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From: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
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Subject: [CGA-EXT] CGA Extensions BOF situation
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This is a heads up of what is going on with the
CGA Extensions BOF proposal.

The proposal for a WG is clear and well justified,
particularly in the areas that relate to maintenance
of existing RFCs. Chartering work for maintaining
an existing spec is an obviously useful thing.
There has been a fair number of people interested
in this, and the discussion has identified possible
new work items. Some of the work items related to
new uses (source address validation, IKEv2) have
been more controversial and need further
documentation & discussion.

The main question mark relating to this BOF has
been the state of implementation and deployment of
SEND. The IETF should spend effort only when technology
has promise of making a significant impact in real-world
networking. We have privately been told that efforts
are underway, however.

After discussions with Marcelo, IAB, IESG, and the
IP Directorate, Marcelo and I have decided to
postpone the BOF to Vancouver. By Vancouver,
we expect the following to have happened:

- Additional documents become available and
  are discussed on the list. This is particularly
  needed for the maintenance items that come
  up during recent int-area list discussion and
  in the new uses of CGAs in other contexts than
  SEND.

- More information about implementation status and
  real-world usage plans has become available.

- An interoperability event has been held. Marcelo
  is planning one for the fall.

- A charter discussion is held on the list to
  determine which of many possible items are
  actually the most interesting ones.

With these items completed, we expect the meeting
in Vancouver to conclude that a WG should be
created, and move on to progress work. We
expect people to work on the above items
starting from now.

Jari


_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext



From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org Mon Jun 18 07:37:04 2007
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From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2007 13:37:08 +0200
To: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
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Cc: cga-ext@ietf.org, Internet Area <int-area@ietf.org>
Subject: [CGA-EXT] Re: CGA Extensions BOF situation
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Hi,

First of all, i would like to thank Jari for his support during all =20
this process and his ideas about how to move forward with this.

I think that in order to be in good shape for having a bof for =20
Vancouver, we need discussion on the different proposed work items.

I include a list of work items that were included in the proposed =20
charter or that were mentioned during the discussion.

I would encourage people that are interested in the different items and =20=

would like to see them included in the charter for the next bof =20
proposal for vancouver to express themselves on the mailing list and if =20=

possible to write a short draft (or update an old draft describing the =20=

motivations for the work. If people are interested in working in some =20=

of the items, please let me know and i can put you in contact with =20
other people that would be also interested in the same topic.

Here is a list of work items open for discussion

------------------------------------------------
Work Originally included in the proposed charter
------------------------------------------------

- Extensions to the SeND protocol to support Neighbour Discovery
Proxies:  SeND protocol as currently defined in RFC 3971 lacks of
support for ND Proxies defined in RFC 4389. Extensions to the SeND
protocol will be defined in order to provide equivalent SeND
security capabilities to ND Proxies.

- Extensions to the IKEv2 protocol to create IPSec SAs associated to
the CGA key. Because of their cryptographic nature, CGAs are
inherently bound to the key pair that was used for their generation.
This is used in existent protocols for proving address ownership.
However, it would be possible also to use this cryptographic material
to create a security association between peers. The key benefit of
such approach is that it allows the creation of a security association
that is cryptographically bound to the IP address of the end points
without dependence on a common trust anchor point, eg. PKI. Such
approach would provide additional protection compared to the
opportunistic approaches. The proposed work will produce an analysis
of this type of solution and the required extensions to CGAs and to
the IKEv2 protocol in order to be able to create IPSec SA using the
CGAs keys.

- DHCP support for CGAs. An analysis of possible approaches to allow
the usage of the DHCP protocol to assign CGAs will be produced. The
output of the analysis will be an informational document describing
the recommended approaches that will be provided as an input to the
DHC working group where the actual DHCP extensions needed for the
recommended approaches will be defined.

- Define a CGA extension to support other public key algorithms: As
currently defined, CGAs can only use RSA keys in the CGA Parameter
Data Structure. An extension to update the CGA specification in
order to multiple public key cryptographic algorithm support will be
defined.

