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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum RG of the IRTF.

        Title           : Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys
        Author          : Stanislav Smyshlyaev
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying-06.txt
	Pages           : 45
	Date            : 2017-09-08

Abstract:
   A certain maximum amount of data can be safely encrypted when
   encryption is performed under a single key.  This amount is called
   "key lifetime".  This specification describes a variety of methods to
   increase the lifetime of symmetric keys.  It provides external and
   internal re-keying mechanisms based on hash functions and on block
   ciphers, that can be used with modes of operations such as CTR, GCM,
   CCM, CBC, CFB and OMAC.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
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A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying-06


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From: Thomas Garcia <tgarcia.3141@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2017 08:12:28 +0100
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Subject: [Cfrg] Side Channel Attacks Against Curve25519
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--f403045fb99476d4cb0558d088b6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hello,
According to [1], the libgcrypt implementation of curve25519 is based on
bignum arithmetic which is not constant-time. A similar issue was raised in
[2], regarding the Go implementation. [1] proposed solving this by
rejecting small order inputs. But this recommendation is problematic [3].
As this issue seems to come up once in a while, I think it should be
addressed. Good crypto should encourage proper implementation, in the sense
that the simplest way of implementing it is the correct way (which isn't
vulnerable to side channel attacks). Curve25519 was developed in accordance
with that philosophy and the addition formulas are well implemented. Can
something similar be done to encourage correct bignum arithmetic? Is it
possible to choose the parameters, such as the prime, such that the
simplest implementation will be less susceptible to side channel attacks?
What I imagine is a prime which would normally have long computation times,
but has a trick that enables simpler addition which is coincidentally
constant time.

Thanks,
Thomas G.

[1] - https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806
[2] - https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000930.html
[3] - https://twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/902415565435830273

--f403045fb99476d4cb0558d088b6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hello,<div>According to [1], the libgcrypt implementation =
of curve25519 is based on bignum arithmetic which is not constant-time. A s=
imilar issue was raised in [2], regarding the Go implementation. [1] propos=
ed solving this by rejecting small order inputs. But this recommendation is=
 problematic [3].</div><div>As this issue seems to come up once in a while,=
 I think it should be addressed. Good crypto should encourage proper implem=
entation, in the sense that the simplest way of implementing it is the corr=
ect way (which isn&#39;t vulnerable to side channel attacks). Curve25519 wa=
s developed in accordance with that philosophy and the addition formulas ar=
e well implemented. Can something similar be done to encourage correct bign=
um arithmetic? Is it possible to choose the parameters, such as the prime, =
such that the simplest implementation will be less susceptible to side chan=
nel attacks? What I imagine is a prime which would normally have long compu=
tation times, but has a trick that enables simpler addition which is coinci=
dentally constant time.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Thomas G=
.</div><div><br></div><div>[1] -=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/20=
17/806">https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806</a></div><div>[2] -=C2=A0<a href=
=3D"https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000930.html">https://=
moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000930.html</a></div><div>[3] -=
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/902415565435830273"=
>https://twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/902415565435830273</a></div></div>

--f403045fb99476d4cb0558d088b6--


From nobody Sun Sep 10 05:40:50 2017
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Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2017 15:40:40 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Thomas Garcia <tgarcia.3141@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Side Channel Attacks Against Curve25519
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On Sun, Sep 10, 2017 at 08:12:28AM +0100, Thomas Garcia wrote:

> something similar be done to encourage correct bignum arithmetic? Is it
> possible to choose the parameters, such as the prime, such that the
> simplest implementation will be less susceptible to side channel attacks?
> What I imagine is a prime which would normally have long computation times,
> but has a trick that enables simpler addition which is coincidentally
> constant time.

I do not know how much modern bigint libraries optimize based on the
prime. However, the very idea of fast primes for ECC is that those
primes have various tricks to perform fast modular multiplication
(since multiplication is the dominant cost). And those kinds of primes
are pretty rare, especially the more efficient (relative to size) ones.


Both X25519 and X448 have useful reductions in base field
((2^51)^5 -> 19 and ((2^56)^4)^2 -> ((2^56)^4)^1 + ((2^56)^4)^0,
respectively).


Of course, one could use reductions like that to optimize the modulo
operation with bigint library, but dedicated constant-time routine
would still likely be faster with little optimization. Especially as
one can partially fold those reductions into multiplication itself.


Then there are other forms of side-channel leakage beside base field
arithmetic. E.g. the conditional swaps in Montgomery ladder. However,
most other forms of elliptic curves have actual conditional adds or
even worse, edge cases in addition.


-Ilari


From nobody Wed Sep 13 03:53:40 2017
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-00.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum RG of the IRTF.

        Title           : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)
        Authors         : Sharon Goldberg
                          Leonid Reyzin
                          Dimitrios Papadopoulos
                          Jan Vcelak
	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-00.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2017-09-13

Abstract:
   A Verifiable Random Function (VRF) is the public-key version of a
   keyed cryptographic hash.  Only the holder of the private key can
   compute the hash, but anyone with public key can verify the
   correctness of the hash.  VRFs are useful for preventing enumeration
   of hash-based data structures.  This document specifies several VRF
   constructions that are secure in the cryptographic random oracle
   model.  One VRF uses RSA and the other VRF uses Eliptic Curves (EC).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf/

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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-00


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Subject: [Cfrg] Review request for SM4 block cipher draft: draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-00
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Review request for SM4 block cipher draft: draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-00
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From: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
To: Ronald Tse <tse@ribose.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
CC: Wai Kit Wong <wongwk@hsmc.edu.hk>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Review request for SM4 block cipher draft: draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-00
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Review request for SM4 block cipher draft: draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-00
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Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Review request for SM4 block cipher draft: draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-00
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Review request for SM4 block cipher draft: draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-00
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Dear CFRG participants,
This message starts 2 week RGLC on "AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Auth=
enticated Encryption" (draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06), that will end on October 1=
st. Please send you comments, as well as expression of support to publish as=
 an RFC (or possible reasons for not doing so) in reply to this message or d=
irectly to CFRG chairs. Your feedback will help chairs to decide whether the=
 document is ready for review by IRSG and subsequent publication as an RFC.

Thank you,
Kenny and Alexey

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><h2 style=3D"box-sizing: border-box; font-w=
eight: 400; line-height: 1.1; margin-top: 21px; margin-bottom: 10.5px;"><fon=
t size=3D"3"><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Dear C=
FRG participants,</span></font></h2><div><font size=3D"3"><span style=3D"bac=
kground-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">This message starts 2 week RGLC on "=
</span></font><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0); font-=
size: medium;">AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption"=
 (</span><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0); font-size:=
 medium;">draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06), that will end on October 1st. Please s=
end you comments, as well as expression of support to publish as an RFC (or p=
ossible reasons for not doing so) in reply to this message or directly to CFR=
G chairs. Your feedback will help chairs to decide whether the document is r=
eady for review by IRSG and subsequent publication as an RFC.</span></div><d=
iv><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0); font-size: mediu=
m;"><br></span></div><div><font size=3D"3">Thank you,</font></div><div><span=
 style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0); font-size: medium;">Kenn=
y and Alexey</span></div><div></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Sat Sep 16 08:18:37 2017
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Changed milestone "Submit "AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated
Encryption" to IRSG", set due date to October 2017 from September 2017.

URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/cfrg/about/


From nobody Sat Sep 16 09:16:40 2017
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-nir-cfrg-rfc7539bis-02.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum RG of the IRTF.

        Title           : ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols
        Authors         : Yoav Nir
                          Adam Langley
	Filename        : draft-nir-cfrg-rfc7539bis-02.txt
	Pages           : 45
	Date            : 2017-09-16

Abstract:
   This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher as well as the use
   of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms and as
   a "combined mode", or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
   (AEAD) algorithm.

   RFC 7539, the predecessor of this document, was meant to serve as a
   stable reference and an implementation guide.  It was a product of
   the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG).  This document merges the
   errata filed against RFC 7539 and adds a little text to the Security
   Considerations section.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-cfrg-rfc7539bis/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-cfrg-rfc7539bis-02
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-cfrg-rfc7539bis-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-nir-cfrg-rfc7539bis-02


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Sat Sep 16 12:20:38 2017
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To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>, prz@acm.org, IRTF CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>, Moxie Marlinspike <moxie@thoughtcrime.org>
References: <23B4CF16-6E26-4674-B128-DCB3FCC5A97F@azet.org> <sjmbmn3zqb6.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <CAOLP8p6QsDPBBJy5RRMjLXVtW4c8DewoMnUpxpO3v5CwFjWEyg@mail.gmail.com> <08A18D2C-794D-4272-9DF3-5F1FB449D5F5@gmail.com> <CAHOTMVLGuJTvXpJjg9zWBmrZOWe8fMmTasoLpCgG2tttr8hUAw@mail.gmail.com>
From: David Jacobson <dmjacobson@sbcglobal.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Word-lists for Diffie-Hellman and Fingerprints
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Sorry for replying to a dead topic.

I took a look at the RFC 1751 list and found these two words: VAIL and 
VALE.   Those seem to be homonyms, and are hard to remember since VAIL 
has only archaic meanings and VALE is a seldom used term for a valley.  
But the most common word of that sound is VEIL.

      --David


On 8/29/17 10:24 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 10:01 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com 
> <mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     Why not re-use the list of words from appendix A of RFC 1751?
>
>
> I can't give a concrete answer, however as someone who's a bit 
> obsessive about comparing various wordlists, granted in an entirely ad 
> hoc way of generating random samples and making a more or less ad hoc 
> judgement about how often I was presented random samples I liked, I 
> really like the EFF's (English) wordlist, and am not a super big fan 
> of RFC 1751. Granted that's a completely non-quantitative opinion, 
> more like one based in aesthetics. I'm sure YMMV...
>
> -- 
> Tony Arcieri
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg



--------------2990F0298A312FB3E2A7DABA
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<html>
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  </head>
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Sorry for replying to a dead topic.<br>
      <br>
      I took a look at the RFC 1751 list and found these two words: VAIL
      and VALE.   Those seem to be homonyms, and are hard to remember
      since VAIL has only archaic meanings and VALE is a seldom used
      term for a valley.  But the most common word of that sound is
      VEIL.<br>
      <br>
           --David<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      On 8/29/17 10:24 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAHOTMVLGuJTvXpJjg9zWBmrZOWe8fMmTasoLpCgG2tttr8hUAw@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div class="gmail_extra">
          <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 10:01 PM,
            Yoav Nir <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                href="mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" target="_blank"
                moz-do-not-send="true">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Why not
              re-use the list of words from appendix A of RFC 1751?</blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>I can't give a concrete answer, however as someone
              who's a bit obsessive about comparing various wordlists,
              granted in an entirely ad hoc way of generating random
              samples and making a more or less ad hoc judgement about
              how often I was presented random samples I liked, I really
              like the EFF's (English) wordlist, and am not a super big
              fan of RFC 1751. Granted that's a completely
              non-quantitative opinion, more like one based in
              aesthetics. I'm sure YMMV...</div>
          </div>
          <div><br>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          <div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">Tony
            Arcieri<br>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg">https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

--------------2990F0298A312FB3E2A7DABA--


From nobody Mon Sep 18 10:51:46 2017
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From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 19:51:36 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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Hi,

I apologize for chiming in so late, but I wasn't aware of this endeavour
till very recently. The question I find myself struggling with is that I
can't find introduction of new primitives justified, at least not in
this context. I did my best sieving through
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?q=gcmsiv) to locate relevant
prior comments, so even with those in mind. One of arguments was that
POLYVAL gets bit order right in comparison to GHASH. Well, comparing the
two is actually boils down to one question: what is it you choose to
bit-flip, input or polynomial? [Do note "bit-flip", not "byte-flip".]
What I'm trying to say is that we have to recognize that POLYVAL is
simply formulated in terms of GHASH polynomial in reverse bit order. On
the other hand on more practical level, i.e. from software
implementation viewpoint, answer to the question is self-obvious, it's
more efficient to bit-flip single polynomial than each fragment of the
input. This last thing effectively means that sensible GHASH
implementation would actually use reverse-bit polynomial (and at least
OpenSSL implementations all do). This in turn means that the only
essential difference between GHASH and POLYVAL is byte order. Now, it
was argued that little-endian byte order gives performance edge [on
platform of popular choice]. But relevant question in the context is if
the edge actually justifies introduction of new algorithm. It was
asserted that it provides 20% improvement and it was attributed to the
fact that PCLMULQDQ-based GHASH implementations use vector byte swap
instructions, *one* per block. But we have to recognize that said
improvement coefficient is actually specific to Skylake. For example on
Haswell we'll observe ... 0% improvement, on Broadwell - 6%, on Ryzen -
3%. Let's even have a look at absolute cycles per processed byte values
for GHASH:

Haswell   0.41
Broadwell 0.29
Skylake   0.36

Do note that effectively we observe regression on Skylake, also note
that it's ~20%. I mean if Skylake inherited Broadwell qualities, GHASH
would have performed ~20% better. With all the numbers in mind it's only
natural to conclude that vector byte swap "costs" unproportionally much
specifically on Skylake [and in GHASH], and it's rather anomaly than
rule. And it's not unlikely to be addressed in next processor
generation. At least other alike cases were, just look at improvement
from Haswell to Broadwell above. And if not, maybe it would still be
more appropriate to demand that Intel fixes this in next-next
generation, instead of introducing new algorithm. Because latter
approach is not really sustainable. I mean how many algorithms would we
have to implement and support if they were introduced on per
specific-processor-pipeline-anomaly basis? Besides, even 20% improvement
has to be considered in overall context, not by itself. I mean if the
only difference between two otherwise equivalent proposals was POLYVAL
vs. GHASH, then improvement for *whole* operation would be ~6% [on
Skylake, and none to negligible on others]. Or in other words this
proposal *could* just as well be formulated with GHASH instead of
POLYVAL, there is no *compelling* reason to introduce another algorithm.

And same can be said about suggested CTR tweak. I.e. suggested mode
*could* just as well be formulated with standard CTR. Even more so, as
there is no apparent difference in performance [on platform of popular
choice].

Well, it's not like I actually reject the sentiment to favour
little-endian platform[s], question rather is if *mode* specification is
right place for it. Protocols are about *communication* and there are
more factors in play, most notably using already available primitives
would facilitate adoption. And if little-endian-centric primitives are
deemed desirable, wouldn't it be more appropriate to define them
separately to promote modularity and re-usability?

Cheers.


From nobody Mon Sep 18 11:01:45 2017
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Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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I support publishing this draft as an RFC.

 

Thanks!

