From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jan  6 02:07:24 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E36828B23E;
	Tue,  6 Jan 2009 02:07:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E34A28B23E
	for <cga-ext@core3.amsl.com>; Tue,  6 Jan 2009 02:07:23 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.502
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.502 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[AWL=-0.008, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451,
	HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id XnEW57arMAJE for <cga-ext@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue,  6 Jan 2009 02:07:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga04-in.huawei.com (unknown [119.145.14.67])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E24A3A67AB
	for <cga-ext@ietf.org>; Tue,  6 Jan 2009 02:07:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga04-in [172.24.2.12])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KD100AIWO3M5H@szxga04-in.huawei.com> for
	cga-ext@ietf.org; Tue, 06 Jan 2009 18:06:58 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.24.1.33])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KD100GWCO3M80@szxga04-in.huawei.com> for
	cga-ext@ietf.org; Tue, 06 Jan 2009 18:06:58 +0800 (CST)
Received: from J66104 ([10.111.12.219])
	by szxml06-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTPA id <0KD100G1BO3IDW@szxml06-in.huawei.com> for
	cga-ext@ietf.org; Tue, 06 Jan 2009 18:06:58 +0800 (CST)
Date: Tue, 06 Jan 2009 18:06:53 +0800
From: Sheng Jiang <shengjiang@huawei.com>
To: cga-ext@ietf.org
Message-id: <00c901c96fe6$806650c0$db0c6f0a@china.huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3350
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-index: Aclv5QZCNA9IX4XKT+2FQFh/j7/E+AAALIvA
Subject: [CGA-EXT] FW: New Version Notification for
	draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-02
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

The new version of draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat has been submitted. According to early
WG agreement, the authors replaced IANA considerations section by no IANA action
claim. The other parts remain unchange.

Comments are welcome.

Best regards,

Sheng

-----Original Message-----
From: IETF I-D Submission Tool [mailto:idsubmission@ietf.org] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2009 5:56 PM
To: shengjiang@huawei.com
Cc: ana.kukec@fer.hr; suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-02


A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-02.txt has been successfuly
submitted by Sheng Jiang and posted to the IETF repository.

Filename:	 draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat
Revision:	 02
Title:		 SeND Hash Threat Analysis
Creation_date:	 2009-01-06
WG ID:		 csi
Number_of_pages: 13

Abstract:
This document analysis the use of hashes in SeND, possible threats and the impact of
recent attacks on hash functions used by SeND.
Current SeND specification [rfc3971] uses SHA-1 [sha-1] hash algorithm and PKIX
certificates [rfc3280] and does not provide support for the hash algorithm agility.
The purpose of the document is to provide analysis of possible hash threats and to
decide how to encode the hash agility support in SeND.
                                                                                  


The IETF Secretariat.




_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jan 13 13:10:17 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E7B8C28C181;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:10:17 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 318CC28C181
	for <cga-ext@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:10:17 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.268
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.268 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, 
	HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MISSING_SUBJECT=1.762, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id tsBh8YkPVWob for <cga-ext@core3.amsl.com>;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:10:13 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga02-in.huawei.com (unknown [119.145.14.65])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13A193A6B23
	for <cga-ext@ietf.org>; Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:10:13 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga02-in [172.24.2.6])
	by szxga02-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDF008UEHGBTT@szxga02-in.huawei.com> for
	cga-ext@ietf.org; Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:09:48 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.24.1.6])
	by szxga02-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDF00IT1HGBRS@szxga02-in.huawei.com> for
	cga-ext@ietf.org; Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:09:47 +0800 (CST)
Received: from JiangXiong (adsl-multi-1-c29-p179.vtx.ch [212.147.29.179])
	by szxml02-in.huawei.com
	(iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug  8 2006))
	with ESMTPA id <0KDF00C4VHG83N@szxml02-in.huawei.com> for
	cga-ext@ietf.org; Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:09:47 +0800 (CST)
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:09:03 +0800
From: Sheng Jiang <shengjiang@huawei.com>
To: cga-ext@ietf.org
Message-id: <8FA506F22BFA42A0AE3A305E02519EDF@JiangXiong>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.0.6000.16669
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-index: Acl1wylxFVMMDBV2ThuZ1wqY3V0oIQ==
Subject: [CGA-EXT] (no subject)
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============1835199220=="
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

这是 MIME 格式的多方邮件。

--===============1835199220==
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
 boundary="Boundary_(ID_RYabz8A8xCsPRe4xEx6eAA)"

这是 MIME 格式的多方邮件。

--Boundary_(ID_RYabz8A8xCsPRe4xEx6eAA)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 

directories. 

 

 

        Title : DHCPv6 and CGA Interaction: Problem Statement 

        Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen 

        Filename : draft-jiang-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01.txt 

        Pages : 8 

        Date : 2009-1-12 

        

This document presents a problem statement for the possible 

   interactions between DHCPv6 and CGA. Firstly, in order to support the 

   co-existing scenarios of DHCPv6 and CGA, Some operations are 

   clarified for the interaction of DHCPv6 servers and CGA-associated 

   hosts. Then, some extended scenarios are also discussed in this 

   document, including using CGAs in DHCPv6 operations to enhance the 

   security features and using DHCPv6 to serve the CGA generation. 

 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01.txt


--Boundary_(ID_RYabz8A8xCsPRe4xEx6eAA)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT

<html xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">

<head>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=us-ascii">
<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 11 (filtered medium)">
<o:SmartTagType namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
 name="chsdate"/>
<!--[if !mso]>
<style>
st1\:*{behavior:url(#default#ieooui) }
</style>
<![endif]-->
<style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:SimSun;
	panose-1:2 1 6 0 3 1 1 1 1 1;}
@font-face
	{font-family:SimSun;
	panose-1:2 1 6 0 3 1 1 1 1 1;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	text-align:justify;
	text-justify:inter-ideograph;
	font-size:10.5pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:Arial;
	color:windowtext;}
 /* Page Definitions */
 @page Section1
	{size:595.3pt 841.9pt;
	margin:72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt;
	layout-grid:15.6pt;}
div.Section1
	{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>

</head>

<body lang=ZH-CN link=blue vlink=purple style='text-justify-trim:punctuation'>

<div class=Section1 style='layout-grid:15.6pt'>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line
Internet-Drafts <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>directories. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Title :
DHCPv6 and CGA Interaction: Problem Statement <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Author(s) :
S. Jiang, S. Shen <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Filename :
draft-jiang-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01.txt <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Pages : 8 <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Date : <st1:chsdate
IsROCDate="False" IsLunarDate="False" Day="12" Month="1" Year="2009" w:st="on">2009-1-12</st1:chsdate>
<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>This document presents a problem statement for the
possible <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp; interactions between DHCPv6 and CGA.
Firstly, in order to support the <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp; co-existing scenarios of DHCPv6 and CGA,
Some operations are <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp; clarified for the interaction of DHCPv6
servers and CGA-associated <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp; hosts. Then, some extended scenarios are
also discussed in this <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp; document, including using CGAs in DHCPv6
operations to enhance the <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>&nbsp;&nbsp; security features and using DHCPv6 to
serve the CGA generation. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>A URL for this Internet-Draft is: <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=MsoNormal><font size=1 face=Arial><span lang=EN-US style='font-size:
9.0pt;font-family:Arial'>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01.txt<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

--Boundary_(ID_RYabz8A8xCsPRe4xEx6eAA)--

--===============1835199220==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext

--===============1835199220==--


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jan 13 13:41:13 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11B7528C1A0;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:41:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D16828C178;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:41:11 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.666
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.666 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.933, 
	BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id LQJYL8Cq60A6; Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:41:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga04-in.huawei.com (szxga04-in.huawei.com [119.145.14.67])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AE6A28C190;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:41:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga04-in [172.24.2.12])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDF00BFGIVXOQ@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Wed,
	14 Jan 2009 05:40:45 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.17.1.36])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDF0067IIVXR9@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Wed,
	14 Jan 2009 05:40:45 +0800 (CST)
Received: from [172.24.1.6] (Forwarded-For: [212.147.29.179])
	by szxmc04-in.huawei.com (mshttpd); Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:40:45 +0800
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:40:45 +0800
From: JiangSheng 66104 <shengjiang@huawei.com>
To: cga-ext@ietf.org, dhcwg@ietf.org
Message-id: <f853f4a630612.30612f853f4a6@huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-Mailer: iPlanet Messenger Express 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug  8 2006)
Content-language: en
Content-disposition: inline
X-Accept-Language: en
Priority: normal
Subject: [CGA-EXT] Update verion draft-jiang-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

According to the IETF73 discussion, the authors have modified the draft. Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP interaction work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.

Best regards,

Sheng

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories. 


        Title : DHCPv6 and CGA Interaction: Problem Statement 
        Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen 
        Filename : draft-jiang-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01.txt 
        Pages : 8 
        Date : 2009-1-12 
        
This document presents a problem statement for the possible 
   interactions between DHCPv6 and CGA. Firstly, in order to support the 
   co-existing scenarios of DHCPv6 and CGA, Some operations are 
   clarified for the interaction of DHCPv6 servers and CGA-associated 
   hosts. Then, some extended scenarios are also discussed in this 
   document, including using CGAs in DHCPv6 operations to enhance the 
   security features and using DHCPv6 to serve the CGA generation. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01.txt


_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jan 13 13:43:16 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34CF728C190;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:43:16 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D55C828C178;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:43:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.43
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.43 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.235, 
	BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, 
	MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id muVxe7-agwYw; Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:43:08 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga03-in.huawei.com (unknown [119.145.14.66])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14BCD28C190;
	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:43:08 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga03-in [172.24.2.9])
	by szxga03-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDF0095DIZ6R2@szxga03-in.huawei.com>; Wed,
	14 Jan 2009 05:42:43 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.17.1.36])
	by szxga03-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDF00BSUIZ6OE@szxga03-in.huawei.com>; Wed,
	14 Jan 2009 05:42:42 +0800 (CST)
Received: from [172.24.1.6] (Forwarded-For: [212.147.29.179])
	by szxmc04-in.huawei.com (mshttpd); Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:42:42 +0800
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 05:42:42 +0800
From: JiangSheng 66104 <shengjiang@huawei.com>
To: cga-ext@ietf.org, dhcwg@ietf.org
Message-id: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-Mailer: iPlanet Messenger Express 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug  8 2006)
Content-language: en
Content-disposition: inline
X-Accept-Language: en
Priority: normal
Subject: [CGA-EXT] =?windows-1252?q?_=93Secure_DHCPv6_Using_CGAs=94_draft-?=
 =?windows-1252?q?jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01?=
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

The below =93Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs=94 has been updated, according to com=
ments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting. Since earl=
y collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP interaction work, this u=
pdate message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.