---------------------------------
Additional work to be considered
---------------------------------

- Moving RFC3971 and RFC3972 to draft standard (J.Kempf)

- SeND extensions to perform source address validation at the local =20
link level (F. Baker)
   see message =20
http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/int-area/current/msg00792.html

- Extensions to secure Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) =20=

for IPv6 (J. Laganier)
   see message =20
http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/int-area/current/msg00807.html
   1. protection against spoofing of multicast listener
   report messages in which a rogue node unsubscribe its
   target from receiving multicast traffic.
   2. protection against spoofing of multicast Listener
   query messages in which a rogue node with a lower IPv6
   address than the current querier will cause querier
   duties to be assigned to the rogue node.

- Definition of EKU for the X.509 certs used for securing Router =20
Discovery, that authorizes use as a router (D. Thaler)
   see message =20
http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/int-area/current/msg00803.html

- Prefix delegation and certificate delegation (J.M. Combes)
   see message =20
http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/int-area/current/msg00802.html

- SeND optimizations for wireless environments (W. Haddad) based on =20
draft-haddad-mipshop-optisend-02
   http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-haddad-mipshop-optisend-02
   Abstract:
    This memo describes a new set of mechanisms, which aims to increase
    the Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol usability by reducing
    the required processing power on small devices and adapting it to
    mobile environment requirements while maintaining its efficiency.

- Cryptographic layering enforcement (CLE) (G. Montenegro) based on =20
draft-montenegro-send-cga-rr-01.txt
   =20
http://www.join.uni-muenster.de/Dokumente/drafts/draft-montenegro-send-=20=

cga-rr-01.txt
   Abstract:
    The known security vulnerabilities in Neighbor Discovery have not
    been properly dealt with.  This note suggests some techniques based
    on cryptographically generated addresses and probes that may be
    applied even in the absence of a pre-established security
    relationship between the parties involved.

- Link Layer HBA Based on =20
http://www.join.uni-muenster.de/Dokumente/drafts/draft-laganier-send-=20
ll-hba-00.txt
   Abstract:
    The current mechanisms used by Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) to
    secure the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) relies almost solely on
    public key cryptography (i.e.  Certificates and/or Cryptographically
    Generated Addresses).  While these approaches provide very strong
    guarantees on the authenticity of an IP address to link layer =
address
    mapping, they are computationally expensive, which might be a =
problem
    on resource-constrained devices.

    It is also recognized in the SEND specification that it does not
    compensate for an insecure link layer; more specifically, no
    protections are offered against spoofing, link disruption, or =
bombing
    DoS attacks launched at the link layer.  Accordingly, this note
    suggests an alternative to the current specification of SEND which
    leverage on the deemed required link layer security to secure NDP.
    This technique is based on the use of a specific kind of IPv6
    addresses, the so-called Link Layer Hashed Based Addresses (LL-HBA),
    and of link layer address reachability tests.

    When the link layer security prevents attacker to redirect frames at
    the link layer layer, this technique allows to provide some level of
    security to NDP while relying solely on symmetric (i.e.,
    computationally inexpensive) cryptography.

Comments on this or other potential work is welcome

Regards, marcelo


El 15/06/2007, a las 13:19, Jari Arkko escribi=F3:

>
> This is a heads up of what is going on with the
> CGA Extensions BOF proposal.
>
> The proposal for a WG is clear and well justified,
> particularly in the areas that relate to maintenance
> of existing RFCs. Chartering work for maintaining
> an existing spec is an obviously useful thing.
> There has been a fair number of people interested
> in this, and the discussion has identified possible
> new work items. Some of the work items related to
> new uses (source address validation, IKEv2) have
> been more controversial and need further
> documentation & discussion.
>
> The main question mark relating to this BOF has
> been the state of implementation and deployment of
> SEND. The IETF should spend effort only when technology
> has promise of making a significant impact in real-world
> networking. We have privately been told that efforts
> are underway, however.
>
> After discussions with Marcelo, IAB, IESG, and the
> IP Directorate, Marcelo and I have decided to
> postpone the BOF to Vancouver. By Vancouver,
> we expect the following to have happened:
>
> - Additional documents become available and
>   are discussed on the list. This is particularly
>   needed for the maintenance items that come
>   up during recent int-area list discussion and
>   in the new uses of CGAs in other contexts than
>   SEND.
>
> - More information about implementation status and
>   real-world usage plans has become available.
>
> - An interoperability event has been held. Marcelo
>   is planning one for the fall.
>
> - A charter discussion is held on the list to
>   determine which of many possible items are
>   actually the most interesting ones.
>
> With these items completed, we expect the meeting
> in Vancouver to conclude that a WG should be
> created, and move on to progress work. We
> expect people to work on the above items
> starting from now.
>
> Jari
>


