
From suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com  Tue Feb  3 13:17:15 2009
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Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 16:15:17 -0500
From: Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>
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To: Tony Cheneau <tony.cheneau@it-sudparis.eu>
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Cc: draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send@tools.ietf.org, cga-ext@ietf.org, Julien Laganier <julien.laganier.ietf@googlemail.com>
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] Question on draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-00
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Hi Tony,
   Thanks for your comments. Please see responses inline.

Tony Cheneau wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I've gone through draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-00 and I have some comments.
> 
> You state in section 5:
>    The Secure Proxy ND becomes part of the trusted infrastructure just
>    like a SEND router.  The Secure Proxy ND is granted a certificate
>    that specifies the range of addresses for which it is allowed to
>    perform proxying of SEND messages.  Hosts can use the same process to
>    discover the certification path between a proxy and one of the host's
>    trust anchors as the one defined for routers in Section 6 of SEND
>    specification [RFC3971].
> 
> As far as I understand, once you authorize a node to act as a Proxy with
> a certificate, if the proxy gets corrupted, it can update Neighbor Cache
> value of all the nodes on the link. Am I right ?

Yes. You are right. This situation needs to be fixed by detecting this 
and revoking the certificate of the proxy.

> 
> If so, maybe you should add a statement in the Security Considerations
> indicating that as specified the protocol is prone to Good Router Gone
> Bad attacks.

OK. Will do.

> 
> I think this attacks should be mitigated by using a Token generated by 
> the proxied node and sent to a proxy to authorize it to actually "proxy" 
> the address. This token will be carried in every proxied messages 
> (modified by the proxy). It will prove the receiver that the proxied 
> node authorized the proxy to act as such.

This is not always possible since the proxied node is not always aware 
of the existence of the proxy. e.g. the ND proxies are transparent to 
the proxied node. That is why we opted to use a certificate issued by 
the trusted infrastructure.

Cheers
Suresh


From sshen@huawei.com  Thu Feb  5 00:24:42 2009
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Date: Thu, 05 Feb 2009 16:24:18 +0800
From: Sean Shen <sshen@huawei.com>
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To: 'Damien Neil' <Damien.Neil@nominum.com>, 'DHC-WG WG' <dhcwg@ietf.org>, cga-ext@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] [dhcwg] "Secure DHCPv6 Using	CGAs"draft-jiang-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-01
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Hi, Damien,
Sorry for the late response, I almost missed your email among tons of emails
after the long holiday. Please see in lines:

>On Jan 21, 2009, at 6:04 PM, Sean Shen wrote:
>>> I think you need to step back and figure out exactly what problem 
>>> you're trying to solve by adding this capability. Just beause we 
>>> could do something, doesn't mean we should.
>> The motivation and benefit (including advantages in relay scenarios 
>> and IP
>> binding) is described in section 3 of the draft.
>
>It's possible that this is just my lack of experience with 
>CGAs speaking, but section 3 hasn't enlightened me on the 
>benefit of this proposal.
Thanks for the comments. Based on the discussion recently, we are improving
the document by addressing the issues, including giving more and clearer
statement of benefit of the proposal. 

>My understanding is that CGA authentication will permit a 
>client to verify that a DHCP message received from a server 
>with a given address was, in fact, sent by the server with 
>that address.  Is there a mechanism, however, which permits 
>the client to verify that this server is authorized to act as 
>a DHCP server?  If not, what security is added by signing the message?
You are right that a public key itself does not include authorization info.
But it does not mean a malicious server is free to do configuration without
being punished. The characteristic of public key cryptosystem is that a pk
owner will be will be responsible for what he signed via his private key.
The pk owner surely can use his private key to play evil, but he will get
caught. For example, practically I can easily cheat on someone by using my
real identity, but I will never do that.
Attribute certificates include authorization info, but they are not included
in current CGA definitions, neither has I found its very necessary so far.
Thanks for your comments.

Best,

Sean 




From tony.cheneau@it-sudparis.eu  Sat Feb 21 04:10:22 2009
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Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 13:10:31 +0100 (CET)
From: Tony Cheneau <tony.cheneau@it-sudparis.eu>
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Cc: "Vanderveen, Michaela" <mvanderv@qualcomm.com>, Maryline Maknavicius <Maryline.Maknavicius@it-sudparis.eu>
Subject: [CGA-EXT] New drafts: draft-cheneau-send-sig-agility-00 and draft-cheneau-cga-pk-agility-00
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Hello CSI people,

Michaela, Maryline, Sean and I have been working lately on "Signature
Algorithm Agility in SEND" and "Support for Multiple Signature
Algorithms in Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs)" (companion
draft).

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-cheneau-send-sig-agility-00.txt
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-cheneau-cga-pk-agility-00.txt

Title: Signature Algorithm Agility in SEND
Abstract:
This draft describes a mechanism to enable the Secure Neighbor Discovery
(SEND) protocol to select between different signature algorithms to use
with Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA).  It also provides
optional support for interoperability between nodes that do not share
any common signature algorithms.

Title: Support for Multiple Signature Algorithms in Cryptographically
Generated Addresses (CGAs)
Abstract:
This document defines an extension field for the CGA Parameters data
structure specified in RFC 3972.  This extension field carries a Public
Key that is used in Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
generation.  This extension enables protocols using CGAs, such as SEND,
to use multiple Public Key signing algorithms and/or multiple Public
Keys.

Comments are welcome.

Regards,
 	Tony Cheneau

From marcelo@it.uc3m.es  Sat Feb 28 13:00:14 2009
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Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 22:00:35 +0100
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
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Subject: [CGA-EXT] Call for slots in the CSI session at the San Fco IETF
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Hi,

CSI WG is meeting in San Fco, so if you want to make a presentation let
us know.

regards, marcelo