Best regards,

Sheng

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =

directories. =


        Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs =

        Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen =

        Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt =

        Pages : 14 =

        Date : 2009-1-8 =

        =

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables =

   DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers =

   configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to =

   various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes the =

   security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms, mainly =

   using CGAs. =


A URL for this Internet-Draft is: =

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt


_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Sun Jan 18 04:10:05 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 227A03A6853;
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 04:10:05 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@ietf.org
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0)
	id AD1B63A6928; Tue,  6 Jan 2009 02:00:01 -0800 (PST)
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <20090106100001.AD1B63A6928@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Tue,  6 Jan 2009 02:00:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 18 Jan 2009 04:10:04 -0800
Cc: cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: [CGA-EXT] I-D Action:draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-02.txt
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org


--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Cga & Send maIntenance Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : SeND Hash Threat Analysis
	Author(s)       : A. Kukec, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-02.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2009-01-06

This document analysis the use of hashes in SeND, possible threats
and the impact of recent attacks on hash functions used by SeND.
Current SeND specification [rfc3971] uses SHA-1 [sha-1] hash
algorithm and PKIX certificates [rfc3280] and does not provide
support for the hash algorithm agility.  The purpose of the document
is to provide analysis of possible hash threats and to decide how to
encode the hash agility support in SeND.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-02.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-02.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID: <2009-01-06015627.I-D@ietf.org>


--NextPart
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext

--NextPart--


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Sun Jan 18 04:10:05 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4168928C105;
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 04:10:05 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B1ED73A677D;
	Sat, 17 Jan 2009 20:03:27 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.267
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.267 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.332, 
	BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id a8u9ho68ivty; Sat, 17 Jan 2009 20:03:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rtp-iport-2.cisco.com (rtp-iport-2.cisco.com [64.102.122.149])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E2673A6824;
	Sat, 17 Jan 2009 20:03:26 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.37,282,1231113600"; d="scan'208";a="34089768"
Received: from rtp-dkim-1.cisco.com ([64.102.121.158])
	by rtp-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 18 Jan 2009 04:03:10 +0000
Received: from rtp-core-2.cisco.com (rtp-core-2.cisco.com [64.102.124.13])
	by rtp-dkim-1.cisco.com (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id n0I43Av6007940; 
	Sat, 17 Jan 2009 23:03:10 -0500
Received: from xbh-rtp-201.amer.cisco.com (xbh-rtp-201.cisco.com
	[64.102.31.12])
	by rtp-core-2.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n0I43ArF027660;
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 04:03:10 GMT
Received: from xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com ([64.102.31.15]) by
	xbh-rtp-201.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); 
	Sat, 17 Jan 2009 23:03:10 -0500
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 23:03:08 -0500
Message-ID: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
	draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
Thread-Index: Acl1x+tQgIoihd8dRC+WvuyQafnDmgDVvoDQ
References: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com>
From: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
To: "JiangSheng 66104" <shengjiang@huawei.com>, <cga-ext@ietf.org>,
	<dhcwg@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 18 Jan 2009 04:03:10.0273 (UTC)
	FILETIME=[AD27FB10:01C97921]
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; l=3901; t=1232251390;
	x=1233115390; c=relaxed/simple; s=rtpdkim1001;
	h=Content-Type:From:Subject:Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version;
	d=cisco.com; i=volz@cisco.com;
	z=From:=20=22Bernie=20Volz=20(volz)=22=20<volz@cisco.com>
	|Subject:=20RE=3A=20[dhcwg]=20=20=22Secure=20DHCPv6=20Using
	=20CGAs=22=20draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01 |Sender:=20
	|To:=20=22JiangSheng=2066104=22=20<shengjiang@huawei.com>,=
	20<cga-ext@ietf.org>,=0A=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20<dhcwg@ietf.
	org>; bh=+q+G9habWhY8RFaHY9Yh4r6FiAYuGTT/vI+KrBhBD7A=;
	b=C5ViVV5U0HB6ZZB50z1KVGKWFJxnCnmwOSerr/aWMA9f2kej5eSVx7MNWP
	RhGYVJhlD06ZDZJHTEjoc/w46FQqrEfQV9CXHLOMoMQPYGv5Sk0VpzVoCsjW
	6hMbCUfcEW;
Authentication-Results: rtp-dkim-1; header.From=volz@cisco.com; dkim=pass (
	sig from cisco.com/rtpdkim1001 verified; ); 
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 18 Jan 2009 04:10:04 -0800
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
	draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

I'm (still) a bit concerned about:

5.2. Signature Option 

   The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be 
   attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option COULD be any place

   within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and 
   options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be 
   processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by 
   this Signature option. The format of the Signature option is 
   described as follows: 

Why is this protection positional? Can you explain why you think this is
useful? Why not secure the entire message with this? 

The only interesting issue is if a client's message includes both a
SIGNATURE and AUTH (RFC 3315) option -- since in this case, two
different hashes over the entire message would need to be run and that
doesn't work. So, I think the SIGNATURE option MUST NOT include the AUTH
option. (The AUTH option would include the SIGNATURE option as RFC 3315
already requires that it cover the entire client message.)

I wonder whether this positional text is a hold over from DHCPv4 to
handle the Relay Agent Option (82) - which is added at the end? Relaying
in DHCPv6 is done far differently.

If there's a reason why the SIGNATURE needs to be positional, we still
have the AUTH option conflict that would need to be discussed (if the
AUTH option isn't excluded from coverage regardless of where it appeared
in the message, it would require the AUTH to follow the SIGNATURE).

---

The draft allows a node to be a DHCPv6 relay agent. I think more text is
required to detail this. Suppose you have:
	Client --> Relay 1 --> Relay 2 --> Server

If Relay 1 includes a SIGNATURE option, and relay 2 does not support
this, what should the server do? How does the server know whether relay
2 validated the SIGNATURE of Relay 1 or not (is there a requirement for
the relay to validate -- it is after all a "node")? Should the server
validate all SIGNATURE options (as in this case, there could be 3 - one
in the Client message, one in the Relay 1 message (which encapsulates
the client's message), and one in the Relay 2 message (which
encapsulates Relay 1's message (which encapsulates the client's
message))?

Perhaps the ability for a relay to be a node should be removed? It keeps
it simpler.

- Bernie 

-----Original Message-----
From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of JiangSheng 66104
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 4:43 PM
To: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
Subject: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01

The below "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" has been updated, according to
comments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting.
Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP interaction
work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.

Best regards,

Sheng

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories. 

        Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs 
        Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen 
        Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt 
        Pages : 14 
        Date : 2009-1-8 
        
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables 
   DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers 
   configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to 
   various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes the

   security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms, mainly 
   using CGAs. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt


_______________________________________________
dhcwg mailing list
dhcwg@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg
_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Sun Jan 18 10:55:15 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51FE73A6A68;
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 10:55:15 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BE773A6925;
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 09:22:20 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.278
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.278 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.321, 
	BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id 3eD4TpINBV9W; Sun, 18 Jan 2009 09:22:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rtp-iport-1.cisco.com (rtp-iport-1.cisco.com [64.102.122.148])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7EC73A67FA;
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 09:22:18 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.37,284,1231113600"; d="scan'208";a="34150103"
Received: from rtp-dkim-2.cisco.com ([64.102.121.159])
	by rtp-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 18 Jan 2009 17:21:47 +0000
Received: from rtp-core-1.cisco.com (rtp-core-1.cisco.com [64.102.124.12])
	by rtp-dkim-2.cisco.com (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id n0IHLluL009574; 
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 12:21:47 -0500
Received: from xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com (xbh-rtp-211.cisco.com
	[64.102.31.102])
	by rtp-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n0IHLlHG024734;
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 17:21:47 GMT
Received: from xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com ([64.102.31.15]) by
	xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830); 
	Sun, 18 Jan 2009 12:21:47 -0500
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2009 12:21:46 -0500
Message-ID: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA80A@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using
	CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
Thread-Index: Acl1x+tQgIoihd8dRC+WvuyQafnDmgDVvoDQABr4C8A=
References: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com>
	<8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
From: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
To: "JiangSheng 66104" <shengjiang@huawei.com>, <cga-ext@ietf.org>,
	<dhcwg@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 18 Jan 2009 17:21:47.0063 (UTC)
	FILETIME=[3DC9E470:01C97991]
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; l=8356; t=1232299307;
	x=1233163307; c=relaxed/simple; s=rtpdkim2001;
	h=Content-Type:From:Subject:Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version;
	d=cisco.com; i=volz@cisco.com;
	z=From:=20=22Bernie=20Volz=20(volz)=22=20<volz@cisco.com>
	|Subject:=20RE=3A=20[dhcwg]=20=22Secure=20DHCPv6=20Using=20
	CGAs=22draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01 |Sender:=20
	|To:=20=22JiangSheng=2066104=22=20<shengjiang@huawei.com>,=
	20<cga-ext@ietf.org>,=0A=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20<dhcwg@ietf.
	org>; bh=Kh+9iKyy4OdSCJ7+vyeOKhq5eshiNF6KLYXnRLVS18g=;
	b=qnKFbE4uIq3GtQP0htJTLYA9xkd9YE4v7t/jV54QfXWox35Qm2UcJ6ykTg
	oTJpew9jnUspBhmaD1FWnEhds/54WTfKyG8wYmZL2zI3lNkv43I9TJxmO5Lu
	vKsd1wUAnf;
Authentication-Results: rtp-dkim-2; header.From=volz@cisco.com; dkim=pass (
	sig from cisco.com/rtpdkim2001 verified; ); 
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 18 Jan 2009 10:55:13 -0800
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using
	CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

I noticed that the draft is actually self conflicting in terms of the
Signature option:

5.2. Signature Option 

   ... The Signature option COULD be any place 
   within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and 
   options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be 
   processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by 
   this Signature option. ...

6.1. Processing Rules of Sender 

   ... The Signature option MUST be constructed as explained in 
   Section 5.2 and be the last DHCPv6 option. 

Again, per my earlier comments I think its position should not matter.

---

In 6.2. Processing Rules of Receiver:

   The receiving node MUST verify the Signature option as follows: the 
   receiver MUST ignore any options that come after the Signature
option. 

What about the contents of the Signature option itself? The document
needs to indicate which, if any, portion of the Signature option is
included in the signature hashing. (The SEND RFC (3791) excludes the
signature option.)

Note that earlier in section 5.2. Signature Option is written:

                       6. The content between the option-len field and 
                       the signature field in this Signature option, in 
                       the format described above.

Might be best to just refer to section 5.2 instead of duplicating the
information (less chance for it to conflict)?

---

This probably exposes my ignorance of CGAs, but is the intent in this
draft that the CGA source address used by the client remains the (CGA)
link-local address?

If this is the case (client uses CGA link-local as IPv6 source address),
all is well.

If the CGA address is not the link-local, then there is a conflict with
RFC 3315:

16. Client Source Address and Interface Selection

   When a client sends a DHCP message to the
   All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers address, it SHOULD send the message
   through the interface for which configuration information is being
   requested.  However, the client MAY send the message through another
   interface attached to the same link, if and only if the client is
-> certain the two interfaces are attached to the same link.  The client
-> MUST use a link-local address assigned to the interface for which it
-> is requesting configuration information as the source address in the
-> header of the IP datagram.