_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext



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From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
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Cc: INT Area <int-area@ietf.org>
Subject: [CGA-EXT] A few more topics on the list to be discussed at the SeND
	& CGA Extensions BOF
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Coming late, hope not too late ...
Having implemented SEND on the router side, there are a few issues/questions 
that came up during a thorough analysis of 3971 and 3972. Is the intention of 
the BOF to go through that type of experience, and eventually 
generate/trigger an update of 3971?
For examples (these are just a few substantial):
- 3971 mandates the CGA address to be the source address for NA. As far as I 
know, the source address does not have to equal the target address. So anyone 
could claim someone else (target) address as long as it does that with a 
valid CGA source address. Protection against address spoofing sounds a bit 
bogus, doesn't it? Or I am missing something? Shouldn't we change that to 
protect the target address instead?
- CPS/CPA are not protected with the SEND options (nonce, timestamp, cga, 
rsa). Why not? It sounds strange to have created a bunch of new options to 
protect old messages, and ignore these for these two. I could not find in the 
archive any discussion  that would explain the omission.
- It's a bit unclear what you have to do with regard to nonces, when 
multicasting advertisements (RA) after receiving a bunch of solicitations 
(RS). In fact 3971 suggest it's broken. My interpretation is that we can 
accumulate all nonces received in RS, and insert all of them in the one RA. 
Should we clarify this?

On the front of new topics, beside the one listed by others (that we would 
definitely  interested to work on), one extra came up during internal and 
external discussions.  Could we come up with some "transitionning" mechanism 
that would enable some third party node (could be the router, switch, or 
external server) to validate router credentials on behalf of hosts which 
don't want to/can't be part of the PKI? The hard part of course is to signal 
the result to the host (not sure there is a good solution to that problem).

Eric Levy-Abegnoli  

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Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] A few more topics on the list to be discussed at the
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Coming late, hope not too late ...
Having implemented SEND on the router side, there are a few issues/questions
that came up during a thorough analysis of 3971 and 3972. Is the intention 
of
the BOF to go through that type of experience, and eventually
generate/trigger an update of 3971?

jak>> Yes, I think that is the main point of restarting the WG.

For examples (these are just a few substantial):
- 3971 mandates the CGA address to be the source address for NA. As far as I
know, the source address does not have to equal the target address. So 
anyone
could claim someone else (target) address as long as it does that with a
valid CGA source address. Protection against address spoofing sounds a bit
bogus, doesn't it? Or I am missing something? Shouldn't we change that to
protect the target address instead?

jak>> RFC 3971 does not apply to proxy ND so the source and target address 
must be the same. This could probably have been made clearer. If the WG is 
formed and proxy ND is supported, then this would need to be changed. In any 
case, the target address must be a CGA.

- CPS/CPA are not protected with the SEND options (nonce, timestamp, cga,
rsa). Why not? It sounds strange to have created a bunch of new options to
protect old messages, and ignore these for these two. I could not find in 
the
archive any discussion  that would explain the omission.

jak>> CPS is requesting a certificate chain, what is the attack? CPA is 
sending one. I guess the attacker might be able to obtain a legitimate 
certificate, advertise itself as a router, then provide a verifable cert 
chain when the victim requested it. This is a problem in hotspot networks 
that use UAM too. But putting the SEND options on the CPA isn't going to 
help here. The receiving node would need to verify the identity of the 
router certificate ("is 'Joe's FlybyNight IP Service' an ISP that I want to 
trust?"). All the cert chain verification tells you is that the public key 
is certified by the parent cert authority.

- It's a bit unclear what you have to do with regard to nonces, when
multicasting advertisements (RA) after receiving a bunch of solicitations
(RS). In fact 3971 suggest it's broken. My interpretation is that we can
accumulate all nonces received in RS, and insert all of them in the one RA.
Should we clarify this?

jak>> If it was unclear to you while implementing it, it sounds like it 
needs to be updated.

