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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Requirements for Management of Name Servers for the DNS
	Author(s)       : W. Hardaker
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs-05.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2011-01-05

Management of name servers for the Domain Name System (DNS) has
traditionally been done using vendor-specific monitoring,
configuration and control methods.  Although some service monitoring
platforms can test the functionality of the DNS itself there is not
an interoperable way to manage (monitor, control and configure) the
internal aspects of a name server itself.

This document discusses the requirements of a management system for
name servers and can be used as a shopping list of needed features
for such a system.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs-05.txt

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From wangzheng@cnnic.cn  Sun Jan  9 16:38:23 2011
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Subject: [DNSOP] Question about the time of regular DS rollover by ICANN
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I have a question on the ICANN's processing time of the regular DS RR rollover
request from TLD operators. 

I find in ICANN's document saying that "the emergency change process will be
completed and reflected in the root zone within 48 hours from the reception of a
valid emergency removal request", but this is only for an emergency change, as the
regular change is more frequently requested by the TLD operators, what about the
time taken by the scheduled key rollovers? 



From dougb@dougbarton.us  Sun Jan  9 22:48:12 2011
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On 01/09/2011 16:40, Zheng Wang wrote:
> I have a question on the ICANN's processing time of the regular DS RR rollover
> request from TLD operators.
>
> I find in ICANN's document saying that "the emergency change process will be
> completed and reflected in the root zone within 48 hours from the reception of a
> valid emergency removal request", but this is only for an emergency change, as the
> regular change is more frequently requested by the TLD operators, what about the
> time taken by the scheduled key rollovers?

I'm confused, why are you asking here rather than asking ICANN?


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/


From jabley@hopcount.ca  Mon Jan 10 07:49:19 2011
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On 2011-01-09, at 16:40, Zheng Wang wrote:

> I have a question on the ICANN's processing time of the regular DS RR =
rollover
> request from TLD operators.=20
>=20
> I find in ICANN's document saying that "the emergency change process =
will be
> completed and reflected in the root zone within 48 hours from the =
reception of a
> valid emergency removal request", but this is only for an emergency =
change, as the
> regular change is more frequently requested by the TLD operators, what =
about the
> time taken by the scheduled key rollovers?=20

Root zone changes (with no associated change of organisation, i.e. =
simple, technical changes with no layer-9 complications) tend to take =
the same amount of time to process regardless of whether they involve =
NS, A or DS RRSet changes. Since I don't work in that area I don't have =
any good statistics to give you, but iana@iana.org might be able to help =
if you need more.

Anecdotally, I've submitted DS record changes for various TLDs over the =
past few months (e.g. the test IDN TLDs, for which we rolled the KSK a =
while ago) and they were all processed in a few working days.

For a scheduled change, precise timing for the workflow seems less =
important than for emergency changes, since the TLD manager has the =
opportunity to generate the incoming keys in advance and submit the root =
zone change request before the replacement KSK is published. The final =
transition can then be managed by changes to the TLD zone, which is all =
in the TLD manager's control; the old DS records can be removed from the =
root zone later as a separate request.

Emergency changes are a different matter (since it's difficult to plan =
ahead of an unplanned emergency), which is why the 48-hour processing =
time was specified.


Joe=

From carlsonj@workingcode.com  Tue Jan 11 09:10:04 2011
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I read this draft with some interest, as I've run into this sort of
problem many times myself.

I'm curious, though, about the architectural implications of the
described design.  In particular, the use of DHCPv6 to convey
suffix/prefix information means that the DHCP server needs to be updated
as various suffixes/prefixes change within a network, and clients need
(somehow) to know to refresh that information as it changes.

For example, suppose my DNS is configured with a set of ip6.arpa
mappings representing my current networks.  I configure my DHCPv6 server
to list these suffixes as part of OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT, so that
clients will know that my DNS server contains this information.

Now I deploy a few new IPv6 networks within my organization.  I have to
update DNS, of course, with the new ip6.arpa entries.  But because I'm
using the feature described in this draft, I now have to update DHCPv6
as well, and I have to make sure that the clients all "refresh" their
DHCP-derived information.  If I don't, then clients will suffer with
incorrect filters (and thus failed look-ups) until they restart.

So, my question is this: did you consider placing the required
suffix/prefix information into DNS itself?  As a simple example -- not
intended to be a complete design -- you could add a new TXT entry to DNS
that contains the same data as the "DNS suffixes and prefixes"
information in this draft.  Clients could then get DNS server addresses
through the existing DHCPv6 mechanisms, and then query the server to get
this new TXT record.  If present, then it gives the same information as
in this draft, *plus* it includes the normal DNS lifetime data and
caching behavior.  If absent, then the client just assumes that the
server contains all data, just as specified in the existing draft, and
just as it should today.

If you did it based on DNS instead of DHCPv6, then you'd have the
following benefits:

  1.  The DNS server's existing caching behavior would cover both
      changes to the suffix/prefix list and to the actual data served,
      so the administrator would have a single point of control.

  2.  Clients would not be forced to refresh DHCPv6 data when the
      contents of the DNS server (the list of suffixes/prefixes
      served) changes.

  3.  If DNSSEC is in use, it would protect the suffix/prefix list;
      something that's missing from the DHCPv6 approach.

  4.  The same approach would work seamlessly for IPv4 and IPv6.

I can see no obvious negative aspects of such a design, though I
certainly admit that I could be missing key issues.

Did you consider this sort of design?  If so, why was a DHCPv6 extension
chosen instead?

-- 
James Carlson         42.703N 71.076W         <carlsonj@workingcode.com>

From teemu.savolainen@nokia.com  Thu Jan 13 06:20:36 2011
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Hi James,

My thinking evolved from DNS search list option defined in RFC3646, hence u=
sing DHCPv6 seemed like a logical choice.

Additionally collecting information required for multi-homing configuration=
 into one place (DHCPv6) seemed useful: this option, DHCPv6 Route Option (d=
raft-ietf-mif-dhcpv6-route-option), and Distributing Address Selection Poli=
cy using DHCPv6 (draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-opt). I.e. single point of con=
trol but different point than what you propose below. DHCPv6 can also suppo=
rt node specific configurations.

Addition of information refreshing considerations is a good proposal. The R=
FC4242, "Information Refresh Time Option", can be utilized for this purpose=
. Well include considerations of this.

About packet integrity protection.. I have thought the same level of integr=
ity protection we have for other DHCPv6 configuration options would suffice=
.=20

About IPv4 and IPv6. Generally multi-homing for IPv4 is a lost cause due se=
rious problems caused by overlapping private addresses and subnets. I will =
consider IPv4 multi-homing only if really really necessary. (This reminds m=
e of v6ops discussion about whether IPv4 should be declared historic and he=
nce no new work (save security fixes) would need to be done for IPv4 in IET=
F:)

Best regards,

Teemu

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext James Carlson [mailto:carlsonj@workingcode.com]
> Sent: 11. tammikuuta 2011 19:12
> To: Savolainen Teemu (Nokia-MS/Tampere); kato@syce.net
> Cc: dnsop@ietf.org
> Subject: draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
>=20
> I read this draft with some interest, as I've run into this sort of
> problem many times myself.
>=20
> I'm curious, though, about the architectural implications of the
> described design.  In particular, the use of DHCPv6 to convey
> suffix/prefix information means that the DHCP server needs to be
> updated
> as various suffixes/prefixes change within a network, and clients need
> (somehow) to know to refresh that information as it changes.
>=20
> For example, suppose my DNS is configured with a set of ip6.arpa
> mappings representing my current networks.  I configure my DHCPv6
> server
> to list these suffixes as part of OPTION_DNS_SERVER_SELECT, so that
> clients will know that my DNS server contains this information.
>=20
> Now I deploy a few new IPv6 networks within my organization.  I have to
> update DNS, of course, with the new ip6.arpa entries.  But because I'm
> using the feature described in this draft, I now have to update DHCPv6
> as well, and I have to make sure that the clients all "refresh" their
> DHCP-derived information.  If I don't, then clients will suffer with
> incorrect filters (and thus failed look-ups) until they restart.
>=20
> So, my question is this: did you consider placing the required
> suffix/prefix information into DNS itself?  As a simple example -- not
> intended to be a complete design -- you could add a new TXT entry to
> DNS
> that contains the same data as the "DNS suffixes and prefixes"
> information in this draft.  Clients could then get DNS server addresses
> through the existing DHCPv6 mechanisms, and then query the server to
> get
> this new TXT record.  If present, then it gives the same information as
> in this draft, *plus* it includes the normal DNS lifetime data and
> caching behavior.  If absent, then the client just assumes that the
> server contains all data, just as specified in the existing draft, and
> just as it should today.
>=20
> If you did it based on DNS instead of DHCPv6, then you'd have the
> following benefits:
>=20
>   1.  The DNS server's existing caching behavior would cover both
>       changes to the suffix/prefix list and to the actual data served,
>       so the administrator would have a single point of control.
>=20
>   2.  Clients would not be forced to refresh DHCPv6 data when the
>       contents of the DNS server (the list of suffixes/prefixes
>       served) changes.
>=20
>   3.  If DNSSEC is in use, it would protect the suffix/prefix list;
>       something that's missing from the DHCPv6 approach.
>=20
>   4.  The same approach would work seamlessly for IPv4 and IPv6.
>=20
> I can see no obvious negative aspects of such a design, though I
> certainly admit that I could be missing key issues.
>=20
> Did you consider this sort of design?  If so, why was a DHCPv6
> extension
> chosen instead?
>=20
> --
> James Carlson         42.703N 71.076W
> <carlsonj@workingcode.com>

From carlsonj@workingcode.com  Thu Jan 13 07:50:48 2011
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teemu.savolainen@nokia.com wrote:
> Hi James,
> 
> My thinking evolved from DNS search list option defined in RFC3646, hence using DHCPv6 seemed like a logical choice.

The two seem quite distinct to me.  The existing search list option
provides a global setting for the client, and is intended to affect how
unqualified (or partially-qualified) names are resolved.  The new option
proposed in this draft isn't global; it specifies what domains are known
or expected to resolve properly with the given server (and/or network
and/or interface; that detail is somewhat unclear to me).

But, ok, I see the motivation.

> Additionally collecting information required for multi-homing configuration into one place (DHCPv6) seemed useful: this option, DHCPv6 Route Option (draft-ietf-mif-dhcpv6-route-option), and Distributing Address Selection Policy using DHCPv6 (draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-opt). I.e. single point of control but different point than what you propose below. DHCPv6 can also support node specific configurations.
> 
> Addition of information refreshing considerations is a good proposal. The RFC4242, "Information Refresh Time Option", can be utilized for this purpose. Well include considerations of this.

OK.

So, operationally, how do I get the DHCPv6 refresh time to line up
usefully with the DNS cache limits, so that I can make changes when I
need to?  This is typically easy when modifying the usual sort of SOA
entry, but it's less clear to me when DHCPv6 is in the mix.  Is the
administrator for the DHCPv6 server assumed to be the same as for the
DNS system?

It still seems quite a bit more complex to use in practice than the
alternative I suggested.

What about nodes that don't use DHCPv6 but do have DNS?  It seems to me
that providing information directly to the DNS client about what domains
ought to resolve is a bit more flexible and independent than vectoring
it through DHCPv6 first.

And, though I agree it's a bit out of scope for the IETF, what about
implementation considerations?  There'll need to be a new way of getting
this data from the DHCPv6 client over to the DNS resolver.  It seems
simpler if this were just an integrated behavior of the resolver.

I suppose the one positive attribute of the DHCPv6 scheme I can see is
that (in many implementations) the data would be forced into a
configuration file or database somewhere, and that would promote caching
and reuse.  (Though with the usual concerns about timeliness of the
information, RFC4242 notwithstanding.)

> About packet integrity protection.. I have thought the same level of integrity protection we have for other DHCPv6 configuration options would suffice. 

Except that they're distinct, I suppose that's true.  DNSSEC protects
the name resolution information, and that's exactly what's at risk if
the list of "official" domains supported is compromised.

> About IPv4 and IPv6. Generally multi-homing for IPv4 is a lost cause due serious problems caused by overlapping private addresses and subnets. I will consider IPv4 multi-homing only if really really necessary. (This reminds me of v6ops discussion about whether IPv4 should be declared historic and hence no new work (save security fixes) would need to be done for IPv4 in IETF:)

I'm not sure I see how names and subnets are so inextricably linked.
The name search problems in the two cases appear to me to be essentially
the same.

But I do understand the lack of interest in v4, although that's how this
whole conversation's been held.  ;-}

-- 
James Carlson         42.703N 71.076W         <carlsonj@workingcode.com>

From teemu.savolainen@nokia.com  Fri Jan 14 04:04:25 2011
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Hi,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext James Carlson [mailto:carlsonj@workingcode.com]
> Sent: 13. tammikuuta 2011 17:53
> To: Savolainen Teemu (Nokia-MS/Tampere)
> Cc: kato@syce.net; dnsop@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
>=20
> > My thinking evolved from DNS search list option defined in RFC3646,
> hence using DHCPv6 seemed like a logical choice.
>=20
> The two seem quite distinct to me.  The existing search list option
> provides a global setting for the client, and is intended to affect how
> unqualified (or partially-qualified) names are resolved. =20

Right, but the same information could originally have been designed to be c=
onfigured through DNS servers. But for some historical reasons, which I am =
not aware of, DHCP was chosen.

In the deployment scenario I could be on right now, the DNS search list opt=
ion content might almost equal the content of what the DNS server selection=
 option would contain (see Appendix A.2 of our draft).

> The new
> option
> proposed in this draft isn't global; it specifies what domains are
> known
> or expected to resolve properly with the given server (and/or network
> and/or interface; that detail is somewhat unclear to me).

