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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] Time vs bootstrap (was Re: draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00)
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On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 2:30 AM, Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> wrote:

> On Tue, 1 Feb 2011, Brian Dickson wrote:
>
>  This may be good enough for DNSSEC purposes.
>>
>
> At least to then do ntp and and see that it matches our rough expectation.
> Though in all, if the attacker is your controlling upstream, you are lost.
>
> Paul


Active man in the middle is rather easier than factoring a 2048 bit RSA.

With active man in the middle it is going to be possible to perform a replay
attack.

Checking for consistency of data is going to make a replay attack harder but
not impossible.

This may not matter if the device that ultimately relies on the data
returned has a trustworthy time source.

Otherwise you need a mechanism that provides trusted time that is secure
against a replay attack. That is at minimum going to require the ability to
persist a trusted time response to provide a weak form of protection but
strong protection requires a challenge response mechanism and trusted time.


Since ICANN does not provide trusted time, an additional trust root is going
to be necessary.

One issue that does come to mind is that if people are going to implement
the trustworthy resolver model, it would probably be useful to be able to
use the DNS resolver as a low fidelity source of trustworthy time.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 2:30 AM, Paul Wou=
ters <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@xelerance.com">paul@xeler=
ance.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On Tue, 1 Feb 2011, Brian Dickson wrote:<br><br></div><di=
v class=3D"im">
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
This may be good enough for DNSSEC purposes.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
At least to then do ntp and and see that it matches our rough expectation.<=
br>
Though in all, if the attacker is your controlling upstream, you are lost.<=
br><font color=3D"#888888">
<br>
Paul</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Active man in the middle is rat=
her easier than factoring a 2048 bit RSA.</div><div><br></div><div>With act=
ive man in the middle it is going to be possible to perform a replay attack=
.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Checking for consistency of data is going to make a rep=
lay attack harder but not impossible.</div><div><br></div><div>This may not=
 matter if the device that ultimately relies on the data returned has a tru=
stworthy time source.</div>
<div>=A0</div></div>Otherwise you need a mechanism that provides trusted ti=
me that is secure against a replay attack. That is at minimum going to requ=
ire the ability to persist a trusted time response to provide a weak form o=
f protection but strong protection requires a challenge response mechanism =
and trusted time.<br clear=3D"all">
<br><div><br></div><div>Since ICANN does not provide trusted time, an addit=
ional trust root is going to be necessary.</div><div><br></div><div>One iss=
ue that does come to mind is that if people are going to implement the trus=
tworthy resolver model, it would probably be useful to be able to use the D=
NS resolver as a low fidelity source of trustworthy time.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/"=
>http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

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On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, John Bashinski wrote:

> > A validator must confirm that its local clock is sufficiently
> > accurate before trust anchors can be established, and before
> > processing of DNSSEC signatures can proceed.
>
> How?

There are two possibilities here: you can't reach a time server because of
some screwup, or someone is deliberately lying to you about the time.

The latter for DNSSEC is a denial of service attack, and the other network
comms in the bootstrap process is similarly vulnerable to DoS.

I agree it is a concern but I'm not sure it needs to cause angst.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7,
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.

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Subject: [DNSOP] bootstrapping using a quorum of witnesses
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Here is a sketch of a scheme for establishing trust in the root KSK based
on a group of less-trusted cryptographic "witnesses", without a single
point of failure.

It is designed to survive a reasonable amount of cryptographic,
operational, and organizational attrition, so that it should be possible
for a ten-year-old validator to successfully and securely bootstrap. Think
of a fifteen-year-old root hints file, which still after all that time
contains eight valid root server IP addresses: enough to bootstrap.

Phillip Hallam-Baker and John Bashinski have recently hinted at something
like this, though I thought up this scheme a few months ago.

* Witnesses

There is a group of about a dozen root trust anchor witnesses. They are
selected from interested parties such as root server operators, TLD
operators, DNS registries, RIRs, software and hardware vendors, etc. They
have diverse software, hardware, crypto algorithms, operations, locations,
politics, etc. There is no need for anyone to trust any single one of them
nor to trust all of them.

* Witness signatures

Periodically (quarterly, perhaps) the witnesses all sign each others'
public keys and the root public key(s). They also sign a digest of the
previous witness signature set to form a historical link, and other
metadata to associate each key with its owner. These mutual signatures
form a proof that all witnesses agree that these are the current keys.

* Interaction with root zone

There is no coupling between the witnesses and root zone operations,
except that witness signing ceremonies must be timed so that validators
can reliably obtain a valid root KSK from the witness zones across a root
KSK rollover.

* Witness zones

Each witness maintains a well-known DNS zone in which that witness
publishes their copy of all historical witness signatures from all
witnesses. This zone's KSK is the witness's current key. (Details of the
format TBD.)

* Key lifetime

We do not require any very long-lived or standby keys: the only keys not
in active oprerational use are historical bootstrap keys whose private
parts have been destroyed. The remaining risk is that these old keys might
fall to crypographic attack; however if the witnesses have reasonable key
and algorithm rolling schedules and the attacks aren't catastrophic, this
vulnerability will only affect validators bootsrapping of very old
(compromised) data. Sufficiently diverse witnesses can also reduce this
vulnerability.

* Bootstrap data

A validator's bootstrap data comprises a list of witness zones and their
keys. This is operationally similar to the root name server hints, in that
moderately stale data doesn't matter.

* Staleness

There are three kinds of change to the set of witness keys.

 - planned key and/or algorithm rollovers

 - deletion of a witness key

 - introduction of a new witness

Deletion and introduction are expected to be fairly rare. (cf. root
server changes.)

* Rollover

There is a mechanism (details TBD) to indicate in the series of witness
signature sets that a witness performed a planned rollover and destroyed
the old key's private part. A bootstrapping validator uses this
information to update its idea of that witness's key while tracing the
chain of witness signature sets.

* Deletion

There is a mechanism (details TBD) to indicate in the series of witness
signature sets that a key was deleted because of loss or compromise or
because the key's owner ceased to act as a witness for some other reason.
Deletion requires agreement by the other witnesses but does not require
action from the deleted witness. A bootstrapping validator does not trust
any witness that it observes to have been deleted.

* Introduction

New witnesses can be added (again details TBD). A bootstrapping validator
ignores witnesses that were not included in its bootstrap data. Validators
will normally ship with an up-to-date list of witnesses.

If an organization wishes to continue its role as a witness after its key
has been deleted from the set (and if the other witnesses agree!), it must
be re-introduced as a new witness.

* Bootstrap actions

A validator traces the chain of witness signature sets in a witness zone.
In each signature set it verifies all the signatures of the witnesses in
its bootstrap data. Witnesses' keys are updated as necessary by rollover
information. Witnesses that the validator observes to have been deleted
according to this zone are excluded from the entire validation process.
The most recent signature set must have a quorum of valid signatures.

The validator repeats this process for each witness zone until a quorum of
the zones has a record of exactly the same valid chain of witness
signature sets. If it fails to find a quorum it cannot bootstrap.

The size of the quorum is chosen to balance security against resilience in
the face of stale bootstrap data.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
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That is along the lines of where I was thinking. It may even be possible to
make it work with less organization, possibly self-assembling.


So the starting point I thought of was that a Large Router Vendor (LRV)
decides to use its own existing offline root key maintain signatures over
the ICANN KSK.

ICANN have published a CSR so it should be relatively easy to generate an
X.509v3 cross certificate for the ICANN KSK. Why use X.509 here? Well
because that allows us to use the code that we already have to service other
equipment. It allows us to specify an expiry date for the cross certificate
- I would suggest one to two years. Also it allows said LRV to avoid
liability issues that I will come to in a moment.

The LRV then publishes the cross certificate at a specified point in their
DNS tree that is a subdomain that they have reserved for this purpose and is
specific to that particular root.

So this might be:

root2009.lrv.biz  CERT ..... blah

If people are willing to write code we could achieve the same thing in pure
DNSSEC. But that would require code to be written to use the existing HSM to
sign DNS records. There would also be some more architectural options.


