Manuel.
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>
>
>


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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 18:15:09 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
> Watson,
>
>>> I=E2=80=99ve been trying to be helpful, but your arguments against well=
 intended
>>> suggestions is frustrating.   It=E2=80=99s difficult to contribute if y=
ou=E2=80=99re
>>> arguing for a sloppy RFC because the code is the reference.
>>
>>I'm arguing for a precise statement of what needs to be calculated,
>>and nothing else.
>
> Likewise =E2=80=A6 but precision of math is not the same as precision of
> protocol interoperability.

If we merely needed to define the protocol to be interoperable, then
"big endian x coordinate of points on y^2=3Dx^3+486662x^2+x over
GF(2^255-19) with Diffie-Hellman packed to 32 bytes with leading 0,
basepoint x coordinate 9" would
completely define the protocol.

What you are asking for is guidance on implementations, which I've
added significant amounts of. Let's not confuse
normative with informative.

>
> Many of the precise words in the latest draft are unnecessary
> from an implementation perspective. An implementor does not
> need to know anything about abelian groups - just that
> there are:
>  - algorithm parameters (curve type and domain parameters)
>  - x,y coordinate points used as input/output to
>    Algorithms using the defined parameters
>  - clear algorithm descriptions using just, input, output
>    And domain parameters to perform a specific operation
>    (point addition and point multiplication)

I think we have that in this draft: even a pseudocode outline of the
ladder/double and add method.

Are there specific aspects of the explicit formulas and the text
around them that you think need clarification?

>
>>That's not sloppy. And in fact I'm supplying
>>what has been requested in terms of implementation details, against my
>>preference for black-box standards. The next
>>version is almost done in fact.
>

> Box is still fuzzy - more suggestions:

Do you have specific comments about where there is ambiguity?

>  - make an outline to the following form:
i.e. the form of RFC 6090. I'll think about that for a few days and
see if it gets
advantages in comprehension that my current draft could never get.

>   - Elliptic Curve Crypto Background
>     (curve types and parameters)
>     - Trival intro Fp and points
>     Define p, order, generator, curve types
>     - background on notation and other necessary functions
>   - Montgomery curves
>     - short overview for reference
>       and pointer to other specs
>       (basically - beware new math ahead)
>   - Edwards curves
>     - point representation
>     - point addition
>       Just one clear set of equations
>     - point multiplication
>   - Twisted Edwards curves
>   - Montgomery Curves
>      - point representation
>      - point addition
>      - multiplication
>   - Cryptographic operations
>     - DH
>       - DH with Edwards Curve
>       - DH with Montgomery Curve
>     - Signature Alg(s)

Signatures are going separately.

>       - Signature Alg with Edwards Curve
>       - Montgomery Curve Signatures ...

If you have a method that will work on a Montgomery curve naturally I
would love to hear it.

Montgomery curves are here for their blazing speed in ECDH without large ta=
bles.
Edwards curves are here for their blazing speed in signatures where we
can't toss out
one coordinate. I'ld much rather use Montgomery for ECDH and Edwards
for signatures
than Edwards for everything.

>   - Curve Catalogue
>     (include curves def=E2=80=99s, origins, refs, strength, NUM+NUTS what=
ever)
>      - Overview
>      - Edwards
>      - Twisted Edwards
>      - Montgomery
>   - References
>  Annex
>    - int to string / string to int per ANSI
>      (could be up front also in intro )
>    - other stuff / recomendations / math options
>
>
>>
>>>
>>> I was pointing to specific examples that we could emulate in a perhaps
>>> more simple manner.  The next step would be get a summary of the
>>>relevant
>>> details required and emulate one or more of these documents.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>  =E2=A8=B3|If we aren't specifying any twisted Edwards curves, why wo=
uld we
>>>>>  =E2=A8=B3|define the formulas?
>>>>>  =E2=A8=B3|I suppose for use with Montgomery form, ala Ransom's sugge=
stion.
>>>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>>>> Yes ... and why did you leave out Ed25519?       It's being used and
>>>>>should at least be discussed/reviewed/
>>>>
>>>>It's the same as Curve25519, and not in safecurves. Let's be real
>>>>clear: isogenies don't change anything substantial.
>>> Substantial???
>>> Curve22519 is not interoperable with Ed25519. What could be more
>>> substantial.  A point on one curve would have a different x and y value
>>> than a curve on the other.
>>
>>If I transmit to you a Curve25519 point, you can treat it as an
>>Ed25519 point (after appropriate transformations) and I
>>will never know the difference.
> But if you do not identify that it is a Curve25519 point versus a
> Ed25519 point you will not know when to do the =E2=80=98appropriate trans=
formation=E2=80=99
>
> So .. both are needed - especially if we are restricting Montgomery
> Curves to DH operations =E2=80=A6 which you imply.

Well, there are Edwards curves of about the same size. I've put it in becau=
se I
take your point: we do need something that has a strongly unified
complete addition law
with that size that can be used for signatures.

The only way I know of to use Montgomery curves for signatures loses
the extreme speed.

As for the transformation, if I tell you that protocol x uses
Curve25519 ECDH, I hopefully
have told you enough to know exactly what will be sent, regardless of what
you chose to do to think about it. Anything in the draft that makes that
not the case is a major issue.

>
>>Again, implementations are different
>>from the results
>>they calculate.
>>
>>> This is one of my core issues with having mathematicians write
>>>protocols =E2=80=A6
>>> the apparent mathematical precision make the implementations very fuzzy=
.
>>>
>>>
>>>>If you want to discuss it separately, go ahead: plenty of people have
>>>>been discussing alternatives on this list already.
>>> Discuss =E2=80=A6  no, let me be clear and rephrase.  Please add Ed2551=
9 to the
>>> RFC.
>>
>>By Ed25519 do you mean the twisted Edwards curve, or the Edwards curve?
>>Becuase
>>the Ed25519 paper uses the Edwards curve, which has a giant parameter,
>>and the twisted
>>Edwards curve is going to be a unique form in the RFC. Either way
>>there is a lot of revising to do, also
>>to the explanation of why the curves were chosen.
>
> Explaining why they were chosen should come after explain what we have.
> We should document both forms of Ed25519 and give them each unique new
> names.
> Once named, we can chose to ignore or recommend any named curve.

The argument for doing this can be extended to the twists of every
curve in the draft already....
I vote for putting in T25519, not the Ed25519 curve, because the small
parameters are much faster.
Yes, you can use an isomorphism to get the speed back, but I don't
like typing giant numbers any more
then you do, and if everyone is going to be using the isomorphism, why
stick with the original curve.

>
>>
>>Do you want to basepoint that corresponds to the choice of basepoint
>>9, or should I pick one?
>>
<snip>
>>>
>>> Ok =E2=80=A6 but introducing Weierstrass allows comparisons and clarity=
 of
>>> specification.
>>> No eed to fully define Weierstrass =E2=80=A6 it=E2=80=99s just easier t=
o have a complete
>>> view
>>> of all options.
>>
>>Unless I include operation counts and real timings from optimized code,
>>that
>>won't be a complete guide to the choice to make. Look at eBATS for
>>performance
>>info.
>
> My point above on Weierstrass was for clarity of implementation.  The
> parameters have names (like =E2=80=98a=E2=80=99).  NIST curves have an =
=E2=80=98a=E2=80=99 that is
> different
> from the usage in Montgomery curves.  You simply need to show both
> equations
> and define what an =E2=80=98a=E2=80=99 means in each context (text alread=
y provided to
> you).
>
> That was the point of an early discourse on these being =E2=80=98new=E2=
=80=99 curves.

I'm having trouble visualizing why putting in the short Weierstrass form he=
re
helps an implementor understand what the document says about Montgomery and
Edwards curves.

<rest omitted>
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 22:42:32 -0800
Thread-Topic: Outline -> was Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 07:07:50 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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On Jan 16, 2014, at 4:15 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
 wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>> Watson,
>>=20
>>>> I=92ve been trying to be helpful, but your arguments against well inte=
nded
>>>> suggestions is frustrating.   It=92s difficult to contribute if you=92=
re
>>>> arguing for a sloppy RFC because the code is the reference.
>>>=20
>>> I'm arguing for a precise statement of what needs to be calculated,
>>> and nothing else.
>>=20
>> Likewise =85 but precision of math is not the same as precision of
>> protocol interoperability.
>=20
> If we merely needed to define the protocol to be interoperable, then
> "big endian x coordinate of points on y^2=3Dx^3+486662x^2+x over
> GF(2^255-19) with Diffie-Hellman packed to 32 bytes with leading 0,
> basepoint x coordinate 9" would
> completely define the protocol.

And just to be on the safe side, it's best to also add a numerical example:=
 an x and y in numerical form and then encoded as on the network.

We usually craft RFCs so as to be understandable to implementers in general=
, which could be fresh comp-sci or software engineering graduates who have =
never taken a cryptography course, and who have never programmed in a low e=
nough level to consider endianness. No, you don't have to explain asymmetri=
c crypto - they can look it up, but you should not assume any deeper knowle=
dge than there is in the relevant wikipedia article.

That should be the assumption for a crypto document. Consider yourself luck=
y. Some documents need to be understood by the "teach yourself Javascript i=
n 21 days" crowd.

Yoav


From lars@netapp.com  Thu Jan 16 00:49:54 2014
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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 08:49:40 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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Hi,

On 2014-1-12, at 0:28, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
> do the wordsmithing on github. Emails to me are still excellent ways
> of communicating issues, but for those inclined to do typo work and
> other valuable (and underappreciated) editing efforts, feel free to
> examine an up-to-date copy at github.com/wbl/safecurvesdraft.

we need to be careful here. When people post suggestions to this mailing =
list, they know they are making contributions to the IRTF and IETF, and =
so they are obligated to make IPR disclosures, when applicable. (See =
http://irtf.org/ipr)

When you incorporate text or ideas that were emailed to you personally, =
those private emails to you are NOT "contributions to the IETF/IRTF", =
because they are not sent to one of our lists. That means people need =
not disclose IPR, and when you (in good faith) incorporate their ideas =
or text, undisclosed IPR may end up in your document.

It's therefore safest to only incorporate ideas and text that were sent =
on the public list.

(That also lets everyone know who made suggestions for edits. In light =
of the long recent discussion on how we can prevent bad actors from =
subverting our standards, having all of this on the list increases =
transparency, which is in the end our best defense.)

Lars

PS: This of course applies to all RG work, not only your draft in =
particular.

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From Johannes.Merkle@secunet.com  Thu Jan 16 03:00:02 2014
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Cc: "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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David McGrew schrieb am 16.01.2014 01:04:
> 
> I think the advocates of "rigid" curves mean to highlight the fact that the rigid process can generate only a small
> number of curves. In contrast, when we are presented by a verifiably pseudorandom curve that was generated with an input
> seed of unknown provenance, it might be the case that many seeds were tested and rejected until one was found that
> generated a curve on which the DL problem could be solved more easily.   (Your model of "each curve has some probability
> of being vulnerable to an unknown attack" I think captures the concern, though one could generalize to a situation in
> which the expected running time of the DLP varied with the parameters.)
> 
My understanding of Dan's reasoning is different. I think, the "unknown" in "probability of being vulnerable to an
unknown attack" relates to the entity generating the curve, i.e. NUTS captures the objective of generating curves in a
way that minimizes the "probability" that the curve may be or become vulnerably to attacks unknown by the party
generating the curve.

Of course, "probability" refers more to a "feeling in the guts" than to a (Bayesian) probability.


> Now, it would be possible to make a "rigid" process out of a pseudorandom process by using a seed value that nobody can
> control (say, the sha512 hash of SP500 prices on a given future date). Perhaps this is what you mean by PRF(NUMS) -> NUNS?
> 

In retrospective this approach would be less convincing because some might still speculate that seed definition had been
specified at a later point of time, in spite of all evidence records.

And still, DJB could argue that the freedom in choices made for the derivation of the parameters, e.g. SHA-512, leaves
some questions unanswered, and he would probably label these curves (on the safecurve page) as being only "somewhat rigid".

regards,
Johannes


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References: <20140113230750.6111382.6841.8590@certicom.com> <52D48450.3070701@akr.io> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1F190@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D59C35.10807@cisco.com> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C2217A@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D72201.6030803@cisco.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] NUMs/rigidity security (Re: [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom)
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You know in principle we ought to stick to something with low entropy for
the NUMs/rigidity seed.  I commented previously for example that someone can
do a fair bit of grinding by building a catalog of headlines, quote
dictionaries, and permuting their punctuation, white space etc.  Also
permuting arbitrary implementation choices (encoding, endianness, equally
plausible rigid choices, etc) So possibly the digits of pi are more
convincing than some obscure literary quote or a headline.  The point is to
start from an ungrindable starting point, with canonicalized choices at each
step.  I think so far the NUMS argument is probably gamable to a non-trivial
extent due to the above effects.

ie for secure NUMs you actually need to canonically encode all fo the
arbitrary choices in a standardized language, sort them, and select the
arbitrary choices at all levels, using the deterministic PRNG seed off pi. 
And even the PRNG design itself needs to be standardized, otherwise its
design variants also admit yet more bits.

The NUMs argument is good but so far is probably itself gameble, we need a
NUMs standard to remove as many of those variabilities as possible.

Adam

ps people might want to trim the quoted text in places, I almost missed some
comments they were that many pages down of recursive unedited quoting!

From ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi  Thu Jan 16 04:30:56 2014
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> Let p be a prime number. There is a unique field with p elements.
> Its elements can be represented as the set of integers {0, 1, ... p}.

Should that be {0, 1, ... p-1} ?

> To compute the additive inverse of a, one can compute (p-1)*a, and again
> take the remainder.

Won't p-a followed by remainder work?

> The remainder of this standard defines abelian groups in which for
> a fixed basepoint (denoted p), distinguishing between (g, [a]p, [b]p, [ab]p)
> with a, b picked uniformly at random from nonnegative integers less then
> the order, and (g, [a]g, [b]g, [c]g), is hard without spending prohibitive
> amounts of time. The time required is the square root of the order of g.

What's c? I presume uniform random nonnegative integer less that the order?

> On Montgomery curves, curves of the form y^2=x^3+a*x^2+x, the typical
> technique is to work over the Kummer variety instead, i.e. drop y
> coordinates for use in Diffie-Hellman. Let (X_1,Z_1), (X_2,Z_2),
> (X_3,Z_3) be coordinates such that X_1/Z_1, X_2/Z_2, X_3/Z_3 are the x
> coordinates of P, Q, and P+Q respectively. Then the equations

Is it P+Q or P-Q?

Also, reading the markup, the formulas below seem to use X1, Z1, etc...
when the above text talks of X_1, Z_1, etc...

> gives X_4/Z_4 as the x coordinate of [2]Q, and X_5/Z_5 as the x
> coordinate of P+[2]Q where a24=(a+2)/4.  If in calculating [n](X, Z),
> Z of the result is zero, this indicates that [n](X,Z) is the point
> at infinity, and so the result has x-coordinate 0.

P+[2]Q... The text below has P_1+P_0 appear in it? How those fit
together?

> 1: Intilize P_0=[1,0], and P_1=[x_P,1]
> 2: Iterate over the bits of n from most to least significant
> 2.1: If the bit is 0, let P_1=P_1+P_0, P_0=2P_0
> 2.2: If the bit is 1, let P_0=P_1+P_0, P_1=2P_1
> 3: Write [x_f, z_f]=P_0
> 4: If z_f is 0, return 0. Otherwise return x_f/z_f.

This section looked messed up in -03 HTML version. Can't easily tell
if you have done anything to it that would fix the formatting in
output.

Also, if one computes x_f/z_f as x_f*z_f^(p-2) mod p, then if z_f=0,
that produces 0 anyway.

> On (twisted) Edwards curves, curves of the form a*x^2+y^2=1+d*x^2y^2,
> a complete addition formula, which works for doubling as well, is
> given by representing points in projective coordinates. The formula
> for adding (X_1, Y_1, Z_1) to (X_2, Y_2, Z_2) is then

Then the formulas below have the X1 vs. X_1 thing.

Also, should doubling formula be given? Yes, straightforward substitution
works, but produces suboptimal algorithm without some manipulation.

> The Montgomery ladder algorithm from above will work with this addition
> and doubling, taking care to represent points as triples, and check that
> points lie on the curve going into and out of the routine. To convert

In what situations that check for points going out can fail. I know two:
- Buggy implementation
- Fault attack.

Others?

> Each curve is given by an equation and a basepoint, together with the
> order of the point and the cofactor.

One thing that could be useful would be listing low-order points (since
none of these curves has more than 8). Checking for those is needed
in some protocols.

I think explicit comparisions are much faster than multiplying 2 or 3
times and checking the result.

> Let (x,y) be a point on E(GF_p), where E is an Edwards curve or
> twisted Edwards curve. Let l=floor[log(p)/log(256)]+1. A point is
> represented as l bytes, l representing in big-endian radix 256 the
> minimal representative of [y] modulo p, and the top bit of the top
> byte set to equal the low bit of x. Because we have always ensured
> that there is extra room in l than is strictly required to represent
> y, we have room for the top bit to be set.

So the intention is that the top byte is always 0x00 or 0x80 for
all curves here, not just E448-Goldilocks (which is the only Edwards
curve here with bitlength multiple of 8)?

> Point encoding is clear in both cases. To decode a point on an Edwards
> curve with parameter d, one takes the y value and computes the
> valuex^2, then takes the square root. Methods for taking the square
> root are sadly highly prime-dependent, but [COHEN] contains a large
> number of options.

Perhaps add a note that if one relies on point decompression to check the
validity of input point, one has to check that the square root actually
exists. Many square root algorithms produce "interesting" results if one
tries to blindly take square roots that don't exist.

And using those "interesting" results might be much worse for security
than just enabling twist attack... 


-Ilari

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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NUMs/rigidity security (Re: [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom)
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Hi Adam,

On 01/16/2014 07:04 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> You know in principle we ought to stick to something with low entropy for
> the NUMs/rigidity seed.  I commented previously for example that 
> someone can
> do a fair bit of grinding by building a catalog of headlines, quote
> dictionaries, and permuting their punctuation, white space etc. Also
> permuting arbitrary implementation choices (encoding, endianness, equally
> plausible rigid choices, etc) So possibly the digits of pi are more
> convincing than some obscure literary quote or a headline.  The point 
> is to
> start from an ungrindable starting point, with canonicalized choices 
> at each
> step.  I think so far the NUMS argument is probably gamable to a 
> non-trivial
> extent due to the above effects.
>
> ie for secure NUMs you actually need to canonically encode all fo the
> arbitrary choices in a standardized language, sort them, and select the
> arbitrary choices at all levels, using the deterministic PRNG seed off 
> pi. And even the PRNG design itself needs to be standardized, 
> otherwise its
> design variants also admit yet more bits.
>
> The NUMs argument is good but so far is probably itself gameble, we 
> need a
> NUMs standard to remove as many of those variabilities as possible.
>
> Adam

I think this is right.   In my comment about using a hash of the S&P 500 
prices on some future date, I had assumed that the canonicalization step 
would be fixed in advance, and used unchanged when trading closed on 
that day.    (My thinking: those prices are easily accessible in the 
public record, and would be implausibly expensive to manipulate, and are 
not under the control of any government.  There might be better 
examples, but I couldn't think of any.)

I agree that using the digits of pi is in some sense more appealing.   
With the hash-of-prices approach, and people could come along after the 
curve group had been generated and call into question whether the 
canonicalization had actually been fixed beforehand.   Using the digits 
of pi would avoid this (mis)perception issue.

Off topic: you mention obscure literary quotes, and this one comes to 
mind.   "How I need a drink, alcoholic of course, after the heavy 
lectures involving quantum mechanics".   Which is of course just a very 
arbitrary encoding of another bit of information ...

David

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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom
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Hi Johannes,

On 01/16/2014 05:59 AM, Johannes Merkle wrote:
> David McGrew schrieb am 16.01.2014 01:04:
>> I think the advocates of "rigid" curves mean to highlight the fact that the rigid process can generate only a small
>> number of curves. In contrast, when we are presented by a verifiably pseudorandom curve that was generated with an input
>> seed of unknown provenance, it might be the case that many seeds were tested and rejected until one was found that
>> generated a curve on which the DL problem could be solved more easily.   (Your model of "each curve has some probability
>> of being vulnerable to an unknown attack" I think captures the concern, though one could generalize to a situation in
>> which the expected running time of the DLP varied with the parameters.)
>>
> My understanding of Dan's reasoning is different. I think, the "unknown" in "probability of being vulnerable to an
> unknown attack" relates to the entity generating the curve, i.e. NUTS captures the objective of generating curves in a
> way that minimizes the "probability" that the curve may be or become vulnerably to attacks unknown by the party
> generating the curve.
>
> Of course, "probability" refers more to a "feeling in the guts" than to a (Bayesian) probability.
>
>
>> Now, it would be possible to make a "rigid" process out of a pseudorandom process by using a seed value that nobody can
>> control (say, the sha512 hash of SP500 prices on a given future date). Perhaps this is what you mean by PRF(NUMS) -> NUNS?
>>
> In retrospective this approach would be less convincing because some might still speculate that seed definition had been
> specified at a later point of time, in spite of all evidence records.

Yes, I agree.

David

>
> And still, DJB could argue that the freedom in choices made for the derivation of the parameters, e.g. SHA-512, leaves
> some questions unanswered, and he would probably label these curves (on the safecurve page) as being only "somewhat rigid".
>
> regards,
> Johannes
>
> .
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 01/16/2014 03:49 AM, Eggert, Lars wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 2014-1-12, at 0:28, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>> To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
>> do the wordsmithing on github. Emails to me are still excellent ways
>> of communicating issues, but for those inclined to do typo work and
>> other valuable (and underappreciated) editing efforts, feel free to
>> examine an up-to-date copy at github.com/wbl/safecurvesdraft.
> we need to be careful here. When people post suggestions to this mailing list, they know they are making contributions to the IRTF and IETF, and so they are obligated to make IPR disclosures, when applicable. (See http://irtf.org/ipr)
>
> When you incorporate text or ideas that were emailed to you personally, those private emails to you are NOT "contributions to the IETF/IRTF", because they are not sent to one of our lists. That means people need not disclose IPR, and when you (in good faith) incorporate their ideas or text, undisclosed IPR may end up in your document.
>
> It's therefore safest to only incorporate ideas and text that were sent on the public list.
>
> (That also lets everyone know who made suggestions for edits. In light of the long recent discussion on how we can prevent bad actors from subverting our standards, having all of this on the list increases transparency, which is in the end our best defense.)

Good points about transparency and IPR.   Thanks Lars.

David


>
> Lars
>
> PS: This of course applies to all RG work, not only your draft in particular.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


--------------020000000204000501090705
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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 01/16/2014 03:49 AM, Eggert, Lars
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:45E1421E-4C32-44A1-9315-BFC48E7C0DD3@netapp.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Hi,

On 2014-1-12, at 0:28, Watson Ladd <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com">&lt;watsonbladd@gmail.com&gt;</a> wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
do the wordsmithing on github. Emails to me are still excellent ways
of communicating issues, but for those inclined to do typo work and
other valuable (and underappreciated) editing efforts, feel free to
examine an up-to-date copy at github.com/wbl/safecurvesdraft.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
we need to be careful here. When people post suggestions to this mailing list, they know they are making contributions to the IRTF and IETF, and so they are obligated to make IPR disclosures, when applicable. (See <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://irtf.org/ipr">http://irtf.org/ipr</a>)

When you incorporate text or ideas that were emailed to you personally, those private emails to you are NOT "contributions to the IETF/IRTF", because they are not sent to one of our lists. That means people need not disclose IPR, and when you (in good faith) incorporate their ideas or text, undisclosed IPR may end up in your document.

It's therefore safest to only incorporate ideas and text that were sent on the public list.

(That also lets everyone know who made suggestions for edits. In light of the long recent discussion on how we can prevent bad actors from subverting our standards, having all of this on the list increases transparency, which is in the end our best defense.)</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Good points about transparency and IPR.&nbsp;&nbsp; Thanks Lars.<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:45E1421E-4C32-44A1-9315-BFC48E7C0DD3@netapp.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">

Lars

PS: This of course applies to all RG work, not only your draft in particular.
</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
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--------------020000000204000501090705--

From adam@cypherspace.org  Thu Jan 16 06:06:10 2014
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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 15:05:45 +0100
From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Message-ID: <20140116140545.GA31053@netbook.cypherspace.org>
References: <20140113230750.6111382.6841.8590@certicom.com> <52D48450.3070701@akr.io> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C1F190@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D59C35.10807@cisco.com> <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF5C2217A@XMB116CNC.rim.net> <52D72201.6030803@cisco.com> <20140116120434.GA26078@netbook.cypherspace.org> <52D7D418.9070305@cisco.com>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, "'cfrg@irtf.org'" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NUMs/rigidity security (Re: [CFRG] Safecurves v Brainpool / Rigid v Pseudorandom)
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 07:44:08AM -0500, David McGrew wrote:
>On 01/16/2014 07:04 AM, Adam Back wrote:
>I think this is right.   In my comment about using a hash of the S&P 
>500 prices on some future date, I had assumed that the 
>canonicalization step would be fixed in advance, and used unchanged 
>when trading closed on that day.  (My thinking: those prices are 
>easily accessible in the public record, and would be implausibly 
>expensive to manipulate, and are not under the control of any 
>government.  There might be better examples, but I couldn't think of 
>any.)

OK.  So what about this: if the generation progam were time-stamped, by
placing the hash of the rigid selection code into the bitcoin block chain,     
and then the containing block hash as the prng seed, and placing the hash of
the selected curve in a following block.  (The current block hash includes
the hash of the previous block hash recursively forming a hash chain).

Minimally this limits the grinding to what can be achieved within 10mins
(and most of the grinding power of an adversary is used up competing with a
17 petahash/sec = 181 exaflop/sec distributed supercomputer formed by
bitcoins hashcash-SHA256^2 ASIC miners), in a directly verifiable way with
no reference to external authority (the usual source of conspiracy
theories).  Its not quite ideal, but it is better than previous proposals
I've seen.

Note the ASIC miners are very hardware optimized 28nm/20nm high parallelism
chips, actual curve cooking selection would have to do far more complicated
selection and do it on general purpose programmable hardware not repeated
ASIC with hashcash coded into it.  Bitcoins hashrate outperforms the top 500
super computrs in *aggregate* by a factor of about 1000x.  Add in the work
to validate a curve for desired properties vs double SHA256 maybe by more.

Secondly looking back in time a month or a year later, both the code and the
rng seed become ever more difficult to retroactively modify.

Thirdly the curve selection code could have a nonce placed into it that
should be kept secret until a month after the selection.  Then people can
review the code and verify the curve.  Not knowing the nonce, a third party
could not grind the following hash.  The current hash forms a quite secure
distributed signature on the parameters.

Adam

ps I invented hashcash back in 1997 (bitcoins mining function) - might as
well get something useful out of the 35MW ongoing powerdraw otherwise only
doing a provably fair job of consensus/validation.

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan 16 07:29:18 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 5:18 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> On 01/16/2014 03:49 AM, Eggert, Lars wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On 2014-1-12, at 0:28, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> To avoid clogging up the IETF with endless revisions, I've decided to
> do the wordsmithing on github. Emails to me are still excellent ways
> of communicating issues, but for those inclined to do typo work and
> other valuable (and underappreciated) editing efforts, feel free to
> examine an up-to-date copy at github.com/wbl/safecurvesdraft.
>
> we need to be careful here. When people post suggestions to this mailing
> list, they know they are making contributions to the IRTF and IETF, and so
> they are obligated to make IPR disclosures, when applicable. (See
> http://irtf.org/ipr)
>
> When you incorporate text or ideas that were emailed to you personally,
> those private emails to you are NOT "contributions to the IETF/IRTF",
> because they are not sent to one of our lists. That means people need not
> disclose IPR, and when you (in good faith) incorporate their ideas or text,
> undisclosed IPR may end up in your document.

The only IPR issue is with patents, and I'm not incorporating new implementation
methods.

With regards to copyright, so far it's been typos. I'll ask people to
agree to license
their contributions under the terms of BCP whatever it is before
incorporating anything
more substantive.

>
> It's therefore safest to only incorporate ideas and text that were sent on
> the public list.
>
> (That also lets everyone know who made suggestions for edits. In light of
> the long recent discussion on how we can prevent bad actors from subverting
> our standards, having all of this on the list increases transparency, which
> is in the end our best defense.)

If your assessment of the draft depends on whether or not I work for the NSA,
you are making a terrible mistake. At some point there will be a text
freeze, for
formal last call consideration. At that point, I hope you pretend
every single word
was written by an unholy consortium of everyone who ever wants to subvert
a standard. Read it like a lawyer reading a deal with the devil.
That suspicion and its discussion on the list is the best defense
against mistakes and errors of all kinds.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
>
> Good points about transparency and IPR.   Thanks Lars.
>
> David
>
>
>
> Lars
>
> PS: This of course applies to all RG work, not only your draft in
> particular.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan 16 07:33:26 2014
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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 07:33:12 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 10:42 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>>
>>Signatures are going separately.
>>
>>>       - Signature Alg with Edwards Curve
>>>       - Montgomery Curve Signatures ...
>>
>>If you have a method that will work on a Montgomery curve naturally I
>>would love to hear it.
>
> That=E2=80=99s the point of having the section =E2=80=A6 you need a secti=
on to say it
> is not a good idea=E2=80=A6 or transform or whatever.
>
>
>>
>>Montgomery curves are here for their blazing speed in ECDH without large
>>tables.
>>Edwards curves are here for their blazing speed in signatures where we
>>can't toss out
>>one coordinate. I'ld much rather use Montgomery for ECDH and Edwards
>>for signatures
>>than Edwards for everything.
>
> Again the point of the outline was to provide a framework to possibly mak=
e
> such recommendations.
>
> These all seem like severe issues with these new curves.  The Weierstrass
> curves
> work well for signatures and key establishment.
>
> A truly =E2=80=98unified' public key system would support both signatures=
 and key
> establishment
> with the same key.

ECDH with Edwards is still extremely fast, and if you have devices with cod=
e
size limitations, is a fine way to fit signatures and ECDH into a limited s=
pace.
However, there is a mandatory check of the square root when decompressing
points that must take place, and whose omission harms security without affe=
cting
interoperability. I'll add text explaining this more clearly.

As for same key, I'm not an expert on the security implications of key reus=
e.
So far the draft is silent on this issue, and I don't feel capable of
saying anything
about it.

>
>>
>>>   - Curve Catalogue
>>>     (include curves def=E2=80=99s, origins, refs, strength, NUM+NUTS wh=
atever)
>>>      - Overview
>>>      - Edwards
>>>      - Twisted Edwards
>>>      - Montgomery
>>>   - References
>>>  Annex
>>>    - int to string / string to int per ANSI
>>>      (could be up front also in intro )
>>>    - other stuff / recomendations / math options
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I was pointing to specific examples that we could emulate in a perhap=
s
>>>>> more simple manner.  The next step would be get a summary of the
>>>>>relevant
>>>>> details required and emulate one or more of these documents.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>  =E2=A8=B3|If we aren't specifying any twisted Edwards curves, why =
would we
>>>>>>>  =E2=A8=B3|define the formulas?
>>>>>>>  =E2=A8=B3|I suppose for use with Montgomery form, ala Ransom's sug=
gestion.
>>>>>>> [ =E2=A8=B3]
>>>>>>> Yes ... and why did you leave out Ed25519?       It's being used an=
d
>>>>>>>should at least be discussed/reviewed/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>It's the same as Curve25519, and not in safecurves. Let's be real
>>>>>>clear: isogenies don't change anything substantial.
>>>>> Substantial???
>>>>> Curve22519 is not interoperable with Ed25519. What could be more
>>>>> substantial.  A point on one curve would have a different x and y
>>>>>value
>>>>> than a curve on the other.
>>>>
>>>>If I transmit to you a Curve25519 point, you can treat it as an
>>>>Ed25519 point (after appropriate transformations) and I
>>>>will never know the difference.
>>> But if you do not identify that it is a Curve25519 point versus a
>>> Ed25519 point you will not know when to do the =E2=80=98appropriate
>>>transformation=E2=80=99
>>>
>>> So .. both are needed - especially if we are restricting Montgomery
>>> Curves to DH operations =E2=80=A6 which you imply.
>>
>>Well, there are Edwards curves of about the same size. I've put it in
>>because I
>>take your point: we do need something that has a strongly unified
>>complete addition law
>>with that size that can be used for signatures.
>>
>>The only way I know of to use Montgomery curves for signatures loses
>>the extreme speed.
>>
>>As for the transformation, if I tell you that protocol x uses
>>Curve25519 ECDH, I hopefully
>>have told you enough to know exactly what will be sent, regardless of wha=
t
>>you chose to do to think about it. Anything in the draft that makes that
>>not the case is a major issue.
>
> =E2=80=A6 And if you are using Ed25519a or Ed25519b you also need to iden=
tify the
> curve.
>
>>> My point above on Weierstrass was for clarity of implementation.  The
>>> parameters have names (like =E2=80=98a=E2=80=99).  NIST curves have an =
=E2=80=98a=E2=80=99 that is
>>> different
>>> from the usage in Montgomery curves.  You simply need to show both
>>> equations
>>> and define what an =E2=80=98a=E2=80=99 means in each context (text alre=
ady provided to
>>> you).
>>>
>>> That was the point of an early discourse on these being =E2=80=98new=E2=
=80=99 curves.
>>
>>I'm having trouble visualizing why putting in the short Weierstrass form
>>here
>>helps an implementor understand what the document says about Montgomery
>>and
>>Edwards curves.
>
> You simply need to put the new curves in the context of the old.
> No need to describe everything about them since they are well known.
> They should be mentioned to show that the math is not the same.
> The outline provided a section to briefly mention the old to introduce th=
e
> new.
>
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
>>
>><rest omitted>
>>Sincerely,
>>Watson Ladd
>>
>>--
>>"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>-- Benjamin Franklin
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Editing work on github of draft-ladd-safecurves
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Hi,

On 2014-1-16, at 16:29, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> The only IPR issue is with patents, and I'm not incorporating new =
implementation
> methods.

that's great, but not really sufficient.

What matters is that others, who may actually believe that they hold IPR =
on something in your draft - whether that claim is valid or not (or =
sensible or not) - are put under an obligation to disclose this belief. =
That obligation only exists if such contributions are made to the IETF =
and IRTF. It does not exist when they make private comments to you =
personally.

The IETF process is carefully designed to bring such IPR claims into the =
open. That's valuable, and I'd hence recommending following it.

> With regards to copyright, so far it's been typos. I'll ask people to
> agree to license
> their contributions under the terms of BCP whatever it is before
> incorporating anything
> more substantive.

The IETF and IRTF already *have* a process that handles this =
automatically when such contributions are made on an IETF or IRTF =
mailing list, see BCP78. Why create more work for everyone involved?

> If your assessment of the draft depends on whether or not I work for =
the NSA,
> you are making a terrible mistake. At some point there will be a text
> freeze, for
> formal last call consideration. At that point, I hope you pretend
> every single word
> was written by an unholy consortium of everyone who ever wants to =
subvert
> a standard. Read it like a lawyer reading a deal with the devil.
> That suspicion and its discussion on the list is the best defense
> against mistakes and errors of all kinds.

I fully agree. However, information is lost when you incorporate ideas =
sent by third parties without being extremely diligent in acknowledging =
where they came from in the document. If you collect feedback on this =
list, everyone can follow who made what suggestion while the document is =
being worked on.

And then at the end, we still apply the "read it like a lawyer reading a =
deal with the devil"-approach.

Lars

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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan 16 08:25:12 2014
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 8:23 AM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 2014-1-16, at 16:29, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>> The only IPR issue is with patents, and I'm not incorporating new implem=
entation
>> methods.
>
> that's great, but not really sufficient.
>
> What matters is that others, who may actually believe that they hold IPR =
on something in your draft - whether that claim is valid or not (or sensibl=
e or not) - are put under an obligation to disclose this belief. That oblig=
ation only exists if such contributions are made to the IETF and IRTF. It d=
oes not exist when they make private comments to you personally.
>
> The IETF process is carefully designed to bring such IPR claims into the =
open. That's valuable, and I'd hence recommending following it.
>
>> With regards to copyright, so far it's been typos. I'll ask people to
>> agree to license
>> their contributions under the terms of BCP whatever it is before
>> incorporating anything
>> more substantive.
>
> The IETF and IRTF already *have* a process that handles this automaticall=
y when such contributions are made on an IETF or IRTF mailing list, see BCP=
78. Why create more work for everyone involved?
>
>> If your assessment of the draft depends on whether or not I work for the=
 NSA,
>> you are making a terrible mistake. At some point there will be a text
>> freeze, for
>> formal last call consideration. At that point, I hope you pretend
>> every single word
>> was written by an unholy consortium of everyone who ever wants to subver=
t
>> a standard. Read it like a lawyer reading a deal with the devil.
>> That suspicion and its discussion on the list is the best defense
>> against mistakes and errors of all kinds.
>
> I fully agree. However, information is lost when you incorporate ideas se=
nt by third parties without being extremely diligent in acknowledging where=
 they came from in the document. If you collect feedback on this list, ever=
yone can follow who made what suggestion while the document is being worked=
 on.
>
> And then at the end, we still apply the "read it like a lawyer reading a =
deal with the devil"-approach.

Okay. I'll ask everyone who sends me comments to put them on the list
and tag them in the subject line so they can be easily ignored by
those
uninterested in typo fixes.

>
> Lars



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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On 2014-1-16, at 17:24, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> Okay. I'll ask everyone who sends me comments to put them on the list
> and tag them in the subject line so they can be easily ignored by
> those
> uninterested in typo fixes.

Great, thanks!

Lars

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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'Paul Lambert' <paul@marvell.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 12:10:35 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>, "'Paul Lambert'" <paul@marvell.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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Hi Kevin, Paul, and Watson,

On 01/16/2014 02:42 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
> Paul Lambert
> On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:43 AM Paul Lambert wrote:
>
>> A truly ‘unified' public key system would support both signatures and
>> key establishment with the same key.
>>
> Received wisdom is that using the same key for both key establishment and
> signatures is a bad idea.  I believe the concern is that one protocol
> might be used an Oracle to subvert the other.

Agreed on that point, but there is a background issue here that I want 
to ask about.

Watson said in a previous email:
 >
 > Montgomery curves are here for their blazing speed in ECDH without 
large tables.
 > Edwards curves are here for their blazing speed in signatures where 
we can't toss out
 > one coordinate. I'ld much rather use Montgomery for ECDH and Edwards
 > for signatures than Edwards for everything.

So, what would this mean for an implementation that uses both ECDH and 
an EC signature?   That the math routines for both Edwards and 
Montgomery need to be included?    Or is translation between the formats 
very efficient?  If a single curve type and a single set of 
math/algorithms could be used for both, then an implementation could be 
simpler and more compact, and could perform better in software.

In any case, it makes sense to consider a complete system, rather than 
to optimize ECDH in isolation, and optimize a signature method in 
isolation.

David

From mike@shiftleft.org  Thu Jan 16 12:44:23 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references
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On Jan 16, 2014, at 12:30 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> Hi Kevin, Paul, and Watson,
>=20
> Watson said in a previous email:
> >
> > Montgomery curves are here for their blazing speed in ECDH without =
large tables.
> > Edwards curves are here for their blazing speed in signatures where =
we can't toss out
> > one coordinate. I'ld much rather use Montgomery for ECDH and Edwards
> > for signatures than Edwards for everything.
>=20
> So, what would this mean for an implementation that uses both ECDH and =
an EC signature?   That the math routines for both Edwards and =
Montgomery need to be included?    Or is translation between the formats =
very efficient?  If a single curve type and a single set of =
math/algorithms could be used for both, then an implementation could be =
simpler and more compact, and could perform better in software.

It is preferable to include both formats.  It is possible to use Edwards =
for ECDH or Montgomery for signatures, but it is not ideal speedwise.  =
Anyway, whereas Montgomery implementations can be extremely simple, =
Edwards implementations are usually significantly more complex (because =
they need complexity to extract maximum performance, unlike the =
Montgomery ladder).  For curves larger than 256 bits, authors probably =
won=92t inline their multiplication formulas into their laddering, so I =
don=92t think the extra formulas will hurt much.

Conversion hurts Montgomery curves more than it hurts Edwards curves, so =
it might make sense to use only Montgomery form for the wire format.  =
The conversion adds non-negligible complexity, though, especially =
because fast conversion routines may vary between curves.

On the other hand, if the wire format is Montgomery, then a *really* =
space-constrained device could use Montgomery for signatures as well as =
ECDH without too much pain.

> David

Cheers,
=97 Mike=

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re: normative references
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:30 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi Kevin, Paul, and Watson,
>
>
> On 01/16/2014 02:42 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
>>
>> Paul Lambert
>> On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:43 AM Paul Lambert wrote:
>>
>>> A truly =E2=80=98unified' public key system would support both signatur=
es and
>>> key establishment with the same key.
>>>
>> Received wisdom is that using the same key for both key establishment an=
d
>> signatures is a bad idea.  I believe the concern is that one protocol
>> might be used an Oracle to subvert the other.
>
>
> Agreed on that point, but there is a background issue here that I want to
> ask about.
>
> Watson said in a previous email:
>
>>
>> Montgomery curves are here for their blazing speed in ECDH without large
>> tables.
>> Edwards curves are here for their blazing speed in signatures where we
>> can't toss out
>> one coordinate. I'ld much rather use Montgomery for ECDH and Edwards
>> for signatures than Edwards for everything.
>
> So, what would this mean for an implementation that uses both ECDH and an=
 EC
> signature?   That the math routines for both Edwards and Montgomery need =
to
> be included?    Or is translation between the formats very efficient?  If=
 a
> single curve type and a single set of math/algorithms could be used for
> both, then an implementation could be simpler and more compact, and could
> perform better in software.

Edwards curves can be used for ECDH and outperform short Weierstrass
over the same
field, so one could use ECDH on an Edwards curve along with
signatures. The one issue
is there is a critical check Edwards curves require that Montgomery
curves do not when
receiving points.

Mike Hamburg pointed out there are clever tricks to do signatures on
Montgomery curves, but they are still
slower than variable time radix k algorithms on Edwards curves
signature verification.

You can use an isogeny to take advantage of the radix-k algorithms in
Edwards curves for
points on a Montgomery curve: this is why T25519 is in the latest
version (along with tons of typos,
and some point checks need to be performed on it, and I've not
documented the algorithm yet)
Right now this is faster for ECDH, but with better differential-addition
chains Montgomery will be back on top. And there is that special check
which makes me worry about poor quality implementations:
send an invalid Edwards encoding, and things can go badly wrong.

>
> In any case, it makes sense to consider a complete system, rather than to
> optimize ECDH in isolation, and optimize a signature method in isolation.

On big servers and clients cold code size is really not an issue:
provided your inner loop and the data it accesses fit in L1, all is
good, so
Montgomery and Edwards make sense to get an extra little bit of
performance. On tiny systems with enough RAM for high performance
Edwards implementations, one could use the Edwards curves. If get
smaller you will lose performance to Edwards curves vs. Montgomery,
but as Mike Hamburg points out in an email below there are special
tricks that can be played.

For a small system I would stick with Edwards: the loss of robustness
might be worth the smaller code size. However, other people might
disagree,
and as new performance tricks come out this could change.
Unfortunately eBATS doesn't include a MSP430, so I really don't know
what life is like
down there.

>From just a pragmatic perspective, people want to use both: the TLS
people want Curve25519 yesterday on top of whatever signature schemes
are lying around already (RSA PKCS 1.5 (blegh!), ECDSA, etc.), while
people who want to verify lots of signatures very quickly want Edwards
curves.
I don't feel confident enough in my knowledge of what will work best
to remove the option of having both from protocol designers.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
> David



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re: normative references
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:10 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Kevin,
>
> =E2=A8=B3|> A truly =E2=80=98unified' public key system would support bot=
h signatures
>  =E2=A8=B3|and
>  =E2=A8=B3|> key establishment with the same key.
>  =E2=A8=B3|>
>  =E2=A8=B3|
>  =E2=A8=B3|Received wisdom is that using the same key for both key establ=
ishment
>  =E2=A8=B3|and signatures is a bad idea.  I believe the concern is that o=
ne
>  =E2=A8=B3|protocol might be used an Oracle to subvert the other.
> [ =E2=A8=B3]
> Yes - greatly appreciate the transfer of wisdom.  General guidelines are =
well documented to this effect.
>
> This makes complete sense in the general case where a curve may support g=
eneric  key establishment or signature algorithms.

>
> However, for specifically selected signature and key establishment method=
s I would assume that and examination could be made of this potential subve=
rsion.  The general guideline seems to be blocking the examination and eval=
uation of the sensitivity of such combined modes.

Signcryption has been an area of research. I think what you want is to
use the same private and public key for multiple purposes.
>
> As a protocol designer, being able to use the same key for signatures and=
 key establishment makes for a simpler design and trust model.  The session=
 key security (e.g. from ECDH) would be implicitly bound to the any signed =
information from the same key.

If I understand correctly you want to use something like HMQV with
keys that can be used in a signature scheme, thus saying "The person I
share key X with is the person who signed messages M_1,\ldots M_n".
This can be done by having a master key sign a key exchange key and a
message signing key. However, people can sign whatever messages they
feel like, so I don't know how helpful the semantics are.

>
> I is possible to just consider a combined public key that is the concaten=
ation of two types ... but then you need another mechanism to validate the =
binding.  Right now if you have two public keys Pe and Ps (public to sign a=
nd public to encrypt) This would be P =3D Pe|Ps ( concatenated).  Binding c=
ould through and be Id =3D h(P)=3Dh(Pe|Ps) or
> Ps signing Pe, etc.
>
> Still ... it doubles the effective required key size and adds additional =
steps in an authenticated key exchange.

The key exchange and PKIX we have now works with this restriction just
fine. The naive solution I mentioned above doesn't require
any extra rounds, just some more data. Yes, it is sort of a pain in
highly restricted environments, but I'm having trouble thinking
of a highly restricted environment with lots of public key ops taking
place that need those semantics.
It's never going to amount to a high percentage of the load anyway.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Paul

Sincerely,
Watson
>
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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Dear all,
Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
might be missing with this decision?

This doesn't really affect the rest of the text at all, and I will
hold off until I hear what other people have to say about this.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From trevp@trevp.net  Thu Jan 16 13:50:26 2014
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear all,
> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
> might be missing with this decision?

I didn't quite suggest that.

I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
(either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).

It takes a great deal of effort to do high-speed, const-time
implementations of a different curve, so we should not diffuse that
effort across too many choices.

Note that Suite B only has 2 curves (P-256 and P-384).


Trevor

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To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Jan 16, 2014, at 1:50 PM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>> Dear all,
>> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are =
there
>> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>> might be missing with this decision?
>=20
> I didn't quite suggest that.
>=20
> I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
> (either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>=20
> It takes a great deal of effort to do high-speed, const-time
> implementations of a different curve, so we should not diffuse that
> effort across too many choices.
>=20
> Note that Suite B only has 2 curves (P-256 and P-384).

Yeah, I was going to protest: instead of using one stronger Montgomery =
curve and one Edwards, maybe we should use a Montgomery curve and a =
birationally equivalent (or at least isogenous) Edwards curve, or =
vice-versa.

=97 Mike=

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On Thu, January 16, 2014 1:50 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>> Dear all,
>> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
>> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>> might be missing with this decision?
>
> I didn't quite suggest that.
>
> I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
> (either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>
> It takes a great deal of effort to do high-speed, const-time
> implementations of a different curve, so we should not diffuse that
> effort across too many choices.
>
> Note that Suite B only has 2 curves (P-256 and P-384).

  I think this is a good idea. Too much choice can lead to confusion
and lack of interoperability. When the brainpool curves were added
we pared it down from 14 (including twisted variants) to 4.

  Suite B has 2 curves because it defines two security levels. We can
define more security levels if needed but we should probably only
have 1 Chicago curve at each level.

  Dan.





From rstruik.ext@gmail.com  Thu Jan 16 14:31:43 2014
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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 17:31:23 -0500
From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>,  'Paul Lambert' <paul@marvell.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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Hi Paul et al:

A counter example in practice to the "received wisdom" not to reuse 
public keys both for key agreement and non-repudiation is during 
certification requests, when the key to be certified is to be used for 
uses including key agreement and where the request is signed.