Well, DHCP is used to configure both local and global information (and conf=
licts with "other global information" learned via other interfaces need to =
be resolved..).

> So, operationally, how do I get the DHCPv6 refresh time to line up
> usefully with the DNS cache limits, so that I can make changes when I
> need to?  This is typically easy when modifying the usual sort of SOA
> entry, but it's less clear to me when DHCPv6 is in the mix.  Is the
> administrator for the DHCPv6 server assumed to be the same as for the
> DNS system?

At least for the deployment scenarios we are looking at you would anyway ha=
ve to update DHCPv6 with corresponding IPv6 routing information delivery. I=
.e. if one deploys private names the chances are that those names map to no=
n-globally reachable IP-addresses. I mean if a name maps to a globally reac=
hable IP address, why the name would not be globally resolvable via DNS?

About lining up times.. I don't have much experience on network operations,=
 but maybe you could do something like adding the entries to DHCPv6 some ti=
me before making changes to DNS, hence decreasing set of hosts that will en=
d up have old information. Hosts that attach through VPN or cellular connec=
tions probably do information refreshes quite often.

In case of common changes you can also ensure your DNS server is the highes=
t priority default server.

> What about nodes that don't use DHCPv6 but do have DNS?  It seems to me
> that providing information directly to the DNS client about what
> domains
> ought to resolve is a bit more flexible and independent than vectoring
> it through DHCPv6 first.

Maybe such nodes would not need advanced multihoming feature at first place=
, as in that case they would also miss e.g. the routing information option =
and distributed address selection policies:)

Stateless DHCPv6 is fairly simple protocol to implement.

> And, though I agree it's a bit out of scope for the IETF, what about
> implementation considerations?  There'll need to be a new way of
> getting
> this data from the DHCPv6 client over to the DNS resolver.  It seems
> simpler if this were just an integrated behavior of the resolver.

You mean each time a new DNS server address would be learned by some means =
(DHCPv6, RA, "well-known", provisioning, manual configuration, L2 means) th=
e DNS resolver would contact said DNS server(s) to fetch new information. W=
ell, either way the DNS resolver must do the DNS server selection based on =
the information it has obtained by some means. We prefer delivering that in=
formation via DHCPv6 at the same time with other configuration information =
required for multihoming.

Btw in the demos we've shown to people at IETF#78 and IETF#79 we used ISC's=
 unmodified BIND running on a host with a small tool creating named.conf dy=
namically based on the information delivered via DHCPv6. However, it is not=
 possible to have all the features currently described in the draft done wi=
th such a setup. For full function the used resolver has to be really modif=
ied.

> Except that they're distinct, I suppose that's true.  DNSSEC protects
> the name resolution information, and that's exactly what's at risk if
> the list of "official" domains supported is compromised.

I didn't follow. If the suffix list is compromised the node may end up send=
ing questions to malicious DNS servers, but as the responses from there wil=
l not validate, the node will retry with other DNS servers and should end u=
p talking to someone who does not lie. Or do you refer to a case where only=
 the suffix list would be validated with DNSSEC, but DNSSEC would not be us=
ed for actual DNS resolution queries?

> > About IPv4 and IPv6. Generally multi-homing for IPv4 is a lost cause
> due serious problems caused by overlapping private addresses and
> subnets. I will consider IPv4 multi-homing only if really really
> necessary. (This reminds me of v6ops discussion about whether IPv4
> should be declared historic and hence no new work (save security fixes)
> would need to be done for IPv4 in IETF:)
>=20
> I'm not sure I see how names and subnets are so inextricably linked.

With that comment I stepped out our of DNS discussion and went to general d=
iscussions:) Sorry for confusion.

One of the significant reasons (but not the main one) why your favorite han=
dset does not usually do WLAN and cellular at the same time is the fact tha=
t it may get same NATted IP address from both network interfaces. That comp=
licates things quite a lot.

Also getting this solution into market will take some time, and by that tim=
e (at least in cellular domain) IPv4 usage ought to be in the  decline. Hen=
ce I think we do not necessarily need feature parity between address famili=
es for all new features:) This is of course for MIF WG to decide.

> The name search problems in the two cases appear to me to be
> essentially the same.

Yes.

> But I do understand the lack of interest in v4, although that's how
> this whole conversation's been held.  ;-}

:) Design of the new technologies is often done with old tools:-)=20

Teemu

From carlsonj@workingcode.com  Fri Jan 14 05:58:18 2011
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On 01/14/11 07:06, teemu.savolainen@nokia.com wrote:
>> The two seem quite distinct to me.  The existing search list option
>> provides a global setting for the client, and is intended to affect how
>> unqualified (or partially-qualified) names are resolved.  
> 
> Right, but the same information could originally have been designed to be configured through DNS servers. But for some historical reasons, which I am not aware of, DHCP was chosen.

Possibly.  I believe that when the DNS resolver portion of this was
being designed, it was assumed that choice of a default domain for
unqualified names was a local matter -- one system administrator might
choose one, and another might choose a different one.  So, it was just a
local configuration option rather than a part of the DNS server.

As yet another local configuration option that could be centralized, it
got swept up into a DHCP option, and there we are.

I believe these two -- search lists and served domain lists -- are
qualitatively different.  Having hints that a particular DNS server is
good for particular queries is quite different from knowing that the
simple name "foobar" should be resolved as "foobar.example.com."

To put it another way, if I hear through this new mechanism that some
DNS server will handle requests for "example.com.", that does *NOT*
imply in any way that I want bare names to be resolved by that server
preferentially.  Perhaps I do -- but perhaps I don't.  That's what the
search list is for.

> In the deployment scenario I could be on right now, the DNS search list option content might almost equal the content of what the DNS server selection option would contain (see Appendix A.2 of our draft).

I don't think that's generally true, though I can see how it might be
true in some cases.

One of the things this draft addresses is the problem that when a
multi-homed client receives multiple DNS server addresses, it doesn't
know where to send the queries.  This solution fixes that problem by
providing clues about direction.  But merely knowing where to send a
full query does _not_ tell the client what domains it should assume when
only a simple name is given.

>> The new
>> option
>> proposed in this draft isn't global; it specifies what domains are
>> known
>> or expected to resolve properly with the given server (and/or network
>> and/or interface; that detail is somewhat unclear to me).
> 
> Well, DHCP is used to configure both local and global information (and conflicts with "other global information" learned via other interfaces need to be resolved..).

I don't know of any information provided by DHCP that's "local" in the
sense that you're saying.

The DHCP information concerning the IP addresses of DNS servers is
"global" in the sense that the client system's resolver can use it to
form a list of servers to query.  There's just one list required.

This new information is quite different, because it's *per* DNS server.
 Each server has a different string that specifies what it will resolve.

A case that illustrates how different these things are would be one
where the DHCPv6 server provides the IP addresses of two different DNS
servers.

There'd still be just one search list to contend with.  And one list of
IP addresses for the DNS servers.  But you'd need to have two of these
selection lists -- one for each of the DNS servers to describe what
domains each server is able to resolve.

>> So, operationally, how do I get the DHCPv6 refresh time to line up
>> usefully with the DNS cache limits, so that I can make changes when I
>> need to?  This is typically easy when modifying the usual sort of SOA
>> entry, but it's less clear to me when DHCPv6 is in the mix.  Is the
>> administrator for the DHCPv6 server assumed to be the same as for the
>> DNS system?
> 
> At least for the deployment scenarios we are looking at you would anyway have to update DHCPv6 with corresponding IPv6 routing information delivery. I.e. if one deploys private names the chances are that those names map to non-globally reachable IP-addresses. I mean if a name maps to a globally reachable IP address, why the name would not be globally resolvable via DNS?

Any of a number of situations can cause that.  Some networks have areas
that don't resolve "outside" the area for testing or security-related
reasons.

At least with the large networks where I have some experience, the folks
handling routing are completely separate from the ones handling name
services.  In fact, they're even employed by different companies.

> About lining up times.. I don't have much experience on network operations, but maybe you could do something like adding the entries to DHCPv6 some time before making changes to DNS, hence decreasing set of hosts that will end up have old information. Hosts that attach through VPN or cellular connections probably do information refreshes quite often.
> 
> In case of common changes you can also ensure your DNS server is the highest priority default server.

I don't think I follow that, because I'm not sure I see how priority
works into the prefix/suffix lists used for DNS server selection.

>> What about nodes that don't use DHCPv6 but do have DNS?  It seems to me
>> that providing information directly to the DNS client about what
>> domains
>> ought to resolve is a bit more flexible and independent than vectoring
>> it through DHCPv6 first.
> 
> Maybe such nodes would not need advanced multihoming feature at first place, as in that case they would also miss e.g. the routing information option and distributed address selection policies:)
> 
> Stateless DHCPv6 is fairly simple protocol to implement.

Indeed; it's not difficult.  But is it operationally necessary?

>> And, though I agree it's a bit out of scope for the IETF, what about
>> implementation considerations?  There'll need to be a new way of
>> getting
>> this data from the DHCPv6 client over to the DNS resolver.  It seems
>> simpler if this were just an integrated behavior of the resolver.
> 
> You mean each time a new DNS server address would be learned by some means (DHCPv6, RA, "well-known", provisioning, manual configuration, L2 means) the DNS resolver would contact said DNS server(s) to fetch new information. Well, either way the DNS resolver must do the DNS server selection based on the information it has obtained by some means. We prefer delivering that information via DHCPv6 at the same time with other configuration information required for multihoming.

The algorithm used by the resolver might be something like:

resolve_name(name):
    if "name" is cached and unexpired:
	just return that
    for each known server address:
	if server has unexpired domain-list and "name" matches:
	    try this server; return on success
    for each known server address:
	if no cached domain-list entry or entry is expired:
	    query server for domain-list and cache result
    for each known server address in priority order:
	if no domain-list or if "name" matches list:
	    try this server; return on success

It's similar to the algorithm required for this draft, except that it
has logic to refresh the domain lists when necessary.  (That's off the
cuff; I'm sure a good designer with more time could do a better job.  ;-})

> Btw in the demos we've shown to people at IETF#78 and IETF#79 we used ISC's unmodified BIND running on a host with a small tool creating named.conf dynamically based on the information delivered via DHCPv6. However, it is not possible to have all the features currently described in the draft done with such a setup. For full function the used resolver has to be really modified.

Sure; both my suggestion and yours require resolver modifications.  And
neither one actually requires changes in the DNS server.

The draft, though, does require DHCP changes.

>> Except that they're distinct, I suppose that's true.  DNSSEC protects
>> the name resolution information, and that's exactly what's at risk if
>> the list of "official" domains supported is compromised.
> 
> I didn't follow. If the suffix list is compromised the node may end up sending questions to malicious DNS servers, but as the responses from there will not validate, the node will retry with other DNS servers and should end up talking to someone who does not lie. Or do you refer to a case where only the suffix list would be validated with DNSSEC, but DNSSEC would not be used for actual DNS resolution queries?

I don't think that's complete.

If I have a malicious DHCPv6 server, I can set up a prefix/suffix list
for one of the valid DNS servers that says that server doesn't handle
any domain I want, including the default "." domain.  If this is done,
then the resolver will never attempt to query the "right" server.

In that case, it doesn't matter whether there are any malicious DNS
servers.  In fact, there might not be any at all.

And my malicious DHCPv6 server won't bother with the refresh option, so
the client is nailed until he manually restarts.

Or are you saying that there are cases where the resolver should just
ignore the prefix/suffix list from DHCPv6, and should send out queries
to servers it doesn't think can answer them, just in case the list is wrong?

Or should the resolver somehow "know" whether the DHCPv6 information is
"secure," for whatever "secure" means?  And how would it know that the
information is as valid as the DNSSEC information?

>>> About IPv4 and IPv6. Generally multi-homing for IPv4 is a lost cause
>> due serious problems caused by overlapping private addresses and
>> subnets. I will consider IPv4 multi-homing only if really really
>> necessary. (This reminds me of v6ops discussion about whether IPv4
>> should be declared historic and hence no new work (save security fixes)
>> would need to be done for IPv4 in IETF:)
>>
>> I'm not sure I see how names and subnets are so inextricably linked.
> 
> With that comment I stepped out our of DNS discussion and went to general discussions:) Sorry for confusion.
> 
> One of the significant reasons (but not the main one) why your favorite handset does not usually do WLAN and cellular at the same time is the fact that it may get same NATted IP address from both network interfaces. That complicates things quite a lot.

Nah, the main reason is that my favorite handset is a plain old phone.
It barely does SMS, let alone fancy data.  ;-}

I understand that problem.  I think what you're really saying is that
you want nothing to do with NATs (and the implications of them), and
since NATs are common with v4 and not with v6, you're doing v6-only.

-- 
James Carlson         42.703N 71.076W         <carlsonj@workingcode.com>

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On Jan 14, 2011, at 9:00 AM, James Carlson wrote:
> Or should the resolver somehow "know" whether the DHCPv6 information =
is
> "secure," for whatever "secure" means?  And how would it know that the
> information is as valid as the DNSSEC information?

This is, of course, the key problem.   The resolver has no way, a =
priori, to know that the information from the DHCPv6 server is valid.   =
It has to validate it somehow, or else the answer it is providing to the =
end-user is potentially harmful.


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From: <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
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This is a generic feature of DHCPv6, right?=20

Teemu

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Ted Lemon [mailto:Ted.Lemon@nominum.com]
> Sent: 14. tammikuuta 2011 16:10
> To: James Carlson
> Cc: Savolainen Teemu (Nokia-MS/Tampere); dnsop@ietf.org; kato@syce.net
> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
>=20
> On Jan 14, 2011, at 9:00 AM, James Carlson wrote:
> > Or should the resolver somehow "know" whether the DHCPv6 information
> is
> > "secure," for whatever "secure" means?  And how would it know that
> the
> > information is as valid as the DNSSEC information?
>=20
> This is, of course, the key problem.   The resolver has no way, a
> priori, to know that the information from the DHCPv6 server is valid.
> It has to validate it somehow, or else the answer it is providing to
> the end-user is potentially harmful.


