
From peter.dettman@bouncycastle.org  Sat Feb  1 21:55:23 2014
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Date: Sun, 02 Feb 2014 12:55:10 +0700
From: Peter Dettman <peter.dettman@bouncycastle.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] OCB test vectors reusing nonces
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I have now verified the new test vectors from draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-06 
with the BouncyCastle implementation(s).

Pete.

> James,
>
> I've updated the OCB draft to include all your changes in the test vector section and have verified the results. Thank you very much for the suggestions and hard work implementing them.
>
> The one suggestion I did not include was N = N + 1 in the final vector algorithm. I felt that that might suggest an implementation as a simple counter, which can easily cause mistakes (either because of endian issues or the fact that the counter exceeds a byte), so I just kept it specified using num2str.
>
> Thanks Matt Caswell, too, for verifying the vectors. With three independent implementations all agreeing, I have pretty good confidence in their correctness.
>
> -Ted
>


From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Mon Feb  3 11:24:53 2014
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Date: Mon, 03 Feb 2014 11:24:51 -0800
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Dragonfly Key Exchange
        Author          : Dan Harkins
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
	Pages           : 17
	Date            : 2014-02-03

Abstract:
   This document specifies a key exchange using discrete logarithm
   cryptography that is authenticated using a password or passphrase.
   It is resistant to active attack, passive attack, and off-line
   dictionary attack.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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From dharkins@lounge.org  Mon Feb  3 11:27:42 2014
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Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2014 11:27:39 -0800 (PST)
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  Hello,

  I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments received
from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.

  regards,

  Dan.

On Mon, February 3, 2014 11:24 am, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working
> Group of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : Dragonfly Key Exchange
>         Author          : Dan Harkins
> 	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
> 	Pages           : 17
> 	Date            : 2014-02-03
>
> Abstract:
>    This document specifies a key exchange using discrete logarithm
>    cryptography that is authenticated using a password or passphrase.
>    It is resistant to active attack, passive attack, and off-line
>    dictionary attack.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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--20cf3010e2d13551aa04f185cabb
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On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
>
>   Hello,
>
>   I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments received
> from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.
>

It still doesn't compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. TLS has shown less
then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for claims made is
forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to points.

Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alternatives? Was
this a joke for groundhog day?

>   regards,
>
>   Dan.
>
> On Mon, February 3, 2014 11:24 am, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > directories.
> >  This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working
> > Group of the IETF.
> >
> >         Title           : Dragonfly Key Exchange
> >         Author          : Dan Harkins
> >       Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
> >       Pages           : 17
> >       Date            : 2014-02-03
> >
> > Abstract:
> >    This document specifies a key exchange using discrete logarithm
> >    cryptography that is authenticated using a password or passphrase.
> >    It is resistant to active attack, passive attack, and off-line
> >    dictionary attack.
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly/
> >
> > There's also a htmlized version available at:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03
> >
> > A diff from the previous version is available at:
> > http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03
> >
> >
> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> > submission
> > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@irtf.org
> > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--20cf3010e2d13551aa04f185cabb
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, &quot;Dan Harkins&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dhar=
kins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 Hello,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments recei=
ved<br>
&gt; from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.<br>
&gt;</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">It still doesn&#39;t compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. T=
LS has shown less then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for cl=
aims made is forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to=
 points.</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alte=
rnatives? Was this a joke for groundhog day?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; =C2=A0 regards,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 Dan.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mon, February 3, 2014 11:24 am, <a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@i=
etf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a> wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Draft=
s<br>
&gt; &gt; directories.<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Grou=
p Working<br>
&gt; &gt; Group of the IETF.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 : Dragonfly Key Exchange<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Author =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0: Dan Harkins<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: draft-=
irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : 1=
7<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0: 2014-02-03<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0This document specifies a key exchange using discret=
e logarithm<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0cryptography that is authenticated using a password =
or passphrase.<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0It is resistant to active attack, passive attack, an=
d off-line<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0dictionary attack.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-drago=
nfly/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly/</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-0=
3">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-dra=
gonfly-03">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03<=
/a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of=
<br>
&gt; &gt; submission<br>
&gt; &gt; until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"h=
ttp://tools.ietf.org">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/">ftp://ftp.ietf.or=
g/internet-drafts/</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.=
irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
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On 02/03/2014 02:47 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>
> On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org 
> <mailto:dharkins@lounge.org>> wrote:
> >
> >
> >   Hello,
> >
> >   I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments received
> > from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.
> >
>
> It still doesn't compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. TLS has shown 
> less then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for claims 
> made is forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to 
> points.
>
> Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alternatives?
>

You mean like draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00?

Drafts are taken up when someone is willing to write one, and there are 
sufficiently many other people that are interested.

> Was this a joke for groundhog day?
>

The sarcasm is not helpful.  Let's stick to a technical discussion.

This draft most certainly should be reviewed, since security concerns 
were raised regarding earlier versions of the draft, especially 
regarding implementation guidance and timing channels.

The process by which CFRG drafts can become RFCs is described in 
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1   Note that there is 
a paragraph in the RFC that describes the relationship of that work to 
the research group.    This mechanism enables the sentiment of the RG to 
be captured in the RFC.

Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations section 
of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack of 
reduction and uniform hashing?

David

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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 02/03/2014 02:47 PM, Watson Ladd
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0cm1f-P95je5AbEbZ02Ut3+HM7Hx28P6j46TqE-=06eZDg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=ISO-8859-1">
      <p dir="ltr"><br>
        On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, "Dan Harkins" &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:dharkins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp; Hello,<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp; I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments
        received<br>
        &gt; from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.<br>
        &gt;</p>
      <p dir="ltr">It still doesn't compare favorably to JPAKE or
        SPAKE2. TLS has shown less then zero interest in it. No
        reduction or evidence for claims made is forthcoming. The draft
        excludes curves with uniform hashing to points.</p>
      <p dir="ltr">Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the
        other alternatives? </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    You mean like draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00?<br>
    <br>
    Drafts are taken up when someone is willing to write one, and there
    are sufficiently many other people that are interested.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0cm1f-P95je5AbEbZ02Ut3+HM7Hx28P6j46TqE-=06eZDg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <p dir="ltr">Was this a joke for groundhog day?</p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    The sarcasm is not helpful.&nbsp; Let's stick to a technical discussion.<br>
    <br>
    This draft most certainly should be reviewed, since security
    concerns were raised regarding earlier versions of the draft,
    especially regarding implementation guidance and timing channels.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    The process by which CFRG drafts can become RFCs is described in
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1">http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1</a>&nbsp;&nbsp; Note that
    there is a paragraph in the RFC that describes the relationship of
    that work to the research group.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This mechanism enables the
    sentiment of the RG to be captured in the RFC.<br>
    <br>
    Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations
    section of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack
    of reduction and uniform hashing?&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    David<br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On Feb 3, 2014 1:49 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>
> On 02/03/2014 02:47 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >   Hello,
>> >
>> >   I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments received
>> > from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.
>> >
>>
>> It still doesn't compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. TLS has shown
less then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for claims made is
forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to points.
>>
>> Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alternatives?
>
>
> You mean like draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00?
>
> Drafts are taken up when someone is willing to write one, and there are
sufficiently many other people that are interested.
>
>> Was this a joke for groundhog day?
>
>
> The sarcasm is not helpful.  Let's stick to a technical discussion.
>
> This draft most certainly should be reviewed, since security concerns
were raised regarding earlier versions of the draft, especially regarding
implementation guidance and timing channels.
>
> The process by which CFRG drafts can become RFCs is described in
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1   Note that there is a
paragraph in the RFC that describes the relationship of that work to the
research group.    This mechanism enables the sentiment of the RG to be
captured in the RFC.
>
> Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations section
of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack of reduction
and uniform hashing?

Sure: "Despite significant efforts, no variant of this protocol has been
proved secure even in the random oracle model with nonstandard assumptions.
None of the security claims are sensible in any accepted formalization of
security protocols. Significant dissent in the WG existed with publication
due to the lack of any more than superficial analysis. No Internet protocol
should use this PAKE when alternatives exist." Just about sums it up.
>
> David

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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Feb 3, 2014 1:49 PM, &quot;David McGrew&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mcgr=
ew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 02/03/2014 02:47 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, &quot;Dan Harkins&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:dharkins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 Hello,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comme=
nts received<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; It still doesn&#39;t compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. TLS has=
 shown less then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for claims m=
ade is forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to point=
s.<br>

&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alternativ=
es?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; You mean like draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Drafts are taken up when someone is willing to write one, and there ar=
e sufficiently many other people that are interested.=C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Was this a joke for groundhog day?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The sarcasm is not helpful.=C2=A0 Let&#39;s stick to a technical discu=
ssion.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This draft most certainly should be reviewed, since security concerns =
were raised regarding earlier versions of the draft, especially regarding i=
mplementation guidance and timing channels.=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The process by which CFRG drafts can become RFCs is described in <a hr=
ef=3D"http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1">http://wiki.tool=
s.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1</a>=C2=A0=C2=A0 Note that there is a pa=
ragraph in the RFC that describes the relationship of that work to the rese=
arch group.=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This mechanism enables the sentiment of the R=
G to be captured in the RFC.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations secti=
on of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack of reductio=
n and uniform hashing?=C2=A0 </p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Sure: &quot;Despite significant efforts, no variant of this =
protocol has been proved secure even in the random oracle model with nonsta=
ndard assumptions. None of the security claims are sensible in any accepted=
 formalization of security protocols. Significant dissent in the WG existed=
 with publication due to the lack of any more than superficial analysis. No=
 Internet protocol should use this PAKE when alternatives exist.&quot; Just=
 about sums it up.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; David<br>
</p>

--20cf3040e42efc31ed04f187cdfe--

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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On 02/03/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>
> On Feb 3, 2014 1:49 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com 
> <mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com>> wrote:
> >
>
> > Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations 
> section of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack 
> of reduction and uniform hashing?
>
> Sure: "Despite significant efforts, no variant of this protocol has 
> been proved secure even in the random oracle model with nonstandard 
> assumptions. None of the security claims are sensible in any accepted 
> formalization of security protocols.
>

Could you rewrite that in a way that would be accessible to someone who 
is not a crypto specialist, and suggest references for the ROM and 
standard assumptions (and the uniform hashing)?   Perhaps cite a 
formalization of a PAKE protocol?

David

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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 02/03/2014 05:11 PM, Watson Ladd
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=zS5GKex3eF_hKgTsL1kH=TiBi3iAP9oMrJ9hDQcT4Gw@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <p dir="ltr"><br>
        On Feb 3, 2014 1:49 PM, "David McGrew" &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt;<br>
        <br>
        &gt; Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security
        considerations section of this draft that captures your concerns
        regarding the lack of reduction and uniform hashing?  </p>
      <p dir="ltr">Sure: "Despite significant efforts, no variant of
        this protocol has been proved secure even in the random oracle
        model with nonstandard assumptions. None of the security claims
        are sensible in any accepted formalization of security
        protocols.<br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Could you rewrite that in a way that would be accessible to someone
    who is not a crypto specialist, and suggest references for the ROM
    and standard assumptions (and the uniform hashing)?   Perhaps cite a
    formalization of a PAKE protocol?  <br>
    <br>
    David <br>
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From dharkins@lounge.org  Mon Feb  3 15:51:52 2014
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From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On Mon, February 3, 2014 2:11 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Feb 3, 2014 1:49 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 02/03/2014 02:47 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >   Hello,
>>> >
>>> >   I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments received
>>> > from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.
>>> >
>>>
>>> It still doesn't compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. TLS has shown
> less then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for claims made is
> forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to points.
>>>
>>> Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alternatives?
>>
>>
>> You mean like draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00?
>>
>> Drafts are taken up when someone is willing to write one, and there are
> sufficiently many other people that are interested.
>>
>>> Was this a joke for groundhog day?
>>
>>
>> The sarcasm is not helpful.  Let's stick to a technical discussion.
>>
>> This draft most certainly should be reviewed, since security concerns
> were raised regarding earlier versions of the draft, especially regarding
> implementation guidance and timing channels.
>>
>> The process by which CFRG drafts can become RFCs is described in
> http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1   Note that there is a
> paragraph in the RFC that describes the relationship of that work to the
> research group.    This mechanism enables the sentiment of the RG to be
> captured in the RFC.
>>
>> Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations section
> of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack of reduction
> and uniform hashing?
>
> Sure: "Despite significant efforts, no variant of this protocol has been
> proved secure even in the random oracle model with nonstandard
> assumptions.
> None of the security claims are sensible in any accepted formalization of
> security protocols. Significant dissent in the WG existed with publication
> due to the lack of any more than superficial analysis. No Internet
> protocol
> should use this PAKE when alternatives exist." Just about sums it up.

  Well the sum is nil due to your statement contradicting itself. You assert
that protocol received "significant efforts" to prove it secure while
simultaneously asserting that it suffers from a "lack of any more than
superficial analysis." Instead of constructing sentences by stitching
together separate phrases purely for their rhetorical effect, I suggest
you use words to construct a sentence that conveys the idea you have.

  And the less derogatory your sentence is the more likely it will be
accepted and become part of the draft.

  Dan.



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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: cfrg@ietf.org, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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--20cf3005155228a21204f18a48f5
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On Feb 3, 2014 4:43 PM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> >From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> >Sent: Monday, February 03, 2014 2:11 PM
>
> >Sure: "Despite significant efforts, no variant of this protocol has been
proved
>
> >secure even in the random oracle model with nonstandard assumptions.
>
>
>
> A proof might be desirable but should not block the use of a proposed
protocol.
>
> For example there is no adequate proof that integer factorization is
=E2=80=9Csecure=E2=80=9D.
>
> This is not a reason to stop using RSA based algorithms.  The lack of
> a  complete security proof for draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt should no=
t
> stop it=E2=80=99s use (in fact it=E2=80=99s already in other standards th=
at would benefit
>
> from the analysis and improvements of this group).

But there is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to RSA security. PKCS 1.5
had no proof, and got broken a few times. RSA has been intensively studied
for decades, dragonfly hasn't. Slight variants of RSA (Rabin-Williams) are
provably reducible to factoring, an extensively studied problem for
centuries.

Kerberos is the poster child for provable security. v4 had a flaw that went
undiscovered until efforts to prove security were made. In retrospect the
flaw is obvious.

Ignoring the 40 years of cryptography in favor of "looks secure" is
malpractice. No structural engineer would ever build a bridge ignoring the
science of mechanics.

Protocols should use augpake or jpake instead.
>
>
>
> I would like to reverse the question.
>
>
>
> Watson, in your technical analysis of the
>
> protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
>
> can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
>
> the protocol?

Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I can't
exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.
>l
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> Sent: Monday, February 03, 2014 2:11 PM
> To: David McGrew
> Cc: cfrg@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
>
>
>
>
> On Feb 3, 2014 1:49 PM, "David McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 02/03/2014 02:47 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >   Hello,
> >> >
> >> >   I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the comments received
> >> > from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.
> >> >
> >>
> >> It still doesn't compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. TLS has shown
less then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for claims made is
forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to points.
> >>
> >> Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alternatives?
> >
> >
> > You mean like draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00?
> >
> > Drafts are taken up when someone is willing to write one, and there are
sufficiently many other people that are interested.
> >
> >> Was this a joke for groundhog day?
> >
> >
> > The sarcasm is not helpful.  Let's stick to a technical discussion.
> >
> > This draft most certainly should be reviewed, since security concerns
were raised regarding earlier versions of the draft, especially regarding
implementation guidance and timing channels.
> >
> > The process by which CFRG drafts can become RFCs is described in
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1   Note that there is a
paragraph in the RFC that describes the relationship of that work to the
research group.    This mechanism enables the sentiment of the RG to be
captured in the RFC.
> >
> > Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations
section of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack of
reduction and uniform hashing?
>
> Sure: "Despite significant efforts, no variant of this protocol has been
proved secure even in the random oracle model with nonstandard assumptions.
None of the security claims are sensible in any accepted formalization of
security protocols. Significant dissent in the WG existed with publication
due to the lack of any more than superficial analysis. No Internet protocol
should use this PAKE when alternatives exist." Just about sums it up.
> >
> > David

--20cf3005155228a21204f18a48f5
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Feb 3, 2014 4:43 PM, &quot;Paul Lambert&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul=
@marvell.com">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-b=
ounces@irtf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd<br>
&gt; &gt;Sent: Monday, February 03, 2014 2:11 PM<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;Sure: &quot;Despite significant efforts, no variant of this protoc=
ol has been proved<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;secure even in the random oracle model with nonstandard assumption=
s.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A proof might be desirable but should not block the use of a proposed =
protocol.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; For example there is no adequate proof that integer factorization is =
=E2=80=9Csecure=E2=80=9D.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This is not a reason to stop using RSA based algorithms.=C2=A0 The lac=
k of<br>
&gt; a =C2=A0complete security proof for draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt s=
hould not<br>
&gt; stop it=E2=80=99s use (in fact it=E2=80=99s already in other standards=
 that would benefit<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; from the analysis and improvements of this group).</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">But there is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to RSA securi=
ty. PKCS 1.5 had no proof, and got broken a few times. RSA has been intensi=
vely studied for decades, dragonfly hasn&#39;t. Slight variants of RSA (Rab=
in-Williams) are provably reducible to factoring, an extensively studied pr=
oblem for centuries.</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">Kerberos is the poster child for provable security. v4 had a=
 flaw that went undiscovered until efforts to prove security were made. In =
retrospect the flaw is obvious.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Ignoring the 40 years of cryptography in favor of &quot;look=
s secure&quot; is malpractice. No structural engineer would ever build a br=
idge ignoring the science of mechanics.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Protocols should use augpake or jpake instead.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I would like to reverse the question.=C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Watson, in your technical analysis of the<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; the protocol?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40=
. I can&#39;t exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn&#39;t have this issue.=
<br>
&gt;l<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Paul<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-bounc=
es@irtf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd<br>
&gt; Sent: Monday, February 03, 2014 2:11 PM<br>
&gt; To: David McGrew<br>
&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@ietf.org">cfrg@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Feb 3, 2014 1:49 PM, &quot;David McGrew&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:mcgrew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On 02/03/2014 02:47 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; On Feb 3, 2014 11:27 AM, &quot;Dan Harkins&quot; &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:dharkins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 Hello,<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 I updated the dragonfly draft to incorporate the =
comments received<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; from Rene and Scott. Please take a look.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; It still doesn&#39;t compare favorably to JPAKE or SPAKE2. TL=
S has shown less then zero interest in it. No reduction or evidence for cla=
ims made is forthcoming. The draft excludes curves with uniform hashing to =
points.<br>

&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Why is this specific PAKE a work item and not the other alter=
natives?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; You mean like draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Drafts are taken up when someone is willing to write one, and the=
re are sufficiently many other people that are interested.=C2=A0<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Was this a joke for groundhog day?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The sarcasm is not helpful.=C2=A0 Let&#39;s stick to a technical =
discussion.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; This draft most certainly should be reviewed, since security conc=
erns were raised regarding earlier versions of the draft, especially regard=
ing implementation guidance and timing channels.=C2=A0 <br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The process by which CFRG drafts can become RFCs is described in =
<a href=3D"http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1">http://wiki=
.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5743#section-2.1</a>=C2=A0=C2=A0 Note that there is=
 a paragraph in the RFC that describes the relationship of that work to the=
 research group.=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This mechanism enables the sentiment of =
the RG to be captured in the RFC.<br>

&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Let me ask: can you suggest text for the security considerations =
section of this draft that captures your concerns regarding the lack of red=
uction and uniform hashing?=C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Sure: &quot;Despite significant efforts, no variant of this protocol h=
as been proved secure even in the random oracle model with nonstandard assu=
mptions. None of the security claims are sensible in any accepted formaliza=
tion of security protocols. Significant dissent in the WG existed with publ=
ication due to the lack of any more than superficial analysis. No Internet =
protocol should use this PAKE when alternatives exist.&quot; Just about sum=
s it up.<br>

&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; David</p>

--20cf3005155228a21204f18a48f5--

From dharkins@lounge.org  Mon Feb  3 23:37:40 2014
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From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Cc: cfrg@ietf.org, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On February 3, 2014 5:08 pm, Watson Ladd (aka Cotton Mather) wrote:
> On Feb 3, 2014 4:43 PM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>>
>> Watson, in your technical analysis of the
>> protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
>> can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
>> the protocol?
>
> Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I can't
> exhibit it, but it exists.

  I kind of hoped that spectral evidence did not apply in the hard
sciences.

  Dan.




From paul@marvell.com  Tue Feb  4 00:05:11 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 00:05:03 -0800
Thread-Topic: 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. -> Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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Cc: "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Subject: [Cfrg] 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. -> Re: I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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--_000_CF15D9D22E696paulmarvellcom_
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> A proof might be desirable but should not block the use of a proposed pro=
tocol.
> For example there is no adequate proof that integer factorization is =93s=
ecure=94.
> This is not a reason to stop using RSA based algorithms.  The lack of
> a  complete security proof for draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt should no=
t
> stop it=92s use (in fact it=92s already in other standards that would ben=
efit
> from the analysis and improvements of this group).

But there is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to RSA security. PKCS 1.5 ha=
d no proof, and got broken a few times. RSA has been intensively studied fo=
r decades, dragonfly hasn't. Slight variants of RSA (Rabin-Williams) are pr=
ovably reducible to factoring, an extensively studied problem for centuries=
.

You missed the point.  The difficulty of factoring as a problem to build se=
cure systems is not provable.
. . .


> Watson, in your technical analysis of the
> protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
> can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
> the protocol?

Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I can't exhib=
it it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.

I will take your answer as a =91no=92 - you are unable to identify any expl=
oitable security flaw with draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt

Making such repeated and  adversarial negative pronouncements on a technica=
l topic without documentation or your own demonstrable analysis would be co=
nsidered by some to be unprofessional behavior.


Paul







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<html><head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space;=
 -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 14p=
x; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><di=
v><p dir=3D"ltr"><br></p></div></span><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><bl=
ockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b=
5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; A proo=
f might be desirable but should not block the use of a proposed protocol.<b=
r>
&gt; For example there is no adequate proof that integer factorization is =
=93secure=94.<br>
&gt; This is not a reason to stop using RSA based algorithms.&nbsp; The lac=
k of<br>
&gt; a &nbsp;complete security proof for draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt s=
hould not<br>
&gt; stop it=92s use (in fact it=92s already in other standards that would =
benefit<br>
&gt; from the analysis and improvements of this group).</p><p dir=3D"ltr">B=
ut there is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to RSA security. PKCS 1.5 had=
 no proof, and got broken a few times. RSA has been intensively studied for=
 decades, dragonfly hasn't. Slight variants of RSA (Rabin-Williams) are pro=
vably reducible to factoring, an extensively studied problem for centuries.=
</p></blockquote></span><div>You missed the point. &nbsp;The difficulty of =
factoring as a problem to build secure systems is not provable. &nbsp;</div=
><div>. . .</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquo=
te id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df =
5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; Watson, in y=
our technical analysis of the<br>
&gt; protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),<br>
&gt; can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to<br>
&gt; the protocol?</p><p dir=3D"ltr">Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses =
passwords in time 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't ha=
ve this issue.</p></blockquote></span><div>I will take your answer as a =91=
no=92 - you are unable to identify any exploitable security flaw with draft=
-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt</div><div><br></div><div>Making such repeated a=
nd &nbsp;adversarial negative pronouncements on a technical topic without d=
ocumentation or your own demonstrable analysis would be considered by some =
to be unprofessional behavior. &nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><d=
iv>Paul</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div></body></html>

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On Feb 4, 2014, at 3:08 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com<mailto:watso=
nbladd@gmail.com>> wrote:



> I would like to reverse the question.
>
>
>
> Watson, in your technical analysis of the
>
> protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
>
> can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
>
> the protocol?

Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I can't exhib=
it it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.

2^40 times doing what?  Is it 2^40 calculations based on a single observed =
authentication?  Observing 2^40 successful authentications?  Actively inter=
acting 2^40 times with the authentication server?

For password-based authentication, these are totally different things, beca=
use most passwords come from a 16-bit pool, and nearly all come from a 24-b=
it pool ([1]). That means that they are very vulnerable to active guessing,=
 which is why pretty much every application limits an attacker's guessing u=
sing timeouts.

So what kind of attack is it that you can't exhibit?

Yoav


[1] http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwmalone/p/www2012-slides.pdf

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e-break: after-white-space; ">
<br>
<div>
<div>On Feb 4, 2014, at 3:08 AM, Watson Ladd &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:watsonbl=
add@gmail.com">watsonbladd@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; I would like to reverse the question.&nbsp;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &nbsp;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Watson, in your technical analysis of the<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; the protocol?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40=
. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.</p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<div>2^40 times doing what? &nbsp;Is it 2^40 calculations based on a single=
 observed authentication? &nbsp;Observing 2^40 successful authentications? =
&nbsp;Actively interacting 2^40 times with the authentication server?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>For password-based authentication, these are totally different things,=
 because most passwords come from a 16-bit pool, and nearly all come from a=
 24-bit pool ([1]). That means that they are very vulnerable to active gues=
sing, which is why pretty much every
 application limits an attacker's guessing using timeouts.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>So what kind of attack is it that you can't exhibit?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yoav</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>[1]&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwmalone/p/www2012-slides=
.pdf">http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwmalone/p/www2012-slides.pdf</a></div>
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From: SeongHan Shin <seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp>
To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00.txt
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Hi Trevor,

I am sorry for this delay.

> - There's obvious similarities with SRP.  Do you think the AugPAKE
>proof techniques could be used to make a security proof for SRP?
I don't think so because the security of SRP cannot be reduced to the SDH
assumption.

>(For
>an elliptic curve SRP, you could imagine using the SRP verifier with
>Elligator to encrypt the g^b value, instead of SRP's traditional "B =
>kv + g^b").
In case of SRP5 (EC version of SRP6), I think it may be possible.


>taken in your TLS draft [1]).  The latest version of SRP [2] was able
>to remove this constraint.  Is it possible to do the same for AugPAKE?
The same approach does not work for AugPAKE.

>or
>requires the client to assume the group and use no salt (the approach
>taken in your TLS draft [1]).
One option may be to use the Supported Elliptic Curve Extension [RFC4492]
though the tls-augpake draft does not specify over ec groups.

Best regards,
Shin


On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 4:41 AM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:

> Hi Shin,
>
> Just to be clear - I was making fun of Kevin Igoe, not yourself -
> AugPAKE seems like a great piece of work.
>
> Couple questions:
>
>  - There's obvious similarities with SRP.  Do you think the AugPAKE
> proof techniques could be used to make a security proof for SRP?  (For
> an elliptic curve SRP, you could imagine using the SRP verifier with
> Elligator to encrypt the g^b value, instead of SRP's traditional "B =
> kv + g^b").
>
>  - There seems to be an ordering constraint between AugPAKE's client
> and server messages, requiring the client to go first.  For TLS at
> least, such a constraint is awkward.  It either requires an extra
> round-trip for the server to communicate the salt and group values, or
> requires the client to assume the group and use no salt (the approach
> taken in your TLS draft [1]).  The latest version of SRP [2] was able
> to remove this constraint.  Is it possible to do the same for AugPAKE?
>
>
> Trevor
>
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shin-tls-augpake-01
>
> [2]
>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5054
>  http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html
>  http://srp.stanford.edu/srp6.ps
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 6, 2013 at 12:26 PM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> wrote:
> > I really like this idea & can find no problems.
> >
> > Since a single cursory opinion counts for CFRG consensus [1,2],
> > consider this approved by CFRG and our NSA overseers.
> >
> > Thanks, come again!
> >
> >
> > Trevor
> >
> >
> > P.S. The treatment of random numbers could be improved, consider
> > referencing NIST SP 800-90A.
> >
> > (psst Kevin ^^^ THIS is how it's done.  *FINESSE*, or you'll never
> > work the big leagues!)
> >
> >
> > [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html
> > [2] http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-tls
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 11:18 PM, SeongHan Shin
> > <seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp> wrote:
> >> Dear all,
> >>
> >> We submitted our I-D regarding augmented PAKE
> >> that provides extra protection to server compromise compared to balanced
> >> PAKE.
> >> (Of course, it can be easily converted to the balanced one)
> >>
> >> Any comments are welcome!
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >> Shin
> >>
> >>
> >> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:45 PM, <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> >>> directories.
> >>>  This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working
> >>> Group of the IETF.
> >>>
> >>>         Title           : Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
> >>> (AugPAKE)
> >>>         Author(s)       : SeongHan Shin
> >>>                           Kazukuni Kobara
> >>>         Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00.txt
> >>>         Pages           : 17
> >>>         Date            : 2013-09-06
> >>>
> >>> Abstract:
> >>>    This document describes a secure and highly-efficient augmented
> >>>    password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a user
> >>>    remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is registered in
> >>>    the intended server.  In general, the user password is chosen from a
> >>>    small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-line
> dictionary
> >>>    attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure against
> >>>    passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary attacks (on
> >>>    the obtained messages with passive/active attacks).  Also, this
> >>>    protocol provides resistance to server compromise in the context
> that
> >>>    an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from the server,
> must
> >>>    at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain any advantage
> in
> >>>    impersonating the user.  The AugPAKE protocol is not only provably
> >>>    secure in the random oracle model but also the most efficient over
> >>>    the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake
> >>>
> >>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> >>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> >>> submission
> >>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> >>>
> >>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> >>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Cfrg mailing list
> >>> Cfrg@irtf.org
> >>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> SeongHan Shin
> >> Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC),
> >> National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST),
> >> Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan
> >> Tel : +81-29-861-2670/5284
> >> Fax : +81-29-861-5285
> >> E-mail : seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Cfrg mailing list
> >> Cfrg@irtf.org
> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >>
>



-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------
SeongHan Shin
Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC),
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST),
Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan
Tel : +81-29-861-2670/5284
Fax : +81-29-861-5285
E-mail : seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp
------------------------------------------------------------------

--089e0160b42c614e5f04f1907524
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Trevor,<br><br></div>I am sorry for this delay.<br=
><br>&gt; - There&#39;s obvious similarities with SRP. =A0Do you think the =
AugPAKE<br>
&gt;proof techniques could be used to make a security proof for SRP?<br><di=
v><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I don&#39;t think so because the security=
 of SRP cannot be reduced to the SDH assumption.<br><br>&gt;(For<br>
&gt;an elliptic curve SRP, you could imagine using the SRP verifier with<br=
>
&gt;Elligator to encrypt the g^b value, instead of SRP&#39;s traditional &q=
uot;B =3D<br>
&gt;kv + g^b&quot;).<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">In case of SRP5 (E=
C version of SRP6), I think it may be possible.<br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">
<br>&gt;taken in your TLS draft [1]). =A0The latest version of SRP [2] was =
able<br>
&gt;to remove this constraint. =A0Is it possible to do the same for AugPAKE=
?<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">The same approach does not work for A=
ugPAKE.<br><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;or<br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">
&gt;requires the client to assume the group and use no salt (the approach<b=
r>
&gt;taken in your TLS draft [1]). <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">One =
option may be to use the Supported Elliptic Curve Extension [RFC4492]<br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">though the tls-augpake draft does not specif=
y over ec groups.<br>
<br>Best regards,<br>Shin<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Dec 10, 2013=
 at 4:41 AM, Trevor Perrin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trevp@tr=
evp.net" target=3D"_blank">trevp@trevp.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Hi Shin,<br>
<br>
Just to be clear - I was making fun of Kevin Igoe, not yourself -<br>
AugPAKE seems like a great piece of work.<br>
<br>
Couple questions:<br>
<br>
=A0- There&#39;s obvious similarities with SRP. =A0Do you think the AugPAKE=
<br>
proof techniques could be used to make a security proof for SRP? =A0(For<br=
>
an elliptic curve SRP, you could imagine using the SRP verifier with<br>
Elligator to encrypt the g^b value, instead of SRP&#39;s traditional &quot;=
B =3D<br>
kv + g^b&quot;).<br>
<br>
=A0- There seems to be an ordering constraint between AugPAKE&#39;s client<=
br>
and server messages, requiring the client to go first. =A0For TLS at<br>
least, such a constraint is awkward. =A0It either requires an extra<br>
round-trip for the server to communicate the salt and group values, or<br>
requires the client to assume the group and use no salt (the approach<br>
taken in your TLS draft [1]). =A0The latest version of SRP [2] was able<br>
to remove this constraint. =A0Is it possible to do the same for AugPAKE?<br=
>
<br>
<br>
Trevor<br>
<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shin-tls-augpake-01" target=
=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shin-tls-augpake-01</a><br>
<br>
[2]<br>
=A0<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5054" target=3D"_blank">http://=
tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5054</a><br>
=A0<a href=3D"http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html" target=3D"_blank">http:/=
/srp.stanford.edu/design.html</a><br>
=A0<a href=3D"http://srp.stanford.edu/srp6.ps" target=3D"_blank">http://srp=
.stanford.edu/srp6.ps</a><br>
<div><div><br>
<br>
On Fri, Dec 6, 2013 at 12:26 PM, Trevor Perrin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trevp@=
trevp.net" target=3D"_blank">trevp@trevp.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; I really like this idea &amp; can find no problems.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Since a single cursory opinion counts for CFRG consensus [1,2],<br>
&gt; consider this approved by CFRG and our NSA overseers.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks, come again!<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Trevor<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; P.S. The treatment of random numbers could be improved, consider<br>
&gt; referencing NIST SP 800-90A.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (psst Kevin ^^^ THIS is how it&#39;s done. =A0*FINESSE*, or you&#39;ll=
 never<br>
&gt; work the big leagues!)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03=
047.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/curre=
nt/msg03047.html</a><br>
&gt; [2] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84-t=
ls" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/84/minutes/minutes-84=
-tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 11:18 PM, SeongHan Shin<br>
&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp" target=3D"_blank">seon=
ghan.shin@aist.go.jp</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; Dear all,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; We submitted our I-D regarding augmented PAKE<br>
&gt;&gt; that provides extra protection to server compromise compared to ba=
lanced<br>
&gt;&gt; PAKE.<br>
&gt;&gt; (Of course, it can be easily converted to the balanced one)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Any comments are welcome!<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Best regards,<br>
&gt;&gt; Shin<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:45 PM, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-dra=
fts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Dr=
afts<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; directories.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Grou=
p Working<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Group of the IETF.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Augmented Password=
-Authenticated Key Exchange<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; (AugPAKE)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Author(s) =A0 =A0 =A0 : SeongHan Shin<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Kazukuni K=
obara<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-irtf-cfrg-augp=
ake-00.txt<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 17<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2013-09-06<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0This document describes a secure and highly-efficient a=
ugmented<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol =
where a user<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is re=
gistered in<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0the intended server. =A0In general, the user password i=
s chosen from a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-l=
ine dictionary<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0attacks. =A0The AugPAKE protocol described here is secu=
re against<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary=
 attacks (on<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0the obtained messages with passive/active attacks). =A0=
Also, this<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0protocol provides resistance to server compromise in th=
e context that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from th=
e server, must<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain an=
y advantage in<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0impersonating the user. =A0The AugPAKE protocol is not =
only provably<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0secure in the random oracle model but also the most eff=
icient over<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-au=
gpake" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-a=
ugpake</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-=
00" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-00=
</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time=
 of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; submission<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=
=3D"http://tools.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_bla=
nk">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.o=
rg</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=
=3D"_blank">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; --<br>
&gt;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------=
<br>
&gt;&gt; SeongHan Shin<br>
&gt;&gt; Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC),<br>
&gt;&gt; National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (=
AIST),<br>
&gt;&gt; Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan<br=
>
&gt;&gt; Tel : <a href=3D"tel:%2B81-29-861-2670" value=3D"+81298612670" tar=
get=3D"_blank">+81-29-861-2670</a>/5284<br>
&gt;&gt; Fax : <a href=3D"tel:%2B81-29-861-5285" value=3D"+81298615285" tar=
get=3D"_blank">+81-29-861-5285</a><br>
&gt;&gt; E-mail : <a href=3D"mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp" target=3D"_bl=
ank">seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp</a><br>
&gt;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------=
<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</=
a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_b=
lank">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br><div style=
=3D"margin:0mm 0mm 0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:&#39;MS UI Gothic&#39;;f=
ont-size:10pt" lang=3D"EN-US">---------------------------------------------=
---------------------<br>

SeongHan Shin<br></span><span style=3D"font-family:&#39;MS UI Gothic&#39;;f=
ont-size:10pt" lang=3D"EN-US">Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC)=
,<br>National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST=
),<br>

Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan<br>Tel : <a=
 href=3D"tel:%2B81-29-861-2670" value=3D"+81298612670" target=3D"_blank">+8=
1-29-861-2670</a>/5284<br>Fax : <a href=3D"tel:%2B81-29-861-5285" value=3D"=
+81298615285" target=3D"_blank">+81-29-861-5285</a><br>
E-mail : <a href=3D"mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp" target=3D"_blank"><fon=
t color=3D"#0000ff">seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp</font></a><br>
------------------------------------------------------------------</span></=
div>
</div></div></div></div>

--089e0160b42c614e5f04f1907524--

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Hi Mike,


Thank you for your comments.

> There are no such BN curves.  I just don't expect that most
> implementers will consider using a 512-bit BN curve, because at that
> size a non-BN curve with k=3D18 or k=3D24 has a better trade-off of
> security vs performance.
> But I suppose that such curves might not be
> ISO/IEC compliant, because of their cofactors.

I misunderstood your intentions.

I also think it is better that we use non-BN curve with k=3D18 or k=3D24
if we need more higher security than 128-bit.
(For example, the comparison of [1] supports it:-) )

On the other hands, our I-D focuses on BN-curves, as you understand.
I hope new I-Ds which are submitted in the future will achieve the
requirement which you pointed out and such activities will become active.

And, although I also don't expect that most implementers will consider=20
using a 512-bit BN curves which are specified in our I-D, we think it is=20
valuable to provide parameters and additional information (on security=20
and differences between M-type and D-type) of curves with international=20
standard.

[1]  http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/232

Cheers,
Kohei KASAMATSU

(2014/01/30 3:31), Mike Hamburg wrote:
>
> On Jan 29, 2014, at 3:01 AM, Kohei Kasamatsu <kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.c=
o.jp> wrote:
>
>>> But isn=92t 512 bits rather large for a BN curve?  If you=92re going =
to
>>> have a curve that large, it seems to me that you=92d want an embeddin=
g
>>> degree of at least 18 even though it costs you a giant cofactor.  A
>>> curve with a 512-bit prime and a 384-bit subgroup might get you to
>>> the 192-bit security level.  This would take a 640-bit BN curve at
>>> minimum, with 720 a more conservative guess.
>>>
>>> Source: Freeman 2006, http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/372.pdf.  My
>>> knowledge on this subject is dated, so I=92m sure you know better...
>>
>> Thank you for your comments and information on security of our memo.
>>
>> Our memo specifies parameters for compatibility with ISO/IEC document =
and parameters for high performance. 512-bit curve and 384-bit curves whi=
ch are compliant with ISO/IEC have 128 security levels because of the fol=
lowing reason.
>> ...
>> If there are parameters of bn-curves with higher security level and hi=
gh performance, we would like to add it into our memo.
>
>
> There are no such BN curves.  I just don't expect that most implementer=
s will consider using a 512-bit BN curve, because at that size a non-BN c=
urve with k=3D18 or k=3D24 has a better trade-off of security vs performa=
nce.  But I suppose that such curves might not be ISO/IEC compliant, beca=
use of their cofactors.
>
> Cheers,
> -- Mike
>
>
>


--=20
Kohei KASAMATSU

NTT Software Corporation
TEL: +81 45 212 7908 FAX: +81 45 212 9800
E-mail: kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp


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Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2014 18:30:01 +0900
From: Kohei Kasamatsu <kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp>
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Hi Laura,


Thank you for your feedback on it.

We will apply that modification to new version.


Best,
Kohei KASAMATSU

(2014/01/30 3:35), Laura Hitt wrote:
> Hi Kohei,
> Yes, thank you, that modification is better.
> -Laura
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Kohei Kasamatsu [mailto:kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2014 5:02 AM
>> To: Laura Hitt; cfrg@irtf.org
>> Cc: kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp; kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>>
>> Hi Laura,
>>
>>
>> Thank you for your comments.
>>
>>> Regarding your statement in Section 6, "The elliptic curve that
>>> supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following
>>> problems, since the security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives
>>> is based on hardness of these problems."  You then list the ECDLP,
>>> ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with auxiliary inputs.
>>>
>>> I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives
>>> are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it's true, but
>>> it's conceivable that a pairing-based scheme could be based on another
>>> hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See,
>>> for example, Section 6 of "Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and
>>> Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography" by Broker, Charles,
>>> Lauter, or "Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for ordinary
>>> elliptic curves" by Galbraith & Stolbunov.)
>>
>> We agree with it.
>> As you say, there are pairing-based cryptographic primitives based on the
>> hardness of different problems from these described in our draft.
>>
>> We would like to change
>> "The elliptic curve that supports a bilinear map requires the hardness of
>> solving following problems, since the security of pairing-based
>> cryptographic primitives is based on hardness of these problems."
>> to
>> "Pairing-based cryptographic primitives are often based on the hardness of
>> the following problems, so when the elliptic curves from this document are
>> used in such schemes, these problems would apply."
>>
>> Does the modification despel the concern?
>>
>> Best,
>> Kohei KASAMATSU
>>
>>
>> (2014/01/24 3:13), Laura Hitt wrote:
>>> Hi Kohei,
>>>
>>> Regarding your statement in Section 6, "The elliptic curve that supports
>> a bilinear map requires the hardness of solving following problems, since
>> the security of pairing-based cryptographic primitives is based on hardness
>> of these problems."  You then list the ECDLP, ECDHP, BDHP, ECDLP with
>> auxiliary inputs.
>>>
>>> I would be hesitant to say ALL pairing-based cryptographic primitives
>>> are based on the hardness of those problems...perhaps it's true, but
>>> it's conceivable that a pairing-based scheme could be based on another
>>> hard problem, such as solving the isogeny problem or co-gap DH. (See,
>>> for example, Section 6 of "Evaluating Large Degree Isogenies and
>>> Applications to Pairing Based Cryptography" by Broker, Charles,
>>> Lauter, or "Improved algorithm for the isogeny problem for ordinary
>>> elliptic curves" by Galbraith & Stolbunov.)
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Laura
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Kohei Kasamatsu
>>> Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 6:04 PM
>>> To: cfrg@irtf.org
>>> Cc: kobayashi.tetsutaro@lab.ntt.co.jp; kawahara.yuto@lab.ntt.co.jp
>>> Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>>>
>>> Hi cfrg folks,
>>>
>>>
>>> Elliptic curves with a special map called a pairing allow cryptographic
>> primitives to achieve functions or efficiency which cannot be realized by
>> conventional mathematical tools. For example, ZSS signature is one of these
>> primitives.
>>>
>>> We have recently submitted an I-D on Barreto-Naehrig curves (BN-curves)
>> which provide efficient operations of a pairing.
>>> The I-D specifies parameters of BN-curves which are particularly useful
>> for realization of efficient cryptographic schemes based on pairing and
>> parameters of BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5.
>>>
>>> We will propose I-Ds on computation of pairing and pairing-based
>> primitives in order to contribute to IETF community in the near future.
>>>
>>> We would appreciate your comments and suggestions on our I-D and works.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Kohei KASAMATSU
>>> -------- Original Message --------
>>> Subject: I-D Action: draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>>> Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 21:13:03 -0800
>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>>> Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>>> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>>>
>>>
>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories.
>>>
>>>
>>>            Title           : Barreto-Naehrig Curves
>>>            Authors         : Kohei Kasamatsu
>>>                              Satoru Kanno
>>>                              Tetsutaro Kobayashi
>>>                              Yuto Kawahara
>>>        Filename        : draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00.txt
>>>        Pages           : 15
>>>        Date            : 2014-01-09
>>>
>>> Abstract:
>>>       Elliptic curves with pairing are useful tools for constructing
>>>       cryptographic primitives.  In this memo, we specify domain
>> parameters
>>>       of Barreto-Naehrig curve (BN-curve) [5].  The BN-curve is an
>> elliptic
>>>       curve suitable for pairings and allows us to achieve high security
>>>       and efficiency of cryptographic schemes.  This memo specifies domain
>>>       parameters of two 254-bit BN-curves [1] [2] which allow us to obtain
>>>       efficient implementations and domain parameters of 224, 256, 384,
>> and
>>>       512-bit BN-curves which are compliant with ISO/IEC 15946-5[3].
>>>       Furthermore, this memo organizes differences between types of
>>>       elliptic curves specified in ISO document and often used in open
>>>       source softwares, which are called M-type and D-type
>>>       respectively[21].
>>>
>>>
>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves/
>>>
>>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-00
>>>
>>>
>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>> submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at
>> tools.ietf.org.
>>>
>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> I-D-Announce mailing list
>>> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
>>> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Kohei KASAMATSU
>>
>> NTT Software Corporation
>> TEL: +81 45 212 7908 FAX: +81 45 212 9800
>> E-mail: kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp
>>
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


-- 
Kohei KASAMATSU

NTT Software Corporation
TEL: +81 45 212 7908 FAX: +81 45 212 9800
E-mail: kasamatsu.kohei@po.ntts.co.jp


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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (AugPAKE)
        Authors         : SeongHan Shin
                          Kazukuni Kobara
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2014-02-04

Abstract:
   This document describes a secure and highly-efficient augmented
   password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a user
   remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is registered in
   the intended server.  In general, the user password is chosen from a
   small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-line dictionary
   attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure against
   passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary attacks (on
   the obtained messages with passive/active attacks).  Also, this
   protocol provides resistance to server compromise in the context that
   an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from the server, must
   at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain any advantage in
   impersonating the user.  The AugPAKE protocol is not only provably
   secure in the random oracle model but also the most efficient over
   the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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--089e01493e467e044f04f19210ea
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Dear all,

I posted an -01 I-D adding a test vector of AugPAKE.

Any comments are welcome!
Best regards,
Shin



On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 6:44 PM, <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working
> Group of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
> (AugPAKE)
>         Authors         : SeongHan Shin
>                           Kazukuni Kobara
>         Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt
>         Pages           : 18
>         Date            : 2014-02-04
>
> Abstract:
>    This document describes a secure and highly-efficient augmented
>    password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a user
>    remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is registered in
>    the intended server.  In general, the user password is chosen from a
>    small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-line dictionary
>    attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure against
>    passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary attacks (on
>    the obtained messages with passive/active attacks).  Also, this
>    protocol provides resistance to server compromise in the context that
>    an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from the server, must
>    at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain any advantage in
>    impersonating the user.  The AugPAKE protocol is not only provably
>    secure in the random oracle model but also the most efficient over
>    the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------
SeongHan Shin
Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC),
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST),
Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan
Tel : +81-29-861-2670/5284
Fax : +81-29-861-5285
E-mail : seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp
------------------------------------------------------------------

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div>Dear all,<br><br></div>I posted an -01=
 I-D adding a test vector of AugPAKE.<br><br></div>Any comments are welcome=
!<br></div>Best regards,<br></div>Shin<br><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 6:44 PM,  <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">
<br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
=A0This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Gro=
up of the IETF.<br>
<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Augmented Password-Authenticate=
d Key Exchange (AugPAKE)<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Authors =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : SeongHan Shin<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Kazukuni Kobara<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt<br=
>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 18<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2014-02-04<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=A0 =A0This document describes a secure and highly-efficient augmented<br>
=A0 =A0password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a user<=
br>
=A0 =A0remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is registered in<b=
r>
=A0 =A0the intended server. =A0In general, the user password is chosen from=
 a<br>
=A0 =A0small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-line dictionar=
y<br>
=A0 =A0attacks. =A0The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure against<br=
>
=A0 =A0passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary attacks (on<=
br>
=A0 =A0the obtained messages with passive/active attacks). =A0Also, this<br=
>
=A0 =A0protocol provides resistance to server compromise in the context tha=
t<br>
=A0 =A0an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from the server, mus=
t<br>
=A0 =A0at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain any advantage i=
n<br>
=A0 =A0impersonating the user. =A0The AugPAKE protocol is not only provably=
<br>
=A0 =A0secure in the random oracle model but also the most efficient over<b=
r>
=A0 =A0the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/</a><=
br>
<br>
There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01" target=3D=
"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01" t=
arget=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-augpake=
-01</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp=
.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank">htt=
p://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br><div style=3D"MARGIN:0m=
m 0mm 0pt"><span style=3D"FONT-FAMILY:&#39;MS UI Gothic&#39;;FONT-SIZE:10pt=
" lang=3D"EN-US">----------------------------------------------------------=
--------<br>
SeongHan Shin<br></span><span style=3D"FONT-FAMILY:&#39;MS UI Gothic&#39;;F=
ONT-SIZE:10pt" lang=3D"EN-US">Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC)=
,<br>National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST=
),<br>
Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan<br>Tel : +8=
1-29-861-2670/5284<br>Fax : +81-29-861-5285<br>E-mail : <a href=3D"mailto:s=
eonghan.shin@aist.go.jp" target=3D"_blank"><font color=3D"#0000ff">seonghan=
.shin@aist.go.jp</font></a><br>
------------------------------------------------------------------</span></=
div>
</div>

--089e01493e467e044f04f19210ea--

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Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2014 08:02:17 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. -> Re: I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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HI Paul and Watson,

On 02/04/2014 03:05 AM, Paul Lambert wrote:
>
>
>     > A proof might be desirable but should not block the use of a proposed protocol.
>     > For example there is no adequate proof that integer
>     factorization is “secure”.
>     > This is not a reason to stop using RSA based algorithms.  The
>     lack of
>     > a  complete security proof for draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
>     should not
>     > stop it’s use (in fact it’s already in other standards that
>     would benefit
>     > from the analysis and improvements of this group).
>
>     But there is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to RSA security.
>     PKCS 1.5 had no proof, and got broken a few times. RSA has been
>     intensively studied for decades, dragonfly hasn't. Slight variants
>     of RSA (Rabin-Williams) are provably reducible to factoring, an
>     extensively studied problem for centuries.
>
> You missed the point.  The difficulty of factoring as a problem to 
> build secure systems is not provable.
> . . .
>

Paul, you are right that the computational cost of factoring the product 
of two large primes is unknown, and there is no proof that it is hard.   
But Watson also has a point, that the factoring problem is easily 
understood and has been very well studied.   In particular, it has been 
more well studied than the dragonfly security conjecture, whatever that 
conjecture is.   (Has it been isolated?)

At the end of the day, none of the crypto that we use is actually proven 
to be unconditionally secure.  (I'm ignoring information theoretic 
security here, to make the discussion easier ;-)  It might be proven to 
be secure if factoring is hard, or if AES with a random secret key is 
indistinguishable from a random permutation, or under some other 
well-understood conjecture.   It is a major goal to reduce the number of 
conjectures that we need to rely on, and to rely on conjectures that we 
have more confidence in.

I think we should prefer algorithms and protocols that rely only on 
well-understood conjectures.   I will hedge this statement, though, and 
say that the security conjectures are just one factor in the decision 
making process.   For instance: the Blum Blum Shub (BBS) pseudorandom 
number generator is secure if factoring is hard, but we use AES or HMAC 
based PRNGs instead, because BBS would be *slow*. Furthermore, it is 
quite possible that AES-CTR is more secure than BBS; it may we be that 
we see advances in the state of the art in factoring.

>     > Watson, in your technical analysis of the
>     > protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
>     > can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
>     > the protocol?
>
>     Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I
>     can't exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.
>

Watson, can you quantify the claim of 2^40?