[see also NIST SP 800-56a-2013, Section 5.6.3.2, item #5:
A static key pair may be used in more than one key-establishment scheme. 
However, one static public/private key pair shall not be used for 
different purposes (for example, a digital signature key pair is not to 
be used for key establishment or vice versa) with the following possible 
exception: when requesting the (initial) certificate for a public static 
key-establishment key, the key-establishment private key associated with 
the public key may be used to sign the certificate request. See SP 
800-57, Part 1 on Key Usage for further information.
]

While key separation seems prudent, it is not entirely clear (to me) 
whether the conditions under which this is required are precisely known 
(even in the above-mentioned case of signed certificate requests).

Best regards, Rene


On 1/16/2014 3:30 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi Kevin, Paul, and Watson,
>
> On 01/16/2014 02:42 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
>> Paul Lambert
>> On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:43 AM Paul Lambert wrote:
>>
>>> A truly ‘unified' public key system would support both signatures and
>>> key establishment with the same key.
>>>
>> Received wisdom is that using the same key for both key establishment 
>> and
>> signatures is a bad idea.  I believe the concern is that one protocol
>> might be used an Oracle to subvert the other.
>
> Agreed on that point, but there is a background issue here that I want 
> to ask about.
>
> [snip]


-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan 16 14:36:38 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, January 16, 2014 1:50 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> Dear all,
>>> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>>> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
>>> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>>> might be missing with this decision?
>>
>> I didn't quite suggest that.
>>
>> I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
>> (either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>>
>> It takes a great deal of effort to do high-speed, const-time
>> implementations of a different curve, so we should not diffuse that
>> effort across too many choices.
>>
>> Note that Suite B only has 2 curves (P-256 and P-384).
>
>   I think this is a good idea. Too much choice can lead to confusion
> and lack of interoperability. When the brainpool curves were added
> we pared it down from 14 (including twisted variants) to 4.
>
>   Suite B has 2 curves because it defines two security levels. We can
> define more security levels if needed but we should probably only
> have 1 Chicago curve at each level.

So the question is which. I think curve25519 and Ed448-Goldilocks make
sense, together with an
isogenous curve for signatures since Montgomery curves are a bit odd
from that perspective. Does anyone see a need
for more security levels then that/are these choices terrible for
reasons we haven't appreciated?

>
>   Dan.
>
>
>
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From paul@marvell.com  Thu Jan 16 14:37:46 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 14:37:27 -0800
Thread-Topic: Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: [Cfrg] Outline -> was Re:  normative references)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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From mike@shiftleft.org  Thu Jan 16 14:54:00 2014
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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Hey Watson,

Let=92s maybe let this sit for a couple of days before declaring the =
matter settled.  I mean, as the author of Goldilocks, I=92d love to see =
it become the one stronger curve that gets adopted.  But Trevor proposed =
chopping curves literally one hour ago, and Goldilocks has been on =
Safecurves for less than a week and isn=92t even completely implemented. =
 I don=92t want it to be railroaded into being the one curve in a new =
RFC, even if just for a couple git revisions.

Defense for why it=92s a good curve, though:
* Cofactor 4 is minimal for Edwards.  It could just as easily be a =
Montgomery curve; Ed vs Mont was mostly an arbitrary choice.
* 448 is a round number (although this can hurt us in point encoding, =
depending on the options)
* 448 is about the largest bitsize which can fit into a 16-limb =
reduced-radix multiplier on a 32-bit arch without carry problems.
* 2^448-2^224-1 is Karatsuba multiplier friendly.
* Solinas primes are fast.  Field mul comparable to about 2 muls over =
2^255-19 on Intel.

Downsides:
* If you don=92t like =93special=94 primes, then you surely won=92t like =
a Solinas trinomial prime.
* If the point encoding is as spec=92d, it=92s one bit too long.

Cheers,
=97 Mike



On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:36 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> =
wrote:
>>=20
>> On Thu, January 16, 2014 1:50 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>> Dear all,
>>>> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>>>> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are =
there
>>>> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>>>> might be missing with this decision?
>>>=20
>>> I didn't quite suggest that.
>>>=20
>>> I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
>>> (either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>>>=20
>>> It takes a great deal of effort to do high-speed, const-time
>>> implementations of a different curve, so we should not diffuse that
>>> effort across too many choices.
>>>=20
>>> Note that Suite B only has 2 curves (P-256 and P-384).
>>=20
>>  I think this is a good idea. Too much choice can lead to confusion
>> and lack of interoperability. When the brainpool curves were added
>> we pared it down from 14 (including twisted variants) to 4.
>>=20
>>  Suite B has 2 curves because it defines two security levels. We can
>> define more security levels if needed but we should probably only
>> have 1 Chicago curve at each level.
>=20
> So the question is which. I think curve25519 and Ed448-Goldilocks make
> sense, together with an
> isogenous curve for signatures since Montgomery curves are a bit odd
> from that perspective. Does anyone see a need
> for more security levels then that/are these choices terrible for
> reasons we haven't appreciated?
>=20
>>=20
>>  Dan.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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From: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
Thread-Index: AQHPEwq885T9nUz/l0CWc/t2sZEdFJqH8PuA//+xpoA=
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 22:57:09 +0000
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References: <CEFC6B5C.2C6E8%paul@marvell.com> <CACsn0ckSMUbEJ4F3bQ5KVMbhdPQw1MTMCce6B8uhMfA_V0Nupw@mail.gmail.com> <CEFCBB2E.2C792%paul@marvell.com> <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CABA9A493F@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> <52D8417B.9030908@cisco.com> <52D85DBB.1010505@gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7FB9E77@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 19:42:34 -0500
From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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To: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>,  Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>,  Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
References: <CEFC6B5C.2C6E8%paul@marvell.com> <CACsn0ckSMUbEJ4F3bQ5KVMbhdPQw1MTMCce6B8uhMfA_V0Nupw@mail.gmail.com> <CEFCBB2E.2C792%paul@marvell.com> <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CABA9A493F@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> <52D8417B.9030908@cisco.com> <52D85DBB.1010505@gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7FB9E77@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CEFDCB1C.13EFA%kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses
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Hi Kenny:

Another useful reference is the Indocrypt2009 paper "Reusing Static Keys 
in Key Agreement Protocols" by Sanjit Chatterjee, Alfred Menezes, and 
Berkant Ustaoglu. This being said, it seems you concur that the picture 
is complicated and that the precise conditions under which key 
separation is required are not exactly known (my original note to Paul 
Lambert's practical question [and discussed as motivation in your 
2011-486 ePrint]).

Best regards, Rene


On 1/16/2014 5:57 PM, Paterson, Kenny wrote:
> Hi
>
> There is significant *scientific* literature on the question of security
> of multiple uses of keys - both for the setting where the same key is used
> in more than one algorithm of the same type (under the name of
> cryptographic agility) and where the same key is used in algorithms of
> different types (e.g. same key in a signature scheme and in a public key
> encryption scheme).
>
> Cautionary examples include:
>
> T. Jager, K.G. Paterson and J. Somorovsky, One Bad Apple: Backwards
> Compatibility Attacks on State-of-the-Art Cryptography. In Network and
> Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2013).
> http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/BackwardsCompatibilityAttacks.pdf
>
>
> J.P. Degabriele, A. Lehmann, K.G. Paterson, N.P. Smart and M. Strefler, On
> the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV. In O. Dunkelmann
> (ed.), CT-RSA 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 7178, pp.
> 116-135, Springer, 2012. Full version at: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615
>
>
> Positive (and some negative) results can be found in:
>
> K.G. Paterson, J.C.N. Schuldt, M. Stam and S. Thomson, On the Joint
> Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited. In D.H. Lee and X. Wang
> (eds.), ASIACRYPT 2011, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 7073, pp.
> 161-178, Springer, 2011. Full version at http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/486
>
>
>
> Acar, T., Belenkiy, M., Bellare, M., Cash, D.: Cryptographic agility and
> its relation to circular encryption.
> In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 403{422.
> Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
>
> Coron, J.S., Joye, M., Naccache, D., Paillier, P.: Universal padding
> schemes for RSA. In: Yung, M. (ed.)
> CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 226{241. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
>
> Haber, S., Pinkas, B.: Securely combining public-key cryptosystems. In:
> ACM Conference on Computer and
> Communications Security. pp. 215{224 (2001)
>
>
>
>
>
> This list is by no means complete, but serves to illustrate that the
> picture is complicated and we are far from having a full understanding of
> this domain. Several additional references can be found in the
> first-mentioned paper above.
>
> Finally, let me draw your attention to this very recent paper which
> highlights the issues arising from multiple key usage in the context of
> TLS:
>
> Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cedric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, Alfredo Pironti,
> Pierre-Yves Strub, and Santiago Zanella-Beguelin. Proving the TLS
> Handshake Secure (as it is).
> https://www.mitls.org/downloads/Proving_the_TLS_Handshake.pdf
>
>
> Happy reading.
>
> Cheers
>
> Kenny
>
> On 16/01/2014 17:37, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Rene,
>>
>> ⨳|-----Original Message-----
>> ⨳|From: Rene Struik [mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com]
>> ⨳|Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2014 2:31 PM
>> ⨳|To: David McGrew; Igoe, Kevin M.; Paul Lambert; Watson Ladd
>> ⨳|Cc: Yaron Sheffer; cfrg@irtf.org
>> ⨳|Subject: Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: [Cfrg] Outline
>> ⨳|-> was Re: normative references)
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|Hi Paul et al:
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|A counter example in practice to the "received wisdom" not to reuse
>> ⨳|public keys both for key agreement and non-repudiation is during
>> ⨳|certification requests, when the key to be certified is to be used for
>> ⨳|uses including key agreement and where the request is signed.
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|[see also NIST SP 800-56a-2013, Section 5.6.3.2, item #5:
>> ⨳|A static key pair may be used in more than one key-establishment
>> ⨳|scheme.
>> ⨳|However, one static public/private key pair shall not be used for
>> ⨳|different purposes (for example, a digital signature key pair is not
>> ⨳|to be used for key establishment or vice versa) with the following
>> ⨳|possible
>> ⨳|exception: when requesting the (initial) certificate for a public
>> ⨳|static key-establishment key, the key-establishment private key
>> ⨳|associated with the public key may be used to sign the certificate
>> ⨳|request. See SP 800-57, Part 1 on Key Usage for further information.
>> ⨳|]
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|While key separation seems prudent, it is not entirely clear (to me)
>> ⨳|whether the conditions under which this is required are precisely
>> ⨳|known (even in the above-mentioned case of signed certificate
>> ⨳|requests).[ ⨳]
>>
>> Yes - exactly!   Caution is good ... but once this guidance was set down
>> we have not bothered to investigate deeply which algorithm combinations
>> are secure for mixed use.
>>
>> Additional wisdom on where specific Oracle exist would be very
>> informative.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Paul
>>
>>
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|Best regards, Rene
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|On 1/16/2014 3:30 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> ⨳|> Hi Kevin, Paul, and Watson,
>> ⨳|>
>> ⨳|> On 01/16/2014 02:42 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
>> ⨳|>> Paul Lambert
>> ⨳|>> On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:43 AM Paul Lambert wrote:
>> ⨳|>>
>> ⨳|>>> A truly ‘unified' public key system would support both signatures
>> ⨳|>>> and key establishment with the same key.
>> ⨳|>>>
>> ⨳|>> Received wisdom is that using the same key for both key
>> ⨳|establishment
>> ⨳|>> and signatures is a bad idea.  I believe the concern is that one
>> ⨳|>> protocol might be used an Oracle to subvert the other.
>> ⨳|>
>> ⨳|> Agreed on that point, but there is a background issue here that I
>> ⨳|want
>> ⨳|> to ask about.
>> ⨳|>
>> ⨳|> [snip]
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|
>> ⨳|--
>> ⨳|email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
>> ⨳|cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363


From adam@cypherspace.org  Thu Jan 16 17:14:45 2014
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From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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Woulnt it make more sense to use two safe curve curves as they seem to be
what people are using and better tested/reviewed (re goldilocks).

Adam

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 02:36:24PM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote:
>On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, January 16, 2014 1:50 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>> Dear all,
>>>> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>>>> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
>>>> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>>>> might be missing with this decision?
>>>
>>> I didn't quite suggest that.
>>>
>>> I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
>>> (either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>>>

From ggr@seer-grog.net  Thu Jan 16 17:19:10 2014
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From: Greg Rose <ggr@seer-grog.net>
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References: <CEFC6B5C.2C6E8%paul@marvell.com> <CACsn0ckSMUbEJ4F3bQ5KVMbhdPQw1MTMCce6B8uhMfA_V0Nupw@mail.gmail.com> <CEFCBB2E.2C792%paul@marvell.com> <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CABA9A493F@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> <52D8417B.9030908@cisco.com> <52D85DBB.1010505@gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7FB9E77@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CEFDCB1C.13EFA%kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
To: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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The same key is used in GSM phones no matter which A5 algorithm is used. =
The algorithm can change with base stations. Two of the algorithms are =
breakable in real time (i.e. quickly enough not to break the =
connection).

Greg.

On Jan 16, 2014, at 14:57 , Paterson, Kenny <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk> =
wrote:

> Hi
>=20
> There is significant *scientific* literature on the question of =
security
> of multiple uses of keys - both for the setting where the same key is =
used
> in more than one algorithm of the same type (under the name of
> cryptographic agility) and where the same key is used in algorithms of
> different types (e.g. same key in a signature scheme and in a public =
key
> encryption scheme).
>=20
> Cautionary examples include:
>=20
> T. Jager, K.G. Paterson and J. Somorovsky, One Bad Apple: Backwards
> Compatibility Attacks on State-of-the-Art Cryptography. In Network and
> Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2013).
> http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/BackwardsCompatibilityAttacks.pdf
>=20
>=20
> J.P. Degabriele, A. Lehmann, K.G. Paterson, N.P. Smart and M. =
Strefler, On
> the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV. In O. =
Dunkelmann
> (ed.), CT-RSA 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 7178, pp.
> 116-135, Springer, 2012. Full version at: =
http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615
>=20
>=20
> Positive (and some negative) results can be found in:
>=20
> K.G. Paterson, J.C.N. Schuldt, M. Stam and S. Thomson, On the Joint
> Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited. In D.H. Lee and X. =
Wang
> (eds.), ASIACRYPT 2011, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 7073, =
pp.
> 161-178, Springer, 2011. Full version at =
http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/486
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Acar, T., Belenkiy, M., Bellare, M., Cash, D.: Cryptographic agility =
and
> its relation to circular encryption.
> In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 403{422.
> Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
>=20
> Coron, J.S., Joye, M., Naccache, D., Paillier, P.: Universal padding
> schemes for RSA. In: Yung, M. (ed.)
> CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 226{241. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
>=20
> Haber, S., Pinkas, B.: Securely combining public-key cryptosystems. =
In:
> ACM Conference on Computer and
> Communications Security. pp. 215{224 (2001)
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> This list is by no means complete, but serves to illustrate that the
> picture is complicated and we are far from having a full understanding =
of
> this domain. Several additional references can be found in the
> first-mentioned paper above.
>=20
> Finally, let me draw your attention to this very recent paper which
> highlights the issues arising from multiple key usage in the context =
of
> TLS:
>=20
> Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cedric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, Alfredo =
Pironti,
> Pierre-Yves Strub, and Santiago Zanella-Beguelin. Proving the TLS
> Handshake Secure (as it is).
> https://www.mitls.org/downloads/Proving_the_TLS_Handshake.pdf
>=20
>=20
> Happy reading.
>=20
> Cheers
>=20
> Kenny
>=20
> On 16/01/2014 17:37, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Hi Rene,
>>=20
>> =E2=A8=B3|-----Original Message-----
>> =E2=A8=B3|From: Rene Struik [mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com]
>> =E2=A8=B3|Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2014 2:31 PM
>> =E2=A8=B3|To: David McGrew; Igoe, Kevin M.; Paul Lambert; Watson Ladd
>> =E2=A8=B3|Cc: Yaron Sheffer; cfrg@irtf.org
>> =E2=A8=B3|Subject: Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: =
[Cfrg] Outline
>> =E2=A8=B3|-> was Re: normative references)
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|Hi Paul et al:
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|A counter example in practice to the "received wisdom" not =
to reuse
>> =E2=A8=B3|public keys both for key agreement and non-repudiation is =
during
>> =E2=A8=B3|certification requests, when the key to be certified is to =
be used for
>> =E2=A8=B3|uses including key agreement and where the request is =
signed.
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|[see also NIST SP 800-56a-2013, Section 5.6.3.2, item #5:
>> =E2=A8=B3|A static key pair may be used in more than one =
key-establishment
>> =E2=A8=B3|scheme.
>> =E2=A8=B3|However, one static public/private key pair shall not be =
used for
>> =E2=A8=B3|different purposes (for example, a digital signature key =
pair is not
>> =E2=A8=B3|to be used for key establishment or vice versa) with the =
following
>> =E2=A8=B3|possible
>> =E2=A8=B3|exception: when requesting the (initial) certificate for a =
public
>> =E2=A8=B3|static key-establishment key, the key-establishment private =
key
>> =E2=A8=B3|associated with the public key may be used to sign the =
certificate
>> =E2=A8=B3|request. See SP 800-57, Part 1 on Key Usage for further =
information.
>> =E2=A8=B3|]
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|While key separation seems prudent, it is not entirely =
clear (to me)
>> =E2=A8=B3|whether the conditions under which this is required are =
precisely
>> =E2=A8=B3|known (even in the above-mentioned case of signed =
certificate
>> =E2=A8=B3|requests).[ =E2=A8=B3]=20
>>=20
>> Yes - exactly!   Caution is good ... but once this guidance was set =
down
>> we have not bothered to investigate deeply which algorithm =
combinations
>> are secure for mixed use.
>>=20
>> Additional wisdom on where specific Oracle exist would be very
>> informative.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>>=20
>> Paul
>>=20
>>=20
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|Best regards, Rene
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|On 1/16/2014 3:30 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> =E2=A8=B3|> Hi Kevin, Paul, and Watson,
>> =E2=A8=B3|>
>> =E2=A8=B3|> On 01/16/2014 02:42 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
>> =E2=A8=B3|>> Paul Lambert
>> =E2=A8=B3|>> On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:43 AM Paul Lambert =
wrote:
>> =E2=A8=B3|>>
>> =E2=A8=B3|>>> A truly =E2=80=98unified' public key system would =
support both signatures
>> =E2=A8=B3|>>> and key establishment with the same key.
>> =E2=A8=B3|>>>
>> =E2=A8=B3|>> Received wisdom is that using the same key for both key
>> =E2=A8=B3|establishment
>> =E2=A8=B3|>> and signatures is a bad idea.  I believe the concern is =
that one
>> =E2=A8=B3|>> protocol might be used an Oracle to subvert the other.
>> =E2=A8=B3|>
>> =E2=A8=B3|> Agreed on that point, but there is a background issue =
here that I
>> =E2=A8=B3|want
>> =E2=A8=B3|> to ask about.
>> =E2=A8=B3|>
>> =E2=A8=B3|> [snip]
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|
>> =E2=A8=B3|--
>> =E2=A8=B3|email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
>> =E2=A8=B3|cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


Greg.

Phone: +1 619 890 8236=20
secure voice / text: Seecrypt +28131139047 (referral code 54smjs if you =
want to try it).
PGP: 09D3E64D 350A 797D 5E21 8D47 E353 7566 ACFB D945 (id says =
ggr@usenix.org, but don=E2=80=99t use that email)


From adam@cypherspace.org  Thu Jan 16 18:37:00 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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Uh I meant the Curve25519 and Curve3617.  Sorry about that (again conflating
safe curves and the Bernstein/Lange curves by the same authors.)

Adam

On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 02:14:14AM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>Woulnt it make more sense to use two safe curve curves as they seem to be
>what people are using and better tested/reviewed (re goldilocks).
>
>Adam
>
>On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 02:36:24PM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>>On Thu, January 16, 2014 1:50 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>>>On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>>>>wrote:
>>>>>Dear all,
>>>>>Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>>>>>E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
>>>>>any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>>>>>might be missing with this decision?
>>>>
>>>>I didn't quite suggest that.
>>>>
>>>>I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
>>>>(either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>>>>

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Thu Jan 16 18:47:33 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:36 PM, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
> Uh I meant the Curve25519 and Curve3617.  Sorry about that (again conflating
> safe curves and the Bernstein/Lange curves by the same authors.)

It would, but Curve25519 is a Montgomery curve and so we want an
Edwards curve for easy signatures.
T25519 should be the same curve, in a different form (if I didn't
screw up my basepoint choice, which I probably did. This weekend I
will do
a good computer search). Curve3617 has a nice Montgomery curve we
should describe for safe ECDH.

I feel like I'm coming around to Robert Ransoms arguments about how to
pick curves.
>
> Adam
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 02:14:14AM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>>
>> Woulnt it make more sense to use two safe curve curves as they seem to be
>> what people are using and better tested/reviewed (re goldilocks).
>>
>> Adam
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 02:36:24PM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, January 16, 2014 1:50 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>>>>>> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
>>>>>> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>>>>>> might be missing with this decision?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I didn't quite suggest that.
>>>>>
>>>>> I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
>>>>> (either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>>>>>
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:53 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
> Kenny,
>
> Many thanks for the references!
>
> These show a clear path forward to joint key usage with ECC and ECIES!
>
> Do you have any opinions or results (+ or -) on ECDH?

Given what ECIES consists of this should imply ECDH+E-Schnorr works,
but I would not be surprised
if this turns out a bit differently. I'll have to reread the Schnorr
proof to think if the reduction can still work
with an ECDH oracle.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
>
> ]On Jan 16, 2014, at 14:57 , Paterson, Kenny <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
> ]wrote:
> ]
> ]> Hi
> ]>
> ]> There is significant *scientific* literature on the question of
> ]> security of multiple uses of keys - both for the setting where the
> ]> same key is used in more than one algorithm of the same type (under
> ]> the name of cryptographic agility) and where the same key is used in
> ]> algorithms of different types (e.g. same key in a signature scheme and
> ]> in a public key encryption scheme).
> ]>
> ]> Cautionary examples include:
> ]>
> ]> T. Jager, K.G. Paterson and J. Somorovsky, One Bad Apple: Backwards
> ]> Compatibility Attacks on State-of-the-Art Cryptography. In Network and
> ]> Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2013).
> ]> http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/BackwardsCompatibilityAttacks.pdf
>
> This shows RSA is dangerous for a particular joint use ...
>   In the public key setting, we focus on
>   RSA encryption and signatures, showing a BC attack on
>   RSA-OAEP when it is used in conjunction with an imple-
>   mentation of PKCS#1v1.5 encryption that is vulnerable to
>   Bleichenbacher=E2=80=99s attack [13]. We also remark that a sig-
>   nature forgery attack is possible under the same circum-
>   stances; here we require the same RSA key to be allowed
>   for use in both encryption and signature algorithms
> ]>
> ]>
> ]> J.P. Degabriele, A. Lehmann, K.G. Paterson, N.P. Smart and M.
> ]> Strefler, On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV. In
> ]> O. Dunkelmann (ed.), CT-RSA 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
> ]Vol. 7178, pp.
> ]> 116-135, Springer, 2012. Full version at:
> ]> http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615
>
> RSA Signature Forgery possible in EMV schemes
> ECIES and EC-Schnorr shown secure:
>     More specifically, we prove that the ECIES encryption scheme
>     and the EC-Schnorr signature scheme are jointly secure
>     in the Random Oracle Model, and that ECIES and the
>     EC-DSA signature scheme are jointly secure in the
>     Generic Group Model (GGM). Such results are the best
>     that we can currently hope for, given the state of
>     the art in analyzing ECC signature schemes.
>
> ]>
> ]>
> ]> Positive (and some negative) results can be found in:
> ]>
> ]> K.G. Paterson, J.C.N. Schuldt, M. Stam and S. Thomson, On the Joint
> ]> Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited. In D.H. Lee and X.
> ]> Wang (eds.), ASIACRYPT 2011, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol.
> ]7073, pp.
> ]> 161-178, Springer, 2011. Full version at
> ]> http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/486
>
> Interesting ...
>    Extending the ideas of a combined public key
>    scheme, we show how to construct a signcryption
>    scheme which enables a user to use a single keypair
>    for both sender and receiver roles, and which furthermore
>    allows ecient instantiations with short public keys in the standard mo=
del
>
>
> Paul
>
> ]>
> ]>
> ]>
> ]> Acar, T., Belenkiy, M., Bellare, M., Cash, D.: Cryptographic agility
> ]> and its relation to circular encryption.
> ]> In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 403{422.
> ]> Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
> ]>
> ]> Coron, J.S., Joye, M., Naccache, D., Paillier, P.: Universal padding
> ]> schemes for RSA. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp.
> ]> 226{241. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
> ]>
> ]> Haber, S., Pinkas, B.: Securely combining public-key cryptosystems.
> ]In:
> ]> ACM Conference on Computer and
> ]> Communications Security. pp. 215{224 (2001)
> ]>
> ]>
> ]>
> ]>
> ]>
> ]> This list is by no means complete, but serves to illustrate that the
> ]> picture is complicated and we are far from having a full understanding
> ]> of this domain. Several additional references can be found in the
> ]> first-mentioned paper above.
> ]>
> ]> Finally, let me draw your attention to this very recent paper which
> ]> highlights the issues arising from multiple key usage in the context
> ]> of
> ]> TLS:
> ]>
> ]> Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cedric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, Alfredo
> ]> Pironti, Pierre-Yves Strub, and Santiago Zanella-Beguelin. Proving the
> ]> TLS Handshake Secure (as it is).
> ]> https://www.mitls.org/downloads/Proving_the_TLS_Handshake.pdf
> ]>
> ]>
> ]> Happy reading.
> ]>
> ]> Cheers
> ]>
> ]> Kenny
> ]>
> ]> On 16/01/2014 17:37, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
> ]>
> ]>> Hi Rene,
> ]>>
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|-----Original Message-----
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|From: Rene Struik [mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com]
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2014 2:31 PM
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|To: David McGrew; Igoe, Kevin M.; Paul Lambert; Watson Ladd
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|Cc: Yaron Sheffer; cfrg@irtf.org
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|Subject: Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: [Cf=
rg]
> ]>> Outline =E2=A8=B3|-> was Re: normative references) =E2=A8=B3| =E2=A8=
=B3|Hi Paul et al:
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|A counter example in practice to the "received wisdom" not =
to reuse
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|public keys both for key agreement and non-repudiation is d=
uring
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|certification requests, when the key to be certified is to =
be used
> ]>> for =E2=A8=B3|uses including key agreement and where the request is s=
igned.
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|[see also NIST SP 800-56a-2013, Section 5.6.3.2, item #5:
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|A static key pair may be used in more than one key-establis=
hment
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|scheme.
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|However, one static public/private key pair shall not be us=
ed for
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|different purposes (for example, a digital signature key pa=
ir is
> ]>> not =E2=A8=B3|to be used for key establishment or vice versa) with th=
e
> ]>> following =E2=A8=B3|possible
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|exception: when requesting the (initial) certificate for a =
public
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|static key-establishment key, the key-establishment private=
 key
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|associated with the public key may be used to sign the cert=
ificate
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|request. See SP 800-57, Part 1 on Key Usage for further
> ]information.
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|]
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|While key separation seems prudent, it is not entirely clea=
r (to
> ]>> me) =E2=A8=B3|whether the conditions under which this is required are
> ]>> precisely =E2=A8=B3|known (even in the above-mentioned case of signed
> ]>> certificate =E2=A8=B3|requests).[ =E2=A8=B3]
> ]>>
> ]>> Yes - exactly!   Caution is good ... but once this guidance was set
> ]down
> ]>> we have not bothered to investigate deeply which algorithm
> ]>> combinations are secure for mixed use.
> ]>>
> ]>> Additional wisdom on where specific Oracle exist would be very
> ]>> informative.
> ]>>
> ]>> Thanks,
> ]>>
> ]>> Paul
> ]>>
> ]>>
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|Best regards, Rene
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|On 1/16/2014 3:30 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|> Hi Kevin, Paul, and Watson,
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|> On 01/16/2014 02:42 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote:
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>> Paul Lambert
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>> On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:43 AM Paul Lambert wrote=
:
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>>
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>>> A truly =E2=80=98unified' public key system would suppo=
rt both
> ]>> signatures =E2=A8=B3|>>> and key establishment with the same key.
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>>>
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>> Received wisdom is that using the same key for both key
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|establishment =E2=A8=B3|>> and signatures is a bad idea.  I=
 believe the
> ]>> concern is that one =E2=A8=B3|>> protocol might be used an Oracle to =
subvert
> ]>> the other.
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|> Agreed on that point, but there is a background issue her=
e that I
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|want =E2=A8=B3|> to ask about.
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|>
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|> [snip]
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|--
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
> ]>> =E2=A8=B3|cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363
> ]>>
> ]>> _______________________________________________
> ]>> Cfrg mailing list
> ]>> Cfrg@irtf.org
> ]>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> ]>
> ]> _______________________________________________
> ]> Cfrg mailing list
> ]> Cfrg@irtf.org
> ]> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> ]
> ]
> ]Greg.
> ]
> ]Phone: +1 619 890 8236
> ]secure voice / text: Seecrypt +28131139047 (referral code 54smjs if you
> ]want to try it).
> ]PGP: 09D3E64D 350A 797D 5E21 8D47 E353 7566 ACFB D945 (id says
> ]ggr@usenix.org, but don=E2=80=99t use that email)
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>, "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 19:18:04 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 19:20:47 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Keys for multiple cryptographic uses (was: Re: Outline -> was Re: normative references)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 17/01/2014 02:36, Adam Back wrote:

> Uh I meant the Curve25519 and Curve3617.

We have three key sizes for AES, and three hash sizes with SHA-2 and
SHA-3 (and the candidates).

I propose:
• curve25519 (plus twist t25519)
• curve3617
• e521

That gives us three curves with strength roughly congruent to the 128,
192 and 256 key sizes, and about as good performance as we're going to
get for those levels.

curve25519 is likely to be used for high-performance ECDH; its twist
is likely to be used for high-performance encryption and signing.

curve3617 seems likely to be used for higher-assurance encryption and
signing (Silent Circle intends to use it, for one).

e521 is slower, but very conservative - maybe you'd want to use it for
very careful signatures or encryption; the prime field is of course a
well-known Mersenne prime people are already used to (thanks to
secp521r1), and it's so rigid, three people came up with the
parameters independently.

I wouldn't cry a river if we dropped e521 from that list.

Those are, I think, the two or three that applications are most likely
to actually want to use in practice.


Regarding the t25519 basepoint, the argument for using the ed25519
basepoint is that it's already out there and thus already rigid, but
yes, it is ugly.

If you do choose a new basepoint, Watson (and I can see the sense in
that), please rigidly document the choice criteria so the decision can
be independently verified and confirmed (minimal y, right?).

I haven't had my first cup of tea yet today, so I apologise if I'm
wrong, but I believe any new basepoint would need to go through the
SafeCurve verification tests again, because ℓ would change? - run it
yourself for sanity checking, and please post the source files on the
list so we can use Sage or something to verify it too, but please also
speak to Tanja and djb about that to get wider verification.

- -- 
/akr
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Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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Hi Michael, and Watson,

On 01/16/2014 05:53 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
> Hey Watson,
>
> Let’s maybe let this sit for a couple of days before declaring the matter settled.  I mean, as the author of Goldilocks, I’d love to see it become the one stronger curve that gets adopted.  But Trevor proposed chopping curves literally one hour ago, and Goldilocks has been on Safecurves for less than a week and isn’t even completely implemented.  I don’t want it to be railroaded into being the one curve in a new RFC, even if just for a couple git revisions.

I agree that people need more time to understand and think about the 
issues.  Let me suggest an approach:

- add a placeholder section to the draft stating that "This draft 
identifies one curve at each important security level, in order to 
promote interoperability.   These curves will be described in a future 
version of this draft.  Feedback should be directed to the authors and 
to cfr@ietf.org."

- in the draft, outline the pros and cons for each curve type (this 
could be as simple as Michael's text in this email)

- collect feedback from reviewers and implementers during the lifetime 
of the draft

- before RFC publication, choose the curves and fill in the section.   
Leave all the text about the curves that were chosen, and move the text 
about the other curves either to an appendix or to the rationale.   Edit 
the rationale section so that it explains why the particular curves were 
chosen as mandatory-to-implement, and why the others were not.

This approach would make sure that the draft gets a broad review, which 
is really important, and it allows us to postpone making choices that 
might limit the solution space that gets considered. Our goal should be 
to create a well-considered RFC that provides value for the broadest 
possible community.

regards,

David

>
> Defense for why it’s a good curve, though:
> * Cofactor 4 is minimal for Edwards.  It could just as easily be a Montgomery curve; Ed vs Mont was mostly an arbitrary choice.
> * 448 is a round number (although this can hurt us in point encoding, depending on the options)
> * 448 is about the largest bitsize which can fit into a 16-limb reduced-radix multiplier on a 32-bit arch without carry problems.
> * 2^448-2^224-1 is Karatsuba multiplier friendly.
> * Solinas primes are fast.  Field mul comparable to about 2 muls over 2^255-19 on Intel.
>
> Downsides:
> * If you don’t like “special” primes, then you surely won’t like a Solinas trinomial prime.
> * If the point encoding is as spec’d, it’s one bit too long.
>
> Cheers,
> — Mike
>
>
>
> On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:36 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>> On Thu, January 16, 2014 1:50 pm, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>> Trevor Perrin suggests that we only put in Curve25519/T25519 and
>>>>> E383/M382 so implementors can focus on 4 curves ala Suite B. Are there
>>>>> any protocols in which larger curves would be useful? Anything we
>>>>> might be missing with this decision?
>>>> I didn't quite suggest that.
>>>>
>>>> I do feel there should be fewer curves.  Perhaps only curve25519 and
>>>> (either Curve3617 or Ed448-Goldilocks).
>>>>
>>>> It takes a great deal of effort to do high-speed, const-time
>>>> implementations of a different curve, so we should not diffuse that
>>>> effort across too many choices.
>>>>
>>>> Note that Suite B only has 2 curves (P-256 and P-384).
>>>   I think this is a good idea. Too much choice can lead to confusion
>>> and lack of interoperability. When the brainpool curves were added
>>> we pared it down from 14 (including twisted variants) to 4.
>>>
>>>   Suite B has 2 curves because it defines two security levels. We can
>>> define more security levels if needed but we should probably only
>>> have 1 Chicago curve at each level.
>> So the question is which. I think curve25519 and Ed448-Goldilocks make
>> sense, together with an
>> isogenous curve for signatures since Montgomery curves are a bit odd
>> from that perspective. Does anyone see a need
>> for more security levels then that/are these choices terrible for
>> reasons we haven't appreciated?
>>
>>>   Dan.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>


From adam@cypherspace.org  Fri Jan 17 04:42:25 2014
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From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
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Cc: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>, cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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I'm not sure if we should be going as far as generating new curves, or
significantly tweaking choices in the existing curves in incompatible way=
s
(eg new generators), I thought original idea was more to provide in RFC
format the best rigid/NUMs curves available that people are already start=
ing
to use so they at least have a reference.

Generating new curves or significantly deviating from them or their exiti=
ng
parameter choices, creates our own NUMs risk, and a restart on the review
process, creates something that needs to have its own (maybe derivative)
name, and places CFRG in the biased editorial position of both generating=
 &
selecting...

Adam

On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 07:41:53AM +0000, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA512
>
>On 17/01/2014 02:36, Adam Back wrote:
>
>> Uh I meant the Curve25519 and Curve3617.
>
>We have three key sizes for AES, and three hash sizes with SHA-2 and
>SHA-3 (and the candidates).
>
>I propose:
>=E2=80=A2 curve25519 (plus twist t25519)
>=E2=80=A2 curve3617
>=E2=80=A2 e521
>
>That gives us three curves with strength roughly congruent to the 128,
>192 and 256 key sizes, and about as good performance as we're going to
>get for those levels.
>
>curve25519 is likely to be used for high-performance ECDH; its twist
>is likely to be used for high-performance encryption and signing.
>
>curve3617 seems likely to be used for higher-assurance encryption and
>signing (Silent Circle intends to use it, for one).
>
>e521 is slower, but very conservative - maybe you'd want to use it for
>very careful signatures or encryption; the prime field is of course a
>well-known Mersenne prime people are already used to (thanks to
>secp521r1), and it's so rigid, three people came up with the
>parameters independently.
>
>I wouldn't cry a river if we dropped e521 from that list.
>
>Those are, I think, the two or three that applications are most likely
>to actually want to use in practice.
>
>
>Regarding the t25519 basepoint, the argument for using the ed25519
>basepoint is that it's already out there and thus already rigid, but
>yes, it is ugly.
>
>If you do choose a new basepoint, Watson (and I can see the sense in
>that), please rigidly document the choice criteria so the decision can
>be independently verified and confirmed (minimal y, right?).
>
>I haven't had my first cup of tea yet today, so I apologise if I'm
>wrong, but I believe any new basepoint would need to go through the
>SafeCurve verification tests again, because =E2=84=93 would change? - ru=
n it
>yourself for sanity checking, and please post the source files on the
>list so we can use Sage or something to verify it too, but please also
>speak to Tanja and djb about that to get wider verification.
>
>- --
>/akr
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From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Fri Jan 17 04:57:19 2014
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Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 12:57:05 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: [Cfrg] new curves vs. algorithms
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Hiya,

I've a question that I think might be worth looking
at when the "new curves" work has settled down a
bit more. (Since I'll forget about it:-) I'm gonna ask
now, but I hope this doesn't get debated until later.

Given that the implementations of the nist curves and
these new curves are radically different and perhaps
quite likely to be done by different folks, is there
a benefit in treating these as if they were entirely
different algorithms in terms of codepoints in
protocols, or are we better off just regarding them
as different curves for the same algorithm.

I'm not sure what answer I prefer, nor if it makes
that much difference, but we should ponder it before
we eventually get to allocating OIDs or other protocol
codepoints. A lot of that is protocol specific but
some is likely generic and might be considered by cfrg.
(When I say "considered" I mean I think it could be
useful if cfrg have given some thought as to how to
get these new curves used. That could be just mail
list traffic though, and need not be text in an RFC.)

I hope the criteria to be used when considering this
(if its significant) would be to go with whatever will
make implementation and deployment easier, since the
impact might be more on APIs and libraries rather than
on protocols, but doing the wrong thing might make it
harder to get broad support for the new stuff, e.g.
if some v. popular implementations had APIs that made
it hard to do both nist and "new" curves depending
on whether the new ones are viewed as a different
algorithm or alg-param.

Or maybe its a dumb question, in which case sorry
for wasting the bytes:-)

Cheers,
S.

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Fri Jan 17 05:26:00 2014
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From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Kevin Fall <kfall@sei.cmu.edu>, Cfrg@irtf.org, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?B=F6rje_Ohlman?= <borje.ohlman@ericsson.com>, "irsg@irtf.org" <irsg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [irsg] IRSG review of draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb
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Hi Stephen,

thanks again for your timely review.   A comment inline on the process 
crapology:

On 01/13/2014 06:34 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> On 01/13/2014 07:48 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> So you don't need to look for it: the ticket for draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb
>> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/group/irtf/trac/ticket/55
>>
>> Stephen, thanks for offering to do the review.
> No problem. My review below. My points are all nits. This is
> ready.
>
> - I think s/privacy/confidentiality/g would be a good change.
> Privacy involves more than confidentiality and crypto only
> provides the latter. But this draft is by no means the only
> sinner in this respect.
>
> - "As with most modes of operation, security degrades in the
> square of the number of blocks of texts divided by two to the
> blocklength." That could do with a reference or being expanded a
> bit. The CFRG reader should be ok with it but if/when OCB gets
> some IETF adoption, or when this is read by less crypto-aware
> folk, that will be too terse I think. (The same point is made in
> the security considerations more clearly so maybe could be
> deleted from the earlier section. But maybe its now in twice
> because of someone else's comment;-)
>
> - I didn't check the algorithm description nor examples in
> detail as IRSG review assumes the RG did that.
>
> Process crapology below. CFRG can ignore.
>
> - Section 6 - Its normal to actually ask IANA to do stuff so
> they know what to do when reviewing the draft. And then the text
> is changed by the RFC editor to say that IANA has added etc. No
> big deal because they'll figure it out.
>
> - Not related to this draft: RFC 5116 says AEAD registrations
> SHOULD be reviewed by CFRG.

IANA let me know that they were asking IESG to identify an expert for 
the expert review as per RFC 5116.   I offered to be that person, and I 
did the review and got back to them with an "OK" on the draft.   
Hopefully they will take me at my word regarding that RFC ;-)

I am not sure how the broader process should work relative to IRTF, 
which is a good question.

David

> What if CFRG ceases to exist? Be no
> harm to sometime say who'd inherit that role maybe. I guess if
> the IRTF don't say, and if/when CFRG passes away, then IANA will
> ask the IAB/IRSG/IESG probably and there'll be a minor fuss when
> someone gets the wrong end of the stick. That's one for Lars
> really - what should happen in general with IANA registries
> depending on expired RGs for review? (My take - IRTF chair
> appoints an expert reviewer or two when killing an RG with
> registries and use IRSG list for discussion of requests until
> that gets to be a PITA. But before Lars asks, no, I won't
> write a draft describing that just now:-)
>
> - I note that the IETF tools page doesn't list the IPR for this
> but does for draft-krovetz-ocb. The datatracker page does show
> the IPR correctly. I thought that had been fixed since the
> replaced-by stuff seems right here. Ah well.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>


From akr@akr.io  Fri Jan 17 06:03:55 2014
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From: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
>>Regarding the t25519 basepoint, the argument for using the ed25519
>>basepoint is that it's already out there and thus already rigid, but
>>yes, it is ugly.
>I'm not sure if we should be going as far as generating new curves, or
>significantly tweaking choices in the existing curves in incompatible
>ways
>(eg new generators), I thought original idea was more to provide in RFC
>format the best rigid/NUMs curves available that people are already
>starting
>to use so they at least have a reference.
>
>Generating new curves or significantly deviating from them or their
>exiting
>parameter choices, creates our own NUMs risk, and a restart on the
>review
>process, creates something that needs to have its own (maybe
>derivative)
>name, and places CFRG in the biased editorial position of both
>generating &
>selecting...
There are arguments in favour of both the existing or a new basepoint for t25519 (which is what I'll call the twisted Edwards representation of Curve25519 used in Ed25519, as I'm not sure it actually has a name of its own?).

Keeping the same basepoint for t25519:
• Preexisting
  - No confusion about where it came from
  - Routines already out there
  - We should perhaps focus on documenting what's in use
• Clear link to Curve25519; conversion?

Generating a new basepoint for t25519:
• Elegant; we can select minimum y that satisfies SafeCurves criteria
  - What advantage, really, would that give in implementation?
  - Is it worth any perceived benefit?
  - Absolute rigidity would be critical to avoid potential manipulation concerns
• Conversion... problematic
  - Is that actually a disadvantage?
  - Goes back to the "dual use key" question, I suppose...
• Reverification necessary, I think.
  - New basepoint → new prime order → new primality tests for SafeCurve script? (Damn. They're the expensive part.)
  - Independence: would have to ask Tanja & djb to double-check our results externally
  - Would probably cause extra delay

Anyone's clearly free to do so. Whether we *want* to do it is another question.

On balance I have to say, I think I prefer keeping the basepoint Ed25519 already uses for t25519, but it's not a strong preference. If we do change it, we do need to dot the i's and cross the t's, so to speak.

- --
/akr
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From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Fri Jan 17 06:33:38 2014
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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On 1/17/14, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:

> There are arguments in favour of both the existing or a new basepoint for
> t25519 (which is what I'll call the twisted Edwards representation of
> Curve25519 used in Ed25519, as I'm not sure it actually has a name of its
> own?).

The curve specified as =E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 (a=3D121666, d=3D121665) in
draft-ladd-safecurves-03 is something that Watson Ladd made up.  The
Ed25519 signature scheme paper
(<http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ed25519-20110926.pdf>) specifies the a=3D-1
form (a=3D-1, d=3D-121665/121666).

> Generating a new basepoint for t25519:
> =E2=80=A2 Elegant; we can select minimum y that satisfies SafeCurves crit=
eria
>   - What advantage, really, would that give in implementation?
>   - Is it worth any perceived benefit?
>   - Absolute rigidity would be critical to avoid potential manipulation
> concerns

Watson Ladd actually chose a point with small Edwards-form x, not
small Edwards-form y.

There is no benefit to choosing a new basepoint, but there's also no
benefit to using =E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 instead of the (more efficient) f=
orm
specified for Ed25519.

As you point out, using a different basepoint does prevent use of keys
in different protocols, even when the protocols are designed to be
safe to use with the same key material, so that's a real (and
unnecessary) cost.

> =E2=80=A2 Reverification necessary, I think.
>   - New basepoint =E2=86=92 new prime order =E2=86=92 new primality tests=
 for SafeCurve
> script? (Damn. They're the expensive part.)

=E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 is isomorphic to Curve25519, so any non-identity g=
roup
element of odd order on T25519 generates the same group as the
standard basepoint of Curve25519 (and has the same order).

> On balance I have to say, I think I prefer keeping the basepoint Ed25519
> already uses for t25519, but it's not a strong preference. If we do chang=
e
> it, we do need to dot the i's and cross the t's, so to speak.

I have a strong preference for throwing out T25519 and using Ed25519
with its standard basepoint.


Robert Ransom

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 6:33 AM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wro=
te:
> On 1/17/14, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
>
>> There are arguments in favour of both the existing or a new basepoint fo=
r
>> t25519 (which is what I'll call the twisted Edwards representation of
>> Curve25519 used in Ed25519, as I'm not sure it actually has a name of it=
s
>> own?).
>
> The curve specified as =E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 (a=3D121666, d=3D121665) =
in
> draft-ladd-safecurves-03 is something that Watson Ladd made up.  The
> Ed25519 signature scheme paper
> (<http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ed25519-20110926.pdf>) specifies the a=3D-1
> form (a=3D-1, d=3D-121665/121666).

Actually the curve is from the 2009 Twisted Edwards paper of Lange and
Bernstein.
On reflection the a=3D-1, d=3D-121665/121666 form saves an an addition,
but the multiplication
is by a bigger number in the complete form. Anyway, I don't have
strong thoughts on the matter.
>
>> Generating a new basepoint for t25519:
>> =E2=80=A2 Elegant; we can select minimum y that satisfies SafeCurves cri=
teria
>>   - What advantage, really, would that give in implementation?
>>   - Is it worth any perceived benefit?
>>   - Absolute rigidity would be critical to avoid potential manipulation
>> concerns

All points in [q] have random self reducible DDH problem. The only
>
> Watson Ladd actually chose a point with small Edwards-form x, not
> small Edwards-form y.
>
> There is no benefit to choosing a new basepoint, but there's also no
> benefit to using =E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 instead of the (more efficient)=
 form
> specified for Ed25519.
>
> As you point out, using a different basepoint does prevent use of keys
> in different protocols, even when the protocols are designed to be
> safe to use with the same key material, so that's a real (and
> unnecessary) cost.

>
>> =E2=80=A2 Reverification necessary, I think.
>>   - New basepoint =E2=86=92 new prime order =E2=86=92 new primality test=
s for SafeCurve
>> script? (Damn. They're the expensive part.)
>
> =E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 is isomorphic to Curve25519, so any non-identity=
 group
> element of odd order on T25519 generates the same group as the
> standard basepoint of Curve25519 (and has the same order).
>
>> On balance I have to say, I think I prefer keeping the basepoint Ed25519
>> already uses for t25519, but it's not a strong preference. If we do chan=
ge
>> it, we do need to dot the i's and cross the t's, so to speak.
>
> I have a strong preference for throwing out T25519 and using Ed25519
> with its standard basepoint.

I'll follow that preference, but ugh, the number in front of x^2y^2 is big.
>
>
> Robert Ransom
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On 17/01/2014 08:41, Alyssa Rowan wrote:
> We have three key sizes for AES, and three hash sizes with SHA-2 and
> SHA-3 (and the candidates).
> 
> I propose:
> • curve25519 (plus twist t25519)
> • curve3617
> • e521
> 
I second that (replacing t25519 with Ed25519 as discussed in the follow-ups).