   When a client sends a DHCP message directly to a server using unicast
   (after receiving the Server Unicast option from that server), the
   source address in the header of the IP datagram MUST be an address
   assigned to the interface for which the client is interested in
   obtaining configuration and which is suitable for use by the server
   in responding to the client.

A non-link-local address is only allowed if the server previously
provided the client with the Server Unicast option.

---

The following text is rather odd:

   If a node has been configured to use Secure DHCPv6, the node MUST 
   send a message using a CGA, which be constructed as specified in 
   Section 4 of [RFC3972], as the source address unless they are sent 
-> with the unspecified source address. In the message, both the CGA 
   option and the Signature option MUST be present in all DHCPv6 
   messages. The CGA Parameter field in the CGA option is filled 
   according to the rules presented above and in [RFC3972]. The public 
   key in the field is taken from the configuration used to generate the

   CGA, typically from a data structure associated with the source 
   address. The Signature option MUST be constructed as explained in 
   Section 5.2 and be the last DHCPv6 option. 

DHCPv6 never uses an unspecified source address.

Also be good to use "CGA Parameter option" instead of "CGA option", as
that is what the option is called. This is an issue throughout the
document.

- Bernie

-----Original Message-----
From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of Bernie Volz (volz)
Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2009 11:03 PM
To: JiangSheng 66104; cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using
CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01

I'm (still) a bit concerned about:

5.2. Signature Option 

   The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be 
   attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option COULD be any place

   within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and 
   options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be 
   processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by 
   this Signature option. The format of the Signature option is 
   described as follows: 

Why is this protection positional? Can you explain why you think this is
useful? Why not secure the entire message with this? 

The only interesting issue is if a client's message includes both a
SIGNATURE and AUTH (RFC 3315) option -- since in this case, two
different hashes over the entire message would need to be run and that
doesn't work. So, I think the SIGNATURE option MUST NOT include the AUTH
option. (The AUTH option would include the SIGNATURE option as RFC 3315
already requires that it cover the entire client message.)

I wonder whether this positional text is a hold over from DHCPv4 to
handle the Relay Agent Option (82) - which is added at the end? Relaying
in DHCPv6 is done far differently.

If there's a reason why the SIGNATURE needs to be positional, we still
have the AUTH option conflict that would need to be discussed (if the
AUTH option isn't excluded from coverage regardless of where it appeared
in the message, it would require the AUTH to follow the SIGNATURE).

---

The draft allows a node to be a DHCPv6 relay agent. I think more text is
required to detail this. Suppose you have:
	Client --> Relay 1 --> Relay 2 --> Server

If Relay 1 includes a SIGNATURE option, and relay 2 does not support
this, what should the server do? How does the server know whether relay
2 validated the SIGNATURE of Relay 1 or not (is there a requirement for
the relay to validate -- it is after all a "node")? Should the server
validate all SIGNATURE options (as in this case, there could be 3 - one
in the Client message, one in the Relay 1 message (which encapsulates
the client's message), and one in the Relay 2 message (which
encapsulates Relay 1's message (which encapsulates the client's
message))?

Perhaps the ability for a relay to be a node should be removed? It keeps
it simpler.

- Bernie 

-----Original Message-----
From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of JiangSheng 66104
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 4:43 PM
To: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
Subject: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01

The below "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" has been updated, according to
comments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting.
Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP interaction
work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.

Best regards,

Sheng

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories. 

        Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs 
        Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen 
        Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt 
        Pages : 14 
        Date : 2009-1-8 
        
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables 
   DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers 
   configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to 
   various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes the

   security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms, mainly 
   using CGAs. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt


_______________________________________________
dhcwg mailing list
dhcwg@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg
_______________________________________________
dhcwg mailing list
dhcwg@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg
_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jan 19 14:07:48 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 014463A69D8;
	Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:07:48 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18FEC3A6944;
	Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:07:47 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.502
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.502 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[AWL=-0.007, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451,
	HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id gk47Todtrdg8; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:07:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga04-in.huawei.com (unknown [119.145.14.67])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 988443A6852;
	Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:07:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga04-in [172.24.2.12])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDQ008NEO4705@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Tue,
	20 Jan 2009 06:07:19 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.17.1.36])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDQ0032PO47S9@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Tue,
	20 Jan 2009 06:07:19 +0800 (CST)
Received: from [172.24.1.6] (Forwarded-For: [212.147.29.179])
	by szxmc04-in.huawei.com (mshttpd); Tue, 20 Jan 2009 06:07:19 +0800
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 06:07:19 +0800
From: JiangSheng 66104 <shengjiang@huawei.com>
In-reply-to: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
To: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
Message-id: <f972b70f39eee.39eeef972b70f@huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-Mailer: iPlanet Messenger Express 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug  8 2006)
Content-language: en
Content-disposition: inline
X-Accept-Language: en
Priority: normal
References: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com>
	<8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
 draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

Bernie,

Thanks so much for your comments. This really helps our work become better. Our design/solution is still remaining open for better. So do comment/discuss further. Please see my reply in lines.

Best regards,

Sheng

> I'm (still) a bit concerned about:
> 
> 5.2. Signature Option
> 
>    The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
>    attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option COULD be any place
> 
>    within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and
>    options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be
>    processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by
>    this Signature option. The format of the Signature option is
>    described as follows:
> 
> Why is this protection positional? Can you explain why you think this is
> useful? Why not secure the entire message with this?

We are thinking how the receiver side is able to decide the protected part of a DHCP message in order to get the right input for verification computing. There are three possible solutions in our minds: 1, the signature option is the last-generated option, it protects all options, including itself; 2, the signature option has a set of sub-options to clear indicate which options are protected; 3, the position of the signature indicates its protected range.

The first design is the best solution except for two scenarios: a, there are some options, such as the AUTH option you mentioned, request to be last generated too; b, some options may added at the end of a DHCP message after signature options has been generated. We don't have a clear example for this. But we cannot rule out the possibility. The second design is too complicated giving the fact we cannot limit the number of options. Then, the third design becomes the most reasonable one for us.

> The only interesting issue is if a client's message includes both a
> SIGNATURE and AUTH (RFC 3315) option -- since in this case, two
> different hashes over the entire message would need to be run and that
> doesn't work. So, I think the SIGNATURE option MUST NOT include the AUTH
> option. (The AUTH option would include the SIGNATURE option as RFC 3315
> already requires that it cover the entire client message.)

En... This is interesting. The AUTH option has already taken the last-generated position. And I assume by the time of design this, the designers already rule out the possibility that some option may request to be generated/added after AUTH option. Now, we have one, at least, it is equally to be last generated comparing the AUTH option.

> I wonder whether this positional text is a hold over from DHCPv4 to
> handle the Relay Agent Option (82) - which is added at the end? Relaying
> in DHCPv6 is done far differently.
> 
> If there's a reason why the SIGNATURE needs to be positional, we still
> have the AUTH option conflict that would need to be discussed (if the
> AUTH option isn't excluded from coverage regardless of where it appeared
> in the message, it would require the AUTH to follow the SIGNATURE).

En... this could be a possible answer, I guess. Both AUTH and SIGNATURE are only protects what in front of them. So, there would have no fixed order for both their positions and generation order. AUTH can be behind SIGNATURE, vice verse. This may also release the restriction "Any DHCP message MUST NOT include more than one Authentication option." [21.2, RFC 3315]

> ---
> 
> The draft allows a node to be a DHCPv6 relay agent. I think more text is
> required to detail this. Suppose you have:
> 	Client --> Relay 1 --> Relay 2 --> Server
> 
> If Relay 1 includes a SIGNATURE option, and relay 2 does not support
> this, what should the server do? How does the server know whether relay
> 2 validated the SIGNATURE of Relay 1 or not (is there a requirement for
> the relay to validate -- it is after all a "node")? Should the server
> validate all SIGNATURE options (as in this case, there could be 3 - one
> in the Client message, one in the Relay 1 message (which encapsulates
> the client's message), and one in the Relay 2 message (which
> encapsulates Relay 1's message (which encapsulates the client's
> message))?
> 
> Perhaps the ability for a relay to be a node should be removed? It keeps
> it simpler.

I agree that we should put more text to explain the process for relaying if we get sure relaying need to be protected. In the above scenario, I don't think reply agent needs to validate the SIGNATURE option unless it uses some information from its received DHCP message. The server, in this case, needs to validate all 3 SIGNATURE options. However, if relay agent does not add its only options, the signature option from it may not be very useful and the SIGNATURE options from relay agent are optional.

Best regards,

Sheng

> - Bernie
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of JiangSheng 66104
> Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 4:43 PM
> To: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
> Subject: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
> draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> 
> The below "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" has been updated, according to
> comments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting.
> Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP interaction
> work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Sheng
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> 
>         Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs
>         Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen
>         Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
>         Pages : 14
>         Date : 2009-1-8
> 
> The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
>    DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
>    configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
>    various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes the
> 
>    security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms, mainly
>    using CGAs.
> 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dhcwg mailing list
> dhcwg@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jan 19 14:08:13 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DBB93A6A0C;
	Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:08:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 702723A69CA;
	Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:08:11 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.5
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.5 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.005, 
	BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, 
	RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id jkkMNMqO5L4b; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:08:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga02-in.huawei.com (unknown [119.145.14.65])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB30C3A693D;
	Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:08:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga02-in [172.24.2.6])
	by szxga02-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDQ00MQSO4VYA@szxga02-in.huawei.com>; Tue,
	20 Jan 2009 06:07:43 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.17.1.36])
	by szxga02-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDQ009J0O4V5P@szxga02-in.huawei.com>; Tue,
	20 Jan 2009 06:07:43 +0800 (CST)
Received: from [172.24.1.6] (Forwarded-For: [212.147.29.179])
	by szxmc04-in.huawei.com (mshttpd); Tue, 20 Jan 2009 06:07:43 +0800
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 06:07:43 +0800
From: JiangSheng 66104 <shengjiang@huawei.com>
In-reply-to: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA80A@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
To: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
Message-id: <f8eaf97c3ce25.3ce25f8eaf97c@huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-Mailer: iPlanet Messenger Express 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug  8 2006)
Content-language: en
Content-disposition: inline
X-Accept-Language: en
Priority: normal
References: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com>
	<8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
	<8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA80A@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using
 CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

HI, Bernie,

Thanks again. Please see my reply in lines.

Best regards,

Sheng

> I noticed that the draft is actually self conflicting in terms of the
> Signature option:
> 
> 5.2. Signature Option
> 
>    ... The Signature option COULD be any place
>    within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and
>    options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be
>    processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by
>    this Signature option. ...
> 
> 6.1. Processing Rules of Sender
> 
>    ... The Signature option MUST be constructed as explained in
>    Section 5.2 and be the last DHCPv6 option.
> 
> Again, per my earlier comments I think its position should not matter.

This text in 6.1 is a careless mistake. It remains unchanged from 00 version. It will be fixed in the future version.

> ---
> 
> In 6.2. Processing Rules of Receiver:
> 
>    The receiving node MUST verify the Signature option as follows: the
>    receiver MUST ignore any options that come after the Signature
> option.
> 
> What about the contents of the Signature option itself? The document
> needs to indicate which, if any, portion of the Signature option is
> included in the signature hashing. (The SEND RFC (3791) excludes the
> signature option.)