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On Jan 14, 2011, at 9:28 AM, <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> =
<teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> wrote:
> This is a generic feature of DHCPv6, right?=20

What is?


From teemu.savolainen@nokia.com  Fri Jan 14 06:55:45 2011
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From: <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
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Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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Lack of trust on information contained in all options?

Teemu

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Ted Lemon [mailto:Ted.Lemon@nominum.com]
> Sent: 14. tammikuuta 2011 16:36
> To: Savolainen Teemu (Nokia-MS/Tampere)
> Cc: carlsonj@workingcode.com; dnsop@ietf.org; kato@syce.net
> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
>=20
> On Jan 14, 2011, at 9:28 AM, <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
> <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> wrote:
> > This is a generic feature of DHCPv6, right?
>=20
> What is?


From teemu.savolainen@nokia.com  Fri Jan 14 07:07:14 2011
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From: <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
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> To put it another way, if I hear through this new mechanism that some
> DNS server will handle requests for "example.com.", that does *NOT*
> imply in any way that I want bare names to be resolved by that server
> preferentially.  Perhaps I do -- but perhaps I don't.  That's what the
> search list is for.

You can ignore the option and talk to the DNS server of your preference. Yo=
u can also choose to listen for the option only from one or more trusted so=
urces.

> One of the things this draft addresses is the problem that when a
> multi-homed client receives multiple DNS server addresses, it doesn't
> know where to send the queries.  This solution fixes that problem by
> providing clues about direction.  But merely knowing where to send a
> full query does _not_ tell the client what domains it should assume
> when only a simple name is given.

A bare name would unlikely find match from the suffix list. You could ask r=
esolution for the bare name from your favorite default.

After appending the bare name with some suffix from your search list you co=
uld look for match from DNS server selection list.

Of course there could be multiple search list from different interfaces. In=
 such case you could prioritize the search lists by some means and start wa=
lking through the suffixes when resolving bare name.

> > Well, DHCP is used to configure both local and global information
> (and conflicts with "other global information" learned via other
> interfaces need to be resolved..).
>=20
> I don't know of any information provided by DHCP that's "local" in the
> sense that you're saying.
>
> The DHCP information concerning the IP addresses of DNS servers is
> "global" in the sense that the client system's resolver can use it to
> form a list of servers to query.  There's just one list required.

>From my viewpoint DNS server address is a perfect example of local informat=
ion, which is valid only on the interface it was learnt on (rarely you can =
contact DNS server via other interfaces). The host of course may put these =
pieces of local information in a form of global list to go through, but tha=
t list then easily becomes an interface preference list and *essentially* h=
ost chooses first the interface to use and then DNS server from there (assu=
ming IP packets to DNS server are sent over the interface DNS server addres=
s was learnt).

> A case that illustrates how different these things are would be one
> where the DHCPv6 server provides the IP addresses of two different DNS
> servers.
>=20
> There'd still be just one search list to contend with.  And one list of
> IP addresses for the DNS servers.  But you'd need to have two of these
> selection lists -- one for each of the DNS servers to describe what
> domains each server is able to resolve.

Would you rather prefer DHCPv6 option that does not specify DNS server addr=
esses, only suffix list? I.e. in that case the suffix list would be interfa=
ce specific? That is something we could discuss about.

> Any of a number of situations can cause that.  Some networks have areas
> that don't resolve "outside" the area for testing or security-related
> reasons.

But the IP addresses of the services pointed by names remain globally reach=
able?

> The algorithm used by the resolver might be something like:
>=20
> resolve_name(name):
>     if "name" is cached and unexpired:
> 	just return that
>     for each known server address:
> 	if server has unexpired domain-list and "name" matches:
> 	    try this server; return on success
>     for each known server address:
> 	if no cached domain-list entry or entry is expired:
> 	    query server for domain-list and cache result
>     for each known server address in priority order:
> 	if no domain-list or if "name" matches list:
> 	    try this server; return on success
>
> It's similar to the algorithm required for this draft, except that it
> has logic to refresh the domain lists when necessary.  (That's off the
> cuff; I'm sure a good designer with more time could do a better job.
> ;-})

This sounds quite like what we have, except that domain-list is fetched wit=
h DHCPv6 and not on-demand as shown above (and also DNSSEC to validate befo=
re declaring success).

> Sure; both my suggestion and yours require resolver modifications.  And
> neither one actually requires changes in the DNS server.
>=20
> The draft, though, does require DHCP changes.

Well, trouble to add new option to DHCP config files is not a big challenge=
. I used ISC's DHCPv6 server and it supported custom options - the option c=
ontent was easy to write to dhcp config.

On the client side, be it resolver or dhc client, they need to modify askin=
g of the information. In the case of DHC that was easy as well.

> If I have a malicious DHCPv6 server, I can set up a prefix/suffix list
> for one of the valid DNS servers that says that server doesn't handle
> any domain I want, including the default "." domain.  If this is done,
> then the resolver will never attempt to query the "right" server.

You mean attacker could use DHCPv6 on one interface to remove/disturbing DN=
S information learnt on other interfaces?=20

That is part of conflict resolution: more trusted interfaces should take pr=
ecedence (and e.g. on WLAN hotspot filled with hacker you might not even wa=
nt to query this option).=20

> Or are you saying that there are cases where the resolver should just
> ignore the prefix/suffix list from DHCPv6, and should send out queries
> to servers it doesn't think can answer them, just in case the list is
> wrong?

The draft talks about walking through available DNS servers and trust level=
s of interfaces. The host may always ask other servers if the one preferred=
 does not yield answer.

After all, many IETF people seem to be happy for sending queries to all DNS=
 servers of all interfaces always:-)

Anyway, we could have it also so that if the most preferred DNS server does=
 not give positive validatable reply in half a second the node resends the =
query out on all interfaces to all DNS servers like a lightning storm. That=
 would ensure the common case does not require DNS storming, but in case of=
 trouble the user experience would remain good.

> I understand that problem.  I think what you're really saying is that
> you want nothing to do with NATs (and the implications of them), and
> since NATs are common with v4 and not with v6, you're doing v6-only.

That's mostly true, but I do fancy properties made possible by the large ad=
dress space that are not possible in public IPv4 (or were, if people were g=
iven large chunks of IPv4 addresses:).

Best regards,

Teemu

From Ted.Lemon@nominum.com  Fri Jan 14 07:10:55 2011
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On Jan 14, 2011, at 9:58 AM, <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> wrote:
> Lack of trust on information contained in all options?

Right.   Generally, we assume that the higher-level protocol will have =
some sort of security mechanism--e.g., DNSSEC.   Or we assume that the =
environment in which DHCP is being done is one in which there is no easy =
opportunity for attack (e.g., cable modem connection, or secured home =
WiFi).

The problem with this proposal is that it creates a new, generic =
mechanism which depends on the data from the DHCP server being =
trustworthy.  If the data is not trustworthy, the mechanism doesn't =
fail.

The question is, is there some way to give you what you want, without =
creating a generic mechanism that has the property of assuming =
trustworthiness without proof of trustworthiness.


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On Fri, Jan 14, 2011 at 03:09:21PM +0000, teemu.savolainen@nokia.com wrote:
> 
> You can ignore the option and talk to the DNS server of your preference. You can also choose to listen for the option only from one or more trusted sources.
> 

I'm really unclear about this "trusted sources" thing, though.  Is
that "trust only if you're on a trusted network"?  Because I think the
problem basically is that there's no sDHCP, right?

> A bare name would unlikely find match from the suffix list. You could ask resolution for the bare name from your favorite default.
> 
> After appending the bare name with some suffix from your search list you could look for match from DNS server selection list.
> 
> Of course there could be multiple search list from different interfaces. In such case you could prioritize the search lists by some means and start walking through the suffixes when resolving bare name.
> 

This is all a little hand-wavy.  "Some means" sounds like the road to
user-surprise-perdition.  Bare names are already a bugbear, and I
don't think we want to make them even more surprising.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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From: <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
To: <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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I have to admit one thing I have not really understood is why the level of =
concern here is so deep.

If I now have e.g. multihomed Linux, often or usually the /etc/resolv.conf =
points to the DNS server address learned most recently via some mean (RA, D=
HCPv6). But people are not too worried what is the content of that file? I.=
e. attacker could just send new RA with DNS server address option and cause=
 problems by drawing DNS traffic to that server?

Shouldn't we work e.g. on securing all DHCPv6 signaling?

Teemu

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Ted Lemon [mailto:Ted.Lemon@nominum.com]
> Sent: 14. tammikuuta 2011 17:13
> To: Savolainen Teemu (Nokia-MS/Tampere)
> Cc: carlsonj@workingcode.com; dnsop@ietf.org; kato@syce.net
> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
>=20
> On Jan 14, 2011, at 9:58 AM, <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> wrote:
> > Lack of trust on information contained in all options?
>=20
> Right.   Generally, we assume that the higher-level protocol will have
> some sort of security mechanism--e.g., DNSSEC.   Or we assume that the
> environment in which DHCP is being done is one in which there is no
> easy opportunity for attack (e.g., cable modem connection, or secured
> home WiFi).
>=20
> The problem with this proposal is that it creates a new, generic
> mechanism which depends on the data from the DHCP server being
> trustworthy.  If the data is not trustworthy, the mechanism doesn't
> fail.
>=20
> The question is, is there some way to give you what you want, without
> creating a generic mechanism that has the property of assuming
> trustworthiness without proof of trustworthiness.


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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On Jan 14, 2011, at 10:53 AM, <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> wrote:
> If I now have e.g. multihomed Linux, often or usually the =
/etc/resolv.conf points to the DNS server address learned most recently =
via some mean (RA, DHCPv6). But people are not too worried what is the =
content of that file? I.e. attacker could just send new RA with DNS =
server address option and cause problems by drawing DNS traffic to that =
server?

The level of concern is that we are just getting to the point where we =
have a DNSSEC infrastructure that can be used to detect fraudulent DNS =
information.   And this proposal puts that at risk by providing a =
mechanism for subverting DNSSEC.   It does this because the whole point =
of the proposal is to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort: doing =
DNS lookups against all proposed DNS servers.

So the point is not that it makes things worse than the status quo, but =
rather that it potentially prevents a solution to a problem in the =
status quo that we thought we'd developed.

> Shouldn't we work e.g. on securing all DHCPv6 signaling?

Possibly, although it's not clear what the security model for such a =
thing would be, nor even if there is a single security model that would =
work.   That's why we've never successfully solved this problem.   We =
have mechanisms for securing the transport, but that says nothing about =
trustworthiness of information provided by the server.


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Fri Jan 14 07:58:57 2011
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Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2011 11:01:20 -0500
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On Fri, Jan 14, 2011 at 03:53:25PM +0000, teemu.savolainen@nokia.com wrote:
> 
> Shouldn't we work e.g. on securing all DHCPv6 signaling?

I would say so, yes.

But note that this particular option makes it easier to target one
domain in particular.  That's a more directed attack, so it seems to
me to be a little more serious than "capture all the traffic".  It's
hard to spoof the entire Internet.  It might not be so hard to spoof
mycompany.com.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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> > You can ignore the option and talk to the DNS server of your
> preference. You can also choose to listen for the option only from one
> or more trusted sources.
> >
>=20
> I'm really unclear about this "trusted sources" thing, though.  Is
> that "trust only if you're on a trusted network"?  Because I think the
> problem basically is that there's no sDHCP, right?

E.g. by definition. Implement this only if you are a CPE or if you are 3GPP=
 handset and then only for this class of interface. Or such. Those two scen=
arios are my main focus. Not believe what CoffeeShopFreeAP tells.

> > Of course there could be multiple search list from different
> interfaces. In such case you could prioritize the search lists by some
> means and start walking through the suffixes when resolving bare name.
> >
>=20
> This is all a little hand-wavy.  "Some means" sounds like the road to
> user-surprise-perdition.  Bare names are already a bugbear, and I
> don't think we want to make them even more surprising.

I say some because I have not considered domain search list conflict resolu=
tion problem before this thread.

Well, if the host is openly multihomed and somewhere comes name "server", y=
ou could append it with all suffixes you know of and try resolve then all i=
n parallel, connect in order of successful resolution:) .. if you don't kno=
w any difference between your interfaces.

Teemu

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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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teemu.savolainen@nokia.com wrote:
> I have to admit one thing I have not really understood is why the level of concern here is so deep.
> 
> If I now have e.g. multihomed Linux, often or usually the /etc/resolv.conf points to the DNS server address learned most recently via some mean (RA, DHCPv6). But people are not too worried what is the content of that file? I.e. attacker could just send new RA with DNS server address option and cause problems by drawing DNS traffic to that server?

A rogue DHCPv6 server can add entries to that file, but can't delete
them.  Thus, it's possible for a bad DHCPv6 server to make life annoying
for a client, but (at least for DNS) it can't prevent the client from
eventually working.

The option (as described in this draft) effectively "deletes" addresses
from the list, by associating each address with a list of domains.
Having that list present for a given server but with no domain match
means no query will be sent to that server (or only "inappropriate"
queries sent) -- as though it were removed.

The shotgun approach you suggested in another reply may well fix that
problem, but isn't in the current draft.

Anyway, I don't seem to be making a great deal of headway, and I've
certainly got other things to do.  So, I've said my piece.  Drive on.

-- 
James Carlson         42.703N 71.076W         <carlsonj@workingcode.com>

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Fri Jan 14 08:56:01 2011
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On Fri, Jan 14, 2011 at 04:01:35PM +0000, teemu.savolainen@nokia.com wrote:
> 
> E.g. by definition. Implement this only if you are a CPE or if you
> are 3GPP handset and then only for this class of interface. Or
> such. Those two scenarios are my main focus. Not believe what
> CoffeeShopFreeAP tells.