--

Regards,

Uri Blumenthal

 

From: Cfrg <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org> on behalf of Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
Date: Saturday, September 16, 2017 at 11:13
To: CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06

 
Dear CFRG participants,
This message starts 2 week RGLC on "AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption" (draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06), that will end on October 1st. Please send you comments, as well as expression of support to publish as an RFC (or possible reasons for not doing so) in reply to this message or directly to CFRG chairs. Your feedback will help chairs to decide whether the document is ready for review by IRSG and subsequent publication as an RFC.



Thank you,

Kenny and Alexey


--B_3588588096_314866157
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--></style></head><body bgcolor=3Dwhite lang=3DEN-US link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954=
F72"><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>I support publishing this dr=
aft as an RFC.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal>Thanks!<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>--<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Regards,<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:blac=
k'>Uri Blumenthal</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/p><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><b><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:12.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:=
black'>Cfrg &lt;cfrg-bounces@irtf.org&gt; on behalf of Alexey Melnikov &lt;a=
lexey.melnikov@isode.com&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Saturday, September 16, 2017 at=
 11:13<br><b>To: </b>CFRG &lt;cfrg@irtf.org&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>[Cfrg] RG=
 Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><h2 style=
=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:15.75pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:7.9pt;margin-lef=
t:.5in;box-sizing: border-box'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-weight:nor=
mal'>Dear CFRG participants,</span><span style=3D'font-weight:normal'><o:p></o=
:p></span></h2><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D=
'font-size:12.0pt'>This message starts 2 week RGLC on &quot;</span><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:13.5pt'>AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encr=
yption&quot; (draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06), that will end on October 1st. Plea=
se send you comments, as well as expression of support to publish as an RFC =
(or possible reasons for not doing so) in reply to this message or directly =
to CFRG chairs. Your feedback will help chairs to decide whether the documen=
t is ready for review by IRSG and subsequent publication as an RFC.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:13.5pt'><br><br></span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Thank you,</s=
pan><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:13.5pt'>Kenny and Alexey</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></d=
iv></body></html>

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--B_3588588096_1941065791--


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From: Ted Krovetz <ted@krovetz.net>
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Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 12:14:51 -0700
Cc: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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For those unfamiliar with Andy's work, he is the primary contributor of =
assembly-language implementations to OpenSSL. For example, most of these =
were written by him and are first-rate.

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/tree/master/crypto/aes/asm
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/tree/master/crypto/modes/asm

If Andy says that there is likely no long-term performance benefit to =
using POLYVAL rather than GHASH, then I think this is probably right.

Before going further with the RFC, could the gcmsiv authors please =
address the long-term cost vs benefit of using POLYVAL and the modified =
CTR rather than GHASH and standard CTR?

Thanks,
Ted=


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 12:35:19 -0700
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On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 10:51 AM, Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I apologize for chiming in so late, but I wasn't aware of this endeavour
> till very recently. The question I find myself struggling with is that I
> can't find introduction of new primitives justified, at least not in
> this context. I did my best sieving through
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?q=gcmsiv) to locate relevant
> prior comments, so even with those in mind. One of arguments was that
> POLYVAL gets bit order right in comparison to GHASH. Well, comparing the
> two is actually boils down to one question: what is it you choose to
> bit-flip, input or polynomial? [Do note "bit-flip", not "byte-flip".]
> What I'm trying to say is that we have to recognize that POLYVAL is
> simply formulated in terms of GHASH polynomial in reverse bit order. On
> the other hand on more practical level, i.e. from software
> implementation viewpoint, answer to the question is self-obvious, it's
> more efficient to bit-flip single polynomial than each fragment of the
> input. This last thing effectively means that sensible GHASH
> implementation would actually use reverse-bit polynomial (and at least
> OpenSSL implementations all do). This in turn means that the only
> essential difference between GHASH and POLYVAL is byte order. Now, it
> was argued that little-endian byte order gives performance edge [on
> platform of popular choice]. But relevant question in the context is if
> the edge actually justifies introduction of new algorithm. It was
> asserted that it provides 20% improvement and it was attributed to the
> fact that PCLMULQDQ-based GHASH implementations use vector byte swap
> instructions, *one* per block. But we have to recognize that said
> improvement coefficient is actually specific to Skylake. For example on
> Haswell we'll observe ... 0% improvement, on Broadwell - 6%, on Ryzen -
> 3%. Let's even have a look at absolute cycles per processed byte values
> for GHASH:

It's important to not conflate the following 3 distinct things:
- The maximum performance attainable by the best implementation on
each microarchitecture
- The maximum performance attainable by a single implementation on
each microarchitecture
- The maximum performance attainable by the best implementation for a
single implementation strategy on each microarchitecture

It's also important not to conflate the following 4 things:
- The arrangement of limbs in a bignum
- The internal arrangement of bits in a limb
- The arrangement of bits in a byte
- Reduction strategy

I don't get a clear impression from your email what implementations
you used or what strategies and representation.

POLYVAL takes the least significant bit of a byte to be the constant
coefficient. No matter what architecture (big or little endian) you
have, this is clearly the right choice as it is exactly the choice
made when considering a byte to be an integer in the range 0 to 255.
GHASH does something weird I don't recall exactly.

dot(a,b) is the result of a Montgomery reduction of the product ab
with Montgomery modulus x^128. This is true no matter what
representation of the polynomials is chosen. Most fast GHASH
implementations use Montgomery form internally, due to the advantages
of Montgomery form. POLYVAL thus removes conversions into and out of
Montgomery form. These conversions might be extremely cheap, but they
are not free. If combined with the GHASH weirdness they may be very
cheap indeed, but POLYVAL conversions are not more expensive even if
you have to swap byte order in a word on read.

I'm thus extremely doubtful that your numbers below are correct: they
may be. But I'm skeptical. Benchmarking is really hard, and I know
I've screwed up plenty of these measurements myself.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


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On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 10:51 AM, Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> wrote:
>
> Well, it's not like I actually reject the sentiment to favour
> little-endian platform[s], question rather is if *mode* specification is
> right place for it. Protocols are about *communication* and there are
> more factors in play, most notably using already available primitives
> would facilitate adoption. And if little-endian-centric primitives are
> deemed desirable, wouldn't it be more appropriate to define them
> separately to promote modularity and re-usability?

Anyone who has implemented GHASH has had to wrestle with the
specification's handling of bit ordering, it's confusing beyond
questions of little- vs big-endian.

But it's also the case that little-endian machines now dominate. It's
nice that some big cores can largely hide the cost of doing the byte
swap, but hiding work is not the same as avoiding it (as your Skylake
numbers show) and smaller cores may not be able to do the
out-of-order, superscalar magic needed. POLYVAL is GHASH done right
for the world as we find it.

As for diversity: that's a cost. Although it's smaller here than in
many cases. Where the diversity costs really bubble up is when they
spread up the stack and we have, say, RSA-with-SHAKE128 to test and
validate everywhere. I think the diversity cost of AES-GCM-SIV is
concentrated in its very existence (i.e. that it's not AES-GCM). For
cases where AES-GCM-SIV isn't being written as a stitched asm blob
(where the full implementation cost of either POLYVAL or GHASH is be
paid anyway), BoringSSL uses the mapping to GHASH to avoid another
implementation, as specified in the draft.


Cheers

AGL

--
Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org


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> If Andy says that there is likely no long-term performance benefit to using POLYVAL rather than GHASH, then I think this is probably right.