David

> I will take your answer as a ‘no’ - you are unable to identify any 
> exploitable security flaw with draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
>
> Making such repeated and  adversarial negative pronouncements on a 
> technical topic without documentation or your own demonstrable 
> analysis would be considered by some to be unprofessional behavior.
>
>
> Paul
>




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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">HI Paul and Watson,<br>
      <br>
      On 02/04/2014 03:05 AM, Paul Lambert wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:CF15D9D2.2E696%25paul@marvell.com" type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div>
          <p dir="ltr"><br>
          </p>
        </div>
      </span><span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <p dir="ltr">&gt; A proof might be desirable but should not
            block the use of a proposed protocol.<br>
            &gt; For example there is no adequate proof that integer
            factorization is “secure”.<br>
            &gt; This is not a reason to stop using RSA based
            algorithms.  The lack of<br>
            &gt; a  complete security proof for
            draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt should not<br>
            &gt; stop it’s use (in fact it’s already in other standards
            that would benefit<br>
            &gt; from the analysis and improvements of this group).</p>
          <p dir="ltr">But there is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to
            RSA security. PKCS 1.5 had no proof, and got broken a few
            times. RSA has been intensively studied for decades,
            dragonfly hasn't. Slight variants of RSA (Rabin-Williams)
            are provably reducible to factoring, an extensively studied
            problem for centuries.</p>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div>You missed the point.  The difficulty of factoring as a
        problem to build secure systems is not provable.  </div>
      <div>. . .</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Paul, you are right that the computational cost of factoring the
    product of two large primes is unknown, and there is no proof that
    it is hard.   But Watson also has a point, that the factoring
    problem is easily understood and has been very well studied.   In
    particular, it has been more well studied than the dragonfly
    security conjecture, whatever that conjecture is.   (Has it been
    isolated?)<br>
    <br>
    At the end of the day, none of the crypto that we use is actually
    proven to be unconditionally secure.  (I'm ignoring information
    theoretic security here, to make the discussion easier ;-)  It might
    be proven to be secure if factoring is hard, or if AES with a random
    secret key is indistinguishable from a random permutation, or under
    some other well-understood conjecture.   It is a major goal to
    reduce the number of conjectures that we need to rely on, and to
    rely on conjectures that we have more confidence in.  <br>
    <br>
    I think we should prefer algorithms and protocols that rely only on
    well-understood conjectures.   I will hedge this statement, though,
    and say that the security conjectures are just one factor in the
    decision making process.   For instance: the Blum Blum Shub (BBS)
    pseudorandom number generator is secure if factoring is hard, but we
    use AES or HMAC based PRNGs instead, because BBS would be *slow*.  
    Furthermore, it is quite possible that AES-CTR is more secure than
    BBS; it may we be that we see advances in the state of the art in
    factoring.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:CF15D9D2.2E696%25paul@marvell.com" type="cite"><span
        id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <p dir="ltr">&gt; Watson, in your technical analysis of the<br>
            &gt; protocol in its current form
            (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),<br>
            &gt; can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific
            to<br>
            &gt; the protocol?</p>
          <p dir="ltr">Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords
            in time 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE
            doesn't have this issue.</p>
        </blockquote>
      </span></blockquote>
    <br>
    Watson, can you quantify the claim of 2^40?<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:CF15D9D2.2E696%25paul@marvell.com" type="cite">
      <div>I will take your answer as a ‘no’ - you are unable to
        identify any exploitable security flaw with
        draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Making such repeated and  adversarial negative pronouncements
        on a technical topic without documentation or your own
        demonstrable analysis would be considered by some to be
        unprofessional behavior.  </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Paul</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------090800080905020500010702--

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Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2014 09:45:35 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] call for reviewers (was: Re: I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt)
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Thanks Shin.

I'd like to call for reviewers on this draft, to read it over and send 
comments to the authors and the list.   Any volunteers?

David

On 02/04/2014 05:25 AM, SeongHan Shin wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> I posted an -01 I-D adding a test vector of AugPAKE.
>
> Any comments are welcome!
> Best regards,
> Shin
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 6:44 PM, <internet-drafts@ietf.org 
> <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>> wrote:
>
>
>     A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>     directories.
>      This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group
>     Working Group of the IETF.
>
>             Title           : Augmented Password-Authenticated Key
>     Exchange (AugPAKE)
>             Authors         : SeongHan Shin
>                               Kazukuni Kobara
>             Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt
>             Pages           : 18
>             Date            : 2014-02-04
>
>     Abstract:
>        This document describes a secure and highly-efficient augmented
>        password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a user
>        remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is registered in
>        the intended server.  In general, the user password is chosen
>     from a
>        small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-line
>     dictionary
>        attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure against
>        passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary attacks (on
>        the obtained messages with passive/active attacks).  Also, this
>        protocol provides resistance to server compromise in the
>     context that
>        an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from the
>     server, must
>        at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain any
>     advantage in
>        impersonating the user.  The AugPAKE protocol is not only provably
>        secure in the random oracle model but also the most efficient over
>        the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).
>
>
>     The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/
>
>     There's also a htmlized version available at:
>     http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01
>
>     A diff from the previous version is available at:
>     http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01
>
>
>     Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>     submission
>     until the htmlized version and diff are available at
>     tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>
>     Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>     ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     Cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> SeongHan Shin
> Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC),
> National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST),
> Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan
> Tel : +81-29-861-2670/5284
> Fax : +81-29-861-5285
> E-mail : seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp <mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Thanks Shin.<br>
      <br>
      I'd like to call for reviewers on this draft, to read it over and
      send comments to the authors and the list.   Any volunteers?   <br>
      <br>
      David<br>
      <br>
      On 02/04/2014 05:25 AM, SeongHan Shin wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAEKgtqmcbMqANhQS=QEztNjz7jg9ftYGbKH7gRd1c5hpc=Jc0Q@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>
          <div>
            <div>
              <div>Dear all,<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              I posted an -01 I-D adding a test vector of AugPAKE.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            Any comments are welcome!<br>
          </div>
          Best regards,<br>
        </div>
        Shin<br>
        <br>
      </div>
      <div class="gmail_extra">
        <br>
        <br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 6:44 PM, <span
            dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target="_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span>
          wrote:<br>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
            .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
            <br>
            A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line
            Internet-Drafts directories.<br>
             This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research
            Group Working Group of the IETF.<br>
            <br>
                    Title           : Augmented Password-Authenticated
            Key Exchange (AugPAKE)<br>
                    Authors         : SeongHan Shin<br>
                                      Kazukuni Kobara<br>
                    Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt<br>
                    Pages           : 18<br>
                    Date            : 2014-02-04<br>
            <br>
            Abstract:<br>
               This document describes a secure and highly-efficient
            augmented<br>
               password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol
            where a user<br>
               remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is
            registered in<br>
               the intended server.  In general, the user password is
            chosen from a<br>
               small set of dictionary whose space is within the
            off-line dictionary<br>
               attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure
            against<br>
               passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary
            attacks (on<br>
               the obtained messages with passive/active attacks).
             Also, this<br>
               protocol provides resistance to server compromise in the
            context that<br>
               an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from the
            server, must<br>
               at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain any
            advantage in<br>
               impersonating the user.  The AugPAKE protocol is not only
            provably<br>
               secure in the random oracle model but also the most
            efficient over<br>
               the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).<br>
            <br>
            <br>
            The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/"
              target="_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/</a><br>
            <br>
            There's also a htmlized version available at:<br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01"
              target="_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01</a><br>
            <br>
            A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01"
              target="_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01</a><br>
            <br>
            <br>
            Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the
            time of submission<br>
            until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a
              moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://tools.ietf.org"
              target="_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
            <br>
            Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target="_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
            <br>
            _______________________________________________<br>
            Cfrg mailing list<br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg"
              target="_blank">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br>
        <br clear="all">
        <br>
        -- <br>
        <div style="MARGIN:0mm 0mm 0pt"><span style="FONT-FAMILY:'MS UI
            Gothic';FONT-SIZE:10pt" lang="EN-US">------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
            SeongHan Shin<br>
          </span><span style="FONT-FAMILY:'MS UI Gothic';FONT-SIZE:10pt"
            lang="EN-US">Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC),<br>
            National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and
            Technology (AIST),<br>
            Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568
            Japan<br>
            Tel : +81-29-861-2670/5284<br>
            Fax : +81-29-861-5285<br>
            E-mail : <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp" target="_blank"><font
                color="#0000ff">seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp</font></a><br>
------------------------------------------------------------------</span></div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
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Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2014 10:06:35 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] call for reviewers
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Hi David:

I can give this a careful look.

Rene

On 2/4/2014 9:45 AM, David McGrew wrote:
> Thanks Shin.
>
> I'd like to call for reviewers on this draft, to read it over and send 
> comments to the authors and the list.   Any volunteers?
>
> David
>
> On 02/04/2014 05:25 AM, SeongHan Shin wrote:
>> Dear all,
>>
>> I posted an -01 I-D adding a test vector of AugPAKE.
>>
>> Any comments are welcome!
>> Best regards,
>> Shin
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 6:44 PM, <internet-drafts@ietf.org 
>> <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>     A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line
>>     Internet-Drafts directories.
>>      This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group
>>     Working Group of the IETF.
>>
>>             Title           : Augmented Password-Authenticated Key
>>     Exchange (AugPAKE)
>>             Authors         : SeongHan Shin
>>                               Kazukuni Kobara
>>             Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt
>>             Pages           : 18
>>             Date            : 2014-02-04
>>
>>     Abstract:
>>        This document describes a secure and highly-efficient augmented
>>        password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a
>>     user
>>        remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is registered in
>>        the intended server.  In general, the user password is chosen
>>     from a
>>        small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-line
>>     dictionary
>>        attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure against
>>        passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary
>>     attacks (on
>>        the obtained messages with passive/active attacks).  Also, this
>>        protocol provides resistance to server compromise in the
>>     context that
>>        an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from the
>>     server, must
>>        at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain any
>>     advantage in
>>        impersonating the user.  The AugPAKE protocol is not only provably
>>        secure in the random oracle model but also the most efficient over
>>        the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).
>>
>>
>>     The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/
>>
>>     There's also a htmlized version available at:
>>     http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01
>>
>>     A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>     http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01
>>
>>
>>     Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>     submission
>>     until the htmlized version and diff are available at
>>     tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>>
>>     Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>     ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     Cfrg mailing list
>>     Cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
>>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>> SeongHan Shin
>> Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC),
>> National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST),
>> Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568 Japan
>> Tel : +81-29-861-2670/5284
>> Fax : +81-29-861-5285
>> E-mail : seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp <mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi David:<br>
      <br>
      I can give this a careful look.<br>
      <br>
      Rene<br>
      <br>
      On 2/4/2014 9:45 AM, David McGrew wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52F0FD0F.8080401@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Thanks Shin.<br>
        <br>
        I'd like to call for reviewers on this draft, to read it over
        and send comments to the authors and the list.   Any
        volunteers?   <br>
        <br>
        David<br>
        <br>
        On 02/04/2014 05:25 AM, SeongHan Shin wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote
cite="mid:CAEKgtqmcbMqANhQS=QEztNjz7jg9ftYGbKH7gRd1c5hpc=Jc0Q@mail.gmail.com"
        type="cite">
        <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
          charset=UTF-8">
        <div dir="ltr">
          <div>
            <div>
              <div>
                <div>Dear all,<br>
                  <br>
                </div>
                I posted an -01 I-D adding a test vector of AugPAKE.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              Any comments are welcome!<br>
            </div>
            Best regards,<br>
          </div>
          Shin<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        <div class="gmail_extra"> <br>
          <br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 6:44 PM, <span
              dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target="_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> <br>
              A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line
              Internet-Drafts directories.<br>
               This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research
              Group Working Group of the IETF.<br>
              <br>
                      Title           : Augmented Password-Authenticated
              Key Exchange (AugPAKE)<br>
                      Authors         : SeongHan Shin<br>
                                        Kazukuni Kobara<br>
                      Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01.txt<br>
                      Pages           : 18<br>
                      Date            : 2014-02-04<br>
              <br>
              Abstract:<br>
                 This document describes a secure and highly-efficient
              augmented<br>
                 password-authenticated key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol
              where a user<br>
                 remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is
              registered in<br>
                 the intended server.  In general, the user password is
              chosen from a<br>
                 small set of dictionary whose space is within the
              off-line dictionary<br>
                 attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure
              against<br>
                 passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary
              attacks (on<br>
                 the obtained messages with passive/active attacks).
               Also, this<br>
                 protocol provides resistance to server compromise in
              the context that<br>
                 an attacker, who obtained the password verifier from
              the server, must<br>
                 at least perform off-line dictionary attacks to gain
              any advantage in<br>
                 impersonating the user.  The AugPAKE protocol is not
              only provably<br>
                 secure in the random oracle model but also the most
              efficient over<br>
                 the previous augmented PAKE protocols (SRP and AMP).<br>
              <br>
              <br>
              The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/"
                target="_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake/</a><br>
              <br>
              There's also a htmlized version available at:<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01"
                target="_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01</a><br>
              <br>
              A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01"
                target="_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01</a><br>
              <br>
              <br>
              Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the
              time of submission<br>
              until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a
                moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://tools.ietf.org"
                target="_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
              <br>
              Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/"
                target="_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
              <br>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              Cfrg mailing list<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg"
                target="_blank">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
          <br clear="all">
          <br>
          -- <br>
          <div style="MARGIN:0mm 0mm 0pt"><span style="FONT-FAMILY:'MS
              UI Gothic';FONT-SIZE:10pt" lang="EN-US">------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
              SeongHan Shin<br>
            </span><span style="FONT-FAMILY:'MS UI
              Gothic';FONT-SIZE:10pt" lang="EN-US">Research Institute
              for Secure Systems (RISEC),<br>
              National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and
              Technology (AIST),<br>
              Central 2, 1-1-1, Umezono, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305-8568
              Japan<br>
              Tel : +81-29-861-2670/5284<br>
              Fax : +81-29-861-5285<br>
              E-mail : <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp" target="_blank"><font
                  color="#0000ff">seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp</font></a><br>
------------------------------------------------------------------</span></div>
        </div>
        <br>
        <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
        <br>
        <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <br>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a> | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363</pre>
  </body>
</html>

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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Feb  4 08:01:24 2014
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References: <20140203192451.6268.76511.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <7af2f9df96e5867d493c614806235363.squirrel@www.trepanning.net> <CACsn0cm1f-P95je5AbEbZ02Ut3+HM7Hx28P6j46TqE-=06eZDg@mail.gmail.com> <52F00EF3.3040505@cisco.com> <CACsn0c=zS5GKex3eF_hKgTsL1kH=TiBi3iAP9oMrJ9hDQcT4Gw@mail.gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B81B7DE5@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CACsn0cn0TaHsDkyN2ewOorxxBzXivCg=QGR-ZnBiC3nJhvhpRg@mail.gmail.com> <14AB44E0-4C90-4E4C-A656-885A31CF4C02@checkpoint.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 08:01:21 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 12:20 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>
> On Feb 4, 2014, at 3:08 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>> I would like to reverse the question.
>>
>>
>>
>> Watson, in your technical analysis of the
>>
>> protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
>>
>> can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
>>
>> the protocol?
>
> Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I can't
> exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.
>
>
> 2^40 times doing what?  Is it 2^40 calculations based on a single observed
> authentication?  Observing 2^40 successful authentications?  Actively
> interacting 2^40 times with the authentication server?

p calculations, where p is the number of passwords, after conducting
one round with the authentication
server.

The algorithm takes the p discrete logarithms of the password elements
with respect to some base, and uses them
to identify the password that leads to the confirmation being sent.
Concretely, the attacker sends g^x, receives g^y
and guesses p that makes g^(xyp^{-1}) the key going into the confirmation.

For MODP groups maybe this can actually be turned into an exhibitable
attack. I don't know: I've not thought about
it enough. But it is still enough to cause issues as I will explain below.

There is also the fact that in the CK model, where ephermental keys
are leaked, dragonfly reveals the pssword
element, and hence the password, in time p. This algorithm can be
exhibited. It's slightly less interesting, because
CK is very strong, but apparently people care.

This issue is more than a curiosity: it forces reductions of dragonfly
to take place in a very artificial security
model where the hash function is selected randomly. Any reduction in
the ROM or standard model assuming
a less than CK adversary will take the first algorithm I outlined, and
only say that attacks with better performance
then it do not exist. But it will not determine whether or not they
can be exhibited.

The model in which the foundations-of-hashing doesn't matter and a
proof is possible is a model which I know nothing about.
I don't know if its been proposed before, or what separation results
exist between it and the ROM, or what
those separations say about what we can and can't do. I also don't
know if Dragonfly in some good model
of PAKE reduces in hardness to something hard in that model.

These sorts of reductions are at the core of the science of
cryptography. Ignoring

Finally, we can adopt AugPAKE or JPAKE and avoid all of these issues
entirely: there is no compelling
reason why Dragonfly should be used instead of AugPAKE. I'm struggling
to see the rationale for standardizing
a solution inferior to protocols we already have.

>
> For password-based authentication, these are totally different things,
> because most passwords come from a 16-bit pool, and nearly all come from a
> 24-bit pool ([1]). That means that they are very vulnerable to active
> guessing, which is why pretty much every application limits an attacker's
> guessing using timeouts.

I used 2^40 from horsebatterystaplecorrect style. Turns out it's worse
than I thought.
>
> So what kind of attack is it that you can't exhibit?

Foundations of hashing.
>
> Yoav
>
>
> [1] http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwmalone/p/www2012-slides.pdf



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Feb  4 09:50:28 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Fun with Alice and Bob
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--20cf301af7fd56de6a04f19846f8
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Bob calls Alice.
Alice calls Bob at the same time.
Bob sets up a date, and Alice repeats back the time.

The next day Alice is a no show.

Alice and Bob used dragonfly. Dragonfly is symmetric: too symmetric.
Echoing one side of the exchange back leads to a succesful negotiation.

Don't be like Bob. Use real PAKEs.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

--20cf301af7fd56de6a04f19846f8
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<p dir="ltr">Bob calls Alice.<br>
Alice calls Bob at the same time.<br>
Bob sets up a date, and Alice repeats back the time.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The next day Alice is a no show.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Alice and Bob used dragonfly. Dragonfly is symmetric: too symmetric. Echoing one side of the exchange back leads to a succesful negotiation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Don&#39;t be like Bob. Use real PAKEs.<br>
Sincerely,<br>
Watson Ladd</p>

--20cf301af7fd56de6a04f19846f8--

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This very notion of security was formalized as Aliveness by Lowe in 1997
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.126.3385&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

It feels ill advised to make an rfc of a protocol failing to achieve that
weak of a property in 2014

Sincerely

-- 
Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div>This very notion of securi=
ty was formalized as Aliveness by Lowe in 1997 <a href=3D"http://citeseerx.=
ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=3D10.1.1.126.3385&amp;rep=3Drep1&amp;type=
=3Dpdf">http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=3D10.1.1.126.3385=
&amp;rep=3Drep1&amp;type=3Dpdf</a>. <br>

It feels ill advised to make an rfc of a protocol failing to achieve that w=
eak of a property in 2014<br><br></div>Sincerely<br><br>-- <br>Alexandre An=
zala-Yamajako<br><br><br>
</div></div>

--047d7b5d2aa224a6ea04f1986516--

From mike@shiftleft.org  Tue Feb  4 10:29:58 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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Hello CFRG,

Let's see if I can provide a less controversial, or at least less =
theoretical, defense of the notion of cryptographic proof.

If this protocol is widely deployed, and people actually use it, there =
will be an incentive for various organizations to break it.  For =
example, NSA might ask Don Coppersmith to lead a team of =
similarly-clever cryptographers to spend a month trying to break it.  =
They would have access to classified techniques and massive computing =
power.  I am almost certain that the NSA and their contractors would put =
in this kind of effort and more into a new widely-deployed symmetric or =
asymmetric cipher.  This is why they hire more mathematicians than =
anyone else.  I suspect that a new protocol would attract a similar =
effort unless they have a better reason than I do to believe it's =
secure.

Likewise, other nations would mount attacks.  Outside researchers would =
too, but at least in that case we'd know if they broke it and could =
switch to something else.

When deploying a new protocol, I want a good reason to believe that it's =
better than the other alternatives.  "Better" could mean that it takes =
less work to implement, or is faster, or has fewer IPR concerns, or is =
easier to use correctly, or that it takes less bandwidth, or has more =
features, or it enables new security systems (like a PAKE).  But =
"better" also means that there is less risk that the NSA or the Chinese =
or the French or Adi Shamir will break it a month or a year down the =
road.  Risk is all we can talk about here, because of course someone =
might build a quantum computer or solve the discrete log problem.

There are two ways to convince me that the risk is low.  One is to have =
teams of elite cryptographers work for months trying to attack the =
system.  This is what happened with AES and SHA-3, but it really isn't =
scalable to every new cipher and protocol.

The other way to convince me is a proof of security.  There are better =
and worse models for this (RO vs standard model, gap assumptions vs CDH, =
whatever), but in the end, a proof is much better than no proof.  It =
means that as long as you haven't messed up the proof and I haven't =
messed up checking it, the adversary will need to pass a certain very =
high bar of cleverness (breaking the model and/or assumptions) in order =
to attack the system.  The more conservative and standard and =
commonly-used the model and assumptions are, the higher the bar will be =
and the more convincing the proof will be.  This doesn't guarantee that =
the adversary will fail, but at least it gives good evidence in that =
direction.

The argument given for Dragonfly is that we've patched all the security =
problems which people have found already, and since then they haven't =
found more.  And also, it looks like it ought to be secure.  These =
arguments are not very convincing.  I don't know who's been looking for =
attacks and how long, but I suspect it hasn't been a monthlong effort =
with a team of elite cryptographers.

I don't have an attack against Dragonfly.  I worked on attacking it for =
maybe an hour, and I'm no Coppersmith.  It looks to me like it ought to =
be secure.  But there have historically been plenty of protocols which =
looked secure and turned out not to be.

What's more, there isn't a formal security definition of Dragonfly.  =
This increases the risk that it will be deployed incorrectly, because it =
makes it harder to analyze the security properties of such a deployment.

Despite these problems, Dragonfly would still be the "best" PAKE =
protocol out there, and even worth deploying, if there weren't other =
good options.  But in fact there are SPAKE2 and "SPAKE2 Elligator =
Edition", which are also IPR-clean, similarly fast and simple, take less =
bandwidth, and have formal security models and proofs.  Furthermore, =
they (optionally) support an augmented/asymmetric PAKE interaction, =
which Dragonfly does not.  This may not matter to Dan Harkins, but it =
will matter to some people.

The advantage that Dragonfly has over these protocols is momentum: it's =
written up in an RFC, and SPAKE2 EE isn't even written up in a white =
paper.  But I, and several other people on this list, don't find that to =
be enough to outweigh its disadvantages.

In sum, saying "if you don't think it's secure, where's your attack =
against it?" isn't productive.  I think that Dragonfly is probably =
secure.  But I want to be much more certain than I am now.  There's not =
even any point in me spending a month trying and failing to break it, =
since I could spend that month writing an RFC and an implementation and =
a paper for SPAKE2 EE instead.

Cheers,
-- Mike Hamburg


From dharkins@lounge.org  Tue Feb  4 10:47:02 2014
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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 10:47:01 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On Tue, February 4, 2014 8:01 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 12:20 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Feb 4, 2014, at 3:08 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I would like to reverse the question.
>>> Watson, in your technical analysis of the
>>> protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
>>> can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
>>> the protocol?
>>
>> Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I can't
>> exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.
>>
>>
>> 2^40 times doing what?  Is it 2^40 calculations based on a single
>> observed
>> authentication?  Observing 2^40 successful authentications?  Actively
>> interacting 2^40 times with the authentication server?
>
> p calculations, where p is the number of passwords, after conducting
> one round with the authentication
> server.
>
> The algorithm takes the p discrete logarithms of the password elements
> with respect to some base, and uses them
> to identify the password that leads to the confirmation being sent.
> Concretely, the attacker sends g^x, receives g^y
> and guesses p that makes g^(xyp^{-1}) the key going into the confirmation.

  This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonfly as an EAP
method), knowledge of r where PE = r * G can enable a dictionary
attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarithm. A discrete
logarithm is assumed to be "computationally infeasible" and you're talking
about doing 2^40 of them!?!

> For MODP groups maybe this can actually be turned into an exhibitable
> attack. I don't know: I've not thought about
> it enough. But it is still enough to cause issues as I will explain below.
>
> There is also the fact that in the CK model, where ephermental keys
> are leaked, dragonfly reveals the pssword
> element, and hence the password, in time p. This algorithm can be
> exhibited. It's slightly less interesting, because
> CK is very strong, but apparently people care.

  Well, just define Reveal() to only give the session key, that's what
AugPAKE does-- doing Reveal() does not give W = g^password. Not
that I have proved dragonfly is secure in the CK model, just that the CK
model let's the particular protocol define what is its "session state"
that gets revealed.

  Dan.



From dharkins@lounge.org  Tue Feb  4 10:51:47 2014
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On Tue, February 4, 2014 9:58 am, Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako wrote:
> This very notion of security was formalized as Aliveness by Lowe in 1997
> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.126.3385&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
>
> It feels ill advised to make an rfc of a protocol failing to achieve that
> weak of a property in 2014

  Yes such a thing would be ill advised, good thing the protocol does not
fail to achieve this property. Please read the I-D.

  Dan.

> Sincerely
>
> --
> Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Feb  4 11:13:15 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>, cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fun with Alice and Bob
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--20cf3040e56e70231a04f1996e1a
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On Feb 4, 2014 10:51 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, February 4, 2014 9:58 am, Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako wrote:
> > This very notion of security was formalized as Aliveness by Lowe in 1997
> >
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.126.3385&rep=rep1&type=pdf
.
> >
> > It feels ill advised to make an rfc of a protocol failing to achieve
that
> > weak of a property in 2014
>
>   Yes such a thing would be ill advised, good thing the protocol does not
> fail to achieve this property. Please read the I-D.

Unless I'm badly mistaken a simple reflection attack does work. I went back
and double checked on receiving your email, and it looks like the key
exchange is symmetric.

You avoided this by specifying a reflection attack protection, but such
protection doesn't work if we interchange 2 exchanges, which I specified in
my story above.

>
>   Dan.
>
> > Sincerely
> >
> > --
> > Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > Cfrg@irtf.org
> > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

--20cf3040e56e70231a04f1996e1a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Feb 4, 2014 10:51 AM, &quot;Dan Harkins&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dhar=
kins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tue, February 4, 2014 9:58 am, Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; This very notion of security was formalized as Aliveness by Lowe =
in 1997<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=3D10=
.1.1.126.3385&amp;rep=3Drep1&amp;type=3Dpdf">http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v=
iewdoc/download?doi=3D10.1.1.126.3385&amp;rep=3Drep1&amp;type=3Dpdf</a>.<br=
>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; It feels ill advised to make an rfc of a protocol failing to achi=
eve that<br>
&gt; &gt; weak of a property in 2014<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 Yes such a thing would be ill advised, good thing the protocol =
does not<br>
&gt; fail to achieve this property. Please read the I-D.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Unless I&#39;m badly mistaken a simple reflection attack doe=
s work. I went back and double checked on receiving your email, and it look=
s like the key exchange is symmetric.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">You avoided this by specifying a reflection attack protectio=
n, but such protection doesn&#39;t work if we interchange 2 exchanges, whic=
h I specified in my story above.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 Dan.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Sincerely<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; --<br>
&gt; &gt; Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.=
irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; Cfrg mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</p>

--20cf3040e56e70231a04f1996e1a--

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To: cfrg@irtf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Using ED25519 in SSHFP Resource Records - draft-moonesamy-sshfp-ed25519-00
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Hello,

As a FYI:

    The Ed25519 signature algorithm has recently been implemented in
    OpenSSH.  This document updates the IANA "SSHFP RR Types for public
    key algorithms" registry by adding an algorithm number for Ed25519.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moonesamy-sshfp-ed25519-00

Regards,
S. Moonesamy


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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:

>   This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonfly as an EAP
> method), knowledge of r where PE =3D r * G can enable a dictionary
> attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarithm. A discret=
e
> logarithm is assumed to be "computationally infeasible" and you're talkin=
g
> about doing 2^40 of them!?!

<http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform> is relevant here.  It
discusses several other =E2=80=98attacks=E2=80=99 of this general type, and=
 explains
why they should not be taken seriously.


Robert Ransom

From dharkins@lounge.org  Tue Feb  4 11:51:59 2014
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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 11:51:58 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fun with Alice and Bob
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On Tue, February 4, 2014 11:13 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Feb 4, 2014 10:51 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, February 4, 2014 9:58 am, Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako wrote:
>> > This very notion of security was formalized as Aliveness by Lowe in
>> 1997
>> >
> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.126.3385&rep=rep1&type=pdf
> .
>> >
>> > It feels ill advised to make an rfc of a protocol failing to achieve
> that
>> > weak of a property in 2014
>>
>>   Yes such a thing would be ill advised, good thing the protocol does
>> not
>> fail to achieve this property. Please read the I-D.
>
> Unless I'm badly mistaken a simple reflection attack does work. I went
> back
> and double checked on receiving your email, and it looks like the key
> exchange is symmetric.
>
> You avoided this by specifying a reflection attack protection, but such
> protection doesn't work if we interchange 2 exchanges, which I specified
> in
> my story above.

  The symmetry of dragonfly is a feature since the world is not client-server
and it most certainly is not HTTP. For ad hoc, mesh and peer to peer
networking either side can initiate and both sides can initiate
simultaneously (while one of the messages will cross the ether before the
other, both parties send the initial message and they view themselves as
"initiator" in the protocol). To allow for password authentication in such
an environment a symmetric PAKE like dragonfly is necessary.

  Dragonfly handles the situation of simultaneous initiation very well
as evidenced by its use in the 802.11 (and the open11s project which
uses a mesh daemon implementing dragonfly to authenticate other
mesh peers). The state machine is quite elegant, if I may say so myself,
and is robust-- it got quite a bit of testing for the open11s project.

  Now, this draft in the CFRG is a generic description of the exchange.
Instantiations of dragonfly for some particular protocol could add
the sender's identity-- MAC address, NAI, whatever-- to the Confirm
message to prevent a reflection attack. But as a general description of
the protocol that information is not available since no medium is used.
The Confirm message is symmetric and the prevention of the attack is
somewhat clunky (make sure what you received differs from what you
sent).

  All that said, I don't see the attack you mention. It looks like one
of the exchanges will fail because it's a reflection attack and the
other will either time out because it was just used to echo back
initial data to the other exchange or it will also fail due to the reflection
attack check.

  Dan.



From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Feb  4 12:11:45 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "rransom. 8774" <rransom.8774@gmail.com>, cfrg@irtf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=20cf3040e42e0e21b104f19a3fa6
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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On Feb 4, 2014 11:41 AM, "Robert Ransom" <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
> >   This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonfly as an EAP
> > method), knowledge of r where PE =3D r * G can enable a dictionary
> > attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarithm. A
discrete
> > logarithm is assumed to be "computationally infeasible" and you're
talking
> > about doing 2^40 of them!?!
>
> <http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform> is relevant here.  It
> discusses several other =E2=80=98attacks=E2=80=99 of this general type, a=
nd explains
> why they should not be taken seriously.

Bernstein actually argues that one should define complexity measures to
exclude such attacks. This is clear in the paper. Unfortunately time memory
product for the weak password variation is only 2^40.

The problem with foundations of hashing usually isn't a real problem: one
can sign r,H (r, m) with r random to bypass it.

This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on reductions,
which are the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be shown
to have no other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof is
forthcoming.

Such a proof would be in the ROM, but as the IETF 88 slides show it would
be tricky.
>
>
> Robert Ransom

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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Feb 4, 2014 11:41 AM, &quot;Robert Ransom&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rr=
ansom.8774@gmail.com">rransom.8774@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dharkins@lounge.org">dhar=
kins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonfly as=
 an EAP<br>
&gt; &gt; method), knowledge of r where PE =3D r * G can enable a dictionar=
y<br>
&gt; &gt; attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarithm. A=
 discrete<br>
&gt; &gt; logarithm is assumed to be &quot;computationally infeasible&quot;=
 and you&#39;re talking<br>
&gt; &gt; about doing 2^40 of them!?!<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform">http://cr.yp.to=
/papers.html#nonuniform</a>&gt; is relevant here. =C2=A0It<br>
&gt; discusses several other =E2=80=98attacks=E2=80=99 of this general type=
, and explains<br>
&gt; why they should not be taken seriously.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Bernstein actually argues that one should define complexity =
measures to exclude such attacks. This is clear in the paper. Unfortunately=
 time memory product for the weak password variation is only 2^40.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">The problem with foundations of hashing usually isn&#39;t a =
real problem: one can sign r,H (r, m) with r random to bypass it.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on =
reductions, which are the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly co=
uld be shown to have no other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such pr=
oof is forthcoming.</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">Such a proof would be in the ROM, but as the IETF 88 slides =
show it would be tricky.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Robert Ransom</p>

--20cf3040e42e0e21b104f19a3fa6--

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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 15:42:48 -0500
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On Feb 4, 2014, at 14:41 , Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>  This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonfly as an EAP
>> method), knowledge of r where PE =3D r * G can enable a dictionary
>> attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarithm. A discre=
te
>> logarithm is assumed to be "computationally infeasible" and you're talki=
ng
>> about doing 2^40 of them!?!
>=20
> <http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform> is relevant here.  It
> discusses several other =91attacks=92 of this general type, and explains
> why they should not be taken seriously.
>=20
> Robert Ransom

Robert,

I think you hit the nail on the head, and made an excellent point.

Thanks!
--
Regards,
Uri               <uri@ll.mit.edu>
<Disclaimer>=

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Feb  4 13:37:59 2014
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On Feb 4, 2014 1:03 PM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, February 4, 2014 12:03 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> > On Feb 4, 2014 11:51 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
> >>   The symmetry of dragonfly is a feature since the world is not
> > client-server
> >> and it most certainly is not HTTP. For ad hoc, mesh and peer to peer
> >> networking either side can initiate and both sides can initiate
> >> simultaneously (while one of the messages will cross the ether before
> >> the
> >> other, both parties send the initial message and they view themselves
as
> >> "initiator" in the protocol). To allow for password authentication in
> >> such
> >> an environment a symmetric PAKE like dragonfly is necessary.
> >
> > Or one can decide to go first.
>
>   Yes, one can decide to go first. But if the other side decides to go
> first too then you need a protocol to settle who goes first. So let's
> say you have this protocol to go first that runs before your augmented
> PAKE. That will require each side to possess the password and the
> verifier since the protocol to go first could pick one or the other. So
> your losing this valuable (to you) feature in your augmented PAKE,
> reducing it to a balanced PAKE, and adding unnecessary complication
> in the form of the protocol to go first. That is a losing proposition.

Maybe, maybe not. Remember dragonfly assumes ordered IDs. Higher ID goes
first doesn't add rounds.

Balanced also doesn't mean symmetric.
>
> >>   Dragonfly handles the situation of simultaneous initiation very well
> >> as evidenced by its use in the 802.11 (and the open11s project which
> >> uses a mesh daemon implementing dragonfly to authenticate other
> >> mesh peers). The state machine is quite elegant, if I may say so
myself,
> >> and is robust-- it got quite a bit of testing for the open11s project.
> >>
> >>   Now, this draft in the CFRG is a generic description of the exchange.
> >> Instantiations of dragonfly for some particular protocol could add
> >> the sender's identity-- MAC address, NAI, whatever-- to the Confirm
> >> message to prevent a reflection attack. But as a general description of
> >> the protocol that information is not available since no medium is used.
> >> The Confirm message is symmetric and the prevention of the attack is
> >> somewhat clunky (make sure what you received differs from what you
> >> sent).
> >
> > Hidden in the above is the assumption that only one instance of the
> > dragonfly state machine runs between Alice and Bob.
> >
> >>
> >>   All that said, I don't see the attack you mention. It looks like one
> >> of the exchanges will fail because it's a reflection attack and the
> >> other will either time out because it was just used to echo back
> >> initial data to the other exchange or it will also fail due to the
> > reflection
> >> attack check.
> >
> > Alice to Eve: g^x.
> > Eve causes Alice to instantiate a different dragonfly instance, leading
> > with g^x.
> > Alice responds with g^y, which Eve relays over to the other connection.
> >
> > Keeping a consistent global anti replay list solves this, but is a real
> > pain point for implementations.
>
>   Yes, the assumption in the draft was that if you're doing a strict
> client-server instantiation then one side is always the client and one
> side is always the server. And if you're not doing client-server then
> you have a single state machine to handle both the initiation role
> and the responder role. That assumption is not explicit in the draft.

It should be. It also isn't sufficient: a client that makes two
simultaneous connections to a server also falls to this attack.

How many more assumptions like this are there? How many real instantiations
will violate these assumptions? Absent a reduction why should I think we
found them all? And why can't you use something more robust?

Did the EAP draft discuss this issue?
Was this discovered in 802.11s?
It wasn't noticed in the TLS debate. I didn't notice it until this morning.

Dragonfly should be secure. It looks at first glance to be secure. But we
don't know if it is secure. It has surprising properties that aren't
documented in the draft.

How certain are you of its security, and when you insist that it is secure,
what do you mean?

Sincereley,
Watson Ladd
>
>   Dan.
>
>
>

--20cf303dd39e02f54504f19b7450
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Feb 4, 2014 1:03 PM, &quot;Dan Harkins&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dhark=
ins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tue, February 4, 2014 12:03 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On Feb 4, 2014 11:51 AM, &quot;Dan Harkins&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:dharkins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; =C2=A0 The symmetry of dragonfly is a feature since the world=
 is not<br>
&gt; &gt; client-server<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; and it most certainly is not HTTP. For ad hoc, mesh and peer =
to peer<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; networking either side can initiate and both sides can initia=
te<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; simultaneously (while one of the messages will cross the ethe=
r before<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; other, both parties send the initial message and they view th=
emselves as<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; &quot;initiator&quot; in the protocol). To allow for password=
 authentication in<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; such<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; an environment a symmetric PAKE like dragonfly is necessary.<=
br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Or one can decide to go first.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 Yes, one can decide to go first. But if the other side decides =
to go<br>
&gt; first too then you need a protocol to settle who goes first. So let&#3=
9;s<br>
&gt; say you have this protocol to go first that runs before your augmented=
<br>
&gt; PAKE. That will require each side to possess the password and the<br>
&gt; verifier since the protocol to go first could pick one or the other. S=
o<br>
&gt; your losing this valuable (to you) feature in your augmented PAKE,<br>
&gt; reducing it to a balanced PAKE, and adding unnecessary complication<br=
>
&gt; in the form of the protocol to go first. That is a losing proposition.=
</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Maybe, maybe not. Remember dragonfly assumes ordered IDs. Hi=
gher ID goes first doesn&#39;t add rounds.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Balanced also doesn&#39;t mean symmetric.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; =C2=A0 Dragonfly handles the situation of simultaneous initia=
tion very well<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; as evidenced by its use in the 802.11 (and the open11s projec=
t which<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; uses a mesh daemon implementing dragonfly to authenticate oth=
er<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; mesh peers). The state machine is quite elegant, if I may say=
 so myself,<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; and is robust-- it got quite a bit of testing for the open11s=
 project.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; =C2=A0 Now, this draft in the CFRG is a generic description o=
f the exchange.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Instantiations of dragonfly for some particular protocol coul=
d add<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; the sender&#39;s identity-- MAC address, NAI, whatever-- to t=
he Confirm<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; message to prevent a reflection attack. But as a general desc=
ription of<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; the protocol that information is not available since no mediu=
m is used.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; The Confirm message is symmetric and the prevention of the at=
tack is<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; somewhat clunky (make sure what you received differs from wha=
t you<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; sent).<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Hidden in the above is the assumption that only one instance of t=
he<br>
&gt; &gt; dragonfly state machine runs between Alice and Bob.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; =C2=A0 All that said, I don&#39;t see the attack you mention.=
 It looks like one<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; of the exchanges will fail because it&#39;s a reflection atta=
ck and the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; other will either time out because it was just used to echo b=
ack<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; initial data to the other exchange or it will also fail due t=
o the<br>
&gt; &gt; reflection<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; attack check.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Alice to Eve: g^x.<br>
&gt; &gt; Eve causes Alice to instantiate a different dragonfly instance, l=
eading<br>
&gt; &gt; with g^x.<br>
&gt; &gt; Alice responds with g^y, which Eve relays over to the other conne=
ction.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Keeping a consistent global anti replay list solves this, but is =
a real<br>
&gt; &gt; pain point for implementations.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 Yes, the assumption in the draft was that if you&#39;re doing a=
 strict<br>
&gt; client-server instantiation then one side is always the client and one=
<br>
&gt; side is always the server. And if you&#39;re not doing client-server t=
hen<br>
&gt; you have a single state machine to handle both the initiation role<br>
&gt; and the responder role. That assumption is not explicit in the draft.<=
/p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">It should be. It also isn&#39;t sufficient: a client that ma=
kes two simultaneous connections to a server also falls to this attack.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">How many more assumptions like this are there? How many real=
 instantiations will violate these assumptions? Absent a reduction why shou=
ld I think we found them all? And why can&#39;t you use something more robu=
st?</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">Did the EAP draft discuss this issue?<br>
Was this discovered in 802.11s?<br>
It wasn&#39;t noticed in the TLS debate. I didn&#39;t notice it until this =
morning.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Dragonfly should be secure. It looks at first glance to be s=
ecure. But we don&#39;t know if it is secure. It has surprising properties =
that aren&#39;t documented in the draft.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">How certain are you of its security, and when you insist tha=
t it is secure, what do you mean?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Sincereley,<br>
Watson Ladd<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 Dan.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;</p>

--20cf303dd39e02f54504f19b7450--

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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 13:42:31 -0800
Thread-Topic: 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. -> Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. -> Re: I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
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David,

Thank you for the thoughtful position.

I to agree that  there should be a slight preference to have a 'proof' of s=
ecurity where possible.  However, the lack of a formal proof should not be =
considered a flaw.

Some of the text you have below might be worth squirreling away to  for use=
 in some future form of CFRG guidelines for recommendations.

Regards,

Paul



From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 5:02 AM
To: Paul Lambert
Cc: Watson Ladd; cfrg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. -> Re: [Cfrg] I-D Act=
ion: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt

HI Paul and Watson,

On 02/04/2014 03:05 AM, Paul Lambert wrote:



> A proof might be desirable but should not block the use of a proposed pro=
tocol.
> For example there is no adequate proof that integer factorization is "sec=
ure".
> This is not a reason to stop using RSA based algorithms.  The lack of
> a  complete security proof for draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt should no=
t
> stop it's use (in fact it's already in other standards that would benefit
> from the analysis and improvements of this group).

But there is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to RSA security. PKCS 1.5 ha=
d no proof, and got broken a few times. RSA has been intensively studied fo=
r decades, dragonfly hasn't. Slight variants of RSA (Rabin-Williams) are pr=
ovably reducible to factoring, an extensively studied problem for centuries=
.
You missed the point.  The difficulty of factoring as a problem to build se=
cure systems is not provable.
. . .


Paul, you are right that the computational cost of factoring the product of=
 two large primes is unknown, and there is no proof that it is hard.   But =
Watson also has a point, that the factoring problem is easily understood an=
d has been very well studied.   In particular, it has been more well studie=
d than the dragonfly security conjecture, whatever that conjecture is.   (H=
as it been isolated?)

At the end of the day, none of the crypto that we use is actually proven to=
 be unconditionally secure.  (I'm ignoring information theoretic security h=
ere, to make the discussion easier ;-)  It might be proven to be secure if =
factoring is hard, or if AES with a random secret key is indistinguishable =
from a random permutation, or under some other well-understood conjecture. =
  It is a major goal to reduce the number of conjectures that we need to re=
ly on, and to rely on conjectures that we have more confidence in.

I think we should prefer algorithms and protocols that rely only on well-un=
derstood conjectures.   I will hedge this statement, though, and say that t=
he security conjectures are just one factor in the decision making process.=
   For instance: the Blum Blum Shub (BBS) pseudorandom number generator is =
secure if factoring is hard, but we use AES or HMAC based PRNGs instead, be=
cause BBS would be *slow*.   Furthermore, it is quite possible that AES-CTR=
 is more secure than BBS; it may we be that we see advances in the state of=
 the art in factoring.



> Watson, in your technical analysis of the
> protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),
> can you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to
> the protocol?

Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in time 2^40. I can't exhib=
it it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.

Watson, can you quantify the claim of 2^40?

David


I will take your answer as a 'no' - you are unable to identify any exploita=
ble security flaw with draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt

Making such repeated and  adversarial negative pronouncements on a technica=
l topic without documentation or your own demonstrable analysis would be co=
nsidered by some to be unprofessional behavior.


Paul




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<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body bgcolor=3Dwhite lang=3DEN-US=
 link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:wi=
ndowtext'>David,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>Thank you for the thou=
ghtful position.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>I to agree that &nbsp;=
there should be a slight preference to have a &#8216;proof&#8217; of securi=
ty where possible.&nbsp; However, the lack of a formal proof should not be =
considered a flaw.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtex=
t'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>Some of the t=
ext you have below might be worth squirreling away to &nbsp;for use in some=
 future form of CFRG guidelines for recommendations.<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:windowtext'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";colo=
r:windowtext'>Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:1=
1.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>Paul<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:windowtext'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-=
serif";color:windowtext'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F=
497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-left:sol=
id blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;bor=
der-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color=
:windowtext'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"T=
ahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'> David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.co=
m] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 04, 2014 5:02 AM<br><b>To:</b> Paul L=
ambert<br><b>Cc:</b> Watson Ladd; cfrg@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: 2^40=
. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. -&gt; Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irt=
f-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>HI Paul and Watson,<br><b=
r>On 02/04/2014 03:05 AM, Paul Lambert wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquo=
te style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;=
padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-right:0in'><p>&gt; A pr=
oof might be desirable but should not block the use of a proposed protocol.=
<br>&gt; For example there is no adequate proof that integer factorization =
is &#8220;secure&#8221;.<br>&gt; This is not a reason to stop using RSA bas=
ed algorithms.&nbsp; The lack of<br>&gt; a &nbsp;complete security proof fo=
r draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt should not<br>&gt; stop it&#8217;s use (=
in fact it&#8217;s already in other standards that would benefit<br>&gt; fr=
om the analysis and improvements of this group).<o:p></o:p></p><p>But there=
 is a proof that OAEP has a reduction to RSA security. PKCS 1.5 had no proo=
f, and got broken a few times. RSA has been intensively studied for decades=
, dragonfly hasn't. Slight variants of RSA (Rabin-Williams) are provably re=
ducible to factoring, an extensively studied problem for centuries.<o:p></o=
:p></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>You missed the point. &nbsp;T=
he difficulty of factoring as a problem to build secure systems is not prov=
able. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>. . .<o:p></o:p>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></blockquote=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>Paul, you are right that the computational cost o=
f factoring the product of two large primes is unknown, and there is no pro=
of that it is hard.&nbsp;&nbsp; But Watson also has a point, that the facto=
ring problem is easily understood and has been very well studied.&nbsp;&nbs=
p; In particular, it has been more well studied than the dragonfly security=
 conjecture, whatever that conjecture is.&nbsp;&nbsp; (Has it been isolated=
?)<br><br>At the end of the day, none of the crypto that we use is actually=
 proven to be unconditionally secure.&nbsp; (I'm ignoring information theor=
etic security here, to make the discussion easier ;-)&nbsp; It might be pro=
ven to be secure if factoring is hard, or if AES with a random secret key i=
s indistinguishable from a random permutation, or under some other well-und=
erstood conjecture.&nbsp;&nbsp; It is a major goal to reduce the number of =
conjectures that we need to rely on, and to rely on conjectures that we hav=
e more confidence in.&nbsp; <br><br>I think we should prefer algorithms and=
 protocols that rely only on well-understood conjectures.&nbsp;&nbsp; I wil=
l hedge this statement, though, and say that the security conjectures are j=
ust one factor in the decision making process.&nbsp;&nbsp; For instance: th=
e Blum Blum Shub (BBS) pseudorandom number generator is secure if factoring=
 is hard, but we use AES or HMAC based PRNGs instead, because BBS would be =
*slow*.&nbsp;&nbsp; Furthermore, it is quite possible that AES-CTR is more =
secure than BBS; it may we be that we see advances in the state of the art =
in factoring.<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style=3D'border:none;bo=
rder-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;=
margin-right:0in'><p>&gt; Watson, in your technical analysis of the<br>&gt;=
 protocol in its current form (draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt),<br>&gt; c=
an you identify any exploitable security flaw specific to<br>&gt; the proto=
col?<o:p></o:p></p><p>Yes: an algorithm exists that guesses passwords in ti=
me 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists. JPAKE doesn't have this issue.<=
o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>Watson, can you quantif=
y the claim of 2^40?<br><br>David<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal>I will take your answer as a &#8216;no&#8217; - you are unable=
 to identify any exploitable security flaw with draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-0=
3.txt<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Making such repeated and &nbsp;adversarial ne=
gative pronouncements on a technical topic without documentation or your ow=
n demonstrable analysis would be considered by some to be unprofessional be=
havior. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal>Paul<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><br=
><br><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></body></html>=

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "rransom. 8774" <rransom.8774@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 14:06:41 -0800
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.
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From mike@shiftleft.org  Tue Feb  4 14:31:46 2014
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From: Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 14:31:44 -0800
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References: <20140203192451.6268.76511.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <7af2f9df96e5867d493c614806235363.squirrel@www.trepanning.net> <CACsn0cm1f-P95je5AbEbZ02Ut3+HM7Hx28P6j46TqE-=06eZDg@mail.gmail.com> <52F00EF3.3040505@cisco.com> <CACsn0c=zS5GKex3eF_hKgTsL1kH=TiBi3iAP9oMrJ9hDQcT4Gw@mail.gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B81B7DE5@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CACsn0cn0TaHsDkyN2ewOorxxBzXivCg=QGR-ZnBiC3nJhvhpRg@mail.gmail.com> <14AB44E0-4C90-4E4C-A656-885A31CF4C02@checkpoint.com> <CACsn0cmDT-FAN8uMZ0w8TX6GKPAZjnrexLeFQd7QhRfoY6AGFQ@mail.gmail.com> <75e1e853dc391b418062ee5e51adeb2f.squirrel@www.trepanning.net> <CABqy+sr7ZKrACj4Ga2_75d9Kea0aKbrp2P5fWWu4YZP53zijxw@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0cmS152wYQWHiX8ykzaMM=6b=r=fwVuLfPj_u0wmoq0jKw@mail.gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B81B7F7C@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.
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On Feb 4, 2014, at 2:06 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:

> >From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> >Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM
> =20
> >This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on =
reductions, which are=20
> >the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be shown to =
have no=20
> >other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof is =
forthcoming.
>=20
> When you say =91no other=92 you continue to imply that you have =
identified a realistic exploitable weakness. The difficulty in =
=91reducing=92 the Dragonfly proposal is not a exploitable flaw.  The =
changes necessary in protocol to allow a formal proof may in fact weaken =
the overall security of the protocol (reference below).
>=20
Does that reference actually show a case where provable security makes =
things weaker?  It looks from the abstract as though =93security loss=94 =
just means that you can=92t make the proof=92s bounds as tight as you=92d =
hope, at least for standard proof strategies.