Manuel.

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 17/01/2014 14:33, Robert Ransom wrote:
> Watson Ladd actually chose a point with small Edwards-form x, not 
> small Edwards-form y. […] ‘T25519’ is isomorphic to Curve25519, so 
> any non-identity group element of odd order on T25519 generates the
> same group as the standard basepoint of Curve25519 (and has the 
> same order).

Ah, thankyou. I missed that (and had mistakenly assumed he'd go for
small y to match the Edwards curves).

Clearly, I haven't had enough tea today!


On 17/01/2014 14:33, Robert Ransom wrote:
> There is no benefit to choosing a new basepoint, but there's also 
> no benefit to using ‘T25519’ instead of the (more efficient) form 
> specified for Ed25519.

On 17/01/2014 15:17, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On reflection the a=-1, d=-121665/121666 form saves an an
> addition, but the multiplication is by a bigger number in the
> complete form. Anyway, I don't have strong thoughts on the matter.

Well then, there's little or no benefit in specifying a new form when
we already have the Ed25519 parameters ready-made and people already
have routines working with it?


On 17/01/2014 14:33, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> I have a strong preference for throwing out T25519 and using 
>> Ed25519 with its standard basepoint.

On 17/01/2014 15:17, Watson Ladd wrote:
> I'll follow that preference, but ugh, the number in front of
> x^2y^2 is big.

If it doesn't really have a performance impact in practice, it's no
big deal.

Ed25519 it seems to be, then. Though, that said, the name might be
confusing. Maybe we'd better call that form something else.

Perhaps: 'te25519', for Twisted Edwards (2^255)-19?

(Deliberately referring to the curve names in lower-case. Thinking
ahead to when people put these things on command-lines or config files
and argue about capitalisation; none of the other curves in IETF
protocols get capitals.)

• If we called it 't25519', people might confuse it with the one in the
  draft here.

• But if we call it 'Ed25519', people might confuse it with the whole
  Ed25519 signature scheme.

  (Sure it's used _in_ that signature scheme, although it seems likely
  to me at this stage that we might be heading more in the general
  direction of a cleaner, fresher version which works with te25519,
  curve3617 and e521, and quite possibly uses a new hash. Demand seems
  stronger for curve25519 ECDHE first, however.)

- -- 
/akr
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 10:58 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> On 17/01/2014 14:33, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> Watson Ladd actually chose a point with small Edwards-form x, not
>> small Edwards-form y. [=E2=80=A6] =E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 is isomorphic=
 to Curve25519, so
>> any non-identity group element of odd order on T25519 generates the
>> same group as the standard basepoint of Curve25519 (and has the
>> same order).
>
> Ah, thankyou. I missed that (and had mistakenly assumed he'd go for
> small y to match the Edwards curves).
>
> Clearly, I haven't had enough tea today!
>
>
> On 17/01/2014 14:33, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> There is no benefit to choosing a new basepoint, but there's also
>> no benefit to using =E2=80=98T25519=E2=80=99 instead of the (more effici=
ent) form
>> specified for Ed25519.
>
> On 17/01/2014 15:17, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On reflection the a=3D-1, d=3D-121665/121666 form saves an an
>> addition, but the multiplication is by a bigger number in the
>> complete form. Anyway, I don't have strong thoughts on the matter.
>
> Well then, there's little or no benefit in specifying a new form when
> we already have the Ed25519 parameters ready-made and people already
> have routines working with it?
>
>
> On 17/01/2014 14:33, Robert Ransom wrote:
>>> I have a strong preference for throwing out T25519 and using
>>> Ed25519 with its standard basepoint.
>
> On 17/01/2014 15:17, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> I'll follow that preference, but ugh, the number in front of
>> x^2y^2 is big.
>
> If it doesn't really have a performance impact in practice, it's no
> big deal.
>
> Ed25519 it seems to be, then. Though, that said, the name might be
> confusing. Maybe we'd better call that form something else.
>
> Perhaps: 'te25519', for Twisted Edwards (2^255)-19?

Okay. I'll follow the Ed25519 paper and call it te25519 and add the
paper as a reference.
Are rationals fine, or do people want me to write big numbers?
>
> (Deliberately referring to the curve names in lower-case. Thinking
> ahead to when people put these things on command-lines or config files
> and argue about capitalisation; none of the other curves in IETF
> protocols get capitals.)
>
> =E2=80=A2 If we called it 't25519', people might confuse it with the one =
in the
>   draft here.

it's an ID: names change.

>
> =E2=80=A2 But if we call it 'Ed25519', people might confuse it with the w=
hole
>   Ed25519 signature scheme.
>
>   (Sure it's used _in_ that signature scheme, although it seems likely
>   to me at this stage that we might be heading more in the general
>   direction of a cleaner, fresher version which works with te25519,
>   curve3617 and e521, and quite possibly uses a new hash. Demand seems
>   stronger for curve25519 ECDHE first, however.)
>
> - --
> /akr
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On 17/01/2014 20:01, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Okay. I'll follow the Ed25519 paper and call it te25519 and add the
> paper as a reference.
> Are rationals fine, or do people want me to write big numbers?

I'm sorry, but I'd prefer big numbers (or best, both). Of course it's more work
for you, but it's less for the readers. And since the document will hopefully be
read more often than it is written... :)

Unrelated, but Alyssa wrote:
>> • But if we call it 'Ed25519', people might confuse it with the whole
>>   Ed25519 signature scheme.
>> 
With all the respect I have for the great work done by Bernstein on this, I find
it unfortunate that the same name is used for a curve, a particular protocol
using this curve (and often even "the" implementation), causing some confusion.
I'll be really glad if the I{R,E}TF encourages more distinct names for curves
and protocols (and of course, many distinct interoperable implementations as usual).

Manuel.

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard
<mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
> On 17/01/2014 20:01, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> Okay. I'll follow the Ed25519 paper and call it te25519 and add the
>> paper as a reference.
>> Are rationals fine, or do people want me to write big numbers?
>
> I'm sorry, but I'd prefer big numbers (or best, both). Of course it's mor=
e work
> for you, but it's less for the readers. And since the document will hopef=
ully be
> read more often than it is written... :)

Blegh. This is going to be one ugly looking equation. 4/5 and
-121665/121666 I can memorize.
Can't do the same with giant numbers. Okay, time to fire up PARI and
make the changes.

>
> Unrelated, but Alyssa wrote:
>>> =E2=80=A2 But if we call it 'Ed25519', people might confuse it with the=
 whole
>>>   Ed25519 signature scheme.
>>>
> With all the respect I have for the great work done by Bernstein on this,=
 I find
> it unfortunate that the same name is used for a curve, a particular proto=
col
> using this curve (and often even "the" implementation), causing some conf=
usion.

I'm not sure this is correct. Bernstein's implementation today is the
donna implementation,
and tweetnacl has tweetnacl implementation of cuve25519. It's no worse
than BLAS, where
ATLAS, gotoBLAS, netlib BLAS, and Intel all provide implementations of BLAS=
.

> I'll be really glad if the I{R,E}TF encourages more distinct names for cu=
rves
> and protocols (and of course, many distinct interoperable implementations=
 as usual).

ECDH on curve XXXX seems to be what people do when disambiguation is requir=
ed.
>
> Manuel.
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From akr@akr.io  Fri Jan 17 12:00:18 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] new curves vs. algorithms
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 17/01/2014 12:57, Stephen Farrell wrote:

> […] is there a benefit in treating these as if they were entirely
> different algorithms in terms of codepoints in protocols, or are we
> better off just regarding them as different curves for the same
> algorithm.

I think that's _very_ protocol-specific, even feeding from what
implementers and existing libraries find most amenable to updates.

I think the only really important thing is that everyone's
crystal-clear about what is what, exactly. (Same as with naming, really?)


Example: For TLS, ECDHE with Montgomery curves (notably curve25519) is
pretty straightforward! draft-joseffsson-tls-curve25519-03
specifically proposes to use the existing ECDHE ciphersuites with
NamedCurve curve25519 (and probably so on for each of the suitable
"Chicago curves" supported); and an implicit opaque ECpoint.point
(currently being debated as to endianness and length).

That seems a sensible approach to me: less code rewrite, less messing
about with library internals, and hopefully the ability to incorporate
the existing great routines out there already to accelerate actual
deployment for something considered an urgent requirement (efficient
forward security).


But conversely, please _don't_ try to just use ECDSA with these
curves. I think that'd be a bit of a square peg in a round hole: you
might be able to make it fit if you really hammered it, but you risk
cutting corners if you did! <g>

There's a discussion in progress around a potential Schnorr-style
signature scheme suitable for use with Edwards (and/or Twisted
Edwards) curves instead and which wouldn't eat entropy when signing -
probably based heavily on djb/Lange's Ed25519 paper, but a bit more
generalised/updated/cleaned-up to fit the other curves we document?
(We're still in the early planning phase.)

I'd think an entirely different signature algorithm like that _would_
warrant a different algorithm ID - but of course that's a future
something for WGs at such a time there's got a solid proposal for it.

- -- 
/akr
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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By the way, folks, are any of these curves actually implemented (in =
C/C++, not python) besides the 25519 ones?

On Jan 17, 2014, at 11:23 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Manuel P=E9gouri=E9-Gonnard
> <mpg@elzevir.fr> wrote:
>> On 17/01/2014 20:01, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>> Okay. I'll follow the Ed25519 paper and call it te25519 and add the
>>> paper as a reference.
>>> Are rationals fine, or do people want me to write big numbers?
>>=20
>> I'm sorry, but I'd prefer big numbers (or best, both). Of course it's =
more work
>> for you, but it's less for the readers. And since the document will =
hopefully be
>> read more often than it is written... :)
>=20
> Blegh. This is going to be one ugly looking equation. 4/5 and
> -121665/121666 I can memorize.
> Can't do the same with giant numbers. Okay, time to fire up PARI and
> make the changes.
>=20
>>=20
>> Unrelated, but Alyssa wrote:
>>>> =95 But if we call it 'Ed25519', people might confuse it with the =
whole
>>>>  Ed25519 signature scheme.
>>>>=20
>> With all the respect I have for the great work done by Bernstein on =
this, I find
>> it unfortunate that the same name is used for a curve, a particular =
protocol
>> using this curve (and often even "the" implementation), causing some =
confusion.
>=20
> I'm not sure this is correct. Bernstein's implementation today is the
> donna implementation,
> and tweetnacl has tweetnacl implementation of cuve25519. It's no worse
> than BLAS, where
> ATLAS, gotoBLAS, netlib BLAS, and Intel all provide implementations of =
BLAS.
>=20
>> I'll be really glad if the I{R,E}TF encourages more distinct names =
for curves
>> and protocols (and of course, many distinct interoperable =
implementations as usual).
>=20
> ECDH on curve XXXX seems to be what people do when disambiguation is =
required.
>>=20
>> Manuel.
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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On 17/01/2014 23:05, Mike Hamburg wrote:
> By the way, folks, are any of these curves actually implemented (in C/C++,
> not python) besides the 25519 ones?
> 
According to http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647

    A proof-of-concept implementation of all these curves is available
    as part of the RELIC library [1]. Work on a production-quality
    implementation is ongoing.

    [1] D. F. Aranha and C. P. L. Gouvêa. RELIC is an Efficient LIbrary
    for Cryptography.

I have a "generic" implementation of Montgomery curves in PolarSSL that
currently offers only Curve25519 but the other curves in Montgomery
forms can be added easily. I also plan to implement curves in Edwards
form there some day (hopefully soon).

Manuel.

From paul@marvell.com  Mon Jan 20 12:11:56 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2014 12:11:49 -0800
Thread-Topic: Brazil Curves -> Re: [Cfrg] Safecurves draft redux
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Subject: [Cfrg] Brazil Curves -> Re:  Safecurves draft redux
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>
>The naming issue is fine: we can say "the safecurve Mxxx has been
>found to be unsafe" without risk of being misunderstood. If there is
>consensus that we should call the IANA registry something else, say
>"Chicago curves", I'm not opposed to it.

More of the curves seem appear to have come from Brazil (not necessarily
the movie) than Chicago.

There was a thread on clear naming conventions that has some consensus
that did not add confusion by creating cute names.  Could we please
proceed with a consensus based draft.

I also believe we are rushing too fast on the =8Ctrimming=B9 before we have
clearly identified and listed the attributes of the curves we have under
recommend.  A draft list the alternates and attributes seems essential.
Consensus might then be possible when we can have are more coherent and
documented review process.

Also, there is value in having strong recommendations for a few curves
used for identity/authentication.  There is also value in describing
alternatives for new protocols that might wish to have some crypto
diversity.  Documented a larger set with well described properties and
possible applications would meet both requirements.



Paul



From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan 20 14:28:07 2014
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Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:28:04 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Brazil Curves -> Re:  Safecurves draft redux
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On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 12:11 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>>
>>The naming issue is fine: we can say "the safecurve Mxxx has been
>>found to be unsafe" without risk of being misunderstood. If there is
>>consensus that we should call the IANA registry something else, say
>>"Chicago curves", I'm not opposed to it.
>
> More of the curves seem appear to have come from Brazil (not necessarily
> the movie) than Chicago.
>
> There was a thread on clear naming conventions that has some consensus
> that did not add confusion by creating cute names.  Could we please
> proceed with a consensus based draft.

Naming them E or M then prime description would work. We would also need a
T. So far I've resisted renaming from the SAFECURVES names, but that
will change since
we need to invent some.

As for naming the whole set, that's where Chicago comes in. Brainpool
is certainly not
a cute name, but I doubt the mental images were in the naming process.

We aren't even at a point where I have something I would sent to Last
Call. I have
some edits to make (see TE25519 discussion where I screwed it up),
and with the start
of the semester haven't had time to do this yet.

>
> I also believe we are rushing too fast on the =C5=92trimming=C2=B9 before=
 we have
> clearly identified and listed the attributes of the curves we have under
> recommend.  A draft list the alternates and attributes seems essential.
> Consensus might then be possible when we can have are more coherent and
> documented review process.

Well, I haven't trimmed anything yet: I just want to have discussion
about how many we should recommend.
As for listing the attributes and identifying them, I think the draft
makes it pretty clear, even it is current state, what
these curves are. Perhaps we need to make more clear that most
implementations of ECC get it wrong. (Even AGL and
I punted when making constant time P256 implementations: we return
errors in some cases where we shouldn't.)

>
> Also, there is value in having strong recommendations for a few curves
> used for identity/authentication.  There is also value in describing
> alternatives for new protocols that might wish to have some crypto
> diversity.  Documented a larger set with well described properties and
> possible applications would meet both requirements.

All curves avoiding certain known badnesses are the same from a
security standpoint.
They aren't from an efficiency standpoint. if a new protocol wants
diversity, it should avoid
ECC entirely.

As for possible applications, I'm really not sure what we're looking
at here. Given a curve you can get
Schnorr signatures and ECDH on it. That will be in a different
draft/is bog-standard cryptography.

There is a PAKE idea for the new curves that is being developed, but
it still needs to get drafted.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
>
>
> Paul
>
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From dharkins@lounge.org  Mon Jan 20 14:59:38 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Brazil Curves -> Re:  Safecurves draft redux
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On Mon, January 20, 2014 2:28 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 12:11 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>>
>> More of the curves seem appear to have come from Brazil (not necessarily
>> the movie) than Chicago.
>>
>> There was a thread on clear naming conventions that has some consensus
>> that did not add confusion by creating cute names.  Could we please
>> proceed with a consensus based draft.
>
> Naming them E or M then prime description would work. We would also need a
> T. So far I've resisted renaming from the SAFECURVES names, but that
> will change since
> we need to invent some.
>
> As for naming the whole set, that's where Chicago comes in. Brainpool
> is certainly not
> a cute name, but I doubt the mental images were in the naming process.
>
> We aren't even at a point where I have something I would sent to Last
> Call. I have
> some edits to make (see TE25519 discussion where I screwed it up),
> and with the start
> of the semester haven't had time to do this yet.

  You seem to think that the next step is Last Call. Please peruse the
RFC database and note the revision of the last draft prior to publication
as an RFC. You'll find many that have double-digit revisions. And you'll
note that very few have an -01 revision.

  It is very helpful in this consensus-based development process to
produce a draft for everyone to read that incorporates a slew of
comments you received. That way we can see how it reads after the
comments were resolved and possibly suggest how to further improve
it, resulting in another version. Holding on to a draft until you personally
feel that it is ready for Last Call is likely to blow up in your face.

  If you want this published in an I{E|R}TF stream then please follow
the process for working on a draft. Github is not an appropriate
substitute.

  Dan.



From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan 20 19:17:27 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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I am proposing that we name the curves with the following scheme: E,
M, TE, indicating
the curve type, followed by a prime designator. The prime designator
will be the concatination
of the numbers a and b such that 2^a-b=p if such a and b exist and are
small. Otherwise I'll think of something (Ed448 Goldilocks I'm looking
at you).

Any objections? Or do we have consensus on this change, and I was just
to dense to notice?

A new version with significant alterations will be hitting the draft
server in a few days.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Jan 20, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> I am proposing that we name the curves with the following scheme: E,
> M, TE, indicating
> the curve type, followed by a prime designator. The prime designator
> will be the concatination
> of the numbers a and b such that 2^a-b=3Dp if such a and b exist and are
> small. Otherwise I'll think of something (Ed448 Goldilocks I'm looking
> at you).
>=20
> Any objections? Or do we have consensus on this change, and I was just
> to dense to notice?
>=20
> A new version with significant alterations will be hitting the draft
> server in a few days.

I think it's overkill, myself.

Really, there's no reason to designate in the name an Edwards curve from a =
Montgomery, especially because in the implementation someone's probably goi=
ng to flip between representations. Only us math weenies really care about =
the representation, and you're going to confuse the coders.

I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about this s=
ort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like "Curve 255-=
19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17" (for the c=
urve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.

	Jon


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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Jan 20 19:54:13 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 7:50 PM, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> wrote:
>
> On Jan 20, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I am proposing that we name the curves with the following scheme: E,
>> M, TE, indicating
>> the curve type, followed by a prime designator. The prime designator
>> will be the concatination
>> of the numbers a and b such that 2^a-b=3Dp if such a and b exist and are
>> small. Otherwise I'll think of something (Ed448 Goldilocks I'm looking
>> at you).
>>
>> Any objections? Or do we have consensus on this change, and I was just
>> to dense to notice?
>>
>> A new version with significant alterations will be hitting the draft
>> server in a few days.
>
> I think it's overkill, myself.
>
> Really, there's no reason to designate in the name an Edwards curve from =
a Montgomery, especially because in the implementation someone's probably g=
oing to flip between representations. Only us math weenies really care abou=
t the representation, and you're going to confuse the coders.

If I hand you a string of bytes, what point does that represent and on
what curve does it fall? Seems to me like that's a representation
issue we should all care about.

>
> I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about this=
 sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like "Curve 25=
5-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17" (for the=
 curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.

This would be great except that we want both Edwards and Montgomery
wire formats. If there is consensus on only Edwards wire formats, that
naming will work fine.


>
>         Jon
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Jan 20, 2014, at 7:54 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>> Really, there's no reason to designate in the name an Edwards curve from=
 a Montgomery, especially because in the implementation someone's probably =
going to flip between representations. Only us math weenies really care abo=
ut the representation, and you're going to confuse the coders.
>=20
> If I hand you a string of bytes, what point does that represent and on
> what curve does it fall? Seems to me like that's a representation
> issue we should all care about.

I think that's *the* issue we should care about.

>=20
>>=20
>> I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about thi=
s sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like "Curve 2=
55-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17" (for th=
e curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.
>=20
> This would be great except that we want both Edwards and Montgomery
> wire formats. If there is consensus on only Edwards wire formats, that
> naming will work fine.

Is the name the right place to solve this?

That's not rhetorical, I'm genuinely asking. If you give me a short descrip=
tion of how you'd handle it, I'm liable to just say, "Oh, yeah."

	Jon



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Jan 20, 2014, at 7:54 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 7:50 PM, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> wrote:
>>=20
>> On Jan 20, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> I am proposing that we name the curves with the following scheme: E,
>>> M, TE, indicating
>>> the curve type, followed by a prime designator. The prime designator
>>> will be the concatination
>>> of the numbers a and b such that 2^a-b=3Dp if such a and b exist and =
are
>>> small. Otherwise I'll think of something (Ed448 Goldilocks I'm =
looking
>>> at you).
>>>=20
>>> Any objections? Or do we have consensus on this change, and I was =
just
>>> to dense to notice?
>>>=20
>>> A new version with significant alterations will be hitting the draft
>>> server in a few days.
>>=20
>> I think it's overkill, myself.
>>=20
>> Really, there's no reason to designate in the name an Edwards curve =
from a Montgomery, especially because in the implementation someone's =
probably going to flip between representations. Only us math weenies =
really care about the representation, and you're going to confuse the =
coders.
>=20
> If I hand you a string of bytes, what point does that represent and on
> what curve does it fall? Seems to me like that's a representation
> issue we should all care about.

It may depend on whether we expect a curve to be used for both =
signatures and ECDH, or just one purpose.  If they're only for one =
thing, then the letters make a difference.

I think Jon wants to use each curve for both purposes, at least =
potentially, which makes sense to me.  This is why I suggested always =
using the Montgomery point representation (or even its inverse square =
root! but maybe that's crazy) even for the Edwards curves.

I suppose in that case we should be using curves with a small A or =
(A-2)/4 in Montgomery form instead of small d in Edwards form, because =
you need to multiply by A more often: Edwards representations are =
probably fastest with Niels+Extended coordinates at that size so they =
almost never multiply by d.

>> I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about =
this sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like =
"Curve 255-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve =
414-17" (for the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.

This is also nice because you could call Ed448-Goldilocks as "Curve =
448-224-1".

> This would be great except that we want both Edwards and Montgomery
> wire formats. If there is consensus on only Edwards wire formats, that
> naming will work fine.

If you're going to pick one, it should be Montgomery.  This is because =
the Montgomery ladder suffers almost a 10% hit from conversion, but =
Edwards suffers like an 0.2% hit.

-- Mike=

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Mon Jan 20 20:25:24 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 1/20/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:

> I suppose in that case we should be using curves with a small A or (A-2)/4
> in Montgomery form instead of small d in Edwards form, because you need to
> multiply by A more often: Edwards representations are probably fastest with
> Niels+Extended coordinates at that size so they almost never multiply by d.

The Montgomery-form ladder is as efficient for small-integer
Edwards-form d as it is for small-integer Montgomery-form parameter
((A-2)/4 or (A+2)/4).


Robert Ransom

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 8:25 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 1/20/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
>
>> I suppose in that case we should be using curves with a small A or (A-2)/4
>> in Montgomery form instead of small d in Edwards form, because you need to
>> multiply by A more often: Edwards representations are probably fastest with
>> Niels+Extended coordinates at that size so they almost never multiply by d.
>
> The Montgomery-form ladder is as efficient for small-integer
> Edwards-form d as it is for small-integer Montgomery-form parameter
> ((A-2)/4 or (A+2)/4).

Maybe it's because it's late, but I don't immediately see why
A=2(1+d)/(1-d) for a small integer d leads
to a fast multiplication in the Montgomery-form ladder. The best
solution I could come up with involves
multiplications by 3 small integers instead of 1. So maybe the
efficiency loss is small, but it still exists.

I also don't see why if you are going to toss in the y coordinate into
Montgomery form to disambiguate addition you
would use the Montgomery form as a wire format instead of Edwards
form. I'm aware you can recalculate the y coordinate
given the original one after a Montgomery ladder, but with radix-k
addition algorithms on Edwards this doesn't seem to be a win.

Maybe Montgomery form is just a red herring, but when I think about
the consequences of a missing square root check in an Edwards
form implementation for ECDH, I feel Montgomery form has a place here.

Sincerely,
Watson
>
>
> Robert Ransom



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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On Jan 20, 2014, at 8:25 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> =
wrote:

> On 1/20/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
>=20
>> I suppose in that case we should be using curves with a small A or =
(A-2)/4
>> in Montgomery form instead of small d in Edwards form, because you =
need to
>> multiply by A more often: Edwards representations are probably =
fastest with
>> Niels+Extended coordinates at that size so they almost never multiply =
by d.
>=20
> The Montgomery-form ladder is as efficient for small-integer
> Edwards-form d as it is for small-integer Montgomery-form parameter
> ((A-2)/4 or (A+2)/4).
>=20
>=20
> Robert Ransom

So it is.  Do you have a reference for that, BTW?  I derived it as:

x' =3D (x^2-z^2)^2
z' =3D 4xz(x^2 + Axz + z^2)

These are typically computed from (x+z)^2 and (x-z)^2, with 4xz being =
the difference between the two.

Substituting A =3D 2(1+d)/(1-d) =3D 4/(1-d)-2, we have

z' =3D 4xz(x^2 - 2xz + z^2 + 4xz/(1-d))

Scaling both x' and z' by (1-d) gives

x' =3D (x+z)^2 (x-z)^2 (1-d)
z' =3D 4xz(4xz + (1-d)(x-z)^2)

requiring the same 2 bigmuls, one smallmul and one add that the standard =
formula requires.

-- Mike



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On 1/20/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
> On Jan 20, 2014, at 8:25 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:

>> The Montgomery-form ladder is as efficient for small-integer
>> Edwards-form d as it is for small-integer Montgomery-form parameter
>> ((A-2)/4 or (A+2)/4).

> So it is.  Do you have a reference for that, BTW?

I don't have a reference for it.  (But I did use it in my Curve1174
implementation last summer, and I'm pretty sure I said it a few days
ago on this list.)

<http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/data/twisted/coordinates> gives an
isomorphism to Montgomery form with A = 4a/(a-d) - 2; the parameter
for the formulas given on
<http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-montgom-xz.html> is a24 =
(A+2)/4 = a/(a-d).  So the fact that when d is a small integer (and a
is 1 or -1, as usual), the Montgomery-form parameter is the reciprocal
of a small integer is fairly obvious from that.

The remaining step is to move the multiplication by 1/a24 into BB.


Robert Ransom

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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 1/20/14, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> I also don't see why if you are going to toss in the y coordinate into
> Montgomery form to disambiguate addition you
> would use the Montgomery form as a wire format instead of Edwards
> form. I'm aware you can recalculate the y coordinate
> given the original one after a Montgomery ladder, but with radix-k
> addition algorithms on Edwards this doesn't seem to be a win.
>
> Maybe Montgomery form is just a red herring, but when I think about
> the consequences of a missing square root check in an Edwards
> form implementation for ECDH, I feel Montgomery form has a place here.

I would suggest using the Montgomery-form x coordinate with the sign
bit of the Edwards-form x coordinate.  (In fact, I *did* suggest that:
<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03868.html>
<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03870.html>)

And yes, the Brier-Joye formulas to recover Montgomery-form y after
the Montgomery ladder would be faster than Brauer's algorithm on
Edwards-form points for variable-base single-scalar multiplication.


Robert Ransom

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 1/20/14, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 1/20/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
>> On Jan 20, 2014, at 8:25 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>
>>> The Montgomery-form ladder is as efficient for small-integer
>>> Edwards-form d as it is for small-integer Montgomery-form parameter
>>> ((A-2)/4 or (A+2)/4).
>
>> So it is.  Do you have a reference for that, BTW?
>
> I don't have a reference for it.  (But I did use it in my Curve1174
> implementation last summer, and I'm pretty sure I said it a few days
> ago on this list.)
>
> <http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/data/twisted/coordinates> gives an
> isomorphism to Montgomery form with A = 4a/(a-d) - 2; the parameter
> for the formulas given on
> <http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-montgom-xz.html> is a24 =
> (A+2)/4 = a/(a-d).  So the fact that when d is a small integer (and a
> is 1 or -1, as usual), the Montgomery-form parameter is the reciprocal
> of a small integer is fairly obvious from that.
>
> The remaining step is to move the multiplication by 1/a24 into BB.

Er.  Move the multiplication by 1/a24 into BB *after* BB is used in
calculating E.


Robert Ransom

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On Jan 20, 2014, at 9:06 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> =
wrote:
> I would suggest using the Montgomery-form x coordinate with the sign
> bit of the Edwards-form x coordinate.  (In fact, I *did* suggest that:
> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03868.html>
> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03870.html>)

Amusingly, if you say that "sign" is "Jacobi symbol" (when p=3D=3D3 mod =
4), the two are the same for q-torsion points.  But either way, the =
difference is a couple of field muls vs a slightly messier spec.

> And yes, the Brier-Joye formulas to recover Montgomery-form y after
> the Montgomery ladder would be faster than Brauer's algorithm on
> Edwards-form points for variable-base single-scalar multiplication.


Is this still true for large curves?  I don't think it's true =
asymptotically, and if people switch from inverse-by-exp to =
inverse-by-blind-and-EGCD, then you lose your free square root and the =
tradeoff might happen before 521 bits.  You might get your freebie back =
again if you spec that sign is Jacobi symbol and use a blind EGCD =
inverse-and-Jacobi-symbol, but again this only works for p=3D=3D3 mod 4.

Cheers,
-- Mike=

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 1/20/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
>
> On Jan 20, 2014, at 9:06 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I would suggest using the Montgomery-form x coordinate with the sign
>> bit of the Edwards-form x coordinate.  (In fact, I *did* suggest that:
>> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03868.html>
>> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03870.html>)
>
> Amusingly, if you say that "sign" is "Jacobi symbol" (when p==3 mod 4), the
> two are the same for q-torsion points.  But either way, the difference is a
> couple of field muls vs a slightly messier spec.

The least significant bit of the least positive residue is easier to
compute during point compression, and is well-defined regardless of
the field order, so I would use that instead.

>> And yes, the Brier-Joye formulas to recover Montgomery-form y after
>> the Montgomery ladder would be faster than Brauer's algorithm on
>> Edwards-form points for variable-base single-scalar multiplication.

> Is this still true for large curves?  I don't think it's true
> asymptotically, and if people switch from inverse-by-exp to
> inverse-by-blind-and-EGCD, then you lose your free square root and the
> tradeoff might happen before 521 bits.  You might get your freebie back
> again if you spec that sign is Jacobi symbol and use a blind EGCD
> inverse-and-Jacobi-symbol, but again this only works for p==3 mod 4.

The Montgomery-form ladder takes 5M+4S+1*param+... per scalar bit.

Edwards-form Brauer (assuming a=-1) takes 3M+4S+... per doubling, and
1M (conversion to extended coordinates) + 7M+... (madd-2008-hwcd-4;
assuming the table is affine) per scalar limb, so it could (just
barely, counting multiplications only) appear to break even using
4-bit limbs.  But the table precomputation for that includes multiple
point additions and an inversion, and each 4-bit scalar limb requires
a constant-time lookup from a 7-element table, so even asymptotically,
you're eaten by overhead.


Robert Ransom

From synp71@live.com  Mon Jan 20 23:28:01 2014
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Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2014 09:27:56 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Brazil Curves -> Re:  Safecurves draft redux
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On 21/1/14 12:59 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
> On Mon, January 20, 2014 2:28 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 12:11 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrot=
e:
>>> More of the curves seem appear to have come from Brazil (not necessar=
ily
>>> the movie) than Chicago.
>>>
>>> There was a thread on clear naming conventions that has some consensu=
s
>>> that did not add confusion by creating cute names.  Could we please
>>> proceed with a consensus based draft.
>> Naming them E or M then prime description would work. We would also ne=
ed a
>> T. So far I've resisted renaming from the SAFECURVES names, but that
>> will change since
>> we need to invent some.
>>
>> As for naming the whole set, that's where Chicago comes in. Brainpool
>> is certainly not
>> a cute name, but I doubt the mental images were in the naming process.=

>>
>> We aren't even at a point where I have something I would sent to Last
>> Call. I have
>> some edits to make (see TE25519 discussion where I screwed it up),
>> and with the start
>> of the semester haven't had time to do this yet.
>    You seem to think that the next step is Last Call. Please peruse the=

> RFC database and note the revision of the last draft prior to publicati=
on
> as an RFC. You'll find many that have double-digit revisions. And you'l=
l
> note that very few have an -01 revision.
>
>    It is very helpful in this consensus-based development process to
> produce a draft for everyone to read that incorporates a slew of
> comments you received. That way we can see how it reads after the
> comments were resolved and possibly suggest how to further improve
> it, resulting in another version. Holding on to a draft until you perso=
nally
> feel that it is ready for Last Call is likely to blow up in your face.
>
>    If you want this published in an I{E|R}TF stream then please follow
> the process for working on a draft. Github is not an appropriate
> substitute.

A substitute - no, but GitHub can be a useful tool when multiple people=20
contribute text. As an example, the http2 draft is being edited in=20
GitHub with the various contributors making suggestions ("pull=20
requests") there. The discussion is mostly done on the mailing list, but =

GitHub is far from useless.

Yoav



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To: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Jan 20, 2014, at 10:44 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> =
wrote:

> On 1/20/14, Mike Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
>>=20
>> On Jan 20, 2014, at 9:06 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>> I would suggest using the Montgomery-form x coordinate with the sign
>>> bit of the Edwards-form x coordinate.  (In fact, I *did* suggest =
that:
>>> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03868.html>
>>> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03870.html>)
>>=20
>> Amusingly, if you say that "sign" is "Jacobi symbol" (when p=3D=3D3 =
mod 4), the
>> two are the same for q-torsion points.  But either way, the =
difference is a
>> couple of field muls vs a slightly messier spec.
>=20
> The least significant bit of the least positive residue is easier to
> compute during point compression, and is well-defined regardless of
> the field order, so I would use that instead.

Yeah, I love the Jacobi thing because it's a cool trick, but I still =
think the low bit is probably better for these reasons.

>>> And yes, the Brier-Joye formulas to recover Montgomery-form y after
>>> the Montgomery ladder would be faster than Brauer's algorithm on
>>> Edwards-form points for variable-base single-scalar multiplication.
>=20
>> Is this still true for large curves?  I don't think it's true
>> asymptotically, and if people switch from inverse-by-exp to
>> inverse-by-blind-and-EGCD, then you lose your free square root and =
the
>> tradeoff might happen before 521 bits.  You might get your freebie =
back
>> again if you spec that sign is Jacobi symbol and use a blind EGCD
>> inverse-and-Jacobi-symbol, but again this only works for p=3D=3D3 mod =
4.
>=20
> The Montgomery-form ladder takes 5M+4S+1*param+... per scalar bit.
>=20
> Edwards-form Brauer (assuming a=3D-1) takes 3M+4S+... per doubling, =
and
> 1M (conversion to extended coordinates) + 7M+... (madd-2008-hwcd-4;
> assuming the table is affine) per scalar limb, so it could (just
> barely, counting multiplications only) appear to break even using
> 4-bit limbs.  But the table precomputation for that includes multiple
> point additions and an inversion, and each 4-bit scalar limb requires
> a constant-time lookup from a 7-element table, so even asymptotically,
> you're eaten by overhead.

For practical purposes, you're right: it's probably at most a wash even =
at longer bit lengths.

I actually measured it for a 252-bit prime, 250-bit curve by =
microbenching some old code.  I measured a constant-time Edwards scalar =
multiply (no conversion to/from affine) vs a constant-time Montgomery =
scalar multiply (start in affine, but no conversion back to affine at =
the end). The result was pretty close, within the margin of error of the =
benchmark on Sandy Bridge.

The code is using "extensible coordinates" for the accumulating point (a =
lazy man's version of Hisil et al's extended with lookahead, which would =
give the same result) and gives you that 8M/add without putting the =
table in affine (it's in "projective half-Niels coordinates", i.e. =
4-coordinate readd form).

Otherwise your math is fine.  You're trading off a constant-time lookup =
in a big table every k bits, and some precomputation (slightly cheaper =
than the lookups) in the Edwards version vs a conditional swap every =
bit, a multiplication by a small number and a couple of extra additions =
for the Montgomery ladder.

After about 300 bits, extrapolation suggests that a 5-bit window should =
be faster than a 4-bit one, if only marginally.  All in all, by 448 bits =
(extrapolating to Ed448-Goldilocks timing measurements) the Edwards =
implementation is maybe half a multiply per bit ahead of the Montgomery =
one, before compression and decompression are taken into account.

But then there's compression and decompression.  I'm pretty sure a =
Montgomery implementation can always use the inverse square root trick =
at worst, whereas Edwards always has to take a square root and a full =
inversion separately (to decompress and to compress, respectively).  I =
don't have a timing for blind-and-EGCD on me.  Maybe it's half a mul per =
bit, and then the whole thing is a wash.  Maybe it's 0.3, and that giant =
pile of complexity and memory thrashing bought you a 2% win.  Woo.

So Montgomery is the better choice on Sandy Bridge out to 448 bits and =
probably to 521 as well.

Cheers,
-- Mike


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From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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--047d7b5d360298fbbe04f07caae7
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Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>:

I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about this
> sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like "Curve
> 255-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17" (for
> the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.


Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of Curve25519 --
concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn't make sense
(except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as "twenty-five thousand
..." you'll know they don't know what they're saying).  I also don't really
like having whitespace in those names, so I'd prefer "Curve-255-19" over
"Curve 255-19".

("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more descriptive
name for this curve that is actually helpful.)

Bodo

--047d7b5d360298fbbe04f07caae7
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Jon =
Callas <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jon@callas.org" target=3D"_b=
lank">jon@callas.org</a>&gt;:</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">

I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about this s=
ort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like &quot;Curve=
 255-19&quot; (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or &quot;Curve 414=
-17&quot; (for the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.</blockquo=
te>
<div><br></div><div>Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of C=
urve25519 -- concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn&=
#39;t make sense (except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as &quot=
;twenty-five thousand ...&quot; you&#39;ll know they don&#39;t know what th=
ey&#39;re saying). =A0I also don&#39;t really like having whitespace in tho=
se names, so I&#39;d prefer &quot;Curve-255-19&quot; over &quot;Curve 255-1=
9&quot;.</div>
<div><br></div><div>(&quot;Curve&quot; isn&#39;t very descriptive, but I&#3=
9;ve yet to see a more descriptive name for this curve that is actually hel=
pful.)</div><div><br></div><div>Bodo</div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

--047d7b5d360298fbbe04f07caae7--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 7:28 AM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
> Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>:
>
>> I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about this
>> sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like "Curve
>> 255-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17" (for
>> the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.

My one concern which I've stated before is that we would then need a
single wire format for Curve25519 and Ed25519.
Robert Ransom's idea (sorry for the hijack) is the following: Suppose
Bv^2=u^3+Au^2+u is isogenous to ax^2+y^2=1+dx^2y^2, with the isogenies
u=(1+y)/(1-y), v=(1+y)/(1-y)x=ux. Then we represent points as u and
the sign of x.

A=2(a+d)/(a-d)
B=4/(a-d).

An implementation using the Montgomery ladder to multiply proceeds as
usual, using the fact that A is the reciprocal of a small integer
to rewrite the equations. It then reconstructs v (there is a fast
formula), and uses that to compute the sign of x. One using the
Edwards curves proceeds as usual, then inverts the isogeny to get u,
and uses x to get the sign bit.
The argument for this is we can specify all our curves in twisted
Edwards form with d small, a=+/-1, and life is nice for everyone.
Unfortunately Curve25519 doesn't fit this nice pattern, and people
want to use that exact curve. This form also involves a bit of extra
field math for everyone, even if they are all going to do ECDH or
Edwards addition afterwards, and so will want that form anyway. There
is also a problem of exceptional cases if a and d are nonsquares
modulo p for example.

Have I rendered correctly the arguments for and against?
>
>
> Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of Curve25519 --
> concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn't make sense
> (except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as "twenty-five thousand
> ..." you'll know they don't know what they're saying).  I also don't really
> like having whitespace in those names, so I'd prefer "Curve-255-19" over
> "Curve 255-19".
>
> ("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more descriptive name
> for this curve that is actually helpful.)

NIST isn't useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.
Anyway, my view is whatever people want to call these they can call
them, bobo and kiki aside.
>
> Bodo
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2014 10:30:41 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 1/21/14, 8:33 AM, "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 7:28 AM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
>> Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>:
>>
>>> I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about
>>>this
>>> sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like "Curve
>>> 255-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17"
>>>(for
>>> the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.

Two names would be better to differentiate between a Edwards or Montgomery
based point representation for the same curve.

WE also are working on the assumption that there are just one curve choice
for a particular field size. We should provide a extensible naming scheme
that would allow the later introduction additional options (e.g. Ed255
would be #1 of that size and flavor).

Paul=20


>
>My one concern which I've stated before is that we would then need a
>single wire format for Curve25519 and Ed25519.
>Robert Ransom's idea (sorry for the hijack) is the following: Suppose
>Bv^2=3Du^3+Au^2+u is isogenous to ax^2+y^2=3D1+dx^2y^2, with the isogenies
>u=3D(1+y)/(1-y), v=3D(1+y)/(1-y)x=3Dux. Then we represent points as u and
>the sign of x.
>
>A=3D2(a+d)/(a-d)
>B=3D4/(a-d).
>
>An implementation using the Montgomery ladder to multiply proceeds as
>usual, using the fact that A is the reciprocal of a small integer
>to rewrite the equations. It then reconstructs v (there is a fast
>formula), and uses that to compute the sign of x. One using the
>Edwards curves proceeds as usual, then inverts the isogeny to get u,
>and uses x to get the sign bit.
>The argument for this is we can specify all our curves in twisted
>Edwards form with d small, a=3D+/-1, and life is nice for everyone.
>Unfortunately Curve25519 doesn't fit this nice pattern, and people
>want to use that exact curve. This form also involves a bit of extra
>field math for everyone, even if they are all going to do ECDH or
>Edwards addition afterwards, and so will want that form anyway. There
>is also a problem of exceptional cases if a and d are nonsquares
>modulo p for example.
>
>Have I rendered correctly the arguments for and against?
>>
>>
>> Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of Curve25519 --
>> concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn't make
>>sense
>> (except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as "twenty-five
>>thousand
>> ..." you'll know they don't know what they're saying).  I also don't
>>really
>> like having whitespace in those names, so I'd prefer "Curve-255-19" over
>> "Curve 255-19".
>>
>> ("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more descriptive
>>name
>> for this curve that is actually helpful.)
>
>NIST isn't useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.
>Anyway, my view is whatever people want to call these they can call
>them, bobo and kiki aside.
>>
>> Bodo
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>
>
>
>--=20
>"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>-- Benjamin Franklin
>_______________________________________________
>Cfrg mailing list
>Cfrg@irtf.org
>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0149460221971d04f07f4394
Cc: cfrg@irtf.org, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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--089e0149460221971d04f07f4394
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On Jan 21, 2014 10:30 AM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/21/14, 8:33 AM, "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 7:28 AM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
> >> Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>:
> >>
> >>> I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about
> >>>this
> >>> sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like
"Curve
> >>> 255-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17"
> >>>(for
> >>> the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.
>
> Two names would be better to differentiate between a Edwards or Montgomery
> based point representation for the same curve.
>
> WE also are working on the assumption that there are just one curve choice
> for a particular field size. We should provide a extensible naming scheme
> that would allow the later introduction additional options (e.g. Ed255
> would be #1 of that size and flavor).
>
Why would we need these other options? If you have a new curve it needs to
look different to have a speed advantage. The security picture for ECC has
been stable for decades now.

> Paul
>
>
> >
> >My one concern which I've stated before is that we would then need a
> >single wire format for Curve25519 and Ed25519.
> >Robert Ransom's idea (sorry for the hijack) is the following: Suppose
> >Bv^2=u^3+Au^2+u is isogenous to ax^2+y^2=1+dx^2y^2, with the isogenies
> >u=(1+y)/(1-y), v=(1+y)/(1-y)x=ux. Then we represent points as u and
> >the sign of x.
> >
> >A=2(a+d)/(a-d)
> >B=4/(a-d).
> >
> >An implementation using the Montgomery ladder to multiply proceeds as
> >usual, using the fact that A is the reciprocal of a small integer
> >to rewrite the equations. It then reconstructs v (there is a fast
> >formula), and uses that to compute the sign of x. One using the
> >Edwards curves proceeds as usual, then inverts the isogeny to get u,
> >and uses x to get the sign bit.
> >The argument for this is we can specify all our curves in twisted
> >Edwards form with d small, a=+/-1, and life is nice for everyone.
> >Unfortunately Curve25519 doesn't fit this nice pattern, and people
> >want to use that exact curve. This form also involves a bit of extra
> >field math for everyone, even if they are all going to do ECDH or
> >Edwards addition afterwards, and so will want that form anyway. There
> >is also a problem of exceptional cases if a and d are nonsquares
> >modulo p for example.
> >
> >Have I rendered correctly the arguments for and against?
> >>
> >>
> >> Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of Curve25519 --
> >> concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn't make
> >>sense
> >> (except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as "twenty-five
> >>thousand
> >> ..." you'll know they don't know what they're saying).  I also don't
> >>really
> >> like having whitespace in those names, so I'd prefer "Curve-255-19"
over
> >> "Curve 255-19".
> >>
> >> ("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more descriptive
> >>name
> >> for this curve that is actually helpful.)
> >
> >NIST isn't useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.
> >Anyway, my view is whatever people want to call these they can call
> >them, bobo and kiki aside.
> >>
> >> Bodo
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Cfrg mailing list
> >> Cfrg@irtf.org
> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >--
> >"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> >Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> >-- Benjamin Franklin
> >_______________________________________________
> >Cfrg mailing list
> >Cfrg@irtf.org
> >http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

--089e0149460221971d04f07f4394
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Jan 21, 2014 10:30 AM, &quot;Paul Lambert&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pa=
ul@marvell.com">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 1/21/14, 8:33 AM, &quot;Watson Ladd&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wat=
sonbladd@gmail.com">watsonbladd@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 7:28 AM, Bodo Moeller &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:bmoeller@acm.org">bmoeller@acm.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Jon Callas &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jon@callas.org">jon@callas.o=
rg</a>&gt;:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at Shm=
ooCon about<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;this<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that nam=
es like &quot;Curve<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; 255-19&quot; (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) o=
r &quot;Curve 414-17&quot;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;(for<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Two names would be better to differentiate between a Edwards or Montgo=
mery<br>
&gt; based point representation for the same curve.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; WE also are working on the assumption that there are just one curve ch=
oice<br>
&gt; for a particular field size. We should provide a extensible naming sch=
eme<br>
&gt; that would allow the later introduction additional options (e.g. Ed255=
<br>
&gt; would be #1 of that size and flavor).<br>
&gt;<br>
Why would we need these other options? If you have a new curve it needs to =
look different to have a speed advantage. The security picture for ECC has =
been stable for decades now.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; Paul<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;My one concern which I&#39;ve stated before is that we would then =
need a<br>
&gt; &gt;single wire format for Curve25519 and Ed25519.<br>
&gt; &gt;Robert Ransom&#39;s idea (sorry for the hijack) is the following: =
Suppose<br>
&gt; &gt;Bv^2=3Du^3+Au^2+u is isogenous to ax^2+y^2=3D1+dx^2y^2, with the i=
sogenies<br>
&gt; &gt;u=3D(1+y)/(1-y), v=3D(1+y)/(1-y)x=3Dux. Then we represent points a=
s u and<br>
&gt; &gt;the sign of x.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;A=3D2(a+d)/(a-d)<br>
&gt; &gt;B=3D4/(a-d).<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;An implementation using the Montgomery ladder to multiply proceeds=
 as<br>
&gt; &gt;usual, using the fact that A is the reciprocal of a small integer<=
br>
&gt; &gt;to rewrite the equations. It then reconstructs v (there is a fast<=
br>
&gt; &gt;formula), and uses that to compute the sign of x. One using the<br=
>
&gt; &gt;Edwards curves proceeds as usual, then inverts the isogeny to get =
u,<br>
&gt; &gt;and uses x to get the sign bit.<br>
&gt; &gt;The argument for this is we can specify all our curves in twisted<=
br>
&gt; &gt;Edwards form with d small, a=3D+/-1, and life is nice for everyone=
.<br>
&gt; &gt;Unfortunately Curve25519 doesn&#39;t fit this nice pattern, and pe=
ople<br>
&gt; &gt;want to use that exact curve. This form also involves a bit of ext=
ra<br>
&gt; &gt;field math for everyone, even if they are all going to do ECDH or<=
br>
&gt; &gt;Edwards addition afterwards, and so will want that form anyway. Th=
ere<br>
&gt; &gt;is also a problem of exceptional cases if a and d are nonsquares<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;modulo p for example.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;Have I rendered correctly the arguments for and against?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of Curve25=
519 --<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn=
&#39;t make<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;sense<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; (except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as &quot;tw=
enty-five<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;thousand<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; ...&quot; you&#39;ll know they don&#39;t know what they&#39;r=
e saying). =C2=A0I also don&#39;t<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;really<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; like having whitespace in those names, so I&#39;d prefer &quo=
t;Curve-255-19&quot; over<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &quot;Curve 255-19&quot;.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; (&quot;Curve&quot; isn&#39;t very descriptive, but I&#39;ve y=
et to see a more descriptive<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;name<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; for this curve that is actually helpful.)<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;NIST isn&#39;t useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.<br>
&gt; &gt;Anyway, my view is whatever people want to call these they can cal=
l<br>
&gt; &gt;them, bobo and kiki aside.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Bodo<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://=
www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;--<br>
&gt; &gt;&quot;Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a litt=
le<br>
&gt; &gt;Temporary Safety deserve neither =C2=A0Liberty nor Safety.&quot;<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;-- Benjamin Franklin<br>
&gt; &gt;_______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.i=
rtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt;<br>
</p>

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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2014 12:06:44 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Jan 21, 2014 10:30 AM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com<mailto:paul@marv=
ell.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/21/14, 8:33 AM, "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com<mailto:watsonbl=
add@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> >On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 7:28 AM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org<mailto:b=
moeller@acm.org>> wrote:
> >> Jon Callas <jon@callas.org<mailto:jon@callas.org>>:
> >>
> >>> I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at ShmooCon about
> >>>this
> >>> sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that names like "Cur=
ve
> >>> 255-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Curve 414-17"
> >>>(for
> >>> the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.
>
> Two names would be better to differentiate between a Edwards or Montgomer=
y
> based point representation for the same curve.
>
> WE also are working on the assumption that there are just one curve choic=
e
> for a particular field size. We should provide a extensible naming scheme
> that would allow the later introduction additional options (e.g. Ed255
> would be #1 of that size and flavor).
>
Why would we need these other options? If you have a new curve it needs to =
look different to have a speed advantage. The security picture for ECC has =
been stable for decades now.