I don't feel that it's what I tried to say, not exactly. I said that
reported 20% improvement is rather anomaly than rule in the POLYVAL vs.
GHASH case, and it wouldn't be sustainable practice if decisions are
based on anomalies. Because anomalies tend to be resolved. In other
words long-run term of mental equation is rather how decisions are made,
than POLYVAL performance per se. As for POLYVAL per se. I'm not saying
that it doesn't offer *any* performance benefit, only that it doesn't on
some platforms, and that in non-anomalous cases it would be far from
"overwhelming". As additional couple of data points I've just collected
results for Cortex-A53, 6%, and Cortex-A57, 0%. It's common big.LITTLE
pair with A53 being "little". [Yes, equivalent of PCLMULQDQ was used. If
it wasn't, difference would be hardly measurable.]

> Before going further with the RFC, could the gcmsiv authors please address the long-term cost vs benefit of using POLYVAL and the modified CTR rather than GHASH and standard CTR?

In the context what I'm also trying to say/imply/suggest is that *mode*
specification is not necessarily right place to introduce primitives.


From nobody Mon Sep 18 15:33:39 2017
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>> Well, it's not like I actually reject the sentiment to favour
>> little-endian platform[s], question rather is if *mode* specification is
>> right place for it. Protocols are about *communication* and there are
>> more factors in play, most notably using already available primitives
>> would facilitate adoption. And if little-endian-centric primitives are
>> deemed desirable, wouldn't it be more appropriate to define them
>> separately to promote modularity and re-usability?
> 
> Anyone who has implemented GHASH has had to wrestle with the
> specification's handling of bit ordering, it's confusing beyond
> questions of little- vs big-endian.

As mentioned in 1st message, it's all about what you bit-flip,
polynomial or input. Or rather how you view polynomial. If GCM
specification is considered confusing (I'm not saying that it isn't),
then why not address *that*? By re-specifying it with bit-flipped
polynomial?

> But it's also the case that little-endian machines now dominate. It's
> nice that some big cores can largely hide the cost of doing the byte
> swap, but hiding work is not the same as avoiding it (as your Skylake
> numbers show) and smaller cores may not be able to do the
> out-of-order, superscalar magic needed.

The assertion that 20% improvement is rather anomaly than rule has
lesser to do with cores being "little" or "big". And I feel that logic
is getting twisted here. "Big" cores are considered to be more likely to
amortize additional cost of byte swap, right? Skylake is "big" core and
it does have computational resources to do so. And fails miserably.

> POLYVAL is GHASH done right
> for the world as we find it.

Then let's say exactly that. Let's specify it as re-usable primitive.
Does it actually have to be interwoven into *this* or *any* specific
mode specification?

> As for diversity: that's a cost. Although it's smaller here than in
> many cases. Where the diversity costs really bubble up is when they
> spread up the stack and we have, say, RSA-with-SHAKE128 to test and
> validate everywhere.

I don't quite follow. This is rather argument against introducing new
primitives. Because as far as testing and validation goes, there is no
difference between these cases. I mean you get more to test in both
cases. But it would be less to test and validate if suggested mode used
existing primitives.

> I think the diversity cost of AES-GCM-SIV is
> concentrated in its very existence (i.e. that it's not AES-GCM). For
> cases where AES-GCM-SIV isn't being written as a stitched asm blob
> (where the full implementation cost of either POLYVAL or GHASH is be
> paid anyway). BoringSSL uses the mapping to GHASH to avoid another> implementation, as specified in the draft.

I sense contradiction here. It's argued that alternative primitives
provide better performance. But attaining acclaimed performance *will*
take dedicated modules, i.e. significantly increase diversity. Even
without stitched implementation. If expectation is that majority will
take easy way out (perform byte swapping of GHASH input and output, and
build modified CTR with signle-block cipher subroutine), then question
about alternative primitives being well justified becomes even more acute...

[On side note, as for stitched implementation, core function in
aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl should be reusable if GHASH and standard CTR were used.]

Cheers.


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> I don't get a clear impression from your email what implementations
> you used or what strategies and representation.

I apologize for not being clear enough. I suppose I assumed that it's
obvious that I referred to OpenSSL implementation[s]. At least that's
what accompanying paper refers to as baseline. The absolute cycles per
byte results are quoted from <openssl>/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl,
where you can also find details about implementation techniques. Do note
that it uses reduction algorithm proposed by Shay, which he already
mentioned here in another thread.

> I'm thus extremely doubtful that your numbers below are correct: they
> may be. But I'm skeptical. Benchmarking is really hard, and I know
> I've screwed up plenty of these measurements myself.

Don't take my word for it, collect your own and tell us about it. [Do
note though that Skylake results are in perfect agreement with referred
paper. And non-Skylake results were collected using same method.]


From nobody Tue Sep 19 00:46:18 2017
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From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
To: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
References: <EA4347BF-D26F-4303-9A8D-E7B28986DE56@isode.com> <71d10985-4c46-4a7c-e634-76a822102a61@openssl.org> <CAMfhd9XLGowg+VtKMxt2owQjmXjedY7V0GLh_cKVu+6WfyquVQ@mail.gmail.com> <d12cad69-411d-132a-ffe6-91850a1e03b1@openssl.org>
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Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 09:46:14 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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>> But it's also the case that little-endian machines now dominate. It's
>> nice that some big cores can largely hide the cost of doing the byte
>> swap, but hiding work is not the same as avoiding it (as your Skylake
>> numbers show) and smaller cores may not be able to do the
>> out-of-order, superscalar magic needed.
> 
> The assertion that 20% improvement is rather anomaly than rule has
> lesser to do with cores being "little" or "big". And I feel that logic
> is getting twisted here. "Big" cores are considered to be more likely to
> amortize additional cost of byte swap, right? Skylake is "big" core and
> it does have computational resources to do so. And fails miserably.

I think I've misinterpreted the original remark in my head, as reply
appears orthogonal now, in the morning. Yes, some processors will fail
to amortize costs of byte swap, but point is that even if they won't,
*customarily* unamortized cost won't be anywhere near 20%. Yes, avoiding
byte swap will lift the question altogether, but question still is if
gain (and we are be talking about non-anomalous cases) justifies
introduction of new primitives. Yes, they might appear more elegant to
little-endian eye, but these two, performance and elegance, are not the
only parts of equation. Not to mention that every term has weight
coefficient. Performance's weight is improvement coefficient (6% on
Skylake, none to effectively negligible on others, negative for those
who choose easy way out(*)), and elegance's weight is...

(*) As mentioned earlier, "easy way out" refers to performing byte
swapping of GHASH input and output, and building modified CTR with
signle-block cipher subroutine. As opposite to investing into
high-performance code that would have to be dedicated. Even unstitched.


From nobody Tue Sep 19 00:47:33 2017
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From: Shay Gueron <shay.gueron@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 10:47:25 +0300
Message-ID: <CAHP81y_CUTvA9Ftqz0Q_qzs94iPddW+4g5ObhzruNKR5zaEPvw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Cc: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>,  Shay Gueron <shay.gueron@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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--94eb2c1c064601c22f05598612a1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Dear Andy (and everyone),

I would like to re-emphase a few points (although they have been already
nicely stated).

The purpose of using POLYVAL is not performance. It is "consistency". The
performance gains are a marginal bonus (and if they are ephemeral it does
not matter).