This is the minimal cheap and cheerful approach. Essentially all that LRV
has done is to replace the ICANN root with themselves. However they are
publishing the cross cert in a public place.

So what happens if Small Router Vendor now comes along and looks at this
scheme and says 'hey, I can free ride on LRV's scheme'. Which originally had
me thinking in terms of putting a practices statement in the certificate or
possibly going so far as to assert copyright in the embedded root key.

To make this scheme worthwhile is is necessary for LRV to spend an
equivalent amount of care etc. in management of their root. They should be
using key sharing, separation of duties etc (to see how it is done read a
certain large CA's CPS that has the whole scheme explained in all the detail
anyone would ever need).


Then I thought that maybe the bug is a feature and that maybe hooking into
LRV alone is not going to meet the needs of SRV after all. They have no more
control over LRV than they have over ICANN. In fact they have rather less
assurance as LRV might decide to issue a firmware update and phase out their
root.

So one model would be for SRV to contract to have someone manage a root for
them in an outsourced model. Which is feasible, but not inexpensive. And the
cumulative duplication of effort is really not worthwhile.


A better model would be for there to be an established standard for this
scheme and for SRV to embed multiple roots and employ a quorum scheme.

The main advantage to LRV is that the concentration of risk is gone and thus
the potential third party liability. They might still want to have some form
of contractual arrangement with the relying party vendors. But the
possibility of unilateral default is gone and with it the liability.
Moreover since the LRV cannot successfully default, there is no incentive
for them to attempt to do so or for someone to attempt to coerce them -
unless they can coerce a quorum of roots.

A second advantage to LRV is that it frequently grows by acquiring SRVs.
Having them use compatible protocol approaches will ease their legacy
maintenance headache.


So now we have arrived at a position where LRV is doing the work but SRV is
actually giving a better assurance to their customers, their equipment is
can only be compromised through multiple failures while LRVs is vulnerable
to a single failure.

So LRV would probably end up employing the same quorum scheme, either with
peers or with some number of specialist providers of outsourced crypto
management.


So now we have a scheme that is independent of any single point of control.
The only question being the circumstances in which the signers would
legitimately sign something other than the current ICANN root KSK.

The point here is not that ICANN would want to default, but that it might be
coerced. The practices they are using are tamper-evident, not absolutely
tamper proof. If we take away the possibility that a coercion attempt would
succeed, we take away the incentive for a rational person to attempt to do
so.


What I like about this scheme is that we can start building the technical
infrastructure without having to first construct a social-political
construct. It In fact I would prefer to avoid creating any such construct
that might be misinterpreted as a 'New World Order' type organization.

The same technical infrastructure can be used to support a quorum of one out
of one to n out of m. And there is the option for the ultimate customer to
choose their own quorum points.


On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 3:48 PM, Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> wrote:

> Here is a sketch of a scheme for establishing trust in the root KSK based
> on a group of less-trusted cryptographic "witnesses", without a single
> point of failure.
>
> It is designed to survive a reasonable amount of cryptographic,
> operational, and organizational attrition, so that it should be possible
> for a ten-year-old validator to successfully and securely bootstrap. Think
> of a fifteen-year-old root hints file, which still after all that time
> contains eight valid root server IP addresses: enough to bootstrap.
>
> Phillip Hallam-Baker and John Bashinski have recently hinted at something
> like this, though I thought up this scheme a few months ago.
>
> * Witnesses
>
> There is a group of about a dozen root trust anchor witnesses. They are
> selected from interested parties such as root server operators, TLD
> operators, DNS registries, RIRs, software and hardware vendors, etc. They
> have diverse software, hardware, crypto algorithms, operations, locations,
> politics, etc. There is no need for anyone to trust any single one of them
> nor to trust all of them.
>
> * Witness signatures
>
> Periodically (quarterly, perhaps) the witnesses all sign each others'
> public keys and the root public key(s). They also sign a digest of the
> previous witness signature set to form a historical link, and other
> metadata to associate each key with its owner. These mutual signatures
> form a proof that all witnesses agree that these are the current keys.
>
> * Interaction with root zone
>
> There is no coupling between the witnesses and root zone operations,
> except that witness signing ceremonies must be timed so that validators
> can reliably obtain a valid root KSK from the witness zones across a root
> KSK rollover.
>
> * Witness zones
>
> Each witness maintains a well-known DNS zone in which that witness
> publishes their copy of all historical witness signatures from all
> witnesses. This zone's KSK is the witness's current key. (Details of the
> format TBD.)
>
> * Key lifetime
>
> We do not require any very long-lived or standby keys: the only keys not
> in active oprerational use are historical bootstrap keys whose private
> parts have been destroyed. The remaining risk is that these old keys might
> fall to crypographic attack; however if the witnesses have reasonable key
> and algorithm rolling schedules and the attacks aren't catastrophic, this
> vulnerability will only affect validators bootsrapping of very old
> (compromised) data. Sufficiently diverse witnesses can also reduce this
> vulnerability.
>
> * Bootstrap data
>
> A validator's bootstrap data comprises a list of witness zones and their
> keys. This is operationally similar to the root name server hints, in that
> moderately stale data doesn't matter.
>
> * Staleness
>
> There are three kinds of change to the set of witness keys.
>
>  - planned key and/or algorithm rollovers
>
>  - deletion of a witness key
>
>  - introduction of a new witness
>
> Deletion and introduction are expected to be fairly rare. (cf. root
> server changes.)
>
> * Rollover
>
> There is a mechanism (details TBD) to indicate in the series of witness
> signature sets that a witness performed a planned rollover and destroyed
> the old key's private part. A bootstrapping validator uses this
> information to update its idea of that witness's key while tracing the
> chain of witness signature sets.
>
> * Deletion
>
> There is a mechanism (details TBD) to indicate in the series of witness
> signature sets that a key was deleted because of loss or compromise or
> because the key's owner ceased to act as a witness for some other reason.
> Deletion requires agreement by the other witnesses but does not require
> action from the deleted witness. A bootstrapping validator does not trust
> any witness that it observes to have been deleted.
>
> * Introduction
>
> New witnesses can be added (again details TBD). A bootstrapping validator
> ignores witnesses that were not included in its bootstrap data. Validators
> will normally ship with an up-to-date list of witnesses.
>
> If an organization wishes to continue its role as a witness after its key
> has been deleted from the set (and if the other witnesses agree!), it must
> be re-introduced as a new witness.
>
> * Bootstrap actions
>
> A validator traces the chain of witness signature sets in a witness zone.
> In each signature set it verifies all the signatures of the witnesses in
> its bootstrap data. Witnesses' keys are updated as necessary by rollover
> information. Witnesses that the validator observes to have been deleted
> according to this zone are excluded from the entire validation process.
> The most recent signature set must have a quorum of valid signatures.
>
> The validator repeats this process for each witness zone until a quorum of
> the zones has a record of exactly the same valid chain of witness
> signature sets. If it fails to find a quorum it cannot bootstrap.
>
> The size of the quorum is chosen to balance security against resilience in
> the face of stale bootstrap data.
>
> Tony.
> --
> f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
> HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO
> 7,
> DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
> ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e6434658d767f1049b44f16e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