And why, if you are a CPE, should you believe what you get via DHCP
either?  Lord knows I have seen rogue DHCP announcements on cable
modems.

Moreover, even supposing that's solved, how is the device supposed to
know when it is attached to CoffeeShopFreeAP and when it's attached to
SuperGoodWellMaintainedISPNet?  Isn't it completely ignorant at this
point?

> Well, if the host is openly multihomed and somewhere comes name
> "server", you could append it with all suffixes you know of and try
> resolve then all in parallel, connect in order of successful
> resolution:) .. if you don't know any difference between your
> interfaces.
 
My first response is ick, but that's my first response to all barename
resolution answers[1], so that's not a good test.  I think this is an
area where text is undoubtedly needed.  I'll think about it more, but
I urge others to do the same.

A


[1] The right answer is, of course, "Stop that," but the horse has
fled, the barn burned down, and the horse died years ago.  


-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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From: <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
To: <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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In the current state a host with multiple interfaces would roughly randomly=
 send DNS query over one interface to primary DNS server of that interface.=
 The order may be determined e.g. by the order in which the interfaces were=
 opened (if e.g. the DNS server learn first or last is preferred over other=
s).=20

Hence from DNS system point of view a current truly multi-homed host may al=
ready ask questions from any DNS server, and it will not ask from all. =20

This option directs a host to ask question from some of the servers it coul=
d have anyway send its question to. How DNSSEC cannot manage to secure DNS =
queries in that case?

Best regards,

Teemu

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Ted Lemon [mailto:Ted.Lemon@nominum.com]
> Sent: 14. tammikuuta 2011 18:00
> To: Savolainen Teemu (Nokia-MS/Tampere)
> Cc: carlsonj@workingcode.com; dnsop@ietf.org; kato@syce.net
> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
>=20
> On Jan 14, 2011, at 10:53 AM, <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> wrote:
> > If I now have e.g. multihomed Linux, often or usually the
> /etc/resolv.conf points to the DNS server address learned most recently
> via some mean (RA, DHCPv6). But people are not too worried what is the
> content of that file? I.e. attacker could just send new RA with DNS
> server address option and cause problems by drawing DNS traffic to that
> server?
>=20
> The level of concern is that we are just getting to the point where we
> have a DNSSEC infrastructure that can be used to detect fraudulent DNS
> information.   And this proposal puts that at risk by providing a
> mechanism for subverting DNSSEC.   It does this because the whole point
> of the proposal is to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort: doing
> DNS lookups against all proposed DNS servers.
>=20
> So the point is not that it makes things worse than the status quo, but
> rather that it potentially prevents a solution to a problem in the
> status quo that we thought we'd developed.
>=20
> > Shouldn't we work e.g. on securing all DHCPv6 signaling?
>=20
> Possibly, although it's not clear what the security model for such a
> thing would be, nor even if there is a single security model that would
> work.   That's why we've never successfully solved this problem.   We
> have mechanisms for securing the transport, but that says nothing about
> trustworthiness of information provided by the server.


From teemu.savolainen@nokia.com  Mon Jan 17 02:27:33 2011
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From: <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
To: <ajs@shinkuro.com>, <dnsop@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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That particular case I have been told is protected against by using DNSSEC,=
 which ensures the host will detect the fraudulent answer to this directed =
attack and will fall back to use other DNS server (or fail)...

If the host would have been single-homed, it would have send all its querie=
s to the interface this attacker has control over.

Teemu

> -----Original Message-----
> From: dnsop-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dnsop-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of ext Andrew Sullivan
> Sent: 14. tammikuuta 2011 18:01
> To: dnsop@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
>=20
> On Fri, Jan 14, 2011 at 03:53:25PM +0000, teemu.savolainen@nokia.com
> wrote:
> >
> > Shouldn't we work e.g. on securing all DHCPv6 signaling?
>=20
> I would say so, yes.
>=20
> But note that this particular option makes it easier to target one
> domain in particular.  That's a more directed attack, so it seems to
> me to be a little more serious than "capture all the traffic".  It's
> hard to spoof the entire Internet.  It might not be so hard to spoof
> mycompany.com.
>=20
> A
>=20
> --
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop

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From: <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>
To: <carlsonj@workingcode.com>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
Thread-Index: AQHLs/dJs9A5o4XEy0qCmsjaNlbINZPQd+oAgAAW9eD///ONAIAAGpgQ///1gYCAAEh+AA==
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 10:29:46 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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> A rogue DHCPv6 server can add entries to that file, but can't delete
> them.  Thus, it's possible for a bad DHCPv6 server to make life
> annoying for a client, but (at least for DNS) it can't prevent the client=
 from
> eventually working.

The rogue DHCPv6 server can insert its DNS server as the preferred one. Thi=
s server can then silently drop all DNS queries except the selected ones. I=
n such case the resolver would silently fallback to use legitimate secondar=
y DNS servers in all other cases except then in the one attacker is targeti=
ng at. Hence similar attack could be launched as with DNS server selection =
option.
=20
> The option (as described in this draft) effectively "deletes" addresses
> from the list, by associating each address with a list of domains.
> Having that list present for a given server but with no domain match
> means no query will be sent to that server (or only "inappropriate"
> queries sent) -- as though it were removed.

I will address this risk.

> The shotgun approach you suggested in another reply may well fix that
> problem, but isn't in the current draft.

Luckily there are plenty of digits left for updates:)

Thank you for discussion!

	Teemu

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Mon Jan 17 05:03:55 2011
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Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 08:06:22 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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References: <056B511A55F8AA42A3E492B7DD19A3191A7B09@008-AM1MPN1-017.mgdnok.nokia.com> <4D305704.70301@workingcode.com> <E31B0BA5-04A8-4B85-A9A4-C432D870E966@nominum.com> <056B511A55F8AA42A3E492B7DD19A3191A7CFC@008-AM1MPN1-017.mgdnok.nokia.com> <F404CE66-6409-42C8-9EF8-A3604D440E2C@nominum.com> <056B511A55F8AA42A3E492B7DD19A3191A7D4A@008-AM1MPN1-017.mgdnok.nokia.com> <C2A5045C-9BAE-44C8-89B6-0160FD519070@nominum.com> <056B511A55F8AA42A3E492B7DD19A3191A7DF5@008-AM1MPN1-017.mgdnok.nokia.com> <20110114160120.GL58308@shinkuro.com> <056B511A55F8AA42A3E492B7DD19A3191D1BBC@008-AM1MPN1-015.mgdnok.nokia.com>
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On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 10:29:45AM +0000, teemu.savolainen@nokia.com wrote:
> That particular case I have been told is protected against by using DNSSEC, which ensures the host will detect the fraudulent answer to this directed attack and will fall back to use other DNS server (or fail)...
> 

Right.  But I guess I'm confused: I thought you were arguing that
DNSSEC wasn't needed.

> If the host would have been single-homed, it would have send all its queries to the interface this attacker has control over.

Correct.


-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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On Jan 17, 2011, at 5:29 AM, <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com> wrote:
> This option directs a host to ask question from some of the servers it =
could have anyway send its question to. How DNSSEC cannot manage to =
secure DNS queries in that case?

Your assertions about the state of the art in DNS resolver =
implementations is probably correct.   However, essentially what you are =
proposing is to take this broken behavior as a standard, and then build =
new functionality on it.   The problem is that the behavior is broken, =
and shouldn't be a basis for building new functionality.   I don't =
disagree with your motivation for building the new functionality; the =
question is whether there's a way to do it that is not, like the status =
quo, broken.

The way your proposal breaks DNSSEC is by allowing an attacker to =
convince your resolver to treat a pre-arranged server as the authority =
for certain named zones.

Hm.   Okay, so the reason this is an issue is that I'm assuming the =
resolver doesn't do its own validation.   And you're right that if it =
doesn't do its own validation, it's not much worse off using this option =
than not using it; the degree to which its worse off is that this option =
allows the attacker to deterministically attack certain domains, whereas =
without the use of this option the attacker would, in a best-case =
scenario, be relying on chance to succeed in its attack.

If the resolver *does* validate to a known trust anchor, then it will =
discover any provable lie a perverted name server tells, even if it does =
the entire query through the perverted name server, because the =
perverted name server can't spoof the trust anchor (we *hope*)!

This actually makes me feel a lot better about the proposal.   I'd like =
to see the proposal require that the resolver validate any query itself =
if it uses the option; otherwise we're going to see interoperability =
problems with this option once resolvers *do* start validating, because =
people will have set their internal zones up wrong.

I think you also need to document the signing architectures that will =
work with this option: either don't sign the zone that contains =
referrals for the internal zone, or else sign two copies of the zone; =
one that's visible from outside and contains no referrals, and a second =
one that's visible from inside, and contains referrals.

The validating resolver obviously must use the substitute server for the =
entire query, not just for the queries in that subdomain, or it will get =
the wrong information from its query for the referral to the internal =
zone.

I realize this may not be agreeable to you, but if it is, I could =
attempt to write text for it.   I am not an expert on DNSSEC, so someone =
who is probably ought to read the text and criticize it.


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Mon Jan 17 06:21:14 2011
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Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 09:22:56 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: dnsop@ietf.org
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On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 08:54:05AM -0500, Ted Lemon wrote:
 
> Hm.  Okay, so the reason this is an issue is that I'm assuming the
> resolver doesn't do its own validation.  And you're right that if it
> doesn't do its own validation, it's not much worse off using this
> option than not using it; the degree to which its worse off is that
> this option allows the attacker to deterministically attack certain
> domains, whereas without the use of this option the attacker would,
> in a best-case scenario, be relying on chance to succeed in its
> attack.

If the resolver doesn't do its own validation, then it is not allowed
to treat the AD bit as meaningful unless it can trust the DNS server
handing it that bit:

   In any case, a security-aware stub resolver MUST
   NOT place any reliance on signature validation allegedly performed on
   its behalf, except when the security-aware stub resolver obtained the
   data in question from a trusted security-aware recursive name server
   via a secure channel. 

(RFC 4035, section 4.9.3).  Presumably, then, the stub needs somehow
to have authenticated the DNS server in question otherwise before
accepting the claims about signature validation.  I can't think of any
way to do this under DHCP, but maybe I don't know the protocol well enough.
 
> I think you also need to document the signing architectures that
> will work with this option: either don't sign the zone that contains
> referrals for the internal zone, or else sign two copies of the
> zone; one that's visible from outside and contains no referrals, and
> a second one that's visible from inside, and contains referrals.

This is the point I was trying to make over on mif: I think that
there's a potential issue here with "closest TA" validation
strategies, but I suspect that we're going to need different TAs for
these "internal zone" cases.  Or something like that.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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On Jan 17, 2011, at 9:22 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> (RFC 4035, section 4.9.3).  Presumably, then, the stub needs somehow
> to have authenticated the DNS server in question otherwise before
> accepting the claims about signature validation.  I can't think of any
> way to do this under DHCP, but maybe I don't know the protocol well =
enough.

No, you know the protocol well enough.   This discussion has been making =
more and more clear to me the need for a DHCP security architecture =
document.


From nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu  Mon Jan 17 06:32:02 2011
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On Jan 17, 2011, at 6:25 AM, Ted Lemon wrote:

> On Jan 17, 2011, at 9:22 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>> (RFC 4035, section 4.9.3).  Presumably, then, the stub needs somehow
>> to have authenticated the DNS server in question otherwise before
>> accepting the claims about signature validation.  I can't think of =
any
>> way to do this under DHCP, but maybe I don't know the protocol well =
enough.
>=20
> No, you know the protocol well enough.   This discussion has been =
making more and more clear to me the need for a DHCP security =
architecture document.

Why bother?  IMO A better approach is NOT to try to patch DHCP/IPv6 =
Route Advertisements/ARP etc, but just ACCEPT these as insecure.  [1]

On a local broadcast network, the attacker is always a trivial MitM.  =
Securing DHCP, IPv6 Router Advertisements, ARP, etc, won't stop the =
attacker anyway.  The only thing that stops the attacker is application =
protocols which work in the face of a MitM.

Yet now its the same issue with DNSSEC for A records against a MitM =
who's also a MitM on final traffic:  The application is a customer of =
the final result from DNS/DHCP/ARP/etc....  And that application is =
either trivially vulnerable to a MitM OR doesn't actually need to care =
that DHCP, ARP, DNS, etc are secure, because such insecurity is no =
different than any other MitM.


[1] Not to mention it may be impossible to make these secure, since they =
are usually 'no initial point of trust bootstrap protocols'....


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On Jan 17, 2011, at 9:34 AM, Nicholas Weaver wrote:
> Why bother?  IMO A better approach is NOT to try to patch DHCP/IPv6 =
Route Advertisements/ARP etc, but just ACCEPT these as insecure.  [1]

Right, but people keep trying to treat them as if they conveyed some =
sort of trustworthiness.   Hence the need for a security architecture =
document.

> Yet now its the same issue with DNSSEC for A records against a MitM =
who's also a MitM on final traffic:  The application is a customer of =
the final result from DNS/DHCP/ARP/etc....  And that application is =
either trivially vulnerable to a MitM OR doesn't actually need to care =
that DHCP, ARP, DNS, etc are secure, because such insecurity is no =
different than any other MitM.

The application needs to get the address of a service to *try* before it =
can validate its trustworthiness.   If DNS is successfully spoofed, the =
application will, at best, simply fail, and at worst, it will reveal =
sensitive information to an attacker or cause damage (or both).