On the front of new topics, beside the one listed by others (that we would
definitely  interested to work on), one extra came up during internal and
external discussions.  Could we come up with some "transitionning" mechanism
that would enable some third party node (could be the router, switch, or
external server) to validate router credentials on behalf of hosts which
don't want to/can't be part of the PKI? The hard part of course is to signal
the result to the host (not sure there is a good solution to that problem).

jak>> Any host running a general operating system these days has a browser 
on it with access to a cache of root cert authority certificates. Most 
operating systems even manage those certs independently of the browser. So 
unless you are talking about an application like sensor networks or 
something like that, I have some difficulty seeing why requiring that the 
host perform certificate validation would be a burden. The host doesn't have 
to be part of the PKI, it just needs to have a certificate cache. The 
protocol was specifically designed like TLS so that the host didn't need to 
be provisioned with a certificate.

                        jak 



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From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org Thu Jun 28 23:23:57 2007
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Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2007 11:22:53 +0800
From: =?gb2312?B?va/KpA==?= <shengjiang@huawei.com>
To: cga-ext@ietf.org
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I suggest we change DHCP item to be "CGA configuration"=A1=A3 The =
requirement
might be "An analysis of possible approaches to configure CGAs so that =
CGAs
can meet the requirements of networking configuration." Generally, the
solutions include the usage of DHCP protocol and the usage Router
Advertisement. "The output of the analysis will be an information =
document
describing the requirements why configuration operations are needed and =
the
overview of recommended approaches. This document will be provided as an
input to the DHCP working group and the RA associated working group =
where
the actual DHCP extensions and RA extensions needed for the recommended
approaches will be defined.

Regards,

> - DHCP support for CGAs. An analysis of possible approaches to allow
> the usage of the DHCP protocol to assign CGAs will be produced. The
> output of the analysis will be an informational document describing
> the recommended approaches that will be provided as an input to the
> DHC working group where the actual DHCP extensions needed for the
> recommended approaches will be defined.

Dr. Sheng JIANG

IP Research Department, Networking Research Department, Network Product
Line, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.




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From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli <elevyabe@cisco.com>
To: "James Kempf" <kempf@docomolabs-usa.com>
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] A few more topics on the list to be discussed at the
	SeND& CGA Extensions BOF
Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2007 10:19:26 +0200
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On Thursday 28 June 2007 11:28 pm, James Kempf wrote:
> Coming late, hope not too late ...
> Having implemented SEND on the router side, there are a few
> issues/questions that came up during a thorough analysis of 3971 and 3972.
> Is the intention of
> the BOF to go through that type of experience, and eventually
> generate/trigger an update of 3971?
>
> jak>> Yes, I think that is the main point of restarting the WG.
>
> For examples (these are just a few substantial):
> - 3971 mandates the CGA address to be the source address for NA. As far as
> I know, the source address does not have to equal the target address. So
> anyone
> could claim someone else (target) address as long as it does that with a
> valid CGA source address. Protection against address spoofing sounds a bit
> bogus, doesn't it? Or I am missing something? Shouldn't we change that to
> protect the target address instead?
>
> jak>> RFC 3971 does not apply to proxy ND so the source and target address
> must be the same. This could probably have been made clearer. If the WG is
> formed and proxy ND is supported, then this would need to be changed. In
> any case, the target address must be a CGA.
Can you tell me which RFC mandates the source to equal the target? Reading 
2461, the source can be any address on the interface. For link-locals, 
because of the scope preference, they are likely to be the same, but for 
global (targets), source could be any global on the link. In fact, I know 
implementations that will source NS with a link-local, even to query global 
target, so the NA will also be sourced with a link-local, different from the 
target.
>
> - CPS/CPA are not protected with the SEND options (nonce, timestamp, cga,
> rsa). Why not? It sounds strange to have created a bunch of new options to
> protect old messages, and ignore these for these two. I could not find in
> the
> archive any discussion  that would explain the omission.
>
> jak>> CPS is requesting a certificate chain, what is the attack?
What is the attack with RS?  NS ? Is it just because they can carry slla ?  
They might not carry it (it's a "SHOULD" for unicast in 2461), hence my 
confusion ... 
 