That is along the lines of where I was thinking. It may even be possible to=
 make it work with less organization, possibly self-assembling.<div><br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div>So the starting point I thought of was that a Large =
Router Vendor (LRV) decides to use its own existing offline root key mainta=
in signatures over the ICANN KSK.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>ICANN have published a CSR so it should be relatively e=
asy to generate an X.509v3 cross certificate for the ICANN KSK. Why use X.5=
09 here? Well because that allows us to use the code that we already have t=
o service other equipment. It allows us to specify an expiry date for the c=
ross certificate - I would suggest one to two years. Also it allows said LR=
V to avoid liability issues that I will come to in a moment.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The LRV then publishes the cross certificate at a speci=
fied point in their DNS tree that is a subdomain that they have reserved fo=
r this purpose and is specific to that particular root.</div><div><br></div=
>
<div>So this might be:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://root2009.=
lrv.biz">root2009.lrv.biz</a> =A0CERT ..... blah</div><div><br></div><div>I=
f people are willing to write code we could achieve the same thing in pure =
DNSSEC. But that would require code to be written to use the existing HSM t=
o sign DNS records. There would also be some more architectural options.=A0=
</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>This is the minimal cheap and cheerful a=
pproach. Essentially all that LRV has done is to replace the ICANN root wit=
h themselves. However they are publishing the cross cert in a public place.=
</div>
<div><br></div><div>So what happens if Small Router Vendor now comes along =
and looks at this scheme and says &#39;hey, I can free ride on LRV&#39;s sc=
heme&#39;. Which originally had me thinking in terms of putting a practices=
 statement in the certificate or possibly going so far as to assert copyrig=
ht in the embedded root key.</div>
<div><br></div><div>To make this scheme worthwhile is is necessary for LRV =
to spend an equivalent amount of care etc. in management of their root. The=
y should be using key sharing, separation of duties etc (to see how it is d=
one read a certain large CA&#39;s CPS that has the whole scheme explained i=
n all the detail anyone would ever need).</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Then I thought that maybe the bug is a f=
eature and that maybe hooking into LRV alone is not going to meet the needs=
 of SRV after all. They have no more control over LRV than they have over I=
CANN. In fact they have rather less assurance as LRV might decide to issue =
a firmware update and phase out their root.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So one model would be for SRV to contract to have someo=
ne manage a root for them in an outsourced model. Which is feasible, but no=
t inexpensive. And the cumulative duplication of effort is really not worth=
while.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>A better model would be for there to be =
an established standard for this scheme and for SRV to embed multiple roots=
 and employ a quorum scheme.</div><div><br></div><div>The main advantage to=
 LRV is that the concentration of risk is gone and thus the potential third=
 party liability. They might still want to have some form of contractual ar=
rangement with the relying party vendors. But the possibility of unilateral=
 default is gone and with it the liability. Moreover since the LRV cannot s=
uccessfully default, there is no incentive for them to attempt to do so or =
for someone to attempt to coerce them - unless they can coerce a quorum of =
roots.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A second advantage to LRV is that it frequently grows b=
y acquiring SRVs. Having them use compatible protocol approaches will ease =
their legacy maintenance headache.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>
So now we have arrived at a position where LRV is doing the work but SRV is=
 actually giving a better assurance to their customers, their equipment is =
can only be compromised through multiple failures while LRVs is vulnerable =
to a single failure.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So LRV would probably end up employing the same quorum =
scheme, either with peers or with some number of specialist providers of ou=
tsourced crypto management.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>So now =
we have a scheme that is independent of any single point of control. The on=
ly question being the circumstances in which the signers would legitimately=
 sign something other than the current ICANN root KSK.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>The point here is not that ICANN would want to default,=
 but that it might be coerced. The practices they are using are tamper-evid=
ent, not absolutely tamper proof. If we take away the possibility that a co=
ercion attempt would succeed, we take away the incentive for a rational per=
son to attempt to do so.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>What I like about this scheme is that we=
 can start building the technical infrastructure without having to first co=
nstruct a social-political construct. It In fact I would prefer to avoid cr=
eating any such construct that might be misinterpreted as a &#39;New World =
Order&#39; type organization.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The same technical infrastructure can be used to suppor=
t a quorum of one out of one to n out of m. And there is the option for the=
 ultimate customer to choose their own quorum points.</div><div><br></div>
<div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 3:48 =
PM, Tony Finch <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dot@dotat.at">dot@do=
tat.at</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Here is a sketch of a scheme for establishing trust in the root KSK based<b=
r>
on a group of less-trusted cryptographic &quot;witnesses&quot;, without a s=
ingle<br>
point of failure.<br>
<br>
It is designed to survive a reasonable amount of cryptographic,<br>
operational, and organizational attrition, so that it should be possible<br=
>
for a ten-year-old validator to successfully and securely bootstrap. Think<=
br>
of a fifteen-year-old root hints file, which still after all that time<br>
contains eight valid root server IP addresses: enough to bootstrap.<br>
<br>
Phillip Hallam-Baker and John Bashinski have recently hinted at something<b=
r>
like this, though I thought up this scheme a few months ago.<br>
<br>
* Witnesses<br>
<br>
There is a group of about a dozen root trust anchor witnesses. They are<br>
selected from interested parties such as root server operators, TLD<br>
operators, DNS registries, RIRs, software and hardware vendors, etc. They<b=
r>
have diverse software, hardware, crypto algorithms, operations, locations,<=
br>
politics, etc. There is no need for anyone to trust any single one of them<=
br>
nor to trust all of them.<br>
<br>
* Witness signatures<br>
<br>
Periodically (quarterly, perhaps) the witnesses all sign each others&#39;<b=
r>
public keys and the root public key(s). They also sign a digest of the<br>
previous witness signature set to form a historical link, and other<br>
metadata to associate each key with its owner. These mutual signatures<br>
form a proof that all witnesses agree that these are the current keys.<br>
<br>
* Interaction with root zone<br>
<br>
There is no coupling between the witnesses and root zone operations,<br>
except that witness signing ceremonies must be timed so that validators<br>
can reliably obtain a valid root KSK from the witness zones across a root<b=
r>
KSK rollover.<br>
<br>
* Witness zones<br>
<br>
Each witness maintains a well-known DNS zone in which that witness<br>
publishes their copy of all historical witness signatures from all<br>
witnesses. This zone&#39;s KSK is the witness&#39;s current key. (Details o=
f the<br>
format TBD.)<br>
<br>
* Key lifetime<br>
<br>
We do not require any very long-lived or standby keys: the only keys not<br=
>
in active oprerational use are historical bootstrap keys whose private<br>
parts have been destroyed. The remaining risk is that these old keys might<=
br>
fall to crypographic attack; however if the witnesses have reasonable key<b=
r>
and algorithm rolling schedules and the attacks aren&#39;t catastrophic, th=
is<br>
vulnerability will only affect validators bootsrapping of very old<br>
(compromised) data. Sufficiently diverse witnesses can also reduce this<br>
vulnerability.<br>
<br>
* Bootstrap data<br>
<br>
A validator&#39;s bootstrap data comprises a list of witness zones and thei=
r<br>
keys. This is operationally similar to the root name server hints, in that<=
br>
moderately stale data doesn&#39;t matter.<br>
<br>
* Staleness<br>
<br>
There are three kinds of change to the set of witness keys.<br>
<br>
=A0- planned key and/or algorithm rollovers<br>
<br>
=A0- deletion of a witness key<br>
<br>
=A0- introduction of a new witness<br>
<br>
Deletion and introduction are expected to be fairly rare. (cf. root<br>
server changes.)<br>
<br>
* Rollover<br>
<br>
There is a mechanism (details TBD) to indicate in the series of witness<br>
signature sets that a witness performed a planned rollover and destroyed<br=
>
the old key&#39;s private part. A bootstrapping validator uses this<br>
information to update its idea of that witness&#39;s key while tracing the<=
br>
chain of witness signature sets.<br>
<br>
* Deletion<br>
<br>
There is a mechanism (details TBD) to indicate in the series of witness<br>
signature sets that a key was deleted because of loss or compromise or<br>
because the key&#39;s owner ceased to act as a witness for some other reaso=
n.<br>
Deletion requires agreement by the other witnesses but does not require<br>
action from the deleted witness. A bootstrapping validator does not trust<b=
r>
any witness that it observes to have been deleted.<br>
<br>
* Introduction<br>
<br>
New witnesses can be added (again details TBD). A bootstrapping validator<b=
r>
ignores witnesses that were not included in its bootstrap data. Validators<=
br>
will normally ship with an up-to-date list of witnesses.<br>
<br>
If an organization wishes to continue its role as a witness after its key<b=
r>
has been deleted from the set (and if the other witnesses agree!), it must<=
br>
be re-introduced as a new witness.<br>
<br>
* Bootstrap actions<br>
<br>
A validator traces the chain of witness signature sets in a witness zone.<b=
r>
In each signature set it verifies all the signatures of the witnesses in<br=
>
its bootstrap data. Witnesses&#39; keys are updated as necessary by rollove=
r<br>
information. Witnesses that the validator observes to have been deleted<br>
according to this zone are excluded from the entire validation process.<br>
The most recent signature set must have a quorum of valid signatures.<br>
<br>
The validator repeats this process for each witness zone until a quorum of<=
br>
the zones has a record of exactly the same valid chain of witness<br>
signature sets. If it fails to find a quorum it cannot bootstrap.<br>
<br>
The size of the quorum is chosen to balance security against resilience in<=
br>
the face of stale bootstrap data.<br>
<br>
Tony.<br>
--<br>
f.anthony.n.finch =A0&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dot@dotat.at">dot@dotat.at</a>&g=
t; =A0<a href=3D"http://dotat.at/" target=3D"_blank">http://dotat.at/</a><b=
r>
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7=
,<br>
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR<b=
r>
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"htt=
p://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