Cheers,
=97 Mike=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><br><div><div>On Feb 4, 2014, at 2:06 PM, Paul =
Lambert &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@marvell.com">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div lang=3D"EN-US" =
link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;"><div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1;"><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif;"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
Tahoma, sans-serif;">&gt;From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; =
font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Cfrg [<a =
href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org" style=3D"color: purple; =
text-decoration: underline;">mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org</a>]<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b>On Behalf Of<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Watson =
Ladd<br><b>&gt;Sent:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Tuesday, February 04, 2014 =
12:12 PM<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;"><b><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, =
sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></b></div><p style=3D"margin-right: 0in; =
margin-left: 0in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif;"><span style=3D"">&gt;This attack is interesting because of the =
limits it puts on reductions, which are<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>&gt;the main tool for =
doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be shown to have no<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>&gt;other weaknesses =
this would be fine, but no such proof is =
forthcoming.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p style=3D"margin-right: 0in; =
margin-left: 0in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif;"><span style=3D"">When you say =91no other=92 you continue to =
imply that you have identified a realistic exploitable weakness. The =
difficulty in =91reducing=92 the Dragonfly proposal is not a exploitable =
flaw.&nbsp; The changes necessary in protocol to allow a formal proof =
may in fact weaken the overall security of the protocol (reference =
below).</span></p></div></div></blockquote><div style=3D"font-size: =
13px;">Does that reference actually show a case where provable security =
makes things weaker? &nbsp;It looks from the abstract as though =
=93security loss=94 just means that you can=92t make the proof=92s =
bounds as tight as you=92d hope, at least for standard proof =
strategies.</div><div style=3D"font-size: 13px;"><br></div><div =
style=3D"font-size: 13px;">Cheers,</div><div style=3D"font-size: =
13px;">=97 Mike</div></div></body></html>=

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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 15:43:56 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>, cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.
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On Feb 4, 2014 2:06 PM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> >From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> >Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM
>
>
>
> >This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on reductions,
which are
> >the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be shown to
have no
> >other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof is forthcoming.
>
> When you say =E2=80=98no other=E2=80=99 you continue to imply that you ha=
ve identified a
realistic exploitable weakness. The difficulty in =E2=80=98reducing=E2=80=
=99 the Dragonfly
proposal is not a exploitable flaw.  The changes necessary in protocol to
allow a formal proof may in fact weaken the overall security of the
protocol (reference below).

The paper below claims no such thing. I am claiming that there is a
weakness in standard model security for dragonfly,  not that there is an
exploitable flaw.

In fact tight reductions are possible, despite your claim otherwise.
>
>
>
>                         On the Security Loss in Cryptographic Reductions
>
> Proceeding: EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International
Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications
Cryptographic Techniques
>
> Pages 72 - 87
>
> Almost all the important cryptographic protocols we have today base their
security on unproven assumptions, which all imply NP $\ne$ P, and thus
having unconditional proofs of their security seems far beyond our reach.
One research effort then is to identify more basic primitives and prove the
security of these protocols by reductions to the security of these
primitives. However, in doing so, one often observes some security loss in
the form that the security of the protocols is measured against weaker
adversaries, e.g., adversaries with a smaller running time. Is such a
security loss avoidable? We study two of the most basic cryptographic
reductions: hardness amplification of one-way functions and constructing
pseudorandom generators from one-way functions. We show that when they are
done in a certain black-box way, such a security loss is in fact
unavoidable.
>
>
>
>
>
> Your adamancy to make up issues with Dragonfly seems to imply you feel
this is a =E2=80=98down selection=E2=80=99 between multiple protocols.  It =
is not.  TLS is
one possible application, but the Dragonfly protocol was written in a
generic manner to specifically allow the analysis independent of the target
application.  Other schemes would be viable for TLS and I would strongly
support publication and review of multiple password protocol  alternatives
for TLS.
>

I am not "making up issues". I simply think that when a protocol goes into
an RFC it gets used. And that means we should be careful with the protocols
we publish.

Which alternative do you think TLS should use?
>
>
> The Dragonfly protocol has been in other standards act ivies for quite a
few years (usually called  SAE).  The review in this forum has improved
side channel security.  Your suggestions for other TLS solutions should not
block the analysis of this protocol if it is secure.  Making sure we have
clarity on the actual security of a fielded solution in critical and we
should be professional and correct in our analysis.  Mesh networking
networks are using SAE (aka Dragonfly).  Other consumer oriented
applications will appear based on the analysis that the protocol has no
exploitable weakness.
>
>

Not our problem. We are the IETF not the consumer electronics board.
Analyse it yourself. Or wait for someone else to do so. Or pay.

>
> Do also note that the  IPR disclosures for AugPAKE that you advocate have
limitations and are constrained to the IETF and TLS.  AugPAKE is completely
unacceptable for any broader application in consumer equipment (IMHO).
There are many engineering criteria to balance in the section of
appropriate algorithms for the industry.  Support of =E2=80=98reductions=E2=
=80=99 for a
formal proof are way down the list in my priorities.  I see that we
disagree on this point, and hope that you would look at the broader set of
industry requirements  and tone down your rhetoric.  If you continue to
have objections, please be clear and correct with the analysis.  You still
owe the group a clarification or a retraction on your claimed  2^40th
attack on Dragonfly.
>

It's a foundations of hashing style attack: utterly impractical but
theoretically important.

Why don't you list the requirements, and we'll come up with a protocol that
meets them?

What about being secure against reflection attacks or being well studied?

Of course I thought we were here to support the IETF. Still, this explains
WEP: marvel does not have a single cryptographer reviewing standards
submissions and expects it to be done by the community.
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM
> To: rransom. 8774; cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
>
>
>
>
> On Feb 4, 2014 11:41 AM, "Robert Ransom" <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
> >
> > >   This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonfly as an EAP
> > > method), knowledge of r where PE =3D r * G can enable a dictionary
> > > attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarithm. A
discrete
> > > logarithm is assumed to be "computationally infeasible" and you're
talking
> > > about doing 2^40 of them!?!
> >
> > <http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform> is relevant here.  It
> > discusses several other =E2=80=98attacks=E2=80=99 of this general type,=
 and explains
> > why they should not be taken seriously.
>
> Bernstein actually argues that one should define complexity measures to
exclude such attacks. This is clear in the paper. Unfortunately time memory
product for the weak password variation is only 2^40.
>
> The problem with foundations of hashing usually isn't a real problem: one
can sign r,H (r, m) with r random to bypass it.
>
> This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on reductions,
which are the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be shown
to have no other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof is
forthcoming.
>
> Such a proof would be in the ROM, but as the IETF 88 slides show it would
be tricky.
> >
> >
> > Robert Ransom

--20cf3040edbaa9e35104f19d36d0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Feb 4, 2014 2:06 PM, &quot;Paul Lambert&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul=
@marvell.com">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-b=
ounces@irtf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd<br>
&gt; &gt;Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on reduct=
ions, which are <br>
&gt; &gt;the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be shown =
to have no <br>
&gt; &gt;other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof is forthcom=
ing.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; When you say =E2=80=98no other=E2=80=99 you continue to imply that you=
 have identified a realistic exploitable weakness. The difficulty in =E2=80=
=98reducing=E2=80=99 the Dragonfly proposal is not a exploitable flaw.=C2=
=A0 The changes necessary in protocol to allow a formal proof may in fact w=
eaken the overall security of the protocol (reference below).</p>

<p dir=3D"ltr">The paper below claims no such thing. I am claiming that the=
re is a weakness in standard model security for dragonfly,=C2=A0 not that t=
here is an exploitable flaw.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">In fact tight reductions are possible, despite your claim ot=
herwise.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 On th=
e Security Loss in Cryptographic Reductions<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Proceeding: EUROCRYPT &#39;09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual Internati=
onal Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications Cryp=
tographic Techniques<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Pages 72 - 87<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Almost all the important cryptographic protocols we have today base th=
eir security on unproven assumptions, which all imply NP $\ne$ P, and thus =
having unconditional proofs of their security seems far beyond our reach. O=
ne research effort then is to identify more basic primitives and prove the =
security of these protocols by reductions to the security of these primitiv=
es. However, in doing so, one often observes some security loss in the form=
 that the security of the protocols is measured against weaker adversaries,=
 e.g., adversaries with a smaller running time. Is such a security loss avo=
idable? We study two of the most basic cryptographic reductions: hardness a=
mplification of one-way functions and constructing pseudorandom generators =
from one-way functions. We show that when they are done in a certain black-=
box way, such a security loss is in fact unavoidable.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Your adamancy to make up issues with Dragonfly seems to imply you feel=
 this is a =E2=80=98down selection=E2=80=99 between multiple protocols.=C2=
=A0 It is not.=C2=A0 TLS is one possible application, but the Dragonfly pro=
tocol was written in a generic manner to specifically allow the analysis in=
dependent of the target application.=C2=A0 Other schemes would be viable fo=
r TLS and I would strongly support publication and review of multiple passw=
ord protocol=C2=A0 alternatives for TLS.<br>

&gt;</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">I am not &quot;making up issues&quot;. I simply think that w=
hen a protocol goes into an RFC it gets used. And that means we should be c=
areful with the protocols we publish.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Which alternative do you think TLS should use?<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The Dragonfly protocol has been in other standards act ivies for quite=
 a few years (usually called=C2=A0 SAE).=C2=A0 The review in this forum has=
 improved side channel security.=C2=A0 Your suggestions for other TLS solut=
ions should not block the analysis of this protocol if it is secure.=C2=A0 =
Making sure we have clarity on the actual security of a fielded solution in=
 critical and we should be professional and correct in our analysis.=C2=A0 =
Mesh networking networks are using SAE (aka Dragonfly).=C2=A0 Other consume=
r oriented applications will appear based on the analysis that the protocol=
 has no exploitable weakness.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Not our problem. We are the IETF not the consumer electronic=
s board. Analyse it yourself. Or wait for someone else to do so. Or pay.</p=
>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt;<br>
&gt; Do also note that the=C2=A0 IPR disclosures for AugPAKE that you advoc=
ate have limitations and are constrained to the IETF and TLS.=C2=A0 AugPAKE=
 is completely unacceptable for any broader application in consumer equipme=
nt (IMHO).=C2=A0 There are many engineering criteria to balance in the sect=
ion of appropriate algorithms for the industry.=C2=A0 Support of =E2=80=98r=
eductions=E2=80=99 for a formal proof are way down the list in my prioritie=
s.=C2=A0 I see that we disagree on this point, and hope that you would look=
 at the broader set of industry requirements=C2=A0 and tone down your rheto=
ric.=C2=A0 If you continue to have objections, please be clear and correct =
with the analysis.=C2=A0 You still owe the group a clarification or a retra=
ction on your claimed=C2=A0 2^40th attack on Dragonfly.<br>

&gt;</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">It&#39;s a foundations of hashing style attack: utterly impr=
actical but theoretically important.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Why don&#39;t you list the requirements, and we&#39;ll come =
up with a protocol that meets them?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">What about being secure against reflection attacks or being =
well studied?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Of course I thought we were here to support the IETF. Still,=
 this explains WEP: marvel does not have a single cryptographer reviewing s=
tandards submissions and expects it to be done by the community.<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Paul<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; From: Cfrg [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-bounc=
es@irtf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd<br>
&gt; Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM<br>
&gt; To: rransom. 8774; <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><=
br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Feb 4, 2014 11:41 AM, &quot;Robert Ransom&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:rransom.8774@gmail.com">rransom.8774@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dharkins@lounge.org"=
>dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; =C2=A0 This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonf=
ly as an EAP<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; method), knowledge of r where PE =3D r * G can enable a dict=
ionary<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarit=
hm. A discrete<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; logarithm is assumed to be &quot;computationally infeasible&=
quot; and you&#39;re talking<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; about doing 2^40 of them!?!<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &lt;<a href=3D"http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform">http://cr.=
yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform</a>&gt; is relevant here. =C2=A0It<br>
&gt; &gt; discusses several other =E2=80=98attacks=E2=80=99 of this general=
 type, and explains<br>
&gt; &gt; why they should not be taken seriously.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Bernstein actually argues that one should define complexity measures t=
o exclude such attacks. This is clear in the paper. Unfortunately time memo=
ry product for the weak password variation is only 2^40.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The problem with foundations of hashing usually isn&#39;t a real probl=
em: one can sign r,H (r, m) with r random to bypass it.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on reductions=
, which are the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be sho=
wn to have no other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof is for=
thcoming.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; Such a proof would be in the ROM, but as the IETF 88 slides show it wo=
uld be tricky.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Robert Ransom</p>

--20cf3040edbaa9e35104f19d36d0--

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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 16:45:54 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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On Tue, February 4, 2014 1:37 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Feb 4, 2014 1:03 PM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, February 4, 2014 12:03 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> > On Feb 4, 2014 11:51 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>> >>   The symmetry of dragonfly is a feature since the world is not
>> > client-server
>> >> and it most certainly is not HTTP. For ad hoc, mesh and peer to peer
>> >> networking either side can initiate and both sides can initiate
>> >> simultaneously (while one of the messages will cross the ether before
>> >> the
>> >> other, both parties send the initial message and they view themselves
> as
>> >> "initiator" in the protocol). To allow for password authentication in
>> >> such
>> >> an environment a symmetric PAKE like dragonfly is necessary.
>> >
>> > Or one can decide to go first.
>>
>>   Yes, one can decide to go first. But if the other side decides to go
>> first too then you need a protocol to settle who goes first. So let's
>> say you have this protocol to go first that runs before your augmented
>> PAKE. That will require each side to possess the password and the
>> verifier since the protocol to go first could pick one or the other. So
>> your losing this valuable (to you) feature in your augmented PAKE,
>> reducing it to a balanced PAKE, and adding unnecessary complication
>> in the form of the protocol to go first. That is a losing proposition.
>
> Maybe, maybe not. Remember dragonfly assumes ordered IDs. Higher ID goes
> first doesn't add rounds.

  Not sure where you got that assumption. But if the ID is conveyed in the
protocol you have a serious chicken-and-egg issue since someone has to
"go first" to find out who goes first. For a protocol like IKE this would not
work either because IKE is initiated because some IP packet got a hit in
the SPD and there's no SA to process it. If that happened on an IKE peer
that had a "lower ID" then all packets would be dropped. Not good.

> Balanced also doesn't mean symmetric.
>>
>> >>   Dragonfly handles the situation of simultaneous initiation very
>> well
>> >> as evidenced by its use in the 802.11 (and the open11s project which
>> >> uses a mesh daemon implementing dragonfly to authenticate other
>> >> mesh peers). The state machine is quite elegant, if I may say so
> myself,
>> >> and is robust-- it got quite a bit of testing for the open11s
>> project.
>> >>
>> >>   Now, this draft in the CFRG is a generic description of the
>> exchange.
>> >> Instantiations of dragonfly for some particular protocol could add
>> >> the sender's identity-- MAC address, NAI, whatever-- to the Confirm
>> >> message to prevent a reflection attack. But as a general description
>> of
>> >> the protocol that information is not available since no medium is
>> used.
>> >> The Confirm message is symmetric and the prevention of the attack is
>> >> somewhat clunky (make sure what you received differs from what you
>> >> sent).
>> >
>> > Hidden in the above is the assumption that only one instance of the
>> > dragonfly state machine runs between Alice and Bob.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>   All that said, I don't see the attack you mention. It looks like
>> one
>> >> of the exchanges will fail because it's a reflection attack and the
>> >> other will either time out because it was just used to echo back
>> >> initial data to the other exchange or it will also fail due to the
>> > reflection
>> >> attack check.
>> >
>> > Alice to Eve: g^x.
>> > Eve causes Alice to instantiate a different dragonfly instance,
>> leading
>> > with g^x.
>> > Alice responds with g^y, which Eve relays over to the other
>> connection.
>> >
>> > Keeping a consistent global anti replay list solves this, but is a
>> real
>> > pain point for implementations.
>>
>>   Yes, the assumption in the draft was that if you're doing a strict
>> client-server instantiation then one side is always the client and one
>> side is always the server. And if you're not doing client-server then
>> you have a single state machine to handle both the initiation role
>> and the responder role. That assumption is not explicit in the draft.
>
> It should be. It also isn't sufficient: a client that makes two
> simultaneous connections to a server also falls to this attack.

  You bring up a good point so I should probably be more explicit but
something tells me you don't really care. You're just throwing bombs.
(And I say that as an experienced bomb thrower).

> How many more assumptions like this are there? How many real
> instantiations
> will violate these assumptions? Absent a reduction why should I think we
> found them all? And why can't you use something more robust?

  As I stated, this is a generic definition. The actual instantiations of
dragonfly are not susceptible to this kind of attack because they
produce a different password element with each run of the protocol
and because they follow the assumptions that I have poorly stated
in this generic definition (since I wrote all the actual instantiations).

  I will address this in a next version of the I-D so that if someone
were to take this generic protocol statement and instantiate it for the
Foo protocol it will be done correctly. Thank you for helping me
to further refine and improve the language in this document. It will
be more clear because of your help.

  Dan.





From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Tue Feb  4 17:20:17 2014
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Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 17:20:12 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fun with Alice and Bob
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On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 4:45 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, February 4, 2014 1:37 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On Feb 4, 2014 1:03 PM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, February 4, 2014 12:03 pm, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>> > On Feb 4, 2014 11:51 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>>> >>   The symmetry of dragonfly is a feature since the world is not
>>> > client-server
>>> >> and it most certainly is not HTTP. For ad hoc, mesh and peer to peer
>>> >> networking either side can initiate and both sides can initiate
>>> >> simultaneously (while one of the messages will cross the ether before
>>> >> the
>>> >> other, both parties send the initial message and they view themselves
>> as
>>> >> "initiator" in the protocol). To allow for password authentication in
>>> >> such
>>> >> an environment a symmetric PAKE like dragonfly is necessary.
>>> >
>>> > Or one can decide to go first.
>>>
>>>   Yes, one can decide to go first. But if the other side decides to go
>>> first too then you need a protocol to settle who goes first. So let's
>>> say you have this protocol to go first that runs before your augmented
>>> PAKE. That will require each side to possess the password and the
>>> verifier since the protocol to go first could pick one or the other. So
>>> your losing this valuable (to you) feature in your augmented PAKE,
>>> reducing it to a balanced PAKE, and adding unnecessary complication
>>> in the form of the protocol to go first. That is a losing proposition.
>>
>> Maybe, maybe not. Remember dragonfly assumes ordered IDs. Higher ID goes
>> first doesn't add rounds.
>
>   Not sure where you got that assumption. But if the ID is conveyed in the
> protocol you have a serious chicken-and-egg issue since someone has to
> "go first" to find out who goes first. For a protocol like IKE this would not
> work either because IKE is initiated because some IP packet got a hit in
> the SPD and there's no SA to process it. If that happened on an IKE peer
> that had a "lower ID" then all packets would be dropped. Not good.

Other than the draft using min and max on IDs? We need to distinguish
the password elements
of different pairs of nodes to avoid A and B negotiating a key with
each other instead of with C
as they both think.

Lower ID could initiate: the idea would be that the higher ID node
would, once it starts initiating,
not respond to a lower ID invitation.

>
>> Balanced also doesn't mean symmetric.
>>>
>>> >>   Dragonfly handles the situation of simultaneous initiation very
>>> well
>>> >> as evidenced by its use in the 802.11 (and the open11s project which
>>> >> uses a mesh daemon implementing dragonfly to authenticate other
>>> >> mesh peers). The state machine is quite elegant, if I may say so
>> myself,
>>> >> and is robust-- it got quite a bit of testing for the open11s
>>> project.
>>> >>
>>> >>   Now, this draft in the CFRG is a generic description of the
>>> exchange.
>>> >> Instantiations of dragonfly for some particular protocol could add
>>> >> the sender's identity-- MAC address, NAI, whatever-- to the Confirm
>>> >> message to prevent a reflection attack. But as a general description
>>> of
>>> >> the protocol that information is not available since no medium is
>>> used.
>>> >> The Confirm message is symmetric and the prevention of the attack is
>>> >> somewhat clunky (make sure what you received differs from what you
>>> >> sent).
>>> >
>>> > Hidden in the above is the assumption that only one instance of the
>>> > dragonfly state machine runs between Alice and Bob.
>>> >
>>> >>
>>> >>   All that said, I don't see the attack you mention. It looks like
>>> one
>>> >> of the exchanges will fail because it's a reflection attack and the
>>> >> other will either time out because it was just used to echo back
>>> >> initial data to the other exchange or it will also fail due to the
>>> > reflection
>>> >> attack check.
>>> >
>>> > Alice to Eve: g^x.
>>> > Eve causes Alice to instantiate a different dragonfly instance,
>>> leading
>>> > with g^x.
>>> > Alice responds with g^y, which Eve relays over to the other
>>> connection.
>>> >
>>> > Keeping a consistent global anti replay list solves this, but is a
>>> real
>>> > pain point for implementations.
>>>
>>>   Yes, the assumption in the draft was that if you're doing a strict
>>> client-server instantiation then one side is always the client and one
>>> side is always the server. And if you're not doing client-server then
>>> you have a single state machine to handle both the initiation role
>>> and the responder role. That assumption is not explicit in the draft.
>>
>> It should be. It also isn't sufficient: a client that makes two
>> simultaneous connections to a server also falls to this attack.
>
>   You bring up a good point so I should probably be more explicit but
> something tells me you don't really care. You're just throwing bombs.
> (And I say that as an experienced bomb thrower).

If you fix those problems, then dragonfly has a security reduction in
the ROM to something somewhat
reasonable. I only discovered this a few minutes ago.

In the ROM we have independent PE's p_{ij} between each pair of nodes
a_i and a_j. Therefore, we can focus on
a given pair A and B with generator g.

Both nodes will strictly alternate between sending g^x for random x
and the confirmation key for the exchange they
just underwent.

The attacker wins if they can learn anything about the key, or cause A
to think that it confirmed with B and B doesn't think so.

The problem of course is the independence assumption is completely
false in the standard model, and the restrictions
on usage really nasty for most protocols. The problem I reduced it to
isn't yet computational, and so we still have work to do.
It also isn't clear how strong it is. Let me write it up and see if it
actually is correct.

Anyway, given this reduction being correct, and some text explaining
the protocol restrictions, I think I don't have any objections to the
protocol.

>
>> How many more assumptions like this are there? How many real
>> instantiations
>> will violate these assumptions? Absent a reduction why should I think we
>> found them all? And why can't you use something more robust?
>
>   As I stated, this is a generic definition. The actual instantiations of
> dragonfly are not susceptible to this kind of attack because they
> produce a different password element with each run of the protocol
> and because they follow the assumptions that I have poorly stated
> in this generic definition (since I wrote all the actual instantiations).
>
>   I will address this in a next version of the I-D so that if someone
> were to take this generic protocol statement and instantiate it for the
> Foo protocol it will be done correctly. Thank you for helping me
> to further refine and improve the language in this document. It will
> be more clear because of your help.
>
>   Dan.
>
>
>
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: [Cfrg] publishing dragonfly (was: Re:  2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.)
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On 02/04/2014 06:43 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>
> On Feb 4, 2014 2:06 PM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com 
> <mailto:paul@marvell.com>> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > >From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org 
> <mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org>] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> > >Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM
> >
> >
> >
> > >This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on 
> reductions, which are
> > >the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly could be shown 
> to have no
> > >other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof is forthcoming.
> >
> > When you say 'no other' you continue to imply that you have 
> identified a realistic exploitable weakness. The difficulty in 
> 'reducing' the Dragonfly proposal is not a exploitable flaw. The 
> changes necessary in protocol to allow a formal proof may in fact 
> weaken the overall security of the protocol (reference below).
>
> The paper below claims no such thing. I am claiming that there is a 
> weakness in standard model security for dragonfly,  not that there is 
> an exploitable flaw.
>
> In fact tight reductions are possible, despite your claim otherwise.
> >
> >
> >
> >                         On the Security Loss in Cryptographic Reductions
> >
> > Proceeding: EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual 
> International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and 
> Applications Cryptographic Techniques
> >
> > Pages 72 - 87
> >
> > Almost all the important cryptographic protocols we have today base 
> their security on unproven assumptions, which all imply NP $\ne$ P, 
> and thus having unconditional proofs of their security seems far 
> beyond our reach. One research effort then is to identify more basic 
> primitives and prove the security of these protocols by reductions to 
> the security of these primitives. However, in doing so, one often 
> observes some security loss in the form that the security of the 
> protocols is measured against weaker adversaries, e.g., adversaries 
> with a smaller running time. Is such a security loss avoidable? We 
> study two of the most basic cryptographic reductions: hardness 
> amplification of one-way functions and constructing pseudorandom 
> generators from one-way functions. We show that when they are done in 
> a certain black-box way, such a security loss is in fact unavoidable.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Your adamancy to make up issues with Dragonfly seems to imply you 
> feel this is a 'down selection' between multiple protocols.  It is 
> not.  TLS is one possible application, but the Dragonfly protocol was 
> written in a generic manner to specifically allow the analysis 
> independent of the target application.  Other schemes would be viable 
> for TLS and I would strongly support publication and review of 
> multiple password protocol  alternatives for TLS.
> >
>
> I am not "making up issues". I simply think that when a protocol goes 
> into an RFC it gets used. And that means we should be careful with the 
> protocols we publish.
>

There are plenty of RFCs that specify things that are rarely used. For 
instance, CAST-128, CAST-256, and RC5 were defined in RFCs, yet never 
saw significant use in the Internet.   Anyway, my understanding is that 
Dragonfly is already in use, as Paul describes below.

It makes sense for CFRG to publish an RFC that describes how it can be 
implemented in a way that avoids timing attacks,  and that documents 
security considerations around its use, including considerations around 
the lack of a proof of security.   In the past, some people have been 
very vocal in their criticism of the dragonfly draft for *not* 
containing these things.   It is just not a credible suggestion to ask 
that the draft not be improved, and that the changes to the draft not 
get review from this list.

Instead of trying to prevent the publication or review of improved 
versions of the draft, you should suggest changes and additions to the 
draft that describe the issues that you have found.   If you suggest 
text that the RG agrees with, it will end up in the draft, and you will 
have made your points.

> Which alternative do you think TLS should use?
> >
> >
> > The Dragonfly protocol has been in other standards act ivies for 
> quite a few years (usually called  SAE).  The review in this forum has 
> improved side channel security.  Your suggestions for other TLS 
> solutions should not block the analysis of this protocol if it is 
> secure.  Making sure we have clarity on the actual security of a 
> fielded solution in critical and we should be professional and correct 
> in our analysis.  Mesh networking networks are using SAE (aka 
> Dragonfly).  Other consumer oriented applications will appear based on 
> the analysis that the protocol has no exploitable weakness.
> >
> >
>
> Not our problem. We are the IETF not the consumer electronics board.
>

CFRG is the IRTF, not the IETF.

> Analyse it yourself. Or wait for someone else to do so. Or pay.
>
> >
> > Do also note that the  IPR disclosures for AugPAKE that you advocate 
> have limitations and are constrained to the IETF and TLS.  AugPAKE is 
> completely unacceptable for any broader application in consumer 
> equipment (IMHO).  There are many engineering criteria to balance in 
> the section of appropriate algorithms for the industry.  Support of 
> 'reductions' for a formal proof are way down the list in my 
> priorities.  I see that we disagree on this point, and hope that you 
> would look at the broader set of industry requirements  and tone down 
> your rhetoric.  If you continue to have objections, please be clear 
> and correct with the analysis.  You still owe the group a 
> clarification or a retraction on your claimed  2^40th attack on Dragonfly.
> >
>
> It's a foundations of hashing style attack: utterly impractical but 
> theoretically important.
>
> Why don't you list the requirements, and we'll come up with a protocol 
> that meets them?
>
> What about being secure against reflection attacks or being well studied?
>
> Of course I thought we were here to support the IETF. Still, this 
> explains WEP: marvel does not have a single cryptographer reviewing 
> standards submissions and expects it to be done by the community.
>

This slap at Paul and Marvel is not OK.   Discussion on the list needs 
to stick to technical substance and be polite.

David


> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> >
> >
> > Paul
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org 
> <mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org>] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> > Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM
> > To: rransom. 8774; cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:cfrg@irtf.org>
> > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Feb 4, 2014 11:41 AM, "Robert Ransom" <rransom.8774@gmail.com 
> <mailto:rransom.8774@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org 
> <mailto:dharkins@lounge.org>> wrote:
> > >
> > > >   This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931 (dragonfly as an EAP
> > > > method), knowledge of r where PE = r * G can enable a dictionary
> > > > attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a discrete logarithm. 
> A discrete
> > > > logarithm is assumed to be "computationally infeasible" and 
> you're talking
> > > > about doing 2^40 of them!?!
> > >
> > > <http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform> is relevant here.  It
> > > discusses several other 'attacks' of this general type, and explains
> > > why they should not be taken seriously.
> >
> > Bernstein actually argues that one should define complexity measures 
> to exclude such attacks. This is clear in the paper. Unfortunately 
> time memory product for the weak password variation is only 2^40.
> >
> > The problem with foundations of hashing usually isn't a real 
> problem: one can sign r,H (r, m) with r random to bypass it.
> >
> > This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on 
> reductions, which are the main tool for doing cryptography. If 
> dragonfly could be shown to have no other weaknesses this would be 
> fine, but no such proof is forthcoming.
> >
> > Such a proof would be in the ROM, but as the IETF 88 slides show it 
> would be tricky.
> > >
> > >
> > > Robert Ransom
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 02/04/2014 06:43 PM, Watson Ladd
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=a5PvZOZgVRjHaJ2avGCPHF6b6nOpNh+iT0909X-jUFA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=ISO-8859-1">
      <p dir="ltr"><br>
        On Feb 4, 2014 2:06 PM, "Paul Lambert" &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul@marvell.com">paul@marvell.com</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &gt;From: Cfrg [mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-bounces@irtf.org</a>]
        On Behalf Of Watson Ladd<br>
        &gt; &gt;Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &gt;This attack is interesting because of the limits it
        puts on reductions, which are <br>
        &gt; &gt;the main tool for doing cryptography. If dragonfly
        could be shown to have no <br>
        &gt; &gt;other weaknesses this would be fine, but no such proof
        is forthcoming.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; When you say &#8216;no other&#8217; you continue to imply that you have
        identified a realistic exploitable weakness. The difficulty in
        &#8216;reducing&#8217; the Dragonfly proposal is not a exploitable flaw.&nbsp;
        The changes necessary in protocol to allow a formal proof may in
        fact weaken the overall security of the protocol (reference
        below).</p>
      <p dir="ltr">The paper below claims no such thing. I am claiming
        that there is a weakness in standard model security for
        dragonfly,&nbsp; not that there is an exploitable flaw.</p>
      <p dir="ltr">In fact tight reductions are possible, despite your
        claim otherwise.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On the Security Loss in
        Cryptographic Reductions<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Proceeding: EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual
        International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory
        and Applications Cryptographic Techniques<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Pages 72 - 87<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Almost all the important cryptographic protocols we have
        today base their security on unproven assumptions, which all
        imply NP $\ne$ P, and thus having unconditional proofs of their
        security seems far beyond our reach. One research effort then is
        to identify more basic primitives and prove the security of
        these protocols by reductions to the security of these
        primitives. However, in doing so, one often observes some
        security loss in the form that the security of the protocols is
        measured against weaker adversaries, e.g., adversaries with a
        smaller running time. Is such a security loss avoidable? We
        study two of the most basic cryptographic reductions: hardness
        amplification of one-way functions and constructing pseudorandom
        generators from one-way functions. We show that when they are
        done in a certain black-box way, such a security loss is in fact
        unavoidable.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Your adamancy to make up issues with Dragonfly seems to
        imply you feel this is a &#8216;down selection&#8217; between multiple
        protocols.&nbsp; It is not.&nbsp; TLS is one possible application, but the
        Dragonfly protocol was written in a generic manner to
        specifically allow the analysis independent of the target
        application.&nbsp; Other schemes would be viable for TLS and I would
        strongly support publication and review of multiple password
        protocol&nbsp; alternatives for TLS.<br>
        &gt;</p>
      <p dir="ltr">I am not "making up issues". I simply think that when
        a protocol goes into an RFC it gets used. And that means we
        should be careful with the protocols we publish.</p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    There are plenty of RFCs that specify things that are rarely used.&nbsp;&nbsp;
    For instance, CAST-128, CAST-256, and RC5 were defined in RFCs, yet
    never saw significant use in the Internet.&nbsp;&nbsp; Anyway, my
    understanding is that Dragonfly is already in use, as Paul describes
    below.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    It makes sense for CFRG to publish an RFC that describes how it can
    be implemented in a way that avoids timing attacks,&nbsp; and that
    documents security considerations around its use, including
    considerations around the lack of a proof of security.&nbsp;&nbsp; In the
    past, some people have been very vocal in their criticism of the
    dragonfly draft for *not* containing these things.&nbsp;&nbsp; It is just not
    a credible suggestion to ask that the draft not be improved, and
    that the changes to the draft not get review from this list.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    Instead of trying to prevent the publication or review of improved
    versions of the draft, you should suggest changes and additions to
    the draft that describe the issues that you have found.&nbsp;&nbsp; If you
    suggest text that the RG agrees with, it will end up in the draft,
    and you will have made your points.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=a5PvZOZgVRjHaJ2avGCPHF6b6nOpNh+iT0909X-jUFA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <p dir="ltr">Which alternative do you think TLS should use?<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; The Dragonfly protocol has been in other standards act
        ivies for quite a few years (usually called&nbsp; SAE).&nbsp; The review
        in this forum has improved side channel security.&nbsp; Your
        suggestions for other TLS solutions should not block the
        analysis of this protocol if it is secure.&nbsp; Making sure we have
        clarity on the actual security of a fielded solution in critical
        and we should be professional and correct in our analysis.&nbsp; Mesh
        networking networks are using SAE (aka Dragonfly).&nbsp; Other
        consumer oriented applications will appear based on the analysis
        that the protocol has no exploitable weakness.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;</p>
      <p dir="ltr">Not our problem. We are the IETF not the consumer
        electronics board. </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    CFRG is the IRTF, not the IETF.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=a5PvZOZgVRjHaJ2avGCPHF6b6nOpNh+iT0909X-jUFA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <p dir="ltr">Analyse it yourself. Or wait for someone else to do
        so. Or pay.</p>
      <p dir="ltr">&gt;<br>
        &gt; Do also note that the&nbsp; IPR disclosures for AugPAKE that you
        advocate have limitations and are constrained to the IETF and
        TLS.&nbsp; AugPAKE is completely unacceptable for any broader
        application in consumer equipment (IMHO).&nbsp; There are many
        engineering criteria to balance in the section of appropriate
        algorithms for the industry.&nbsp; Support of &#8216;reductions&#8217; for a
        formal proof are way down the list in my priorities.&nbsp; I see that
        we disagree on this point, and hope that you would look at the
        broader set of industry requirements&nbsp; and tone down your
        rhetoric.&nbsp; If you continue to have objections, please be clear
        and correct with the analysis.&nbsp; You still owe the group a
        clarification or a retraction on your claimed&nbsp; 2^40th attack on
        Dragonfly.<br>
        &gt;</p>
      <p dir="ltr">It's a foundations of hashing style attack: utterly
        impractical but theoretically important.</p>
      <p dir="ltr">Why don't you list the requirements, and we'll come
        up with a protocol that meets them?</p>
      <p dir="ltr">What about being secure against reflection attacks or
        being well studied?</p>
      <p dir="ltr">Of course I thought we were here to support the IETF.
        Still, this explains WEP: marvel does not have a single
        cryptographer reviewing standards submissions and expects it to
        be done by the community.<br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This slap at Paul and Marvel is not OK.&nbsp;&nbsp; Discussion on the list
    needs to stick to technical substance and be polite.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0c=a5PvZOZgVRjHaJ2avGCPHF6b6nOpNh+iT0909X-jUFA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <p dir="ltr">
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Thanks,<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Paul<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; From: Cfrg [mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">cfrg-bounces@irtf.org</a>]
        On Behalf Of Watson Ladd<br>
        &gt; Sent: Tuesday, February 04, 2014 12:12 PM<br>
        &gt; To: rransom. 8774; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
        &gt; Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action:
        draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03.txt<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; &nbsp;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; On Feb 4, 2014 11:41 AM, "Robert Ransom" &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:rransom.8774@gmail.com">rransom.8774@gmail.com</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt; &gt;<br>
        &gt; &gt; On 2/4/14, Dan Harkins &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="mailto:dharkins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt; &gt;<br>
        &gt; &gt; &gt; &nbsp; This is mentioned in section 6.3 of RFC 5931
        (dragonfly as an EAP<br>
        &gt; &gt; &gt; method), knowledge of r where PE = r * G can
        enable a dictionary<br>
        &gt; &gt; &gt; attack. But knowledge of r requires doing a
        discrete logarithm. A discrete<br>
        &gt; &gt; &gt; logarithm is assumed to be "computationally
        infeasible" and you're talking<br>
        &gt; &gt; &gt; about doing 2^40 of them!?!<br>
        &gt; &gt;<br>
        &gt; &gt; &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform">http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#nonuniform</a>&gt;
        is relevant here. &nbsp;It<br>
        &gt; &gt; discusses several other &#8216;attacks&#8217; of this general
        type, and explains<br>
        &gt; &gt; why they should not be taken seriously.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Bernstein actually argues that one should define complexity
        measures to exclude such attacks. This is clear in the paper.
        Unfortunately time memory product for the weak password
        variation is only 2^40.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; The problem with foundations of hashing usually isn't a
        real problem: one can sign r,H (r, m) with r random to bypass
        it.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; This attack is interesting because of the limits it puts on
        reductions, which are the main tool for doing cryptography. If
        dragonfly could be shown to have no other weaknesses this would
        be fine, but no such proof is forthcoming.<br>
        &gt;<br>
        &gt; Such a proof would be in the ROM, but as the IETF 88 slides
        show it would be tricky.<br>
        &gt; &gt;<br>
        &gt; &gt;<br>
        &gt; &gt; Robert Ransom</p>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
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From mcgrew@cisco.com  Wed Feb  5 05:39:42 2014
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Cc: clefia-q@jp.sony.com, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] License for CLEFIA in RFC 6114 and draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02
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Thanks, Stephen, for your quick and detailed response.

Let me restate this for the benefit of folks who are not familiar with 
how to look for IPR considerations for IETF drafts and RFCs.   Use the 
"tools" interface  by using the URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/docname, 
where "docname" is the RFC or draft of interest, then look for the "IPR" 
link at the top of the page.

David

On 01/30/2014 06:04 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
>
> Hiya,
>
> On 01/30/2014 10:04 AM, Joachim Strömbergson wrote:
>> Aloha!
>>
>> I took a brief look at RFC 6114 which provides informational
>> description of the CLEFIA cipher. In the RFC I don't see any
>> reference to licensing of IP claims on the cipher.
> Yes it can be hard to know where to find that, but it
> exists. RFCs generally do not contain IPR stuff in the
> body of the RFC these days, as RFCs do not change but
> licensing does. There's also the not-well-understood
> factoid that 6114 is an independent submission RFC and
> is not an IETF or IRTF stream RFC. Its common for
> algorithm descriptions to be independent stream RFCs
> as they are often just copies of something else and
> so not really under IETF or IRTF change control.
>
> But anyway, if you look at the IETF tools page [1] for
> 6114 there is a link to the IPR declarations [2] that
> were made for that. To fully grok that you might also
> need to understand the IETF's general IPR rules [3]
> which are also generally used in the IRTF in case
> work moves from one to the other.
>
> Even if this isn't an IETF document, people tend to
> want to follow those rules if they hope their
> encumbered algorithms might get broader adoption.
> (In my personal opinion, having any patent on your
> crypto stuff is a fine way of ensuring that it is
> not likely to get broad adoption, but people filing
> patent applications don't seem to get that;-)
>
>     [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6114
>     [2]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?option=rfc_search&rfc_search=6114
>     [3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp79
>
>> draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02 which presents a way of adding CLEFIA to
>> TLS does not contain any information about licensing nor claimed
>> rights.
> Same as above, you can find that via [4] at [5].
>
>     [4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-katagi-tls-clefia-02
>     [5]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?option=document_search&document_search=draft-katagi-tls-clefia
>
>> There is however a license for CLEFIA, a license that seems to
>> combine an open BSD license with a quite strict license which makes
>> it impossible for anyone but Sony to develop support for CLEFIA:
>>
>> http://www.sony.net/Products/cryptography/clefia/download/
>>
>> (Nota bene: IANAL)
>>
>> The RFC is a done deal, but wouldn't it be appropriate to add a
>> section in the draft about licensing and IP rights. And to point to
>> the License agreement?
>>
>>
>> Also, the link to the technical related information for CLEFIA in
>> section 7 of the draft seems to be broken.
>>
>> (This link:
>> http://www.sony.net/Products/cryptography/clefia/technical/related_material.html)
> That'd
> be one for the authors. If that draft were to
> become an RFC (and I don't recall if the TLS wg have
> looked at it or not), then the RFC editor would likely
> want it fixed before publication as well to reference
> something more stable.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
>
>> _______________________________________________ Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
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From lars@netapp.com  Wed Feb  5 06:36:23 2014
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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] publishing dragonfly (was: Re:  2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.)
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] publishing dragonfly (was: Re: 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.)
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On 2014-2-5, at 14:32, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
> This slap at Paul and Marvel is not OK.   Discussion on the list needs =
to stick to technical substance and be polite. =20

Agree with David.

Watson, RG participants have already asked me to suspend your posting =
rights per BCP38 due to repeated unprofessional statements on the list. =
I am monitoring this. Please consider yourself warned.

Lars Eggert
IRTF Chair

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From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Wed Feb  5 08:19:20 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: [Cfrg] On Dragonfly
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Dear all,
First let me apologize to Paul Lambert. My remark on his cryptographic
capabilities was uncalled for, and detracted from my argument, and I
am sorry to have said it. Unfortunately it will remain as a monument
to human frailty forever on the internet. (insert commas ad libertam)

Secondly, I was unaware that there was a strong presumption in favor
of RFC publication of any protocol. I do not think this presumption is
wise, but that is for another day.

Thirdly, let me clearly explain where I now stand on Dragonfly, after
discovering what kind of reduction is possible.

Dragonfly requires that each password element be used between a single
pair of nodes, who
have only one outstanding exchange between them. This requirement is
surprising, and Dan Harkins agrees it should go in the draft.

In the ROM, given that, we can reduce to Dragonfly between two nodes,
with a strict ordering of interactions, and I believe this can be
reduced to some reasonable computational assumption. I haven't done it
yet, so I don't know what that assumption looks like. My belief that
this wasn't possible was due to a slide of Dan's from IETF 88 which
was completely wrong: just because something similar doesn't reduce,
doesn't mean the protocol you actually make reduces! I should have
read it as a challenge, not a limitation, earlier. This removes my
biggest objection.

Anyway, I don't have much more to say on the issue. I do think that
the earlier IEEE standardization, followed by several IETF protocols
supporting, and only now a decent analysis, raises significant
questions as to the prudent exercise of cryptographic engineering. I
would be quite dismayed to learn that a bridge I go over every day was
only now being examined to determine if it was designed to support the
weight of traffic.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com  Wed Feb  5 15:34:50 2014
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From: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 10:34:45 +1100
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] publishing dragonfly (was: Re: 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.)
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From lars@netapp.com  Wed Feb  5 23:16:10 2014
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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] publishing dragonfly (was: Re: 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.)
Thread-Index: AQHPIsre7dMajC0+eUin/ZQFR4FNZ5qoVxyA
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 07:16:06 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] publishing dragonfly (was: Re: 2^40. I can't exhibit it, but it exists.)
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Hi,

On 2014-2-6, at 0:34, Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> =
wrote:
> Instead of publicly warning a useful contributor,

I'm not debating the usefulness of Watson's contributions (I am in no =
position to). I am warning him that his tone has on occasion been =
problematic, and informed him that I have been asked to consider a BCP38 =
posting rights action.

> could you take a minimal stand against the sabotage of crypto =
standards by the NSA. I'm glad other IETF groups are trying to address =
pervasive surveillance with technical measures, but we also know: the =
NSA has sabotaged crypto standards; they have not told us which =
standards bodies or which specifications are affected; they haven't told =
us the nature of the sabotage. The NSA have tarnished a lot of work by =
our standards community on improving internet security. In this =
situation it is totally untenable for an NSA employee to chair this =
crypto standards group. Make it clear that an organization cannot both =
sabotage our work and have their employees openly participate in our =
civil community.

The CFRG is not a standards group. It does not produce standards. It's =
discussions and documents may influence IETF standards, but those =
discussions happen in IETF working groups governed by the IETF process. =
This is important, because not all of the IETF rules apply to the IRTF, =
see RFC2014. (For example, IRTF research groups need not come to =
consensus on their output.)

As an individual, I am fully in favor of making widespread wiretapping =
as difficult and costly as possible, and I am very supportive of =
anything the IETF and IRTF can do here.

That said, replacing Kevin Igoe as co-chair of the CFRG is not an action =
that will get us any closer towards that goal. Please see my detailed =
reply to Trevor for why; the short version is that I don't believe that =
Kevin (or David, for that matter) have any greater influence over the =
output of the research group than other participants. They don't have =
any veto rights, or an ability to suppress contributions or discussions, =
or a way to mandate certain outcomes.

Our best defense against IRTF and IETF work being subverted is =
transparency, and getting as much review from as diverse a group of =
people as possible. Eliminating groups of people from participating =
because of their current or past employment status, or based on whom =
they consulted for or took research grants from weakens that open =
process.

Lars

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From mcgrew@cisco.com  Thu Feb  6 05:15:47 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] On Dragonfly
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Thanks Watson,

On 02/05/2014 11:19 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> First let me apologize to Paul Lambert. My remark on his cryptographic
> capabilities was uncalled for, and detracted from my argument, and I
> am sorry to have said it. Unfortunately it will remain as a monument
> to human frailty forever on the internet. (insert commas ad libertam)

it is notoriously difficult for an online group forum to maintain an 
even temper, because text does such a poor job of communicating 
emotional nuances that are so important in social cues.

>
> Secondly, I was unaware that there was a strong presumption in favor
> of RFC publication of any protocol.

Not "any protocol".   The question with dragonfly is: should we leave 
the draft as it is, or improve it and document the security 
considerations accurately?    The latter choice clearly does better by 
the Internet community.

> I do not think this presumption is
> wise, but that is for another day.
>
> Thirdly, let me clearly explain where I now stand on Dragonfly, after
> discovering what kind of reduction is possible.
>
> Dragonfly requires that each password element be used between a single
> pair of nodes, who
> have only one outstanding exchange between them. This requirement is
> surprising, and Dan Harkins agrees it should go in the draft.
>
> In the ROM, given that, we can reduce to Dragonfly between two nodes,
> with a strict ordering of interactions, and I believe this can be
> reduced to some reasonable computational assumption. I haven't done it
> yet, so I don't know what that assumption looks like. My belief that
> this wasn't possible was due to a slide of Dan's from IETF 88 which
> was completely wrong: just because something similar doesn't reduce,
> doesn't mean the protocol you actually make reduces! I should have
> read it as a challenge, not a limitation, earlier. This removes my
> biggest objection.

Very cool, I look forward to hearing more on this.

>
> Anyway, I don't have much more to say on the issue. I do think that
> the earlier IEEE standardization, followed by several IETF protocols
> supporting, and only now a decent analysis, raises significant
> questions as to the prudent exercise of cryptographic engineering. I
> would be quite dismayed to learn that a bridge I go over every day was
> only now being examined to determine if it was designed to support the
> weight of traffic.

I agree, there are lessons that could be learned, and what interests me 
most is how CFRG could improve the process.   I would love to see some 
recommendations or considerations get written up.   There are a lot of 
different and useful perspectives and backgrounds in CFRG. You had 
suggested at some point writing up a draft on security models and 
proofs, which could be part these recommendations.   I would like to 
hear from others on what they think about this. (Note: I'm not asking 
you to start writing a draft, I just wanted to re-start the discussion 
on this point.)

We also have the option of engaging more with standards activities in 
IETF.   Many individuals on the list are so engaged, but on the other 
hand, the academically oriented people on the list likely do not follow 
those standards activities.   Would it be useful to have a summary of 
new standards activities that use crypto get presented to CFRG?   I 
would guess that we could find volunteers to put together a presentation 
or a long email on that topic.

David

> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com  Thu Feb  6 07:00:20 2014
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From: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 02:00:09 +1100
Thread-Topic: NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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From: Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako <anzalaya@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 16:14:54 +0100
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To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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--001a11339e2e54fd7104f1be5810
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At the very least we should be able to demand from the members of cfrg to
take a public stand against the NSA sabotage of crypto standards. As far as
I know this has been asked of Kevin Igoe and was only met by silence.

As a non-us citizen working in crypto engineering my efforts to get grad
students involved with the cfrg has been met with disbelief and disinterest
when finding out the affiliation of one of its chairs.
According to me, the question whether or not what's happening to Kevin Igoe
is fair (until proven otherwise, I don't doubt his judgement or his
honesty) is interesting but beyond the point. Right now we should be
thinking about what's fair to the cfrg

Regards

-- 
Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako

--001a11339e2e54fd7104f1be5810
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div>At the very least we should be able to=
 demand from the members of cfrg to take a public stand against the NSA sab=
otage of crypto standards. As far as I know this has been asked of Kevin Ig=
oe and was only met by silence.<br>

<br></div></div>As a non-us citizen working in crypto engineering my effort=
s to get grad students involved with the cfrg has been met with disbelief a=
nd disinterest when finding out the affiliation of one of its chairs.<br>

</div>According to me, the question whether or not what&#39;s happening to =
Kevin Igoe is fair (until proven otherwise, I don&#39;t doubt his judgement=
 or his honesty) is interesting but beyond the point. Right now we should b=
e thinking about what&#39;s fair to the cfrg <br>

<br></div>Regards<br clear=3D"all"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>-- <br>Al=
exandre Anzala-Yamajako<br><br><br>
</div></div>

--001a11339e2e54fd7104f1be5810--

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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Thread-Topic: NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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Hi,

I want to respond to a few of your points. I won't get into a prolonged =
debate here.

On 2014-2-6, at 16:00, Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> =
wrote:
>> The CFRG is not a standards group. It does not produce standards.
>=20
> These look and smell like standards to me, and this is where they are =
worked on.

<snip>

but they aren't. By definition, the IRTF does not produce standards, and =
the first sentence of the boilerplate of any IRTF RFC says

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for examination, experimental implementation, and
   evaluation.

and then goes on to state even more caveats. That's about as clear as we =
can be.

>> As an individual, I am fully in favor of making widespread =
wiretapping
>> as difficult and costly as possible, and I am very supportive of
>> anything the IETF and IRTF can do here.
>=20
> NSA have been sabotaging crypto standards. This is separate from =
widespread wiretapping.

Fair point.

I would also be in favor of any action that would make it more difficult =
for anyone to subvert the work we do. I still do not believe that =
replacing Kevin as chair would actually serve that purpose.

> Removing Kevin Igoe will be a concrete statement that we find the NSA =
sabotage of crypto standards unacceptable.

No, it wouldn't. It would be a demonstration that we believe in guilt by =
association. We'd make Kevin the scapegoat, irrespective of the fact =
that his personal actions do not warrant such a removal.

If the CFRG wants to make a statement about the actions of the NSA, then =
it can certainly do exactly that, i.e., folks can craft text to that =
effect and then the group can see if it has consensus to publish that =
statement. (The IETF did make such a statement via the Vancouver plenary =
poll.)

>> Eliminating groups of people from participating
>> because of their current or past employment status, or based on whom
>> they consulted for or took research grants from weakens that open
>> process.
>=20
> We are not eliminating groups, we are saying we strongly object to one =
organization's actual behaviour.
> My understanding is that Kevin Igoe is a current employee of the NSA, =
paid (at least in part) to work on crypto standards.
>=20
>> past employment status
>> consulted for
>> took research grants
>=20
> No one is suggesting anything about those categories.
> Listing them feels like an attempt to invoke an imaginary slippery =
slope as an excuse not to act.