Your particular metrics for speed may not always the primary consideration =
for a system design. We should not be limiting diversity.

Clearing having two names for the Montgomery and Twisted Edwards version of=
 a 'curve set' facilities the description of the processing and gives clari=
ty in the point representation sent over a protocol.

Paul


> Paul
>
>
> >
> >My one concern which I've stated before is that we would then need a
> >single wire format for Curve25519 and Ed25519.
> >Robert Ransom's idea (sorry for the hijack) is the following: Suppose
> >Bv^2=3Du^3+Au^2+u is isogenous to ax^2+y^2=3D1+dx^2y^2, with the isogeni=
es
> >u=3D(1+y)/(1-y), v=3D(1+y)/(1-y)x=3Dux. Then we represent points as u an=
d
> >the sign of x.
> >
> >A=3D2(a+d)/(a-d)
> >B=3D4/(a-d).
> >
> >An implementation using the Montgomery ladder to multiply proceeds as
> >usual, using the fact that A is the reciprocal of a small integer
> >to rewrite the equations. It then reconstructs v (there is a fast
> >formula), and uses that to compute the sign of x. One using the
> >Edwards curves proceeds as usual, then inverts the isogeny to get u,
> >and uses x to get the sign bit.
> >The argument for this is we can specify all our curves in twisted
> >Edwards form with d small, a=3D+/-1, and life is nice for everyone.
> >Unfortunately Curve25519 doesn't fit this nice pattern, and people
> >want to use that exact curve. This form also involves a bit of extra
> >field math for everyone, even if they are all going to do ECDH or
> >Edwards addition afterwards, and so will want that form anyway. There
> >is also a problem of exceptional cases if a and d are nonsquares
> >modulo p for example.
> >
> >Have I rendered correctly the arguments for and against?
> >>
> >>
> >> Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of Curve25519 --
> >> concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn't make
> >>sense
> >> (except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as "twenty-five
> >>thousand
> >> ..." you'll know they don't know what they're saying).  I also don't
> >>really
> >> like having whitespace in those names, so I'd prefer "Curve-255-19" ov=
er
> >> "Curve 255-19".
> >>
> >> ("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more descriptiv=
e
> >>name
> >> for this curve that is actually helpful.)
> >
> >NIST isn't useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.
> >Anyway, my view is whatever people want to call these they can call
> >them, bobo and kiki aside.
> >>
> >> Bodo
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Cfrg mailing list
> >> Cfrg@irtf.org<mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >--
> >"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> >Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> >-- Benjamin Franklin
> >_______________________________________________
> >Cfrg mailing list
> >Cfrg@irtf.org<mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
> >http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



--_000_CF04120A2CF06paulmarvellcom_
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode:=
 space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-si=
ze: 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTI=
ON"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; col=
or:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOT=
TOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt so=
lid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><br></div><blockquote id=
=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 sol=
id; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Jan 21, 2014 10:30 AM, "Paul Lambert" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@marvell=
.com">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 1/21/14, 8:33 AM, "Watson Ladd" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@g=
mail.com">watsonbladd@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 7:28 AM, Bodo Moeller &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:bmoeller@acm.org">bmoeller@acm.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Jon Callas &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jon@callas.org">jon@callas.o=
rg</a>&gt;:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; I spent time talking to Dan and Tanja this weekend at Shm=
ooCon about<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;this<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; sort of thing and I think that our agreement was that nam=
es like "Curve<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; 255-19" (which covers both Curve25519 and Ed25519) or "Cu=
rve 414-17"<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;(for<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; the curve formerly known as Curve3617) made sense.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Two names would be better to differentiate between a Edwards or Montgo=
mery<br>
&gt; based point representation for the same curve.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; WE also are working on the assumption that there are just one curve ch=
oice<br>
&gt; for a particular field size. We should provide a extensible naming sch=
eme<br>
&gt; that would allow the later introduction additional options (e.g. Ed255=
<br>
&gt; would be #1 of that size and flavor).<br>
&gt;<br>
Why would we need these other options? If you have a new curve it needs to =
look different to have a speed advantage. The security picture for ECC has =
been stable for decades now.</p></blockquote></span><div>Your particular me=
trics for speed may not always the primary consideration for a system desig=
n. We should not be limiting diversity. &nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Cle=
aring having two names for the Montgomery and Twisted Edwards version of a =
'curve set' facilities the description of the processing and gives clarity =
in the point representation sent over a protocol.</div><div><br></div><div>=
Paul</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=
=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 sol=
id; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; Paul<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;My one concern which I've stated before is that we would then need=
 a<br>
&gt; &gt;single wire format for Curve25519 and Ed25519.<br>
&gt; &gt;Robert Ransom's idea (sorry for the hijack) is the following: Supp=
ose<br>
&gt; &gt;Bv^2=3Du^3+Au^2+u is isogenous to ax^2+y^2=3D1+dx^2y^2, with the i=
sogenies<br>
&gt; &gt;u=3D(1+y)/(1-y), v=3D(1+y)/(1-y)x=3Dux. Then we represent points a=
s u and<br>
&gt; &gt;the sign of x.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;A=3D2(a+d)/(a-d)<br>
&gt; &gt;B=3D4/(a-d).<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;An implementation using the Montgomery ladder to multiply proceeds=
 as<br>
&gt; &gt;usual, using the fact that A is the reciprocal of a small integer<=
br>
&gt; &gt;to rewrite the equations. It then reconstructs v (there is a fast<=
br>
&gt; &gt;formula), and uses that to compute the sign of x. One using the<br=
>
&gt; &gt;Edwards curves proceeds as usual, then inverts the isogeny to get =
u,<br>
&gt; &gt;and uses x to get the sign bit.<br>
&gt; &gt;The argument for this is we can specify all our curves in twisted<=
br>
&gt; &gt;Edwards form with d small, a=3D+/-1, and life is nice for everyone=
.<br>
&gt; &gt;Unfortunately Curve25519 doesn't fit this nice pattern, and people=
<br>
&gt; &gt;want to use that exact curve. This form also involves a bit of ext=
ra<br>
&gt; &gt;field math for everyone, even if they are all going to do ECDH or<=
br>
&gt; &gt;Edwards addition afterwards, and so will want that form anyway. Th=
ere<br>
&gt; &gt;is also a problem of exceptional cases if a and d are nonsquares<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;modulo p for example.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;Have I rendered correctly the arguments for and against?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Yes, it does. This would fix the single major flaw of Curve25=
519 --<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; concatenating base-10 numbers to spell out a tuple just doesn=
't make<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;sense<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; (except as a trap, so that if anyone reads it out as "twenty-=
five<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;thousand<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; ..." you'll know they don't know what they're saying). &nbsp;=
I also don't<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;really<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; like having whitespace in those names, so I'd prefer "Curve-2=
55-19" over<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; "Curve 255-19".<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; ("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more d=
escriptive<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;name<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; for this curve that is actually helpful.)<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;NIST isn't useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.<br>
&gt; &gt;Anyway, my view is whatever people want to call these they can cal=
l<br>
&gt; &gt;them, bobo and kiki aside.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Bodo<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://=
www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;--<br>
&gt; &gt;"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little<br=
>
&gt; &gt;Temporary Safety deserve neither &nbsp;Liberty nor Safety."<br>
&gt; &gt;-- Benjamin Franklin<br>
&gt; &gt;_______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.i=
rtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt;<br></p></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div><br></div></body></html=
>

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 21/01/2014 19:30, Paul Lambert wrote:
> Two names would be better to differentiate between a Edwards or Montgomery
> based point representation for the same curve.
> 
> WE also are working on the assumption that there are just one curve choice
> for a particular field size. We should provide a extensible naming scheme
> that would allow the later introduction additional options (e.g. Ed255
> would be #1 of that size and flavor).
> 
How about something like curve-255-19-m1 and curve-255-19-e1 for Montgomery and
Edwards form, respectively? m/e is for the type, and "1" is here as a hint that
they're not the only (secure) curves over this field.

Or, more in line with the existing names:
- curve255m1 (just the field size)
- curvep255m1 (same, with a p for "prime field").

Manuel.

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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On Jan 21, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>> Reviews and comments would be greatly appreciated, as well as anyone che=
cking my examples.
>=20
> In the introduction: I think ChaCha20+Poly1305 are useful for software
> implementations, beyond their use as a backup to AES. AES in not
> suitable for pure, software implementations and they tend to be be
> slow and have side-channels. (AES-GCM even more so.)

I agree that a pure C-language implementation of AES is slower than either =
ChaCha20 or RC4, although it is still much faster than 3DES. Processor vend=
ors have been adding hardware implementation of common tasks to so-called g=
eneral purpose processors for years. So we got floating point in the late 8=
0s, and "multi-media extension" 128-bit registers in the 90s, then vector p=
rocessors, and now encryption functions. Is software that uses the AESENC o=
pcode software or hardware? I think by now the line is blurred. For IPsec, =
AES has been the fastest algorithm even in pure C implementations.  I'll ad=
d something about being fast in software implementation to the next iterati=
on.

> "The ChaCha20 block function"...
>=20
> I asked DJB and he said that ChaCha is the name of the cipher and
> ChaCha20 is the specific variant with 20 rounds.

Yeah, that's how I used it.

>=20
> "The 14th word is the least significant 32 bits of the input nonce
> (nonce | 0xffffffff)"
>=20
> AND not OR, I think.

Oops. You're right, of course.

> You've changed the AEAD by switching the length values from uint64le
> to uint32be. Seems unnecessary.

I'll change it back. For some reason I thought AES-GCM for IPsec was like t=
hat, but looking again, I see that it isn't.

>=20
> "for a particular key. counters"
>=20
> nit: missing capital letter.

Will fix. Thanks.

> I'm not suitable to evaluate the higher-level integration into IPSec.
>=20

I've posted this to ipsec as well. They said that we need a better normativ=
e reference for the functions. DJB's papers discuss security properties and=
 link to source code, but don't have a good definition.

Yoav


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Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2014 13:05:13 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, cfrg@irtf.org, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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--f46d0402dd6e4aba8804f0815dae
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On Jan 21, 2014 12:59 PM, "Yoav Nir" <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Jan 21, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
> >> Reviews and comments would be greatly appreciated, as well as anyone
checking my examples.
> >
> > In the introduction: I think ChaCha20+Poly1305 are useful for software
> > implementations, beyond their use as a backup to AES. AES in not
> > suitable for pure, software implementations and they tend to be be
> > slow and have side-channels. (AES-GCM even more so.)
>
> I agree that a pure C-language implementation of AES is slower than
either ChaCha20 or RC4, although it is still much faster than 3DES.
Processor vendors have been adding hardware implementation of common tasks
to so-called general purpose processors for years. So we got floating point
in the late 80s, and "multi-media extension" 128-bit registers in the 90s,
then vector processors, and now encryption functions. Is software that uses
the AESENC opcode software or hardware? I think by now the line is blurred.
For IPsec, AES has been the fastest algorithm even in pure C
implementations.  I'll add something about being fast in software
implementation to the next iteration.
>
> > "The ChaCha20 block function"...
> >
> > I asked DJB and he said that ChaCha is the name of the cipher and
> > ChaCha20 is the specific variant with 20 rounds.
>
> Yeah, that's how I used it.
>
> >
> > "The 14th word is the least significant 32 bits of the input nonce
> > (nonce | 0xffffffff)"
> >
> > AND not OR, I think.
>
> Oops. You're right, of course.
>
> > You've changed the AEAD by switching the length values from uint64le
> > to uint32be. Seems unnecessary.
>
> I'll change it back. For some reason I thought AES-GCM for IPsec was like
that, but looking again, I see that it isn't.
>
> >
> > "for a particular key. counters"
> >
> > nit: missing capital letter.
>
> Will fix. Thanks.
>
> > I'm not suitable to evaluate the higher-level integration into IPSec.
> >
>
> I've posted this to ipsec as well. They said that we need a better
normative reference for the functions. DJB's papers discuss security
properties and link to source code, but don't have a good definition.
>

Are you reading the same paper I am? He defines Salsa and ChaCha in terms
of applying a well defined quarter round function to the rows and diagonals
of a 4x4 matrix.

> Yoav
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Jan 21, 2014 12:59 PM, &quot;Yoav Nir&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ynir@c=
heckpoint.com">ynir@checkpoint.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 21, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Adam Langley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:agl@go=
ogle.com">agl@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Yoav Nir &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ynir@checkpoint.com">ynir@checkpoint.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Reviews and comments would be greatly appreciated, as well as=
 anyone checking my examples.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; In the introduction: I think ChaCha20+Poly1305 are useful for sof=
tware<br>
&gt; &gt; implementations, beyond their use as a backup to AES. AES in not<=
br>
&gt; &gt; suitable for pure, software implementations and they tend to be b=
e<br>
&gt; &gt; slow and have side-channels. (AES-GCM even more so.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I agree that a pure C-language implementation of AES is slower than ei=
ther ChaCha20 or RC4, although it is still much faster than 3DES. Processor=
 vendors have been adding hardware implementation of common tasks to so-cal=
led general purpose processors for years. So we got floating point in the l=
ate 80s, and &quot;multi-media extension&quot; 128-bit registers in the 90s=
, then vector processors, and now encryption functions. Is software that us=
es the AESENC opcode software or hardware? I think by now the line is blurr=
ed. For IPsec, AES has been the fastest algorithm even in pure C implementa=
tions. =C2=A0I&#39;ll add something about being fast in software implementa=
tion to the next iteration.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &quot;The ChaCha20 block function&quot;...<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I asked DJB and he said that ChaCha is the name of the cipher and=
<br>
&gt; &gt; ChaCha20 is the specific variant with 20 rounds.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Yeah, that&#39;s how I used it.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &quot;The 14th word is the least significant 32 bits of the input=
 nonce<br>
&gt; &gt; (nonce | 0xffffffff)&quot;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; AND not OR, I think.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Oops. You&#39;re right, of course.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; You&#39;ve changed the AEAD by switching the length values from u=
int64le<br>
&gt; &gt; to uint32be. Seems unnecessary.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ll change it back. For some reason I thought AES-GCM for IPsec w=
as like that, but looking again, I see that it isn&#39;t.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &quot;for a particular key. counters&quot;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; nit: missing capital letter.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Will fix. Thanks.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I&#39;m not suitable to evaluate the higher-level integration int=
o IPSec.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve posted this to ipsec as well. They said that we need a better=
 normative reference for the functions. DJB&#39;s papers discuss security p=
roperties and link to source code, but don&#39;t have a good definition.<br=
>

&gt;</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Are you reading the same paper I am? He defines Salsa and Ch=
aCha in terms of applying a well defined quarter round function to the rows=
 and diagonals of a 4x4 matrix.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; Yoav<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</p>

--f46d0402dd6e4aba8804f0815dae--

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To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On Jan 21, 2014, at 11:01 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
 wrote:

> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:58 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>> I've posted this to ipsec as well. They said that we need a better norma=
tive reference for the functions. DJB's papers discuss security properties =
and link to source code, but don't have a good definition.
>=20
> Would you like the ChaCha in TLS draft to be split into a draft to
> define Chacha, Poly1305 and the AEAD and a separate draft for the TLS
> bits?
>=20

I think that would be useful.

Yoav


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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, cfrg@irtf.org, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On 21/1/14 11:05 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
> >
> > I've posted this to ipsec as well. They said that we need a better=20
> normative reference for the functions. DJB's papers discuss security=20
> properties and link to source code, but don't have a good definition.
> >
>
> Are you reading the same paper I am? He defines Salsa and ChaCha in=20
> terms of applying a well defined quarter round function to the rows=20
> and diagonals of a 4x4 matrix.
>

I'm reading this one:
http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf

It's mixing description, comparison with Salsa20, security analysis and=20
performance data. That's fine for a paper. I could probably write an=20
implementation based on that, but I would have very little confidence=20
that it is correct.

For RFCs, we like to have a clear document that is as short as possible, =

and has a very clear definition, and a few test vectors so an=20
implementer can check their code.

I'm not totally convinced by Yaron's response ([1]), but I'd rather not=20
be forced to repeat much of the algorithm in my draft, as Adam did in=20
sections 3 & 4 of [2].

Yoav

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg08929.html
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On Jan 21, 2014, at 10:58 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:

>=20
>> You've changed the AEAD by switching the length values from uint64le
>> to uint32be. Seems unnecessary.
>=20
> I'll change it back. For some reason I thought AES-GCM for IPsec was like=
 that, but looking again, I see that it isn't.

Looking into GCM, I see two other things:
 1. The lengths there are big-endian ("...a 64-bit string containing the no=
nnegative integer describing the number of bits in its argument, with the l=
east significant bit on the right.")
 2. The lengths there are the number of bits, not bytes.

Big-endian always seemed to me to be more "natural" because most binary pro=
tocols transmit numbers that way, but I don't think there's any reason to c=
ount bits, is there?

Yoav


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

My concern is essentially this:

Assume a curve that we'll call 1234-56 for some reason. If it's a nominally=
 Edwards curve (like 414-19, fka Curve3617), it can (and will) appear in Ed=
wards, twisted Edwards, and Montgomery forms. There are lots of good reason=
s for flopping it around and doing arcane things with it.

On the one hand, one might want to transport the curve in any of those form=
ats. The primary purpose of a standard is for interoperability. Thus, havin=
g a way to know what form a curve is transported in is a good idea.

On the other hand, having many names for things causes questions and confus=
ion because you then have to explain why the different names are really the=
 same thing. Elliptic curves are hard enough as it is.

On the third hand, it might even be good to have a single *transport* forma=
t and just pick one. Force people to transport in one format.

On the fourth hand, is that *really* going to cause less confusion than hav=
ing a name for each format?

See -- I don't have an answer here. With my standards hat on, I tend toward=
s the third hand. Define *a* transport format and have just one. With my cr=
ypto hat on, some crypto people would cheer that, and others wouldn't. Eith=
er way, there's chance for error.

	Jon


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Chopping out curves
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On Jan 16, 2014, at 6:36 PM, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:

> Uh I meant the Curve25519 and Curve3617.  Sorry about that (again conflat=
ing
> safe curves and the Bernstein/Lange curves by the same authors.)

For what it's worth, I'm using Curve414-19 (fka Curve3617) and it would be =
nice to have it in standards. Not having it in standards isn't going to mak=
e me change.

	Jon


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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Jan 21 21:13:00 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> My concern is essentially this:

Let me reduce the number of hands you have to deal with.

>
> Assume a curve that we'll call 1234-56 for some reason. If it's a nominal=
ly Edwards curve (like 414-19, fka Curve3617), it can (and will) appear in =
Edwards, twisted Edwards, and Montgomery forms. There are lots of good reas=
ons for flopping it around and doing arcane things with it.

Not our problem: if an implementation does something arcane, and it
gets the right answer, it isn't a problem if our standard doesn't
explain what it does. The issue would be if protocols were likely to
do arcane things, and it was useful to put them in this draft as well.

>
> On the one hand, one might want to transport the curve in any of those fo=
rmats. The primary purpose of a standard is for interoperability. Thus, hav=
ing a way to know what form a curve is transported in is a good idea.
>
> On the other hand, having many names for things causes questions and conf=
usion because you then have to explain why the different names are really t=
he same thing. Elliptic curves are hard enough as it is.

Not the same, isomorphic. Ed25519 isn't the same as Curve25519, they
are isomorphic curves. Does it matter to implementors if they are
isomorphic or not? Not really: the formulas work, and those who get it
can take advantage of that fact.

>
> On the third hand, it might even be good to have a single *transport* for=
mat and just pick one. Force people to transport in one format.

Currently my idea is each curve name has a specified format. How is
this confusing?

>
> On the fourth hand, is that *really* going to cause less confusion than h=
aving a name for each format?
>
> See -- I don't have an answer here. With my standards hat on, I tend towa=
rds the third hand. Define *a* transport format and have just one. With my =
crypto hat on, some crypto people would cheer that, and others wouldn't. Ei=
ther way, there's chance for error.

Here is the problem in a nutshell: some protocols can get away with
transporting only an x-coordinate, and some cannot. For those that
can,
Montgomery ladders naturally work on the twist as well as on the
original curve, so there is no issue with a missing check causing
problems.

However, if the transport format requires a y coordinate, than
Montgomery ladder implementations have to do some extra work to
transmit. The extra work isn't prohibitive, but given that we aren't
adding points, it seems a bit useless to do that work.

We've already crossed the Rubicon when we decided not everything was a
short Weierstrass curve. The zero, one, many rule still seems good to
me.

When an implementation uses an Edwards curve, it needs to reconstruct
points correctly. This is involves a check of being a quadratic
residue or the correct answer to a square root, which if missing isn't
an interop problem but a potential security issue for ECDH. However,
the extra bit for exact reconstruction is free when packing.

With signature schemes the natural approach is to use Edwards curves
and take full advantage of batching. This can't be done with
Montgomery ladder, and as the exponents (except for the signature
creation exponent) are public (well, random, but revealing them after
you start can't hurt you) Edwards curves can use Bos-Coster algorithm
for very high verification speed. Forcing an Edwards curve to pack to
Montgomery form is a waste of time, given that the receiver is going
to be using Edwards form anyway.

I've not seen a strong argument for using a unique form per
isomorphism class. ECDH can work on Edwards curves if implementation
size is an issue. Robert Ransom argues that as small Edwards d leads
to fast Montgomery arithmetic, we should specify only Edwards curves,
and the equivalent Montgomery form, but he wants a single point format
that requires reconstructing y for a Montgomery ladder and turning
points into Montgomery points. (Ask him why it makes sense: I
disagree).

For a protocol like MQV, Edwards form would still make sense.
Implementations could use the Montgomery ladder and reconstruction for
the single-exponents, and take full advantage of Shamir's trick on an
Edwards curve for the final key. But MQV isn't used because of
patents, and it isn't that useful. I don't see a reason to expand the
draft's scope to support this niche case with an implementation
strategy that isn't strictly necessary.

Hopefully this explains my position and the issues more clearly then
my prior emails.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
>         Jon
>
>
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> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
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Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
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From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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--047d7b33cad2f242c204f08ba934
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>
> > ("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more descriptive
> name
> > for this curve that is actually helpful.)
>
> NIST isn't useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.
>

I'm fine with "Curve-255-19" (plus possibly a postfix) given that
"Curve25519" is a reasonably well-known and reasonably unique name in the
research literature, but I think that "Curve" is much worse a prefix than
"NIST".  While the latter also doesn't tell you anything specific about a
given curve, at least it tells you who assigned that name, whereas "Curve"
is more of a generic honorific than an actual name (curves without "Curve"
in their name are curves just as much as the others).

--047d7b33cad2f242c204f08ba934
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im">&gt; (&quot;Curve&quot; isn&#3=
9;t very descriptive, but I&#39;ve yet to see a more descriptive name<br>

&gt; for this curve that is actually helpful.)<br>
<br>
</div>NIST isn&#39;t useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.<br></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m fine with &quot;Curve-255-19&quot; (p=
lus possibly a postfix) given that &quot;Curve25519&quot; is a reasonably w=
ell-known and reasonably unique name in the research literature, but I thin=
k that &quot;Curve&quot; is much worse a prefix than &quot;NIST&quot;. =A0W=
hile the latter also doesn&#39;t tell you anything specific about a given c=
urve, at least it tells you who assigned that name, whereas &quot;Curve&quo=
t; is more of a generic honorific than an actual name (curves without &quot=
;Curve&quot; in their name are curves just as much as the others).</div>
<div><br></div></div></div></div>

--047d7b33cad2f242c204f08ba934--

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Jan 22 08:10:45 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 1:22 AM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote:
>> > ("Curve" isn't very descriptive, but I've yet to see a more descriptive
>> > name
>> > for this curve that is actually helpful.)
>>
>> NIST isn't useful either as a prefix, but we live with it.
>
>
> I'm fine with "Curve-255-19" (plus possibly a postfix) given that
> "Curve25519" is a reasonably well-known and reasonably unique name in the
> research literature, but I think that "Curve" is much worse a prefix than
> "NIST".  While the latter also doesn't tell you anything specific about a
> given curve, at least it tells you who assigned that name, whereas "Curve"
> is more of a generic honorific than an actual name (curves without "Curve"
> in their name are curves just as much as the others).

So let's drop curve and replace with E, M, or TE to represent the
shape. For the possible generations
(which would support code size reductions with multiple curves over
the same primes) we could use m1,m2 etc.

My alternative is  g1p255-19m486662. g1p indicates genus 1 over a
prime field, 255-19 designates the prime, m486662 indicates
that is the montgomery curve with constant 486662. The problem with
this naming scheme is that it involves remembering a bunch of
constants.

Honestly, if someone could suggest a good naming scheme, I'm all ears.
But names aren't that important: the discussion over encoding formats
is much more important. Using the Safecurves names doesn't appear to
have anything wrong with it, and ends this stupid bikeshedding.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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--089e015367ecdde6cd04f091a3c2
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That's why I said that I'm fine with using something like "Curve-255-19"
(plus a prefix).

--089e015367ecdde6cd04f091a3c2
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<div dir="ltr">That&#39;s why I said that I&#39;m fine with using something like &quot;Curve-255-19&quot; (plus a prefix).<div><br></div><br></div>

--089e015367ecdde6cd04f091a3c2--

From kmigoe@nsa.gov  Wed Jan 22 09:30:04 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: "'dan@geer.org'" <dan@geer.org>, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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References: Your message of "Tue, 07 Jan 2014 13:05:31 PST." <CEF1A5BF.2BBC6%paul@marvell.com> <20140110171000.15EB92280EA@palinka.tinho.net>
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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If we were to put "key centric" on the CFRG agenda for IETF-89, do we=20
have a speaker willing to give a presentation?  If this is too short of a=20
deadline to meet, we can always have a presentation at a later meeting?

Three options:=20
	1) discuss at nest meeting
	2) discuss in the near future but not at the next meeting
	3) no support for a presentation in the near future. Maybe sometime later.
	4) Utter silence on the mailing list.

As to #4, the Germans have a saying "Keine Antwort ist auch eine Antwort"
(no is answer is also an answer).

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of dan@geer.org
> Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:10 PM
> To: Paul Lambert
> Cc: Sean Turner; David McGrew; cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
>=20
>=20
>  > A useful mechanism, but it would be better to start with reexamining
> and  > redefining our usage of public keys.  Specifically - I'm an
> advocate of  > keys as the primary identifiers.  A "key centric"
> approach is a dual model
>  > to Kohnfelder/X.509   The SDSI/SPKI work did progress work in this
>  > direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.
>=20
> Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is it not?
>=20
> I rather doubt that the Administration's push for the NSTIC is likely
> to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborate on your
> preference for it?  I'm sympathetic to it on the grounds that it
> directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentation.
>=20
> If I'm being obtuse, feel free to say so.
>=20
> --dan
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From paul@marvell.com  Wed Jan 22 11:14:23 2014
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 11:14:09 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] New names for draft-ladd-safecurves
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On 1/22/14, 8:10 AM, "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:


>Honestly, if someone could suggest a good naming scheme, I'm all ears.

I=B9m skeptical about the size of your ears, but here is some text suitable
for an RFC on the topic of curve identifiers for the clear naming and
identification of elliptic curves (attached below).

Paul

- - - - - -

Curve Identifiers

Curve identifiers are uniquely identify a class of elliptic curves and a
specific set of domain parameters for the curve type.

The first two characters of the curve identifier represent the curve type:
   mo - Montgomery curve
   ed - Edwards curve
   te - Twisted Edwards curve
   sm - Small Weierstrass curve

The third character of the identifier describes the field type:
   P - prime field Fp
   T - binary field F2m

The digits (usually 3) following the field type represent the order of the
field base 2 (255 for p =3D 2^255-19).

Following the field size digits, characters and digits are used to
indicate origin and version of the parameters.  Where a set of isogenous
curves are described these characters should be the same for each of the
related parameter sets.

- - -   end text - - -

Example entry for inclusion in a catalog for the documentation and
categorization of elliptic curves for use in Internet protocols.

- - -  catalog entry - - -




    curveId =3D =8CmoP521s1=B9    # also known as =8CM521=B9
    strength =3D 259
    oid =3D None
    p  =3D 2**521-1
    d  =3D -376014
    xG =3D=20
0x752cb45c48648b189df90cb2296b2878a3bfd9f42fc6c818ec8bf3c9c0c62039\
          =20
13f6ecc5ccc72434b1ae949d568fc99c6059d0fb13364838aa302a940a2f19ba6c
    yG =3D 12
    order  =3D 2**519 - 3375547632585017057891076304187826360719\
                      04961214051226618635150085779108655765
    order =3D=20
0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff\
             =20
fd15b6c64746fc85f736b8af5e7ec53f04fbd8c4569a8f1f4540ea2435f5180d6b
    cofactor =3D 4




[B1] Diego F. Aranha, Paulo Barreto, Geovandro Pereira and Jefferson E.
Ricardini, "A note on high-security general-purpose elliptic curves=B2,
http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647.pdf, 2012.

- - -    - - -




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Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
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Hi cfrg folks,


Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographic
primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized
by conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of
these primitives.

We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves)
which provide efficient operations of a pairing.
The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly useful
for realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing and 
parameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.

We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based 
primitives in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.

We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works.

Best,
Kohei KASAMATSU
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.


         Title           : Barreto-Naehrig Curves
         Authors         : Kohei Kasamatsu
                           Satoru Kanno
                           Tetsutaro Kobayashi
                           Yuto Kawahara
	Filename        : draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2014-01-09

Abstract:
    Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing
    cryptographic primitives.  In this memo, we specify domain parameters
    of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5].  The BN-curve is an elliptic
    curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security
    and efficiency of cryptographic schemes.  This memo specifies domain
    parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtain
    efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384, and
    512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].
    Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of
    elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open
    source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type
    respectively[21].


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

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From mike@shiftleft.org  Wed Jan 22 16:46:44 2014
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From: Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Cc: kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp, kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp, cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
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Hello Kohei and company,

It=92s cool to see pairing-friendly curves specced.  I=92ve always found =
the applications of these curves fascinating, so progress toward =
deploying them is very nice to see.

But isn=92t 512 bits rather large for a BN curve?  If you=92re going to =
have a curve that large, it seems to me that you=92d want an embedding =
degree of at least 18 even though it costs you a giant cofactor.  A =
curve with a 512-bit prime and a 384-bit subgroup might get you to the =
192-bit security level.  This would take a 640-bit BN curve at minimum, =
with 720 a more conservative guess.

Source: Freeman 2006, http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/372.pdf.  My knowledge =
on this subject is dated, so I=92m sure you know better...

Cheers,
=97 Mike Hamburg

On Jan 22, 2014, at 4:04 PM, Kohei Kasamatsu =
<kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp> wrote:

> Hi cfrg folks,
>=20
>=20
> Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow =
cryptographic
> primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized
> by conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one =
of
> these primitives.
>=20
> We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves =
(BN-curves)
> which provide efficient operations of a pairing.
> The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly =
useful
> for realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing =
and parameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.
>=20
> We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based =
primitives in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.
>=20
> We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and =
works.
>=20
> Best,
> Kohei KASAMATSU
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
> Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
>=20
>=20
>        Title           : Barreto-Naehrig Curves
>        Authors         : Kohei Kasamatsu
>                          Satoru Kanno
>                          Tetsutaro Kobayashi
>                          Yuto Kawahara
> 	Filename        : draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
> 	Pages           : 15
> 	Date            : 2014-01-09
>=20
> Abstract:
>   Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing
>   cryptographic primitives.  In this memo, we specify domain =
parameters
>   of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5].  The BN-curve is an =
elliptic
>   curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security
>   and efficiency of cryptographic schemes.  This memo specifies domain
>   parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtain
>   efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384, =
and
>   512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].
>   Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of
>   elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open
>   source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type
>   respectively[21].
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Hello Kohei and =
company,</div><div><br></div><div>It=92s cool to see pairing-friendly =
curves specced. &nbsp;I=92ve always found the applications of these =
curves fascinating, so progress toward deploying them is very nice to =
see.</div><div><br></div><div>But isn=92t 512 bits rather large for a BN =
curve? &nbsp;If you=92re going to have a curve that large, it seems to =
me that you=92d want an embedding degree of at least 18 even though it =
costs you a giant cofactor. &nbsp;A curve with a 512-bit prime and a =
384-bit subgroup might get you to the 192-bit security level. &nbsp;This =
would take a 640-bit BN curve at minimum, with 720 a more conservative =
guess.</div><div><br></div><div>Source: Freeman 2006,&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/372.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/3=
72.pdf</a>. &nbsp;My knowledge on this subject is dated, so I=92m sure =
you know better...</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>=97 Mike =
Hamburg</div><div><br></div><div><div>On Jan 22, 2014, at 4:04 PM, Kohei =
Kasamatsu &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp">kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.j=
p</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Hi cfrg folks,<br><br><br>Elliptic curves with a special =
map called a pairing allow cryptographic<br>primitives to achieve =
functions or efficiency which cannot be realized<br>by conventional =
mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of<br>these =
primitives.<br><br>We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig =
curves (BN-curves)<br>which provide efficient operations of a =
pairing.<br>The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are =
particularly useful<br>for realization of efficient cryptographic =
schemes based on pairing and parameters of BN-curves which are compliant =
with ISO/IEC 15946-5.<br><br>We will propose I-Ds on computation of =
pairing and pairing-based primitives in order to contribute to IETF =
community in the near future.<br><br>We would appreciate your comments =
and suggestions on our I-D and works.<br><br>Best,<br>Kohei =
KASAMATSU<br>-------- Original Message --------<br>Subject: I-D Action: =
draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<br>Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 =
-0800<br>From: <a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a><br>R=
eply-To: <a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a><br>T=
o: <a =
href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.org</a><br><br><br=
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.<br><br><br> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Title =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: =
Barreto-Naehrig Curves<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Authors =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: Kohei Kasamatsu<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;Satoru Kanno<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;Tetsutaro Kobayashi<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;Yuto Kawahara<br><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Filename =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: =
draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<br><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Pages =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: =
15<br><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>Date =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: =
2014-01-09<br><br>Abstract:<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;Elliptic curves with pairing =
are useful tools for constructing<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;cryptographic =
primitives. &nbsp;In this memo, we specify domain parameters<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5]. &nbsp;The BN-curve =
is an elliptic<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;curve suitable for pairings and allows us =
to achieve high security<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;and efficiency of cryptographic =
schemes. &nbsp;This memo specifies domain<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;parameters of =
two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtain<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, =
384, and<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with =
ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;Furthermore, this memo organizes =
differences between types of<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;elliptic curves specified =
in ISO document and often used in open<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;source softwares, =
which are called M-type and D-type<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;respectively[21].<br><br><br>The IETF datatracker status =
page for this draft is:<br><a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/">https:=
//datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/</a><br><br>There's =
also a htmlized version available =
at:<br>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00<br><br><br>P=
lease note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission<br>until the htmlized version and diff are available at =
tools.ietf.org.<br><br>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous =
FTP =
at:<br>ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/<br><br>________________________=
_______________________<br>I-D-Announce mailing =
list<br>I-D-Announce@ietf.org<br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d=
-announce<br>Internet-Draft directories: =
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html<br>or =
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt<br><br><br><br><br>_____________=
__________________________________<br>Cfrg mailing =
list<br>Cfrg@irtf.org<br>http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg<br></bl=
ockquote></div><br></body></html>=

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Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 17:13:40 +1100
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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Jan 22 22:56:23 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Change of point formats
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Dear all,
After thinking about it for a while, I discovered an argument that
changed my opinion about point formats. Robert Ransom's suggestion to
use a sign for an Edwards x and send the body of a Montgomery x is
much better then it looks like at first.

The argument is as follows: right now the proposed format forces a
protocol to decide whether a point will be used in addition or not.
For most applications this is perfectly fine, and the efficiency
considerations mitigate against Robert Ransom's proposal.

But there is one application for which this is not ideal: Tor. The Tor
developers would love to smuggle in a point that can be added in the
place where one that cannot lives. Add to it the possibility of using
one implementation for everything, and I see a lot of value in this
idea.

Supporting this proposal involves some dramatic changes to the draft.
For one thing Montgomery form with reciprocals of small integers will
have to be introduced. Several curves (and I don't know which yet)
will have to vanish because they are not amenable to this trick.

I'm also considering adding the Elligator map, given its usefulness
when uniform representations are required.

Anyway, several more days, possibly even a few weekends before the
next version comes out.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From mcgrew@cisco.com  Thu Jan 23 06:54:28 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] questions on performance and side channel resistance for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec and TLS
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Hi Adam and Yoav,

I have some questions and comments on these crypto algorithms and their 
use in TLS and IPsec.

On 01/21/2014 01:06 PM, Adam Langley wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>> Reviews and comments would be greatly appreciated, as well as anyone checking my examples.
> In the introduction: I think ChaCha20+Poly1305 are useful for software
> implementations, beyond their use as a backup to AES. AES in not
> suitable for pure, software implementations and they tend to be be
> slow and have side-channels. (AES-GCM even more so.)

The claims that ChaCha20+Poly1305 are faster than AES GCM in pure 
software environments should be quantified in (at least one of) the 
drafts.   I am not challenging the fact that ChaCha20+Poly1305 will 
perform better than a side-channel resistant implementation of AES GCM 
on some processors, and I support the development of an alternative AEAD 
mechanism for TLS, for diversity's sake even if there were no other 
considerations.   But as performance is cited as a motivation for 
adoption, it is important to document the true state of affairs by 
citing some relevant performance study for the combined AEAD algorithm, 
or at the very least extrapolate the performance of the combined 
algorithm from published performance of the constituent algorithms.

The important questions that I see:

- how much faster is ChaCha20+Poly1305 on typical 16 or 32-bit 
processors, when no hardware support for AES or GF multiplication are 
available?   The most interesting "typical" processor, I think, would be 
a mobile phone class processor, like a Snapdragon.

- how much slower is ChaCha20+Poly1305 when that hardware support is 
available?

It would also be interesting to look into the power used by the 
different algorithms, since battery life is important on mobile devices.

Another goal for this ciphersuite is to avoid side channel attacks, 
though it is not directly mentioned in the draft.    The design 
rationale for Salsa describes how timing channels are avoided by not 
using multiplication in that function.   However, Poly1305 uses *lots* 
of multiplication operations, by a fixed constant.  Unless I am missing 
something, this is an inconsistency with the motivation for the 
ciphersuite.  In any case, if Poly1305 requires implementation 
techniques to avoid side channels, they should be documented in the 
draft that specifies that function.

As a side note: the timing channels in GCM and Poly1305 can potentially 
leak the authentication key, but this would not affect 
confidentiality.   A timing channel in an AES implementation, on the 
other hand, could leak the encryption key.    So using ChaCha in some 
environments (a CPU small enough that bitslicing AES is unwieldy, for 
instance) seems well motivated.   Perhaps the timing channel on Poly1305 
is smaller than that of GHASH, at least for some implementation 
techniques, but regardless, the use of Poly1305 as a replacement for 
GHASH is less well motivated.

I assume that the timing channels are the major concern, and that the 
attack model is one in which an untrusted process running on a trusted 
operating system aims to discover the key of a ciphersuite in use by 
some other process.   It would be good to document that fact, to give 
implementers an idea of what the important channel is.   (Otherwise, 
they might mistakenly think that the attacker is only able to observe 
network traffic.)  Is it also a goal to avoid power analysis attacks?    
It would be good to document that fact, either way.

I think your goal here is to have both client and server use a 
hardware-friendly ciphersuite when they both have the right hardware, 
and to use a software-friendly ciphersuite otherwise. This would imply 
that the hardware-friendly ciphersuite comes first in the proposal when 
it is available; does it also mean that when the hardware support is 
absent, that the hardware-friendly ciphersuite is not offered?    Also, 
it seems that it would be necessary, in TLS, to have ciphersuites 
offered in hardware/software pairs, to ensure that an appropriate 
authentication method is available.   Maybe I misunderstood the goal, if 
so I trust that you will set me straight.   But if this is the goal, it 
would make sense to include guidance to this effect in the draft.

regards,

David



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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On 01/21/2014 05:08 PM, Adam Langley wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:53 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>> Looking into GCM, I see two other things:
>>   1. The lengths there are big-endian ("...a 64-bit string containing the nonnegative integer describing the number of bits in its argument, with the least significant bit on the right.")
>>   2. The lengths there are the number of bits, not bytes.
>>
>> Big-endian always seemed to me to be more "natural" because most binary protocols transmit numbers that way, but I don't think there's any reason to count bits, is there?
> There might be an implementation of GCM that supports bit lengths that
> are not a multiple of 8, but I'm not aware of it.

I'm not aware of it either, if it exists.

With GCM, we took this strategy: make the inputs and outputs octet 
strings, since that is what really matters in the real world, but then 
use the number of bits in the computation of the authentication tag 
rather than the number of bytes, so that it would be possible for 
someone else to define a bit-oriented version of the algorithm if they 
really need to.

> I think little-endian makes more sense in a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD
> because everything else in the AEAD (ChaCha and Poly1305) is handled
> as little-endian.
>
> (I've also done enough implementations of the arithmetic that I find
> little-endian to be preferable in general, but that might just be
> brain damage.)
>

For what it is worth, little endian has a legitimate advantage in that 
enables better pipelining of multiplications.   But I think this is a 
six-or-half-dozen issue.

David

> Cheers
>
> AGL
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec
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Hi Yoav,

On 01/21/2014 04:25 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> On 21/1/14 11:05 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>
>> >
>> > I've posted this to ipsec as well. They said that we need a better 
>> normative reference for the functions. DJB's papers discuss security 
>> properties and link to source code, but don't have a good definition.
>> >
>>
>> Are you reading the same paper I am? He defines Salsa and ChaCha in 
>> terms of applying a well defined quarter round function to the rows 
>> and diagonals of a 4x4 matrix.
>>
>
> I'm reading this one:
> http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
>
> It's mixing description, comparison with Salsa20, security analysis 
> and performance data. That's fine for a paper. I could probably write 
> an implementation based on that, but I would have very little 
> confidence that it is correct.


The "spec.pdf" file in the "Design, Specification, Security and Speed" 
zipfile submitted to ESTREAM might be useful to you 
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/e2-salsa20.html

David

>
> For RFCs, we like to have a clear document that is as short as 
> possible, and has a very clear definition, and a few test vectors so 
> an implementer can check their code.
>
> I'm not totally convinced by Yaron's response ([1]), but I'd rather 
> not be forced to repeat much of the algorithm in my draft, as Adam did 
> in sections 3 & 4 of [2].
>
> Yoav
>
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg08929.html
> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
>


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Dear IAB and Mary Barnes,

On January 6 I emailed CFRG and the IAB objecting to the IRTF chair's
decision not to remove Kevin Igoe from CFRG co-chair.

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03778.html

On January 7 Mary Barnes, IAB Executive Director, emailed myself, the
IAB, and CFRG, and asked for "confirmation one way or the other as to
whether you are explicitly requesting the IAB consider this as an
official appeal, in which case we will deliberate and generate a
public response".

I confirmed to the same recipients that I wanted the appeal to be considered.

I haven't heard anything since.  Could the IAB confirm to the CFRG
list whether they are considering this appeal, and provide any
transparency on the process and timeline?


Trevor


On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 9:42 AM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 9:34 AM, Mary Barnes <mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi Trevor,
>>
>> I am the IAB Executive Director and we have a question as to whether you
>> would like the IAB to consider your response below as an official appeal
>> request?
>
> Hi Mary,
>
> Yes, if that's an option (I wasn't sure it was).
>
> Thanks for being on top of this.
>
>
> Trevor

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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] questions on performance and side channel resistance for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec and TLS
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On 1/23/14, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> Another goal for this ciphersuite is to avoid side channel attacks,
> though it is not directly mentioned in the draft.    The design
> rationale for Salsa describes how timing channels are avoided by not
> using multiplication in that function.   However, Poly1305 uses *lots*
> of multiplication operations, by a fixed constant.  Unless I am missing
> something, this is an inconsistency with the motivation for the
> ciphersuite.  In any case, if Poly1305 requires implementation
> techniques to avoid side channels, they should be documented in the
> draft that specifies that function.

Dr. Bernstein's original implementation of Poly1305 used the IA-32
floating-point unit to avoid timing leaks on the processors available
in 2005.  My understanding is that essentially all modern processors
have constant-time integer multipliers, so special implementation
techniques are no longer required.


Robert Ransom

From paul@marvell.com  Thu Jan 23 10:37:45 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>, "'dan@geer.org'" <dan@geer.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 10:37:01 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Hi Kevin,

On 1/22/14, 9:29 AM, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:

>If we were to put "key centric" on the CFRG agenda for IETF-89, do we
>have a speaker willing to give a presentation?
Thank you for your interest in the topic. I would be very willing and
interested in presenting on =8Ckey centric=B9, however for the first time
in many years the IETF is occurring the same week as the Wi-Fi
Alliance =8A so I=B9m not available that week.

>If this is too short of a
>deadline to meet, we can always have a presentation at a later meeting?
Yes.  That would work well.

Paul

>
>Three options:=20
>	1) discuss at nest meeting
>	2) discuss in the near future but not at the next meeting
>	3) no support for a presentation in the near future. Maybe sometime
>later.
>	4) Utter silence on the mailing list.
>
>As to #4, the Germans have a saying "Keine Antwort ist auch eine Antwort"
>(no is answer is also an answer).
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of dan@geer.org
>> Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:10 PM
>> To: Paul Lambert
>> Cc: Sean Turner; David McGrew; cfrg@irtf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
>>=20
>>=20
>>  > A useful mechanism, but it would be better to start with reexamining
>> and  > redefining our usage of public keys.  Specifically - I'm an
>> advocate of  > keys as the primary identifiers.  A "key centric"
>> approach is a dual model
>>  > to Kohnfelder/X.509   The SDSI/SPKI work did progress work in this
>>  > direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.
>>=20
>> Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is it not?
>>=20
>> I rather doubt that the Administration's push for the NSTIC is likely
>> to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborate on your
>> preference for it?  I'm sympathetic to it on the grounds that it
>> directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentation.
>>=20
>> If I'm being obtuse, feel free to say so.
>>=20
>> --dan
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
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 Hi Kohei,

Regarding your statement in Section 6, "The elliptic curve that supports a
bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following problems, since the
security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives is based on hardness of
these problems."  You then list the ECDLP, ECDHP, BDHP, and ECDLP with
auxiliary inputs.