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On 2 Feb 2011, at 04:18, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20

I'm glad you think my sheme is reasonably plausible. I'm not sure your idea o=
f a self-assembling committee of witnesses is likely to happen. It seems to m=
e that more deliberate setup will be faster and more likely to succeed. But i=
t requires politics which isn't my area...

> So now we have a scheme that is independent of any single point of control=
. The only question being the circumstances in which the signers would legit=
imately sign something other than the current ICANN root KSK.=20

The same question applies to the root server operators' relationship with IC=
ANN...

Tony.
--
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/=

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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dnsext] draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap-00
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On 1 feb 2011, at 01.40, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> My advice to Cisco would be to use their existing root to sign the =
published CSR for the DNS root KSK in the short term at least.

That's why we (the Root DNSSEC Design Team) included a CSR as one output =
from the key generation ceremony.

	jakob


From dwessels@verisign.com  Wed Feb  2 07:18:06 2011
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Subject: [DNSOP] Please upgrade validators to at least BIND-9.7.2 before .com is signed
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Following the deployment of DNSSEC in the .net zone, Verisign became aware
of issues experienced by users of certain BIND versions when used as a
recursive name server and configured for validation.

A user of a BIND 9.7.0-P2, configured for validation with the root trust
anchor, experienced SERVFAIL responses for all unsigned .net domains after
the .net DS record was published in the root zone and after .net NS records
expired from his name server's cache.

We were able to reproduce the issue in our lab and confirm this behavior.
We believe it is present in BIND versions 9.6.2 through 9.7.0, but not in
9.7.1b1 and later versions. When configured for validation, stub resolvers
querying a recursive name server running the aforementioned versions have
a 50% chance of experiencing the issue upon introduction of a new DS record.
Upon restart of the named process, resolution and validation both work as
expected, without issues.

We recommend anyone using BIND 9.6.2 through 9.7.0 for DNSSEC validation
upgrade to 9.7.2 or later prior to 31 March 2011 (when the DS record for
.com is planned to be published in the root zone). If you are unable to
upgrade, we recommend monitoring the root zone on 31 March for the presence
of the .com DS record and restarting recursive name servers performing
validation as soon as possible after this DS record appears.

A more detailed description of this issue and our analysis is available
at http://www.verisignlabs.com/documents/BIND-DS-Servfail.pdf.

From jelte@isc.org  Thu Feb  3 02:54:05 2011
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] NSCP Pros and Cons: draft-dickinson-dnsop-nameserver-control
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On 01/26/2011 06:58 PM, Stephen Morris wrote:
> To restart the dormant discussion on NSCP...
> 

keeping it on life-support :)

> On 13 Dec 2010, at 08:51, Jelte Jansen wrote:
> 
>> It has been said (perhaps by you) that perhaps we ought to think about splitting
>> up the data model and the protocol. I'm not sure about the advantage of that
>> (well, apart from doc length), but thought i'd mention it.
> 
> In part it is document length, but also to allow the development of NSCP to proceed without getting side-tracked by discussions on whether NETCONF should be used as the underlying protocol.
> 

So would the 'data-model' be completely abstract or still represented in an
existing language (or both, where the language serves 'as an example'?)

> 
>> Two more things, I've also heard complaints about Netconf/yang being overkill,
>> do we know if this is about netconf, yang, or both?
> 
> I've also heard mutterings along those lines, but nothing definitive.
> 
> NETCONF was proposed as the underlying protocol for the reasons outlined in the draft.  I don't think it is overkill, as anything that implemented NSCP would need to supply a lot of the functionality that comes with NETCONF.
> 

Right. It was also specifically made for things like this, although 'back in the
day' there weren't much ready-to-use libraries for it. I hear things are better
now but I must confess I haven't looked :)

> With regards to YANG, that was in development around the time NSCP was being developed. As it was being promoted as a data modelling language for NETCONF, it made sense to use it for a NETCONF-based application.  However, it is new and the specification, RFC 6020, is over 170 pages long; perhaps that it putting people off?  If we don't use YANG for NSCP, what should be used?
> 

no idea...

> 
>> Related to that, someone proposed a RESTful protocol, but noone made a specific
>> proposal for that. Should we try to get someone to do that? :)
> 
> If someone would like to formally propose a RESTful approach, that would be a useful contribution to the discussion.  But whatever the underlying protocol, we still need to get agreement on the data model.
> 

If someone is actually looking into or working on this, please give a ping, even
if it isn't much formed yet

Jelte
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From iesg-secretary@ietf.org  Fri Feb  4 09:14:38 2011
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Subject: [DNSOP] Document Action: 'Requirements for Management of Name Servers for the	DNS' to Informational RFC	(draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs-05.txt)
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Requirements for Management of Name Servers for the DNS'
  (draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs-05.txt) as an
Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Domain Name System Operations Working
Group.

The IESG contact persons are Ron Bonica and Dan Romascanu.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs/




Technical Summary 

Management of name servers for the Domain Name System (DNS) has
traditionally been done using vendor-specific configuration and control
methods.  Although some service monitoring platforms can test the
functionality of the DNS itself there is not an interoperable way to
manage (control, configure, and monitor) the internal aspects of a name
server itself.

This document discusses the requirements of a management system, protocol
or framework for name servers and can be used as a shopping list of needed
features for such a system.

Working Group Summary 

The document represents the consensus of the Working Group.

Document Quality 

The document provides a set of requirements rather than a design of a
protocol. However, followup work has already been started within the IETF
to develop a framework based on this document.

Personnel

Peter Kock is document shepherd.

From matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl  Fri Feb 18 03:06:25 2011
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Hi Rickard,

A long email deserves a long response:)

On 11/08/2010 05:51 PM, Rickard Bellgrim wrote:
> Hi Olaf
> 
> Sorry for this long email, but I got some comments on your draft:
> “DNSSEC Operational practices”. It is a good draft this is needed,
> just want to clarify some stuff.
> 
> 1.2 Time Definitions: “Signature publication period” You mention that
> the replacement takes place in the master zone file. You are probably
> not manipulating the master zone file, but rather the data in the
> “signer”. Some solutions do write to a zone file, but is that always
> the case? You also mention that caches need to expire, etc. But it is
> not clear if this time is part of the definition of signature
> publication period or not.

Would it be good enough to abstract from the master zone file, by just
referring to the zone? Proposed text:

  "Signature publication period" The period that a signature is
  published. It starts at the time the signature is introduced in the
  zone for the first time and ends at the time when the signature is
  removed or replaced with a new signature.

> 1.2 Time Definitions: “Key effectivity period” I would define the key
> effectivity period as the time between creating the first signature
> and the last signature with this key. Remember that the inception
> time can be set to a time earlier than now because of the inception
> offset. And that key will become not active during a rollover, but
> the signatures may be reused for some extra days to get a smooth
> rollover of the signatures. So that you do not drop them at the same
> time.

While technically it is true that a key becomes operative once it has
created the first signature, you could also say that for validators it
looks like that the key is in effect since the first signatures are
incepted. The signer pretends as if the key was in effect earlier than
the first signature was actually created.