My purpose in defining the hash function as POLYVAL and not GHASH are
"consistency", as follows. A polynomial of degree 127 is sum (j=0..127) a_j
x^j. The relation between a polynomial and a string of bits is an arbitrary
choice (i.e., the direction from which the string is read). However, when
GHASH is combined with AES, to define AES-GCM, there is some inconsistency.
AES is defined over a state of 16 bytes. And bytes have a specific order of
bits inside them. This is independent of endianness (which is related to
the order of the bytes). For AES-GCM - the order of the bits for GHASH, is
inconsistent with the order of the bits in the bytes of the AES state (and
in general).

If you look at the AES-GCM spec, you will see that GHASH is defined via a
bit-wise algorithm. The interpretation that it is a polynomial in
GF(2^128), with the specific reduction polynomial, is somehow misleading.
Because the actual field representation would then need to involve a bit
reflection.

I proposed a way to solve this (
https://crypto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pdf) , by
describing GHASH over a GF(2^128) with a different reduction polynomial, Q
= x^128 + x^127+x^126+x^121+1.  And then, the operation is not the field
multiplication, but rather  it is A * B * x^(-127) mod Q. With this,
AES-GCM gets an algebraic formulation.

Computing A * B * x^(-127) is not conveninet, nor efficient. So, for
implementation  AES-GCM uses the identity
(A * x)  B * x^(-128) mod Q, taking advantage that A is fixed (the hash
key).

For POLYVAL, we started from A * B * x^(-128) mod Q, and from a definition
of the polynomials is consistent with the way that bytes are used. This
makes a cleaner definition.

The AES-GCM-SIV spec provides a formula that one can use, to implement it
via calls to GHASH, if one wishes to do that. BoringSSL does it.
Also, if someone is interested in an implementation that interleaves
decryption and hashing, there is such code published (and BoringSSL does
it).

Shay


2017-09-19 10:19 GMT+03:00 Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>:

> > I don't get a clear impression from your email what implementations
> > you used or what strategies and representation.
>
> I apologize for not being clear enough. I suppose I assumed that it's
> obvious that I referred to OpenSSL implementation[s]. At least that's
> what accompanying paper refers to as baseline. The absolute cycles per
> byte results are quoted from <openssl>/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl,
> where you can also find details about implementation techniques. Do note
> that it uses reduction algorithm proposed by Shay, which he already
> mentioned here in another thread.
>
> > I'm thus extremely doubtful that your numbers below are correct: they
> > may be. But I'm skeptical. Benchmarking is really hard, and I know
> > I've screwed up plenty of these measurements myself.
>
> Don't take my word for it, collect your own and tell us about it. [Do
> note though that Skylake results are in perfect agreement with referred
> paper. And non-Skylake results were collected using same method.]
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

--94eb2c1c064601c22f05598612a1
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"rtl"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dear Andy (and everyone),=C2=A0</div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">I would like to re-emphase a few po=
ints (although they have been already nicely stated).=C2=A0</div><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">The purpose of using POLYVAL is not per=
formance. It is &quot;consistency&quot;. The performance gains are a margin=
al bonus (and if they are ephemeral it does not matter).=C2=A0</div><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">My purpose in defining the hash functi=
on as POLYVAL and not GHASH are &quot;consistency&quot;, as follows. A poly=
nomial of degree 127 is sum (j=3D0..127) a_j x^j. The relation between a po=
lynomial and a string of bits is an arbitrary choice (i.e., the direction f=
rom which the string is read). However, when GHASH is combined with AES, to=
 define AES-GCM, there is some inconsistency. AES is defined over a state o=
f 16 bytes. And bytes have a specific order of bits inside them. This is in=
dependent of endianness (which is related to the order of the bytes). For A=
ES-GCM - the order of the bits for GHASH, is inconsistent with the order of=
 the bits in the bytes of the AES state (and in general).=C2=A0</div><div d=
ir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">If you look at the AES-GCM spec, you =
will see that GHASH is defined via a bit-wise algorithm. The interpretation=
 that it is a polynomial in GF(2^128), with the specific reduction polynomi=
al, is somehow misleading. Because the actual field representation would th=
en need to involve a bit reflection.=C2=A0<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></=
div><div dir=3D"ltr">I proposed a way to solve this (<a href=3D"https://cry=
pto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pdf">https://crypto.stanford=
.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pdf</a>)=C2=A0, by describing GHASH over=
 a GF(2^128) with a different reduction polynomial, Q =3D x^128 + x^127+x^1=
26+x^121+1.=C2=A0 And then, the operation is not the field multiplication, =
but rather=C2=A0 it is A * B * x^(-127) mod Q. With this, AES-GCM gets an a=
lgebraic formulation.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Comp=
uting A * B * x^(-127) is not conveninet, nor efficient. So, for implementa=
tion=C2=A0 AES-GCM uses the identity</div><div dir=3D"ltr">(A * x)=C2=A0 B =
* x^(-128) mod Q, taking advantage that A is fixed (the hash key).=C2=A0<br=
></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">For POLYVAL, we started =
from A * B * x^(-128) mod Q, and from a definition of the polynomials is co=
nsistent with the way that bytes are used. This makes a cleaner definition.=
=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">The AES-GCM-SIV spe=
c provides a formula that one can use, to implement it via calls to GHASH, =
if one wishes to do that. BoringSSL does it.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr">Al=
so, if someone is interested in an implementation that interleaves decrypti=
on and hashing, there is such code published (and BoringSSL does it).=C2=A0=
</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Shay</div><div dir=3D"ltr=
">=C2=A0</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e"><div dir=3D"ltr">2017-09-19 10:19 GMT+03:00 Andy Polyakov <span dir=3D"l=
tr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:appro@openssl.org" target=3D"_blank">appro@openss=
l.org</a>&gt;</span>:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">&gt; I don&#39;t =
get a clear impression from your email what implementations<br>
&gt; you used or what strategies and representation.<br>
<br>
I apologize for not being clear enough. I suppose I assumed that it&#39;s<b=
r>
obvious that I referred to OpenSSL implementation[s]. At least that&#39;s<b=
r>
what accompanying paper refers to as baseline. The absolute cycles per<br>
byte results are quoted from &lt;openssl&gt;/crypto/modes/asm/<a href=3D"ht=
tp://ghash-x86_64.pl" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">gha<wbr>sh-x86_6=
4.pl</a>,<br>
where you can also find details about implementation techniques. Do note<br=
>
that it uses reduction algorithm proposed by Shay, which he already<br>
mentioned here in another thread.<br>
<br>
&gt; I&#39;m thus extremely doubtful that your numbers below are correct: t=
hey<br>
&gt; may be. But I&#39;m skeptical. Benchmarking is really hard, and I know=
<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve screwed up plenty of these measurements myself.<br>
<br>
Don&#39;t take my word for it, collect your own and tell us about it. [Do<b=
r>
note though that Skylake results are in perfect agreement with referred<br>
paper. And non-Skylake results were collected using same method.]<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.irtf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--94eb2c1c064601c22f05598612a1--


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From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 11:53:03 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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Hi,

> I would like to re-emphase a few points (although they have been already
> nicely stated). 
> 
> The purpose of using POLYVAL is not performance. It is "consistency".
> The performance gains are a marginal bonus (and if they are ephemeral it
> does not matter). 