There are really four levels of security we could reasonably aspire to =
having:

- None: the DHCP server and/or DNS server can lie to the client with =
impunity, because it does not attempt to validate DHCP and/or DNS =
responses that it gets.
- Some: the DHCP server and/or DNS server's lies will be detected, but =
the client has no way to get the truth, so the lies amount to DoS =
attacks.
- Some more: the DHCP client and/or DNS resolver can detect rogue =
servers and can re-try the protocol using different servers in hopes of =
getting a working network connection, using cached information.
- Some more still: the DHCP client is configured with keys that it knows =
belong to trusted DHCP servers, and hence when it receives multiple =
offers, some of which come from trusted servers and some of which do =
not, can entirely avoid DoS attacks by using  a trusted server.

As you can see, none of these levels of security reliably protect the =
application layer, yet all of them except the first are clear usability =
improvements over the first.   So to say that there is no value in doing =
validation in these protocols is simply nonsense.   You could argue that =
there isn't enough value to justify going to the trouble, but there is =
value.


From rdroms.ietf@gmail.com  Mon Jan 17 20:43:56 2011
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Subject: [DNSOP] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01.txt> (Special-Use Domain Names) to Proposed Standard
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FYI; review and comment requested...

- Ralph

Begin forwarded message:

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
Date: January 17, 2011 3:00:48 PM PST
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Subject: Last Call: <draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01.txt> =
(Special-Use Domain Names) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
the following document:
- 'Special-Use Domain Names'
 <draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01.txt> as a Proposed Standard

  Abstract

  This document describes what it means to say that a DNS name is
  reserved for special use, when reserving such a name is appropriate,
  and the procedure for doing so.

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2011-02-14. Exceptionally, comments may =
be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

The file can be obtained via
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From jabley@hopcount.ca  Tue Jan 18 07:06:20 2011
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01.txt> (Special-Use Domain Names) to Proposed Standard
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On 2011-01-17, at 23:46, Ralph Droms wrote:

> FYI; review and comment requested...

Comments below, in-line.

>                         Special-Use Domain Names
>                  draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01
>=20
> Abstract
>=20
>    This document describes what it means to say that a DNS name is
>    reserved for special use, when reserving such a name is =
appropriate,
>    and the procedure for doing so.

The acronym DNS should perhaps be expanded upon first use.

> 1.  Introduction
>=20
>    Certain individual IP addresses and IP address ranges are treated
>    specially by network implementations, and consequently are not
>    suitable for use as unicast addresses. For example, IPv4 addresses
>    224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255 are multicast addresses [RFC2606], =
with
>    224.0.0.1 being the "all hosts" multicast address [RFC1112]
>    [RFC5771]. Another example is 127.0.0.1, the IPv4 "local host"
>    address [RFC5735].
>=20
>    Analogous to Special-Use IPv4 Addresses [RFC5735], DNS has its own
>    concept of reserved names, such as "example.com", "example.net", =
and
>    "example.org", or any name falling under the top level =
pseudo-domain
>    "invalid" [RFC2606]. However, "Reserved Top Level DNS Names"
>    [RFC2606] does not state whether implementations are expected to
>    treat such names differently, and if so, in what way.

DNS could be expanded again, upon first use outside the abstract, and a =
reference to 1034/1035 wouldn't hurt.

I don't think special-use names are a concept of the DNS in the protocol =
sense, but rather a set of administrative conventions. I think it's =
fairly clear that 2606 does not specify a protocol restriction (and, =
consequently, does not specify special handling in implementations); it =
doesn't update 1034/1035, and the rationale given in section 2 suggests =
normal handling in DNS software (it wouldn't be much of a test if your =
test cases were all handled differently from production, non-reserved =
names).

The idea of creating an IANA registry of special-use names for ease of =
reference by other documents seems worthwhile, however.

> 2.  Applicability
>=20
>    When IP multicast was created [RFC1112], implementations had to be
>    updated to understand what a multicast address means and what to do
>    with it. Adding IP multicast to a networking stack entailed more =
than
>    merely adding the right routing table entries for those addresses.
>    Moreover, supporting IP multicast entails some level of commonality
>    that is consistent across all conformant hosts, independent of what
>    networks those hosts may be connected to. While it is possible to
>    build a private isolated network using whatever valid unicast IP
>    addresses and routing topology you choose (regardless of whether
>    those unicast IP addresses are already in use by other hosts on the
>    public Internet) the IPv4 multicast address 224.0.0.1 is always the
>    "all hosts" multicast address and that's not a local decision.

The examples above are all those in which special implementation =
decisions are required for handling special-use addresses. That covers =
part of the story, but...

>    Similarly, if a domain name has special properties that affect the
>    way hardware and software implementations handle the name, which
>    apply universally regardless of what network the implementation may
>    be connected to, then that may be a candidate for having the IETF
>    declare the name to be a Special-Use Domain Name and specify what
>    special treatment implementations should give to that name. If
>    declaring a given name to be special would result in no change to =
any
>    implementations, then that suggests that the name may not be =
special
>    in any material way, and it may be more appropriate to use the
>    existing DNS mechanisms [RFC1034] to provide the desired =
delegation,
>    data, or lack-of-data for the name in question. Where the desired
>    behaviour can be achieved via the existing domain name registration
>    processes, that process should be used. Reservation of a =
Special-Use
>    Domain Names is not a mechanism for circumventing normal domain =
name
>    registration processes.

... I disagree with the characterisation that follows. Just because =
there is no intended special handling required for INVALID as a TLD =
doesn't make INVALID less special in the operational sense; implications =
remain for root zone management (i.e. the label INVALID should not =
appear) that can't be signalled using resource records. EXAMPLE.COM and =
friends are delegated, and require no special handling in DNS software, =
but those names remain special in the sense that they have specific =
application in documentation.

> 3.  Procedure
>=20
>    If it is determined that special handling of a name is required in
>    order to implement some desired new functionality, then an IETF
>    "Standards Action" RFC [RFC5226] needs to be published describing =
the
>    new functionality, and:

If the criteria for expansion of the IANA registry is a standards =
action, then that detail belongs in the IANA Considerations section. See =
below for more on that.

>     o The RFC needs to state how implementations determine that the
>       special handling is required for any given name. This is =
typically
>       done by stating that any fully-qualified domain names ending in =
a
>       certain suffix (i.e. falling within a specified parent pseudo-
>       domain) will receive the special behaviour. In effect this =
carves
>       off a sub-tree of the DNS namespace in which the modified name
>       treatment rules apply, analogous to how IP multicast [RFC1112] =
or
>       IP link-local addresses [RFC3927] [RFC4862] carve off chunks of
>       the IP address space in which their respective modified address
>       treatment rules apply.

I think the description above is largely implicit in the word "domain", =
which means a sub-tree of the namespace anchored at a particular domain =
name.

>     o The RFC needs to state, in each of the seven categories below,
>       what special treatment, if any, is to be applied. If the answer =
in
>       all seven categories is "none", then possibly no special =
treatment
>       is required and requesting reservation of a Special-Use Domain
>       Name may not be appropriate.

This direction contains vaguely normative-sounding language ("needs") =
but it's not clear what that means in practice. I think this advice =
cannot be normative, but really seeks to give guidance much as RFC 3552 =
and RFC 2434 do. This document would be easier to put in context if it =
did similarly, I think. If there are hard requirements for updating the =
IANA registry that this document also specifies be created then they =
belong in the IANA Considerations section, since in effect they are =
directions to the IANA for maintaining that registry. The text which =
follows in section 4 looks like guidance to me, however.

> 4.  Domain Name Reservation Considerations
>=20
>    An IETF "Standards Action" RFC specifying some new naming =
behaviour,
>    which requires a Special-Use Domain Name be reserved to implement
>    this desired new behaviour, needs to contain a "Domain Name
>    Reservation Considerations" section giving answers in the following
>    seven categories:

I am not sure that instantiating a new named document section is =
practical or necessary, and certainly seems destined to delay this =
document's progress as there's little recent precedent for it. Modifying =
the review and publication process for the RFC Editor will likely also =
require IAB review.

Most of the considerations that are described in the rest of this =
section look entirely reasonable, but perhaps it's not an exhaustive =
list. There's no discussion of the applicability of DNSSEC for the =
domains concerned, for example -- it might be beneficial for some =
applications to specify that zones not be signed, for some reason, or =
that the zone in which a definitively non-existent name does not exist =
is signed in order to provide cryptographic confidence in its =
non-existence.

This one, however, touches on policy that I might argue is effectively =
outside the realm of IETF specifications:

>    7. DNS Registrars:
>=20
>       How should DNS Registrars treat requests to register this =
reserved
>       domain name? Should such requests be denied? Should such =
requests
>       be allowed, but only to a specially-designated entity? (For
>       example, the name "www.example.org" is reserved for =
documentation
>       examples and is not available for registration; however, the =
name
>       is in fact registered; and there is even a web site at that =
name,
>       which states circularly that the name is reserved for use in
>       documentation and cannot be registered!)

EXAMPLE.ORG is in fact reserved as described; the implementation of that =
reservation is an entry in the ORG registry, but the effect is as =
intended.

Domain Name:EXAMPLE.ORG
Created On:31-Aug-1995 04:00:00 UTC
Last Updated On:27-Jul-2010 20:57:51 UTC
Expiration Date:30-Aug-2010 04:00:00 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) =
(R193-LROR)
Status:DELETE PROHIBITED
Status:RENEW PROHIBITED
Status:TRANSFER PROHIBITED
Status:UPDATE PROHIBITED

> 5.  Security Considerations
>=20
>    This document outlines the circumstances in which reserving a =
domain
>    name for special-use is appropriate, and the procedure for having
>    that Special-Use Domain Name recorded by IANA. Any document
>    requesting such a Special-Use Domain Name needs to contain an
>    appropriate "Security Considerations" section which describes any
>    security issues relevant to that special use.

This seems like an additional guideline that would more usefully belong =
in section 4. This document doesn't seem to me to have any security =
considerations, but a back-reference to guidance in section 4 doesn't =
seem unreasonable.

> 6.  IANA Considerations
>=20
>    IANA needs to create a new registry of Special-Use Domain Names.
>=20
>    When IANA receives a request to record a new "Special-Use Domain
>    Name" it should verify that the IETF "Standards Action" RFC =
[RFC5226]
>    includes the required "Domain Name Reservation Considerations"
>    section stating how the special meaning of this name affects the
>    behaviour of hardware, software, and humans in the seven =
categories,
>    and if so, record in the registry the Special-Use Domain Name and a
>    reference to the RFC that documents it.

I don't pretend to speak authoritatively for Michelle and her team, but =
this seems almost unimplementable as-written. It would be much easier =
for IANA staff to handle this direction if it included more explicit =
instructions such as specifying the registry name and the circumstances =
in which entries in the registry are to be added, deleted and changed, =
and gave clearer instructions (rows, columns) on how the registry was to =
be created. An initial set of data for the registry to contain would =
also be useful to mention.

For what it's worth I drafted a document some time ago with similar =
objectives, but without the useful guidance that this document includes. =
I've attached a copy to further illustrate my thoughts above. Perhaps =
it's not unreasonable to split the content of this document into two =
I-Ds, one which specifies the registry and a second which gives guidance =
to future document authors who seek to make use of it.


Joe

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Network Working Group                                           J. Abley
Internet-Draft                                                     ICANN
Intended status: BCP                                    October 18, 2010
Expires: April 21, 2011


                         Reserved Domain Names
                 draft-jabley-reserved-domain-names-00

Abstract

   The Domain Name System (DNS) makes use of a hierarchical naming
   scheme.  The validity of a particular name in the DNS is governed by
   protocol, operational and policy considerations.

   The IETF has identified particular domain names to have special
   considerations associated with their use.  These domain names have
   been identified in various documents in the RFC series.  This
   document describes the creation of an IANA registry to catalogue such
   domain names and provides direction about how this registry should be
   maintained.

   This document does not identify any new domain name as having special
   considerations associated with its use.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal



Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 1]
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Internet-Draft            Reserved Domain Names             October 2010


   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.











































Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 2]
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Internet-Draft            Reserved Domain Names             October 2010


1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System (DNS) is described in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].

   The DNS makes use of a hierarchical naming scheme.  The validity of a
   particular name in the DNS is governed by protocol, operational and
   policy considerations.

   The IETF has identified particular domain names to have special
   considerations associated with their use.  Examples of such domain
   names are "LOCALHOST" and "EXAMPLE.ORG" which are discussed in
   [RFC2606], and "LOCAL" and "254.169.IN-ADDR.ARPA" which are described
   in [I-D.cheshire-dnsext-multicastdns].

   This document describes the creation of an IANA registry to catalogue
   such domain names and provides direction about how this registry
   should be maintained.

   This document does not identify any new domain name as having special
   considerations associated with its use.































Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 3]
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Internet-Draft            Reserved Domain Names             October 2010


2.  IANA Considerations

   This document directs the IANA to create a registry as follows:

    +-------------------------+--------------------------------------+
    | Parameter               | Value                                |
    +-------------------------+--------------------------------------+
    | Registry Name           | Reserved Domain Names                |
    |                         |                                      |
    | Reference               | This document (RFCXXXX)              |
    |                         |                                      |
    | Registration Procedures | Document Published with IAB Approval |
    +-------------------------+--------------------------------------+

   The initial registry contents should be as follows:

   +-------------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
   | Domain Name | Description                             | Reference |
   +-------------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
   | TEST        | Recommended for use in testing of       | [RFC2606] |
   |             | current or new DNS related code         |           |
   |             |                                         |           |
   | EXAMPLE     | Recommended for use in documentation or | [RFC2606] |
   |             | as examples                             |           |
   |             |                                         |           |
   | INVALID     | Recommended for use in documentation or | [RFC2606] |
   |             | as examples                             |           |
   |             |                                         |           |
   | LOCALHOST   | Traditionally statically defined in     | [RFC2606] |
   |             | host DNS implementations as having an A |           |
   |             | record pointing to the loop back IP     |           |
   |             | address, and reserved for such use      |           |
   |             |                                         |           |
   | EXAMPLE.COM | Available for use as examples           | [RFC2606] |
   |             |                                         |           |
   | EXAMPLE.NET | Available for use as examples           | [RFC2606] |
   |             |                                         |           |
   | EXAMPLE.ORG | Available for use as examples           | [RFC2606] |
   +-------------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+












Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 4]
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3.  Security Considerations

   This document poses no new security issues.
















































Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 5]
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4.  Informative References

   [I-D.cheshire-dnsext-multicastdns]
              Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS",
              draft-cheshire-dnsext-multicastdns-11 (work in progress),
              March 2010.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2606]  Eastlake, D. and A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS
              Names", BCP 32, RFC 2606, June 1999.




































Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 6]
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Appendix A.  Editorial Notes

   This section (and sub-sections) to be removed prior to publication.

A.1.  Change History

   00 Initial draft.












































Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 7]
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Author's Address

   Joe Abley
   ICANN
   4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
   Marina del Rey, CA  90292
   USA

   Phone: +1 519 670 9327
   Email: joe.abley@icann.org









































Abley                    Expires April 21, 2011                 [Page 8]
=0C

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* Joe Abley:

> I don't think special-use names are a concept of the DNS in the
> protocol sense, but rather a set of administrative conventions.

LOCAL. is very much protocol-enshrined, but I think it has been
reserved neither by IETF nor IANA.  Would any other reserved name
share a similar fate?  Then you might be right in the sense that the
IETF cannot set aside names for use at the protocol level.

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99

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Cc: dnsop@ietf.org, dnsext@ietf.org, IETF Directorate DNS <dns-dir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01.txt> (Special-Use Domain Names) to Proposed Standard
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On 2011-01-18, at 10:17, Florian Weimer wrote:

> * Joe Abley:
>=20
>> I don't think special-use names are a concept of the DNS in the
>> protocol sense, but rather a set of administrative conventions.
>=20
> LOCAL. is very much protocol-enshrined, but I think it has been
> reserved neither by IETF nor IANA.  Would any other reserved name
> share a similar fate?  Then you might be right in the sense that the
> IETF cannot set aside names for use at the protocol level.

You're right. I was actually referring to special-use names which have =
been specified at the IETF to date rather than those that are in the =
process of being specified, but that wasn't clear in the words I used.

(I appreciate that in the sense of widespread deployment and =
implementation bonjour is clearly extremely specified, but in an IETF =
context the work is still ongoing, I think).


Joe=

From ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net  Tue Jan 18 12:45:55 2011
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: Last Call:	<draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01.txt> (Special-Use	Domain Names) to Proposed Standard
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There are label segments that have semantics.

The "--" violation, prepended by something, "^xn", where "^" indicates 
a label boundary, to indicate a (the current) "IDN" processing.

Bytes within a label with values in excess of 127.

Off hand I can't think of anything else (that is intentional). Along 
the accidental sort-of-intended mumble access of forensic engineering 
are terminating (TLD) labels that brain-dead dead-ware interprets (if 
anyone living were to ask it) character representations of digit 
sequences as v4 addresses that currently has the pants scared off of 
ICANN and some folks from this side of the policy|tech divide.

Everything else seems to just be intentional carve outs of string 
spaces, suited, if there is a purpose, to the (defunct) User Services 
Area Directorate and its inform-the-community mission that "example" 
is not a means to repeat for the bazillionth time the flagship brand 
of Verisign.

.local has sufficient meaning to care about.

John Levin's draft covers some "don't pretend you're ARPA" ground, 
which is a useful restriction on what appears in the IANA root (and 
any other used by every user in China) and in SLDs, assuming that a 
means other than persuasion is available to inform both 
auctions-are-good gTLD operators and ICANN-is-irrelevant ccTLD 
operators that some restrictions are beneficial.

The chief defect of Stewart's draft is that it makes an analogy to the 
semantics of addressing, and postulates a pseudo-technical set of 
implementation responsibilities, and fails to mention ICANN, which has 
some coordination mission.

What isn't a layer 9 is worth documenting. What is at layer 9 should 
be documented as being at layer 9.

Eric

From teemu.savolainen@nokia.com  Wed Jan 19 01:09:23 2011
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-savolainen-mif-dns-server-selection-06.txt
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Hi,

> Your assertions about the state of the art in DNS resolver
> implementations is probably correct.   However, essentially what you
> are proposing is to take this broken behavior as a standard, and then
> build new functionality on it.   The problem is that the behavior is

Well, if the only standard is de facto standard then I think one must build=
 on top of that:)

> The way your proposal breaks DNSSEC is by allowing an attacker to
> convince your resolver to treat a pre-arranged server as the authority
> for certain named zones.

No, this option is not intended to say a DNS server has any authority. This=
 essentially says if lacking better information the pointed DNS server migh=
t be a good pick. And after your comments I have clarified to the draft tha=
t the host should not stick only to this DNS server, but can try also other=
s.
=20
> Hm.   Okay, so the reason this is an issue is that I'm assuming the
> resolver doesn't do its own validation.   And you're right that if it
> doesn't do its own validation, it's not much worse off using this
> option than not using it; the degree to which its worse off is that
> this option allows the attacker to deterministically attack certain
> domains, whereas without the use of this option the attacker would, in
> a best-case scenario, be relying on chance to succeed in its attack.

Correct.

> This actually makes me feel a lot better about the proposal.   I'd like
> to see the proposal require that the resolver validate any query itself
> if it uses the option; otherwise we're going to see interoperability
> problems with this option once resolvers *do* start validating, because
> people will have set their internal zones up wrong.

Sounds good, will include in -01. Actually I assumed host validation alread=
y, but I didn't spell it out in the draft.=20

Going off-topic a bit, maybe someone here could tell me in which case a hos=
t *can* trust DNS server to do the validation, save the case where host tal=
ks to DNS server over trusted access (e.g. VPN/IPsec or cellular)?

> I think you also need to document the signing architectures that will
> work with this option: either don't sign the zone that contains
> referrals for the internal zone, or else sign two copies of the zone;
> one that's visible from outside and contains no referrals, and a second
> one that's visible from inside, and contains referrals.

This makes me feel even more so that the draft should have co-author with d=
eep DNSSEC expertise..=20

> The validating resolver obviously must use the substitute server for
> the entire query, not just for the queries in that subdomain, or it
> will get the wrong information from its query for the referral to the
> internal zone.
=20
Let try to follow this. If resolver gets CNAME/DNAME reply, it must send fo=
llowing queries to the same DNS server?

> I realize this may not be agreeable to you, but if it is, I could
> attempt to write text for it.   I am not an expert on DNSSEC, so
> someone who is probably ought to read the text and criticize it.

I would very much welcome you, or someone with better DNSSEC knowledge than=
 I do, to co-author the document. By the time of IETF#80 deadline should be=
 just fine.

Anyhow, it is MIF that will eventually decide what is agreeable, as this is=
 now MIF WG doc. However, for me personally it is easier to judge when we h=
ave text in I-D rather than on hundred emails:)

Teemu

From fanf2@hermes.cam.ac.uk  Wed Jan 19 05:39:23 2011
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Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2011 13:41:59 +0000
From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: Last Call:	<draft-cheshire-dnsext-special-names-01.txt> (Special-Use	Domain Names) to Proposed Standard
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On Tue, 18 Jan 2011, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
>
> The "--" violation

It is not a violation. Double hyphens have been permitted by the syntax
forever.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7,
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.

From jason_livingood@cable.comcast.com  Wed Jan 26 04:36:47 2011
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From: "Livingood, Jason" <Jason_Livingood@cable.comcast.com>
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--_000_C9657ED515718jasonlivingoodcablecomcastcom_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

At the last IETF meeting I presented my individual I-D on IPv6 DNS whitelis=
ting. This was subsequently adopted as a WG item in v6ops. Yesterday, I pos=
ted a new -01 version of this draft for WG feedback by v6ops and dnsop at h=
ttp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-v6-aaaa-whitelisting-implication=
s-01. I expect to receive some feedback, primarily in v6ops, and then quick=
ly incorporate that into a =9602 which will then hopefully be mature enough=
 to stand for a WGLC. --> There are several items listed below that I am se=
eking specific dnsop WG feedback on. <--

1 - Figure 2 has been updated. As was pointed out at the IETF meeting, this=
 was a bit lacking in detail (did not show both A and AAAA queries). Let me=
 know if this updated figure is suitable or if it still could use some twea=
ks.

2 =96 Section 4.2: Any good reference(s) to round robin DNS as a load balan=
cing technique?

3 =96 Section 4.2: Any good reference(s) to the technical subject of load b=
alancing in general?

4 =96 Section 4.2: Any good reference(s) to the practice of CDNs varying th=
eir DNS query responses based on an estimated geographic location?

Thanks in advace!
Jason

--_000_C9657ED515718jasonlivingoodcablecomcastcom_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-ID: <92929890AF82744080903B87293CCEAD@cable.comcast.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 16px; font-fami=
ly: Calibri, sans-serif; ">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>At the last IETF meeting I presented my individual I-D on IPv6 DNS whi=
telisting. This was subsequently adopted as a WG item in v6ops.&nbsp;Yester=
day, I posted a new -01 version of this draft for WG feedback by v6ops and =
dnsop at&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-v6-aaa=
a-whitelisting-implications-01">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-v6ops=
-v6-aaaa-whitelisting-implications-01</a>.
 I expect to receive some feedback, primarily in v6ops, and then quickly in=
corporate that into a =9602 which will then hopefully be mature enough to s=
tand for a WGLC. --&gt; There are several items listed below that I am seek=
ing specific dnsop WG feedback on. &lt;--</div>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1 - Figure 2 has been updated. As was pointed out at the IETF meeting,=
 this was a bit lacking in detail (did not show both A and AAAA queries). L=
et me know if this updated figure is suitable or if it still could use some=
 tweaks.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>2 =96 Section 4.2: Any good reference(s) to round robin DNS as a load =
balancing technique?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>3 =96 Section 4.2: Any good reference(s) to the technical subject of l=
oad balancing in general?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>4 =96 Section 4.2: Any good reference(s) to the practice of CDNs varyi=
ng their DNS query responses based on an estimated geographic location?</di=
v>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks in advace!</div>
<div>Jason</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_C9657ED515718jasonlivingoodcablecomcastcom_--

From sa.morris7@googlemail.com  Wed Jan 26 09:55:05 2011
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] NSCP Pros and Cons: draft-dickinson-dnsop-nameserver-control
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To restart the dormant discussion on NSCP...

On 13 Dec 2010, at 08:51, Jelte Jansen wrote:

> It has been said (perhaps by you) that perhaps we ought to think about =
splitting
> up the data model and the protocol. I'm not sure about the advantage =
of that
> (well, apart from doc length), but thought i'd mention it.

In part it is document length, but also to allow the development of NSCP =
to proceed without getting side-tracked by discussions on whether =
NETCONF should be used as the underlying protocol.


> Two more things, I've also heard complaints about Netconf/yang being =
overkill,
> do we know if this is about netconf, yang, or both?

I've also heard mutterings along those lines, but nothing definitive.

NETCONF was proposed as the underlying protocol for the reasons outlined =
in the draft.  I don't think it is overkill, as anything that =
implemented NSCP would need to supply a lot of the functionality that =
comes with NETCONF.

With regards to YANG, that was in development around the time NSCP was =
being developed. As it was being promoted as a data modelling language =
for NETCONF, it made sense to use it for a NETCONF-based application.  =
However, it is new and the specification, RFC 6020, is over 170 pages =
long; perhaps that it putting people off?  If we don't use YANG for =
NSCP, what should be used?


> Related to that, someone proposed a RESTful protocol, but noone made a =
specific
> proposal for that. Should we try to get someone to do that? :)

If someone would like to formally propose a RESTful approach, that would =
be a useful contribution to the discussion.  But whatever the underlying =
protocol, we still need to get agreement on the data model.


Stephen=

From mlarson@verisign.com  Fri Jan 28 05:58:03 2011
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Subject: [DNSOP] .com DNSSEC operational message
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Over the next several weeks, Verisign will deploy DNSSEC in the .com
zone.  This message contains operational information related to the
deployment that might be of interest to the Internet operational
community.

The .com DNSSEC deployment consists of the following major milestones:

February 26, 2011: The .com registry system will allow
ICANN-accredited registrars to submit DS records for domains under
.com.  These DS records will not be published in the .com zone until
the .com zone is actually signed.

February 28, 2011: A deliberately unvalidatable .com zone will be
published.  Any DS records for .com that have been submitted by
registrars will be published in the deliberately unvalidatable zone.

March 31, 2011: The .com key material will have been unobscured over
the course of the preceding several days and the .com zone will now be
usable for DNSSEC validation.  DS records for .com should appear in
the root zone on this day.


If you have any questions or comments, please send email to
info@verisign-grs.com or reply to this message.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (Darwin)

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From nkong@cnnic.cn  Sun Jan 30 22:22:11 2011
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To: "Jay Daley" <jay@nzrs.net.nz>, "dnsop" <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Hi Jay,

Apologies for the late response. Thanks for your attention and feedback.

> I've read this draft now and my feedback is:
> 
> 1. the linkage to domain names is defined by the briefest of paragraphs,
to
> quote:
> 
> >    For example, there is a clause used to specify the "example.com" zone
> >    that the name server needs to support, and the mechanism of zone
> >    transfer for this zone is AXFR.  Then the NAME of a CZ for this
> >    clause is "example.com", the CLASS of this kind of CZs can be defined
> >    as "Zone", the type of a CR for the mechanism of zone transfer can be
> >    defined as "zone_transfer", and the RDATA will contain the following
> >    characters "AXFR"."
> 
> This needs a clear and unambiguous definition.
> 
> it also needs a definition of a) how the name matching is meant to work
and b)
> how the service is to be located.