Not sure if this is important enough to argue about: We talk about key
effectivity periods of months, years and even decades.

> 3.1 Operational Motivations (5th paragraph) Is it true that you get
> “operational flexibility and higher computational performance” by
> using a file based ZSK and smartcard KSK (offline in a safe) than a
> single key stored on an HSM? The HSM can give you the option to have
> the keys online, thus no need to take out the smartcard from the
> safe. And the HSM can be designed to give you speed. I know that my
> HSM is faster than OpenSSL on my machine.

It may be unwise to talk about higher computational performance in this
section. The section motivates scenarios where operators may benefit
from a ZSK/KSK split. The 5th paragraph is worried about key compromise,
and how a split provides you more protection without losing too much of
your operational flexibility. Speed is not a motivation here.

I do agree that 'on-line HSMs' marginalizes the argument in favor of the
split significantly.

> 3.2 Practical Consequences (2nd paragraph) The statement is that you
> can have signature validity periods on the order of days for ZSK
> signatures, because there is no interaction with the parent during a
> key rollover. Well this is not true. There is nothing that prevents
> you from having short validity periods for KSK signatures. ZSK and
> KSK is thus equal in that aspect.

I agree. Paul Wouters responded:

"It depends on how long the parent's DS/NS records are valid for (TTL)
and how fast they can update the DS record. It's not fully in your
control, so there is some possible delay (and you NEED a monitor to
avoid a bad rollover)",

but I think that is more related to KSK rollover, not the KSK signature
validity period.

> 3.2 Practical Consequences (3rd paragraph) During a KSK rollover,
> there will be “interactions with parties other than the zone
> administrator”. This sounds like there is an interaction with the
> zone administrator during a ZSK rollover. It is true if you have an
> offline KSK. But ZSK rollover can be automated if you have the KSK
> online in e.g. an HSM. I would suggest removing the last part of the
> statement.

I agree.

> 3.3 Key Effectivity Period (2nd paragraph) You say that you should
> choose 13 months as the KSK key effectivity period with the intent to
> replace it after 12 months. Why this extra month? The KSK key
> effectivity period is mostly just a policy. You do not know if you
> are able to complete all of the actions that are needed to do the
> rollover on that exact date. After the rollover, you can say that the
> effectivity period was e.g. 12.5 months because the interaction with
> your parent took some time. So before the rollover, the key
> effectivity period is a policy and after the rollover it is a fact.
> Nothing breaks if you take longer time. (The choice of 12 months is
> another discussion...)

I agree. The key effectivity period should not be considered a constant
value. Do you want to start the discussion of 12 months now? ;)

> 3.3 Key Effectivity Period (4th paragraph) Ok, in a lab it might be
> possible to do rollovers every few minutes. But in the real world,
> your DNSKEY RRset would grow really big because of pre- and
> post-publishing of the key (depending on your rollover mechanism).
> And this document is almost like a BCP, should we tell people that
> this is possible?

Although perhaps considered a BCP by some, it is informational. But I
agree that this short paragraph doesn't add much.

> 3.4.1 Key Algorithm (1st paragraph) Don’t forget to mention GOST and
> that DSA (in DNSSEC) is limited to maximum 1024 bit keys.

Ok.

> 3.4.1 Key Algorithm (2nd paragraph) “RSA/MD5 should not be” =>
> “RSA/MD5 must not be”

It is NOT RECOMMENDED in 4034, so I think the should is sufficient here.

> 3.4.2 Key Sizes This section talks about key sizes, but that depends
> on what algorithm you are talking about. Please mention RSA
> somewhere.

Yes.

> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (1st paragraph) “can safely use 1024-bit keys for at
> least the next ten years”. NIST SP 800-131 says that 1024 – 2048 bit
> is acceptable to use in 2010. It is deprecated between 2011 and 2013.
> From 2011 you should use keys larger than 2048 bits. 
> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/draftSP800-131_June_11_2010.pdf

The recommendation is prepared for use by federal agencies. Is DNSSEC
required to follow these guidelines?

>  3.4.2 Key Sizes (1st paragraph) Why mention the equivalent strength
> of a symmetric key if there is no other algorithm to compare with?

It is compared with the typically next larger key size (2048 bits).
Should that comparison be removed as well?

> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (2nd paragraph) “the next larger key size used is
> 2048 bits”. Is this a dramatic increase from 1024 bit, as the next
> larger key? There are more steps between 1024 and 2048 bits.

It says typically. I am inclined to say that we do not have to go into
all possible key sizes.

> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (2nd paragraph) Double the key size will make
> verification four times slower and signing eight times slower (not
> four times). “public key operations take O(k2) steps, private key
> operations take O(k3) steps, and key generation takes O(k4) steps” -
> http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2215

But such notation might be to vaguely for operators.

> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (5th paragraph) DSA in general can have larger keys
> than 1024, but it is limited to 1024 bits in DNSSEC.

Ok.

> 3.4.3 Private Key Storage (2nd paragraph) Not only dynamic updates
> can require that you have “access” to one private key. It is more
> about regular / automatic updates. E.g. that your system push out a
> new zone file every second hour. No system administrator / security
> officer is willing to go to the server room regularly every day.

Added ', or any other mechanism that runs at a regular interval'.

> 3.4.3 Private Key Storage (last paragraph) See arguments above. How
> does this paragraph then fit in?

I don't see a reason for having the private key on-line with your
regular update mechanism. Do you?

> 3.4.4 Key Generation HSM:s also provide a good facility for key
> generation. With good random numbers.

Added the note.

> 4.1 Key Rollovers I would STRONGLY suggest that you minimize this
> section. Just give an overview of how the different rollover methods
> function and compare them with each other. Refer to the key timing
> draft, so that we do not get the timings in two documents.

If I am correct, you are referring to the tables. I believe there is
still strong consensus to keep the tables in here. The tables do not
really go into timing parameters imho, they merely talk about TTL intervals.

> 4.2.1 KSK Compromise (2nd paragraph) A compromised KSK used by an
> attacker can also sign data in the zone other than the key set. An
> attacker does not need to follow the definitions of KSK vs ZSK.

I am guessing that you aim for a small change here: to note that all
RRsets in the zone can be signed with the compromised KSK. I am tempted
not to add this because with a KSK compromise, the key set is
compromised anyway. Signing other RRsets is possible, but seems
arbitrary (like Jelte pointed out as well).

> 4.2.1.1 Keeping the Chain of Trust Intact (1st paragraph) Why do we
> want to make the key set expire in the caches by lowering the
> signature lifetime? Caching is based on the minimum of TTL and
> remaining signature lifetime, right? Why not use a lower TTL on
> DNSKEY? Less to tweak in the signer.

I agree. Then you would not have to do lowering signature validity
periods at all.

> 4.2.1.2 Breaking the Chain of Trust (2nd paragraph) Isn’t this method
> just breaking your own zone. Not the one that the attacker has? See
> the last paragraph in 4.2.1.

The attacker is still able to spoof the child's zone until the DS is
replaced in the parent, yes.

> 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 What happens if both KSK and ZSK are compromised? In
> most deployments they are probably stored in the same location.

You follow both guidelines described in 4.2.1 and 4.2.2?

> 4.2.3 Compromises of keys Anchored in Resolvers (1st paragraph) 
> Shouldn’t we think the DNSSEC deployment in the root as successful?

Removed the line "For instance, if DNSSEC is successfully deployed...".
But I still think this section has value.

> 4.3.1 Initial Key Exchange I also think that it should be possible to
> send in a DS RR for which there is no DNSKEY in the child zone. I
> know that there are registries that disallow this and others allow
> this. The reason is to not limit any (future) rollover mechanism.
> What we could say is that there should be at least one of the DS RRs
> pointing to a DNSKEY.

Yes.

> 4.3.2 Storing Keys or Hashes (2nd paragraph) Why would storing the
> DNSKEY help troubleshooting, from a registry perspective? If it were
> to debug the conversion from DNSKEY to DS at registry level, then
> that would not be an argument to storing DNSKEY for troubleshooting,
> you would need the DNSKEY anyways.