I would be hesitant to suggest all pairing-based cryptographic primitives
are based on the hardness of only those problems...it's conceivable that a
pairing-based scheme could be based on another hard problem, such as
solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See, for example, Section 6 of
"Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and Applications to Pairing Based
Cryptography" by Broker, Charles, Lauter, or "Improved algorithm for the
isogeny problem for ordinary elliptic curves" by Galbraith & Stolbunov.)

Best,
Laura



-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Kohei Kasamatsu
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 6:04 PM
To: cfrg@irtf.org
Cc: kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp; kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp
Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt

Hi cfrg folks,


Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographic
primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized by
conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of these
primitives.

We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves)
which provide efficient operations of a pairing.
The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly useful for
realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing and
parameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.

We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based primitives
in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.

We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works.

Best,
Kohei KASAMATSU
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.


         Title           : Barreto-Naehrig Curves
         Authors         : Kohei Kasamatsu
                           Satoru Kanno
                           Tetsutaro Kobayashi
                           Yuto Kawahara
        Filename        : draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
        Pages           : 15
        Date            : 2014-01-09

Abstract:
    Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing
    cryptographic primitives.  In this memo, we specify domain parameters
    of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5].  The BN-curve is an elliptic
    curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security
    and efficiency of cryptographic schemes.  This memo specifies domain
    parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtain
    efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384, and
    512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].
    Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of
    elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open
    source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type
    respectively[21].


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at
tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

_______________________________________________
I-D-Announce mailing list
I-D-Announce@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
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http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--001a11c3e84c2169d304f0a9658d
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
Hi Kohei,<br>
<br>
Regarding your statement in Section 6, &quot;The elliptic curve that suppor=
ts a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following problems, sinc=
e the security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives is based on hardne=
ss of these problems.&quot; =A0You then list the ECDLP, ECDHP, BDHP, and EC=
DLP with auxiliary inputs.<br>


<br>
I would be hesitant to suggest all pairing-based cryptographic primitives a=
re based on the hardness of only those problems...it&#39;s conceivable that=
 a pairing-based scheme could be based on another hard problem, such as sol=
ving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See, for example, Section 6 of &quo=
t;Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and Applications to Pairing Based Crypt=
ography&quot; by Broker, Charles, Lauter, or &quot;Improved algorithm for t=
he isogeny problem for ordinary elliptic curves&quot; by Galbraith &amp; St=
olbunov.)<br>


<br>
Best,<br>
Laura<br>


<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 <br></p><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org" target=3D"_blan=
k">cfrg-bounces@irtf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Kohei Kasamatsu<br>
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 6:04 PM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br=
>
Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp" target=3D"_blank">=
kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:kawahara.yuto@lab.=
ntt.co.jp" target=3D"_blank">kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp</a><br>
Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<br>
<br>
Hi cfrg folks,<br>
<br>
<br>
Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographic pri=
mitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized by conv=
entional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of these pri=
mitives.<br>


<br>
We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves) whi=
ch provide efficient operations of a pairing.<br>
The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly useful for=
 realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing and parame=
ters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.<br>
<br>
We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based primitives=
 in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.<br>
<br>
We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Kohei KASAMATSU<br>
-------- Original Message --------<br>
Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<br>
Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">interne=
t-drafts@ietf.org</a><br>
Reply-To: <a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">int=
ernet-drafts@ietf.org</a><br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">i-d-announce=
@ietf.org</a><br>
<br>
<br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
<br>
<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Barreto-Naehrig Curves<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Authors =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Kohei Kasamatsu<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Satoru Kanno<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Tetsutaro Kobayashi<=
br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Yuto Kawahara<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<b=
r>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 15<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2014-01-09<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=A0 =A0 Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing<br>
=A0 =A0 cryptographic primitives. =A0In this memo, we specify domain parame=
ters<br>
=A0 =A0 of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5]. =A0The BN-curve is an elli=
ptic<br>
=A0 =A0 curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security<=
br>
=A0 =A0 and efficiency of cryptographic schemes. =A0This memo specifies dom=
ain<br>
=A0 =A0 parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtai=
n<br>
=A0 =A0 efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384, a=
nd<br>
=A0 =A0 512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].<br>
=A0 =A0 Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of<br>
=A0 =A0 elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open<br=
>
=A0 =A0 source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type<br>
=A0 =A0 respectively[21].<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/" targ=
et=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/</a=
><br>
<br>
There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00" target=
=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://to=
ols.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp=
.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
I-D-Announce mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:I-D-Announce@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">I-D-Announce@iet=
f.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announceInternet-Draft=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce<br>
Internet-Draft</a> directories: <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html"=
 target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html</a> or <a href=3D"ftp://=
ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt" target=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/i=
etf/1shadow-sites.txt</a><br>


<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank">htt=
p://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</div><br></div>

--001a11c3e84c2169d304f0a9658d--

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Thu Jan 23 14:18:37 2014
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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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This is relevant to CFRG discussions as well, and I don't know whether
everyone on the CFRG list is also subscribed to the TLS list.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 13:37:18 -0800
Subject: Re: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
To: Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org>
Cc: tls@ietf.org

On 1/23/14, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 1/23/14, Manuel P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org> wrote:
>> On 23/01/2014 02:17, Robert Ransom wrote:

>>> * If you do not add a leading point-format byte, there is no reason to
>>> specify the meaning of the high bit in this document.  If you do add a
>>> leading byte, you will have to choose in this document whether the
>>> sign bit is for the Edwards-form x coordinate or the Montgomery-form y
>>> coordinate.
>>>
>> Or we could add a leading byte now and say that the meaning of the msb i=
s
>> not
>> defined yet an reserved for future use (which is what you suggest anyway=
,
>> IIUC).
>> Then a future document could update the meaning of this leading byte.
>
> I think that's easiest (provided that current implementations also
> accept 64-byte points and discard the second half; see below).

On further thought, there is a major technical benefit to sending
(either all of or a sign bit for) the Edwards-form x coordinate rather
than the Montgomery-form y coordinate.  Denoting the Montgomery-form
point as (u, v) and the Edwards-form point as (x, y), the isomorphism
from Montgomery form to Edwards form computes x =3D 2 u/v, which is
undefined for the point of order 2 (Montgomery (0, 0)).

I think that issue, combined with the fact that implementations which
use the sign bit will almost certainly use Edwards form internally,
should rule out any use of a Montgomery-form y coordinate in any
current or future protocol.

Since Curve25519's coordinate field order is congruent to 5 mod 8,
there is no notion of =E2=80=98principal square root=E2=80=99, and thus no =
plausible
alternative to using the least significant bit of a coordinate as its
sign bit.  So there is only one likely choice of sign bit for
Curve25519 group elements, and that is the LSB of the Edwards-form x
coordinate.

Now that I'm not worried about what will eventually be chosen as the
sign bit, the only reason I can see to use a leading magic byte in the
point format is to distinguish =E2=80=98the sender did not compute the sign
bit of this point=E2=80=99 from =E2=80=98the sender computed the sign bit o=
f this
point, and it is 0=E2=80=99.  I have previously suggested that distinguishi=
ng
those cases could be useful, but now I think mitigation of
implementation fingerprinting is more important -- I see no reason to
advertise whether an implementation computes the sign bit of its group
elements or not, even if an attacker could infer that piece of
information after a series of connections.


Robert Ransom

From frodo@baggins.org  Thu Jan 23 15:28:28 2014
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Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 23:28:13 +0000
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From: Matt Caswell <frodo@baggins.org>
To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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On 23 January 2014 06:13, Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> I have implemented OCB authenticated encryption as per
> draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05.
>
> I concur with the sample results in Appendix A.
>
>
>
> The sample results include 16 { aad, plaintext, ciphertext} tuples, but they
> are all for a tag length of 128.
>
> It would be nice to include 1 similar sample with another tag length (in
> addition to the final section of Appendix A that does include results for
> other tag lengths, but only after a more complex combination of 385
> encryptions).

For info, in my own OCB implementation I used the following additional
sample result with alternative tag length (96 bits). This was
generated using the reference implementation. Key and nonce as per the
other samples:

A: 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
18191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
P: 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
18191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627
C:09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C21
4FF6567ADA08A96766FC4E2EE3E3A5A11B6C44F34E3ABB3CBF8976E7

I have validated this against my own implementation (a patch for
OpenSSL) available here:

https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3181&user=guest&pass=guest

Regards

Matt

From crypto@brainhub.org  Thu Jan 23 17:04:32 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 01/23/2014 02:18 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> This is relevant to CFRG discussions as well, and I don't know whether
> everyone on the CFRG list is also subscribed to the TLS list.
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
> Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 13:37:18 -0800
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
> To: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
>
> On 1/23/14, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 1/23/14, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org> wrote:
>>> On 23/01/2014 02:17, Robert Ransom wrote:
>>>> * If you do not add a leading point-format byte, there is no reason to
>>>> specify the meaning of the high bit in this document.  If you do add a
>>>> leading byte, you will have to choose in this document whether the
>>>> sign bit is for the Edwards-form x coordinate or the Montgomery-form y
>>>> coordinate.
>>>>
>>> Or we could add a leading byte now and say that the meaning of the msb is
>>> not
>>> defined yet an reserved for future use (which is what you suggest anyway,
>>> IIUC).
>>> Then a future document could update the meaning of this leading byte.
>> I think that's easiest (provided that current implementations also
>> accept 64-byte points and discard the second half; see below).
> On further thought, there is a major technical benefit to sending
> (either all of or a sign bit for) the Edwards-form x coordinate rather
> than the Montgomery-form y coordinate.  Denoting the Montgomery-form
> point as (u, v) and the Edwards-form point as (x, y), the isomorphism
> from Montgomery form to Edwards form computes x = 2 u/v, which is
> undefined for the point of order 2 (Montgomery (0, 0)).
>
> I think that issue, combined with the fact that implementations which
> use the sign bit will almost certainly use Edwards form internally,
> should rule out any use of a Montgomery-form y coordinate in any
> current or future protocol.
>
> Since Curve25519's coordinate field order is congruent to 5 mod 8,
> there is no notion of ‘principal square root’, and thus no plausible
> alternative to using the least significant bit of a coordinate as its
> sign bit.  So there is only one likely choice of sign bit for
> Curve25519 group elements, and that is the LSB of the Edwards-form x
> coordinate.

Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another 
method?

Traditionally the problem was solved by carrying 1 bit and then finding 
a place to fit it in and defining what it means, etc. There is another 
way. One can adjust the private key to make the coordinate that we drop, 
x in this case, be the smallest of the two possibilities.

The nice feature of my proposal is that you can still also encode the 
bit if you wish so, as you proposed.

>
> Now that I'm not worried about what will eventually be chosen as the
> sign bit, the only reason I can see to use a leading magic byte in the
> point format is to distinguish ‘the sender did not compute the sign
> bit of this point’ from ‘the sender computed the sign bit of this
> point, and it is 0’.  I have previously suggested that distinguishing
> those cases could be useful, but now I think mitigation of
> implementation fingerprinting is more important -- I see no reason to
> advertise whether an implementation computes the sign bit of its group
> elements or not, even if an attacker could infer that piece of
> information after a series of connections.

That's why I think that the party that generates the key needs to be 
nice to everybody and make the key "compliant". If you mandate a very 
fast adjustment Order-private_key (if you have to), there is no ambiguity.

In general, I think that whatever the encoding of the bit is, it needs 
to be fixed in the document.

( BTW, the proposal in the draft is in public domain since it was 
published on December 10, 2012. )

From ted@krovetz.net  Thu Jan 23 17:22:38 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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Thanks James for verifying the vectors.=20

I'm reluctant to modify the draft this substantially at this point in =
the process. Such a change might significantly delay its progress.

Although I agree that your selection of tests is probably better than =
those in the draft, I also believe that the vectors in the draft along =
with reference implementations is sufficient to produce a correct =
implementation.

-Ted

On Jan 22, 2014, at 10:13 PM, Manger, James =
<James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:

> I have implemented OCB authenticated encryption as per =
draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-05.
> I concur with the sample results in Appendix A.
> =20
> The sample results include 16 { aad, plaintext, ciphertext} tuples, =
but they are all for a tag length of 128.
> It would be nice to include 1 similar sample with another tag length =
(in addition to the final section of Appendix A that does include =
results for other tag lengths, but only after a more complex combination =
of 385 encryptions).
> =20
> The first 16 samples all use the same key and nonce.
> The last 9 samples involve reusing key & nonce pairs 3 times.
> A crucial feature of OCB is that a key & nonce pair MUST NOT be =
reused.
> The sample results should not violate this crucial condition.
> The samples might actually be hard to run in some implementations that =
take strong measures to prevent nonce reuse.
> =20
> I suggest using incrementing nonces for the samples:
> OLD
>    Each of the following (A,P,C) triples show the ciphertext C that
>    results from OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,A,P) when K and N are fixed with the
>    values
> =20
>    K : 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
>    N : 000102030405060708090A0B
> =20
> =20
>    An empty entry indicates the empty string.
> =20
>      A:
>      P:
>      C: 197B9C3C441D3C83EAFB2BEF633B9182
> =20
>      A: 0001020304050607
>      P: 0001020304050607
>      C: 92B657130A74B85A16DC76A46D47E1EAD537209E8A96D14E
>    ...
> =20
> NEW
>    Each of the following (N,A,P,C) tuples show the ciphertext C that
>    results from OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,A,P) when K is fixed with the
>    value
> =20
>    K : 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
> =20
> =20
>    An empty entry indicates the empty string. The nonces are =
incrementing.
> =20
>      N: BBAA99887766554433221100
>      A:
>      P:
>      C: 785407BFFFC8AD9EDCC5520AC9111EE6
> =20
>      N: BBAA99887766554433221101
>      A: 0001020304050607
>      P: 0001020304050607
>      C: 6820B3657B6F615A5725BDA0D3B4EB3A257C9AF1F8F03009
>    ...
> =20
> OLD
>    K =3D zeros(KEYLEN)                  // Keylength of AES in use
>    C =3D <empty string>
>    for i =3D 0 to 127 do
>       S =3D zeros(8i)                   // i bytes of zeros
>       N =3D zeros(88) || num2str(i,8)   // 11 byte zero then 1 byte i
>       C =3D C || OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,S,S)
>       C =3D C || OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,<empty string>,S)
>       C =3D C || OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,S,<empty string>)
>    end for
>    N =3D zeros(96)
>    Output : OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,C,<empty string>)
> =20
> NEW
>    K =3D zeros(KEYLEN)                  // Keylength of AES in use
>    C =3D <empty string>
>    for i =3D 0 to 127 do
>       S =3D zeros(8i)                   // i bytes of zeros
>       N =3D zeros(80) || num2str(i,8) || num2str(1,8)
>       C =3D C || OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,S,S)
>       N =3D zeros(80) || num2str(i,8) || num2str(2,8)
>       C =3D C || OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,<empty string>,S)
>       N =3D zeros(80) || num2str(i,8) || num2str(3,8)
>       C =3D C || OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,S,<empty string>)
>    end for
>    N =3D zeros(96)
>    Output : OCB-ENCRYPT(K,N,C,<empty string>)
> =20
>    ...and change the results accordingly...
> =20
> =20
> Other than these tweak to the samples, the OCB spec looks great.
> =20
> --
> James Manger
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From mike@shiftleft.org  Thu Jan 23 18:08:50 2014
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To: Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On Jan 23, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>=20
> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be =
another method?
>=20
> Traditionally the problem was solved by carrying 1 bit and then =
finding a place to fit it in and defining what it means, etc. There is =
another way. One can adjust the private key to make the coordinate that =
we drop, x in this case, be the smallest of the two possibilities.
>=20
> The nice feature of my proposal is that you can still also encode the =
bit if you wish so, as you proposed.

This is interesting, but I think it works better with the Edwards =
x-coordinate instead of the Montgomery y-coordinate.  That is, it =
applies well to Watson=92s (Montgomery x, Edwards x) representation.  =
This is because not every point you might want to transmit is a public =
key; it might be the product of something which does not support an easy =
negation, such as PAKE.  In this case, with your proposal, implementers =
have to send the sign bit, and we have two wire formats again.  But if =
the Edwards x-coordinate is used, you can also fast-adjust by adding the =
point of order 2, which maps EdX to -EdX.  (It maps EdY to -EdY and =
MontX to 1/MontX.)  If the protocol wipes out the cofactor (almost every =
protocol does for security reasons), then this is more likely to be =
acceptable than negating the point.

Then again, any discussion like this is fraught with issues about =
alternative encodings for non-wire formats, implementation =
compatibility, uniqueness, covert channels, etc.  Might take some =
hashing out.

Cheers,
=97 Mike=

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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 1/23/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:

> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another
> method?

> ( BTW, the proposal in the draft is in public domain since it was
> published on December 10, 2012. )

Are you claiming that the point format that I suggested is patented?


Robert Ransom

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Thu Jan 23 19:17:15 2014
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References: <87ob3456s1.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <CABqy+spt7BYqjsqLAkZssGp3aY9M+iLqV+pmyr7ZN-TXmJJpVg@mail.gmail.com> <52E060D0.9030801@polarssl.org> <CABqy+spJoswrPovxf18QS1SGdk6K=mfny6joJm3X24Vh65oagQ@mail.gmail.com> <52E0E241.40406@polarssl.org> <CABqy+sqs31ATDWJSum55m1o5pRvw8Wq5GtB-mF-hgP2emB5eFQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+sozYSOTh7pbUS2GXf=4kYV3zgztXZBa10Bx=s-N8zHHyA@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+soSojSMfx=yU9eFhmAeuJaJ_r=4h=RDR6JtOchYZ9zsQA@mail.gmail.com> <52E1BAE0.8060809@brainhub.org> <2311ADE0-B85D-4EEA-A675-03ED3735DE1D@shiftleft.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 19:17:12 -0800
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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 1/23/14, Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
> On Jan 23, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>
>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another
>> method?
>>
>> Traditionally the problem was solved by carrying 1 bit and then finding =
a
>> place to fit it in and defining what it means, etc. There is another way=
.
>> One can adjust the private key to make the coordinate that we drop, x in
>> this case, be the smallest of the two possibilities.
>>
>> The nice feature of my proposal is that you can still also encode the bi=
t
>> if you wish so, as you proposed.
>
> This is interesting, but I think it works better with the Edwards
> x-coordinate instead of the Montgomery y-coordinate.  That is, it applies
> well to Watson=E2=80=99s (Montgomery x, Edwards x) representation.  This =
is because
> not every point you might want to transmit is a public key; it might be t=
he
> product of something which does not support an easy negation, such as PAK=
E.
> In this case, with your proposal, implementers have to send the sign bit,
> and we have two wire formats again.  But if the Edwards x-coordinate is
> used, you can also fast-adjust by adding the point of order 2, which maps
> EdX to -EdX.  (It maps EdY to -EdY and MontX to 1/MontX.)  If the protoco=
l
> wipes out the cofactor (almost every protocol does for security reasons),
> then this is more likely to be acceptable than negating the point.

This makes point encoding to Montgomery-form x slightly less efficient
and more complex -- instead of computing (for the main coordinate)
Zinv=3D1/Z, then x=3DX*Zinv, this requires XZinv=3D1/(X*Z), then either
x=3DX^2*XZinv or xinv=3DZ^2*XZinv (conditional on the sign bit of the
Edwards-form x coordinate).  (I'm omitting the part where Zinv or
XZinv must be batched with the inversion to compute the Edwards-form x
coordinate and its sign bit.)

(It may still be worthwhile; I'm just pointing out exactly what effect
this would have on implementations.  I should also point out that the
Montgomery-form x coordinate can't distinguish the identity element
from the point of order 2.)


Robert Ransom

From execd@iab.org  Thu Jan 23 19:32:37 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] IAB Comments Regarding the IRTF CFRG chair
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The IAB thanks Trevor Perrin for his request for our review of the decision
made by the chair of the IRTF regarding Kevin Igoe as co-chair for the
CFRG.  We have taken Trevor Perrin's concerns and others' quite seriously,
as we do the functioning of the IRTF and the CFRG.  We have also taken
into account the comments that we have received from the community.

Sections 2  and 4 of RFC 2014 specify that changes to research groups
are to be sent to us by the chair of the IRTF.  The IAB has concluded
that the chair of the IRTF has, in accordance with RFC 2014,
properly and diligently exercised his responsibilities by investigating
the matter, taking community input, and providing a timely response
that addresses the points that were raised by Trevor Perrin and others.
In doing so, he has decided not to forward to us for consideration any
changes to the CFRG at this time.

While it is certainly true that positions of individuals are often aligned =

with those of their employers, RFC 2014 states: =E2=80=9CParticipation is b=
y =

individual contributors, rather than by representatives of organizations.=
=E2=80=9D  =

We expect individuals to participate in the IRTF in their own capacity
to further the research goals of the IRTF and the Internet community.  =

In doing so, we must all remember that as individuals we will all make =

mistakes from time to time.  The best way for anyone to allay their =

concerns about the direction and decisions of a group is to contribute
their own ideas and actively review ideas of others, engaging in discussion=
s =

so that everyone's understanding can be improved.

We count on the chair of the IRTF to continually monitor the CFRG and all R=
Gs
to see that they function properly as specified by their charters.  Should =
he
find that this is not the case with the CFRG in the future, he may at that =
time
initiate changes in consultation with the RG and IRSG as specified in Secti=
on 4
of RFC 2014.  We understand the CFRG is engaging in discussions on how to
evolve itself and its procedures over time.  The RG may wish to more clearly
specify the manner by which decisions are made and represented. We =

encourage all interested parties to participate in those discussions, and w=
e look forward to any changes the chair of the IRTF would bring to us as a =
result.

Please note that Russ Housley recused himself from this matter.

On behalf of the IAB,
Mary Barnes
IAB Executive Director

From dol@cryptocom.ru  Thu Jan 23 21:30:44 2014
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From: Basil Dolmatov <dol@cryptocom.ru>
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To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] IAB Comments Regarding the IRTF CFRG chair
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Trevor,

thank you for your efforts in demonstration that the system evolved is =
rock-solid and stable and cannot be influenced by any  community =
opinions ;)

In any case it was the nice try. Thanks again!

dol@
ROFL ;)

24 =FF=ED=E2. 2014 =E3., =E2 7:32, IAB Executive Director =
<execd@iab.org> =ED=E0=EF=E8=F1=E0=EB(=E0):

> The IAB thanks Trevor Perrin for his request for our review of the =
decision
> made by the chair of the IRTF regarding Kevin Igoe as co-chair for the
> CFRG.  We have taken Trevor Perrin's concerns and others' quite =
seriously,
> as we do the functioning of the IRTF and the CFRG.  We have also taken
> into account the comments that we have received from the community.
>=20
> Sections 2  and 4 of RFC 2014 specify that changes to research groups
> are to be sent to us by the chair of the IRTF.  The IAB has concluded
> that the chair of the IRTF has, in accordance with RFC 2014,
> properly and diligently exercised his responsibilities by =
investigating
> the matter, taking community input, and providing a timely response
> that addresses the points that were raised by Trevor Perrin and =
others.
> In doing so, he has decided not to forward to us for consideration any
> changes to the CFRG at this time.
>=20
> While it is certainly true that positions of individuals are often =
aligned=20
> with those of their employers, RFC 2014 states: =93Participation is by=20=

> individual contributors, rather than by representatives of =
organizations.=94 =20
> We expect individuals to participate in the IRTF in their own capacity
> to further the research goals of the IRTF and the Internet community. =20=

> In doing so, we must all remember that as individuals we will all make=20=

> mistakes from time to time.  The best way for anyone to allay their=20
> concerns about the direction and decisions of a group is to contribute
> their own ideas and actively review ideas of others, engaging in =
discussions=20
> so that everyone's understanding can be improved.
>=20
> We count on the chair of the IRTF to continually monitor the CFRG and =
all RGs
> to see that they function properly as specified by their charters.  =
Should he
> find that this is not the case with the CFRG in the future, he may at =
that time
> initiate changes in consultation with the RG and IRSG as specified in =
Section 4
> of RFC 2014.  We understand the CFRG is engaging in discussions on how =
to
> evolve itself and its procedures over time.  The RG may wish to more =
clearly
> specify the manner by which decisions are made and represented. We=20
> encourage all interested parties to participate in those discussions, =
and we look forward to any changes the chair of the IRTF would bring to =
us as a result.
>=20
> Please note that Russ Housley recused himself from this matter.
>=20
> On behalf of the IAB,
> Mary Barnes
> IAB Executive Director
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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References: <87ob3456s1.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <CABqy+spt7BYqjsqLAkZssGp3aY9M+iLqV+pmyr7ZN-TXmJJpVg@mail.gmail.com> <52E060D0.9030801@polarssl.org> <CABqy+spJoswrPovxf18QS1SGdk6K=mfny6joJm3X24Vh65oagQ@mail.gmail.com> <52E0E241.40406@polarssl.org> <CABqy+sqs31ATDWJSum55m1o5pRvw8Wq5GtB-mF-hgP2emB5eFQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+sozYSOTh7pbUS2GXf=4kYV3zgztXZBa10Bx=s-N8zHHyA@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+soSojSMfx=yU9eFhmAeuJaJ_r=4h=RDR6JtOchYZ9zsQA@mail.gmail.com> <52E1BAE0.8060809@brainhub.org> <2311ADE0-B85D-4EEA-A675-03ED3735DE1D@shiftleft.org> <CABqy+souWU30JvfzE61GY11gZLevL+Ru50GHkxJDfCkLMuRYqg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On Jan 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> =
wrote:

> On 1/23/14, Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> wrote:
>> On Jan 23, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be =
another
>>> method?
>>>=20
>>> Traditionally the problem was solved by carrying 1 bit and then =
finding a
>>> place to fit it in and defining what it means, etc. There is another =
way.
>>> One can adjust the private key to make the coordinate that we drop, =
x in
>>> this case, be the smallest of the two possibilities.
>>>=20
>>> The nice feature of my proposal is that you can still also encode =
the bit
>>> if you wish so, as you proposed.
>>=20
>> This is interesting, but I think it works better with the Edwards
>> x-coordinate instead of the Montgomery y-coordinate.  That is, it =
applies
>> well to Watson=92s (Montgomery x, Edwards x) representation.  This is =
because
>> not every point you might want to transmit is a public key; it might =
be the
>> product of something which does not support an easy negation, such as =
PAKE.
>> In this case, with your proposal, implementers have to send the sign =
bit,
>> and we have two wire formats again.  But if the Edwards x-coordinate =
is
>> used, you can also fast-adjust by adding the point of order 2, which =
maps
>> EdX to -EdX.  (It maps EdY to -EdY and MontX to 1/MontX.)  If the =
protocol
>> wipes out the cofactor (almost every protocol does for security =
reasons),
>> then this is more likely to be acceptable than negating the point.
>=20
> This makes point encoding to Montgomery-form x slightly less efficient
> and more complex -- instead of computing (for the main coordinate)
> Zinv=3D1/Z, then x=3DX*Zinv, this requires XZinv=3D1/(X*Z), then =
either
> x=3DX^2*XZinv or xinv=3DZ^2*XZinv (conditional on the sign bit of the
> Edwards-form x coordinate).  (I'm omitting the part where Zinv or
> XZinv must be batched with the inversion to compute the Edwards-form x
> coordinate and its sign bit.)
>=20
> (It may still be worthwhile; I'm just pointing out exactly what effect
> this would have on implementations.  I should also point out that the
> Montgomery-form x coordinate can't distinguish the identity element
> from the point of order 2.)


You're right.

The part that counts is complexity, though, not speed.  Adding a dozen =
muls to a 2500-mul computation is less than half a percent.  The bigger =
the curve, the smaller the fraction.

Furthermore, to be a truly uniform point-encoding format (including for =
hashes and stuff), you'd have to modify your ladder to figure out which =
y is correct at the end.  And that's going to be complicated.  Or you =
could not do that, but then again you'd have to figure out which =
encoding to use where.  I should probably go work out the formulas and =
post them at some point...

So yeah.  Upside.  Downside.

-- Mike=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>On Jan 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Robert Ransom =
&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rransom.8774@gmail.com">rransom.8774@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">On 1/23/14, Michael Hamburg &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mike@shiftleft.org">mike@shiftleft.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On Jan 23, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Andrey =
Jivsov &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:crypto@brainhub.org">crypto@brainhub.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><br>Wouldn't <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact">http://tools.=
ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact</a> be =
another<br>method?<br><br>Traditionally the problem was solved by =
carrying 1 bit and then finding a<br>place to fit it in and defining =
what it means, etc. There is another way.<br>One can adjust the private =
key to make the coordinate that we drop, x in<br>this case, be the =
smallest of the two possibilities.<br><br>The nice feature of my =
proposal is that you can still also encode the bit<br>if you wish so, as =
you proposed.<br></blockquote><br>This is interesting, but I think it =
works better with the Edwards<br>x-coordinate instead of the Montgomery =
y-coordinate. &nbsp;That is, it applies<br>well to Watson=92s =
(Montgomery x, Edwards x) representation. &nbsp;This is because<br>not =
every point you might want to transmit is a public key; it might be =
the<br>product of something which does not support an easy negation, =
such as PAKE.<br>In this case, with your proposal, implementers have to =
send the sign bit,<br>and we have two wire formats again. &nbsp;But if =
the Edwards x-coordinate is<br>used, you can also fast-adjust by adding =
the point of order 2, which maps<br>EdX to -EdX. &nbsp;(It maps EdY to =
-EdY and MontX to 1/MontX.) &nbsp;If the protocol<br>wipes out the =
cofactor (almost every protocol does for security reasons),<br>then this =
is more likely to be acceptable than negating the =
point.<br></blockquote><br>This makes point encoding to Montgomery-form =
x slightly less efficient<br>and more complex -- instead of computing =
(for the main coordinate)<br>Zinv=3D1/Z, then x=3DX*Zinv, this requires =
XZinv=3D1/(X*Z), then either<br>x=3DX^2*XZinv or xinv=3DZ^2*XZinv =
(conditional on the sign bit of the<br>Edwards-form x coordinate). =
&nbsp;(I'm omitting the part where Zinv or<br>XZinv must be batched with =
the inversion to compute the Edwards-form x<br>coordinate and its sign =
bit.)<br><br>(It may still be worthwhile; I'm just pointing out exactly =
what effect<br>this would have on implementations. &nbsp;I should also =
point out that the<br>Montgomery-form x coordinate can't distinguish the =
identity element<br>from the point of order =
2.)<br></div></blockquote></div><div><br></div><div>You're =
right.</div><br><div>The part that counts is complexity, though, not =
speed. &nbsp;Adding a dozen muls to a 2500-mul computation is less than =
half a percent. &nbsp;The bigger the curve, the smaller the =
fraction.</div><div><br></div><div>Furthermore, to be a truly uniform =
point-encoding format (including for hashes and stuff), you'd have to =
modify your ladder to figure out which y is correct at the end. =
&nbsp;And that's going to be complicated. &nbsp;Or you could not do =
that, but then again you'd have to figure out which encoding to use =
where. &nbsp;I should probably go work out the formulas and post them at =
some point...</div><div><br></div><div>So yeah. &nbsp;Upside. =
&nbsp;Downside.</div><div><br></div><div>-- Mike</div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_0E29B95A-AF6E-4EF4-97CE-0E3AA4474C51--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 01/23/2014 06:08 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
> On Jan 23, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>
>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another method?
>>
>> Traditionally the problem was solved by carrying 1 bit and then finding a place to fit it in and defining what it means, etc. There is another way. One can adjust the private key to make the coordinate that we drop, x in this case, be the smallest of the two possibilities.
>>
>> The nice feature of my proposal is that you can still also encode the bit if you wish so, as you proposed.
>
> This is interesting, but I think it works better with the Edwards x-coordinate instead of the Montgomery y-coordinate.  That is, it applies well to Watson’s (Montgomery x, Edwards x) representation.  This is because not every point you might want to transmit is a public key; it might be the product of something which does not support an easy negation, such as PAKE.  In this case, with your proposal, implementers have to send the sign bit, and we have two wire formats again.  But if the Edwards x-coordinate is used, you can also fast-adjust by adding the point of order 2, which maps EdX to -EdX.  (It maps EdY to -EdY and MontX to 1/MontX.)  If the protocol wipes out the cofactor (almost every protocol does for security reasons), then this is more likely to be acceptable than negating the point.
>
> Then again, any discussion like this is fraught with issues about alternative encodings for non-wire formats, implementation compatibility, uniqueness, covert channels, etc.  Might take some hashing out.
>
> Cheers,
> — Mike
>

It seems to me that it will be possible to find an option to tweak the 
private scalar in more complex protocols, while making this an internal 
adjustment.

For example, in
http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-02#page-10

the PE is never sent out, so its generation doesn't change.

The Element is a point, which is very similar to a public key for our 
purpose. The Element is sent to the other peer and it needs to be 
"compliant". The element is generated from a random mask and PE; thus 
the mask can be adjusted appropriately so that the Element is 
"compliant" (then the 'scalar' is calculated with the appropriately 
adjusted mask).




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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Hi Kevin and Paul,

I think the key-centric stuff is interesting and worthwhile, but to some 
extent it is outside the scope of CFRG.   Can I ask that the CFRG 
presentation on this topic cover the crypto mechanisms and protocols 
that are relevant for a key-centric architecture, rather than focus on 
the public-key authentication architecture itself?

Not trying to discourage work in this area, just trying to make sure 
that agenda time covers algorithms and protocols first.

David

On 01/23/2014 01:37 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
> Hi Kevin,
>
> On 1/22/14, 9:29 AM, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>
>> If we were to put "key centric" on the CFRG agenda for IETF-89, do we
>> have a speaker willing to give a presentation?
> Thank you for your interest in the topic. I would be very willing and
> interested in presenting on Œkey centric¹, however for the first time
> in many years the IETF is occurring the same week as the Wi-Fi
> Alliance Š so I¹m not available that week.
>
>> If this is too short of a
>> deadline to meet, we can always have a presentation at a later meeting?
> Yes.  That would work well.
>
> Paul
>
>> Three options:
>> 	1) discuss at nest meeting
>> 	2) discuss in the near future but not at the next meeting
>> 	3) no support for a presentation in the near future. Maybe sometime
>> later.
>> 	4) Utter silence on the mailing list.
>>
>> As to #4, the Germans have a saying "Keine Antwort ist auch eine Antwort"
>> (no is answer is also an answer).
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of dan@geer.org
>>> Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:10 PM
>>> To: Paul Lambert
>>> Cc: Sean Turner; David McGrew; cfrg@irtf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
>>>
>>>
>>>   > A useful mechanism, but it would be better to start with reexamining
>>> and  > redefining our usage of public keys.  Specifically - I'm an
>>> advocate of  > keys as the primary identifiers.  A "key centric"
>>> approach is a dual model
>>>   > to Kohnfelder/X.509   The SDSI/SPKI work did progress work in this
>>>   > direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.
>>>
>>> Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is it not?
>>>
>>> I rather doubt that the Administration's push for the NSTIC is likely
>>> to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborate on your
>>> preference for it?  I'm sympathetic to it on the grounds that it
>>> directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentation.
>>>
>>> If I'm being obtuse, feel free to say so.
>>>
>>> --dan
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] questions on performance and side channel resistance for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec and TLS
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Hi Adam,

On 01/23/2014 11:51 AM, Adam Langley wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 9:54 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>> Hi Adam and Yoav,
>>
>> I have some questions and comments on these crypto algorithms and their use
>> in TLS and IPsec.
>>
>> On 01/21/2014 01:06 PM, Adam Langley wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>>> Reviews and comments would be greatly appreciated, as well as anyone
>>>> checking my examples.
>>> In the introduction: I think ChaCha20+Poly1305 are useful for software
>>> implementations, beyond their use as a backup to AES. AES in not
>>> suitable for pure, software implementations and they tend to be be
>>> slow and have side-channels. (AES-GCM even more so.)
>>
>> The claims that ChaCha20+Poly1305 are faster than AES GCM in pure software
>> environments should be quantified in (at least one of) the drafts.
> I have no problem with that, but it's not something that I typically
> see in IETF drafts and so I didn't do any actual numbers for it.

Agreed that it is not something one would expect to see in a TLS draft, 
but if the definitive algorithm specification is going to be an RFC, it 
should be there.   Watson suggested having a separate RFC that defines 
this algorithm combination, which makes sense to me.

>
> ARM testing is done with with the AES-GCM from OpenSSL 1.0.1f (which
> has optimised asm routines for both AES and GCM, although they are
> *not* side-channel free). ChaCha20 and Poly1305 code come from
> SUPERCOP, but integrated into OpenSSL so the overhead is the same. A
> 1KB block size is used
>
> OMAP 4460: 24.1 MB/s (AES-GCM), 75.3 MB/s (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
> Snapdragon S4 Pro: 41.5 MB/s (AES-GCM), 130.9 MB/s (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
>
> So ChaCha20-Poly1305 is ~3x faster, with side-channel protection,
> little dcache pressure and with a 256-bit cipher rather than 128-bit.
>
> On a Sandy Bridge Xeon, AES-GCM runs at ~900 MB/s and
> ChaCha20-Poly1305 at ~500 MB/s.
>
> In both cases, I'm ignoring the extra cache pressure of AES-GCM.

Thanks, this is good data.

> Over time, AESNI will get faster but also the vector units will get
> wider, which helps ChaCha20 and Poly1305. I expect that on high-end,
> Intel chips, the gap will contain to be a small multiple, but it might
> not be as small as 2x on future chips.
>
>> It would also be interesting to look into the power used by the different
>> algorithms, since battery life is important on mobile devices.
> I don't have data on power usage I'm afraid because I don't have the
> equipment to test it. I'm happy to provide a testing binary for
> Android if anyone does.

Maybe it would be possible to write a "run until low battery" app on 
android?   I am no expert on the platform, but it seems that something 
like this would be possible using a receiver for ACTION_BATTERY_LOW.

Just for clarity's sake: I did not mean to suggest that the draft should 
include this data.   It would be good info to know, and it might support 
the case for the newer algorithms, but if the data doesn't exist, its 
not fair to ask that it to be in there.

>> The design rationale for Salsa
>> describes how timing channels are avoided by not using multiplication in
>> that function.   However, Poly1305 uses *lots* of multiplication operations,
>> by a fixed constant.  Unless I am missing something, this is an
>> inconsistency with the motivation for the ciphersuite.  In any case, if
>> Poly1305 requires implementation techniques to avoid side channels, they
>> should be documented in the draft that specifies that function.
> Some CPUs (the G4e is mentioned in the Salsa paper) do have
> non-constant time multiplication and, on those systems, a
> constant-time Poly1305 implementation will be troublesome.
>
> However, those CPUs are rare I believe. (Does anyone know if the PPC64
> chips have the same issue?) For the case of common Intel and ARM CPUs
> it's not a problem. But you're right that it's worth pointing out,
> although I'm not aware that anyone has attempted a constant-time
> Poly1305 on such a chip.

I bet that Dan has thought about the timing issues - it would be great 
to get his input.    He said that it was "often" an issue for 
multiplication, back in 2007, but Robert Ransom mentions in a separate 
note that many modern CPUs have constant-time integer multiplication.

>
>> I assume that the timing channels are the major concern, and that the attack
>> model is one in which an untrusted process running on a trusted operating
>> system aims to discover the key of a ciphersuite in use by some other
>> process.   It would be good to document that fact, to give implementers an
>> idea of what the important channel is.   (Otherwise, they might mistakenly
>> think that the attacker is only able to observe network traffic.)  Is it
>> also a goal to avoid power analysis attacks?    It would be good to document
>> that fact, either way.
> I think the goal is to make crypto as boring as possible. Avoiding
> clear side-channels is just more relaxing because there's less to
> worry about and all the things that you list (simple power analysis,
> mixing mutually untrusting code on the same system etc) are all
> concerns.
>
> But yes, a section on this in the draft is warranted.
>

My guess is that power analysis attacks are less relevant for TLS and 
for mobile phones, but more relevant for Internet of Things scenarios 
and long-term secret keys.


>> I think your goal here is to have both client and server use a
>> hardware-friendly ciphersuite when they both have the right hardware, and to
>> use a software-friendly ciphersuite otherwise. This would imply that the
>> hardware-friendly ciphersuite comes first in the proposal when it is
>> available; does it also mean that when the hardware support is absent, that
>> the hardware-friendly ciphersuite is not offered?    Also, it seems that it
>> would be necessary, in TLS, to have ciphersuites offered in
>> hardware/software pairs, to ensure that an appropriate authentication method
>> is available.   Maybe I misunderstood the goal, if so I trust that you will
>> set me straight.   But if this is the goal, it would make sense to include
>> guidance to this effect in the draft.
> I'm not sure whether this draft is the correct place for it, but it's
> currently the case that Chrome will switch the positions of AES-GCM
> and CHACHA20-POLY1305 in its ciphersuite preferences depending on
> whether AES hardware support is present. Additionally, some Google
> servers (the rollout is in progress) have partial ciphersuite
> preferences: they will respect the client's preference between some
> ciphersuites. This allows AES-GCM to be used when the client has
> hardware and CHACHA20-POLY1305 otherwise.

To me it seems worthwhile to have some guidance on this subject in the 
TLS draft, but if there is a separate draft defining the algorithm, then 
negotiation seems out of scope.

thanks,

David

>
>
> Cheers
>
> AGL
> .
>


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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] questions on performance and side channel resistance for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec and TLS
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Hi Robert,

On 01/23/2014 01:26 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 1/23/14, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>> Another goal for this ciphersuite is to avoid side channel attacks,
>> though it is not directly mentioned in the draft.    The design
>> rationale for Salsa describes how timing channels are avoided by not
>> using multiplication in that function.   However, Poly1305 uses *lots*
>> of multiplication operations, by a fixed constant.  Unless I am missing
>> something, this is an inconsistency with the motivation for the
>> ciphersuite.  In any case, if Poly1305 requires implementation
>> techniques to avoid side channels, they should be documented in the
>> draft that specifies that function.
> Dr. Bernstein's original implementation of Poly1305 used the IA-32
> floating-point unit to avoid timing leaks on the processors available
> in 2005.  My understanding is that essentially all modern processors
> have constant-time integer multipliers, so special implementation
> techniques are no longer required.

this would be great news.   The issue does deserve to be documented, 
though, even if we can cite a study that shows that current processors 
don't have the issue, since future processors might behave differently.

thanks,

David

>
>
> Robert Ransom
> .
>


From mike@shiftleft.org  Fri Jan 24 10:45:01 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On Jan 23, 2014, at 10:31 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:

> On 01/23/2014 06:08 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
>> On Jan 23, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be =
another method?
>>>=20
>>> Traditionally the problem was solved by carrying 1 bit and then =
finding a place to fit it in and defining what it means, etc. There is =
another way. One can adjust the private key to make the coordinate that =
we drop, x in this case, be the smallest of the two possibilities.
>>>=20
>>> The nice feature of my proposal is that you can still also encode =
the bit if you wish so, as you proposed.
>>=20
>> This is interesting, but I think it works better with the Edwards =
x-coordinate instead of the Montgomery y-coordinate.  That is, it =
applies well to Watson=92s (Montgomery x, Edwards x) representation.  =
This is because not every point you might want to transmit is a public =
key; it might be the product of something which does not support an easy =
negation, such as PAKE.  In this case, with your proposal, implementers =
have to send the sign bit, and we have two wire formats again.  But if =
the Edwards x-coordinate is used, you can also fast-adjust by adding the =
point of order 2, which maps EdX to -EdX.  (It maps EdY to -EdY and =
MontX to 1/MontX.)  If the protocol wipes out the cofactor (almost every =
protocol does for security reasons), then this is more likely to be =
acceptable than negating the point.
>>=20
>> Then again, any discussion like this is fraught with issues about =
alternative encodings for non-wire formats, implementation =
compatibility, uniqueness, covert channels, etc.  Might take some =
hashing out.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> =97 Mike
>>=20
>=20
> It seems to me that it will be possible to find an option to tweak the =
private scalar in more complex protocols, while making this an internal =
adjustment.
>=20
> For example, in
> http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-02#page-10
>=20
> the PE is never sent out, so its generation doesn't change.
>=20
> The Element is a point, which is very similar to a public key for our =
purpose. The Element is sent to the other peer and it needs to be =
"compliant". The element is generated from a random mask and PE; thus =
the mask can be adjusted appropriately so that the Element is =
"compliant" (then the 'scalar' is calculated with the appropriately =
adjusted mask).


Dragonfly, SPEKE and ECDH don=92t use addition, and don=92t need =
y-coordinates at all.  They could use a Montgomery ladder and never =
compute or transmit those coordinates.

Some systems, such as signatures, use addition but don=92t send the =
results out on the wire.  Your technique works well for those.  You =
still need a point encoding before hashing, but compression has no value =
there anyway.

But I can=92t think of an obvious way to extend your approach to a =
protocol like SPAKE2 which requires sending a point out after addition.

=97 Mike


From crypto@brainhub.org  Fri Jan 24 12:07:53 2014
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On 01/24/2014 10:44 AM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
> On Jan 23, 2014, at 10:31 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>
>> On 01/23/2014 06:08 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
>>> On Jan 23, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another method?
>>>>
>>>> Traditionally the problem was solved by carrying 1 bit and then finding a place to fit it in and defining what it means, etc. There is another way. One can adjust the private key to make the coordinate that we drop, x in this case, be the smallest of the two possibilities.
>>>>
>>>> The nice feature of my proposal is that you can still also encode the bit if you wish so, as you proposed.
>>> This is interesting, but I think it works better with the Edwards x-coordinate instead of the Montgomery y-coordinate.  That is, it applies well to Watson’s (Montgomery x, Edwards x) representation.  This is because not every point you might want to transmit is a public key; it might be the product of something which does not support an easy negation, such as PAKE.  In this case, with your proposal, implementers have to send the sign bit, and we have two wire formats again.  But if the Edwards x-coordinate is used, you can also fast-adjust by adding the point of order 2, which maps EdX to -EdX.  (It maps EdY to -EdY and MontX to 1/MontX.)  If the protocol wipes out the cofactor (almost every protocol does for security reasons), then this is more likely to be acceptable than negating the point.
>>>
>>> Then again, any discussion like this is fraught with issues about alternative encodings for non-wire formats, implementation compatibility, uniqueness, covert channels, etc.  Might take some hashing out.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> — Mike
>>>
>> It seems to me that it will be possible to find an option to tweak the private scalar in more complex protocols, while making this an internal adjustment.
>>
>> For example, in
>> http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-02#page-10
>>
>> the PE is never sent out, so its generation doesn't change.
>>
>> The Element is a point, which is very similar to a public key for our purpose. The Element is sent to the other peer and it needs to be "compliant". The element is generated from a random mask and PE; thus the mask can be adjusted appropriately so that the Element is "compliant" (then the 'scalar' is calculated with the appropriately adjusted mask).
>
> Dragonfly, SPEKE and ECDH don’t use addition, and don’t need y-coordinates at all.  They could use a Montgomery ladder and never compute or transmit those coordinates.
>
> Some systems, such as signatures, use addition but don’t send the results out on the wire.  Your technique works well for those.  You still need a point encoding before hashing, but compression has no value there anyway.
>
> But I can’t think of an obvious way to extend your approach to a protocol like SPAKE2 which requires sending a point out after addition.
I looked at this description of SPAKE2 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03840.html

I will use the additive notation. Assuming M=m*G, the SPAKE2 client 
sends the point (x+h(pass)m) G

It must be a compliant point. Let's say that the client must adjust (1) 
to (2)

    (x+h(pass)m)  (1)
    Ord - x - h(pass)m   (2)

Doing just that will not work because the server will be subtracting (in 
effect) h(pass)m and the server will not arrive at either x or Ord-x.

Here is what the client does instead.

The client adjusts the randomly generated x as

    x' = Ord - x - 2h(pass)m

and assumes x' and x'*G as the ephemeral keypair (corresponding to the 
g^x in the above email reference)

Now, with that private x' plugged into the equation (1), (1) is exactly 
(2), which we said is a compliant point. Then the value in (2) times G 
is sent out.