So we agree that performance *gains* are marginal. Should we consider
performance *losses* elsewhere? For example for those who choose "easy
way out". Or have to do so, for example because they have dedicated
GHASH hardware. But even if we take performance out of equation, do we
all agree that "consistency" is sufficient by its own? To justify
additional implementation/diversity costs that is. Do note that we are
not exactly still struggling with GCM. Effectively thanks to

> I proposed a way to solve this
> (https://crypto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pdf) ,

And once again, if we agree that "consistency" is sufficient by its own,
does it have to be interwoven with specific mode specification? Isn't it
like starting building house from *roof*? If we consider that we would
be better off if primitives were little-endian-centric, then let's say
that and start building *foundation*...


From nobody Tue Sep 19 03:19:48 2017
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From: Shay Gueron <shay.gueron@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 13:19:35 +0300
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To: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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--001a113fc2ee2e4eb90559883259
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Dear Andy,

>>> do we all agree that "consistency" is sufficient by its own?

To me, a clean and consistent specification has value. The ability to
express a mode which depends on algebraic properties, via natural algebraic
formulation, has value.
Here, by natural, I mean a*b*x^-128 in GF(2^128). Compare this to AES-GCM's
a*b*x^-127 and then pushing one "*x" into H (and pre-computing "H*x") to
actually shift it to something that can be computed efficiently.
But this is an opinion.

>>> those who choose "easy way out".
>>> because they have dedicated GHASH hardware.
As Adam had mentioned, adding AES-GCM-SIV (to gain misuse resistance) has
its cost anyway, so adding the bytes swap to that cost is not a big deal. I
think it is very good that we have the easy way out.

>>> does it have to be interwoven with specific mode specification?
In fact, one might say that it is GHASH that was interwoven with the
specific mode...

Regards, Shay


2017-09-19 12:53 GMT+03:00 Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>:

> Hi,
>
> > I would like to re-emphase a few points (although they have been already
> > nicely stated).
> >
> > The purpose of using POLYVAL is not performance. It is "consistency".
> > The performance gains are a marginal bonus (and if they are ephemeral it
> > does not matter).
>
> So we agree that performance *gains* are marginal. Should we consider
> performance *losses* elsewhere? For example for those who choose "easy
> way out". Or have to do so, for example because they have dedicated
> GHASH hardware. But even if we take performance out of equation, do we
> all agree that "consistency" is sufficient by its own? To justify
> additional implementation/diversity costs that is. Do note that we are
> not exactly still struggling with GCM. Effectively thanks to
>
> > I proposed a way to solve this
> > (https://crypto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pdf) ,
>
> And once again, if we agree that "consistency" is sufficient by its own,
> does it have to be interwoven with specific mode specification? Isn't it
> like starting building house from *roof*? If we consider that we would
> be better off if primitives were little-endian-centric, then let's say
> that and start building *foundation*...
>

--001a113fc2ee2e4eb90559883259
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"rtl"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dear Andy,=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0do we all agree that &quot;consi=
stency&quot; is sufficient by its own?</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr">To me, a clean and consistent specification has value. The abi=
lity to express a mode which depends on algebraic properties, via natural a=
lgebraic formulation, has value.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr">Here, by natur=
al, I mean a*b*x^-128 in GF(2^128). Compare this to AES-GCM&#39;s a*b*x^-12=
7 and then pushing one &quot;*x&quot; into H (and pre-computing &quot;H*x&q=
uot;) to actually shift it to something that can be computed efficiently.=
=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr">But this is an opinion.=C2=A0<br></div><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;&gt;&gt; those who choose &quot;ea=
sy way out&quot;.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;&gt;&gt; because they hav=
e dedicated GHASH hardware.=C2=A0<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">As Adam had men=
tioned, adding AES-GCM-SIV (to gain misuse resistance) has its cost anyway,=
 so adding the bytes swap to that cost is not a big deal. I think it is ver=
y good that we have the easy way out.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div=
><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0does it have to be interwoven with spec=
ific mode specification?</div><div dir=3D"ltr">In fact, one might say that =
it is GHASH that was interwoven with the specific mode...=C2=A0=C2=A0</div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Regards, Shay=C2=A0</div><div d=
ir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te"><div dir=3D"ltr">2017-09-19 12:53 GMT+03:00 Andy Polyakov <span dir=3D"=
ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:appro@openssl.org" target=3D"_blank">appro@opens=
sl.org</a>&gt;</span>:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">Hi,<br>
<br>
&gt; I would like to re-emphase a few points (although they have been alrea=
dy<br>
&gt; nicely stated).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The purpose of using POLYVAL is not performance. It is &quot;consisten=
cy&quot;.<br>
&gt; The performance gains are a marginal bonus (and if they are ephemeral =
it<br>
&gt; does not matter).<br>
<br>
So we agree that performance *gains* are marginal. Should we consider<br>
performance *losses* elsewhere? For example for those who choose &quot;easy=
<br>
way out&quot;. Or have to do so, for example because they have dedicated<br=
>
GHASH hardware. But even if we take performance out of equation, do we<br>
all agree that &quot;consistency&quot; is sufficient by its own? To justify=
<br>
additional implementation/diversity costs that is. Do note that we are<br>
not exactly still struggling with GCM. Effectively thanks to<br>
<br>
&gt; I proposed a way to solve this<br>
&gt; (<a href=3D"https://crypto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.=
pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://crypto.stanford.edu/<wbr>=
RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.<wbr>pdf</a>) ,<br>
<br>
And once again, if we agree that &quot;consistency&quot; is sufficient by i=
ts own,<br>
does it have to be interwoven with specific mode specification? Isn&#39;t i=
t<br>
like starting building house from *roof*? If we consider that we would<br>
be better off if primitives were little-endian-centric, then let&#39;s say<=
br>
that and start building *foundation*...<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a113fc2ee2e4eb90559883259--


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To: Shay Gueron <shay.gueron@gmail.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
References: <EA4347BF-D26F-4303-9A8D-E7B28986DE56@isode.com> <71d10985-4c46-4a7c-e634-76a822102a61@openssl.org> <CACsn0cnSq9nJpdjpDQ-HpHX7i6W-0=JkCOB-WenBRoMSKO9ypA@mail.gmail.com> <b751593d-20bb-8914-de96-e9040080e15d@openssl.org> <CAHP81y_CUTvA9Ftqz0Q_qzs94iPddW+4g5ObhzruNKR5zaEPvw@mail.gmail.com> <46eaa04f-09ef-3f11-4729-dfeec1b1cf60@openssl.org> <CAHP81y-bNDvF9_tQZO0BvrCqPU=Wa71PyraiRm39oh1bJo0sWw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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>>>> do we all agree that "consistency" is sufficient by its own?
> 
> To me, a clean and consistent specification has value.

I don't deny its value, question was it is sufficient [to justify
additional implementation/diversity costs].

>>>> those who choose "easy way out". 
>>>> because they have dedicated GHASH hardware. 
> As Adam had mentioned, adding AES-GCM-SIV (to gain misuse resistance)
> has its cost anyway,

Yes, and assertion is that it could have been *lower* if it was
formulated with GHASH and standard CTR.

> so adding the bytes swap to that cost is not a big
> deal. I think it is very good that we have the easy way out.

As already mentioned, there is another actor in the drama, tweaked CTR.
If byte swap for GHASH can be considered acceptable (what's your
estimate by the way?), question about alternative CTR remains. Thing is
that if it's built upon single-block function, its performance would be
*significantly* lower in comparison to dedicated optimized CTR
subroutine. Well, one can mitigate it by deploying ECB, but not all
[OpenSSL] modules have dedicated ECB subroutine...