I don't seem to understand what your point is here...

> 4.3.3 Security Lameness (2nd paragraph) No, the parent should allow
> DS RR pointing to non-published DNSKEY. We should not limit any
> (future) rollover mechanisms. There should of course be at least one
> DS pointing to one DNSKEY.

The section does not prohibit it. It actually mentions the rollover
scheme that may be used.

> 4.3.4 DS Signature Validity Period (2nd Paragraph) It probably does
> not matter how low the period is set in the parent’s policy. Some few
> hour or minutes is enough for an attacker to do damage. Long time
> before the child even considers switching the DS RR.

Do you want to suggest text that should be included into this section?

> 4.3.4 DS Signature Validity Period (3rd Paragraph) Is a period
> between a week and months a good compromise between the operation
> constraints of the parent and minimizing the damage for the child?
> You can do a lot of things during these months…

You are arguing that the upper limit of months should be a lot lower.
That makes sense. Do you have suggestions?

> 4.3.4 DS Signature Validity Period (4th Paragraph) Lower TTL does not
> help against replay attacks.

But it does reduce the damage of a successful replay attack.

> 4.3.5 Changing DNS Operators (1st paragraph) This is not the
> definition of a thin registry. It is a definition of a
> registry-registrar model.

ok.

> 4.3.5.1 Cooperating DNS operators Isn’t the Double-DS method better
> than the double signature KSK rollover in this case? You only share
> DNSKEY RRset with each other. Not sharing signatures.

If the registry and registrars for security lame DS records, then yes.
I will add text.

> 4.4.1 Time Considerations (2nd bullet point) Ok, this means that you
> are reusing the signature up to the point where there is only one
> maximum zone TTL left. If your signing or distribution system breaks
> down, then you only have that time to fix it. Can you fix your system
> within these few hours? Is four days more reasonable? See 4.4.2.2

Yes, will add the operational havoc consideration here too.

> 4.4.1 Time Considerations (3rd bullet point) But it is ok to have 0s
> or 1s TTL for RR that are in the leafs of the DNS tree, right?

Perhaps. You want that in the document?

> 4.4.1 Time Considerations (4th bullet point, 7th paragraph) The SOA
> expiration timer should not be compared with signature validity
> period, but with the refresh period (- resign period).

Ok.

> 4.4.2.2 Minimum Value (last paragraph) I would like to have more text
> about clock skew. It is important to talked about this since time in
> DNSSEC is not relative but absolute. E.g. that one hour for inception
> offset is ok, because if the clocks are more skewed than that, then
> other stuff will break down in your infrastructure.

Do you want to provide text?

> 4.4.2.4 Other timing parameters in a zone This text conflicts with
> the text in 4.4.1 (4th bullet point, 7th paragraph). Here you want
> the SOA expiration to be greater than the signature validity period.

Should be equal to or lower than Refresh period.

> 5.3.2 NSEC3 Iterations (2nd paragraph) You (NLnet Labs) recently
> published a report where large number of iterations made the name
> server less responsive. How would you compare the recommendation in
> this draft with the result from your report?

The report was about the impact for name servers and validators in a
worst case scenario: all NXDOMAINs, very high iteration value. The
conlusion was that name servers dictate these parameters but are
affected the most as well. Because of being worst case scenario
research, I am not sure if the conclusions would fit into 4641bis.

> 5.3.3 NSEC3 Salt (3rd paragraph) You recommend doing re-salting at
> the same time as ZSK rollover. But it is not required to drop all
> signatures at once during a ZSK rollover. This can be a smooth
> transition determined by the refresh period.

ok.

> Appendix A – Key Size Yes in RSA you use the modulus size to
> determine the key size. But it does not apply to other algorithms.

ok.

> Appendix A – Refresh Period New definition: The time before the
> expiration of the signature where it is not reused anymore.

ok.

> Appendix C Move this to the key timing draft.

Consensus was that tables should stay.

> Finally: You are missing text about standby keys. Used to speed up
> the rollover in case of an emergency. But also as part of your
> disaster recovery, when you have lost access to your keys and the
> backups cannot be restored. This is how you do it: 1. Generate
> standby KSK and ZSK. Store them safely. 2. Prepublish standby ZSK in
> zone. 3. Prepublish DS of standby KSK in parent zone. 4. You have a
> disaster. 5. Create a new datacenter and import the standby keys. 6.
> Postpublish old ZSK in zone (fetch it from a secondary somewhere). 7.
> Sign and publish zone. 8. After "some" TTL remove old ZSK and old DS 
> 9. Continue with normal operation.

Ok.

Thanks for the extensive review.

Matthijs

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On 18 feb 2011, at 12.06, Matthijs Mekking wrote:

>> 1.2 Time Definitions: =93Signature publication period=94 You mention tha=
t
>> the replacement takes place in the master zone file. You are probably
>> not manipulating the master zone file, but rather the data in the
>> =93signer=94. Some solutions do write to a zone file, but is that always
>> the case? You also mention that caches need to expire, etc. But it is
>> not clear if this time is part of the definition of signature
>> publication period or not.
>=20
> Would it be good enough to abstract from the master zone file, by just
> referring to the zone? Proposed text:
>=20
>  "Signature publication period" The period that a signature is
>  published. It starts at the time the signature is introduced in the
>  zone for the first time and ends at the time when the signature is
>  removed or replaced with a new signature.

Ok

>> 1.2 Time Definitions: =93Key effectivity period=94 I would define the ke=
y
>> effectivity period as the time between creating the first signature
>> and the last signature with this key. Remember that the inception
>> time can be set to a time earlier than now because of the inception
>> offset. And that key will become not active during a rollover, but
>> the signatures may be reused for some extra days to get a smooth
>> rollover of the signatures. So that you do not drop them at the same
>> time.
>=20
> While technically it is true that a key becomes operative once it has
> created the first signature, you could also say that for validators it
> looks like that the key is in effect since the first signatures are
> incepted. The signer pretends as if the key was in effect earlier than
> the first signature was actually created.
>=20
> Not sure if this is important enough to argue about: We talk about key
> effectivity periods of months, years and even decades.

Ok

>> 3.1 Operational Motivations (5th paragraph) Is it true that you get
>> =93operational flexibility and higher computational performance=94 by
>> using a file based ZSK and smartcard KSK (offline in a safe) than a
>> single key stored on an HSM? The HSM can give you the option to have
>> the keys online, thus no need to take out the smartcard from the
>> safe. And the HSM can be designed to give you speed. I know that my
>> HSM is faster than OpenSSL on my machine.
>=20
> It may be unwise to talk about higher computational performance in this
> section. The section motivates scenarios where operators may benefit
> from a ZSK/KSK split. The 5th paragraph is worried about key compromise,
> and how a split provides you more protection without losing too much of
> your operational flexibility. Speed is not a motivation here.
>=20
> I do agree that 'on-line HSMs' marginalizes the argument in favor of the
> split significantly.

Ok

>> 3.3 Key Effectivity Period (2nd paragraph) You say that you should
>> choose 13 months as the KSK key effectivity period with the intent to
>> replace it after 12 months. Why this extra month? The KSK key
>> effectivity period is mostly just a policy. You do not know if you
>> are able to complete all of the actions that are needed to do the
>> rollover on that exact date. After the rollover, you can say that the
>> effectivity period was e.g. 12.5 months because the interaction with
>> your parent took some time. So before the rollover, the key
>> effectivity period is a policy and after the rollover it is a fact.
>> Nothing breaks if you take longer time. (The choice of 12 months is
>> another discussion...)
>=20
> I agree. The key effectivity period should not be considered a constant
> value. Do you want to start the discussion of 12 months now? ;)

Lets have another email thread about that :)

>> 3.4.1 Key Algorithm (2nd paragraph) =93RSA/MD5 should not be=94 =3D>
>> =93RSA/MD5 must not be=94
>=20
> It is NOT RECOMMENDED in 4034, so I think the should is sufficient here.