Performance-wise, the delta = Ord - 2h(pass)m by which the x may need to 
be adjusted is fixed for the user (provided that the M is fixed).



Hopefully, I can always get away with this technique, as long as a peer 
generates a random private-key-like scalar that I can adjust (by Ord in 
trivial cases, but potentially by other quantities as in SPAKE2).

This should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map, assuming 
that I get the corresponding scalar.

I will need access to the private m for M=mG. I assumed it is sort of a 
user static public key.

The server side adjustments are similar.
> — Mike


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From: Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 12:13:49 -0800
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References: <87ob3456s1.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <CABqy+spt7BYqjsqLAkZssGp3aY9M+iLqV+pmyr7ZN-TXmJJpVg@mail.gmail.com> <52E060D0.9030801@polarssl.org> <CABqy+spJoswrPovxf18QS1SGdk6K=mfny6joJm3X24Vh65oagQ@mail.gmail.com> <52E0E241.40406@polarssl.org> <CABqy+sqs31ATDWJSum55m1o5pRvw8Wq5GtB-mF-hgP2emB5eFQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+sozYSOTh7pbUS2GXf=4kYV3zgztXZBa10Bx=s-N8zHHyA@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+soSojSMfx=yU9eFhmAeuJaJ_r=4h=RDR6JtOchYZ9zsQA@mail.gmail.com> <52E1BAE0.8060809@brainhub.org> <2311ADE0-B85D-4EEA-A675-03ED3735DE1D@shiftleft.org> <52E208AD.2020100@brainhub.org> <0F98B193-910E-430B-A5DF-4F72A3D9C6EC@shiftleft.org> <52E2C6A2.1010403@brainhub.org>
To: Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org>
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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
> This should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map, =
assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.
>=20
> I will need access to the private m for M=3DmG. I assumed it is sort =
of a user static public key.
>=20
> The server side adjustments are similar.

It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know m.  Part =
of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the possibility that someone =
could somehow figure out m, thereby breaking the security of the entire =
system.  It is an essential security feature of Elligator (in this use =
and others) that it does not give you access to that discrete log.

So, in other words, you can=92t do this, and changing the system so that =
you can do this would break it.

Cheers,
=97 Mike=

--Apple-Mail=_1B2A3C34-139A-4B9D-BF14-72892ED54265
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:crypto@brainhub.org">crypto@brainhub.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">This =
should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map, assuming that =
I get the corresponding scalar.<br><br>I will need access to the private =
m for M=3DmG. I assumed it is sort of a user static public =
key.<br><br>The server side adjustments are =
similar.<br></div></blockquote><br></div><div>It is critical to the =
security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know m. &nbsp;Part of why Elligator =
is nice is that it removes the possibility that someone could somehow =
figure out m, thereby breaking the security of the entire system. =
&nbsp;It is an essential security feature of Elligator (in this use and =
others) that it does not give you access to that discrete =
log.</div><div><br></div><div>So, in other words, you can=92t do this, =
and changing the system so that you can do this would break =
it.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>=97 =
Mike</div></body></html>=

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From crypto@brainhub.org  Fri Jan 24 12:24:38 2014
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Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 12:19:21 -0800
From: Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org>
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References: <87ob3456s1.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <CABqy+spt7BYqjsqLAkZssGp3aY9M+iLqV+pmyr7ZN-TXmJJpVg@mail.gmail.com> <52E060D0.9030801@polarssl.org> <CABqy+spJoswrPovxf18QS1SGdk6K=mfny6joJm3X24Vh65oagQ@mail.gmail.com> <52E0E241.40406@polarssl.org> <CABqy+sqs31ATDWJSum55m1o5pRvw8Wq5GtB-mF-hgP2emB5eFQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+sozYSOTh7pbUS2GXf=4kYV3zgztXZBa10Bx=s-N8zHHyA@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+soSojSMfx=yU9eFhmAeuJaJ_r=4h=RDR6JtOchYZ9zsQA@mail.gmail.com> <52E1BAE0.8060809@brainhub.org> <2311ADE0-B85D-4EEA-A675-03ED3735DE1D@shiftleft.org> <52E208AD.2020100@brainhub.org> <0F98B193-910E-430B-A5DF-4F72A3D9C6EC@shiftleft.org> <52E2C6A2.1010403@brainhub.org> <98B78561-8357-4636-ADA7-1A55FE32C491@shiftleft.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 01/24/2014 12:13 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
> On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org 
> <mailto:crypto@brainhub.org>> wrote:
>> This should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map, 
>> assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.
>>
>> I will need access to the private m for M=mG. I assumed it is sort of 
>> a user static public key.
>>
>> The server side adjustments are similar.
>
> It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know m.  Part 
> of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the possibility that 
> someone could somehow figure out m, thereby breaking the security of 
> the entire system.  It is an essential security feature of Elligator 
> (in this use and others) that it does not give you access to that 
> discrete log.
>
> So, in other words, you can’t do this, and changing the system so that 
> you can do this would break it.
>
> Cheers,
> — Mike

Given that I am trusted to keep my password, why am I not trusted to 
keep my m in M=m*G private?

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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 01/24/2014 12:13 PM, Michael Hamburg
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:98B78561-8357-4636-ADA7-1A55FE32C491@shiftleft.org"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <div>On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:crypto@brainhub.org">crypto@brainhub.org</a>&gt;
        wrote:</div>
      <div>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <div style="font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant:
            normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal;
            line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
            text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
            widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width:
            0px;">This should work for your suggestions to use the
            Elligator map, assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.<br>
            <br>
            I will need access to the private m for M=mG. I assumed it
            is sort of a user static public key.<br>
            <br>
            The server side adjustments are similar.<br>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <br>
      </div>
      <div>It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know
        m.  Part of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the
        possibility that someone could somehow figure out m, thereby
        breaking the security of the entire system.  It is an essential
        security feature of Elligator (in this use and others) that it
        does not give you access to that discrete log.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>So, in other words, you can’t do this, and changing the
        system so that you can do this would break it.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Cheers,</div>
      <div>— Mike</div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Given that I am trusted to keep my password, why am I not trusted to
    keep my m in M=m*G private?<br>
  </body>
</html>

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Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 13:04:59 -0800
Message-ID: <CABqy+sp0dKL3iCimRuDOrV_k229UH3tm5n=sFQ8i3DnUjSastw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org>
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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 1/24/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
> On 01/24/2014 12:13 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
>> On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org
>> <mailto:crypto@brainhub.org>> wrote:
>>> This should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map,
>>> assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.
>>>
>>> I will need access to the private m for M=3DmG. I assumed it is sort of
>>> a user static public key.
>>>
>>> The server side adjustments are similar.
>>
>> It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know m.  Part
>> of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the possibility that
>> someone could somehow figure out m, thereby breaking the security of
>> the entire system.  It is an essential security feature of Elligator
>> (in this use and others) that it does not give you access to that
>> discrete log.
>>
>> So, in other words, you can=E2=80=99t do this, and changing the system s=
o that
>> you can do this would break it.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> =E2=80=94 Mike
>
> Given that I am trusted to keep my password, why am I not trusted to
> keep my m in M=3Dm*G private?

M and N are protocol parameters, and must be shared among all users.


Robert Ransom

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Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:38:31 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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From crypto@brainhub.org  Fri Jan 24 14:42:22 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 01/24/2014 01:04 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 1/24/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>> On 01/24/2014 12:13 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
>>> On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org
>>> <mailto:crypto@brainhub.org>> wrote:
>>>> This should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map,
>>>> assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.
>>>>
>>>> I will need access to the private m for M=mG. I assumed it is sort of
>>>> a user static public key.
>>>>
>>>> The server side adjustments are similar.
>>> It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know m.  Part
>>> of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the possibility that
>>> someone could somehow figure out m, thereby breaking the security of
>>> the entire system.  It is an essential security feature of Elligator
>>> (in this use and others) that it does not give you access to that
>>> discrete log.
>>>
>>> So, in other words, you can’t do this, and changing the system so that
>>> you can do this would break it.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> — Mike
>> Given that I am trusted to keep my password, why am I not trusted to
>> keep my m in M=m*G private?
> M and N are protocol parameters, and must be shared among all users.
>
I see. So the protocol allows a network of nodes where each one can be a 
server or a client. Given recent discussions on this list, the trusted 
3d party that is generating the M,N and forgetting the m,n is better be 
really trusted ;-).

The solution then is the "black box" one. Generate x randomly until the 
X = xG + h(pass)M is a compliant point. The expected number of tries 
should be 2. (sec 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact-03#section-4.2.1 but 
the criterion is for X, not xG )

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Fri Jan 24 15:15:10 2014
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References: <87ob3456s1.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <CABqy+spt7BYqjsqLAkZssGp3aY9M+iLqV+pmyr7ZN-TXmJJpVg@mail.gmail.com> <52E060D0.9030801@polarssl.org> <CABqy+spJoswrPovxf18QS1SGdk6K=mfny6joJm3X24Vh65oagQ@mail.gmail.com> <52E0E241.40406@polarssl.org> <CABqy+sqs31ATDWJSum55m1o5pRvw8Wq5GtB-mF-hgP2emB5eFQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+sozYSOTh7pbUS2GXf=4kYV3zgztXZBa10Bx=s-N8zHHyA@mail.gmail.com> <CABqy+soSojSMfx=yU9eFhmAeuJaJ_r=4h=RDR6JtOchYZ9zsQA@mail.gmail.com> <52E1BAE0.8060809@brainhub.org> <2311ADE0-B85D-4EEA-A675-03ED3735DE1D@shiftleft.org> <52E208AD.2020100@brainhub.org> <0F98B193-910E-430B-A5DF-4F72A3D9C6EC@shiftleft.org> <52E2C6A2.1010403@brainhub.org> <98B78561-8357-4636-ADA7-1A55FE32C491@shiftleft.org> <52E2CAC9.2080100@brainhub.org> <CABqy+sp0dKL3iCimRuDOrV_k229UH3tm5n=sFQ8i3DnUjSastw@mail.gmail.com> <52E2EB11.5030409@brainhub.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 15:15:06 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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--089e013d19f84eec5e04f0bf87ed
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On Jan 24, 2014 2:42 PM, "Andrey Jivsov" <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>
> On 01/24/2014 01:04 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
>>
>> On 1/24/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 01/24/2014 12:13 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org
>>>> <mailto:crypto@brainhub.org>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> This should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map,
>>>>> assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.
>>>>>
>>>>> I will need access to the private m for M=3DmG. I assumed it is sort =
of
>>>>> a user static public key.
>>>>>
>>>>> The server side adjustments are similar.
>>>>
>>>> It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know m.  Part
>>>> of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the possibility that
>>>> someone could somehow figure out m, thereby breaking the security of
>>>> the entire system.  It is an essential security feature of Elligator
>>>> (in this use and others) that it does not give you access to that
>>>> discrete log.
>>>>
>>>> So, in other words, you can=E2=80=99t do this, and changing the system=
 so that
>>>> you can do this would break it.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> =E2=80=94 Mike
>>>
>>> Given that I am trusted to keep my password, why am I not trusted to
>>> keep my m in M=3Dm*G private?
>>
>> M and N are protocol parameters, and must be shared among all users.
>>
> I see. So the protocol allows a network of nodes where each one can be a
server or a client. Given recent discussions on this list, the trusted 3d
party that is generating the M,N and forgetting the m,n is better be really
trusted ;-).

All of this to save 32 bytes?

>
> The solution then is the "black box" one. Generate x randomly until the X
=3D xG + h(pass)M is a compliant point. The expected number of tries should
be 2. (sec
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact-03#section-4.2.1 but
the criterion is for X, not xG )
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--089e013d19f84eec5e04f0bf87ed
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Jan 24, 2014 2:42 PM, &quot;Andrey Jivsov&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cr=
ypto@brainhub.org">crypto@brainhub.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 01/24/2014 01:04 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On 1/24/14, Andrey Jivsov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:crypto@brainhub.or=
g">crypto@brainhub.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 01/24/2014 12:13 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:crypto@brainhub.org">crypto@brainhub.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:crypto@brainhub.org">crypto@b=
rainhub.org</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; This should work for your suggestions to use the Ellig=
ator map,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I will need access to the private m for M=3DmG. I assu=
med it is sort of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; a user static public key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; The server side adjustments are similar.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can k=
now m. =C2=A0Part<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the possibilit=
y that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; someone could somehow figure out m, thereby breaking the s=
ecurity of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the entire system. =C2=A0It is an essential security featu=
re of Elligator<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; (in this use and others) that it does not give you access =
to that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; discrete log.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So, in other words, you can=E2=80=99t do this, and changin=
g the system so that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; you can do this would break it.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =E2=80=94 Mike<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Given that I am trusted to keep my password, why am I not trus=
ted to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; keep my m in M=3Dm*G private?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; M and N are protocol parameters, and must be shared among all user=
s.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; I see. So the protocol allows a network of nodes where each one can be=
 a server or a client. Given recent discussions on this list, the trusted 3=
d party that is generating the M,N and forgetting the m,n is better be real=
ly trusted ;-).</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">All of this to save 32 bytes?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt;<br>
&gt; The solution then is the &quot;black box&quot; one. Generate x randoml=
y until the X =3D xG + h(pass)M is a compliant point. The expected number o=
f tries should be 2. (sec <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivso=
v-ecc-compact-03#section-4.2.1">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc=
-compact-03#section-4.2.1</a> but the criterion is for X, not xG )<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</p>

--089e013d19f84eec5e04f0bf87ed--

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Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 18:17:25 -0500
From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] 'key centric' architecture (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Hi Paul:

It may help to write a short I-D where you introduce the topic of 'key 
centric' architecture, so that people who are unfamiliar with the topic 
area have context and a potential problem statement to work from 
(researchers like problem statements...). This also makes it easier to 
add to this than going over past emails sent to mailing lists.

I can imagine this would fit with saag or cfrg, depending on details.

It would be great to see you in Toronto in July.

Best regards, Rene

On 1/24/2014 5:38 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
> David,
>
>
> ]Hi Kevin and Paul,
> ]
> ]I think the key-centric stuff is interesting and worthwhile, but to some
> ]extent it is outside the scope of CFRG.
> Perhaps yes since it's not just number theory.  However I'm not sure
> where else any discussion would belong in the IETF.  I also just noticed my
> response to Dan's last question on this topic is still dormant
> in my drafts box, so I will dump one more note to this list ...
> Advice on any forum to discuss non-X.509 public key architectures
> would be appreciated.
>
> ] Can I ask that the CFRG
> ]presentation on this topic cover the crypto mechanisms and protocols
> ]that are relevant for a key-centric architecture, rather than focus on
> ]the public-key authentication architecture itself?
>
> ???
> Protocols should be defined by the use cases and architecture.
>
> The grab-bag of mechanisms is still an interesting list, but
> Might be confusing when taken out-of-context from the use
> Case analysis and overall architecture.  I've already been
> asking related questions to the list.  Mechanism specific
> topics related to a 'key centric' architecture might
> include:
>   - public key algorithms and alternative algorithms
>     (like Edwards curves)
>   - public key algorithm representation, identification and enumeration
>     (partial proposal previously posted to list on naming
>     ... no response)
>   - definition of cipher suites in to facilitate
>     the clear semantics of public key usage in combination
>     with the other necessary cryptographic mechanisms.
>     Public keys and associated hashes, kdfs, encryption
>     Are handled in various ways in Internet protocols.
>     If the semantics of a public key is to be well defined, it
>     needs to be clearly associated with a set of appropriate
>     algorithms.
>   - privacy and anonymity mechanisms related to encodings
>     of key and key identifiers
>   - definition and of suitable crypto
>     mechanisms/standards for generation of key identifiers
>   - definition of suitable encoding mechanism for binary
>     identifiers and keys (human readable)
>   - clear definition and enumeration of crypto mechanisms
>     suitable for particular public key types
>     (e.g. earlier discussion of encrypting and signing
>     with the same public key)
>   - cryptographic protocols using public keys to
>     support various types of authentication and
>     the bootstrapping of 'key centric' identities.
>     The protocols need to be tuned to the use case
>     requirements.
>
> On protocols ... is the discussion of set theoretic
> protocol semantics (like RT) a viable topic area for this group?
> Or ... is this group limited to number theoretic discussions?
>
> ]]Not trying to discourage work in this area, just trying to make sure
> ]that agenda time covers algorithms and protocols first.
>
> First - when you say agenda, is it the yet to be scheduled
> invited F2F presentation (likely would have been July)
> or the agenda of this mailing list?
>
> Algorithms would never be the first thing I'd present.
> So, your limitations are very discouraging.  I was at first
> enthusiastic that there was any interest in my proposed
> set of architectural concepts. Now, rather than being able to
> present a coherent set of ideas, you are telling me to
> focus on the 'math/crypto'.  The architectural concepts
> need to defined before the math.   I'd be happy to have
> review of material prior to a f2f presentation and
> adjustments could be made at that point.
>
> I will just move my work to non-IETF forums if
> contributions are discouraged or if they are not able
> to make any impact. The impact of a 'research' group
> is questionable by definition and I fear I am wasting
> my time participating on this mailing list.
>   
>
> Paul
>
> ]
> ]David
> ]
> ]On 01/23/2014 01:37 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
> ]> Hi Kevin,
> ]>
> ]> On 1/22/14, 9:29 AM, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
> ]>
> ]>> If we were to put "key centric" on the CFRG agenda for IETF-89, do we
> ]>> have a speaker willing to give a presentation?
> ]> Thank you for your interest in the topic. I would be very willing and
> ]> interested in presenting on Œkey centric¹, however for the first time
> ]> in many years the IETF is occurring the same week as the Wi-Fi
> ]> Alliance Š so I¹m not available that week.
> ]>
> ]>> If this is too short of a
> ]>> deadline to meet, we can always have a presentation at a later
> ]meeting?
> ]> Yes.  That would work well.
> ]>
> ]> Paul
> ]>
> ]>> Three options:
> ]>> 	1) discuss at nest meeting
> ]>> 	2) discuss in the near future but not at the next meeting
> ]>> 	3) no support for a presentation in the near future. Maybe
> ]sometime
> ]>> later.
> ]>> 	4) Utter silence on the mailing list.
> ]>>
> ]>> As to #4, the Germans have a saying "Keine Antwort ist auch eine
> ]Antwort"
> ]>> (no is answer is also an answer).
> ]>>
> ]>>> -----Original Message-----
> ]>>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of dan@geer.org
> ]>>> Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:10 PM
> ]>>> To: Paul Lambert
> ]>>> Cc: Sean Turner; David McGrew; cfrg@irtf.org
> ]>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
> ]>>>
> ]>>>
> ]>>>   > A useful mechanism, but it would be better to start with
> ]>>> reexamining and  > redefining our usage of public keys.
> ]>>> Specifically - I'm an advocate of  > keys as the primary
> ]identifiers.  A "key centric"
> ]>>> approach is a dual model
> ]>>>   > to Kohnfelder/X.509   The SDSI/SPKI work did progress work in
> ]this
> ]>>>   > direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.
> ]>>>
> ]>>> Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is it not?
> ]>>>
> ]>>> I rather doubt that the Administration's push for the NSTIC is
> ]>>> likely to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborate on
> ]>>> your preference for it?  I'm sympathetic to it on the grounds that
> ]>>> it directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentation.
> ]>>>
> ]>>> If I'm being obtuse, feel free to say so.
> ]>>>
> ]>>> --dan
> ]>>>
> ]>>> _______________________________________________
> ]>>> Cfrg mailing list
> ]>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
> ]>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> ]> .
> ]>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] questions on performance and side channel resistance for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec and TLS
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On 24/1/14 3:45 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi Adam,
>
> On 01/23/2014 11:51 AM, Adam Langley wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 9:54 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote=
:
>>> Hi Adam and Yoav,
>>>
>>> I have some questions and comments on these crypto algorithms and=20
>>> their use
>>> in TLS and IPsec.
>>>
>>> On 01/21/2014 01:06 PM, Adam Langley wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>=20
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Reviews and comments would be greatly appreciated, as well as anyon=
e
>>>>> checking my examples.
>>>> In the introduction: I think ChaCha20+Poly1305 are useful for softwa=
re
>>>> implementations, beyond their use as a backup to AES. AES in not
>>>> suitable for pure, software implementations and they tend to be be
>>>> slow and have side-channels. (AES-GCM even more so.)
>>>
>>> The claims that ChaCha20+Poly1305 are faster than AES GCM in pure=20
>>> software
>>> environments should be quantified in (at least one of) the drafts.
>> I have no problem with that, but it's not something that I typically
>> see in IETF drafts and so I didn't do any actual numbers for it.
>
> Agreed that it is not something one would expect to see in a TLS=20
> draft, but if the definitive algorithm specification is going to be an =

> RFC, it should be there.   Watson suggested having a separate RFC that =

> defines this algorithm combination, which makes sense to me.

Hi David.

I'm trying to throw together a separate document describing ChaCha20,=20
Poly1305, and Adam's AEAD, every step with test vectors. I hope to have=20
it ready by Monday.

Yoav



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References: <CEF1A5BF.2BBC6%paul@marvell.com> <20140110171000.15EB92280EA@palinka.tinho.net> <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CABA9C8FFD@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> <CF068ACA.2D33A%paul@marvell.com> <52E25DD0.9020703@cisco.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B80AF535@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <52E2F485.5040202@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2014 09:21:02 +0100
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 'key centric' architecture (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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+1 to an I-D

Key centric architecture sounds like something I would be interested in.  I
think I've got a rough idea of what Paul means based on his mail, but would
appreciate more detail on what he's thinking.


On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 12:17 AM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> wrote=
:

> Hi Paul:
>
> It may help to write a short I-D where you introduce the topic of 'key
> centric' architecture, so that people who are unfamiliar with the topic
> area have context and a potential problem statement to work from
> (researchers like problem statements...). This also makes it easier to ad=
d
> to this than going over past emails sent to mailing lists.
>
> I can imagine this would fit with saag or cfrg, depending on details.
>
> It would be great to see you in Toronto in July.
>
> Best regards, Rene
>
> On 1/24/2014 5:38 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>
>> David,
>>
>>
>> ]Hi Kevin and Paul,
>> ]
>> ]I think the key-centric stuff is interesting and worthwhile, but to som=
e
>> ]extent it is outside the scope of CFRG.
>> Perhaps yes since it's not just number theory.  However I'm not sure
>> where else any discussion would belong in the IETF.  I also just noticed
>> my
>> response to Dan's last question on this topic is still dormant
>> in my drafts box, so I will dump one more note to this list ...
>> Advice on any forum to discuss non-X.509 public key architectures
>> would be appreciated.
>>
>> ] Can I ask that the CFRG
>> ]presentation on this topic cover the crypto mechanisms and protocols
>> ]that are relevant for a key-centric architecture, rather than focus on
>> ]the public-key authentication architecture itself?
>>
>> ???
>> Protocols should be defined by the use cases and architecture.
>>
>> The grab-bag of mechanisms is still an interesting list, but
>> Might be confusing when taken out-of-context from the use
>> Case analysis and overall architecture.  I've already been
>> asking related questions to the list.  Mechanism specific
>> topics related to a 'key centric' architecture might
>> include:
>>   - public key algorithms and alternative algorithms
>>     (like Edwards curves)
>>   - public key algorithm representation, identification and enumeration
>>     (partial proposal previously posted to list on naming
>>     ... no response)
>>   - definition of cipher suites in to facilitate
>>     the clear semantics of public key usage in combination
>>     with the other necessary cryptographic mechanisms.
>>     Public keys and associated hashes, kdfs, encryption
>>     Are handled in various ways in Internet protocols.
>>     If the semantics of a public key is to be well defined, it
>>     needs to be clearly associated with a set of appropriate
>>     algorithms.
>>   - privacy and anonymity mechanisms related to encodings
>>     of key and key identifiers
>>   - definition and of suitable crypto
>>     mechanisms/standards for generation of key identifiers
>>   - definition of suitable encoding mechanism for binary
>>     identifiers and keys (human readable)
>>   - clear definition and enumeration of crypto mechanisms
>>     suitable for particular public key types
>>     (e.g. earlier discussion of encrypting and signing
>>     with the same public key)
>>   - cryptographic protocols using public keys to
>>     support various types of authentication and
>>     the bootstrapping of 'key centric' identities.
>>     The protocols need to be tuned to the use case
>>     requirements.
>>
>> On protocols ... is the discussion of set theoretic
>> protocol semantics (like RT) a viable topic area for this group?
>> Or ... is this group limited to number theoretic discussions?
>>
>> ]]Not trying to discourage work in this area, just trying to make sure
>> ]that agenda time covers algorithms and protocols first.
>>
>> First - when you say agenda, is it the yet to be scheduled
>> invited F2F presentation (likely would have been July)
>> or the agenda of this mailing list?
>>
>> Algorithms would never be the first thing I'd present.
>> So, your limitations are very discouraging.  I was at first
>> enthusiastic that there was any interest in my proposed
>> set of architectural concepts. Now, rather than being able to
>> present a coherent set of ideas, you are telling me to
>> focus on the 'math/crypto'.  The architectural concepts
>> need to defined before the math.   I'd be happy to have
>> review of material prior to a f2f presentation and
>> adjustments could be made at that point.
>>
>> I will just move my work to non-IETF forums if
>> contributions are discouraged or if they are not able
>> to make any impact. The impact of a 'research' group
>> is questionable by definition and I fear I am wasting
>> my time participating on this mailing list.
>>
>> Paul
>>
>> ]
>> ]David
>> ]
>> ]On 01/23/2014 01:37 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>> ]> Hi Kevin,
>> ]>
>> ]> On 1/22/14, 9:29 AM, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
>> ]>
>> ]>> If we were to put "key centric" on the CFRG agenda for IETF-89, do w=
e
>> ]>> have a speaker willing to give a presentation?
>> ]> Thank you for your interest in the topic. I would be very willing and
>> ]> interested in presenting on =C5=92key centric=C2=B9, however for the =
first time
>> ]> in many years the IETF is occurring the same week as the Wi-Fi
>> ]> Alliance =C5=A0 so I=C2=B9m not available that week.
>> ]>
>> ]>> If this is too short of a
>> ]>> deadline to meet, we can always have a presentation at a later
>> ]meeting?
>> ]> Yes.  That would work well.
>> ]>
>> ]> Paul
>> ]>
>> ]>> Three options:
>> ]>>     1) discuss at nest meeting
>> ]>>     2) discuss in the near future but not at the next meeting
>> ]>>     3) no support for a presentation in the near future. Maybe
>> ]sometime
>> ]>> later.
>> ]>>     4) Utter silence on the mailing list.
>> ]>>
>> ]>> As to #4, the Germans have a saying "Keine Antwort ist auch eine
>> ]Antwort"
>> ]>> (no is answer is also an answer).
>> ]>>
>> ]>>> -----Original Message-----
>> ]>>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of dan@geer.org
>> ]>>> Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:10 PM
>> ]>>> To: Paul Lambert
>> ]>>> Cc: Sean Turner; David McGrew; cfrg@irtf.org
>> ]>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
>> ]>>>
>> ]>>>
>> ]>>>   > A useful mechanism, but it would be better to start with
>> ]>>> reexamining and  > redefining our usage of public keys.
>> ]>>> Specifically - I'm an advocate of  > keys as the primary
>> ]identifiers.  A "key centric"
>> ]>>> approach is a dual model
>> ]>>>   > to Kohnfelder/X.509   The SDSI/SPKI work did progress work in
>> ]this
>> ]>>>   > direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.
>> ]>>>
>> ]>>> Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is it not=
?
>> ]>>>
>> ]>>> I rather doubt that the Administration's push for the NSTIC is
>> ]>>> likely to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborate on
>> ]>>> your preference for it?  I'm sympathetic to it on the grounds that
>> ]>>> it directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentation.
>> ]>>>
>> ]>>> If I'm being obtuse, feel free to say so.
>> ]>>>
>> ]>>> --dan
>> ]>>>
>> ]>>> _______________________________________________
>> ]>>> Cfrg mailing list
>> ]>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> ]>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>> ]> .
>> ]>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>
>
> --
> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

--089e0111c09ab93bbf04f0c727bb
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>+1 to an I-D <br><br></div>Key centric architecture s=
ounds like something I would be interested in.=C2=A0 I think I&#39;ve got a=
 rough idea of what Paul means based on his mail, but would appreciate more=
 detail on what he&#39;s thinking.<br>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat,=
 Jan 25, 2014 at 12:17 AM, Rene Struik <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a>&gt;<=
/span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Paul:<br>
<br>
It may help to write a short I-D where you introduce the topic of &#39;key =
centric&#39; architecture, so that people who are unfamiliar with the topic=
 area have context and a potential problem statement to work from (research=
ers like problem statements...). This also makes it easier to add to this t=
han going over past emails sent to mailing lists.<br>

<br>
I can imagine this would fit with saag or cfrg, depending on details.<br>
<br>
It would be great to see you in Toronto in July.<br>
<br>
Best regards, Rene<br>
<br>
On 1/24/2014 5:38 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
David,<br>
<br>
<br>
]Hi Kevin and Paul,<br>
]<br>
]I think the key-centric stuff is interesting and worthwhile, but to some<b=
r>
]extent it is outside the scope of CFRG.<br>
Perhaps yes since it&#39;s not just number theory. =C2=A0However I&#39;m no=
t sure<br>
where else any discussion would belong in the IETF. =C2=A0I also just notic=
ed my<br>
response to Dan&#39;s last question on this topic is still dormant<br>
in my drafts box, so I will dump one more note to this list ...<br>
Advice on any forum to discuss non-X.509 public key architectures<br>
would be appreciated.<br>
<br>
] Can I ask that the CFRG<br>
]presentation on this topic cover the crypto mechanisms and protocols<br>
]that are relevant for a key-centric architecture, rather than focus on<br>
]the public-key authentication architecture itself?<br>
<br>
???<br>
Protocols should be defined by the use cases and architecture.<br>
<br>
The grab-bag of mechanisms is still an interesting list, but<br>
Might be confusing when taken out-of-context from the use<br>
Case analysis and overall architecture. =C2=A0I&#39;ve already been<br>
asking related questions to the list. =C2=A0Mechanism specific<br>
topics related to a &#39;key centric&#39; architecture might<br>
include:<br>
=C2=A0 - public key algorithms and alternative algorithms<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (like Edwards curves)<br>
=C2=A0 - public key algorithm representation, identification and enumeratio=
n<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (partial proposal previously posted to list on naming<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ... no response)<br>
=C2=A0 - definition of cipher suites in to facilitate<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the clear semantics of public key usage in combination<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 with the other necessary cryptographic mechanisms.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Public keys and associated hashes, kdfs, encryption<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Are handled in various ways in Internet protocols.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the semantics of a public key is to be well defined, it<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 needs to be clearly associated with a set of appropriate<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithms.<br>
=C2=A0 - privacy and anonymity mechanisms related to encodings<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 of key and key identifiers<br>
=C2=A0 - definition and of suitable crypto<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 mechanisms/standards for generation of key identifiers<br>
=C2=A0 - definition of suitable encoding mechanism for binary<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 identifiers and keys (human readable)<br>
=C2=A0 - clear definition and enumeration of crypto mechanisms<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 suitable for particular public key types<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (e.g. earlier discussion of encrypting and signing<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 with the same public key)<br>
=C2=A0 - cryptographic protocols using public keys to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 support various types of authentication and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the bootstrapping of &#39;key centric&#39; identities.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The protocols need to be tuned to the use case<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 requirements.<br>
<br>
On protocols ... is the discussion of set theoretic<br>
protocol semantics (like RT) a viable topic area for this group?<br>
Or ... is this group limited to number theoretic discussions?<br>
<br>
]]Not trying to discourage work in this area, just trying to make sure<br>
]that agenda time covers algorithms and protocols first.<br>
<br>
First - when you say agenda, is it the yet to be scheduled<br>
invited F2F presentation (likely would have been July)<br>
or the agenda of this mailing list?<br>
<br>
Algorithms would never be the first thing I&#39;d present.<br>
So, your limitations are very discouraging. =C2=A0I was at first<br>
enthusiastic that there was any interest in my proposed<br>
set of architectural concepts. Now, rather than being able to<br>
present a coherent set of ideas, you are telling me to<br>
focus on the &#39;math/crypto&#39;. =C2=A0The architectural concepts<br>
need to defined before the math. =C2=A0 I&#39;d be happy to have<br>
review of material prior to a f2f presentation and<br>
adjustments could be made at that point.<br>
<br>
I will just move my work to non-IETF forums if<br>
contributions are discouraged or if they are not able<br>
to make any impact. The impact of a &#39;research&#39; group<br>
is questionable by definition and I fear I am wasting<br>
my time participating on this mailing list.<br>
=C2=A0 <br>
Paul<br>
<br>
]<br>
]David<br>
]<br>
]On 01/23/2014 01:37 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:<br>
]&gt; Hi Kevin,<br>
]&gt;<br>
]&gt; On 1/22/14, 9:29 AM, &quot;Igoe, Kevin M.&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:kmigoe@nsa.gov" target=3D"_blank">kmigoe@nsa.gov</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
]&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt; If we were to put &quot;key centric&quot; on the CFRG agenda for =
IETF-89, do we<br>
]&gt;&gt; have a speaker willing to give a presentation?<br>
]&gt; Thank you for your interest in the topic. I would be very willing and=
<br>
]&gt; interested in presenting on =C5=92key centric=C2=B9, however for the =
first time<br>
]&gt; in many years the IETF is occurring the same week as the Wi-Fi<br>
]&gt; Alliance =C5=A0 so I=C2=B9m not available that week.<br>
]&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt; If this is too short of a<br>
]&gt;&gt; deadline to meet, we can always have a presentation at a later<br=
>
]meeting?<br>
]&gt; Yes. =C2=A0That would work well.<br>
]&gt;<br>
]&gt; Paul<br>
]&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt; Three options:<br>
]&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 1) discuss at nest meeting<br>
]&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 2) discuss in the near future but not at the next m=
eeting<br>
]&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 3) no support for a presentation in the near future=
. Maybe<br>
]sometime<br>
]&gt;&gt; later.<br>
]&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 4) Utter silence on the mailing list.<br>
]&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt; As to #4, the Germans have a saying &quot;Keine Antwort ist auch =
eine<br>
]Antwort&quot;<br>
]&gt;&gt; (no is answer is also an answer).<br>
]&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">cfrg-bounces@irtf.org</a>] On Behalf Of <a href=3D"mailto:=
dan@geer.org" target=3D"_blank">dan@geer.org</a><br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:10 PM<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; To: Paul Lambert<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; Cc: Sean Turner; David McGrew; <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.or=
g" target=3D"_blank">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 &gt; A useful mechanism, but it would be better to sta=
rt with<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; reexamining and =C2=A0&gt; redefining our usage of public key=
s.<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; Specifically - I&#39;m an advocate of =C2=A0&gt; keys as the =
primary<br>
]identifiers. =C2=A0A &quot;key centric&quot;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; approach is a dual model<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 &gt; to Kohnfelder/X.509 =C2=A0 The SDSI/SPKI work did=
 progress work in<br>
]this<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 &gt; direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.<b=
r>
]&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is =
it not?<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; I rather doubt that the Administration&#39;s push for the NST=
IC is<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; likely to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborat=
e on<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; your preference for it? =C2=A0I&#39;m sympathetic to it on th=
e grounds that<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; it directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentati=
on.<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; If I&#39;m being obtuse, feel free to say so.<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; --dan<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; ______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.=
org</a><br>
]&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=
=3D"_blank">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
]&gt; .<br>
]&gt;<br>
<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank">htt=
p://www.irtf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/cfrg</a><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><fo=
nt color=3D"#888888"><br>
</font></span></blockquote><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
email: <a href=3D"mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rstruik.e=
xt@gmail.com</a> | Skype: rstruik<br>
cell: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28647%29%20867-5658" value=3D"+16478675658" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">+1 (647) 867-5658</a> | US: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28415%29=
%20690-7363" value=3D"+14156907363" target=3D"_blank">+1 (415) 690-7363</a>=
<br>
<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank">htt=
p://www.irtf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--089e0111c09ab93bbf04f0c727bb--

From dharkins@lounge.org  Sat Jan 25 01:34:36 2014
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Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2014 01:34:33 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On Fri, January 24, 2014 3:15 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Jan 24, 2014 2:42 PM, "Andrey Jivsov" <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>
>> On 01/24/2014 01:04 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
>>>
>>> On 1/24/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 01/24/2014 12:13 PM, Michael Hamburg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jan 24, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org
>>>>> <mailto:crypto@brainhub.org>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This should work for your suggestions to use the Elligator map,
>>>>>> assuming that I get the corresponding scalar.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I will need access to the private m for M=mG. I assumed it is sort
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> a user static public key.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The server side adjustments are similar.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is critical to the security of SPAKE2 that nobody can know m.
>>>>> Part
>>>>> of why Elligator is nice is that it removes the possibility that
>>>>> someone could somehow figure out m, thereby breaking the security of
>>>>> the entire system.  It is an essential security feature of Elligator
>>>>> (in this use and others) that it does not give you access to that
>>>>> discrete log.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, in other words, you can’t do this, and changing the system so
>>>>> that
>>>>> you can do this would break it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>> — Mike
>>>>
>>>> Given that I am trusted to keep my password, why am I not trusted to
>>>> keep my m in M=m*G private?
>>>
>>> M and N are protocol parameters, and must be shared among all users.
>>>
>> I see. So the protocol allows a network of nodes where each one can be a
> server or a client. Given recent discussions on this list, the trusted 3d
> party that is generating the M,N and forgetting the m,n is better be
> really
> trusted ;-).
>
> All of this to save 32 bytes?

  No, it has nothing to do with saving 32 bytes. It has to do with making
SPAKE2 be something other than the DUAL_EC_DRBG of PAKEs (a protocol
with SUTS-- something up their sleeve).

  Dan.




From mcgrew@cisco.com  Sun Jan 26 01:17:54 2014
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Cc: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
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Hi Paul,

On 01/24/2014 05:38 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
> David,
>
>
> ]Hi Kevin and Paul,
> ]
> ]I think the key-centric stuff is interesting and worthwhile, but to some
> ]extent it is outside the scope of CFRG.
> Perhaps yes since it's not just number theory.  However I'm not sure
> where else any discussion would belong in the IETF.  I also just noticed my
> response to Dan's last question on this topic is still dormant
> in my drafts box, so I will dump one more note to this list ...
> Advice on any forum to discuss non-X.509 public key architectures
> would be appreciated.
>
> ] Can I ask that the CFRG
> ]presentation on this topic cover the crypto mechanisms and protocols
> ]that are relevant for a key-centric architecture, rather than focus on
> ]the public-key authentication architecture itself?
>
> ???

What I'm asking is just that the presentation cover topics in the RG 
charter.   From the list you provide below, it looks like this won't be 
a problem.

> Protocols should be defined by the use cases and architecture.
>
> The grab-bag of mechanisms is still an interesting list, but
> Might be confusing when taken out-of-context from the use
> Case analysis and overall architecture.

Yes, by all means explain the architecture.

>    I've already been
> asking related questions to the list.  Mechanism specific
> topics related to a 'key centric' architecture might
> include:
>   - public key algorithms and alternative algorithms
>     (like Edwards curves)
>   - public key algorithm representation, identification and enumeration
>     (partial proposal previously posted to list on naming
>     ... no response)
>   - definition of cipher suites in to facilitate
>     the clear semantics of public key usage in combination
>     with the other necessary cryptographic mechanisms.
>     Public keys and associated hashes, kdfs, encryption
>     Are handled in various ways in Internet protocols.
>     If the semantics of a public key is to be well defined, it
>     needs to be clearly associated with a set of appropriate
>     algorithms.

Good topic, IMO.

>   - privacy and anonymity mechanisms related to encodings
>     of key and key identifiers

Another good topic.

>   - definition and of suitable crypto
>     mechanisms/standards for generation of key identifiers

And another.

>   - definition of suitable encoding mechanism for binary
>     identifiers and keys (human readable)
>   - clear definition and enumeration of crypto mechanisms
>     suitable for particular public key types
>     (e.g. earlier discussion of encrypting and signing
>     with the same public key)
>   - cryptographic protocols using public keys to
>     support various types of authentication and
>     the bootstrapping of 'key centric' identities.
>     The protocols need to be tuned to the use case
>     requirements.
>
> On protocols ... is the discussion of set theoretic
> protocol semantics (like RT) a viable topic area for this group?
> Or ... is this group limited to number theoretic discussions?

Short answer: no.   Long answer: please see the charter at 
http://irtf.org/cfrg

>
> ]]Not trying to discourage work in this area, just trying to make sure
> ]that agenda time covers algorithms and protocols first.
>
> First - when you say agenda, is it the yet to be scheduled
> invited F2F presentation (likely would have been July)
> or the agenda of this mailing list?

We requested a slot at IETF 89 in London, 
http://www.ietf.org/meeting/89/index.html and when I said "agenda" I was 
referring to that meeting.   Yes, I realize now that you will be at IETF 
90 but not IETF 89.

>
> Algorithms would never be the first thing I'd present.
> So, your limitations are very discouraging.  I was at first
> enthusiastic that there was any interest in my proposed
> set of architectural concepts. Now, rather than being able to
> present a coherent set of ideas, you are telling me to
> focus on the 'math/crypto'.  The architectural concepts
> need to defined before the math.   I'd be happy to have
> review of material prior to a f2f presentation and
> adjustments could be made at that point.
>
> I will just move my work to non-IETF forums if
> contributions are discouraged or if they are not able
> to make any impact. The impact of a 'research' group
> is questionable by definition and I fear I am wasting
> my time participating on this mailing list.

I think you misunderstood me.   As you know, one of the responsibilities 
of a chair is to make sure that either the group stays within its 
charter, or changes its charter when needed.   At any rate, after seeing 
the list of topics that you intend to address, I don't have any concerns.

David

>   
>
> Paul
>
> ]
> ]David
> ]
> ]On 01/23/2014 01:37 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
> ]> Hi Kevin,
> ]>
> ]> On 1/22/14, 9:29 AM, "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:
> ]>
> ]>> If we were to put "key centric" on the CFRG agenda for IETF-89, do we
> ]>> have a speaker willing to give a presentation?
> ]> Thank you for your interest in the topic. I would be very willing and
> ]> interested in presenting on Œkey centric¹, however for the first time
> ]> in many years the IETF is occurring the same week as the Wi-Fi
> ]> Alliance Š so I¹m not available that week.
> ]>
> ]>> If this is too short of a
> ]>> deadline to meet, we can always have a presentation at a later
> ]meeting?
> ]> Yes.  That would work well.
> ]>
> ]> Paul
> ]>
> ]>> Three options:
> ]>> 	1) discuss at nest meeting
> ]>> 	2) discuss in the near future but not at the next meeting
> ]>> 	3) no support for a presentation in the near future. Maybe
> ]sometime
> ]>> later.
> ]>> 	4) Utter silence on the mailing list.
> ]>>
> ]>> As to #4, the Germans have a saying "Keine Antwort ist auch eine
> ]Antwort"
> ]>> (no is answer is also an answer).
> ]>>
> ]>>> -----Original Message-----
> ]>>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of dan@geer.org
> ]>>> Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:10 PM
> ]>>> To: Paul Lambert
> ]>>> Cc: Sean Turner; David McGrew; cfrg@irtf.org
> ]>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG
> ]>>>
> ]>>>
> ]>>>   > A useful mechanism, but it would be better to start with
> ]>>> reexamining and  > redefining our usage of public keys.
> ]>>> Specifically - I'm an advocate of  > keys as the primary
> ]identifiers.  A "key centric"
> ]>>> approach is a dual model
> ]>>>   > to Kohnfelder/X.509   The SDSI/SPKI work did progress work in
> ]this
> ]>>>   > direction, but failed for a variety of reasons.
> ]>>>
> ]>>> Key-centric versus name-centric identity is The Question, is it not?
> ]>>>
> ]>>> I rather doubt that the Administration's push for the NSTIC is
> ]>>> likely to settle in on key-centricity, but might you elaborate on
> ]>>> your preference for it?  I'm sympathetic to it on the grounds that
> ]>>> it directly enables multi-personna and, thus, data segmentation.
> ]>>>
> ]>>> If I'm being obtuse, feel free to say so.
> ]>>>
> ]>>> --dan
> ]>>>
> ]>>> _______________________________________________
> ]>>> Cfrg mailing list
> ]>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
> ]>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> ]> .
> ]>
>


From mcgrew@cisco.com  Sun Jan 26 01:22:13 2014
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Cc: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] questions on performance and side channel resistance for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IPsec and TLS
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On 01/24/2014 06:19 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> On 24/1/14 3:45 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Hi Adam,
>>
>> On 01/23/2014 11:51 AM, Adam Langley wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 9:54 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>>> Hi Adam and Yoav,
>>>>
>>>> I have some questions and comments on these crypto algorithms and 
>>>> their use
>>>> in TLS and IPsec.
>>>>
>>>> On 01/21/2014 01:06 PM, Adam Langley wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> Reviews and comments would be greatly appreciated, as well as anyone
>>>>>> checking my examples.
>>>>> In the introduction: I think ChaCha20+Poly1305 are useful for 
>>>>> software
>>>>> implementations, beyond their use as a backup to AES. AES in not
>>>>> suitable for pure, software implementations and they tend to be be
>>>>> slow and have side-channels. (AES-GCM even more so.)
>>>>
>>>> The claims that ChaCha20+Poly1305 are faster than AES GCM in pure 
>>>> software
>>>> environments should be quantified in (at least one of) the drafts.
>>> I have no problem with that, but it's not something that I typically
>>> see in IETF drafts and so I didn't do any actual numbers for it.
>>
>> Agreed that it is not something one would expect to see in a TLS 
>> draft, but if the definitive algorithm specification is going to be 
>> an RFC, it should be there.   Watson suggested having a separate RFC 
>> that defines this algorithm combination, which makes sense to me.
>
> Hi David.
>
> I'm trying to throw together a separate document describing ChaCha20, 
> Poly1305, and Adam's AEAD, every step with test vectors. I hope to 
> have it ready by Monday.
>
> Yoav
>
>

Thanks Yoav, I offer to provide some detailed comments.   Can I ask for 
some other volunteers in the group to do the same?    It would be good 
to make sure that the review gets done in a timely way, considering the 
IETF interest.

David

From ted@krovetz.net  Sun Jan 26 07:11:23 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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> For the above two reasons I think it would be worth updating the test =
vectors, despite some risk of causing a slight delay. Surely the draft =
doesn=92t have to repeat much of the vetting process if only sample =
results change. I am willing to confirm new test vectors quickly.

This makes sense. I'll do it. In the coming days I'll update the OCB =
vectors as James suggested, he and I will confirm the results, and I'll =
update the draft for others to verify.

-Ted=

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Hi Ted,

On 01/26/2014 10:11 AM, Ted Krovetz wrote:
>> For the above two reasons I think it would be worth updating the test vectors, despite some risk of causing a slight delay. Surely the draft doesn’t have to repeat much of the vetting process if only sample results change. I am willing to confirm new test vectors quickly.
> This makes sense. I'll do it. In the coming days I'll update the OCB vectors as James suggested, he and I will confirm the results, and I'll update the draft for others to verify.

that's great, thanks for being so responsive.

If anyone else would be able to independently verify the text cases 
between now and February 7, please contact Ted directly, and thanks in 
advance.

David

> -Ted
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Sun Jan 26 07:23:29 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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On 01/26/2014 03:19 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi Ted,
> 
> On 01/26/2014 10:11 AM, Ted Krovetz wrote:
>>> For the above two reasons I think it would be worth updating the test
>>> vectors, despite some risk of causing a slight delay. Surely the
>>> draft doesn’t have to repeat much of the vetting process if only
>>> sample results change. I am willing to confirm new test vectors quickly.
>> This makes sense. I'll do it. In the coming days I'll update the OCB
>> vectors as James suggested, he and I will confirm the results, and
>> I'll update the draft for others to verify.
> 
> that's great, thanks for being so responsive.
> 
> If anyone else would be able to independently verify the text cases
> between now and February 7, please contact Ted directly, and thanks in
> advance.

I won't be able to do that, but can confirm that this wouldn't
affect my IRSG review etc. And it does seem like a good idea.