> CPA is 
> sending one. I guess the attacker might be able to obtain a legitimate
> certificate, advertise itself as a router, then provide a verifable cert
> chain when the victim requested it. This is a problem in hotspot networks
> that use UAM too. But putting the SEND options on the CPA isn't going to
> help here. The receiving node would need to verify the identity of the
> router certificate ("is 'Joe's FlybyNight IP Service' an ISP that I want to
> trust?"). All the cert chain verification tells you is that the public key
> is certified by the parent cert authority.
agree
>
> - It's a bit unclear what you have to do with regard to nonces, when
> multicasting advertisements (RA) after receiving a bunch of solicitations
> (RS). In fact 3971 suggest it's broken. My interpretation is that we can
> accumulate all nonces received in RS, and insert all of them in the one RA.
> Should we clarify this?
>
> jak>> If it was unclear to you while implementing it, it sounds like it
> needs to be updated.
>
> On the front of new topics, beside the one listed by others (that we would
> definitely  interested to work on), one extra came up during internal and
> external discussions.  Could we come up with some "transitionning"
> mechanism that would enable some third party node (could be the router,
> switch, or external server) to validate router credentials on behalf of
> hosts which don't want to/can't be part of the PKI? The hard part of course
> is to signal the result to the host (not sure there is a good solution to
> that problem).
>
> jak>> Any host running a general operating system these days has a browser
> on it with access to a cache of root cert authority certificates. Most
> operating systems even manage those certs independently of the browser. So
> unless you are talking about an application like sensor networks or
> something like that, I have some difficulty seeing why requiring that the
> host perform certificate validation would be a burden. The host doesn't
> have to be part of the PKI, it just needs to have a certificate cache. The
> protocol was specifically designed like TLS so that the host didn't need to
> be provisioned with a certificate.
I am concerned by IP extensions which might not be something common in root 
cert authority certificates for some time. So either you consider this part 
"very" optional, but that does not seem to be the spirit of 3971. Or hosts 
must get a certificate from a more specialized cert authority.
BTW some hosts (printers, fax, ...) don't run a browser.
I am also concerned about host access to CRL, which might be more critical if 
IP extensions triger more frequent certificate invalidations.
Eric
>
>                         jak

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From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org Fri Jun 29 18:11:25 2007
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Source=3D=3Dtarget is not part of generic ND (RFC 2461). It is an =
implicit part of SEND (RFC 3971) in that RFC 3971 disallows proxies (see =
Section 1, Paragraph 7). But this should have been more explicitly =
stated. The case you mention (sourcing under link local with global as =
the target) wasn't even considered when we did the original spec, but I =
can see why people might want to do it. Clearly, the host isn't proxying =
the target since it owns the link local. I agree that these cases should =
be clarified if the WG is restarted. These kind of implementation =
twitters are the exactly kind of thing that the WG needs to address.
=20
My point about the CPS is that it is requesting information. Every node =
on the link has  the right to request that information, regardless. CPS =
does not have a semantic that involves requring it to prove a claim of =
authorization to operate on an address.  Therefore, requiring a CGA and =
signature doesn't make sense to me. For the CPA, though, it might make  =
sense since the receiver might want to know that it did, indeed, come =
from a certified  router, as we discussed.
=20
I don't understand this point:
=20
I am concerned by IP extensions which might not be something common in =
root
cert authority certificates for some time. So either you consider this =
part
"very" optional, but that does not seem to be the spirit of 3971. Or =
hosts
must get a certificate from a more specialized cert authority.
BTW some hosts (printers, fax, ...) don't run a browser.
I am also concerned about host access to CRL, which might be more =
critical if
IP extensions triger more frequent certificate invalidations.

=20

It sounds like you are worried about the cert extensions for prefixes, =
right? 3971 doesn't require this. As a practical matter,  I think the =
value of getting the certs validated by a proxy able to handle the IP =
extension and getting that information securely to a host would be =
minimal beyond just simply deploying a cert without the IP extensions =
and letting the host do it, due to the complexities involved in setting =
up and verifying trust between the three entities.

=20

       jak


=20

________________________________

From: Eric Levy-Abegnoli [mailto:elevyabe@cisco.com]
Sent: Fri 6/29/2007 1:19 AM
To: James Kempf
Cc: cga-ext@ietf.org; INT Area
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] A few more topics on the list to be discussed at =
the SeND& CGA Extensions BOF



On Thursday 28 June 2007 11:28 pm, James Kempf wrote:
> Coming late, hope not too late ...
> Having implemented SEND on the router side, there are a few
> issues/questions that came up during a thorough analysis of 3971 and =
3972.
> Is the intention of
> the BOF to go through that type of experience, and eventually
> generate/trigger an update of 3971?
>
> jak>> Yes, I think that is the main point of restarting the WG.
>
> For examples (these are just a few substantial):
> - 3971 mandates the CGA address to be the source address for NA. As =
far as
> I know, the source address does not have to equal the target address. =
So
> anyone
> could claim someone else (target) address as long as it does that with =
a
> valid CGA source address. Protection against address spoofing sounds a =
bit
> bogus, doesn't it? Or I am missing something? Shouldn't we change that =
to
> protect the target address instead?
>
> jak>> RFC 3971 does not apply to proxy ND so the source and target =
address
> must be the same. This could probably have been made clearer. If the =
WG is
> formed and proxy ND is supported, then this would need to be changed. =
In
> any case, the target address must be a CGA.
Can you tell me which RFC mandates the source to equal the target? =
Reading
2461, the source can be any address on the interface. For link-locals,
because of the scope preference, they are likely to be the same, but for
global (targets), source could be any global on the link. In fact, I =
know
implementations that will source NS with a link-local, even to query =
global
target, so the NA will also be sourced with a link-local, different from =
the
target.
>
> - CPS/CPA are not protected with the SEND options (nonce, timestamp, =
cga,
> rsa). Why not? It sounds strange to have created a bunch of new =
options to
> protect old messages, and ignore these for these two. I could not find =
in
> the
> archive any discussion  that would explain the omission.
>
> jak>> CPS is requesting a certificate chain, what is the attack?
What is the attack with RS?  NS ? Is it just because they can carry slla =
?=20
They might not carry it (it's a "SHOULD" for unicast in 2461), hence my
confusion ...

> CPA is
> sending one. I guess the attacker might be able to obtain a legitimate
> certificate, advertise itself as a router, then provide a verifable =
cert
> chain when the victim requested it. This is a problem in hotspot =
networks
> that use UAM too. But putting the SEND options on the CPA isn't going =
to
> help here. The receiving node would need to verify the identity of the
> router certificate ("is 'Joe's FlybyNight IP Service' an ISP that I =
want to
> trust?"). All the cert chain verification tells you is that the public =
key
> is certified by the parent cert authority.
agree
>
> - It's a bit unclear what you have to do with regard to nonces, when
> multicasting advertisements (RA) after receiving a bunch of =
solicitations
> (RS). In fact 3971 suggest it's broken. My interpretation is that we =
can
> accumulate all nonces received in RS, and insert all of them in the =
one RA.
> Should we clarify this?
>
> jak>> If it was unclear to you while implementing it, it sounds like =
it
> needs to be updated.
>
> On the front of new topics, beside the one listed by others (that we =
would
> definitely  interested to work on), one extra came up during internal =
and
> external discussions.  Could we come up with some "transitionning"
> mechanism that would enable some third party node (could be the =
router,
> switch, or external server) to validate router credentials on behalf =
of
> hosts which don't want to/can't be part of the PKI? The hard part of =
course
> is to signal the result to the host (not sure there is a good solution =
to
> that problem).
>
> jak>> Any host running a general operating system these days has a =
browser
> on it with access to a cache of root cert authority certificates. Most
> operating systems even manage those certs independently of the =
browser. So
> unless you are talking about an application like sensor networks or
> something like that, I have some difficulty seeing why requiring that =
the
> host perform certificate validation would be a burden. The host =
doesn't
> have to be part of the PKI, it just needs to have a certificate cache. =
The
> protocol was specifically designed like TLS so that the host didn't =
need to
> be provisioned with a certificate.
I am concerned by IP extensions which might not be something common in =
root
cert authority certificates for some time. So either you consider this =
part
"very" optional, but that does not seem to be the spirit of 3971. Or =
hosts
must get a certificate from a more specialized cert authority.
BTW some hosts (printers, fax, ...) don't run a browser.
I am also concerned about host access to CRL, which might be more =
critical if
IP extensions triger more frequent certificate invalidations.
Eric
>
>                         jak