You are arguing to remove Kevin based on his affiliation. I'm therefore =
guessing you have similar concerns about other current NSA employees. =
And possibly the other groups I listed above, since their financial =
relationship with the NSA could be argued to influence their =
participation. The slippery slope is not an excuse - where do you draw =
the line?

All that said, I fully understand people's anger at the action's of the =
NSA, and I do share it. I also understand the impulse to want to do =
something. But I don't consider punishing an individual contributor to =
the group for the actions of his employer an appropriate action. I also =
do not believe that the solution lies in preventing individuals from =
contributing solely based on their affiliation.

Lars

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Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 09:00:44 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Thu, Feb 6, 2014 at 8:20 AM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I want to respond to a few of your points. I won't get into a prolonged debate here.
>
> On 2014-2-6, at 16:00, Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>>> The CFRG is not a standards group. It does not produce standards.
>>
>> These look and smell like standards to me, and this is where they are worked on.
>
> <snip>
>
> but they aren't. By definition, the IRTF does not produce standards, and the first sentence of the boilerplate of any IRTF RFC says
>
>    This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
>    published for examination, experimental implementation, and
>    evaluation.
>
> and then goes on to state even more caveats. That's about as clear as we can be.

Just because a document says this, doesn't mean it's actually true.
And when it comes to the CFRG, it largely isn't.
IETF working groups will follow suit if they see that some new
protocol is documented by the CFRG. That's the role
the CFRG exists to play: supporting IETF WGs when they have to
evaluate crypto. Furthermore, if we aren't actually
producing documents meant to say "This is X, and X is good" for some
definition of good, what are we doing here?

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From yaronf.ietf@gmail.com  Thu Feb  6 09:08:36 2014
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Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2014 09:08:31 -0800
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] CFRG processes and vetting crypto RFCs
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I am quoting Lars's comments below, taking them deliberately out of context.

I think these two statements together (CFRG does not need to reach 
consensus, and CFRG - represented by its chairs - cannot "suppress 
discussion") means that CFRG cannot be a useful way to vet and approve 
or disapprove crypto contributions. The way I read these statements is 
that anything that goes into CFRG will eventually be published. As an 
IETF customer of CFRG, this is not helpful at all. I certainly need CFRG 
to "suppress" what it considers inappropriate.

Thanks,
	Yaron

> Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 07:16:06 +0000 From: "Eggert, Lars"
[...]

> The CFRG is not a standards group. It does not produce standards.
> It's discussions and documents may influence IETF standards, but
> those discussions happen in IETF working groups governed by the IETF
> process. This is important, because not all of the IETF rules apply
> to the IRTF, see RFC2014. (For example, IRTF research groups need not
> come to consensus on their output.)
>
[...]

> I don't
> believe that Kevin (or David, for that matter) have any greater
> influence over the output of the research group than other
> participants. They don't have any veto rights, or an ability to
> suppress contributions or discussions, or a way to mandate certain
> outcomes.


From lars@netapp.com  Thu Feb  6 10:31:16 2014
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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] CFRG processes and vetting crypto RFCs
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Hi,

On 2014-2-6, at 18:08, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> I think these two statements together (CFRG does not need to reach =
consensus, and CFRG - represented by its chairs - cannot "suppress =
discussion") means that CFRG cannot be a useful way to vet and approve =
or disapprove crypto contributions. The way I read these statements is =
that anything that goes into CFRG will eventually be published.

that's not the case, and I apologize if my statements have been =
confusing.

What I meant to express by the "cannot suppress discussion" phrase - =
apparently poorly - was that if the overall RG was really interested in =
discussing a certain topic, the *chairs* really have no way to make that =
discussion die. The WG overall certainly can, by making it clear to the =
proponents of a certain idea that the majority considers it poor or out =
of scope, etc. (with the expectation that the proponents would then =
eventually let the matter drop.)

The "need not reach consensus" statement was meant to explain the =
following:

RFC5743 defines the IRTF RFC Stream, with additional details found in =
RFC5742. Section 2.1 of RFC5743 describes the process that an RG follows =
to publish a document. The key bullet point it this:

   o  There must be a paragraph near the beginning (for example, in the
      introduction) describing the level of support for publication.
      Example text might read: "this document represents the consensus
      of the FOOBAR RG" or "the views in this document were considered
      controversial by the FOOBAR RG but the RG reached a consensus that
      the document should still be published".

Obviously, if the RG was so conflicted about a document that they =
couldn't even agree that it should be published even with such a =
paragraph explaining the controversy, it can't be taken forward. And if =
everyone agreed that something was a really bad idea, well, there have =
been "foo considered harmful" RFCs in the past that had broad consensus.

> As an IETF customer of CFRG, this is not helpful at all. I certainly =
need CFRG to "suppress" what it considers inappropriate.


Agreed.

Lars

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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Feb 6, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> IETF working groups will follow suit if they see that some new
> protocol is documented by the CFRG.

Can you give examples of that? Having been active in many IETF WGs for =
15+ years, I can't think of one, but I could have forgotten some.

> That's the role
> the CFRG exists to play: supporting IETF WGs when they have to
> evaluate crypto.

Evaluating crypto is quite different than creating "some new protocol". =
The CFRG most often evaluates existing crypto protocols and modes, it =
doesn't create them.

> Furthermore, if we aren't actually
> producing documents meant to say "This is X, and X is good" for some
> definition of good, what are we doing here?

Lots of things:

- This is X, and while X is good, doing Y in X would be very bad

- This is X, and we have some shaky feelings about X, but we're totally =
fine with Z, which can be used in most of the same places

- Current IETF protocols use X, but X is now out of favor for these =
reasons; please strongly consider using Z

In the latter two cases, Z is not "some new protocol", they are existing =
ones that have been studied.

--Paul Hoffman=

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Thu, Feb 6, 2014 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
> On Feb 6, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> IETF working groups will follow suit if they see that some new
>> protocol is documented by the CFRG.
>
> Can you give examples of that? Having been active in many IETF WGs for 15+ years, I can't think of one, but I could have forgotten some.

Dragonfly in TLS was the first time this happened. Had Rene Struik not
noticed that CFRG hadn't done anything, life would be interesting.
My understanding was that CFRG existed so that IETF WGs without
cryptographers could borrow some temporarily from us. That's what the
HTTP
auth people are doing, and what TLS did with Dragonfly.

>
>> That's the role
>> the CFRG exists to play: supporting IETF WGs when they have to
>> evaluate crypto.
>
> Evaluating crypto is quite different than creating "some new protocol". The CFRG most often evaluates existing crypto protocols and modes, it doesn't create them.

I think we're saying the same thing: IETF WG wants a protocol that
does blah. They look around and see the proposals blah1, blah2 etc.
exist.
Then one of them gets picked. Whether this is defining a new protocol
or evaluating the existing blah1, blah2, etc. is I think more semantic
than anything else. A useful evaluation results in changes to address
found deficiencies, or a statement that there are none and will be
none. The easiest time to replace a broken mechanism is when it is
being designed, before it is deployed. If we are playing catchup to
deployment, the only thing we can say is "we're doomed" when we find a
problem.

There is also the everpresent turning the paper into a spec. This is
fairly routine for most protocols, but the details matter, and can
completely change what actually is going on. SSL v3 looked like it was
using CBC mode, but because they decided to use chained IV's, actually
were doing something completely different.

>
>> Furthermore, if we aren't actually
>> producing documents meant to say "This is X, and X is good" for some
>> definition of good, what are we doing here?
>
> Lots of things:
>
> - This is X, and while X is good, doing Y in X would be very bad
>
> - This is X, and we have some shaky feelings about X, but we're totally fine with Z, which can be used in most of the same places
>
> - Current IETF protocols use X, but X is now out of favor for these reasons; please strongly consider using Z
>
> In the latter two cases, Z is not "some new protocol", they are existing ones that have been studied.

Are any of the CFRG WG drafts/IRTF publications actually of this form?
I really don't know: from my review of the mailing list
the CFRG did very little up until last year or so. I agree these are
also documents that require production, especially when some ancient
protocol hasn't been studied because it isn't as attractive a target
as TLS. We need some sort of idea how to do this kind of review
systematically.
I've tried by reviewing all cfrg drafts, but there are some emails I'm
behind on, and there is no way I can do all 7 thousand RFCs in a
reasonable amount of time.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu Feb  6 11:29:22 2014
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Feb 6, 2014, at 11:10 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Feb 6, 2014 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> =
wrote:
>> On Feb 6, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> IETF working groups will follow suit if they see that some new
>>> protocol is documented by the CFRG.
>>=20
>> Can you give examples of that? Having been active in many IETF WGs =
for 15+ years, I can't think of one, but I could have forgotten some.
>=20
> Dragonfly in TLS was the first time this happened.

Sorry, but that is wrong. Dan Harkins brought it to the TLS WG long =
before it was considered by the CFRG.

> Had Rene Struik not
> noticed that CFRG hadn't done anything, life would be interesting.

Life is always interesting. :-)

> My understanding was that CFRG existed so that IETF WGs without
> cryptographers could borrow some temporarily from us.

I hope Lars' repeated messages about that have disabused you of that =
notion. There are lots of cryptographers in the TLS WG, the IPsecME WG, =
the defunct S/MIME and OpenPGP WGs, and so on.

> That's what the
> HTTP
> auth people are doing, and what TLS did with Dragonfly.

It is incorrect to state that the httpauth WG and the TLS WG have no =
cryptographers.

A different view, one that we rely on in the IPsecME WG, is that any =
time we're doing something "interesting" with crypto, we alert the CFRG. =
Almost all the time, we don't hear anything back, so we assume that we =
can continue.

>>> That's the role
>>> the CFRG exists to play: supporting IETF WGs when they have to
>>> evaluate crypto.
>>=20
>> Evaluating crypto is quite different than creating "some new =
protocol". The CFRG most often evaluates existing crypto protocols and =
modes, it doesn't create them.
>=20
> I think we're saying the same thing: IETF WG wants a protocol that
> does blah. They look around and see the proposals blah1, blah2 etc.
> exist.
> Then one of them gets picked. Whether this is defining a new protocol
> or evaluating the existing blah1, blah2, etc. is I think more semantic
> than anything else. A useful evaluation results in changes to address
> found deficiencies, or a statement that there are none and will be
> none. The easiest time to replace a broken mechanism is when it is
> being designed, before it is deployed. If we are playing catchup to
> deployment, the only thing we can say is "we're doomed" when we find a
> problem.

Fully agree. But I fear you place too much emphasis on IETF WGs for =
that. In the case of Dragonfly, the work was initiated *outside the =
IETF*, and only brought in later when it seemed we might align with =
other SDOs.

> There is also the everpresent turning the paper into a spec. This is
> fairly routine for most protocols, but the details matter, and can
> completely change what actually is going on. SSL v3 looked like it was
> using CBC mode, but because they decided to use chained IV's, actually
> were doing something completely different.

Yes, that. The CFRG used to be much more active in those evaluations. I =
would love to see it get re-energized on that. If nothing else, there =
are enough crypto professors here who could say to one of their =
indentured servants^W^Wgrad students, "take a look at this new proposal; =
finding something wrong with it is the correct answer".

>>> Furthermore, if we aren't actually
>>> producing documents meant to say "This is X, and X is good" for some
>>> definition of good, what are we doing here?
>>=20
>> Lots of things:
>>=20
>> - This is X, and while X is good, doing Y in X would be very bad
>>=20
>> - This is X, and we have some shaky feelings about X, but we're =
totally fine with Z, which can be used in most of the same places
>>=20
>> - Current IETF protocols use X, but X is now out of favor for these =
reasons; please strongly consider using Z
>>=20
>> In the latter two cases, Z is not "some new protocol", they are =
existing ones that have been studied.
>=20
> Are any of the CFRG WG drafts/IRTF publications actually of this form?

Many of the encryption mode documents and advice given to WGs are =
exactly of that form. Your current "new curves; warnings attached" =
document seems to be.

> I really don't know: from my review of the mailing list
> the CFRG did very little up until last year or so. I agree these are
> also documents that require production, especially when some ancient
> protocol hasn't been studied because it isn't as attractive a target
> as TLS. We need some sort of idea how to do this kind of review
> systematically.
> I've tried by reviewing all cfrg drafts, but there are some emails I'm
> behind on, and there is no way I can do all 7 thousand RFCs in a
> reasonable amount of time.

Consider cloning....

--Paul Hoffman=

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References: <20140203192451.6268.76511.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <14AB44E0-4C90-4E4C-A656-885A31CF4C02@checkpoint.com> <CACsn0cmDT-FAN8uMZ0w8TX6GKPAZjnrexLeFQd7QhRfoY6AGFQ@mail.gmail.com> <75e1e853dc391b418062ee5e51adeb2f.squirrel@www.trepanning.net> <CABqy+sr7ZKrACj4Ga2_75d9Kea0aKbrp2P5fWWu4YZP53zijxw@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0cmS152wYQWHiX8ykzaMM=6b=r=fwVuLfPj_u0wmoq0jKw@mail.gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B81B7F7C@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CACsn0c=a5PvZOZgVRjHaJ2avGCPHF6b6nOpNh+iT0909X-jUFA@mail.gmail.com> <52F23D52.4090509@cisco.com> <EFA9E215-3B01-43C6-A8F0-3F98E3ED2E26@netapp.com> <255B9BB34FB7D647A5! 06DC292726F6E1153AD4CF05@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <3E30D764-7E19-45DB-9D6D-63949F5B36CB@netapp.com> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E1153AE65F2E@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <570B8BE5-1362-4D08-A22D-FE86FC4A77DC@netapp.com> <CACsn0ckm95r4x7VBrW81+f7Resf7RcS6iOBPx3yqu9m1VuELhw@mail.gmail.com> <6F8C22FA-B968-4B3C-8A8D-C24F1DFC5021@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On 02/06/2014 01:48 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Feb 6, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> IETF working groups will follow suit if they see that some new
>> protocol is documented by the CFRG.
> Can you give examples of that? Having been active in many IETF WGs for 15+ years, I can't think of one, but I could have forgotten some.

Well, AEAD was adopted by TLS following the AEAD RFC that was 
extensively reviewed in CFRG, and it has been adopted by some other IETF 
protocols as well.

David

>
>> That's the role
>> the CFRG exists to play: supporting IETF WGs when they have to
>> evaluate crypto.
> Evaluating crypto is quite different than creating "some new protocol". The CFRG most often evaluates existing crypto protocols and modes, it doesn't create them.
>
>> Furthermore, if we aren't actually
>> producing documents meant to say "This is X, and X is good" for some
>> definition of good, what are we doing here?
> Lots of things:
>
> - This is X, and while X is good, doing Y in X would be very bad
>
> - This is X, and we have some shaky feelings about X, but we're totally fine with Z, which can be used in most of the same places
>
> - Current IETF protocols use X, but X is now out of favor for these reasons; please strongly consider using Z
>
> In the latter two cases, Z is not "some new protocol", they are existing ones that have been studied.
>
> --Paul Hoffman
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Thu Feb  6 14:09:52 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
        Authors         : Ted Krovetz
                          Phillip Rogaway
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07.txt
	Pages           : 19
	Date            : 2014-02-06

Abstract:
   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
   encryption scheme that provides confidentiality and authenticity for
   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From ted@krovetz.net  Thu Feb  6 14:12:01 2014
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From: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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This version has very minor changes in response to IESG reviewer =
suggestions.

-Ted


On Feb 6, 2014, at 2:09 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum Research Group Working =
Group of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm
>        Authors         : Ted Krovetz
>                          Phillip Rogaway
> 	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07.txt
> 	Pages           : 19
> 	Date            : 2014-02-06
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies OCB, a shared-key blockcipher-based
>   encryption scheme that provides confidentiality and authenticity for
>   plaintexts and authenticity for associated data.  This document is a
>   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From lars@netapp.com  Thu Feb  6 23:36:15 2014
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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: IESG IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Request for RFC5742 review of draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07
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Subject: [Cfrg] Request for RFC5742 review of draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb-07
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Hi, IESG secretary (BCC'ed),

this is a request for the IESG to perform an RFC5742 review of draft-irtf-c=
frg-ocb-07 from the CFRG, to be published as an Informational RFC on the IR=
TF Stream.

This document has been approved for publication by the IRSG, and an IANA re=
view was performed. See http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/group/irtf/trac/ticket/5=
5 for details on prior reviews. Please copy all correspondence to the docum=
ent shepherd, Kevin Igoe (kmigoe@nsa.gov).

Thanks,
Lars


From dharkins@lounge.org  Fri Feb  7 00:31:13 2014
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Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 00:31:10 -0800 (PST)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Thu, February 6, 2014 11:10 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 6, 2014 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> wrote:
>> On Feb 6, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> IETF working groups will follow suit if they see that some new
>>> protocol is documented by the CFRG.
>>
>> Can you give examples of that? Having been active in many IETF WGs for
>> 15+ years, I can't think of one, but I could have forgotten some.
>
> Dragonfly in TLS was the first time this happened. Had Rene Struik not
> noticed that CFRG hadn't done anything, life would be interesting.
> My understanding was that CFRG existed so that IETF WGs without
> cryptographers could borrow some temporarily from us. That's what the
> HTTP
> auth people are doing, and what TLS did with Dragonfly.

  I don't want to perpetuate this unfortunate thread but I would like
to correct the record. I came up with the dragonfly exchange quite
a long time ago and have been promoting its use in different
protocols-- EAP, IKE, 802.11, TLS. All that activity precedes the
CFRG draft.

  Rene's review of the CFRG draft was, as he notes in the title of his email,
"triggered by" the TLS-pwd last call. Note that the hullabaloo over
TLS-pwd was triggered by Trevor Perrin's realization (after 2 years)
that TLS-pwd existed and his subsequent incorporation of dragonfly
into a conspiracy theory involving the NSA. So actually, had Trevor
paid as little attention to the TLS WG that week as he did the previous
2 years, things would've been less "interesting" (to use your word).

  Basically, the timeframe and the process you're suggesting is a
little off.

  Also, note your "understanding was that CFRG existed so that IETF
WGs without cryptographers could borrow some temporarily" is
without basis. The WG that produced IPsec and IKE had such notable
cryptographers as Krawczyk, Canetti, Orman, and Bellovin, as active
participants (and I commit a sin of omission here by failing to mention
others, my apologies). Other working groups have similar participation
by very well-respected experts.

  Now, you may have issues with IPsec, IKE, TLS, or whatever but
please realize that is most likely the result of the sausage making
function of a standards process. I have lots of problems with IKE but
none of them were the result of the brilliant cryptographers that
helped produce it, they were the result of engineering shortcuts,
compromise among differing viewpoints in order to achieve
consensus (some of which appear in hindsight quite ridiculous),
haste to get the standards out there, and a failure to specify the
protocol properly.

  The rubber hits the road in an IETF WG. If you want to make sure
that a particular IETF protocol is done right than engage there.
The CFRG should be, in my opinion, a bridge between theory and
practice.

  regards,

  Dan.



From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Fri Feb  7 07:59:57 2014
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Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 07:59:55 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 12:31 AM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, February 6, 2014 11:10 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 6, 2014 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
>> wrote:
>>> On Feb 6, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> IETF working groups will follow suit if they see that some new
>>>> protocol is documented by the CFRG.
>>>
>>> Can you give examples of that? Having been active in many IETF WGs for
>>> 15+ years, I can't think of one, but I could have forgotten some.
>>
>> Dragonfly in TLS was the first time this happened. Had Rene Struik not
>> noticed that CFRG hadn't done anything, life would be interesting.
>> My understanding was that CFRG existed so that IETF WGs without
>> cryptographers could borrow some temporarily from us. That's what the
>> HTTP
>> auth people are doing, and what TLS did with Dragonfly.
>
>   I don't want to perpetuate this unfortunate thread but I would like
> to correct the record. I came up with the dragonfly exchange quite
> a long time ago and have been promoting its use in different
> protocols-- EAP, IKE, 802.11, TLS. All that activity precedes the
> CFRG draft.

I stand corrected.

>
>   Rene's review of the CFRG draft was, as he notes in the title of his email,
> "triggered by" the TLS-pwd last call. Note that the hullabaloo over
> TLS-pwd was triggered by Trevor Perrin's realization (after 2 years)
> that TLS-pwd existed and his subsequent incorporation of dragonfly
> into a conspiracy theory involving the NSA. So actually, had Trevor
> paid as little attention to the TLS WG that week as he did the previous
> 2 years, things would've been less "interesting" (to use your word).
>
>   Basically, the timeframe and the process you're suggesting is a
> little off.

>
>   Also, note your "understanding was that CFRG existed so that IETF
> WGs without cryptographers could borrow some temporarily" is
> without basis. The WG that produced IPsec and IKE had such notable
> cryptographers as Krawczyk, Canetti, Orman, and Bellovin, as active
> participants (and I commit a sin of omission here by failing to mention
> others, my apologies). Other working groups have similar participation
> by very well-respected experts.
>
>   Now, you may have issues with IPsec, IKE, TLS, or whatever but
> please realize that is most likely the result of the sausage making
> function of a standards process. I have lots of problems with IKE but
> none of them were the result of the brilliant cryptographers that
> helped produce it, they were the result of engineering shortcuts,
> compromise among differing viewpoints in order to achieve
> consensus (some of which appear in hindsight quite ridiculous),
> haste to get the standards out there, and a failure to specify the
> protocol properly.
>
>   The rubber hits the road in an IETF WG. If you want to make sure
> that a particular IETF protocol is done right than engage there.
> The CFRG should be, in my opinion, a bridge between theory and
> practice.

How does the bridge between theory and practice help the rubber hit
the road? I can't possibly ensure every protocol is done right: at
some point people need to learn how crypto works, or not do crypto. In
your view CFRG only comes in for standardizing something that the WGs
admit they can't understand. Of course, 90% of IETF (maybe all IETF)
protocols don't use advanced crypto. No one is suggesting a fully
homomorphic traitor tracing oblivious transfer protocol for use
between computationally restricted nodes. Most protocols need to
authenticate information to everyone (use a signature), authenticate
two parties to each other (hundreds of good solutions, hundreds of bad
solutions), and encrypt and authenticate information flowing between
parties (use CBC+HMAC, or GCM, or ...). We don't really have that much
to do in that view, other than post-quantum stuff.

But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.

In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC. Also in
1995 RC4 is broken by the exhibition of several two-byte biases by
Flueuer and a coauthor. In 2004 Gregory Bard describes BEAST.

As we should all be aware, it's not until 2013 that these problems
start getting addressed, and it is unlikely that we will fully fix
them for a decade. What exactly was so important to the sausage making
process that letting attackers steal millions of credit card numbers
wasn't as big a priority?

I don't think the TLS WG is uniquely bad in this regard. IPSEC has had
its share of missteps, which I'm not that familiar with. I'm sure
plenty of protocols are sitting out there, vulnerable because
researchers just haven't looked.

What do we do to address this problem?

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

From n.mavrogiannopoulos@gmail.com  Fri Feb  7 08:12:38 2014
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On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:

> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.
> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.

I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.

In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years later,
but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.

regards,
Nikos


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.
>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>
> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.

Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.

>
> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years later,
> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.

It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
MAC-then-encrypt was not.
Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if we
take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
being informed of an attack.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> regards,
> Nikos
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

From prvs=7115ef9fce=uri@ll.mit.edu  Fri Feb  7 08:40:14 2014
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To: "'watsonbladd@gmail.com'" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "'nmav@gnutls.org'" <nmav@gnutls.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 11:39:51 -0500
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Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented Lucifer and=
 DES ciphers.)

You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how thing=
s were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book was publis=
hed.

The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing things i=
n that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol (circa 1992-1994) t=
o diverge from that approach, and it took some flak for not doing what was =
the conventional wisdom of that day.

Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now "Encrypt-then-MA=
C" is the standard.

Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less combative he=
re. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a limit.

--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Lexington, MA  02420-9185      =20

Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/

=20

MIT LL Root CA:=20

 <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>


DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638

----- Original Message -----
From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM=0A=
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards

On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> w=
rote:
> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.
>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>
> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.

Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.

>
> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years later,
> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.

It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
MAC-then-encrypt was not.
Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if we
take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
being informed of an attack.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> regards,
> Nikos
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin
_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Fri Feb  7 09:10:18 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
<uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented Lucifer a=
nd DES ciphers.)
>
> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how thi=
ngs were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book was publ=
ished.
>
> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing things=
 in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol (circa 1992-1994)=
 to diverge from that approach, and it took some flak for not doing what wa=
s the conventional wisdom of that day.

Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.

The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
responding to the changing situation.

>
> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now "Encrypt-then-=
MAC" is the standard.
>
> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less combative =
here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a limit.

What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the
CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
protocols don't make similar mistakes?
I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
and I'll do it.

Sincerely,
Watson
>
> --
> Regards,
> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>
> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>
>
>
> MIT LL Root CA:
>
>  <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>
>
> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>
> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>=
 wrote:
>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>
>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.
>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>
>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>
> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>
>>
>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years later,
>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>
> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if we
> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
> being informed of an attack.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>>
>> regards,
>> Nikos
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>
>
> --
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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Date: Fri, 07 Feb 2014 14:04:13 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi All,

it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do 
differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.

Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rather 
by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, and 
I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about what 
needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at 
present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider 
changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note that 
we would need to get those changes approved.)

An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanisms 
for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keeping 
in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or might 
never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with 
existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacement.

It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that can 
be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all of 
those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in use.   We 
can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of software 
that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that will 
slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is.   
As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of 
cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for 
deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy 
that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden is 
on us to provide this justification.

At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad cryptography 
is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it 
might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now.   
I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with 
human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in particular.   It 
would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and how 
bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on our 
opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front of 
the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident that, if 
we can offer IETF good information about the security of current 
standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information.

An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some 
useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would be 
willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one 
case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were done 
right.

David

On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>
>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book was published.
>>
>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>
> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
> responding to the changing situation.
>
>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>
>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a limit.
> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the
> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
> and I'll do it.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson
>> --
>> Regards,
>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>
>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>
>>
>>
>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>
>>   <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>
>>
>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>
>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.
>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>
>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years later,
>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if we
>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
>> being informed of an attack.
>>
>> Sincerely,
>> Watson Ladd
>>> regards,
>>> Nikos
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>>
>> --
>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>


From dkg@fifthhorseman.net  Fri Feb  7 11:29:04 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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On 02/07/2014 02:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanisms=

> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keeping
> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or migh=
t
> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacement.=


beyond figuring out how to deprecate currently-bad crypto, i think it
would also be a worthwhile exercise to think about how to design
*deprecatable* crypto mechanisms and protocols.

Our current state-of-the-art for cryptographic agility is that we build
ways for systems to tack on newer and better features.  The trouble is
that we don't have a way to systematically deprecate older/known-bad
features.

I don't know if this specifically in-scope for the CFRG, but i would be
very happy to see some best-practices advice that suggests a way to
ensure that the cryptographic mechanisms we deploy have a clear way to
deprecate them when known attacks and vulnerabilities surface.

One way of thinking about this is the idea of revocation, but algorithm
revocation instead of certificate revocation.  This is troubling,
though, because we are currently terrible at certificate revocation :(

Another approach could be to design cryptographic software with built-in
expiration dates for *every* algorithm.  The software could check the
current date, and would know when a given algorithm was due to expire,
and warn the user that their communications security is in doubt if they
are using an expired algorithm (or refuse to use the expired algorithm).
 Software updates could either (a) deploy new algorithms with later
expiration dates, or (b) indicate that we have more confidence in an
existing algorithm, thereby extending its current expiration date.

Having this built in from the beginning means that we would at least
have a time-limited window to re-validate algorithms, and service
operators could remove expired mechanisms with confidence.  It would
also mean that devices need to be able to update their software, or
their algorithm definitions and expiration dates as well (it would not
work for clockless or non-networked devices or devices without any way
to signal to the user that the algorithm is expired).

Anyone interested in discussing sane and safe ways to pro-actively plan
for secure and sane algorithm or protocol deprecation?  Can we deem this
in-scope for the CFRG, or are there other places where the discussion
might be better placed?

> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad cryptograph=
y
> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it
> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now. =
=20
> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in particular.   I=
t
> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and how
> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on ou=
r
> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front of=

> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident that, i=
f
> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information.

I also think formally and explicitly deprecating known-bad approaches is
good.  RFC 6176 is an excellent and useful document.  However, i remain
surprised that we haven't made such a statement about cleartext(!) -- if
we believe that pervasive surveillance is an attack on the internet, a
strong and explicit RFC stating cleartext communication on the 'net is a
Bad Thing could be comparably useful.

	--dkg


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1. Yes, those objections were informed - and based on the best data we *all=
* had *back then*. (I personally discussed it with Don Johnson, and Don Cop=
persmith, which was easy as we worked in the same building. There is *a lot=
* to say on the subject, but it does not matter now.)
This is the blessing of and the problem with the hindsight. We did Encrypt-=
then-MAC mostly for performance reasons, and hoped there were no unforeseen=
 negative security implications. A decade later it turned out that our appr=
oach was preferable from security point of view, and now (2+ decades later)=
 people are criticized for not embracing our method... But for sure I can't=
 call my colleagues of that time "mistaken".

Who knows what we'll learn in the next ten years?

2. "Blunder" is a strong word. I cannot call what happened in those WG a "b=
lunder" (much unlike the [in]famous WEP).

What should be done? A good question. Theoretically, impacted standards and=
 implementations should be re-done to address the problems we know about no=
w. Practically, considering the inertia of the industry and the leg irons o=
f backwards compatibility? With the money considerations (cost of the chang=
es vs expected revenue from them) thrown in this mix?  Off-hand, I don't kn=
ow.

On one hand, IETF needs a (better) ability to deprecate algorithms and prot=
ocols (as Dave McGrew just said). On the other hand, there is no enforcemen=
t arm, and if (for the sake of the argument) Microsoft decides to keep a de=
precated protocol alive, you and I can criticize it all we want, but it won=
't take it off the 90% of the world's desktops and who knows what percentag=
e of the servers that must communicate with those desktops.=20

3. Regarding the new protocols? It should be simpler, as they rarely carry =
the burden of compatibility with something we may or may not like. IETF is =
trying to steer things away from bad by making statements like "No new prot=
ocol shall use MD5" (back then, or SHA-1, in later days).=20

IMHO, one way to improve things is getting out IESG statements like "Constr=
uct X was shown to be vulnerable to A, B, and C - and must not be used in a=
ny new protocol", and "Construct Y was shown to be strong/good for D, E, an=
d F - and new protocols doing those should employ Y"... Security AD  would =
be a reasonable source of such statements. It is up to the individual membe=
rs to create, analyze/debug/vet such statements, and submit them for AD's c=
onsideration. If such a statement were coming from CFRG rather than a singl=
e individual, it would be even better.

Describing attacks against proposed protocols, together with recommended fi=
xes, would also help. The more practical and specific the attacks are - the=
 likelier it is that the WG would listen (and vs versa). Availability and u=
sability of the fixes is a factor too...

One caveat: security proofs is a tricky field. I remember having fun readin=
g proofs and "dis-proofs" on MQV/HMQV/FHMQV. It is far from, e.g., proofs i=
n geometry or algebra that we're so used to rely upon. :-). So I personally=
 tale security proofs with a good grain of salt, and try to look at the ass=
umptions much more closely than at the actual proofs.

Also, implementers positively hate designs/protocols encumbered by IPR. The=
y would much rather take a chance of a weird attack than of a potential lit=
igation. If a good protocol is patented - it won't be touched with a 10-foo=
t pole (e.g., think EKE), no matter how great security proofs or performanc=
e advantages it has.=20

GPL license is great (when available :), but it doesn't cover all the needs=
 of the industry...

I better stop here before I lose too much of coherence. :-)

Would be happy to answer specific questions, or discuss specific steps.

TNX!
--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Lexington, MA  02420-9185      =20

Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/

=20

MIT LL Root CA:=20

 <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>


DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638

----- Original Message -----
From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 12:10 PM=0A=
To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
Cc: nmav@gnutls.org <nmav@gnutls.org>; cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards

On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
<uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented Lucifer a=
nd DES ciphers.)
>
> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how thi=
ngs were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book was publ=
ished.
>
> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing things=
 in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol (circa 1992-1994)=
 to diverge from that approach, and it took some flak for not doing what wa=
s the conventional wisdom of that day.

Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.

The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
responding to the changing situation.

>
> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now "Encrypt-then-=
MAC" is the standard.
>
> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less combative =
here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a limit.

What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the
CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
protocols don't make similar mistakes?
I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
and I'll do it.

Sincerely,
Watson
>
> --
> Regards,
> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>
> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>
>
>
> MIT LL Root CA:
>
>  <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>
>
> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>
> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>=
 wrote:
>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>
>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.
>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>
>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>
> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>
>>
>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years later,
>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>
> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if we
> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
> being informed of an attack.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>>
>> regards,
>> Nikos
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>
>
> --
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 11:54:30 -0800
Thread-Topic: Halon's Razor ->  Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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Changing the subject line since we are moving beyond the NSA conspiracy
theories.  The increased interest in security is a great benefit =8A but
much of=20
=20
    "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by
stupidity"
>>
>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>
>Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
>Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
SIV is MAC then encrypt =8A in it=B9s own unusual manner.

Conservative from the view of simplicity of proof does not invalidate
other criteria. For example, Rivest=B9s Tweakable Cipher=B9s offers potenti=
al
for breaking away from conservative conventional wisdom.

Paul



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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 12:16:22 -0800
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Date: Fri, 07 Feb 2014 21:37:58 +0000
From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "nmav@gnutls.org" <nmav@gnutls.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi David,

good discussion points.

Here are my views:

a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software lifecycle,
as I did in
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01,
then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level of
cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with Internet
security. That's good news.

The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work that
would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does not offer
end-to-end security and that's something that could be fixed in the IETF
(and there is work ongoing in the DIME working group for Diameter at
least). The main challenge, however, is the attitude problem of those
deploying the protocol.

b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks that
are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients are=
:
* open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecting
an algorithm
* a suitable way for publishing these documents.

Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it more
credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community could
reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms, encryption
algorithms, etc.

Just a thought...

Ciao
Hannes


On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi All,
>=20
> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do
> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>=20
> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rather
> by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, and=

> I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about what
> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at
> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider
> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note tha=
t
> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>=20
> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanisms=

> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keeping
> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or migh=
t
> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacement.=

>=20
> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that can=

> be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all of=

> those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in use.   W=
e
> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of software
> that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that will=

> slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is. =20
> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of
> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for
> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy
> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden is=

> on us to provide this justification.
>=20
> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad cryptograph=
y
> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it
> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now. =
=20
> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in particular.   I=
t
> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and how
> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on ou=
r
> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front of=

> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident that, i=
f
> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information.
>=20
> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some
> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would be=

> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one
> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were done=

> right.
>=20
> David
>=20
> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented
>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>
>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how=

>>> things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book=

>>> was published.
>>>
>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing
>>> things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol
>>> (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some
>>> flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
>> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
>> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
>> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
>> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>>
>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
>> responding to the changing situation.
>>
>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now
>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>
>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less
>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a
>>> limit.
>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the=

>> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
>> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
>> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
>> and I'll do it.
>>
>> Sincerely,
>> Watson
>>> --=20
>>> Regards,
>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>
>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>
>>>   <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>
>>>
>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in T=
LS.
>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). Ther=
e
>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.=

>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>
>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years late=
r,
>>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if w=
e
>>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after=

>>> being informed of an attack.
>>>
>>> Sincerely,
>>> Watson Ladd
>>>> regards,
>>>> Nikos
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>
>>>
>>> --=20
>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>>
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Halon's Razor ->  Re:  NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Tom Shrimpton <teshrim@pdx.edu>, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Halon's Razor ->  Re:  NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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Quick note to the list: Tom's original email, copied below, hasn't hit 
the list yet, I think because he sent it from a non-subscribed email 
account.   I think that Kevin added this other account as a member, but 
this won't re-send the message.   So read Tom's original message at the 
bottom first, then Paul's response above it :-)

David

On 02/07/2014 04:54 PM, Paul Lambert wrote:
> Tom,
>
> Thank you for your shameless plug... it's very interesting work.  Also, my apologies on  my imprecise statement about SIV.  SIV is very interesting because it is NOT the conventional conservative model - it's clearly not encrypt-then-MAC.   It is an excellent example of out-of-the-conventional-box thinking that would be eliminated if we create arbitrary guidelines for algorithm structure.
>
> Do send a pointer to the list when it's posted.
>
> Regards,
>
> Paul
>
> ]-----Original Message-----
> ]From: Tom Shrimpton [mailto:teshrim@pdx.edu]
> ]Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 12:24 PM
> ]To: Paul Lambert
> ]Cc: cfrg@irtf.org; Watson Ladd; Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
> ]Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Halon's Razor -> Re: NSA sabotaging crypto standards
> ]
> ]
> ]
> ]On Fri Feb 7 11:54:30 2014, Paul Lambert wrote:
> ]>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
> ]>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
> ]>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
> ]>
> ]> SIV is MAC then encrypt Š in it¹s own unusual manner.
> ]As one of the designers of SIV, I have to object to saying that SIV is
> ]MAC-then-encrypt, even if you soften the claim with "in it's own unusual
> ]manner."  SIV doesn't fit into any of the traditional generic
> ]composition categories -- MAC-then-encrypt, encrypt-then-MAC, encrypt-
> ]and-MAC -- for a number of reasons.
> ]
> ]For one thing, treating the PRF output as the IV (and the transmitted
> ]tag!) is quite different that treating it as part of the plaintext to be
> ]encrypted.
> ]
> ]For another, SIV mode neither starts with, nor yields the kind of
> ]cryptographic object that the Bellare-Namprempre results address.
> ](I'm pointing to the (excellent) [BN] paper because it has significantly
> ]shaped the way our community thinks about building AE schemes via MtE,
> ]EtM and
> ]E&M.)
> ][BN] is about producing *probabilistic* AE schemes from *probabilistic*
> ]encryption, and a MAC.  But SIV is a *deterministic*, nonce-based AE
> ]scheme, built from an underlying *deterministic*, IV-based encryption
> ]scheme, and a PRF.
> ]
> ]This is something that Phil Rogaway, Chanathip Namprempre and I have
> ]been thinking about a lot lately -- what is the GC story when one starts
> ]from nonce-based or IV-based encryption, and a PRF, and wants to produce
> ]a nonce-based AEAD scheme?
> ]At Eurocrypt 2014, we'll present a paper that explores this question in
> ]detail.
> ](You can expect the full version to appear on the IACR eprint server in
> ]the next week or so.)
> ]
> ]Sorry if that seemed like a shameless plug, but it did seem appropriate
> ]to mention the upcoming paper as part of this response.
> ]
> ]Cheers,
> ]-Tom Shrimpton
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Halon's Razor -> Re: NSA sabotaging crypto standards
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On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 12:16 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
> Premature click-itis on prior post - sorry, please ignore =E2=80=A6=E2=80=
=A6.
>
> Changing the subject line since we are moving beyond the NSA conspiracy
> theories.  The increased interest in security is a great benefit  but
> much of our problems I fear are of our own creation:
>
>     "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by
> Stupidity=E2=80=9D    :-(
>
> Improvements come not from accusations of past work, but a work plan to
> look at new activities and better criteria.

Well, one good criterion would be requiring documentation of
assumptions and the security actually provided by a protocol. The
reason we should ask for this is that it would have stopped attacks in
the past. That's why the history of TLS matters: it makes the case
that the past practices weren't good enough, and raises the question
of what practices would have stopped the problems that were
identified.

>
> Concrete suggestions:
>  - identification and documentation of vulnerabilities and possible
> =E2=80=9Cmistakes"
>  - identification and documentation of selection criteria
>     - very interesting for ECC
>       e.g. Benefits or issues of a =3D -3, p =3D pseudo mersenne,

So draft-ladd-safecurves will have this. I've been doing other things
for a while, and we also are still searching for the best point
format, but hopefully I will be able to discuss the whole landscape.

>       impact of zero value points and DPA
>  - protocol review and refresh of guidelines and/or protocols
>    - e.g. IPsec has a guideline I know needs changing =E2=80=A6
>  - re-examination of privacy in protocol designs
>    - addresses, names and long term identifiers are the norm
>      now =E2=80=A6 changes are possible
>
>
>>>
>>>I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>>>encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
>>>was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>
>>Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
>>Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>
> SIV is MAC then encrypt in it=C2=B9s own unusual manner.  Conservative fr=
om the
> view of simplicity of proof does not invalidate other criteria. For
> example, Rivest=C2=B9s Tweakable Cipher=C2=B9s offers potential for break=
ing away
> from conservative conventional block cipher wisdom. There are pseudo
> homomorphic applications where it=E2=80=99s more appropriate to MAC-then-=
encrypt.
> There continues to be a gulf between =E2=80=98applied crypto=E2=80=99 and=
 'academic
> crypto=E2=80=99.  Adamant mandates of abstract guidelines will not build =
consensus
> or good products.  Progress can be made by more rapid academic analysis o=
f
> =E2=80=98real protocols=E2=80=99, and more rapid translation of academic =
work into useable
> designs.

The reason academic analysis of real protocols takes a while is many
real protocols have features that make analysis hard. Key confirmation
is a particular pain point, but so is having lots of slightly
different mechanisms, instead of one overall mechanism with some
options. I'll have to disagree with protocol papers not being usable
designs: you take the protocol, look what it requires, and pick one
for each thing it needs.

For example I'll take http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/171.pdf, mostly at
random. There is a table in there (figure 5) describing a signature
scheme in fairly standard notation. There are some nonstandard bits,
but mostly definitions. It looks to me like translating it into an RFC
would take a few choices of primitive, but not much additional work.
What else would you desire to make it more implementable?
>
>
>
> Paul
>
Sincerely.
Watson Ladd

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Mon Feb 10 07:16:03 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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On 07/02/14 19:28, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
<snip>
> Another approach could be to design cryptographic software with built-in
> expiration dates for *every* algorithm.  The software could check the
> current date, and would know when a given algorithm was due to expire,
> and warn the user that their communications security is in doubt if they
> are using an expired algorithm (or refuse to use the expired algorithm).
>   Software updates could either (a) deploy new algorithms with later
> expiration dates, or (b) indicate that we have more confidence in an
> existing algorithm, thereby extending its current expiration date.

No-longer-deemed-secure algorithms aren't the only security problems 
facing out-of-date cryptographic software.  So why not go one step 
further and make the cryptographic software itself expire?

(Yes, IE6, I'm looking at you!)

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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HI Hannes,

On 02/07/2014 04:37 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> good discussion points.
>
> Here are my views:
>
> a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software lifecycle,
> as I did in
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01,
> then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level of
> cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with Internet
> security. That's good news.

thanks for chiming in, I think you are right regarding primitives; let 
me note that weak protocols and insecure deployment practices are 
perfectly in scope for CFRG  as well as primitives.   But the other 
major category of weakness, widespread exploitable vulnerabilities in 
software implementations, is one that is hugely important, and which is 
out of scope for CFRG.   The problem of exploitable vulnerabilities 
doesn't get the air-time that it deserves, relative to the other 
issues.   An exploit could force its victim to do all sorts of bad 
cryptographic practices, such as leak a key in an IV, or use a fixed or 
low-entropy key.

>
> The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work that
> would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does not offer
> end-to-end security and that's something that could be fixed in the IETF
> (and there is work ongoing in the DIME working group for Diameter at
> least). The main challenge, however, is the attitude problem of those
> deploying the protocol.

I agree about the attitude, but I don't agree that CFRG couldn't 
help.    Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the 
problems with RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and 
helping to socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in 
charter and are worth doing.

>
> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks that
> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients are:
> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecting
> an algorithm
> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>
> Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it more
> credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community could
> reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms, encryption
> algorithms, etc.
>
> Just a thought...

Agree that IETF is and should be willing to act as an international 
standards body for crypto, and that CFRG could support that process.   
We need to be careful not to over-commit in this area, but if the IETF 
wanted CFRG to vet some crypto standards options, we should be able to 
do that.

David

>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Hi All,
>>
>> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do
>> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>>
>> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rather
>> by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, and
>> I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about what
>> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at
>> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider
>> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note that
>> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>>
>> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanisms
>> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keeping
>> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or might
>> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
>> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacement.
>>
>> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that can
>> be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all of
>> those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in use.   We
>> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of software
>> that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that will
>> slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is.
>> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of
>> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for
>> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy
>> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden is
>> on us to provide this justification.
>>
>> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad cryptography
>> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it
>> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now.
>> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
>> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in particular.   It
>> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and how
>> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on our
>> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front of
>> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident that, if
>> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
>> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information.
>>
>> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some
>> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would be
>> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one
>> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were done
>> right.
>>
>> David
>>
>> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
>>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented
>>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>>
>>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how
>>>> things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book
>>>> was published.
>>>>
>>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing
>>>> things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol
>>>> (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some
>>>> flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
>>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
>>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
>>> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
>>> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
>>> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
>>> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>>>
>>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
>>> responding to the changing situation.
>>>
>>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now
>>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>>
>>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less
>>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a
>>>> limit.
>>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
>>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the
>>> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
>>> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
>>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
>>> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
>>> and I'll do it.
>>>
>>> Sincerely,
>>> Watson
>>>> -- 
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>>
>>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>>
>>>>    <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in TLS.
>>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>>>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
>>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
>>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>>
>>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years later,
>>>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if we
>>>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
>>>> being informed of an attack.
>>>>
>>>> Sincerely,
>>>> Watson Ladd
>>>>> regards,
>>>>> Nikos
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>
>>>> -- 
>>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi Hannes:

Historically, not that many CFRG/IETF people seem to have participated 
in solicitations for public review of NIST draft publications. I wonder, 
therefore, what makes you feel this would change dramatically, should 
CFRG/IETF take on an effort as complement or partially duplicated effort 
of what NIST has already done.

Note - data suggests this has been pretty consistent over time, both for 
the last solicited draft crypto recommendation review and for those in 
the last few years.

Best regards, Rene

==
[excerpt of email Hannes Tschofenig, February 7,2014, 4:37pm EST]

b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks that
are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients are:
* open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecting
an algorithm
* a suitable way for publishing these documents.

On 2/10/2014 2:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> HI Hannes,
>
> On 02/07/2014 04:37 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> good discussion points.
>>
>> Here are my views:
>>
>> a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software lifecycle,
>> as I did in
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01,
>> then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level of
>> cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with Internet
>> security. That's good news.
>
> thanks for chiming in, I think you are right regarding primitives; let 
> me note that weak protocols and insecure deployment practices are 
> perfectly in scope for CFRG  as well as primitives.   But the other 
> major category of weakness, widespread exploitable vulnerabilities in 
> software implementations, is one that is hugely important, and which 
> is out of scope for CFRG.   The problem of exploitable vulnerabilities 
> doesn't get the air-time that it deserves, relative to the other 
> issues.   An exploit could force its victim to do all sorts of bad 
> cryptographic practices, such as leak a key in an IV, or use a fixed 
> or low-entropy key.
>
>>
>> The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work that
>> would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does not offer
>> end-to-end security and that's something that could be fixed in the IETF
>> (and there is work ongoing in the DIME working group for Diameter at
>> least). The main challenge, however, is the attitude problem of those
>> deploying the protocol.
>
> I agree about the attitude, but I don't agree that CFRG couldn't 
> help.    Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the 
> problems with RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues 
> and helping to socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all 
> in charter and are worth doing.
>
>>
>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks that
>> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
>> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
>> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients 
>> are:
>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecting
>> an algorithm
>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>
>> Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it more
>> credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community could
>> reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms, encryption
>> algorithms, etc.
>>
>> Just a thought...
>
> Agree that IETF is and should be willing to act as an international 
> standards body for crypto, and that CFRG could support that process.   
> We need to be careful not to over-commit in this area, but if the IETF 
> wanted CFRG to vet some crypto standards options, we should be able to 
> do that.
>
> David
>
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>
>> On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>> Hi All,
>>>
>>> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do
>>> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>>>
>>> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rather
>>> by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, and
>>> I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about what
>>> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at
>>> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider
>>> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note 
>>> that
>>> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>>>
>>> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanisms
>>> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keeping
>>> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or 
>>> might
>>> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
>>> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacement.
>>>
>>> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that can
>>> be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all of
>>> those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in 
>>> use.   We
>>> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of software
>>> that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that will
>>> slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is.
>>> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of
>>> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for
>>> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy
>>> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden is
>>> on us to provide this justification.
>>>
>>> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad 
>>> cryptography
>>> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it
>>> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now.
>>> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
>>> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in 
>>> particular.   It
>>> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and how
>>> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on 
>>> our
>>> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front of
>>> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident 
>>> that, if
>>> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
>>> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information.
>>>
>>> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some
>>> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would be
>>> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one
>>> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were done
>>> right.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
>>>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented
>>>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>>>
>>>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how
>>>>> things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book
>>>>> was published.
>>>>>
>>>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing
>>>>> things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol
>>>>> (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some
>>>>> flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
>>>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
>>>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
>>>> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
>>>> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
>>>> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
>>>> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>>>>
>>>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
>>>> responding to the changing situation.
>>>>
>>>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now
>>>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>>>
>>>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less
>>>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a
>>>>> limit.
>>>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
>>>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the
>>>> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
>>>> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
>>>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
>>>> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>>>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
>>>> and I'll do it.
>>>>
>>>> Sincerely,
>>>> Watson
>>>>> -- 
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>>>
>>>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>>>
>>>>> <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>>>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did 
>>>>>>> in TLS.
>>>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>>>>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). 
>>>>>> There
>>>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
>>>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>>>
>>>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years 
>>>>>> later,
>>>>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>>>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>>>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even 
>>>>> if we
>>>>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
>>>>> being informed of an attack.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>> Watson Ladd
>>>>>> regards,
>>>>>> Nikos
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>
>>>>> -- 
>>>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363


From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Mon Feb 10 12:59:21 2014
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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I think adding energy and appropriate tasking to CFRG is a fine
idea, but this bit is a bit of a potential rathole...

On 02/10/2014 07:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the problems with
> RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and helping to
> socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in charter and
> are worth doing.

I'm not clear on this. I don't think there are non-obvious
crypto issues with RADIUS or Diameter that CFRG can tackle
to be honest. Or maybe I'm not missing something?

I don't think CFRG should be collectively "documenting security
issues" generally, if those that are not cryptographic. Reason
being that that'd likely generate more heat than light and would
overlap with secdir and IETF WGs too much probably.

I could maybe see re-chartering to include theorem-prover style
analyses or results in CFRG's charter, but I interpret the above
differently.

If some CFRG folk are interested in e.g. RADIUS security,
then they are just as free as anyone to send mail to the
DIME list.

Cheers,
S.



From mcgrew@cisco.com  Mon Feb 10 14:45:58 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] CFRG at IETF 89 in London - call for presentation requests
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Hi,

CFRG will be meeting in London; the agenda is here 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/89/agenda.html

Please let us know if you would like a slot at the meeting to give a 
presentation.   To those people who have already sent in requests, you 
don't need to send in another.  Remote presentations have been done at 
previous meetings.   The experience is not great, but it is possible.

Interestingly, the 21st International Workshop on Fast Software 
Encryption is also in London at the same time, at the Natural History 
Museum across Kensington Gardens: http://fse2014.isg.rhul.ac.uk/     
Perhaps some of us can find a pub somewhere in between :-)   The 
unfortunate part is that the CFRG session overlaps with the morning of 
the first day of FSE.