The 01 version of this draft definitely needs a further improvement. I'm
planning to update this draft before IETF 80, and I'm sure to make these
paragraphs more clear.

> 2.  the use of DNS as a transport is not thought through and does not work
as
> specified.  DNS is a binary format and yet some key fields of this
proposal are
> text based and no transformation to the binary format is given.  For
example,
> the doc says:
> 
> >  TYPE: A type of the requested CR.  This fields are represented as
> >       a sequence of labels, where each label consists of a length octet
> >       followed by that number of octets.
> 
> but in DNS this is a two octet field.

A new OpCode is required by this draft to identify a queries or responses
message of the automated synchronization mechanism for the configuration
data of multiple DNS name servers. The format of Configuration Record is
based on the section 3.2.1 of [RFC1035], with some fields (such as TYPE
field) redefined by this draft.

> 3.  If a two octet type code was defined for TYPE, then either this is
chosen
> without regard to DNS RRtypes, and so the same set of data sent over the
wire
> (i.e. a DNS packet using a particular RR and a packet in this protocol
using the
> same two octet identifier as that RR) can only be understood when the
context
> of where that data was used in known.  Or if the two octet code is defined
> with regard to DNS RRtypes to avoid conflict, then this is creating RRs by
a
> backdoor.

A new OpCode is used, so I think there won't be any confusion you mentioned.

> 4.  I don't agree with the principle implicit in this draft that DNS can
be used
> to hold configuration data for nameservers that is not related to DNS.
For
> example this could theoretically include telling the nameserver to restart
or
> turn on logging, which is a fundamental change of use of DNS and one to
> which it is unsuited.

This draft only focuses on providing an automated synchronization mechanism
for configuration data of DNS name servers. What kinds of configuration data
needed to be synchronized should be decided by others (such as DNS
administrators or DNS experts of DNSOP WG). 
Actually, the principle implicit in this draft is that DNS can be used to
hold configuration data for nameservers that is related to DNS name servers
(not related to DNS). IMO, turning on logging within your example is one
configuration item for DNS name servers, so it might be supported by this
automated synchronization mechanism. But I think restarting of DNS name
servers within your example belongs to Control not to Configuration. As you
know, management operations are divided into four categories by the
requirement draft [draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs-05]. These
are control, configuration, monitoring and alarms. So far, this draft only
focuses on solving the problems belong to the second category (Configuration
category).


> 5.  The approach of leaving others to define the CRs renders this
unusable.
> The feature set of nameservers is well known and any protocol must attempt
> to enumerate those and provide a well thought out framework for
> representing them to provide minimum usable functionality and to prevent
> inconsistencies appearing later.

+1. I definitely agree with you at this point. I think the 01 version of
this draft is still in a very early stage. A lot of further work needs to be
done in future.


Cheers,
Ning


From jabley@hopcount.ca  Mon Jan 31 11:29:24 2011
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Subject: [DNSOP] draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00
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Hi all,

Per below, Dave and I scribbled some thoughts down about how we might =
recommend validators obtain a useful root zone trust anchor on startup.

It's scrappy, and it's little more than I have said on this list in the =
past week, but I thought it might be handy to have in written form. I =
used a dnsop tag rather than a dnsext one at Andrew Sullivan's =
suggestion, since this looks like operations more than it looks like =
protocol work.

dnsoppers: there's a party going on in dnsext. Look over the fence for =
context.

Reply-To set.


Joe

Begin forwarded message:

> From: IETF I-D Submission Tool <idsubmission@ietf.org>
> Date: 31 January 2011 14:24:56 EST
> To: Joe Abley <joe.abley@icann.org>
> Cc: Dave Knight <dave.knight@icann.org>
> Subject: New Version Notification for =
draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00=20
>=20
>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00.txt =
has been successfully submitted by Joe Abley and posted to the IETF =
repository.
>=20
> Filename:	 draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap
> Revision:	 00
> Title:		 Establishing an Appropriate Root Zone DNSSEC =
Trust Anchor at Startup
> Creation_date:	 2011-01-31
> WG ID:		 Independent Submission
> Number_of_pages: 17
>=20
> Abstract:
> Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) allow cryptographic
> signatures to be used to validate responses received from the Domain
> Name System (DNS).  A DNS client which validates such signatures is
> known as a validator.
>=20
> The choice of appropriate root zone trust anchor for a validator is
> expected to vary over time as the corresponding cryptographic keys
> used in DNSSEC are changed.
>=20
> This document provides guidance on how validators might determine an
> appropriate trust anchor for the root zone to use at start-up, or
> when other mechanisms intended to allow key rollover to be tolerated
> gracefully are not available.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat.
>=20
>=20


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On Jan 31, 2011, at 2:32 PM, Joe Abley wrote:
> It's scrappy, and it's little more than I have said on this list in =
the past week, but I thought it might be handy to have in written form.

I'm not entirely sure I grokked section 6.   It sounds like you're =
proposing that we use locally-configured X.509 certs from certificate =
authorities as the only mechanism for validating the trust anchor that =
we retrieve from the IANA.


From jbash@cisco.com  Mon Jan 31 13:41:11 2011
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On 2011-01-31 14:32, Joe Abley wrote:

> Per below, Dave and I scribbled some thoughts down about how we might
> recommend validators obtain a useful root zone trust anchor on
> startup.

Wow, that's fast service. :-)

> Individual trust anchors are also packaged as X.509 identity
> certificates, signed by various Certificate Authorities (CAs).

How firmly are you attached to your approach? Would you be prepared to
consider supporting alternatives, if consensus could be gathered behind
them?

If so, what would be your concerns? We've heard a lot about my/our
requirements. What are *your* requirements? What would an alternative
bootstrap scheme have to do before you could support it? What procedural
guarantees can you provide, and what guarantees can't you provide?

=46rom what I'm seeing, I kind of doubt we'll get consensus on anything
else quickly enough to be useful on our timetable, so I *suspect* we're
going to have to do what you suggest, at least until something better
comes along, and maybe forever. For the longer term, maybe we could
think about other things.

Given our own constraints, under your draft we (Cisco) would need to
maintain our own bootstrapping service. Specifically, we'd need to play
the role of the X.509 CA signing the root KSKs in your section 5.3:

> Individual trust anchors are also packaged as X.509 identity
> certificates, signed by various Certificate Authorities (CAs).

If we do have to roll our own as you suggest, we may want to give
customers more assurance than your draft specifies, by augmenting your
procedure.

Specifically, we might do as you suggest, but *additionally* retrieve
from Cisco a signed 5011 rollover list.  The idea there would be that
somebody would have to compromise *both* Cisco and at least one
historical root KSK. Of course, the downside would be that any non-5011
key roll would break the devices.  We'll probably have to think about
that. Of course, it's even less likely that you'd want to suggest it to
others than that we'd do it ourselves.

Prodedural details
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
I assume you *are* saying that the

  http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml

URL is guaranteed good for a long time?

I'm not sure what procedure we're meant to use to get the validated CSRs
to create the X.509 certificates for new KSKs. Can you say anything
about that?

I assume that the "ultimate" way to do it is to send some people to a
key ceremony. To be honest, I'm not sure that I could convince
management (or even myself) that that gave enough extra assurance to be
worth it.  I suspect what we'd end up doing, absent other guidance,
would be just grabbing the CSR from wherever, and looking at the root
KSK in use on our own internal systems to see if it was right... then
signing it.

Some comments on the draft itself:

Finding CAs
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
You say:

> URLs
> to allow those certificates to be retrieved are included as optional
> elements in the XML document.

I don't actually see any CA URLs in the XML at the moment.

Obviously you can't just grab a root cert from such a URL and trust
it, anyway... you have to have either a wired-in copy of the cert
itself, or at least a wired-in copy of its public key. So I'm
not sure I see what having the URLs in the XML would do for anybody.

> alternatively a vendor may instantiate its own CA and make
> arrangements with the root zone KSK manager to have the corresponding
> identity certificate locations published in root-anchors.xml.

Our devices already have copies of our own CA's root cert for other
reasons, so we'd just let them rely on that. I'd assume others would
do similarly.

Time
=3D=3D=3D=3D

> 3.1 Initial State
> [...]
> A validator must confirm that its local clock is sufficiently
> accurate before trust anchors can be established, and before
> processing of DNSSEC signatures can proceed.  Discussion of timing
> considerations can be found in Section 4.

How?

I know I brought it up, but I'm getting a little nervous about using the
home router as the only reference point. Nonetheless, it's a good
paradigmatic case, and I'll go with it for now. You're a home
router. You've just been plugged in, either new from the box or after
being in a closet for a long time. Do you:

1. Rely on your local real-time clock? I'm not saying this is impossible,=

   but:

   a. Much existing hardware (not just Linksys; many home routers)
      doesn't have RTCs. Putting one in would significantly increase the
      build cost of the hardware, I'm guessing by several percent.
      And it would reduce the reliability and shelf life.

   b. If you've been in a closet for a while, your RTC may have drifted
      enough to matter. Perhaps more likely, the battery for your
      RTC may have died... an event you may or may not be able to detect
      and usually can't report.

   c. The user may have set the RTC wrong before you went into that
      closet. This is perhaps more likely for a PC than for a router,
      but it could happen... and PCs are also in scope.

2. Rely on NTP? If so, then:

   a. How do you know which NTP sources to trust?
   b. How do you set up authentication with them?

   Public NTP is unauthenticated, and if I remember correctly it's not
   *possible* to authenticate NTP in a public network. The public-key
   stuff is used to distribute shared keys. I could be wrong; it's
   been a while. But that's how I remember it. Anyway, you'd need some
   kind of NTP trust anchor... which puts us back where we started.

3. GPS? WWVB (or non-US equivalent)? Can't receive either one where my
   router is, even if it had the hardware. And both are jammable. WWVB,
   at least, is easily falsified, as are the similar but incompatible
   systems in use in various places outside North America... those where
   such systems exists, that is. I haven't looked into GPS, but I suspect=

   it's spoofable too.

4. Make the user enter the time? How does the user know she needs to
   do that?

   For us, another question is how we keep the user from buying the
   competitor's box that doesn't do DNSSEC and doesn't ask for the
   time. Users see all this stuff as a hassle. I was told today
   that even entering a PIN to get WiFi up causes a noticeable number
   of products to go back to the store.

The state of the art in enterprise networks is *unauthenticated* NTP
with internal hosts. The state of the art in consumer is unauthenticated
NTP with a pool on the public Internet.

This is a huge problem for us with bootstrapping all kinds of crypto
protocols, actually, not just DNSSEC. There's this pervasive assumption
that the time of day is not only known, but known with such certainty
that it can be trusted to ensure the security of systems that are
otherwise engineered to take CPU-aeons to compromise. The problem is
that it's just not an assumption we know how to meet.

In a lot of cases, we just end up having to assume that keys are valid
from the beginning of time to the end of time. I'd very much like to not
have that be true, but I don't know how to fix it.

I could imagine a distributed system of digital notaries and time
stampers that at least let you establish that it was "no earlier than"
some particular time, and that also gave you some assurance that some
set of past events had happened in a particular sequence and within
particular time parameters. You could build that with mutually
distrustful "authorities", and use a quorum or something to prevent any
one of them from messing it up. I think that sort of thing is (part of)
what Phillip Hallam-Baker is getting at. But I'm not sure we can deploy
it sanely in time to be useful for this application... and I don't
think you can build *anything* that lets you detect lies about the
time if an attacker controls *all* your communications.

Trust
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
I'm not sure I understand the phrase "trust anchor" the same way you
do.

> 5.1 Retrieval of Trust Anchors from Local Sources
>
> A trust anchor which is packaged with validator software can never be
> trusted, [...]
>=20
> Validators should never use local trust anchors for bootstrapping.

I think that by "trust anchor" here, you really mean "DNSSEC root
KSK", because below you say:

> 5.3 Retrieval of Trust Anchors from the Root Zone KSK Manager
> [...]
>
>  3. Retrieve the corresponding X.509 identity certificates for the
>     key identified in the previous step, for use in establishing
>     trust in the retrieved trust anchor (see Section 6).
> [...]
> 6. Establishing Trust in Candidate Trust Anchors
>=20
> Once a candidate trust anchor has been retrieved, the validator must
> establish that it is authentic before it can be used.  This document
> recommends that this be carried out by checking the signatures on
> each of the X.509 identity certificates retrieved in the previous
> step until a certificate is found which matches a CA trust anchor
>
> This verification phase requires that validators ship with a useful
> set of CA trust anchors, and that corresponding identity certificates
> are published by the root zone KSK manager.

Either way, it's a local trust anchor... and I don't see why X.509
keys are any less compromisable than DNS keys...

					-- jbash


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From jabley@hopcount.ca  Mon Jan 31 14:11:36 2011
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00
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[we should probably choose either dnsop or dnsext for this, and stop =
posting to both, sorry for starting that trend]

On 2011-01-31, at 16:44, John Bashinski wrote:

> On 2011-01-31 14:32, Joe Abley wrote:
>=20
>> Individual trust anchors are also packaged as X.509 identity
>> certificates, signed by various Certificate Authorities (CAs).
>=20
> How firmly are you attached to your approach? Would you be prepared to
> consider supporting alternatives, if consensus could be gathered =
behind
> them?

Publishing the trust anchor as a CSR and subsequently signing that to =
produce a certificate is part of the existing workflow for KSK =
ceremonies, and changing it will not happen quickly. Change is certainly =
possible, however.

My hope with this document was to present it in Prague, and suggest that =
the (a) working group adopt it. I think the general subject area needs =
work, and I think a working group is likely to do a better job than a =
pair of individuals.

I don't think anybody is married to any particular approach.