S.

> 
> David
> 
>> -Ted
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> 

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] process for cfrg blessing of [insert algorithm name here]
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Hi Sean,

thanks for sharing your thoughts; you raise a lot of good points.   More =

inline:

On 01/12/2014 04:25 PM, Sean Turner wrote:
> On Jan 08, 2014, at 10:03, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 12:16 AM, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com> wrote:=

>>> I'd like to get to the thread that I think Waton/David are after [0]/=
[1].
>>
>> Thank you very much for writing the email that I wanted to have
>> written, but wasn't able to write.
>>
>>>
>>> I've got a hat but I'm not wearing it here (and my hat goes away in t=
wo months anyway).  I guess I'd like to add that I'm not a cryptographer,=
 but I don't know why I need to say that because it's not like anybody ha=
s to take a test to contribute to the CFRG.  And anyway you'd figure it o=
ut right quick when I responded "do I get an egg roll with that" when qui=
zzed about the Chinese remainder theorem.  (it's a long email I thought I=
'd lead with a joke)
>>>
>>> Because the "IRTF does not set standards" [2], remember there are RFC=
s that are on standards track and some not [3], it kind of follows that t=
he "The Research Group input carries no more weight than other community =
input" [2].  But, I kind of find it hard to believe that if the CFRG publ=
ishes "[insert cryptographic algorithm's name] is rubbish" that the IETF =
would produce a standard around said algorithm.  On the flip side, just b=
ecause the CFRG publishes "[insert cryptographic algorithm's name] is fab=
ulous" I wouldn't expect every IETF WG to fall over themselves changing t=
heir MTI (Mandatory To Implement) algorithm.
>>
>> I think this is unduly optimistic about the ability of IETF WGs to vet=

>> their use of cryptography. The TLS WG has a long and ignominious
>> history of failure in the form of unforced errors, and that is merely
>> the most visible and researched one. These mistakes mostly aren't
>> algorithmic, but rather
>> how the algorithms fit together to form a protocol.
>
> There are very few WGs that roll their own crypto mostly they just poin=
t to other work in protocols that are similar.  For example, in many of t=
he routing protocols just do the HMAC, but what they sometimes do is re-w=
rite what's in RFC 2104 using the terms from their protocol.  We often tr=
y to discourage them from doing this, but copying text isn't grounds for =
stopping work progressing.
>
> When a draft rolls its own crypto, we generally try to see what the cfr=
g things about it.

Agreed.   Historically, CFRG has focused on algorithms and not=20
protocols, and the IETF security area groups have done crypto protocols, =

and not algorithms; that is, IETF WGs have felt confident to design=20
protocols that use cryptographic primitives.   Now, the CFRG charter=20
does not limit itself to algorithms, it refers to "techniques" and=20
"mechanisms", so its past focus has not been limited by its charter.  =20
Going forward, it could do more protocol oriented work, if that would be =

fruitful.

Our aim should be to (better) isolate the security-relevant aspects of a =

crypto mechanism.  For instance, AEAD provided better isolation than=20
earlier DIY methods.  It is also possible to specify a crypto protocol=20
in a way that is transport-independent, which could be an avenue for=20
us.   I think you hit on a key point below: the more proactive we are,=20
the more successful we will be.

>
>
>>> The current practice that the Security ADs have been using is here [4=
], which resulted from input from the IETF community as a result of push =
back from implementers on what I called "crypto proliferation". (yes the =
email referenced says TLS but that's because folks with algorithms want t=
o do that one first as most bang for buck and then move on to other WGs) =
 You'll note the CFRG isn't listed there and I don't think I'd require it=
 be there, but what's not documented there is what happens before authors=
 go for code points.  Before authors are going to get a code point, they =
need to document their algorithm (in English) someplace.  A lot of times =
that's ended up being an internet-draft that goes through the ISE process=
 and gets published as an Informational RFC; examples include: GOST [5], =
Camellia [6], SEED [7], ARIA [8], Rabbit [9], Brainpool [10], CLEFIA [11]=
, and Kcipher-2 [12].  To get through the ISE process they need to show s=
ome kind of review, here's where everybody says go to the CFRG and see wh=
at they say they're the cryptographers.  To be honest most of the time it=
's pretty quiet.  Maybe that's to do with the fact that many of the reque=
sts for review are for national algorithms.
>>>
>>> In any event, I think we should consider the following (there might b=
e more):
>>>
>>> 0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
>>> 1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
>>> 2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the "process"?
>>>
>>> I use the term process her pretty loosely but it'll address the CFRG =
impact on IETF adoption of cryptography.
>>>
>>> Here's what I think:
>>>
>>> 0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
>>>
>>> I say no for a couple of reasons:
>>>
>>> a) I think it's not necessary unless we're going to start standardizi=
ng cryptographic algorithms.   I don't think the IETF has ever published =
a cryptographic algorithm on standards track (more examples include [13][=
14][15][16]) instead what's done is a standards track RFC that documents =
the "use of cryptographic algorithm x in protocol y" (e.g., [17][18][19])=
=2E  (yes there was one BCP that deprecate the use of well-known weak alg=
orithms [20]).  I think many of the successes of the IETF actually come f=
rom protocols that were partially developed outside of the process and th=
en finished off (for some value of finished off) and I suspect the same w=
ill be true of any cryptographic algorithm published by the IRTF or throu=
gh the individual stream (more on this distinction later).
>>>
>>> b) I can't see having a WG or RG that has the "power" to enforce "cry=
ptogoodness".  It would be perceived as a hammer with which to beat up dr=
aft authors, wg chains, and other ADs and if you're following the thread =
on the IETF discuss list about Stephen's perpass-attack draft you'll note=
 that seems to be a fear shared by more than a couple of people.  Rechart=
ering to enforce "cryptogoodness", I bet, will no doubt be challenging an=
d I'd submit an unnecessary waste of time.
>>
>> Do you think that if someone had beaten the TLS 1.0 authors over the
>> head about EtM vs MtE, that this would have been a bad thing? The
>> issue of the disconnect between what an engineer knows about crypto
>> and what they need to know about crypto is very far reaching: every
>> single WG that considers a cryptographic protocol faces it. The best
>> way I think to handle this is provide a central resource to ask: "hey,=

>> we are doing X, is it a good idea?" and tell people they should
>> seriously consider it. That means having a very fast process, and
>> having a reputation for giving good answers.
>
> No I don't think it would have been a bad thing, but I'm sure there is =
history about why it didn't get changed that was before my time.
>
> I agree that having a central resource would be a good idea I just don'=
t think that the central repository gets veto power.  I also want to avoi=
d the "bring me a rock" game and get something documented that explains w=
hat's primitives etc are good for what, which I guess is scattered around=
 at this point but it might be good to centralize (I might even be able t=
o do this draft :).

I agree with you here, but let me add that I think we could improve=20
things by structuring/defining the relationship between IETF and CFRG in =

a way that brings CFRG more into the IETF process.   CFRG should not=20
have veto power, but documenting the response of the RG could become=20
part of the vetting process for new uses of crypto, for instance.    On=20
the CFRG side, we would need to make sure that we have enough people=20
with the skills and time to do such vetting.

>
>
>>> c) I really think the CFRG should look out past the IETF's time horiz=
on.  You'll note the word "new" in the CFRG's charter and from what I've =
seen adopting "new" crypto is not really done it's usually got to marinat=
e for a while.  So having something we'd been thinking about for a while =
to replace say RC4 would have been well nice.  Now some of this is water =
under the bridge but maybe we should be thinking two steps ahead to the n=
ext curve beyond say 25519, cha cha, etc.  I'd be cool if we actually did=
 stuff like provide a venue for folks to exchange test vectors etc when d=
eveloping (preferably) open source crypto.
>>
>> How many implementations does the world need?
>
> If I were kind for a day - three: one primary, one backup, and one in t=
he wings.
>
>> Once again the distinction between primitives and protocols comes
>> back. A new block cipher definitely needs to marinate: we don't have a=

>> comprehensive idea of what could be possible. But a new ECC parameter
>> set can be validated in a few minutes with GP/PARI: compute certain
>> invariants, and see that they avoid known bad choices. A new key
>> agreement protocol should require a solid proof and automatic
>> verification.
>> The process we follow needs to take this into account.
>
> What this highlights to me is that we need to maybe not lump every sing=
le cryptographic "thing" together.  I'm pretty sure I mixed 'em all up in=
 this message.
>
>> Post-Quantum Crypto is something we will need, and is going to need a
>> lot of development. NTRU is I think mature from a design perspective,
>> but patented, while McBits involves giant keys. (Not necessarily that
>> bad). The situation with post-quantum signatures is annoying: we have
>> Merkel signatures, but HFE variants are nicer to use, but a lot have
>> fallen, or it's unclear what parameters are needed. Anyway, we have
>> some urgent issues to deal with first.
>>
>>>
>>> 1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
>>>
>>> I know what the fox says [21]: Hell yeah!
>>>
>>> There's *nothing, nada, zilch, null, z=E9ro, ???, ?* stopping anybody=
 from writing an individual draft and then asking for it to be adopted by=
 the RG.
>>>
>>>      Chairs: Do you prefer RG adoption emails come from
>>>      you (initiated by authors) or a more free-for-all approach
>>>      when authors ask that it be adopted from the RG?

When someone has a crypto technique or a requirements or security=20
analysis that they think should be picked up by the Research Group, I=20
ask that they write up an email formally suggesting that adoption, and=20
send it to the list.   Ideally, the subject line should contain=20
something like "proposal for RG adoption" or some similar text.   I=20
think this way of doing things will provide as much transparency as=20
possible, which is good.

>>>
>>>
>>> I wanted to put the final IETF nail in the coffin for MD2, MD4, and M=
D5 (certain uses) [22][23][24] and got some input from CFRG  participants=
=2E  If there's more like this that need to be done, just do 'em and then=
 we can use it them to deter folks from making bad choices.
>>>
>>> If you're really keen, then I'd also like to suggest that you volunte=
er with the ISE (Independent Stream Editor) to help review the cryptograp=
hic protocols that come through their stream.  There's a couple on call, =
but more would certainly be welcome.  Mail to: rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org.

This is a good suggestion.  It seems that some coordination would be=20
good here.   Perhaps we could get someone in CFRG to take on the=20
responsibility of handling coordination with the ISE, and triage the=20
drafts to find the ones that need the most attention, and match=20
volunteer reviewers from CFRG to drafts as needed.

>>>
>>>
>>> 2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the "process"?
>>>
>>> I think it kind of depends on the definition of "new" is, the type of=
 algorithm, the type of registry from which you're requesting a code poin=
t [25], and what the WG requires.  Let's explore some of these:
>>>
>>> Based on what happened in the past, should the CFRG and not the ISE b=
e the stream where algorithms get published?  For those not in the know, =
the stream dictates what kind of review the draft gets and what "kind" of=
 RFC can pop out at the end.
>>
>> As an author, how do I determine what streams my drafts are going
>> into, and how do I push them to active consideration?
>> A lot of good crypto drafts sit around in limbo: I'm sure this is true=

>> for all drafts, but for some of the crypto ones it's causing
>> actively exploited problems to linger unfixed for years.
>
> Streams are defined in RFC 4844 (http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc4844).=
  As an author, it's up to you to pick which stream you want your draft t=
o go through.  The catch is the RFC 5742 review, which is the "end-run" c=
heck, so if there's an IETF WG in that space then it's pretty much got to=
 go through that WG unless the WG decides to take a pass at it.
>
> For strict crypto internet drafts (and by this I mean something like AE=
S in some new mode and not AES in some new mode used with protocol x), th=
ere isn't an IETF WG so really three of the streams are available: throug=
h the IETF stream as an AD sponsored internet-draft, CFRG, or Independent=
=2E  In the past, the "crypto" internet-drafts have gone through the Inde=
pendent stream intended for informational status.
>
> I'm probably okay with the Independent stream publishing informational =
RFCs for algorithms, the CFRG then saying yeah these algorithms would be =
appropriate for use here, and then the IETF WG actually standardizing it.=
  And, yes this seems like a horrific amount of paper work, but I think i=
t makes the most sense given what we've got now.
>
> Alternatively, I could see the CFRG publishing crypto drafts instead of=
 the Independent stream.  Because the CFRG might work on things that aren=
't ready for prime time though if this path gets taken then maybe we need=
 some boiler plate that says "ready for prime time" and "not ready for pr=
ime time."

Agreed, it would be useful to come up with some boilerplate that could=20
be added to RFCs, which captures the CFRG opinion.  This sort of text=20
could also be useful for endorsing work that we feel is ready for=20
adoption.   I need to think more about what sort of categories we would=20
want to define, but I like this idea.


>
>
>>> I suspect that authors care little about the stream.  They just want =
to get published.  If the algorithm:
>>>
>>> a) Is a national algorithm - I've no doubt it'll get reviewed like ev=
ery draft progressing through the process and possibly even some errors w=
ill be uncovered (it's happened).  Somebody who works for the newly forme=
d national gov't of Bitcoinlandia shows up with Cesar's Cipher - would "B=
itcoinlandia's Ceasar's Cipher" be blocked from publication?  I suspect t=
hat it wouldn't as long as it was clear that it was a national algorithm =
or one of a suite of national algorithms.  In any event, if changes were =
offered and not accepted I'm thinking the ISE is likely to let it go prob=
ably based on the grounds that the changes would make the published RFC d=
iffer from the already published national standard.  Would the CFRG do so=
mething different?

The IETF ISE should be willing to publish informational RFCs that=20
describe existing work, such as a national cipher, in order to introduce =

that work to the Internet community and to provide an accessible=20
specification.   I don't think CFRG can or should be able to prevent any =

such publication.   But what would be good is to record the CFRG opinion =

on the algorithm.   This could be done in a subsection of the RFC, for=20
instance, or it could be written up in a separate RFC (along the lines=20
of cipher-catalog).

>>>
>>>
>>> b) Has properly marinated over time and not been shown to have weaken=
ed considerably and there was a security proof - I suspect that the grill=
ing would be procedural in that the authors would just need to have the i=
ntestinal fortitude to make it through the process.  I guess the same que=
stion from a applies though.
>>>
>>> c) Is like b but it doesn't have a security proof - If an author brin=
gs a draft to the CFRG is progression through the IRTF going to require o=
ne?  If the an author goes to the ISE is the CFRG going to block progress=
ion based on a lack of security proof?

My opinion on the lack of security proof: no, we should not prevent=20
publication because of a lack of a security proof.   A proof is highly=20
desirable when dealing with a complex protocol or algorithm because it=20
shows that security is equivalent to some easier-to-understand crypto=20
challenge that has not yet been broken.   But new ciphers, for instance, =

do not have such reductions; we can't reasonably expect a proof of=20
security for CLEFIA, say.   So while we might prefer proofs, we should=20
not require them.

Watson had suggested, a couple of weeks back, that CFRG consider writing =

up a statement of what sort of proofs and models were best, and I liked=20
that idea.   A document like that could also make the job of explaining=20
security to IETF WGs easier.

>>>
>>>
>>> d) Is "new" with no security proof - I've no doubt it'd get raked ove=
r the coals (i.e., given rough treatment), but ... I guess the 800lbs Gor=
illa is on what grounds is it okay to stop a draft in its tracks?
>>>
>>> - How long must crypto marinate?
>>>
>>> - If it's similar to something that's already available should it be =
stopped?  Maybe the existing algorithm won't work for whatever reason or =
the consumers (I'm assuming there is somebody who wants to use it it's no=
t just about getting an RFC published) are somehow sold on the "new" way.=

>>
>> I think if the already available protocol has stronger security
>> properties, and there isn't a compelling need for the new one, than we=

>> should avoid giving people the choice.
>
> I guess I tend to agree, and I guess it depends on the definition of co=
mpelling because we've definitely published multiple ways to do one thing=
=2E
>
>>> - If there's no security proof, then how does an author get one (wait=
, pay, beg)?  Seriously: I know some cryptographers but they have day job=
s and I know some researchers but I think they're maybe more motivated by=
 publishing a new attack on a well-known and widely deployed protocol am =
I just supposed to know my role and not try to develop a cryptographic pr=
otocol.

This is a really valid question.   I'll add that the people who are=20
designing systems to solve real-world problems are the people that we=20
want to use well-reviewed, proven secure algorithms, and they are the=20
ones who will be asking the question that you pose above.

It would be valuable if there were a body of literature describing best=20
practices for crypto implementations, which was easily accessible to=20
crypto practitioners.   Here I mean accessible in the sense of "I can=20
understand the security properties and how to implement it" as well as=20
"I can find and download the document easily".    This goal gets beyond=20
the current CFRG charter, I think.   To give academic cryptographers=20
"full credit" for participating, it would be useful to establish a=20
peer-reviewed journal for the publication of these documents.

>>
>> The way you do this is by looking in IACR for an eprint solving your
>> problem, and adapt that to your situation. I've never seen or heard of=

>> an IETF protocol requiring a new primitive. If you are not a
>> cryptographer, you shouldn't be doing cryptography, any more than
>> someone who isn't a structural engineer should design a bridge. And
>> just as most bridges can be ordered from a catalogue, most protocols
>> don't require new crypto.
>>
>>>
>>> - What if the authors are actually engaging and making changes but th=
ere is a point at which there is an impasse - can they document the known=
 vulnerability/weakness in the security considerations and move on?
>>
>> No. There is never a compelling reason to approve or use an algorithm
>> with a known weakness when a better one is available. If there is a
>> new
>> need that existing algorithms don't fill, then an effort should be
>> made to fill it with the best algorithm possible.
>
> Generally, I guess I agree with you but there's algorithms like AES-CCM=
 that were published stating restrictions on the amount of data to be enc=
rypted with a single key and AES-GCM that requires counters never be reus=
ed.

The IRTF approach to a situation in which there is a diversity of=20
opinion on a draft is to document the different opinions.   I think that =

is a good approach to take when there is not a consensus, and I think it =

could be useful in a situation like you describe.

David

>
>
>>> There are also registries that only require expert review and there i=
s no requirement for them to consult with the CFRG on the goodness of alg=
orithms before choosing to give a code point.  I can't think of a time wh=
en this happened and I'm pretty sure an expert wouldn't do that, but I'm =
also unsure whether the process would be changed to give the CFRG veto po=
wer.
>>
>> Depends on who the expert is. If you ask DJB or Tanja Lange about an
>> elliptic curve, you are asking the right people. Ask Knudsen about
>> block
>> ciphers. But if you ask Knudsen about curves, or DJB about block
>> ciphers, they won't know much more than you do. The best solution is
>> to have a
>> body of people, maybe a "Crypto Forum Group" who when asked can find
>> out what is known and document it.
>
> I'm perfectly fine with a group of different SME (subject matter expert=
s).
>
> spt
>
>>> After getting here and re-reading what I wrote it all sounds like doo=
m and gloom but remember what the fox said!
>>>
>>> spt
>>>
>>> [0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03595.html
>>> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03685.html
>>> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2014/
>>> [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/
>>> [4] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06470.html
>>> [5] GOST:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5830/
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5831/
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5832/
>>> [6] Camellia
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3713/
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5528/
>>> [7] SEED
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4269/
>>> [8] ARIA
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5794/
>>> [9] Rabbit
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4503/
>>> [10] Brainpool
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5639/
>>> [11] CLEIFA
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6114/
>>> [12] Kcipher-2
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7008/
>>> [13] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2104/
>>> [14] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/
>>> [15] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3447/
>>> [16] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3610/
>>> [17] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4056/
>>> [18] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/
>>> [19] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp/
>>> [20] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6649/
>>> [21] http://www.google.com/url?sa=3Dt&rct=3Dj&q=3D&esrc=3Ds&source=3D=
web&cd=3D1&ved=3D0CCsQtwIwAA&url=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3=
Fv%3DjofNR_WkoCE&ei=3D5q_EUsv0MbSqsAT1-oDYDQ&usg=3DAFQjCNE9-Z1oW5gVjc6rJg=
_-KAhmjY_Qfg&bvm=3Dbv.58187178,d.cWc
>>> [22] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6149/
>>> [23] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6150/
>>> [24] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6151/
>>> [25] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5226/ and updates
>>> (actually check out https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-leiba-cott=
on-iana-5226bis/)
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --=20
>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Sean,<br>
      <br>
      thanks for sharing your thoughts; you raise a lot of good
      points.&nbsp;&nbsp; More inline:<br>
      <br>
      On 01/12/2014 04:25 PM, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""><big>On Jan 08, 2014, at 10:03, Watson Ladd <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com">&lt;watsonbladd@gmail.com&gt;</a> wrote:

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap=""><big>On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 12:16 AM, Sean Turner <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:TurnerS@ieca.com">&lt;TurnerS@ieca.com&gt;</a> wrote:
</big></pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>I&#8217;d like to get to the thread that I think Waton/David are after [0]/[1].
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
Thank you very much for writing the email that I wanted to have
written, but wasn't able to write.

</big></pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>
I&#8217;ve got a hat but I&#8217;m not wearing it here (and my hat goes away in two months anyway).  I guess I&#8217;d like to add that I&#8217;m not a cryptographer, but I don&#8217;t know why I need to say that because it&#8217;s not like anybody has to take a test to contribute to the CFRG.  And anyway you&#8217;d figure it out right quick when I responded &#8220;do I get an egg roll with that&#8221; when quizzed about the Chinese remainder theorem.  (it&#8217;s a long email I thought I&#8217;d lead with a joke)

Because the "IRTF does not set standards&#8221; [2], remember there are RFCs that are on standards track and some not [3], it kind of follows that the &#8220;The Research Group input carries no more weight than other community input&#8221; [2].  But, I kind of find it hard to believe that if the CFRG publishes "[insert cryptographic algorithm's name] is rubbish&#8221; that the IETF would produce a standard around said algorithm.  On the flip side, just because the CFRG publishes "[insert cryptographic algorithm's name] is fabulous&#8221; I wouldn't expect every IETF WG to fall over themselves changing their MTI (Mandatory To Implement) algorithm.
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
I think this is unduly optimistic about the ability of IETF WGs to vet
their use of cryptography. The TLS WG has a long and ignominious
history of failure in the form of unforced errors, and that is merely
the most visible and researched one. These mistakes mostly aren't
algorithmic, but rather
how the algorithms fit together to form a protocol.
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
There are very few WGs that roll their own crypto mostly they just point to other work in protocols that are similar.  For example, in many of the routing protocols just do the HMAC, but what they sometimes do is re-write what&#8217;s in RFC 2104 using the terms from their protocol.  We often try to discourage them from doing this, but copying text isn&#8217;t grounds for stopping work progressing.

When a draft rolls its own crypto, we generally try to see what the cfrg things about it.</big></pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Agreed.&nbsp;&nbsp; Historically, CFRG has focused on algorithms and not
    protocols, and the IETF security area groups have done crypto
    protocols, and not algorithms; that is, IETF WGs have felt confident
    to design protocols that use cryptographic primitives.&nbsp;&nbsp; Now, the
    CFRG charter does not limit itself to algorithms, it refers to
    "techniques" and "mechanisms", so its past focus has not been
    limited by its charter.&nbsp;&nbsp; Going forward, it could do more protocol
    oriented work, if that would be fruitful.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    Our aim should be to (better) isolate the security-relevant aspects
    of a crypto mechanism.&nbsp; For instance, AEAD provided better isolation
    than earlier DIY methods.&nbsp; It is also possible to specify a crypto
    protocol in a way that is transport-independent, which could be an
    avenue for us.&nbsp;&nbsp; I think you hit on a key point below: the more
    proactive we are, the more successful we will be.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""><big>

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>The current practice that the Security ADs have been using is here [4], which resulted from input from the IETF community as a result of push back from implementers on what I called &#8220;crypto proliferation". (yes the email referenced says TLS but that&#8217;s because folks with algorithms want to do that one first as most bang for buck and then move on to other WGs)  You&#8217;ll note the CFRG isn&#8217;t listed there and I don&#8217;t think I&#8217;d require it be there, but what&#8217;s not documented there is what happens before authors go for code points.  Before authors are going to get a code point, they need to document their algorithm (in English) someplace.  A lot of times that&#8217;s ended up being an internet-draft that goes through the ISE process and gets published as an Informational RFC; examples include: GOST [5], Camellia [6], SEED [7], ARIA [8], Rabbit [9], Brainpool [10], CLEFIA [11], and Kcipher-2 [12].  To get through the ISE proc
 e
ss they need to show some kind of review, here&#8217;s where everybody says go to the CFRG and see what they say they&#8217;re the cryptographers.  To be honest most of the time it&#8217;s pretty quiet.  Maybe that&#8217;s to do with the fact that many of the requests for review are for national algorithms.

In any event, I think we should consider the following (there might be more):

0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?
1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?
2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the &#8220;process&#8221;?

I use the term process her pretty loosely but it&#8217;ll address the CFRG impact on IETF adoption of cryptography.

Here&#8217;s what I think:

0) Should we move the CFRG to the IETF?

I say no for a couple of reasons:

a) I think it&#8217;s not necessary unless we&#8217;re going to start standardizing cryptographic algorithms.   I don&#8217;t think the IETF has ever published a cryptographic algorithm on standards track (more examples include [13][14][15][16]) instead what&#8217;s done is a standards track RFC that documents the "use of cryptographic algorithm x in protocol y&#8221; (e.g., [17][18][19]).  (yes there was one BCP that deprecate the use of well-known weak algorithms [20]).  I think many of the successes of the IETF actually come from protocols that were partially developed outside of the process and then finished off (for some value of finished off) and I suspect the same will be true of any cryptographic algorithm published by the IRTF or through the individual stream (more on this distinction later).

b) I can&#8217;t see having a WG or RG that has the &#8220;power&#8221; to enforce &#8220;cryptogoodness&#8221;.  It would be perceived as a hammer with which to beat up draft authors, wg chains, and other ADs and if you&#8217;re following the thread on the IETF discuss list about Stephen&#8217;s perpass-attack draft you&#8217;ll note that seems to be a fear shared by more than a couple of people.  Rechartering to enforce &#8220;cryptogoodness&#8221;, I bet, will no doubt be challenging and I&#8217;d submit an unnecessary waste of time.
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
Do you think that if someone had beaten the TLS 1.0 authors over the
head about EtM vs MtE, that this would have been a bad thing? The
issue of the disconnect between what an engineer knows about crypto
and what they need to know about crypto is very far reaching: every
single WG that considers a cryptographic protocol faces it. The best
way I think to handle this is provide a central resource to ask: "hey,
we are doing X, is it a good idea?" and tell people they should
seriously consider it. That means having a very fast process, and
having a reputation for giving good answers.
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
No I don&#8217;t think it would have been a bad thing, but I'm sure there is history about why it didn&#8217;t get changed that was before my time.

I agree that having a central resource would be a good idea I just don&#8217;t think that the central repository gets veto power.  I also want to avoid the "bring me a rock" game and get something documented that explains what&#8217;s primitives etc are good for what, which I guess is scattered around at this point but it might be good to centralize (I might even be able to do this draft :).</big></pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I agree with you here, but let me add that I think we could improve
    things by structuring/defining the relationship between IETF and
    CFRG in a way that brings CFRG more into the IETF process.&nbsp;&nbsp; CFRG
    should not have veto power, but documenting the response of the RG
    could become part of the vetting process for new uses of crypto, for
    instance.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On the CFRG side, we would need to make sure that we
    have enough people with the skills and time to do such vetting.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""><big>

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>c) I really think the CFRG should look out past the IETF's time horizon.  You&#8217;ll note the word &#8220;new&#8221; in the CFRG&#8217;s charter and from what I&#8217;ve seen adopting &#8220;new&#8221; crypto is not really done it&#8217;s usually got to marinate for a while.  So having something we&#8217;d been thinking about for a while to replace say RC4 would have been well nice.  Now some of this is water under the bridge but maybe we should be thinking two steps ahead to the next curve beyond say 25519, cha cha, etc.  I&#8217;d be cool if we actually did stuff like provide a venue for folks to exchange test vectors etc when developing (preferably) open source crypto.
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
How many implementations does the world need?
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
If I were kind for a day - three: one primary, one backup, and one in the wings.

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap=""><big>Once again the distinction between primitives and protocols comes
back. A new block cipher definitely needs to marinate: we don't have a
comprehensive idea of what could be possible. But a new ECC parameter
set can be validated in a few minutes with GP/PARI: compute certain
invariants, and see that they avoid known bad choices. A new key
agreement protocol should require a solid proof and automatic
verification.
The process we follow needs to take this into account.
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
What this highlights to me is that we need to maybe not lump every single cryptographic &#8220;thing&#8221; together.  I&#8217;m pretty sure I mixed &#8216;em all up in this message.

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap=""><big>Post-Quantum Crypto is something we will need, and is going to need a
lot of development. NTRU is I think mature from a design perspective,
but patented, while McBits involves giant keys. (Not necessarily that
bad). The situation with post-quantum signatures is annoying: we have
Merkel signatures, but HFE variants are nicer to use, but a lot have
fallen, or it's unclear what parameters are needed. Anyway, we have
some urgent issues to deal with first.

</big></pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>
1) Should the CFRG be more proactive?

I know what the fox says [21]: Hell yeah!

There's *nothing, nada, zilch, null, z&eacute;ro, &#1589;&#1601;&#1585;, &#38646;* stopping anybody from writing an individual draft and then asking for it to be adopted by the RG.

    Chairs: Do you prefer RG adoption emails come from
    you (initiated by authors) or a more free-for-all approach
    when authors ask that it be adopted from the RG?</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    When someone has a crypto technique or a requirements or security
    analysis that they think should be picked up by the Research Group,
    I ask that they write up an email formally suggesting that adoption,
    and send it to the list.&nbsp;&nbsp; Ideally, the subject line should contain
    something like "proposal for RG adoption" or some similar text.&nbsp;&nbsp; I
    think this way of doing things will provide as much transparency as
    possible, which is good.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>

I wanted to put the final IETF nail in the coffin for MD2, MD4, and MD5 (certain uses) [22][23][24] and got some input from CFRG  participants.  If there&#8217;s more like this that need to be done, just do &#8216;em and then we can use it them to deter folks from making bad choices.

If you&#8217;re really keen, then I&#8217;d also like to suggest that you volunteer with the ISE (Independent Stream Editor) to help review the cryptographic protocols that come through their stream.  There&#8217;s a couple on call, but more would certainly be welcome.  Mail to: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org">rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org</a>.</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This is a good suggestion.&nbsp; It seems that some coordination would be
    good here.&nbsp;&nbsp; Perhaps we could get someone in CFRG to take on the
    responsibility of handling coordination with the ISE, and triage the
    drafts to find the ones that need the most attention, and match
    volunteer reviewers from CFRG to drafts as needed.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>

2) How does a new cryptographic algorithm get through the &#8220;process&#8221;?

I think it kind of depends on the definition of &#8220;new&#8221; is, the type of algorithm, the type of registry from which you&#8217;re requesting a code point [25], and what the WG requires.  Let&#8217;s explore some of these:

Based on what happened in the past, should the CFRG and not the ISE be the stream where algorithms get published?  For those not in the know, the stream dictates what kind of review the draft gets and what &#8220;kind&#8221; of RFC can pop out at the end.
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
As an author, how do I determine what streams my drafts are going
into, and how do I push them to active consideration?
A lot of good crypto drafts sit around in limbo: I'm sure this is true
for all drafts, but for some of the crypto ones it's causing
actively exploited problems to linger unfixed for years.
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
Streams are defined in RFC 4844 (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc4844">http://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc4844</a>).  As an author, it&#8217;s up to you to pick which stream you want your draft to go through.  The catch is the RFC 5742 review, which is the &#8220;end-run&#8221; check, so if there&#8217;s an IETF WG in that space then it&#8217;s pretty much got to go through that WG unless the WG decides to take a pass at it.

For strict crypto internet drafts (and by this I mean something like AES in some new mode and not AES in some new mode used with protocol x), there isn&#8217;t an IETF WG so really three of the streams are available: through the IETF stream as an AD sponsored internet-draft, CFRG, or Independent.  In the past, the &#8220;crypto&#8221; internet-drafts have gone through the Independent stream intended for informational status.

I&#8217;m probably okay with the Independent stream publishing informational RFCs for algorithms, the CFRG then saying yeah these algorithms would be appropriate for use here, and then the IETF WG actually standardizing it.  And, yes this seems like a horrific amount of paper work, but I think it makes the most sense given what we&#8217;ve got now.

Alternatively, I could see the CFRG publishing crypto drafts instead of the Independent stream.  Because the CFRG might work on things that aren&#8217;t ready for prime time though if this path gets taken then maybe we need some boiler plate that says &#8220;ready for prime time&#8221; and &#8220;not ready for prime time.&#8221;</big></pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Agreed, it would be useful to come up with some boilerplate that
    could be added to RFCs, which captures the CFRG opinion.&nbsp; This sort
    of text could also be useful for endorsing work that we feel is
    ready for adoption.&nbsp;&nbsp; I need to think more about what sort of
    categories we would want to define, but I like this idea.<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""><big>

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>I suspect that authors care little about the stream.  They just want to get published.  If the algorithm:

a) Is a national algorithm - I&#8217;ve no doubt it&#8217;ll get reviewed like every draft progressing through the process and possibly even some errors will be uncovered (it&#8217;s happened).  Somebody who works for the newly formed national gov't of Bitcoinlandia shows up with Cesar's Cipher - would &#8220;Bitcoinlandia&#8217;s Ceasar&#8217;s Cipher&#8221; be blocked from publication?  I suspect that it wouldn&#8217;t as long as it was clear that it was a national algorithm or one of a suite of national algorithms.  In any event, if changes were offered and not accepted I&#8217;m thinking the ISE is likely to let it go probably based on the grounds that the changes would make the published RFC differ from the already published national standard.  Would the CFRG do something different?</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    The IETF ISE should be willing to publish informational RFCs that
    describe existing work, such as a national cipher, in order to
    introduce that work to the Internet community and to provide an
    accessible specification.&nbsp;&nbsp; I don't think CFRG can or should be able
    to prevent any such publication.&nbsp;&nbsp; But what would be good is to
    record the CFRG opinion on the algorithm.&nbsp;&nbsp; This could be done in a
    subsection of the RFC, for instance, or it could be written up in a
    separate RFC (along the lines of cipher-catalog).<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>

b) Has properly marinated over time and not been shown to have weakened considerably and there was a security proof - I suspect that the grilling would be procedural in that the authors would just need to have the intestinal fortitude to make it through the process.  I guess the same question from a applies though.

c) Is like b but it doesn&#8217;t have a security proof - If an author brings a draft to the CFRG is progression through the IRTF going to require one?  If the an author goes to the ISE is the CFRG going to block progression based on a lack of security proof?</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    My opinion on the lack of security proof: no, we should not prevent
    publication because of a lack of a security proof.&nbsp;&nbsp; A proof is
    highly desirable when dealing with a complex protocol or algorithm
    because it shows that security is equivalent to some
    easier-to-understand crypto challenge that has not yet been
    broken.&nbsp;&nbsp; But new ciphers, for instance, do not have such
    reductions; we can't reasonably expect a proof of security for
    CLEFIA, say.&nbsp;&nbsp; So while we might prefer proofs, we should not
    require them.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    Watson had suggested, a couple of weeks back, that CFRG consider
    writing up a statement of what sort of proofs and models were best,
    and I liked that idea.&nbsp;&nbsp; A document like that could also make the
    job of explaining security to IETF WGs easier.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>

d) Is &#8220;new&#8221; with no security proof - I&#8217;ve no doubt it&#8217;d get raked over the coals (i.e., given rough treatment), but &#8230; I guess the 800lbs Gorilla is on what grounds is it okay to stop a draft in its tracks?

- How long must crypto marinate?

- If it&#8217;s similar to something that&#8217;s already available should it be stopped?  Maybe the existing algorithm won&#8217;t work for whatever reason or the consumers (I&#8217;m assuming there is somebody who wants to use it it&#8217;s not just about getting an RFC published) are somehow sold on the &#8220;new&#8221; way.
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
I think if the already available protocol has stronger security
properties, and there isn't a compelling need for the new one, than we
should avoid giving people the choice.
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
I guess I tend to agree, and I guess it depends on the definition of compelling because we&#8217;ve definitely published multiple ways to do one thing.

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>- If there&#8217;s no security proof, then how does an author get one (wait, pay, beg)?  Seriously: I know some cryptographers but they have day jobs and I know some researchers but I think they&#8217;re maybe more motivated by publishing a new attack on a well-known and widely deployed protocol am I just supposed to know my role and not try to develop a cryptographic protocol.
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This is a really valid question.&nbsp;&nbsp; I'll add that the people who are
    designing systems to solve real-world problems are the people that
    we want to use well-reviewed, proven secure algorithms, and they are
    the ones who will be asking the question that you pose above.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    It would be valuable if there were a body of literature describing
    best practices for crypto implementations, which was easily
    accessible to crypto practitioners.&nbsp;&nbsp; Here I mean accessible in the
    sense of "I can understand the security properties and how to
    implement it" as well as "I can find and download the document
    easily".&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This goal gets beyond the current CFRG charter, I
    think.&nbsp;&nbsp; To give academic cryptographers "full credit" for
    participating, it would be useful to establish a peer-reviewed
    journal for the publication of these documents.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap=""><big>
The way you do this is by looking in IACR for an eprint solving your
problem, and adapt that to your situation. I've never seen or heard of
an IETF protocol requiring a new primitive. If you are not a
cryptographer, you shouldn't be doing cryptography, any more than
someone who isn't a structural engineer should design a bridge. And
just as most bridges can be ordered from a catalogue, most protocols
don't require new crypto.

</big></pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>
- What if the authors are actually engaging and making changes but there is a point at which there is an impasse - can they document the known vulnerability/weakness in the security considerations and move on?
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
No. There is never a compelling reason to approve or use an algorithm
with a known weakness when a better one is available. If there is a
new
need that existing algorithms don't fill, then an effort should be
made to fill it with the best algorithm possible.
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
Generally, I guess I agree with you but there&#8217;s algorithms like AES-CCM that were published stating restrictions on the amount of data to be encrypted with a single key and AES-GCM that requires counters never be reused.  </big></pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    The IRTF approach to a situation in which there is a diversity of
    opinion on a draft is to document the different opinions.&nbsp;&nbsp; I think
    that is a good approach to take when there is not a consensus, and I
    think it could be useful in a situation like you describe.<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:E5019A5C-468E-4D62-86AC-D6E9D6ABFBB7@ieca.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""><big>

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>There are also registries that only require expert review and there is no requirement for them to consult with the CFRG on the goodness of algorithms before choosing to give a code point.  I can&#8217;t think of a time when this happened and I&#8217;m pretty sure an expert wouldn&#8217;t do that, but I'm also unsure whether the process would be changed to give the CFRG veto power.
</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>
Depends on who the expert is. If you ask DJB or Tanja Lange about an
elliptic curve, you are asking the right people. Ask Knudsen about
block
ciphers. But if you ask Knudsen about curves, or DJB about block
ciphers, they won't know much more than you do. The best solution is
to have a
body of people, maybe a "Crypto Forum Group" who when asked can find
out what is known and document it.
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
I&#8217;m perfectly fine with a group of different SME (subject matter experts).

spt

</big></pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap=""><big>After getting here and re-reading what I wrote it all sounds like doom and gloom but remember what the fox said!

spt

[0] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03595.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03595.html</a>
[1] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03685.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03685.html</a>
[2] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2014/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2014/</a>
[3] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/</a>
[4] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06470.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06470.html</a>
[5] GOST:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5830/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5830/</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5831/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5831/</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5832/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5832/</a>
[6] Camellia
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3713/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3713/</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5528/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5528/</a>
[7] SEED
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4269/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4269/</a>
[8] ARIA
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5794/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5794/</a>
[9] Rabbit
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4503/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4503/</a>
[10] Brainpool
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5639/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5639/</a>
[11] CLEIFA
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6114/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6114/</a>
[12] Kcipher-2
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7008/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7008/</a>
[13] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2104/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2104/</a>
[14] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/</a>
[15] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3447/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3447/</a>
[16] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3610/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3610/</a>
[17] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4056/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4056/</a>
[18] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/</a>
[19] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp/</a>
[20] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6649/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6649/</a>
[21] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;ved=0CCsQtwIwAA&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DjofNR_WkoCE&amp;ei=5q_EUsv0MbSqsAT1-oDYDQ&amp;usg=AFQjCNE9-Z1oW5gVjc6rJg_-KAhmjY_Qfg&amp;bvm=bv.58187178,d.cWc">http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;ved=0CCsQtwIwAA&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DjofNR_WkoCE&amp;ei=5q_EUsv0MbSqsAT1-oDYDQ&amp;usg=AFQjCNE9-Z1oW5gVjc6rJg_-KAhmjY_Qfg&amp;bvm=bv.58187178,d.cWc</a>
[22] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6149/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6149/</a>
[23] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6150/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6150/</a>
[24] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6151/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6151/</a>
[25] <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5226/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5226/</a> and updates
(actually check out <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-leiba-cotton-iana-5226bis/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-leiba-cotton-iana-5226bis/</a>)
_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>

</big></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap=""><big>


-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin
</big></pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap=""><big>
</big></pre>
      <big><br>
      </big>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <big><br>
      </big>
      <pre wrap=""><big>_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</big></pre>
      <big>
      </big></blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From ynir@checkpoint.com  Mon Jan 27 14:15:34 2014
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
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Hi

I've submitted the below draft about ChaCha20 and Poly1305. This document a=
ims to describe the algorithms (and AGL's AEAD based on them) in such a way=
 that an implementer will be able to write code that implements these funct=
ions with only this document as a reference. The intention is for this docu=
ment to serve as a reference for future documents entitled "ChaCha20, Poly1=
305 and their use in XXX". I personally intend to use it for an IPsec docum=
ent.

This version -00 is quite drafty, and I'm not sure of my calculations, espe=
cially in Poly1305 (I used "bc" for all of them). So this document needs re=
view. IMO it could also make a good undergraduate project that will also he=
lp to verify the examples and test vectors interspersed throughout.  More t=
est vectors is another thing this document needs.

This document

  *   does not introduce any new crypto - it's all from DJB and AGL.
  *   does not provide security proofs - there's plenty of that in academic=
 papers, although I would be happy to link to those as informative referenc=
es.
  *   does not have any timing data or performance numbers. Those are very =
platform-dependent, so I don't know if they're appropriate. If they are, I'=
ll be happy to include them.

There are a few open issues I'd like to address:

  1.  When converting a 256-bit buffer into a pair of numbers, k & r, Adam'=
s draft takes "r" from the first 128 bits, and "k" from the following bits.=
 DJB's sample code seems to go the other way. I went with Adam's way.
  2.  In cases where buffers are converted to integers or vice versa, we us=
ed little-endian order. This is different from the way it's done in (for ex=
ample) GCM and in many protocols. It's true that some parts of the ChaCha20=
 algorithm itself are explicitly little-endian
  3.  The lengths encoded in the AEAD construction are in bytes, whereas in=
 GCM they are in bits.

Thanks

Yoav

Begin forwarded message:

From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org<mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>>
Subject: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
Date: January 27, 2014 1:45:46 PM GMT+02:00
To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org<mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org>>
Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org<mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>>


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.


       Title           : ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF protocols
       Author          : Yoav Nir
Filename        : draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
Pages           : 20
Date            : 2014-01-27

Abstract:
  This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher, as well as the use
  of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms, and as
  a :"combined mode", or Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
  (AEAD) algorithm.

  This document does not introduce any new crypto, but is meant to
  serve as a stable reference and an implementation guide.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

_______________________________________________
I-D-Announce mailing list
I-D-Announce@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt

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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space; ">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; fo=
nt-size: 15px; line-height: 21px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">H=
i</span>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
I've submitted the below draft about ChaCha20 and Poly1305. This document a=
ims to describe the algorithms (and AGL's AEAD based on them) in such a way=
 that an implementer will be able to write code that implements these funct=
ions with only this document as
 a reference. The intention is for this document to serve as a reference fo=
r future documents entitled &quot;ChaCha20, Poly1305 and their use in XXX&q=
uot;. I personally intend to use it for an IPsec document.</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
This version -00 is quite drafty, and I'm not sure of my calculations, espe=
cially in Poly1305 (I used &quot;bc&quot; for all of them). So this documen=
t needs review. IMO it could also make a good undergraduate project that wi=
ll also help to verify the examples and test
 vectors interspersed throughout. &nbsp;More test vectors is another thing =
this document needs.</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
This document</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<ul style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 20px 1em; padding: 0px 0px 0px 1em; ">
<li style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 3px; "><span style=3D"line-height: 22px; font-=
size: 12pt;">does not introduce any new crypto - it's all from DJB and AGL.=
</span></li><li style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 3px; "><span style=3D"line-height:=
 22px; font-size: 12pt;">does not provide security proofs - there's plenty =
of that in academic papers, although I would be happy to link to those as i=
nformative references.</span></li><li style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 3px; "><span=
 style=3D"line-height: 22px; font-size: 12pt;">does not have any timing dat=
a or performance numbers. Those are very platform-dependent, so I don't kno=
w if they're appropriate. If they are, I'll be happy to include them.</span=
></li></ul>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There are a few open issues I'd like to address:</div>
<div>
<ol>
<li style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 3px; ">When converting a 256-bit buffer into a=
 pair of numbers, k &amp; r, Adam's draft takes &quot;r&quot; from the firs=
t 128 bits, and &quot;k&quot; from the following bits. DJB's sample code se=
ems to go the other way. I went with Adam's way.</li><li style=3D"margin: 0=
px 0px 3px; ">In cases where buffers are converted to integers or vice vers=
a, we used little-endian order. This is different from the way it's done in=
 (for example) GCM and in many protocols. It's true that some parts of the =
ChaCha20 algorithm
 itself are explicitly little-endian</li><li style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 3px; =
">The lengths encoded in the AEAD construction are in bytes, whereas in GCM=
 they are in bits.&nbsp;</li></ol>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
Thanks</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"line-height: 21px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); posi=
tion: static; z-index: auto; ">
Yoav</div>
<div><br>
<div>Begin forwarded message:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;">
<span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, =
0, 1.0);"><b>From:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;=
<br>
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;">
<span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, =
0, 1.0);"><b>Subject:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;"><b>I-=
D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt</b><br>
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;">
<span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, =
0, 1.0);"><b>Date:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;">Janua=
ry 27, 2014 1:45:46 PM GMT&#43;02:00<br>
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;">
<span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, =
0, 1.0);"><b>To:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margi=
n-left: 0px;">
<span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, =
0, 1.0);"><b>Reply-To:
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;=
<br>
</span></div>
<br>
<div><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Title &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF protocols=
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Author &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: Yoav Nir<br>
<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre"></span>Filename &n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-=
00.txt<br>
<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre"></span>Pages &nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: 20<br>
<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre"></span>Date &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: 2014-01-27<br=
>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher, as well as th=
e use<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms, =
and as<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;a :&quot;combined mode&quot;, or Authenticated Encryption with =
Additional Data<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;(AEAD) algorithm.<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;This document does not introduce any new crypto, but is meant t=
o<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;serve as a stable reference and an implementation guide.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly130=
5/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305/</a><=
br>
<br>
There's also a htmlized version available at:<br>
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00<br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
I-D-Announce mailing list<br>
I-D-Announce@ietf.org<br>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce<br>
Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html<br>
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt<br>
<br>
Email secured by Check Point<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</body>
</html>

--_000_2DD6FE86A5C6414487782DFFCA8AD5F8checkpointcom_--

From ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi  Mon Jan 27 15:35:02 2014
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Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2014 01:34:54 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
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On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 10:15:26PM +0000, Yoav Nir wrote:

> Filename        : draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt



>   Rounds 1-4 are part of the "column" round, while 5-8 are part of the
>   "diagonal" round:

Should the first "Rounds" be "Quaterrounds" or something?

>   AEAD Construction for Poly1305:
>   000  50 51 52 53 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00|PQRS............
>   016  00 00 00 00 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc|.......4d.`.{...
>   032  53 ef 7e c2 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7|S.~....Q)n......
>   048  36 ee 62 d6 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69|6.b.=..^..g....i
>   064  da 92 72 8b 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6|..r..q.....)....
>   080  7e cd 3b 36 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3|~.;6...-w......
>   096  28 09 1b 58 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b|(..X..$...u.U...
>   112  48 31 d7 bc 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65|H1..?....Kz..v.e
>   128  86 ce c6 4b 61 16 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00      |...Ka.r.......