David and Kevin


From dan@geer.org  Mon Feb 10 21:09:05 2014
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From: dan@geer.org
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 10 Feb 2014 15:15:57 GMT." <52F8ED2D.4060502@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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 > No-longer-deemed-secure algorithms aren't the only security problems 
 > facing out-of-date cryptographic software.  So why not go one step 
 > further and make the cryptographic software itself expire?


Might I extend this to crypto-in-hardware-in-embedded-systems?

In other words, absolutely all embedded systems must either have a
remote upgrade capability or a not-to-exceed pre-defined lifetime.

Both options are ugly.

--dan


From watsonbladd@gmail.com  Mon Feb 10 21:47:56 2014
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On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:09 PM,  <dan@geer.org> wrote:
>
>  > No-longer-deemed-secure algorithms aren't the only security problems
>  > facing out-of-date cryptographic software.  So why not go one step
>  > further and make the cryptographic software itself expire?
>
>
> Might I extend this to crypto-in-hardware-in-embedded-systems?
>
> In other words, absolutely all embedded systems must either have a
> remote upgrade capability or a not-to-exceed pre-defined lifetime.

There is an assumption being made here: that algorithms will age
badly. This assumption is largely unwarranted.
First off, software does not decay. It does not develop security
problems spontaneously. Protocols with reductions remain
secure so long as the fundamental problems they reduce to remain hard.

The reasons why a piece of hardware made in 1996 would, 17 years
later, be no longer secure if properly designed in the first place,
would
likely be the hash function. IDEA remains secure, even with the small
block causing fun at 4 GB. Blowfish is unlikely to have been done in
hardware. Triple DES would be fine today, but single DES would have
been on the way out due to the small 2^56 key size.

Public key would likely be RSA. The big advances in algorithms were
all known at that point, so one just has to play the Moore's law game.
For ECC the security situation looks the same, and for Diffie-Hellman
over prime fields, I don't recall.

The hash function would have died: it would have been MD5. With any
luck they would have used signature schemes that avoid falling to
simple collisions, but that's unlikely for RSA.

The big problem is that the standards were and are so terrible. SSL v3
made 3 mistakes: predictable IVs, a complex state machine, and
exposing a CBC padding oracle. PKCS 1.5 had lots wrong with it. For
this hardware to be useful, it wouldn't have made it to 2013 without
massive problems beyond the weak hash.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin


From dkg@fifthhorseman.net  Mon Feb 10 22:40:38 2014
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Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2014 01:40:32 -0500
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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On 02/11/2014 12:47 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> There is an assumption being made here: that algorithms will age
> badly. This assumption is largely unwarranted.

As the person who suggested "expiring" algorithms or protocols, i should
probably point out that this is *not* my underlying assumption.

My assumption was that we gain knowledge and experience, and in light of
the new knowledge and experience, *some* algorithms or protocols do not
hold up well (as you document clearly about hash functions and SSLv3).

In hindsight, we know which mechanisms didn't hold up; but during
deployment, that's not necessarily knowable.  Presumably we believe the
code we're deploying to be reasonably strong when we deploy it; and we
assume that it will hold up over time, but we don't know.

Introducing an "expiration" date is a mechanism for ensuring that the
software actively validates that assumption against some external source
at some point.  It's even possible that the source could say "carry on;
algorithm X should have its expiration date extended to June of 2020".

The alternative might be what we have today: a bunch of known-broken
algorithms, widely-deployed, with no clear termination date, so everyone
keeps on deploying them, because we keep expecting to need to
interoperate with these interminably-unsupportable known-bad
implementations.

If there are other ideas about how to avoid this problem besides
expiration or revocation, i'd love to hear some suggestions.  What we
have now doesn't seem to be working to get the 'net switched over to
known-good tools with any sort of plausible speed, even as known
weaknesses are present.

> Protocols with reductions remain
> secure so long as the fundamental problems they reduce to remain hard.

Even with a security reduction, it's possible that researchers discover
that the security model used with the reduction doesn't actually apply
in a real-world scenario where the algorithm was actually used; or that
the algorithm's resistance to online attack in a given instance (or with
given parameters) can be weakened with some sort of novel massive
pre-computation that we didn't expect to be feasible; or some other
break in the relationship between the model and reality that no one fores=
aw.

If there is consensus that any of these cryptanalysis failures happened,
having an expiration or a globalized check for revocation would provide
a way to disable a mechanism for a given use.

Regards,

	--dkg


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi Stephen,

On 02/10/2014 03:59 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> I think adding energy and appropriate tasking to CFRG is a fine
> idea, but this bit is a bit of a potential rathole...
>
> On 02/10/2014 07:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the problems with
>> RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and helping to
>> socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in charter and
>> are worth doing.
> I'm not clear on this. I don't think there are non-obvious
> crypto issues with RADIUS or Diameter that CFRG can tackle
> to be honest. Or maybe I'm not missing something?
>
> I don't think CFRG should be collectively "documenting security
> issues" generally, if those that are not cryptographic. Reason
> being that that'd likely generate more heat than light and would
> overlap with secdir and IETF WGs too much probably.

I was being too vague, sorry.  By "documenting security issues" I had in 
mind those cases in which some sort of cryptanalysis needs to be brought 
to bear in order to show that, yes, there is an actual attack that can 
be performed.   Sometimes some applied cryptanalysis needs to be done to 
make the point that some existing algorithm or parameter choice is no 
longer appropriate (or perhaps was never a good idea).    The 
standards-oriented people in CFRG could probably identify some 
low-hanging fruit that the cryptanalysis-oriented people would enjoy 
breaking.

Definitely we need to avoid the overlap that you mention.

David

>
> I could maybe see re-chartering to include theorem-prover style
> analyses or results in CFRG's charter, but I interpret the above
> differently.
>
> If some CFRG folk are interested in e.g. RADIUS security,
> then they are just as free as anyone to send mail to the
> DIME list.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
>
> .
>


From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Tue Feb 11 08:31:20 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi David,

Thanks for the clarification. Makes sense now.

On 02/11/2014 04:16 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> The standards-oriented people in CFRG could probably identify some
> low-hanging fruit that the cryptanalysis-oriented people would enjoy
> breaking.

I have one that might tempt someone. HTTPBIS are trying to
find a way to compress headers that's not vulnerable to
BEAST/CRIME like attacks. There's a thread at. [1]

Its not crypto exactly, but the same kinds of expertise
would be very useful.


Cheers,
S.

[1] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2014JanMar/0233.html


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If I look at where we are now (well, I look at the bad parts of it) -
and  I look back at how we could have avoided being in the bad shapes
we are, the following comes to mind.


Small-Key RSA has taken too long to deprecate. RSA512, RSA1024.
RSA1024 is going to be used in some applications (payment devices) for
the next several years.  What would accelerate their deprecation? I've
spoken to numerous folks, and while they're all quite familiar with
the GNFS, no one is willing to go record with estimates. Perhaps the
CRFG could estimate computation needs, and costs for factoring RSA
1024 and 2048, and reevaluate it every so often. There's a difference
bewteen "The NSA can pobably factor RSA1024" and "This group of
cryptographers think we can factor it if we have $2 Million".
(Especially if someone has $2M and wants to have a go at it.)


SSL Devices have caused extraordinary upgrade pains. 0-Byte Record
Sizes, Version Intolerance, Suite & Extension Intolerance. Rigorous
test cases for these may have prevented these.  At the very least, we
wouldn't _still_ be generally ignorant about what vendors and firmware
versions are intolerant. Public pressure could help get these resolved
sooner.


We _still_ don't have a general purpose, largely complete SSL
certificate deployment for testing certificate validation. And lord
knows we have enough incorrect certificate validators.


We focus on content confidentiality. Maybe we don't care about sender
or receiver anonymity. (I do, a lot of folks do, but maybe this group
doesn't.) But if we do, we could work on that.


Similarly, there are very few designs (one?) for mutually distrusting
centrally managed architectures. In Certificate Transparency, you have
N logs all run independently asserting their view of things. What if
you had N logs talking to each other and voting to assert one
consensus document?


How about remote attestation of servers so we can assert they are
running the software stack (and web application) they purport to be?


Just some thoughts.
-tom


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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'Watson Ladd' <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "dan@geer.org" <dan@geer.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Watson et al:

>=20
> There is an assumption being made here: that algorithms will age badly.
> This assumption is largely unwarranted.
> First off, software does not decay. It does not develop security
> problems spontaneously. Protocols with reductions remain secure so long
> as the fundamental problems they reduce to remain hard.
>=20

I'd disagree slightly in that Moore's law says that the computational cost
of an attack halves every 18 months.  If one assumes Moore's law will conti=
nue
to apply, eventually its rising tide will engulf any given choice of parame=
ter=20
sizes.  Certainly Moore's Law must eventually grind to a halt, but over the=
=20
years I've lost good money by drawing a line in the sand that I bet Moore's=
=20
law could never get past.

There are, of course, more pressing issues than worrying about Moore's law.


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:48 AM
> To: dan@geer.org
> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
>=20
> On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:09 PM,  <dan@geer.org> wrote:
> >
> >  > No-longer-deemed-secure algorithms aren't the only security
> > problems  > facing out-of-date cryptographic software.  So why not go
> > one step  > further and make the cryptographic software itself
> expire?
> >
> >
> > Might I extend this to crypto-in-hardware-in-embedded-systems?
> >
> > In other words, absolutely all embedded systems must either have a
> > remote upgrade capability or a not-to-exceed pre-defined lifetime.
>=20
> There is an assumption being made here: that algorithms will age badly.
> This assumption is largely unwarranted.
> First off, software does not decay. It does not develop security
> problems spontaneously. Protocols with reductions remain secure so long
> as the fundamental problems they reduce to remain hard.
>=20
I'd disagree slightly in that Moore's law says that the computational cost
of an attack halves every 18 months.  If one assume Moore's law will contin=
ue
to apply, inevitably the rising tide will engulf any give choice of paramet=
er
sizes.  Of course Moore's Law must eventually grind to a halt, but over the
years I've lost good money by drawing a line in the sand that I bet Moore's=
=20
law could never get past.=20



> The reasons why a piece of hardware made in 1996 would, 17 years later,
> be no longer secure if properly designed in the first place, would
> likely be the hash function. IDEA remains secure, even with the small
> block causing fun at 4 GB. Blowfish is unlikely to have been done in
> hardware. Triple DES would be fine today, but single DES would have
> been on the way out due to the small 2^56 key size.
>=20
> Public key would likely be RSA. The big advances in algorithms were all
> known at that point, so one just has to play the Moore's law game.
> For ECC the security situation looks the same, and for Diffie-Hellman
> over prime fields, I don't recall.
>=20
> The hash function would have died: it would have been MD5. With any
> luck they would have used signature schemes that avoid falling to
> simple collisions, but that's unlikely for RSA.
>=20
> The big problem is that the standards were and are so terrible. SSL v3
> made 3 mistakes: predictable IVs, a complex state machine, and exposing
> a CBC padding oracle. PKCS 1.5 had lots wrong with it. For this
> hardware to be useful, it wouldn't have made it to 2013 without massive
> problems beyond the weak hash.
>=20
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>=20
> --
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Wed Feb 12 12:21:02 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi David,

I believe it is important to move beyond writing specifications to
improving implementations and deployments. I think we both agree. I have
been arguing for this for a while now and got pretty much no positive
feedback. I also tried to convince the IAB that this would be somewhat
important and completely failed. The response I got was: "This would
require a completely different skill set." and "ISOC should do it."

I don't have a good story for how to do that even at the level of
individual work groups. I tried this in the OAuth working group and
couldn't really find a way how to reach out to the large number of guys
implementing OAuth libraries let alone those who deploy them.

The CFRG might, unfortunately, not be the right group either. To me it
seems that the folks in this group are focused on crypto (as the name of
the group indicates). What we need is guys who understand the broader
Internet ecosystem and know how to improve security libraries and to
reach out to the wider Internet (security) community. One does not need
to start from scratch since some of these communities exist but they
often have no connection to the IETF or the relationship is very weak.
As such, you often find a misalignment between the IETF security
community and various other groups.

My impression is that most IETF participants have not even recognized
the need to take any action yet. I have often heard that this is
"out-side-the-scope".

Ciao
Hannes

On 02/10/2014 07:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> HI Hannes,
>=20
> On 02/07/2014 04:37 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> good discussion points.
>>
>> Here are my views:
>>
>> a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software lifecycl=
e,
>> as I did in
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01,
>> then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level of
>> cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with Interne=
t
>> security. That's good news.
>=20
> thanks for chiming in, I think you are right regarding primitives; let
> me note that weak protocols and insecure deployment practices are
> perfectly in scope for CFRG  as well as primitives.   But the other
> major category of weakness, widespread exploitable vulnerabilities in
> software implementations, is one that is hugely important, and which is=

> out of scope for CFRG.   The problem of exploitable vulnerabilities
> doesn't get the air-time that it deserves, relative to the other
> issues.   An exploit could force its victim to do all sorts of bad
> cryptographic practices, such as leak a key in an IV, or use a fixed or=

> low-entropy key.
>=20
>>
>> The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work tha=
t
>> would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does not off=
er
>> end-to-end security and that's something that could be fixed in the IE=
TF
>> (and there is work ongoing in the DIME working group for Diameter at
>> least). The main challenge, however, is the attitude problem of those
>> deploying the protocol.
>=20
> I agree about the attitude, but I don't agree that CFRG couldn't
> help.    Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the
> problems with RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and=

> helping to socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in
> charter and are worth doing.
>=20
>>
>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role=
=2E
>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks th=
at
>> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
>> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done=

>> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients
>> are:
>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecti=
ng
>> an algorithm
>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>
>> Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it more
>> credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community could
>> reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms, encryption
>> algorithms, etc.
>>
>> Just a thought...
>=20
> Agree that IETF is and should be willing to act as an international
> standards body for crypto, and that CFRG could support that process. =20
> We need to be careful not to over-commit in this area, but if the IETF
> wanted CFRG to vet some crypto standards options, we should be able to
> do that.
>=20
> David
>=20
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>
>> On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>> Hi All,
>>>
>>> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do
>>> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>>>
>>> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rathe=
r
>>> by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, a=
nd
>>> I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about what=

>>> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at
>>> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider
>>> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note t=
hat
>>> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>>>
>>> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanis=
ms
>>> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keepin=
g
>>> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or mi=
ght
>>> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
>>> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacemen=
t.
>>>
>>> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that c=
an
>>> be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all =
of
>>> those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in use.  =
 We
>>> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of softwar=
e
>>> that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that wi=
ll
>>> slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is.
>>> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of
>>> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for
>>> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy
>>> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden =
is
>>> on us to provide this justification.
>>>
>>> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad cryptogra=
phy
>>> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it=

>>> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now=
=2E
>>> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
>>> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in particular.  =
 It
>>> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and ho=
w
>>> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on =
our
>>> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front =
of
>>> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident that,=
 if
>>> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
>>> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information=
=2E
>>>
>>> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some
>>> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would =
be
>>> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one
>>> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were do=
ne
>>> right.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
>>>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented
>>>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>>>
>>>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of h=
ow
>>>>> things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" bo=
ok
>>>>> was published.
>>>>>
>>>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing
>>>>> things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol
>>>>> (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some
>>>>> flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
>>>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
>>>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
>>>> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't=

>>>> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare th=
e
>>>> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13=

>>>> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>>>>
>>>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
>>>> responding to the changing situation.
>>>>
>>>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now
>>>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>>>
>>>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less
>>>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a=

>>>>> limit.
>>>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
>>>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has t=
he
>>>> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problem=
s
>>>> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
>>>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that ne=
w
>>>> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>>>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,=

>>>> and I'll do it.
>>>>
>>>> Sincerely,
>>>> Watson
>>>>> --=20
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>>>
>>>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>>>
>>>>>    <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>>>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in=

>>>>>>> TLS.
>>>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested=

>>>>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). Th=
ere
>>>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attack=
s.
>>>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>>>
>>>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years
>>>>>> later,
>>>>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>>>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>>>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if=
 we
>>>>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years aft=
er
>>>>> being informed of an attack.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>> Watson Ladd
>>>>>> regards,
>>>>>> Nikos
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>
>>>>> --=20
>>>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
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From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Wed Feb 12 12:23:29 2014
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi Rene,

my impression was that until recently many IETF participants just
trusted NIST to do the right thing. So, why would you care when things
are going fine anyway?

During the last few months that impression might have changed a bit and
there might be more energy to improve transparency and to explore new
directions.

Ciao
Hannes

On 02/10/2014 08:05 PM, Rene Struik wrote:
> Hi Hannes:
>=20
> Historically, not that many CFRG/IETF people seem to have participated
> in solicitations for public review of NIST draft publications. I wonder=
,
> therefore, what makes you feel this would change dramatically, should
> CFRG/IETF take on an effort as complement or partially duplicated effor=
t
> of what NIST has already done.
>=20
> Note - data suggests this has been pretty consistent over time, both fo=
r
> the last solicited draft crypto recommendation review and for those in
> the last few years.
>=20
> Best regards, Rene
>=20
> =3D=3D
> [excerpt of email Hannes Tschofenig, February 7,2014, 4:37pm EST]
>=20
> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.=

> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks tha=
t
> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients a=
re:
> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selectin=
g
> an algorithm
> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>=20
> On 2/10/2014 2:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> HI Hannes,
>>
>> On 02/07/2014 04:37 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>>> Hi David,
>>>
>>> good discussion points.
>>>
>>> Here are my views:
>>>
>>> a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software lifecyc=
le,
>>> as I did in
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01,
>>> then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level of
>>> cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with Intern=
et
>>> security. That's good news.
>>
>> thanks for chiming in, I think you are right regarding primitives; let=

>> me note that weak protocols and insecure deployment practices are
>> perfectly in scope for CFRG  as well as primitives.   But the other
>> major category of weakness, widespread exploitable vulnerabilities in
>> software implementations, is one that is hugely important, and which
>> is out of scope for CFRG.   The problem of exploitable vulnerabilities=

>> doesn't get the air-time that it deserves, relative to the other
>> issues.   An exploit could force its victim to do all sorts of bad
>> cryptographic practices, such as leak a key in an IV, or use a fixed
>> or low-entropy key.
>>
>>>
>>> The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work th=
at
>>> would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does not of=
fer
>>> end-to-end security and that's something that could be fixed in the I=
ETF
>>> (and there is work ongoing in the DIME working group for Diameter at
>>> least). The main challenge, however, is the attitude problem of those=

>>> deploying the protocol.
>>
>> I agree about the attitude, but I don't agree that CFRG couldn't
>> help.    Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the
>> problems with RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues
>> and helping to socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all
>> in charter and are worth doing.
>>
>>>
>>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting rol=
e.
>>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks t=
hat
>>> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
>>> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not don=
e
>>> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients=

>>> are:
>>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and select=
ing
>>> an algorithm
>>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>>
>>> Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it more=

>>> credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community could
>>> reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms, encryption
>>> algorithms, etc.
>>>
>>> Just a thought...
>>
>> Agree that IETF is and should be willing to act as an international
>> standards body for crypto, and that CFRG could support that process.  =

>> We need to be careful not to over-commit in this area, but if the IETF=

>> wanted CFRG to vet some crypto standards options, we should be able to=

>> do that.
>>
>> David
>>
>>>
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>>
>>> On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>>> Hi All,
>>>>
>>>> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do
>>>> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>>>>
>>>> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rath=
er
>>>> by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, =
and
>>>> I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about wha=
t
>>>> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at=

>>>> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider=

>>>> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note
>>>> that
>>>> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>>>>
>>>> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechani=
sms
>>>> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keepi=
ng
>>>> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or
>>>> might
>>>> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
>>>> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replaceme=
nt.
>>>>
>>>> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that =
can
>>>> be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all=
 of
>>>> those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in
>>>> use.   We
>>>> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of softwa=
re
>>>> that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that w=
ill
>>>> slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is.=

>>>> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of
>>>> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for
>>>> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy=

>>>> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden=
 is
>>>> on us to provide this justification.
>>>>
>>>> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad
>>>> cryptography
>>>> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that i=
t
>>>> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process no=
w.
>>>> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
>>>> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in
>>>> particular.   It
>>>> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and h=
ow
>>>> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on=

>>>> our
>>>> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front=
 of
>>>> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident
>>>> that, if
>>>> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
>>>> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that informatio=
n.
>>>>
>>>> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some
>>>> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would=
 be
>>>> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one=

>>>> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were d=
one
>>>> right.
>>>>
>>>> David
>>>>
>>>> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
>>>>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented
>>>>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of =
how
>>>>>> things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" b=
ook
>>>>>> was published.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing=

>>>>>> things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol
>>>>>> (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some
>>>>>> flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
>>>>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
>>>>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons=

>>>>> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn'=
t
>>>>> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare t=
he
>>>>> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 1=
3
>>>>> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>>>>>
>>>>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
>>>>> responding to the changing situation.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now
>>>>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less
>>>>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has =
a
>>>>>> limit.
>>>>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
>>>>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has =
the
>>>>> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these proble=
ms
>>>>> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
>>>>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that n=
ew
>>>>> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>>>>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them=
,
>>>>> and I'll do it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>> Watson
>>>>>> --=20
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>>>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>>>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>>>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>>>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>>>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>>>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>>>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>>>>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did
>>>>>>>> in TLS.
>>>>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggeste=
d
>>>>>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>>>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent).
>>>>>>> There
>>>>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>>>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>>>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attac=
ks.
>>>>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years
>>>>>>> later,
>>>>>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>>>>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>>>>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>>>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even
>>>>>> if we
>>>>>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years af=
ter
>>>>>> being informed of an attack.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>> Watson Ladd
>>>>>>> regards,
>>>>>>> Nikos
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --=20
>>>>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>>>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>>>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>=20
>=20


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Hi David,

there are really no crypto issues with RADIUS and Diameter.

The issue is that vendors don't implement the security protocols
mandated in our RFCs and, if they are implemented, operators don't turn
them on because they rely on "physical security".

On top of that we don't have a incomplete toolbox; there is no e2e
security solution standardized for RADIUS/Diameter.

The consequence is that highly sensitive transaction data flies around
in the clear or, if it is protected, then all intermediaries see it.

I organized a few Diameter interops several years ago and the biggest
problem we had was with security. Very few implementations implemented
TLS and it took us a day at each event to configure the certificates
since every implementation had their own management interface which
nobody knew how to use. Once we got past that point we found out that
none of the implementations were actually checking the certificates anywa=
y.

A couple of years have passed since that time and I really hope that the
situation is better now. At least there is FreeDiameter...

Ciao
Hannes

On 02/11/2014 04:16 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
>=20
> On 02/10/2014 03:59 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> I think adding energy and appropriate tasking to CFRG is a fine
>> idea, but this bit is a bit of a potential rathole...
>>
>> On 02/10/2014 07:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>> Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the problems with=

>>> RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and helping to
>>> socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in charter and=

>>> are worth doing.
>> I'm not clear on this. I don't think there are non-obvious
>> crypto issues with RADIUS or Diameter that CFRG can tackle
>> to be honest. Or maybe I'm not missing something?
>>
>> I don't think CFRG should be collectively "documenting security
>> issues" generally, if those that are not cryptographic. Reason
>> being that that'd likely generate more heat than light and would
>> overlap with secdir and IETF WGs too much probably.
>=20
> I was being too vague, sorry.  By "documenting security issues" I had i=
n
> mind those cases in which some sort of cryptanalysis needs to be brough=
t
> to bear in order to show that, yes, there is an actual attack that can
> be performed.   Sometimes some applied cryptanalysis needs to be done t=
o
> make the point that some existing algorithm or parameter choice is no
> longer appropriate (or perhaps was never a good idea).    The
> standards-oriented people in CFRG could probably identify some
> low-hanging fruit that the cryptanalysis-oriented people would enjoy
> breaking.
>=20
> Definitely we need to avoid the overlap that you mention.
>=20
> David
>=20
>>
>> I could maybe see re-chartering to include theorem-prover style
>> analyses or results in CFRG's charter, but I interpret the above
>> differently.
>>
>> If some CFRG folk are interested in e.g. RADIUS security,
>> then they are just as free as anyone to send mail to the
>> DIME list.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>
>>
>> .
>>
>=20


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Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 17:34:41 -0500
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "nmav@gnutls.org" <nmav@gnutls.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi Hannes,

On 02/12/2014 12:35 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> there are really no crypto issues with RADIUS and Diameter.

certainly that's true if RFC 6614 is used (TLS for RADIUS).   There are 
issues with the crypto defined in the original RFC 2865 RADIUS, on the 
other hand.  (Encryption is done using MD5 as a keystream generator, 
with a secret that may be vulnerable to a dictionary attack, with 
incomplete authentication.)

> The issue is that vendors don't implement the security protocols
> mandated in our RFCs and, if they are implemented, operators don't turn
> them on because they rely on "physical security".
>
> On top of that we don't have a incomplete toolbox; there is no e2e
> security solution standardized for RADIUS/Diameter.
>
> The consequence is that highly sensitive transaction data flies around
> in the clear or, if it is protected, then all intermediaries see it.

Agreed.   We don't need a new crypto design to solve these problems.   
Some applied cryptanalysis on the currently-fielded systems might 
motivate people to upgrade to the newer, mandated mechanisms - that's 
what I was hoping when I mentioned RADIUS, anyway.

>
> I organized a few Diameter interops several years ago and the biggest
> problem we had was with security. Very few implementations implemented
> TLS and it took us a day at each event to configure the certificates
> since every implementation had their own management interface which
> nobody knew how to use. Once we got past that point we found out that
> none of the implementations were actually checking the certificates anyway.

Not good :-(

David

>
> A couple of years have passed since that time and I really hope that the
> situation is better now. At least there is FreeDiameter...
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> On 02/11/2014 04:16 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Hi Stephen,
>>
>> On 02/10/2014 03:59 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>> I think adding energy and appropriate tasking to CFRG is a fine
>>> idea, but this bit is a bit of a potential rathole...
>>>
>>> On 02/10/2014 07:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>>> Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the problems with
>>>> RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and helping to
>>>> socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in charter and
>>>> are worth doing.
>>> I'm not clear on this. I don't think there are non-obvious
>>> crypto issues with RADIUS or Diameter that CFRG can tackle
>>> to be honest. Or maybe I'm not missing something?
>>>
>>> I don't think CFRG should be collectively "documenting security
>>> issues" generally, if those that are not cryptographic. Reason
>>> being that that'd likely generate more heat than light and would
>>> overlap with secdir and IETF WGs too much probably.
>> I was being too vague, sorry.  By "documenting security issues" I had in
>> mind those cases in which some sort of cryptanalysis needs to be brought
>> to bear in order to show that, yes, there is an actual attack that can
>> be performed.   Sometimes some applied cryptanalysis needs to be done to
>> make the point that some existing algorithm or parameter choice is no
>> longer appropriate (or perhaps was never a good idea).    The
>> standards-oriented people in CFRG could probably identify some
>> low-hanging fruit that the cryptanalysis-oriented people would enjoy
>> breaking.
>>
>> Definitely we need to avoid the overlap that you mention.
>>
>> David
>>
>>> I could maybe see re-chartering to include theorem-prover style
>>> analyses or results in CFRG's charter, but I interpret the above
>>> differently.
>>>
>>> If some CFRG folk are interested in e.g. RADIUS security,
>>> then they are just as free as anyone to send mail to the
>>> DIME list.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> S.
>>>
>>>
>>> .
>>>


From paul@marvell.com  Wed Feb 12 16:19:52 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 16:19:24 -0800
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On 2/12/14, 9:35 AM, "Hannes Tschofenig" <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:

>Hi David,
>
>there are really no crypto issues with RADIUS and Diameter.

??  Perhaps because they have no crypto.
The RADIUS/Diameter AAA architecture is flawed by the inclusion
of so many options that insecure deployments are common.

>
>The issue is that vendors don't implement the security protocols
>mandated in our RFCs and, if they are implemented, operators don't turn
>them on because they rely on "physical security".

Yes.  Our guidelines here are poor.  TLS or IPsec are specified
and even when used typically leave gaps due to =B3physical security"

>
>On top of that we don't have a incomplete toolbox; there is no e2e
>security solution standardized for RADIUS/Diameter.

Would this be a work item?

>
>The consequence is that highly sensitive transaction data flies around
>in the clear or, if it is protected, then all intermediaries see it.
>
>I organized a few Diameter interops several years ago and the biggest
>problem we had was with security. Very few implementations implemented
>TLS and it took us a day at each event to configure the certificates
>since every implementation had their own management interface which
>nobody knew how to use. Once we got past that point we found out that
>none of the implementations were actually checking the certificates
>anyway.
Yes!  A fundamental problem - X.509 :-)

Al


>
>A couple of years have passed since that time and I really hope that the
>situation is better now. At least there is FreeDiameter...
>
>Ciao
>Hannes
>
>On 02/11/2014 04:16 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Hi Stephen,
>>=20
>> On 02/10/2014 03:59 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>> I think adding energy and appropriate tasking to CFRG is a fine
>>> idea, but this bit is a bit of a potential rathole...
>>>
>>> On 02/10/2014 07:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>>> Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the problems with
>>>> RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and helping to
>>>> socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in charter and
>>>> are worth doing.
>>> I'm not clear on this. I don't think there are non-obvious
>>> crypto issues with RADIUS or Diameter that CFRG can tackle
>>> to be honest. Or maybe I'm not missing something?
>>>
>>> I don't think CFRG should be collectively "documenting security
>>> issues" generally, if those that are not cryptographic. Reason
>>> being that that'd likely generate more heat than light and would
>>> overlap with secdir and IETF WGs too much probably.
>>=20
>> I was being too vague, sorry.  By "documenting security issues" I had in
>> mind those cases in which some sort of cryptanalysis needs to be brought
>> to bear in order to show that, yes, there is an actual attack that can
>> be performed.   Sometimes some applied cryptanalysis needs to be done to
>> make the point that some existing algorithm or parameter choice is no
>> longer appropriate (or perhaps was never a good idea).    The
>> standards-oriented people in CFRG could probably identify some
>> low-hanging fruit that the cryptanalysis-oriented people would enjoy
>> breaking.
>>=20
>> Definitely we need to avoid the overlap that you mention.
>>=20
>> David
>>=20
>>>
>>> I could maybe see re-chartering to include theorem-prover style
>>> analyses or results in CFRG's charter, but I interpret the above
>>> differently.
>>>
>>> If some CFRG folk are interested in e.g. RADIUS security,
>>> then they are just as free as anyone to send mail to the
>>> DIME list.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> S.
>>>
>>>
>>> .
>>>
>>=20
>


From paul@marvell.com  Wed Feb 12 17:43:42 2014
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Subject: [Cfrg] AAA versus A+AA was -> Re: how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 22:28:49 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Cc: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "nmav@gnutls.org" <nmav@gnutls.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 9:08 AM, Hannes Tschofenig
<hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> I believe it is important to move beyond writing specifications to
> improving implementations and deployments. I think we both agree. I have
> been arguing for this for a while now and got pretty much no positive
> feedback. I also tried to convince the IAB that this would be somewhat
> important and completely failed. The response I got was: "This would
> require a completely different skill set." and "ISOC should do it."
>

Well, let's take TLS as an example. The two liberally licensed TLS
implementations are terrible in terms of code quality. PolarSSL is
better, but is GPL licensed and missing some essential security
features. The API for certificate validation in particular is quite
complex, and so certificates tend not to be validated.

I'll use this as a point to riff on the earlier issue of
vulnerabilities. So long as we write in C for the last epsilon of
performance we have a problem. Ada, Go, Java, Pascal, etc. are all
better because you cannot have the sort of memory issues that lead to
remote code execution. However, we know the solution and there are
very few interop issues with implementing it. Crypto is harder because
interop means innovation has to come all at once, and the standards
committees (especially ISO, but also IEC) are terrible. Look up
cryptanalysis of ISO standards sometime.

> I don't have a good story for how to do that even at the level of
> individual work groups. I tried this in the OAuth working group and
> couldn't really find a way how to reach out to the large number of guys
> implementing OAuth libraries let alone those who deploy them.

The idea is to put in the RFC everything needed to do the job right.
However, this is tricky.

>
> The CFRG might, unfortunately, not be the right group either. To me it
> seems that the folks in this group are focused on crypto (as the name of
> the group indicates). What we need is guys who understand the broader
> Internet ecosystem and know how to improve security libraries and to
> reach out to the wider Internet (security) community. One does not need
> to start from scratch since some of these communities exist but they
> often have no connection to the IETF or the relationship is very weak.
> As such, you often find a misalignment between the IETF security
> community and various other groups.
>
> My impression is that most IETF participants have not even recognized
> the need to take any action yet. I have often heard that this is
> "out-side-the-scope".

Incentives determine behaviour. So long as end-users give vendors a
pass on security, vendors will treat it as not a priority. It's also
unclear what the IETF can do here.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> On 02/10/2014 07:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> HI Hannes,
>>
>> On 02/07/2014 04:37 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>>> Hi David,
>>>
>>> good discussion points.
>>>
>>> Here are my views:
>>>
>>> a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software lifecycle,
>>> as I did in
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01,
>>> then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level of
>>> cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with Internet
>>> security. That's good news.
>>
>> thanks for chiming in, I think you are right regarding primitives; let
>> me note that weak protocols and insecure deployment practices are
>> perfectly in scope for CFRG  as well as primitives.   But the other
>> major category of weakness, widespread exploitable vulnerabilities in
>> software implementations, is one that is hugely important, and which is
>> out of scope for CFRG.   The problem of exploitable vulnerabilities
>> doesn't get the air-time that it deserves, relative to the other
>> issues.   An exploit could force its victim to do all sorts of bad
>> cryptographic practices, such as leak a key in an IV, or use a fixed or
>> low-entropy key.
>>
>>>
>>> The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work that
>>> would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does not offer
>>> end-to-end security and that's something that could be fixed in the IETF
>>> (and there is work ongoing in the DIME working group for Diameter at
>>> least). The main challenge, however, is the attitude problem of those
>>> deploying the protocol.
>>
>> I agree about the attitude, but I don't agree that CFRG couldn't
>> help.    Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the
>> problems with RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues and
>> helping to socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all in
>> charter and are worth doing.
>>
>>>
>>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
>>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks that
>>> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
>>> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
>>> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients
>>> are:
>>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecting
>>> an algorithm
>>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>>
>>> Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it more
>>> credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community could
>>> reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms, encryption
>>> algorithms, etc.
>>>
>>> Just a thought...
>>
>> Agree that IETF is and should be willing to act as an international
>> standards body for crypto, and that CFRG could support that process.
>> We need to be careful not to over-commit in this area, but if the IETF
>> wanted CFRG to vet some crypto standards options, we should be able to
>> do that.
>>
>> David
>>
>>>
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>>
>>> On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>>> Hi All,
>>>>
>>>> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do
>>>> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>>>>
>>>> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rather
>>>> by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, and
>>>> I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about what
>>>> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at
>>>> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider
>>>> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note that
>>>> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>>>>
>>>> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanisms
>>>> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keeping
>>>> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or might
>>>> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
>>>> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacement.
>>>>
>>>> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that can
>>>> be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all of
>>>> those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in use.   We
>>>> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of software
>>>> that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that will
>>>> slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is.
>>>> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of
>>>> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for
>>>> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy
>>>> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden is
>>>> on us to provide this justification.
>>>>
>>>> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad cryptography
>>>> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it
>>>> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now.
>>>> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
>>>> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in particular.   It
>>>> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and how
>>>> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on our
>>>> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front of
>>>> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident that, if
>>>> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
>>>> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information.
>>>>
>>>> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some
>>>> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would be
>>>> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one
>>>> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were done
>>>> right.
>>>>
>>>> David
>>>>
>>>> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
>>>>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented
>>>>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how
>>>>>> things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book
>>>>>> was published.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing
>>>>>> things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol
>>>>>> (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some
>>>>>> flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
>>>>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
>>>>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
>>>>> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
>>>>> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
>>>>> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
>>>>> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>>>>>
>>>>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
>>>>> responding to the changing situation.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now
>>>>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less
>>>>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a
>>>>>> limit.
>>>>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
>>>>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the
>>>>> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
>>>>> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
>>>>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
>>>>> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>>>>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
>>>>> and I'll do it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>> Watson
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>>>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>>>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>>>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>>>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>>>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>>>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>>>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>>>>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did in
>>>>>>>> TLS.
>>>>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>>>>>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>>>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent). There
>>>>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>>>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>>>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
>>>>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years
>>>>>>> later,
>>>>>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>>>>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>>>>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>>>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even if we
>>>>>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
>>>>>> being informed of an attack.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>> Watson Ladd
>>>>>>> regards,
>>>>>>> Nikos
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>>>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>>>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>
>
> _______________________________________________
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>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin


From paul@marvell.com  Thu Feb 13 09:27:07 2014
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "mcgrew@cisco.com" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 09:25:44 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] AAA versus A+AA was -> Re: how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] AAA versus A+AA was -> Re: how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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On 2/12/14, 9:36 PM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

>Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> writes:
>
>>I continue to wonder why we continue to build new systems on symmetric
>>key=20
>>based authentication techniques.  Symmetric keys are the main reason we
>>have=20
>>a triple-A (AAA -> authentication, authorization and accounting) versus
>>splitting up the functions and enabling a A+AA architecture where the
>>authentication could be performed directly by the directly participating
>>parties.
>
>The reason why it's a bad idea to do that with public-key is that, at
>least in=20
>the form of PKI, you start off doing the first A, and then you redo the
>first=20
>A, and then you make more changes to the first A, and then you release
>first-A=20
>version 3, and then you do some more of the first A, and 25-30 years
>later=20
>you're still redoing the first A without ever getting around to the other
>two.=20
>Symmetric-key RADIUS et al at least got around to doing all three right
>from=20
>the start.

Yes =8A good point, RADIUS could be relatively easily installed and then
worked well enough.

So the root of all security problems in the Internet is X.509  :-)

We have architected security based on a subtly flawed overly complex
authentication architecture.


Paul



>
>Peter.


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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To me, this seems to be an entirely new perspective on what it means to be an engineer or scientist :(((.

==
So, why would you care when things are going fine anyway?

On 2/12/2014 12:11 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Hi Rene,
>
> my impression was that until recently many IETF participants just
> trusted NIST to do the right thing. So, why would you care when things
> are going fine anyway?
>
> During the last few months that impression might have changed a bit and
> there might be more energy to improve transparency and to explore new
> directions.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> On 02/10/2014 08:05 PM, Rene Struik wrote:
>> Hi Hannes:
>>
>> Historically, not that many CFRG/IETF people seem to have participated
>> in solicitations for public review of NIST draft publications. I wonder,
>> therefore, what makes you feel this would change dramatically, should
>> CFRG/IETF take on an effort as complement or partially duplicated effort
>> of what NIST has already done.
>>
>> Note - data suggests this has been pretty consistent over time, both for
>> the last solicited draft crypto recommendation review and for those in
>> the last few years.
>>
>> Best regards, Rene
>>
>> ==
>> [excerpt of email Hannes Tschofenig, February 7,2014, 4:37pm EST]
>>
>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks that
>> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
>> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
>> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients are:
>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecting
>> an algorithm
>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>
>> On 2/10/2014 2:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>> HI Hannes,
>>>
>>> On 02/07/2014 04:37 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>>>> Hi David,
>>>>
>>>> good discussion points.
>>>>
>>>> Here are my views:
>>>>
>>>> a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software lifecycle,
>>>> as I did in
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01,
>>>> then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level of
>>>> cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with Internet
>>>> security. That's good news.
>>> thanks for chiming in, I think you are right regarding primitives; let
>>> me note that weak protocols and insecure deployment practices are
>>> perfectly in scope for CFRG  as well as primitives.   But the other
>>> major category of weakness, widespread exploitable vulnerabilities in
>>> software implementations, is one that is hugely important, and which
>>> is out of scope for CFRG.   The problem of exploitable vulnerabilities
>>> doesn't get the air-time that it deserves, relative to the other
>>> issues.   An exploit could force its victim to do all sorts of bad
>>> cryptographic practices, such as leak a key in an IV, or use a fixed
>>> or low-entropy key.
>>>
>>>> The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work that
>>>> would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does not offer
>>>> end-to-end security and that's something that could be fixed in the IETF
>>>> (and there is work ongoing in the DIME working group for Diameter at
>>>> least). The main challenge, however, is the attitude problem of those
>>>> deploying the protocol.
>>> I agree about the attitude, but I don't agree that CFRG couldn't
>>> help.    Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the
>>> problems with RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues
>>> and helping to socialize them with the IETF and the user base are all
>>> in charter and are worth doing.
>>>
>>>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
>>>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks that
>>>> are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic
>>>> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not done
>>>> by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredients
>>>> are:
>>>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and selecting
>>>> an algorithm
>>>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>>>
>>>> Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it more
>>>> credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community could
>>>> reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms, encryption
>>>> algorithms, etc.
>>>>
>>>> Just a thought...
>>> Agree that IETF is and should be willing to act as an international
>>> standards body for crypto, and that CFRG could support that process.
>>> We need to be careful not to over-commit in this area, but if the IETF
>>> wanted CFRG to vet some crypto standards options, we should be able to
>>> do that.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>>>> Hi All,
>>>>>
>>>>> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do
>>>>> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>>>>>
>>>>> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but rather
>>>>> by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to be done, and
>>>>> I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consensus about what
>>>>> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at
>>>>> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider
>>>>> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note
>>>>> that
>>>>> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>>>>>
>>>>> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement mechanisms
>>>>> for the ones in current use that we think need to be replaced, keeping
>>>>> in mind that the actual replacement might take ten years or so, or
>>>>> might
>>>>> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
>>>>> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacement.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems that can
>>>>> be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia created by all of
>>>>> those millions of crypto implementations that are currently in
>>>>> use.   We
>>>>> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of software
>>>>> that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance, and that will
>>>>> slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much better it is.
>>>>> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of
>>>>> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for
>>>>> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy
>>>>> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden is
>>>>> on us to provide this justification.
>>>>>
>>>>> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad
>>>>> cryptography
>>>>> is in use, which should have been replaced long ago. The fact that it
>>>>> might take years to replace is no excuse not to start the process now.
>>>>> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with
>>>>> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in
>>>>> particular.   It
>>>>> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and how
>>>>> bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert consensus on
>>>>> our
>>>>> opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could get a slot in front of
>>>>> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident
>>>>> that, if
>>>>> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current
>>>>> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information.
>>>>>
>>>>> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some
>>>>> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would be
>>>>> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one
>>>>> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were done
>>>>> right.
>>>>>
>>>>> David
>>>>>
>>>>> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
>>>>>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented
>>>>>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?) of how
>>>>>>> things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New Dimension" book
>>>>>>> was published.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for doing
>>>>>>> things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF protocol
>>>>>>> (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it took some
>>>>>>> flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of that day.
>>>>>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't
>>>>>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those reasons
>>>>>> informed? Just because everyone was making the same mistakes doesn't
>>>>>> make those mistakes less serious. Even if we make Bellare-Nampare the
>>>>>> point at which no one should have done MAC then Encrypt, that was 13
>>>>>> years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 years before the demonstration.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in
>>>>>> responding to the changing situation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now
>>>>>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less
>>>>>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience has a
>>>>>>> limit.
>>>>>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that
>>>>>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What has the
>>>>>> CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have these problems
>>>>>> addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have disbanded?
>>>>>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that new
>>>>>> protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>>>>>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix them,
>>>>>> and I'll do it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>> Watson
>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>>>>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>>>>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>>>>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>>>>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>>>>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>>>>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>>>>>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did
>>>>>>>>> in TLS.
>>>>>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>>>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway suggested
>>>>>>>> encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were suggesting
>>>>>>>> MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what is sent).
>>>>>>>> There
>>>>>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>>>>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>>>>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attacks.
>>>>>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years
>>>>>>>> later,
>>>>>>>> but the challenge is to properly decide at the right time.
>>>>>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while
>>>>>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>>>>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even
>>>>>>> if we
>>>>>>> take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9 years after
>>>>>>> being informed of an attack.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>>> Watson Ladd
>>>>>>>> regards,
>>>>>>>> Nikos
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
>>>>>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>>>>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>


-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Certification/Qualification is an expensive process.  Engineers under sched=
ule pressure will use whatever is qualified, and gets the job done. =20

We need an entity with the knowledge, resources, and reputation to say 'thi=
s algorithm is good for this purpose'.=20

We thought NIST was that entity.  They've damaged their reputation.  Anyone=
 planning to implement an algorithm standardized by NIST which hasn't gone =
through an open and transparent competition?

If NIST doesn't run open and transparent competitions for future algorithms=
, the world will look to some other organization to do it.  If there isn't =
a single organization we all trust, algorithm selection will fragment along=
 national lines.  CFRG/IRTF can tell NIST how to earn back its reputation, =
CFRG/IRTF can step into the vacuum created by an untrustworthy NIST, or CRF=
G/IRTF can start cultivating NIST's replacement as the internationally reco=
gnized and trusted 'certifier' of crypto algorithms.

-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Rene Struik
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2014 12:21 PM
To: Hannes Tschofenig; David McGrew
Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?

To me, this seems to be an entirely new perspective on what it means to be =
an engineer or scientist :(((.

=3D=3D
So, why would you care when things are going fine anyway?

On 2/12/2014 12:11 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Hi Rene,
>
> my impression was that until recently many IETF participants just=20
> trusted NIST to do the right thing. So, why would you care when things=20
> are going fine anyway?
>
> During the last few months that impression might have changed a bit=20
> and there might be more energy to improve transparency and to explore=20
> new directions.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> On 02/10/2014 08:05 PM, Rene Struik wrote:
>> Hi Hannes:
>>
>> Historically, not that many CFRG/IETF people seem to have=20
>> participated in solicitations for public review of NIST draft=20
>> publications. I wonder, therefore, what makes you feel this would=20
>> change dramatically, should CFRG/IETF take on an effort as complement=20
>> or partially duplicated effort of what NIST has already done.
>>
>> Note - data suggests this has been pretty consistent over time, both=20
>> for the last solicited draft crypto recommendation review and for=20
>> those in the last few years.
>>
>> Best regards, Rene
>>
>> =3D=3D
>> [excerpt of email Hannes Tschofenig, February 7,2014, 4:37pm EST]
>>
>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role.
>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks=20
>> that are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the cryptographic=20
>> algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that is today not=20
>> done by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done since the ingredien=
ts are:
>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and=20
>> selecting an algorithm
>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>
>> On 2/10/2014 2:18 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>> HI Hannes,
>>>
>>> On 02/07/2014 04:37 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>>>> Hi David,
>>>>
>>>> good discussion points.
>>>>
>>>> Here are my views:
>>>>
>>>> a) If we look at the problems at the entire Internet software=20
>>>> lifecycle, as I did in=20
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-perpass-surveillance-01
>>>> , then I believe it is fair to say that the problems at the level=20
>>>> of cryptographic primitives are the least challenging issues with=20
>>>> Internet security. That's good news.
>>> thanks for chiming in, I think you are right regarding primitives;=20
>>> let me note that weak protocols and insecure deployment practices are
>>> perfectly in scope for CFRG  as well as primitives.   But the other
>>> major category of weakness, widespread exploitable vulnerabilities=20
>>> in software implementations, is one that is hugely important, and which
>>> is out of scope for CFRG.   The problem of exploitable vulnerabilities
>>> doesn't get the air-time that it deserves, relative to the other
>>> issues.   An exploit could force its victim to do all sorts of bad
>>> cryptographic practices, such as leak a key in an IV, or use a fixed=20
>>> or low-entropy key.
>>>
>>>> The problems you mentioned with RADIUS have little to do with work=20
>>>> that would be done in the CFRG. RADIUS, similarly to Diameter, does=20
>>>> not offer end-to-end security and that's something that could be=20
>>>> fixed in the IETF (and there is work ongoing in the DIME working=20
>>>> group for Diameter at least). The main challenge, however, is the=20
>>>> attitude problem of those deploying the protocol.
>>> I agree about the attitude, but I don't agree that CFRG couldn't
>>> help.    Surely we don't need new crypto mechanisms to solve the
>>> problems with RADIUS, but analyzing and documenting security issues=20
>>> and helping to socialize them with the IETF and the user base are=20
>>> all in charter and are worth doing.
>>>
>>>> b) I do, however, believe that the CFRG could play an interesting role=
.
>>>> I am curious whether it would be possible to move some of the tasks=20
>>>> that are currently done in NIST to the IRTF, namely the=20
>>>> cryptographic algorithm selections. I know that this is a job that=20
>>>> is today not done by the IETF/IRTF but I believe it could be done=20
>>>> since the ingredients
>>>> are:
>>>> * open and transparent process for publishing, commenting, and=20
>>>> selecting an algorithm
>>>> * a suitable way for publishing these documents.
>>>>
>>>> Doing this work in a global standards organization also gives it=20
>>>> more credibility. I am also confident that the IETF/IRTF community=20
>>>> could reach out to researchers working on hash algorithms,=20
>>>> encryption algorithms, etc.
>>>>
>>>> Just a thought...
>>> Agree that IETF is and should be willing to act as an international=20
>>> standards body for crypto, and that CFRG could support that process.
>>> We need to be careful not to over-commit in this area, but if the=20
>>> IETF wanted CFRG to vet some crypto standards options, we should be=20
>>> able to do that.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 02/07/2014 07:04 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>>>> Hi All,
>>>>>
>>>>> it is healthy to have a discussion on what CFRG and IETF can do=20
>>>>> differently to improve security and privacy in the Internet.
>>>>>
>>>>> Ultimately, we are not limited by the current CFRG charter, but=20
>>>>> rather by our collective willingness to do the work that needs to=20
>>>>> be done, and I suppose on our ability to develop enough rough consens=
us about what
>>>>> needs to be done.   We do have a charter that we need to stick to at
>>>>> present, but we can do more within that charter, and we can consider
>>>>> changes to the charter if we think those are needed.   (Though note
>>>>> that
>>>>> we would need to get those changes approved.)
>>>>>
>>>>> An approach that might work for us is to develop replacement=20
>>>>> mechanisms for the ones in current use that we think need to be=20
>>>>> replaced, keeping in mind that the actual replacement might take=20
>>>>> ten years or so, or might
>>>>> never happen.   At the same time, we can document the problems with
>>>>> existing mechanisms, to help provide a motivation for that replacemen=
t.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is worthwhile to keep in mind the interoperability problems=20
>>>>> that can be caused by changes in cryptography, and the inertia=20
>>>>> created by all of those millions of crypto implementations that are c=
urrently in
>>>>> use.   We
>>>>> can't expect new crypto to appear in a five year old piece of=20
>>>>> software that is no longer supported by its creator, for instance,=20
>>>>> and that will slow down adoption of newer crypto, no matter how much =
better it is.
>>>>> As a practical matter, we also need to realize that many users of=20
>>>>> cryptography believe that there is no economic justification for=20
>>>>> deploying new crypto until breaking the old crypto scheme is so easy
>>>>> that a script kiddie can do it with a backtrack CD-ROM.   The burden =
is
>>>>> on us to provide this justification.
>>>>>
>>>>> At the same time, I share the frustration that too much bad=20
>>>>> cryptography is in use, which should have been replaced long ago.=20
>>>>> The fact that it might take years to replace is no excuse not to=20
>>>>> start the process now.
>>>>> I'm thinking of RADIUS and other protocols that are used with=20
>>>>> human-generated passwords (and are not PAKE systems) in
>>>>> particular.   It
>>>>> would be *great* to have CFRG document what protocols are bad, and=20
>>>>> how bad they are, in a way that we could demonstrate expert=20
>>>>> consensus on our opinions. If we did a decent job, I bet we could=20
>>>>> get a slot in front of
>>>>> the IESG or some other responsible IETF group.   I am confident
>>>>> that, if
>>>>> we can offer IETF good information about the security of current=20
>>>>> standards, they will find a way to propagate and use that information=
.
>>>>>
>>>>> An aside: a history of crypto protocols at IETF might provide some=20
>>>>> useful perspective; maybe a couple of people who were involved would =
be
>>>>> willing to write up something?    It might be useful to focus on one
>>>>> case study where things were done wrong, and one where things were=20
>>>>> done right.
>>>>>
>>>>> David
>>>>>
>>>>> On 02/07/2014 12:10 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL=20
>>>>>> <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>> Don Johnson, for one. Carl Meyer. (Yes, those guys who invented=20
>>>>>>> Lucifer and DES ciphers.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You keep forgetting (or simply aren't old enough to be aware?)=20
>>>>>>> of how things were done back when the "Cryptography: The New=20
>>>>>>> Dimension" book was published.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The standard was "MAC, then Encrypt", and it had reasons for=20
>>>>>>> doing things in that order. In fact, SNMP was the first IETF=20
>>>>>>> protocol (circa 1992-1994) to diverge from that approach, and it=20
>>>>>>> took some flak for not doing what was the conventional wisdom of th=
at day.
>>>>>> Was that flack informed? Or was it coming from people who didn't=20
>>>>>> really understand the mathematics behind crypto? Were those=20
>>>>>> reasons informed? Just because everyone was making the same=20
>>>>>> mistakes doesn't make those mistakes less serious. Even if we=20
>>>>>> make Bellare-Nampare the point at which no one should have done=20
>>>>>> MAC then Encrypt, that was 13 years ago. Bard explained BEAST 9 year=
s before the demonstration.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The best you can say is that the TLS WG was woefully slow in=20
>>>>>> responding to the changing situation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since then the priorities and the attacks changed, and now=20
>>>>>>> "Encrypt-then-MAC" is the standard.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Watson, I'd like to join other suggesting that you become less=20
>>>>>>> combative here. I'm not a "peacenik" myself, but any patience=20
>>>>>>> has a limit.
>>>>>> What should the CFRG and the IETF do more broadly to ensure that=20
>>>>>> blunders as serious as the ones above don't happen again? What=20
>>>>>> has the CFRG done to ensure that other 90's era protocols have=20
>>>>>> these problems addressed, particularly when the WGs responsible have=
 disbanded?
>>>>>> Should we simply let sleeping dogs lie, and work on ensuring that=20
>>>>>> new protocols don't make similar mistakes?
>>>>>> I'm here to fix the problems: explain what I need to do to fix=20
>>>>>> them, and I'll do it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>> Watson
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>> Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
>>>>>>> Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
>>>>>>> MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
>>>>>>> 244 Wood Street                        Email: <uri@ll.mit.edu>
>>>>>>> Lexington, MA  02420-9185
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> MIT LL Root CA:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> DSN:   478-5980 ask Lincoln ext.1638
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>>>> From: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 11:28 AM
>>>>>>> To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
>>>>>>> Cc: cfrg@irtf.org <cfrg@irtf.org>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos=20
>>>>>>> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 02/07/2014 04:59 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But let's go into detail about how well the cryptographers did=20
>>>>>>>>> in TLS.
>>>>>>>>> In 1995 Phil Rogaway tells everyone to use encrypt-then-MAC.
>>>>>>>> I believe you are oversimplifying things. Indeed Rogaway=20
>>>>>>>> suggested encrypt-then-MAC, but other cryptographers were=20
>>>>>>>> suggesting MAC-then-Encrypt (authenticate what is meant not what i=
s sent).
>>>>>>>> There
>>>>>>>> was also no attack known for MAC-then-encrypt.
>>>>>>> Show me one cryptographer who recommended MAC-then-Encrypt.
>>>>>>> Also, absence of known attacks is not the same as absence of attack=
s.
>>>>>>> Encrypt-then-MAC was the conservative choice.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In general it is very easy to see the obvious solution 20 years=20
>>>>>>>> later, but the challenge is to properly decide at the right=20
>>>>>>>> time.
>>>>>>> It was obvious then: encrypt-then-MAC was known secure, while=20
>>>>>>> MAC-then-encrypt was not.
>>>>>>> Any excuse vanishes with Bellare-Nampare (2000). Of course, even=20
>>>>>>> if we take the best interpretation, the TLS WG frittered away 9=20
>>>>>>> years after being informed of an attack.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>>> Watson Ladd
>>>>>>>> regards,
>>>>>>>> Nikos
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little=20
>>>>>>> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
>>>>>>> -- Benjamin Franklin
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>


--
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
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Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 19:49:25 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Hi,

the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim Schaad 
and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.