>>>> does it have to be interwoven with specific mode specification?
> In fact, one might say that it is GHASH that was interwoven with the
> specific mode...  

Fair point. But was it optimal choice? I mean does it actually mean that
it has to be that way even now and for all eternity? :-)

Cheers.


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Suppose we have a protocol, where everything is encrypted.

 

If the clear (short) text may be guessed by an attacker (it could be an
ASN.1 NULL), do we then have a security issue, where the encryption key
could be revealed? 

 

Best regard,

Erik

 


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class=3DMsoNormal>Suppose we have a protocol, where everything is =
encrypted.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>If the clear (short) text may be guessed by an =
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From nobody Fri Sep 22 09:31:54 2017
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From: Greg Rose <ggr@seer-grog.net>
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To: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Encrypting a known short text
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No. Availability of the plaintext to the attacker is a standard =
assumption.

Greg.

Phone/Signal:  +1 619 890 8236=20
GPG/PGP:  1081A37C  232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C

> On Sep 22, 2017, at 9:19 , Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu> wrote:
>=20
> Suppose we have a protocol, where everything is encrypted.
> =20
> If the clear (short) text may be guessed by an attacker (it could be =
an ASN.1 NULL), do we then have a security issue, where the encryption =
key could be revealed?=20
> =20
> Best regard,
> Erik
> =20
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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From: Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 16:33:09 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Encrypting a known short text
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https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Known-plaintext_attack


On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 12:20 Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu> wrote:

> Suppose we have a protocol, where everything is encrypted.
>
>
>
> If the clear (short) text may be guessed by an attacker (it could be an
> ASN.1 NULL), do we then have a security issue, where the encryption key
> could be revealed?
>
>
>
> Best regard,
>
> Erik
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

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<div dir=3D"auto"><a href=3D"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Known-plaintex=
t_attack">https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Known-plaintext_attack</a><br></d=
iv><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>On =
Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 12:20 Erik Andersen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:era@x500.eu"=
>era@x500.eu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div la=
ng=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div class=3D"m_-7442563854=
180757247WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Suppose we have a protocol, w=
here everything is encrypted.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the clear (short) text may be =
guessed by an attacker (it could be an ASN.1 NULL), do we then have a secur=
ity issue, where the encryption key could be revealed? <u></u><u></u></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Best re=
gard,<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Erik<u></u><u></u></p><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div>_______________________=
________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 18:57:27 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Encrypting a known short text
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Den 22 sep. 2017 18:20 skrev "Erik Andersen" <era@x500.eu>:

Suppose we have a protocol, where everything is encrypted.

If the clear (short) text may be guessed by an attacker (it could be an
ASN.1 NULL), do we then have a security issue, where the encryption key
could be revealed?

For modern ciphers and ciphermodes, the private key is never at risk even
if both the plaintext message, the ciphertext and any nonce/IV are known.
They resist known plaintext attacks.

At best the adversary could use sidechannel leakage, metadata and size
correlation to make a guess, but without the secret key or another form of
verifier (like a hash of the plaintext, or similar derived data) they can't
confirm it.

For some contexts it may be a risk, like for "convergent encryption" in
which the encryption key is deterministicly determined from the plaintext,
for the purpose of deduplication in encrypted file storage. This is part of
the security model of such systems, but the users may not always be fully
aware that somebody can guess what files they have stored if the adversary
have a full identical copy of the plaintext or can guess it.
This would for example apply to leaked documents or honeypot documents
being possible to detect if unmodified, where your file list could be
compared against known files.
But if you're a bunch of people using it to store your non-sensitive media
collections, then there's no problem with it.

For comparison, regular encryption have full resistance to known plaintext
attacks. They also have ciphertext indistinguishability (the adversary
can't tell which ciphertext came from which plaintext message, even if you
know the full messages).

Convergent encryption also resists known plaintext attacks in the classic
definition (except for when the full exact message is known, wherein you
can derive the key directly), but the scheme fails completely on ciphertext
indistinguishability (you can always tell *what it isn't*, and sometimes
also tell what it is).

--001a113d544497a0440559ca1a4e
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<div dir=3D"auto"><div class=3D"gmail_extra" dir=3D"auto"><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">Den 22 sep. 2017 18:20 skrev &quot;Erik Andersen&quot; &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:era@x500.eu" target=3D"_blank">era@x500.eu</a>&gt;:<br type=
=3D"attribution"><blockquote class=3D"m_-709517706476714371m_78580763193350=
34169quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div class=
=3D"m_-709517706476714371m_7858076319335034169m_1077092833535371804WordSect=
ion1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Suppose we have a protocol, where everything i=
s encrypted.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the clear (short) text may be gue=
ssed by an attacker (it could be an ASN.1 NULL), do we then have a security=
 issue, where the encryption key could be revealed?</p></div></div></blockq=
uote></div></div><div dir=3D"auto">For modern ciphers and ciphermodes, the =
private key is never at risk even if both the plaintext message, the cipher=
text and any nonce/IV are known. They resist known plaintext attacks.=C2=A0=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">At best the adversary c=
ould use sidechannel leakage, metadata and size correlation to make a guess=
, but without the secret key or another form of verifier (like a hash of th=
e plaintext, or similar derived data) they can&#39;t confirm it.=C2=A0</div=
><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">For some contexts it may be =
a risk, like for &quot;convergent encryption&quot; in which the encryption =
key is deterministicly determined from the plaintext, for the purpose of de=
duplication in encrypted file storage. This is part of the security model o=
f such systems, but the users may not always be fully aware that somebody c=
an guess what files they have stored if the adversary have a full identical=
 copy of the plaintext or can guess it.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto">This w=
ould for example apply to leaked documents or honeypot documents being poss=
ible to detect if unmodified, where your file list could be compared agains=
t known files.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto">But if you&#39;re a bunch of pe=
ople using it to store your non-sensitive media collections, then there&#39=
;s no problem with it.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"a=
uto">For comparison, regular encryption have full resistance to known plain=
text attacks. They also have ciphertext indistinguishability (the adversary=
 can&#39;t tell which ciphertext came from which plaintext message, even if=
 you know the full messages).=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div d=
ir=3D"auto">Convergent encryption also resists known plaintext attacks in t=
he classic definition (except for when the full exact message is known, whe=
rein you can derive the key directly), but the scheme fails completely on c=
iphertext indistinguishability (you can always tell *what it isn&#39;t*, an=
d sometimes also tell what it is). =C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" d=
ir=3D"auto"></div></div>

--001a113d544497a0440559ca1a4e--


From nobody Wed Sep 27 14:50:38 2017
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From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
References: <EA4347BF-D26F-4303-9A8D-E7B28986DE56@isode.com> <71d10985-4c46-4a7c-e634-76a822102a61@openssl.org> <CACsn0cnSq9nJpdjpDQ-HpHX7i6W-0=JkCOB-WenBRoMSKO9ypA@mail.gmail.com> <b751593d-20bb-8914-de96-e9040080e15d@openssl.org> <CAHP81y_CUTvA9Ftqz0Q_qzs94iPddW+4g5ObhzruNKR5zaEPvw@mail.gmail.com> <46eaa04f-09ef-3f11-4729-dfeec1b1cf60@openssl.org> <CAHP81y-bNDvF9_tQZO0BvrCqPU=Wa71PyraiRm39oh1bJo0sWw@mail.gmail.com> <3b106ff6-373c-eb5c-c8a8-98cc4a5060ce@openssl.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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>>>>> do we all agree that "consistency" is sufficient by its own?
>>
>> To me, a clean and consistent specification has value.
> 
> I don't deny its value, question was it is sufficient [to justify
> additional implementation/diversity costs].