What are that stuff at the begnning (the first 20 bytes)? The
12 byte additional data + its length?


-Ilari

From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Mon Jan 27 16:21:55 2014
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On 1/27/14, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
> Hi
>
> I've submitted the below draft about ChaCha20 and Poly1305. This document
> aims to describe the algorithms (and AGL's AEAD based on them) in such a =
way
> that an implementer will be able to write code that implements these
> functions with only this document as a reference. The intention is for th=
is
> document to serve as a reference for future documents entitled "ChaCha20,
> Poly1305 and their use in XXX". I personally intend to use it for an IPse=
c
> document.
>
> This version -00 is quite drafty, and I'm not sure of my calculations,
> especially in Poly1305 (I used "bc" for all of them). So this document ne=
eds
> review. IMO it could also make a good undergraduate project that will als=
o
> help to verify the examples and test vectors interspersed throughout.  Mo=
re
> test vectors is another thing this document needs.
>
> This document
>
>   *   does not introduce any new crypto - it's all from DJB and AGL.
>   *   does not provide security proofs - there's plenty of that in academ=
ic
> papers, although I would be happy to link to those as informative
> references.
>   *   does not have any timing data or performance numbers. Those are ver=
y
> platform-dependent, so I don't know if they're appropriate. If they are,
> I'll be happy to include them.
>
> There are a few open issues I'd like to address:
>
>   1.  When converting a 256-bit buffer into a pair of numbers, k & r, Ada=
m's
> draft takes "r" from the first 128 bits, and "k" from the following bits.
> DJB's sample code seems to go the other way. I went with Adam's way.

You're confusing Poly1305 with Poly1305-AES.  Poly1305 uses a key of
the form (r, s) to authenticate one message; Poly1305-AES uses a key
of the form (k, r), takes a unique nonce n for each message, and
derives s =3D E_k(n).  Dr. Bernstein's standalone Poly1305
implementations do use the first half of the key bitstring as r and
the second half as s.

>   2.  In cases where buffers are converted to integers or vice versa, we
> used little-endian order. This is different from the way it's done in (fo=
r
> example) GCM and in many protocols. It's true that some parts of the
> ChaCha20 algorithm itself are explicitly little-endian

Every multi-byte value in ChaCha and Poly1305 is little-endian.

>   3.  The lengths encoded in the AEAD construction are in bytes, whereas =
in
> GCM they are in bits.

That's a good thing.  It rules out bugs like
<http://cr.yp.to/talks/2009.02.28-3/slides.pdf>.



Section 3 (=E2=80=98Implementation Advice=E2=80=99) states that the GMP-bas=
ed Poly1305
implementation given as an alternate form of the specification in the
Poly1305-AES paper runs in constant time.  As far as I can tell, it
does not.  There is a constant-time =E2=80=98ref=E2=80=99 implementation in=
 NaCl, and
I have portable 32-bit and 64-bit integer-multiplication
implementations as well.


Section 4 (=E2=80=98Security Considerations=E2=80=99) discusses the risk th=
at the
Poly1305 key derived from a ChaCha (key, nonce) pair will collide.
This is not a risk at all.  Poly1305 keys are supposed to be chosen
uniformly at random, and most of the effort of proving Poly1305-AES
secure was in bounding the security loss caused by the fact that AES
could not produce the same value of s for two different nonces.


Robert Ransom

From James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com  Mon Jan 27 21:22:38 2014
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
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On Jan 28, 2014, at 1:34 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
 wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 10:15:26PM +0000, Yoav Nir wrote:
>=20
>> Filename        : draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
>=20
>=20
>=20
>>  Rounds 1-4 are part of the "column" round, while 5-8 are part of the
>>  "diagonal" round:
>=20
> Should the first "Rounds" be "Quaterrounds" or something?

1, 2, 3, and 4 are quarter-rounds. Together they make up a round. In this c=
ase, a column round.

>=20
>>  AEAD Construction for Poly1305:
>>  000  50 51 52 53 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00|PQRS............
>>  016  00 00 00 00 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc|.......4d.`.{...
>>  032  53 ef 7e c2 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7|S.~....Q)n......
>>  048  36 ee 62 d6 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69|6.b.=3D..^..g....i
>>  064  da 92 72 8b 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6|..r..q.....)....
>>  080  7e cd 3b 36 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3|~.;6...-w......
>>  096  28 09 1b 58 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b|(..X..$...u.U...
>>  112  48 31 d7 bc 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65|H1..?....Kz..v.e
>>  128  86 ce c6 4b 61 16 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00      |...Ka.r.......
>=20
> What are that stuff at the begnning (the first 20 bytes)? The
> 12 byte additional data + its length?

It is. The AAD is "50:51:52:53:0c:00:00:00:00:00:00:00". Now that you menti=
on it, I see that I omitted to include the AAD in my example. Will fix in t=
he next revision (coming soon)

Thanks

Yoav


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
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On Jan 28, 2014, at 2:21 AM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 1/27/14, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>> Hi
>>=20
>> I've submitted the below draft about ChaCha20 and Poly1305. This documen=
t
>> aims to describe the algorithms (and AGL's AEAD based on them) in such a=
 way
>> that an implementer will be able to write code that implements these
>> functions with only this document as a reference. The intention is for t=
his
>> document to serve as a reference for future documents entitled "ChaCha20=
,
>> Poly1305 and their use in XXX". I personally intend to use it for an IPs=
ec
>> document.
>>=20
>> This version -00 is quite drafty, and I'm not sure of my calculations,
>> especially in Poly1305 (I used "bc" for all of them). So this document n=
eeds
>> review. IMO it could also make a good undergraduate project that will al=
so
>> help to verify the examples and test vectors interspersed throughout.  M=
ore
>> test vectors is another thing this document needs.
>>=20
>> This document
>>=20
>> *   does not introduce any new crypto - it's all from DJB and AGL.
>> *   does not provide security proofs - there's plenty of that in academi=
c
>> papers, although I would be happy to link to those as informative
>> references.
>> *   does not have any timing data or performance numbers. Those are very
>> platform-dependent, so I don't know if they're appropriate. If they are,
>> I'll be happy to include them.
>>=20
>> There are a few open issues I'd like to address:
>>=20
>> 1.  When converting a 256-bit buffer into a pair of numbers, k & r, Adam=
's
>> draft takes "r" from the first 128 bits, and "k" from the following bits=
.
>> DJB's sample code seems to go the other way. I went with Adam's way.
>=20
> You're confusing Poly1305 with Poly1305-AES.  Poly1305 uses a key of
> the form (r, s) to authenticate one message; Poly1305-AES uses a key
> of the form (k, r), takes a unique nonce n for each message, and
> derives s =3D E_k(n).  Dr. Bernstein's standalone Poly1305
> implementations do use the first half of the key bitstring as r and
> the second half as s.

Thanks. I'll rename "k" to "s" to keep it consistent.

>=20
>> 2.  In cases where buffers are converted to integers or vice versa, we
>> used little-endian order. This is different from the way it's done in (f=
or
>> example) GCM and in many protocols. It's true that some parts of the
>> ChaCha20 algorithm itself are explicitly little-endian
>=20
> Every multi-byte value in ChaCha and Poly1305 is little-endian.

True. Which is why I kept it like that. But note that there is a controvers=
y running about endianness (endianity?) on the TLS list, this time about cu=
rve25519.

>> 3.  The lengths encoded in the AEAD construction are in bytes, whereas i=
n
>> GCM they are in bits.
>=20
> That's a good thing.  It rules out bugs like
> <http://cr.yp.to/talks/2009.02.28-3/slides.pdf>.
>=20
>=20
> Section 3 (=91Implementation Advice=92) states that the GMP-based Poly130=
5
> implementation given as an alternate form of the specification in the
> Poly1305-AES paper runs in constant time.  As far as I can tell, it
> does not.  There is a constant-time =91ref=92 implementation in NaCl, and
> I have portable 32-bit and 64-bit integer-multiplication
> implementations as well.
>=20

Thanks. I will change that text to point to NaCl as an example.

> Section 4 (=91Security Considerations=92) discusses the risk that the
> Poly1305 key derived from a ChaCha (key, nonce) pair will collide.
> This is not a risk at all.  Poly1305 keys are supposed to be chosen
> uniformly at random, and most of the effort of proving Poly1305-AES
> secure was in bounding the security loss caused by the fact that AES
> could not produce the same value of s for two different nonces.

AES cannot, and if we took the entire 512-bits from ChaCha, they would not =
repeat either. But with taking only half the bytes, they will repeat much s=
ooner. That is why you shouldn't use the first 64 bits of an AES-encrypted =
counter as an IV for 3DES. You'll likely get a collision after 2^32 message=
s, and you'll get an unacceptably high chance of collision much sooner.=20

With taking 128 bits for s out of 512, the odds are much better, so they're=
 acceptable. That is what the section says.

Yoav


From crypto@brainhub.org  Tue Jan 28 00:26:07 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 01/23/2014 06:58 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 1/23/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>
>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another
>> method?
>
>> ( BTW, the proposal in the draft is in public domain since it was
>> published on December 10, 2012. )
>
> Are you claiming that the point format that I suggested is patented?

I was making a statement about my contribution, in case this issue comes up.

The IP for the use of 1 bit to compress a point is a common knowledge, 
but I've heard that some of them are expiring.

However, I am concerned about the cofactor issue. These curves have the 
cofactor greater than 1. Unlike "unsafe" NIST curves, this needs to be 
handled. The draft suggest methods that, as I understand them, may run 
into IP issues. Besides, there may be protocols that want to do classic 
DH. One solution to these issues is to enumerate the points in the small 
subgroup, explicitly in the document, or by providing the method to 
identify them.


From rransom.8774@gmail.com  Tue Jan 28 06:47:52 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 1/28/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
> On 01/23/2014 06:58 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
>> On 1/23/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another
>>> method?
>>
>>> ( BTW, the proposal in the draft is in public domain since it was
>>> published on December 10, 2012. )
>>
>> Are you claiming that the point format that I suggested is patented?
>
> I was making a statement about my contribution, in case this issue comes
> up.
>
> The IP for the use of 1 bit to compress a point is a common knowledge,
> but I've heard that some of them are expiring.

If you are referring to the patent addressed in
<http://cr.yp.to/patents/us/6141420.html>, claim 29 of the same patent
covers point decompression with your proposal.


> However, I am concerned about the cofactor issue. These curves have the
> cofactor greater than 1. Unlike "unsafe" NIST curves, this needs to be
> handled. The draft suggest methods that, as I understand them, may run
> into IP issues. Besides, there may be protocols that want to do classic
> DH. One solution to these issues is to enumerate the points in the small
> subgroup, explicitly in the document, or by providing the method to
> identify them.

U.S. patent 6,226,383 (Jablon) claims 31 and 32 cover the use of your
suggestion in ECDH.


Dr. Bernstein's paper which specifies Curve25519 for use in ECDH
addresses its groups' cofactors by (a) generating Diffie-Hellman
keypairs such that the secret exponent is divisible by the cofactor
(as is common in multiplicative-group Diffie-Hellman, where the
cofactor is at least 2), and (b) requiring that the shared-secret
group element be used only as input to a hash function or hash-based
KDF (as is required for all Diffie-Hellman systems).

Are you aware of any specific patent claims which cover these
techniques, or are you merely trying to spread patent FUD?


Robert Ransom

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00.txt
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On 1/28/14, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>
> On Jan 28, 2014, at 2:21 AM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
> wrote:

>> Section 4 (=E2=80=98Security Considerations=E2=80=99) discusses the risk=
 that the
>> Poly1305 key derived from a ChaCha (key, nonce) pair will collide.
>> This is not a risk at all.  Poly1305 keys are supposed to be chosen
>> uniformly at random, and most of the effort of proving Poly1305-AES
>> secure was in bounding the security loss caused by the fact that AES
>> could not produce the same value of s for two different nonces.
>
> AES cannot, and if we took the entire 512-bits from ChaCha, they would no=
t
> repeat either. But with taking only half the bytes, they will repeat much
> sooner. That is why you shouldn't use the first 64 bits of an AES-encrypt=
ed
> counter as an IV for 3DES. You'll likely get a collision after 2^32
> messages, and you'll get an unacceptably high chance of collision much
> sooner.
>
> With taking 128 bits for s out of 512, the odds are much better, so they'=
re
> acceptable. That is what the section says.

You missed the point entirely.  The attacker does not benefit from the
repeated use of a Poly1305 key unless he/she/it knows that the key
will be repeated.  Poly1305's security relies on the assumption that
the attacker has no information at all about its keys.

Using an injective function to derive s from a nonce, as in
Poly1305-AES, does give the attacker information about Poly1305's
keys.  Dr. Bernstein's proof that the security loss due to this
information leak is tolerably small, even after 2^64 messages,
justified a paper of its own
(<http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/permutations-20050323.pdf>).


Robert Ransom

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On Jan 28, 2014, at 4:55 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 1/28/14, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> On Jan 28, 2014, at 2:21 AM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>=20
>>> Section 4 (=91Security Considerations=92) discusses the risk that the
>>> Poly1305 key derived from a ChaCha (key, nonce) pair will collide.
>>> This is not a risk at all.  Poly1305 keys are supposed to be chosen
>>> uniformly at random, and most of the effort of proving Poly1305-AES
>>> secure was in bounding the security loss caused by the fact that AES
>>> could not produce the same value of s for two different nonces.
>>=20
>> AES cannot, and if we took the entire 512-bits from ChaCha, they would n=
ot
>> repeat either. But with taking only half the bytes, they will repeat muc=
h
>> sooner. That is why you shouldn't use the first 64 bits of an AES-encryp=
ted
>> counter as an IV for 3DES. You'll likely get a collision after 2^32
>> messages, and you'll get an unacceptably high chance of collision much
>> sooner.
>>=20
>> With taking 128 bits for s out of 512, the odds are much better, so they=
're
>> acceptable. That is what the section says.
>=20
> You missed the point entirely.  The attacker does not benefit from the
> repeated use of a Poly1305 key unless he/she/it knows that the key
> will be repeated.  Poly1305's security relies on the assumption that
> the attacker has no information at all about its keys.

Right. Thanks. I missed that only non-predictability was required (rather t=
han non-repeatability).=20

OK. Will fix.

Yoav


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: [TLS] Curve25519 in TLS and Additional Curves in TLS
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On 01/28/2014 06:47 AM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 1/28/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>> On 01/23/2014 06:58 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
>>> On 1/23/14, Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Wouldn't http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact be another
>>>> method?
>>>
>>>> ( BTW, the proposal in the draft is in public domain since it was
>>>> published on December 10, 2012. )
>>>
>>> Are you claiming that the point format that I suggested is patented?
>>
>> I was making a statement about my contribution, in case this issue comes
>> up.
>>
>> The IP for the use of 1 bit to compress a point is a common knowledge,
>> but I've heard that some of them are expiring.
>
> If you are referring to the patent addressed in
> <http://cr.yp.to/patents/us/6141420.html>, claim 29 of the same patent
> covers point decompression with your proposal.

I am basing the method on the the CRYPTO '85 paper, which tells:

> Finally, it should be remarked, that even though we have phrased
> everything in terms of points on an elliptic curve, that, for the key
> exchange protocol (and other uses as one-way functions), that only the
> x-coordinate needs to be transmitted. The formulas for multiples of a
> point cited in the first section make it clear that the x-coordinate of
> a multiple depends only on the x-coordinate of the original point.


>> However, I am concerned about the cofactor issue. These curves have the
>> cofactor greater than 1. Unlike "unsafe" NIST curves, this needs to be
>> handled. The draft suggest methods that, as I understand them, may run
>> into IP issues. Besides, there may be protocols that want to do classic
>> DH. One solution to these issues is to enumerate the points in the small
>> subgroup, explicitly in the document, or by providing the method to
>> identify them.
>
> U.S. patent 6,226,383 (Jablon) claims 31 and 32 cover the use of your
> suggestion in ECDH.

I try not to read patents, one never knows what can be found there...

Because any modp group will have a cofactor of at least 2, all modp 
operations are effected by these claims. These claims would cover, for 
example, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6989 sec 2.2 that excludes 0 and p-1.

I was assuming that such a general method of comparing one element to 
another, or a concept of a subgroup, were known before 1990s.

>
>
> Dr. Bernstein's paper which specifies Curve25519 for use in ECDH
> addresses its groups' cofactors by (a) generating Diffie-Hellman
> keypairs such that the secret exponent is divisible by the cofactor
> (as is common in multiplicative-group Diffie-Hellman, where the
> cofactor is at least 2), and (b) requiring that the shared-secret
> group element be used only as input to a hash function or hash-based
> KDF (as is required for all Diffie-Hellman systems).
>
> Are you aware of any specific patent claims which cover these
> techniques, or are you merely trying to spread patent FUD?

The quick search reveals this one: US6563928. Yes, I did notice that the 
paper specifies that the key generation must clear the lower bits, which 
is equivalent to multiplying by a (power of 2) cofactor. Such a method 
hardwires the cofactor multiplication into the field operation. This was 
not necessarily needed, but I understand that this was important to be 
"safe". I personally would prefer the cofactor not to be a part of the 
raw ECC operations.



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On 28 January 2014 05:21, Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> Ted,
>
> Attached is my version of the updated test vectors for appendix A of draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb.
>
> The first 16 {N,A,P,C} tuples use incrementing nonces.
>
> I added one example with a 96-bit tag and a separate key (since we recommend using a single tag length with any given key). It uses the same nonce as the 128-bit tag example with the same A and P.
>
> The final examples use incrementing nonces.
>
> I made minor changes to the text.

I have successfully managed to verify all of these proposed test
vectors with my implementation of OCB.

However, I understood that one of your objectives for proposing a
change to the test vectors was to not reuse the same key and nonce
within the tests. This objective has not been achieved in the final
set of 9 more complex tests. Whilst you have incremented the nonce
between each encryption within a test, each test starts with an all
zero nonce and a fixed key.

Also - a more minor nit - your notation for incrementing the nonce
seems odd to me. The nonce is defined as a string of bytes - whereas
in your notation it is treated as an integer which can be incremented.

Matt

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From: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: Matt Caswell <frodo@baggins.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 12:06:07 +1100
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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Hello Mike


> It=92s cool to see pairing-friendly curves specced.  I=92ve always foun=
d
> the applications of these curves fascinating, so progress toward
> deploying them is very nice to see.

Thank you for your feedback on the activities.
We are glad if we contribute to progress of the applications of these=20
curves with you.


> But isn=92t 512 bits rather large for a BN curve?  If you=92re going to
> have a curve that large, it seems to me that you=92d want an embedding
> degree of at least 18 even though it costs you a giant cofactor.  A
> curve with a 512-bit prime and a 384-bit subgroup might get you to
> the 192-bit security level.  This would take a 640-bit BN curve at
> minimum, with 720 a more conservative guess.
>
> Source: Freeman 2006, http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/372.pdf.  My
> knowledge on this subject is dated, so I=92m sure you know better...

Thank you for your comments and information on security of our memo.

Our memo specifies parameters for compatibility with ISO/IEC document=20
and parameters for high performance. 512-bit curve and 384-bit curves=20
which are compliant with ISO/IEC have 128 security levels because of the=20
following reason.

-----
We need to consider security on point of an elliptic curve and output of=20
pairing, respectively ECDLP and FFDLP.
Table 1 shows correspondence between security level and p-elliptic curve=20
against Pollard-rho attack. This is attack which must be considered in=20
NIST-curve and so on.
Furthermore, table 1 shows correspondence between security level and=20
output of pairing whose space is F_{p^k} against Number Field Sieve=20
method, where k is called as an embedding degree.

Table 1
Security level (bit) | size of prime p (bit) | size of p^k
      128             |          256          |     3072
      192             |          384          |     7680
      256             |          512          |     15360

On the other hands, table 2 shows a prime p and size of output of=20
pairing because BN-curves have embedding degree k=3D12.

Table 2
size of prime p (bit) | size of p^k   |
        256            |     3072      |
        384            |     4608      |
        512            |     6144      |

As table 1 and 2, sizes of p^k of 384-bit and 512-bit bn-curves are=20
lower than sizes for security level 192-bit. Hence we evaluate that=20
384-bit and 512-bit bn-curves have 128 security level. (advantage of=20
bn-curve is that its embedding degree is optimal for obtaining security=20
level 128-bit)
-----

If there are parameters of bn-curves with higher security level and high=20
performance, we would like to add it into our memo.


Cheers,
Kohei KASAMATSU


(2014/01/23 9:46), Michael Hamburg wrote:
> Hello Kohei and company,
>
> It=92s cool to see pairing-friendly curves specced.  I=92ve always foun=
d the applications of these curves fascinating, so progress toward deploy=
ing them is very nice to see.
>
> But isn=92t 512 bits rather large for a BN curve?  If you=92re going to=
 have a curve that large, it seems to me that you=92d want an embedding d=
egree of at least 18 even though it costs you a giant cofactor.  A curve =
with a 512-bit prime and a 384-bit subgroup might get you to the 192-bit =
security level.  This would take a 640-bit BN curve at minimum, with 720 =
a more conservative guess.
>
> Source: Freeman 2006, http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/372.pdf.  My knowledg=
e on this subject is dated, so I=92m sure you know better...
>
> Cheers,
> =97 Mike Hamburg
>
> On Jan 22, 2014, at 4:04 PM, Kohei Kasamatsu <kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.c=
o.jp> wrote:
>
>> Hi cfrg folks,
>>
>>
>> Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographi=
c
>> primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized
>> by conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one =
of
>> these primitives.
>>
>> We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves=
)
>> which provide efficient operations of a pairing.
>> The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly usefu=
l
>> for realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing an=
d parameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.
>>
>> We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based primi=
tives in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.
>>
>> We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works.
>>
>> Best,
>> Kohei KASAMATSU
>> -------- Original Message --------
>> Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>> Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800
>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>> Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>>
>>
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories.
>>
>>
>>         Title           : Barreto-Naehrig Curves
>>         Authors         : Kohei Kasamatsu
>>                           Satoru Kanno
>>                           Tetsutaro Kobayashi
>>                           Yuto Kawahara
>> 	Filename        : draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>> 	Pages           : 15
>> 	Date            : 2014-01-09
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing
>>    cryptographic primitives.  In this memo, we specify domain paramete=
rs
>>    of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5].  The BN-curve is an ellipt=
ic
>>    curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security
>>    and efficiency of cryptographic schemes.  This memo specifies domai=
n
>>    parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtai=
n
>>    efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384, a=
nd
>>    512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].
>>    Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of
>>    elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open
>>    source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type
>>    respectively[21].
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/
>>
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of subm=
ission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> I-D-Announce mailing list
>> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
>> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
>> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>


--=20
Kohei KASAMATSU

NTT Software Corporation
TEL: +81 45 212 7908 FAX: +81 45 212 9800
E-mail: kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp


From kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp  Wed Jan 29 03:03:15 2014
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Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 20:02:21 +0900
From: Kohei Kasamatsu <kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
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Hi Laura,


Thank you for your comments.

> Regarding your statement in Section 6, "The elliptic curve that
> supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following
> problems, since the security of pairing-based cryptographic
> primitives is based on hardness of these problems."  You then list
> the ECDLP, ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with auxiliary inputs.
>
> I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives
> are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it's true, but
> it's conceivable that a pairing-based scheme could be based on
> another hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap
> DH. (See, for example, Section 6 of "Evaluating Large Degree
> Isogenies and Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography" by Broker,
> Charles, Lauter, or "Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for
> ordinary elliptic curves" by Galbraith & Stolbunov.)

We agree with it.
As you say, there are pairing-based cryptographic primitives based on 
the hardness of different problems from these described in our draft.

We would like to change
"The elliptic curve that supports a bilinear map requires the hardness 
of solving following problems, since the security of pairing-based 
cryptographic primitives is based on hardness of these problems."
to
"Pairing-based cryptographic primitives are often based on the
hardness of the following problems, so when the elliptic
curves from this document are used in such schemes, these problems
would apply."

Does the modification despel the concern?

Best,
Kohei KASAMATSU


(2014/01/24 3:13), Laura Hitt wrote:
> Hi Kohei,
>
> Regarding your statement in Section 6, "The elliptic curve that supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following problems, since the security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives is based on hardness of these problems."  You then list the ECDLP, ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with auxiliary inputs.
>
> I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it's true, but it's conceivable that a pairing-based scheme could be based on another hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See, for example, Section 6 of "Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography" by Broker, Charles, Lauter, or "Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for ordinary elliptic curves" by Galbraith & Stolbunov.)
>
> Best,
> Laura
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Kohei Kasamatsu
> Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 6:04 PM
> To: cfrg@irtf.org
> Cc: kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp; kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp
> Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>
> Hi cfrg folks,
>
>
> Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographic primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized by conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of these primitives.
>
> We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves) which provide efficient operations of a pairing.
> The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly useful for realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing and parameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.
>
> We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based primitives in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.
>
> We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works.
>
> Best,
> Kohei KASAMATSU
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
> Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>
>
>           Title           : Barreto-Naehrig Curves
>           Authors         : Kohei Kasamatsu
>                             Satoru Kanno
>                             Tetsutaro Kobayashi
>                             Yuto Kawahara
> 	Filename        : draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
> 	Pages           : 15
> 	Date            : 2014-01-09
>
> Abstract:
>      Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing
>      cryptographic primitives.  In this memo, we specify domain parameters
>      of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5].  The BN-curve is an elliptic
>      curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security
>      and efficiency of cryptographic schemes.  This memo specifies domain
>      parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtain
>      efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384, and
>      512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].
>      Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of
>      elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open
>      source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type
>      respectively[21].
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>


-- 
Kohei KASAMATSU

NTT Software Corporation
TEL: +81 45 212 7908 FAX: +81 45 212 9800
E-mail: kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
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On Jan 29, 2014, at 3:01 AM, Kohei Kasamatsu =
<kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp> wrote:

>> But isn=92t 512 bits rather large for a BN curve?  If you=92re going =
to
>> have a curve that large, it seems to me that you=92d want an =
embedding
>> degree of at least 18 even though it costs you a giant cofactor.  A
>> curve with a 512-bit prime and a 384-bit subgroup might get you to
>> the 192-bit security level.  This would take a 640-bit BN curve at
>> minimum, with 720 a more conservative guess.
>>=20
>> Source: Freeman 2006, http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/372.pdf.  My
>> knowledge on this subject is dated, so I=92m sure you know better...
>=20
> Thank you for your comments and information on security of our memo.
>=20
> Our memo specifies parameters for compatibility with ISO/IEC document =
and parameters for high performance. 512-bit curve and 384-bit curves =
which are compliant with ISO/IEC have 128 security levels because of the =
following reason.
> ...
> If there are parameters of bn-curves with higher security level and =
high performance, we would like to add it into our memo.


There are no such BN curves.  I just don't expect that most implementers =
will consider using a 512-bit BN curve, because at that size a non-BN =
curve with k=3D18 or k=3D24 has a better trade-off of security vs =
performance.  But I suppose that such curves might not be ISO/IEC =
compliant, because of their cofactors.

Cheers,
-- Mike


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From: Laura Hitt <LHitt@21CT.com>
To: cfrg@irtf.org, kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp,  kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
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Hi Kohei,
Yes, thank you, that modification is better.
-Laura


-----Original Message-----
> From: Kohei Kasamatsu [mailto:kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:02 AM
> To: Laura Hitt; cfrg@irtf.org
> Cc: kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp; kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>
> Hi Laura,
>
>
> Thank you for your comments.
>
> > Regarding your statement in Section 6, "The elliptic curve that
> > supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following
> > problems, since the security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives
> > is based on hardness of these problems."  You then list the ECDLP,
> > ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with auxiliary inputs.
> >
> > I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives
> > are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it's true, but
> > it's conceivable that a pairing-based scheme could be based on another
> > hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See,
> > for example, Section 6 of "Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and
> > Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography" by Broker, Charles,
> > Lauter, or "Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for ordinary
> > elliptic curves" by Galbraith & Stolbunov.)
>
> We agree with it.
> As you say, there are pairing-based cryptographic primitives based on the
> hardness of different problems from these described in our draft.
>
> We would like to change
> "The elliptic curve that supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of
> solving following problems, since the security of pairing-based
> cryptographic primitives is based on hardness of these problems."
> to
> "Pairing-based cryptographic primitives are often based on the hardness of
> the following problems, so when the elliptic curves from this document are
> used in such schemes, these problems would apply."
>
> Does the modification despel the concern?
>
> Best,
> Kohei KASAMATSU
>
>
> (2014/01/24 3:13), Laura Hitt wrote:
> > Hi Kohei,
> >
> > Regarding your statement in Section 6, "The elliptic curve that supports
> a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following problems, since
> the security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives is based on hardness
> of these problems."  You then list the ECDLP, ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with
> auxiliary inputs.
> >
> > I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives
> > are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it's true, but
> > it's conceivable that a pairing-based scheme could be based on another
> > hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See,
> > for example, Section 6 of "Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and
> > Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography" by Broker, Charles,
> > Lauter, or "Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for ordinary
> > elliptic curves" by Galbraith & Stolbunov.)
> >
> > Best,
> > Laura
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Kohei Kasamatsu
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 6:04 PM
> > To: cfrg@irtf.org
> > Cc: kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp; kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp
> > Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
> >
> > Hi cfrg folks,
> >
> >
> > Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographic
> primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized by
> conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of these
> primitives.
> >
> > We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves)
> which provide efficient operations of a pairing.
> > The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly useful
> for realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing and
> parameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.
> >
> > We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based
> primitives in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.
> >
> > We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works.
> >
> > Best,
> > Kohei KASAMATSU
> > -------- Original Message --------
> > Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
> > Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800
> > From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> > Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> > To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> >
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> >
> >
> >           Title           : Barreto-Naehrig Curves
> >           Authors         : Kohei Kasamatsu
> >                             Satoru Kanno
> >                             Tetsutaro Kobayashi
> >                             Yuto Kawahara
> >       Filename        : draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
> >       Pages           : 15
> >       Date            : 2014-01-09
> >
> > Abstract:
> >      Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing
> >      cryptographic primitives.  In this memo, we specify domain
> parameters
> >      of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5].  The BN-curve is an
> elliptic
> >      curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security
> >      and efficiency of cryptographic schemes.  This memo specifies domain
> >      parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtain
> >      efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384,
> and
> >      512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].
> >      Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of
> >      elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open
> >      source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type
> >      respectively[21].
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/
> >
> > There's also a htmlized version available at:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00
> >
> >
> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> > submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at
> tools.ietf.org.
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > I-D-Announce mailing list
> > I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> > Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@irtf.org
> > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Kohei KASAMATSU
>
> NTT Software Corporation
> TEL: +81 45 212 7908 FAX: +81 45 212 9800
> E-mail: kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp
>
>

--001a11c2bf04f3390f04f12034e1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Hi Kohei,<br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">Yes, thank you, that modification is better.<br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">-Laura<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">
<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-lef=
t:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im">
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Kohei Kasamatsu [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.=
jp">kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp</a>]<br>
Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:02 AM<br>
To: Laura Hitt; <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp">kobayashi.tetsutar=
o@lab.ntt.co.jp</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp">kawahar=
a.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp</a><br>
</div>Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<=
br>
<br>
Hi Laura,<br>
<br>
<br>
Thank you for your comments.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; Regarding your statement in Section 6, &quot;The elliptic curve that<b=
r>
&gt; supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following<br>
&gt; problems, since the security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives=
<br>
&gt; is based on hardness of these problems.&quot; =A0You then list the ECD=
LP,<br>
</div><div class=3D"im">&gt; ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with auxiliary inputs.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives<=
br>
&gt; are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it&#39;s true, b=
ut<br>
</div><div class=3D"im">&gt; it&#39;s conceivable that a pairing-based sche=
me could be based on another<br>
&gt; hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See,<=
br>
&gt; for example, Section 6 of &quot;Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and<=
br>
&gt; Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography&quot; by Broker, Charles,<b=
r>
&gt; Lauter, or &quot;Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for ordina=
ry<br>
&gt; elliptic curves&quot; by Galbraith &amp; Stolbunov.)<br>
<br>
</div>We agree with it.<br>
As you say, there are pairing-based cryptographic primitives based on the h=
ardness of different problems from these described in our draft.<br>
<br>
We would like to change<br>
<div class=3D"im">&quot;The elliptic curve that supports a bilinear map req=
uires the hardness of solving following problems, since the security of pai=
ring-based cryptographic primitives is based on hardness of these problems.=
&quot;<br>

</div>to<br>
&quot;Pairing-based cryptographic primitives are often based on the hardnes=
s of the following problems, so when the elliptic curves from this document=
 are used in such schemes, these problems would apply.&quot;<br>
<br>
Does the modification despel the concern?<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Kohei KASAMATSU<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
(2014/01/24 3:13), Laura Hitt wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi Kohei,<br>
&gt;<br>
</div><div class=3D"im">&gt; Regarding your statement in Section 6, &quot;T=
he elliptic curve that supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of sol=
ving following problems, since the security of pairing-based cryptographic =
primitives is based on hardness of these problems.&quot; =A0You then list t=
he ECDLP, ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with auxiliary inputs.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives<=
br>
&gt; are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it&#39;s true, b=
ut<br>
</div><div><div class=3D"h5">&gt; it&#39;s conceivable that a pairing-based=
 scheme could be based on another<br>
&gt; hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See,<=
br>
&gt; for example, Section 6 of &quot;Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and<=
br>
&gt; Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography&quot; by Broker, Charles,<b=
r>
&gt; Lauter, or &quot;Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for ordina=
ry<br>
&gt; elliptic curves&quot; by Galbraith &amp; Stolbunov.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Best,<br>
&gt; Laura<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-bounc=
es@irtf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Kohei Kasamatsu<br>
&gt; Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 6:04 PM<br>
&gt; To: <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp">kobayashi.tet=
sutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp">ka=
wahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp</a><br>
&gt; Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi cfrg folks,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographi=
c primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized by=
 conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of thes=
e primitives.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves=
) which provide efficient operations of a pairing.<br>
&gt; The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly usefu=
l for realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing and p=
arameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based primi=
tives in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works=
.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Best,<br>
&gt; Kohei KASAMATSU<br>
&gt; -------- Original Message --------<br>
&gt; Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<br>
&gt; Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800<br>
&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf=
.org</a><br>
&gt; Reply-To: <a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@=
ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; To: <a href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Barreto-Naehrig Curves=
<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Authors =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Kohei Kasamatsu<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Satoru Kanno<b=
r>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Tetsutaro Koba=
yashi<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Yuto Kawahara<=
br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt<=
br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 15<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2014-01-09<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for construct=
ing<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0cryptographic primitives. =A0In this memo, we specify domai=
n parameters<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5]. =A0The BN-curve is=
 an elliptic<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high s=
ecurity<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0and efficiency of cryptographic schemes. =A0This memo speci=
fies domain<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us =
to obtain<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256=
, 384, and<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[=
3].<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types =
of<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in=
 open<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0respectively[21].<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurve=
s/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00" tar=
get=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00</a><b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of<br>
&gt; submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a hre=
f=3D"http://tools.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank">ftp:=
//ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; I-D-Announce mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:I-D-Announce@ietf.org">I-D-Announce@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce</a><br>
&gt; Internet-Draft directories: <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html=
" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html</a> or<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt" target=3D"_blank=
">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank=
">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div>--<br>
Kohei KASAMATSU<br>
<br>
NTT Software Corporation<br>
TEL: <a href=3D"tel:%2B81%2045%20212%207908" value=3D"+81452127908">+81 45 =
212 7908</a> FAX: <a href=3D"tel:%2B81%2045%20212%209800" value=3D"+8145212=
9800">+81 45 212 9800</a><br>
E-mail: <a href=3D"mailto:kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp">kasamatsu.kohei@po=
.ntts.co.jp</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a11c2bf04f3390f04f12034e1--

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References: <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E1153850CDA3@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <6232F83F-A6F5-41C7-8EAD-B60EF8B11165@krovetz.net> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E11538595640@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <5E4A161D-6631-4026-A432-F7C0DC200079@krovetz.net> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E115386DFD48@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <CAMoSCWbdhwgrOLoCZ4PZu4xOz0D_hAS9UXiO+a=JPwiLEzn+uA@mail.gmail.com> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E1153876A898@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 19:50:16 +0000
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From: Matt Caswell <frodo@baggins.org>
To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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On 29 January 2014 01:06, Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> One solution is to change the key for each tag length, giving 9 distinct keys for the 9 cases.
>
>    K = num2str(TAGLEN, KEYLEN)    // eg 00..0040 when TAGLEN == 64
>
> I then get:
>
>    AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN128 Output: 67E944D23256C5E0B6C61FA22FDF1EA2
>    AEAD_AES_192_OCB_TAGLEN128 Output: F673F2C3E7174AAE7BAE986CA9F29E17
>    AEAD_AES_256_OCB_TAGLEN128 Output: D90EB8E9C977C88B79DD793D7FFA161C
>    AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN96 Output : 77A3D8E73589158D25D01209
>    AEAD_AES_192_OCB_TAGLEN96 Output : 05D56EAD2752C86BE6932C5E
>    AEAD_AES_256_OCB_TAGLEN96 Output : 5458359AC23B0CBA9E6330DD
>    AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN64 Output : 192C9B7BD90BA06A
>    AEAD_AES_192_OCB_TAGLEN64 Output : 0066BC6E0EF34E24
>    AEAD_AES_256_OCB_TAGLEN64 Output : 7D4EA5D445501CBE
>

I have successfully verified these.

>> Also - a more minor nit - your notation for incrementing the nonce
>> seems odd to me. The nonce is defined as a string of bytes - whereas
>> in your notation it is treated as an integer which can be incremented.
>>
>> Matt
>
> I think "N = N + 1" is more obvious than "N = num2str(3*i + 1, 96)", even if it does mix byte strings and arithmetic.

Agreed. One possibility is just to use the convention used elsewhere
in the draft and define a function for this purpose, e.g. "N =
incrementstr(N)".

Matt

From Joachim@Strombergson.com  Thu Jan 30 02:04:21 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] License for CLEFIA in RFC 6114 and draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Aloha!

I took a brief look at RFC 6114 which provides informational description
of the CLEFIA cipher. In the RFC I don't see any reference to licensing
of IP claims on the cipher.

draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02 which presents a way of adding CLEFIA to TLS
does not contain any information about licensing nor claimed rights.

There is however a license for CLEFIA, a license that seems to combine
an open BSD license with a quite strict license which makes it
impossible for anyone but Sony to develop support for CLEFIA:

http://www.sony.net/Products/cryptography/clefia/download/

(Nota bene: IANAL)

The RFC is a done deal, but wouldn't it be appropriate to add a section
in the draft about licensing and IP rights. And to point to the License
agreement?


Also, the link to the technical related information for CLEFIA in
section 7 of the draft seems to be broken.

(This link:
http://www.sony.net/Products/cryptography/clefia/technical/related_material.html)

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
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From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Thu Jan 30 03:04:52 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] License for CLEFIA in RFC 6114 and draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02
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Hiya,

On 01/30/2014 10:04 AM, Joachim Strömbergson wrote:
> Aloha!
> 
> I took a brief look at RFC 6114 which provides informational
> description of the CLEFIA cipher. In the RFC I don't see any
> reference to licensing of IP claims on the cipher.

Yes it can be hard to know where to find that, but it
exists. RFCs generally do not contain IPR stuff in the
body of the RFC these days, as RFCs do not change but
licensing does. There's also the not-well-understood
factoid that 6114 is an independent submission RFC and
is not an IETF or IRTF stream RFC. Its common for
algorithm descriptions to be independent stream RFCs
as they are often just copies of something else and
so not really under IETF or IRTF change control.

But anyway, if you look at the IETF tools page [1] for
6114 there is a link to the IPR declarations [2] that
were made for that. To fully grok that you might also
need to understand the IETF's general IPR rules [3]
which are also generally used in the IRTF in case
work moves from one to the other.

Even if this isn't an IETF document, people tend to
want to follow those rules if they hope their
encumbered algorithms might get broader adoption.
(In my personal opinion, having any patent on your
crypto stuff is a fine way of ensuring that it is
not likely to get broad adoption, but people filing
patent applications don't seem to get that;-)

   [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6114
   [2]
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?option=rfc_search&rfc_search=6114
   [3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp79

> draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02 which presents a way of adding CLEFIA to
> TLS does not contain any information about licensing nor claimed
> rights.

Same as above, you can find that via [4] at [5].

   [4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02
   [5]
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?option=document_search&document_search=draft-katagi-tls-clefia

> There is however a license for CLEFIA, a license that seems to
> combine an open BSD license with a quite strict license which makes
> it impossible for anyone but Sony to develop support for CLEFIA:
> 
> http://www.sony.net/Products/cryptography/clefia/download/
> 
> (Nota bene: IANAL)
> 
> The RFC is a done deal, but wouldn't it be appropriate to add a
> section in the draft about licensing and IP rights. And to point to
> the License agreement?
> 
> 
> Also, the link to the technical related information for CLEFIA in 
> section 7 of the draft seems to be broken.
> 
> (This link: 
> http://www.sony.net/Products/cryptography/clefia/technical/related_material.html)

That'd
> 
be one for the authors. If that draft were to
become an RFC (and I don't recall if the TLS wg have
looked at it or not), then the RFC editor would likely
want it fixed before publication as well to reference
something more stable.

Cheers,
S.


> 
> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list 
> Cfrg@irtf.org http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
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From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Thu Jan 30 10:44:51 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group=
 of the IETF.

        Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
        Authors         : Ted Krovetz
                          Phillip Rogaway
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-06.txt
	Pages           : 19
	Date            : 2014-01-30

Abstract:
   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
   encryption scheme that provides confidentiality and authenticity for
   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-06


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From ted@krovetz.net  Thu Jan 30 10:45:50 2014
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From: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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James,

I've updated the OCB draft to include all your changes in the test =
vector section and have verified the results. Thank you very much for =
the suggestions and hard work implementing them.

The one suggestion I did not include was N =3D N + 1 in the final vector =
algorithm. I felt that that might suggest an implementation as a simple =
counter, which can easily cause mistakes (either because of endian =
issues or the fact that the counter exceeds a byte), so I just kept it =
specified using num2str.

Thanks Matt Caswell, too, for verifying the vectors. With three =
independent implementations all agreeing, I have pretty good confidence =
in their correctness.

-Ted


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] FW:  Review of draft-irtf-cfrg-zss*
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--001a1139b1264f6d4a04f13661db
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Dear Watson,

Thank you for your review of these drafts.  My apologies for the delayed
reply, this email got buried in the onslaught of replies to this list on
and around Christmas about other matters.

First, regarding the existence of the two drafts--I had actually combined
two separate drafts (on supersingluar curves and on BN curves) into one
draft, titled "draft-irtf-cfrg-zss-02". All others should be
ignored/expire, as they are encapsulated in this one.

I have now fixed the typo you found, thank you.  It will appear corrected
in the next version I upload.

Regarding the issue of the intermediate assumptions on the hash function
being open: Do you have any suggestion on how to tie this down?  I don't
believe it's customary to specify a particular hash function, but do you
recommend placing certain stipulations on properties the hash must satisfy,
to help alleviate your concerns?

Regarding the security tables: The NIST tables are the standard reference
used in many papers, but do you have a reference for alternative entries in
the security table you'd prefer I use?

Thank you,

Laura

-----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> Sent: Tuesday, December 24, 2013 11:39 AM
> To: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: [Cfrg] Review of draft-irtf-cfrg-zss*
>
> Dear all,
> These two drafts define a signature scheme based on pairings over BN and
> supersingular curves. Actually, the setting is a general pairing of Type
> III, with no hashing to group required.
> The signature scheme reduces to a k-DH style assumption in the ROM, and I
> haven't cooked up a dirty hash that can break it. Intermediate assumptions
> on the hash function to get a reduction are open. This is not a Fiat-Shamir
> transform of a ZKP, so the standard heuristics are not quite sufficient.
>
> The standardization does not pick a curve or a hash.
>
> There is a typo that leads to the representation of points on E' not being
> defined: F_p in that section should be replaced by "any field".
>
> Supersingular curves have small embedding degree: this forces the use of
> uncompetitively large primes.
>
> BN curves have embedding degree 12. This means a tower of degree 3, then
> 4. In such a tower the discrete logarithm problem can be solved quicker
> than over a prime field of the same size. I am currently searching the
> literature for the exact coefficients, but I do not feel the table in the
> draft is correct.
>
> This signature scheme promises shorter signatures than schemes of
> schnorr-style. However, in practice the failure to use point compression
> means Ed25519 is shorter. It's also much faster to verify, as pairings are
> expensive.
>
> If the k-DH complexity and discrete log complexities can be tied down
> better, I would have no objection to publishing this as an RFC.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

--001a1139b1264f6d4a04f13661db
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">

<p class=3D"">Dear Watson,</p>

<p class=3D"">Thank you for your review of these drafts.<span style>=A0 </s=
pan>My apologies for the delayed reply, this
email got buried in the onslaught of replies to this list on and around
Christmas about other matters.</p>



<p class=3D"">First, regarding the existence of the two drafts--I had
actually combined two separate drafts (on supersingluar curves and on BN
curves) into one draft, titled &quot;draft-irtf-cfrg-zss-02&quot;. All othe=
rs
should be ignored/expire, as they are encapsulated in this one.=A0

</p><p class=3D"">I have now fixed the typo you found, thank you.=A0 It wil=
l appear corrected in the next version I upload.<br></p>



<p class=3D"">Regarding the issue of the intermediate assumptions on
the hash function being open: Do you have any suggestion on how to tie this
down?<span style>=A0 </span>I don&#39;t believe it&#39;s customary to
specify a particular hash function, but do you recommend placing certain
stipulations on properties the hash must satisfy, to help alleviate your
concerns?=A0

</p><p class=3D"">Regarding the security tables: The NIST tables are the
standard reference used in many papers, but do you have a reference for
alternative entries in the security table you&#39;d prefer I use?<span styl=
e>=A0 </span></p>



<p class=3D"">Thank you,</p>

<p class=3D"">Laura</p>

<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-bounces@ir=
tf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd<br>
Sent: Tuesday, December 24, 2013 11:39 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
Subject: [Cfrg] Review of draft-irtf-cfrg-zss*<br>
<br>
Dear all,<br>
These two drafts define a signature scheme based on pairings over BN and su=
persingular curves. Actually, the setting is a general pairing of Type III,=
 with no hashing to group required.<br>
The signature scheme reduces to a k-DH style assumption in the ROM, and I h=
aven&#39;t cooked up a dirty hash that can break it. Intermediate assumptio=
ns on the hash function to get a reduction are open. This is not a Fiat-Sha=
mir transform of a ZKP, so the standard heuristics are not quite sufficient=
.<br>

<br>
The standardization does not pick a curve or a hash.<br>
<br>
There is a typo that leads to the representation of points on E&#39; not be=
ing defined: F_p in that section should be replaced by &quot;any field&quot=
;.<br>
<br>
Supersingular curves have small embedding degree: this forces the use of un=
competitively large primes.<br>
<br>
BN curves have embedding degree 12. This means a tower of degree 3, then 4.=
 In such a tower the discrete logarithm problem can be solved quicker than =
over a prime field of the same size. I am currently searching the literatur=
e for the exact coefficients, but I do not feel the table in the draft is c=
orrect.<br>

<br>
This signature scheme promises shorter signatures than schemes of schnorr-s=
tyle. However, in practice the failure to use point compression means Ed255=
19 is shorter. It&#39;s also much faster to verify, as pairings are expensi=
ve.<br>

<br>
If the k-DH complexity and discrete log complexities can be tied down bette=
r, I would have no objection to publishing this as an RFC.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
Watson Ladd<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank">htt=
p://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1139b1264f6d4a04f13661db--

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
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Hi

I've submitted version -01 of this draft.

Changes include:
 - Adam Langley is now a co-author
 - Changed nonce size to 96 bits to match other AEAD, specifically RFC 5116
 - Fixed terminology to match the non-AES version of Poly1305 (thanks, Robe=
rt Ransom)
 - Fixed example for constant-time implementation of Poly1305=20
 - Fixed security considerations

Yoav