Ok

>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (1st paragraph) =93can safely use 1024-bit keys for at
>> least the next ten years=94. NIST SP 800-131 says that 1024 =96 2048 bit
>> is acceptable to use in 2010. It is deprecated between 2011 and 2013.
>> From 2011 you should use keys larger than 2048 bits.
>> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/draftSP800-131_June_11_=
2010.pdf
>=20
> The recommendation is prepared for use by federal agencies. Is DNSSEC
> required to follow these guidelines?

We do not need to follow this, but it is good to have information from cryp=
to experts.

>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (1st paragraph) Why mention the equivalent strength
>> of a symmetric key if there is no other algorithm to compare with?
>=20
> It is compared with the typically next larger key size (2048 bits).
> Should that comparison be removed as well?

It is good as a reference on how strong RSA is compared with a symmetric ke=
y. But it would be more useful if there was a comparison between e.g. RSA a=
nd ECDSA. But ECDSA for DNSSEC is only a draft. So keep the text for now.

>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (2nd paragraph) =93the next larger key size used is
>> 2048 bits=94. Is this a dramatic increase from 1024 bit, as the next
>> larger key? There are more steps between 1024 and 2048 bits.
>=20
> It says typically. I am inclined to say that we do not have to go into
> all possible key sizes.

Ok

>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (2nd paragraph) Double the key size will make
>> verification four times slower and signing eight times slower (not
>> four times). =93public key operations take O(k2) steps, private key
>> operations take O(k3) steps, and key generation takes O(k4) steps=94 -
>> http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=3D2215
>=20
> But such notation might be to vaguely for operators.

Yes, that was a copy of the text from RSA. It is just a reference for my ar=
gument that signing gets eight time slower and not four times.

>> 3.4.3 Private Key Storage (2nd paragraph) Not only dynamic updates
>> can require that you have =93access=94 to one private key. It is more
>> about regular / automatic updates. E.g. that your system push out a
>> new zone file every second hour. No system administrator / security
>> officer is willing to go to the server room regularly every day.
>=20
> Added ', or any other mechanism that runs at a regular interval'.

Ok

> I don't see a reason for having the private key on-line with your
> regular update mechanism. Do you?

The ZSK needs to be on-line. The KSK can be off-line.

>> 4.2.1 KSK Compromise (2nd paragraph) A compromised KSK used by an
>> attacker can also sign data in the zone other than the key set. An
>> attacker does not need to follow the definitions of KSK vs ZSK.
>=20
> I am guessing that you aim for a small change here: to note that all
> RRsets in the zone can be signed with the compromised KSK. I am tempted
> not to add this because with a KSK compromise, the key set is
> compromised anyway. Signing other RRsets is possible, but seems
> arbitrary (like Jelte pointed out as well).

Yes, ok.

>> 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 What happens if both KSK and ZSK are compromised? In
>> most deployments they are probably stored in the same location.
>=20
> You follow both guidelines described in 4.2.1 and 4.2.2?

Ok

>> 4.3.2 Storing Keys or Hashes (2nd paragraph) Why would storing the
>> DNSKEY help troubleshooting, from a registry perspective? If it were
>> to debug the conversion from DNSKEY to DS at registry level, then
>> that would not be an argument to storing DNSKEY for troubleshooting,
>> you would need the DNSKEY anyways.
>=20
> I don't seem to understand what your point is here...

This section is about whether a registry should accept DS or DNSKEY from th=
e registrar. And one of the arguments for receiving the DNSKEY was that it =
can be used for debugging. What do you want to debug?

The only thing you can debug within the registry with the help of the DNSKE=
Y, is in fact the conversion from DNSKEY to DS. But that is just a self ful=
filling argument.

E.g:
"We want to receive the DNSKEY and not the DS, because we can then debug th=
e conversion from DNSKEY to DS"

>> 4.3.4 DS Signature Validity Period (2nd Paragraph) It probably does
>> not matter how low the period is set in the parent=92s policy. Some few
>> hour or minutes is enough for an attacker to do damage. Long time
>> before the child even considers switching the DS RR.
>=20
> Do you want to suggest text that should be included into this section?

We probably can keep the original text. It at least tells the reader to thi=
nk about this.

>> 4.3.4 DS Signature Validity Period (3rd Paragraph) Is a period
>> between a week and months a good compromise between the operation
>> constraints of the parent and minimizing the damage for the child?
>> You can do a lot of things during these months=85
>=20
> You are arguing that the upper limit of months should be a lot lower.
> That makes sense. Do you have suggestions?

We probably can keep the original text. It at least tells the reader to thi=
nk about this.

>> 4.3.4 DS Signature Validity Period (4th Paragraph) Lower TTL does not
>> help against replay attacks.
>=20
> But it does reduce the damage of a successful replay attack.

Ok

>> 4.4.1 Time Considerations (3rd bullet point) But it is ok to have 0s
>> or 1s TTL for RR that are in the leafs of the DNS tree, right?
>=20
> Perhaps. You want that in the document?

It might depend on the implementation. Maybe the BIND or Unbound people kno=
ws more about this.

>> 4.4.2.2 Minimum Value (last paragraph) I would like to have more text
>> about clock skew. It is important to talked about this since time in
>> DNSSEC is not relative but absolute. E.g. that one hour for inception
>> offset is ok, because if the clocks are more skewed than that, then
>> other stuff will break down in your infrastructure.
>=20
> Do you want to provide text?

From:
   "Note that in the figure the validity of the signature starts shortly
   before the inception time.  That is done to deal with validators that
   might have some clock skew."

To:
   "Note that in the figure the validity of the signature starts shortly
   before the signing time.  That is done to deal with validators that
   might have some clock skew. The inception offset should be
   chosen so that you minimize the false negatives to a reasonable
   level."

>> 4.4.2.4 Other timing parameters in a zone This text conflicts with
>> the text in 4.4.1 (4th bullet point, 7th paragraph). Here you want
>> the SOA expiration to be greater than the signature validity period.
>=20
> Should be equal to or lower than Refresh period.

Yes. My comment "Here you want the ..." should have been written like this =
"The draft now say: It is advised to set the SOA expiration to a value grea=
ter than the signature validity period."

>> 5.3.2 NSEC3 Iterations (2nd paragraph) You (NLnet Labs) recently
>> published a report where large number of iterations made the name
>> server less responsive. How would you compare the recommendation in
>> this draft with the result from your report?
>=20
> The report was about the impact for name servers and validators in a
> worst case scenario: all NXDOMAINs, very high iteration value. The
> conlusion was that name servers dictate these parameters but are
> affected the most as well. Because of being worst case scenario
> research, I am not sure if the conclusions would fit into 4641bis.

But it sounds quite high to follow the recommendation of choosing two-third=
s of the maximum from the values 150 (1024 bit), 500 (2048 bit), and 2500 (=
4096 bit). A DDoS attack could query for domains that does not exist. You e=
.g. only get 50 % performance on NSD with the recommended value for 1024 bi=
t keys and 25 % with the values for 2048 bit.

// Rickard


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Comments on RFC4641bis
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Hi Rickard,

On 02/22/2011 02:52 PM, Rickard Bellgrim wrote:
>>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (1st paragraph) “can safely use 1024-bit keys for at
>>> least the next ten years”. NIST SP 800-131 says that 1024 – 2048 bit
>>> is acceptable to use in 2010. It is deprecated between 2011 and 2013.
>>> From 2011 you should use keys larger than 2048 bits.
>>> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/draftSP800-131_June_11_2010.pdf
>>
>> The recommendation is prepared for use by federal agencies. Is DNSSEC
>> required to follow these guidelines?
> 
> We do not need to follow this, but it is good to have information from crypto experts.

True. But my point is that NIST is a guideline for local policy. This
document targets a larger audience.