It's obvious that more natural bit order in POLYVAL was not the goal by
itself. Performance on par with GCM also was. And not just any GCM
performance, but one assisted by AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ instructions or
their equivalents. Next thing to understand is that referred GCM
performance is achieved by optimizing for specific cases, CTR and GHASH,
and in x86_64 case even stitched CTR-GHASH. And keyword is "specific
cases". Draft in question asserts that suggested mode decrypt
performance is virtually equivalent to GCM, but fails to emphasize that
this holds true only provided that one has devoted equivalent effort
into optimizing code for specific cases of modified CTR and POLYVAL.
Because if one doesn't do that and takes "easy way out" by exploiting
byte order equivalence with GHASH and modified CTR relying on
single-block encrypt, performance impact would be devastating, up to
several *times*. On the other hand if mode was specified using GHASH and
standard CTR, as already discussed, difference would be none to
negligible [in non-anomalous cases].

>>>>> those who choose "easy way out". 
>>>>> because they have dedicated GHASH hardware. 
>> As Adam had mentioned, adding AES-GCM-SIV (to gain misuse resistance)
>> has its cost anyway,
> 
> Yes, and assertion is that it could have been *lower* if it was
> formulated with GHASH and standard CTR.

Because it would be limited to ordering calls to existing GHASH and CTR.

Cheers.


From nobody Wed Sep 27 19:01:36 2017
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Side Channel Attacks
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Thomas Garcia writes:
> According to [1], the libgcrypt implementation of curve25519 is based
> on bignum arithmetic which is not constant-time.

This isn't specific to Curve25519: libgcrypt has a huge amount of
non-constant-time code that needs to be fixed or replaced.

> Can something similar be done to encourage correct bignum arithmetic?
> Is it possible to choose the parameters, such as the prime, such that
> the simplest implementation will be less susceptible to side channel
> attacks?

Here's some discussion of prime choices from this perspective:

   https://cr.yp.to/talks.html#2015.06.11

Of course, bad choices at lower levels of the software stack can create
tensions between simplicity and security at higher levels. For example,
if your choice is between

   * simply calling a variable-time ECC library or
   * writing constant-time ECC software from scratch,

then the first option will be simpler for you, but will be insecure. As
a less extreme example, if your choice is between

   * simply calling a variable-time modular-arithmetic library or
   * writing constant-time modular-arithmetic software from scratch,

then the first option will again be simpler for you, but will be
insecure. The second option---done properly---produces a simpler,
smaller ECC software stack, but this is obscured by the existing
library for the first option.

---Dan


From nobody Sat Sep 30 07:00:19 2017
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] RG Last Call on draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06
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Dear CFRG:

We wanted to bring to your attention a potential optimization of the
key-derivation step in AES-GCM-SIV that has come out of some of our
related research work. Sorry this comes somewhat late: We are in the
process of finalizing a clean write up, but due to time sensitivity,
we wanted to make the CFRG list aware of this related work.

Currently, the key-derivation function DeriveKey of AES-GCM-SIV uses
4-6 AES calls (4 to generate a 256-bit key, and 6 to generate a
384-bit key). The overhead of key derivation over plain GCM-SIV can be
up to 10% for messages under 1KB (according to the authors=E2=80=99
benchmarks). Our findings suggest a simple optimization that halves
the number of calls.

Concretely: Suppose that we have a master key K and a 96-bit nonce N.
If we want to produce a 256-bit key, DeriveKey(K,N) will output

AES_K(pad(N, 0)) || AES_K(pad(N, 1)),

whereas if we want to produce a 384-bit key, we will instead output

AES_K(pad(N, 0)) || AES_K(pad(N, 1)) || AES_K(pad(N, 2)).

Here, we demand that pad(N, 0), pad(N, 1), pad(N, 2) is different from
pad(N=E2=80=99, 0), pad(N=E2=80=99, 1), pad(N=E2=80=99, 2), and that pad(N,=
 0) is not a
possible input to AES within CTR encryption. Due to the way in which
AES-GCM-SIV already adopts domain separation elsewhere, it is enough
to implement pad(N, i) as the concatenation of the 96-bit nonce N and
a 32-bit counter of value i, but here note that one has to swap the
relative ordering of nonce and counter in the current proposal, namely
the nonce comes first, and then the counter.

To see why this would work, we note that the current DeriveKey
function, and other proposals by Iwata and Seurin, are required to be
a highly-secure pseudorandom function. Intuitively, this is because
the current approach to prove security of AES-GCM-SIV reduces (as an
intermediate step) to the security of GCM-SIV, and in turn of AES,
under (multiple) independent random keys. This independence is not
necessary in general, and security proofs go through even when key
distributions are much more structured, such as the one produced by
our simple DeriveKey proposal. (This can be validated in the so-called
ideal cipher model, and we are not aware of any cryptanalytic insights
that would invalidate this when using AES.) Similar ideas of more
structured block-cipher based key-derivation have been used in
different contexts, e.g., in https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/877.

We can prove excellent security bounds for this variant of
AES-GCM-SIV, in particular in the so-called =E2=80=9Cmulti-user setting=E2=
=80=9D,
where attackers are accessing multiple instantiations of the scheme
under independent keys (think of this as multiple TLS sessions using
the scheme). In this case, we obtain a bound of the order LB / 2^{128}
+ d(T + L) / 2^k, where: L is a bound on the number of blocks, B is a
bound on the number of blocks encrypted/verified for a nonce-user
pair, d is the maximum number of users that re-use a nonce in
encryption queries, T is a bound on the time-complexity of the
attacker, and k is the key length of AES, which is either 128 or 256
bits. (For the single-user setting then obviously d =3D 1.) If nonces in
encryption queries are picked at random then d is a small constant,
and thus the multi-user security is roughly the same as the
single-user security. (In particular, there is a folklore
understanding that multi-user security fails when more than 2^{64}
users are involved, for k =3D 128, as two of them will likely have the
same key, but show that this is not an issue for AES-GCM-SIV.)

If nonces are picked arbitrarily then d can be as big as the number of
queries; in this case we need to pick key length k =3D 256 for high
security in the multi-user setting.

We note that previous analyses do not consider the multi-user setting.

Best,

Priyanka Bose (UC Santa Barbara)
Viet Tung Hoang (Florida State University)
Stefano Tessaro (UC Santa Barbara)


On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 5:15 PM, Alexey Melnikov
<alexey.melnikov@isode.com> wrote:
> Dear CFRG participants,
>
> This message starts 2 week RGLC on "AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant
> Authenticated Encryption" (draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-06), that will end on
> October 1st. Please send you comments, as well as expression of support t=
o
> publish as an RFC (or possible reasons for not doing so) in reply to this
> message or directly to CFRG chairs. Your feedback will help chairs to dec=
ide
> whether the document is ready for review by IRSG and subsequent publicati=
on
> as an RFC.
>
> Thank you,
> Kenny and Alexey
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>



--=20
Stefano Tessaro
Assistant Professor of Computer Science
University of California, Santa Barbara
http://cs.ucsb.edu/~tessaro/