Yes, this Signature option protects its own header. We describe this in the signature field of Signature option, section 5.2

> Note that earlier in section 5.2. Signature Option is written:
> 
>                        6. The content between the option-len field and
>                        the signature field in this Signature option, in
>                        the format described above.
> 
> Might be best to just refer to section 5.2 instead of duplicating the
> information (less chance for it to conflict)?

Ok, we will add quotation there to make it clearer.

> ---
> 
> This probably exposes my ignorance of CGAs, but is the intent in this
> draft that the CGA source address used by the client remains the (CGA)
> link-local address?
> 
> If this is the case (client uses CGA link-local as IPv6 source address),
> all is well.
> 
> If the CGA address is not the link-local, then there is a conflict with
> RFC 3315:
> 
> 16. Client Source Address and Interface Selection
> 
>    When a client sends a DHCP message to the
>    All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers address, it SHOULD send the message
>    through the interface for which configuration information is being
>    requested.  However, the client MAY send the message through another
>    interface attached to the same link, if and only if the client is
> -> certain the two interfaces are attached to the same link.  The client
> -> MUST use a link-local address assigned to the interface for which it
> -> is requesting configuration information as the source address in the
> -> header of the IP datagram.
> 
>    When a client sends a DHCP message directly to a server using unicast
>    (after receiving the Server Unicast option from that server), the
>    source address in the header of the IP datagram MUST be an address
>    assigned to the interface for which the client is interested in
>    obtaining configuration and which is suitable for use by the server
>    in responding to the client.
> 
> A non-link-local address is only allowed if the server previously
> provided the client with the Server Unicast option.

I believe we are talking about link-local CGAs here. However, "link-local (CGA) addresses are vulnerable because the same prefix is used by all IPv6 node", [section 7.2, rfc 3972]. Fortunately, the same section provides a hash extension mechanism to protect link-local address.

> ---
> 
> The following text is rather odd:
> 
>    If a node has been configured to use Secure DHCPv6, the node MUST
>    send a message using a CGA, which be constructed as specified in
>    Section 4 of [RFC3972], as the source address unless they are sent
> -> with the unspecified source address. In the message, both the CGA
>    option and the Signature option MUST be present in all DHCPv6
>    messages. The CGA Parameter field in the CGA option is filled
>    according to the rules presented above and in [RFC3972]. The public
>    key in the field is taken from the configuration used to generate the
> 
>    CGA, typically from a data structure associated with the source
>    address. The Signature option MUST be constructed as explained in
>    Section 5.2 and be the last DHCPv6 option.
> 
> DHCPv6 never uses an unspecified source address.

This came from the similar claim in SEND. Ok, "unless they are sent
> -> with the unspecified source address" will be revomed.

> Also be good to use "CGA Parameter option" instead of "CGA option", as
> that is what the option is called. This is an issue throughout the
> document.

Will change it. "CGA Parameter option" is the name to be.

My thanks, again. Best regards,

Sheng

> - Bernie
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Bernie Volz (volz)
> Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2009 11:03 PM
> To: JiangSheng 66104; cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using
> CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> 
> I'm (still) a bit concerned about:
> 
> 5.2. Signature Option
> 
>    The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
>    attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option COULD be any place
> 
>    within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and
>    options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be
>    processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by
>    this Signature option. The format of the Signature option is
>    described as follows:
> 
> Why is this protection positional? Can you explain why you think this is
> useful? Why not secure the entire message with this?
> 
> The only interesting issue is if a client's message includes both a
> SIGNATURE and AUTH (RFC 3315) option -- since in this case, two
> different hashes over the entire message would need to be run and that
> doesn't work. So, I think the SIGNATURE option MUST NOT include the AUTH
> option. (The AUTH option would include the SIGNATURE option as RFC 3315
> already requires that it cover the entire client message.)
> 
> I wonder whether this positional text is a hold over from DHCPv4 to
> handle the Relay Agent Option (82) - which is added at the end? Relaying
> in DHCPv6 is done far differently.
> 
> If there's a reason why the SIGNATURE needs to be positional, we still
> have the AUTH option conflict that would need to be discussed (if the
> AUTH option isn't excluded from coverage regardless of where it appeared
> in the message, it would require the AUTH to follow the SIGNATURE).
> 
> ---
> 
> The draft allows a node to be a DHCPv6 relay agent. I think more text is
> required to detail this. Suppose you have:
> 	Client --> Relay 1 --> Relay 2 --> Server
> 
> If Relay 1 includes a SIGNATURE option, and relay 2 does not support
> this, what should the server do? How does the server know whether relay
> 2 validated the SIGNATURE of Relay 1 or not (is there a requirement for
> the relay to validate -- it is after all a "node")? Should the server
> validate all SIGNATURE options (as in this case, there could be 3 - one
> in the Client message, one in the Relay 1 message (which encapsulates
> the client's message), and one in the Relay 2 message (which
> encapsulates Relay 1's message (which encapsulates the client's
> message))?
> 
> Perhaps the ability for a relay to be a node should be removed? It keeps
> it simpler.
> 
> - Bernie
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of JiangSheng 66104
> Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 4:43 PM
> To: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
> Subject: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
> draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> 
> The below "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" has been updated, according to
> comments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting.
> Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP interaction
> work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Sheng
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> 
>         Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs
>         Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen
>         Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
>         Pages : 14
>         Date : 2009-1-8
> 
> The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
>    DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
>    configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
>    various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes the
> 
>    security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms, mainly
>    using CGAs.
> 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dhcwg mailing list
> dhcwg@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg
> _______________________________________________
> dhcwg mailing list
> dhcwg@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext


From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jan 20 02:40:36 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 714EA3A6BBA;
	Tue, 20 Jan 2009 02:40:36 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8069F3A6BBA;
	Tue, 20 Jan 2009 02:40:35 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.499
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.499 tagged_above=-999 required=5
	tests=[AWL=-0.004, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451,
	HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32])
	by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id krRhhHtYdTzB; Tue, 20 Jan 2009 02:40:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga04-in.huawei.com (unknown [119.145.14.67])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD16A3A698D;
	Tue, 20 Jan 2009 02:40:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga04-in [172.24.2.12])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDR00AJBMYVQI@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Tue,
	20 Jan 2009 18:40:07 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.17.1.36])
	by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14
	(built Aug
	8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDR00JBXMYUUV@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Tue,
	20 Jan 2009 18:40:07 +0800 (CST)
Received: from [172.24.1.6] (Forwarded-For: [212.147.29.179])
	by szxmc04-in.huawei.com (mshttpd); Tue, 20 Jan 2009 18:40:06 +0800
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 18:40:06 +0800
From: JiangSheng 66104 <shengjiang@huawei.com>
In-reply-to: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA94F@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
To: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
Message-id: <fb8ee23839412.39412fb8ee238@huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-Mailer: iPlanet Messenger Express 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug  8 2006)
Content-language: en
Content-disposition: inline
X-Accept-Language: en
Priority: normal
References: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com>
	<8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
	<f972b70f39eee.39eeef972b70f@huawei.com>
	<8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA94F@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
 draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>,
	<mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org

See my reply in lines. Cheers,

Sheng

> Note that while the AUTH option needs to be generated last (since it
> covers the entire message), it does not have to be the LAST option in
> the message.

I understand this. Now, the problem is, for the same reason =96 to protect =
all DHCP message, including AUTH option, the Signature option wants to be g=
enerated after AUTH option.

> In DHCPv6, no entity (relay agent or server) adds options to the
> messages while it is 'in-flight' as is done for the DHCPv4 relay agent
> option. Once the message is formed, a relay may encapsulate it in a
> Relay Message option in its own message, but that does NOT alter the
> original message.

This is fine. I knew it. Again, the point is two options both want to be ge=
nerated after another one.

> I think:
> - CGA Signature can be anywhere in the message.
> - CGA Signature covers the ENTIRE message EXCEPT for some of its own
> fields and the AUTH option.
> - The AUTH option covers the ENTIRE message, including the CGA Signature
> option.
> =

> This way, the AUTH gives complete protection of the entire message as it
> was intended to.

Yes, this can work. But one assumption you take here is AUTH provide more p=
rotection. I am not convinced yet. For me, AUTH and Signature have differen=
t purposes and it is not suitable to say one is safer than another one. The=
y should be equal. Only one reason I can think out: AUTH has been clearly d=
efined to be last-generated and we don=92t want change the existing. If so,=
 I am fine with above design.

> I'm not sure if it will be common for the SIGNATURE and AUTH to be used
> together, as it seems to me that using the AUTH message gives the better
> protection to begin with. But, if they are used together, it works.
> =

> I'd also highly recommend the CGA stuff be limited to clients and
> servers (a client can add/server validate). Note that a server can NOT
> use this for to provide proof of a CGA (the server's source address)
> because this ONLY works when the client and server are on the same link.
> If a relay agent is involved, the source address of the packet sent to
> the client is a relay agent address and thus the Signature would never
> validate.

Are you suggestion to disable signature option to be used in relay message?=
 This is fine, if the relay agent does not add its own options. However, if=
 the relay agent does add some options, these options need to be protected =
too. In this case, the client has two signature options to be validated: fi=
rst one from the relay agent, the second one is from the server within the =
encapsulated server message. However, I noticed that even the first one fai=
led, the second one might success. This is something I am not very sure yet=
. For me, it seems mean options from relay agent are unsecure, but the opti=
ons from server are secure.

> This I think makes this much simpler (though perhaps it defeats some of
> the purpose).
> =

> ---
> =

> I also haven't yet figured out (again, perhaps due to my lack of fully
> understanding all of this CGA stuff) what the benefit of this is. It
> seems to me that if a client needs a public and private key, and the
> server needs the public key, that using the AUTH option could be
> possible and would be far better? Perhaps all you need here is a
> mechanism for the key to be communicated -- which might mean new values
> of the AUTH Option protocol and algorithm fields and a definition for
> what is in the "authentication information". Also, this might then allow
> client-to-server and server-to-client authentication since the "CGA" is
> itself not involved.

This is not about public key provision or distribution. It is after key has=
 been configured. Servers and clients can validate the identity of message =
sender and the integrity of the message.

> And, perhaps this works better to match the SEND model which is (if I
> recall correctly) where the router is using a CGA and wants to prove
> that it is a valid router to the client -- so, you ideally want the
> DHCPv6 server to prove that is a valid DHCPv6 server to the client (and
> the client only needs the public key -- not a private key). Thus, the
> server-to-client authentication is really of the most interest? And,
> this would now work (whereas it does not using the original design).

Yes, this is one of the major scenarios. Also the client-to-server authenti=
cation is also important, to verify the client has the right to access and =
receive the service from the network/DHCP server.