The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption 
scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are available, 
but no dedicated AE schemes are available.   Also, it doesn't require 
deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in some situations.

It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be pseudorandomly 
generated.   It would be especially useful to generate the IV using the 
same key as used for encryption, with an unpredictable counter, or 
something like that.   Is anyone aware of a security proof that could be 
cited for that sort of technique?   I think that some systems would have 
a much easier time maintaining a counter than they would generating 
truly random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my opinion.   Glad 
to hear other thoughts on this subject.

David

--

A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	03
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/
Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03

Abstract:
    This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
    associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
    Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
    mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
    authentication code (MAC).

    These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
    use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
    invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.




	

	

	

	


                                                                                   


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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    Hi, <br>
    <br>
    the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim
    Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.<br>
    <br>
    The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption
    scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are
    available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available.   Also, it
    doesn't require deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in some
    situations.<br>
    <br>
    It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
    pseudorandomly generated.   It would be especially useful to
    generate the IV using the same key as used for encryption, with an
    unpredictable counter, or something like that.   Is anyone aware of
    a security proof that could be cited for that sort of technique?   I
    think that some systems would have a much easier time maintaining a
    counter than they would generating truly random IVs, which is
    reasonable motivation in my opinion.   Glad to hear other thoughts
    on this subject.<br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    --<br>
    <div class="moz-forward-container"><br>
      <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	03
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt</a>
Status:         <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/</a>
Htmlized:       <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>
Diff:           <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>

Abstract:
   This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
   authentication code (MAC).

   These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
   use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
   invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.</pre>
      <br>
      <br>
      <table class="moz-email-headers-table" border="0" cellpadding="0"
        cellspacing="0">
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <pre>

                                                                                  


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</pre>
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--------------020903060707070807080806--


From nobody Thu Feb 13 17:44:11 2014
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--20cf300e51e5ee96cc04f253f00e
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On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 4:49 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>  Hi,
>
> the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim Schaad and
> Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.
>
> The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption scheme
> suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are available, but no
> dedicated AE schemes are available.   Also, it doesn't require
> deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in some situations.
>
> It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be pseudorandomly
> generated.   It would be especially useful to generate the IV using the
> same key as used for encryption, with an unpredictable counter, or
> something like that.   Is anyone aware of a security proof that could be
> cited for that sort of technique?   I think that some systems would have a
> much easier time maintaining a counter than they would generating truly
> random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my opinion.   Glad to hear
> other thoughts on this subject.
>

Doesn't the usual PRF definition give you exactly this?


> David
>
> --
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
> has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
> Revision:	03
> Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
> Document date:	2014-02-13
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		29
> URL:            http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/
> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>
> Abstract:
>    This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
>    associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
>    Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
>    mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
>    authentication code (MAC).
>
>    These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
>    use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
>    invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
> .
>
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-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary
Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

--20cf300e51e5ee96cc04f253f00e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 4:49 PM, David McGrew <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Hi, <br>
    <br>
    the latest version of this draft is out.=C2=A0 Thanks are due to Jim
    Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.<br>
    <br>
    The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption
    scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are
    available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Also,=
 it
    doesn&#39;t require deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in som=
e
    situations.<br>
    <br>
    It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
    pseudorandomly generated.=C2=A0=C2=A0 It would be especially useful to
    generate the IV using the same key as used for encryption, with an
    unpredictable counter, or something like that.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Is anyone aw=
are of
    a security proof that could be cited for that sort of technique?=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 I
    think that some systems would have a much easier time maintaining a
    counter than they would generating truly random IVs, which is
    reasonable motivation in my opinion.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Glad to hear other tho=
ughts
    on this subject.=C2=A0</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Doesn&#39;=
t the usual PRF definition give you exactly this?=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    --<br>
    <div><br>
      <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	03
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew=
-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/inter=
net-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt</a>
Status:         <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-ae=
ad-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/</a>
Htmlized:       <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes=
-cbc-hmac-sha2-03" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgre=
w-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>
Diff:           <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-mcgrew-=
aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?ur=
l2=3Ddraft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>

Abstract:
   This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
   authentication code (MAC).

   These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
   use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
   invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.</pre>
      <br>
      <br>
      <table border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0">
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"><br>
            </th>
            <td><br>
            </td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <pre>                                                                =
                 =20


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.

The IETF Secretariat

.

</pre>
      <br>
    </div>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank">htt=
p://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>&quot;Th=
ose who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safe=
ty deserve neither=C2=A0 Liberty nor Safety.&quot;<br>-- Benjamin Franklin=
=20
</div></div>

--20cf300e51e5ee96cc04f253f00e--


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On 2/13/14 4:49 PM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi,
>
> the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim Schaad 
> and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.
>
> The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption 
> scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are 
> available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available.   Also, it 
> doesn't require deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in some 
> situations.
>
> It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be pseudorandomly 
> generated.   It would be especially useful to generate the IV using 
> the same key as used for encryption, with an unpredictable counter, or 
> something like that.   Is anyone aware of a security proof that could 
> be cited for that sort of technique?   I think that some systems would 
> have a much easier time maintaining a counter than they would 
> generating truly random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my 
> opinion.   Glad to hear other thoughts on this subject.
>
> David
>
> --
There is a mismatched parenthesis in the first sentence of Section 2.4.

It seems that your intent is to truncate the MAC to the length of the 
MAC_KEY.  Also these two seem to be half the size of the hash function 
output block size.  However, that is not explicitly stated.  I suggest 
you mention that somewhere.

Above you mention generating the IV with the same key as is used for 
encryption.  Note that this is in conflict with Section 3, which says 
"However, if a pseudorandom method is used, that method MUST NOT make 
use of ENC_KEY or MAC_KEY."  Maybe you are thinking the we CFRG people 
can come up with a safe way to use the encryption key, but you don't 
trust users to do that.

Above you mention an unpredictable counter.  I suspect you mean a 
counter that begins at a secret value, and wraps in the obvious way.  
Therefore it has be generated at random and stored in secure 
non-volatile storage.  So it seems strictly harder than just 
randomness.  So I don't know what is gained by using an unpredictable 
counter.

You have chosen to avoid nonces, but instead to require randomness.   It 
is debatable whether this is a good tradeoff.  I suspect it would be 
better to have a system that requires a nonce, where the only 
requirement is that it is doesn't repeat (or is sufficiently unlikely to 
repeat, to allow for random nonces if the user finds that convenient).  
Examples of suitable nonces are a counter, time, or random.  You could 
compute the IV  as SHA256(E_ek(nonce)) and use only the first 128 bits.  
E_ek means encrypt with the encryption key.  This doesn't leak an ECB 
mode plaintext-ciphertext pair to an attacker, even if he knows or can 
easily guess the nonce (e.g. when the nonce is time or when he knows the 
number of messages that have been sent).  Since the attacker doesn't 
know the encryption key, he can't predict the nonce.

You have a key that is the concatenation of the MAC_KEY and the 
ENC_KEY.  This might tempt lazy or incompetent implementers  do 
something stupid.  You might consider deriving the MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY 
from a single key.  If you did that, you could generate the MAC_KEY, 
ENC_KEY, and IV like this.  Use HMAC(key, 0x1 || counter) to generate 
enough bits for MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY.  Use HMAC(key, 0x2 || nonce) to 
compute the IV.  (This is a different proposal for the IV than the last 
paragraph.)  Even if the  attacker can predict the nonce, he cannot 
predict the IV because he doesn't know the key.

If you really don't want to accept a nonce, have the library generate 
its own nonce with something from inside the system, such processID || 
date_time || message_counter_in_this_process. (Remember, this only has 
to be unique within users of the same key. It doesn't have to be 
world-wide unique.)  The downside is that any such scheme is specific to 
a particular system.  I think most of us would rather say "compute this 
and pass it in as the nonce" than "modify the code to collect this".

As to the question you actually asked, I don't see that you can have 
randomness in the encryption if you don't have either randomness as an 
input or use a nonce.  It is completely deterministic and the same 
message will be encrypted the same every time.  However, you can do a 
bit better.  In some applications the authenticated but unencrypted part 
(called A in the draft) will contain a sequence number or timestamp.  If 
you compute MAC_KEY, ENC_KEY, and IV similar to the way in the last 
paragraph, but change the IV computation to HMAC(key, 0x2 || A).  
Absolutely identical messages will result in the same bits over the 
channel, but if the unencrypted part contains a sequence number or 
timestamp, the encrypted part will be randomized.  My final suggestion 
is to compute IV as HMAC(key, 0x2 || length(A) || A || nonce).  This 
way, users who supply non-repeating nonces get randomized encryption, 
and even if they mess up, they will get randomized encryption if the A 
part has a time stamp or sequence number.

     --David Jacobson

>
> A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
> has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
> Revision:	03
> Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
> Document date:	2014-02-13
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		29
> URL:http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
> Status:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/
> Htmlized:http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
> Diff:http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>
> Abstract:
>     This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
>     associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
>     Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
>     mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
>     authentication code (MAC).
>
>     These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
>     use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
>     invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.
>
>
>
> 	
>
> 	
>
> 	
>
> 	
>
>                                                                                    
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
> .
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/13/14 4:49 PM, David McGrew wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FD6815.70402@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
        charset=ISO-8859-1">
      Hi, <br>
      <br>
      the latest version of this draft is out.&nbsp; Thanks are due to Jim
      Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.<br>
      <br>
      The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption
      scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are
      available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available.&nbsp;&nbsp; Also, it
      doesn't require deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in
      some situations.<br>
      <br>
      It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
      pseudorandomly generated.&nbsp;&nbsp; It would be especially useful to
      generate the IV using the same key as used for encryption, with an
      unpredictable counter, or something like that.&nbsp;&nbsp; Is anyone aware
      of a security proof that could be cited for that sort of
      technique?&nbsp;&nbsp; I think that some systems would have a much easier
      time maintaining a counter than they would generating truly random
      IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my opinion.&nbsp;&nbsp; Glad to hear
      other thoughts on this subject.<br>
      <br>
      David<br>
      <br>
      --<br>
    </blockquote>
    There is a mismatched parenthesis in the first sentence of Section
    2.4.<br>
    <br>
    It seems that your intent is to truncate the MAC to the length of
    the MAC_KEY.&nbsp; Also these two seem to be half the size of the hash
    function output block size.&nbsp; However, that is not explicitly
    stated.&nbsp; I suggest you mention that somewhere.<br>
    <br>
    Above you mention generating the IV with the same key as is used for
    encryption.&nbsp; Note that this is in conflict with Section 3, which
    says "However, if a pseudorandom method is used, that method MUST
    NOT make use of ENC_KEY or MAC_KEY."&nbsp; Maybe you are thinking the we
    CFRG people can come up with a safe way to use the encryption key,
    but you don't trust users to do that.<br>
    <br>
    Above you mention an unpredictable counter.&nbsp; I suspect you mean a
    counter that begins at a secret value, and wraps in the obvious
    way.&nbsp; Therefore it has be generated at random and stored in secure
    non-volatile storage.&nbsp; So it seems strictly harder than just
    randomness.&nbsp; So I don't know what is gained by using an
    unpredictable counter.<br>
    <br>
    You have chosen to avoid nonces, but instead to require
    randomness.&nbsp;&nbsp; It is debatable whether this is a good tradeoff.&nbsp; I
    suspect it would be better to have a system that requires a nonce,
    where the only requirement is that it is doesn't repeat (or is
    sufficiently unlikely to repeat, to allow for random nonces if the
    user finds that convenient).&nbsp; Examples of suitable nonces are a
    counter, time, or random.&nbsp; You could compute the IV&nbsp; as
    SHA256(E_ek(nonce)) and use only the first 128 bits.&nbsp; E_ek means
    encrypt with the encryption key.&nbsp; This doesn't leak an ECB mode
    plaintext-ciphertext pair to an attacker, even if he knows or can
    easily guess the nonce (e.g. when the nonce is time or when he knows
    the number of messages that have been sent).&nbsp; Since the attacker
    doesn't know the encryption key, he can't predict the nonce.<br>
    <br>
    You have a key that is the concatenation of the MAC_KEY and the
    ENC_KEY.&nbsp; This might tempt lazy or incompetent implementers&nbsp; do
    something stupid.&nbsp; You might consider deriving the MAC_KEY and
    ENC_KEY from a single key.&nbsp; If you did that, you could generate the
    MAC_KEY, ENC_KEY, and IV like this.&nbsp; Use HMAC(key, 0x1 || counter)
    to generate enough bits for MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY.&nbsp; Use HMAC(key, 0x2
    || nonce) to compute the IV.&nbsp; (This is a different proposal for the
    IV than the last paragraph.)&nbsp; Even if the&nbsp; attacker can predict the
    nonce, he cannot predict the IV because he doesn't know the key.<br>
    <br>
    If you really don't want to accept a nonce, have the library
    generate its own nonce with something from inside the system, such
    processID || date_time || message_counter_in_this_process.&nbsp;&nbsp;
    (Remember, this only has to be unique within users of the same key.&nbsp;
    It doesn't have to be world-wide unique.)&nbsp; The downside is that any
    such scheme is specific to a particular system.&nbsp; I think most of us
    would rather say "compute this and pass it in as the nonce" than
    "modify the code to collect this".<br>
    &nbsp; <br>
    As to the question you actually asked, I don't see that you can have
    randomness in the encryption if you don't have either randomness as
    an input or use a nonce.&nbsp; It is completely deterministic and the
    same message will be encrypted the same every time.&nbsp; However, you
    can do a bit better.&nbsp; In some applications the authenticated but
    unencrypted part (called A in the draft) will contain a sequence
    number or timestamp.&nbsp; If you compute MAC_KEY, ENC_KEY, and IV
    similar to the way in the last paragraph, but change the IV
    computation to HMAC(key, 0x2 || A).&nbsp; Absolutely identical messages
    will result in the same bits over the channel, but if the
    unencrypted part contains a sequence number or timestamp, the
    encrypted part will be randomized.&nbsp; My final suggestion is to
    compute IV as HMAC(key, 0x2 || length(A) || A || nonce).&nbsp; This way,
    users who supply non-repeating nonces get randomized encryption, and
    even if they mess up, they will get randomized encryption if the A
    part has a time stamp or sequence number.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; --David Jacobson<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FD6815.70402@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <div class="moz-forward-container"><br>
        <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	03
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt</a>
Status:         <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/</a>
Htmlized:       <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>
Diff:           <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>

Abstract:
   This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
   authentication code (MAC).

   These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
   use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
   invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.</pre>
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        <pre>
                                                                                  


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New Version Notification for draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
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On 02/13/2014 08:44 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 4:49 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com 
> <mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com>> wrote:
>
>     Hi,
>
>     the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim
>     Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.
>
>     The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption
>     scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are
>     available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available.   Also, it
>     doesn't require deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in
>     some situations.
>
>     It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
>     pseudorandomly generated.   It would be especially useful to
>     generate the IV using the same key as used for encryption, with an
>     unpredictable counter, or something like that.   Is anyone aware
>     of a security proof that could be cited for that sort of
>     technique?   I think that some systems would have a much easier
>     time maintaining a counter than they would generating truly random
>     IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my opinion.   Glad to hear
>     other thoughts on this subject.
>
>
> Doesn't the usual PRF definition give you exactly this?

Yes; the only tricky bit is showing that using the CBC encryption key to 
generate pseudorandom IVs doesn't affect CBC encryption security.   I'm 
sure that it can be done securely, but I don't know of a proof of 
security (for using a single key for both CBC and to generate IVs) that 
I can point to.

David

>
>
>     David
>
>     --
>
>     A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
>     has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
>     IETF repository.
>
>     Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
>     Revision:	03
>     Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
>     Document date:	2014-02-13
>     Group:		Individual Submission
>     Pages:		29
>     URL:http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
>     Status:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/
>     Htmlized:http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>     Diff:http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>
>     Abstract:
>         This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
>         associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
>         Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
>         mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
>         authentication code (MAC).
>
>         These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
>         use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
>         invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.
>
>
>
>
>     	
>
>     	
>
>     	
>
>     	
>
>                                                                                        
>
>
>     Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>     until the htmlized version and diff are available attools.ietf.org  <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>
>     The IETF Secretariat
>
>     .
>
>
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     Cfrg@irtf.org <mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org>
>     http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little 
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 02/13/2014 08:44 PM, Watson Ladd
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0ckjNvq1=k3krVt9sK6fCtWwCv+8XkJWJiqxn-Qg=1Rq_g@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr"><br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 4:49 PM,
            David McGrew <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com" target="_blank">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> Hi, <br>
                <br>
                the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due
                to Jim Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on
                version 02.<br>
                <br>
                The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated
                encryption scheme suitable for use in those cases where
                CBC and HMAC are available, but no dedicated AE schemes
                are available.   Also, it doesn't require deterministic
                nonces, which itself is useful in some situations.<br>
                <br>
                It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
                pseudorandomly generated.   It would be especially
                useful to generate the IV using the same key as used for
                encryption, with an unpredictable counter, or something
                like that.   Is anyone aware of a security proof that
                could be cited for that sort of technique?   I think
                that some systems would have a much easier time
                maintaining a counter than they would generating truly
                random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my
                opinion.   Glad to hear other thoughts on this subject. </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Doesn't the usual PRF definition give you exactly this?
              <br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Yes; the only tricky bit is showing that using the CBC encryption
    key to generate pseudorandom IVs doesn't affect CBC encryption
    security.   I'm sure that it can be done securely, but I don't know
    of a proof of security (for using a single key for both CBC and to
    generate IVs) that I can point to.  <br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CACsn0ckjNvq1=k3krVt9sK6fCtWwCv+8XkJWJiqxn-Qg=1Rq_g@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div class="gmail_extra">
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <br>
                David<br>
                <br>
                --<br>
                <div><br>
                  <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	03
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt" target="_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt</a>
Status:         <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/" target="_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/</a>
Htmlized:       <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03" target="_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>
Diff:           <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03" target="_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>

Abstract:
   This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
   authentication code (MAC).

   These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
   use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
   invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.</pre>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
                    <tbody>
                      <tr>
                        <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap"
                          valign="BASELINE"><br>
                        </th>
                        <td><br>
                        </td>
                      </tr>
                      <tr>
                        <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap"
                          valign="BASELINE"><br>
                        </th>
                        <td><br>
                        </td>
                      </tr>
                      <tr>
                        <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap"
                          valign="BASELINE"><br>
                        </th>
                        <td><br>
                        </td>
                      </tr>
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                        <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap"
                          valign="BASELINE"><br>
                        </th>
                        <td><br>
                        </td>
                      </tr>
                    </tbody>
                  </table>
                  <pre>                                                                                  


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://tools.ietf.org" target="_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.

The IETF Secretariat

.

</pre>
                  <br>
                </div>
                <br>
              </div>
              <br>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              Cfrg mailing list<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg"
                target="_blank">http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
              <br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
          <br clear="all">
          <div><br>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a
          little Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."<br>
          -- Benjamin Franklin </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 06:21:58 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New Version Notification for draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
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On 02/14/2014 12:12 AM, Manger, James wrote:
>> Title: Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
>> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-
>> hmac-sha2-03
> Appendix B "Alternative Interface for Legacy Encoding" isn't quite clear that "the ciphertext C, as described in Appendix A" is only C_1 || ... || C_n. It excludes C_0 (which is the IV) as the IV is a separate field.
>
> Suggested change (in two places):
> FROM
>        the initialization vector IV as defined in Appendix A,
>        the ciphertext C, as defined in Appendix A, and
>        the message authentication tag T, as defined in Section 2.1.
> TO
>        the initialization vector IV as defined in Appendix A,
>        the ciphertext excluding the IV (C_1 || ... || C_n), as defined in Appendix A, and
>        the message authentication tag T, as defined in Section 2.1.

good catch; I've made these changes.

>
> K and A are not mentioned as inputs to the decryption operation.
> Suggested change:
> FROM
>     The inputs to the decryption operation are:
>        ... IV ... C ... T
> TO
>     The inputs to the decryption operation (in addition
>     to the secret key K and associated data A) are:
>        ... IV ... C ... T
>
>
> Typo: appendix B (missing "are")
>    The inputs to the encryption operation *are* the same

Fixed, along with the other typos identified in your previous email.   
Many thanks for the quick review.

David

> --
> James Manger
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>


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Hi David,

On 02/14/2014 01:34 AM, David Jacobson wrote:
> On 2/13/14 4:49 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim 
>> Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.
>>
>> The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption 
>> scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are 
>> available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available. Also, it 
>> doesn't require deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in some 
>> situations.
>>
>> It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be 
>> pseudorandomly generated.   It would be especially useful to generate 
>> the IV using the same key as used for encryption, with an 
>> unpredictable counter, or something like that.   Is anyone aware of a 
>> security proof that could be cited for that sort of technique?   I 
>> think that some systems would have a much easier time maintaining a 
>> counter than they would generating truly random IVs, which is 
>> reasonable motivation in my opinion.   Glad to hear other thoughts on 
>> this subject.
>>
>> David
>>
>> --
> There is a mismatched parenthesis in the first sentence of Section 2.4.
>

got it.

> It seems that your intent is to truncate the MAC to the length of the 
> MAC_KEY.  Also these two seem to be half the size of the hash function 
> output block size.  However, that is not explicitly stated.  I suggest 
> you mention that somewhere.

Added this to the rationale.

<t>
The algorithms in this note truncate the HMAC output to half of the
size of the output of the underlying hash function.  This size is the
recommended minimum (see Section 5 of <xref target="RFC2104"/>), and
this parameter choice has withstood the test of time.
</t>

>
> Above you mention generating the IV with the same key as is used for 
> encryption.  Note that this is in conflict with Section 3, which says 
> "However, if a pseudorandom method is used, that method MUST NOT make 
> use of ENC_KEY or MAC_KEY."  Maybe you are thinking the we CFRG people 
> can come up with a safe way to use the encryption key, but you don't 
> trust users to do that.

RIght; if there is a security analysis somewhere that I can cite, I 
would like to do so.   Otherwise, I want to leave it out.

>
> Above you mention an unpredictable counter.  I suspect you mean a 
> counter that begins at a secret value, and wraps in the obvious way.  
> Therefore it has be generated at random and stored in secure 
> non-volatile storage.  So it seems strictly harder than just 
> randomness.  So I don't know what is gained by using an unpredictable 
> counter.

It would enable the algorithms to be used for encryption on devices that 
lacked a random source, and it would allow other systems to avoid the 
complication of calling a random source during each encryption 
invocation.   I don't have a lot of trust in good random sources being 
done correctly and being available.   Maybe another good way to say it 
is that the requirement to tap into good randomness or pseudorandomness 
is a very significant external dependency.    For example, if a 
non-crypto-specialist downloads the source code for these ciphersuites 
off the Internet and links it to their application, it would be much 
better to have no such external dependancy, since the developer might 
not even understand the randomness requirement.

>
> You have chosen to avoid nonces, but instead to require randomness.   
> It is debatable whether this is a good tradeoff.  I suspect it would 
> be better to have a system that requires a nonce, where the only 
> requirement is that it is doesn't repeat (or is sufficiently unlikely 
> to repeat, to allow for random nonces if the user finds that convenient). 

Respectfully disagree.   The goal here is not to develop a new AEAD 
algorithm, but rather to show people how they can construct a good AEAD 
out of the CBC and HMAC components that they probably have in their 
toolkits.   The Rationale sections outlines the goals.

> Examples of suitable nonces are a counter, time, or random.  You could 
> compute the IV  as SHA256(E_ek(nonce)) and use only the first 128 
> bits.  E_ek means encrypt with the encryption key.  This doesn't leak 
> an ECB mode plaintext-ciphertext pair to an attacker, even if he knows 
> or can easily guess the nonce (e.g. when the nonce is time or when he 
> knows the number of messages that have been sent).  Since the attacker 
> doesn't know the encryption key, he can't predict the nonce.
>
> You have a key that is the concatenation of the MAC_KEY and the 
> ENC_KEY.  This might tempt lazy or incompetent implementers  do 
> something stupid.  You might consider deriving the MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY 
> from a single key.  If you did that, you could generate the MAC_KEY, 
> ENC_KEY, and IV like this.  Use HMAC(key, 0x1 || counter) to generate 
> enough bits for MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY.  Use HMAC(key, 0x2 || nonce) to 
> compute the IV.  (This is a different proposal for the IV than the 
> last paragraph.)  Even if the attacker can predict the nonce, he 
> cannot predict the IV because he doesn't know the key.

This draft consciously avoids key derivation for simplicity, and to 
avoid potential complications around validation (especially FIPS-140 key 
derivation).

>
> If you really don't want to accept a nonce, have the library generate 
> its own nonce with something from inside the system, such processID || 
> date_time || message_counter_in_this_process. (Remember, this only has 
> to be unique within users of the same key.  It doesn't have to be 
> world-wide unique.)  The downside is that any such scheme is specific 
> to a particular system.  I think most of us would rather say "compute 
> this and pass it in as the nonce" than "modify the code to collect this".
>
> As to the question you actually asked, I don't see that you can have 
> randomness in the encryption if you don't have either randomness as an 
> input or use a nonce.  It is completely deterministic and the same 
> message will be encrypted the same every time.  However, you can do a 
> bit better.  In some applications the authenticated but unencrypted 
> part (called A in the draft) will contain a sequence number or 
> timestamp.  If you compute MAC_KEY, ENC_KEY, and IV similar to the way 
> in the last paragraph, but change the IV computation to HMAC(key, 0x2 
> || A). Absolutely identical messages will result in the same bits over 
> the channel, but if the unencrypted part contains a sequence number or 
> timestamp, the encrypted part will be randomized.  My final suggestion 
> is to compute IV as HMAC(key, 0x2 || length(A) || A || nonce).  This 
> way, users who supply non-repeating nonces get randomized encryption, 
> and even if they mess up, they will get randomized encryption if the A 
> part has a time stamp or sequence number.

Thanks for your comments and feedback.   You bring up some valid 
considerations, some of which fall outside the particular (modest) goals 
of this draft.

David

>
>     --David Jacobson
>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
>> Revision:	03
>> Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
>> Document date:	2014-02-13
>> Group:		Individual Submission
>> Pages:		29
>> URL:http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
>> Status:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/
>> Htmlized:http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>> Diff:http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>>
>> Abstract:
>>     This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
>>     associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
>>     Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
>>     mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
>>     authentication code (MAC).
>>
>>     These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
>>     use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
>>     invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.
>>
>>
>>
>> 	
>>
>> 	
>>
>> 	
>>
>> 	
>>
>>                                                                                    
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi David,<br>
      <br>
      On 02/14/2014 01:34 AM, David Jacobson wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=ISO-8859-1">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/13/14 4:49 PM, David McGrew
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote cite="mid:52FD6815.70402@cisco.com" type="cite"> Hi, <br>
        <br>
        the latest version of this draft is out.&nbsp; Thanks are due to Jim
        Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.<br>
        <br>
        The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated
        encryption scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and
        HMAC are available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available.&nbsp;&nbsp;
        Also, it doesn't require deterministic nonces, which itself is
        useful in some situations.<br>
        <br>
        It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
        pseudorandomly generated.&nbsp;&nbsp; It would be especially useful to
        generate the IV using the same key as used for encryption, with
        an unpredictable counter, or something like that.&nbsp;&nbsp; Is anyone
        aware of a security proof that could be cited for that sort of
        technique?&nbsp;&nbsp; I think that some systems would have a much easier
        time maintaining a counter than they would generating truly
        random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my opinion.&nbsp;&nbsp; Glad
        to hear other thoughts on this subject.<br>
        <br>
        David<br>
        <br>
        --<br>
      </blockquote>
      There is a mismatched parenthesis in the first sentence of Section
      2.4.<br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    got it.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite"> It
      seems that your intent is to truncate the MAC to the length of the
      MAC_KEY.&nbsp; Also these two seem to be half the size of the hash
      function output block size.&nbsp; However, that is not explicitly
      stated.&nbsp; I suggest you mention that somewhere.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Added this to the rationale.<br>
    <br>
    &lt;t&gt;<br>
    The algorithms in this note truncate the HMAC output to half of the<br>
    size of the output of the underlying hash function.&nbsp; This size is
    the<br>
    recommended minimum (see Section 5 of &lt;xref
    target="RFC2104"/&gt;), and<br>
    this parameter choice has withstood the test of time.<br>
    &lt;/t&gt;<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite"> <br>
      Above you mention generating the IV with the same key as is used
      for encryption.&nbsp; Note that this is in conflict with Section 3,
      which says "However, if a pseudorandom method is used, that method
      MUST NOT make use of ENC_KEY or MAC_KEY."&nbsp; Maybe you are thinking
      the we CFRG people can come up with a safe way to use the
      encryption key, but you don't trust users to do that.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    RIght; if there is a security analysis somewhere that I can cite, I
    would like to do so.&nbsp;&nbsp; Otherwise, I want to leave it out.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite"> <br>
      Above you mention an unpredictable counter.&nbsp; I suspect you mean a
      counter that begins at a secret value, and wraps in the obvious
      way.&nbsp; Therefore it has be generated at random and stored in secure
      non-volatile storage.&nbsp; So it seems strictly harder than just
      randomness.&nbsp; So I don't know what is gained by using an
      unpredictable counter.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    It would enable the algorithms to be used for encryption on devices
    that lacked a random source, and it would allow other systems to
    avoid the complication of calling a random source during each
    encryption invocation.&nbsp;&nbsp; I don't have a lot of trust in good random
    sources being done correctly and being available.&nbsp;&nbsp; Maybe another
    good way to say it is that the requirement to tap into good
    randomness or pseudorandomness is a very significant external
    dependency.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For example, if a non-crypto-specialist downloads the
    source code for these ciphersuites off the Internet and links it to
    their application, it would be much better to have no such external
    dependancy, since the developer might not even understand the
    randomness requirement.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite"> <br>
      You have chosen to avoid nonces, but instead to require
      randomness.&nbsp;&nbsp; It is debatable whether this is a good tradeoff.&nbsp; I
      suspect it would be better to have a system that requires a nonce,
      where the only requirement is that it is doesn't repeat (or is
      sufficiently unlikely to repeat, to allow for random nonces if the
      user finds that convenient).&nbsp; </blockquote>
    <br>
    Respectfully disagree.&nbsp;&nbsp; The goal here is not to develop a new AEAD
    algorithm, but rather to show people how they can construct a good
    AEAD out of the CBC and HMAC components that they probably have in
    their toolkits.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Rationale sections outlines the goals.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite">Examples
      of suitable nonces are a counter, time, or random.&nbsp; You could
      compute the IV&nbsp; as SHA256(E_ek(nonce)) and use only the first 128
      bits.&nbsp; E_ek means encrypt with the encryption key.&nbsp; This doesn't
      leak an ECB mode plaintext-ciphertext pair to an attacker, even if
      he knows or can easily guess the nonce (e.g. when the nonce is
      time or when he knows the number of messages that have been
      sent).&nbsp; Since the attacker doesn't know the encryption key, he
      can't predict the nonce.<br>
      <br>
      You have a key that is the concatenation of the MAC_KEY and the
      ENC_KEY.&nbsp; This might tempt lazy or incompetent implementers&nbsp; do
      something stupid.&nbsp; You might consider deriving the MAC_KEY and
      ENC_KEY from a single key.&nbsp; If you did that, you could generate
      the MAC_KEY, ENC_KEY, and IV like this.&nbsp; Use HMAC(key, 0x1 ||
      counter) to generate enough bits for MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY.&nbsp; Use
      HMAC(key, 0x2 || nonce) to compute the IV.&nbsp; (This is a different
      proposal for the IV than the last paragraph.)&nbsp; Even if the&nbsp;
      attacker can predict the nonce, he cannot predict the IV because
      he doesn't know the key.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This draft consciously avoids key derivation for simplicity, and to
    avoid potential complications around validation (especially FIPS-140
    key derivation).&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite"> <br>
      If you really don't want to accept a nonce, have the library
      generate its own nonce with something from inside the system, such
      processID || date_time || message_counter_in_this_process.&nbsp;&nbsp;
      (Remember, this only has to be unique within users of the same
      key.&nbsp; It doesn't have to be world-wide unique.)&nbsp; The downside is
      that any such scheme is specific to a particular system.&nbsp; I think
      most of us would rather say "compute this and pass it in as the
      nonce" than "modify the code to collect this".<br>
      &nbsp; <br>
      As to the question you actually asked, I don't see that you can
      have randomness in the encryption if you don't have either
      randomness as an input or use a nonce.&nbsp; It is completely
      deterministic and the same message will be encrypted the same
      every time.&nbsp; However, you can do a bit better.&nbsp; In some
      applications the authenticated but unencrypted part (called A in
      the draft) will contain a sequence number or timestamp.&nbsp; If you
      compute MAC_KEY, ENC_KEY, and IV similar to the way in the last
      paragraph, but change the IV computation to HMAC(key, 0x2 || A).&nbsp;
      Absolutely identical messages will result in the same bits over
      the channel, but if the unencrypted part contains a sequence
      number or timestamp, the encrypted part will be randomized.&nbsp; My
      final suggestion is to compute IV as HMAC(key, 0x2 || length(A) ||
      A || nonce).&nbsp; This way, users who supply non-repeating nonces get
      randomized encryption, and even if they mess up, they will get
      randomized encryption if the A part has a time stamp or sequence
      number.&nbsp; <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Thanks for your comments and feedback.&nbsp;&nbsp; You bring up some valid
    considerations, some of which fall outside the particular (modest)
    goals of this draft.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite"> <br>
      &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; --David Jacobson<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote cite="mid:52FD6815.70402@cisco.com" type="cite">
        <div class="moz-forward-container"><br>
          <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	03
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt</a>
Status:         <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/</a>
Htmlized:       <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>
Diff:           <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>

Abstract:
   This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
   authentication code (MAC).

   These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
   use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
   invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.</pre>
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          <pre>                                                                                  


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Subject: [Cfrg] New Version Notification for draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt
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Thanks James and David for the quick review and suggestions.

David


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	New Version Notification for 
draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt
Date: 	Fri, 14 Feb 2014 03:48:13 -0800
From: 	<internet-drafts@ietf.org>
To: 	John Foley <foleyj@cisco.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, 
"Kenny Paterson" <kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk>, John Foley 
<foleyj@cisco.com>, "Dr. David A. McGrew" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Kenny 
Paterson <kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk>



A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	04
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-14
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/
Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04
Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04

Abstract:
    This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
    associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
    Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
    mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
    authentication code (MAC).

    These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
    use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
    invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.

                                                                                   


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

.




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    Thanks James and David for the quick review and suggestions.   <br>
    <br>
    David<br>
    <div class="moz-forward-container"><br>
      <br>
      -------- Original Message --------
      <table class="moz-email-headers-table" border="0" cellpadding="0"
        cellspacing="0">
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Subject:
            </th>
            <td>New Version Notification for
              draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Date: </th>
            <td>Fri, 14 Feb 2014 03:48:13 -0800</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">From: </th>
            <td><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">&lt;internet-drafts@ietf.org&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">To: </th>
            <td>John Foley <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:foleyj@cisco.com">&lt;foleyj@cisco.com&gt;</a>, David McGrew
              <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">&lt;mcgrew@cisco.com&gt;</a>, "Kenny Paterson"
              <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk">&lt;kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk&gt;</a>, John Foley
              <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:foleyj@cisco.com">&lt;foleyj@cisco.com&gt;</a>, "Dr. David A. McGrew"
              <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">&lt;mcgrew@cisco.com&gt;</a>, Kenny Paterson
              <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk">&lt;kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <br>
      <br>
      <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	04
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-14
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04.txt</a>
Status:         <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/</a>
Htmlized:       <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04</a>
Diff:           <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-04</a>

Abstract:
   This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
   authentication code (MAC).

   These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
   use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
   invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.

                                                                                  


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

.

</pre>
      <br>
    </div>
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  </body>
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From nobody Fri Feb 14 07:55:20 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New Version Notification for draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
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On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 3:05 AM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>  On 02/13/2014 08:44 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 4:49 PM, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>>  Hi,
>>
>> the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim Schaad
>> and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.
>>
>> The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption scheme
>> suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are available, but no
>> dedicated AE schemes are available.   Also, it doesn't require
>> deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in some situations.
>>
>> It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be pseudorandomly
>> generated.   It would be especially useful to generate the IV using the
>> same key as used for encryption, with an unpredictable counter, or
>> something like that.   Is anyone aware of a security proof that could be
>> cited for that sort of technique?   I think that some systems would have a
>> much easier time maintaining a counter than they would generating truly
>> random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my opinion.   Glad to hear
>> other thoughts on this subject.
>>
>
>  Doesn't the usual PRF definition give you exactly this?
>
>
> Yes; the only tricky bit is showing that using the CBC encryption key to
> generate pseudorandom IVs doesn't affect CBC encryption security.   I'm
> sure that it can be done securely, but I don't know of a proof of security
> (for using a single key for both CBC and to generate IVs) that I can point
> to.
>

Okay, I didn't realize we needed a single key. Then I think the following
proof works, but I don't know how strong the result is. Replace the PRP
with a PRF by Bernstein's lemma. Then so long as we've never encrypted a
block equal to the counter, life is good. Show this can't happen with more
than negligible probability for the ideal PRF. Conclude that an attacker
who breaks the scheme turns into one who can distinguish the PRF from an
ideal PRF with some loss.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

>
> David
>
>
>
>
>> David
>>
>> --
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
>> Revision:	03
>> Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
>> Document date:	2014-02-13
>> Group:		Individual Submission
>> Pages:		29
>> URL:            http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/
>> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
>>    associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
>>    Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
>>    mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
>>    authentication code (MAC).
>>
>>    These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
>>    use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
>>    invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>>
>
>
>  --
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary
> Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
>
>
>


-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary
Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

--20cf3040e42ec6e77804f25fd480
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 3:05 AM, David McGrew <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><div class=3D"">
    <div>On 02/13/2014 08:44 PM, Watson Ladd
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        <div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 4:49 PM,
            David McGrew <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mcgrew@cis=
co.com" target=3D"_blank">mcgrew@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"> Hi, <br>
                <br>
                the latest version of this draft is out.=C2=A0 Thanks are d=
ue
                to Jim Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on
                version 02.<br>
                <br>
                The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated
                encryption scheme suitable for use in those cases where
                CBC and HMAC are available, but no dedicated AE schemes
                are available.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Also, it doesn&#39;t require det=
erministic
                nonces, which itself is useful in some situations.<br>
                <br>
                It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
                pseudorandomly generated.=C2=A0=C2=A0 It would be especiall=
y
                useful to generate the IV using the same key as used for
                encryption, with an unpredictable counter, or something
                like that.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Is anyone aware of a security proof =
that
                could be cited for that sort of technique?=C2=A0=C2=A0 I th=
ink
                that some systems would have a much easier time
                maintaining a counter than they would generating truly
                random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in my
                opinion.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Glad to hear other thoughts on this su=
bject.=C2=A0</div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Doesn&#39;t the usual PRF definition give you exactly this=
?
              <br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br></div>
    Yes; the only tricky bit is showing that using the CBC encryption
    key to generate pseudorandom IVs doesn&#39;t affect CBC encryption
    security.=C2=A0=C2=A0 I&#39;m sure that it can be done securely, but I =
don&#39;t know
    of a proof of security (for using a single key for both CBC and to
    generate IVs) that I can point to.=C2=A0 <br></div></blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div>Okay, I didn&#39;t realize we needed a single key. Then I thin=
k the following proof works, but I don&#39;t know how strong the result is.=
 Replace the PRP with a PRF by Bernstein&#39;s lemma. Then so long as we&#3=
9;ve never encrypted a block equal to the counter, life is good. Show this =
can&#39;t happen with more than negligible probability for the ideal PRF. C=
onclude that an attacker who breaks the scheme turns into one who can disti=
nguish the PRF from an ideal PRF with some loss.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Sincerely,<br>Watson Ladd</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><fo=
nt color=3D"#888888">
    <br>
    David</font></span><div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div class=3D"gmail_extra">
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"> <br>
                David<br>
                <br>
                --<br>
                <div><br>
                  <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac=
-sha2-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by David McGrew and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2
Revision:	03
Title:		Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
Document date:	2014-02-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		29
URL:            <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mcgrew=
-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/inter=
net-drafts/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt</a>
Status:         <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-ae=
ad-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2/</a>
Htmlized:       <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aead-aes=
-cbc-hmac-sha2-03" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgre=
w-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>
Diff:           <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-mcgrew-=
aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?ur=
l2=3Ddraft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03</a>

Abstract:
   This document specifies algorithms for authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) that are based on the composition of the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
   mode of operation for encryption, and the HMAC-SHA message
   authentication code (MAC).

   These are randomized encryption algorithms, and thus are suitable for
   use with applications that cannot provide distinct nonces to each
   invocation of the AEAD encrypt operation.</pre>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <table border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0">
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                        <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"><br>
                        </th>
                        <td><br>
                        </td>
                      </tr>
                      <tr>
                        <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"><br>
                        </th>
                        <td><br>
                        </td>
                      </tr>
                      <tr>
                        <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"><br>
                        </th>
                        <td><br>
                        </td>
                      </tr>
                    </tbody>
                  </table>
                  <pre>                                                    =
                             =20


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
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until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
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The IETF Secretariat

.

</pre>
                  <br>
                </div>
                <br>
              </div>
              <br>
              _______________________________________________<br>
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            </blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
          <br clear=3D"all">
          <div><br>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          &quot;Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a
          little Temporary Safety deserve neither=C2=A0 Liberty nor Safety.=
&quot;<br>
          -- Benjamin Franklin </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div></div></div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>&quot;Those =
who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety d=
eserve neither=C2=A0 Liberty nor Safety.&quot;<br>-- Benjamin Franklin=20
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From: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 08:26:17 -0800
From: David Jacobson <dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net>
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To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
References: <20140214004117.27381.4308.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <52FD6815.70402@cisco.com> <52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net> <52FE01A8.7020307@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] New Version Notification for draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-03.txt
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On 2/14/14 3:44 AM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> On 02/14/2014 01:34 AM, David Jacobson wrote:
>> On 2/13/14 4:49 PM, David McGrew wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> the latest version of this draft is out.  Thanks are due to Jim 
>>> Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.
>>>
>>> The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated encryption 
>>> scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC and HMAC are 
>>> available, but no dedicated AE schemes are available.   Also, it 
>>> doesn't require deterministic nonces, which itself is useful in some 
>>> situations.
>>>
>>> It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be 
>>> pseudorandomly generated.   It would be especially useful to 
>>> generate the IV using the same key as used for encryption, with an 
>>> unpredictable counter, or something like that.   Is anyone aware of 
>>> a security proof that could be cited for that sort of technique?   I 
>>> think that some systems would have a much easier time maintaining a 
>>> counter than they would generating truly random IVs, which is 
>>> reasonable motivation in my opinion.   Glad to hear other thoughts 
>>> on this subject.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>> --
>> [SNIP]
>>
>> Above you mention an unpredictable counter.  I suspect you mean a 
>> counter that begins at a secret value, and wraps in the obvious way.  
>> Therefore it has be generated at random and stored in secure 
>> non-volatile storage.  So it seems strictly harder than just 
>> randomness.  So I don't know what is gained by using an unpredictable 
>> counter.
>
> It would enable the algorithms to be used for encryption on devices 
> that lacked a random source, and it would allow other systems to avoid 
> the complication of calling a random source during each encryption 
> invocation.   I don't have a lot of trust in good random sources being 
> done correctly and being available. Maybe another good way to say it 
> is that the requirement to tap into good randomness or 
> pseudorandomness is a very significant external dependency.    For 
> example, if a non-crypto-specialist downloads the source code for 
> these ciphersuites off the Internet and links it to their application, 
> it would be much better to have no such external dependancy, since the 
> developer might not even understand the randomness requirement.
>
You may have missed my point.  If  by "unpredictable counter" you mean 
one where the starting value is secret and it is incremented modulo the 
counter range once for each message, then you need randomness to get the 
initial counter value.  So you haven't eliminated the need for 
randomness.  Now maybe you were thinking of something like the TICK 
counter available in some CPUs.  It is incremented once each clock tick, 
and hence is pretty hard for the attacker to predict exactly.

[SNIP]
> This draft consciously avoids key derivation for simplicity, and to 
> avoid potential complications around validation (especially FIPS-140 
> key derivation).
>
>
Thank you for clarifying that.  Thus the key you describe may be an 
abstraction for managed keys in a hardware security module, and you 
can't get to them, and it is hard to push new ones in.  That changes a 
lot of things.

There is another concern:  replay attacks.   There is no way for the 
receiver to differentiate between a genuine fresh message sent by the 
sender and a replay of that message sent by an attacker.  I suggest that 
you mention that fact in Section 6 (Security Concerns), and say that for 
applications where replay resistance is required, the application is 
responsible for implementing replay resistance. The data used to 
implement replay resistance (say a sequence number or time stamp) can 
safely be put in the unencrypted portion.