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<HTML dir=3Dltr><HEAD><TITLE>Re: [CGA-EXT] A few more topics on the list =
to be discussed at the SeND& CGA Extensions BOF</TITLE>=0A=
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dunicode">=0A=
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<DIV id=3DidOWAReplyText97676 dir=3Dltr>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#000000 =
size=3D2>Source=3D=3Dtarget is not part of generic ND (RFC 2461). It is =
an implicit part of SEND (RFC 3971) in that RFC 3971 disallows proxies =
(see Section 1, Paragraph 7). But this should&nbsp;have been&nbsp;more =
explicitly stated. The case you mention (sourcing under link local with =
global as the target) wasn't even considered when we did the original =
spec, but I can see why people might want to do it. Clearly, the host =
isn't proxying the target since it owns the link local.&nbsp;I agree =
that these cases should be clarified if the WG is restarted. These kind =
of implementation twitters are the exactly kind of thing that the WG =
needs to address.</FONT></DIV>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>My point about the CPS is =
that it is requesting information. Every node on the link has&nbsp; the =
right to request that information, regardless. CPS does not have a =
semantic that involves requring it to prove a claim of authorization to =
operate on an address.&nbsp; Therefore, requiring a CGA and signature =
doesn't make sense to me. For the CPA, though, it might make&nbsp; sense =
since the receiver might want to know that it did, indeed, come from a =
certified&nbsp; router, as we discussed.</FONT></DIV>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I don't understand this =
point:</FONT></DIV>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr>&nbsp;</DIV>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><FONT face=3D"Times New =
Roman">I am concerned by IP extensions which might not be something =
common in root<BR>cert authority certificates for some time. So either =
you consider this part<BR>"very" optional, but that does not seem to be =
the spirit of 3971. Or hosts<BR>must get a certificate from a more =
specialized cert authority.<BR>BTW some hosts (printers, fax, ...) don't =
run a browser.<BR>I am also concerned about host access to CRL, which =
might be more critical if<BR>IP extensions triger more frequent =
certificate invalidations.</FONT></FONT></DIV><FONT face=3DArial =
size=3D2><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman"></FONT></FONT></DIV>=0A=
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</P>=0A=
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">It sounds =
like you are worried about the cert extensions for prefixes, right? 3971 =
doesn't require this. As a practical matter,&nbsp; I think the value of =
getting the certs validated by a proxy able to handle the IP extension =
and getting that information securely to a host would =
be&nbsp;minimal&nbsp;beyond just simply deploying a cert without the IP =
extensions and letting the host do it, due to the complexities involved =
in setting up and verifying trust between the three =
entities.</FONT></FONT></P>=0A=
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><FONT face=3D"Times New =
Roman"></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</P>=0A=
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><FONT face=3D"Times New =
Roman">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; jak</FONT></P>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><BR></DIV></FONT>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>=0A=
<DIV dir=3Dltr><BR>=0A=
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>=0A=
<FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><B>From:</B> Eric Levy-Abegnoli =
[mailto:elevyabe@cisco.com]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Fri 6/29/2007 1:19 =
AM<BR><B>To:</B> James Kempf<BR><B>Cc:</B> cga-ext@ietf.org; INT =
Area<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: [CGA-EXT] A few more topics on the list to =
be discussed at the SeND&amp; CGA Extensions BOF<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>=0A=
<DIV>=0A=
<P><FONT size=3D2>On Thursday 28 June 2007 11:28 pm, James Kempf =
wrote:<BR>&gt; Coming late, hope not too late ...<BR>&gt; Having =
implemented SEND on the router side, there are a few<BR>&gt; =
issues/questions that came up during a thorough analysis of 3971 and =
3972.<BR>&gt; Is the intention of<BR>&gt; the BOF to go through that =
type of experience, and eventually<BR>&gt; generate/trigger an update of =
3971?<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; jak&gt;&gt; Yes, I think that is the main point of =
restarting the WG.<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; For examples (these are just a few =
substantial):<BR>&gt; - 3971 mandates the CGA address to be the source =
address for NA. As far as<BR>&gt; I know, the source address does not =
have to equal the target address. So<BR>&gt; anyone<BR>&gt; could claim =
someone else (target) address as long as it does that with a<BR>&gt; =