Regards, Sheng

> -----Original Message-----
> From: JiangSheng 66104 [mailto:shengjiang@huawei.com]
> Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 5:07 PM
> To: Bernie Volz (volz)
> Cc: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org; shengjiang@huawei.com
> Subject: Re: RE: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
> draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> =

> Bernie,
> =

> Thanks so much for your comments. This really helps our work become
> better. Our design/solution is still remaining open for better. So do
> comment/discuss further. Please see my reply in lines.
> =

> Best regards,
> =

> Sheng
> =

> > I'm (still) a bit concerned about:
> >
> > 5.2. Signature Option
> >
> >    The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
> >    attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option COULD be any
> place
> >
> >    within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and
> >    options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be
> >    processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by
> >    this Signature option. The format of the Signature option is
> >    described as follows:
> >
> > Why is this protection positional? Can you explain why you think this
> is
> > useful? Why not secure the entire message with this?
> =

> We are thinking how the receiver side is able to decide the protected
> part of a DHCP message in order to get the right input for verification
> computing. There are three possible solutions in our minds: 1, the
> signature option is the last-generated option, it protects all options,
> including itself; 2, the signature option has a set of sub-options to
> clear indicate which options are protected; 3, the position of the
> signature indicates its protected range.
> =

> The first design is the best solution except for two scenarios: a, there
> are some options, such as the AUTH option you mentioned, request to be
> last generated too; b, some options may added at the end of a DHCP
> message after signature options has been generated. We don't have a
> clear example for this. But we cannot rule out the possibility. The
> second design is too complicated giving the fact we cannot limit the
> number of options. Then, the third design becomes the most reasonable
> one for us.
> =

> > The only interesting issue is if a client's message includes both a
> > SIGNATURE and AUTH (RFC 3315) option -- since in this case, two
> > different hashes over the entire message would need to be run and that
> > doesn't work. So, I think the SIGNATURE option MUST NOT include the
> AUTH
> > option. (The AUTH option would include the SIGNATURE option as RFC
> 3315
> > already requires that it cover the entire client message.)
> =

> En... This is interesting. The AUTH option has already taken the
> last-generated position. And I assume by the time of design this, the
> designers already rule out the possibility that some option may request
> to be generated/added after AUTH option. Now, we have one, at least, it
> is equally to be last generated comparing the AUTH option.
> =

> > I wonder whether this positional text is a hold over from DHCPv4 to
> > handle the Relay Agent Option (82) - which is added at the end?
> Relaying
> > in DHCPv6 is done far differently.
> >
> > If there's a reason why the SIGNATURE needs to be positional, we still
> > have the AUTH option conflict that would need to be discussed (if the
> > AUTH option isn't excluded from coverage regardless of where it
> appeared
> > in the message, it would require the AUTH to follow the SIGNATURE).
> =

> En... this could be a possible answer, I guess. Both AUTH and SIGNATURE
> are only protects what in front of them. So, there would have no fixed
> order for both their positions and generation order. AUTH can be behind
> SIGNATURE, vice verse. This may also release the restriction "Any DHCP
> message MUST NOT include more than one Authentication option." [21.2,
> RFC 3315]
> =

> > ---
> >
> > The draft allows a node to be a DHCPv6 relay agent. I think more text
> is
> > required to detail this. Suppose you have:
> > 	Client --> Relay 1 --> Relay 2 --> Server
> >
> > If Relay 1 includes a SIGNATURE option, and relay 2 does not support
> > this, what should the server do? How does the server know whether
> relay
> > 2 validated the SIGNATURE of Relay 1 or not (is there a requirement
> for
> > the relay to validate -- it is after all a "node")? Should the server
> > validate all SIGNATURE options (as in this case, there could be 3 -
> one
> > in the Client message, one in the Relay 1 message (which encapsulates
> > the client's message), and one in the Relay 2 message (which
> > encapsulates Relay 1's message (which encapsulates the client's
> > message))?
> >
> > Perhaps the ability for a relay to be a node should be removed? It
> keeps
> > it simpler.
> =

> I agree that we should put more text to explain the process for relaying
> if we get sure relaying need to be protected. In the above scenario, I
> don't think reply agent needs to validate the SIGNATURE option unless it
> uses some information from its received DHCP message. The server, in
> this case, needs to validate all 3 SIGNATURE options. However, if relay
> agent does not add its only options, the signature option from it may
> not be very useful and the SIGNATURE options from relay agent are
> optional.
> =

> Best regards,
> =

> Sheng
> =

> > - Bernie
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> > Of JiangSheng 66104
> > Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 4:43 PM
> > To: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
> > Subject: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
> > draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> >
> > The below "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" has been updated, according to
> > comments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting.
> > Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP
> interaction
> > work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.
> >
> > Best regards,
> >
> > Sheng
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > directories.
> >
> >         Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs
> >         Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen
> >         Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
> >         Pages : 14
> >         Date : 2009-1-8
> >
> > The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
> >    DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
> >    configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
> >    various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes
> the
> >
> >    security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms, mainly
> >    using CGAs.
> >
> > A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> >
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > dhcwg mailing list
> > dhcwg@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext



From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jan 20 13:02:40 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BFC8B3A6868; Tue, 20 Jan 2009 13:02:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B9BE93A6806; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:32:53 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.297
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.297 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.302,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rAOLxqU+iq45; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:32:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rtp-iport-2.cisco.com (rtp-iport-2.cisco.com [64.102.122.149]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E95093A6934; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:32:46 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.37,291,1231113600"; d="scan'208";a="34208106"
Received: from rtp-dkim-2.cisco.com ([64.102.121.159]) by rtp-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 19 Jan 2009 22:32:30 +0000
Received: from rtp-core-1.cisco.com (rtp-core-1.cisco.com [64.102.124.12]) by rtp-dkim-2.cisco.com (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id n0JMWUjG027175;  Mon, 19 Jan 2009 17:32:30 -0500
Received: from xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com (xbh-rtp-211.cisco.com [64.102.31.102]) by rtp-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n0JMWUd8003445; Mon, 19 Jan 2009 22:32:30 GMT
Received: from xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com ([64.102.31.15]) by xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830);  Mon, 19 Jan 2009 17:32:30 -0500
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 17:32:29 -0500
Message-ID: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA94F@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <f972b70f39eee.39eeef972b70f@huawei.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: RE: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
Thread-Index: Acl6gl+2oBUVWFEUTlC4s9U9vvFhtQAAQFPQ
References: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com> <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com> <f972b70f39eee.39eeef972b70f@huawei.com>
From: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
To: "JiangSheng 66104" <shengjiang@huawei.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 19 Jan 2009 22:32:30.0495 (UTC) FILETIME=[D08D9AF0:01C97A85]
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; l=9543; t=1232404350; x=1233268350; c=relaxed/simple; s=rtpdkim2001; h=Content-Type:From:Subject:Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version; d=cisco.com; i=volz@cisco.com; z=From:=20=22Bernie=20Volz=20(volz)=22=20<volz@cisco.com> |Subject:=20RE=3A=20RE=3A=20[dhcwg]=20=20=22Secure=20DHCPv6 =20Using=20CGAs=22=20draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01 |Sender:=20 |To:=20=22JiangSheng=2066104=22=20<shengjiang@huawei.com>; bh=uIr6iJfiJu3nQCqsJDe/dehGHd2bl3LYhDBOqFXFs34=; b=oCn+4iIjDgvvKOTlLMw7kSWq6peuDb9tshaIsNPJURyc/j54/OqmUmgju4 6Sfc8faWa3QSC454hQGeTCQijuxlovQnGvcaDZfP73ugtvJ3o0sB95VQw/D3 inQCVzzAuS;
Authentication-Results: rtp-dkim-2; header.From=volz@cisco.com; dkim=pass ( sig from cisco.com/rtpdkim2001 verified; ); 
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 13:02:39 -0800
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org Note that while the AUTH option needs to be generated last (since it
covers the entire message), it does not have to be the LAST option in
the message.

In DHCPv6, no entity (relay agent or server) adds options to the
messages while it is 'in-flight' as is done for the DHCPv4 relay agent
option. Once the message is formed, a relay may encapsulate it in a
Relay Message option in its own message, but that does NOT alter the
original message.

I think:
- CGA Signature can be anywhere in the message.
- CGA Signature covers the ENTIRE message EXCEPT for some of its own
fields and the AUTH option.
- The AUTH option covers the ENTIRE message, including the CGA Signature
option.

This way, the AUTH gives complete protection of the entire message as it
was intended to.

I'm not sure if it will be common for the SIGNATURE and AUTH to be used
together, as it seems to me that using the AUTH message gives the better
protection to begin with. But, if they are used together, it works.

I'd also highly recommend the CGA stuff be limited to clients and
servers (a client can add/server validate). Note that a server can NOT
use this for to provide proof of a CGA (the server's source address)
because this ONLY works when the client and server are on the same link.
If a relay agent is involved, the source address of the packet sent to
the client is a relay agent address and thus the Signature would never
validate.

This I think makes this much simpler (though perhaps it defeats some of
the purpose).

---

I also haven't yet figured out (again, perhaps due to my lack of fully
understanding all of this CGA stuff) what the benefit of this is. It
seems to me that if a client needs a public and private key, and the
server needs the public key, that using the AUTH option could be
possible and would be far better? Perhaps all you need here is a
mechanism for the key to be communicated -- which might mean new values
of the AUTH Option protocol and algorithm fields and a definition for
what is in the "authentication information". Also, this might then allow
client-to-server and server-to-client authentication since the "CGA" is
itself not involved.

And, perhaps this works better to match the SEND model which is (if I
recall correctly) where the router is using a CGA and wants to prove
that it is a valid router to the client -- so, you ideally want the
DHCPv6 server to prove that is a valid DHCPv6 server to the client (and
the client only needs the public key -- not a private key). Thus, the
server-to-client authentication is really of the most interest? And,
this would now work (whereas it does not using the original design).

- Bernie

-----Original Message-----
From: JiangSheng 66104 [mailto:shengjiang@huawei.com] 
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 5:07 PM
To: Bernie Volz (volz)
Cc: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org; shengjiang@huawei.com
Subject: Re: RE: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01

Bernie,

Thanks so much for your comments. This really helps our work become
better. Our design/solution is still remaining open for better. So do
comment/discuss further. Please see my reply in lines.

Best regards,

Sheng

> I'm (still) a bit concerned about:
> 
> 5.2. Signature Option
> 
>    The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
>    attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option COULD be any
place
> 
>    within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and
>    options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be
>    processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected by
>    this Signature option. The format of the Signature option is
>    described as follows:
> 
> Why is this protection positional? Can you explain why you think this
is
> useful? Why not secure the entire message with this?

We are thinking how the receiver side is able to decide the protected
part of a DHCP message in order to get the right input for verification
computing. There are three possible solutions in our minds: 1, the
signature option is the last-generated option, it protects all options,
including itself; 2, the signature option has a set of sub-options to
clear indicate which options are protected; 3, the position of the
signature indicates its protected range.

The first design is the best solution except for two scenarios: a, there
are some options, such as the AUTH option you mentioned, request to be
last generated too; b, some options may added at the end of a DHCP
message after signature options has been generated. We don't have a
clear example for this. But we cannot rule out the possibility. The
second design is too complicated giving the fact we cannot limit the
number of options. Then, the third design becomes the most reasonable
one for us.