>>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (1st paragraph) Why mention the equivalent strength
>>> of a symmetric key if there is no other algorithm to compare with?
>>
>> It is compared with the typically next larger key size (2048 bits).
>> Should that comparison be removed as well?
> 
> It is good as a reference on how strong RSA is compared with a symmetric key. But it would be more useful if there was a comparison between e.g. RSA and ECDSA. But ECDSA for DNSSEC is only a draft. So keep the text for now.

Ok.

>>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (2nd paragraph) Double the key size will make
>>> verification four times slower and signing eight times slower (not
>>> four times). “public key operations take O(k2) steps, private key
>>> operations take O(k3) steps, and key generation takes O(k4) steps” -
>>> http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2215
>>
>> But such notation might be to vaguely for operators.
> 
> Yes, that was a copy of the text from RSA. It is just a reference for my argument that signing gets eight time slower and not four times.

Ok.

>>> 4.3.2 Storing Keys or Hashes (2nd paragraph) Why would storing the
>>> DNSKEY help troubleshooting, from a registry perspective? If it were
>>> to debug the conversion from DNSKEY to DS at registry level, then
>>> that would not be an argument to storing DNSKEY for troubleshooting,
>>> you would need the DNSKEY anyways.
>>
>> I don't seem to understand what your point is here...
> 
> This section is about whether a registry should accept DS or DNSKEY from the registrar. And one of the arguments for receiving the DNSKEY was that it can be used for debugging. What do you want to debug?
> 
> The only thing you can debug within the registry with the help of the DNSKEY, is in fact the conversion from DNSKEY to DS. But that is just a self fulfilling argument.
> 
> E.g:
> "We want to receive the DNSKEY and not the DS, because we can then debug the conversion from DNSKEY to DS"

So should we remove the paragraph? (The section will just recommend
storing DS records, and optionally DNSKEY records (e.g. if the
registrars don't allow for uploading DS records).

>>> 4.4.1 Time Considerations (3rd bullet point) But it is ok to have 0s
>>> or 1s TTL for RR that are in the leafs of the DNS tree, right?
>>
>> Perhaps. You want that in the document?
> 
> It might depend on the implementation. Maybe the BIND or Unbound people knows more about this.

I guess we could say that data at the leafs has less impact on recursive
nameservers than data at delegation points (regarding frequent
verification).

>>> 4.4.2.2 Minimum Value (last paragraph) I would like to have more text
>>> about clock skew. It is important to talked about this since time in
>>> DNSSEC is not relative but absolute. E.g. that one hour for inception
>>> offset is ok, because if the clocks are more skewed than that, then
>>> other stuff will break down in your infrastructure.
>>
>> Do you want to provide text?
> 
> From:
>    "Note that in the figure the validity of the signature starts shortly
>    before the inception time.  That is done to deal with validators that
>    might have some clock skew."
> 
> To:
>    "Note that in the figure the validity of the signature starts shortly
>    before the signing time.  That is done to deal with validators that
>    might have some clock skew. The inception offset should be
>    chosen so that you minimize the false negatives to a reasonable
>    level."

Ok.

>>> 5.3.2 NSEC3 Iterations (2nd paragraph) You (NLnet Labs) recently
>>> published a report where large number of iterations made the name
>>> server less responsive. How would you compare the recommendation in
>>> this draft with the result from your report?
>>
>> The report was about the impact for name servers and validators in a
>> worst case scenario: all NXDOMAINs, very high iteration value. The
>> conlusion was that name servers dictate these parameters but are
>> affected the most as well. Because of being worst case scenario
>> research, I am not sure if the conclusions would fit into 4641bis.
> 
> But it sounds quite high to follow the recommendation of choosing two-thirds of the maximum from the values 150 (1024 bit), 500 (2048 bit), and 2500 (4096 bit). A DDoS attack could query for domains that does not exist. You e.g. only get 50 % performance on NSD with the recommended value for 1024 bit keys and 25 % with the values for 2048 bit.

Ah ok. The report does point out that the half performance count on
nameservers (or at least NSD) in worst case scenarios is about 100
iterations, regardless of the key size. So perhaps the recommendation
should in 4641bis should take that into account.

Best regards,

Matthijs
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From rickard.bellgrim@iis.se  Wed Feb 23 02:26:51 2011
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From: Rickard Bellgrim <rickard.bellgrim@iis.se>
To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@NLnetLabs.nl>
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On 23 feb 2011, at 10.11, Matthijs Mekking wrote:

>>>> 3.4.2 Key Sizes (1st paragraph) =93can safely use 1024-bit keys for at
>>>> least the next ten years=94. NIST SP 800-131 says that 1024 =96 2048 b=
it
>>>> is acceptable to use in 2010. It is deprecated between 2011 and 2013.
>>>> From 2011 you should use keys larger than 2048 bits.
>>>> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/draftSP800-131_June_1=
1_2010.pdf
>>>=20
>>> The recommendation is prepared for use by federal agencies. Is DNSSEC
>>> required to follow these guidelines?
>>=20
>> We do not need to follow this, but it is good to have information from c=
rypto experts.
>=20
> True. But my point is that NIST is a guideline for local policy. This
> document targets a larger audience.

Ok

>>>> 4.3.2 Storing Keys or Hashes (2nd paragraph) Why would storing the
>>>> DNSKEY help troubleshooting, from a registry perspective? If it were
>>>> to debug the conversion from DNSKEY to DS at registry level, then
>>>> that would not be an argument to storing DNSKEY for troubleshooting,
>>>> you would need the DNSKEY anyways.
>>>=20
>>> I don't seem to understand what your point is here...
>>=20
>> This section is about whether a registry should accept DS or DNSKEY from=
 the registrar. And one of the arguments for receiving the DNSKEY was that =
it can be used for debugging. What do you want to debug?
>>=20
>> The only thing you can debug within the registry with the help of the DN=
SKEY, is in fact the conversion from DNSKEY to DS. But that is just a self =
fulfilling argument.
>>=20
>> E.g:
>> "We want to receive the DNSKEY and not the DS, because we can then debug=
 the conversion from DNSKEY to DS"
>=20
> So should we remove the paragraph? (The section will just recommend
> storing DS records, and optionally DNSKEY records (e.g. if the
> registrars don't allow for uploading DS records).

Yes, but the second part of the paragraph:
   "Having an out-of-band mechanism, such as a registry
   directory (e.g., Whois), to find out which keys are used to generate
   DS Resource Records for specific owners and/or zones may also help
   with troubleshooting."

is more relevant and helpful. Maybe it can be used in another context in th=
e draft. Because you could also display the DS RRs in the Whois.

>>>> 4.4.1 Time Considerations (3rd bullet point) But it is ok to have 0s
>>>> or 1s TTL for RR that are in the leafs of the DNS tree, right?
>>>=20
>>> Perhaps. You want that in the document?
>>=20
>> It might depend on the implementation. Maybe the BIND or Unbound people =
knows more about this.
>=20
> I guess we could say that data at the leafs has less impact on recursive
> nameservers than data at delegation points (regarding frequent
> verification).

Ok

>>>> 5.3.2 NSEC3 Iterations (2nd paragraph) You (NLnet Labs) recently
>>>> published a report where large number of iterations made the name
>>>> server less responsive. How would you compare the recommendation in
>>>> this draft with the result from your report?
>>>=20
>>> The report was about the impact for name servers and validators in a
>>> worst case scenario: all NXDOMAINs, very high iteration value. The
>>> conlusion was that name servers dictate these parameters but are
>>> affected the most as well. Because of being worst case scenario
>>> research, I am not sure if the conclusions would fit into 4641bis.
>>=20
>> But it sounds quite high to follow the recommendation of choosing two-th=
irds of the maximum from the values 150 (1024 bit), 500 (2048 bit), and 250=
0 (4096 bit). A DDoS attack could query for domains that does not exist. Yo=
u e.g. only get 50 % performance on NSD with the recommended value for 1024=
 bit keys and 25 % with the values for 2048 bit.
>=20
> Ah ok. The report does point out that the half performance count on
> nameservers (or at least NSD) in worst case scenarios is about 100
> iterations, regardless of the key size. So perhaps the recommendation
> should in 4641bis should take that into account.

Yes

// Rickard=