valid CGA source address. Protection against address spoofing sounds a =
bit<BR>&gt; bogus, doesn't it? Or I am missing something? Shouldn't we =
change that to<BR>&gt; protect the target address =
instead?<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; jak&gt;&gt; RFC 3971 does not apply to proxy ND =
so the source and target address<BR>&gt; must be the same. This could =
probably have been made clearer. If the WG is<BR>&gt; formed and proxy =
ND is supported, then this would need to be changed. In<BR>&gt; any =
case, the target address must be a CGA.<BR>Can you tell me which RFC =
mandates the source to equal the target? Reading<BR>2461, the source can =
be any address on the interface. For link-locals,<BR>because of the =
scope preference, they are likely to be the same, but for<BR>global =
(targets), source could be any global on the link. In fact, I =
know<BR>implementations that will source NS with a link-local, even to =
query global<BR>target, so the NA will also be sourced with a =
link-local, different from the<BR>target.<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; - CPS/CPA are =
not protected with the SEND options (nonce, timestamp, cga,<BR>&gt; =
rsa). Why not? It sounds strange to have created a bunch of new options =
to<BR>&gt; protect old messages, and ignore these for these two. I could =
not find in<BR>&gt; the<BR>&gt; archive any discussion&nbsp; that would =
explain the omission.<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; jak&gt;&gt; CPS is requesting a =
certificate chain, what is the attack?<BR>What is the attack with =
RS?&nbsp; NS ? Is it just because they can carry slla ?&nbsp;<BR>They =
might not carry it (it's a "SHOULD" for unicast in 2461), hence =
my<BR>confusion ...<BR><BR>&gt; CPA is<BR>&gt; sending one. I guess the =
attacker might be able to obtain a legitimate<BR>&gt; certificate, =
advertise itself as a router, then provide a verifable cert<BR>&gt; =
chain when the victim requested it. This is a problem in hotspot =
networks<BR>&gt; that use UAM too. But putting the SEND options on the =
CPA isn't going to<BR>&gt; help here. The receiving node would need to =
verify the identity of the<BR>&gt; router certificate ("is 'Joe's =
FlybyNight IP Service' an ISP that I want to<BR>&gt; trust?"). All the =
cert chain verification tells you is that the public key<BR>&gt; is =
certified by the parent cert authority.<BR>agree<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; - It's =
a bit unclear what you have to do with regard to nonces, when<BR>&gt; =
multicasting advertisements (RA) after receiving a bunch of =
solicitations<BR>&gt; (RS). In fact 3971 suggest it's broken. My =
interpretation is that we can<BR>&gt; accumulate all nonces received in =
RS, and insert all of them in the one RA.<BR>&gt; Should we clarify =
this?<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; jak&gt;&gt; If it was unclear to you while =
implementing it, it sounds like it<BR>&gt; needs to be =
updated.<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; On the front of new topics, beside the one =
listed by others (that we would<BR>&gt; definitely&nbsp; interested to =
work on), one extra came up during internal and<BR>&gt; external =
discussions.&nbsp; Could we come up with some "transitionning"<BR>&gt; =
mechanism that would enable some third party node (could be the =
router,<BR>&gt; switch, or external server) to validate router =
credentials on behalf of<BR>&gt; hosts which don't want to/can't be part =
of the PKI? The hard part of course<BR>&gt; is to signal the result to =
the host (not sure there is a good solution to<BR>&gt; that =
problem).<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt; jak&gt;&gt; Any host running a general =
operating system these days has a browser<BR>&gt; on it with access to a =
cache of root cert authority certificates. Most<BR>&gt; operating =
systems even manage those certs independently of the browser. So<BR>&gt; =
unless you are talking about an application like sensor networks =
or<BR>&gt; something like that, I have some difficulty seeing why =
requiring that the<BR>&gt; host perform certificate validation would be =
a burden. The host doesn't<BR>&gt; have to be part of the PKI, it just =
needs to have a certificate cache. The<BR>&gt; protocol was specifically =
designed like TLS so that the host didn't need to<BR>&gt; be provisioned =
with a certificate.<BR>I am concerned by IP extensions which might not =
be something common in root<BR>cert authority certificates for some =
time. So either you consider this part<BR>"very" optional, but that does =
not seem to be the spirit of 3971. Or hosts<BR>must get a certificate =
from a more specialized cert authority.<BR>BTW some hosts (printers, =
fax, ...) don't run a browser.<BR>I am also concerned about host access =
to CRL, which might be more critical if<BR>IP extensions triger more =
frequent certificate =
invalidations.<BR>Eric<BR>&gt;<BR>&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
jak<BR></FONT></P></DIV></BODY></HTML>
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