> The only interesting issue is if a client's message includes both a
> SIGNATURE and AUTH (RFC 3315) option -- since in this case, two
> different hashes over the entire message would need to be run and that
> doesn't work. So, I think the SIGNATURE option MUST NOT include the
AUTH
> option. (The AUTH option would include the SIGNATURE option as RFC
3315
> already requires that it cover the entire client message.)

En... This is interesting. The AUTH option has already taken the
last-generated position. And I assume by the time of design this, the
designers already rule out the possibility that some option may request
to be generated/added after AUTH option. Now, we have one, at least, it
is equally to be last generated comparing the AUTH option.

> I wonder whether this positional text is a hold over from DHCPv4 to
> handle the Relay Agent Option (82) - which is added at the end?
Relaying
> in DHCPv6 is done far differently.
> 
> If there's a reason why the SIGNATURE needs to be positional, we still
> have the AUTH option conflict that would need to be discussed (if the
> AUTH option isn't excluded from coverage regardless of where it
appeared
> in the message, it would require the AUTH to follow the SIGNATURE).

En... this could be a possible answer, I guess. Both AUTH and SIGNATURE
are only protects what in front of them. So, there would have no fixed
order for both their positions and generation order. AUTH can be behind
SIGNATURE, vice verse. This may also release the restriction "Any DHCP
message MUST NOT include more than one Authentication option." [21.2,
RFC 3315]

> ---
> 
> The draft allows a node to be a DHCPv6 relay agent. I think more text
is
> required to detail this. Suppose you have:
> 	Client --> Relay 1 --> Relay 2 --> Server
> 
> If Relay 1 includes a SIGNATURE option, and relay 2 does not support
> this, what should the server do? How does the server know whether
relay
> 2 validated the SIGNATURE of Relay 1 or not (is there a requirement
for
> the relay to validate -- it is after all a "node")? Should the server
> validate all SIGNATURE options (as in this case, there could be 3 -
one
> in the Client message, one in the Relay 1 message (which encapsulates
> the client's message), and one in the Relay 2 message (which
> encapsulates Relay 1's message (which encapsulates the client's
> message))?
> 
> Perhaps the ability for a relay to be a node should be removed? It
keeps
> it simpler.

I agree that we should put more text to explain the process for relaying
if we get sure relaying need to be protected. In the above scenario, I
don't think reply agent needs to validate the SIGNATURE option unless it
uses some information from its received DHCP message. The server, in
this case, needs to validate all 3 SIGNATURE options. However, if relay
agent does not add its only options, the signature option from it may
not be very useful and the SIGNATURE options from relay agent are
optional.

Best regards,

Sheng

> - Bernie
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of JiangSheng 66104
> Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 4:43 PM
> To: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
> Subject: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
> draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> 
> The below "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" has been updated, according to
> comments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting.
> Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP
interaction
> work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Sheng
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> 
>         Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs
>         Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen
>         Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
>         Pages : 14
>         Date : 2009-1-8
> 
> The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
>    DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
>    configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
>    various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes
the
> 
>    security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms, mainly
>    using CGAs.
> 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dhcwg mailing list
> dhcwg@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext

From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jan 20 13:02:40 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D81363A697A; Tue, 20 Jan 2009 13:02:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8246D3A69CF; Tue, 20 Jan 2009 11:37:30 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.306
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.306 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.293,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KF1pw-p7t4rr; Tue, 20 Jan 2009 11:37:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rtp-iport-2.cisco.com (rtp-iport-2.cisco.com [64.102.122.149]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7214D28C0E9; Tue, 20 Jan 2009 11:37:28 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.37,296,1231113600"; d="scan'208";a="34307364"
Received: from rtp-dkim-1.cisco.com ([64.102.121.158]) by rtp-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 20 Jan 2009 19:37:11 +0000
Received: from rtp-core-1.cisco.com (rtp-core-1.cisco.com [64.102.124.12]) by rtp-dkim-1.cisco.com (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id n0KJbBLa000853;  Tue, 20 Jan 2009 14:37:11 -0500
Received: from xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com (xbh-rtp-211.cisco.com [64.102.31.102]) by rtp-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n0KJbB3I026385; Tue, 20 Jan 2009 19:37:11 GMT
Received: from xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com ([64.102.31.15]) by xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830);  Tue, 20 Jan 2009 14:37:11 -0500
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 14:37:10 -0500
Message-ID: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACACCD@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <fb8ee23839412.39412fb8ee238@huawei.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: RE: RE: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
Thread-Index: Acl6633gmd5syA3xR7iVg5fxJWmChAASa86w
References: <f82680633062d.3062df8268063@huawei.com> <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA7F5@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com> <f972b70f39eee.39eeef972b70f@huawei.com> <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA94F@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com> <fb8ee23839412.39412fb8ee238@huawei.com>
From: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
To: "JiangSheng 66104" <shengjiang@huawei.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 20 Jan 2009 19:37:11.0151 (UTC) FILETIME=[7CF2D7F0:01C97B36]
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; l=13730; t=1232480231; x=1233344231; c=relaxed/simple; s=rtpdkim1001; h=Content-Type:From:Subject:Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version; d=cisco.com; i=volz@cisco.com; z=From:=20=22Bernie=20Volz=20(volz)=22=20<volz@cisco.com> |Subject:=20RE=3A=20RE=3A=20RE=3A=20[dhcwg]=20=20=22Secure= 20DHCPv6=20Using=20CGAs=22=20draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-0 1 |Sender:=20 |To:=20=22JiangSheng=2066104=22=20<shengjiang@huawei.com>; bh=rgXYSmNcvLA4Hki8nZFgPtqNKFHD4ScIlIvizHd/K4Y=; b=NbM5U1C51dll0FYuun54ChOnqvNLbpSwB+yd2tKcRwbm0NHNdFOx+qjOv1 Vzz5VwWjnbyRUm1iM8FWn1J4ZdepfnoCDL4EknIyvj78BP3gdOj/tRF5VzVk LpTrVQpC5i;
Authentication-Results: rtp-dkim-1; header.From=volz@cisco.com; dkim=pass ( sig from cisco.com/rtpdkim1001 verified; ); 
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 13:02:39 -0800
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org See below (BV>).

- Bernie

-----Original Message-----
From: JiangSheng 66104 [mailto:shengjiang@huawei.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2009 5:40 AM
To: Bernie Volz (volz)
Cc: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org; shengjiang@huawei.com
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01

See my reply in lines. Cheers,

Sheng

> Note that while the AUTH option needs to be generated last (since it
> covers the entire message), it does not have to be the LAST option in
> the message.

I understand this. Now, the problem is, for the same reason - to protect
all DHCP message, including AUTH option, the Signature option wants to
be generated after AUTH option.

BV> One of the has to go last. I think the AUTH should - period.

> In DHCPv6, no entity (relay agent or server) adds options to the
> messages while it is 'in-flight' as is done for the DHCPv4 relay agent
> option. Once the message is formed, a relay may encapsulate it in a
> Relay Message option in its own message, but that does NOT alter the
> original message.

This is fine. I knew it. Again, the point is two options both want to be
generated after another one.

> I think:
> - CGA Signature can be anywhere in the message.
> - CGA Signature covers the ENTIRE message EXCEPT for some of its own
> fields and the AUTH option.
> - The AUTH option covers the ENTIRE message, including the CGA
Signature
> option.
> 
> This way, the AUTH gives complete protection of the entire message as
it
> was intended to.

Yes, this can work. But one assumption you take here is AUTH provide
more protection. I am not convinced yet. For me, AUTH and Signature have
different purposes and it is not suitable to say one is safer than
another one. They should be equal. Only one reason I can think out: AUTH
has been clearly defined to be last-generated and we don't want change
the existing. If so, I am fine with above design.

> I'm not sure if it will be common for the SIGNATURE and AUTH to be
used
> together, as it seems to me that using the AUTH message gives the
better
> protection to begin with. But, if they are used together, it works.
> 
> I'd also highly recommend the CGA stuff be limited to clients and
> servers (a client can add/server validate). Note that a server can NOT
> use this for to provide proof of a CGA (the server's source address)
> because this ONLY works when the client and server are on the same
link.
> If a relay agent is involved, the source address of the packet sent to
> the client is a relay agent address and thus the Signature would never
> validate.

Are you suggestion to disable signature option to be used in relay
message? This is fine, if the relay agent does not add its own options.
However, if the relay agent does add some options, these options need to
be protected too. In this case, the client has two signature options to
be validated: first one from the relay agent, the second one is from the
server within the encapsulated server message. However, I noticed that
even the first one failed, the second one might success. This is
something I am not very sure yet. For me, it seems mean options from
relay agent are unsecure, but the options from server are secure.

BV> No, I am not suggesting double signature. I'm suggesting that CGA
from *SERVER* to *CLIENT* will not work if a relay agent is involved as
you have defined the Signature to include:

                       2. The 128-bit Source Address field from the IP 
                       header. 

BV> And, while the server can generate the signature using its source
address, the client will NOT receive the server's source address (if
relayed) and hence can never validate the signature option. So, this is
seriously flawed.

BV> Review the DHCPv6 protocol document (RFC 3315), especially section
20. Relay Agent Behavior. Even if this were DHCPv4, this would not work
when relay agents are involved.

> This I think makes this much simpler (though perhaps it defeats some
of
> the purpose).
> 
> ---
> 
> I also haven't yet figured out (again, perhaps due to my lack of fully
> understanding all of this CGA stuff) what the benefit of this is. It
> seems to me that if a client needs a public and private key, and the
> server needs the public key, that using the AUTH option could be
> possible and would be far better? Perhaps all you need here is a
> mechanism for the key to be communicated -- which might mean new
values
> of the AUTH Option protocol and algorithm fields and a definition for
> what is in the "authentication information". Also, this might then
allow
> client-to-server and server-to-client authentication since the "CGA"
is
> itself not involved.

This is not about public key provision or distribution. It is after key
has been configured. Servers and clients can validate the identity of
message sender and the integrity of the message.

BV> Exactly ... The problem with the RFC 3315 AUTH Option is the key
distribution problem. With CGA, you assume that they keys are already
distributed. So, bingo -- use these keys with the AUTH option (forget
about validating the CGA -- validate the client/server interaction,
either in one direction or both). If keys are already available to do
CGA, let's use them for DHCPv6 AUTH and we avoid yet another key
distribution requirement and can bootstrap DHCPv6 AUTH to get it more
widely deployed. This also matches one of the key requirements in
networks where clients need correct ROUTING and ADDRESSING information.
SEND can distribute routing information and then DHCPv6 (with the keys
used for CGA used by the server/client) to validate DHCPv6 messages
(from server to client or client to server or both).

> And, perhaps this works better to match the SEND model which is (if I
> recall correctly) where the router is using a CGA and wants to prove
> that it is a valid router to the client -- so, you ideally want the
> DHCPv6 server to prove that is a valid DHCPv6 server to the client
(and
> the client only needs the public key -- not a private key). Thus, the
> server-to-client authentication is really of the most interest? And,
> this would now work (whereas it does not using the original design).