    --David Jacobson

[SNIP]


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/14/14 3:44 AM, David McGrew wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FE01A8.7020307@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
        http-equiv="Content-Type">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi David,<br>
        <br>
        On 02/14/2014 01:34 AM, David Jacobson wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite">
        <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
          charset=ISO-8859-1">
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/13/14 4:49 PM, David McGrew
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote cite="mid:52FD6815.70402@cisco.com" type="cite"> Hi,
          <br>
          <br>
          the latest version of this draft is out.&nbsp; Thanks are due to
          Jim Schaad and Rob Napier for their feedback on version 02.<br>
          <br>
          The goals of this draft are to provide an authenticated
          encryption scheme suitable for use in those cases where CBC
          and HMAC are available, but no dedicated AE schemes are
          available.&nbsp;&nbsp; Also, it doesn't require deterministic nonces,
          which itself is useful in some situations.<br>
          <br>
          It might be nice to add a description of how IVs can be
          pseudorandomly generated.&nbsp;&nbsp; It would be especially useful to
          generate the IV using the same key as used for encryption,
          with an unpredictable counter, or something like that.&nbsp;&nbsp; Is
          anyone aware of a security proof that could be cited for that
          sort of technique?&nbsp;&nbsp; I think that some systems would have a
          much easier time maintaining a counter than they would
          generating truly random IVs, which is reasonable motivation in
          my opinion.&nbsp;&nbsp; Glad to hear other thoughts on this subject.<br>
          <br>
          David<br>
          <br>
          --<br>
        </blockquote>
        [SNIP]<br>
      </blockquote>
      <blockquote cite="mid:52FDB8F4.90203@sbcglobal.net" type="cite"> <br>
        Above you mention an unpredictable counter.&nbsp; I suspect you mean
        a counter that begins at a secret value, and wraps in the
        obvious way.&nbsp; Therefore it has be generated at random and stored
        in secure non-volatile storage.&nbsp; So it seems strictly harder
        than just randomness.&nbsp; So I don't know what is gained by using
        an unpredictable counter.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      It would enable the algorithms to be used for encryption on
      devices that lacked a random source, and it would allow other
      systems to avoid the complication of calling a random source
      during each encryption invocation.&nbsp;&nbsp; I don't have a lot of trust
      in good random sources being done correctly and being available.&nbsp;&nbsp;
      Maybe another good way to say it is that the requirement to tap
      into good randomness or pseudorandomness is a very significant
      external dependency.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For example, if a non-crypto-specialist
      downloads the source code for these ciphersuites off the Internet
      and links it to their application, it would be much better to have
      no such external dependancy, since the developer might not even
      understand the randomness requirement.<br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    You may have missed my point.&nbsp; If&nbsp; by "unpredictable counter" you
    mean one where the starting value is secret and it is incremented
    modulo the counter range once for each message, then you need
    randomness to get the initial counter value.&nbsp; So you haven't
    eliminated the need for randomness.&nbsp; Now maybe you were thinking of
    something like the TICK counter available in some CPUs.&nbsp; It is
    incremented once each clock tick, and hence is pretty hard for the
    attacker to predict exactly.<br>
    <br>
    [SNIP]<br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:52FE01A8.7020307@cisco.com" type="cite"> This
      draft consciously avoids key derivation for simplicity, and to
      avoid potential complications around validation (especially
      FIPS-140 key derivation).&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    Thank you for clarifying that.&nbsp; Thus the key you describe may be an
    abstraction for managed keys in a hardware security module, and you
    can't get to them, and it is hard to push new ones in.&nbsp; That changes
    a lot of things.<br>
    <br>
    There is another concern:&nbsp; replay attacks.&nbsp;&nbsp; There is no way for the
    receiver to differentiate between a genuine fresh message sent by
    the sender and a replay of that message sent by an attacker.&nbsp; I
    suggest that you mention that fact in Section 6 (Security Concerns),
    and say that for applications where replay resistance is required,
    the application is responsible for implementing replay resistance.&nbsp;
    The data used to implement replay resistance (say a sequence number
    or time stamp) can safely be put in the unencrypted portion.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; --David Jacobson<br>
    <br>
    [SNIP]<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------030007090501050106030109--


From nobody Mon Feb 17 12:19:29 2014
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Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2014 11:25:18 -0800
To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi Hannes,
At 09:08 12-02-2014, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>The CFRG might, unfortunately, not be the right group either. To me it
>seems that the folks in this group are focused on crypto (as the name of
>the group indicates). What we need is guys who understand the broader
>Internet ecosystem and know how to improve security libraries and to
>reach out to the wider Internet (security) community. One does not need
>to start from scratch since some of these communities exist but they
>often have no connection to the IETF or the relationship is very weak.
>As such, you often find a misalignment between the IETF security
>community and various other groups.

The above is also valid for other IETF technologies, i.e. there is a 
void between writing specifications and the implementation or 
deployment side.  I would not try to convince the IETF or the IAB to 
do anything about that. :-)

>My impression is that most IETF participants have not even recognized
>the need to take any action yet. I have often heard that this is
>"out-side-the-scope".

Yes.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy 


From nobody Mon Feb 17 14:52:00 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?
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Hi Hannes,

On 02/12/2014 12:08 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> I believe it is important to move beyond writing specifications to
> improving implementations and deployments. I think we both agree. I have
> been arguing for this for a while now and got pretty much no positive
> feedback. I also tried to convince the IAB that this would be somewhat
> important and completely failed. The response I got was: "This would
> require a completely different skill set." and "ISOC should do it."
>
> I don't have a good story for how to do that even at the level of
> individual work groups. I tried this in the OAuth working group and
> couldn't really find a way how to reach out to the large number of guys
> implementing OAuth libraries let alone those who deploy them.
>
> The CFRG might, unfortunately, not be the right group either. To me it
> seems that the folks in this group are focused on crypto (as the name of
> the group indicates). What we need is guys who understand the broader
> Internet ecosystem and know how to improve security libraries and to
> reach out to the wider Internet (security) community. One does not need
> to start from scratch since some of these communities exist but they
> often have no connection to the IETF or the relationship is very weak.
> As such, you often find a misalignment between the IETF security
> community and various other groups.

I think I know what you mean.   My own thinking in this space is that it 
would be healthy to develop stronger connections with the open source 
community.   For instance, if CFRG were to recommend a particular crypto 
mechanism, and then it turns out that the linux community rejects that 
mechanism (due to patents, performance, code size, complexity, API 
incompatibility, whatever), then there is probably something that we 
need to learn.   Better connections with the open source world could 
address some of that misalignment you mention, I think, though of course 
it is no panacea.

David


From nobody Mon Feb 17 21:47:43 2014
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From nobody Tue Feb 18 01:14:11 2014
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 09:13:57 +0000
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Cc: "agl@imperialviolet.org" <agl@imperialviolet.org>, "nisse@lysator.liu.se" <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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"Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>What is needed is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a message in=0A=
>chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they have received =
an=0A=
>authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to support=0A=
>streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.=0A=
=0A=
I think the means of doing this is going to be protocol-specific, since it=
=0A=
depends on the PDU format being used.  For things like SSL/TLS and SSH the=
=0A=
problem is already solved since data amounts are quantised to the protocol=
=0A=
data packet size, for store-and-forward protocols like PGP and S/MIME you'd=
=0A=
need to add a mechanism for it in a PGP/SMIME-specific manner, but then you=
'd=0A=
also need to figure out how to communicate it to the other side... and then=
=0A=
you're back to relying on ad-hoc mechanisms.=0A=
=0A=
When I had to do this years ago I used something like:=0A=
=0A=
len1 || data1 || h1 =3D HMAC( len1 || data1 ), =0A=
len2 || data2 || h2 =3D HMAC( h1 || len2 || data2 ),=0A=
len3 || data3 || h3 =3D HMAC( h2 || len3 || data3 ),=0A=
...=0A=
=0A=
A length of 0 indicated end-of-contents.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


From nobody Tue Feb 18 05:16:38 2014
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Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 08:16:28 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Cc: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>, =?UTF-8?B?TmllbHMgTcO2bGxlcg==?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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Hi James,

thanks for introducing this topic, more inline:

On 02/18/2014 12:47 AM, Manger, James wrote:
> Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) is a great primitive for securing messages, but it has one serious limitation: you only learn that the plaintext is authentic after processing all of the ciphertext. A crypto library performing decryption either has to: 1) cache the whole message (of arbitrary size) before returning the authentic plaintext; or 2) return unauthenticated plaintext chunks, and indicate authenticity only later when (or if) the end of the message is reached.
> Neither of these choices are ideal.

In "Pipelineable On-Line Encryption" (to be presented at FSE in a couple 
of weeks http://fse2014.isg.rhul.ac.uk/index.php?p=accepted) we call the 
act of releasing (would-be) plaintext prior to the completion of the 
authentication check "decryption misuse".   You are absolutely right 
that many crypto APIs enable or require decryption misuse, including 
openSSL and PKCS11 through their "decryptUpdate" functions.   A crypto 
module that does AEAD decryption of long messages at high data rates 
might be forced into doing decryption misuse if it has limited memory, 
or if the latency of plaintext buffering was unacceptable.   Decryption 
misuse is a problem that deserves to be addressed.

The simplest way to avoid decryption misuse is to never call the 
"decryptUpdate" function.   In some software environments, it is 
possible to re-write code so that this function is not called. This 
won't solve every problem, but it is worth mentioning.

Next up the scale in terms of difficultly, the length of the plaintext 
and associated data can be kept below some limit, to lower the latency 
and the memory requirements.   Do so requires that there is some 
flexibility in how the plaintext is "packetized", that is, how the 
sequence of plaintext messages is mapped onto the AEAD's plaintext inputs.

>
> What is needed is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a message in chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they have received an authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to support streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.
>
> A discussion on this topic has started on the IETF TLS list (in a thread unhelpfully titled "Comments on")
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg11282.html
>
> I think this would be a perfect topic for CFRG to address.
>
> Instead of sending C = AEAD(N, A, P);
> send C = AEAD(N1, A1, P1) || AEAD(N2, A2, P2) || ... || AEAD(Nm, Am, Pm).
> Presumably incrementing nonces can be used (eg N2 = N1 + 1).
> How do you flag the end of the message: a flag in the nonce; a flag in the AAD; empty plaintext; inside a modified AEAD primitive?
> How do you flag the start of the message?
> Should the byte offset of each chunk be put in that chunk's AAD?
> Is the real AAD fed to the first or last AEAD instantiation; or can parts be passed to any AEAD instantiation?

Here you are pointing out that a single associated data and plaintext 
value (A,P) could be fragmented into multiple values before AEAD 
processing is used.   This is surely true.   If the fragmentation was 
handled by the higher layer protocol (TLS, ESP, whatever) then this 
could be done with any AEAD algorithm.

>
> Should this be built from AEAD primitives? What about ones without nonces (eg draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2)?
> Is it sufficient for a Streaming-AEAD primitive to distinguish 4 modes (full message; 1st chunk; intermediate chunk; last chunk) plus a stipulation to use incrementing nonces for successive chunks?
> Or should we aim for a Streaming-AEAD that can create extra intermediate authentication tags, without affecting the final tag?
>
>
> As a strawman, what if OCB [draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb] was tweaked so the internal 128-bit Nonce field was changed from:
> Nonce = num2str(TAGLEN mod 128,7) || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
> to:
> Nonce = num2str((TAGLEN mod 128)/4,5) || num2str(FLAG,2) || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N
> where
> FLAG = 00 means the AEAD operation covers a full message,
> FLAG = 01 means the AEAD operation covers the first chunk of a message,
> FLAG = 10 means the AEAD operation covers a subsequent chunk of a message (incrementing N),
> FLAG = 11 means the AEAD operation covers the last chunk of a message (incrementing N).
>
> With 5 minutes analyses from a non-cryptanalyst that looks sufficient for a secure streaming-AEAD :)

Alternatively, the associated data could be formatted so that it 
contains the usual header, followed by a fragment number.   That 
technique would work with any of the AEAD algorithms.

Fragmenting the plaintexts before applying AEAD requires that each AEAD 
message be independently authenticated, and thus this technique has more 
data/encapsulation overhead.

In the POE approach that I mentioned above, we describe a way to make an 
AEAD algorithm robust against decryption misuse, though partial 
non-malleability.   That is, if the attacker changes any part of a 
ciphertext, then the corresponding post-decryption plaintext will be 
indistinguishable from random.   If conventional AEAD is used with the 
decryptUpdate function, the attacker can cause the post-decryption 
plaintext output by that function to have any value.   In contrast, if 
POE is used, then the output of decryptUpdate will be indistinguishable 
from random, and not under the control of an attacker.

This robustness against decryption misuse is a valuable property for an 
AEAD algorithm to have.   Nonetheless, it would be better if the 
protocol using AEAD actually performed some sort of plaintext 
fragmentation, if it can accommodate the overhead, because the security 
would be better.   Another advantage to using a plaintext fragmentation 
scheme is that the scheme could be used to hide the lengths and timings 
of the actual plaintext messages, thus preventing traffic analysis (like 
that done in Dyer et. al. "Peek-a-Boo, I Still See You: Why Efficient 
Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail").

This line of thinking is part of the rationale behind AERO 
(draft-mcgrew-aero-01) with a wide PRP: since we need to avoid 
decryption misuse, we force the decrypter to maintain some state, and 
given that fact, we might as well get the best security possible.

>
> --
> James Manger
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
> Sent: Monday, 17 February 2014 7:10 PM
> To: Adam Langley
> Cc: Niels Möller; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments on
>
> On Fri, 2014-02-14 at 14:49 -0500, Adam Langley wrote:
>
>>> By streaming, I don't advocate you do the decryption in a pipe line;
>>> that's clearly a dangerous habit. Usecase is more like on one machine
>>> running
>>>    src-machine$ tar -cf - foo-dir | aead-encrypt | send
>> This use of streaming is fine by my criteria, assuming that
>> "aead-encrypt" is chunking the input into different blocks and
>> applying the AEAD to each block. This is perfectly fine with a
>> one-shot(*), AEAD API at the core.
> I'd pretty much agree with the chunked approach, but I now realize that
> it is more hard to get it right than the streaming one. In the chunked
> approach one would need to implement sequence numbers (could be implicit
> as additional data) and a termination block. So both approaches have
> quite some disadvantages. The streaming approach allows for misuse of
> the API which may cancel the benefits of AEAD, and the chunked approach
> requires the developer to create a safe protocol over AEAD.
>
> If the idea is for AEAD to be used by an average developer, it seems we
> need even a higher abstraction than that; even for such a simple
> use-cases.

It makes sense to consider higher-level abstractions, but hopefully the 
problem can be addressed in many cases by having the higher-layer 
protocol avoid long plaintexts.

In any event, what are up against here is an important principle in 
secure protocol design: a receiver should not trust any data that gets 
sent to it until that data has been authenticated, and it should not be 
forced to use up its memory (e.g. to store post-decryption plaintext) on 
unauthenticated data.

thanks,

David

>
> regards,
> Nikos
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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Hi Peter,

On 02/18/2014 04:13 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> writes:
>
>> What is needed is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a message in
>> chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they have received an
>> authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to support
>> streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.
> I think the means of doing this is going to be protocol-specific, since it
> depends on the PDU format being used.

I think that's right.   It still makes sense to consider what should be 
going on above the AEAD layer, in a generic sense.

> For things like SSL/TLS and SSH the
> problem is already solved since data amounts are quantised to the protocol
> data packet size,

I hope that's right.   I am not sure that SSL/TLS implementers would be 
comfortable if they could never use the decryptUpdate function though.

> for store-and-forward protocols like PGP and S/MIME you'd
> need to add a mechanism for it in a PGP/SMIME-specific manner, but then you'd
> also need to figure out how to communicate it to the other side... and then
> you're back to relying on ad-hoc mechanisms.
>
> When I had to do this years ago I used something like:
>
> len1 || data1 || h1 = HMAC( len1 || data1 ),
> len2 || data2 || h2 = HMAC( h1 || len2 || data2 ),
> len3 || data3 || h3 = HMAC( h2 || len3 || data3 ),
> ...
>
> A length of 0 indicated end-of-contents.

Interesting, is there a writeup?

thanks,

David

>
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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Hi,

The problem of streaming AEAD seems to be closely related to our paper
"Security of Symmetric Encryption in the Presence of Ciphertext
Fragmentation" with Alexandra Boldyreva, Kenny Paterson, and Martijn Stam
from Eurocrypt 2012. In it we consider the problem of achieving
authenticated encryption over channels that may fragment the ciphertext in
arbitrary manner, as is the case with TCP/IP. Protocols like TLS and SSH
tackle this problem by introducing a length field in their respective data
formats.

Extending AEAD to support fragmentation raises a number of new security
concerns. In particular, it can totally undermine the privacy of the
scheme, as was the case with SSH-CBC (see Albrecht Paterson and Watson from
Oakland 09). Additionally it may introduce new vulnerabilities that relate
to Denial of Service. On the other hand, as David already mentioned,
supporting fragmentation may provide a strategy for mitigating Traffic
Analysis if certain additional security properties are met.

In the paper we provide a formal treatment of ciphertext fragmentation
addressing all of these points, and present some constructions which relate
to some of the ideas that you mentioned in this thread. We are currently
doing some major revisions on the proceedings version and an updated full
version will be available on eprint soon.

Best

Jean Paul Degabriele

--001a11336a2e490b0804f2b6a671
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,=A0</div><div><br></div>The problem of streaming A=
EAD seems to be closely related to our paper &quot;Security of Symmetric En=
cryption in the Presence of Ciphertext Fragmentation&quot; with Alexandra B=
oldyreva, Kenny Paterson, and Martijn Stam from Eurocrypt 2012. In it we co=
nsider the problem of achieving authenticated encryption over channels that=
 may fragment the ciphertext in arbitrary manner, as is the case with TCP/I=
P. Protocols like TLS and SSH tackle this problem by introducing a length f=
ield in their respective data formats.<div>
<br></div><div>Extending AEAD to support fragmentation raises a number of n=
ew security concerns. In particular, it can totally undermine the privacy o=
f the scheme, as was the case with SSH-CBC (see Albrecht Paterson and Watso=
n from Oakland 09). Additionally it may introduce new vulnerabilities that =
relate to Denial of Service. On the other hand, as David already mentioned,=
 supporting fragmentation may provide a strategy for mitigating Traffic Ana=
lysis if certain additional security properties are met.</div>
<div><br></div><div>In the paper we provide a formal treatment of ciphertex=
t fragmentation addressing all of these points, and present some constructi=
ons which relate to some of the ideas that you mentioned in this thread. We=
 are currently doing some major revisions on the proceedings version and an=
 updated full version will be available on eprint soon.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Best</div><div><br></div><div>Jean Paul Degabriele</div=
><div><br></div><div>=A0=A0 =A0=A0</div></div>

--001a11336a2e490b0804f2b6a671--


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Dear cryptographers in CFRG,

I have been working on writing a few cryptographic algorithms documents: SM2
elliptic curve digital signature algorithm and SM3 hash function. The two
algorithms are published in China for years and required to be used in IT
systems like electronic authentication service system. 

It was my pleasure to provide the IETF documents to make these algorithms
public to IETF community and hence the whole Internet industry. The two
documents have been in published for quite a while and I updated a few
versions. I also have given presentations in IETF meetings a few times to
security guys in CFRG. Audience has been very interested in them. 

I think these works are valuable to both IETF community and vendors in
Chinese market. So I hope the two documents on the track to be IETF RFCs.

Also I prepared a simple webpage to give information (related documents and
implementations) of a few crypto algorithms used in China, including SM2 and
SM3. I will keep updating the draft and webpage , hope they are helpful to
the community. Please check:

http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page 

I will appreciate and reviews and suggestions.

 

Sean Shen

CNNIC

 

 

 

 

 

A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been successfully
submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.

 

Name:               draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa

Revision:  02

Title:                  SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm

Document date:       2014-02-14

Group:               Individual Submission

Pages:               40

URL:            http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.
txt

Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/

Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02

Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02

 

Abstract:

   This document discribles a set of public key cryptographic algorithms

   based on elliptic curves which is invented by Xiaoyun Wang et al.

   These algorithms and recommended parameters are published by Chinese

   Commercial Cryptography Administration Office ([SM2 Algorithms] and

   [SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of electronic authentication

   service system.  This document gives IETF standard description of the

   algorithms and parameters in [SM2 Algorithms] and [SM2 Algorithms

   Parameters].

 

   The document [SM2 Algorithms] published by Chinese Commercial

   Cryptography Administration Office includes four parts: general

   introdocution, Digital Signature Algorithm, Key Exchange Protocol and

   Public Key Encryption Algorithm.

 

   The document [SM2 Algorithms Parameters] gives a set of recommended

   parameters.

 

 

 

A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt has been successfully
submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.

 

Name:               draft-shen-sm3-hash

Revision:  01

Title:                  SM3 Hash function

Document date:       2014-02-14

Group:               Individual Submission

Pages:               13

URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt

Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/

Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01

Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-shen-sm3-hash-01

 

Abstract:

   This document discribles a hash function which is invented by Xiaoyun

   Wang et al.  This algorithm is published by Chinese Commercial

   Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for the use of electronic

   authentication service system.  This document gives IETF standard

   description of the algorithm.

 

 

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DZH-CN link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'text-justify-trim:punctuation'><div =
class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>Dear =
cryptographers in CFRG,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>I have been working on writing a few cryptographic =
algorithms documents: SM2 elliptic curve digital signature algorithm and =
SM3 hash function. The two algorithms are published in China for years =
and required to be used in IT systems like electronic authentication =
service system. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>It was my pleasure to provide the IETF documents to make =
these algorithms public to IETF community and hence the whole Internet =
industry. The two documents have been in published for quite a while and =
I updated a few versions. I also have given presentations in IETF =
meetings a few times to security guys in CFRG. Audience has been very =
interested in them. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>I think these works are valuable to both IETF community and =
vendors in Chinese market. So I hope the two documents on the track to =
be IETF RFCs.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Also I prepared a simple webpage to give information =
(related documents and implementations) of a few crypto algorithms used =
in China, including SM2 and SM3. I will keep updating the draft and =
webpage , hope they are helpful to the community. Please =
check:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><a =
href=3D"http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page">http://218.241=
.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I will appreciate and reviews and =
suggestions.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Sean Shen<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>CNNIC<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been =
successfully submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF =
repository.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Name:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Revision:&nbsp; 02<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Title:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SM2 Digital Signature =
Algorithm<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Document date:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
2014-02-14<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Group:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Individual =
Submission<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Pages:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 40<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>URL:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt">=
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt</a><o:p><=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Status:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/">https://d=
atatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Htmlized:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02">http://tools.=
ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Diff:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02">http:=
//www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02</a><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Abstract:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; This document =
discribles a set of public key cryptographic =
algorithms<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; based on elliptic curves which is invented by =
Xiaoyun Wang et al.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; These algorithms and recommended parameters =
are published by Chinese<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; Commercial =
Cryptography Administration Office ([SM2 Algorithms] =
and<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; [SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of =
electronic authentication<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; service =
system.&nbsp; This document gives IETF standard description of =
the<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithms and parameters in [SM2 Algorithms] =
and [SM2 Algorithms<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp; &nbsp;Parameters].<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; The document [SM2 =
Algorithms] published by Chinese Commercial<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; Cryptography =
Administration Office includes four parts: =
general<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; introdocution, Digital Signature Algorithm, =
Key Exchange Protocol and<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; Public Key =
Encryption Algorithm.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; The document [SM2 Algorithms Parameters] gives =
a set of recommended<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; parameters.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>A new version of I-D, =
draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Sean Shen =
and posted to the IETF repository.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Name:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
draft-shen-sm3-hash<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Revision:&nbsp; 01<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Title:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SM3 Hash =
function<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Document date:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
2014-02-14<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Group:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Individual =
Submission<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Pages:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 13<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>URL:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt">h=
ttp://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt</a><o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Status:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/">https://da=
tatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Htmlized:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01">http://tools.i=
etf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Diff:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm3-hash-01">http:/=
/www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm3-hash-01</a><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Abstract:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; This document =
discribles a hash function which is invented by =
Xiaoyun<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; Wang et al.&nbsp; This algorithm is published =
by Chinese Commercial<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for =
the use of electronic<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; authentication service system.&nbsp; This =
document gives IETF standard<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DEN-US>&nbsp;&nbsp; description of the =
algorithm.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_00AB_01CF2D51.007DF790--


From nobody Tue Feb 18 17:31:21 2014
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update
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If this is a valid transcription of the standard, it should be fine.
But the place you want to go is the IPSEC and TLS WGs to get it into
implementations.

Note that this is not a recommendation for usage: I haven't validated
parameters or the algorithms, and SM3 in particular looks sketchy.
(It's an MD-style hash, in a world where many have fallen). Has there
been a lot of analytical attention devoted to it that I've missed
hearing about?

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Sean Shen =E6=B2=88=E7=83=81 <shenshuo@cnn=
ic.cn> wrote:
> Dear cryptographers in CFRG,
>
> I have been working on writing a few cryptographic algorithms documents: =
SM2
> elliptic curve digital signature algorithm and SM3 hash function. The two
> algorithms are published in China for years and required to be used in IT
> systems like electronic authentication service system.
>
> It was my pleasure to provide the IETF documents to make these algorithms
> public to IETF community and hence the whole Internet industry. The two
> documents have been in published for quite a while and I updated a few
> versions. I also have given presentations in IETF meetings a few times to
> security guys in CFRG. Audience has been very interested in them.
>
> I think these works are valuable to both IETF community and vendors in
> Chinese market. So I hope the two documents on the track to be IETF RFCs.
>
> Also I prepared a simple webpage to give information (related documents a=
nd
> implementations) of a few crypto algorithms used in China, including SM2 =
and
> SM3. I will keep updating the draft and webpage , hope they are helpful t=
o
> the community. Please check:
>
> http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page
>
> I will appreciate and reviews and suggestions.
>
>
>
> Sean Shen
>
> CNNIC
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been successfully
> submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>
>
>
> Name:               draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa
>
> Revision:  02
>
> Title:                  SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm
>
> Document date:       2014-02-14
>
> Group:               Individual Submission
>
> Pages:               40
>
> URL:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt
>
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/
>
> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
>
> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-0=
2
>
>
>
> Abstract:
>
>    This document discribles a set of public key cryptographic algorithms
>
>    based on elliptic curves which is invented by Xiaoyun Wang et al.
>
>    These algorithms and recommended parameters are published by Chinese
>
>    Commercial Cryptography Administration Office ([SM2 Algorithms] and
>
>    [SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of electronic authentication
>
>    service system.  This document gives IETF standard description of the
>
>    algorithms and parameters in [SM2 Algorithms] and [SM2 Algorithms
>
>    Parameters].
>
>
>
>    The document [SM2 Algorithms] published by Chinese Commercial
>
>    Cryptography Administration Office includes four parts: general
>
>    introdocution, Digital Signature Algorithm, Key Exchange Protocol and
>
>    Public Key Encryption Algorithm.
>
>
>
>    The document [SM2 Algorithms Parameters] gives a set of recommended
>
>    parameters.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt has been successfully
> submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>
>
>
> Name:               draft-shen-sm3-hash
>
> Revision:  01
>
> Title:                  SM3 Hash function
>
> Document date:       2014-02-14
>
> Group:               Individual Submission
>
> Pages:               13
>
> URL:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt
>
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/
>
> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>
> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>
>
>
> Abstract:
>
>    This document discribles a hash function which is invented by Xiaoyun
>
>    Wang et al.  This algorithm is published by Chinese Commercial
>
>    Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for the use of electronic
>
>    authentication service system.  This document gives IETF standard
>
>    description of the algorithm.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



--=20
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin


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<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple style=3D'text-justify-trim:punctuation'><div class=3DWordSectio=
n1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Hi She=
n,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0p=
t;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Very interesting work.&nbsp; It is good t=
o see more curves appearing.&nbsp; Thank you very much for publishing.&nbsp=
; A couple small questions.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Is there a licen=
sing statement associated with the submittal?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:.5in'><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:11.0pt;color:black'><a href=3D"http://www.google.com/patents/CN10210=
4481A?cl=3Den">http://www.google.com/patents/CN102104481A?cl=3Den</a> <o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color=
:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:11.0pt;color:black'>When you say public below, I assume this stateme=
nt means the work is being placed into the public domain. <o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Yes?=
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;=
color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Thanks in advance,<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;colo=
r:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:11.0pt;color:black'>Paul<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=
<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;paddin=
g:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft style=3D'text-align:=
left'><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'=
>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans=
-serif"'> Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Sean Shen=
 ??<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 18, 2014 5:00 PM<br><b>To:</b> cfrg@i=
rtf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update<o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dleft style=3D'text-al=
ign:left'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Dear cryptographers in =
CFRG,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I have been working on writing a f=
ew cryptographic algorithms documents: SM2 elliptic curve digital signature=
 algorithm and SM3 hash function. The two algorithms are published in China=
 for years and required to be used in IT systems like electronic authentica=
tion service system. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>It was my pleasure=
 to provide the IETF documents to make these algorithms public to IETF comm=
unity and hence the whole Internet industry. The two documents have been in=
 published for quite a while and I updated a few versions. I also have give=
n presentations in IETF meetings a few times to security guys in CFRG. Audi=
ence has been very interested in them. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
I think these works are valuable to both IETF community and vendors in Chin=
ese market. So I hope the two documents on the track to be IETF RFCs.<o:p><=
/o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Also I prepared a simple webpage to give info=
rmation (related documents and implementations) of a few crypto algorithms =
used in China, including SM2 and SM3. I will keep updating the draft and we=
bpage , hope they are helpful to the community. Please check:<o:p></o:p></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><a href=3D"http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Ma=
in_Page">http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page</a> <o:p></o:p><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I will appreciate and reviews and suggestions.<o:p>=
</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Se=
an Shen<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>CNNIC<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DM=
soNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>A n=
ew version of I-D, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been successfully submit=
ted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoPlainText><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Name:&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Revision:&nbsp;=
 02<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Title:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Docu=
ment date:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2014-02-14<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText>Group:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Individual Submission<o:p></o:p></p><p=
 class=3DMsoPlainText>Pages:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 40<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainT=
ext>URL:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt"=
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt</a><o:p></=
o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Status:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecd=
sa/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/</a><o:p></o:p><=
/p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Htmlized:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a=
 href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02">http://tools.i=
etf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainT=
ext>Diff:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a hr=
ef=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02">http://ww=
w.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02</a><o:p></o:p></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoPlainText><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Abstract:<o:p=
></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; This document discribles a =
set of public key cryptographic algorithms<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlai=
nText>&nbsp;&nbsp; based on elliptic curves which is invented by Xiaoyun Wa=
ng et al.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; These algorith=
ms and recommended parameters are published by Chinese<o:p></o:p></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; Commercial Cryptography Administration Offic=
e ([SM2 Algorithms] and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
[SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of electronic authentication<o:p><=
/o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; service system.&nbsp; This do=
cument gives IETF standard description of the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoP=
lainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithms and parameters in [SM2 Algorithms] and [SM=
2 Algorithms<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp; &nbsp;Parameters]=
.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMso=
PlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; The document [SM2 Algorithms] published by Chinese C=
ommercial<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; Cryptography A=
dministration Office includes four parts: general<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D=
MsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; introdocution, Digital Signature Algorithm, Key E=
xchange Protocol and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; Pub=
lic Key Encryption Algorithm.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; The document [SM2 Algori=
thms Parameters] gives a set of recommended<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPla=
inText>&nbsp;&nbsp; parameters.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>A new version of I-D, draft-s=
hen-sm3-hash-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Sean Shen and posted=
 to the IETF repository.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Name:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-shen-sm3-hash<o:p></o=
:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Revision:&nbsp; 01<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D=
MsoPlainText>Title:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SM3 Hash function<o:p></o:p>=
</p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Document date:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; 2014-02-14<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Group:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Indivi=
dual Submission<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Pages:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 13<o:=
p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>URL:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-dra=
fts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-s=
hen-sm3-hash-01.txt</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Status:&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.i=
etf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sh=
en-sm3-hash/</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Htmlized:&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-=
sm3-hash-01">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01</a><o:p></o:=
p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>Diff:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-sh=
en-sm3-hash-01">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm3-hash-01</=
a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMs=
oPlainText>Abstract:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; Thi=
s document discribles a hash function which is invented by Xiaoyun<o:p></o:=
p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; Wang et al.&nbsp; This algorithm=
 is published by Chinese Commercial<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for the use of elect=
ronic<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; authentication ser=
vice system.&nbsp; This document gives IETF standard<o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoPlainText>&nbsp;&nbsp; description of the algorithm.<o:p></o:p></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B82EE46FSCVEXCH2marve_--


From nobody Tue Feb 18 17:44:17 2014
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Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 01:44:05 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update
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On 02/19/2014 01:31 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> If this is a valid transcription of the standard, it should be fine.
> But the place you want to go is the IPSEC and TLS WGs to get it into
> implementations.

Not yet perhaps. I figure there's value in some more crypto clue
validating that the text of the drafts looks fine since they're
not simple transcriptions and e.g. maybe some more test vectors
or something might be suggested and added. At that point shooting
these via the independent submission stream is the usual thing
and after that it'd be time to head to TLS or IPSECME.

> Note that this is not a recommendation for usage: I haven't validated
> parameters or the algorithms, and SM3 in particular looks sketchy.
> (It's an MD-style hash, in a world where many have fallen). Has there
> been a lot of analytical attention devoted to it that I've missed
> hearing about?

Right. Those are the things it'd be great to have seen
informed comment on here.

S

> 
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> 
> On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Sean Shen 沈烁 <shenshuo@cnnic.cn> wrote:
>> Dear cryptographers in CFRG,
>>
>> I have been working on writing a few cryptographic algorithms documents: SM2
>> elliptic curve digital signature algorithm and SM3 hash function. The two
>> algorithms are published in China for years and required to be used in IT
>> systems like electronic authentication service system.
>>
>> It was my pleasure to provide the IETF documents to make these algorithms
>> public to IETF community and hence the whole Internet industry. The two
>> documents have been in published for quite a while and I updated a few
>> versions. I also have given presentations in IETF meetings a few times to
>> security guys in CFRG. Audience has been very interested in them.
>>
>> I think these works are valuable to both IETF community and vendors in
>> Chinese market. So I hope the two documents on the track to be IETF RFCs.
>>
>> Also I prepared a simple webpage to give information (related documents and
>> implementations) of a few crypto algorithms used in China, including SM2 and
>> SM3. I will keep updating the draft and webpage , hope they are helpful to
>> the community. Please check:
>>
>> http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page
>>
>> I will appreciate and reviews and suggestions.
>>
>>
>>
>> Sean Shen
>>
>> CNNIC
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been successfully
>> submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>>
>>
>>
>> Name:               draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa
>>
>> Revision:  02
>>
>> Title:                  SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm
>>
>> Document date:       2014-02-14
>>
>> Group:               Individual Submission
>>
>> Pages:               40
>>
>> URL:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt
>>
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/
>>
>> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
>>
>> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
>>
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>
>>    This document discribles a set of public key cryptographic algorithms
>>
>>    based on elliptic curves which is invented by Xiaoyun Wang et al.
>>
>>    These algorithms and recommended parameters are published by Chinese
>>
>>    Commercial Cryptography Administration Office ([SM2 Algorithms] and
>>
>>    [SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of electronic authentication
>>
>>    service system.  This document gives IETF standard description of the
>>
>>    algorithms and parameters in [SM2 Algorithms] and [SM2 Algorithms
>>
>>    Parameters].
>>
>>
>>
>>    The document [SM2 Algorithms] published by Chinese Commercial
>>
>>    Cryptography Administration Office includes four parts: general
>>
>>    introdocution, Digital Signature Algorithm, Key Exchange Protocol and
>>
>>    Public Key Encryption Algorithm.
>>
>>
>>
>>    The document [SM2 Algorithms Parameters] gives a set of recommended
>>
>>    parameters.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt has been successfully
>> submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>>
>>
>>
>> Name:               draft-shen-sm3-hash
>>
>> Revision:  01
>>
>> Title:                  SM3 Hash function
>>
>> Document date:       2014-02-14
>>
>> Group:               Individual Submission
>>
>> Pages:               13
>>
>> URL:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt
>>
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/
>>
>> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>>
>> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>>
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>
>>    This document discribles a hash function which is invented by Xiaoyun
>>
>>    Wang et al.  This algorithm is published by Chinese Commercial
>>
>>    Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for the use of electronic
>>
>>    authentication service system.  This document gives IETF standard
>>
>>    description of the algorithm.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
> 
> 
> 


From nobody Tue Feb 18 18:36:20 2014
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From: =?utf-8?Q?Sean_Shen_=E6=B2=88=E7=83=81?= <shenshuo@cnnic.cn>
To: <cfrg@irtf.org>
References: <00aa01cf2d0d$f25ab790$d71026b0$@cn> <CACsn0c=HcQjatb6M12N7m46=Ko3vOtwO7=TWFhd7cK8Ch=VOPw@mail.gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 10:36:13 +0800
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update
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These are the documents describing algorithms themselves, trying to =
stick to the original standards. I discussed with the security =
directors, they also think CFRG is the proper place for algorithms =
regarding clarity and correctness of the text.
As for implementations, hope the algorithms will be options for =
applications, IPSEC and TLS definitely are definitely widely used ones, =
maybe also DNSSEC although DNSEXT WG is concluded currently. So far I =
haven't discussed with guys in those area regarding adopting SM2 and SM3 =
in those application, I plan to have the algorithms documents ready for =
the IETF reference first.=20

Regarding the SM3 Hash function. It is based on the Merkle-Damg=C3=A5rd =
design and very similar to SHA-2 but includes some additional =
strengthening features, it was designed by Xiaoyun Wang et al. I am not =
the designer and did not crypto analysis myself, but I collected some =
related arypto analysis paper in the webpage I mentioned, you can =
especially check: =
http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/SM3%27s_related_papers  =20


-----=E9=82=AE=E4=BB=B6=E5=8E=9F=E4=BB=B6-----
=E5=8F=91=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]=20
=E5=8F=91=E9=80=81=E6=97=B6=E9=97=B4: 2014=E5=B9=B42=E6=9C=8819=E6=97=A5 =
9:31
=E6=94=B6=E4=BB=B6=E4=BA=BA: Sean Shen =E6=B2=88=E7=83=81
=E6=8A=84=E9=80=81: cfrg@irtf.org
=E4=B8=BB=E9=A2=98: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update

If this is a valid transcription of the standard, it should be fine.
But the place you want to go is the IPSEC and TLS WGs to get it into =
implementations.

Note that this is not a recommendation for usage: I haven't validated =
parameters or the algorithms, and SM3 in particular looks sketchy.
(It's an MD-style hash, in a world where many have fallen). Has there =
been a lot of analytical attention devoted to it that I've missed =
hearing about?

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Sean Shen =E6=B2=88=E7=83=81 =
<shenshuo@cnnic.cn> wrote:
> Dear cryptographers in CFRG,
>
> I have been working on writing a few cryptographic algorithms=20
> documents: SM2 elliptic curve digital signature algorithm and SM3 hash =

> function. The two algorithms are published in China for years and=20
> required to be used in IT systems like electronic authentication =
service system.
>
> It was my pleasure to provide the IETF documents to make these=20
> algorithms public to IETF community and hence the whole Internet=20
> industry. The two documents have been in published for quite a while=20
> and I updated a few versions. I also have given presentations in IETF=20
> meetings a few times to security guys in CFRG. Audience has been very =
interested in them.
>
> I think these works are valuable to both IETF community and vendors in =

> Chinese market. So I hope the two documents on the track to be IETF =
RFCs.
>
> Also I prepared a simple webpage to give information (related=20
> documents and
> implementations) of a few crypto algorithms used in China, including=20
> SM2 and SM3. I will keep updating the draft and webpage , hope they=20
> are helpful to the community. Please check:
>
> http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page
>
> I will appreciate and reviews and suggestions.
>
>
>
> Sean Shen
>
> CNNIC
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been=20
> successfully submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>
>
>
> Name:               draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa
>
> Revision:  02
>
> Title:                  SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm
>
> Document date:       2014-02-14
>
> Group:               Individual Submission
>
> Pages:               40
>
> URL:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt
>
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/
>
> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
>
> Diff:           =
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
>
>
>
> Abstract:
>
>    This document discribles a set of public key cryptographic=20
> algorithms
>
>    based on elliptic curves which is invented by Xiaoyun Wang et al.
>
>    These algorithms and recommended parameters are published by=20
> Chinese
>
>    Commercial Cryptography Administration Office ([SM2 Algorithms] and
>
>    [SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of electronic=20
> authentication
>
>    service system.  This document gives IETF standard description of=20
> the
>
>    algorithms and parameters in [SM2 Algorithms] and [SM2 Algorithms
>
>    Parameters].
>
>
>
>    The document [SM2 Algorithms] published by Chinese Commercial
>
>    Cryptography Administration Office includes four parts: general
>
>    introdocution, Digital Signature Algorithm, Key Exchange Protocol=20
> and
>
>    Public Key Encryption Algorithm.
>
>
>
>    The document [SM2 Algorithms Parameters] gives a set of recommended
>
>    parameters.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt has been successfully =

> submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>
>
>
> Name:               draft-shen-sm3-hash
>
> Revision:  01
>
> Title:                  SM3 Hash function
>
> Document date:       2014-02-14
>
> Group:               Individual Submission
>
> Pages:               13
>
> URL:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt
>
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/
>
> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>
> Diff:           =
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>
>
>
> Abstract:
>
>    This document discribles a hash function which is invented by=20
> Xiaoyun
>
>    Wang et al.  This algorithm is published by Chinese Commercial
>
>    Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for the use of=20
> electronic
>
>    authentication service system.  This document gives IETF standard
>
>    description of the algorithm.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



--
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little =
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin


From nobody Tue Feb 18 19:59:34 2014
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From: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 14:59:22 +1100
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From: Mridul Nandi <mridul.nandi@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 10:38:53 +0530
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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Dear ALL,

When we have limited buffer or we need to release the computation of
message and ciphertext in a regular interval, we can go for AEAD which
supports intermediate tag.  You may have a look on section 6 of our paper
http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/767.pdf
which talks about intermediate tag. Computation of intermediate tag in our
construction is very less.


Thanks and regards,
Mridul Nandi
 Assistant Professor
Indian Statistical Institute
Kolkata



On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 9:29 AM, Manger, James <
James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:

> > >> What is needed is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a message
> in
> > >> chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they have
> received an
> > >> authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to support
> > >> streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.
>
> > > I think the means of doing this is going to be protocol-specific,
> since it
> > > depends on the PDU format being used.
>
> Not necessarily.
> I was thinking we could define a new alg identifier such as
> "AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN96/10K", meaning OCB on 10 KB chunks.
> Once the 10228th byte (10KB - 96 bits) of plaintext is streamed
> to the encrypt function, it finishes the first AEAD operation and
> inserts a 96-bit tag into the ciphertext. A decryption function
> caches the ciphertext it is streamed until it reaches a 10KB
> boundary then it returns 10228 bytes of plaintext.
>
> An app sees a different alg id, but doesn't need to notice that
> the ciphertext PDU is actually ct tag ct tag ct tag...
> [It might need to know which nonces have been used internally though!]
>
>
> > I think that's right.   It still makes sense to consider what should be
> > going on above the AEAD layer, in a generic sense.
> >
> > > For things like SSL/TLS and SSH the
> > > problem is already solved since data amounts are quantised to the
> > protocol
> > > data packet size,
> >
> > I hope that's right.   I am not sure that SSL/TLS implementers would be
> > comfortable if they could never use the decryptUpdate function though.
> >
> > > for store-and-forward protocols like PGP and S/MIME you'd
> > > need to add a mechanism for it in a PGP/SMIME-specific manner, but
> > then you'd
> > > also need to figure out how to communicate it to the other side...
> > and then
> > > you're back to relying on ad-hoc mechanisms.
> > >
> > > When I had to do this years ago I used something like:
> > >
> > > len1 || data1 || h1 = HMAC( len1 || data1 ),
> > > len2 || data2 || h2 = HMAC( h1 || len2 || data2 ),
> > > len3 || data3 || h3 = HMAC( h2 || len3 || data3 ),
> > > ...
> > >
> > > A length of 0 indicated end-of-contents.
> >
> > Interesting, is there a writeup?
>
>
> So for packetizing plaintext for ~AEAD chunks:
> * TLS puts a sequence number in the AAD;
> * Peter (sort of) puts a tag for the previous prefix in the AAD;
> * I suggested using sequential nonces and a start/middle/end flag;
> * AERO hides the details in state;
> * Pipelineable On-Line Encryption randomizes unauthentic plaintext.
>
>
> My only concern with putting state (eg sequence number, byte count,
> previous hash) into AAD is that you need something at a higher layer to
> ensure that AEAD(X||Y,P) is always interpreted as "chunk mode with state=X,
> user-provided-AAD=Y", and never as "non-chunk mode with
> user-provided-AAD=X||Y". You probably cannot safely use 1 key in chunk and
> non-chunk modes.
>
> --
> James Manger
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

--089e0158b938ca97da04f2bb6346
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Dear ALL,<div style><br></div><div style>When we have limi=
ted buffer or we need to release the computation of message and ciphertext =
in a regular interval, we can go for AEAD which supports intermediate tag. =
=A0You may have a look on section 6 of our paper=A0<a href=3D"http://eprint=
.iacr.org/2013/767.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/767.pdf</a>=A0</div>

<div style>which talks about intermediate tag. Computation of intermediate =
tag in our construction is very less.</div><div style><br></div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br clear=3D"all"><div><div>Thanks and regards,<br>Mr=
idul Nandi<br>

</div>
<div>Assistant Professor</div>
<div>Indian Statistical Institute</div>
<div>Kolkata</div>
<div>=A0</div></div>
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 9:29 AM, Manger,=
 James <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.=
com" target=3D"_blank">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote=
:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">&gt; &gt;&gt; What is needed=
 is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a message in<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they h=
ave received an<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to =
support<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.<=
br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; I think the means of doing this is going to be protocol-specific,=
 since it<br>
&gt; &gt; depends on the PDU format being used.<br>
<br>
</div>Not necessarily.<br>
I was thinking we could define a new alg identifier such as<br>
&quot;AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN96/10K&quot;, meaning OCB on 10 KB chunks.<br>
Once the 10228th byte (10KB - 96 bits) of plaintext is streamed<br>
to the encrypt function, it finishes the first AEAD operation and<br>
inserts a 96-bit tag into the ciphertext. A decryption function<br>
caches the ciphertext it is streamed until it reaches a 10KB<br>
boundary then it returns 10228 bytes of plaintext.<br>
<br>
An app sees a different alg id, but doesn&#39;t need to notice that<br>
the ciphertext PDU is actually ct tag ct tag ct tag...<br>
[It might need to know which nonces have been used internally though!]<br>
<div class=3D""><br>
<br>
&gt; I think that&#39;s right. =A0 It still makes sense to consider what sh=
ould be<br>
&gt; going on above the AEAD layer, in a generic sense.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; For things like SSL/TLS and SSH the<br>
&gt; &gt; problem is already solved since data amounts are quantised to the=
<br>
&gt; protocol<br>
&gt; &gt; data packet size,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I hope that&#39;s right. =A0 I am not sure that SSL/TLS implementers w=
ould be<br>
&gt; comfortable if they could never use the decryptUpdate function though.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; for store-and-forward protocols like PGP and S/MIME you&#39;d<br>
&gt; &gt; need to add a mechanism for it in a PGP/SMIME-specific manner, bu=
t<br>
&gt; then you&#39;d<br>
&gt; &gt; also need to figure out how to communicate it to the other side..=
.<br>
&gt; and then<br>
&gt; &gt; you&#39;re back to relying on ad-hoc mechanisms.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; When I had to do this years ago I used something like:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; len1 || data1 || h1 =3D HMAC( len1 || data1 ),<br>
&gt; &gt; len2 || data2 || h2 =3D HMAC( h1 || len2 || data2 ),<br>
&gt; &gt; len3 || data3 || h3 =3D HMAC( h2 || len3 || data3 ),<br>
&gt; &gt; ...<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A length of 0 indicated end-of-contents.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Interesting, is there a writeup?<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>So for packetizing plaintext for ~AEAD chunks:<br>
* TLS puts a sequence number in the AAD;<br>
* Peter (sort of) puts a tag for the previous prefix in the AAD;<br>
* I suggested using sequential nonces and a start/middle/end flag;<br>
* AERO hides the details in state;<br>
* Pipelineable On-Line Encryption randomizes unauthentic plaintext.<br>
<br>
<br>
My only concern with putting state (eg sequence number, byte count, previou=
s hash) into AAD is that you need something at a higher layer to ensure tha=
t AEAD(X||Y,P) is always interpreted as &quot;chunk mode with state=3DX, us=
er-provided-AAD=3DY&quot;, and never as &quot;non-chunk mode with user-prov=
ided-AAD=3DX||Y&quot;. You probably cannot safely use 1 key in chunk and no=
n-chunk modes.<br>


<br>
--<br>
James Manger<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">___________________________________=
____________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" target=3D"_blank">htt=
p://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 17:48:29 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update
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Hi Sean,

On 02/18/2014 09:36 PM, Sean Shen 沈烁 wrote:
> These are the documents describing algorithms themselves, trying to stick to the original standards. I discussed with the security directors, they also think CFRG is the proper place for algorithms regarding clarity and correctness of the text.

I agree with you and the ADs.   CFRG is the best place to have these 
documents reviewed.

CFRG people should keep in mind that these docs are informational, and 
that they aim to describe how to implement algorithms that are specified 
in other documents.   Comments and questions that would improve the 
clarity of description are helpful; comments on design alternatives are 
not.   Outside of the normative text, it might be possible for people to 
suggest useful informative text, on security considerations or 
implementation techniques, say.   It would also be good if we can 
establish interoperability between independent implementations.

Anyone willing to volunteer to review the docs, or to check test cases?

thanks,

David

> As for implementations, hope the algorithms will be options for applications, IPSEC and TLS definitely are definitely widely used ones, maybe also DNSSEC although DNSEXT WG is concluded currently. So far I haven't discussed with guys in those area regarding adopting SM2 and SM3 in those application, I plan to have the algorithms documents ready for the IETF reference first.
>
> Regarding the SM3 Hash function. It is based on the Merkle-Damgård design and very similar to SHA-2 but includes some additional strengthening features, it was designed by Xiaoyun Wang et al. I am not the designer and did not crypto analysis myself, but I collected some related arypto analysis paper in the webpage I mentioned, you can especially check: http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/SM3%27s_related_papers
>
>
> -----邮件原件-----
> 发件人: Watson Ladd [mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com]
> 发送时间: 2014年2月19日 9:31
> 收件人: Sean Shen 沈烁
> 抄送: cfrg@irtf.org
> 主题: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update
>
> If this is a valid transcription of the standard, it should be fine.
> But the place you want to go is the IPSEC and TLS WGs to get it into implementations.
>
> Note that this is not a recommendation for usage: I haven't validated parameters or the algorithms, and SM3 in particular looks sketchy.
> (It's an MD-style hash, in a world where many have fallen). Has there been a lot of analytical attention devoted to it that I've missed hearing about?
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>
> On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Sean Shen 沈烁 <shenshuo@cnnic.cn> wrote:
>> Dear cryptographers in CFRG,
>>
>> I have been working on writing a few cryptographic algorithms
>> documents: SM2 elliptic curve digital signature algorithm and SM3 hash
>> function. The two algorithms are published in China for years and
>> required to be used in IT systems like electronic authentication service system.
>>
>> It was my pleasure to provide the IETF documents to make these
>> algorithms public to IETF community and hence the whole Internet
>> industry. The two documents have been in published for quite a while
>> and I updated a few versions. I also have given presentations in IETF
>> meetings a few times to security guys in CFRG. Audience has been very interested in them.
>>
>> I think these works are valuable to both IETF community and vendors in
>> Chinese market. So I hope the two documents on the track to be IETF RFCs.
>>
>> Also I prepared a simple webpage to give information (related
>> documents and
>> implementations) of a few crypto algorithms used in China, including
>> SM2 and SM3. I will keep updating the draft and webpage , hope they
>> are helpful to the community. Please check:
>>
>> http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page
>>
>> I will appreciate and reviews and suggestions.
>>
>>
>>
>> Sean Shen
>>
>> CNNIC
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been
>> successfully submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>>
>>
>>
>> Name:               draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa
>>
>> Revision:  02
>>
>> Title:                  SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm
>>
>> Document date:       2014-02-14
>>
>> Group:               Individual Submission
>>
>> Pages:               40
>>
>> URL:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt
>>
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/
>>
>> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
>>
>> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
>>
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>
>>     This document discribles a set of public key cryptographic
>> algorithms
>>
>>     based on elliptic curves which is invented by Xiaoyun Wang et al.
>>
>>     These algorithms and recommended parameters are published by
>> Chinese
>>
>>     Commercial Cryptography Administration Office ([SM2 Algorithms] and
>>
>>     [SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of electronic
>> authentication
>>
>>     service system.  This document gives IETF standard description of
>> the
>>
>>     algorithms and parameters in [SM2 Algorithms] and [SM2 Algorithms
>>
>>     Parameters].
>>
>>
>>
>>     The document [SM2 Algorithms] published by Chinese Commercial
>>
>>     Cryptography Administration Office includes four parts: general
>>
>>     introdocution, Digital Signature Algorithm, Key Exchange Protocol
>> and
>>
>>     Public Key Encryption Algorithm.
>>
>>
>>
>>     The document [SM2 Algorithms Parameters] gives a set of recommended
>>
>>     parameters.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt has been successfully
>> submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repository.
>>
>>
>>
>> Name:               draft-shen-sm3-hash
>>
>> Revision:  01
>>
>> Title:                  SM3 Hash function
>>
>> Document date:       2014-02-14
>>
>> Group:               Individual Submission
>>
>> Pages:               13
>>
>> URL:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt
>>
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/
>>
>> Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>>
>> Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-shen-sm3-hash-01
>>
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>
>>     This document discribles a hash function which is invented by
>> Xiaoyun
>>
>>     Wang et al.  This algorithm is published by Chinese Commercial
>>
>>     Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for the use of
>> electronic
>>
>>     authentication service system.  This document gives IETF standard
>>
>>     description of the algorithm.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>
>
>
> --
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


From nobody Wed Feb 19 18:45:02 2014
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Dear all,
I haven't read the paper yet, but this looks worrying.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2188922.
This doesn't mean the curves or the hash function are bad, but we
might want to note that this sort of thing is possible.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


From nobody Wed Feb 19 19:45:14 2014
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hi, Uri

>=20
> Are there (free :) reference implementations available?
Yes, there are free implementations, please check the infor web I =
included in the email:
http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page=20
There is a "software implementation" link on the left.=20

>=20
> TNX!
>=20
> P.S. I wonder why China and Russia went with their own ECC digital =
signature
> standards rather than embracing ECDSA :).