> Prodedural details
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> I assume you *are* saying that the
>=20
>  http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml
>=20
> URL is guaranteed good for a long time?

It's specified in the KSK manager's DNSSEC Practice Statement, and the =
IANA people at ICANN are happy to support it for as long as we manage =
the key.

> I'm not sure what procedure we're meant to use to get the validated =
CSRs
> to create the X.509 certificates for new KSKs. Can you say anything
> about that?

We (IANA, again) expect to find a workflow that suits the CA in =
question. If that means that IANA staff provide attestations and a copy =
of the CSR in a tamper-evident bag with corresponding documentation for =
a chain of custody, we can do that.

> I assume that the "ultimate" way to do it is to send some people to a
> key ceremony. To be honest, I'm not sure that I could convince
> management (or even myself) that that gave enough extra assurance to =
be
> worth it.  I suspect what we'd end up doing, absent other guidance,
> would be just grabbing the CSR from wherever, and looking at the root
> KSK in use on our own internal systems to see if it was right... then
> signing it.

The participants who attended the first ceremony were able to witness =
the generation of the key and the corresponding hash on a screen =
connected directly to the ceremony laptop. Subsequent ceremonies have =
principally been concerned with processing the set of key material =
supplied by VeriSign for the next quarter, and have not involved key =
generation.

> Some comments on the draft itself:
>=20
> Finding CAs
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> You say:
>=20
>> URLs
>> to allow those certificates to be retrieved are included as optional
>> elements in the XML document.
>=20
> I don't actually see any CA URLs in the XML at the moment.

Right, this is something that occurred to me as we were discussing the =
bootstrap problem. I have a rev to the trust anchor document ready to go =
that includes those optional elements.

> Obviously you can't just grab a root cert from such a URL and trust
> it, anyway... you have to have either a wired-in copy of the cert
> itself, or at least a wired-in copy of its public key. So I'm
> not sure I see what having the URLs in the XML would do for anybody.

The certificates you pull from those URLs would be of the form

  http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/Kxxxxxx.crt
    (the current name for the certificate produced using the IANA CA)
  http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/Kxxxxxx.crt.cisco
    (if that's the kind of thing cisco decided to do)
  http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/Kxxxxxx.crt.some-commercial-CA
    (and so on)

The idea of inserting optional elements into the XML schema was to allow =
a device parsing root-anchors.xml to enumerate a list of URLs for =
candidate certificates.

Whether or not you decided to trust that certificate would depend on =
whether you had shipped with an appropriate CA trust anchor (e.g. the =
IANA one, or a cisco one, or the some-commercial-CA one).

>> alternatively a vendor may instantiate its own CA and make
>> arrangements with the root zone KSK manager to have the corresponding
>> identity certificate locations published in root-anchors.xml.
>=20
> Our devices already have copies of our own CA's root cert for other
> reasons, so we'd just let them rely on that. I'd assume others would
> do similarly.

Then perhaps this scheme is not as unwieldy for cisco as it might first =
have seemed -- if that cisco CA key can be exercised to process the CSR =
containing the root zone KSK public key, and we can publish that in a =
reasonable place, the extra process involved might be fairly small.

> Time
> =3D=3D=3D=3D
>=20
>> 3.1 Initial State
>> [...]
>> A validator must confirm that its local clock is sufficiently
>> accurate before trust anchors can be established, and before
>> processing of DNSSEC signatures can proceed.  Discussion of timing
>> considerations can be found in Section 4.
>=20
> How?

Good question. The fact that the answer is not obvious doesn't eliminate =
the requirement to set the local clock, though.

> Trust
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> I'm not sure I understand the phrase "trust anchor" the same way you
> do.
>=20
>> 5.1 Retrieval of Trust Anchors from Local Sources
>>=20
>> A trust anchor which is packaged with validator software can never be
>> trusted, [...]
>>=20
>> Validators should never use local trust anchors for bootstrapping.
>=20
> I think that by "trust anchor" here, you really mean "DNSSEC root
> KSK", because below you say:

Yes, I mean a copy of the root zone KSK public key, or a hash of it.

> Either way, it's a local trust anchor... and I don't see why X.509
> keys are any less compromisable than DNS keys...

The difference is that X.509 keys, as deployed by CAs, have expected =
lifetimes measured in decades. Right now we don't know what the expected =
lifetime of the root zone KSK is.


Joe=

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To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00
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On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 5:14 PM, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:

>
> > Either way, it's a local trust anchor... and I don't see why X.509
> > keys are any less compromisable than DNS keys...
>
> The difference is that X.509 keys, as deployed by CAs, have expected
> lifetimes measured in decades. Right now we don't know what the expected
> lifetime of the root zone KSK is.
>

To be precise here, there is no difference in the likelihood that the keys
will be compromised.

The difference is that the X.509 protocol is designed to support keys that
are persistent over long periods (decades) and DNSSEC is not.

In particular an X.509 self-signed certificate is an assertion that the key
holder will maintain and use the associated private key in accordance with
the specified practices for the specified length of time.

You can easily find out how long Comodo or Symantec or whoever is going to
maintain their SSL CA roots, the information is right there in the cert
store and is irrevocable in that the CA can extend the time period (through
recertification) but cannot reduce it.


My advice to Cisco would be to use their existing root to sign the published
CSR for the DNS root KSK in the short term at least.

In the longer term we are going to have to have a look at the problem at a
higher level and work out how we are going to solve it in a scalable way
across all the platforms that involve a root key.

We are starting to make quite a little collection of industry forums that
are doing this root key management as a sideline.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e642d3badd99a6049b2dc72a
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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 5:14 PM, Joe Abl=
ey <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jabley@hopcount.ca">jabley@hopco=
unt.ca</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; Either way, it&#39;s a local trust anchor... and I don&#39;t see why X=
.509<br>
&gt; keys are any less compromisable than DNS keys...<br>
<br>
</div>The difference is that X.509 keys, as deployed by CAs, have expected =
lifetimes measured in decades. Right now we don&#39;t know what the expecte=
d lifetime of the root zone KSK is.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>
To be precise here, there is no difference in the likelihood that the keys =
will be compromised.</div><div><br></div><div>The difference is that the X.=
509 protocol is designed to support keys that are persistent over long peri=
ods (decades) and DNSSEC is not.</div>
<div><br></div><div>In particular an X.509 self-signed certificate is an as=
sertion that the key holder will maintain and use the associated private ke=
y in accordance with the specified practices for the specified length of ti=
me.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>You can easily find out how long Comodo or Symantec or =
whoever is going to maintain their SSL CA roots, the information is right t=
here in the cert store and is irrevocable in that the CA can extend the tim=
e period (through recertification) but cannot reduce it.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>My advice to Cisco would be=A0to use the=
ir existing root to sign the published CSR for the DNS root KSK in the shor=
t term at least.</div><div>=A0</div><div>In the longer term we are going to=
 have to have a look at the problem at a higher level and work out how we a=
re going to solve it in a scalable way across all the platforms that involv=
e a root key.</div>
<div><br></div><div>We are starting to make quite a little collection of in=
dustry forums that are doing this root key management as a sideline.=A0</di=
v></div><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hall=
ambaker.com/</a><br>
<br>

--0016e642d3badd99a6049b2dc72a--

From jabley@hopcount.ca  Mon Jan 31 17:50:42 2011
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00
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On 2011-01-31, at 15:26, Ted Lemon wrote:

> On Jan 31, 2011, at 2:32 PM, Joe Abley wrote:
>> It's scrappy, and it's little more than I have said on this list in =
the past week, but I thought it might be handy to have in written form.
>=20
> I'm not entirely sure I grokked section 6.   It sounds like you're =
proposing that we use locally-configured X.509 certs from certificate =
authorities as the only mechanism for validating the trust anchor that =
we retrieve from the IANA.

The problem I was trying to find a solution for was how an unattended =
validator with default configuration that nobody is ever going to =
change, and which might sit on the shelf for a year before it is plugged =
in, can find a useful trust anchor for the root zone.

ICANN has made no promises about the longevity of either the PGP key or =
the certificate used to generate the S/MIME signature over the =
root-anchors.xml file, so that's not necessarily the right answer.

Using signatures from established X.509 CAs whose policy and practice =
statements confirm their intention for keys to be long lived seems like =
a solution that would work, more or less with what is published today, =
and that's what we wrote up. It also doesn't depend on a single key; if =
a variety of certificates were available (as opposed to the single =
certificate from the IANA CA today) there is operational recourse to =
events such as CA failure/compromise that doesn't involve truck-roll.

For some platforms using a SysTrust-accredited CA trust anchor seems =
like it comes for free, since the operating system vendor already =
maintains that list as part of its regular software update process.

No doubt there are other answers.


Joe=

From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Mon Jan 31 21:41:27 2011
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Subject: [DNSOP] Time vs bootstrap (was Re: [dnsext] draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00)
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Top-replying here, to attempt a high-level suggestion on how to get
some close approximation of time, using DNS/DNSSEC exclusively.

(Warning to those with weak stomachs - this is mildly evil stuff.)

First, without any assurances on the accuracy of local time, the best
that can be achieved regarding bootstrap-to-trust-anchor is
consistency validation.
Having multiple ways to validate the consistency of answers received
over DNSSEC, can create a high degree of confidence in the validity of
the root key, but cannot get to 100% (I don't think, anyway).

However, once you have a trust anchor (root key) that you have a lot
of confidence in, you can then do some cute DNSSEC tricks to get a
rough idea of time, and then a better idea of time.

First, look at the contents of the RRSIGs for the root. If you believe
the RRSIGs, you also necessarily believe that the current time must be
within the start/end time of those RRSIGs.

That might not be close enough for your needs, but may be enough to
further validate the root key. (If it is, validate it before
continuing.)

Next, consider what needs to happen for TLDs that update very frequently.
When they update, their SOA SN needs to change.
And, if they are signed zones, the SOA record's RRSIG needs to be
generated when this happens.
Using the start date/time of such an RRSIG on the SOA for such a zone,
should give a pretty good value for the current time, to at least an
accuracy of a couple of minutes.
This may be good enough for DNSSEC purposes.

(If you do use RRSIG timestamps, be sure to validate the RRSIG first
before trusting the values on the timestamp!!!)

While horribly kludgey and mildly evil, it does get an answer that is
reasonably trustworthy, moderately accurate/precise, and only uses
DNSSEC.

(It borrows the main idea from using GPS for clock as well as position.)

Brian

On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 5:44 PM, John Bashinski <jbash@cisco.com> wrote:
> On 2011-01-31 14:32, Joe Abley wrote:
>
>
> Time
> =3D=3D=3D=3D
>
>> 3.1 Initial State
>> [...]
>> A validator must confirm that its local clock is sufficiently
>> accurate before trust anchors can be established, and before
>> processing of DNSSEC signatures can proceed. =A0Discussion of timing
>> considerations can be found in Section 4.
>
> How?
>
> I know I brought it up, but I'm getting a little nervous about using the
> home router as the only reference point. Nonetheless, it's a good
> paradigmatic case, and I'll go with it for now. You're a home
> router. You've just been plugged in, either new from the box or after
> being in a closet for a long time.
>
>
> The state of the art in enterprise networks is *unauthenticated* NTP
> with internal hosts. The state of the art in consumer is unauthenticated
> NTP with a pool on the public Internet.
>
> This is a huge problem for us with bootstrapping all kinds of crypto
> protocols, actually, not just DNSSEC. There's this pervasive assumption
> that the time of day is not only known, but known with such certainty
> that it can be trusted to ensure the security of systems that are
> otherwise engineered to take CPU-aeons to compromise. The problem is
> that it's just not an assumption we know how to meet.
>
> In a lot of cases, we just end up having to assume that keys are valid
> from the beginning of time to the end of time. I'd very much like to not
> have that be true, but I don't know how to fix it.
>
> I could imagine a distributed system of digital notaries and time
> stampers that at least let you establish that it was "no earlier than"
> some particular time, and that also gave you some assurance that some
> set of past events had happened in a particular sequence and within
> particular time parameters. You could build that with mutually
> distrustful "authorities", and use a quorum or something to prevent any
> one of them from messing it up. I think that sort of thing is (part of)
> what Phillip Hallam-Baker is getting at. But I'm not sure we can deploy
> it sanely in time to be useful for this application... and I don't
> think you can build *anything* that lets you detect lies about the
> time if an attacker controls *all* your communications.

From paul@xelerance.com  Mon Jan 31 23:27:05 2011
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Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 02:30:17 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Time vs bootstrap (was Re: draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00)
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On Tue, 1 Feb 2011, Brian Dickson wrote:

> However, once you have a trust anchor (root key) that you have a lot
> of confidence in, you can then do some cute DNSSEC tricks to get a
> rough idea of time, and then a better idea of time.
>
> First, look at the contents of the RRSIGs for the root. If you believe
> the RRSIGs, you also necessarily believe that the current time must be
> within the start/end time of those RRSIGs.

But if the rootkey was compromised, so would the RRSIGs? At least for the
view of the device - if the attacker cannot fool the client that the old
compromised root key is the real one, or preset a fake successor in some
history zone, then the attacker lost anyway.

> Next, consider what needs to happen for TLDs that update very frequently.
> When they update, their SOA SN needs to change.
> And, if they are signed zones, the SOA record's RRSIG needs to be
> generated when this happens.
> Using the start date/time of such an RRSIG on the SOA for such a zone,
> should give a pretty good value for the current time, to at least an
> accuracy of a couple of minutes.

That actually is a nice trick. Though I don't think it gets you acuracy on
the minute, but hours surely. org. got me witin an hour, gov. within 3 hours.

> This may be good enough for DNSSEC purposes.

At least to then do ntp and and see that it matches our rough expectation.
Though in all, if the attacker is your controlling upstream, you are lost.

Paul