Yes, this is one of the major scenarios. Also the client-to-server
authentication is also important, to verify the client has the right to
access and receive the service from the network/DHCP server.

Regards, Sheng

> -----Original Message-----
> From: JiangSheng 66104 [mailto:shengjiang@huawei.com]
> Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 5:07 PM
> To: Bernie Volz (volz)
> Cc: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org; shengjiang@huawei.com
> Subject: Re: RE: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
> draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> 
> Bernie,
> 
> Thanks so much for your comments. This really helps our work become
> better. Our design/solution is still remaining open for better. So do
> comment/discuss further. Please see my reply in lines.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Sheng
> 
> > I'm (still) a bit concerned about:
> >
> > 5.2. Signature Option
> >
> >    The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
> >    attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option COULD be any
> place
> >
> >    within the DHCPv6 message. It protects all the DHCPv6 header and
> >    options before it. Any options after the Signature option can be
> >    processed, but it should be noticed that they are not protected
by
> >    this Signature option. The format of the Signature option is
> >    described as follows:
> >
> > Why is this protection positional? Can you explain why you think
this
> is
> > useful? Why not secure the entire message with this?
> 
> We are thinking how the receiver side is able to decide the protected
> part of a DHCP message in order to get the right input for
verification
> computing. There are three possible solutions in our minds: 1, the
> signature option is the last-generated option, it protects all
options,
> including itself; 2, the signature option has a set of sub-options to
> clear indicate which options are protected; 3, the position of the
> signature indicates its protected range.
> 
> The first design is the best solution except for two scenarios: a,
there
> are some options, such as the AUTH option you mentioned, request to be
> last generated too; b, some options may added at the end of a DHCP
> message after signature options has been generated. We don't have a
> clear example for this. But we cannot rule out the possibility. The
> second design is too complicated giving the fact we cannot limit the
> number of options. Then, the third design becomes the most reasonable
> one for us.
> 
> > The only interesting issue is if a client's message includes both a
> > SIGNATURE and AUTH (RFC 3315) option -- since in this case, two
> > different hashes over the entire message would need to be run and
that
> > doesn't work. So, I think the SIGNATURE option MUST NOT include the
> AUTH
> > option. (The AUTH option would include the SIGNATURE option as RFC
> 3315
> > already requires that it cover the entire client message.)
> 
> En... This is interesting. The AUTH option has already taken the
> last-generated position. And I assume by the time of design this, the
> designers already rule out the possibility that some option may
request
> to be generated/added after AUTH option. Now, we have one, at least,
it
> is equally to be last generated comparing the AUTH option.
> 
> > I wonder whether this positional text is a hold over from DHCPv4 to
> > handle the Relay Agent Option (82) - which is added at the end?
> Relaying
> > in DHCPv6 is done far differently.
> >
> > If there's a reason why the SIGNATURE needs to be positional, we
still
> > have the AUTH option conflict that would need to be discussed (if
the
> > AUTH option isn't excluded from coverage regardless of where it
> appeared
> > in the message, it would require the AUTH to follow the SIGNATURE).
> 
> En... this could be a possible answer, I guess. Both AUTH and
SIGNATURE
> are only protects what in front of them. So, there would have no fixed
> order for both their positions and generation order. AUTH can be
behind
> SIGNATURE, vice verse. This may also release the restriction "Any DHCP
> message MUST NOT include more than one Authentication option." [21.2,
> RFC 3315]
> 
> > ---
> >
> > The draft allows a node to be a DHCPv6 relay agent. I think more
text
> is
> > required to detail this. Suppose you have:
> > 	Client --> Relay 1 --> Relay 2 --> Server
> >
> > If Relay 1 includes a SIGNATURE option, and relay 2 does not support
> > this, what should the server do? How does the server know whether
> relay
> > 2 validated the SIGNATURE of Relay 1 or not (is there a requirement
> for
> > the relay to validate -- it is after all a "node")? Should the
server
> > validate all SIGNATURE options (as in this case, there could be 3 -
> one
> > in the Client message, one in the Relay 1 message (which
encapsulates
> > the client's message), and one in the Relay 2 message (which
> > encapsulates Relay 1's message (which encapsulates the client's
> > message))?
> >
> > Perhaps the ability for a relay to be a node should be removed? It
> keeps
> > it simpler.
> 
> I agree that we should put more text to explain the process for
relaying
> if we get sure relaying need to be protected. In the above scenario, I
> don't think reply agent needs to validate the SIGNATURE option unless
it
> uses some information from its received DHCP message. The server, in
> this case, needs to validate all 3 SIGNATURE options. However, if
relay
> agent does not add its only options, the signature option from it may
> not be very useful and the SIGNATURE options from relay agent are
> optional.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Sheng
> 
> > - Bernie
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dhcwg-bounces@ietf.org] On
Behalf
> > Of JiangSheng 66104
> > Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 4:43 PM
> > To: cga-ext@ietf.org; dhcwg@ietf.org
> > Subject: [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"
> > draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
> >
> > The below "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs" has been updated, according to
> > comments that have been discussed in dhc maillist and IETF meeting.
> > Since early collaboration is requested for this CGA and DHCP
> interaction
> > work, this update message is sent to both CSI WG and DHC WG.
> >
> > Best regards,
> >
> > Sheng
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > directories.
> >
> >         Title : Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs
> >         Author(s) : S. Jiang, S. Shen
> >         Filename : draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
> >         Pages : 14
> >         Date : 2009-1-8
> >
> > The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
> >    DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
> >    configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable
to
> >    various attacks, particularly fake attack. This document analyzes
> the
> >
> >    security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies security mechanisms,
mainly
> >    using CGAs.
> >
> > A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> >
>
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01.txt
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > dhcwg mailing list
> > dhcwg@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext

From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jan 21 01:55:58 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AAAE228C0DE; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 01:55:58 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3B3E3A68CC; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 01:55:57 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.961
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.961 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.466, BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mGTgSlx7jGaG; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 01:55:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga04-in.huawei.com (unknown [119.145.14.67]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7FDDE3A684C; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 01:55:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga04-in [172.24.2.12]) by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug 8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDT00EV9FF2N0@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 17:52:14 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.24.1.12]) by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug 8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDT004BWFF2AE@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 17:52:14 +0800 (CST)
Received: from s00102542 ([10.111.12.128]) by szxml05-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug 8 2006)) with ESMTPA id <0KDT00IHLFF1MA@szxml05-in.huawei.com>; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 17:52:14 +0800 (CST)
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 17:52:13 +0800
From: Sean Shen <sshen@huawei.com>
In-reply-to: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA94F@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
To: "'Bernie Volz (volz)'" <volz@cisco.com>, 'JiangSheng 66104' <shengjiang@huawei.com>
Message-id: <005001c97bad$f008b170$800c6f0a@china.huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3350
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-index: Acl6gl+2oBUVWFEUTlC4s9U9vvFhtQAAQFPQAEf/9tA=
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org Hi, Bernie,
Thank you for the detailed review. I was not able to access email regularly
recently and the situation will remain for another week or 10 days, but I
will try to reply as fast as I can. Please see comments in lines:  

>Note that while the AUTH option needs to be generated last 
>(since it covers the entire message), it does not have to be 
>the LAST option in the message.
>
>In DHCPv6, no entity (relay agent or server) adds options to 
>the messages while it is 'in-flight' as is done for the DHCPv4 
>relay agent option. Once the message is formed, a relay may 
>encapsulate it in a Relay Message option in its own message, 
>but that does NOT alter the original message.
>
>I think:
>- CGA Signature can be anywhere in the message.
>- CGA Signature covers the ENTIRE message EXCEPT for some of 
>its own fields and the AUTH option.
>- The AUTH option covers the ENTIRE message, including the CGA 
>Signature option.
>
>This way, the AUTH gives complete protection of the entire 
>message as it was intended to.
It works. 

>I'm not sure if it will be common for the SIGNATURE and AUTH 
>to be used together, as it seems to me that using the AUTH 
>message gives the better protection to begin with. But, if 
>they are used together, it works.
Sure they can be used together. The good part of SIGNATURE is that it can be
used in relay senarios, thus we don't need to rely on IPSEC for protection.
(for the issue you found in relay scenario, please see the following
comments)

>I'd also highly recommend the CGA stuff be limited to clients 
>and servers (a client can add/server validate). Note that a 
>server can NOT use this for to provide proof of a CGA (the 
>server's source address) because this ONLY works when the 
>client and server are on the same link.
>If a relay agent is involved, the source address of the packet 
>sent to the client is a relay agent address and thus the 
>Signature would never validate.
Thanks for the issue you found, it's very important. 
The souce address lost problem happened only for SERVER-->Relay-->Client.
For Client-->Relay-->Server, the souce address is kept in "link-address"
field of relay messages. Comparing AUTH and SIGNATURE, we have the
situation:

			No Relay		C-->R-->S	S-->R-->C

AUTH			yes			no		no

SIGNATURE		yes			yes 		yes with
proper solution*

Possbile solutions*: 
Server's DHCP message (in relay senario) carry source address of server. For
example, this can be done by defining new option to carry server's source
address; or simply use the Server Identifier Option, define a new "link
address plus time" type for DUID content. 
SIGNATURE is good for Relay scenarios where AUTH does not work. Entities
along the route can sign messages as long as have the ability and are
configured to do so. Receiver's can tell which signature belongs to whom.
There are no pair-wise configurations of symmetric keys.
For the questions whether all relay nodes should sign the message or whether
the server/client should verify all the signatures, personally I think we
can leave the decision for implementations or policys. Of course it's worth
discussion whether we should enforce it in protocol.     

BW,

Sean

  

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext

From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jan 21 18:04:25 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AFCBE3A6B64; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 18:04:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FF823A6B5D; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 18:04:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.971
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.971 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.628,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id E47zpqp4655d; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 18:04:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from szxga04-in.huawei.com (szxga04-in.huawei.com [119.145.14.67]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9902F3A67C0; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 18:04:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from huawei.com (szxga04-in [172.24.2.12]) by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug 8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDU00GTHOETOC@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 10:04:05 +0800 (CST)
Received: from huawei.com ([172.24.1.33]) by szxga04-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug 8 2006)) with ESMTP id <0KDU0033TOETG4@szxga04-in.huawei.com>; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 10:04:05 +0800 (CST)
Received: from s00102542 ([10.111.12.128]) by szxml06-in.huawei.com (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.14 (built Aug 8 2006)) with ESMTPA id <0KDU00739OESED@szxml06-in.huawei.com>; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 10:04:05 +0800 (CST)
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 10:04:04 +0800
From: Sean Shen <sshen@huawei.com>
In-reply-to: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACAF58@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
To: "'Bernie Volz (volz)'" <volz@cisco.com>, 'JiangSheng 66104' <shengjiang@huawei.com>
Message-id: <007101c97c35$b4376550$800c6f0a@china.huawei.com>
MIME-version: 1.0
X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3350
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11
Thread-index: Acl6gl+2oBUVWFEUTlC4s9U9vvFhtQAAQFPQAEf/9tAACcSkoAAYkdvg
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org hi, Bernie,
Please see in lines.  