Well, it's common for countries to adopt both internationally widely =
used algorithms and their own algorithms. It happened in many countries =
and various technique areas. I tend to have these algorithms open to the =
community for both studying and commercial convenience.=20

Best,

Sean



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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Aloha!

Sean Shen 沈烁 wrote:
> hi, Uri
> 
>> Are there (free :) reference implementations available?
> Yes, there are free implementations, please check the infor web I
> included in the email: 
> http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page There is a
> "software implementation" link on the left.

You might want to look into the naming of the directory that has been
zipped:

http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/File:Sm2_sm3_sm4_c_language_open_source_code.zip

It unzips to something quite incomprehensible.

The files does not contain any copyright or licensing statements and no
other information about it is given. Can you please add that?

I may be interested at implementing at least sm3 (I have previously
looked at ZUC), but will not do that unless I know the licensing and IPR
status.

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
========================================================================
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On 2/19/14 22:45 , "Sean Shen =E6=B2=88=E7=83=81" <shenshuo@cnnic.cn> wrote:

>>Are there (free :) reference implementations available?
>Yes, there are free implementations, please check the infor web I
>included in the email:
>http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page
>There is a "software implementation" link on the left.

Nice!=20

Unfortunately, quite a few things - including directory name in at least
one case - are in Chinese (literally :). Since unfortunately I don't
speak/read Chinese, it adds unnecessary difficulties. Suggestion: edit it
so they are entirely in English, preferably using ASCII.

Also, I'd like to second the question that Joachim asked earlier: what are
the Copyright and Intellectual Property statements for this code, and for
these algorithms? Who owns them, and who does the owner allow usage of
those algorithms (and of that code)? On what conditions (if any are
stated)?

Also, I'm interested in the SM2 suite, especially its Authenticated Key
Exchange part. Us there (a) a complete description in English, and (b)
source code available for it? There was a paper at CANS 2011 "Comments on
SM2 Key Exchange" that pointed out a weakness, and suggested a fix for it.
Can you tell whether that suggestion has been incorporated in the current
SM2 key exchange standard?

Again, to repeat myself and echo Joachim: in order to do anything with
these algorithms (even to look at them) we need to know their
licensing/IPR and copyright status.

Thanks!

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--B_3475741153_123867666--


From nobody Fri Feb 21 21:18:41 2014
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To: "'Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL'" <uri@ll.mit.edu>, <cfrg@irtf.org>
References: <010601cf2d1b$5b4cf210$11e6d630$@cn> <VCCVFZQNKCJOSEAXLSEVCUJZJDZE.prvs=71278c4eaf=uri@ll.mit.edu> <01b601cf2dee$25bb9330$7132b990$@cn> <CF2B946E.11EA6%uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2014 13:18:35 +0800
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update
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hi, Uri

> >>Are there (free :) reference implementations available?
> >Yes, there are free implementations, please check the infor web I
> >included in the email:
> >http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page
> >There is a "software implementation" link on the left.
>=20
> Nice!
>=20
> Unfortunately, quite a few things - including directory name in at =
least
> one case - are in Chinese (literally :). Since unfortunately I don't
> speak/read Chinese, it adds unnecessary difficulties. Suggestion: edit =
it
> so they are entirely in English, preferably using ASCII.

Thanks for the suggestions. I checked the codes, one of them has a =
Chinese word in direction name, 3 of them have Chinese comments in the =
codes, only one code is in pure English.=20
Here is what I will do: since I am not the author of the codes, probably =
not proper for me to change the codes. I will have the Chinese =
translated and provide the pure English versions for download beside the =
original ones, also provide a note on the download page and stating the =
situation.=20
This will be done before Monday afternoon (Beijing time).=20

Here are the details:
________________________________________________
1.=20
c language open source codes:SM2,SM3,SM4
http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/File:Sm2_sm3_sm4_c_language_open_=
source_code.zip

There is a Chinese word in Dictionary. I will replace it by English.

2.=20
Java language:ECC
http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/File:Java_ecc_code.zip

There are Chinese comments in the codes. I will translate it in English.

3.=20
openssl language:SM2
http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/File:SM2-Openssl_language.zip

No langusage problems

4.=20
Java language:SM3
http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/File:Sm3-Java.zip

There are a lot Chinese comments in the codes. I will translate it in =
English.

5.=20
Java language:SM4
http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/File:Sm4-Java.zip

There are a few Chinese comments in the codes. I will translate it in =
English.
____________________________________________________________________

=20
> Also, I'd like to second the question that Joachim asked earlier: what =
are
> the Copyright and Intellectual Property statements for this code, and =
for
> these algorithms? Who owns them, and who does the owner allow usage of
> those algorithms (and of that code)? On what conditions (if any are
> stated)?

Good questions.
As for the algorithms, here is what I am aware of:=20
There is patent (or patents) with the algorithms. But when the =
algorithms were adopted by TCG (Trusted Computing Group) in TPM 2.0 =
standards, the owners announced these patents free in TCG. I contacted =
the owners and they are discussing to give statement here following =
IETF's rules. I will keep updating it for all, on both my web and ietf =
mailing list.
As for the codes, they were collected on the internet, some from =
programmers' community or from course projects, by people who are =
interested in this area or students who did course project. These are =
just for simple testing of the algorithms. If I need codes for my =
serious purpose (commercial or non-commercial), I would prefer =
commercial development work or our own development, it's not a lot work =
after all.  =20
Authors of these codes didn't left information regarding copyright or =
license, I am contacting the authors of the codes via limited contact =
information in codes, if I am lucky to get in touched with them, they =
might give more information.   =20
Also CCed and thanks Joachim for his attention. I try to put similar =
answers in this single reply so that I won't miss any if the thread goes =
long.=20

> Also, I'm interested in the SM2 suite, especially its Authenticated =
Key
> Exchange part. Us there (a) a complete description in English, and (b)
> source code available for it? There was a paper at CANS 2011 "Comments =
on
> SM2 Key Exchange" that pointed out a weakness, and suggested a fix for =
it.
> Can you tell whether that suggestion has been incorporated in the =
current
> SM2 key exchange standard?

Thanks for this information. To answer that I will finish reading the =
paper and give clear feedback. I will give feedbacks soon following =
Watson's thread.  =20
Thanks!

Sean

> Again, to repeat myself and echo Joachim: in order to do anything with
> these algorithms (even to look at them) we need to know their
> licensing/IPR and copyright status.
>=20
> Thanks!


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update
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the pure English versions is ready on the web by now. 

> > >>Are there (free :) reference implementations available?
> > >Yes, there are free implementations, please check the infor web I
> > >included in the email:
> > >http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page
> > >There is a "software implementation" link on the left.
> >
> > Nice!
> >
> > Unfortunately, quite a few things - including directory name in at
> > least one case - are in Chinese (literally :). Since unfortunately I
> > don't speak/read Chinese, it adds unnecessary difficulties.
> > Suggestion: edit it so they are entirely in English, preferably using
ASCII.
> 
> Thanks for the suggestions. I checked the codes, one of them has a Chinese
> word in direction name, 3 of them have Chinese comments in the codes, only
> one code is in pure English.
> Here is what I will do: since I am not the author of the codes, probably
not
> proper for me to change the codes. I will have the Chinese translated and
> provide the pure English versions for download beside the original ones,
also
> provide a note on the download page and stating the situation.
> This will be done before Monday afternoon (Beijing time).




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Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 09:15:47 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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Hi James,

On 02/18/2014 10:59 PM, Manger, James wrote:
>>>> What is needed is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a message in
>>>> chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they have received an
>>>> authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to support
>>>> streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.
>>> I think the means of doing this is going to be protocol-specific, since it
>>> depends on the PDU format being used.
> Not necessarily.
> I was thinking we could define a new alg identifier such as
> "AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN96/10K", meaning OCB on 10 KB chunks.
> Once the 10228th byte (10KB - 96 bits) of plaintext is streamed
> to the encrypt function, it finishes the first AEAD operation and
> inserts a 96-bit tag into the ciphertext. A decryption function
> caches the ciphertext it is streamed until it reaches a 10KB
> boundary then it returns 10228 bytes of plaintext.
>
> An app sees a different alg id, but doesn't need to notice that
> the ciphertext PDU is actually ct tag ct tag ct tag...
> [It might need to know which nonces have been used internally though!]

I take your point.  If there was a streaming-AEAD algorithm (using an 
API similar to RFC 5116 but extended a bit), then it could be used in a 
protocol regardless of that protocol's message formats and sizes.

It would be somewhat awkward that the sender needs to know the right 
chunk size that the receiver can handle, so the chunk size is something 
that one would want to "negotiate", or at least have the receiver advise 
the sender on.

If a streaming-AEAD gets defined, it would be attractive to define a way 
in which any of the existing AEAD schemes could be used in chunk-mode.

>
>
>> I think that's right.   It still makes sense to consider what should be
>> going on above the AEAD layer, in a generic sense.
>>
>>> For things like SSL/TLS and SSH the
>>> problem is already solved since data amounts are quantised to the
>> protocol
>>> data packet size,
>> I hope that's right.   I am not sure that SSL/TLS implementers would be
>> comfortable if they could never use the decryptUpdate function though.
>>
>>> for store-and-forward protocols like PGP and S/MIME you'd
>>> need to add a mechanism for it in a PGP/SMIME-specific manner, but
>> then you'd
>>> also need to figure out how to communicate it to the other side...
>> and then
>>> you're back to relying on ad-hoc mechanisms.
>>>
>>> When I had to do this years ago I used something like:
>>>
>>> len1 || data1 || h1 = HMAC( len1 || data1 ),
>>> len2 || data2 || h2 = HMAC( h1 || len2 || data2 ),
>>> len3 || data3 || h3 = HMAC( h2 || len3 || data3 ),
>>> ...
>>>
>>> A length of 0 indicated end-of-contents.
>> Interesting, is there a writeup?
>
> So for packetizing plaintext for ~AEAD chunks:
> * TLS puts a sequence number in the AAD;
> * Peter (sort of) puts a tag for the previous prefix in the AAD;
> * I suggested using sequential nonces and a start/middle/end flag;
> * AERO hides the details in state;
> * Pipelineable On-Line Encryption randomizes unauthentic plaintext.
>
>
> My only concern with putting state (eg sequence number, byte count, previous hash) into AAD is that you need something at a higher layer to ensure that AEAD(X||Y,P) is always interpreted as "chunk mode with state=X, user-provided-AAD=Y", and never as "non-chunk mode with user-provided-AAD=X||Y". You probably cannot safely use 1 key in chunk and non-chunk modes.

Agreed; chunk mode would need to be well defined, understood by both 
sender and receiver, and never share keys with non-chunk modes.

David

>
> --
> James Manger


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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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--_000_CF30392032588paulmarvellcom_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="gb2312"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html><head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dgb2312"><=
/head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webk=
it-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 14px;"><d=
iv style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><br></div><div>Sean,</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>There=A1=AFs a small error in&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www.=
ietf.org/id/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-shen-=
sm2-ecdsa-02.txt</a>&nbsp;in section A.1</div><div><br></div><div>The encod=
ing: &nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp; '414C 49434531 32334059 41484F4F 2E434F=
4=A1=AF</div><div>should be:</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp; '414C 49434531 3233405=
9 41484F4F 2E434F4D=A1=AF &nbsp; &lt;- D at end of string</div><div><div st=
yle=3D"margin: 0px;"><br></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px;"><br></div>=
<div style=3D"margin: 0px;">Also =A8C is there any accompanying documentati=
on on the process for selecting the curve parameters?</div><div style=3D"ma=
rgin: 0px;"><br></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px;"><br></div><div style=3D"m=
argin: 0px;"><br></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px;">Best Regards,</div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0px;"><br></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px;">Paul</div><div=
 style=3D"margin: 0px;"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family: Menlo; margin:=
 0px;"><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family: Ca=
libri, sans-serif;"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" s=
tyle=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><di=
v xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsof=
t-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmln=
s:x=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel" xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.mi=
crosoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">=
<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"text-justify-tr=
im:punctuation"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div sty=
le=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt"><=
div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:left=
"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;">From=
:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif=
;"> Cfrg [<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org">mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf=
.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Sean Shen ??<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 18, 2014=
 5:00 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org">cfrg@irtf.org</a><b=
r><b>Subject:</b> [Cfrg] Recent SM2 and SM3 drafts update<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"left" style=3D"text-align:l=
eft"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Dear cryptographers in CFR=
G,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I have been working on writing a fe=
w cryptographic algorithms documents: SM2 elliptic curve digital signature =
algorithm and SM3 hash function. The two algorithms are published in China =
for years and required to be used in IT systems like
 electronic authentication service system. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal">It was my pleasure to provide the IETF documents to make these algori=
thms public to IETF community and hence the whole Internet industry. The tw=
o documents have been in published for quite a while and I updated a few ve=
rsions. I also have
 given presentations in IETF meetings a few times to security guys in CFRG.=
 Audience has been very interested in them.
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think these works are valuable to b=
oth IETF community and vendors in Chinese market. So I hope the two documen=
ts on the track to be IETF RFCs.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Also =
I prepared a simple webpage to give information (related documents and impl=
ementations) of a few crypto algorithms used in China, including SM2 and SM=
3. I will keep updating the draft and webpage , hope they are helpful to th=
e community.
 Please check:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"http://218.2=
41.108.63/wiki/en/index.php/Main_Page">http://218.241.108.63/wiki/en/index.=
php/Main_Page</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I will appreciate an=
d reviews and suggestions.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Sean Shen<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">CNNIC<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">A new version of I-D, draft-s=
hen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt has been successfully submitted by Sean Shen and poste=
d to the IETF repository.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Name:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa<o=
:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Revision:&nbsp; 02<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3D"MsoPlainText">Title:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SM2 Digital Signat=
ure Algorithm<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Document date:&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2014-02-14<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlain=
Text">Group:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Individual Submission<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPl=
ainText">Pages:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 40<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">URL:&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"=
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt">
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.txt</a><o:p></o=
:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Status:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ec=
dsa/">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa/</a><o:p></o:p></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoPlainText">Htmlized:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a hr=
ef=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02</a><o:p></o:p></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoPlainText">Diff:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecd=
sa-02">
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02</a><o:p></o:p></=
p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">=
Abstract:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; This documen=
t discribles a set of public key cryptographic algorithms<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; based on elliptic curves which is inven=
ted by Xiaoyun Wang et al.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&n=
bsp; These algorithms and recommended parameters are published by Chinese<o=
:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; Commercial Cryptography=
 Administration Office ([SM2 Algorithms] and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoP=
lainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; [SM2 Algorithms Parameters]) for the use of electron=
ic authentication<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; serv=
ice system.&nbsp; This document gives IETF standard description of the<o:p>=
</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithms and parameters =
in [SM2 Algorithms] and [SM2 Algorithms<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainT=
ext">&nbsp; &nbsp;Parameters].<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; The document [SM2 A=
lgorithms] published by Chinese Commercial<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPla=
inText">&nbsp;&nbsp; Cryptography Administration Office includes four parts=
: general<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; introdocutio=
n, Digital Signature Algorithm, Key Exchange Protocol and<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; Public Key Encryption Algorithm.<o:p></=
o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlain=
Text">&nbsp;&nbsp; The document [SM2 Algorithms Parameters] gives a set of =
recommended<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; parameters=
.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoPlainText">A new version of I-D, draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt ha=
s been successfully submitted by Sean Shen and posted to the IETF repositor=
y.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D=
"MsoPlainText">Name:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-shen-sm3-hash<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D=
"MsoPlainText">Revision:&nbsp; 01<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">T=
itle:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SM3 Hash function<o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3D"MsoPlainText">Document date:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2014-0=
2-14<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Group:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Individual Sub=
mission<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Pages:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 13<o:p></o:=
p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">URL:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/=
draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt">
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01.txt</a><o:p></o:=
p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Status:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-has=
h/">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sm3-hash/</a><o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3D"MsoPlainText">Htmlized:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a hre=
f=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash-01</a><o:p></o:p></p><p clas=
s=3D"MsoPlainText">Diff:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm3-hash=
-01">
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-shen-sm3-hash-01</a><o:p></o:p></p=
><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">A=
bstract:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; This document=
 discribles a hash function which is invented by Xiaoyun<o:p></o:p></p><p c=
lass=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; Wang et al.&nbsp; This algorithm is publ=
ished by Chinese Commercial<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Cryptography Administration Office ([SM3]) for the use of electronic<=
o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; authentication service=
 system.&nbsp; This document gives IETF standard<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"=
MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; description of the algorithm.<o:p></o:p></p><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></di=
v></blockquote></span><div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><br>=
</div><div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><br></div><style><!-=
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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Hi James,

On 02/23/2014 09:15 AM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi James,
>
> On 02/18/2014 10:59 PM, Manger, James wrote:
>>>>> What is needed is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a 
>>>>> message in
>>>>> chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they have 
>>>>> received an
>>>>> authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to support
>>>>> streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.
>>>> I think the means of doing this is going to be protocol-specific, 
>>>> since it
>>>> depends on the PDU format being used.
>> Not necessarily.
>> I was thinking we could define a new alg identifier such as
>> "AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN96/10K", meaning OCB on 10 KB chunks.
>> Once the 10228th byte (10KB - 96 bits) of plaintext is streamed
>> to the encrypt function, it finishes the first AEAD operation and
>> inserts a 96-bit tag into the ciphertext. A decryption function
>> caches the ciphertext it is streamed until it reaches a 10KB
>> boundary then it returns 10228 bytes of plaintext.
>>
>> An app sees a different alg id, but doesn't need to notice that
>> the ciphertext PDU is actually ct tag ct tag ct tag...
>> [It might need to know which nonces have been used internally though!]
>

A thought occurred to me.   Currently, many systems use an 
init/update/final interface for AEAD decryption.  The streaming AEAD 
algorithm that you propose would not enable them to continue using this 
interface as they currently are.   The problem is that the decryptUpdate 
function is required to provide plaintext when it returns; at least this 
is the case in some libraries.  If decryptUpdate is not required to 
provide plaintext when it returns, then the implementation could just 
buffer the (pre-auth-verification) plaintext until the auth verification 
is done.

David

> I take your point.  If there was a streaming-AEAD algorithm (using an 
> API similar to RFC 5116 but extended a bit), then it could be used in 
> a protocol regardless of that protocol's message formats and sizes.
>
> It would be somewhat awkward that the sender needs to know the right 
> chunk size that the receiver can handle, so the chunk size is 
> something that one would want to "negotiate", or at least have the 
> receiver advise the sender on.
>
> If a streaming-AEAD gets defined, it would be attractive to define a 
> way in which any of the existing AEAD schemes could be used in 
> chunk-mode.
>
>>
>>
>>> I think that's right.   It still makes sense to consider what should be
>>> going on above the AEAD layer, in a generic sense.
>>>
>>>> For things like SSL/TLS and SSH the
>>>> problem is already solved since data amounts are quantised to the
>>> protocol
>>>> data packet size,
>>> I hope that's right.   I am not sure that SSL/TLS implementers would be
>>> comfortable if they could never use the decryptUpdate function though.
>>>
>>>> for store-and-forward protocols like PGP and S/MIME you'd
>>>> need to add a mechanism for it in a PGP/SMIME-specific manner, but
>>> then you'd
>>>> also need to figure out how to communicate it to the other side...
>>> and then
>>>> you're back to relying on ad-hoc mechanisms.
>>>>
>>>> When I had to do this years ago I used something like:
>>>>
>>>> len1 || data1 || h1 = HMAC( len1 || data1 ),
>>>> len2 || data2 || h2 = HMAC( h1 || len2 || data2 ),
>>>> len3 || data3 || h3 = HMAC( h2 || len3 || data3 ),
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>> A length of 0 indicated end-of-contents.
>>> Interesting, is there a writeup?
>>
>> So for packetizing plaintext for ~AEAD chunks:
>> * TLS puts a sequence number in the AAD;
>> * Peter (sort of) puts a tag for the previous prefix in the AAD;
>> * I suggested using sequential nonces and a start/middle/end flag;
>> * AERO hides the details in state;
>> * Pipelineable On-Line Encryption randomizes unauthentic plaintext.
>>
>>
>> My only concern with putting state (eg sequence number, byte count, 
>> previous hash) into AAD is that you need something at a higher layer 
>> to ensure that AEAD(X||Y,P) is always interpreted as "chunk mode with 
>> state=X, user-provided-AAD=Y", and never as "non-chunk mode with 
>> user-provided-AAD=X||Y". You probably cannot safely use 1 key in 
>> chunk and non-chunk modes.
>
> Agreed; chunk mode would need to be well defined, understood by both 
> sender and receiver, and never share keys with non-chunk modes.
>
> David
>
>>
>> -- 
>> James Manger
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> .
>


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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Streaming AEAD
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On 2/25/14 7:52 AM, David McGrew wrote:
> Hi James,
>
> On 02/23/2014 09:15 AM, David McGrew wrote:
>> Hi James,
>>
>> On 02/18/2014 10:59 PM, Manger, James wrote:
>>>>>> What is needed is a way to use an AEAD algorithm to secure a 
>>>>>> message in
>>>>>> chunks. Streaming-AEAD would allow a recipient to know they have 
>>>>>> received an
>>>>>> authentic prefix of a message. It would allow crypto APIs to support
>>>>>> streaming modes while never returning unauthentic plaintext.
>>>>> I think the means of doing this is going to be protocol-specific, 
>>>>> since it
>>>>> depends on the PDU format being used.
>>> Not necessarily.
>>> I was thinking we could define a new alg identifier such as
>>> "AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN96/10K", meaning OCB on 10 KB chunks.
>>> Once the 10228th byte (10KB - 96 bits) of plaintext is streamed
>>> to the encrypt function, it finishes the first AEAD operation and
>>> inserts a 96-bit tag into the ciphertext. A decryption function
>>> caches the ciphertext it is streamed until it reaches a 10KB
>>> boundary then it returns 10228 bytes of plaintext.
>>>
>>> An app sees a different alg id, but doesn't need to notice that
>>> the ciphertext PDU is actually ct tag ct tag ct tag...
>>> [It might need to know which nonces have been used internally though!]
>>
>
> A thought occurred to me.   Currently, many systems use an 
> init/update/final interface for AEAD decryption.  The streaming AEAD 
> algorithm that you propose would not enable them to continue using 
> this interface as they currently are.   The problem is that the 
> decryptUpdate function is required to provide plaintext when it 
> returns; at least this is the case in some libraries.  If 
> decryptUpdate is not required to provide plaintext when it returns, 
> then the implementation could just buffer the (pre-auth-verification) 
> plaintext until the auth verification is done.
>
> David
[snip]

It is simpler than that.  The decryptUpdate just blocks until it has 
gotten to a verification tag.  If the length parameter to the 
decryptUpdate is less than the plaintext up to the auth tag, it delivers 
the requested amount of plaintext, and buffers the remainder, which can, 
of course, be immediately returned on the next call.

Now like many protocols with chunking, there is the possibility of 
deadlock if such protocols are used interactively. That is something to 
think about.

    --David Jacobson




From nobody Wed Feb 26 08:16:22 2014
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the Attacks on key agreement in SM2
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On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 11:23 PM, Limin LIU <lmliu@is.ac.cn> wrote:
> Dear Watson,
>
>     This is Limin from the team of SM2 patent holder, Data Assurance and
> Communication Security Center in Chinese Academy of Sciences. Following is
> the response to your concern about the attacks on SM2. (Attacks on key
> agreement in SM2.
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg04297.html )
>
>     In Xu's (CANS 2011) paper, the attack towards SM2 key exchange protocol
> is launched in Canetti-Krawczyk model, where adversary could reveal private
> session state. To make the attack successful, the adversary should have the
> ability to reveal the state variable (x_v,y_v). (x_v,y_v) is the result of a
> computation from B's private key d_B, B's private random number r_B, along
> with other public parameters. The question here is, d_B and r_B are not easy
> to be obtained in real world. What's more, if the adversary has such kind of
> knowledge, he could already obtain the session key K_B by K_B =
> KDF(x_v||y_v||z_A||z_B,klen), it seems unnecessary to launch other attacks.
> Overall, this attack is academic crypto analysis based on strong
> assumptions. It's not a practical threaten to the algorithm.
>
>    Hope this could address your concerns. Any further comments will be
> greatly appreciated.

It doesn't. Instead of an analysis showing that in some reasonable
threat model SM2 security reduces to some reasonable assumptions, you
present an argument that the one attack I found in the literature
doesn't matter in practical applications. There is a large literature
and well-understood theory of key negotiation protocols, and I have
yet to see any demonstration that SM2 was designed with that in mind.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> Best,
> Limin
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin


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Subject: [Cfrg] tentative agenda for CFRG at IETF 89
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Hi,

the tentative agenda for the CFRG meeting is below.  The plan is go over 
the status of all of the drafts, very briefly for those drafts that will 
be discussed later in the meeting.   Then we will have some 
presentations on a bunch of interesting topics.

Unfortunately, no one has volunteered (yet?) to give a presentation or 
lead a discussion on the new elliptic curve crypto mechanisms. So we 
will likely review the status, and then have a brief discussion.

The TLS WG has asked for the CFRG opinion on ChaCha+Poly1305.    We also 
should be offering an opinion on the new ECC mechanisms.   Some 
questions for you: should we take on draft-ladd-safecurves-03 as an RG 
draft?   Should we recommend its adoption in TLS?

Comments welcome; please copy the whole list.

thanks,

David and Kevin

--

CFRG @ IETF 89 Agenda

Agenda Bashing
Documents
    RFCs published
        OCB
    Review status of CFRG drafts:
        draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01, Augmented Password-Authenticated Key 
Exchange (AugPAKE), 2014-02-04
        draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03, Dragonfly Key Exchange, 2014-02-03
        draft-irtf-cfrg-zss-02, ZSS Short Signature Scheme for 
Supersingular and BN Curves, 2013-12-11
        draft-irtf-cfrg-zssbn-01, ZSS Short Signature Scheme for BN 
Curves, 2013-09-11
        draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-01, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for 
IETF protocols, 2014-01-30
        draft-urien-cfrg-cose-00, Cloud of Secure Elements(CoSE), 2014-02-10
        draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01, Ciphers in Use in the 
Internet, 2012-10-22  (expired)
     Review status of other drafts of interest to the RG
        draft-ladd-safecurves-03, Additional Elliptic Curves for IETF 
protocols, 2014-01-15
        draft-mcgrew-aero-01, Authenticated Encryption with Replay 
prOtection (AERO), 2014-2-14

Password Authenticated Key Exchange
    Presentation on AugPAKE seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp 
<mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp>
    DragonFly quick status update

New Authenticated Encryption Mechanisms
        Presentation on ChaCha+Poly1305 - ynir@checkpoint.com
        DISCUSSION: feedback on ChaCha+Poly1305 requested by TLS WG
        Presentation on Authenticated Encryption using Replay Protection 
(AERO)  draft-mcgrew-srtp-aero-01 mcgrew@cisco.com <mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com>

New Elliptic Curve Crypto
        Status of non-standard curves
        DISCUSSION: feedback on non-standard curves requested by TLS WG
        Deterministic RBGs - rstruik.ext@gmail.com

Consideration of new topics
    Post-quantum crypto
    Key-centric architectures
    <other?>






--------------010805060707000400020309
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<html>
  <head>

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    Hi,<br>
    <br>
    the tentative agenda for the CFRG meeting is below.&nbsp; The plan is go
    over the status of all of the drafts, very briefly for those drafts
    that will be discussed later in the meeting.&nbsp;&nbsp; Then we will have
    some presentations on a bunch of interesting topics.<br>
    <br>
    Unfortunately, no one has volunteered (yet?) to give a presentation
    or lead a discussion on the new elliptic curve crypto mechanisms.&nbsp;
    So we will likely review the status, and then have a brief
    discussion.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    The TLS WG has asked for the CFRG opinion on ChaCha+Poly1305.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; We
    also should be offering an opinion on the new ECC mechanisms.&nbsp;&nbsp; Some
    questions for you: should we take on draft-ladd-safecurves-03 as an
    RG draft?&nbsp;&nbsp; Should we recommend its adoption in TLS?&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    Comments welcome; please copy the whole list.<br>
    <br>
    thanks,<br>
    <br>
    David and Kevin<br>
    <br>
    --<br>
    <br>
    CFRG @ IETF 89 Agenda<br>
    <br>
    Agenda Bashing<br>
    Documents<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; RFCs published<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCB<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; Review status of CFRG drafts: <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake-01, Augmented Password-Authenticated
    Key Exchange (AugPAKE), 2014-02-04<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03, Dragonfly Key Exchange,
    2014-02-03<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-irtf-cfrg-zss-02, ZSS Short Signature Scheme for
    Supersingular and BN Curves, 2013-12-11<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-irtf-cfrg-zssbn-01, ZSS Short Signature Scheme for BN
    Curves, 2013-09-11<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-01, ChaCha20 and Poly1305
    for IETF protocols, 2014-01-30<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-urien-cfrg-cose-00, Cloud of Secure Elements(CoSE),
    2014-02-10<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01, Ciphers in Use in the
    Internet, 2012-10-22&nbsp; (expired)<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Review status of other drafts of interest to the RG<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-ladd-safecurves-03, Additional Elliptic Curves for IETF
    protocols, 2014-01-15<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft-mcgrew-aero-01, Authenticated Encryption with Replay
    prOtection (AERO), 2014-2-14<br>
    <br>
    Password Authenticated Key Exchange<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; Presentation on AugPAKE&nbsp; <a
      href="mailto:seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp">seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp</a>
    <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; DragonFly quick status update <br>
    <br>
    New Authenticated Encryption Mechanisms<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Presentation on ChaCha+Poly1305 - <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:ynir@checkpoint.com">ynir@checkpoint.com</a><br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DISCUSSION: feedback on ChaCha+Poly1305 requested by TLS WG<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Presentation on Authenticated Encryption using Replay
    Protection (AERO)&nbsp; draft-mcgrew-srtp-aero-01
    <a href="mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com">mcgrew@cisco.com</a><br>
    <br>
    New Elliptic Curve Crypto<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Status of non-standard curves <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DISCUSSION: feedback on non-standard curves requested by TLS
    WG<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Deterministic RBGs - <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a><br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    Consideration of new topics<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; Post-quantum crypto<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; Key-centric architectures<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;other?&gt;<br>
    &nbsp;<br>
    <br>
    &nbsp;<br>
    <br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------010805060707000400020309--


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From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] tentative agenda for CFRG at IETF 89
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On 2/27/14, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

> The TLS WG has asked for the CFRG opinion on ChaCha+Poly1305.    We also
> should be offering an opinion on the new ECC mechanisms.   Some
> questions for you: should we take on draft-ladd-safecurves-03 as an RG
> draft?

I strongly oppose adoption of draft-ladd-safecurves-03 as an RG draft or an=
 RFC:

* In draft-ladd-safecurves-00, the =E2=80=98author=E2=80=99 merely copied a=
 pile of
curve equations into an I-D and tried to pass it off as his own useful
contribution.  draft-ladd-safecurves-03 still takes a fundamentally
wrong approach in specifying several specific curves, when what is
needed is a document describing how the whole class of Montgomery and
Edwards curves is currently used and can be used in future
applications.

* It repeatedly claims to specify a =E2=80=98standard=E2=80=99 for ECC on t=
hose
curves; however, the draft is =E2=80=98Informational=E2=80=99, and it speci=
fies point
formats for Curve25519 which are deliberately incompatible with the
existing standard practices among implementations.  Thus, it is
attempting to specify a new =E2=80=98standard=E2=80=99 in a non-standards-t=
rack
Internet document, in clear defiance of IETF policy.

* It contains several factual inaccuracies.

* It takes a condescending tone toward implementors, while omitting
critical details needed to apply what little information it provides
to other Montgomery and Edwards curves.

* None of the text of the draft explains any aspect of the use of
Montgomery and Edwards curves or any background information in a
useful level of detail.  It is not useful even as a starting point for
an RFC on this topic.

* The author has repeatedly disregarded advice from other RG members
regarding this draft, usually with unnecessary hostility.  I have not
yet seen any reason to believe that he will change his behaviour.  If
he is chosen as the editor of an RG document at this time, I will not
waste my effort on attempting to contribute to it.


I have nearly finished writing a relatively elementary exposition of
the background in abstract algebra and (Weierstrass-form) elliptic
curves needed to properly explain Montgomery and Edwards curves and
their use in cryptography.  I intend to send it to the CFRG mailing
list either tonight or tomorrow for review.  After that, the portion
of a document describing Montgomery and Edwards curves themselves (as
currently used) should be relatively easy.


> Should we recommend its adoption in TLS?

draft-ladd-safecurves is not needed in order to adopt Curve25519 for use in=
 TLS.

Dr. Bernstein's Curve25519 paper specifies the existing standard for
scalar multiplication on Curve25519 in sufficient detail to serve as a
normative reference for RFCs specifying its use in ECDH in IETF
protocols.  I believe that Curve25519 should be recommended for
adoption in TLS, and that a future version of
draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519 (which addresses the comments made on
the TLS list regarding the (current) -04 version) will be suitable for
publication as an RFC.


Robert Ransom


From source@stbuehler.de  Fri Feb 28 03:14:55 2014
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Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2014 12:14:48 +0100
From: Stefan =?UTF-8?B?QsO8aGxlcg==?= <source@stbuehler.de>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
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Hi,

I propose using "HChaCha20" (analog to HSalsa20) to compress larger
nonces:
* supports nonce lengths of 8 and 24 bytes, and everything between by
  prefixing with zeros.
  (I can't claim to have understood the paper on XSalsa20/HSalsa20
  completely, so I'm not sure whether more than one HSalsa20 step would
  still be covered by the proof; but I guess it should work.
  This means one could support almost any nonce length >= 8 bytes)
* uses the original ChaCha20 algorithm (some implementations might not
  allow changing the length of nonce/counter; these implementations
  are still compatible with a nonce length of 8 bytes)
* compatible with draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 (using nonce length
  of 8 bytes, plain ChaCha20)

Define P: extract 256-bit from 512-bit
P(z0, z1, z2, z3) := (z0, z3)  # z_i are 128-bit

Define HChaCha20: takes 256-bit key, 128-bit nonce
HChaCha20_k(n) := P(doublerounds^10(x))
    where
    x := (salsaconst, k, n)

Define Q: calculates HChaCha from 64-bit nonce and 512-bit ChaCha
Q(n, x) := P(x) - (salsaconst, n)  # subtraction on 32-bit words

HChaCha20_k(n) = Q(n, ChaCha20_k(n))
(Q is used in the proof: it is a public computation (salsaconst and
nonce are public) of HChaCha20_k(n) from ChaCha_k(n), and maps uniform
random strings to uniform random strings)

Define XChaCha20: takes 256-bit key, 192-bit nonce and a little-endian
64-bit counter
XChaCha20_k(n, i) = ChaCha20_k1(n2, i)
    where
    (n1, n2) := n # n1 is 128-bit, n2 64-bit
    k1 := HChaCha20_k(n1)

The proof for XSalsa20/HSalsa20 should work for XChaCha20/HChaCha20 too
afaics. (http://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20110204.pdf
on http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html)

Now depending on the length of the nonce either use ChaCha20 (8 byte
nonce) or XChaCha20 (24 byte nonce).

I suggest the zero padding should be prefixed to the nonce, so the last
8 bytes of the AEAD nonce are always the 8 bytes used in the ChaCha20
stream. If only those are changed (typical nonce increment) the
key/nonce compression "k1" can be cached.

Padding nonces should be safe: if the input nonces were unique, the
padded nonces are unique too. As nonces are often counters anyway, they
already are almost 0 - adding more zeros shouldn't hurt.

regards,
Stefan


From nobody Fri Feb 28 06:26:27 2014
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=27Stefan_B=FChler=27?= <source@stbuehler.de>, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
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Stefan:

  Will you be at Monday's meeting in London?  We could discuss this in
more depth after Yoav's presentation.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Stefan B=FChler
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2014 6:15 AM
> To: Yoav Nir; cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> I propose using "HChaCha20" (analog to HSalsa20) to compress larger
> nonces:
> * supports nonce lengths of 8 and 24 bytes, and everything between by
>   prefixing with zeros.
>   (I can't claim to have understood the paper on XSalsa20/HSalsa20
>   completely, so I'm not sure whether more than one HSalsa20 step would
>   still be covered by the proof; but I guess it should work.
>   This means one could support almost any nonce length >=3D 8 bytes)
> * uses the original ChaCha20 algorithm (some implementations might not
>   allow changing the length of nonce/counter; these implementations
>   are still compatible with a nonce length of 8 bytes)
> * compatible with draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 (using nonce length
>   of 8 bytes, plain ChaCha20)
>=20
> Define P: extract 256-bit from 512-bit
> P(z0, z1, z2, z3) :=3D (z0, z3)  # z_i are 128-bit
>=20
> Define HChaCha20: takes 256-bit key, 128-bit nonce
> HChaCha20_k(n) :=3D P(doublerounds^10(x))
>     where
>     x :=3D (salsaconst, k, n)
>=20
> Define Q: calculates HChaCha from 64-bit nonce and 512-bit ChaCha Q(n,
> x) :=3D P(x) - (salsaconst, n)  # subtraction on 32-bit words
>=20
> HChaCha20_k(n) =3D Q(n, ChaCha20_k(n))
> (Q is used in the proof: it is a public computation (salsaconst and
> nonce are public) of HChaCha20_k(n) from ChaCha_k(n), and maps uniform
> random strings to uniform random strings)
>=20
> Define XChaCha20: takes 256-bit key, 192-bit nonce and a little-endian
> 64-bit counter XChaCha20_k(n, i) =3D ChaCha20_k1(n2, i)
>     where
>     (n1, n2) :=3D n # n1 is 128-bit, n2 64-bit
>     k1 :=3D HChaCha20_k(n1)
>=20
> The proof for XSalsa20/HSalsa20 should work for XChaCha20/HChaCha20 too
> afaics. (http://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20110204.pdf
> on http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html)
>=20
> Now depending on the length of the nonce either use ChaCha20 (8 byte
> nonce) or XChaCha20 (24 byte nonce).
>=20
> I suggest the zero padding should be prefixed to the nonce, so the last
> 8 bytes of the AEAD nonce are always the 8 bytes used in the ChaCha20
> stream. If only those are changed (typical nonce increment) the
> key/nonce compression "k1" can be cached.
>=20
> Padding nonces should be safe: if the input nonces were unique, the
> padded nonces are unique too. As nonces are often counters anyway, they
> already are almost 0 - adding more zeros shouldn't hurt.
>=20
> regards,
> Stefan
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2014 16:05:22 +0100
From: Stefan =?UTF-8?B?QsO8aGxlcg==?= <source@stbuehler.de>
To: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
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On Fri, 28 Feb 2014 14:26:07 +0000
"Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> wrote:

> Stefan:
> 
>   Will you be at Monday's meeting in London?  We could discuss this in
> more depth after Yoav's presentation.

No, sorry, I will not be at the meeting.


From nobody Fri Feb 28 07:54:37 2014
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Hi Robert,

On 02/27/2014 10:17 PM, Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 2/27/14, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>> The TLS WG has asked for the CFRG opinion on ChaCha+Poly1305.    We also
>> should be offering an opinion on the new ECC mechanisms.   Some
>> questions for you: should we take on draft-ladd-safecurves-03 as an RG
>> draft?
> I strongly oppose adoption of draft-ladd-safecurves-03 as an RG draft or an RFC:
>
> * In draft-ladd-safecurves-00, the ‘author’ merely copied a pile of
> curve equations into an I-D and tried to pass it off as his own useful
> contribution.  draft-ladd-safecurves-03 still takes a fundamentally
> wrong approach in specifying several specific curves, when what is
> needed is a document describing how the whole class of Montgomery and
> Edwards curves is currently used and can be used in future
> applications.
>
> * It repeatedly claims to specify a ‘standard’ for ECC on those
> curves; however, the draft is ‘Informational’, and it specifies point
> formats for Curve25519 which are deliberately incompatible with the
> existing standard practices among implementations.  Thus, it is
> attempting to specify a new ‘standard’ in a non-standards-track
> Internet document, in clear defiance of IETF policy.
>
> * It contains several factual inaccuracies.
>
> * It takes a condescending tone toward implementors, while omitting
> critical details needed to apply what little information it provides
> to other Montgomery and Edwards curves.
>
> * None of the text of the draft explains any aspect of the use of
> Montgomery and Edwards curves or any background information in a
> useful level of detail.  It is not useful even as a starting point for
> an RFC on this topic.
>
> * The author has repeatedly disregarded advice from other RG members
> regarding this draft, usually with unnecessary hostility.  I have not
> yet seen any reason to believe that he will change his behaviour.  If
> he is chosen as the editor of an RG document at this time, I will not
> waste my effort on attempting to contribute to it.

That makes your position clear.

>
>
> I have nearly finished writing a relatively elementary exposition of
> the background in abstract algebra and (Weierstrass-form) elliptic
> curves needed to properly explain Montgomery and Edwards curves and
> their use in cryptography.  I intend to send it to the CFRG mailing
> list either tonight or tomorrow for review.  After that, the portion
> of a document describing Montgomery and Edwards curves themselves (as
> currently used) should be relatively easy.

Thanks for the offer to contribute here.

>
>> Should we recommend its adoption in TLS?
> draft-ladd-safecurves is not needed in order to adopt Curve25519 for use in TLS.
>
> Dr. Bernstein's Curve25519 paper specifies the existing standard for
> scalar multiplication on Curve25519 in sufficient detail to serve as a
> normative reference for RFCs specifying its use in ECDH in IETF
> protocols.  I believe that Curve25519 should be recommended for
> adoption in TLS, and that a future version of
> draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519 (which addresses the comments made on
> the TLS list regarding the (current) -04 version) will be suitable for
> publication as an RFC.

I am wary of relying on the curve25519 paper as a normative reference.   
Perhaps your goal here is to provide an informational document (the 
draft that you mention above) that offers implementation guidance, 
instead of a normative reference?

David

>
>
> Robert Ransom
> .
>


From nobody Fri Feb 28 08:26:09 2014
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Dear all,

Currently we do not know what point format to use if we want a unified
one . Robert Ransom has a suggestion for one which is somewhat
reasonable, but I still need to dig up formulas, check they work, etc
to put it into the draft. Anyone can send me a diff if they so desire.
The endianness issue is as stupid as it is important: I'm not attached
to big endian and can change it if there is consensus, but given that
IETF protocols use big-endian all the time, I was hesitant to do so.
(There is also a private key coding issue with existing
implementations) Some proposed representations aren't total: I really
don't like that.

We also need to reduce the number of curves.

These are the technical issues I can deal with.

The name and formatting have generated a vast amount of unimportant
controversy, and I have zero desire to encourage the propagation of
this fencepainting. Hex v. dec is somewhat more reasonable, except my
favorite CAS for number theory doesn't support hex. Someday I suppose
I'll switch to Sage.

The major issue from a non-normative perspective is that people want
pseudocode that implements the algorithms safely, or an explanation of
how to do DH in groups with large prime order subgroups. Fine, I'll
add it. The explanation of signatures wasn't going to be a part of
this draft: I wanted it to be in a separate document.

The bigger problem is people want things like "these curves aren't
Weierstrass curves" or "here is the double-and-add formula found in
every elementary book on computation". I've added much of this, but 1)
it's completely non-normative, and 2) you should know it already if
you are an implementor.

Lastly, just because this says encoding should be done one way,
nothing stops a protocol from doing it another way for whatever
reasons. I don't see why we should consider things like existing
implementations etc. here, when they can be considered much closer to
the pointy end where other considerations show up. In particular
Elligator has not featured in this draft, but some protocols will want
to use it.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


From nobody Fri Feb 28 19:41:42 2014
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Message-ID: <CABqy+soS=t3riOZkDnJ5jMApJfWv95So34DdFona5JXERAws_w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
To: cfrg@irtf.org
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/U0w7lUET20b6ZTi2mG7g2Njtztw
Subject: [Cfrg] Review of ECC topics
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--001a11c3e246cc856004f3835492
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

See attached for a document reviewing the background in abstract
algebra, number theory, and elliptic curves that I consider necessary
to properly explain the specific design and implementation details of
Montgomery and Edwards curves (including conditions for twist
security, conversion between Montgomery and Edwards forms, conditions
for completeness of the Edwards-form addition law, use of Edwards
forms with a=-1 in fields where -1 is a non-square, and implementation
of simple point formats).

My main goal is to convey the intuition behind a few critical
mathematical concepts; I'm not trying to teach readers to implement
computations involving e.g. algebraic extension fields or Weierstrass
curves.  (Except for the sections on non-squares and square-root
computations, where I can only provide insight without a long
digression for fields in which -1 is a non-square.)


I would greatly appreciate any comments, especially from non-experts.
I am particularly interested in whether the sections on polynomial
rings, algebraic extension fields, and maps between curves (and
elliptic curves) are easy to understand.


Robert Ransom

--001a11c3e246cc856004f3835492
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From nobody Fri Feb 28 20:16:47 2014
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On 2/28/14, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> wrote:

>> I have nearly finished writing a relatively elementary exposition of
>> the background in abstract algebra and (Weierstrass-form) elliptic
>> curves needed to properly explain Montgomery and Edwards curves and
>> their use in cryptography.  I intend to send it to the CFRG mailing
>> list either tonight or tomorrow for review.  After that, the portion
>> of a document describing Montgomery and Edwards curves themselves (as
>> currently used) should be relatively easy.
>
> Thanks for the offer to contribute here.

I've sent that document to the list now (attached to =E2=80=98Review of ECC=
 topics=E2=80=99).


>>> Should we recommend its adoption in TLS?
>> draft-ladd-safecurves is not needed in order to adopt Curve25519 for use
>> in TLS.
>>
>> Dr. Bernstein's Curve25519 paper specifies the existing standard for
>> scalar multiplication on Curve25519 in sufficient detail to serve as a
>> normative reference for RFCs specifying its use in ECDH in IETF
>> protocols.  I believe that Curve25519 should be recommended for
>> adoption in TLS, and that a future version of
>> draft-josefsson-tls-curve25519 (which addresses the comments made on
>> the TLS list regarding the (current) -04 version) will be suitable for
>> publication as an RFC.
>
> I am wary of relying on the curve25519 paper as a normative reference.
> Perhaps your goal here is to provide an informational document (the
> draft that you mention above) that offers implementation guidance,
> instead of a normative reference?

RFC 4492 (ECC ciphersuites for TLS) cites ANSI X9.62, IEEE 1363, and a
few documents labeled as =E2=80=98standards=E2=80=99 by the corporations wh=
ich
authored them as normative references.  It cannot be implemented
without the information in ANSI X9.62 and IEEE 1363.  ANSI X9.62 is
available from ANSI for 100 USD; IEEE 1363 is available from ANSI for
168 USD.

It is true that the author of the Curve25519 paper is neither a large
corporation nor an organization with =E2=80=9CStandards=E2=80=9D in its nam=
e, and did
not label Curve25519 as a =E2=80=98standard=E2=80=99 in the paper's title. =
 However,
the Curve25519 scalar multiplication function specified in the paper
became a =E2=80=98standard=E2=80=99, in the sense which IETF claims to use =
the word,
when software developers came to the rough consensus that it was a
good cryptographic primitive to use, and wrote and deployed running
code which implements it.  The Curve25519 paper is available for free
from the URL <http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf>.

What is your objection to using the Curve25519 paper as a normative
reference for the standard Curve25519 scalar multiplication function?


Robert Ransom


From nobody Fri Feb 28 20:37:03 2014
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Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2014 20:36:58 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Review of ECC topics
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Some notes, from the concrete to the abstract:
I do not see what the grade school definition of polynomial has to
offer above the one recorded below. Furthermore, polynomial addition
and multiplication are defined so as to make F[x] a commutative ring:
it is not the case that one can show that the results hold without
defining the multiplication and addition.

Vector space is mentioned but is never defined.

Despite desiring to avoid algebraic geometry, the world "multiplicity"
is used without explanation. The parenthetical is an explanation only
for the initiate or the credulous. Furthermore, to avoid algebraic
geometry in explaining elliptic curves is to evade the nature of the
subject. I strongly question the comprehensibility of any such attempt
in the final reckoning.

An algebraic curve is not the zero set of f(x,y) in some affine plane:
the field must be algebraically closed for the classical definition,
and in the modern definition that only is the F_p rational points. In
particular one runs into the issue of x^p+y^p=0 over F_p, which is not
the same curve as x+y=0.

Not every morphism is given by a single polynomial, but rather a rule
assigning to every open set a polynomial in a compatible manner. This
matters because the addition morphism on a curve in short Weierstrass
form is not given by a single polynomial, hence the need for complete
addition laws in the first place. (I will temporarily leave aside the
issue of defining the product to define the addition law as a
morphism).

Your definition of isogeny differs from that of Silverman, the
standard text in this area. In particular your first condition is
somewhat mystifying to me: it is not part of the definition of
Silverman, and so I am concerned the there might actually be a
difference between them that is material. I have not thought about
this hard enough to be sure either way. But in one case it is
unnecessary, and in the other it is wrong.

Lastly, intuition does not come from definitions and quoted results.
It comes from examples. Perhaps "convey the definitions of a few
critical concepts" would better fit the goals here.

Sincerely,
Watson

On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 7:41 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
> See attached for a document reviewing the background in abstract
> algebra, number theory, and elliptic curves that I consider necessary
> to properly explain the specific design and implementation details of
> Montgomery and Edwards curves (including conditions for twist
> security, conversion between Montgomery and Edwards forms, conditions
> for completeness of the Edwards-form addition law, use of Edwards
> forms with a=-1 in fields where -1 is a non-square, and implementation
> of simple point formats).
>
> My main goal is to convey the intuition behind a few critical
> mathematical concepts; I'm not trying to teach readers to implement
> computations involving e.g. algebraic extension fields or Weierstrass
> curves.  (Except for the sections on non-squares and square-root
> computations, where I can only provide insight without a long
> digression for fields in which -1 is a non-square.)
>
>
> I would greatly appreciate any comments, especially from non-experts.
> I am particularly interested in whether the sections on polynomial
> rings, algebraic extension fields, and maps between curves (and
> elliptic curves) are easy to understand.
>
>
> Robert Ransom
>
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