>If we want to replace IPSec with something else for relay to 
>relay/relay to server communication, we could always just 
>allow use of the AUTH option. There's little need for CGA.
It can be a try if you want to use AUTH for relay-->relay/relay-->server,
but I doubt it can fit the scenario well. AUTH is basicly symmetric crypto,
good for two parties. It's rare to use it for 3 or more parties because you
don't want to manage keys for each pair of parties. Also if you want your
AUTH be checked by all the nodes on the route, you have to calculate and
carry multiple AUTHs for all of them, while RFC3315 clearly defined that
only one AUTH can be used, not mentioing that a client may not even know
which router will check the AUTH (hence don't know which key to use). 
Since I am not an author of RFC3315, I don' t know other reasons (besides
what I just said above) that AUTH is not simply used in relay scenarios. If
you think it's doable, more discussion of its feasibility will be
interesting.   

>However, I don't believe there's a need to find an alternative 
>to IPSec.
The reason is simple: NOT all routers can and like to use IPsec.

>I think you need to step back and figure out exactly what 
>problem you're trying to solve by adding this capability. Just 
>beause we could do something, doesn't mean we should.
The motivation and benefit (including advantages in relay scenarios and IP
binding) is described in section 3 of the draft. 


>Personally, I still find that using the keys used by SEND 
>(CGA) with the AUTH option to authentication servers (and 
>possibly clients to servers) is the most interesting beause if 
>you've already distributed those keys, it avoids having to 
>distribute yet another set of keys. And, the folks that manage 
>the routers often manage the DHCPv6 servers as well.
Generally using same key for multiple purposes should be avoided in crypto
(unless good hash processing involved), just like you don't want to use a
same key for both encryption and authentication. Again we said before, the
reason is not only about key management.

Best,

Sean

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext

From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jan 22 01:01:41 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0161E3A68BA; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 01:01:41 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C448B3A6A08; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:23:34 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.314
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.314 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.285,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DuAqBR+SS2vb; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:23:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rtp-iport-2.cisco.com (rtp-iport-2.cisco.com [64.102.122.149]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72F433A677E; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:23:32 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.37,300,1231113600"; d="scan'208";a="34386227"
Received: from rtp-dkim-2.cisco.com ([64.102.121.159]) by rtp-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 21 Jan 2009 13:23:15 +0000
Received: from rtp-core-2.cisco.com (rtp-core-2.cisco.com [64.102.124.13]) by rtp-dkim-2.cisco.com (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id n0LDNFtY019544;  Wed, 21 Jan 2009 08:23:15 -0500
Received: from xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com (xbh-rtp-211.cisco.com [64.102.31.102]) by rtp-core-2.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n0LDNFwR010943; Wed, 21 Jan 2009 13:23:15 GMT
Received: from xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com ([64.102.31.15]) by xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830);  Wed, 21 Jan 2009 08:23:15 -0500
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 08:22:50 -0500
Message-ID: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACAF58@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <005001c97bad$f008b170$800c6f0a@china.huawei.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
Thread-Index: Acl6gl+2oBUVWFEUTlC4s9U9vvFhtQAAQFPQAEf/9tAACcSkoA==
References: <8E296595B6471A4689555D5D725EBB210AACA94F@xmb-rtp-20a.amer.cisco.com> <005001c97bad$f008b170$800c6f0a@china.huawei.com>
From: "Bernie Volz (volz)" <volz@cisco.com>
To: "Sean Shen" <sshen@huawei.com>, "JiangSheng 66104" <shengjiang@huawei.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 21 Jan 2009 13:23:15.0389 (UTC) FILETIME=[6A9AFED0:01C97BCB]
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; l=4432; t=1232544195; x=1233408195; c=relaxed/simple; s=rtpdkim2001; h=Content-Type:From:Subject:Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version; d=cisco.com; i=volz@cisco.com; z=From:=20=22Bernie=20Volz=20(volz)=22=20<volz@cisco.com> |Subject:=20RE=3A=20[CGA-EXT]=20[dhcwg]=20=22Secure=20DHCPv 6=20Using=20CGAs=22draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01 |Sender:=20 |To:=20=22Sean=20Shen=22=20<sshen@huawei.com>,=20=22JiangSh eng=2066104=22=20<shengjiang@huawei.com>; bh=y0gXwD7je/H60CJ14yFAwF1uEnrKih3NZOspJXXTLbg=; b=HdmGRLFxn2Q9yXUxAjjhhSToJ6eZHC1NS0QMvJnx3nwhuavwMmGcG/JIxL MGqMeV+BFeq33bcNm3Zyke0Zk7Cee5u5NOj8LwH/zIS90UgHZmAIcx7kN6Rj 13S7rqrt5p;
Authentication-Results: rtp-dkim-2; header.From=volz@cisco.com; dkim=pass ( sig from cisco.com/rtpdkim2001 verified; ); 
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 01:01:39 -0800
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org If we want to replace IPSec with something else for relay to relay/relay
to server communication, we could always just allow use of the AUTH
option. There's little need for CGA.

However, I don't believe there's a need to find an alternative to IPSec.

I think you need to step back and figure out exactly what problem you're
trying to solve by adding this capability. Just beause we could do
something, doesn't mean we should.

Personally, I still find that using the keys used by SEND (CGA) with the
AUTH option to authentication servers (and possibly clients to servers)
is the most interesting beause if you've already distributed those keys,
it avoids having to distribute yet another set of keys. And, the folks
that manage the routers often manage the DHCPv6 servers as well.

- Bernie 

-----Original Message-----
From: Sean Shen [mailto:sshen@huawei.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 4:52 AM
To: Bernie Volz (volz); 'JiangSheng 66104'
Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org; cga-ext@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using
CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01

Hi, Bernie,
Thank you for the detailed review. I was not able to access email
regularly
recently and the situation will remain for another week or 10 days, but
I
will try to reply as fast as I can. Please see comments in lines:  

>Note that while the AUTH option needs to be generated last 
>(since it covers the entire message), it does not have to be 
>the LAST option in the message.
>
>In DHCPv6, no entity (relay agent or server) adds options to 
>the messages while it is 'in-flight' as is done for the DHCPv4 
>relay agent option. Once the message is formed, a relay may 
>encapsulate it in a Relay Message option in its own message, 
>but that does NOT alter the original message.
>
>I think:
>- CGA Signature can be anywhere in the message.
>- CGA Signature covers the ENTIRE message EXCEPT for some of 
>its own fields and the AUTH option.
>- The AUTH option covers the ENTIRE message, including the CGA 
>Signature option.
>
>This way, the AUTH gives complete protection of the entire 
>message as it was intended to.
It works. 

>I'm not sure if it will be common for the SIGNATURE and AUTH 
>to be used together, as it seems to me that using the AUTH 
>message gives the better protection to begin with. But, if 
>they are used together, it works.
Sure they can be used together. The good part of SIGNATURE is that it
can be
used in relay senarios, thus we don't need to rely on IPSEC for
protection.
(for the issue you found in relay scenario, please see the following
comments)

>I'd also highly recommend the CGA stuff be limited to clients 
>and servers (a client can add/server validate). Note that a 
>server can NOT use this for to provide proof of a CGA (the 
>server's source address) because this ONLY works when the 
>client and server are on the same link.
>If a relay agent is involved, the source address of the packet 
>sent to the client is a relay agent address and thus the 
>Signature would never validate.
Thanks for the issue you found, it's very important. 
The souce address lost problem happened only for
SERVER-->Relay-->Client.
For Client-->Relay-->Server, the souce address is kept in "link-address"
field of relay messages. Comparing AUTH and SIGNATURE, we have the
situation:

			No Relay		C-->R-->S
S-->R-->C

AUTH			yes			no		no

SIGNATURE		yes			yes 		yes with
proper solution*

Possbile solutions*: 
Server's DHCP message (in relay senario) carry source address of server.
For
example, this can be done by defining new option to carry server's
source
address; or simply use the Server Identifier Option, define a new "link
address plus time" type for DUID content. 
SIGNATURE is good for Relay scenarios where AUTH does not work. Entities
along the route can sign messages as long as have the ability and are
configured to do so. Receiver's can tell which signature belongs to
whom.
There are no pair-wise configurations of symmetric keys.
For the questions whether all relay nodes should sign the message or
whether
the server/client should verify all the signatures, personally I think
we
can leave the decision for implementations or policys. Of course it's
worth
discussion whether we should enforce it in protocol.     

BW,

Sean

  

_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext

From cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jan 22 01:01:41 2009
Return-Path: <cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: cga-ext-archive@optimus.ietf.org
Delivered-To: ietfarch-cga-ext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B30728C120; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 01:01:41 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC50128C11A; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 00:27:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1FISt8fVlvSv; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 00:26:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from exprod7og114.obsmtp.com (exprod7og114.obsmtp.com [64.18.2.215]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D84B628C112; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 00:26:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: from source ([64.89.228.228]) (using TLSv1) by exprod7ob114.postini.com ([64.18.6.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKSXgtvsSHNKDVZg0FpO6GKRdCYMpsSbkq@postini.com; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 00:26:38 PST
Received: from [192.168.1.75] (dsl092-048-218.sfo4.dsl.speakeasy.net [66.92.48.218]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by shell-ng.nominum.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D9F81A8206; Thu, 22 Jan 2009 00:26:37 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from neild@nominum.com)
Message-Id: <E5CD475B-F8EE-49F4-8B8C-F14EA65E16AE@nominum.com>
From: Damien Neil <Damien.Neil@nominum.com>
To: DHC-WG WG <dhcwg@ietf.org>, cga-ext@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <007101c97c35$b4376550$800c6f0a@china.huawei.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v930.3)
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 00:26:35 -0800
References: <007101c97c35$b4376550$800c6f0a@china.huawei.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.930.3)
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 01:01:39 -0800
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/pipermail/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed"; DelSp="yes"
Sender: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: cga-ext-bounces@ietf.org On Jan 21, 2009, at 6:04 PM, Sean Shen wrote:
>> I think you need to step back and figure out exactly what
>> problem you're trying to solve by adding this capability. Just
>> beause we could do something, doesn't mean we should.
> The motivation and benefit (including advantages in relay scenarios  
> and IP
> binding) is described in section 3 of the draft.

It's possible that this is just my lack of experience with CGAs  
speaking, but section 3 hasn't enlightened me on the benefit of this  
proposal.

My understanding is that CGA authentication will permit a client to  
verify that a DHCP message received from a server with a given address  
was, in fact, sent by the server with that address.  Is there a  
mechanism, however, which permits the client to verify that this  
server is authorized to act as a DHCP server?  If not, what security  
is added by signing the message?

What prevents a malicious DHCP server from generating a new CGA, using  
it to sign its messages, and serving addresses to clients?

It might help me understand the benefits of this proposal if you could  
describe a specific attack which it can defend against.

                - Damien
_______________________________________________
CGA-EXT mailing list
CGA-EXT@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext
