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Cc: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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At 15:47 27-03-2014, Joe Abley wrote:
>There was a plan underway to roll the KSK. I was at ICANN briefly 
>when that started (I spoke publicly, albeit briefly about it in the 
>dnsop meeting in Berlin). I'm no longer at ICANN and hence no longer 
>have anything authoritative to say, but it seems plausible that the 
>events leading up to NTIA's announcement the other week caused some 
>delays or rescheduling of the KSK roll project. A KSK roll would be 
>a good opportunity to change the key size.

Yes, assuming that there is a reason for such a change [1].

I could not find any report about the outcome of the Rollover consultation.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy

1. "To date, despite huge efforts, no one has broken a regular 
1024-bit key;  in fact, the best completed attack is estimated to be 
the equivalent of a 700-bit key.  An attacker breaking a 1024-bit 
signing key would need to expend phenomenal amounts of networked 
computing power in a way that would not be detected in order to break 
a single key. Because of this, it is estimated that most zones can 
safely use 1024-bit keys for at least the next ten years."  That was 
the IETF Consensus in 2012.


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Mar 27, 2014, at 6:54 PM, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net> wrote:

>=20
> On Mar 27, 2014, at 10:14 AM, Matth=E4us Wander =
<matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de> wrote:
>> Here's a small statistic about RSA key lengths of 741,552 signed
>> second-level domains (collected on 2014-01-27, counting KSK and =
ZSKs):
>>=20
>> 1024 bit: 1298238
>> 2048 bit: 698232
>> 1280 bit: 28441
>> 4096 bit: 25326
>> 512 bit:   8893
>> 1536 bit: 385
>=20
> Matth=E4us, do you have an easy way of separating out KSK from ZSK in =
your statistics?  FWIW, we=92re currently doing 2048-bit KSK and =
1024-bit ZSK, but will shortly be transitioning to 4096-and-2048.
>=20
>                                -Bill
>=20


Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key size =
increases three things:
	time to generate signatures =20
	bits on the wire
	verification time.=20

I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
that is a red herring).
Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.=20=


                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8

Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by =
roughly by about 70%.=20

KSK's verification times affect the time to traverse the DNS tree, thus=20=

If 1024 is too short 1280 is fine for now
If 2048 is too short 2400 bit key is much harder to break thus it should =
be fine.=20

just a plea for key use policy sanity not picking on Bill in any way.

	Olafur


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On Apr 1, 2014, at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
> Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key =
size increases three things:
> 	time to generate signatures =20
> 	bits on the wire
> 	verification time.=20
>=20
> I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
that is a red herring).
> Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.=20=


Agreed=85  Signing time is our problem to manage as a budgetary matter.  =
Bits on the wire seem too small, relative to the overall stream of =
traffic, to be of any significance.  But...

>                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
> rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
> rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
> rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8

=85you think the difference between 53 uSec and 199 uSec is material for =
end-users?  Even if they have to traverse several levels of zones signed =
at 4096 bits?

There=92s also the issue that we have to plan some time in advance for =
changes like this, and by the time the change is actually in production, =
these times will have dropped still further.  So, I agree, incremental =
and continuous upgrading of key-lengths is necessary to counter =
brute-force attacks, but I=92m not sure I want the granularity to be so =
fine that I=92m rolling KSKs all the time.

                                -Bill





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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>=20
> Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key =
size increases three things:
> 	time to generate signatures =20
> 	bits on the wire
> 	verification time.=20
>=20
> I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
that is a red herring).
> Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.=20=

>=20
>                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
> rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
> rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
> rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8
>=20
> Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by =
roughly by about 70%.=20
>=20
> KSK's verification times affect the time to traverse the DNS tree, =
thus=20
> If 1024 is too short 1280 is fine for now
> If 2048 is too short 2400 bit key is much harder to break thus it =
should be fine.=20
>=20
> just a plea for key use policy sanity not picking on Bill in any way.

NO!  FUCK THAT SHIT.  Seriously.

There is far far far too much worrying about "performance" of crypto, in =
cases like this where the performance just doesn't matter!

Yes, you can only do 18K verifies per CPU per second for 2048b keys.  =
Cry me a river.  Bite the bullet, go to 2048 bits NOW, especially since =
the servers do NOT have resistance to roll-back-the-clock attacks.



In a major cluster validating recursive resolver, like what Comcast runs =
with Nominum or Google uses with Public DNS, the question is not how =
many verifies it can do per second per CPU core, but how many verifies =
it needs to do per second per CPU core.

And at the same time, this is a problem we already know how to =
parallelize, and which is obscenely parallel, and which also caches...

Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major ISP =
centralized resolver, and that all are verified.  Thats less 1 CPU =
core-day to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys. =20

And yeah, DNS is peaky, but that's also why this task is being run on a =
cluster already, and each cluster node has a lot of CPUs.


--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2014 09:39:54 -0400
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Nicholas Weaver
<nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>wrote:

>
> On Apr 1, 2014, at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
> >
> > Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key size
> increases three things:
> >       time to generate signatures
> >       bits on the wire
> >       verification time.
> >
> > I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think
> that is a red herring).
> > Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.
> >
> >                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
> > rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
> > rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
> > rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8
> >
> > Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by
> roughly by about 70%.
> >
> > KSK's verification times affect the time to traverse the DNS tree, thus
> > If 1024 is too short 1280 is fine for now
> > If 2048 is too short 2400 bit key is much harder to break thus it should
> be fine.
> >
> > just a plea for key use policy sanity not picking on Bill in any way.
>
> NO!  FUCK THAT SHIT.  Seriously.
>
> There is far far far too much worrying about "performance" of crypto, in
> cases like this where the performance just doesn't matter!
>
> Yes, you can only do 18K verifies per CPU per second for 2048b keys.  Cry
> me a river.  Bite the bullet, go to 2048 bits NOW, especially since the
> servers do NOT have resistance to roll-back-the-clock attacks.
>
>
>
> In a major cluster validating recursive resolver, like what Comcast runs
> with Nominum or Google uses with Public DNS, the question is not how many
> verifies it can do per second per CPU core, but how many verifies it needs
> to do per second per CPU core.
>
> And at the same time, this is a problem we already know how to
> parallelize, and which is obscenely parallel, and which also caches...
>
> Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major ISP
> centralized resolver, and that all are verified.  Thats less 1 CPU core-day
> to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys.
>


Yes, I agree, but you are proposing a different DNSSEC model to the one
they believe in.

The DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from Authoritative to
Stub client model. They only view the Authoritative to Resolver as a
temporary deployment hack.

So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-client <-> Resolver
protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model will work.


Weakening the crypto algorithms to make the architecture work is always a
sign that the wrong architecture is being applied.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--089e0158b87c9c259504f5fb4d95
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Nicholas Weaver <span dir=3D"ltr">&=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu" target=3D"_blank">nweaver@i=
csi.berkeley.edu</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D""><br>
On Apr 1, 2014, at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ogud@o=
gud.com">ogud@ogud.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
</div><div class=3D"">&gt; Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, =
increasing the key size increases three things:<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 time to generate signatures<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 bits on the wire<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 verification time.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
that is a red herring).<br>
&gt; Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0sign =A0 =A0verify =A0 =A0sign/s ve=
rify/s<br>
&gt; rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s =A0 3902.8 =A062233.2<br>
&gt; rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s =A0 =A0580.7 =A018852.8<br>
&gt; rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s =A0 =A0 80.0 =A0 5016.8<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by r=
oughly by about 70%.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KSK&#39;s verification times affect the time to traverse the DNS tree,=
 thus<br>
&gt; If 1024 is too short 1280 is fine for now<br>
&gt; If 2048 is too short 2400 bit key is much harder to break thus it shou=
ld be fine.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; just a plea for key use policy sanity not picking on Bill in any way.<=
br>
<br>
</div>NO! =A0FUCK THAT SHIT. =A0Seriously.<br>
<br>
There is far far far too much worrying about &quot;performance&quot; of cry=
pto, in cases like this where the performance just doesn&#39;t matter!<br>
<br>
Yes, you can only do 18K verifies per CPU per second for 2048b keys. =A0Cry=
 me a river. =A0Bite the bullet, go to 2048 bits NOW, especially since the =
servers do NOT have resistance to roll-back-the-clock attacks.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
In a major cluster validating recursive resolver, like what Comcast runs wi=
th Nominum or Google uses with Public DNS, the question is not how many ver=
ifies it can do per second per CPU core, but how many verifies it needs to =
do per second per CPU core.<br>

<br>
And at the same time, this is a problem we already know how to parallelize,=
 and which is obscenely parallel, and which also caches...<br>
<br>
Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major ISP cen=
tralized resolver, and that all are verified. =A0Thats less 1 CPU core-day =
to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys.<br></blockquote>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Yes, I agree, but you are proposing a di=
fferent DNSSEC model to the one they believe in.</div><div><br></div><div>T=
he DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from Authoritative to S=
tub client model. They only view the Authoritative to Resolver as a tempora=
ry deployment hack.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-clie=
nt &lt;-&gt; Resolver protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model=
 will work.=A0</div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Weakening the =
crypto algorithms to make the architecture work is always a sign that the w=
rong architecture is being applied.</div>
<div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://h=
allambaker.com/</a><br>
</div></div>

--089e0158b87c9c259504f5fb4d95--


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From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 6:39 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Yes, I agree, but you are proposing a different DNSSEC model to the =
one they believe in.
>=20
> The DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from =
Authoritative to Stub client model. They only view the Authoritative to =
Resolver as a temporary deployment hack.

And in that case (which is, I agree, what is needed), the time to verify =
really doesn't matter one fucking bit, since those clients really won't =
care about an extra 50 MICROseconds to validate the crypto.  Heck, they =
won't notice 50 milliseconds...

> Weakening the crypto algorithms to make the architecture work is =
always a sign that the wrong architecture is being applied.

And weakening the crypto needlessly like this is even worse.  IMO, all =
DNSSEC software should simply refuse to generate <2048b RSA keys.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On 04/01/2014 03:39 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> 
> Yes, I agree, but you are proposing a different DNSSEC model to the one
> they believe in.
> 
> The DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from Authoritative
> to Stub client model. They only view the Authoritative to Resolver as a
> temporary deployment hack.
> 
> So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-client <-> Resolver
> protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model will work. 
> 
> 
> Weakening the crypto algorithms to make the architecture work is always
> a sign that the wrong architecture is being applied.
> 

Oh come on.

If anything, one would expect that doing the validation on the end
machines is *easier* despite needing more cycles to do so, since there
is much less work to do and generally much more cycles to spare. So I
don't see your reasoning about 'them' follow up into this conclusion here.

The way I read it, Olafur is asking for people to consider other sizes,
and operational issues, rather than simply saying "double 'em up,
yeeha". One may disagree (I do too, as it happens, for different
reasons), or one can consider it and still come to the conclusion that
2048/4096 are the only right sizes (for now, we'll need better algos
soonish I guess).

Jelte


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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:

> Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key size
> increases three things:
>         time to generate signatures
>         bits on the wire
>         verification time.
>
> I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think that
> is a red herring).
> Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.
>
>                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
> rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
> rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
> rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8
>
> Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by
> roughly by about 70%.
>

With those numbers; if the validating resolver uses speculative/optimistic
concurrency [1] then jumping from 1024 to 4096 bits, the user-impact is
that ~180us are added to the overall resolution time. Zero in the cached
case.

There is an impact on the overall capacity of the resolver, though it's a
function of cache-miss-rate (since cache hits need not be verified). Large
centralised resolver operators may face some pressure (anyone doing
validation locally is unlikely to notice), but is it sensible to compromise
your zone security to accommodate that?

[1] There's no need to wait for a response to be validated before
recursing, a validating resolver can first recurse and later backtrack if
the parent signature doesn't verify.

-- 
Colm

--f46d0444ed6ddaa69104f5fca343
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:ogud@ogud.com" target=3D"_blank">ogud@ogud.com</a>&gt;</spa=
n> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to =
do, increasing the key size increases three things:<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 time to generate signatures<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 bits on the wire<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 verification time.<br>
<br>
I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think that =
is a red herring).<br>
Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.<br>
<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 sign =A0 =A0verify =A0 =A0sign/s verify=
/s<br>
rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s =A0 3902.8 =A062233.2<br>
rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s =A0 =A0580.7 =A018852.8<br>
rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s =A0 =A0 80.0 =A0 5016.8<br>
<br>
Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by roughl=
y by about 70%.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>With those numbers; if =
the validating resolver uses speculative/optimistic concurrency [1] then ju=
mping from 1024 to 4096 bits, the user-impact is that ~180us are added to t=
he overall resolution time. Zero in the cached case.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>There is an impact on the overall capacity of the resol=
ver, though it&#39;s a function of cache-miss-rate (since cache hits need n=
ot be verified). Large centralised resolver operators may face some pressur=
e (anyone doing validation locally is unlikely to notice), but is it sensib=
le to compromise your zone security to accommodate that?</div>
<div><br></div><div>[1] There&#39;s no need to wait for a response to be va=
lidated before recursing, a validating resolver can first recurse and later=
 backtrack if the parent signature doesn&#39;t verify.</div><div><br></div>
</div>-- <br>Colm
</div></div>

--f46d0444ed6ddaa69104f5fca343--


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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 6:39 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu
> > wrote:
>
>> Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major ISP
>> centralized resolver, and that all are verified.  Thats less 1 CPU core-day
>> to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys.
>>
>
>
> Yes, I agree, but you are proposing a different DNSSEC model to the one
> they believe in.
>
> The DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from Authoritative to
> Stub client model. They only view the Authoritative to Resolver as a
> temporary deployment hack.
>


I think even in the imagined future of validating stub resolvers, there's
still value in centralized caching; it speeds up lookup times. There's no
sense in intermediates caching bad answers, especially since it can lead to
denial of service, so there's still some value in validating centrally too.

-- 
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 6:39 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">hallam@gmail.com</a>&=
gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Nicholas We=
aver <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu" tar=
get=3D"_blank">nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion =
external lookups for a major ISP centralized resolver, and that all are ver=
ified. =A0Thats less 1 CPU core-day to validate every DNSSEC lookup that da=
y at 2048b keys.<br>

</div></blockquote>
<div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div>Yes, I agree, but you are proposin=
g a different DNSSEC model to the one they believe in.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>The DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from Authoritativ=
e to Stub client model. They only view the Authoritative to Resolver as a t=
emporary deployment hack.</div>

</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I think e=
ven in the imagined future of validating stub resolvers, there&#39;s still =
value in centralized caching; it speeds up lookup times. There&#39;s no sen=
se in intermediates caching bad answers, especially since it can lead to de=
nial of service, so there&#39;s still some value in validating centrally to=
o.=A0</div>
</div><div><br></div>-- <br>Colm
</div></div>

--089e0141a7ca47ce0704f5fecd1c--


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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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In message <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com>
, Phillip Hallam-Baker writes:
> 
> On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Nicholas Weaver
> <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>wrote:
> 
> >
> > On Apr 1, 2014, at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key size
> > increases three things:
> > >       time to generate signatures
> > >       bits on the wire
> > >       verification time.
> > >
> > > I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think
> > that is a red herring).
> > > Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.
> > >
> > >                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
> > > rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
> > > rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
> > > rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8
> > >
> > > Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by
> > roughly by about 70%.
> > >
> > > KSK's verification times affect the time to traverse the DNS tree, thus
> > > If 1024 is too short 1280 is fine for now
> > > If 2048 is too short 2400 bit key is much harder to break thus it should
> > be fine.
> > >
> > > just a plea for key use policy sanity not picking on Bill in any way.
> >
> > NO!  FUCK THAT SHIT.  Seriously.
> >
> > There is far far far too much worrying about "performance" of crypto, in
> > cases like this where the performance just doesn't matter!
> >
> > Yes, you can only do 18K verifies per CPU per second for 2048b keys.  Cry
> > me a river.  Bite the bullet, go to 2048 bits NOW, especially since the
> > servers do NOT have resistance to roll-back-the-clock attacks.
> >
> >
> >
> > In a major cluster validating recursive resolver, like what Comcast runs
> > with Nominum or Google uses with Public DNS, the question is not how many
> > verifies it can do per second per CPU core, but how many verifies it needs
> > to do per second per CPU core.
> >
> > And at the same time, this is a problem we already know how to
> > parallelize, and which is obscenely parallel, and which also caches...
> >
> > Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major ISP
> > centralized resolver, and that all are verified.  Thats less 1 CPU core-day
> > to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys.
> >
> 
> 
> Yes, I agree, but you are proposing a different DNSSEC model to the one
> they believe in.
> 
> The DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from Authoritative to
> Stub client model. They only view the Authoritative to Resolver as a
> temporary deployment hack.

As I have said many times.  There is a myth that recursive servers
do not need to validate answers.  Recursive servers will always
need to validate answers.  Stub resolvers can't recover from recursive
servers that pass through bogus answers.  Stub resolvers/applications
also need to validate answers.

Always set CD=1 is also bad advice.  Stub resolvers need to send
both CD=1 and CD=0 queries and should default to CD=0.  CD=1 should
be left to the case where they get a SERVFAIL result to the CD=0
to handle the case where the recursive server's clock is broken or
it has a bad trust anchor.

> So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-client <-> Resolver
> protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model will work.

DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path.  Why do you need
a second protocol.

> Weakening the crypto algorithms to make the architecture work is always a
> sign that the wrong architecture is being applied.
> 
> -- 
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
> 
> --089e0158b87c9c259504f5fb4d95
> Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> 
> <div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
> _quote">On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Nicholas Weaver <span dir=3D"ltr">&=
> lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu" target=3D"_blank">nweaver@i=
> csi.berkeley.edu</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
> <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
> x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D""><br>
> On Apr 1, 2014, at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ogud@o=
> gud.com">ogud@ogud.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
> &gt;<br>
> </div><div class=3D"">&gt; Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, =
> increasing the key size increases three things:<br>
> &gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 time to generate signatures<br>
> &gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 bits on the wire<br>
> &gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 verification time.<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
> that is a red herring).<br>
> &gt; Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.=
> <br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0sign =A0 =A0verify =A0 =A0sign/s ve=
> rify/s<br>
> &gt; rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s =A0 3902.8 =A062233.2<br>
> &gt; rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s =A0 =A0580.7 =A018852.8<br>
> &gt; rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s =A0 =A0 80.0 =A0 5016.8<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by r=
> oughly by about 70%.<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; KSK&#39;s verification times affect the time to traverse the DNS tree,=
>  thus<br>
> &gt; If 1024 is too short 1280 is fine for now<br>
> &gt; If 2048 is too short 2400 bit key is much harder to break thus it shou=
> ld be fine.<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; just a plea for key use policy sanity not picking on Bill in any way.<=
> br>
> <br>
> </div>NO! =A0FUCK THAT SHIT. =A0Seriously.<br>
> <br>
> There is far far far too much worrying about &quot;performance&quot; of cry=
> pto, in cases like this where the performance just doesn&#39;t matter!<br>
> <br>
> Yes, you can only do 18K verifies per CPU per second for 2048b keys. =A0Cry=
>  me a river. =A0Bite the bullet, go to 2048 bits NOW, especially since the =
> servers do NOT have resistance to roll-back-the-clock attacks.<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> In a major cluster validating recursive resolver, like what Comcast runs wi=
> th Nominum or Google uses with Public DNS, the question is not how many ver=
> ifies it can do per second per CPU core, but how many verifies it needs to =
> do per second per CPU core.<br>
> 
> <br>
> And at the same time, this is a problem we already know how to parallelize,=
>  and which is obscenely parallel, and which also caches...<br>
> <br>
> Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major ISP cen=
> tralized resolver, and that all are verified. =A0Thats less 1 CPU core-day =
> to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys.<br></blockquote>
> <div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Yes, I agree, but you are proposing a di=
> fferent DNSSEC model to the one they believe in.</div><div><br></div><div>T=
> he DNS world has put all their eggs into the DNSSEC from Authoritative to S=
> tub client model. They only view the Authoritative to Resolver as a tempora=
> ry deployment hack.</div>
> <div><br></div><div>So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-clie=
> nt &lt;-&gt; Resolver protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model=
>  will work.=A0</div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Weakening the =
> crypto algorithms to make the architecture work is always a sign that the w=
> rong architecture is being applied.</div>
> <div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://h=
> allambaker.com/</a><br>
> </div></div>
> 
> --089e0158b87c9c259504f5fb4d95--
> 
> 
> --===============8670379042506024621==
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> 
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 
> --===============8670379042506024621==--
> 
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From nobody Tue Apr  1 17:07:56 2014
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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <20140401223943.528B71226903@rock.dv.isc.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2014 17:07:46 -0700
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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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Cc: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Matth=E4us_Wander?= <matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de>, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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--089e011825440f264b04f604135f
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On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 3:39 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
>
> As I have said many times.  There is a myth that recursive servers
> do not need to validate answers.  Recursive servers will always
> need to validate answers.  Stub resolvers can't recover from recursive
> servers that pass through bogus answers.


This too is going too far; of course they can, they can ask another
recursive resolver.

Always set CD=1 is also bad advice.  Stub resolvers need to send
> both CD=1 and CD=0 queries and should default to CD=0.  CD=1 should
> be left to the case where they get a SERVFAIL result to the CD=0
> to handle the case where the recursive server's clock is broken or
> it has a bad trust anchor.
>

Defaulting to CD=0 renders DNSSEC, essentially, pointless. Resolvers, and
the path between resolvers and stubs, are the easiest components in the
lookup chain to subvert.

> So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-client <-> Resolver
> > protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model will work.
>
> DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path.  Why do you need
> a second protocol.
>

That statement is not consistent with setting CD=0 on that path.

-- 
Colm

--089e011825440f264b04f604135f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
ue, Apr 1, 2014 at 3:39 PM, Mark Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:marka@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">marka@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
As I have said many times. =A0There is a myth that recursive servers<br>
do not need to validate answers. =A0Recursive servers will always<br>
need to validate answers. =A0Stub resolvers can&#39;t recover from recursiv=
e<br>
servers that pass through bogus answers. =A0</blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>This too is going too far; of course they can, they can ask another recur=
sive resolver.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">

Always set CD=3D1 is also bad advice. =A0Stub resolvers need to send<br>
both CD=3D1 and CD=3D0 queries and should default to CD=3D0. =A0CD=3D1 shou=
ld<br>
be left to the case where they get a SERVFAIL result to the CD=3D0<br>
to handle the case where the recursive server&#39;s clock is broken or<br>
it has a bad trust anchor.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Defaulting t=
o CD=3D0 renders DNSSEC, essentially, pointless. Resolvers, and the path be=
tween resolvers and stubs, are the easiest components in the lookup chain t=
o subvert.=A0<br>
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bord=
er-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">
&gt; So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-client &lt;-&gt; Re=
solver<br>
&gt; protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model will work.<br>
<br>
</div>DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path. =A0Why do you need<b=
r>
a second protocol.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That statement is no=
t consistent with setting CD=3D0 on that path.=A0</div></div><div><br></div=
>-- <br>Colm
</div></div>

--089e011825440f264b04f604135f--


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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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In message <CAAF6GDe=39bmVDOtox+9coaH7R06erm-JUK19ZwPEUVkxepKTg@mail.gmail.com>, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= writ
es:
> --089e011825440f264b04f604135f
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> 
> On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 3:39 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
> >
> > As I have said many times.  There is a myth that recursive servers
> > do not need to validate answers.  Recursive servers will always
> > need to validate answers.  Stub resolvers can't recover from recursive
> > servers that pass through bogus answers.
> 
> 
> This too is going too far; of course they can, they can ask another
> recursive resolver.

Which also passes through bogus answers.  I will repeat stub resolvers
can't recover from recursive servers that pass through bogus answers.

> > Always set CD=1 is also bad advice.  Stub resolvers need to send
> > both CD=1 and CD=0 queries and should default to CD=0.  CD=1 should
> > be left to the case where they get a SERVFAIL result to the CD=0
> > to handle the case where the recursive server's clock is broken or
> > it has a bad trust anchor.
> 
> Defaulting to CD=0 renders DNSSEC, essentially, pointless. Resolvers, and
> the path between resolvers and stubs, are the easiest components in the
> lookup chain to subvert.

CD=0 tells the resolver to validate the answers it getsi if it is
validating.  It has NOTHING to do with whether you are validating
or not.  You have fallen for the myth that CD=1 indicates that you
intend to validate and that CD=0 means that you are not validating.
CD DOES NOT HAVE THOSE MEANINGS.

DO=1 is the ONLY bit REQUIRED to be set if you are validating.

If DO=1 is set you should assume the client may be validating.
Named assumes this when deciding if it will intentionally break
DNSSEC validation down stream.

> > So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-client <-> Resolver
> > > protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model will work.
> >
> > DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path.  Why do you need
> > a second protocol.
> >
> 
> That statement is not consistent with setting CD=0 on that path.

I sugges that you go re-read all the DNSSEC RFC's if you believe
that because you are categorically WRONG.
 
> -- 
> Colm
> 
> --089e011825440f264b04f604135f
> Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> 
> <div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
> ue, Apr 1, 2014 at 3:39 PM, Mark Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
> ailto:marka@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">marka@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
> blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
>  #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> As I have said many times. =A0There is a myth that recursive servers<br>
> do not need to validate answers. =A0Recursive servers will always<br>
> need to validate answers. =A0Stub resolvers can&#39;t recover from recursiv=
> e<br>
> servers that pass through bogus answers. =A0</blockquote><div><br></div><di=
> v>This too is going too far; of course they can, they can ask another recur=
> sive resolver.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
> =3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> 
> Always set CD=3D1 is also bad advice. =A0Stub resolvers need to send<br>
> both CD=3D1 and CD=3D0 queries and should default to CD=3D0. =A0CD=3D1 shou=
> ld<br>
> be left to the case where they get a SERVFAIL result to the CD=3D0<br>
> to handle the case where the recursive server&#39;s clock is broken or<br>
> it has a bad trust anchor.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Defaulting t=
> o CD=3D0 renders DNSSEC, essentially, pointless. Resolvers, and the path be=
> tween resolvers and stubs, are the easiest components in the lookup chain t=
> o subvert.=A0<br>
> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bord=
> er-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">
> &gt; So they resisted the idea of an authenticated Stub-client &lt;-&gt; Re=
> solver<br>
> &gt; protocol and they dumb down the crypto so their model will work.<br>
> <br>
> </div>DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path. =A0Why do you need<b=
> r>
> a second protocol.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That statement is no=
> t consistent with setting CD=3D0 on that path.=A0</div></div><div><br></div=
> >-- <br>Colm
> </div></div>
> 
> --089e011825440f264b04f604135f--
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2014 18:25:12 -0700
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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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--001a11c300def88e1804f6052728
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On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 5:31 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:

> > This too is going too far; of course they can, they can ask another
> > recursive resolver.
>
> Which also passes through bogus answers.  I will repeat stub resolvers
> can't recover from recursive servers that pass through bogus answers.
>

DNSSEC is a mitigation against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle
interception-and-rewriting and cache compromises. These threats are
endpoint and path specific, so it's entirely possible that one of your
resolvers (or its path) has been compromised, but not others. If all of
your paths have been compromised, then there is no recovery; only
detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC.


> > Defaulting to CD=0 renders DNSSEC, essentially, pointless. Resolvers, and
> > the path between resolvers and stubs, are the easiest components in the
> > lookup chain to subvert.
>
> CD=0 tells the resolver to validate the answers it getsi if it is
> validating.  It has NOTHING to do with whether you are validating
> or not.  You have fallen for the myth that CD=1 indicates that you
> intend to validate and that CD=0 means that you are not validating.
> CD DOES NOT HAVE THOSE MEANINGS.
>
> DO=1 is the ONLY bit REQUIRED to be set if you are validating.
>
> If DO=1 is set you should assume the client may be validating.
> Named assumes this when deciding if it will intentionally break
> DNSSEC validation down stream.
>

As you pointed out, if I set CD=1, I always expect a meaningful answer
containing signatures that I can validate. If I set CD=0, then an empty
SERVFAIL response is valid. If I get SERVFAIL, how do I validate that it's
a real error? Your suggestion is to regress to the CD=0 case and re-check
it (or maybe do your own recursion?). Why not just do CD=0 all along?

Now I agree that a resolver should always validate the signatures anyway,
and if I were writing a caching resolver, I'd never cache rrsets that fail
validation, even if the user has CD set to 1. But that's separate.

> > DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path.  Why do you need
> > > a second protocol.
> >
> > That statement is not consistent with setting CD=0 on that path.
>
> I sugges that you go re-read all the DNSSEC RFC's if you believe
> that because you are categorically WRONG.
>

Please stay civil, and also please don't assume that I haven't read the
DNSSEC RFCs.

If you set CD=0, you can't authenticate the failure case, empty SERVFAILs
can be spoofed or inserted towards the stub. And how do you disambiguate
between SERVFAILs that are validation errors and other server failures?
Without some kind of resolver redundancy (so recovering via retrying
another resolver) I don't see a way. Of course if all of your resolvers
return SERVFAIL, you're left in the same situation - but again, if every
path you have has been compromised, there is no escape.

But this can all be boiled down to;  As you've already written, you agree
that CD=1 is necessary in the failure case - it's the only hope of
authenticating the error. So why bother with CD=0 at all?

-- 
Colm

--001a11c300def88e1804f6052728
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
ue, Apr 1, 2014 at 5:31 PM, Mark Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:marka@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">marka@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"">&gt; This too is going too far; of course they can, they ca=
n ask another<br>
&gt; recursive resolver.<br>
<br>
</div>Which also passes through bogus answers. =A0I will repeat stub resolv=
ers<br>
<div class=3D"">can&#39;t recover from recursive servers that pass through =
bogus answers.<br></div></blockquote><div>=A0</div><div>DNSSEC is a mitigat=
ion against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle interception-and-rewriting=
 and cache compromises. These threats are endpoint and path specific, so it=
&#39;s entirely possible that one of your resolvers (or its path) has been =
compromised, but not others. If all of your paths have been compromised, th=
en there is no recovery; only detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC=
.=A0</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">
&gt; Defaulting to CD=3D0 renders DNSSEC, essentially, pointless. Resolvers=
, and<br>
&gt; the path between resolvers and stubs, are the easiest components in th=
e<br>
&gt; lookup chain to subvert.<br>
<br>
</div>CD=3D0 tells the resolver to validate the answers it getsi if it is<b=
r>
validating. =A0It has NOTHING to do with whether you are validating<br>
or not. =A0You have fallen for the myth that CD=3D1 indicates that you<br>
intend to validate and that CD=3D0 means that you are not validating.<br>
CD DOES NOT HAVE THOSE MEANINGS.<br>
<br>
DO=3D1 is the ONLY bit REQUIRED to be set if you are validating.<br>
<br>
If DO=3D1 is set you should assume the client may be validating.<br>
Named assumes this when deciding if it will intentionally break<br>
DNSSEC validation down stream.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As you p=
ointed out, if I set CD=3D1, I always expect a meaningful answer containing=
 signatures that I can validate. If I set CD=3D0, then an empty SERVFAIL re=
sponse is valid. If I get SERVFAIL, how do I validate that it&#39;s a real =
error? Your suggestion is to regress to the CD=3D0 case and re-check it (or=
 maybe do your own recursion?). Why not just do CD=3D0 all along?=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>Now I agree that a resolver should always validate the =
signatures anyway, and if I were writing a caching resolver, I&#39;d never =
cache rrsets that fail validation, even if the user has CD set to 1. But th=
at&#39;s separate.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path. =A0Why do you ne=
ed<br>
&gt; &gt; a second protocol.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That statement is not consistent with setting CD=3D0 on that path.<br>
<br>
</div>I sugges that you go re-read all the DNSSEC RFC&#39;s if you believe<=
br>
that because you are categorically WRONG.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><d=
iv>Please stay civil, and also please don&#39;t assume that I haven&#39;t r=
ead the DNSSEC RFCs.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>If you set CD=3D0, you can=
&#39;t authenticate the failure case, empty SERVFAILs can be spoofed or ins=
erted towards the stub. And how do you disambiguate between SERVFAILs that =
are validation errors and other server failures? Without some kind of resol=
ver redundancy (so recovering via retrying another resolver) I don&#39;t se=
e a way. Of course if all of your resolvers return SERVFAIL, you&#39;re lef=
t in the same situation - but again, if every path you have has been compro=
mised, there is no escape.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>But this can all be boiled down to; =A0As you&#39;ve al=
ready written, you agree that CD=3D1 is necessary in the failure case - it&=
#39;s the only hope of authenticating the error. So why bother with CD=3D0 =
at all?=A0</div>
<div><br></div></div>-- <br>Colm
</div></div>

--001a11c300def88e1804f6052728--


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 9:05 AM, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> =
wrote:

>=20
> On Apr 1, 2014, at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key =
size increases three things:
>> 	time to generate signatures =20
>> 	bits on the wire
>> 	verification time.=20
>>=20
>> I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
that is a red herring).
>> Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is =
immaterial.=20
>>=20
>>                 sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
>> rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
>> rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
>> rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8
>>=20
>> Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by =
roughly by about 70%.=20
>>=20
>> KSK's verification times affect the time to traverse the DNS tree, =
thus=20
>> If 1024 is too short 1280 is fine for now
>> If 2048 is too short 2400 bit key is much harder to break thus it =
should be fine.=20
>>=20
>> just a plea for key use policy sanity not picking on Bill in any way.
>=20
> NO!  FUCK THAT SHIT.  Seriously.

Watch your language, just because I'm calling you on the carpet for =
simplistic world view, does not mean you need to use foul language.=20

>=20
> There is far far far too much worrying about "performance" of crypto, =
in cases like this where the performance just doesn't matter!
>=20

disagree strongly, you are only looking at a part of the whole picture.=20=

Verification adds resolution latency + verification adds extra queries =
which is more latency
	latency =3D=3D un-happy eye-balls. =20

> Yes, you can only do 18K verifies per CPU per second for 2048b keys.  =
Cry me a river.  Bite the bullet, go to 2048 bits NOW, especially since =
the servers do NOT have resistance to roll-back-the-clock attacks.

Why not go to a good ECC instead ? (not sure which one, but not P256 or =
P384)=20

18K answers/second =3D=3D> is a fraction of what larger resolver servers =
do today during peak times, yes not all answers need validation.
BUT you need to take into account that in some cases there is going to =
be lots of redundancy in verification in large resolver clusters, thus
if your query stream hits 5 different hosts all of them may end up doing =
almost 5x of the work, thus adding servers does not scale.=20
Yes people can create any cast clusters in depth where only the front =
end ones do verification and the back end ones only answer queries, but
that has different implications.=20

Remember it is not average load that matters it is peak load, even if =
the peak for 30 minutes on one day of the year.=20

Over the years I have been saying use keys that are appropriate, thus =
for someone like Paypal it makes sense to have strong keys,
but for my private domain does it matter what key size I use?=20
I do not buy the theory that one size fits all model for crypto, people =
should not use unsafe crypto, but the one size fits all is not the
right answer, just like not every zone needs a KSK and ZSK split. ( I =
use single 1280 bit RSA key with NSEC)=20

A real world analogy is that not everyone needs the same kind of car, =
some people need big cars, others small ones or even no car.=20

Furthermore using larger keys than your parents is non-sensical as that =
moves the cheap point of key cracking attack.=20
=20
> In a major cluster validating recursive resolver, like what Comcast =
runs with Nominum or Google uses with Public DNS, the question is not =
how many verifies it can do per second per CPU core, but how many =
verifies it needs to do per second per CPU core.

I have no doubt that CPU's can keep up but the point I was trying to =
make is increasing the key sizes by this big jump=20
=3D=3D> invalidates peoples assumptions on what the load is going to be =
in the near term.=20

>=20
> And at the same time, this is a problem we already know how to =
parallelize, and which is obscenely parallel, and which also caches=85

Do we? Some high performance DNS software is still un-treaded, many =
resolvers are run in VM's with low number of cores=20
exported to the VM.=20

>=20
> Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major =
ISP centralized resolver, and that all are verified.  Thats less 1 CPU =
core-day to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys. =20

1B is low due to low TTL's and synthetic names used for transactions, =
and as I said before it is peak load that matters not average.=20
DNSSEC processing is just a part of the whole processing model.=20

>=20
> And yeah, DNS is peaky, but that's also why this task is being run on =
a cluster already, and each cluster node has a lot of CPUs.

that costs money, and effort to operate.

	Olafur


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From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2014 22:45:52 -0400
Message-Id: <C88DDFA1-6585-4666-870D-91762129C725@ogud.com>
References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <CAAF6GDfGiB_GEVQ=igi4BeQsYBtQrqQ=uKZvAoJuSTLYL6PRyA@mail.gmail.com>
To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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Cc: dnsop@ietf.org, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Matth=E4us_Wander?= <matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de>, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 11:15 AM, Colm MacC=E1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> =
wrote:

>=20
> On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> =
wrote:
> Doing these big jumps is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key =
size increases three things:
>         time to generate signatures
>         bits on the wire
>         verification time.
>=20
> I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
that is a red herring).
> Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is immaterial.
>=20
>                   sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
> rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s   3902.8  62233.2
> rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s    580.7  18852.8
> rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s     80.0   5016.8
>=20
> Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by =
roughly by about 70%.
>=20
> With those numbers; if the validating resolver uses =
speculative/optimistic concurrency [1] then jumping from 1024 to 4096 =
bits, the user-impact is that ~180us are added to the overall resolution =
time. Zero in the cached case.=20
>=20

you are assuming one validation per question ?=20
what if the resolver needs to to 10? that is 1.8ms,=20

> There is an impact on the overall capacity of the resolver, though =
it's a function of cache-miss-rate (since cache hits need not be =
verified). Large centralised resolver operators may face some pressure =
(anyone doing validation locally is unlikely to notice), but is it =
sensible to compromise your zone security to accommodate that?

What is the security model ?=20
without defining that we can not discuss "compromise" in practical =
terms.=20
In my mind the question is what is the value of breaking key for "X", =
and the value depends on who/what "X" is.=20
How valuable is it to anyone to break the key for ogud.com vs amazon.com =
?=20
As amazon.com is more valuable they SHOULD use stronger keys at all =
times, but .com key is even more valuable.

In all system design we need to take into account where the system can =
be subverted, right now the=20
registration part of DNS system is the weakest link, thus most cost =
effective way to gain hold of a domain is to=20
divert the registration.=20

Secondly what can someone do with "cracked" key and for how long? =20

>=20
> [1] There's no need to wait for a response to be validated before =
recursing, a validating resolver can first recurse and later backtrack =
if the parent signature doesn't verify.

In the scope of things verification times are small compared to network =
delays but can add up if done as batch operation.=20

	Olafur





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	charset=iso-8859-1

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Diso-8859-1"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><br><div><div>On Apr 1, 2014, at 11:15 AM, Colm MacC=E1rthaigh &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:colm@allcosts.net">colm@allcosts.net</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 5:39 AM, Olafur Gudmundsson =
<span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ogud@ogud.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ogud@ogud.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Doing these big jumps =
is the wrong thing to do, increasing the key size increases three =
things:<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; time to generate signatures<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; bits on the wire<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; verification time.<br>
<br>
I care more about verification time than bits on the wire (as I think =
that is a red herring).<br>
Signing time increase is a self inflicted wound so that is =
immaterial.<br>
<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; sign =
&nbsp; &nbsp;verify &nbsp; &nbsp;sign/s verify/s<br>
rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s &nbsp; 3902.8 &nbsp;62233.2<br>
rsa 2048 bits 0.001722s 0.000053s &nbsp; &nbsp;580.7 &nbsp;18852.8<br>
rsa 4096 bits 0.012506s 0.000199s &nbsp; &nbsp; 80.0 &nbsp; 5016.8<br>
<br>
Thus doubling the key size decreases the verification performance by =
roughly by about 70%.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>With those =
numbers; if the validating resolver uses speculative/optimistic =
concurrency [1] then jumping from 1024 to 4096 bits, the user-impact is =
that ~180us are added to the overall resolution time. Zero in the cached =
case.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>you are =
assuming one validation per question ?&nbsp;</div><div>what if the =
resolver needs to to 10? that is =
1.8ms,&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>There is an impact on the overall capacity of =
the resolver, though it's a function of cache-miss-rate (since cache =
hits need not be verified). Large centralised resolver operators may =
face some pressure (anyone doing validation locally is unlikely to =
notice), but is it sensible to compromise your zone security to =
accommodate =
that?</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>What is the =
security model ?&nbsp;</div><div>without defining that we can not =
discuss "compromise" in practical terms.&nbsp;</div><div>In my mind the =
question is what is the value of breaking key for "X", and the value =
depends on who/what "X" is.&nbsp;</div><div>How valuable is it to anyone =
to break the key for <a href=3D"http://ogud.com">ogud.com</a> vs <a =
href=3D"http://amazon.com">amazon.com</a> ?&nbsp;</div><div>As <a =
href=3D"http://amazon.com">amazon.com</a> is more valuable they SHOULD =
use stronger keys at all times, but .com key is even more =
valuable.</div><div><br></div><div>In all system design we need to take =
into account where the system can be subverted, right now =
the&nbsp;</div><div>registration part of DNS system is the weakest link, =
thus most cost effective way to gain hold of a domain is =
to&nbsp;</div><div>divert the =
registration.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Secondly what can someone =
do with "cracked" key and for how =
long?&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div><br></div><div>[1] There's no need to wait for a response to be =
validated before recursing, a validating resolver can first recurse and =
later backtrack if the parent signature doesn't =
verify.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In the =
scope of things verification times are small compared to network delays =
but can add up if done as batch =
operation.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>Olafur</div><div><br></div><br></div><div><br></div><br></body></ht=
ml>=

--Apple-Mail=_1E6B7F66-E5F0-4A7D-BEAE-2BEBC030A458--


From nobody Tue Apr  1 19:48:37 2014
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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CFA0ED6F-6800-4638-90B0-CD414301C501@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 7:37 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:

> Why not go to a good ECC instead ? (not sure which one, but not P256 =
or P384)=20

Why not P256 or P384? They are the most-studied curves. Some of the =
newer curves do have advantages, but they are also newer.

--Paul Hoffman=


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Subject: [DNSOP] CD (Re:  Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 06:25:12PM -0700, Colm MacC?rthaigh wrote:
> DNSSEC is a mitigation against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle
> interception-and-rewriting and cache compromises. These threats are
> endpoint and path specific, so it's entirely possible that one of your
> resolvers (or its path) has been compromised, but not others. If all of
> your paths have been compromised, then there is no recovery; only
> detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC.

Consider the scenario in which one authoritative server for a zone
has been compromised and the others have not, and that one happens to
have the lowest round-trip time, so it's favored by your resolver.

If you query with CD=0, a validating resolver detects the problem
and tries again with another auth server.  It doesn't give up until
the whole NS RRset has failed.

If you query with CD=1, you get the bogus data and it won't validate.
If you try again, you'll get the same bogus data out of the cache.
Use a different resolver, and if it happens to use the same auth
server, then the same thing happens again.

Your best chance of getting an answer that you can validate is to
send CD=0 to a recursive resolver that is itself validating.  If you get
SERVFAIL, *then* you try with CD=1, and if the result validates, you
know it was the resolver that was broken rather than the data.

-- 
Evan Hunt -- each@isc.org
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.


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To: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <20140401223943.528B71226903@rock.dv.isc.org> <CAAF6GDe=39bmVDOtox+9coaH7R06erm-JUK19ZwPEUVkxepKTg@mail.gmail.com> <20140402003159.B4B631228652@rock.dv.isc.org> <CAAF6GDdLs3V9JMa8jgD_asYqhmt=PCaBAmk4LO0JaX_q6q0UHQ@mail.gmail.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 01 Apr 2014 18:25:12 -0700." <CAAF6GDdLs3V9JMa8jgD_asYqhmt=PCaBAmk4LO0JaX_q6q0UHQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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In message <CAAF6GDdLs3V9JMa8jgD_asYqhmt=PCaBAmk4LO0JaX_q6q0UHQ@mail.gmail.com>
, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= writes:
> 
> On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 5:31 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
> 
> > > This too is going too far; of course they can, they can ask another
> > > recursive resolver.
> >
> > Which also passes through bogus answers.  I will repeat stub resolvers
> > can't recover from recursive servers that pass through bogus answers.
> >
> 
> DNSSEC is a mitigation against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle
> interception-and-rewriting and cache compromises. These threats are
> endpoint and path specific, so it's entirely possible that one of your
> resolvers (or its path) has been compromised, but not others. If all of
> your paths have been compromised, then there is no recovery; only
> detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC.

There is also the good answers mixed in with the bad answers coming
to the recursive server which is supposed to discard the bad answers
and wait for the good answer which will be in the query stream.

> > > Defaulting to CD=0 renders DNSSEC, essentially, pointless. Resolvers, and
> > > the path between resolvers and stubs, are the easiest components in the
> > > lookup chain to subvert.
> >
> > CD=0 tells the resolver to validate the answers it getsi if it is
> > validating.  It has NOTHING to do with whether you are validating
> > or not.  You have fallen for the myth that CD=1 indicates that you
> > intend to validate and that CD=0 means that you are not validating.
> > CD DOES NOT HAVE THOSE MEANINGS.
> >
> > DO=1 is the ONLY bit REQUIRED to be set if you are validating.
> >
> > If DO=1 is set you should assume the client may be validating.
> > Named assumes this when deciding if it will intentionally break
> > DNSSEC validation down stream.
> >
> 
> As you pointed out, if I set CD=1, I always expect a meaningful answer
> containing signatures that I can validate.  If I set CD=0, then an empty
> SERVFAIL response is valid. If I get SERVFAIL, how do I validate that it's
> a real error?

You re-check with CD=1.

> Your suggestion is to regress to the CD=0 case and re-check
> it (or maybe do your own recursion?). Why not just do CD=0 all along?

CD=1 is for bad trust anchors / clocks in the validating recusive server.
CD=0 is for attacker sending spoofed traffic at the recursive server.

Different fail/attack profiles, different query bits needed.

The recursive server sorts the wheat from the chaff and passes the
stub resolver the wheat.

> Now I agree that a resolver should always validate the signatures anyway,
> and if I were writing a caching resolver, I'd never cache rrsets that fail
> validation, even if the user has CD set to 1. But that's separate.
> 
> > > DNSSEC is quite capable to protecting that path.  Why do you need
> > > > a second protocol.
> > >
> > > That statement is not consistent with setting CD=0 on that path.
> >
> > I sugges that you go re-read all the DNSSEC RFC's if you believe
> > that because you are categorically WRONG.
> >
> 
> Please stay civil, and also please don't assume that I haven't read the
> DNSSEC RFCs.
>
> If you set CD=0, you can't authenticate the failure case, empty SERVFAILs
> can be spoofed or inserted towards the stub. And how do you disambiguate
> between SERVFAILs that are validation errors and other server failures?

You retry with CD=1, which I stated initially.  Note if the recursive
server is returning SERVFAILs to CD=0 it will be causing problems
for all its clients so will likely be fixed.  Additionally CD=0 helps
when the recursive server mis-classifies authoritative servers as not
supporting EDNS.

> Without some kind of resolver redundancy (so recovering via retrying
> another resolver) I don't see a way. Of course if all of your resolvers
> return SERVFAIL, you're left in the same situation - but again, if every
> path you have has been compromised, there is no escape.
> 
> But this can all be boiled down to;  As you've already written, you agree
> that CD=1 is necessary in the failure case - it's the only hope of
> authenticating the error. So why bother with CD=0 at all?

Because CD=1 does not get the good answers to the stub when the
responses to the recursive server are being spoofed.

> Colm
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2014 22:58:54 -0400
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: [DNSOP] CD bit (was Re:  Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 09:39:43AM +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:

> Always set CD=1 is also bad advice.  Stub resolvers need to send
> both CD=1 and CD=0 queries and should default to CD=0.  CD=1 should
> be left to the case where they get a SERVFAIL result to the CD=0
> to handle the case where the recursive server's clock is broken or
> it has a bad trust anchor.

It strikes me that this argument has been hashed pretty well to death
before, but just to refresh everyone's memory, there are several
different strategies one can use here:

1.  CD=1 all the time, and if you get into trouble consider the
failure a feature.  Mark's argument (which has some merit) is that
this is too strong, because if the stub gets the bogus answer, it
can't "fall through" and pick up another one that might be good.

2.  CD=1 mostly, and if you get a failure try falling back to CD=0.
Maybe with CD=0, the recursive server will find you something that
validates in order to get you on your way.

3.  The opposite of (2), defauling to CD=0 (what Mark advocates).  

4.  Give up on stubs and be a full service resolver all the time.

For 1-3, people may have a peek at RFC 6840, especially section 5.9
and Appendix B.

None of this, AFAICT, helps us at all with the 1024/2048 choice.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 10:48 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> On Apr 1, 2014, at 7:37 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Why not go to a good ECC instead ? (not sure which one, but not P256 =
or P384)=20
>=20
> Why not P256 or P384? They are the most-studied curves. Some of the =
newer curves do have advantages, but they are also newer.
>=20
> --Paul Hoffman


The verification performance is bad, P256 takes 24x times longer to =
verify a signature than 2048 bit RSA key.=20
Studied !=3D good performance

	Olafur




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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Tuesday, April 1, 2014, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>
> you are assuming one validation per question ?
> what if the resolver needs to to 10? that is 1.8ms,
>

I'm not :) as I wrote - if the resolver validates after it has recursed,
only the final end of the line validation increases the overall latency.
Responses can be assumed to be valid, recursed and then that recursion can
be cancelled and backtracked if the response is found to be invalid.

In all system design we need to take into account where the system can be
> subverted, right now the
> registration part of DNS system is the weakest link, thus most cost
> effective way to gain hold of a domain is to
> divert the registration.
>

 There are several weak links, and it makes sense to work on them all.

> [1] There's no need to wait for a response to be validated before
> recursing, a validating resolver can first recurse and later backtrack if
> the parent signature doesn't verify.
>
>
> In the scope of things verification times are small compared to network
> delays but can add up if done as batch operation.
>

Optimistic concurrency doesn't imply batching. Each response can be
validated, while the next question is awaiting a response - one at a time.



-- 
Colm

--001a11c2fcba57202a04f60685cc
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On Tuesday, April 1, 2014, Olafur Gudmundsson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ogud@og=
ud.com">ogud@ogud.com</a>&gt; wrote:<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div sty=
le=3D"word-wrap:break-word">
<div>you are assuming one validation per question ?=A0</div><div>what if th=
e resolver needs to to 10? that is 1.8ms,=A0</div></div></blockquote><div><=
br></div><div>I&#39;m not :) as I wrote - if the resolver validates after i=
t has recursed, only the final end of the line validation=A0increases the o=
verall latency. Responses can be assumed to be valid, recursed and then tha=
t recursion can be cancelled and backtracked if the response is found to be=
 invalid.</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break=
-word"><div>In all system design we need to take into account where the sys=
tem can be subverted, right now the=A0</div>
<div>registration part of DNS system is the weakest link, thus most cost ef=
fective way to gain hold of a domain is to=A0</div><div>divert the registra=
tion.=A0</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=A0There are several w=
eak links, and it makes sense to work on them all.</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote">

<div>[1] There&#39;s no need to wait for a response to be validated before =
recursing, a validating resolver can first recurse and later backtrack if t=
he parent signature doesn&#39;t verify.</div></div></div></div></blockquote=
>
<div><br></div><div>In the scope of things verification times are small com=
pared to network delays but can add up if done as batch operation.</div></d=
iv></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Optimistic concurrency doesn&#39;=
t imply batching. Each response can be validated, while the next question i=
s awaiting a response - one at a time.</div>
<br><br><br>-- <br>Colm<br>

--001a11c2fcba57202a04f60685cc--


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Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2014 23:06:37 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Tue, 1 Apr 2014, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

> Over the years I have been saying use keys that are appropriate, thus for someone like Paypal it makes sense to have strong keys,
> but for my private domain does it matter what key size I use?

That depends. How much money is in your ogud@ogud.com paypal account?

Seriously though, security strength should not depend on who uses
it. Just like opensource software does not tell you for what you can
use the software. No one can make consistent judgement calls on that.

We already see security that is only available to "important
players", like EV certificates, and browser vendors pinning their own
certificates, OS vendors hardcoding their IP addresses. It's a position
of priviledge. We should not design or deploy to accomodate that. One
the of advantages of DNSSEC is that we can give everyone the highest
levels of security. Don't make a security economy class.

People running giant DNS resolver farms can add a few boxes to their
farm. People running resolvers on the stub can take the extra hit for
the few domains they are resolving.

Paul


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] CD bit (was Re: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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In message <20140402025854.GB90415@mx1.yitter.info>, Andrew Sullivan writes:
> On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 09:39:43AM +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> 
> > Always set CD=1 is also bad advice.  Stub resolvers need to send
> > both CD=1 and CD=0 queries and should default to CD=0.  CD=1 should
> > be left to the case where they get a SERVFAIL result to the CD=0
> > to handle the case where the recursive server's clock is broken or
> > it has a bad trust anchor.
> 
> It strikes me that this argument has been hashed pretty well to death
> before, but just to refresh everyone's memory, there are several
> different strategies one can use here:
> 
> 1.  CD=1 all the time, and if you get into trouble consider the
> failure a feature.  Mark's argument (which has some merit) is that
> this is too strong, because if the stub gets the bogus answer, it
> can't "fall through" and pick up another one that might be good.
> 
> 2.  CD=1 mostly, and if you get a failure try falling back to CD=0.
> Maybe with CD=0, the recursive server will find you something that
> validates in order to get you on your way.
> 
> 3.  The opposite of (2), defauling to CD=0 (what Mark advocates).  
> 
> 4.  Give up on stubs and be a full service resolver all the time.
> 
> For 1-3, people may have a peek at RFC 6840, especially section 5.9
> and Appendix B.

And I pointed out before RFC 6840 was published that the appendix
was incomplete in its analysis.  You didn't want to reopen the
analysis, as it was a long discussion to get what was there, and
the wg, I suspect, was too fried to care one way or the other.  As
a result we have to deal with the fallout now.

> None of this, AFAICT, helps us at all with the 1024/2048 choice.

Actually it does as it shows that recursive servers need to validate.
If you are looking at workload you have to factor that into the
analysis.

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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Cc: dnsop WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 7:37 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:

Pardon my language, but you are repeating the same bogus performance =
arguments that have hurt crypto for years.  Having heard the same thing, =
over and over and over again, over the better part of a decade and =
change, it really does get to me.


Symmetric key is effectively free on a modern computer (even when AES =
first came out you could do nearly a gigabit on a single core.  Try =
getting a gigabit of I/O into or out of a circa 2001 PC), and even =
slow-old RSA, especially RSA validation, is close enough to free for =
practical purposes.

And when you do have big load on a server serving many clients in the =
very rare case where the crypto IS the critical bottleneck, this is an =
obscenely parallel task...=20



>> There is far far far too much worrying about "performance" of crypto, =
in cases like this where the performance just doesn't matter!
>>=20
>=20
> disagree strongly, you are only looking at a part of the whole =
picture.=20
> Verification adds resolution latency + verification adds extra queries =
which is more latency
> 	latency =3D=3D un-happy eye-balls. =20

You are talking about 50 microseconds of additional latency for using a =
real key length instead of 1024b lengths.  Not milliseconds.  =
Microseconds.

3e8 m/s * 1e-6s/us is 300m/us.  So thats 15 kilometers of network travel =
if you remove all switches and lay down a vacuum cable.


And remember, its not on the critical path except for the final =
validation, because you can use glue before it validates to do your =
lookups and validate the upper pieces of the hierarchy while waiting for =
the lower pieces to arrive, and well, its going to take a lot longer =
than 50 microseconds for that data to arrive.

I don't see HFT systems doing DNSSEC validation...



>> Yes, you can only do 18K verifies per CPU per second for 2048b keys.  =
Cry me a river.  Bite the bullet, go to 2048 bits NOW, especially since =
the servers do NOT have resistance to roll-back-the-clock attacks.
>=20
> Why not go to a good ECC instead ? (not sure which one, but not P256 =
or P384)=20
>=20
> 18K answers/second =3D=3D> is a fraction of what larger resolver =
servers do today during peak times, yes not all answers need validation.
> BUT you need to take into account that in some cases there is going to =
be lots of redundancy in verification in large resolver clusters, thus
> if your query stream hits 5 different hosts all of them may end up =
doing almost 5x of the work, thus adding servers does not scale.=20
> Yes people can create any cast clusters in depth where only the front =
end ones do verification and the back end ones only answer queries, but
> that has different implications.=20

If the crypto is too much time in your cluster resolver, hash(name) to =
find cluster node that already has the answer.  These have known, off =
the shelf solutions in the unlikely event that such a key length jump =
makes a difference.


> Remember it is not average load that matters it is peak load, even if =
the peak for 30 minutes on one day of the year.=20

And even in that universal deployment case, of 10x the load of the =
average case, that is a whopping 10 CPU cores to do the crypto for a 1B =
lookup/day case.  Thats less than a single server these days.

1B uncached lookups is a lot.  This is a big number for things that are =
largely driven by human processes and which (even in the nightmare that =
is CDNs and 10s TTLs), cache, and which ISPs distribute close to the end =
user to save latency.


Oh, and unless the CDN is doing dynamic signing, the RRSIG TTLs are much =
longer, so the crypto operations cache for a lot longer TTL.

> Over the years I have been saying use keys that are appropriate, thus =
for someone like Paypal it makes sense to have strong keys,
> but for my private domain does it matter what key size I use?=20
> I do not buy the theory that one size fits all model for crypto, =
people should not use unsafe crypto, but the one size fits all is not =
the
> right answer, just like not every zone needs a KSK and ZSK split. ( I =
use single 1280 bit RSA key with NSEC)=20

> A real world analogy is that not everyone needs the same kind of car, =
some people need big cars, others small ones or even no car.=20

But at the same time, we mandate certain crash resistance.  RSA keys of =
less than 2048b should be deprecated, and DNSSEC software MUST NOT =
generate them. =20

We do not sell cars with bodies made of silly putty and airbags made =
from party balloons, we SHOULD NOT deploy software with known unsafe key =
lengths.


> Furthermore using larger keys than your parents is non-sensical as =
that moves the cheap point of key cracking attack.=20

And why do you think I'm so pissed at the root, and com, and everyone =
else using 1024b keys?

Thats a joke, a bad one, and it needs to be fixed, and it needs to be =
fixed to be a real value, and real value, based on real cryptographers =
recommendations dating back the better part of a decade is 2048b.

>> In a major cluster validating recursive resolver, like what Comcast =
runs with Nominum or Google uses with Public DNS, the question is not =
how many verifies it can do per second per CPU core, but how many =
verifies it needs to do per second per CPU core.
>=20
> I have no doubt that CPU's can keep up but the point I was trying to =
make is increasing the key sizes by this big jump=20
> =3D=3D> invalidates peoples assumptions on what the load is going to =
be in the near term.=20

How many resolvers are currently spending more than 10% of CPU doing =
DNSSEC validation right now?  Any above 1%?

>> And at the same time, this is a problem we already know how to =
parallelize, and which is obscenely parallel, and which also caches=85
>=20
> Do we? Some high performance DNS software is still un-treaded, many =
resolvers are run in VM's with low number of cores=20
> exported to the VM.=20

Who is running a major centralized ISP (1M+ customers on a single =
resolver instance, 1B+ external lookups/day) on a un-threaded, low =
powered system for DNS yet doing DNSSEC validation?

The systems you are talking about are in the 100M external lookup range =
or less, and in that case the crypto really doesn't matter to the =
performance.  Oh, and they aren't validating anyway, so who cares?


>> Lets assume a typical day of 1 billion external lookups for a major =
ISP centralized resolver, and that all are verified.  Thats less 1 CPU =
core-day to validate every DNSSEC lookup that day at 2048b keys. =20
>=20
> 1B is low due to low TTL's and synthetic names used for transactions, =
and as I said before it is peak load that matters not average.=20
> DNSSEC processing is just a part of the whole processing model.

1B external lookups is a number taken from when I was looking at SIE =
data (which captures the queries from the participating recursive =
resolvers) about a year ago to detect covert channels.

It was ~2B/day lookups in the data set, but there were multiple major =
cluster resolvers belonging to a single top 10 US ISP which dominated =
that dataset.


Even assuming peak load 10x average (an unrealistic amount of peakiness =
if you've ever looked at network traffic graphs), and every answer has =
to validate once (yes, you may have a few more, but in practice this =
caches as well, since all 1B lookups are not going to be to 1B different =
domains...), thats still just 10 CPU cores. =20

The nearly 2-year-old mac mini on my desktop is a quad core.  If your =
billion lookup a day DNS resolver is validating DNSSEC, everything is =
signed, yet you  can't afford to run on a single modern dual-CPU =
oct-core system, you get no sympathy from me.


>> And yeah, DNS is peaky, but that's also why this task is being run on =
a cluster already, and each cluster node has a lot of CPUs.
>=20
> that costs money, and effort to operate.

Effort?  How?  The assumption is you are already going through the =
hassle of validation.

Money?  You're talking peanuts.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From nobody Tue Apr  1 21:28:05 2014
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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 00:27:57 -0400
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] CD bit (was Re: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 02:23:50PM +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:

> And I pointed out before RFC 6840 was published that the appendix
> was incomplete in its analysis.

For whatever it's worth, my recollection is that, among other things,
you offered the sort of calm, reasoned, fully-explained analysis that
you and Nick Weaver seem to be competing to offer in this discussion,
with the all-caps lines and everything.  But in any case, since that
was another WG and since that document is published, I'm not sure the
value in debating the history.

There _is_ discussion of some of these issues in 6840, and I think it
is helpful for people to have read it.  It would not surprise me, of
course, if it turned out that 6840 or any other document about the DNS
turned out to have some issues.

> Actually it does as it shows that recursive servers need to validate.

No, it shows that under some use cases the recursive server will
provide better results if it validates, which is subtly different from
what you say there.  "Need to" is too strong.  "Undesirable things
happen if not" might be true.  

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com


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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>
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Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, Matth?us Wander <matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de>, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] CD (Re: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Evan Hunt <each@isc.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 06:25:12PM -0700, Colm MacC?rthaigh wrote:
> > DNSSEC is a mitigation against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle
> > interception-and-rewriting and cache compromises. These threats are
> > endpoint and path specific, so it's entirely possible that one of your
> > resolvers (or its path) has been compromised, but not others. If all of
> > your paths have been compromised, then there is no recovery; only
> > detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC.
>
> Consider the scenario in which one authoritative server for a zone
> has been compromised and the others have not, and that one happens to
> have the lowest round-trip time, so it's favored by your resolver.


> If you query with CD=0, a validating resolver detects the problem
> and tries again with another auth server.  It doesn't give up until
> the whole NS RRset has failed.


> If you query with CD=1, you get the bogus data and it won't validate.
>

I don't think this makes much sense for a coherent resolver. If I were
writing a resolver, the behaviour would instead be;  try really hard to
find a valid response, exhaust every reasonable possibility. If it can't
get a valid response, then if CD=1 it's ok to pass back the invalid
response and its supposed signatures - maybe the stub will no better, at
least fail open. If CD=0, then SERVFAIL, fail closed.

Although CD means "checking disabled", I wouldn't actually disable
checking, simply because that's stupid (I don't mean to be impolite, but I
don't have a better word to use here). But by preserving the on-the-wire
semantics of the CD bit, I'd preserve effectiveness as a cache, and pass on
what's needed to validate even the failure cases.


-- 
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Evan Hunt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:each@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">each@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
r><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 06:25:12PM -0700, Colm MacC?rthaigh wrote:<br>
&gt; DNSSEC is a mitigation against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle<br=
>
&gt; interception-and-rewriting and cache compromises. These threats are<br=
>
&gt; endpoint and path specific, so it&#39;s entirely possible that one of =
your<br>
&gt; resolvers (or its path) has been compromised, but not others. If all o=
f<br>
&gt; your paths have been compromised, then there is no recovery; only<br>
&gt; detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC.<br>
<br>
Consider the scenario in which one authoritative server for a zone<br>
has been compromised and the others have not, and that one happens to<br>
have the lowest round-trip time, so it&#39;s favored by your resolver.=A0</=
blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bor=
der-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If you query with CD=3D0, a validating resolver detects the problem<br>
and tries again with another auth server. =A0It doesn&#39;t give up until<b=
r>
the whole NS RRset has failed.=A0</blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex=
">
<br>
If you query with CD=3D1, you get the bogus data and it won&#39;t validate.=
<br></blockquote><div>=A0</div><div>I don&#39;t think this makes much sense=
 for a coherent resolver. If I were writing a resolver, the behaviour would=
 instead be; =A0try really hard to find a valid response, exhaust every rea=
sonable possibility. If it can&#39;t get a valid response, then if CD=3D1 i=
t&#39;s ok to pass back the invalid response and its supposed signatures - =
maybe the stub will no better, at least fail open. If CD=3D0, then SERVFAIL=
, fail closed.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>Although CD means &quot;checking disabled&quot;, I woul=
dn&#39;t actually disable checking, simply because that&#39;s stupid (I don=
&#39;t mean to be impolite, but I don&#39;t have a better word to use here)=
. But by preserving the on-the-wire semantics of the CD bit, I&#39;d preser=
ve effectiveness as a cache, and pass on what&#39;s needed to validate even=
 the failure cases.=A0</div>
<div><br></div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Colm
</div></div>

--001a11c2a20c040b1504f60880b6--


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To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/PAwKTwcgn2ClH9KcmxlIZyI63tI
Cc: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Matth?us Wander <matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] CD (Re: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 10:24 PM, Colm MacC=E1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> =
wrote:
> =20
> I don't think this makes much sense for a coherent resolver. If I were =
writing a resolver, the behaviour would instead be;  try really hard to =
find a valid response, exhaust every reasonable possibility. If it can't =
get a valid response, then if CD=3D1 it's ok to pass back the invalid =
response and its supposed signatures - maybe the stub will no better, at =
least fail open. If CD=3D0, then SERVFAIL, fail closed.=20

The bigger problem is not the CD case, but getting the data at all to =
validate locally. =20

A lot (and I mean a LOT) of NATs give a DNS proxy that doesn't =
understand or forward requests for DNSSEC information. Heck, even Apple =
(which in my opinion makes the best overall CPE) doesn't do this right.  =
These NATs don't give the IP of the real recursive resolver, which often =
does support DNSSEC (and, in the case of Comcast, even validates).

Which means you have to go around and do a full local fetch, starting at =
the root and going down from there to validate on the client.

And then, to make matters worse, you have the hotspots and similar cases =
which force the user to use the configured recursive resolver.  =
Fortunately, most of those support fetching DNSSEC records.  But note =
that I said most, not all....

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 10:48 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> On Apr 1, 2014, at 7:37 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>
> > Why not go to a good ECC instead ? (not sure which one, but not P256 or
> P384)
>
> Why not P256 or P384? They are the most-studied curves. Some of the newer
> curves do have advantages, but they are also newer.
>

Same answer as always: A patent troll with the most worthless claim ever is
still going to cost $4 million to get a declarative judgement against.

RIM is on the verge of bankruptcy and it is very likely the patents will be
acquired by a troll.

And the new tactic is to go after the customers, not the technology
providers. So without the declarative judgement we are swapping a
technology we know we have no problem with for one with an expensive
liability. So we definitely need a declarative judgement.


IF the size of the signatures vs the packet size was the issue we could go
to DSA. It has some implementation issues but I'll take 2048 bit DSA over
1024 bit RSA.

Alternatively, we can forget the ICANN root as being the primary validation
path and have people publish a 2048 bit cert in a WebPKI validated chain in
their zone. We already have the records for that.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 10:48 PM, Paul Hoffman <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" target=3D"_blank">paul.hoffman@vp=
nc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">On Apr 1, 2014, at 7:37 PM, =
Olafur Gudmundsson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ogud@ogud.com">ogud@ogud.com</a>&g=
t; wrote:<br>

<br>
&gt; Why not go to a good ECC instead ? (not sure which one, but not P256 o=
r P384)<br>
<br>
</div>Why not P256 or P384? They are the most-studied curves. Some of the n=
ewer curves do have advantages, but they are also newer.<br></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>Same answer as always: A patent troll with the most worth=
less claim ever is still going to cost $4 million to get a declarative judg=
ement against.</div>
<div><br></div><div>RIM is on the verge of bankruptcy and it is very likely=
 the patents will be acquired by a troll.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>And t=
he new tactic is to go after the customers, not the technology providers. S=
o without the declarative judgement we are swapping a technology we know we=
 have no problem with for one with an expensive liability. So we definitely=
 need a declarative judgement.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>IF the size of the signatures vs the pac=
ket size was the issue we could go to DSA. It has some implementation issue=
s but I&#39;ll take 2048 bit DSA over 1024 bit RSA.</div></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">
<br></div>Alternatively, we can forget the ICANN root as being the primary =
validation path and have people publish a 2048 bit cert in a WebPKI validat=
ed chain in their zone. We already have the records for that.<br clear=3D"a=
ll">
<div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://h=
allambaker.com/</a><br>
</div></div>

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Cc: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
Subject: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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After a break of a few months I rejoined the DNSOP WG mail list. After =
the very first message I sent a complaint to the chairs over the tone =
and language.  I feel I should send a note about that to the open list =
itself.

It=92s not that I have a puritan tongue.  It=92s that such low-brow =
language, including the subject line=92s obtuse reference to an obscene =
expression and finally to the out right vulgar expression in the thread =
call into doubt the level of professionalism of this WG.  It=92s hard to =
defend the work that results from a group that exhibits juvenile =
behavior.  I realize that I am reacting to perhaps the writing of one =
person (perhaps, I never tried to verify the originator) and perhaps =
reacting to the interaction of a small group of individuals - even if =
some are well-intentioned here.  But I think that it is up to the WG to =
defend it=92s stature and not accommodate this low level of discourse.

As to the matter at hand, I had been an operator of DNS services for =
about the past decade, designed the initial role out of DNSSEC in =
places, and ran a measurement experiment for a few years to quantify the =
choices.

I found that there are two primary reasons why 1024 bits is used in zone =
signing keys.

 One - peer pressure.  Most other operators start out with 1024 bits.  I =
know of some cases where operators wanted to choose other sizes but were =
told to =93follow the flock.=94

Two - it works.  No one has ever demonstrated a failure of a 1024 bit =
key to provide as-expected protection.

=46rom these two main reasons (and you=92ll notice nothing about =
cryptographic strength in there) a third very import influence must be =
understood - the tools operators use more or less nudge operators to the =
1024 bit size.  Perhaps via the default settings or perhaps in the =
tutorials and documentation that is read.

Why do operators seem to ignore the input of cryptographers?  I can tell =
you that from personal experience.  Cryptographers, whenever given a =
straight question on DNSSEC have failed to give straight answers.  As is =
evident in the thread, theoretical statements are made and the =
discussion will veer off into recursive (really cache-protection) =
behaviors, but never wind up with a result that is clearly presented and =
defended.  In my personal experience, when I recommended 1024 bits, it =
was after consulting cryptographic experts who would just waffle on what =
size is needed and then relying on what we did in workshops 15 years =
ago.

What does it matter from a security perspective?  DNS messages are short =
lived.  It=92s not like we are encrypting a novel to be kept secret for =
100 years.  With zone signing keys lasting a month, 6 months, or so, and =
the ability to disallow them fairly quickly, what=92s the difference =
between this so-called 80 or 112 bit strength difference?  Yes, I =
understand the doomsday scenario that someone might =93guess=94 my =
private key and forge messages.  But an attack is not as simple as =
forging messages, it takes the ability to inject them too.  That can be =
done - but chaining all these things together just makes the attack that =
much less prevalent.

Saving space and time does matter.  Roughly half the operators I studied =
would include a backup key on-line because =93they could=94 with the =
shorted length.  And performance does matter - ask the web browser =
people.

It nets to this - cryptographers urge for longer lengths but can=92t =
come up with a specific, clearly rational, recommendation.  DNS =
operators want smaller, web performance wants quicker.  Putting all that =
together, the smaller key size makes sense.  In operations.

PS - Yes, some operators do use longer keys.  Generally, those that do =
have decent =93excuses=94 (read: unusual use cases) and so they are not =
used in the peer pressure arguments.


From nobody Wed Apr  2 06:44:42 2014
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From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 06:44:26 -0700
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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <knJn1n01E0xxhYs01nJoHJ> <1904697C-49EF-4F77-A71A-3E0E4FC16575@cox.net>
To: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
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Cc: "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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The profanity is deliberate.  The same discredited performance arguments =
have come up for a decade+.  It gets very frustrating to see the same =
ignorance, again and again.


On Apr 2, 2014, at 6:30 AM, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:
>> =46rom these two main reasons (and you=92ll notice nothing about =
cryptographic strength in there) a third very import influence must be =
understood - the tools operators use more or less nudge operators to the =
1024 bit size.  Perhaps via the default settings or perhaps in the =
tutorials and documentation that is read.
>=20
> Why do operators seem to ignore the input of cryptographers?  I can =
tell you that from personal experience.  Cryptographers, whenever given =
a straight question on DNSSEC have failed to give straight answers.  As =
is evident in the thread, theoretical statements are made and the =
discussion will veer off into recursive (really cache-protection) =
behaviors, but never wind up with a result that is clearly presented and =
defended.  In my personal experience, when I recommended 1024 bits, it =
was after consulting cryptographic experts who would just waffle on what =
size is needed and then relying on what we did in workshops 15 years =
ago.

Well, its because for the most part, cryptographers do seem to =
understand that DNSSEC is a bit of a joke when it comes to actually =
securing conventional DNS records.

And the NIST crypto recommendations have existed for years.  1024b RSA =
was "deprecated in 2010, eliminate completely in 2013".  There may be =
doubt in NIST now, but 2 years ago, to ignore the standard =
recommendations is foolish.

> What does it matter from a security perspective?  DNS messages are =
short lived.  It=92s not like we are encrypting a novel to be kept =
secret for 100 years.  With zone signing keys lasting a month, 6 months, =
or so, and the ability to disallow them fairly quickly, what=92s the =
difference between this so-called 80 or 112 bit strength difference?  =
Yes, I understand the doomsday scenario that someone might =93guess=94 =
my private key and forge messages.  But an attack is not as simple as =
forging messages, it takes the ability to inject them too.  That can be =
done - but chaining all these things together just makes the attack that =
much less prevalent.

Do your resolvers have protection against "roll back the clock" attacks? =
 If not, you do not "gain protection" from the short-lived (well, =
really, a few month, they don't roll the actual key every 2 weeks) =
nature of the ZSK for root, .com, etc.

> Saving space and time does matter.  Roughly half the operators I =
studied would include a backup key on-line because =93they could=94 with =
the shorted length.  And performance does matter - ask the web browser =
people.

Amdahl's law seems to be something that computer science in general =
always seems to forget.  The performance impact, both in size and =
cryptographic overhead, to shift to 2048b keys is negligible in almost =
all cases. =20

And the step function in DNS cost, the "Internet can't do fragments" =
problem, doesn't really come into play at 2048b.

> It nets to this - cryptographers urge for longer lengths but can=92t =
come up with a specific, clearly rational, recommendation. =20

Yes they have.  2048b.

> DNS operators want smaller, web performance wants quicker.  Putting =
all that together, the smaller key size makes sense.  In operations.

The real dirty secret. =20

DNSSEC is actually useless for, well, DNS.  A records and the like do =
not benefit from cryptographic protection against a MitM adversary, as =
that adversary can just as easily attack the final protocol.

Thus the only actual use for DNSSEC is not protecting A records, but =
protecting cryptographic material and other similar operations: DANE is =
probably the best example to date, but there is also substantial utility =
in, e.g., email keys. =20

DNSSEC is unique in that it is a PKI with constrained and enforced path =
of trust along existing business relationships.

Building the root of this foundation on the sand of short keys, keys =
that we know that are well within range for nation-state adversaries, =
from the root and TLDs is a recipe to ensure that DNSSEC is, rightly, =
treated by the rest of the world as a pointless joke.


> PS - Yes, some operators do use longer keys.  Generally, those that do =
have decent =93excuses=94 (read: unusual use cases) and so they are not =
used in the peer pressure arguments.

And that does no good unless the upstream in the path of trust, starting =
at the root, actually use real length keys.

The difference between 2^80 and 2^100 effort is huge.  2^80 is in range =
today of nation states, and near the range of academics.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From nobody Wed Apr  2 06:48:03 2014
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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 15:47:24 +0200
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CFA0ED6F-6800-4638-90B0-CD414301C501@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 10:37:54PM -0400,
 Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote 
 a message of 158 lines which said:

> Furthermore using larger keys than your parents is non-sensical as
> that moves the cheap point of key cracking attack.

Mostly true, but still too strong a statement, in my opinion. This is
because, if you are an attacker and managed to crack a key somewhere
between the root (inclusive) and your real target, the higher you are
in the tree, the more things you have to emulate or simulate below. If
you are after ogud.com, and you cracked the root key, you need to
either create a false DS for .com (and then the resolver will croak on
most .com responses, detecting there is something wrong) or a false
NSEC proving that .com is not signed (but the fact that .com is signed
is rapidly cached in validating resolvers).

So, yes, basically, you are right, since DNSSEC is tree-based, the
security of the weakest node is what matters. But, in practice,
exploiting a cracked key upper in the tree is a bit more difficult
than it seems.



From nobody Wed Apr  2 07:04:53 2014
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On Apr 1, 2014, at 8:02 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:

>=20
> On Apr 1, 2014, at 10:48 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> =
wrote:
>=20
>> On Apr 1, 2014, at 7:37 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> Why not go to a good ECC instead ? (not sure which one, but not P256 =
or P384)=20
>>=20
>> Why not P256 or P384? They are the most-studied curves. Some of the =
newer curves do have advantages, but they are also newer.
>>=20
>> --Paul Hoffman
>=20
>=20
> The verification performance is bad, P256 takes 24x times longer to =
verify a signature than 2048 bit RSA key.=20
> Studied !=3D good performance

I believe that there are no elliptic curves that get *much* better =
verification speeds that P256/P384. Some are a bit faster, but not even =
close to RSA2048. =46rom your question "Why not go to a good ECC =
instead", I assumed you were caring about predictability against attacks =
and key length, which are the strengths of elliptic curve cryptography.

--Paul Hoffman=


From nobody Wed Apr  2 07:19:32 2014
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From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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There's been a lot of noise and very little signal in the recent =
discussion.

It would be helpful if there was real data on this topic. Is an RSA key =
of N bits too "weak" or too "strong"? I don't know. Is N bits "good =
enough"? Probably. Change the algorithm and/or value of N to taste.

My gut feel is large ZSKs are overkill because the signatures should be =
short-lived and the keys rotated frequently. Though the trade-offs here =
are unclear: is a 512-bit key that changes daily (say) better than a =
2048-bit key that gets rotated once a week/month/whatever? Remember too =
we're not talking about keys to launch ICBMs or authenticate billion =
dollar transactions. I doubt it matters if a previous key can be cracked =
provided it gets retired before the bad guys can throw enough CPU-years =
to break it.

However I'm just going on my own gut feel and common sense which could =
be wrong. Large keys might well be advisable at the root and/or for TLD =
KSKs. But so far there does not appear to have been much science or =
engineering on just how large those keys should be or how frequently =
they change. So in the absence of other firm foundations the established =
wisdom becomes "do what gets done for the root".

If there is a threat or risk here, please present solid evidence. Or, =
better still, an actual example of how any DNSSEC key has been =
compromised and then used for a real-world (or proof of concept) =
spoofing attack.=20


BTW, the apparent profanity on an earlier thread was annoying because it =
didn't spell "whisky" correctly. As every drinker of fine single malt =
knows. :-)


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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <knJn1n01E0xxhYs01nJoHJ> <1904697C-49EF-4F77-A71A-3E0E4FC16575@cox.net> <ED3B19A8-D4AD-46AC-84BD-9FD1C333EAF0@icsi.berkeley.edu>
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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On Apr 2, 2014, at 6:44 AM, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU> =
wrote:

> The profanity is deliberate. =20

And so is the pushback against it. You may believe that the only way to =
get the operational change you want in the root zone is to be obnoxious =
and repetitive; others may believe that you are purposely hurting a =
cause that they too support.

--Paul Hoffman=


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On Apr 2, 2014, at 10:19 AM, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
> My gut feel is large ZSKs are overkill because the signatures should =
be short-lived and the keys rotated frequently. Though the trade-offs =
here are unclear: is a 512-bit key that changes daily (say) better than =
a 2048-bit key that gets rotated once a week/month/whatever? Remember =
too we're not talking about keys to launch ICBMs or authenticate billion =
dollar transactions. I doubt it matters if a previous key can be cracked =
provided it gets retired before the bad guys can throw enough CPU-years =
to break it.

The problem with the way you've phrased this question is that there does =
not seem to be agreement amongst the parties to this discussion whether =
old keys matter.   If you think they do, you need longer keys.   If you =
think they don't, you need shorter keys.   So rather than talking about =
key lengths first, it would be more productive to come to a consensus =
about which threat model we are trying to address.


From nobody Wed Apr  2 07:49:44 2014
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On 2 Apr 2014, at 10:26, Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com> wrote:

> The problem with the way you've phrased this question is that there =
does not seem to be agreement amongst the parties to this discussion =
whether old keys matter.   If you think they do, you need longer keys.   =
If you think they don't, you need shorter keys.   So rather than talking =
about key lengths first, it would be more productive to come to a =
consensus about which threat model we are trying to address.

I'm trying to understand the time-based attack, but I'm not seeing it.

The gist seems to be that if I can turn back the clock on a remote =
resolver, I can pollute its cache with old signatures (made with an old, =
presumably compromised key) and the results will appear to clients of =
the resolver to validate.

This sounds plausible, but without administrative compromise of the =
remote resolver (in which case you have much simpler options) this =
attack seems to involve:

1. subverting sufficient NTP responses over a long enough period to =
cause the remote resolver's clock to turn back in time (long period =
suggested due to many/most? implementations' refuse large steps in =
times, and hence many smaller steps might be required)

2. replacing every secure response that would normally arrive at the =
resolver with a new one that will validate properly at whatever the =
resolver's idea of the time and date is (or, if not every, sufficient =
that the client population don't see validation failures for non-target =
queries). This potentially involves having factored or otherwise =
recovered every ZSK and KSK that might be used to generate a signature =
in a response to the resolver, for the time period between now and then.

This seems like an intractably difficult thing to accomplish.

What am I missing?


Joe=


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Subject: [DNSOP] mailing list behavior Re: Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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Colleagues,

We've noted the tone some participants in the key length discussion have =
taken, and the complaints about it.=20

We're handling off-list, in accordance with IETF mailing list moderation =
policy.=20

Understood that this is a frustrating topic, but less heat, more light, =
please.


thanks,
Suzanne & Tim=


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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On 02 Apr 2014, at 15:19, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

> There's been a lot of noise and very little signal in the recent =
discussion.
>=20
> It would be helpful if there was real data on this topic. Is an RSA =
key of N bits too "weak" or too "strong"? I don't know. Is N bits "good =
enough"? Probably. Change the algorithm and/or value of N to taste.
>=20
> My gut feel is large ZSKs are overkill because the signatures should =
be short-lived and the keys rotated frequently. Though the trade-offs =
here are unclear: is a 512-bit key that changes daily (say) better than =
a 2048-bit key that gets rotated once a week/month/whatever? Remember =
too we're not talking about keys to launch ICBMs or authenticate billion =
dollar transactions. I doubt it matters if a previous key can be cracked =
provided it gets retired before the bad guys can throw enough CPU-years =
to break it.
>=20
> However I'm just going on my own gut feel and common sense which could =
be wrong. Large keys might well be advisable at the root and/or for TLD =
KSKs. But so far there does not appear to have been much science or =
engineering on just how large those keys should be or how frequently =
they change. So in the absence of other firm foundations the established =
wisdom becomes "do what gets done for the root".
>=20
> If there is a threat or risk here, please present solid evidence. Or, =
better still, an actual example of how any DNSSEC key has been =
compromised and then used for a real-world (or proof of concept) =
spoofing attack.=20
>=20
>=20
> BTW, the apparent profanity on an earlier thread was annoying because =
it didn't spell "whisky" correctly. As every drinker of fine single malt =
knows. :-)

:-)

Jim,

Just a thought that occured to me. Crypto-maffia folk are looking for a =
minimum (i.e. at least so many bits otherwise its insecure). DNS-maffia =
folk are looking for a maximum (i.e. at most soo many bits otherwise =
fragmentation/fallback to tcp). It seems that the cryptomaffia=92s =
minimum might actually be larger than the DNS-maffia=92s maximum.

As an example (dns-op perspective).=20

Average case: 2 keys (KSK/ZSK) + 1 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at =
least 768 bytes (and then some).
Roll case: 3 keys(2 KSK/1 ZSK) + 2 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at =
least 1280 bytes (and then some).

Then there is this section in SAC63: "Interaction of Response Size and =
IPv6 Fragmentation=94=20

Which relates to response sizes larger than 1280 and IPv6 and blackhole =
effects.

https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-063-en.pdf

Hope this helps

Roy




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From nobody Wed Apr  2 08:20:18 2014
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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 16:55:23 +0200
From: Phil Regnauld <regnauld@nsrc.org>
To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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References: <78F386B0-BC6B-4159-B9D4-4BFEB10252A6@rfc1035.com> <16A7DDD8-AB8E-458F-B031-80E5141CAE5A@nominum.com> <195BD466-22EF-4EE6-9E43-D1051502AF36@hopcount.ca>
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Cc: IETF DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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Joe Abley (jabley) writes:
> 
> 
> 1. subverting sufficient NTP responses over a long enough period to cause the remote resolver's clock to turn back in time (long period suggested due to many/most? implementations' refuse large steps in times, and hence many smaller steps might be required)

	Many systems will run ntpdate on startup.

> This seems like an intractably difficult thing to accomplish.

	It does seem far fetched.

> What am I missing?

	There may be good reasons to increase key length, this is not one I'm
	worried about (then again, no one worried about source port randomization
	before 2008 :)

	P.


From nobody Wed Apr  2 08:26:45 2014
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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <1904697C-49EF-4F77-A71A-3E0E4FC16575@cox.net>
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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 6:30 AM, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>wrote:

> I found that there are two primary reasons why 1024 bits is used in zone
> signing keys.
>
>  One - peer pressure.  Most other operators start out with 1024 bits.  I
> know of some cases where operators wanted to choose other sizes but were
> told to "follow the flock."
>
> Two - it works.  No one has ever demonstrated a failure of a 1024 bit key
> to provide as-expected protection.
>

Cryptographic failures are often undemonstrated for decades. If a state
actor has broken 1024b keys, they're unlikely to advertise that, just use
it now and then as quietly as they can.

Secondly, the application of signatures in DNS and the nature of the DNS
protocol itself presents significant risks that don't make a
straightforward comparison easy.

Suppose your goal is to intercept traffic, and you'd like to cause
www.example.com, a signed domain, to resolve to an IP address that you
control.  Now suppose you also happen to have a /16, not unreasonable for a
large actor - small even. If you can craft a matching signature for
www.example.com with even one of your 2^16 IP addresses, you've succeeded.
You don't have to care which particular IP address you happened to craft a
matching signature for.  This property makes it easier to sieve for
matching signatures.

>From these two main reasons (and you'll notice nothing about cryptographic
> strength in there) a third very import influence must be understood - the
> tools operators use more or less nudge operators to the 1024 bit size.
>  Perhaps via the default settings or perhaps in the tutorials and
> documentation that is read.
>

Do you think that this would be as relevant to the root zone and large TLDs
though?

-- 
Colm

--047d7b33cf28fb8f3d04f610e806
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 6:30 AM, Edward Lewis <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:edlewis.subscriber@cox.net" target=3D"_blank">edlewis.subscriber=
@cox.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I found that there are two primary reasons w=
hy 1024 bits is used in zone signing keys.<br>
<br>
&nbsp;One - peer pressure. &nbsp;Most other operators start out with 1024 b=
its. &nbsp;I know of some cases where operators wanted to choose other size=
s but were told to &ldquo;follow the flock.&rdquo;<br>
<br>
Two - it works. &nbsp;No one has ever demonstrated a failure of a 1024 bit =
key to provide as-expected protection.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
Cryptographic failures are often undemonstrated for decades. If a state act=
or has broken 1024b keys, they&#39;re unlikely to advertise that, just use =
it now and then as quietly as they can.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br></div><div>Secondly, the application of signatures in DNS and the =
nature of the DNS protocol itself presents significant risks that don&#39;t=
 make a straightforward comparison easy.</div><div><br></div><div>Suppose y=
our goal is to intercept traffic, and you&#39;d like to cause <a href=3D"ht=
tp://www.example.com">www.example.com</a>, a signed domain, to resolve to a=
n IP address that you control. &nbsp;Now suppose you also happen to have a =
/16, not unreasonable for a large actor - small even. If you can craft a ma=
tching signature for <a href=3D"http://www.example.com">www.example.com</a>=
 with even one of your 2^16 IP addresses, you&#39;ve succeeded. You don&#39=
;t have to care which particular IP address you happened to craft a matchin=
g signature for. &nbsp;This property makes it easier to sieve for matching =
signatures.</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
>From these two main reasons (and you&rsquo;ll notice nothing about cryptogr=
aphic strength in there) a third very import influence must be understood -=
 the tools operators use more or less nudge operators to the 1024 bit size.=
 &nbsp;Perhaps via the default settings or perhaps in the tutorials and doc=
umentation that is read.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Do you think that this would be as relevan=
t to the root zone and large TLDs though?</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>=
Colm
</div></div>

--047d7b33cf28fb8f3d04f610e806--


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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 11:19 AM, =F0=9F=94=92 Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec> wrot=
e:

> Just a thought that occured to me. Crypto-maffia folk are looking for a m=
inimum (i.e. at least so many bits otherwise its insecure). DNS-maffia folk=
 are looking for a maximum (i.e. at most soo many bits otherwise fragmentat=
ion/fallback to tcp). It seems that the cryptomaffia=E2=80=99s minimum migh=
t actually be larger than the DNS-maffia=E2=80=99s maximum.
>
> As an example (dns-op perspective).
>
> Average case: 2 keys (KSK/ZSK) + 1 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at =
least 768 bytes (and then some).
> Roll case: 3 keys(2 KSK/1 ZSK) + 2 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at =
least 1280 bytes (and then some).
>

Part of jim's query is of interest:
  "Where are the requirements?" (boiled down some to that I think)

There's also a point I asked about previously in jim's note:
  "Where's the POC at?"

I don't think anyone's going to change anything without your referred
to 2008-like incident... and without some requirements at least as a
swag, right?

I'd expect the key length discussion relates pretty closely to:
  "If I can factor the key in less time than you will rotate keys..."

So, how often to the keys rotate? at least every 30 days? So you have
to be able to be 'secure' longer than 30 days of compute resources
time, right?

> Then there is this section in SAC63: "Interaction of Response Size and IP=
v6 Fragmentation=E2=80=9D
>
> Which relates to response sizes larger than 1280 and IPv6 and blackhole e=
ffects.
>
> https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-063-en.pdf

good times :(


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Christopher Morrow
<morrowc.lists@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 11:19 AM, =F0=9F=94=92 Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec> wr=
ote:
>
>> Just a thought that occured to me. Crypto-maffia folk are looking for a =
minimum (i.e. at least so many bits otherwise its insecure). DNS-maffia fol=
k are looking for a maximum (i.e. at most soo many bits otherwise fragmenta=
tion/fallback to tcp). It seems that the cryptomaffia=E2=80=99s minimum mig=
ht actually be larger than the DNS-maffia=E2=80=99s maximum.
>>
>> As an example (dns-op perspective).
>>
>> Average case: 2 keys (KSK/ZSK) + 1 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at=
 least 768 bytes (and then some).
>> Roll case: 3 keys(2 KSK/1 ZSK) + 2 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at=
 least 1280 bytes (and then some).
>>
>
> Part of jim's query is of interest:
>   "Where are the requirements?" (boiled down some to that I think)
>
> There's also a point I asked about previously in jim's note:
>   "Where's the POC at?"
>
> I don't think anyone's going to change anything without your referred
> to 2008-like incident... and without some requirements at least as a
> swag, right?

oops, apologies, phil's 2008 reference.

>
> I'd expect the key length discussion relates pretty closely to:
>   "If I can factor the key in less time than you will rotate keys..."
>
> So, how often to the keys rotate? at least every 30 days? So you have
> to be able to be 'secure' longer than 30 days of compute resources
> time, right?
>
>> Then there is this section in SAC63: "Interaction of Response Size and I=
Pv6 Fragmentation=E2=80=9D
>>
>> Which relates to response sizes larger than 1280 and IPv6 and blackhole =
effects.
>>
>> https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-063-en.pdf
>
> good times :(


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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On Apr 2, 2014, at 10:49 AM, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:
> This seems like an intractably difficult thing to accomplish.

Bear in mind that all you _really_ have to do is get a bogus ZSK with =
the current time into the resolver, which you may be able to do with =
some clever NTP shenanigans over a relatively short timescale.   But =
yeah, this isn't likely to be useful except in cases where a device has =
been powered off, doesn't have an accurate battery-backed-up clock, and =
does DNSSEC, which is a weird set of circumstances.


From nobody Wed Apr  2 08:38:53 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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On Wed, 2 Apr 2014, Nicholas Weaver wrote:

> Well, its because for the most part, cryptographers do seem to understand that DNSSEC is a bit of a joke when it comes to actually securing conventional DNS records.

Funny, the cryptographers I talk to, like at the University of Waterloo,
have always told me our key sizes are giant for the deployment time we
are using them and that we're far above minimum.

> And the NIST crypto recommendations have existed for years.  1024b RSA was "deprecated in 2010, eliminate completely in 2013".  There may be doubt in NIST now, but 2 years ago, to ignore the standard recommendations is foolish.

I love how people now cherry pick NIST. If it agrees with them they
quote it. If it disagreed with them they shout NSA subverted them.

> Do your resolvers have protection against "roll back the clock" attacks?  If not, you do not "gain protection" from the short-lived (well, really, a few month, they don't roll the actual key every 2 weeks) nature of the ZSK for root, .com, etc.

Yes, there is a 5011 unbound anchor verification on some of them. And
ntpd doesn't let you jump months in a second either, so only systems
that run ntpdate before ntpd are vulnerable, and only those systems
without a battery backed up clock should do that.

>> Saving space and time does matter.  Roughly half the operators I studied would include a backup key on-line because “they could” with the shorted length.  And performance does matter - ask the web browser people.

Because we want to make security decisions based on a 1ms latency browser war?

> Amdahl's law seems to be something that computer science in general always seems to forget.  The performance impact, both in size and cryptographic overhead, to shift to 2048b keys is negligible in almost all cases.

Mind you, I agree we can move to 2048 for ZKSs

> And the step function in DNS cost, the "Internet can't do fragments" problem, doesn't really come into play at 2048b.

I don't think the entire cannot do fragments issue is really still a big
problem. Networks using/depending on 8.8.8.8 has actually cleaned up a
lot of the transport issues involved I think.

>> It nets to this - cryptographers urge for longer lengths but can’t come up with a specific, clearly rational, recommendation.
>
> Yes they have.  2048b.

Actually my Waterloo cryptographer said you can pick something smaller
than 2048 and larger than 1024 too.

> DNSSEC is actually useless for, well, DNS.  A records and the like do not benefit from cryptographic protection against a MitM adversary, as that adversary can just as easily attack the final protocol.

You are mixing in local vs global attacks. For example, Brasil's attack
where the majority of cable modems got their DNS setting changed for
their DHCP server. If hosts were running DNSSEC with using their ISP
as forwarders, this massive attack affecting millions would have
failed. So your statement is rather simplistic and wrong.

> Building the root of this foundation on the sand of short keys, keys that we know that are well within range for nation-state adversaries, from the root and TLDs is a recipe to ensure that DNSSEC is, rightly, treated by the rest of the world as a pointless joke.

Actually, I would LOVE to see a rogue entry signed by the root ZSK. It's
a giant enigma problem if the USG can make these. Please do invite me to
the root-servers meeting following that exposure.

I don't think there is a reason not to switch to 2048 for ZSKs. But I'm
basing that on "there are no significant transport obstacles left".

Paul


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Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2014 09:06:32 -0700
To: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>, dnsop@ietf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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Hi Ed,
At 06:30 02-04-2014, Edward Lewis wrote:
>I found that there are two primary reasons why 1024 bits is used in 
>zone signing keys.
>
>  One - peer pressure.  Most other operators start out with 1024 
> bits.  I know of some cases where operators wanted to choose other 
> sizes but were told to "follow the flock."
>
>Two - it works.  No one has ever demonstrated a failure of a 1024 
>bit key to provide as-expected protection.

My short comment would be Yes to the above.

The problem might be the "follow the flock" as there is an assumption 
that someone looked at the details before choosing the 1024 bit key.

>What does it matter from a security perspective?  DNS messages are 
>short lived.  It's not like we are encrypting a novel to be kept 
>secret for 100 years.  With zone signing keys lasting a month, 6 
>months, or so, and the ability to disallow them fairly quickly, 
>what's the difference between this so-called 80 or 112 bit strength 
>difference?  Yes, I understand the doomsday scenario that someone 
>might "guess" my private key and forge messages.  But an attack is 
>not as simple as forging messages, it takes the ability to inject 
>them too.  That can be done - but chaining all these things together 
>just makes the attack that much less prevalent.

For context, the discussion is about a ZSK.  There is a theory that 
it would take under a year and several million (U.S.) dollars to 
break 1024 bits.  It has been said (not on this mailing list) that an 
organization could do it within a shorter time.  It's not a good idea 
to wait for the demonstration as it can raise concerns about the 
entity which chose the key.

As a general comment I tried to find out which NIST recommendations 
are being discussed in respect to DNSSEC.  The requirements mentioned 
by Joe Abley refers to NIST SP 800-78.  That document is about 
"Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity
Verification".  Is that the NIST recommendation on which this 
discussion is based?

Regards,
S. Moonesamy  


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On Apr 2, 2014, at 8:26 AM, Colm MacC=E1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> =
wrote:

> Cryptographic failures are often undemonstrated for decades.=20

This is an important point, particularly when talking about RSA keys. It =
is important to note that RSA keys are *not* broken by brute force. =
There is some tricky math that is used to make the problem of finding =
the private key easier. That math was discovered long after the RSA =
algorithm was developed. That math kept getting much better for over a =
decade, but there have been no major public improvements in the math in =
about a decade. There easily could be non-public improvements that we =
don't know about; there are certainly a lot of papers that chip away at =
the problem, albeit slowly for keys >~768 bits.

For elliptic curve cryptography, there was a major improvement that came =
almost immediately (that's why P256 only has 128 bits of strength), and =
nothing since then at all. That's why cryptographers think of ECC as =
more "reliable": there is little expectation that the math will improve =
for attackers of ECC, and high expectation that it will improve for =
attackers of RSA and non-EC DSA.

--Paul Hoffman=


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On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 11:33:20AM -0400, Ted Lemon wrote:
> Bear in mind that all you _really_ have to do is get a bogus ZSK with the
> current time into the resolver, which you may be able to do with some
> clever NTP shenanigans over a relatively short timescale.   But yeah,
> this isn't likely to be useful except in cases where a device has been
> powered off, doesn't have an accurate battery-backed-up clock, and does
> DNSSEC, which is a weird set of circumstances.

I predict that will be a less weird set of circumstances in a year or
so: dnsmasq now has DNSSEC validation in beta.

(Tony Finch has a nifty idea to replace ntpdate with a quorum of tlsdate
responses; it might still be subvertible but it would be a much harder
nut to crack. https://git.csx.cam.ac.uk/x/ucs/u/fanf2/temporum.git)

-- 
Evan Hunt -- each@isc.org
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.


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From: "Rose, Scott" <scott.rose@nist.gov>
To: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
Thread-Index: AQHPTnfOAMhm4SIXL0+1BjKoLx/Ns5r+VmMAgAAp6AWAABCDgA==
Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 17:13:31 +0000
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References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <knJn1n01E0xxhYs01nJoHJ> <1904697C-49EF-4F77-A71A-3E0E4FC16575@cox.net> <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <knJn1n01E0xxhYs01nJoHJ> <1904697C-49EF-4F77-A71A-3E0E4FC16575@cox.net> <ED3B19A8-D4AD-46AC-84BD-9FD1C333EAF0@icsi.berkeley.edu> <6.2.5.6.2.20140402080754.0d35b798@resistor.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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On Apr 2, 2014, at 12:06 PM, S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> wrote:

>=20
>> What does it matter from a security perspective?  DNS messages are short=
 lived.  It's not like we are encrypting a novel to be kept secret for 100 =
years.  With zone signing keys lasting a month, 6 months, or so, and the ab=
ility to disallow them fairly quickly, what's the difference between this s=
o-called 80 or 112 bit strength difference?  Yes, I understand the doomsday=
 scenario that someone might "guess" my private key and forge messages.  Bu=
t an attack is not as simple as forging messages, it takes the ability to i=
nject them too.  That can be done - but chaining all these things together =
just makes the attack that much less prevalent.
>=20
> For context, the discussion is about a ZSK.  There is a theory that it wo=
uld take under a year and several million (U.S.) dollars to break 1024 bits=
.  It has been said (not on this mailing list) that an organization could d=
o it within a shorter time.  It's not a good idea to wait for the demonstra=
tion as it can raise concerns about the entity which chose the key.
>=20
> As a general comment I tried to find out which NIST recommendations are b=
eing discussed in respect to DNSSEC.  The requirements mentioned by Joe Abl=
ey refers to NIST SP 800-78.  That document is about "Cryptographic Algorit=
hms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity
> Verification".  Is that the NIST recommendation on which this discussion =
is based?
>=20

The only DNSSEC related NIST SP's are 800-57 and 800-81-2.  SP 800-57 is in=
 3 parts, part one is general key considerations and part 3 covers specific=
 uses like DNSSEC.  It's showing its age though. =20

The US Federal policy (now) is 2048 bit RSA for all uses, DNSSEC has a spec=
ial exemption for 1024 bit ZSK's if desired (to reduce risks of fragmented =
packets).  I do know some .gov zones using 2048 bit KSK and ZSK's as local =
policies can call for stronger keys.  By 2015, .gov/mil zones should migrat=
e to ECDSA.  Not sure if that will happen given the track record, but that =
is the roadmap. =20

Scott

> Regards,
> S. Moonesamy =20
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Scott Rose
NIST
scott.rose@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
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Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2014 15:07:51 -0400
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Subject: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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--------------070002070001040207080403
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Greetings,

This is the starting of the WGLC on Automating DNSSEC delegation trust 
maintenance.  This was briefly covered in London and these are ready for 
WGLC.   The current versions of this documents can be found here:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-03.txt


We'll have a 2 week period for comments, closing on April 16th, 2014.

thanks
tim


--------------070002070001040207080403
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<html>
  <head>

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <tt>Greetings,</tt><tt><br>
    </tt><tt><br>
    </tt><tt>This is the starting of the WGLC on Automating DNSSEC
      delegation trust maintenance.  This was briefly covered in London
      and these are ready for WGLC.   The current versions of this
      documents can be found here:</tt><tt><br>
    </tt>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <tt><br>
    </tt><tt>   
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/</a></tt><tt><br>
    </tt><tt>   
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-03.txt">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-03.txt</a></tt><tt><br>
      <br>
      <br>
      We'll have a 2 week period for comments, closing on April 16th,
      2014.  <br>
    </tt><tt><br>
      thanks<br>
      tim<br>
      <br>
    </tt>
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--------------070002070001040207080403--


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Subject: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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All,

This is the beginning of the Working Group Last Call on Child To Parent 
Synchronization in DNS.
The London update showed that this work is complete and ready to move 
forward.

The document can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization/
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization-00.txt

Please take a moment to review the final versions and send up any comments.

This document willhave a 2 week period for comments, closing on April 
16th, 2014.

thanks
tim


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From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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On Apr 2, 2014, at 11:19 AM, =F0=9F=94=92 Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec> =
wrote:
>=20
> Just a thought that occured to me. Crypto-maffia folk are looking for =
a minimum (i.e. at least so many bits otherwise its insecure). =
DNS-maffia folk are looking for a maximum (i.e. at most soo many bits =
otherwise fragmentation/fallback to tcp). It seems that the =
cryptomaffia=E2=80=99s minimum might actually be larger than the =
DNS-maffia=E2=80=99s maximum.

The problem from the dns-op maximalist viewpoint is there is basically =
two magic numbers: 512B and ~1400B.  As someone who's measured this, the =
512B is not a problem, but the 1400B "here be fragments" is.  Yet at the =
same time, the current 1024B ZSK/2048B KSK configuration on TLDs does =
blow through it: I reported in the previous thread how org's DNSKEY =
record already blew past that limit.


And even in that case, resolvers can handle "fragments don't work", =
albeit with a latency penalty.  So its not a "DNSSEC fails" point but =
simply "performance degraded".


So the real question is "do the common answers fragment", the ones with =
short TTLs that are accessed a lot, have a fragment problem.  With 2048b =
keys, they don't: the one that gets you is NSEC3, and that only blows up =
in your face on 4096b keys.  (But boy does it, those 3 RRSIGs get big =
when you're using 4096b keys).


And please don't discount the psychology of the issue.  If DNSSEC wants =
to be taken seriously, it needs to show it.  Using short keys for root =
and the major TLDs, under the assumptions that it can't be cracked =
quickly (IMO, we have to assume 1024b can be.) and that old keys don't =
matter [1], is something that really does draw criticism.



[1] IMO they do until validators record and use a 'root key ratchet': =
never accept a key who's expiration is older than the inception date of =
the RRSIG on the youngest root ZSK seen, or have some other defense to =
roll-back-the-clock attacks.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From nobody Wed Apr  2 13:45:20 2014
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From: Frederico A C Neves <fneves@registro.br>
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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Nicholas,

On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 04:25:10PM -0400, Nicholas Weaver wrote:
> 
... 
> And please don't discount the psychology of the issue.  If DNSSEC
> wants to be taken seriously, it needs to show it.  Using short keys
> for root and the major TLDs, under the assumptions that it can't be
> cracked quickly (IMO, we have to assume 1024b can be.) and that old
> keys don't matter [1], is something that really does draw criticism.
>
> [1] IMO they do until validators record and use a 'root key
> ratchet': never accept a key who's expiration is older than the
> inception date of the RRSIG on the youngest root ZSK seen, or have
> some other defense to roll-back-the-clock attacks.

What do you mean by "..key who's expiration is.."? A new propertie
recorded at this "ratchet", btw what is this?

Fred


From nobody Wed Apr  2 13:49:13 2014
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From: Richard Lamb <richard.lamb@icann.org>
To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>, Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 13:49:07 -0700
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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Speaking for myself:

First:  Thank you Jim and Joe for seeking to increase the signal-to-noise r=
atio on this thread and for explaining what the attack vector would be for =
lower IQ folk like myself.

Second: I have always taken my instructions from the community. So regardle=
ss of what I believe I will faithfully do my part (with your help) to make =
it happen.

Third: From my vantage point and as author of the code used for the KSK sid=
e of things, I do not see any immediate barriers  to increasing key lengths=
.  The members of the original root DNSSEC design team have enjoyed a very =
good working relationship and I expect that to continue.  However, like any=
 other change at this level it must be one that is approached conservativel=
y and thoroughly tested before deployed (software, increased RRSet sizes, I=
Pv6 impact, new ZSK generation).  This will take human resources and time.

I look forward to following further discussions on this topic.

-Rick



-----Original Message-----
From: DNSOP [mailto:dnsop-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Joe Abley
Sent: Wednesday, April 02, 2014 7:50 AM
To: Ted Lemon
Cc: IETF DNSOP WG
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC


On 2 Apr 2014, at 10:26, Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com> wrote:

> The problem with the way you've phrased this question is that there does =
not seem to be agreement amongst the parties to this discussion whether old=
 keys matter.   If you think they do, you need longer keys.   If you think =
they don't, you need shorter keys.   So rather than talking about key lengt=
hs first, it would be more productive to come to a consensus about which th=
reat model we are trying to address.

I'm trying to understand the time-based attack, but I'm not seeing it.

The gist seems to be that if I can turn back the clock on a remote resolver=
, I can pollute its cache with old signatures (made with an old, presumably=
 compromised key) and the results will appear to clients of the resolver to=
 validate.

This sounds plausible, but without administrative compromise of the remote =
resolver (in which case you have much simpler options) this attack seems to=
 involve:

1. subverting sufficient NTP responses over a long enough period to cause t=
he remote resolver's clock to turn back in time (long period suggested due =
to many/most? implementations' refuse large steps in times, and hence many =
smaller steps might be required)

2. replacing every secure response that would normally arrive at the resolv=
er with a new one that will validate properly at whatever the resolver's id=
ea of the time and date is (or, if not every, sufficient that the client po=
pulation don't see validation failures for non-target queries). This potent=
ially involves having factored or otherwise recovered every ZSK and KSK tha=
t might be used to generate a signature in a response to the resolver, for =
the time period between now and then.

This seems like an intractably difficult thing to accomplish.

What am I missing?


Joe
_______________________________________________
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From nobody Wed Apr  2 14:40:34 2014
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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu> <53345C77.8040603@uni-due.de> <B7893984-2FAD-472D-9A4E-766A5C212132@pch.net> <102C13BE-E45E-437A-A592-FA373FF5C8F0@ogud.com> <474B0834-C16B-4843-AA0A-FC2A2085FEFB@icsi.berkeley.edu> <CAMm+Lwh-G7D5Cjx4NWMOhTjBZd=VVRHiPdK7L1zm-P0QRP8P2Q@mail.gmail.com> <20140401223943.528B71226903@rock.dv.isc.org> <CAAF6GDe=39bmVDOtox+9coaH7R06erm-JUK19ZwPEUVkxepKTg@mail.gmail.com> <20140402003159.B4B631228652@rock.dv.isc.org> <CAAF6GDdLs3V9JMa8jgD_asYqhmt=PCaBAmk4LO0JaX_q6q0UHQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140402024919.GA97087@isc.org> <CAAF6GDcP77MBBUJbEdQgOqOLh2UHPEOmxYNTaAO-8F=OdLYxOQ@mail.gmail.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 01 Apr 2014 22:24:34 -0700." <CAAF6GDcP77MBBUJbEdQgOqOLh2UHPEOmxYNTaAO-8F=OdLYxOQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 08:40:01 +1100
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Cc: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Matth?us Wander <matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] CD (Re: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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In message <CAAF6GDcP77MBBUJbEdQgOqOLh2UHPEOmxYNTaAO-8F=OdLYxOQ@mail.gmail.com>
, =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= writes:
> 
> On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Evan Hunt <each@isc.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 06:25:12PM -0700, Colm MacC?rthaigh wrote:
> > > DNSSEC is a mitigation against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle
> > > interception-and-rewriting and cache compromises. These threats are
> > > endpoint and path specific, so it's entirely possible that one of your
> > > resolvers (or its path) has been compromised, but not others. If all of
> > > your paths have been compromised, then there is no recovery; only
> > > detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC.
> >
> > Consider the scenario in which one authoritative server for a zone
> > has been compromised and the others have not, and that one happens to
> > have the lowest round-trip time, so it's favored by your resolver.
> 
> 
> > If you query with CD=0, a validating resolver detects the problem
> > and tries again with another auth server.  It doesn't give up until
> > the whole NS RRset has failed.
> 
> 
> > If you query with CD=1, you get the bogus data and it won't validate.
> >
> 
> I don't think this makes much sense for a coherent resolver. If I were
> writing a resolver, the behaviour would instead be;  try really hard to
> find a valid response, exhaust every reasonable possibility. If it can't
> get a valid response, then if CD=1 it's ok to pass back the invalid
> response and its supposed signatures - maybe the stub will no better, at
> least fail open. If CD=0, then SERVFAIL, fail closed.

Guess what, resolvers do not work like that.  They are not required
to work like that.  They are however required to search if CD=0.
SERVFAIL should be a rare event.  SERVFAIL that gets fixed with
CD=1 and then validates successfull should be a even much rarer
event.

We know that there are cases where some of the authoritative servers
broken DNSSEC wise yet you want to optimise for the bad time / trust
anchor in the recursive server.

> Although CD means "checking disabled", I wouldn't actually disable
> checking, simply because that's stupid (I don't mean to be impolite, but I
> don't have a better word to use here). But by preserving the on-the-wire
> semantics of the CD bit, I'd preserve effectiveness as a cache, and pass on
> what's needed to validate even the failure cases.
> 
> 
> -- 
> Colm
> 
> --001a11c2a20c040b1504f60880b6
> Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> 
> <div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
> On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Evan Hunt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
> mailto:each@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">each@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
> r><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
> 1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 06:25:12PM -0700, Colm MacC?rthaigh wrote:<br>
> &gt; DNSSEC is a mitigation against spoofed responses, man-in-the-middle<br=
> >
> &gt; interception-and-rewriting and cache compromises. These threats are<br=
> >
> &gt; endpoint and path specific, so it&#39;s entirely possible that one of =
> your<br>
> &gt; resolvers (or its path) has been compromised, but not others. If all o=
> f<br>
> &gt; your paths have been compromised, then there is no recovery; only<br>
> &gt; detection. But that is always true for DNSSEC.<br>
> <br>
> Consider the scenario in which one authoritative server for a zone<br>
> has been compromised and the others have not, and that one happens to<br>
> have the lowest round-trip time, so it&#39;s favored by your resolver.=A0</=
> blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bor=
> der-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> <br>
> If you query with CD=3D0, a validating resolver detects the problem<br>
> and tries again with another auth server. =A0It doesn&#39;t give up until<b=
> r>
> the whole NS RRset has failed.=A0</blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
> ote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex=
> ">
> <br>
> If you query with CD=3D1, you get the bogus data and it won&#39;t validate.=
> <br></blockquote><div>=A0</div><div>I don&#39;t think this makes much sense=
>  for a coherent resolver. If I were writing a resolver, the behaviour would=
>  instead be; =A0try really hard to find a valid response, exhaust every rea=
> sonable possibility. If it can&#39;t get a valid response, then if CD=3D1 i=
> t&#39;s ok to pass back the invalid response and its supposed signatures - =
> maybe the stub will no better, at least fail open. If CD=3D0, then SERVFAIL=
> , fail closed.=A0</div>
> <div><br></div><div>Although CD means &quot;checking disabled&quot;, I woul=
> dn&#39;t actually disable checking, simply because that&#39;s stupid (I don=
> &#39;t mean to be impolite, but I don&#39;t have a better word to use here)=
> . But by preserving the on-the-wire semantics of the CD bit, I&#39;d preser=
> ve effectiveness as a cache, and pass on what&#39;s needed to validate even=
>  the failure cases.=A0</div>
> <div><br></div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Colm
> </div></div>
> 
> --001a11c2a20c040b1504f60880b6--
> 
> 
> --===============8417192190596279555==
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> MIME-Version: 1.0
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> 
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 
> --===============8417192190596279555==--
> 
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 14:56:18 -0700
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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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Cc: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Matth?us Wander <matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] CD (Re: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...)
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--001a11c2c104b1769304f6165aed
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On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 2:40 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:

> > I don't think this makes much sense for a coherent resolver. If I were
> > writing a resolver, the behaviour would instead be;  try really hard to
> > find a valid response, exhaust every reasonable possibility. If it can't
> > get a valid response, then if CD=1 it's ok to pass back the invalid
> > response and its supposed signatures - maybe the stub will no better, at
> > least fail open. If CD=0, then SERVFAIL, fail closed.
>
> Guess what, resolvers do not work like that.  They are not required
> to work like that.


Nothing can compel any particular resolver to choose a particular
implementation - but I take note of
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840#section-5.9 and
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840#appendix-B which recommends it (as a
"SHOULD") and I generally agree with the good reasoning that's in the RFC.

As I wrote, if it were me writing a validating stub resolver, I would
always set CD=1 - and when acting as an intermediate resolver, I would
always make a reasonable effort to find a validating response, even if CD=0
is on the incoming query. I'm certain that at least one resolver does work
like this, and I suspect it's also how Google Public DNS works, based on
some experimentation.


-- 
Colm

--001a11c2c104b1769304f6165aed
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On W=
ed, Apr 2, 2014 at 2:40 PM, Mark Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:marka@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">marka@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:soli=
d;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"">&gt; I don&#39;t think this makes much sense for a coherent=
 resolver. If I were<br>
&gt; writing a resolver, the behaviour would instead be; =A0try really hard=
 to<br>
&gt; find a valid response, exhaust every reasonable possibility. If it can=
&#39;t<br>
&gt; get a valid response, then if CD=3D1 it&#39;s ok to pass back the inva=
lid<br>
&gt; response and its supposed signatures - maybe the stub will no better, =
at<br>
&gt; least fail open. If CD=3D0, then SERVFAIL, fail closed.<br>
<br>
</div>Guess what, resolvers do not work like that. =A0They are not required=
<br>
to work like that. =A0</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Nothing can compel a=
ny particular resolver to choose a particular implementation - but I take n=
ote of=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840#section-5.9">https:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840#section-5.9</a> and <a href=3D"https://tools.=
ietf.org/html/rfc6840#appendix-B">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840#appen=
dix-B</a>=A0which recommends it (as a &quot;SHOULD&quot;) and I generally a=
gree with the good reasoning that&#39;s in the RFC.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>As I wrote, if it were me writing a validating stub res=
olver, I would always set CD=3D1 - and when acting as an intermediate resol=
ver, I would always make a reasonable effort to find a validating response,=
 even if CD=3D0 is on the incoming query. I&#39;m certain that at least one=
 resolver does work like this, and I suspect it&#39;s also how Google Publi=
c DNS works, based on some experimentation. =A0</div>
<div><br></div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Colm
</div></div>

--001a11c2c104b1769304f6165aed--


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Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2014 14:46:01 -0700
To: "Rose, Scott" <scott.rose@nist.gov>, dnsop@ietf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Cc: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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Hi Scott,
At 10:13 02-04-2014, Rose, Scott wrote:
>The only DNSSEC related NIST SP's are 800-57 and 800-81-2.  SP 
>800-57 is in 3 parts, part one is general key considerations and 
>part 3 covers specific uses like DNSSEC.  It's showing its age though.
>
>The US Federal policy (now) is 2048 bit RSA for all uses, DNSSEC has 
>a special exemption for 1024 bit ZSK's if desired (to reduce risks 
>of fragmented packets).  I do know some .gov zones using 2048 bit 
>KSK and ZSK's as local policies can call for stronger keys.  By 
>2015, .gov/mil zones should migrate to ECDSA.  Not sure if that will 
>happen given the track record, but that is the roadmap.

Thanks for the above information.  Adding to it, 1024-bit RSA keys 
are allowed until 2015.  There is an explanation about that 
recommendation, i.e. it's not only about packet size.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy 


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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 19:21:11 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwgNoNhg7wSO+wqCGujBSfC4Fu3cwMPu2nTmkdvDwAD5Mw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: IETF DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 11:19 AM, =F0=9F=94=92 Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec> wrot=
e:

> On 02 Apr 2014, at 15:19, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
>
> > There's been a lot of noise and very little signal in the recent
> discussion.
> >
> > It would be helpful if there was real data on this topic. Is an RSA key
> of N bits too "weak" or too "strong"? I don't know. Is N bits "good
> enough"? Probably. Change the algorithm and/or value of N to taste.
> >
> > My gut feel is large ZSKs are overkill because the signatures should be
> short-lived and the keys rotated frequently. Though the trade-offs here a=
re
> unclear: is a 512-bit key that changes daily (say) better than a 2048-bit
> key that gets rotated once a week/month/whatever? Remember too we're not
> talking about keys to launch ICBMs or authenticate billion dollar
> transactions. I doubt it matters if a previous key can be cracked provide=
d
> it gets retired before the bad guys can throw enough CPU-years to break i=
t.
> >
> > However I'm just going on my own gut feel and common sense which could
> be wrong. Large keys might well be advisable at the root and/or for TLD
> KSKs. But so far there does not appear to have been much science or
> engineering on just how large those keys should be or how frequently they
> change. So in the absence of other firm foundations the established wisdo=
m
> becomes "do what gets done for the root".
> >
> > If there is a threat or risk here, please present solid evidence. Or,
> better still, an actual example of how any DNSSEC key has been compromise=
d
> and then used for a real-world (or proof of concept) spoofing attack.
> >
> >
> > BTW, the apparent profanity on an earlier thread was annoying because i=
t
> didn't spell "whisky" correctly. As every drinker of fine single malt
> knows. :-)
>
> :-)
>
> Jim,
>
> Just a thought that occured to me. Crypto-maffia folk are looking for a
> minimum (i.e. at least so many bits otherwise its insecure). DNS-maffia
> folk are looking for a maximum (i.e. at most soo many bits otherwise
> fragmentation/fallback to tcp). It seems that the cryptomaffia=E2=80=99s =
minimum
> might actually be larger than the DNS-maffia=E2=80=99s maximum.
>
> As an example (dns-op perspective).
>
> Average case: 2 keys (KSK/ZSK) + 1 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at
> least 768 bytes (and then some).
> Roll case: 3 keys(2 KSK/1 ZSK) + 2 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at
> least 1280 bytes (and then some).
>
> Then there is this section in SAC63: "Interaction of Response Size and
> IPv6 Fragmentation=E2=80=9D
>
> Which relates to response sizes larger than 1280 and IPv6 and blackhole
> effects.
>
> https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-063-en.pdf


There is no doubt that we can get close to the limit on response sizes.
Which is why I have been pushing the notion that if we are going to do DNSE
then part of the DNSE solution should be to get us out of the single
response packet straightjacket.

Its not just crypto that gets crippled by this issue.

We are not in 1995 any more. We have bigger computing resources and bigger
security challenges. The Internet isn't a science project any more.


Too much of the debate here has been for one security approach versus
another. That is obsolete thinking we have been moving to multiple layers
of cryptography for some time now.



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--001a11c2620c44704d04f6178a27
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 11:19 AM, =F0=9F=94=92 Roy Arends <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:roy@dnss.ec" target=3D"_blank">roy@dnss.ec</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">On 0=
2 Apr 2014, at 15:19, Jim Reid &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jim@rfc1035.com">jim@r=
fc1035.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

<br>
&gt; There&#39;s been a lot of noise and very little signal in the recent d=
iscussion.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It would be helpful if there was real data on this topic. Is an RSA ke=
y of N bits too &quot;weak&quot; or too &quot;strong&quot;? I don&#39;t kno=
w. Is N bits &quot;good enough&quot;? Probably. Change the algorithm and/or=
 value of N to taste.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; My gut feel is large ZSKs are overkill because the signatures should b=
e short-lived and the keys rotated frequently. Though the trade-offs here a=
re unclear: is a 512-bit key that changes daily (say) better than a 2048-bi=
t key that gets rotated once a week/month/whatever? Remember too we&#39;re =
not talking about keys to launch ICBMs or authenticate billion dollar trans=
actions. I doubt it matters if a previous key can be cracked provided it ge=
ts retired before the bad guys can throw enough CPU-years to break it.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; However I&#39;m just going on my own gut feel and common sense which c=
ould be wrong. Large keys might well be advisable at the root and/or for TL=
D KSKs. But so far there does not appear to have been much science or engin=
eering on just how large those keys should be or how frequently they change=
. So in the absence of other firm foundations the established wisdom become=
s &quot;do what gets done for the root&quot;.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; If there is a threat or risk here, please present solid evidence. Or, =
better still, an actual example of how any DNSSEC key has been compromised =
and then used for a real-world (or proof of concept) spoofing attack.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; BTW, the apparent profanity on an earlier thread was annoying because =
it didn&#39;t spell &quot;whisky&quot; correctly. As every drinker of fine =
single malt knows. :-)<br>
<br>
</div></div>:-)<br>
<br>
Jim,<br>
<br>
Just a thought that occured to me. Crypto-maffia folk are looking for a min=
imum (i.e. at least so many bits otherwise its insecure). DNS-maffia folk a=
re looking for a maximum (i.e. at most soo many bits otherwise fragmentatio=
n/fallback to tcp). It seems that the cryptomaffia=E2=80=99s minimum might =
actually be larger than the DNS-maffia=E2=80=99s maximum.<br>

<br>
As an example (dns-op perspective).<br>
<br>
Average case: 2 keys (KSK/ZSK) + 1 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at le=
ast 768 bytes (and then some).<br>
Roll case: 3 keys(2 KSK/1 ZSK) + 2 sig (by KSK) with 2048 bit keys is at le=
ast 1280 bytes (and then some).<br>
<br>
Then there is this section in SAC63: &quot;Interaction of Response Size and=
 IPv6 Fragmentation=E2=80=9D<br>
<br>
Which relates to response sizes larger than 1280 and IPv6 and blackhole eff=
ects.<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-063-en.pdf" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-063-en.=
pdf</a></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There is no doubt that we can get c=
lose to the limit on response sizes. Which is why I have been pushing the n=
otion that if we are going to do DNSE then part of the DNSE solution should=
 be to get us out of the single response packet straightjacket.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Its not just crypto that gets crippled by this issue.</=
div><div><br></div><div>We are not in 1995 any more. We have bigger computi=
ng resources and bigger security challenges. The Internet isn&#39;t a scien=
ce project any more.<br>
</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Too much of the debate here has be=
en for one security approach versus another. That is obsolete thinking we h=
ave been moving to multiple layers of cryptography for some time now.=C2=A0=
</div>
<div><br></div></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a hr=
ef=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br>
</div></div>

--001a11c2620c44704d04f6178a27--


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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 19:31:06 -0400
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: [DNSOP] DNSng-ish (was Re:  key lengths for DNSSEC)
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On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 07:21:11PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> Which is why I have been pushing the notion that if we are going to do DNSE
> then part of the DNSE solution should be to get us out of the single
> response packet straightjacket.

I've seen what you've had to say on that, and what I just don't
understand yet is how that answer is deployable.  That is, how is what
you are suggesting there (and in your other discussions of this topic)
not "replace DNS"?  Or, if it is, why don't we just do a new protocol
completely?  We could fix the internationalization issues.  We could
ditch UDP and in a single blow eliminate a major source of DDoS on the
Internet.  And so on.

The only problem is getting everyone to upgrade.  No?

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com


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Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 21:07:07 -0400
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 7:31 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 07:21:11PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
> > Which is why I have been pushing the notion that if we are going to do
> DNSE
> > then part of the DNSE solution should be to get us out of the single
> > response packet straightjacket.
>
> I've seen what you've had to say on that, and what I just don't
> understand yet is how that answer is deployable.  That is, how is what
> you are suggesting there (and in your other discussions of this topic)
> not "replace DNS"?  Or, if it is, why don't we just do a new protocol
> completely?  We could fix the internationalization issues.  We could
> ditch UDP and in a single blow eliminate a major source of DDoS on the
> Internet.  And so on.
>
> The only problem is getting everyone to upgrade.  No?
>

There are three different parts of the protocol

1) Client -> Resolver
2) Resolver -> Authoritative
3) The DNS data model

Changing 1 is the easiest and also the part that is most in need. We need
to find a way round all the crud that is making port 53 pretty much
unusable. The privacy concerns are the most restrictive, etc.

Changing 2 is a little harder but changes to BIND etc will eventually
percolate through.

Changing 3 is a ten year program at least and is not feasible unless 1 and
2 are addressed first.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--089e0160adf821d80f04f6190512
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On W=
ed, Apr 2, 2014 at 7:31 PM, Andrew Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com" target=3D"_blank">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com=
</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 07:21:11PM -0400, Ph=
illip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Which is why I have been pushing the notion that if we are going to do=
 DNSE<br>
&gt; then part of the DNSE solution should be to get us out of the single<b=
r>
&gt; response packet straightjacket.<br>
<br>
I&#39;ve seen what you&#39;ve had to say on that, and what I just don&#39;t=
<br>
understand yet is how that answer is deployable. =A0That is, how is what<br=
>
you are suggesting there (and in your other discussions of this topic)<br>
not &quot;replace DNS&quot;? =A0Or, if it is, why don&#39;t we just do a ne=
w protocol<br>
completely? =A0We could fix the internationalization issues. =A0We could<br=
>
ditch UDP and in a single blow eliminate a major source of DDoS on the<br>
Internet. =A0And so on.<br>
<br>
The only problem is getting everyone to upgrade. =A0No?<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>There are three different parts of the protocol</div><div>=
<br></div><div>1) Client -&gt; Resolver</div><div>2) Resolver -&gt; Authori=
tative</div>
<div>3) The DNS data model</div><div><br></div><div>Changing 1 is the easie=
st and also the part that is most in need. We need to find a way round all =
the crud that is making port 53 pretty much unusable. The privacy concerns =
are the most restrictive, etc.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Changing 2 is a little harder but changes to BIND etc w=
ill eventually percolate through.</div><div><br></div><div>Changing 3 is a =
ten year program at least and is not feasible unless 1 and 2 are addressed =
first.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://halla=
mbaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br>
</div></div>

--089e0160adf821d80f04f6190512--


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On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 09:07:07PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> 1) Client -> Resolver

> Changing 1 is the easiest and also the part that is most in need.

>From where I sit, that project appears to reduce to roughly "upgrade
all the computers on Earth."  It may be that we do not have a common
meaning of "easiest".  Perhaps you could say more.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com


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Paul,

On Apr 3, 2014, at 12:38 AM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>> Saving space and time does matter.  Roughly half the operators I =
studied would include a backup key on-line because =93they could=94 with =
the shorted length.  And performance does matter - ask the web browser =
people.
> Because we want to make security decisions based on a 1ms latency =
browser war?

We want to make security decisions that actually improve security.

Making a decision that results in people turning security off because =
the (perceived at least) performance impact is too large does not =
improve security.

People are already doing insanely stupid things (e.g., not following =
TTLs) because they eke out a couple of extra milliseconds in reduced RTT =
per query (which, multiplied by the zillions of queries today's high =
content websites require, does actually make a difference).

Having not looked into it sufficiently, I do not have a strong opinion =
as to whether increasing key lengths will result in people either not =
signing or turning off validation, but I believe it wrong to disregard =
performance considerations.

Regards,
-drc


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On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 10:48 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 09:07:07PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > 1) Client -> Resolver
>
> > Changing 1 is the easiest and also the part that is most in need.
>
> >From where I sit, that project appears to reduce to roughly "upgrade
> all the computers on Earth."  It may be that we do not have a common
> meaning of "easiest".  Perhaps you could say more.
>

Nope, just the gateway devices and the main DNS servers.

Legacy DNS over raw UDP will be around for decades to come. But DNS over a
privacy protected transport is quite viable.

The privacy issues are most acute at the network gateway device, the
firewall or the WiFi router.


Privacy protection plus anti-censorship protection is in big demand right
now.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--001a1135e20cef6fe804f61af0fe
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 10:48 PM, Andrew Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">=
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com" target=3D"_blank">ajs@anvilwa=
lrusden.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 09:07:07PM -0400, Ph=
illip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
&gt; 1) Client -&gt; Resolver<br>
<div class=3D""><br>
&gt; Changing 1 is the easiest and also the part that is most in need.<br>
<br>
</div>&gt;From where I sit, that project appears to reduce to roughly &quot=
;upgrade<br>
all the computers on Earth.&quot; =A0It may be that we do not have a common=
<br>
meaning of &quot;easiest&quot;. =A0Perhaps you could say more.<br></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>Nope, just the gateway devices and the main DNS ser=
vers.</div><div><br></div><div>Legacy DNS over raw UDP will be around for d=
ecades to come. But DNS over a privacy protected transport is quite viable.=
</div>
<div><br></div><div>The privacy issues are most acute at the network gatewa=
y device, the firewall or the WiFi router.</div><div><br></div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Privacy protection plus anti-censorship protection is in big demand=
 right now.</div>
</div><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">ht=
tp://hallambaker.com/</a><br>
</div></div>

--001a1135e20cef6fe804f61af0fe--


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On Thu, 3 Apr 2014, David Conrad wrote:

> We want to make security decisions that actually improve security.
>
> Making a decision that results in people turning security off because the (perceived at least) performance impact is too large does not improve security.

I'm happy to hear the browser vendors taking DNS latency seriously, and
look forward to their contributions towards solving that, with solutions
such as http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wouters-edns-tcp-chain-query/

Perhaps they will even advise running resolvers on the stubs with
pre-fetching of low TTL records so they can get out of the DNS caching
business themselves.

> People are already doing insanely stupid things (e.g., not following TTLs) because they eke out a couple of extra milliseconds in reduced RTT per query (which, multiplied by the zillions of queries today's high content websites require, does actually make a difference).

Luckily, I think we've seen the chrome/speed pendulum is already
swinging back, and the browser vendors are seeing that users do
care about more than just about latency.

> Having not looked into it sufficiently, I do not have a strong opinion as to whether increasing key lengths will result in people either not signing or turning off validation, but I believe it wrong to disregard performance considerations.

My previous email explained why I believe those performance considerations
were wrong.  I am not disregarding those out of principle, I'm disregarding
because I don't agree with the reasons offered. Big resolvers can add more
hardware without pain. End nodes like phones have plenty of CPU to use
up while waiting for latency, and then some.

Paul


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First of all, let me thank the people that have been working so hard on =
this. I have followed the process, but now again re-read the whole =
thing, and because of that have some comments. Ignore or think about... =
:-)

>    This document describes a method for automating maintanance of the
>    delegation trust information, and proposes a polled / periodic
>    trigger for simplicity.  Some users may prefer a different trigger,
>    such as a button on a webpage, a REST interface, DNS NOTIFY, etc.
>    These alternate / additional triggers are not discussed in this
>    document.

This is good, but as I would like to have added in the Security =
Considerations Section (see below) having multiple paths between child =
dns operator and parental agent increases the risk there are =
inconsistencies (if intermediary systems are caching information flowing =
along the paths).

Because of this, I do not mind having some extra words here, like:

"This proposal do not include all operations needed for maintenance of =
DNSSEC key material, specifically introduction and complete removal of =
all keys. Because of this alternate communications mechanisms must =
always exist, which might introduce extra complexity."

> 2.2.1.  Solution Space
:
:
>    Some parents want the child to express their DNSKEYS in the form of
>    DS records, while others want to receive the DNSKEY records and
>    calculate the DS records themselves.  There is no consensus on =
which
>    method is better; both have good reasons to exist.  The proposal
>    below can operate with both models, but the child needs to be aware
>    of the parental policies.

Mumble...I really dislike the fact we have not agreed on what to do. It =
increases complexity _a_lot_. And yes, this is one of the reasons why we =
do not see more deployment of DNSSEC.

Why do we (IETF) fail on this?

> 2.2.2.  DNSSEC key change process
>=20
>    After a Child DNS operator first signs the zone, there is a need to
>    interact with the Parent, for example via the delegation account
>    interface, to "upload / paste-in the zone's DS information".  The
>    action of logging in through the delegation account user interface
>    authenticates that the user is authorized to change delegation
>    information for the child published in the parent zone.  In the =
case
>    where the "Child DNS Operator" does not have access to the
>    registration account, the Child needs to perform the action.
>=20
>    At a later date, the Child DNS Operator may want to publish a new =
DS
>    record in the parent, either because they are rolling keys, or
>    because they want to publish a stand-by key.  This involves
>    performing the same process as before.  Furthermore when this is a
>    manual process with cut and paste, operational mistakes will happen
>    -- or worse, the update action is not performed at all.

Should it not be mentioned here that child might want to remove all keys =
as well? I mean, if this is supposed to be a complete list of potential =
operations the child is interested in?

I see in fact (with some special cases):

A. Introduction of new keys

A.1. Introduction when old keys exists and can be used

A.2. Introduction when no old keys can be used (because they can not be =
trusted or because no such exists)

B. Removal of keys

B.1. Removal of old keys when at least one key still remains in the =
RRSet of zone apex

B.2. Removal of last key from the RRSet of the zone apex

If I understand things correctly, you say this draft can only be used =
for A.1 and B.1?

I think that should be spelled out very explicitly in section 2.

> 4.  Automating DS maintainance with CDS/CDNSKEY records
>=20
>    CDS/CDNSKEY records are intended to be "consumed" by delegation =
trust
>    maintainers.  The use of CDS/CDNSKEY is optional.
>=20
>    Some parents prefer to accept DNSSEC key information in DS format,
>    some parents prefer to accept it in DNSKEY format, and calculate =
the
>    DS record on the child's behalf.  Each method has pros and cons, =
both
>    technical and policy.  This solution is DS vs DNSKEY agnostic, and
>    allows operation with either.
>=20
>    If the child knows what the parent prefers, they can publish the
>    parent's preferred record type.  If the child does not know (or
>    simply chooses to), they can publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>    child publishes both, the two RRsets they SHOULD match in content.

Why not a MUST?

>    The parent should use whichever one they choose, but SHOULD NOT =
query
>    for both and perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY
>    records.

Why not? Why talk about it at all?

I think this document should say:

   The child can publish one or both of CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
   child publishes both, the two RRsets they MUST match in content.

We do not need more RFCs that can be interpreted in multiple ways. And =
why use more words than what we need?

> 4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>=20
>    If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
>    signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  This
>    means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
>    operator MAY remove all CDS records from the zone.

I am really nervous we will have a state enforced somewhere, that must =
remember what has happened. I much rather want to see the child always =
have CDS/CDNSKEY for the proper key set.

So, there must be a reason why this is not allowed?

Also, the MAY here does not match the SHOULD further down.

>    Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY records =
as
>    follows:
>=20
>    o  Location: "the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be at the child zone
>       apex".
>=20
>    o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both =
the
>       current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>=20
>    o  Continuity: "SHOULD NOT break the current delegation if applied =
to
>       DS RRset"

I do not understand the SHOULD NOT in this case. Specifically together =
with references to 4.1 below.

I presume what this says is that the DNSKEY that is signing the =
CDS/CDNSKEY SHOULD be included in what the CDS / CDNSKEY is covering?

If that is true, are we sure that the SHOULD NOT is inverse to SHOULD in =
this case?

>    If any these conditions fail the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be
>    ignored.

How can it be a MUST when Continuity include a SHOULD NOT?

I am a bit confused, but maybe it ends up being clearer if I actually =
wrote code that implemented this ;-)

> 5.  Child's CDS / CDNSKEY Publication
>=20
>    Child DNS Operator SHOULD only publish a CDS or CDNSKEY RRset when =
it
>    wants to make a change to the DS RRset in the Parent.

Does not match the MAY further up.

>    The CDS /
>    CDNSKEY RRset SHOULD be compliant with the rules in Section 4.1.

Does not match the MUST that covers 4.1.

>    When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY, the Child =
DNS
>    Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset(s).

See above. How does the child know? Do you because of this require the =
child to poll the parent zone? And if the parent want to re-fetch the =
data for some reason, it might be gone from the child zone. Not good.

>    Note that if the
>    child has published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS, it will have to =
calculate
>    the DS (using the requested digest algorithm) to do the comparison.

Hmmm..."published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS"? The CDS was to include a DS. =
Right?

>    A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses to
>    publish both, it SHOULD attempt to maintain consistency (a matching
>    CDS for each CDNSKEY)

No, it MUST represent the same data. Please!

I also want to have it spelled out explicitly here whether the =
CDS/DNSKEY MUST include the data for the dnssec key material that signs =
the CDS/DNSKEY or not. I think it MUST include the current key as well. =
Otherwise it ends up being same as having no CDS/CDNSKEY and that way =
removing keys. So that at every point in time the chain of trust is =
secured.

So one go from:

1. No keys at all

This process can not be used, but say DNSKEY K1 is added. CDNSKEY K1 is =
added to the zone.

2. K1 is in use

K2 is introduced by adding CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 be added to the =
zone. Signed by at least K1.

3. K1 and K2 is in use

Ensure that CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 are both signed with at least =
K2.

4. K2 is in use

Remove CDNSKEY for K1.

5. K2 is in use

Removal of K2 without introducing K3 is not possible.

6. No key is in use

See 1.

> 6.  Parent side CDS / CDNSKEY Consumption
>=20
>    The CDS / CDNSKEY RRset MAY be used by the Parental Agent to update
>    the DS RRset in the parent zone.  The Parental Agent for this uses =
a
>    tool that understands the CDS / CDNSKEY signing rules from
>    Section 4.1 so it may not be able to use a standard validator.

What do the author know about "standard validators"? :-)

>    Parent SHOULD treat the Continuity rule as "MUST".

Well...here we have confusion. The continuity rule is a SHOULD, the =
whole block is a MUST and above it is sort of wobbly...

>    The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY records, and
>    MUST NOT expect there to be both.  A parent SHOULD NOT perform a
>    consistency check between CDS and CDNSKEY (other than for
>    informational / debugging use).

Ok. Do though see above about MUST regarding client requirement on =
having the two RR in sync if both exists.

> 6.1.  Detecting a changed CDS / CDNSKEY
:
>    Pushing  The delegation user interface has a button {Fetch DS} when
>          pushed preforms the CDS / CDNSKEY processing.  If the Parent
>          zone does not contain DS for this delegation then the "push"
>          MUST be ignored.

Well, I do not think there should be a MUST. As written below there =
might be other means that can be used to ensure the data is correct. =
Saying SHOULD is ok. Together with explanation what risk exists. Like:

...then the "push" SHOULD be ignored. Reasons for the "push" to be =
trusted might be additional user interface/interactions, two factor =
authentication to validate the "push" and similar.

>    In either case the Parental Agent MAY apply additional rules that
>    defer the acceptance of a CDS / CDNSKEY change, these rules may
>    include a condition that the CDS / CDNSKEY remains in place and =
valid
>    for some time period before it is accepted.  It may be appropriate =
in
>    the "Pushing" case to assume that the Child is ready and thus =
accept
>    changes without delay.

Does not work if you have a MUST above. Just remove this paragraph.

Either you have a MUST or not. Not MUST and then a paragraph that make =
things not a MUST.

> 6.2.  Using the new CDS / CDNSKEY records
>=20
>    Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
>    CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to =
obtain
>    a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone.  It would be a
>    good idea if the Parental Agent checked all NS RRs listed at the
>    delegation.

What does "would be a good idea" mean in RFC 1918 speak? :-)

More seriously, no, I do not think that requirement should be there at =
all. How to handle lame delegation, inability to use cached information, =
what TTL can be acceptable etc is hidden in this "good idea". Just =
remove it.

Either DNS is used to fetch the RR or not.

>    The Parental Agent MUST ensure that old versions of the CDS / =
CDNSKEY
>    RRset do not overwrite newer versions.

I do not think this is a good idea. See above.

Please remove.

This is because there is a requirement on state in the parent. I dislike =
that. Much better if the CDS/CDNSKEY is always reflecting the current =
state in the child zone. And just say so.

> 6.2.1.  Parent calculates DS
>=20
>    There are cases where the Parent wants to calculate the DS record =
due
>    to policy reasons.  In this case, the Child publishes CDNSKEY =
records
>    containing DNSKEYs.
>=20
>    The parent calculates the DS records on behalf of the children.  =
The
>    DNS Parent needs to publish guidelines for the children as to what
>    digest algorithms are acceptable in the CDS record.

What is "needs to"? MUST?

:
:
>    Implications on Parental Agent are that the CDNSKEY and DS are not
>    exactly the same after update thus it needs to take that into
>    consideration when checking CDNSKEY records.  Same goes for the =
Child
>    DNS Operator, it needs to be able to detect that the new DS RRset =
is
>    "equivalent" to the current CDNSKEY RRset, thus it can remove the
>    CDNSKEY RRset.

Why not say instead:

In the case the parent fetch the CDNSKEY and calculate the DS it MAY be =
the case that the DS published in the parent zone is not identical with =
the data in the CDS record made available by the child.

Because I think that is what you try to say?

> 9.  Security Considerations

Please add something like:

As this introduces a mechanism to contact the parent it MUST be clear =
who is fetching the records and creates the appropriate records in the =
parent zone. Specifically as some operations MUST be using other =
mechanisms than what is described here. If for example communication =
normally is done via a registrar that via epp is communicating with the =
registry, the registrar is normally "caching" the data passed to it. If =
then the registry is fetching the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry have a =
different view of the DNSSEC key material situation than the registrar, =
and the result of such a situation is unclear. Because of this, this =
mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass intermediaries that might cache =
information and because of that get the wrong state.=20

> 10.  Acknowledgements
>=20
>    We would like to thank a large number of folk, including: Mark
>    Andrews, Joe Abley, Jaap Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Doug Barton, Brian
>    Dickinson, Paul Ebersman, Tony Finch, Patrik Faltsrom, Jim Galvin,

Please spell my last name "Faltstrom".

   Patrik


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On 3 Apr 2014, at 12:09, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m <paf@frobbit.se> wrote:

> What does "would be a good idea" mean in RFC 1918 speak? :-)

Hmm...not enough coffee...RFC 2119 of course.

   Patrik


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Current DNSOP thread and why 1024 bits
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On 3 April 2014 04:18, David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> wrote:
> Paul,
>
> On Apr 3, 2014, at 12:38 AM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>>> Saving space and time does matter.  Roughly half the operators I studi=
ed would include a backup key on-line because "they could" with the shorted=
 length.  And performance does matter - ask the web browser people.
>> Because we want to make security decisions based on a 1ms latency browse=
r war?
>
> We want to make security decisions that actually improve security.
>
> Making a decision that results in people turning security off because the=
 (perceived at least) performance impact is too large does not improve secu=
rity.
>
> People are already doing insanely stupid things (e.g., not following TTLs=
) because they eke out a couple of extra milliseconds in reduced RTT per qu=
ery (which, multiplied by the zillions of queries today's high content webs=
ites require, does actually make a difference).
>
> Having not looked into it sufficiently, I do not have a strong opinion as=
 to whether increasing key lengths will result in people either not signing=
 or turning off validation, but I believe it wrong to disregard performance=
 considerations.

Before that question even becomes relevant, DNSSEC has to actually get
to the endpoints reliably, which we know it doesn't. By the time that
happens, the whole question of what key size should be used will
likely have a different answer anyway.


From nobody Thu Apr  3 04:37:36 2014
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSng-ish (was Re: key lengths for DNSSEC)
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--047d7b342f6cb42b0f04f621cd2a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 11:24 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>wrote:

>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 10:48 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 09:07:07PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>> > 1) Client -> Resolver
>>
>> > Changing 1 is the easiest and also the part that is most in need.
>>
>> >From where I sit, that project appears to reduce to roughly "upgrade
>> all the computers on Earth."  It may be that we do not have a common
>> meaning of "easiest".  Perhaps you could say more.
>>
>
> Nope, just the gateway devices and the main DNS servers.
>
> Legacy DNS over raw UDP will be around for decades to come. But DNS over a
> privacy protected transport is quite viable.
>
> The privacy issues are most acute at the network gateway device, the
> firewall or the WiFi router.
>
>
> Privacy protection plus anti-censorship protection is in big demand right
> now.
>

Since we have essentially zero DNSSEC stub clients in operation and 100% of
those that are in use are being deployed by aggressive early adopters,
deployment in the stub client -> recursive loop is actually quite easy.

What we can't do is to break legacy DNS without DNSSEC. That is the
deployment scenario that is beyond redemption.



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--047d7b342f6cb42b0f04f621cd2a
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 11:24 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <span dir=3D"=
ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">hallam@gmail=
.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"">On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 =
at 10:48 PM, Andrew Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ajs@an=
vilwalrusden.com" target=3D"_blank">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 09:07:07PM -0400, Ph=
illip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
&gt; 1) Client -&gt; Resolver<br>
<div><br>
&gt; Changing 1 is the easiest and also the part that is most in need.<br>
<br>
</div>&gt;From where I sit, that project appears to reduce to roughly &quot=
;upgrade<br>
all the computers on Earth.&quot; =A0It may be that we do not have a common=
<br>
meaning of &quot;easiest&quot;. =A0Perhaps you could say more.<br></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div></div><div>Nope, just the gateway devices and the main D=
NS servers.</div><div><br></div><div>Legacy DNS over raw UDP will be around=
 for decades to come. But DNS over a privacy protected transport is quite v=
iable.</div>

<div><br></div><div>The privacy issues are most acute at the network gatewa=
y device, the firewall or the WiFi router.</div><div><br></div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Privacy protection plus anti-censorship protection is in big demand=
 right now.</div>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Since we have essentiall=
y zero DNSSEC stub clients in operation and 100% of those that are in use a=
re being deployed by aggressive early adopters, deployment in the stub clie=
nt -&gt; recursive loop is actually quite easy.</div>
<div><br></div><div>What we can&#39;t do is to break legacy DNS without DNS=
SEC. That is the deployment scenario that is beyond redemption.=A0</div><di=
v><br></div><div>=A0<br></div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=
=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br>

</div></div>

--047d7b342f6cb42b0f04f621cd2a--


From nobody Thu Apr  3 06:12:01 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

>  The verification performance is bad, P256 takes 24x times longer to verify a
>  signature than 2048 bit RSA key. 

=> I got a different figure (6x) for my ECC paper, and:
 - it was published the 3 may 2013 so one can expect ECC performance
  has been improved since I got it

 - P256 ECDSA is stronger than 2048 bit RSA so it is like comparing
  oranges and grapefruits.

BTW if signing is faster than verifying it is not an ECC property
but an (EC)DSA one.

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

PS: to come back to the 1024 vs 2048 discussion: 1024 bit RSA is weaker
than some might want but there is (and will be in a reasonable time
frame) no practical attack against it. In fact I am more concerned
by possible (?) attacks against a rollover chain...


From nobody Thu Apr  3 12:11:48 2014
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Last summer I believed that this draft was vitally important, but, and =
as the editor=92s know, I am less optimistic.

Below is a minor nit to start and then trying to re-write (for my =
benefit) the protocol this is describing.  I did the latter to try to =
clean up a lot of loose language and in the process found three red =
flags.

I=92m not saying don=92t publish this - it isn=92t standards track.  (Is =
there still an experimental track?)  But in the name of protocol =
specifications, there are a number of places this can be cleaned up.   =
Even if it won=92t scale (because not everyone cares about zones with =
over a million cut points), I can=92t see who interoperable code can be =
written with so many loose ends.

On Apr 2, 2014, at 15:07, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Greetings,
>=20
> This is the starting of the WGLC on Automating DNSSEC delegation trust =
maintenance.  This was briefly covered in London and these are ready for =
WGLC.   The current versions of this documents can be found here:
>=20
>     =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintai=
nance/
>     =
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-03.t=
xt

>3.  CDS / CDNSKEY (Child DS/ Child DNSKEY) record definitions
>
>   This document specifies two new DNS RRtypes (CDS and CDNSKEY) that
>   indicates what the Child wants the parent's DS RRset to contain.  =
...
Poorly written and leads to the wrong interpretation. I would read the =
above to say that SLD.example. will use these to types to indicate what =
it wants example./IN/DS to be.  A suggested fix:
"This document specifies two new resource records, CDS and CDNSKEY.  =
These records are used to convey, from one zone to it=92s parent, the =
desired contents of the zone=92s DS resource record set residing in the =
parent zone."
>4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>
>   If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
>   signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  This
>   means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
>   operator MAY remove all CDS records from the zone.
>
>   Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY records =
as
>   follows:
>
>   o  Location: "the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be at the child zone
>      apex".
>
>   o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both =
the
>      current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>
>   o  Continuity: "SHOULD NOT break the current delegation if applied =
to
>      DS RRset"
>
>   If any these conditions fail the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be
>   ignored.

Particularly the rule for the signer.  (To disclose some background - =
I=92ve voiced displeasure about this before.)  Before you laugh at how =
long this is, how late this is in the process, this is how I would break =
down the protocol being specified.  I think it=92s close to what is in =
the draft, but, written this way, makes be dubious that this is a stable =
protocol.

(E.g., what action do DNS servers and clients take when a record MUST be =
ignored?)

In the spirit that the CDS/CDNSKEY records are said in section 3 to be =
=93regular RR types=94 and that in RFC 4035 there=92s no mention of =
checking for the SEP flag in validation (section 5.3.1), the MUST =
represents a fracture to me.  I propose that the rule be changed to =
this:

The CDS/DDNSKEY set MUST be signed and validated as any other RRSet in =
the zone (except for the zone=92s own DNSKEY set) for the purposes of =
DNSSEC processing.  In addition, to indicate that the record set is =
authorized to convey a new secure entry point, the signer MUST also =
include a signature generated from a key that is in the zone=92s DNSKEY =
and DS sets.  This signature MUST be validated before the change to the =
current DS set is authorized.

The wording in there is a bit funky because the passage above is not =
using what I=92d call =93standard=94 terminology.  The =93Signer=94 I =
assume to be the child zone signature generation process.

=97=97Okay, at this point, I couldn=92t resist mashing this into a =
specification of a protocol:

If were to rewrite 4.1 more radically:

4.1 Processing Rules  (Note - some of these appear in later sections of =
the document, not always the way I say them here.)

The processing rules apply to both ordinary DNS protocol operations =
(query/response, zone transfer) and to the application-specific nature =
of these records.  I.e., these records are used as input to the process =
of generating a zone=92s contents which is sometimes called =
provisioning.  It is for this latter purpose that special rules exist.

4.1.1. Publication Rules

An owner of a CDS RR set MAY also own a CDNSKEY RR set.  In general =
practice, only one or the other SHOULD be present, but there may be =
cases when both are needed.

The owner of a CDS/CDNSKEY RR set SHOULD be in the process of requesting =
a change to the owner=92s DS RR set.  An owner MAY retain a CDS/CDNSKEY =
once the request has been granted but this will cause unnecessary =
processing by the parent. (RED FLAG #1)
=20
A CDS/CDNSKEY set MUST be owned by a child zone=92s apex in order to be =
considered a request to change the child=92s DS RR set.  Other names MAY =
own a CDS/CDNSKEY set but such sets have no meaning and are ignored by =
provisioning systems.

A CDS/CDNSKEY set MUST be signed as a set within the zone, subject to =
the rules in section 2 of RFC 4035.

A CDS/CDNSKEY set MUST (also) be signed by a key that is currently =
represented in the owner=92s DNSKEY set and owner=92s DS set held at the =
parent.

Once the owner=92s DS set appears to conform with the contents indicated =
in the CDS/CDNSKEY set, the CDS/CDNSKEY set SHOULD be removed.

If, after an undefined extended period of time the owner=92s DS set does =
not conform with the contents indicated in the CDS/CDNSKEY set, =
out-of-band means are to be taken to discover why this is the case. (RED =
FLAG#2)

4.1.2 Processing Rules

If a CDS/CDNSKEY set fails ordinary DNSSEC validation rules, it is to be =
ignored.

If a CDS/CDNSKEY set is owned by a child zone and is signed by key that =
is currently represented in the child=92s DS RR set, the provisioning =
system is to begin the process of handling a DS RR set change.

If a CDS/CDNSKEY requested state matches the existing state, processing =
is to be aborted.=20

If a CDS/CDNSKEY requested state would lead to no child-owned DNSKEY =
matching any key indicated in the child DS RR set, processing is =
aborted. (RED FLAG #3)

Once appropriate authentication, authorization, and sanity checks pass, =
the parent MUST change the child=92s DS RR set to the state described in =
the CDS/CDNSKEY.

RED FLAG #1 - allowing a set to remain (or by being unable to enforce =
removal) means it is trivial to DOS the parent.  If there are a lot of =
signed delegations and each have these records all the time, the parent =
will have to go through the motions just to discover it=92s a no-op.

RED FLAG #2 - as one could imagine, without a feedback loop, =93silence=94=
 is not a good way to indicate =93no, wrong, buzz.=94

RED FLAG #3 - this step means the parent has to retrieve child records.  =
What if the child servers are out of synchronization, what if the child =
is spinning in the =93no change, just wait=94 rule above.  I dare say =
that trying to put this protocol into code would be very difficult.



--Apple-Mail=_310B03DF-E02F-4FB1-8977-BBF336780F24
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=windows-1252

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Last summer I believed that this draft was =
vitally important, but, and as the editor=92s know, I am less =
optimistic.</div><div><br></div><div>Below is a minor nit to start and =
then trying to re-write (for my benefit) the protocol this is =
describing. &nbsp;I did the latter to try to clean up a lot of loose =
language and in the process found three red =
flags.</div><div><br></div><div>I=92m not saying don=92t publish this - =
it isn=92t standards track. &nbsp;(Is there still an experimental =
track?) &nbsp;But in the name of protocol specifications, there are a =
number of places this can be cleaned up. &nbsp; Even if it won=92t scale =
(because not everyone cares about zones with over a million cut points), =
I can=92t see who interoperable code can be written with so many loose =
ends.</div><br><div><div>On Apr 2, 2014, at 15:07, Tim Wicinski &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tjw.ietf@gmail.com">tjw.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">
 =20

    <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DISO-8859-1">
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    <tt>Greetings,</tt><tt><br>
    </tt><tt><br>
    </tt><tt>This is the starting of the WGLC on Automating DNSSEC
      delegation trust maintenance.&nbsp; This was briefly covered in =
London
      and these are ready for WGLC.&nbsp;&nbsp; The current versions of =
this
      documents can be found here:</tt><tt><br>
    </tt>
    <meta charset=3D"utf-8">
    <tt><br>
    </tt><tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust=
-maintainance/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegati=
on-trust-maintainance/</a></tt><tt><br>
    </tt><tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintaina=
nce-03.txt">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maint=
ainance-03.txt</a></tt><tt><br></tt></div></blockquote><br></div><div><pre=
 style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap;">&gt;3.  CDS / =
CDNSKEY (Child DS/ Child DNSKEY) record definitions
&gt;
&gt;   This document specifies two new DNS RRtypes (CDS and CDNSKEY) =
that
&gt;   indicates what the Child wants the parent's DS RRset to contain.  =
...</pre><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: =
pre-wrap;">Poorly written and leads to the wrong interpretation. I would =
read the above to say that SLD.example. will use these to types to =
indicate what it wants example./IN/DS to be.  A suggested fix:</pre><pre =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap;">"This document =
specifies two new resource records, CDS and CDNSKEY.  These records are =
used to convey, from one zone to it=92s parent, the desired contents of =
the zone=92s DS resource record set residing in the parent =
zone."</pre></div><div><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: =
pre-wrap;">&gt;4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
&gt;
&gt;   If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
&gt;   signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  =
This
&gt;   means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
&gt;   operator MAY remove all CDS records from the zone.
&gt;
&gt;   Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY =
records as
&gt;   follows:
&gt;
&gt;   o  Location: "the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be at the child zone
&gt;      apex".
&gt;
&gt;   o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both =
the
&gt;      current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
&gt;
&gt;   o  Continuity: "SHOULD NOT break the current delegation if =
applied to
&gt;      DS RRset"
&gt;
&gt;   If any these conditions fail the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be
&gt;   ignored.
</pre><div><br></div><div>Particularly the rule for the signer. =
&nbsp;(To disclose some background - I=92ve voiced displeasure about =
this before.) &nbsp;Before you laugh at how long this is, how late this =
is in the process, this is how I would break down the protocol being =
specified. &nbsp;I think it=92s close to what is in the draft, but, =
written this way, makes be dubious that this is a stable =
protocol.</div><div><br></div><div>(E.g., what action do DNS servers and =
clients take when a record MUST be ignored?)</div><div><br></div><div>In =
the spirit that the CDS/CDNSKEY records are said in section 3 to be =
=93regular RR types=94 and that in RFC 4035 there=92s no mention of =
checking for the SEP flag in validation (section 5.3.1), the MUST =
represents a fracture to me. &nbsp;I propose that the rule be changed to =
this:</div><div><br></div><div>The CDS/DDNSKEY set MUST be signed and =
validated as any other RRSet in the zone (except for the zone=92s own =
DNSKEY set) for the purposes of DNSSEC processing. &nbsp;In addition, to =
indicate that the record set is authorized to convey a new secure entry =
point, the signer MUST also include a signature generated from a key =
that is in the zone=92s DNSKEY and DS sets. &nbsp;This signature MUST be =
validated before the change to the current DS set is =
authorized.</div><div><br></div><div>The wording in there is a bit funky =
because the passage above is not using what I=92d call =93standard=94 =
terminology. &nbsp;The =93Signer=94 I assume to be the child zone =
signature generation process.</div><div><br></div><div>=97=97Okay, at =
this point, I couldn=92t resist mashing this into a specification of a =
protocol:</div><div><br></div><div>If were to rewrite 4.1 more =
radically:</div><div><br></div><div>4.1 Processing Rules &nbsp;(Note - =
some of these appear in later sections of the document, not always the =
way I say them here.)</div><div><br></div><div>The processing rules =
apply to both ordinary DNS protocol operations (query/response, zone =
transfer) and to the application-specific nature of these records. =
&nbsp;I.e., these records are used as input to the process of generating =
a zone=92s contents which is sometimes called provisioning. &nbsp;It is =
for this latter purpose that special rules =
exist.</div><div><br></div><div>4.1.1. Publication =
Rules</div><div><br></div><div>An owner of a CDS RR set MAY also own a =
CDNSKEY RR set. &nbsp;In general practice, only one or the other SHOULD =
be present, but there may be cases when both are =
needed.</div><div><br></div><div>The owner of a CDS/CDNSKEY RR set =
SHOULD be in the process of requesting a change to the owner=92s DS RR =
set. &nbsp;An owner MAY retain a CDS/CDNSKEY once the request has been =
granted but this will cause unnecessary processing by the parent. (RED =
FLAG #1)</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>A CDS/CDNSKEY set MUST be owned by a =
child zone=92s apex in order to be considered a request to change the =
child=92s DS RR set. &nbsp;Other names MAY own a CDS/CDNSKEY set but =
such sets have no meaning and are ignored by provisioning =
systems.</div><div><br></div><div>A CDS/CDNSKEY set MUST be signed as a =
set within the zone, subject to the rules in section 2 of RFC =
4035.</div><div><br></div><div>A CDS/CDNSKEY set MUST (also) be signed =
by a key that is currently represented in the owner=92s DNSKEY set and =
owner=92s DS set held at the parent.</div><div><br></div><div>Once the =
owner=92s DS set appears to conform with the&nbsp;contents indicated in =
the CDS/CDNSKEY set,&nbsp;the CDS/CDNSKEY set SHOULD be =
removed.</div><div><br></div><div>If, after an undefined extended period =
of time the owner=92s DS set does not conform with the contents =
indicated in the CDS/CDNSKEY set, out-of-band means are to be taken to =
discover why this is the case. (RED =
FLAG#2)</div><div><br></div><div>4.1.2 Processing =
Rules</div><div><br></div><div>If a CDS/CDNSKEY set fails ordinary =
DNSSEC validation rules, it is to be =
ignored.</div><div><br></div><div>If a CDS/CDNSKEY set is owned by a =
child zone and is signed by key that is currently represented in the =
child=92s DS RR set, the provisioning system is to begin the process of =
handling a DS RR set change.</div><div><br></div><div>If a CDS/CDNSKEY =
requested state matches the existing state, processing is to be =
aborted.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>If a CDS/CDNSKEY requested state =
would lead to no child-owned DNSKEY matching any key indicated in the =
child DS RR set, processing is aborted. (RED FLAG =
#3)</div><div><br></div><div>Once appropriate authentication, =
authorization, and sanity checks pass, the parent MUST change the =
child=92s DS RR set to the state described in the =
CDS/CDNSKEY.</div><div><br></div><div>RED FLAG #1 - allowing a set to =
remain (or by being unable to enforce removal) means it is trivial to =
DOS the parent. &nbsp;If there are a lot of signed delegations and each =
have these records all the time, the parent will have to go through the =
motions just to discover it=92s a no-op.</div><div><br></div><div>RED =
FLAG #2 - as one could imagine, without a feedback loop, =93silence=94 =
is not a good way to indicate =93no, wrong, =
buzz.=94</div><div><br></div><div>RED FLAG #3 - this step means the =
parent has to retrieve child records. &nbsp;What if the child servers =
are out of synchronization, what if the child is spinning in the =93no =
change, just wait=94 rule above. &nbsp;I dare say that trying to put =
this protocol into code would be very =
difficult.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_310B03DF-E02F-4FB1-8977-BBF336780F24--


From nobody Thu Apr  3 14:40:14 2014
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From: Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com>
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Cc: "<dnsop-chairs@tools.ietf.org>" <dnsop-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: [DNSOP] draft new charter
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Colleagues,

Here is draft text for the new charter we've been talking about for =
DNSOP.

When we have something the WG is comfortable with, we get to ask our AD =
to take it to the IESG, so please review and comment.

(If you want to comment off-list, please send to =
dnsop-chairs@tools.ietf.org, cc'd above, so we both see it=85.but =
on-list is preferable.)


best,
Tim & Suzanne

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
The DNS Operations Working Group will develop guidelines for the
operation of DNS software and services and for the administration of DNS =
zones.
These guidelines will provide technical information
relating to the implementation of the DNS protocol by the
operators and administrators of DNS zones. The group will
perform the following activities:

1. Define the processes by which Domain Name System (DNS) software
   may be efficiently and correctly administered, configured, and
   operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone
   name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for other DNS
   zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS resolvers.
   As part of this effort, the group will produce documents
   explaining to the general Internet community what processes
   and mechanisms should be employed for the effective management
   and operation of DNS software and services, including root, TLD,
   and recursive servers.

2. Publish documents concerning DNSSEC operational procedures.

3. Publish documents concerning DNS operational
   procedures in IPv6 and mixed IPv6-IPv4 networks, and provide =
documentation=20
   and guidance on DNS-related IPv6 transition and coexistence
   issues.

4. Publish documents on extensions or protocol maintenance to the DNS
   Protocol, with a focus on the operational impacts of
   such changes. Act as clearinghouse for discussion or provide advice =
to ADs
   and other WGs on EDNS0 options, new RRTYPEs, DNSSEC, record
   synthesis, or other mechanics of extending DNS to support other
   applications.

5. Serve as a clearinghouse for DNS-related issues where people can
   bring drafts that document the problem space around these issues.
   The group will then decide whether these issues belong in DNSOP and, =
if not,
   will work with the authors and appropriate ADs to determine the
   appropriate group for the work.

6. Publish documents that attempt to better define the overlapping
   area among the public DNS root, DNS-like names as used in local or =
restricted
   naming scopes, and the 'special names' registry that IETF
   manages, and how they will interact moving forward.  Work in a
   liaison capacity to ICANN to assist in this.


From nobody Thu Apr  3 14:50:33 2014
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Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2014 17:50:20 -0400
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:

>    operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone
>    name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for other DNS
>    zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS resolvers.

Is there a reason to call out these particular functions, or not to
include something like, "or any other resolver or server functioning
as part of the global DNS"?  I'm just worried, for instance, that
stubs don't appear there, even though there might be advice I can
imagine the WG providing.

>    manages, and how they will interact moving forward.  Work in a
>    liaison capacity to ICANN to assist in this.

Given that "liaison" is a term of art around the IETF, perhaps the
latter sentence needs to be phrased another way?  I'm not sure exactly
what you have in mind, or I'd suggest something.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com


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On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> =
wrote:

> On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:
>=20
>>   operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone
>>   name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for other DNS
>>   zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS resolvers.
>=20
> Is there a reason to call out these particular functions, or not to
> include something like, "or any other resolver or server functioning
> as part of the global DNS"?  I'm just worried, for instance, that
> stubs don't appear there, even though there might be advice I can
> imagine the WG providing.

+1 to at least calling out stub resolvers, but Andrew's non-list =
formulation is better.

>>   manages, and how they will interact moving forward.  Work in a
>>   liaison capacity to ICANN to assist in this.
>=20
> Given that "liaison" is a term of art around the IETF, perhaps the
> latter sentence needs to be phrased another way?  I'm not sure exactly
> what you have in mind, or I'd suggest something.

Let me be more blunt than Andrew: an IETF WG cannot work as a "liaison" =
to anyone. The IETF has liaisons to ICANN (and bless them for doing that =
somewhat thankless task!). ICANN should not expect that any WG would be =
a direct point of contact for ICANN work at all.

--Paul Hoffman=


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Paul (and Andrew),

On Apr 3, 2014, at 6:42 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Given that "liaison" is a term of art around the IETF, perhaps the
>> latter sentence needs to be phrased another way?  I'm not sure =
exactly
>> what you have in mind, or I'd suggest something.
>=20
> Let me be more blunt than Andrew: an IETF WG cannot work as a =
"liaison" to anyone. The IETF has liaisons to ICANN (and bless them for =
doing that somewhat thankless task!). ICANN should not expect that any =
WG would be a direct point of contact for ICANN work at all.


Understood that wordsmithing is needed, and getting the wording right is =
an important detail, but I think we're even more interested in whether =
the item should be there at all: should DNSOP, in appropriate =
collaboration with all relevant parties by whatever mechanism applies, =
be taking on special names/RFC 6761 issues?


thanks,
Suzanne



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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter
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On Apr 3, 2014, at 4:00 PM, Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com> =
wrote:

> Understood that wordsmithing is needed, and getting the wording right =
is an important detail, but I think we're even more interested in =
whether the item should be there at all: should DNSOP, in appropriate =
collaboration with all relevant parties by whatever mechanism applies, =
be taking on special names/RFC 6761 issues?

In all seriousness, the WG might not get a choice. I've heard from two =
folks in the I* leadership that they're watching our threads. I replied =
to both of them that I thought that might not be a good idea, but they =
indicated that it was better than it being done in the smoke-filled =
telechats.

Having said that, I would be happy to propose ripping that out of our =
charter. Yes, we're all into politics and such (and law...), but we =
don't offer much expertise other than "yes, there is a difference =
between these different places that should block or resolve those =
names".

--Paul Hoffman=


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From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter
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On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400,
 Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com> wrote 
 a message of 69 lines which said:

> 4. Publish documents on extensions or protocol maintenance to the DNS
>    Protocol, with a focus on the operational impacts of
>    such changes. Act as clearinghouse for discussion or provide advice to ADs
>    and other WGs on EDNS0 options, new RRTYPEs, DNSSEC, record
>    synthesis, or other mechanics of extending DNS to support other
>    applications.

Do we all agree that it may cover, in the future, the work which is
currently discussed on the dns-privacy mailing list?
 
> 6. Publish documents that attempt to better define the overlapping
>    area among the public DNS root, DNS-like names as used in local or restricted
>    naming scopes, and the 'special names' registry that IETF
>    manages, and how they will interact moving forward.  Work in a
>    liaison capacity to ICANN to assist in this.

I strongly dislike "the public DNS root" as if there were only one
(technically, any root is a root and, for dnsop, it does not matter if
it is the USG root or any other, the DNS operational issues are the
same) and I dislike even more "DNS-like names", which seems to imply
there are inferior names. www.foobar.local is a domain name, even if
it is not resolved through the DNS.

I suggest: Publish documents that attempt to better define the
overlapping area among the DNS and other resolution protocols which
use domain names (and may have gateways to the DNS), especially in the
context of the 'special names' registry that IETF manages (RFC 6761).


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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

op 04-04-14 10:59, Stephane Bortzmeyer schreef:

> same) and I dislike even more "DNS-like names", which seems to
> imply there are inferior names. www.foobar.local is a domain name,
> even if it is not resolved through the DNS.

I tend to disagree to this marketing definition of a domain name.
For me, a domain name is a name that consists of labels seperated by a
dot that is resolvable through the DOMAIN name system.

Any name that consists of labels seperated by dots but is not present
in a domain name system is just that: A name with dots in them. Maybe
that same name scheme is used in other protocols as well, but that
does not make a name a domain name.

I don't considder these other names with dots in them inferior, but
they are simply not domain names.


- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
Mailto: antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl
XMPP: antoin.verschuren@jabber.sidn.nl
HTTP://www.sidn.nl/
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On Apr 4, 2014, at 8:53 AM, Antoin Verschuren =
<antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> wrote:
> I don't considder these other names with dots in them inferior, but
> they are simply not domain names.

Whether you are right or not, I think Stephane's interpretation is =
technically correct.   I don't mean that it _is_, I just mean that I =
think it is.   So we aren't going to get to the truth of the matter by =
casting slogans at each other, because it's just a matter of opinion.   =
It's not wrong to describe the names the way Stephane has, and it's not =
wrong to describe them the way you have.   So we should choose based on =
what meaning more clearly expresses the policy we ultimately decide on, =
rather than trying to drive the policy choice on the basis of what name =
we prefer.


From nobody Fri Apr  4 07:23:54 2014
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On Apr 3, 2014, at 17:39, Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com> wrote:

> 6. Publish documents that attempt to better define the overlapping
>   area among the public DNS root, DNS-like names as used in local or =
restricted
>   naming scopes, and the 'special names' registry that IETF
>   manages, and how they will interact moving forward.  Work in a
>   liaison capacity to ICANN to assist in this.

I=92m going to cherry-pick on this one as it is already causing =
comments.

The generic need is:

Derive a means by which the DNS name space can accommodate limited-scope =
names, and publish documents describing the solution.

I realize that this topic has come up in the context of having both the =
IETF and ICANN independently decide what is delegated in the root zone =
operated by IANA.  I propose to recast the problem as defining the =
concept of =93scoping=94 names - to take this squarely into where the =
IETF expertise is - engineering the protocol.  And by =93propose=94 I =
mean just that, perhaps =93scoping=94 isn=92t the word to use.

I=92m not saying =93scoping=94 is a sure fire winner.  In fact, I bet =
there=92s a disaster in that based on past experience and based on the =
tools we have.
- Locally scoped (=93site-local=94) IPv6 addresses are, err, were =
dead-on-arrival (RFC 3879 killed them and 4007 commented, 3513 had =
proposed them).
- The DNS lacks =93autonomous system numbers=94 which can help a router =
know when not forward an advertisement for prefixes representing =
so-called =93RFC 1918=94 space.
- And the DNS protocol doesn=92t have the notion of a =93link=94 - for =
link-local.

But, as for charter language, there is a need to come up with a way to =
manage the scope of names.  For instance, I want to have my LAN users go =
to printer01.corp and treat that as a domain name fully in application =
software yet never once see a query for printer01.corp leave my =
organization=92s virtual LAN (which might be a few sites around the =
globe).  I am not saying it is easy or fits in the model of the DNS, but =
there is a user constituency that has stated =93a requirement=94 for it.


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On Apr 4, 2014, at 9:09, Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@nominum.com> wrote:

> On Apr 4, 2014, at 8:53 AM, Antoin Verschuren =
<antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> wrote:
>> I don't considder these other names with dots in them inferior, but
>> they are simply not domain names.
>=20
> Whether you are right or not, I think Stephane's interpretation is =
technically correct.   I don't mean that it _is_, I just mean that I =
think it is.   So we aren't going to get to the truth of the matter by =
casting slogans at each other, because it's just a matter of opinion.   =
It's not wrong to describe the names the way Stephane has, and it's not =
wrong to describe them the way you have.   So we should choose based on =
what meaning more clearly expresses the policy we ultimately decide on, =
rather than trying to drive the policy choice on the basis of what name =
we prefer.

My observation is that there is a world out there and name are applied =
to things (in the sense, the answer to the questions a toddler asks =
=93what is that?=94).  These names transcend oral and written forms, are =
not always universal, and are some times applied with a heavy cultural =
bias.  In short, the names can be in conflict with each other, there=92s =
no sense of order to naming.

And that there=92s this DNS which enables a representation of the world. =
 The DNS contains a mapping of the world into a hierarchy of domain =
names (and I=92ll keep the adjective here to =93scope=94 what is meant =
by =93name").  Mapping means a transference of one reality onto another, =
it doesn=92t guarantee a perfect copy, but a representation for a =
particular purpose.  The point is, domain names are a proper subset of =
all names.

It=92s tempting to also comment on the quality of the mapping.  The DNS =
itself =93is what it is=94 - a system which imposes various and sometime =
seemingly arbitrary impingements on a smooth mapping.  With it today we =
can only do so much.  That shouldn=92t stop us, but, it makes the work =
harder up to the point that it becomes necessary to overhaul the system.

DNSOP WG has been convened around the DNS.  The expertise present is =
expected to be knowledgeable about the protocol as it stands (and where =
it can =93go=94) and the set of requirements that are placed against =
it[0].  To this end, the work is to manage how domain names are =
operated, what is delegated and what kind of data is associated with =
each node.  So, I think it is a non-starter to get into =93inferior=94 =
names and whatever that means.  We should stick to working with domain =
names and how they are operated.

For example, in some cases, domain names could be barred from the =
protocol.  These might be names that fail some test of what names should =
be mapped into domain names.  You might think of content censorship here =
or you might think of visibly confusing combinations of different =
writing scripts (those are ratholes the WG is arguable not prepared to =
discuss).  In other cases, some domain names can be restricted or scoped =
because in contexts, two names might mean different things and result in =
confusion and delay[1] or worse yet, a security concern.

Oh, and as  PS - in direct response to Antoin=92s message, =93Will.i.am=94=
 is a singer, not a domain name. ;)  That is meant as a joke.  However, =
I do not think a domain name is label.label.label. (Yes, despite STD 13 =
documenting the presentation format.)  That is just a textual =
representation of the =93byte count=94 =93value=94 =93byte count=94 =
=93value=94 =85 =93byte count=3D0=94 you see "on the wire.=94  I regret =
that people think of the =93dot=94 as the official, burned-in-to-the =
protocol separator - it=92s just what is thrown into representations in =
the Latin character set world (because back then, that=92s all that was =
considered in the documents).  There=92s no reason why a special =
character native to the Han glyph set could be used in =
Chinese-Japanese-Korean representations of domain names, and when it =
comes to right-to-left scripts like Arabic, the =93problem=94 of =
directionality would be solved.  Sigh, the DNS =93is what it is."

[0] I say this having spent time trying to determine the official name =
of some governments in various, local scripts.  Although this is =
=93naming=94 it is not anything like understanding the DNS.
[1] After a few Thomas the Tank Engine books, you can=92t get that =
phrase out of your head.


From nobody Fri Apr  4 09:05:36 2014
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Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2014 17:05:17 +0100
From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:

> I'm trying to understand the time-based attack, but I'm not seeing it.

I think a plausible form of this attack involves DNSSEC validation at
the edge.

(1) DoS your victim, to force them into trouble-shooting mode. Hopefully
they will reboot, at which point you can lie to them about the time, and
they will probably believe you.

(2) You have compromised a key that was valid at the point in time which
your victim now believes is current. The signature chain from the root to
your compromised key works. You have a sample of other records from the
same time so you can maybe make other stuff seem to work.

(3) Go wild signing attack records with your compromised key and sending
them in responses to your victim.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
Trafalgar: Westerly or southwesterly 4 or 5, occasionally 6 in north. Rough
becoming moderate. Rain or showers, mainly in north. Good, occasionally poor
in north.


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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Not that this matters, but this is the first look I have had at this =
document.

I=92ll start with a heavy dose of skepticism as this is intended for the =
standards track.

This is =93impossible to implement=94:

2.3.2.  Child Nameserver Selection

   Parental agents will need to poll child nameservers in search of
   CSYNC records and related data records.
One word - any cast.  (Okay, the spell checker says it is two words.)  A =
casual observer can estimate the rest of the elided comment.

But, truth be told, =93polling=94 as described here is not necessary for =
this proposal.

I do have a more serious concern about where the parental agent gets =
it=92s information.  I accept that a properly DNSSEC-signed CSYNC record =
is sufficient to indicate a child has a configuration that it wants to =
see replicated in the parent.  Tying this to serial numbers makes the =
CSYNC independent of the copy-on-the-server, meaning, this depends on =
the data space and not the server space.

Getting the NS set has one challenge, making sure the NS set comes from =
the same serial number version as the CSYNC.  When I issue =93zone/IN/NS=94=
 I don=92t see the serial number though.  I=92d have to use the ANY =
query type to capture the SOA and NS set resident in the answering =
server (and hopefully we=92ll assume an authoritative server).  Given:=20=

   Parental agents MAY offer a configuration interface to allow child
   operators to specify which nameserver should be considered the master
   to send data queries too.  This master may not be one of the
   publically listed nameservers in the NS set (i.e., it may be a
   "hidden master").
this issue is not a show stopper, but the =93protocol implication=94 of =
not getting the SOA and NS in the same response is probably a =
significant note to add.

My concern with the glue records is more substantial.  There are two use =
cases to consider.

One case is where the addresses of the NS names are owned in a different =
(perhaps sub) zone.  The other case is where the addresses are in zone =
that is =93above=94 the child but still under the parent - think =
multi-label deep parents.

In the first case, once I can get the CSYNC and SOA and NS to be =93in =
sync=94 as far as what the child is declaring, it=92s not as easy to =
guarantee the set of zones owning the address records agree.  And I say =
=93set of zones=94 because, well, you can imagine.  What if=85the zones =
in question here are not under the management of the child, pertinent =
here not as =93control=94 but =93not monitored=94 and they fall out of =
date or experience some other failure.  Or are not signed the same way =
the child is?

In the second case, to make this a bit clearer, the child zone is =
"store.franchise.example." delegated from the parent zone =93example.=94. =
 The NS set has names that are in corporate.example. which is also =
delegated from example (one-label deep).  The child zone could not know =
that the glue is needed because the names are out of bailiwick, but to =
the parent zone, they are.  This is, yes, a trick question.  The child =
administrator would need to know that address records are needed in the =
type bit map field even though they are =93over there=94 tree-wise.

I do commend this observation (which is one of the problems I have with =
the CDS/CDNSKEY proposal):
2.3.1.  Error Reporting

   There is no inline mechanism for a parental agent to report errors to
   operators of child zones.  Thus, the only error reporting mechanisms
   must be out of band, such as through a web console or over email.

But I am dubious on the flag for =93immediate.=94  In my experience, =
I=92ve never seen queue-jumping to every pay off unless the underlying =
system is over subscribed as it is.  If this system is oversubscribed,   =
there are bigger problems.  Normally I=92d let this lie, but it reminds =
me of the key strength field in the KEY RR - a spectacular dud of a =
concept.   (KEY RR was the DNSSEC key holder before DNSKEY RR.)

These are my comments assuming that the proposal works as advertised.  I =
have my doubts regarding the use of the DNS to =93pass messages=94 for a =
few reasons.  Out-boxes aren=92t always cleared out (meaning old =
requests hang around).  In-boxes may not be checked regularly.  And the =
lack of a reverse channel is a pretty major obstacle - as the draft =
says, out of band communication is needed.  (This reminds me of a joke - =
you can talk to a diety, but if they talk back, check yourself into a =
hospital.)

PS - What if the parental agent tries to retrieve the AAAA records and =
gets no response - persistently?  I don=92t mean =93No Answer=94 I mean =
nothing back?  I=92m picking on this (as opposed to A) as a somewhat =
more realistic operational happenstance.  Who would initiate the =
debugging of this, the parental agent who detects the failure but is =
mum, or the child whose patience is being tested?

On Apr 2, 2014, at 15:14, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>=20
> All,
>=20
> This is the beginning of the Working Group Last Call on Child To =
Parent Synchronization in DNS.
> The London update showed that this work is complete and ready to move =
forward.
>=20
> The document can be found here:
> =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization/
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization-00.txt
>=20
> Please take a moment to review the final versions and send up any =
comments.
>=20
> This document willhave a 2 week period for comments, closing on April =
16th, 2014.
>=20
> thanks
> tim
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


--Apple-Mail=_2DE9CC6A-143A-4BC3-84BB-57D81A22F5CA
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=windows-1252

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Not that this matters, but this is the first =
look I have had at this document.</div><div><br></div><div>I=92ll start =
with a heavy dose of skepticism as this is intended for the standards =
track.</div><div><br></div><div>This is =93impossible to =
implement=94:</div><div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"word-wrap: =
break-word; white-space: pre-wrap;">2.3.2.  Child Nameserver Selection

   Parental agents will need to poll child nameservers in search of
   CSYNC records and related data records.
</pre></div><div>One word - any cast. &nbsp;(Okay, the spell checker =
says it is two words.) &nbsp;A casual observer can estimate the rest of =
the elided comment.</div><div><br></div><div>But, truth be told, =
=93polling=94 as described here is not necessary for this =
proposal.</div><div><br></div><div>I do have a more serious concern =
about where the parental agent gets it=92s information. &nbsp;I accept =
that a properly DNSSEC-signed CSYNC record is sufficient to indicate a =
child has a configuration that it wants to see replicated in the parent. =
&nbsp;Tying this to serial numbers makes the CSYNC independent of the =
copy-on-the-server, meaning, this depends on the data space and not the =
server space.</div><div><br></div><div>Getting the NS set has one =
challenge, making sure the NS set comes from the same serial number =
version as the CSYNC. &nbsp;When I issue =93zone/IN/NS=94 I don=92t see =
the serial number though. &nbsp;I=92d have to use the ANY query type to =
capture the SOA and NS set resident in the answering server (and =
hopefully we=92ll assume an authoritative server). =
&nbsp;Given:&nbsp;</div><div><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
white-space: pre-wrap;">   Parental agents MAY offer a configuration =
interface to allow child
   operators to specify which nameserver should be considered the master
   to send data queries too.  This master may not be one of the
   publically listed nameservers in the NS set (i.e., it may be a
   "hidden master").</pre><div>this issue is not a show stopper, but the =
=93protocol implication=94 of not getting the SOA and NS in the same =
response is probably a significant note to =
add.</div></div><div><br></div><div>My concern with the glue records is =
more substantial. &nbsp;There are two use cases to =
consider.</div><div><br></div><div>One case is where the addresses of =
the NS names are owned in a different (perhaps sub) zone. &nbsp;The =
other case is where the addresses are in zone that is =93above=94 the =
child but still under the parent - think multi-label deep =
parents.</div><div><br></div><div>In the first case, once I can get the =
CSYNC and SOA and NS to be =93in sync=94 as far as what the child is =
declaring, it=92s not as easy to guarantee the set of zones owning the =
address records agree. &nbsp;And I say =93set of zones=94 because, well, =
you can imagine. &nbsp;What if=85the zones in question here are not =
under the management of the child, pertinent here not as =93control=94 =
but =93not monitored=94 and they fall out of date or experience some =
other failure. &nbsp;Or are not signed the same way the child =
is?</div><div><br></div><div>In the second case, to make this a bit =
clearer, the child zone is "store.franchise.example." delegated from the =
parent zone =93example.=94. &nbsp;The NS set has names that are in =
corporate.example. which is also delegated from example (one-label =
deep). &nbsp;The child zone could not know that the glue is needed =
because the names are out of bailiwick, but to the parent zone, they =
are. &nbsp;This is, yes, a trick question. &nbsp;The child administrator =
would need to know that address records are needed in the type bit map =
field even though they are =93over there=94 =
tree-wise.</div><div><br></div><div>I do commend this observation (which =
is one of the problems I have with the CDS/CDNSKEY =
proposal):</div><div><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: =
pre-wrap;">2.3.1.  Error Reporting

   There is no inline mechanism for a parental agent to report errors to
   operators of child zones.  Thus, the only error reporting mechanisms
   must be out of band, such as through a web console or over =
email.</pre><div><br></div></div><div>But I am dubious on the flag for =
=93immediate.=94 &nbsp;In my experience, I=92ve never seen queue-jumping =
to every pay off unless the underlying system is over subscribed as it =
is. &nbsp;If this system is oversubscribed, &nbsp; there are bigger =
problems. &nbsp;Normally I=92d let this lie, but it reminds me of the =
key strength field in the KEY RR - a spectacular dud of a concept. =
&nbsp; (KEY RR was the DNSSEC key holder before DNSKEY =
RR.)</div><div><br></div><div>These are my comments assuming that the =
proposal works as advertised. &nbsp;I have my doubts regarding the use =
of the DNS to =93pass messages=94 for a few reasons. &nbsp;Out-boxes =
aren=92t always cleared out (meaning old requests hang around). =
&nbsp;In-boxes may not be checked regularly. &nbsp;And the lack of a =
reverse channel is a pretty major obstacle - as the draft says, out of =
band communication is needed. &nbsp;(This reminds me of a joke - you can =
talk to a diety, but if they talk back, check yourself into a =
hospital.)</div><div><br></div><div>PS - What if the parental agent =
tries to retrieve the AAAA records and gets no response - persistently? =
&nbsp;I don=92t mean =93No Answer=94 I mean nothing back? &nbsp;I=92m =
picking on this (as opposed to A) as a somewhat more realistic =
operational happenstance. &nbsp;Who would initiate the debugging of =
this, the parental agent who detects the failure but is mum, or the =
child whose patience is being tested?</div><br><div><div>On Apr 2, 2014, =
at 15:14, Tim Wicinski &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tjw.ietf@gmail.com">tjw.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br>All,<br><br>This is the beginning of the Working Group =
Last Call on Child To Parent Synchronization in DNS.<br>The London =
update showed that this work is complete and ready to move =
forward.<br><br>The document can be found here:<br><a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncroniza=
tion/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronizat=
ion/</a><br>http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization-0=
0.txt<br><br>Please take a moment to review the final versions and send =
up any comments.<br><br>This document willhave a 2 week period for =
comments, closing on April 16th, =
2014.<br><br>thanks<br>tim<br><br>________________________________________=
_______<br>DNSOP mailing =
list<br>DNSOP@ietf.org<br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop<br><=
/blockquote></div><br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_2DE9CC6A-143A-4BC3-84BB-57D81A22F5CA--


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From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] key lengths for DNSSEC
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Frederico A C Neves <fneves@registro.br> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 04:25:10PM -0400, Nicholas Weaver wrote:
> >
> > IMO they do until validators record and use a 'root key ratchet':
> > never accept a key who's expiration is older than the inception date
> > of the RRSIG on the youngest root ZSK seen, or have some other defense
> > to roll-back-the-clock attacks.
>
> What do you mean by "..key who's expiration is.."? A new propertie
> recorded at this "ratchet", btw what is this?

I assume he means that the ratchet would observe when a key is no longer
published in the DNSKEY RRset and treat it as implicitly revoked.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
Portland, Plymouth: South 4 or 5, occasionally 6 in Plymouth. Slight or
moderate. Rain, fog patches later. Moderate or poor, occasionally very poor.


From nobody Fri Apr  4 11:59:38 2014
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Subject: [DNSOP] Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding (Was: key lengths for DNSSEC)
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Perhaps this a good time for me to plug adoption of Signaling =
Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding, per RFC 6975.  The sooner this =
gets included in the implementation on the query side, the sooner we =
will have solid information on when it will be ok to phase out an =
obsolete algorithm.

This is not directly related to changes in key lengths, but it is =
relevant for the shifts from one algorithm to another, including changes =
in hash algorithms.

Steve



On Apr 4, 2014, at 12:28 PM, Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> wrote:

> Frederico A C Neves <fneves@registro.br> wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 04:25:10PM -0400, Nicholas Weaver wrote:
>>>=20
>>> IMO they do until validators record and use a 'root key ratchet':
>>> never accept a key who's expiration is older than the inception date
>>> of the RRSIG on the youngest root ZSK seen, or have some other =
defense
>>> to roll-back-the-clock attacks.
>>=20
>> What do you mean by "..key who's expiration is.."? A new propertie
>> recorded at this "ratchet", btw what is this?
>=20
> I assume he means that the ratchet would observe when a key is no =
longer
> published in the DNSKEY RRset and treat it as implicitly revoked.
>=20
> Tony.
> --=20
> f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
> Portland, Plymouth: South 4 or 5, occasionally 6 in Plymouth. Slight =
or
> moderate. Rain, fog patches later. Moderate or poor, occasionally very =
poor.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


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Subject: [DNSOP] Review of draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15
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[This is about draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15]

IMHO, the draft is not ready to be published. Details:

I believe it is important to have such a document on the consequences
of the DNS response size. I congratulate the initial authors and the
recent resurrector. The document is a thorough analysis of the
intricacies of DNS responses.  However, in its current form, there are
two issues, an inconsistent terminology, and a pessimistic tone which
do not seem fully backed by the facts.

The biggest issue comes from the many misuses of the word
"truncation". Unlike many DNS concepts, where there is no standard
vocabulary and huge variation between RFCs, "truncation" is well
defined (RFC 2181, section 9, since RFC 1035 was much more
sloppy). Truncation =3D=3D TC bit set =3D=3D an incomplete RRset was includ=
ed.

But the draft often uses truncation in a much broader meaning,
something like "I would have wanted to include more data", meaning
which is explicitely excluded by RFC 2181. OMISSION OF DATA IS NOT
TRUNCATION and this draft keeps forgetting that. Examples:

Section 3.1 "Note that truncation of the additional data section might
not be signaled via the TC bit since additional data is often
optional" which is false (if the TC bit is not set, there is no
truncation, per definition; if there is an incomplete RRset even in
the additional section, TC bit MUST be set).

Section 3.2 "The best case is no truncation at all.  This is because
many requesters will retry using TCP immediately, or will
automatically requery for RRSets that are possibly truncated, without
considering whether the omitted data was actually necessary." It is
not false but it seems to imply that omission of some data is the same
thing as truncation.

Section 3.3 "If any "necessary" content cannot be fit in the response,
then it is advisable that the TC bit be set" This directly contradicts
RFC 2181, section 9.

Note also that "required" and "necessary" are used in the draft but
never defined. In a referral, the only RRset (for non-DNSSEC answers)
which is really required is the NS set. Glue records are not required
(you can always make a specific request for them: it means one more
RTT but it will work). Section 3.3 is very ambiguous here, in its
second paragraph.

My suggestions for fixing this would be:

1) A clear reminder of the definition of truncation, stating that
truncation =3D=3D TC bit set, and truncation /=3D omission of data.

2) A definition of "required". Something like: "data is required if
its absence would stop the name resolution process". For instance,
including the IP addresses of name servers is an optimization, it is
not required, even if the name servers are in-zone.

3) Modify the draft to use "truncation" only when it fits. Use
"omission of data" for the rest.

Second issue, the pessimistic tone. The draft could be read as a
warning that horrible things will happen if the size of the answer is
not kept well below 512 bytes. But, since the version -00 has been
published, typical response sizes have increased and nothing
happened. The respsize.pl tool flags .com as always red, for maximum
size queries. But we observe daily that .com works.=20

Technical:

I've reviewed the tool respsize.pl, both by checking its source code
and by running it against many different zones and it seems
flawless. The actual quantitative analysis of DNS sizes (this tool,
and section 3) is the best part of the draft and a good reason to
continue the work on it.

Editorial:

Abstract: "With a mandated default minimum maximum UDP message size of 512
octets" The concept of minimum maximum is not clear.

Section 3.2 : "Anycast [RFC3258] [RFC4786] is a useful technique for
improving performance and below the zone cut being described by a
delegation is responses." My parser crashed here.





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From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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On Apr 6, 2014, at 7:06 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> =
wrote:
>=20
> Second issue, the pessimistic tone. The draft could be read as a
> warning that horrible things will happen if the size of the answer is
> not kept well below 512 bytes. But, since the version -00 has been
> published, typical response sizes have increased and nothing
> happened. The respsize.pl tool flags .com as always red, for maximum
> size queries. But we observe daily that .com works.=20

To add to this: The horribles when they do occur occur not at 512b but =
at ~1400B, when things start fragmenting, as far too many devices (and =
its worse on IPv6) have decreed that fragments don't work. =20

This also means that the recursive resolver, unless its doing raw packet =
reception, does not know that this is the problem source.


Yet even in this case, its only a few (single-digit-percent) of =
recursive resolvers affected (its more when you include the path to the =
clients). =20

My belief is that EDNS0 fallback (like what BIND does) should be to use =
an MTU of 1400B and then 1200B first (which guarantees no fragmentation =
on IPv6, even in the face of tunnels, and a practical guarantee of no =
fragments on IPv4), rather than skipping directly down to EDNS with an =
MTU of 512B, and if multiple authority servers require this fallback, =
the recursive resolver should use this MTU for all authorities, and just =
accept the minor latency hit incurred in having to shift to TCP more in =
the very rare case

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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(catching up, and I'll jump into the middle of things)

On 4/4/14, 4:59 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400,
>   Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com> wrote
>   a message of 69 lines which said:
>
>> 4. Publish documents on extensions or protocol maintenance to the DNS
>>     Protocol, with a focus on the operational impacts of
>>     such changes. Act as clearinghouse for discussion or provide advice to ADs
>>     and other WGs on EDNS0 options, new RRTYPEs, DNSSEC, record
>>     synthesis, or other mechanics of extending DNS to support other
>>     applications.
> Do we all agree that it may cover, in the future, the work which is
> currently discussed on the dns-privacy mailing list?

Short Answer: yes. Long Answer: if what comes out is a new protocol or a 
major spin of the protocol, the idea is to delegate that to a new 
working group.

The idea is to keep this specifically vague that allows new things that 
come up to be addressed, rather than being constrained by the charter.
>> 6. Publish documents that attempt to better define the overlapping
>>     area among the public DNS root, DNS-like names as used in local or restricted
>>     naming scopes, and the 'special names' registry that IETF
>>     manages, and how they will interact moving forward.  Work in a
>>     liaison capacity to ICANN to assist in this.
> I strongly dislike "the public DNS root" as if there were only one
> (technically, any root is a root and, for dnsop, it does not matter if
> it is the USG root or any other, the DNS operational issues are the
> same) and I dislike even more "DNS-like names", which seems to imply
> there are inferior names. www.foobar.local is a domain name, even if
> it is not resolved through the DNS.
>
> I suggest: Publish documents that attempt to better define the
> overlapping area among the DNS and other resolution protocols which
> use domain names (and may have gateways to the DNS), especially in the
> context of the 'special names' registry that IETF manages (RFC 6761).
>
>
This isn't a bad option, but this whole line item is a giant ball of 
pain but something we've been asked to help facilitate.   We have some 
ways to go it seems.

tim


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On 4/6/14, 4:25 PM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
> (catching up, and I'll jump into the middle of things)
>=20
> On 4/4/14, 4:59 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
>> On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400,
>>   Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com> wrote
>>   a message of 69 lines which said:
>>
>>> 4. Publish documents on extensions or protocol maintenance to the DNS=

>>>     Protocol, with a focus on the operational impacts of
>>>     such changes. Act as clearinghouse for discussion or provide
>>> advice to ADs
>>>     and other WGs on EDNS0 options, new RRTYPEs, DNSSEC, record
>>>     synthesis, or other mechanics of extending DNS to support other
>>>     applications.
>> Do we all agree that it may cover, in the future, the work which is
>> currently discussed on the dns-privacy mailing list?
>=20
> Short Answer: yes. Long Answer: if what comes out is a new protocol or =
a
> major spin of the protocol, the idea is to delegate that to a new
> working group.

As with the rapid spinup of dnssd I think we can be confident that the
internet area remains the right place and has the will to do new DNS
work, and we can and should address the undertaking of new protocol work
through that channel.

> The idea is to keep this specifically vague that allows new things that=

> come up to be addressed, rather than being constrained by the charter.
>>> 6. Publish documents that attempt to better define the overlapping
>>>     area among the public DNS root, DNS-like names as used in local
>>> or restricted
>>>     naming scopes, and the 'special names' registry that IETF
>>>     manages, and how they will interact moving forward.  Work in a
>>>     liaison capacity to ICANN to assist in this.
>> I strongly dislike "the public DNS root" as if there were only one
>> (technically, any root is a root and, for dnsop, it does not matter if=

>> it is the USG root or any other, the DNS operational issues are the
>> same) and I dislike even more "DNS-like names", which seems to imply
>> there are inferior names. www.foobar.local is a domain name, even if
>> it is not resolved through the DNS.
>>
>> I suggest: Publish documents that attempt to better define the
>> overlapping area among the DNS and other resolution protocols which
>> use domain names (and may have gateways to the DNS), especially in the=

>> context of the 'special names' registry that IETF manages (RFC 6761).
>>
>>
> This isn't a bad option, but this whole line item is a giant ball of
> pain but something we've been asked to help facilitate.   We have some
> ways to go it seems.

from my vantage point documenting the attracive nuisance that exists
today is one problem.  what to do about the existing problems is
another. how to allow for future inovation without tha same consequences
as before is the third.

> tim
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>=20



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From nobody Sun Apr  6 17:52:37 2014
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This document seems clear and reasonable. The author has done a good job =
of clearing up issues from earlier drafts.

FWIW, I disagree strongly with Ed Lewis' skepticism. See below.

On Apr 4, 2014, at 9:12 AM, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:

> Not that this matters, but this is the first look I have had at this =
document.
>=20
> I=92ll start with a heavy dose of skepticism as this is intended for =
the standards track.
>=20
> This is =93impossible to implement=94:
>=20
> 2.3.2.  Child Nameserver Selection
>=20
>    Parental agents will need to poll child nameservers in search of
>    CSYNC records and related data records.
>=20
> One word - any cast.  (Okay, the spell checker says it is two words.)  =
A casual observer can estimate the rest of the elided comment.

That does not make the document "impossible to implement", it makes it =
unreliable when the child's nameserver is anycast. That's why the =
document says not to do that in Section 2.2.1

> But, truth be told, =93polling=94 as described here is not necessary =
for this proposal.
>=20
> I do have a more serious concern about where the parental agent gets =
it=92s information.  I accept that a properly DNSSEC-signed CSYNC record =
is sufficient to indicate a child has a configuration that it wants to =
see replicated in the parent.  Tying this to serial numbers makes the =
CSYNC independent of the copy-on-the-server, meaning, this depends on =
the data space and not the server space.
>=20
> Getting the NS set has one challenge, making sure the NS set comes =
from the same serial number version as the CSYNC.  When I issue =
=93zone/IN/NS=94 I don=92t see the serial number though.  I=92d have to =
use the ANY query type to capture the SOA and NS set resident in the =
answering server (and hopefully we=92ll assume an authoritative server). =
 Given:=20
>    Parental agents MAY offer a configuration interface to allow child
>    operators to specify which nameserver should be considered the =
master
>    to send data queries too.  This master may not be one of the
>    publically listed nameservers in the NS set (i.e., it may be a
>    "hidden master").
>=20
> this issue is not a show stopper, but the =93protocol implication=94 =
of not getting the SOA and NS in the same response is probably a =
significant note to add.

Again: isn't your concern covered by the four steps in Section 2.2.1?

--Paul Hoffman=


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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On Apr 6, 2014, at 20:52, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> That does not make the document "impossible to implement", it makes it =
unreliable when the child's nameserver is anycast. That's why the =
document says not to do that in Section 2.2.1

My comment wasn=92t that the =93document was impossible to implement=94 =
but that with the advent of any cast one can never query all of the name =
servers (from one location).

> Again: isn't your concern covered by the four steps in Section 2.2.1?

As far as the SOA and NS, that is a good approximation, but it doesn=92t =
cover the A and AAAA records that could be elsewhere.

It is not that this stuff can=92t work.  It=92s that ideas like this =
(adding to the DNS protocol=92s management toolset) are only ever =
approximations that run the risk of adding complications when things =
don=92t go well.  The alternative is another protocol for this, and I =
expect a blank stare in return to the comment.  So in the mean time, I =
just want to call out the rough edges of these proposals.

The document does do a good job of handling as many as it can, but =
there=92s still the underlying limitations of one-way-only message =
passing.   The only way this will work (in the sense of scale and =
stability over time) is if the parental agent gets notified reliably to =
check and the child=92s (agent?) stays on the ball until the action is =
completed.=


From nobody Sun Apr  6 19:01:27 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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On Apr 6, 2014, at 6:56 PM, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:

>=20
> On Apr 6, 2014, at 20:52, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>=20
>> That does not make the document "impossible to implement", it makes =
it unreliable when the child's nameserver is anycast. That's why the =
document says not to do that in Section 2.2.1
>=20
> My comment wasn=92t that the =93document was impossible to implement=94 =
but that with the advent of any cast one can never query all of the name =
servers (from one location).
>=20
>> Again: isn't your concern covered by the four steps in Section 2.2.1?
>=20
> As far as the SOA and NS, that is a good approximation, but it doesn=92t=
 cover the A and AAAA records that could be elsewhere.
>=20
> It is not that this stuff can=92t work.  It=92s that ideas like this =
(adding to the DNS protocol=92s management toolset) are only ever =
approximations that run the risk of adding complications when things =
don=92t go well.  The alternative is another protocol for this, and I =
expect a blank stare in return to the comment.  So in the mean time, I =
just want to call out the rough edges of these proposals.

Calling out rough edges is fine; those should be admitted in the =
documents in question. My review of =
draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization says that the rough edges are =
called out; if you have particular places in the document that you think =
should have bigger warnings, point them out.

> The document does do a good job of handling as many as it can, but =
there=92s still the underlying limitations of one-way-only message =
passing.   The only way this will work (in the sense of scale and =
stability over time) is if the parental agent gets notified reliably to =
check and the child=92s (agent?) stays on the ball until the action is =
completed.

That is a good summary; maybe it should be added to the end of Section =
1.

--Paul Hoffman=


From nobody Sun Apr  6 22:29:20 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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Tim Wicinski wrote:

> This is the beginning of the Working Group Last Call on Child To
> Parent Synchronization in DNS. The London update showed that this
> work is complete and ready to move forward.

The following paragraph:

   Some resource records (RRs) in a parent zone are typically expected
   to be in-sync with the source data in the child's zone.  The most
   common records, to date, that should match are the nameserver (NS)
   records and any necessary associated address "glue" records (A and
   AAAA).  These records are referred to as "delegation records".

does not make much sense, because parent zone, today, is already
free to update glue by itself. That is, if multiple child zones
sharing an NS report different glues, the parent zone must check
the current most information.

The problem is a little more serious. That is, in case when a
child zone do not provide glue and another provide false glue,
the parent zone MUST always check and provide the current most
glue information.

Moreover, though the draft says:

   Clients deploying
   CSYNC MUST ensure their zones are signed, current and properly linked
   to the parent zone with a DS record that points to an appropriate
   DNSKEY of the child's zone.

it is more difficult than making referral NSes and glues up to date.

Though one may argue that DS inconsistency is more serious to cause
validation failures, which motivates child zone administrators
seriously maintain the consistency, inconsistencies of referral
NSes and glues may also be serious. Or, if they are not so serious,
it means there are no reason to synchronize only to waste operational
efforts for inessential no problems.

That is, the draft does not have much operational value, I'm
afraid.

                                                    Masataka Ohta

PS

I feel terminology of "agent" in the draft is annoying. "parent
zone" or "parent zone administrator" should be more consistent
with the terminology of rfc1034.


From nobody Mon Apr  7 09:41:11 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter
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This charter seems to fly in the fase of the traditional IETF charter =
style, wherein a WG was deemed to have a set end point.  =93Develop =
guidelines=94, =93publish documents=94 and =93serve as a clearinghouse=94 =
are terms that engender more activity but don=92t indicate progress.  (A =
long time ago, in a government job, I was taught terms that guaranteed =
one would never fail a performance review - like =93participate in=94 =
and so on.  The terms here fall into the same category.)

Comment on =85

=85 item 1.

Don=92t attempt to list the functional roles name servers name servers =
fill.  Most roles have never had formal definitions and in the industry =
=93roles=94 have been used confusingly.  E.g., many practitioners think =
=93root servers=94 are the servers for a TLD or are the (authoritative) =
servers of any zone.  While terminology can be refined and new =
definitions given, the confusion today means that the role labels don=92t =
fit in the charter.

To be more specific, what problems exist in the current state of DNS =
operations?  (I believe there are quite a few.)  The specific issues the =
WG is willing to look into should be enumerated.  (A blanket charter is =
a bad idea - a restrictive charter can always be updated, a blanket =
allows for =93make-work=94 items.)

=85 item 2.

DNSSEC is a clumsy protocol extension.  Empirical evidence suggests that =
it is - (without a quantitative study, I=92ll go out on a limb and say) =
most DNSSEC validation failures stem from operator or operations related =
errors than forged messages.  What can be done is come up with a way to =
counter the =93lack of a child knowing about the parent=94 in the =
assembling of the signed chain of trust.  I.e., sending the key material =
from child to parent.  Other needed improvement is to develop practices =
for debugging (SERVFAIL means what?), monitoring, and measurement.   =
E.g., The RFC for DS hash algorithm 2 has a trigger in it for when =
algorithm 2 is well deployed - but there=92s no means to discover that. =
(http://iepg.org/2012-03-ietf83/IETF83IEPGLewis.pdf, slide 23)

See also =93Crypto Alg Undertanding.=94

And another topic here - clear and understandable guidance on the =
parameters of DNSSEC - key lengths, durations, etc.

=85 item 3

Again - something specific is needed.  I am a loss here for suggestions. =
 Hasn=92t DNS been ready for IPv6 for a very long time?

=85 item 4 and item 5

This is kind of like saying that one of my duties is =93show up for =
work.=94  Isn=92t #4 just saying the WG should act as WG?  =93Protocol =
maintenance=94 might just mean adding DNSSEC key algorithm numbers or it =
might mean a new zone transfer protocol.  The latter is something I =
wouldn=92t think this group is wanting to take on.

(I had written that for 4, but then I saw 5 gave me the same impression. =
 In the sense I do see 4 and 5 are different, if I have the same =
reaction, they are two general to be =93good=94 charter items unless the =
goal is to have a never ending WG.)

=85 item 6

Already commented on that.

On Apr 3, 2014, at 17:39, Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com> wrote:

> Colleagues,
>=20
> Here is draft text for the new charter we've been talking about for =
DNSOP.
...


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Greetings again. It is quite important that there be an interoperable =
mechanism where a child can say to its parent "please update your DS for =
me" in a secure fashion. Parents don't need to implement this mechanism: =
they can still do the updates in non-interoperable fashions like they do =
today and nothing will be worse. However, to get greater deployment of =
DNSSEC, we need to make the operations of the DNSSEC records more =
automated without reducing security.

At this point, I'm unconvinced that doing the DS update through the DNS =
is the right method. If it is the right method, =
draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance is probably OK after a =
bit of updating. However, the flaws that both Patrik and Ed have brought =
up indicate that the document might need even more words, and more =
mechanisms, than it has now. It feels like it has the same amount of =
creep that NSEC and NSEC3 did. Maybe that's a good thing, but it doesn't =
feel that way to me.

At various meetings, people have said that we should be doing this =
update using a real update protocol like HTTPS. I have thought that is =
right, but now I'm not sure. Each time I sketch that out, it is almost =
as complicated as this draft. Getting the authentication right will =
actually be harder than what is in this draft.

Some particular notes on the current draft:

- It says too much loosely. It can be shorted in ways that will make it =
less likely that people will mis-implement by taking out the off-hand =
remarks that are mostly about use cases. Search for "etc" and see =
whether those lists or whole paragraphs can be removed.

- There are places that use SHOULD instead of MUST but don't explain the =
exceptions. Some of those places open security holes if they are not =
explained. Every SHOULD needs an explanation.

- In Section 1, the phrase "their DS record(s) (or DNSKEY(s))" is =
completely unclear until you get to Section 3. Instead, until you say =
that there are two things that a child might tell its parent, =
consistently talk about "information that would cause the parent to =
update the DS record". Before 1.1, put a new section that describes why =
there are two records, admit that this might be confusing, and say that =
it's here because different parents want different things. But the big =
point is to not treat the two records as equivalent: treat them as both =
having the same result, that the parent will create a new DS.

- The document uses "change" and "roll" for the reasons for wanting a =
new DS. They are different, and "roll" is a subset of "change". (A child =
might want a change because they are changing signing algorithms, or =
they might want a change because they are rolling a key within the same =
algorithm.) Use "change" throughout, and leave "roll" to other =
documents.

- The text throughout would be easier to read if it used "Child DNS =
Operator" instead of "Child DNS operator"; same for the "Parent DNS =
Operator".

- In 6.2, the discussion of "old version" and "new version" is =
completely unclear. It needs to be specific about what the contents of a =
"version" is.

--Paul Hoffman=


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On 4/7/14, 9:40 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> This charter seems to fly in the fase of the traditional IETF charter
> style, wherein a WG was deemed to have a set end point.

that's not entirely uncommon in ops charters. for better or worse
operations (of dns, ipv6, multicast, global routing etc)  doesn't just
end when a working group as cleared it current milestones.



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Subject: [DNSOP] terminology in Re: Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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I wanted to echo this.  I hadn=92t been so detailed in my review...

On Apr 7, 2014, at 1:29, Masataka Ohta =
<mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> wrote:

> I feel terminology of "agent" in the draft is annoying.=20

I strongly agree with that.  Parental =93Agent=94 is too broad.

> "parent
> zone" or "parent zone administrator" should be more consistent
> with the terminology of rfc1034.

The latter term is closer, but =93administration.=94  However, I don=92t =
think the original RFCs gave much consideration to =93how the data was =
assembled for the zone=94 so I wouldn=92t stick to only those terms.

Parent Provisioning System is more in line with operational terminology, =
it would be a component of the Parent Zone Administration.  I know that =
the use of =93provisioning=94 isn=92t commonplace, it=92s what I=92ve =
become used to seeing.  Perhaps there=92s a better term for that.



From nobody Mon Apr  7 10:12:30 2014
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sent from Google nexus 4
kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 4 Apr 2014 13:53, "Antoin Verschuren" <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> op 04-04-14 10:59, Stephane Bortzmeyer schreef:
>
> > same) and I dislike even more "DNS-like names", which seems to
> > imply there are inferior names. www.foobar.local is a domain name,
> > even if it is not resolved through the DNS.
>
> I tend to disagree to this marketing definition of a domain name.
> For me, a domain name is a name that consists of labels seperated by a
> dot that is resolvable through the DOMAIN name system.
>
May I know what a domain name system (by IETF) definition mean? Because me
thinks any name that resolves (either through public DNS, private or local
to pc) is a domain name.

So if your definition of domain name system include all those 3 categories,
then I agree to your view.

Regards
>
>
> - --
> Antoin Verschuren
>
> Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
> Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands
>
> P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
> Mailto: antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl
> XMPP: antoin.verschuren@jabber.sidn.nl
> HTTP://www.sidn.nl/
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> _______________________________________________
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<p dir=3D"ltr">sent from Google nexus 4<br>
kindly excuse brevity and typos.<br>
On 4 Apr 2014 13:53, &quot;Antoin Verschuren&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:an=
toin.verschuren@sidn.nl">antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----<br>
&gt; Hash: SHA1<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; op 04-04-14 10:59, Stephane Bortzmeyer schreef:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; same) and I dislike even more &quot;DNS-like names&quot;, which s=
eems to<br>
&gt; &gt; imply there are inferior names. www.foobar.local is a domain name=
,<br>
&gt; &gt; even if it is not resolved through the DNS.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I tend to disagree to this marketing definition of a domain name.<br>
&gt; For me, a domain name is a name that consists of labels seperated by a=
<br>
&gt; dot that is resolvable through the DOMAIN name system.<br>
&gt;<br>
May I know what a domain name system (by IETF) definition mean? Because me =
thinks any name that resolves (either through public DNS, private or local =
to pc) is a domain name.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">So if your definition of domain name system include all thos=
e 3 categories, then I agree to your view.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Regards<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - --<br>
&gt; Antoin Verschuren<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Technical Policy Advisor SIDN<br>
&gt; Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; P: +31 26 3525500 =A0M: +31 6 23368970<br>
&gt; Mailto: <a href=3D"mailto:antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl">antoin.verschuren=
@sidn.nl</a><br>
&gt; XMPP: <a href=3D"mailto:antoin.verschuren@jabber.sidn.nl">antoin.versc=
huren@jabber.sidn.nl</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"HTTP://www.sidn.nl/">HTTP://www.sidn.nl/</a><br>
&gt; -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----<br>
&gt; Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)<br>
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&gt; O/wZnE6kU3pYcPCrjmrUCGagvCYHRWEa4yUvq7gaMop/hDnqswhIxvp+MDPHx7fE<br>
&gt; D4mTtVZTY73WwwtmrC/ayIYUg5sXyODeQOZjo2Re8cJG3rtqgYkzmVTy7hNh69a6<br>
&gt; iCuLugKYFensweHFwgu55EUHFcf3IwfO2TpdSZvRVYCDTxP9/F5qE4bMgabXsOo=3D<br>
&gt; =3D8KYt<br>
&gt; -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; DNSOP mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:DNSOP@ietf.org">DNSOP@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop">https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop</a><br>
</p>

--001a11c2d1c214416c04f676f8b0--


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Date: Tue, 08 Apr 2014 02:54:17 -0700
To: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>, dnsop@ietf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter
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Hi Ed,
At 09:40 07-04-2014, Edward Lewis wrote:
>This charter seems to fly in the fase of the=20
>traditional IETF charter style, wherein a WG was=20
>deemed to have a set end point.  =93Develop=20
>guidelines=94, =93publish documents=94 and =93serve as a=20
>clearinghouse=94 are terms that engender more=20
>activity but don=92t indicate progress.  (A long=20
>time ago, in a government job, I was taught=20
>terms that guaranteed one would never fail a=20
>performance review - like =93participate in=94 and=20
>so on.  The terms here fall into the same category.)

:-)

>=85 item 4 and item 5
>
>This is kind of like saying that one of my=20
>duties is =93show up for work.=94  Isn=92t #4 just=20
>saying the WG should act as WG?  =93Protocol=20
>maintenance=94 might just mean adding DNSSEC key=20
>algorithm numbers or it might mean a new zone=20
>transfer protocol.  The latter is something I=20
>wouldn=92t think this group is wanting to take on.
>
>(I had written that for 4, but then I saw 5 gave=20
>me the same impression.  In the sense I do see 4=20
>and 5 are different, if I have the same=20
>reaction, they are two general to be =93good=94=20
>charter items unless the goal is to have a never ending WG.)

Item 4 ("extensions or protocol maintenance")=20
allows the working group to improve DNS.  I am=20
not sure whether that covers DNSSEC.  It is like have a mini-DNSng. :-)

Regards,
S. Moonesamy=20


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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On 4.4.2014 00:42, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan<ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>  wrote:
>
>> >On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:
>> >
>>> >>   operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone
>>> >>   name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for other DNS
>>> >>   zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS resolvers.
>> >
>> >Is there a reason to call out these particular functions, or not to
>> >include something like, "or any other resolver or server functioning
>> >as part of the global DNS"?  I'm just worried, for instance, that
>> >stubs don't appear there, even though there might be advice I can
>> >imagine the WG providing.
> +1 to at least calling out stub resolvers, but Andrew's non-list formulation is better.

I agree that including stub-resolvers and other DNS-related software sounds 
like a good idea.

There were long threads about DNSSEC handling in stub-resolvers on dane-list 
[0] but dnsop seems like a better place to discuss this matter.

Note that this discussion is not over so we can move it to dnsop if dnsop agrees.

[0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html

-- 
Petr Spacek  @  Red Hat


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From: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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=46rom the linked message:

1) DNS-Architecturally speaking, this statement is incorrect:

*Local validating resolver is strongly recommended.*

What  is needed is:=20

*Local validator is strongly recommended.*

Well, this is better:

*Local validator is required.*

Or "local validation is required in order to assess the level of trust =
in what is received=94.  If the goal is being able to trust what is =
received, you have to have validation, it=92s not just a good idea.

2) /etc/sresolv.conf.

- System-wide configuration format (e.g. modify resolv.conf vs. add a =
new file)

In 1998 I used =93/etc/sresolv.conf=94 in the first prototype validator. =
 It had configuration lines for trust anchors and all the rest of =
/etc/resolv.conf.

There=92s no reason you can=92t reuse the existing file or soft link =
(/etc/resolv.conf -> ../var/run/resolv.conf)

3) As far as AD bit stripping=85.

The question to ask is whether you trust the stub resolver=92s (set of) =
sources or not.  If you trust the sources for all things other than =
DANE, why not trust them for DANE too?  Conversely, if you don=92t trust =
them for DANE, why trust the sources for anything?

One can view DNSSEC as a standalone application.  The =93server=94 is =
the dnssec signer, the =93client=94 is the validator.  Those two act =
like IPSEC tunnel endpoints.  What goes in one comes out the other =
unmolested.  The fact that =93below=94 the DNSSEC plane is plain old DNS =
is irrelevant.  I could take the results of the signer and FTP them to =
the validator, rsync them, etc.  DNSSEC only allows the validator to =
determine if what it got was produced by an authorized(-by-the =
DNS-zone-administrator) signer, operated in an authorized manner.

It is (or was) possible to tweak the DNSSEC to have the signer be in the =
hands of whomever is responsible for DANE but not the DNS.  That would =
be by attaching RRSIGs generated by keys that are identified as =
DANE-not-DNS.  (This is in the concept, don=92t know if it is in the =
software anymore.)

On Apr 8, 2014, at 7:38, Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com> wrote:

> On 4.4.2014 00:42, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan<ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>  =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> >On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:
>>> >
>>>> >>   operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone
>>>> >>   name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for other DNS
>>>> >>   zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS resolvers.
>>> >
>>> >Is there a reason to call out these particular functions, or not to
>>> >include something like, "or any other resolver or server =
functioning
>>> >as part of the global DNS"?  I'm just worried, for instance, that
>>> >stubs don't appear there, even though there might be advice I can
>>> >imagine the WG providing.
>> +1 to at least calling out stub resolvers, but Andrew's non-list =
formulation is better.
>=20
> I agree that including stub-resolvers and other DNS-related software =
sounds like a good idea.
>=20
> There were long threads about DNSSEC handling in stub-resolvers on =
dane-list [0] but dnsop seems like a better place to discuss this =
matter.
>=20
> Note that this discussion is not over so we can move it to dnsop if =
dnsop agrees.
>=20
> [0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html
>=20
> --=20
> Petr Spacek  @  Red Hat
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


--Apple-Mail=_B5E8902D-E751-4D56-BCB5-E52A53707AC7
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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	charset=windows-1252

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>=46rom the linked =
message:</div><div><br></div><div>1) DNS-Architecturally speaking, this =
statement is incorrect:</div><div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"margin: =
0em;">*Local validating resolver is strongly recommended.*
</pre></div><div><br></div><div>What &nbsp;is needed =
is:&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"margin: 0em;">*Local =
validator is strongly recommended.*</pre></div><div><br></div><div>Well, =
this is better:</div><div><br></div><div><div><pre style=3D"margin: =
0em;">*Local validator is =
required.*</pre></div></div><div><br></div><div>Or "local validation is =
required in order to assess the level of trust in what is received=94. =
&nbsp;If the goal is being able to trust what is received, you have to =
have validation, it=92s not just a good =
idea.</div><div><br></div><div>2) =
/etc/sresolv.conf.</div><div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"margin: =
0em;">- System-wide configuration format (e.g. modify resolv.conf vs. =
add a new file)
</pre></div><div><br></div><div>In 1998 I used =93/etc/sresolv.conf=94 =
in the first prototype validator. &nbsp;It had configuration lines for =
trust anchors and all the rest of =
/etc/resolv.conf.</div><div><br></div><div>There=92s no reason you can=92t=
 reuse the existing file or soft link (<span style=3D"font-family: =
Menlo; font-size: 11px;">/etc/resolv.conf -&gt; =
../var/run/resolv.conf</span>)</div><div><br></div><div>3) As far as AD =
bit stripping=85.</div><div><br></div><div>The question to ask is =
whether you trust the stub resolver=92s (set of) sources or not. =
&nbsp;If you trust the sources for all things other than DANE, why not =
trust them for DANE too? &nbsp;Conversely, if you don=92t trust them for =
DANE, why trust the sources for anything?</div><div><br></div><div>One =
can view DNSSEC as a standalone application. &nbsp;The =93server=94 is =
the dnssec signer, the =93client=94 is the validator. &nbsp;Those two =
act like IPSEC tunnel endpoints. &nbsp;What goes in one comes out the =
other unmolested. &nbsp;The fact that =93below=94 the DNSSEC plane is =
plain old DNS is irrelevant. &nbsp;I could take the results of the =
signer and FTP them to the validator, rsync them, etc. &nbsp;DNSSEC only =
allows the validator to determine if what it got was produced by an =
authorized(-by-the DNS-zone-administrator) signer, operated in an =
authorized manner.</div><div><br></div><div>It is (or was) possible to =
tweak the DNSSEC to have the signer be in the hands of whomever is =
responsible for DANE but not the DNS. &nbsp;That would be by attaching =
RRSIGs generated by keys that are identified as DANE-not-DNS. =
&nbsp;(This is in the concept, don=92t know if it is in the software =
anymore.)</div><div><br></div><div><div>On Apr 8, 2014, at 7:38, Petr =
Spacek &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pspacek@redhat.com">pspacek@redhat.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">On 4.4.2014 00:42, Paul Hoffman wrote:<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com</a>&gt; =
&nbsp;wrote:<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">&gt;On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 =
at 05:39:58PM -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:<br>&gt;<br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;operated on Internet networks. This =
will include root zone<br>&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;name servers, TLD name =
servers, name servers for other DNS<br>&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;zones, =
iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS =
resolvers.<br></blockquote>&gt;<br>&gt;Is there a reason to call out =
these particular functions, or not to<br>&gt;include something like, "or =
any other resolver or server functioning<br>&gt;as part of the global =
DNS"? &nbsp;I'm just worried, for instance, that<br>&gt;stubs don't =
appear there, even though there might be advice I can<br>&gt;imagine the =
WG providing.<br></blockquote>+1 to at least calling out stub resolvers, =
but Andrew's non-list formulation is better.<br></blockquote><br>I agree =
that including stub-resolvers and other DNS-related software sounds like =
a good idea.<br><br>There were long threads about DNSSEC handling in =
stub-resolvers on dane-list [0] but dnsop seems like a better place to =
discuss this matter.<br><br>Note that this discussion is not over so we =
can move it to dnsop if dnsop agrees.<br><br>[0] <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html">h=
ttp://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html</a><br><br>=
-- <br>Petr Spacek &nbsp;@ &nbsp;Red =
Hat<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>DNSOP =
mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:DNSOP@ietf.org">DNSOP@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/dnsop<br></blockquote></div><br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_B5E8902D-E751-4D56-BCB5-E52A53707AC7--


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From: Jonne Soininen <jonne.soininen@broadcom.com>
To: Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com>, DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] draft new charter
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Hello everybody,


-----Original Message-----
From: DNSOP [mailto:dnsop-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Suzanne Woolf
Sent: Friday, April 04, 2014 2:00 AM
To: DNSOP WG
Cc: <dnsop-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter

Paul (and Andrew),

On Apr 3, 2014, at 6:42 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrot=
e:
>=20
>> Given that "liaison" is a term of art around the IETF, perhaps the=20
>> latter sentence needs to be phrased another way?  I'm not sure=20
>> exactly what you have in mind, or I'd suggest something.
>=20
> Let me be more blunt than Andrew: an IETF WG cannot work as a "liaison" t=
o anyone. The IETF has liaisons to ICANN (and bless them for doing that som=
ewhat thankless task!). ICANN should not expect that any WG would be a dire=
ct point of contact for ICANN work at all.


Understood that wordsmithing is needed, and getting the wording right is an=
 important detail, but I think we're even more interested in whether the it=
em should be there at all: should DNSOP, in appropriate collaboration with =
all relevant parties by whatever mechanism applies, be taking on special na=
mes/RFC 6761 issues?

JSo: yes, I think DNSOP should. I think this is one of the major short/medi=
um term issues the IETF should address and I believe DNSOP has the expertis=
e to do it. I also do find the word "liaison" a bit difficult here. I think=
 we should describe what we get done (I think there was another thread on t=
his) rather than the activity.=20

So, my proposal is (maybe somebody can translate this to English, though):=
=20

"6. Update or replace RFC6761 to specify the usage of the 'special names' r=
egistry in a way fitting today's requirements. Gather adequate input from t=
he ICANN community to ensure compatibility with ICANN policies. Specify a s=
olution or solutions to address overlapping name spaces between the public =
DNS root and the DNS-like names used in the Internet."

My feeble attempt is to focus more on the outcome than on the "liaising".  =
I personally believe that we get the right outcome of key people from the I=
CANN community come to the DNSOP to work on this rather than the WG tries t=
o pull the information from ICANN. This is my experience with working toget=
her with different organizations and the IETF - for instance, in the case o=
f 3GPP and IETF in the good old days... (No, they weren't actually that goo=
d).

Cheers,

Jonne.


thanks,
Suzanne


_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list
DNSOP@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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On 8.4.2014 15:20, Edward Lewis wrote:
>  From the linked message:

Let me quote very first part of the message to put it into context:
>>>>>>>> People start to disagree when it comes to questions like "Is it feasible to
>>>>>>>> rely on a local validating resolver in the near future? How can applications
>>>>>>>> detect that a validating resolver is not configured and that DNS responses
>>>>>>>> can't be trusted?"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Aim of the proposal below is to enable applications to stay safe on systems
 >>>>>>>> without a validating resolver.

In other words, we are looking for a way how to augment current APIs to move 
DNSSEC-related knobs from applications to system-wide level (so you don't need 
to tweak OpenSSH config and Postfix config separately, for instance).

> 1) DNS-Architecturally speaking, this statement is incorrect:
>
> *Local validating resolver is strongly recommended.*
>
> What  is needed is:
>
> *Local validator is strongly recommended.*
>
> Well, this is better:
>
> *Local validator is required.*
>
> Or "local validation is required in order to assess the level of trust in what is received”.  If the goal is being able to trust what is received, you have to have validation, it’s not just a good idea.

Sure, I think that nobody opposes that. The problem is more about "How can an 
application detect that validating resolver is in place?"

Note that this proposal is about declaring that answer is untrusted, never the 
other way around. Declaring answer as trusted is *always* done by validator.

> 2) /etc/sresolv.conf.
>
> - System-wide configuration format (e.g. modify resolv.conf vs. add a new file)
>
> In 1998 I used “/etc/sresolv.conf” in the first prototype validator.  It had configuration lines for trust anchors and all the rest of /etc/resolv.conf.
>
> There’s no reason you can’t reuse the existing file or soft link (/etc/resolv.conf -> ../var/run/resolv.conf)
>
> 3) As far as AD bit stripping….
>
> The question to ask is whether you trust the stub resolver’s (set of) sources or not.  If you trust the sources for all things other than DANE, why not trust them for DANE too?  Conversely, if you don’t trust them for DANE, why trust the sources for anything?
>
> One can view DNSSEC as a standalone application.  The “server” is the dnssec signer, the “client” is the validator.  Those two act like IPSEC tunnel endpoints.
Sure. The question is "How can an application detect that the IPSEC tunnel is 
in place?"

I hope this clarifies purpose of the proposal.

Have a nice day!

Petr Spacek  @  Red Hat

 > What goes in one comes out the other unmolested.  The fact that “below” the 
DNSSEC plane is plain old DNS is irrelevant.  I could take the results of the 
signer and FTP them to the validator, rsync them, etc.  DNSSEC only allows the 
validator to determine if what it got was produced by an authorized(-by-the 
DNS-zone-administrator) signer, operated in an authorized manner.
>
> It is (or was) possible to tweak the DNSSEC to have the signer be in the hands of whomever is responsible for DANE but not the DNS.  That would be by attaching RRSIGs generated by keys that are identified as DANE-not-DNS.  (This is in the concept, don’t know if it is in the software anymore.)
>
> On Apr 8, 2014, at 7:38, Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>> On 4.4.2014 00:42, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>> On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan<ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>  wrote:
>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>>    operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone
>>>>>>>    name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for other DNS
>>>>>>>    zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS resolvers.
>>>>>
>>>>> Is there a reason to call out these particular functions, or not to
>>>>> include something like, "or any other resolver or server functioning
>>>>> as part of the global DNS"?  I'm just worried, for instance, that
>>>>> stubs don't appear there, even though there might be advice I can
>>>>> imagine the WG providing.
>>> +1 to at least calling out stub resolvers, but Andrew's non-list formulation is better.
>>
>> I agree that including stub-resolvers and other DNS-related software sounds like a good idea.
>>
>> There were long threads about DNSSEC handling in stub-resolvers on dane-list [0] but dnsop seems like a better place to discuss this matter.
>>
>> Note that this discussion is not over so we can move it to dnsop if dnsop agrees.
>>
>> [0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html
>>
>> --
>> Petr Spacek  @  Red Hat


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On 8 Apr 2014, at 9:54, Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com> wrote:

> On 8.4.2014 15:20, Edward Lewis wrote:
>> =46rom the linked message:
>=20
> Let me quote very first part of the message to put it into context:
>>>>>>>>> People start to disagree when it comes to questions like "Is =
it feasible to
>>>>>>>>> rely on a local validating resolver in the near future? How =
can applications
>>>>>>>>> detect that a validating resolver is not configured and that =
DNS responses
>>>>>>>>> can't be trusted?"
>>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>> Aim of the proposal below is to enable applications to stay =
safe on systems
> >>>>>>>> without a validating resolver.
>=20
> In other words, we are looking for a way how to augment current APIs =
to move DNSSEC-related knobs from applications to system-wide level (so =
you don't need to tweak OpenSSH config and Postfix config separately, =
for instance).

I think introducing a new API to inform applications as to what security =
measures are in place is going to be messy and complex. The better =
approach is surely to let applications decide what features they want =
and specify them through the same API they use to perform DNS =
resolution, e.g.

http://www.vpnc.org/getdns-api/


Joe=


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From: Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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On 8.4.2014 16:10, Joe Abley wrote:
> On 8 Apr 2014, at 9:54, Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>> On 8.4.2014 15:20, Edward Lewis wrote:
>>>  From the linked message:
>>
>> Let me quote very first part of the message to put it into context:
>>>>>>>>>> People start to disagree when it comes to questions like "Is it feasible to
>>>>>>>>>> rely on a local validating resolver in the near future? How can applications
>>>>>>>>>> detect that a validating resolver is not configured and that DNS responses
>>>>>>>>>> can't be trusted?"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Aim of the proposal below is to enable applications to stay safe on systems
>>>>>>>>>> without a validating resolver.
>>
>> In other words, we are looking for a way how to augment current APIs to move DNSSEC-related knobs from applications to system-wide level (so you don't need to tweak OpenSSH config and Postfix config separately, for instance).
>
> I think introducing a new API to inform applications as to what security measures are in place is going to be messy and complex. The better approach is surely to let applications decide what features they want and specify them through the same API they use to perform DNS resolution, e.g.
>
> http://www.vpnc.org/getdns-api/

I definitely agree that new API is necessary, but I'm afraid that it is long 
term effort. Unfortunately, many (non-DNS-related projects) have roadmaps 
filled with more interesting stuff (for them) than a new fancy DNS API.

I would rather see RFC 4025, RFC 4255, draft-wouters-dane-openpgp and 
draft-wouters-dane-openpgpkey-usage to be practically implemented and widely 
used sooner than later.

Thank you for your time.

-- 
Petr Spacek  @  Red Hat


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On 8 Apr 2014, at 10:27, Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com> wrote:

> I would rather see RFC 4025, RFC 4255, draft-wouters-dane-openpgp and =
draft-wouters-dane-openpgpkey-usage to be practically implemented and =
widely used sooner than later.

I would like to see those things too. But they're a bit useless without =
a solid way for applications to retrieve and validate the signed =
records.

Time spent making the API available and promoting its use amongst =
developers would bring us closer to DANE being useful.


Joe


From nobody Tue Apr  8 08:01:13 2014
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Subject: [DNSOP] MAC vs. DAC - Re:  draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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But isn=92t that example (below) a new API? ;)

Back in the earliest days of my security work I recall reading about =
=93mandatory=94 versus =93discretionary=94 security.  The former was =
security enforced by a controlling system that was untouchable by the =
entities involved, the latter the security enforcement could be altered =
by the entities.

Googling for that, I found these slides =
(https://wiki.engr.illinois.edu/download/attachments/183272958/mandatory-s=
ecurity-policy.pdf?version=3D2&modificationDate=3D1318258701000) on the =
4th slide is =93MAC vs. DAC.=94  I include that reference just to help =
define my terminology.

If the question is how to enforce that software is =93running secure=94 =
in this context, the question is whether you want to let the application =
developer decide that or take away the option.  I can see this being =
done by specifying (the only tool the IETF has) and the verifying via =
code reviews/testing that an turn-key (for security) API is used over a =
specified set of libraries.  That=92s if I don=92t have a tight control =
loop over the developer community.

One one extreme, applications can be left to their own devices to do all =
they need.  I=92d argue that over the long haul we will wind up with an =
unmanageable spectrum of code =93doing security=94 in various =
not-so-consistent ways.  There comes a time when things ought  to be =
tightened up.  (Examples, what=92s going on in EPP, places where =
developers have had a decade or two to extend protocols.)

I=92m not sold on sticking with a current API.  Perhaps build a more =
restrictive API for domain-specific security - based on some current =
API?

On Apr 8, 2014, at 10:10, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:

>=20
> On 8 Apr 2014, at 9:54, Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On 8.4.2014 15:20, Edward Lewis wrote:
>>> =46rom the linked message:
>>=20
>> Let me quote very first part of the message to put it into context:
>>>>>>>>>> People start to disagree when it comes to questions like "Is =
it feasible to
>>>>>>>>>> rely on a local validating resolver in the near future? How =
can applications
>>>>>>>>>> detect that a validating resolver is not configured and that =
DNS responses
>>>>>>>>>> can't be trusted?"
>>>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>>> Aim of the proposal below is to enable applications to stay =
safe on systems
>>>>>>>>>> without a validating resolver.
>>=20
>> In other words, we are looking for a way how to augment current APIs =
to move DNSSEC-related knobs from applications to system-wide level (so =
you don't need to tweak OpenSSH config and Postfix config separately, =
for instance).
>=20
> I think introducing a new API to inform applications as to what =
security measures are in place is going to be messy and complex. The =
better approach is surely to let applications decide what features they =
want and specify them through the same API they use to perform DNS =
resolution, e.g.
>=20
> http://www.vpnc.org/getdns-api/
>=20
>=20
> Joe
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Tue Apr  8 09:02:55 2014
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From: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] MAC vs. DAC - Re: draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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On 8 Apr 2014, at 11:01, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:

> But isn=92t that example (below) a new API? ;)

I wasn't reacting to the newness of the API, but rather the dual =
approaches of (a) provide a new DNS API for applications, or (b) leave =
applications using the existing/archaic API for name resolution, and =
introduce an additional API that characterises the security =
characteristics of their use.

Amongst the problems with (b) is the lack of fine-grained (e.g. =
DNSSEC-specific) message passing to the application, so that it can =
react to the various failure modes in a manner that allows users to be =
informed and the application generally to make good choices.


Joe=


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Thu, Apr 3, 2014 at 3:07 AM, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Greetings,
>
> This is the starting of the WGLC on Automating DNSSEC delegation trust
> maintenance.  This was briefly covered in London and these are ready for
> WGLC.   The current versions of this documents can be found here:
>
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
>
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-03.txt
>
>
> We'll have a 2 week period for comments, closing on April 16th, 2014.

Just a quick note -- Olafur and I have been a little swamped (travel,
the TLS heartbeat vulnerability, etc), and have been having a hard
time sync'ing up to discuss the comments.
Just wanted to let y'all know that we are not simply ignoring you - we
appreciate the comments and want to deal with them all in one go...

W





>
> thanks
> tim
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>


From nobody Thu Apr 10 09:34:20 2014
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC delegation trust maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-04.txt
	Pages           : 19
	Date            : 2014-04-10

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-04

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-04


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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[ Top post ]
We have received a number of comments, and are integrating them.
So far we have mostly just covered Patrik's - I'm posting a newer
version with some of these integrated, so it's easier for folk to see
what the doc looks like with the changes. We plan to post a more
updated version with Paul / Ed's comments later...



On Thu, Apr 3, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m <paf@frobbit.se> wrote=
:
> First of all, let me thank the people that have been working so hard on t=
his. I have followed the process, but now again re-read the whole thing, an=
d because of that have some comments. Ignore or think about... :-)
>
>>    This document describes a method for automating maintanance of the
>>    delegation trust information, and proposes a polled / periodic
>>    trigger for simplicity.  Some users may prefer a different trigger,
>>    such as a button on a webpage, a REST interface, DNS NOTIFY, etc.
>>    These alternate / additional triggers are not discussed in this
>>    document.
>
> This is good, but as I would like to have added in the Security Considera=
tions Section (see below) having multiple paths between child dns operator =
and parental agent increases the risk there are inconsistencies (if interme=
diary systems are caching information flowing along the paths).
>
> Because of this, I do not mind having some extra words here, like:
>
> "This proposal do not include all operations needed for maintenance of DN=
SSEC key material, specifically introduction and complete removal of all ke=
ys. Because of this alternate communications mechanisms must always exist, =
which might introduce extra complexity."

DONE.

>
>> 2.2.1.  Solution Space
> :
> :
>>    Some parents want the child to express their DNSKEYS in the form of
>>    DS records, while others want to receive the DNSKEY records and
>>    calculate the DS records themselves.  There is no consensus on which
>>    method is better; both have good reasons to exist.  The proposal
>>    below can operate with both models, but the child needs to be aware
>>    of the parental policies.
>
> Mumble...I really dislike the fact we have not agreed on what to do. It i=
ncreases complexity _a_lot_. And yes, this is one of the reasons why we do =
not see more deployment of DNSSEC.
>
> Why do we (IETF) fail on this?
>

Yes; however, we want this to be deployed and usable by as many people
as possible, so we are avoiding the religious argument in this
document. Registry operators are entitled to their own opinion, as
much as we dislike it....

>> 2.2.2.  DNSSEC key change process
>>
>>    After a Child DNS operator first signs the zone, there is a need to
>>    interact with the Parent, for example via the delegation account
>>    interface, to "upload / paste-in the zone's DS information".  The
>>    action of logging in through the delegation account user interface
>>    authenticates that the user is authorized to change delegation
>>    information for the child published in the parent zone.  In the case
>>    where the "Child DNS Operator" does not have access to the
>>    registration account, the Child needs to perform the action.
>>
>>    At a later date, the Child DNS Operator may want to publish a new DS
>>    record in the parent, either because they are rolling keys, or
>>    because they want to publish a stand-by key.  This involves
>>    performing the same process as before.  Furthermore when this is a
>>    manual process with cut and paste, operational mistakes will happen
>>    -- or worse, the update action is not performed at all.
>
> Should it not be mentioned here that child might want to remove all keys =
as well? I mean, if this is supposed to be a complete list of potential ope=
rations the child is interested in?
>
> I see in fact (with some special cases):
>
> A. Introduction of new keys
>
> A.1. Introduction when old keys exists and can be used
>
> A.2. Introduction when no old keys can be used (because they can not be t=
rusted or because no such exists)
>
> B. Removal of keys
>
> B.1. Removal of old keys when at least one key still remains in the RRSet=
 of zone apex
>
> B.2. Removal of last key from the RRSet of the zone apex
>
> If I understand things correctly, you say this draft can only be used for=
 A.1 and B.1?
>
> I think that should be spelled out very explicitly in section 2.

We had specifically decided not to allow B.2 because we don't want
this be be used to go from signed to unsigned. You also cannot use
this for initial enrollment of keys (A.2 - explained in Section 2.2.2
& the security considerations section), you can only use it for
introducing new keys when you have one working key and removing all
except the last key. Added text to clarify what use cases we do and do
not support.

We also had, in the intro: "This proposal does not include all
operations needed for the maintenance of DNSSEC key material,
specifically the introduction or complete removal of all keys."

>> 4.  Automating DS maintainance with CDS/CDNSKEY records
>>
>>    CDS/CDNSKEY records are intended to be "consumed" by delegation trust
>>    maintainers.  The use of CDS/CDNSKEY is optional.
>>
>>    Some parents prefer to accept DNSSEC key information in DS format,
>>    some parents prefer to accept it in DNSKEY format, and calculate the
>>    DS record on the child's behalf.  Each method has pros and cons, both
>>    technical and policy.  This solution is DS vs DNSKEY agnostic, and
>>    allows operation with either.
>>
>>    If the child knows what the parent prefers, they can publish the
>>    parent's preferred record type.  If the child does not know (or
>>    simply chooses to), they can publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>>    child publishes both, the two RRsets they SHOULD match in content.
>
> Why not a MUST?

DONE.
Ok, this is somewhat of a philosophical discussion -- I'm always
uncomfortable putting a MUST on anything where a user enters the
information. Users (in my experience) seem to take a perverse pleasure
in ignoring MUSTs.

Having this as a MUST makes me concerned that implementations will
treat cases where the data does not match as an error -- and we
specifically don't want that (more below). If you are one of the
registries that likes DNSKEYS (and so consumes CDNSKEY), you shouldn't
care what's in the CDS...
But, a number of folk have said that they would rather that this be a
MUST, so I've just changed it...


>
>>    The parent should use whichever one they choose, but SHOULD NOT query
>>    for both and perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY
>>    records.
>
> Why not? Why talk about it at all?
>
> I think this document should say:
>
>    The child can publish one or both of CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>    child publishes both, the two RRsets they MUST match in content.
>
> We do not need more RFCs that can be interpreted in multiple ways. And wh=
y use more words than what we need?
>

See above, the Editor note ("It is not an error for a child to have
published CDS records and not have CDNSKEYs that hash to those
records, nor for there to be CDNSKEY records without matching DS
records. This is because a child might have been publishing CDS
records and then the parent's policy changes to require CDNSKEY
records. The child might forget to remove the CDS, etc. This avoids
all sorts of error conditions / complexity, etc"), and Section 6.

This data / information might be coming from user input (yes, we
expect that signer tools will create these, but user's might also
enter them).  We'd much rather be liberal in what we accept when it
comes to user input.
If we were to *require* that they match, what happens in the case
where they *don't*? Do we fail the keyroll? That seems suboptimal. Do
we throw a log message? No one will see it... If you consume CDS (or
CDNSKEY), you simply ignore the other one -- it's not really relevant
to you, and no good can come from looking at it. Ignorance is bliss...



>> 4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>>
>>    If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
>>    signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  This
>>    means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
>>    operator MAY remove all CDS records from the zone.
>
> I am really nervous we will have a state enforced somewhere, that must re=
member what has happened. I much rather want to see the child always have C=
DS/CDNSKEY for the proper key set.
>
> So, there must be a reason why this is not allowed?

Much of the point of this is to *avoid* the parent having to keep
state. If it queries the zone and sees no CDS records, it simply goes
back to sleep.

Let's say that example.com is signed but has never used CDS / CDNSKEY
(like every signed zone currently is). We really don't want the parent
going through and removing DS records because there is no CDS
published :-) By having a "take no action if there is no CDS/CNSKEY"
rule the parent doesn't need to track which children use this.

>
> Also, the MAY here does not match the SHOULD further down.
>
>>    Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY records as
>>    follows:
>>
>>    o  Location: "the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be at the child zone
>>       apex".
>>
>>    o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>>       current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>>
>>    o  Continuity: "SHOULD NOT break the current delegation if applied to
>>       DS RRset"
>
> I do not understand the SHOULD NOT in this case. Specifically together wi=
th references to 4.1 below.
>

DONE.
Yeah. This should be a MUST NOT. Fixed.


> I presume what this says is that the DNSKEY that is signing the CDS/CDNSK=
EY SHOULD be included in what the CDS / CDNSKEY is covering?
>
> If that is true, are we sure that the SHOULD NOT is inverse to SHOULD in =
this case?
>
>>    If any these conditions fail the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be
>>    ignored.
>
> How can it be a MUST when Continuity include a SHOULD NOT?

DONE.
Yup, see above. Fixed.

>
> I am a bit confused, but maybe it ends up being clearer if I actually wro=
te code that implemented this ;-)
>
>> 5.  Child's CDS / CDNSKEY Publication
>>
>>    Child DNS Operator SHOULD only publish a CDS or CDNSKEY RRset when it
>>    wants to make a change to the DS RRset in the Parent.
>
> Does not match the MAY further up.

DONE.
Fixed.

>
>>    The CDS /
>>    CDNSKEY RRset SHOULD be compliant with the rules in Section 4.1.
>
> Does not match the MUST that covers 4.1.

DONE.
I guess this is a philosophical difference. I am somewhat leery about
using MUST when it comes to user input. We put in SHOULD, to
acknowledge that users will often do "wrong" things, it just means
that the record will not be valid/processed. I recognize that I'm off
in the rough on this, so changed to a must...


>
>>    When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY, the Child DNS
>>    Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset(s).
>
> See above. How does the child know? Do you because of this require the ch=
ild to poll the parent zone? And if the parent want to re-fetch the data fo=
r some reason, it might be gone from the child zone. Not good.

Yes, the child checks the parent to see if it's in sync. A number of
working group participants (I had thought yourself included), had
indicated that they would rather have this as more of a transaction
system, so that the user publishes a record, the parental agent
performs the operation, and then the user is expected to remove the
"instruction." The reason for this was so that the user's intent is
clear and parental agents can, if they wish, log the "transaction." I
will see if I can find references to that (it's not noted in the minutes, b=
ut
I think Antoin Verschuren said it and a bunch of other folk agreed).

>
>>    Note that if the
>>    child has published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS, it will have to calculate
>>    the DS (using the requested digest algorithm) to do the comparison.
>
> Hmmm..."published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS"? The CDS was to include a DS. R=
ight?

Edited for clarity -- left over from an old version of the doc.

>
>>    A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses to
>>    publish both, it SHOULD attempt to maintain consistency (a matching
>>    CDS for each CDNSKEY)
>
> No, it MUST represent the same data. Please!

DONE.
It seems like you feel strongly about this :-) My reason for
originally having this as a SHOULD are described above (expecting
users the follow a MUST leads to implementers to treat "violations" of
the MUST as an error...). But, seems like I'm off in the rough,
changed...


>
> I also want to have it spelled out explicitly here whether the CDS/DNSKEY=
 MUST include the data for the dnssec key material that signs the CDS/DNSKE=
Y or not. I think it MUST include the current key as well.
>Otherwise it ends up being same as having no CDS/CDNSKEY and that way remo=
ving keys.

Nope, you don't *have* to -- you probably would want to, but it isn't
(IMO) a strict MUST.

A happy day:
Let's say you start with a zone signed with K1
You generate a new key, K2.
You sign your zone with K1 and K2.
You publish K2 (only) in the zone (in a CDS), signed with K1.
Your parent picks up the CDS and validates the K2 CDS using K1.
The draft says: "In particular the Parental Agent MUST double check
the Continuity rule and do its best not to invalidate the Child zone."
- publishing only K2 will not break the Continuity rule (Continuity:
"MUST NOT break the current delegation if applied to DS RRset") and so
the parent publishes only K2.

A sad day:
Let's say you start with a zone signed with K1
You generate a new key, K2.
You get sidetracked and forget to sign your zone with K2 (or you
somehow otherwise screw up).
You publish K2 (only) in the zone (in a CDS), signed with K1.
Your parent picks up the CDS and validates the K2 CDS using K1.
The draft says: "In particular the Parental Agent MUST double check
the Continuity rule and do its best not to invalidate the Child zone."
- publishing only K2 would violate the continuity rule, and so the
parent does not proceed.

If it were *me*, I'd publish a CDS with *both* K1 and K2, wait a
little bit, then publish only K2, but this is not a required way of
rolling keys.


 So that at every point in time the chain of trust is secured.
>
> So one go from:
>
> 1. No keys at all
>
> This process can not be used, but say DNSKEY K1 is added. CDNSKEY K1 is a=
dded to the zone.
>
> 2. K1 is in use
>
> K2 is introduced by adding CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 be added to the =
zone. Signed by at least K1.
>
> 3. K1 and K2 is in use
>
> Ensure that CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 are both signed with at least K=
2.
>
> 4. K2 is in use
>
> Remove CDNSKEY for K1.
>
> 5. K2 is in use
>
> Removal of K2 without introducing K3 is not possible.
>
> 6. No key is in use
>
> See 1.
>
>> 6.  Parent side CDS / CDNSKEY Consumption
>>
>>    The CDS / CDNSKEY RRset MAY be used by the Parental Agent to update
>>    the DS RRset in the parent zone.  The Parental Agent for this uses a
>>    tool that understands the CDS / CDNSKEY signing rules from
>>    Section 4.1 so it may not be able to use a standard validator.
>
> What do the author know about "standard validators"? :-)
>
>>    Parent SHOULD treat the Continuity rule as "MUST".
>
> Well...here we have confusion. The continuity rule is a SHOULD, the whole=
 block is a MUST and above it is sort of wobbly...
>

DONE.
Ok. This was yet another instance of me being timid and not not liking
telling people what to do!

>>    The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY records, and
>>    MUST NOT expect there to be both.  A parent SHOULD NOT perform a
>>    consistency check between CDS and CDNSKEY (other than for
>>    informational / debugging use).
>
> Ok. Do though see above about MUST regarding client requirement on having=
 the two RR in sync if both exists.
>
>> 6.1.  Detecting a changed CDS / CDNSKEY
> :
>>    Pushing  The delegation user interface has a button {Fetch DS} when
>>          pushed preforms the CDS / CDNSKEY processing.  If the Parent
>>          zone does not contain DS for this delegation then the "push"
>>          MUST be ignored.
>
> Well, I do not think there should be a MUST. As written below there might=
 be other means that can be used to ensure the data is correct. Saying SHOU=
LD is ok. Together with explanation what risk exists. Like:
>
> ...then the "push" SHOULD be ignored. Reasons for the "push" to be truste=
d might be additional user interface/interactions, two factor authenticatio=
n to validate the "push" and similar.

Hmmm.. If I'm understanding what you are suggesting, you would like a
user to be able to go to a web page, click the "Fetch DS" button and
have this used for initial enrollment? This still seems like a bad
idea to me -- unless it is explicitly a "Fetch DS, show user what was
fetched and ask him to confirm the submission".
We do have some text in the security section saying that this should not be
used for initial key enrollment as we don't really want to be dictating par=
ental
behavior for this.


>
>>    In either case the Parental Agent MAY apply additional rules that
>>    defer the acceptance of a CDS / CDNSKEY change, these rules may
>>    include a condition that the CDS / CDNSKEY remains in place and valid
>>    for some time period before it is accepted.  It may be appropriate in
>>    the "Pushing" case to assume that the Child is ready and thus accept
>>    changes without delay.
>
> Does not work if you have a MUST above. Just remove this paragraph.
>
> Either you have a MUST or not. Not MUST and then a paragraph that make th=
ings not a MUST.

Um, what? Above doesn't parse for me.
A legitimate use case is that the parent polls for keys, but doesn't
do anything with them until the user click "Please make the change".
Or, the parent polls once a day, but the user can request an immediate
action by asking for it.

>
>> 6.2.  Using the new CDS / CDNSKEY records
>>
>>    Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
>>    CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to obtain
>>    a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone.  It would be a
>>    good idea if the Parental Agent checked all NS RRs listed at the
>>    delegation.
>
> What does "would be a good idea" mean in RFC 1918 speak? :-)
>
> More seriously, no, I do not think that requirement should be there at al=
l.

Which one? I'm assuming you are fine with / like the "Parental Agent
MUST use a DNSSEC validator"?

> How to handle lame delegation, inability to use cached information, what =
TTL can be acceptable etc is hidden in this "good idea". Just remove it.
>
> Either DNS is used to fetch the RR or not.
>
>>    The Parental Agent MUST ensure that old versions of the CDS / CDNSKEY
>>    RRset do not overwrite newer versions.
>
> I do not think this is a good idea. See above.
>
> Please remove.
>
> This is because there is a requirement on state in the parent. I dislike =
that. Much better if the CDS/CDNSKEY is always reflecting the current state=
 in the child zone. And just say so.


This was specifically added because folk asked for it. You have a
"primary" DNS server and a bunch of "secondaries" (by "primary" and
"secondary" I mean you have one server where you make the changes, and
the others all slave from it).
You are in the process of rolling from key BAR to key FOO.

You have:
. CDS KEY_FOO on the primary.
and
. CDS KEY_BAR on the secondaries because they have not yet AXFRed the zone.

The parent chooses an NS at random - it picks the "primary" and
updates what it publishes for the child.
It then tries again, and happens to hit a "secondary".. and updates
what it publishes for the child.
Lather, rinse, repeat.


>
>> 6.2.1.  Parent calculates DS
>>
>>    There are cases where the Parent wants to calculate the DS record due
>>    to policy reasons.  In this case, the Child publishes CDNSKEY records
>>    containing DNSKEYs.
>>
>>    The parent calculates the DS records on behalf of the children.  The
>>    DNS Parent needs to publish guidelines for the children as to what
>>    digest algorithms are acceptable in the CDS record.
>
> What is "needs to"? MUST?

I guess. This wasn't a requirement, more of a "I think that parents
should do this sort of thing anyway."
I'll just remove that sentence...

>
> :
> :
>>    Implications on Parental Agent are that the CDNSKEY and DS are not
>>    exactly the same after update thus it needs to take that into
>>    consideration when checking CDNSKEY records.  Same goes for the Child
>>    DNS Operator, it needs to be able to detect that the new DS RRset is
>>    "equivalent" to the current CDNSKEY RRset, thus it can remove the
>>    CDNSKEY RRset.
>
> Why not say instead:
>
> In the case the parent fetch the CDNSKEY and calculate the DS it MAY be t=
he case that the DS published in the parent zone is not identical with the =
data in the CDS record made available by the child.
>
> Because I think that is what you try to say?

DONE.
Yup, this is cleaner.

>
>> 9.  Security Considerations
>
> Please add something like:
>
> As this introduces a mechanism to contact the parent it MUST be clear who=
 is fetching the records and creates the appropriate records in the parent =
zone. Specifically as some operations MUST be using other mechanisms than w=
hat is described here. If for example communication normally is done via a =
registrar that via epp is communicating with the registry, the registrar is=
 normally "caching" the data passed to it. If then the registry is fetching=
 the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry have a different view of the DNSSEC ke=
y material situation than the registrar, and the result of such a situation=
 is unclear. Because of this, this mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass in=
termediaries that might cache information and because of that get the wrong=
 state.

I reworded this to be:
"As this introduces a new mechanism to update information in the
parent it MUST be clear who is fetching the records and creating the
appropriate records in the parent zone. Specifically some operations
may use other mechanisms than what is described here. For example, a
registrar may assume that it is maintaining the DNSSEC key information
in the registry, and may have this cached. If the registry is fetching
the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry and registrar may have different
views of the DNSSEC key material and the result of such a situation is
unclear. Because of this, this mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass
intermediaries that might cache information and because of that get
the wrong state. "


>
>> 10.  Acknowledgements
>>
>>    We would like to thank a large number of folk, including: Mark
>>    Andrews, Joe Abley, Jaap Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Doug Barton, Brian
>>    Dickinson, Paul Ebersman, Tony Finch, Patrik Faltsrom, Jim Galvin,
>
> Please spell my last name "Faltstrom".
>

DONE.

>    Patrik
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>

On Thu, Apr 3, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m <paf@frobbit.se> wrote=
:
> First of all, let me thank the people that have been working so hard on t=
his. I have followed the process, but now again re-read the whole thing, an=
d because of that have some comments. Ignore or think about... :-)
>
>>    This document describes a method for automating maintanance of the
>>    delegation trust information, and proposes a polled / periodic
>>    trigger for simplicity.  Some users may prefer a different trigger,
>>    such as a button on a webpage, a REST interface, DNS NOTIFY, etc.
>>    These alternate / additional triggers are not discussed in this
>>    document.
>
> This is good, but as I would like to have added in the Security Considera=
tions Section (see below) having multiple paths between child dns operator =
and parental agent increases the risk there are inconsistencies (if interme=
diary systems are caching information flowing along the paths).
>
> Because of this, I do not mind having some extra words here, like:
>
> "This proposal do not include all operations needed for maintenance of DN=
SSEC key material, specifically introduction and complete removal of all ke=
ys. Because of this alternate communications mechanisms must always exist, =
which might introduce extra complexity."
>
>> 2.2.1.  Solution Space
> :
> :
>>    Some parents want the child to express their DNSKEYS in the form of
>>    DS records, while others want to receive the DNSKEY records and
>>    calculate the DS records themselves.  There is no consensus on which
>>    method is better; both have good reasons to exist.  The proposal
>>    below can operate with both models, but the child needs to be aware
>>    of the parental policies.
>
> Mumble...I really dislike the fact we have not agreed on what to do. It i=
ncreases complexity _a_lot_. And yes, this is one of the reasons why we do =
not see more deployment of DNSSEC.
>
> Why do we (IETF) fail on this?
>
>> 2.2.2.  DNSSEC key change process
>>
>>    After a Child DNS operator first signs the zone, there is a need to
>>    interact with the Parent, for example via the delegation account
>>    interface, to "upload / paste-in the zone's DS information".  The
>>    action of logging in through the delegation account user interface
>>    authenticates that the user is authorized to change delegation
>>    information for the child published in the parent zone.  In the case
>>    where the "Child DNS Operator" does not have access to the
>>    registration account, the Child needs to perform the action.
>>
>>    At a later date, the Child DNS Operator may want to publish a new DS
>>    record in the parent, either because they are rolling keys, or
>>    because they want to publish a stand-by key.  This involves
>>    performing the same process as before.  Furthermore when this is a
>>    manual process with cut and paste, operational mistakes will happen
>>    -- or worse, the update action is not performed at all.
>
> Should it not be mentioned here that child might want to remove all keys =
as well? I mean, if this is supposed to be a complete list of potential ope=
rations the child is interested in?
>
> I see in fact (with some special cases):
>
> A. Introduction of new keys
>
> A.1. Introduction when old keys exists and can be used
>
> A.2. Introduction when no old keys can be used (because they can not be t=
rusted or because no such exists)
>
> B. Removal of keys
>
> B.1. Removal of old keys when at least one key still remains in the RRSet=
 of zone apex
>
> B.2. Removal of last key from the RRSet of the zone apex
>
> If I understand things correctly, you say this draft can only be used for=
 A.1 and B.1?
>
> I think that should be spelled out very explicitly in section 2.
>
>> 4.  Automating DS maintainance with CDS/CDNSKEY records
>>
>>    CDS/CDNSKEY records are intended to be "consumed" by delegation trust
>>    maintainers.  The use of CDS/CDNSKEY is optional.
>>
>>    Some parents prefer to accept DNSSEC key information in DS format,
>>    some parents prefer to accept it in DNSKEY format, and calculate the
>>    DS record on the child's behalf.  Each method has pros and cons, both
>>    technical and policy.  This solution is DS vs DNSKEY agnostic, and
>>    allows operation with either.
>>
>>    If the child knows what the parent prefers, they can publish the
>>    parent's preferred record type.  If the child does not know (or
>>    simply chooses to), they can publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>>    child publishes both, the two RRsets they SHOULD match in content.
>
> Why not a MUST?
>
>>    The parent should use whichever one they choose, but SHOULD NOT query
>>    for both and perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY
>>    records.
>
> Why not? Why talk about it at all?
>
> I think this document should say:
>
>    The child can publish one or both of CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>    child publishes both, the two RRsets they MUST match in content.
>
> We do not need more RFCs that can be interpreted in multiple ways. And wh=
y use more words than what we need?
>
>> 4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>>
>>    If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
>>    signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  This
>>    means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
>>    operator MAY remove all CDS records from the zone.
>
> I am really nervous we will have a state enforced somewhere, that must re=
member what has happened. I much rather want to see the child always have C=
DS/CDNSKEY for the proper key set.
>
> So, there must be a reason why this is not allowed?
>
> Also, the MAY here does not match the SHOULD further down.
>
>>    Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY records as
>>    follows:
>>
>>    o  Location: "the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be at the child zone
>>       apex".
>>
>>    o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>>       current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>>
>>    o  Continuity: "SHOULD NOT break the current delegation if applied to
>>       DS RRset"
>
> I do not understand the SHOULD NOT in this case. Specifically together wi=
th references to 4.1 below.
>
> I presume what this says is that the DNSKEY that is signing the CDS/CDNSK=
EY SHOULD be included in what the CDS / CDNSKEY is covering?
>
> If that is true, are we sure that the SHOULD NOT is inverse to SHOULD in =
this case?
>
>>    If any these conditions fail the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be
>>    ignored.
>
> How can it be a MUST when Continuity include a SHOULD NOT?
>
> I am a bit confused, but maybe it ends up being clearer if I actually wro=
te code that implemented this ;-)
>
>> 5.  Child's CDS / CDNSKEY Publication
>>
>>    Child DNS Operator SHOULD only publish a CDS or CDNSKEY RRset when it
>>    wants to make a change to the DS RRset in the Parent.
>
> Does not match the MAY further up.
>
>>    The CDS /
>>    CDNSKEY RRset SHOULD be compliant with the rules in Section 4.1.
>
> Does not match the MUST that covers 4.1.
>
>>    When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY, the Child DNS
>>    Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset(s).
>
> See above. How does the child know? Do you because of this require the ch=
ild to poll the parent zone? And if the parent want to re-fetch the data fo=
r some reason, it might be gone from the child zone. Not good.
>
>>    Note that if the
>>    child has published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS, it will have to calculate
>>    the DS (using the requested digest algorithm) to do the comparison.
>
> Hmmm..."published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS"? The CDS was to include a DS. R=
ight?
>
>>    A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses to
>>    publish both, it SHOULD attempt to maintain consistency (a matching
>>    CDS for each CDNSKEY)
>
> No, it MUST represent the same data. Please!
>
> I also want to have it spelled out explicitly here whether the CDS/DNSKEY=
 MUST include the data for the dnssec key material that signs the CDS/DNSKE=
Y or not. I think it MUST include the current key as well. Otherwise it end=
s up being same as having no CDS/CDNSKEY and that way removing keys. So tha=
t at every point in time the chain of trust is secured.
>
> So one go from:
>
> 1. No keys at all
>
> This process can not be used, but say DNSKEY K1 is added. CDNSKEY K1 is a=
dded to the zone.
>
> 2. K1 is in use
>
> K2 is introduced by adding CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 be added to the =
zone. Signed by at least K1.
>
> 3. K1 and K2 is in use
>
> Ensure that CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 are both signed with at least K=
2.
>
> 4. K2 is in use
>
> Remove CDNSKEY for K1.
>
> 5. K2 is in use
>
> Removal of K2 without introducing K3 is not possible.
>
> 6. No key is in use
>
> See 1.
>
>> 6.  Parent side CDS / CDNSKEY Consumption
>>
>>    The CDS / CDNSKEY RRset MAY be used by the Parental Agent to update
>>    the DS RRset in the parent zone.  The Parental Agent for this uses a
>>    tool that understands the CDS / CDNSKEY signing rules from
>>    Section 4.1 so it may not be able to use a standard validator.
>
> What do the author know about "standard validators"? :-)
>
>>    Parent SHOULD treat the Continuity rule as "MUST".
>
> Well...here we have confusion. The continuity rule is a SHOULD, the whole=
 block is a MUST and above it is sort of wobbly...
>
>>    The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY records, and
>>    MUST NOT expect there to be both.  A parent SHOULD NOT perform a
>>    consistency check between CDS and CDNSKEY (other than for
>>    informational / debugging use).
>
> Ok. Do though see above about MUST regarding client requirement on having=
 the two RR in sync if both exists.
>
>> 6.1.  Detecting a changed CDS / CDNSKEY
> :
>>    Pushing  The delegation user interface has a button {Fetch DS} when
>>          pushed preforms the CDS / CDNSKEY processing.  If the Parent
>>          zone does not contain DS for this delegation then the "push"
>>          MUST be ignored.
>
> Well, I do not think there should be a MUST. As written below there might=
 be other means that can be used to ensure the data is correct. Saying SHOU=
LD is ok. Together with explanation what risk exists. Like:
>
> ...then the "push" SHOULD be ignored. Reasons for the "push" to be truste=
d might be additional user interface/interactions, two factor authenticatio=
n to validate the "push" and similar.
>
>>    In either case the Parental Agent MAY apply additional rules that
>>    defer the acceptance of a CDS / CDNSKEY change, these rules may
>>    include a condition that the CDS / CDNSKEY remains in place and valid
>>    for some time period before it is accepted.  It may be appropriate in
>>    the "Pushing" case to assume that the Child is ready and thus accept
>>    changes without delay.
>
> Does not work if you have a MUST above. Just remove this paragraph.
>
> Either you have a MUST or not. Not MUST and then a paragraph that make th=
ings not a MUST.
>
>> 6.2.  Using the new CDS / CDNSKEY records
>>
>>    Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
>>    CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to obtain
>>    a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone.  It would be a
>>    good idea if the Parental Agent checked all NS RRs listed at the
>>    delegation.
>
> What does "would be a good idea" mean in RFC 1918 speak? :-)
>
> More seriously, no, I do not think that requirement should be there at al=
l. How to handle lame delegation, inability to use cached information, what=
 TTL can be acceptable etc is hidden in this "good idea". Just remove it.
>
> Either DNS is used to fetch the RR or not.
>
>>    The Parental Agent MUST ensure that old versions of the CDS / CDNSKEY
>>    RRset do not overwrite newer versions.
>
> I do not think this is a good idea. See above.
>
> Please remove.
>
> This is because there is a requirement on state in the parent. I dislike =
that. Much better if the CDS/CDNSKEY is always reflecting the current state=
 in the child zone. And just say so.
>
>> 6.2.1.  Parent calculates DS
>>
>>    There are cases where the Parent wants to calculate the DS record due
>>    to policy reasons.  In this case, the Child publishes CDNSKEY records
>>    containing DNSKEYs.
>>
>>    The parent calculates the DS records on behalf of the children.  The
>>    DNS Parent needs to publish guidelines for the children as to what
>>    digest algorithms are acceptable in the CDS record.
>
> What is "needs to"? MUST?
>
> :
> :
>>    Implications on Parental Agent are that the CDNSKEY and DS are not
>>    exactly the same after update thus it needs to take that into
>>    consideration when checking CDNSKEY records.  Same goes for the Child
>>    DNS Operator, it needs to be able to detect that the new DS RRset is
>>    "equivalent" to the current CDNSKEY RRset, thus it can remove the
>>    CDNSKEY RRset.
>
> Why not say instead:
>
> In the case the parent fetch the CDNSKEY and calculate the DS it MAY be t=
he case that the DS published in the parent zone is not identical with the =
data in the CDS record made available by the child.
>
> Because I think that is what you try to say?
>
>> 9.  Security Considerations
>
> Please add something like:
>
> As this introduces a mechanism to contact the parent it MUST be clear who=
 is fetching the records and creates the appropriate records in the parent =
zone. Specifically as some operations MUST be using other mechanisms than w=
hat is described here. If for example communication normally is done via a =
registrar that via epp is communicating with the registry, the registrar is=
 normally "caching" the data passed to it. If then the registry is fetching=
 the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry have a different view of the DNSSEC ke=
y material situation than the registrar, and the result of such a situation=
 is unclear. Because of this, this mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass in=
termediaries that might cache information and because of that get the wrong=
 state.
>
>> 10.  Acknowledgements
>>
>>    We would like to thank a large number of folk, including: Mark
>>    Andrews, Joe Abley, Jaap Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Doug Barton, Brian
>>    Dickinson, Paul Ebersman, Tony Finch, Patrik Faltsrom, Jim Galvin,
>
> Please spell my last name "Faltstrom".
>
>    Patrik
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>


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On 10 apr 2014, at 18:34, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

>> Because of this, I do not mind having some extra words here, like:
>>=20
>> "This proposal do not include all operations needed for maintenance =
of DNSSEC key material, specifically introduction and complete removal =
of all keys. Because of this alternate communications mechanisms must =
always exist, which might introduce extra complexity."
>=20
> DONE.

Thanks!

>>> 2.2.1.  Solution Space
>> :
>> :
>>>   Some parents want the child to express their DNSKEYS in the form =
of
>>>   DS records, while others want to receive the DNSKEY records and
>>>   calculate the DS records themselves.  There is no consensus on =
which
>>>   method is better; both have good reasons to exist.  The proposal
>>>   below can operate with both models, but the child needs to be =
aware
>>>   of the parental policies.
>>=20
>> Mumble...I really dislike the fact we have not agreed on what to do. =
It increases complexity _a_lot_. And yes, this is one of the reasons why =
we do not see more deployment of DNSSEC.
>>=20
>> Why do we (IETF) fail on this?
>>=20
>=20
> Yes; however, we want this to be deployed and usable by as many people
> as possible, so we are avoiding the religious argument in this
> document. Registry operators are entitled to their own opinion, as
> much as we dislike it....

This is not YOUR fault, and you can not fix this problem in THIS draft. =
I just find it being...not fun.

>>> 2.2.2.  DNSSEC key change process
>>>=20
>>>   After a Child DNS operator first signs the zone, there is a need =
to
>>>   interact with the Parent, for example via the delegation account
>>>   interface, to "upload / paste-in the zone's DS information".  The
>>>   action of logging in through the delegation account user interface
>>>   authenticates that the user is authorized to change delegation
>>>   information for the child published in the parent zone.  In the =
case
>>>   where the "Child DNS Operator" does not have access to the
>>>   registration account, the Child needs to perform the action.
>>>=20
>>>   At a later date, the Child DNS Operator may want to publish a new =
DS
>>>   record in the parent, either because they are rolling keys, or
>>>   because they want to publish a stand-by key.  This involves
>>>   performing the same process as before.  Furthermore when this is a
>>>   manual process with cut and paste, operational mistakes will =
happen
>>>   -- or worse, the update action is not performed at all.
>>=20
>> Should it not be mentioned here that child might want to remove all =
keys as well? I mean, if this is supposed to be a complete list of =
potential operations the child is interested in?
>>=20
>> I see in fact (with some special cases):
>>=20
>> A. Introduction of new keys
>>=20
>> A.1. Introduction when old keys exists and can be used
>>=20
>> A.2. Introduction when no old keys can be used (because they can not =
be trusted or because no such exists)
>>=20
>> B. Removal of keys
>>=20
>> B.1. Removal of old keys when at least one key still remains in the =
RRSet of zone apex
>>=20
>> B.2. Removal of last key from the RRSet of the zone apex
>>=20
>> If I understand things correctly, you say this draft can only be used =
for A.1 and B.1?
>>=20
>> I think that should be spelled out very explicitly in section 2.
>=20
> We had specifically decided not to allow B.2 because we don't want
> this be be used to go from signed to unsigned.

That is fine.

> You also cannot use
> this for initial enrollment of keys (A.2 - explained in Section 2.2.2
> & the security considerations section), you can only use it for
> introducing new keys when you have one working key and removing all
> except the last key. Added text to clarify what use cases we do and do
> not support.

Thanks!

> We also had, in the intro: "This proposal does not include all
> operations needed for the maintenance of DNSSEC key material,
> specifically the introduction or complete removal of all keys."

Yup, I did understand this, but just felt it was not really crystal =
clear enough. I know DNSSEC (I think....:-) ) and still had to look at =
some of the text a few times to ensure that there where no loopholes.

>>> 4.  Automating DS maintainance with CDS/CDNSKEY records
>>>=20
>>>   CDS/CDNSKEY records are intended to be "consumed" by delegation =
trust
>>>   maintainers.  The use of CDS/CDNSKEY is optional.
>>>=20
>>>   Some parents prefer to accept DNSSEC key information in DS format,
>>>   some parents prefer to accept it in DNSKEY format, and calculate =
the
>>>   DS record on the child's behalf.  Each method has pros and cons, =
both
>>>   technical and policy.  This solution is DS vs DNSKEY agnostic, and
>>>   allows operation with either.
>>>=20
>>>   If the child knows what the parent prefers, they can publish the
>>>   parent's preferred record type.  If the child does not know (or
>>>   simply chooses to), they can publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>>>   child publishes both, the two RRsets they SHOULD match in content.
>>=20
>> Why not a MUST?
>=20
> DONE.
> Ok, this is somewhat of a philosophical discussion -- I'm always
> uncomfortable putting a MUST on anything where a user enters the
> information.

Aha.

> Users (in my experience) seem to take a perverse pleasure
> in ignoring MUSTs.

I did not see this as a "GUI"-issue... Hmm...

> Having this as a MUST makes me concerned that implementations will
> treat cases where the data does not match as an error -- and we
> specifically don't want that (more below).

Hmm...

> If you are one of the
> registries that likes DNSKEYS (and so consumes CDNSKEY), you shouldn't
> care what's in the CDS...
> But, a number of folk have said that they would rather that this be a
> MUST, so I've just changed it...

The only alternative I can see is to not say anything about whether they =
are the same or not, but instead say that whoever consumes the CDS and =
CDNSKEY MUST be able to pick one of them (and not the other), and it is =
the parent that do the selection that can be random. Whether the CDS and =
CDNSKEY is the same or not is up to the child. The parent will only pick =
one. And things must still work.

>>>   The parent should use whichever one they choose, but SHOULD NOT =
query
>>>   for both and perform consistency checks between the CDS and =
CDNSKEY
>>>   records.
>>=20
>> Why not? Why talk about it at all?
>>=20
>> I think this document should say:
>>=20
>>   The child can publish one or both of CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>>   child publishes both, the two RRsets they MUST match in content.
>>=20
>> We do not need more RFCs that can be interpreted in multiple ways. =
And why use more words than what we need?
>=20
> See above, the Editor note ("It is not an error for a child to have
> published CDS records and not have CDNSKEYs that hash to those
> records, nor for there to be CDNSKEY records without matching DS
> records.

This I understand.

> This is because a child might have been publishing CDS
> records and then the parent's policy changes to require CDNSKEY
> records. The child might forget to remove the CDS, etc. This avoids
> all sorts of error conditions / complexity, etc"), and Section 6.

Ack. I did not think of this situation. But the parent might also swap =
back, and then will eat the old DS again, which creates problems.

So the parent might select randomly CDS or CDNSKEY, without the child =
knowing which one, and things should still work. This implies to me that =
from the parents perspective use of the CDS and use of CDNSKEY is to =
lead to the same result. Because of this, they MUST be the same.

But I get the point about "error condition".

> This data / information might be coming from user input (yes, we
> expect that signer tools will create these, but user's might also
> enter them).  We'd much rather be liberal in what we accept when it
> comes to user input.

Agree.

> If we were to *require* that they match, what happens in the case
> where they *don't*? Do we fail the keyroll? That seems suboptimal. Do
> we throw a log message? No one will see it... If you consume CDS (or
> CDNSKEY), you simply ignore the other one -- it's not really relevant
> to you, and no good can come from looking at it. Ignorance is bliss...

Understood.

But I think you must explain what the parent should do.

Fetch CDS and CDNSKEY, look at them and see that they lead to different =
result. What should then the parent do? Pick CDS or CDNSKEY, or pick one =
by random, or...?

>>> 4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>>>=20
>>>   If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
>>>   signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  This
>>>   means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
>>>   operator MAY remove all CDS records from the zone.
>>=20
>> I am really nervous we will have a state enforced somewhere, that =
must remember what has happened. I much rather want to see the child =
always have CDS/CDNSKEY for the proper key set.
>>=20
>> So, there must be a reason why this is not allowed?
>=20
> Much of the point of this is to *avoid* the parent having to keep
> state. If it queries the zone and sees no CDS records, it simply goes
> back to sleep.
>=20
> Let's say that example.com is signed but has never used CDS / CDNSKEY
> (like every signed zone currently is). We really don't want the parent
> going through and removing DS records because there is no CDS
> published :-) By having a "take no action if there is no CDS/CNSKEY"
> rule the parent doesn't need to track which children use this.

Ok, I was thinking of the fact that one can not remove the last =
DS/DNSKEY, so "neither CDS, nor CDNSKEY" is a special case (as you say), =
so I do not see any problem with the situation you talk about.

I was thinking of the last sentence that ask the child to poll parent =
and see whether DS is published, and if so, remove the CDS/CDNSKEY.

What I do not want is having people enforcing children to keep polling =
parent. This by tell DNS hosting providers they are doing the wrong =
thing if they do not remove the CDS/CDNSKEY.

Secondly, the reason why you have to remember state here and there is =
because of the following can happen:

1. Zone signed with K1
2. K1 is published in parent
3. CDS for K1 is published
4. CDS for K1 is removed
5. Zone signed with K1 and K2
6. CDS for K1 and K2 is added
7. Parent pick up CDS for K1 and K2
8. Parent publish data for K1 and K2
9. Child remove CDS for K1 and K2
10. Zone signed with K2
11. CDS for K2 is published
12. Parent pick up CDS for K2
13. Parent remove DS for K1

Much easier, I claim, specifically when K1 disappears:

1. Zone signed with K1
2. K1 is published in parent
3. CDS for K1 is added
4. Zone signed with K1 and K2
5. CDS for K2 is added (CDS for K1 is already there)
7. Parent pick up CDS for K1 and K2
8. Parent publish data for K2 (in addition for already existing data for =
K1)
9. Zone signed with K2
10. CDS for K1 removed
11. Parent detect CDS for K1 is removed
12. Parent remove DS for K1

>> Also, the MAY here does not match the SHOULD further down.
>>=20
>>>   Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY records =
as
>>>   follows:
>>>=20
>>>   o  Location: "the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be at the child zone
>>>      apex".
>>>=20
>>>   o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both =
the
>>>      current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>>>=20
>>>   o  Continuity: "SHOULD NOT break the current delegation if applied =
to
>>>      DS RRset"
>>=20
>> I do not understand the SHOULD NOT in this case. Specifically =
together with references to 4.1 below.
>>=20
>=20
> DONE.
> Yeah. This should be a MUST NOT. Fixed.

Thanks!

>> I presume what this says is that the DNSKEY that is signing the =
CDS/CDNSKEY SHOULD be included in what the CDS / CDNSKEY is covering?
>>=20
>> If that is true, are we sure that the SHOULD NOT is inverse to SHOULD =
in this case?
>>=20
>>>   If any these conditions fail the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be
>>>   ignored.
>>=20
>> How can it be a MUST when Continuity include a SHOULD NOT?
>=20
> DONE.
> Yup, see above. Fixed.

+1

>> I am a bit confused, but maybe it ends up being clearer if I actually =
wrote code that implemented this ;-)
>>=20
>>> 5.  Child's CDS / CDNSKEY Publication
>>>=20
>>>   Child DNS Operator SHOULD only publish a CDS or CDNSKEY RRset when =
it
>>>   wants to make a change to the DS RRset in the Parent.
>>=20
>> Does not match the MAY further up.
>=20
> DONE.
> Fixed.

+1

>>>   The CDS /
>>>   CDNSKEY RRset SHOULD be compliant with the rules in Section 4.1.
>>=20
>> Does not match the MUST that covers 4.1.
>=20
> DONE.
> I guess this is a philosophical difference. I am somewhat leery about
> using MUST when it comes to user input. We put in SHOULD, to
> acknowledge that users will often do "wrong" things, it just means
> that the record will not be valid/processed. I recognize that I'm off
> in the rough on this, so changed to a must...

Understood. Just ensure the text matches as this is covered in multiple =
places.

>>>   When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY, the Child =
DNS
>>>   Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset(s).
>>=20
>> See above. How does the child know? Do you because of this require =
the child to poll the parent zone? And if the parent want to re-fetch =
the data for some reason, it might be gone from the child zone. Not =
good.
>=20
> Yes, the child checks the parent to see if it's in sync. A number of
> working group participants (I had thought yourself included), had
> indicated that they would rather have this as more of a transaction
> system, so that the user publishes a record, the parental agent
> performs the operation, and then the user is expected to remove the
> "instruction." The reason for this was so that the user's intent is
> clear and parental agents can, if they wish, log the "transaction." I
> will see if I can find references to that (it's not noted in the =
minutes, but
> I think Antoin Verschuren said it and a bunch of other folk agreed).

See above.

I am lazy as a programmer. I do not want people to start to REQUIRE the =
CDS/CDNSKEY to be removed. It must be perfectly ok to have the =
CDS/CDNSKEY in the zone all the time.

Maybe I am more relaxed if you explicitly say that is a normal case.

>>>   Note that if the
>>>   child has published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS, it will have to =
calculate
>>>   the DS (using the requested digest algorithm) to do the =
comparison.
>>=20
>> Hmmm..."published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS"? The CDS was to include a =
DS. Right?
>=20
> Edited for clarity -- left over from an old version of the doc.

:-)

>>>   A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses to
>>>   publish both, it SHOULD attempt to maintain consistency (a =
matching
>>>   CDS for each CDNSKEY)
>>=20
>> No, it MUST represent the same data. Please!
>=20
> DONE.
> It seems like you feel strongly about this :-) My reason for
> originally having this as a SHOULD are described above (expecting
> users the follow a MUST leads to implementers to treat "violations" of
> the MUST as an error...). But, seems like I'm off in the rough,
> changed...

Ha ha ha...

See above, I now understand.

I want to know what happens both from the child and parent perspective =
IF the CDS and CDNSKEY differs.

Just say what the result should be.

Parent pick one at random?

>> I also want to have it spelled out explicitly here whether the =
CDS/DNSKEY MUST include the data for the dnssec key material that signs =
the CDS/DNSKEY or not. I think it MUST include the current key as well.
>> Otherwise it ends up being same as having no CDS/CDNSKEY and that way =
removing keys.
>=20
> Nope, you don't *have* to -- you probably would want to, but it isn't
> (IMO) a strict MUST.

:-)

> A happy day:
> Let's say you start with a zone signed with K1

Plus:
K1 is in parent zone

> You generate a new key, K2.
> You sign your zone with K1 and K2.
> You publish K2 (only) in the zone (in a CDS), signed with K1.
> Your parent picks up the CDS and validates the K2 CDS using K1.
> The draft says: "In particular the Parental Agent MUST double check
> the Continuity rule and do its best not to invalidate the Child zone."
> - publishing only K2 will not break the Continuity rule (Continuity:
> "MUST NOT break the current delegation if applied to DS RRset") and so
> the parent publishes only K2.

Plus:
The parent removes K1

> A sad day:
> Let's say you start with a zone signed with K1

Plus:
K1 published by parent

> You generate a new key, K2.
> You get sidetracked and forget to sign your zone with K2 (or you
> somehow otherwise screw up).
> You publish K2 (only) in the zone (in a CDS), signed with K1.
> Your parent picks up the CDS and validates the K2 CDS using K1.
> The draft says: "In particular the Parental Agent MUST double check
> the Continuity rule and do its best not to invalidate the Child zone."
> - publishing only K2 would violate the continuity rule, and so the
> parent does not proceed.

Agree.

> If it were *me*, I'd publish a CDS with *both* K1 and K2, wait a
> little bit, then publish only K2, but this is not a required way of
> rolling keys.

Nope, the fact there is no CDS/CDNSKEY for K1, data for K1 MUST be =
removed (as there is CDS/CDNSKEY for K2). So with your way of doing =
things, you would violate some earlier rules in the RFC. Right?

I.e. you either break the continuity rule OR you break the rule that K1 =
MUST be removed when the CDS/CDNSKEY is removed.

> So that at every point in time the chain of trust is secured.
>>=20
>> So one go from:
>>=20
>> 1. No keys at all
>>=20
>> This process can not be used, but say DNSKEY K1 is added. CDNSKEY K1 =
is added to the zone.
>>=20
>> 2. K1 is in use
>>=20
>> K2 is introduced by adding CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 be added to =
the zone. Signed by at least K1.
>>=20
>> 3. K1 and K2 is in use
>>=20
>> Ensure that CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 are both signed with at =
least K2.
>>=20
>> 4. K2 is in use
>>=20
>> Remove CDNSKEY for K1.
>>=20
>> 5. K2 is in use
>>=20
>> Removal of K2 without introducing K3 is not possible.
>>=20
>> 6. No key is in use
>>=20
>> See 1.
>>=20
>>> 6.  Parent side CDS / CDNSKEY Consumption
>>>=20
>>>   The CDS / CDNSKEY RRset MAY be used by the Parental Agent to =
update
>>>   the DS RRset in the parent zone.  The Parental Agent for this uses =
a
>>>   tool that understands the CDS / CDNSKEY signing rules from
>>>   Section 4.1 so it may not be able to use a standard validator.
>>=20
>> What do the author know about "standard validators"? :-)
>>=20
>>>   Parent SHOULD treat the Continuity rule as "MUST".
>>=20
>> Well...here we have confusion. The continuity rule is a SHOULD, the =
whole block is a MUST and above it is sort of wobbly...
>>=20
>=20
> DONE.
> Ok. This was yet another instance of me being timid and not not liking
> telling people what to do!

See above. Just make text consistent!

>>>   The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY records, =
and
>>>   MUST NOT expect there to be both.  A parent SHOULD NOT perform a
>>>   consistency check between CDS and CDNSKEY (other than for
>>>   informational / debugging use).
>>=20
>> Ok. Do though see above about MUST regarding client requirement on =
having the two RR in sync if both exists.
>>=20
>>> 6.1.  Detecting a changed CDS / CDNSKEY
>> :
>>>   Pushing  The delegation user interface has a button {Fetch DS} =
when
>>>         pushed preforms the CDS / CDNSKEY processing.  If the Parent
>>>         zone does not contain DS for this delegation then the "push"
>>>         MUST be ignored.
>>=20
>> Well, I do not think there should be a MUST. As written below there =
might be other means that can be used to ensure the data is correct. =
Saying SHOULD is ok. Together with explanation what risk exists. Like:
>>=20
>> ...then the "push" SHOULD be ignored. Reasons for the "push" to be =
trusted might be additional user interface/interactions, two factor =
authentication to validate the "push" and similar.
>=20
> Hmmm.. If I'm understanding what you are suggesting, you would like a
> user to be able to go to a web page, click the "Fetch DS" button and
> have this used for initial enrollment? This still seems like a bad
> idea to me -- unless it is explicitly a "Fetch DS, show user what was
> fetched and ask him to confirm the submission".

Something like that.

> We do have some text in the security section saying that this should =
not be
> used for initial key enrollment as we don't really want to be =
dictating parental
> behavior for this.

The problem is that exactly this is what people ask for... :-P

How often do you click "yes" and "no" when your ssh client show you an =
initial fingerprint? ;-)

>>>   In either case the Parental Agent MAY apply additional rules that
>>>   defer the acceptance of a CDS / CDNSKEY change, these rules may
>>>   include a condition that the CDS / CDNSKEY remains in place and =
valid
>>>   for some time period before it is accepted.  It may be appropriate =
in
>>>   the "Pushing" case to assume that the Child is ready and thus =
accept
>>>   changes without delay.
>>=20
>> Does not work if you have a MUST above. Just remove this paragraph.
>>=20
>> Either you have a MUST or not. Not MUST and then a paragraph that =
make things not a MUST.
>=20
> Um, what? Above doesn't parse for me.
> A legitimate use case is that the parent polls for keys, but doesn't
> do anything with them until the user click "Please make the change".

Aha.

> Or, the parent polls once a day, but the user can request an immediate
> action by asking for it.

Ok, I get it.

>>> 6.2.  Using the new CDS / CDNSKEY records
>>>=20
>>>   Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
>>>   CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to =
obtain
>>>   a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone.  It would be =
a
>>>   good idea if the Parental Agent checked all NS RRs listed at the
>>>   delegation.
>>=20
>> What does "would be a good idea" mean in RFC 1918 speak? :-)
>>=20
>> More seriously, no, I do not think that requirement should be there =
at all.
>=20
> Which one? I'm assuming you are fine with / like the "Parental Agent
> MUST use a DNSSEC validator"?

I just wanted to know in official MAY/MUST/SHOULD language what "be a =
good idea" means first of all.

>> How to handle lame delegation, inability to use cached information, =
what TTL can be acceptable etc is hidden in this "good idea". Just =
remove it.
>>=20
>> Either DNS is used to fetch the RR or not.
>>=20
>>>   The Parental Agent MUST ensure that old versions of the CDS / =
CDNSKEY
>>>   RRset do not overwrite newer versions.
>>=20
>> I do not think this is a good idea. See above.
>>=20
>> Please remove.
>>=20
>> This is because there is a requirement on state in the parent. I =
dislike that. Much better if the CDS/CDNSKEY is always reflecting the =
current state in the child zone. And just say so.
>=20
> This was specifically added because folk asked for it. You have a
> "primary" DNS server and a bunch of "secondaries" (by "primary" and
> "secondary" I mean you have one server where you make the changes, and
> the others all slave from it).
> You are in the process of rolling from key BAR to key FOO.
>=20
> You have:
> . CDS KEY_FOO on the primary.
> and
> . CDS KEY_BAR on the secondaries because they have not yet AXFRed the =
zone.
>=20
> The parent chooses an NS at random - it picks the "primary" and
> updates what it publishes for the child.
> It then tries again, and happens to hit a "secondary".. and updates
> what it publishes for the child.
> Lather, rinse, repeat.

No, I absolutely do not like this.

You also have caching, you have lame delegation and a million other =
things.

This is why we do key rollover with multiple keys.

So you never jump from CDS KEY_FOO to CDS KEY_BAR in one hop. You always =
have them overlap, OR, you get the problem you talk about. And it is not =
the parents responsibility to ensure you do not as a child shoot =
yourself in your foot.

We already have too many parents that have I do not know how many stupid =
rules for what various values must be in the child hosting situation, =
and in many cases that make it plain impossible to do what you want as a =
child. Really silly rules.

Parent should not control the child.

If the child do NOT want the problem you talk about, have overlapping =
CDS/CDNSKEY. If you want to jump quickly, do what you suggest with non =
overlapping CDS/CDNSKEY but risk that the wrong DS might be published in =
parent zone. Up to you as a child.

Compared to many other things that I suggest, I can give up my =
arguments, but not this. This I must really be convinced why I am wrong.

And you have btw not said what happens when you have a lame delegation =
in your scenario. Or when you do not get a response. Or when you get a =
response over IPv4 but not IPv6. Or when you can not even send a DNS =
query to the IP address of one of the auth servers because you do not =
have that IP address in your routing table. It might be an RFC 1918 =
address. Or you might be behind a firewall that do not allow any direct =
DNS queries, you can only issue queries via a forwarder. Or...

>>> 6.2.1.  Parent calculates DS
>>>=20
>>>   There are cases where the Parent wants to calculate the DS record =
due
>>>   to policy reasons.  In this case, the Child publishes CDNSKEY =
records
>>>   containing DNSKEYs.
>>>=20
>>>   The parent calculates the DS records on behalf of the children.  =
The
>>>   DNS Parent needs to publish guidelines for the children as to what
>>>   digest algorithms are acceptable in the CDS record.
>>=20
>> What is "needs to"? MUST?
>=20
> I guess. This wasn't a requirement, more of a "I think that parents
> should do this sort of thing anyway."
> I'll just remove that sentence...

:-)

> :
>> :
>>>   Implications on Parental Agent are that the CDNSKEY and DS are not
>>>   exactly the same after update thus it needs to take that into
>>>   consideration when checking CDNSKEY records.  Same goes for the =
Child
>>>   DNS Operator, it needs to be able to detect that the new DS RRset =
is
>>>   "equivalent" to the current CDNSKEY RRset, thus it can remove the
>>>   CDNSKEY RRset.
>>=20
>> Why not say instead:
>>=20
>> In the case the parent fetch the CDNSKEY and calculate the DS it MAY =
be the case that the DS published in the parent zone is not identical =
with the data in the CDS record made available by the child.
>>=20
>> Because I think that is what you try to say?
>=20
> DONE.
> Yup, this is cleaner.

Phew...

>>=20
>>> 9.  Security Considerations
>>=20
>> Please add something like:
>>=20
>> As this introduces a mechanism to contact the parent it MUST be clear =
who is fetching the records and creates the appropriate records in the =
parent zone. Specifically as some operations MUST be using other =
mechanisms than what is described here. If for example communication =
normally is done via a registrar that via epp is communicating with the =
registry, the registrar is normally "caching" the data passed to it. If =
then the registry is fetching the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry have a =
different view of the DNSSEC key material situation than the registrar, =
and the result of such a situation is unclear. Because of this, this =
mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass intermediaries that might cache =
information and because of that get the wrong state.
>=20
> I reworded this to be:
> "As this introduces a new mechanism to update information in the
> parent it MUST be clear who is fetching the records and creating the
> appropriate records in the parent zone. Specifically some operations
> may use other mechanisms than what is described here. For example, a
> registrar may assume that it is maintaining the DNSSEC key information
> in the registry, and may have this cached. If the registry is fetching
> the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry and registrar may have different
> views of the DNSSEC key material and the result of such a situation is
> unclear. Because of this, this mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass
> intermediaries that might cache information and because of that get
> the wrong state. "

Thanks!

>>> 10.  Acknowledgements
>>>=20
>>>   We would like to thank a large number of folk, including: Mark
>>>   Andrews, Joe Abley, Jaap Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Doug Barton, Brian
>>>   Dickinson, Paul Ebersman, Tony Finch, Patrik Faltsrom, Jim Galvin,
>>=20
>> Please spell my last name "Faltstrom".
>>=20
>=20
> DONE.

;-)

   Patrik


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Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 11:36:21 +0200
From: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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References: <533C6007.4070600@gmail.com> <1721093A-28F6-44F1-A6E1-87F43CE02879@frobbit.se> <CAHw9_iJ_t==kw2UBGFdyJ+RHdfZzOcPsKC=X2Mp691NdXNsAcA@mail.gmail.com> <75DFBECC-B6E8-4BED-A27B-81FB1F317541@frobbit.se>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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Hi,


On 04/10/2014 09:54 PM, Patrik Fältström wrote:
>>>> 2.2.1.  Solution Space
>>> : :
>>>> Some parents want the child to express their DNSKEYS in the
>>>> form of DS records, while others want to receive the DNSKEY
>>>> records and calculate the DS records themselves.  There is no
>>>> consensus on which method is better; both have good reasons to
>>>> exist.  The proposal below can operate with both models, but
>>>> the child needs to be aware of the parental policies.
>>> 
>>> Mumble...I really dislike the fact we have not agreed on what to
>>> do. It increases complexity _a_lot_. And yes, this is one of the
>>> reasons why we do not see more deployment of DNSSEC.
>>> 
>>> Why do we (IETF) fail on this?
>>> 
>> 
>> Yes; however, we want this to be deployed and usable by as many
>> people as possible, so we are avoiding the religious argument in
>> this document. Registry operators are entitled to their own
>> opinion, as much as we dislike it....
> 
> This is not YOUR fault, and you can not fix this problem in THIS
> draft. I just find it being...not fun.

I had proposed to have one CDS record that has the RDATA identical as
the DNSKEY record, plus a hash digest type field. For example:

    example.com. 86400 IN CDS *1* 257 3 8 AwEAA...

This would work for both agents that want DS and agents that want
DNSKEY. Counter arguments from Warren were:

1. No, because now the parents who want DS are not getting DS -- they
are getting DNSKEY.

My understanding was that the reason why parents want DS is so that the
child can determine the hash digest to be used. So the format of the CDS
record does not really matter.

2. Some children want to be able to publish a DS record, but not expose
the DNSKEY until they start using it -- the method you have described
doesn't allow for that

Why would you not want to expose the DNSKEY that you are going to use?

I had not yet received good responses for my 'counter-counter'
questions. But if Warren's arguments are valid, then having two
different records is imo the cleanest solution.


>>>> 4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>>>> 
>>>> If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child,
>>>> this signals that no change should be made to the current DS
>>>> set.  This means that, once the child and parent are in sync,
>>>> the child DNS operator MAY remove all CDS records from the
>>>> zone.
>>> 
>>> I am really nervous we will have a state enforced somewhere, that
>>> must remember what has happened. I much rather want to see the
>>> child always have CDS/CDNSKEY for the proper key set.
>>> 
>>> So, there must be a reason why this is not allowed?
>> 
>> Much of the point of this is to *avoid* the parent having to keep 
>> state. If it queries the zone and sees no CDS records, it simply
>> goes back to sleep.

If the child will maintain the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset in its zone, the only
extra step the parental agent has to make is to do a compare and if the
compare returns 'in-sync', it simply goes back to sleep.

>> Let's say that example.com is signed but has never used CDS /
>> CDNSKEY (like every signed zone currently is). We really don't want
>> the parent going through and removing DS records because there is
>> no CDS published :-) By having a "take no action if there is no
>> CDS/CNSKEY" rule the parent doesn't need to track which children
>> use this.

But you have to do the polling anyway. And there is no tracking or
maintaining state for the parent if the child maintains the CDS/CDNSKEY
RRset.

So, it makes it marginally more difficult (one compare per poll) for the
parent, while the rule of removing the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset when in-sync
makes it much more complex for the child, with all the polling and
additional state it needs to maintain.


>>>> When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY, the
>>>> Child DNS Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset(s).
>>> 
>>> See above. How does the child know? Do you because of this
>>> require the child to poll the parent zone? And if the parent want
>>> to re-fetch the data for some reason, it might be gone from the
>>> child zone. Not good.
>> 
>> Yes, the child checks the parent to see if it's in sync. A number
>> of working group participants (I had thought yourself included),
>> had indicated that they would rather have this as more of a
>> transaction system, so that the user publishes a record, the
>> parental agent performs the operation, and then the user is
>> expected to remove the "instruction." The reason for this was so
>> that the user's intent is clear and parental agents can, if they
>> wish, log the "transaction." I will see if I can find references to
>> that (it's not noted in the minutes, but I think Antoin Verschuren
>> said it and a bunch of other folk agreed).
> 
> See above.
> 
> I am lazy as a programmer. I do not want people to start to REQUIRE
> the CDS/CDNSKEY to be removed. It must be perfectly ok to have the
> CDS/CDNSKEY in the zone all the time.

I am a programmer. I do not want to track and remove the CDS/CDNSKEY if
they are in-sync.

> Maybe I am more relaxed if you explicitly say that is a normal case.

Fully agree.


>>>> A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses
>>>> to publish both, it SHOULD attempt to maintain consistency (a
>>>> matching CDS for each CDNSKEY)
>>> 
>>> No, it MUST represent the same data. Please!
>> 
>> DONE. It seems like you feel strongly about this :-) My reason for 
>> originally having this as a SHOULD are described above (expecting 
>> users the follow a MUST leads to implementers to treat "violations"
>> of the MUST as an error...). But, seems like I'm off in the rough, 
>> changed...
> 
> Ha ha ha...
> 
> See above, I now understand.
> 
> I want to know what happens both from the child and parent
> perspective IF the CDS and CDNSKEY differs.
> 
> Just say what the result should be.
> 
> Parent pick one at random?

At random? Then you still don't really know that the result would be ;)

Best regards,
  Matthijs



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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On 11 apr 2014, at 11:36, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> =
wrote:

>> I want to know what happens both from the child and parent
>> perspective IF the CDS and CDNSKEY differs.
>>=20
>> Just say what the result should be.
>>=20
>> Parent pick one at random?
>=20
> At random? Then you still don't really know that the result would be =
;)

Exactly, thats why I think we should say MUST (but explain what we mean =
with it).

   Patrik


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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op 10-04-14 21:54, Patrik Fältström schreef:
> On 10 apr 2014, at 18:34, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

>> If we were to *require* that they match, what happens in the
>> case where they *don't*? Do we fail the keyroll? That seems
>> suboptimal. Do we throw a log message? No one will see it... If
>> you consume CDS (or CDNSKEY), you simply ignore the other one --
>> it's not really relevant to you, and no good can come from
>> looking at it. Ignorance is bliss...
> 
> Understood.
> 
> But I think you must explain what the parent should do.
> 
> Fetch CDS and CDNSKEY, look at them and see that they lead to
> different result. What should then the parent do? Pick CDS or
> CDNSKEY, or pick one by random, or...?

What should a parent do when it fetches a CDS or CDNSKEY and the Rdata
does not make sense at all on its own? f.e. the Rdata does not parse
as a DNSKEY or DS? If a child puts a CDS in his zone where the Rdata
says "this is not a key at all", should I publish that?

I think since this is a protocol definition, CDS and CDNSKEY MUST
match. What a parent should do when the protocol is violated is I
guess an implementation issue, BCP, or perhaps even local policy. A
parent may only look at CDNSKEY or CDS or both. Saying they MUST match
when they are both in the zone does not state anything on what the
parent should do when they don't, same as when the Rdata is rubish.

I would personally accept a CDNSKEY that does not match a CDS, knowing
that the child may be in trouble when I change my policy in accepting
CDS in the future. But that's the price the child pays for violating
the protocol. I don't see any use case or excuse for the CDNSKEY and
CDS not matching -if- they are both in the zone.

- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
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From nobody Fri Apr 11 03:30:04 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] MAC vs. DAC - Re: draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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On 8.4.2014 18:02, Joe Abley wrote:
>
> On 8 Apr 2014, at 11:01, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> wrote:
>
>> But isn’t that example (below) a new API? ;)
>
> I wasn't reacting to the newness of the API, but rather the dual approaches of (a) provide a new DNS API for applications, or (b) leave applications using the existing/archaic API for name resolution, and introduce an additional API that characterises the security characteristics of their use.
>
> Amongst the problems with (b) is the lack of fine-grained (e.g. DNSSEC-specific) message passing to the application, so that it can react to the various failure modes in a manner that allows users to be informed and the application generally to make good choices.

I should clarify that the proposal sent to dane-list is just a temporary 
solution. *It doesn't prevent us from inventing a completely new shiny API.*

The purpose of the proposal is to ease transition from non-DNSSEC aware 
applications/security models to DNSSEC-aware ones (without polluting every 
application with validation logic and related configuration).

Sure, we can throw all existing APIs out of the window and wait few 
years/decades until a new shiny API is available everywhere and upstream 
developers decide to use it instead of old APIs...

Personally, I think it it is better to give application developers some really 
easy way how to use data from DNS(SEC) tree today and let them gradually 
migrate to new APIs later.

Once again: A new API definitely has value (e.g. better error handling etc.), 
I'm not opposing it.

I just don't want to wait too long. From my perspective, it is much easier to 
make/review/push patches which add one new flag to existing DNS library calls. 
Compare it with replacing existing name resolution code with new shiny library.

I hope this clarifies my intent.

-- 
Petr Spacek  @  Red Hat


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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Hi,

I support publication of this document, but I agree that some things
should be improved before its ready to do so. Mainly the RFC2119
language (raised by Patrik), the rule of removing the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset
at the child and missing/no clear guidelines to prevent "DS flapping".

Besides some nits which I will send the editors off-list, here are my
comments:


2.1.  DNS delegations

   But this
   fails to meet some operating needs, including the child having no
   influence what DS digest algorithms are used and DS records can only
   be published for keys that are in the DNSKEY RRset.

The reason why that is bad is because it then would not be compatible
with the Double-DS key rollover method. Perhaps it is good to add that
explicitly.


4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules

   If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
   signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  This
   means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
   operator SHOULD remove all CDS records from the zone.

I would rather see MAY here, having the retain RRset be the normal case,
agreeing with Patrik Faltstrom earlier comments.


   Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY records as
   follows:

   o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
      current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."

In other words: The CDS and CDNSKEY RRsets MUST be signed with an active
KSK. This introduces new tasks for keys that have the role of KSK. In
current software, a KSK only signs the DNSKEY RRset. Basically, with
this rule you are extending the role to also sign the CDS and CDNSKEY
RRsets. I am fine with that, they all are there for the same main
purpose: maintaining the chain of trust. But I think this can be
mentioned more explicitly in the document.

Now do we also require the ZSK have signing these RRsets? I don't think
so. So also the signing rules for ZSKs can be adjusted.


5.  Child's CDS / CDNSKEY Publication

   A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses to
   publish both, it MUST attempt to maintain consistency (a matching CDS
   for each CDNSKEY).

Another weak RFC2119 requirement: MUST attempt. I think you have to get
rid of the word attempt.


6.2.  Using the new CDS / CDNSKEY records

   Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
   CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to obtain
   a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone.  It would be a
   good idea if the Parental Agent checked all NS RRs listed at the
   delegation.

Patrik already asked what the RFC2119 equivalent for 'good idea' would
be. Perhaps this is a SHOULD. This way the parental agent can be more
sure of things being in-sync at the child name servers.

   The Parental Agent MUST ensure that old versions of the CDS / CDNSKEY
   RRset do not overwrite newer versions.  This MAY be accomplished by
   checking that the signature inception in the RRSIG for CDS / CDNSKEY
   is newer and/or the serial number on the child's SOA is greater.
   This may require the Parental Agent to maintain some state
   information.

Or use the good idea from above, to prevent maintaining state.


Best regards,
  Matthijs




On 04/02/2014 09:07 PM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
> Greetings,
> 
> This is the starting of the WGLC on Automating DNSSEC delegation trust
> maintenance.  This was briefly covered in London and these are ready for
> WGLC.   The current versions of this documents can be found here:
> 
>    
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
>    
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-03.txt
> 
> 
> We'll have a 2 week period for comments, closing on April 16th, 2014. 
> 
> thanks
> tim
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 


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On 11 apr 2014, at 12:03, Antoin Verschuren <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> =
wrote:

> I think since this is a protocol definition, CDS and CDNSKEY MUST
> match. What a parent should do when the protocol is violated is I
> guess an implementation issue, BCP, or perhaps even local policy. A
> parent may only look at CDNSKEY or CDS or both. Saying they MUST match
> when they are both in the zone does not state anything on what the
> parent should do when they don't, same as when the Rdata is rubish.

I support this. This makes possible for parents to decide themselves =
whether:

1. They only fetch CDNSKEY and will not fetch CDS
2. They only fetch CDS and will not fetch CDNSKEY
3. They fetch CDNSKEY first, and then CDS if CDNSKEY does not exist
4. They fetch CDS and first, and then CDNSKEY if CDS does not exist
5. They fetch both CDS and CDNSKEY and will only pick data if the two =
are the same
6, ...

Etc.

If that is not the case, i.e. that the wg want a specific algorithm, =
then that should be explicit.

Unless we have an algorithm, then I support the fact that according to =
the protocol, they MUST result in the same result, as the parent can =
choose what algorithm they use.

   Patrik




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From nobody Fri Apr 11 07:43:46 2014
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From: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
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Subject: [DNSOP] Supporting with changes was Re: ... draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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I=92m a little confused by this:

> I support publication of this document, but I agree that some things
> should be improved before its ready to do so. =85


Perhaps this is more of a pet peeve than a to-the-point comment.

I don=92t see how one can be in support of publishing a document and =
then suggest changes.

In the case of this document, I think it needs a lot of changes (already =
suggested by many), I think publishing it as is would not be very =
constructive.

Looking at the comments, I keep thinking of =93what is the best way to =
specify a protocol.=94  This comes up here in the discussion about =
whether a CDS and CDNSKEY, if both are present, MUST or not MUST be the =
same.

If you think my concern is academic, I=92ll refer to the flap over the =
requirement that a set of data be signed with all algorithms in the DS =
and DNSKEY set being interpreted as =93the validator must see all=94 =
even if the validator had a way to build a chain of trust.

The basics of protocol specification include:

A statement about the set of messages that are to be exchanged.
When causes a particular statement to be sent.
The reaction to the receipt of a particular statement.

I don=92t think this version of the document does a good job of that - =
and my previous comment suggested some fixes.  Whether or not the =
particulars of what I wrote are adopted, I encourage structuring the =
document according to the three lines above.

One reason software is so badly implemented is that the specifications =
are poorly written.  "One reason" - for sure.  If you ask me (and you =
didn=92t) it is the responsibility of the IETF to generate quality =
documents and effort should be extended to make sure what is produced is =
clear and every requirement testable.

When it comes to saying there are statements A and B and that the two =
are supposed to be equivalent - require that.  Require (MUST) the sender =
to make the two be equivalent.  Then write rules for the receiver to =
deal with =93what happens when they are not equivalent.=94  The latter =
is done to make the protocol exchange more robust.

=93Be conservative in what you send, be liberal in what you accept=94 is =
advice for implementers, not necessarily protocol designers.  The role =
of the latter is to restrict communications into a form that makes =
sense.



From nobody Fri Apr 11 08:14:57 2014
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On 04/11/2014 04:43 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> I’m a little confused by this:
> 
>> I support publication of this document, but I agree that some
>> things should be improved before its ready to do so. …
> 
> 
> Perhaps this is more of a pet peeve than a to-the-point comment.

It is, I mean I want this document to published *in the end*, but we are
not there yet.

> I don’t see how one can be in support of publishing a document and
> then suggest changes.
> 
> In the case of this document, I think it needs a lot of changes
> (already suggested by many), I think publishing it as is would not be
> very constructive.

Thus not *as is*.

> Looking at the comments, I keep thinking of “what is the best way to
> specify a protocol.”  This comes up here in the discussion about
> whether a CDS and CDNSKEY, if both are present, MUST or not MUST be
> the same.
> 
> If you think my concern is academic, I’ll refer to the flap over the
> requirement that a set of data be signed with all algorithms in the
> DS and DNSKEY set being interpreted as “the validator must see all”
> even if the validator had a way to build a chain of trust.
> 
> The basics of protocol specification include:
> 
> A statement about the set of messages that are to be exchanged. When
> causes a particular statement to be sent. The reaction to the receipt
> of a particular statement.
> 
> I don’t think this version of the document does a good job of that -
> and my previous comment suggested some fixes.  Whether or not the
> particulars of what I wrote are adopted, I encourage structuring the
> document according to the three lines above.
> 
> One reason software is so badly implemented is that the
> specifications are poorly written.  "One reason" - for sure.  If you
> ask me (and you didn’t) it is the responsibility of the IETF to
> generate quality documents and effort should be extended to make sure
> what is produced is clear and every requirement testable.
> 
> When it comes to saying there are statements A and B and that the two
> are supposed to be equivalent - require that.  Require (MUST) the
> sender to make the two be equivalent.  Then write rules for the
> receiver to deal with “what happens when they are not equivalent.”
> The latter is done to make the protocol exchange more robust.
> 
> “Be conservative in what you send, be liberal in what you accept” is
> advice for implementers, not necessarily protocol designers.  The
> role of the latter is to restrict communications into a form that
> makes sense.
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list 
> DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 


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On 4/11/14, 10:43 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> I’m a little confused by this:
>
>> I support publication of this document, but I agree that some things
>> should be improved before its ready to do so. …
>
> Perhaps this is more of a pet peeve than a to-the-point comment.
>
> I don’t see how one can be in support of publishing a document and then suggest changes.
>
>

I read these to be translated to "I have issues/suggested changes, but 
they are not enough to warrant not publishing this document."

As Shepherd for this document I have been in contact with the authors on 
the issues being raised. All three of us have things that have caused us 
to be distracted from being more attentive.  I suspect in the next week 
all the issues raised will be addressed in some manner.

tim


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On Apr 11, 2014, at 7:43 AM, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:

> I don=92t see how one can be in support of publishing a document and =
then suggest changes.

Because we believe that the basic idea of the document is sound.=20

> In the case of this document, I think it needs a lot of changes =
(already suggested by many), I think publishing it as is would not be =
very constructive.

So far, no one has said "publish as is", have they?

--Paul Hoffman=


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On Apr 11, 2014, at 11:24, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
> So far, no one has said "publish as is", have they?

Considering the last call was for a specific version of a specific =
document[0], I interpret the =93this" in "this document=94 to be the =
specific version.  So, yes, I think =93they=94 have said so.

Perhaps it=92s obvious I=92m picking on Matthij=92s comment, but don=92t =
intend to single him out.

[0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11542.html =
links to =
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-03.t=
xt=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><br><div><div>On Apr 11, 2014, at 11:24, Paul =
Hoffman &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><blockquote type=3D"cite">So far, no one has said "publish =
as is", have they?<br></blockquote></div><br><div><font =
face=3D"Courier">Considering the last call was for a specific version of =
a specific document[0], I interpret the =93this" in "this document=94 to =
be the specific version. &nbsp;So, yes, I think =93they=94 have said =
so.</font></div><div><br></div><div><font face=3D"Courier">Perhaps it=92s =
obvious I=92m picking on Matthij=92s comment, but don=92t intend to =
single him out.</font></div><div><font =
face=3D"Courier"><br></font></div><div><font =
face=3D"Courier">[0]&nbsp;</font><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11542.html">=
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11542.html</a>&nbsp;=
links to <a rel=3D"nofollow" class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintaina=
nce-03.txt" style=3D"font-family: monospace; font-size: medium; =
background-color: rgb(255, 255, =
255);">http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainan=
ce-03.txt</a></div></body></html>=

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On Apr 11, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:

> On Apr 11, 2014, at 11:24, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>> So far, no one has said "publish as is", have they?
>=20
> Considering the last call was for a specific version of a specific =
document[0], I interpret the =93this" in "this document=94 to be the =
specific version.  So, yes, I think =93they=94 have said so.

Then you simply aren't reading the messages: they all say the opposite. =
What can we do to help you read more of the message than just that one =
part?

--Paul Hoffman


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Hi there all,

At the moment this document says that the child SHOULD remove the
CDS/CDNSKEY record once the parent has consumed / acted on it (this
behavior was requested by someone -- unfortunately I cannot remember
whom).

I *think* that I'm hearing that folk would prefer that the child
SHOULD leave it in, or, less strongly MAY remove it.

This (IMO) makes the doc and the child's life simpler, but potentially
makes a bit more work for the parent -- currently most of the
time the parent will see no CDS, and so will go back to sleep. If the
child leaves them around, the parent will need to check them against
what is currently published and take action if they differ.

Can folk please let us know if they would prefer:
A: The child SHOULD remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
parent has published it (currently documented behavior) or

B: The child SHOULD NOT remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR (will require a
small edit to the doc)

My personal preference is for B - it seems more elegant, but (as
always) we'll do whatever the WG wants.

W


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Subject: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-tcp-keepalive-00.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : The edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option
        Authors         : Paul Wouters
                          Joe Abley
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-tcp-keepalive-00.txt
	Pages           : 10
	Date            : 2014-04-11

Abstract:
   DNS messages between clients and servers may be received over either
   UDP or TCP.  UDP transport involves keeping less state on a busy
   server, but can cause truncation and retries over TCP.  Additionally,
   UDP can be exploited for reflection attacks.  Using TCP would reduce
   retransmits and amplification.  However, clients are currently
   limited in their use of the TCP transport as RFC 5966 suggests
   closing idle TCP sessions "in the order of seconds", making use of
   TCP only suitable for individual queries generated as a fallback
   protocol for truncated UDP answers.

   This document defines an EDNS0 option ("edns-tcp-keepalive") that
   allows DNS clients and servers to signal their respective readiness
   to conduct multiple DNS transactions over individual TCP sessions.
   This signalling facilitates a better balance of UDP and TCP transport
   between individual clients and servers, reducing the impact of
   problems associated with UDP transport and allowing the state
   associated with TCP transport to be managed effectively with minimal
   impact on the DNS transaction time.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-tcp-keepalive/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-tcp-keepalive-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
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Subject: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-chain-query-00.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Chain Query requests in DNS
        Author          : Paul Wouters
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-chain-query-00.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2014-04-11

Abstract:
   This document defines an EDNS0 extension that can be used by a DNSSEC
   enabled Recursive Nameserver configured as a forwarder to send a
   single DNS query requesting to receive a complete validation path
   along with the regular DNS answer, without the need to rapid-fire
   many UDP requests in an attempt to attain a low latency.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-chain-query/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-chain-query-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 3:54 PM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m <paf@frobbit.se> wrot=
e:
> On 10 apr 2014, at 18:34, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>
>>> Because of this, I do not mind having some extra words here, like:
>>>
>>> "This proposal do not include all operations needed for maintenance of =
DNSSEC key material, specifically introduction and complete removal of all =
keys. Because of this alternate communications mechanisms must always exist=
, which might introduce extra complexity."
>>
>> DONE.
>
> Thanks!


No worries, we aim to please!

>
>>>> 2.2.1.  Solution Space
>>> :
>>> :
>>>>   Some parents want the child to express their DNSKEYS in the form of
>>>>   DS records, while others want to receive the DNSKEY records and
>>>>   calculate the DS records themselves.  There is no consensus on which
>>>>   method is better; both have good reasons to exist.  The proposal
>>>>   below can operate with both models, but the child needs to be aware
>>>>   of the parental policies.
>>>
>>> Mumble...I really dislike the fact we have not agreed on what to do. It=
 increases complexity _a_lot_. And yes, this is one of the reasons why we d=
o not see more deployment of DNSSEC.
>>>
>>> Why do we (IETF) fail on this?
>>>
>>
>> Yes; however, we want this to be deployed and usable by as many people
>> as possible, so we are avoiding the religious argument in this
>> document. Registry operators are entitled to their own opinion, as
>> much as we dislike it....
>
> This is not YOUR fault, and you can not fix this problem in THIS draft. I=
 just find it being...not fun.

Yup, me too.
If they made me President of the Universe:
1: SPAM would be a capitol offense.
2: All movies **MUST** (RFC2119-style) contain a blooper reel (if
nothing funny happened while filming, well then film some more...)
3: Everyone would take DNSKEYs (I used to think DS but Antoin
convinced me otherwise....).
4: By the time they reach 21, everyone would have to have visited at
least 3 other countries, with noticeably different language and
culture (government assistance would be provided to those who really
cannot afford this on their own).
5: Kylie Minogue's "Locomotion" would be banned. I dislike censorship
as much as the next person, but you have to draw the line somewhere.

>
>>>> 2.2.2.  DNSSEC key change process
>>>>
>>>>   After a Child DNS operator first signs the zone, there is a need to
>>>>   interact with the Parent, for example via the delegation account
>>>>   interface, to "upload / paste-in the zone's DS information".  The
>>>>   action of logging in through the delegation account user interface
>>>>   authenticates that the user is authorized to change delegation
>>>>   information for the child published in the parent zone.  In the case
>>>>   where the "Child DNS Operator" does not have access to the
>>>>   registration account, the Child needs to perform the action.
>>>>
>>>>   At a later date, the Child DNS Operator may want to publish a new DS
>>>>   record in the parent, either because they are rolling keys, or
>>>>   because they want to publish a stand-by key.  This involves
>>>>   performing the same process as before.  Furthermore when this is a
>>>>   manual process with cut and paste, operational mistakes will happen
>>>>   -- or worse, the update action is not performed at all.
>>>
>>> Should it not be mentioned here that child might want to remove all key=
s as well? I mean, if this is supposed to be a complete list of potential o=
perations the child is interested in?
>>>
>>> I see in fact (with some special cases):
>>>
>>> A. Introduction of new keys
>>>
>>> A.1. Introduction when old keys exists and can be used
>>>
>>> A.2. Introduction when no old keys can be used (because they can not be=
 trusted or because no such exists)
>>>
>>> B. Removal of keys
>>>
>>> B.1. Removal of old keys when at least one key still remains in the RRS=
et of zone apex
>>>
>>> B.2. Removal of last key from the RRSet of the zone apex
>>>
>>> If I understand things correctly, you say this draft can only be used f=
or A.1 and B.1?
>>>
>>> I think that should be spelled out very explicitly in section 2.
>>
>> We had specifically decided not to allow B.2 because we don't want
>> this be be used to go from signed to unsigned.
>
> That is fine.
>
>> You also cannot use
>> this for initial enrollment of keys (A.2 - explained in Section 2.2.2
>> & the security considerations section), you can only use it for
>> introducing new keys when you have one working key and removing all
>> except the last key. Added text to clarify what use cases we do and do
>> not support.
>
> Thanks!
>
>> We also had, in the intro: "This proposal does not include all
>> operations needed for the maintenance of DNSSEC key material,
>> specifically the introduction or complete removal of all keys."
>
> Yup, I did understand this, but just felt it was not really crystal clear=
 enough. I know DNSSEC (I think....:-) ) and still had to look at some of t=
he text a few times to ensure that there where no loopholes.

I *think* the -04 version addresses this now -- good 'nuff?
Actually, in my edit buffer (which will become -05 -- "Launch and
iterate") I have:
"This proposal does not include all operations needed for the
maintenance of DNSSEC key material, specifically the initial
introduction or complete removal of all keys. Because of this,
alternate communications mechanisms must always exist, potentially
introducing more complexity."



>
>>>> 4.  Automating DS maintainance with CDS/CDNSKEY records
>>>>
>>>>   CDS/CDNSKEY records are intended to be "consumed" by delegation trus=
t
>>>>   maintainers.  The use of CDS/CDNSKEY is optional.
>>>>
>>>>   Some parents prefer to accept DNSSEC key information in DS format,
>>>>   some parents prefer to accept it in DNSKEY format, and calculate the
>>>>   DS record on the child's behalf.  Each method has pros and cons, bot=
h
>>>>   technical and policy.  This solution is DS vs DNSKEY agnostic, and
>>>>   allows operation with either.
>>>>
>>>>   If the child knows what the parent prefers, they can publish the
>>>>   parent's preferred record type.  If the child does not know (or
>>>>   simply chooses to), they can publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>>>>   child publishes both, the two RRsets they SHOULD match in content.
>>>
>>> Why not a MUST?
>>
>> DONE.
>> Ok, this is somewhat of a philosophical discussion -- I'm always
>> uncomfortable putting a MUST on anything where a user enters the
>> information.
>
> Aha.
>
>> Users (in my experience) seem to take a perverse pleasure
>> in ignoring MUSTs.
>
> I did not see this as a "GUI"-issue... Hmm...
>
>> Having this as a MUST makes me concerned that implementations will
>> treat cases where the data does not match as an error -- and we
>> specifically don't want that (more below).
>
> Hmm...
>
>> If you are one of the
>> registries that likes DNSKEYS (and so consumes CDNSKEY), you shouldn't
>> care what's in the CDS...
>> But, a number of folk have said that they would rather that this be a
>> MUST, so I've just changed it...
>
> The only alternative I can see is to not say anything about whether they =
are the same or not, but instead say that whoever consumes the CDS and CDNS=
KEY MUST be able to pick one of them (and not the other), and it is the par=
ent that do the selection that can be random. Whether the CDS and CDNSKEY i=
s the same or not is up to the child. The parent will only pick one. And th=
ings must still work.

That was what we were trying to say. I guess we failed. Anyway, we
have liberally sprinkled MUSTs all over what the child should^w must
do :-)
We specifically wanted to allow the child to publish only CDS if they
a: so choose and b: know that their parents take DS.
Some folk want to be able to prepublish DS and keep their DNSKEY
hidden until "needed". "

In my -05 edit buffer:
The child SHOULD publish both CDS and CDNSKEY. If the child knows
which the parent consumes, it MAY choose to only publish that record
type (for example, some children wish the parent to publish a DS, but
they wish to keep the DNSKEY "hidden" until needed). If the child
publishes both, the two RRsets MUST match in content. The parent
should use whichever one they choose, but SHOULD NOT query for both
and perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY records.

Note: It is not an error for a child to have published CDS records and
not have CDNSKEYs that hash to those records, nor for there to be
CDNSKEY records without matching CDS records. This is because a child
might have been publishing CDS records and then the parent's policy
changes to require CDNSKEY records. The child might forget to remove
the CDS, etc. This avoids all sorts of error conditions / complexity,
etc"

Is this better / clearer? I'm uncomfortable with the "If the child
publishes both, the two RRsets MUST match in content.". It sort of
sounds like the rdata must be identical. Can anyone suggest better
text? "the two RRsets MUST have the same semantic meaning?" something?



>
>>>>   The parent should use whichever one they choose, but SHOULD NOT quer=
y
>>>>   for both and perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY
>>>>   records.
>>>
>>> Why not? Why talk about it at all?
>>>
>>> I think this document should say:
>>>
>>>   The child can publish one or both of CDS and CDNSKEY.  If the
>>>   child publishes both, the two RRsets they MUST match in content.
>>>
>>> We do not need more RFCs that can be interpreted in multiple ways. And =
why use more words than what we need?
>>
>> See above, the Editor note ("It is not an error for a child to have
>> published CDS records and not have CDNSKEYs that hash to those
>> records, nor for there to be CDNSKEY records without matching DS
>> records.
>
> This I understand.
>
>> This is because a child might have been publishing CDS
>> records and then the parent's policy changes to require CDNSKEY
>> records. The child might forget to remove the CDS, etc. This avoids
>> all sorts of error conditions / complexity, etc"), and Section 6.
>
> Ack. I did not think of this situation. But the parent might also swap ba=
ck, and then will eat the old DS again, which creates problems.

Yup. See new text above.

>
> So the parent might select randomly CDS or CDNSKEY, without the child kno=
wing which one, and things should still work. This implies to me that from =
the parents perspective use of the CDS and use of CDNSKEY is to lead to the=
 same result. Because of this, they MUST be the same.
>
> But I get the point about "error condition".
>
>> This data / information might be coming from user input (yes, we
>> expect that signer tools will create these, but user's might also
>> enter them).  We'd much rather be liberal in what we accept when it
>> comes to user input.
>
> Agree.
>
>> If we were to *require* that they match, what happens in the case
>> where they *don't*? Do we fail the keyroll? That seems suboptimal. Do
>> we throw a log message? No one will see it... If you consume CDS (or
>> CDNSKEY), you simply ignore the other one -- it's not really relevant
>> to you, and no good can come from looking at it. Ignorance is bliss...
>
> Understood.
>
> But I think you must explain what the parent should do.

How is:
"The child SHOULD publish both CDS and CDNSKEY records. If the child
knows which the parent consumes, it MAY choose to only publish that
record type (for example, some children wish the parent to publish a
DS, but they wish to keep the DNSKEY "hidden" until needed). If the
child publishes both, the two RRsets MUST match in content. The parent
should use whichever one they choose, but MUST NOT query for both and
perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY records."

I cleaned this up (see above) - is it clear enough now?

>
> Fetch CDS and CDNSKEY, look at them and see that they lead to different r=
esult. What should then the parent do? Pick CDS or CDNSKEY, or pick one by =
random, or...?
>
>>>> 4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>>>>
>>>>   If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child, this
>>>>   signals that no change should be made to the current DS set.  This
>>>>   means that, once the child and parent are in sync, the child DNS
>>>>   operator MAY remove all CDS records from the zone.
>>>
>>> I am really nervous we will have a state enforced somewhere, that must =
remember what has happened. I much rather want to see the child always have=
 CDS/CDNSKEY for the proper key set.
>>>
>>> So, there must be a reason why this is not allowed?
>>
>> Much of the point of this is to *avoid* the parent having to keep
>> state. If it queries the zone and sees no CDS records, it simply goes
>> back to sleep.
>>
>> Let's say that example.com is signed but has never used CDS / CDNSKEY
>> (like every signed zone currently is). We really don't want the parent
>> going through and removing DS records because there is no CDS
>> published :-) By having a "take no action if there is no CDS/CNSKEY"
>> rule the parent doesn't need to track which children use this.
>
> Ok, I was thinking of the fact that one can not remove the last DS/DNSKEY=
, so "neither CDS, nor CDNSKEY" is a special case (as you say), so I do not=
 see any problem with the situation you talk about.
>
> I was thinking of the last sentence that ask the child to poll parent and=
 see whether DS is published, and if so, remove the CDS/CDNSKEY.
>
> What I do not want is having people enforcing children to keep polling pa=
rent. This by tell DNS hosting providers they are doing the wrong thing if =
they do not remove the CDS/CDNSKEY.
>
> Secondly, the reason why you have to remember state here and there is bec=
ause of the following can happen:
>
> 1. Zone signed with K1
> 2. K1 is published in parent
> 3. CDS for K1 is published
> 4. CDS for K1 is removed
> 5. Zone signed with K1 and K2
> 6. CDS for K1 and K2 is added
> 7. Parent pick up CDS for K1 and K2
> 8. Parent publish data for K1 and K2
> 9. Child remove CDS for K1 and K2
> 10. Zone signed with K2
> 11. CDS for K2 is published
> 12. Parent pick up CDS for K2
> 13. Parent remove DS for K1
>
> Much easier, I claim, specifically when K1 disappears:
>
> 1. Zone signed with K1
> 2. K1 is published in parent
> 3. CDS for K1 is added
> 4. Zone signed with K1 and K2
> 5. CDS for K2 is added (CDS for K1 is already there)
> 7. Parent pick up CDS for K1 and K2
> 8. Parent publish data for K2 (in addition for already existing data for =
K1)
> 9. Zone signed with K2
> 10. CDS for K1 removed
> 11. Parent detect CDS for K1 is removed
> 12. Parent remove DS for K1
>
>>> Also, the MAY here does not match the SHOULD further down.
>>>
>>>>   Following acceptance rules are placed on the CDS / CDNSKEY records a=
s
>>>>   follows:
>>>>
>>>>   o  Location: "the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be at the child zone
>>>>      apex".
>>>>
>>>>   o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both th=
e
>>>>      current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>>>>
>>>>   o  Continuity: "SHOULD NOT break the current delegation if applied t=
o
>>>>      DS RRset"
>>>
>>> I do not understand the SHOULD NOT in this case. Specifically together =
with references to 4.1 below.
>>>
>>
>> DONE.
>> Yeah. This should be a MUST NOT. Fixed.
>
> Thanks!

"Service with a smile"

>
>>> I presume what this says is that the DNSKEY that is signing the CDS/CDN=
SKEY SHOULD be included in what the CDS / CDNSKEY is covering?
>>>
>>> If that is true, are we sure that the SHOULD NOT is inverse to SHOULD i=
n this case?
>>>
>>>>   If any these conditions fail the CDS / CDNSKEY record MUST be
>>>>   ignored.
>>>
>>> How can it be a MUST when Continuity include a SHOULD NOT?
>>
>> DONE.
>> Yup, see above. Fixed.
>
> +1
>
>>> I am a bit confused, but maybe it ends up being clearer if I actually w=
rote code that implemented this ;-)
>>>
>>>> 5.  Child's CDS / CDNSKEY Publication
>>>>
>>>>   Child DNS Operator SHOULD only publish a CDS or CDNSKEY RRset when i=
t
>>>>   wants to make a change to the DS RRset in the Parent.
>>>
>>> Does not match the MAY further up.
>>
>> DONE.
>> Fixed.
>
> +1
>
>>>>   The CDS /
>>>>   CDNSKEY RRset SHOULD be compliant with the rules in Section 4.1.
>>>
>>> Does not match the MUST that covers 4.1.
>>
>> DONE.
>> I guess this is a philosophical difference. I am somewhat leery about
>> using MUST when it comes to user input. We put in SHOULD, to
>> acknowledge that users will often do "wrong" things, it just means
>> that the record will not be valid/processed. I recognize that I'm off
>> in the rough on this, so changed to a must...
>
> Understood. Just ensure the text matches as this is covered in multiple p=
laces.
>
>>>>   When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY, the Child DN=
S
>>>>   Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset(s).
>>>
>>> See above. How does the child know? Do you because of this require the =
child to poll the parent zone? And if the parent want to re-fetch the data =
for some reason, it might be gone from the child zone. Not good.
>>
>> Yes, the child checks the parent to see if it's in sync. A number of
>> working group participants (I had thought yourself included), had
>> indicated that they would rather have this as more of a transaction
>> system, so that the user publishes a record, the parental agent
>> performs the operation, and then the user is expected to remove the
>> "instruction." The reason for this was so that the user's intent is
>> clear and parental agents can, if they wish, log the "transaction." I
>> will see if I can find references to that (it's not noted in the minutes=
, but
>> I think Antoin Verschuren said it and a bunch of other folk agreed).
>
> See above.
>
> I am lazy as a programmer. I do not want people to start to REQUIRE the C=
DS/CDNSKEY to be removed. It must be perfectly ok to have the CDS/CDNSKEY i=
n the zone all the time.
>
> Maybe I am more relaxed if you explicitly say that is a normal case.

Just sent mail to the list explicitly asking which folk would prefer.
My preference is that children just leave the records around (and
update the doc to say so). We had originally put this in because
someone asked us too (and we cannot remember who that was!).
Hopefully folk will want the behavior you (and Matthijs) are asking for.

>
>>>>   Note that if the
>>>>   child has published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS, it will have to calculat=
e
>>>>   the DS (using the requested digest algorithm) to do the comparison.
>>>
>>> Hmmm..."published a DNSKEY RR in the CDS"? The CDS was to include a DS.=
 Right?
>>
>> Edited for clarity -- left over from an old version of the doc.
>
> :-)
>
>>>>   A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses to
>>>>   publish both, it SHOULD attempt to maintain consistency (a matching
>>>>   CDS for each CDNSKEY)
>>>
>>> No, it MUST represent the same data. Please!
>>
>> DONE.
>> It seems like you feel strongly about this :-) My reason for
>> originally having this as a SHOULD are described above (expecting
>> users the follow a MUST leads to implementers to treat "violations" of
>> the MUST as an error...). But, seems like I'm off in the rough,
>> changed...
>
> Ha ha ha...
>
> See above, I now understand.
>
> I want to know what happens both from the child and parent perspective IF=
 the CDS and CDNSKEY differs.
>
> Just say what the result should be.
>
> Parent pick one at random?

In edit buffer (S4):
"The child SHOULD publish both CDS and CDNSKEY. If the child knows
which the parent consumes, it MAY choose to only publish that record
type (for example some children wish the parent to publish a DS, but
they wish to keep the DNSKEY "hidden" until needed). If the child
publishes both, the two RRsets MUST match in content. The parent
should use whichever one they choose, but MUST NOT query for both and
perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY records."



>
>>> I also want to have it spelled out explicitly here whether the CDS/DNSK=
EY MUST include the data for the dnssec key material that signs the CDS/DNS=
KEY or not. I think it MUST include the current key as well.
>>> Otherwise it ends up being same as having no CDS/CDNSKEY and that way r=
emoving keys.
>>
>> Nope, you don't *have* to -- you probably would want to, but it isn't
>> (IMO) a strict MUST.
>
> :-)
>
>> A happy day:
>> Let's say you start with a zone signed with K1
>
> Plus:
> K1 is in parent zone
>
>> You generate a new key, K2.
>> You sign your zone with K1 and K2.
>> You publish K2 (only) in the zone (in a CDS), signed with K1.
>> Your parent picks up the CDS and validates the K2 CDS using K1.
>> The draft says: "In particular the Parental Agent MUST double check
>> the Continuity rule and do its best not to invalidate the Child zone."
>> - publishing only K2 will not break the Continuity rule (Continuity:
>> "MUST NOT break the current delegation if applied to DS RRset") and so
>> the parent publishes only K2.
>
> Plus:
> The parent removes K1
>
>> A sad day:
>> Let's say you start with a zone signed with K1
>
> Plus:
> K1 published by parent
>
>> You generate a new key, K2.
>> You get sidetracked and forget to sign your zone with K2 (or you
>> somehow otherwise screw up).
>> You publish K2 (only) in the zone (in a CDS), signed with K1.
>> Your parent picks up the CDS and validates the K2 CDS using K1.
>> The draft says: "In particular the Parental Agent MUST double check
>> the Continuity rule and do its best not to invalidate the Child zone."
>> - publishing only K2 would violate the continuity rule, and so the
>> parent does not proceed.
>
> Agree.
>
>> If it were *me*, I'd publish a CDS with *both* K1 and K2, wait a
>> little bit, then publish only K2, but this is not a required way of
>> rolling keys.
>
> Nope, the fact there is no CDS/CDNSKEY for K1, data for K1 MUST be remove=
d (as there is CDS/CDNSKEY for K2). So with your way of doing things, you w=
ould violate some earlier rules in the RFC. Right?
>
> I.e. you either break the continuity rule OR you break the rule that K1 M=
UST be removed when the CDS/CDNSKEY is removed.
>
>> So that at every point in time the chain of trust is secured.
>>>
>>> So one go from:
>>>
>>> 1. No keys at all
>>>
>>> This process can not be used, but say DNSKEY K1 is added. CDNSKEY K1 is=
 added to the zone.
>>>
>>> 2. K1 is in use
>>>
>>> K2 is introduced by adding CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 be added to th=
e zone. Signed by at least K1.
>>>
>>> 3. K1 and K2 is in use
>>>
>>> Ensure that CDNSKEY for K1 and CDNSKEY K2 are both signed with at least=
 K2.
>>>
>>> 4. K2 is in use
>>>
>>> Remove CDNSKEY for K1.
>>>
>>> 5. K2 is in use
>>>
>>> Removal of K2 without introducing K3 is not possible.
>>>
>>> 6. No key is in use
>>>
>>> See 1.
>>>
>>>> 6.  Parent side CDS / CDNSKEY Consumption
>>>>
>>>>   The CDS / CDNSKEY RRset MAY be used by the Parental Agent to update
>>>>   the DS RRset in the parent zone.  The Parental Agent for this uses a
>>>>   tool that understands the CDS / CDNSKEY signing rules from
>>>>   Section 4.1 so it may not be able to use a standard validator.
>>>
>>> What do the author know about "standard validators"? :-)
>>>
>>>>   Parent SHOULD treat the Continuity rule as "MUST".
>>>
>>> Well...here we have confusion. The continuity rule is a SHOULD, the who=
le block is a MUST and above it is sort of wobbly...
>>>
>>
>> DONE.
>> Ok. This was yet another instance of me being timid and not not liking
>> telling people what to do!
>
> See above. Just make text consistent!
>
>>>>   The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY records, and
>>>>   MUST NOT expect there to be both.  A parent SHOULD NOT perform a
>>>>   consistency check between CDS and CDNSKEY (other than for
>>>>   informational / debugging use).
>>>
>>> Ok. Do though see above about MUST regarding client requirement on havi=
ng the two RR in sync if both exists.
>>>
>>>> 6.1.  Detecting a changed CDS / CDNSKEY
>>> :
>>>>   Pushing  The delegation user interface has a button {Fetch DS} when
>>>>         pushed preforms the CDS / CDNSKEY processing.  If the Parent
>>>>         zone does not contain DS for this delegation then the "push"
>>>>         MUST be ignored.
>>>
>>> Well, I do not think there should be a MUST. As written below there mig=
ht be other means that can be used to ensure the data is correct. Saying SH=
OULD is ok. Together with explanation what risk exists. Like:
>>>
>>> ...then the "push" SHOULD be ignored. Reasons for the "push" to be trus=
ted might be additional user interface/interactions, two factor authenticat=
ion to validate the "push" and similar.
>>
>> Hmmm.. If I'm understanding what you are suggesting, you would like a
>> user to be able to go to a web page, click the "Fetch DS" button and
>> have this used for initial enrollment? This still seems like a bad
>> idea to me -- unless it is explicitly a "Fetch DS, show user what was
>> fetched and ask him to confirm the submission".
>
> Something like that.
>
>> We do have some text in the security section saying that this should not=
 be
>> used for initial key enrollment as we don't really want to be dictating =
parental
>> behavior for this.
>
> The problem is that exactly this is what people ask for... :-P
>
> How often do you click "yes" and "no" when your ssh client show you an in=
itial fingerprint? ;-)

Well, I never click Yes *and* No :-)

Do you like:
"The delegation user interface has a button {Fetch DS} when pushed
preforms the CDS / CDNSKEY processing. If the Parent zone does not
contain DS for this delegation then the "push" SHOULD be ignored. If
the Parental Agent displays the contents of the CDS / CDSNKEY to the
user and gets confirmation that this represents their key, the
Parental Agent MAY use this for initial enrolment (when the Parent
zone does not contain the DS for this delgation). "



>
>>>>   In either case the Parental Agent MAY apply additional rules that
>>>>   defer the acceptance of a CDS / CDNSKEY change, these rules may
>>>>   include a condition that the CDS / CDNSKEY remains in place and vali=
d
>>>>   for some time period before it is accepted.  It may be appropriate i=
n
>>>>   the "Pushing" case to assume that the Child is ready and thus accept
>>>>   changes without delay.
>>>
>>> Does not work if you have a MUST above. Just remove this paragraph.
>>>
>>> Either you have a MUST or not. Not MUST and then a paragraph that make =
things not a MUST.
>>
>> Um, what? Above doesn't parse for me.
>> A legitimate use case is that the parent polls for keys, but doesn't
>> do anything with them until the user click "Please make the change".
>
> Aha.
>
>> Or, the parent polls once a day, but the user can request an immediate
>> action by asking for it.
>
> Ok, I get it.
>
>>>> 6.2.  Using the new CDS / CDNSKEY records
>>>>
>>>>   Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
>>>>   CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to obtain
>>>>   a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone.  It would be a
>>>>   good idea if the Parental Agent checked all NS RRs listed at the
>>>>   delegation.
>>>
>>> What does "would be a good idea" mean in RFC 1918 speak? :-)
>>>
>>> More seriously, no, I do not think that requirement should be there at =
all.
>>
>> Which one? I'm assuming you are fine with / like the "Parental Agent
>> MUST use a DNSSEC validator"?
>
> I just wanted to know in official MAY/MUST/SHOULD language what "be a goo=
d idea" means first of all.
>
>>> How to handle lame delegation, inability to use cached information, wha=
t TTL can be acceptable etc is hidden in this "good idea". Just remove it.
>>>
>>> Either DNS is used to fetch the RR or not.
>>>
>>>>   The Parental Agent MUST ensure that old versions of the CDS / CDNSKE=
Y
>>>>   RRset do not overwrite newer versions.
>>>
>>> I do not think this is a good idea. See above.
>>>
>>> Please remove.
>>>
>>> This is because there is a requirement on state in the parent. I dislik=
e that. Much better if the CDS/CDNSKEY is always reflecting the current sta=
te in the child zone. And just say so.
>>
>> This was specifically added because folk asked for it. You have a
>> "primary" DNS server and a bunch of "secondaries" (by "primary" and
>> "secondary" I mean you have one server where you make the changes, and
>> the others all slave from it).
>> You are in the process of rolling from key BAR to key FOO.
>>
>> You have:
>> . CDS KEY_FOO on the primary.
>> and
>> . CDS KEY_BAR on the secondaries because they have not yet AXFRed the zo=
ne.
>>
>> The parent chooses an NS at random - it picks the "primary" and
>> updates what it publishes for the child.
>> It then tries again, and happens to hit a "secondary".. and updates
>> what it publishes for the child.
>> Lather, rinse, repeat.
>
> No, I absolutely do not like this.
>
> You also have caching, you have lame delegation and a million other thing=
s.
>
> This is why we do key rollover with multiple keys.
>
> So you never jump from CDS KEY_FOO to CDS KEY_BAR in one hop. You always =
have them overlap, OR, you get the problem you talk about. And it is not th=
e parents responsibility to ensure you do not as a child shoot yourself in =
your foot.
>
> We already have too many parents that have I do not know how many stupid =
rules for what various values must be in the child hosting situation, and i=
n many cases that make it plain impossible to do what you want as a child. =
Really silly rules.
>
> Parent should not control the child.
>
> If the child do NOT want the problem you talk about, have overlapping CDS=
/CDNSKEY. If you want to jump quickly, do what you suggest with non overlap=
ping CDS/CDNSKEY but risk that the wrong DS might be published in parent zo=
ne. Up to you as a child.
>
> Compared to many other things that I suggest, I can give up my arguments,=
 but not this. This I must really be convinced why I am wrong.

Ok. Fair. Removed.

>
> And you have btw not said what happens when you have a lame delegation in=
 your scenario. Or when you do not get a response. Or when you get a respon=
se over IPv4 but not IPv6. Or when you can not even send a DNS query to the=
 IP address of one of the auth servers because you do not have that IP addr=
ess in your routing table. It might be an RFC 1918 address. Or you might be=
 behind a firewall that do not allow any direct DNS queries, you can only i=
ssue queries via a forwarder. Or...
>
>>>> 6.2.1.  Parent calculates DS
>>>>
>>>>   There are cases where the Parent wants to calculate the DS record du=
e
>>>>   to policy reasons.  In this case, the Child publishes CDNSKEY record=
s
>>>>   containing DNSKEYs.
>>>>
>>>>   The parent calculates the DS records on behalf of the children.  The
>>>>   DNS Parent needs to publish guidelines for the children as to what
>>>>   digest algorithms are acceptable in the CDS record.
>>>
>>> What is "needs to"? MUST?
>>
>> I guess. This wasn't a requirement, more of a "I think that parents
>> should do this sort of thing anyway."
>> I'll just remove that sentence...
>
> :-)
>
>> :
>>> :
>>>>   Implications on Parental Agent are that the CDNSKEY and DS are not
>>>>   exactly the same after update thus it needs to take that into
>>>>   consideration when checking CDNSKEY records.  Same goes for the Chil=
d
>>>>   DNS Operator, it needs to be able to detect that the new DS RRset is
>>>>   "equivalent" to the current CDNSKEY RRset, thus it can remove the
>>>>   CDNSKEY RRset.
>>>
>>> Why not say instead:
>>>
>>> In the case the parent fetch the CDNSKEY and calculate the DS it MAY be=
 the case that the DS published in the parent zone is not identical with th=
e data in the CDS record made available by the child.
>>>
>>> Because I think that is what you try to say?
>>
>> DONE.
>> Yup, this is cleaner.
>
> Phew...
>
>>>
>>>> 9.  Security Considerations
>>>
>>> Please add something like:
>>>
>>> As this introduces a mechanism to contact the parent it MUST be clear w=
ho is fetching the records and creates the appropriate records in the paren=
t zone. Specifically as some operations MUST be using other mechanisms than=
 what is described here. If for example communication normally is done via =
a registrar that via epp is communicating with the registry, the registrar =
is normally "caching" the data passed to it. If then the registry is fetchi=
ng the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry have a different view of the DNSSEC =
key material situation than the registrar, and the result of such a situati=
on is unclear. Because of this, this mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass =
intermediaries that might cache information and because of that get the wro=
ng state.
>>
>> I reworded this to be:
>> "As this introduces a new mechanism to update information in the
>> parent it MUST be clear who is fetching the records and creating the
>> appropriate records in the parent zone. Specifically some operations
>> may use other mechanisms than what is described here. For example, a
>> registrar may assume that it is maintaining the DNSSEC key information
>> in the registry, and may have this cached. If the registry is fetching
>> the CDS / CDNSKEY then the registry and registrar may have different
>> views of the DNSSEC key material and the result of such a situation is
>> unclear. Because of this, this mechanism SHOULD NOT be use to bypass
>> intermediaries that might cache information and because of that get
>> the wrong state. "
>
> Thanks!
>
>>>> 10.  Acknowledgements
>>>>
>>>>   We would like to thank a large number of folk, including: Mark
>>>>   Andrews, Joe Abley, Jaap Akkerhuis, Roy Arends, Doug Barton, Brian
>>>>   Dickinson, Paul Ebersman, Tony Finch, Patrik Faltsrom, Jim Galvin,
>>>
>>> Please spell my last name "Faltstrom".
>>>
>>
>> DONE.
>
> ;-)
>
>    Patrik
>

W


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:36 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> w=
rote:
> Hi,
>
>
> On 04/10/2014 09:54 PM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m wrote:
>>>>> 2.2.1.  Solution Space
>>>> : :
>>>>> Some parents want the child to express their DNSKEYS in the
>>>>> form of DS records, while others want to receive the DNSKEY
>>>>> records and calculate the DS records themselves.  There is no
>>>>> consensus on which method is better; both have good reasons to
>>>>> exist.  The proposal below can operate with both models, but
>>>>> the child needs to be aware of the parental policies.
>>>>
>>>> Mumble...I really dislike the fact we have not agreed on what to
>>>> do. It increases complexity _a_lot_. And yes, this is one of the
>>>> reasons why we do not see more deployment of DNSSEC.
>>>>
>>>> Why do we (IETF) fail on this?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes; however, we want this to be deployed and usable by as many
>>> people as possible, so we are avoiding the religious argument in
>>> this document. Registry operators are entitled to their own
>>> opinion, as much as we dislike it....
>>
>> This is not YOUR fault, and you can not fix this problem in THIS
>> draft. I just find it being...not fun.
>
> I had proposed to have one CDS record that has the RDATA identical as
> the DNSKEY record, plus a hash digest type field. For example:
>
>     example.com. 86400 IN CDS *1* 257 3 8 AwEAA...
>
> This would work for both agents that want DS and agents that want
> DNSKEY. Counter arguments from Warren were:
>
> 1. No, because now the parents who want DS are not getting DS -- they
> are getting DNSKEY.
>
> My understanding was that the reason why parents want DS is so that the
> child can determine the hash digest to be used. So the format of the CDS
> record does not really matter.
>
> 2. Some children want to be able to publish a DS record, but not expose
> the DNSKEY until they start using it -- the method you have described
> doesn't allow for that
>
> Why would you not want to expose the DNSKEY that you are going to use?

Some folk believe that publishing only the DS, and keeping the standby
DNSKEY in your pocket for later use is "safer".
By only publishing the DS, the attacker cannot see the DNSKEY and so
cannot try factor it. It doesn't matter is this is a valid concern or
not -- it's a viewpoint that some hold and so we should accomodate it.


>
> I had not yet received good responses for my 'counter-counter'
> questions. But if Warren's arguments are valid, then having two
> different records is imo the cleanest solution.
>
>
>>>>> 4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY processing rules
>>>>>
>>>>> If there are no CDS / CDNSKEY resource records in the child,
>>>>> this signals that no change should be made to the current DS
>>>>> set.  This means that, once the child and parent are in sync,
>>>>> the child DNS operator MAY remove all CDS records from the
>>>>> zone.
>>>>
>>>> I am really nervous we will have a state enforced somewhere, that
>>>> must remember what has happened. I much rather want to see the
>>>> child always have CDS/CDNSKEY for the proper key set.
>>>>
>>>> So, there must be a reason why this is not allowed?
>>>
>>> Much of the point of this is to *avoid* the parent having to keep
>>> state. If it queries the zone and sees no CDS records, it simply
>>> goes back to sleep.
>
> If the child will maintain the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset in its zone, the only
> extra step the parental agent has to make is to do a compare and if the
> compare returns 'in-sync', it simply goes back to sleep.

Yup.

>
>>> Let's say that example.com is signed but has never used CDS /
>>> CDNSKEY (like every signed zone currently is). We really don't want
>>> the parent going through and removing DS records because there is
>>> no CDS published :-) By having a "take no action if there is no
>>> CDS/CNSKEY" rule the parent doesn't need to track which children
>>> use this.
>
> But you have to do the polling anyway. And there is no tracking or
> maintaining state for the parent if the child maintains the CDS/CDNSKEY
> RRset.
>
> So, it makes it marginally more difficult (one compare per poll) for the
> parent, while the rule of removing the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset when in-sync
> makes it much more complex for the child, with all the polling and
> additional state it needs to maintain.


Yup. I just posted mail to the list (Argh! Forgot a subject on the
mail!) asking for feedback on which folk would prefer. I personally
like the "just leave the record in the zone" view. Hopefully others
will too...

>
>
>>>>> When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY, the
>>>>> Child DNS Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset(s).
>>>>
>>>> See above. How does the child know? Do you because of this
>>>> require the child to poll the parent zone? And if the parent want
>>>> to re-fetch the data for some reason, it might be gone from the
>>>> child zone. Not good.
>>>
>>> Yes, the child checks the parent to see if it's in sync. A number
>>> of working group participants (I had thought yourself included),
>>> had indicated that they would rather have this as more of a
>>> transaction system, so that the user publishes a record, the
>>> parental agent performs the operation, and then the user is
>>> expected to remove the "instruction." The reason for this was so
>>> that the user's intent is clear and parental agents can, if they
>>> wish, log the "transaction." I will see if I can find references to
>>> that (it's not noted in the minutes, but I think Antoin Verschuren
>>> said it and a bunch of other folk agreed).
>>
>> See above.
>>
>> I am lazy as a programmer. I do not want people to start to REQUIRE
>> the CDS/CDNSKEY to be removed. It must be perfectly ok to have the
>> CDS/CDNSKEY in the zone all the time.
>
> I am a programmer. I do not want to track and remove the CDS/CDNSKEY if
> they are in-sync.
>
>> Maybe I am more relaxed if you explicitly say that is a normal case.
>
> Fully agree.
>
>
>>>>> A child MAY publish both CDS and CDNSKEY.  If a child chooses
>>>>> to publish both, it SHOULD attempt to maintain consistency (a
>>>>> matching CDS for each CDNSKEY)
>>>>
>>>> No, it MUST represent the same data. Please!
>>>
>>> DONE. It seems like you feel strongly about this :-) My reason for
>>> originally having this as a SHOULD are described above (expecting
>>> users the follow a MUST leads to implementers to treat "violations"
>>> of the MUST as an error...). But, seems like I'm off in the rough,
>>> changed...
>>
>> Ha ha ha...
>>
>> See above, I now understand.
>>
>> I want to know what happens both from the child and parent
>> perspective IF the CDS and CDNSKEY differs.
>>
>> Just say what the result should be.
>>
>> Parent pick one at random?
>
> At random? Then you still don't really know that the result would be ;)

Hopefully the text is now clearer. The parent should choose either DS
*or* DNSKEY (based upon local registry policy - they have already done
this). They then poll for the corresponding RR (CDS *or* CDNSKEY) and
ignore the other one.

>
> Best regards,
>   Matthijs
>
>


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Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 18:06:55 -0400
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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 7:10 AM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m <paf@frobbit.se> wrot=
e:
>
> On 11 apr 2014, at 12:03, Antoin Verschuren <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> w=
rote:
>
>> I think since this is a protocol definition, CDS and CDNSKEY MUST
>> match. What a parent should do when the protocol is violated is I
>> guess an implementation issue, BCP, or perhaps even local policy. A
>> parent may only look at CDNSKEY or CDS or both. Saying they MUST match
>> when they are both in the zone does not state anything on what the
>> parent should do when they don't, same as when the Rdata is rubish.
>
> I support this. This makes possible for parents to decide themselves whet=
her:
>
> 1. They only fetch CDNSKEY and will not fetch CDS
> 2. They only fetch CDS and will not fetch CDNSKEY
> 3. They fetch CDNSKEY first, and then CDS if CDNSKEY does not exist
> 4. They fetch CDS and first, and then CDNSKEY if CDS does not exist
> 5. They fetch both CDS and CDNSKEY and will only pick data if the two are=
 the same
> 6, ...
>
> Etc.
>
> If that is not the case, i.e. that the wg want a specific algorithm, then=
 that should be explicit.
>
> Unless we have an algorithm, then I support the fact that according to th=
e protocol, they MUST result in the same result, as the parent can choose w=
hat algorithm they use.

Yup. The document currently (-04) says that if the child publishes
both, they MUST match. However, it also says that the parent MUST NOT
perform a consistency check -- it chooses either DS or DNSKEY based
upon local policy and then consumes the corresponding record type.

Relevant text:
"Some parents prefer to accept DNSSEC key information in DS format,
some parents prefer to accept it in DNSKEY format, and calculate the
DS record on the child's behalf. Each method has pros and cons, both
technical and policy. This solution is DS vs DNSKEY agnostic, and
allows operation with either.

The child SHOULD publish both CDS and CDNSKEY records. If the child
knows which the parent consumes, it MAY choose to only publish that
record type (for example, some children wish the parent to publish a
DS, but they wish to keep the DNSKEY "hidden" until needed). If the
child publishes both, the two RRsets MUST match in content. The parent
should use whichever one they choose, but MUST NOT query for both and
perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY records."

"The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY records (based
upon local policy), and MUST NOT expect there to be both. A parent
MUST NOT perform a consistency check between CDS and CDNSKEY (other
than for informational / debugging use)."

Is this A: sane and B: reasonable?

W


>
>    Patrik
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>


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Subject: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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[ Apologies all - I initially sent this with no subject line.
Resending. Hopefully this makes things clearer... Also, unless we hear
strong objections I'm planning on doing what Patrik and Matthijs
suggested, option A ]


On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
> Hi there all,
>
> At the moment this document says that the child SHOULD remove the
> CDS/CDNSKEY record once the parent has consumed / acted on it (this
> behavior was requested by someone -- unfortunately I cannot remember
> whom).
>
> I *think* that I'm hearing that folk would prefer that the child
> SHOULD leave it in, or, less strongly MAY remove it.
>
> This (IMO) makes the doc and the child's life simpler, but potentially
> makes a bit more work for the parent -- currently most of the
> time the parent will see no CDS, and so will go back to sleep. If the
> child leaves them around, the parent will need to check them against
> what is currently published and take action if they differ.
>
> Can folk please let us know if they would prefer:
> A: The child SHOULD remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
> parent has published it (currently documented behavior) or
>
> B: The child SHOULD NOT remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR (will require a
> small edit to the doc)
>
> My personal preference is for B - it seems more elegant, but (as
> always) we'll do whatever the WG wants.
>
> W
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Fri Apr 11 15:40:24 2014
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05.txt
	Pages           : 19
	Date            : 2014-04-11

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Hi all,

In the launch and iterate spirit here is the latest
draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance.
I have incorporated many of Patrik's comment, and also some Ed and
Paul Hoffman text too.
Matthijs Mekking sent us a bunch of nits off-lisnt which we have also
incorporated.

Thank you everyone for providing feedback, etc.
One of hte biggest outstanding issues is whether the child should
remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR once the parent has published it. The
feedback we are getting is that they should not (and this is our
prefernce too) - we have asked for consensus on list, and will (of
course) do what ever the WG decides.

W



---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 6:40 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05.txt
To: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>, George Barwood
<george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk>, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05.txt
has been successfully submitted by Warren Kumari and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
Revision:       05
Title:          Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
Document date:  2014-04-11
Group:          dnsop
Pages:          19
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
Htmlized:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05
Diff:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-05

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat


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On 11 apr 2014, at 23:48, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

>> This is not YOUR fault, and you can not fix this problem in THIS =
draft. I just find it being...not fun.
>=20
> Yup, me too.
> If they made me President of the Universe:
> 1: SPAM would be a capitol offense.
> 2: All movies **MUST** (RFC2119-style) contain a blooper reel (if
> nothing funny happened while filming, well then film some more...)
> 3: Everyone would take DNSKEYs (I used to think DS but Antoin
> convinced me otherwise....).
> 4: By the time they reach 21, everyone would have to have visited at
> least 3 other countries, with noticeably different language and
> culture (government assistance would be provided to those who really
> cannot afford this on their own).
> 5: Kylie Minogue's "Locomotion" would be banned. I dislike censorship
> as much as the next person, but you have to draw the line somewhere.

Where do I cast my vote?

>> Yup, I did understand this, but just felt it was not really crystal =
clear enough. I know DNSSEC (I think....:-) ) and still had to look at =
some of the text a few times to ensure that there where no loopholes.
>=20
> I *think* the -04 version addresses this now -- good 'nuff?
> Actually, in my edit buffer (which will become -05 -- "Launch and
> iterate") I have:
> "This proposal does not include all operations needed for the
> maintenance of DNSSEC key material, specifically the initial
> introduction or complete removal of all keys. Because of this,
> alternate communications mechanisms must always exist, potentially
> introducing more complexity."

Excellent!

> In my -05 edit buffer:
> The child SHOULD publish both CDS and CDNSKEY. If the child knows
> which the parent consumes, it MAY choose to only publish that record
> type (for example, some children wish the parent to publish a DS, but
> they wish to keep the DNSKEY "hidden" until needed). If the child
> publishes both, the two RRsets MUST match in content. The parent
> should use whichever one they choose, but SHOULD NOT query for both
> and perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY records.
>=20
> Note: It is not an error for a child to have published CDS records and
> not have CDNSKEYs that hash to those records, nor for there to be
> CDNSKEY records without matching CDS records. This is because a child
> might have been publishing CDS records and then the parent's policy
> changes to require CDNSKEY records. The child might forget to remove
> the CDS, etc. This avoids all sorts of error conditions / complexity,
> etc"
>=20
> Is this better / clearer? I'm uncomfortable with the "If the child
> publishes both, the two RRsets MUST match in content.". It sort of
> sounds like the rdata must be identical. Can anyone suggest better
> text? "the two RRsets MUST have the same semantic meaning?" something?

Excellent.

The rest of the comments are approximately this. You only have to say =
this once.

>> I am lazy as a programmer. I do not want people to start to REQUIRE =
the CDS/CDNSKEY to be removed. It must be perfectly ok to have the =
CDS/CDNSKEY in the zone all the time.
>>=20
>> Maybe I am more relaxed if you explicitly say that is a normal case.
>=20
> Just sent mail to the list explicitly asking which folk would prefer.
> My preference is that children just leave the records around (and
> update the doc to say so). We had originally put this in because
> someone asked us too (and we cannot remember who that was!).
> Hopefully folk will want the behavior you (and Matthijs) are asking =
for.

We'll see.

>> How often do you click "yes" and "no" when your ssh client show you =
an initial fingerprint? ;-)
>=20
> Well, I never click Yes *and* No :-)

Mumble, I blame a few reports from the Swedish Government on Fibre =
deployment that was pure crap, lack of coffee and other things.

> Do you like:
> "The delegation user interface has a button {Fetch DS} when pushed
> preforms the CDS / CDNSKEY processing. If the Parent zone does not
> contain DS for this delegation then the "push" SHOULD be ignored. If
> the Parental Agent displays the contents of the CDS / CDSNKEY to the
> user and gets confirmation that this represents their key, the
> Parental Agent MAY use this for initial enrolment (when the Parent
> zone does not contain the DS for this delgation). "

Good!

>>>>> 6.2.  Using the new CDS / CDNSKEY records
>>>>>=20
>>>>>  Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
>>>>>  CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to =
obtain
>>>>>  a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone.  It would be =
a
>>>>>  good idea if the Parental Agent checked all NS RRs listed at the
>>>>>  delegation.
>>>>=20
>>>> What does "would be a good idea" mean in RFC 1918 speak? :-)
>>>>=20
>>>> More seriously, no, I do not think that requirement should be there =
at all.
>>>=20
>>> Which one? I'm assuming you are fine with / like the "Parental Agent
>>> MUST use a DNSSEC validator"?
>>=20
>> I just wanted to know in official MAY/MUST/SHOULD language what "be a =
good idea" means first of all.
>>=20
>>>> How to handle lame delegation, inability to use cached information, =
what TTL can be acceptable etc is hidden in this "good idea". Just =
remove it.
>>>>=20
>>>> Either DNS is used to fetch the RR or not.
>>>>=20
>>>>>  The Parental Agent MUST ensure that old versions of the CDS / =
CDNSKEY
>>>>>  RRset do not overwrite newer versions.
>>>>=20
>>>> I do not think this is a good idea. See above.
>>>>=20
>>>> Please remove.
>>>>=20
>>>> This is because there is a requirement on state in the parent. I =
dislike that. Much better if the CDS/CDNSKEY is always reflecting the =
current state in the child zone. And just say so.
>>>=20
>>> This was specifically added because folk asked for it. You have a
>>> "primary" DNS server and a bunch of "secondaries" (by "primary" and
>>> "secondary" I mean you have one server where you make the changes, =
and
>>> the others all slave from it).
>>> You are in the process of rolling from key BAR to key FOO.
>>>=20
>>> You have:
>>> . CDS KEY_FOO on the primary.
>>> and
>>> . CDS KEY_BAR on the secondaries because they have not yet AXFRed =
the zone.
>>>=20
>>> The parent chooses an NS at random - it picks the "primary" and
>>> updates what it publishes for the child.
>>> It then tries again, and happens to hit a "secondary".. and updates
>>> what it publishes for the child.
>>> Lather, rinse, repeat.
>>=20
>> No, I absolutely do not like this.
>>=20
>> You also have caching, you have lame delegation and a million other =
things.
>>=20
>> This is why we do key rollover with multiple keys.
>>=20
>> So you never jump from CDS KEY_FOO to CDS KEY_BAR in one hop. You =
always have them overlap, OR, you get the problem you talk about. And it =
is not the parents responsibility to ensure you do not as a child shoot =
yourself in your foot.
>>=20
>> We already have too many parents that have I do not know how many =
stupid rules for what various values must be in the child hosting =
situation, and in many cases that make it plain impossible to do what =
you want as a child. Really silly rules.
>>=20
>> Parent should not control the child.
>>=20
>> If the child do NOT want the problem you talk about, have overlapping =
CDS/CDNSKEY. If you want to jump quickly, do what you suggest with non =
overlapping CDS/CDNSKEY but risk that the wrong DS might be published in =
parent zone. Up to you as a child.
>>=20
>> Compared to many other things that I suggest, I can give up my =
arguments, but not this. This I must really be convinced why I am wrong.
>=20
> Ok. Fair. Removed.

Thank you VERY much!

Hint: Try to register a domain name in the .IS ccTLD. That is the latest =
hangup I have regarding broken policy by a registry. There are probably =
others as well, but this is my latest "interesting" case.

   Patrik


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On 11 apr 2014, at 23:12, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

> Hi there all,
>=20
> At the moment this document says that the child SHOULD remove the
> CDS/CDNSKEY record once the parent has consumed / acted on it (this
> behavior was requested by someone -- unfortunately I cannot remember
> whom).
>=20
> I *think* that I'm hearing that folk would prefer that the child
> SHOULD leave it in, or, less strongly MAY remove it.
>=20
> This (IMO) makes the doc and the child's life simpler, but potentially
> makes a bit more work for the parent -- currently most of the
> time the parent will see no CDS, and so will go back to sleep. If the
> child leaves them around, the parent will need to check them against
> what is currently published and take action if they differ.
>=20
> Can folk please let us know if they would prefer:
> A: The child SHOULD remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
> parent has published it (currently documented behavior) or
>=20
> B: The child SHOULD NOT remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR (will require a
> small edit to the doc)
>=20
> My personal preference is for B - it seems more elegant, but (as
> always) we'll do whatever the WG wants.

Let me try to explain in a neutral way what I see as an issue:

As I am one of the persons that have rised the issue that we must be =
extremely clear on what we thing is ok here, let me explain the =
situation I am looking at, and that is how things work when child want =
to do a key rollover. I.e. child has for example DS foo and want to swap =
to DS bar. This implies having CDS for foo ate some point in time, CDS =
for foo and bar at some interval and then CDS for bar at some point in =
time. I.e. both add bar and remove foo.

This is, I think -- but can be wrong, much easier if CDS foo is in the =
zone all the time DS for foo is to be valid, and then CDS for bar is in =
the zone as long as the DS for bar is to be valid. Example below is for =
CDS because it is shorter to type, but can be valid for CDNSKEY as well =
of course (and yes, Antoine has convinced me as well that DNSKEY is the =
path forward...;-) ).

The argument for me is that if CDS is removed, then we have:

1. Add DS foo
1.1. Add CDS foo
1.2. Remove CDS foo

2. Add DS bar and remove DS foo
1.2. Add CDS foo
2.2. Add CDS bar
2.3. Remove CDS foo
2.4. Remove CDS bar

I am here nervous over the parent detecting 2.4 before 2.3, and the =
wrong DS is removed. Note that the last DS is never removed if the last =
CDS is removed from the zone. And the parent still must detect when CDS =
foo is added that that is already in the parent zone, and no action is =
needed.

If the CDS stays in the zone, we have:

1. Add DS foo
1.1 Add CDS foo

2. Add DS bar and remove DS foo
2.1. Add CDS bar
2.2 Remove CDS foo

So I am in favor of B.

   Patrik


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.

  Patrik

On 12 apr 2014, at 00:11, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

> [ Apologies all - I initially sent this with no subject line.
> Resending. Hopefully this makes things clearer... Also, unless we hear
> strong objections I'm planning on doing what Patrik and Matthijs
> suggested, option A ]
> 
> 
> On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>> Hi there all,
>> 
>> At the moment this document says that the child SHOULD remove the
>> CDS/CDNSKEY record once the parent has consumed / acted on it (this
>> behavior was requested by someone -- unfortunately I cannot remember
>> whom).
>> 
>> I *think* that I'm hearing that folk would prefer that the child
>> SHOULD leave it in, or, less strongly MAY remove it.
>> 
>> This (IMO) makes the doc and the child's life simpler, but potentially
>> makes a bit more work for the parent -- currently most of the
>> time the parent will see no CDS, and so will go back to sleep. If the
>> child leaves them around, the parent will need to check them against
>> what is currently published and take action if they differ.
>> 
>> Can folk please let us know if they would prefer:
>> A: The child SHOULD remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
>> parent has published it (currently documented behavior) or
>> 
>> B: The child SHOULD NOT remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR (will require a
>> small edit to the doc)
>> 
>> My personal preference is for B - it seems more elegant, but (as
>> always) we'll do whatever the WG wants.
>> 
>> W
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> DNSOP mailing list
>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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On Sat, Apr 12, 2014 at 3:28 AM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m <paf@frobbit.se> wrot=
e:
> No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.

Doh! Yes.
Sorry, when I resent this with the subject added I forgot which order
I'd listed the two options - I'd though A was B and B was A.
Unless we hear objections I'm planning on doing what Patrik and
Matthijs suggested, option ***B***.

Gods I suck at this.
W


>
>   Patrik
>
> On 12 apr 2014, at 00:11, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>
>> [ Apologies all - I initially sent this with no subject line.
>> Resending. Hopefully this makes things clearer... Also, unless we hear
>> strong objections I'm planning on doing what Patrik and Matthijs
>> suggested, option A ]
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote=
:
>>> Hi there all,
>>>
>>> At the moment this document says that the child SHOULD remove the
>>> CDS/CDNSKEY record once the parent has consumed / acted on it (this
>>> behavior was requested by someone -- unfortunately I cannot remember
>>> whom).
>>>
>>> I *think* that I'm hearing that folk would prefer that the child
>>> SHOULD leave it in, or, less strongly MAY remove it.
>>>
>>> This (IMO) makes the doc and the child's life simpler, but potentially
>>> makes a bit more work for the parent -- currently most of the
>>> time the parent will see no CDS, and so will go back to sleep. If the
>>> child leaves them around, the parent will need to check them against
>>> what is currently published and take action if they differ.
>>>
>>> Can folk please let us know if they would prefer:
>>> A: The child SHOULD remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
>>> parent has published it (currently documented behavior) or
>>>
>>> B: The child SHOULD NOT remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR (will require a
>>> small edit to the doc)
>>>
>>> My personal preference is for B - it seems more elegant, but (as
>>> always) we'll do whatever the WG wants.
>>>
>>> W
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> DNSOP mailing list
>>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> DNSOP mailing list
>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft new charter: add stub resolvers?
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On 4/8/14, 7:38 AM, Petr Spacek wrote:
> On 4.4.2014 00:42, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan<ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>  
>> wrote:
>>
>>> >On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:
>>> >
>>>> >>   operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone
>>>> >>   name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for other DNS
>>>> >>   zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS resolvers.
>>> >
>>> >Is there a reason to call out these particular functions, or not to
>>> >include something like, "or any other resolver or server functioning
>>> >as part of the global DNS"?  I'm just worried, for instance, that
>>> >stubs don't appear there, even though there might be advice I can
>>> >imagine the WG providing.
>> +1 to at least calling out stub resolvers, but Andrew's non-list 
>> formulation is better.
>
> I agree that including stub-resolvers and other DNS-related software 
> sounds like a good idea.
>
> There were long threads about DNSSEC handling in stub-resolvers on 
> dane-list [0] but dnsop seems like a better place to discuss this matter.
>
> Note that this discussion is not over so we can move it to dnsop if 
> dnsop agrees.
>
> [0] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html
>
The wording in Item #1 is essentially intact from the current charter.  
So it could take some updating.  We can change that sentence to say:

     This will include root zone name servers, TLD name servers, or any
     other resolver or server functioning as part of the global DNS.

That would address the lack of stub resolvers, but also allow the 
flexibility for anything we may fail to specifically mention.

tim




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      http-equiv="Content-Type">
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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/8/14, 7:38 AM, Petr Spacek wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:5343DFAC.4020209@redhat.com" type="cite">On
      4.4.2014 00:42, Paul Hoffman wrote:
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">On Apr 3, 2014, at 2:50 PM, Andrew
        Sullivan<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com">&lt;ajs@anvilwalrusden.com&gt;</a>  wrote:
        <br>
        <br>
        <blockquote type="cite">&gt;On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 05:39:58PM
          -0400, Suzanne Woolf wrote:
          <br>
          &gt;
          <br>
          <blockquote type="cite">&gt;&gt;   operated on Internet
            networks. This will include root zone
            <br>
            &gt;&gt;   name servers, TLD name servers, name servers for
            other DNS
            <br>
            &gt;&gt;   zones, iterative DNS resolvers, and recursive DNS
            resolvers.
            <br>
          </blockquote>
          &gt;
          <br>
          &gt;Is there a reason to call out these particular functions,
          or not to
          <br>
          &gt;include something like, "or any other resolver or server
          functioning
          <br>
          &gt;as part of the global DNS"?  I'm just worried, for
          instance, that
          <br>
          &gt;stubs don't appear there, even though there might be
          advice I can
          <br>
          &gt;imagine the WG providing.
          <br>
        </blockquote>
        +1 to at least calling out stub resolvers, but Andrew's non-list
        formulation is better.
        <br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I agree that including stub-resolvers and other DNS-related
      software sounds like a good idea.
      <br>
      <br>
      There were long threads about DNSSEC handling in stub-resolvers on
      dane-list [0] but dnsop seems like a better place to discuss this
      matter.
      <br>
      <br>
      Note that this discussion is not over so we can move it to dnsop
      if dnsop agrees.
      <br>
      <br>
      [0]
      <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06658.html</a>
      <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <tt>The wording in Item #1 is essentially intact from the current
      charter.  So it could take some updating.  We can change that
      sentence to say:<br>
      <br>
          This will include root zone name servers, TLD name servers, or
      any<br>
          other resolver or server functioning as part of the global
      DNS.<br>
      <br>
      That would address the lack of stub resolvers, but also allow the
      flexibility for anything we may fail to specifically mention. <br>
      <br>
      tim<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </tt><tt></tt>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
  </body>
</html>

--------------060305020407080706020608--


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From: Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Supporting with changes was Re: ... draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Apr 11, 2014, at 12:08 PM, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:
> On Apr 11, 2014, at 11:24, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>> So far, no one has said "publish as is", have they?
>=20
> Considering the last call was for a specific version of a specific =
document[0], I interpret the =93this" in "this document=94 to be the =
specific version.  So, yes, I think =93they=94 have said so.

FWIW=85.I wasn't thinking of WGLC as an assertion the document was ready =
to publish as-is, which we'd move forward unless actively challenged =
with an argument that it wasn't. I was thinking of it more as a =
question: "Does this document we've been working on have consensus =
support that it's ready to publish? If not, what do you think it still =
needs in order to get that consensus?"=20

For anyone pondering additional comments-- if you have comments please =
make them, so we can answer the second part of the question as well as =
the first.

thanks,
Suzanne




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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><br><div><div>On Apr 11, 2014, at 12:08 PM, Edward Lewis &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:edlewis.subscriber@cox.net">edlewis.subscriber@cox.net</a>&=
gt; wrote:</div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><meta =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div><div>On Apr 11, 2014, at 11:24, Paul Hoffman =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt;=
 wrote:</div><blockquote type=3D"cite">So far, no one has said "publish =
as is", have they?<br></blockquote></div><br><div><font =
face=3D"Courier">Considering the last call was for a specific version of =
a specific document[0], I interpret the =93this" in "this document=94 to =
be the specific version. &nbsp;So, yes, I think =93they=94 have said =
so.</font></div></div></blockquote><br></div><div>FWIW=85.I wasn't =
thinking of WGLC as an assertion the document was ready to publish =
as-is, which we'd move forward unless actively challenged with an =
argument that it wasn't. I was thinking of it more as a question: "Does =
this document we've been working on have consensus support that it's =
ready to publish? If not, what do you think it still needs in order to =
get that consensus?"&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>For anyone pondering =
additional comments-- if you have comments please make them, so we can =
answer the second part of the question as well as the =
first.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Suzanne</div><div><br></=
div><div><br></div><div><br></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Sat Apr 12 23:53:11 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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On 12 apr 2014, at 15:04, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

> Gods I suck at this.

No, you are good at this!

   Patrik


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op 11-04-14 23:12, Warren Kumari schreef:
> 
> Can folk please let us know if they would prefer: A: The child
> SHOULD remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the parent has
> published it (currently documented behavior) or
> 
> B: The child SHOULD NOT remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR (will require a 
> small edit to the doc)

I can remember the arguments against leaving them in the zone. They were:

- -Leaving them in the zone makes the zone larger for a longer period of
time, consuming more memory and bandwith for master-slave transfers. I
think this is only minor, but it is an argument.

- -Zones that do not support CDNSKEY/CDS don't have those records in the
zone as well, so a provision by the server what to do in absence of
the records should be made anyway for backward compatibility.

- -If a zone is transfered to an operator not (yet) supporting
CDNSKEY/CDS, what's the procedure for removing the records from the
zone if they were compulsary?

That's why we concluded that it was not compulsory to leave them in
the zone, or even have them in the zone, but no harm should be done if
people left them in the zone.

I think the current text assumes people should allways remove the
records. That I think is wrong. The text should say:

- -It's ok to leave the records in the zone.

- -It's also ok to take the records out of the zone, but if you do so,
please follow these rules about the order to take them out: State rules.

Because the procedure HOW to take the records out consumes more text,
it looks like that's the standard procedure, but it isn't. That should
be made more clear. Both leaving them in and taking them out are ok
with me. So the text I would go with would be:

C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.


- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
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From nobody Mon Apr 14 02:27:12 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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op 12-04-14 00:06, Warren Kumari schreef:
> The parent should use whichever one they choose, but MUST NOT query
> for both and perform consistency checks between the CDS and CDNSKEY
> records."
> 
> "A parent MUST NOT perform a consistency check between CDS and
> CDNSKEY (other than for informational / debugging use)."

I want this part deleted. Whether or not parents do DNS protocol
verification is local policy and up to the parent. While pedantic to
some, it may serve a local need to others. An RFC is not the place to
enforce a specific local policy to parents that annoys only a certain
part of the DNS community. Just state how the protocol works, but do
not state it may or may not be verified. This protocol does not only
work for TLD registries, but especially also lower down the tree, and
I know protocol verification is a reasonable requirement there for
certain use cases. If you're not happy with that local policy, choose
a different parent or complain to your local parent, not the IETF.

You can publish a CDNSKEY or CDS or both.
If you publish both, they MUST match.

I can live with this line (watch the "MAY"):

"The parent MAY choose to only accept either CDS or CDNSKEY records
(based upon local policy), but MUST NOT expect there to be both."

Because it is perfectly sane from a protocol perspective to only have
one type and not the other if you know the local policy of your parent
or have a preference as a child in case they accept both.

Since CDNSKEY and CDS MUST match, the parent can:
- -accept CDNSKEY and only receive CDNSKEY
- -accept CDS and only receive CDS
- -accept both and have a preference for CDNSKEY if they receive both
- -accept both and have a preference for CDS if they receive both
- -accept both and use CDNSKEY if they only receive CDNSKEY
- -accept both and use CDS if they only receive CDS
- -accept CDNSKEY and not verify if they receive both
- -accept CDS and not verify is they receive both
- -accept CDNSKEY and verify if they recieve both
- -accept CDS and verify if they receive both
- -.....



- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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op 10-04-14 21:54, Patrik Fältström schreef:

> We already have too many parents that have I do not know how many
> stupid rules for what various values must be in the child hosting
> situation, and in many cases that make it plain impossible to do
> what you want as a child. Really silly rules.

While I agree with you some (TLD) parents are sometimes too pedantic,
it may serve a need for parents to refuse certain use cases under
their parenthood. If the rules are stupid, complain to the parent if
you want to be his child.

> Parent should not control the child.

I don't agree you can put it that generic. Some parents only want
specific use under their tree, and you cannot force a parent to grant
you a use case you want. While I agree with you some parents want to
control their children too much, and hence have silly rules that don't
match the use case they want to accommodate, it's not always the case.
Don't throw away the child with the bathwater.

Let me give you a use case where this may be clear.
Suppose I want to set up a network of probes under a parent
"probenetwork.example.com". Every probe gets a registration, but for
the probenetwork to work, every delegation MUST do DNSSEC with an
algoritm the probe architecture can handle and know the whereabouts of
every other probe. Every probe handles it's own delegation so queries
over the network requires the zones to contain specific records the
probes use. So my local policy is to only allow delegations for
certain DNSSEC algorithms, and every delegated zone MUST contain a LOC
record.
In order not to disturb the running probe network, I only accept new
delegations after I verify the child zone for that.

Another example may be that as a parent, we do not want too short
TTL's on the child's NS RRset because our infrastructure is hit with
more queries that are useless with our zone's publication frequency.
And we don't want too long TTL's as a countermeasure against ghost
domains misused by botnets. Now the botnet herders may be against that
policy, but it's our choice as a parent not to accommodate that use
case in our tree unless someone convinces us there's a legitimate
other use case that cannot live with those rules.

- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
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op 12-04-14 09:28, Patrik Fältström schreef:
> No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.

To keep it in the same thread,
I want:

C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.

So I'm ok if they stay in, but we need a way to get them out for the
ones that need that.

- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
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On 14 apr 2014, at 14:32, Antoin Verschuren <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> =
wrote:

> op 12-04-14 09:28, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m schreef:
> > No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.
>=20
> To keep it in the same thread,
> I want:
>=20
> C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
> parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.
>=20
> So I'm ok if they stay in, but we need a way to get them out for the
> ones that need that.

I am fine with C.

   paf


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From nobody Mon Apr 14 06:06:04 2014
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From: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
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To: DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Cc: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
Subject: [DNSOP] Spinning out of scope on draft-...-delegation-trust...
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Perhaps again I=92ll be labelled as a potential troll for this.  Again, =
using an example for a non-specific comment...

On Apr 14, 2014, at 7:09, one person wrote:

> At 10-04-14 21:54, someone else:
>=20
>> We already have too many parents that have I do not know how many
>> stupid rules for ...
>=20
> While I agree with you some (TLD) parents are sometimes too pedantic,

It is not in scope for the WG to judge the requirements which various =
DNS registries (TLD and otherwise) have signed up to meet.  It would be =
far more constructive to accept actual, demonstrated needs than such for =
a tech-utopia.  One of the things I learned when comparing DNSSEC =
operations to protocol engineering was that operators face a wide range =
of environments.  If the IETF is to produce protocols that are =
universally appealing, then the protocol has to pander - or be so good =
that it results in =93simplifying=94 the number of different =
environments.  The IETF desires greater operator involvement, you don=92t =
get that by complaining about the operators=92 use cases.

Process-wise I=92m surprised to see a new version come out before the =
end of the last call.  There was a draft a few years ago that I was =
following.  Each time I=92d redline half a copy I=92d learn that the one =
I was reading had been replaced by the next.  That wasn=92t a last call =
time, so it was annoying.  But this time there is a last call and I =
would think the editors should wait for any stragglers.  (This time I =
did respond earlier.)

The rest of this I may have said before.  This draft (the CDS/CDNSKEY) =
describes an interchange from essential the key manager of the child =
zone and the provisioning system of the parent zone.  The communications =
medium is one direction, no feedback possible, but the client (in the =
sense that one end takes the initiative) can detect changes made by the =
server.

This is like (analogy time) one person who can speak to another and see =
the result, but there=92s no other communication path. (Unrelated, this =
also applies to praying.)  Staying in-band only, the only way to make =
this work is to involve relative time (time-outs).

I do not to intend to say this is dead when I say: this cannot scale =
(unquantifed).  I mean that, in the sense we give up on scaling, we can =
define a protocol.

I think it is silly to burn two RR types to communicate the same thing.  =
You=92re inviting debate on testing and handling the two being out of =
sync.

I don=92t have a problem with leaving the records in as long as the =
parent is supposed to have the record represented in its zone - but only =
because I=92m willing to sacrifice scaling.  This causes less state to =
be maintained (but is does create a greater load on a parent system that =
is polling).

I think that all use of the communications medium has to adhere to the =
basic rules of security.    Here that being ZSK signed - knowing that =
the validation engine does not inspect the SEP bit - but that when =
considering this is a client key manager to parent provisioning protocol =
(not DNS), the extra signature should be there.  (Come to think of it, =
the ZSK RRSIG is a redundant, but don=92t expect cache-protecting =
validators to respect the SEP bit.)

Please take steps to simplify the protocol and discussion.  Giving up on =
scaling can make this a tool that some operators can use - and perhaps =
on a small scale within an organization.  It would be interesting to see =
is a general purpose DNS implementation will try this to manage a set of =
zones (as opposed to managing zones in isolation).

DNSSEC is clumsy.  It needs a solution here.





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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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On 04/14/2014 02:32 PM, Antoin Verschuren wrote:
> op 12-04-14 09:28, Patrik Fältström schreef:
>> No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.
> 
> To keep it in the same thread,
> I want:
> 
> C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
> parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.
> 
> So I'm ok if they stay in, but we need a way to get them out for the
> ones that need that.

I actually am for C too, mainly because the parental agent has to deal
with this scenario anyway. As long as this is not the default scenario,
it is fine with me. Hence MAY sounds reasonable to me.

The rules can be:

Wait until the new CDS and/or CDNSKEY RRsets have propagated to all the
child name servers. Then, for each parent name server, query the DS
RRset and make sure it is in sync with the CDS and/or CDNSKEY RRset.
Only then it is safe to remove the CDS and/or CDNSKEY RRsets again.

Best regards,
  Matthijs


> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Spinning out of scope on draft-...-delegation-trust...
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On 04/14/2014 03:05 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> I think it is silly to burn two RR types to communicate the same
> thing.  You’re inviting debate on testing and handling the two being
> out of sync.

Would you prefer one RR type with varying RDATA format (like with
IPSECKEY)? I don't.

Best regards,
  Matthijs


From nobody Mon Apr 14 06:17:30 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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On 4/14/14, 8:50 AM, Patrik Fältström wrote:
> On 14 apr 2014, at 14:32, Antoin Verschuren <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> wrote:
>
>> op 12-04-14 09:28, Patrik Fältström schreef:
>>> No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.
>> To keep it in the same thread,
>> I want:
>>
>> C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
>> parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.
>>
>> So I'm ok if they stay in, but we need a way to get them out for the
>> ones that need that.
> I am fine with C.
>
>     paf
>

Actually C helps me with some of  the wording, as I spent some time 
yesterday with a red pen going over editorial issues.

tim


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References: <533C6007.4070600@gmail.com> <1721093A-28F6-44F1-A6E1-87F43CE02879@frobbit.se> <CAHw9_iJ_t==kw2UBGFdyJ+RHdfZzOcPsKC=X2Mp691NdXNsAcA@mail.gmail.com> <75DFBECC-B6E8-4BED-A27B-81FB1F317541@frobbit.se> <pn9G1n00K0xxhYs01n9HXo> <0BC982D8-2AC9-4699-B4BE-F7595F2703D2@cox.net> <534BDFAF.4020309@nlnetlabs.nl>
To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Spinning out of scope on draft-...-delegation-trust...
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On 14 apr 2014, at 15:16, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> =
wrote:

> On 04/14/2014 03:05 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
>> I think it is silly to burn two RR types to communicate the same
>> thing.  You=92re inviting debate on testing and handling the two =
being
>> out of sync.
>=20
> Would you prefer one RR type with varying RDATA format (like with
> IPSECKEY)? I don't.

...or NAPTR...

No thank you. :-)

I.e. completely agree with Matthijs!

You want RRTypes that are designed so that the triple {owner,class,type} =
do select an RRSet that is appropriate for whatever use it has.

   Patrik


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On 4/14/14, 9:21 AM, Patrik FÃ¤ltstrÃ¶m wrote:
> On 14 apr 2014, at 15:16, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>
>> On 04/14/2014 03:05 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
>>> I think it is silly to burn two RR types to communicate the same
>>> thing.  Youâ€™re inviting debate on testing and handling the two being
>>> out of sync.
>> Would you prefer one RR type with varying RDATA format (like with
>> IPSECKEY)? I don't.
> ...or NAPTR...
>
> No thank you. :-)
>
> I.e. completely agree with Matthijs!
>
> You want RRTypes that are designed so that the triple {owner,class,type} do select an RRSet that is appropriate for whatever use it has.
>
>     Patrik
>
>

My first thought for this was "Why don't we use TXT records with a 
specific format string to represent these"?

But then you would just realize I was making sure everyone was awake and 
alert.

tim


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Subject: [DNSOP] Final revision of the charter
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------050405060700030602020904
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All,

The bulk of the comments in the last round where in regards to the 
poorly worded Item 6 on 'Special Names'.  With the assisting of Andrew 
Sullivan, we've replaced the wording of that one to be more focused on 
the outcome and not the process, and removed those words like 'liason'.

Additionally, I replaced the sentence in Item 1 listing the type of 
resolvers but failing to mention stub resolvers, per comments from Petr 
and Andrew, et. al.

Also, in a fit of editorial obsession, I ran 'fmt' over the whole 
document, so if you're


We feel this has reached a 'rough consensus' and our Wonderful AD will 
present this to the IESG to begin that process.

Thanks everyone for your comments and opinions.

tim

-------

The DNS Operations Working Group will develop guidelines for the
operation of DNS software and services and for the administration
of DNS zones.  These guidelines will provide technical information
relating to the implementation of the DNS protocol by the operators
and administrators of DNS zones. The group will perform the following
activities:

1. Define the processes by which Domain Name System (DNS) software
    may be efficiently and correctly administered, configured, and
    operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone name
    servers, TLD name servers, or any other resolver or server
    functioning as part of the global DNS.  As part of this effort,
    the group will produce documents explaining to the general
    Internet community what processes and mechanisms should be
    employed for the effective management and operation of DNS
    software and services, including root, TLD, and recursive servers.

2. Publish documents concerning DNSSEC operational procedures.

3. Publish documents concerning DNS operational
    procedures in IPv6 and mixed IPv6-IPv4 networks, and provide
    documentation and guidance on DNS-related IPv6 transition and
    coexistence issues.

4. Publish documents on extensions or protocol maintenance to the
    DNS Protocol, with a focus on the operational impacts of such
    changes.  Act as clearinghouse for discussion or provide advice
    to ADs and other WGs on EDNS0 options, new RRTYPEs, DNSSEC,
    record synthesis, or other mechanics of extending DNS to support
    other applications.

5. Serve as a clearinghouse for DNS-related issues where people can
    bring drafts that document the problem space around these issues.
    The group will then decide whether these issues belong in DNSOP
    and, if not, will work with the authors and appropriate ADs to
    determine the appropriate group for the work.

6. Publish documents that attempt to better define the overlapping
    area among the public DNS root, DNS-like names as used in local
    or restricted naming scopes, and the 'special names' registry
    that IETF manages, perhaps including how they might interact.
    This work must take into consideration issues that are strictly
    beyond the operation of the DNS itself, and the working group
    will consult with IETF liaisons to other organizations as
    appropriate.



--------------050405060700030602020904
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

<html>
  <head>

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <tt>All,<br>
      <br>
      The bulk of the comments in the last round where in regards to the
      poorly worded Item 6 on 'Special Names'.  With the assisting of
      Andrew Sullivan, we've replaced the wording of that one to be more
      focused on the outcome and not the process, and removed those words
      like 'liason'.<br>
      <br>
      Additionally, I replaced the sentence in Item 1 listing the type
      of resolvers but failing to mention stub resolvers, per comments
      from Petr and Andrew, et. al.<br>
      <br>
      Also, in a fit of editorial obsession, I ran 'fmt' over the whole
      document, so if you're <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      We feel this has reached a 'rough consensus' and our Wonderful AD
      will present this to the IESG to begin that process.<br>
      <br>
      Thanks everyone for your comments and opinions. <br>
      <br>
      tim<br>
      <br>
      ------- <br>
    </tt><br>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <pre style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">The DNS Operations Working Group will develop guidelines for the
operation of DNS software and services and for the administration
of DNS zones.  These guidelines will provide technical information
relating to the implementation of the DNS protocol by the operators
and administrators of DNS zones. The group will perform the following
activities:

1. Define the processes by which Domain Name System (DNS) software
   may be efficiently and correctly administered, configured, and
   operated on Internet networks. This will include root zone name
   servers, TLD name servers, or any other resolver or server
   functioning as part of the global DNS.  As part of this effort,
   the group will produce documents explaining to the general
   Internet community what processes and mechanisms should be
   employed for the effective management and operation of DNS
   software and services, including root, TLD, and recursive servers.

2. Publish documents concerning DNSSEC operational procedures.

3. Publish documents concerning DNS operational
   procedures in IPv6 and mixed IPv6-IPv4 networks, and provide
   documentation and guidance on DNS-related IPv6 transition and
   coexistence issues.

4. Publish documents on extensions or protocol maintenance to the
   DNS Protocol, with a focus on the operational impacts of such
   changes.  Act as clearinghouse for discussion or provide advice
   to ADs and other WGs on EDNS0 options, new RRTYPEs, DNSSEC,
   record synthesis, or other mechanics of extending DNS to support
   other applications.

5. Serve as a clearinghouse for DNS-related issues where people can
   bring drafts that document the problem space around these issues.
   The group will then decide whether these issues belong in DNSOP
   and, if not, will work with the authors and appropriate ADs to
   determine the appropriate group for the work.

6. Publish documents that attempt to better define the overlapping
   area among the public DNS root, DNS-like names as used in local
   or restricted naming scopes, and the 'special names' registry
   that IETF manages, perhaps including how they might interact.
   This work must take into consideration issues that are strictly
   beyond the operation of the DNS itself, and the working group
   will consult with IETF liaisons to other organizations as
   appropriate.
</pre>
    <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
  </body>
</html>

--------------050405060700030602020904--


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From: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
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Cc: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Spinning out of scope on draft-...-delegation-trust...
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In the world of trade-offs:

Having one record:

1) Can retrieve it in one query
2) Easier to specify what to publish and what to read
3) Parsing involved inspection of RDATA

Having two records:

1) Need two queries or rely on ANY
2) Have to explain to the client what to publish, server has to deal =
with inconsistencies
3) Parsing reuses existing code

I invite more trade-offs to be added.

The parsing should not be in the DNS client or server, that would be =
buried in the client key manager and the parent provisioning systems.  =
Each of those have to add and check a that there=92s a other-wise valid =
signature corresponding to a key with a SEP bit set, so, they have some =
rewriting to do anyway.

There=92s no reason that a RFC 1034-style DNS server and client need to =
read these records.  They are not used by the name server.  By RFC-1034 =
style I am excluding DNS servers that have on-line key management built =
in (such as ISC=92s BIND 9.7 and on - don=92t quote me on version =
numbers, it may have been earlier).

I don=92t see why the RDATA presentation can=92t just be a hex sequence =
(or Base64)=85.so long as the end points can read and write it.

Come to think of it - we can use the TXT record for maximum flexibility! =
;)

Looking at these tradeoffs, I see the expense of trying to specify and =
explain to operators - via the tools they use - of why there are two =
records and what happens if they aren=92t the same as far more costly =
than having the name server need to deal with varying formats.  Yes, I =
know that NAPTR is also a poor example, in fact, there aren=92t too many =
examples of varying record formats out there - except of course for TXT. =
 (Hmmm, perhaps that is one reason why it is so popular.  I mean, =
besides the firewall pass through and other acceptance =93features.")

On Apr 14, 2014, at 9:16, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> =
wrote:

> On 04/14/2014 03:05 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
>> I think it is silly to burn two RR types to communicate the same
>> thing.  You=92re inviting debate on testing and handling the two =
being
>> out of sync.
>=20
> Would you prefer one RR type with varying RDATA format (like with
> IPSECKEY)? I don't.
>=20
> Best regards,
>  Matthijs
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Mon Apr 14 08:10:40 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/14/14, 8:50 AM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m wrote:
>>
>> On 14 apr 2014, at 14:32, Antoin Verschuren <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> op 12-04-14 09:28, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m schreef:
>>>>
>>>> No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.
>>>
>>> To keep it in the same thread,
>>> I want:
>>>
>>> C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
>>> parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.
>>>
>>> So I'm ok if they stay in, but we need a way to get them out for the
>>> ones that need that.
>>
>> I am fine with C.
>>
>>     paf
>>
>
> Actually C helps me with some of  the wording, as I spent some time
> yesterday with a red pen going over editorial issues.

Hopefully you are reviewing the latest (-05) :-)

Actually, I'm planning on incorporating C - chairs, please let me know
if this does not align with your view of consensus.

W


>
> tim
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Mon Apr 14 09:09:37 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 11:10 AM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 4/14/14, 8:50 AM, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 apr 2014, at 14:32, Antoin Verschuren <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> op 12-04-14 09:28, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m schreef:
>>>>>
>>>>> No, I want B. That CDS and CDNSKEY is staying in the zone.
>>>>
>>>> To keep it in the same thread,
>>>> I want:
>>>>
>>>> C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
>>>> parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.
>>>>
>>>> So I'm ok if they stay in, but we need a way to get them out for the
>>>> ones that need that.
>>>
>>> I am fine with C.
>>>
>>>     paf
>>>
>>
>> Actually C helps me with some of  the wording, as I spent some time
>> yesterday with a red pen going over editorial issues.
>
> Hopefully you are reviewing the latest (-05) :-)
>
> Actually, I'm planning on incorporating C - chairs, please let me know
> if this does not align with your view of consensus.
>

... and I've just posted -06, incorporating option C.
I have outlined the changes in the Change / Author Notes section --
they were primarily to ensure consistency and to remove duplicated
text.
One of the bits that is a larger change, and that I'd like some feedback on=
 is:
Section 6:
I changed:
"Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent MUST use a DNSSEC validator to obtain a
validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone."
to:
"Regardless of how the Parental Agent detected changes to a CDS /
CDNSKEY RR, the Parental Agent SHOULD use a DNSSEC validator to obtain
a validated CDS / CDNSKEY RRset from the Child zone. The only
exception to this is if the parent perfoms some additional validation
on the data to confirm that it is the "correct" ket. This behavior is
NOT RECOMMENDED."

As Patrik (and others) have pointed out, a number of folk would like
to use this for initial enrollment. How do folk feel about the above?
Plan is that a user will publish a CDS in an (e.g) unsigned zone, and
will then logon to the registrars web interface. They click "Fetch
CDS/CDNSKEY" and the web interface displays the key. They user
checks[0] that it is correct then click "LGTM". Now they are signed...
I'm somewhat uncomfortable with the above, but, hey, whatever...


W
[0]: Yup, they really check it, and make sure the key matches. They
don't, for example just blindly click OK :-P

@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!
It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.
The fingerprint for the DSA key sent by the remote host is
e5:33:f0:e6:22:24:0c:ee:e2:ed:f2:d2:e7:a0:3f:a6.
Please contact your system administrator.




> W
>
>
>>
>> tim
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> DNSOP mailing list
>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Mon Apr 14 09:09:47 2014
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-06.txt
	Pages           : 19
	Date            : 2014-04-14

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-06


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance - should child remove the CDS RR?
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At Mon, 14 Apr 2014 15:10:56 +0200,
Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:

> > C: The child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RR from the zone once the
> > parent has published it, and this is how to do that safely.
> >
> > So I'm ok if they stay in, but we need a way to get them out for the
> > ones that need that.
>
> I actually am for C too, mainly because the parental agent has to deal
> with this scenario anyway. As long as this is not the default scenario,
> it is fine with me. Hence MAY sounds reasonable to me.
>
> The rules can be:
>
> Wait until the new CDS and/or CDNSKEY RRsets have propagated to all the
> child name servers. Then, for each parent name server, query the DS
> RRset and make sure it is in sync with the CDS and/or CDNSKEY RRset.
> Only then it is safe to remove the CDS and/or CDNSKEY RRsets again.

I'm fine with option C (but not "RR", but "RRset"), too, but probably
more important, I'd like the draft to explain why one might want to
remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets.  Warren's explanation makes sense to
me:

At Fri, 11 Apr 2014 18:11:39 -0400,
Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

> > This (IMO) makes the doc and the child's life simpler, but potentially
> > makes a bit more work for the parent -- currently most of the
> > time the parent will see no CDS, and so will go back to sleep. If the
> > child leaves them around, the parent will need to check them against
> > what is currently published and take action if they differ.

(except the "and take action if they differ" part; we can't avoid this
overhead by removing the CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets when there is no change)
but the rationale is not obvious, at least to me.

--
JINMEI, Tatuya


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 7:09 AM, Antoin Verschuren
<antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> op 10-04-14 21:54, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m schreef:
>
>> We already have too many parents that have I do not know how many
>> stupid rules for what various values must be in the child hosting
>> situation, and in many cases that make it plain impossible to do
>> what you want as a child. Really silly rules.
>
> While I agree with you some (TLD) parents are sometimes too pedantic,
> it may serve a need for parents to refuse certain use cases under
> their parenthood. If the rules are stupid, complain to the parent if
> you want to be his child.
>
>> Parent should not control the child.
>
> I don't agree you can put it that generic. Some parents only want
> specific use under their tree, and you cannot force a parent to grant
> you a use case you want. While I agree with you some parents want to
> control their children too much, and hence have silly rules that don't
> match the use case they want to accommodate, it's not always the case.
> Don't throw away the child with the bathwater.
>
> Let me give you a use case where this may be clear.
> Suppose I want to set up a network of probes under a parent
> "probenetwork.example.com". Every probe gets a registration, but for
> the probenetwork to work, every delegation MUST do DNSSEC with an
> algoritm the probe architecture can handle and know the whereabouts of
> every other probe. Every probe handles it's own delegation so queries
> over the network requires the zones to contain specific records the
> probes use. So my local policy is to only allow delegations for
> certain DNSSEC algorithms, and every delegated zone MUST contain a LOC
> record.
> In order not to disturb the running probe network, I only accept new
> delegations after I verify the child zone for that.
>
> Another example may be that as a parent, we do not want too short
> TTL's on the child's NS RRset because our infrastructure is hit with
> more queries that are useless with our zone's publication frequency.
> And we don't want too long TTL's as a countermeasure against ghost
> domains misused by botnets. Now the botnet herders may be against that
> policy, but it's our choice as a parent not to accommodate that use
> case in our tree unless someone convinces us there's a legitimate
> other use case that cannot live with those rules.

Just checking -- do you want any action *on this doc*? I *think* that
we are generic/non-prescriptive enough that you can implement whatever
policy you want...
If you'd like something additional (probably in Section 6.2) saying
something like "Acting on CDS/CDNSKEY records may be subject to local
policy" or something, please help by providing text...

I *think* that we are generic enough that this is covered, but...

W

>
> - --
> Antoin Verschuren
>
> Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
> Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands
>
> P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
> Mailto: antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl
> XMPP: antoin.verschuren@jabber.sidn.nl
> HTTP://www.sidn.nl/
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From nobody Mon Apr 14 12:41:18 2014
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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: [DNSOP] draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt
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--f46d043c092e8f848c04f705dd40
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Hi folks,

Please find draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt [1]  This draft
comes in the context of generic TLD with possible naming collision. In
order to keep naming resolution stable and reliable, it describes 1) how
resolver should generate their search list, 2) how resolver should
distinguish a name resolution that needs to be associated with a search
list and 3) how a resolver should perform a resolution involving search
list.

Feel free to comment/review.

BR,
Daniel

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00

-- 
Daniel Migault
Orange Labs -- Security
+33 6 70 72 69 58

--f46d043c092e8f848c04f705dd40
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks, <br><br></div>Please find <a href=3D"http:/=
/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt">draft-mglt-dnsop-search-li=
st-processing-00.txt</a> [1]=C2=A0 This draft comes in the context of gener=
ic TLD with possible naming collision. In order to keep naming resolution s=
table and reliable, it describes  1) how resolver should generate their sea=
rch list, 2) how resolver should=C2=A0 distinguish a name resolution that n=
eeds to be associated with a search list and 3) how a resolver should perfo=
rm a resolution involving search list. <br>
<br>Feel free to comment/review.<br><br>BR, <br>Daniel<br><br>[1] <a href=
=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00">=
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00</a> <=
br clear=3D"all">
<div><div><br>-- <br>Daniel Migault<br>Orange Labs -- Security<br>+33 6 70 =
72 69 58
</div></div></div>

--f46d043c092e8f848c04f705dd40--


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Subject: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-07.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-07.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2014-04-14

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Mon Apr 14 15:14:25 2014
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Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2014 00:14:17 +0200
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References: <533C6007.4070600@gmail.com> <1721093A-28F6-44F1-A6E1-87F43CE02879@frobbit.se> <CAHw9_iJ_t==kw2UBGFdyJ+RHdfZzOcPsKC=X2Mp691NdXNsAcA@mail.gmail.com> <75DFBECC-B6E8-4BED-A27B-81FB1F317541@frobbit.se> <pn9G1n00K0xxhYs01n9HXo> <0BC982D8-2AC9-4699-B4BE-F7595F2703D2@cox.net> <ppGg1n0200xxhYs01pGh7E> <8A4CDCDA-4E90-490A-8A5C-0BAF67A9E371@cox.net>
To: Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Spinning out of scope on draft-...-delegation-trust...
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On 14 apr 2014, at 16:06, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:

> Looking at these tradeoffs, I see the expense of trying to specify and =
explain to operators - via the tools they use - of why there are two =
records and what happens if they aren=92t the same as far more costly =
than having the name server need to deal with varying formats.  Yes, I =
know that NAPTR is also a poor example, in fact, there aren=92t too many =
examples of varying record formats out there - except of course for TXT. =
 (Hmmm, perhaps that is one reason why it is so popular.  I mean, =
besides the firewall pass through and other acceptance =93features.")

How much code, in the number of implementations, have you _personally_ =
written that parses RRSets returned from a query and selects the subset =
you want to actually use? Including issues with size of RRSets? ;-)

Just Do Not Go In That Direction!

Yes, I once upon a time supported NAPTR strongly, but because of that I =
also now hate it and support URI.

For this very reason.

;-)

   Patrik


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From nobody Mon Apr 14 19:20:38 2014
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To: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt
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In message <CADZyTkn2Wau99zfQR+jjwHVr4Jnq3Eo=Ht+OEScbvKBLc=7e2w@mail.gmail.com>
, Daniel Migault writes:
> 
> Hi folks,
> 
> Please find draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt [1]  This draft
> comes in the context of generic TLD with possible naming collision. In
> order to keep naming resolution stable and reliable, it describes 1) how
> resolver should generate their search list, 2) how resolver should
> distinguish a name resolution that needs to be associated with a search
> list and 3) how a resolver should perform a resolution involving search
> list.
> 
> Feel free to comment/review.
> 
> BR,
> Daniel
> 
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00
> 
> -- 
> Daniel Migault
> Orange Labs -- Security
> +33 6 70 72 69 58
> 

Firstly there is unqualified, partially qualified, fully qualified and
absolutely names in use today.

	unqualified - single label
	partially qualified  - multi label intended to be fully qualified
			by use of searching.
	fully qualified - multi label not intended to be fully qualified
			by the use of searching.
	absolutely qualified - period at the end (not supported by all
			protocol elements)

	ndots is used to distingish which order to treat a multi
	label input in libresolv/libbind and was added as a response
	to RFC 1535.

	unqualified - search list then as entered.
	partially qualified - search list then as entered.
	fully qualified - as entered then search list.
	absolutely qualified - as entered.

	Additionall there is search continuation on SERFVAIL, NOTIMP
	and NOERROR NO DATA responses to consider.

One also needs to look at RFC 1535 which discourages the use of
automatically constructed search lists.

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From nobody Mon Apr 14 22:57:39 2014
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	http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-andrews-edns1-00.txt

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE:	+61 2 9871 4742		         INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From nobody Tue Apr 15 01:24:05 2014
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op 14-04-14 21:18, Warren Kumari schreef:

>> Just checking -- do you want any action *on this doc*? I *think*
>> that we are generic/non-prescriptive enough that you can
>> implement whatever policy you want...

Yes, like I said, I would like to have this line deleted in section 6:

  "A parent MUST NOT perform a consistency check between CDS and
   CDNSKEY (other than for informational / debugging use) resource
   records."

That's not protocol, but prescriptive language that a parent is
disallowed to have a policy to verify the records.

I also think the line just above that:

  "The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY resource
   records (based upon local policy), and MUST NOT expect there to be
   both."

is mixing up 2 things:
- -What the parent -accepts-
- -What the parent -uses- when both are present.

I think it's perfectly fine for a parent to accept both, but it must
state which it will use when it sees both in the zone to manage
expectancy.

So suggested text to replace that with:

"The parent MUST choose to use either CDNSKEY or CDS resource records
as their default updating mechanism.
The parent MAY only accept either CDNSKEY or CDS, but it MAY also
accept both, so it can use the other in the absence of the default
updating mechanism, but it MUST NOT expect there to be both."

- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
Mailto: antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl
XMPP: antoin.verschuren@jabber.sidn.nl
HTTP://www.sidn.nl/
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From nobody Tue Apr 15 01:46:34 2014
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Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2014 10:46:14 +0200
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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Hi,

Some feedback:

1. Introduction, last paragraph.
To me, the mentioning of not addressing DNSSEC bootstrapping comes out
the blue. One sentence later it mentions it is not intended for DNSSEC
synchronization at all. I'd prefer a rewrite of this last paragraph:

    "This specification was not designed to synchronize DNSSEC
     security records, such as DS RRsets. For such a solution, see the
     complimentary solution [REF] for maintaining security delegation
     information. In addition, this specification does not address how
     to perform bootstrapping operations, including to get the required
     initial DNSSEC-secured operating environment in place."


2.1.1.1. The SOA Serial Field
First, this document talks about serial being greater than... It might
be good to reference RFC 1982 serial number arithmetic that defines
serial comparison.

Second, I don't like having a special value of 0 to indicate something.
0 is a valid serial number, which is now not allowed to be used in
restrictions. Perhaps it is better to define a new flag in the Flags
Field that says a serial restriction is being advertised.


2.2.1. Processing Procedure
I am feeling slightly uncomfortable too that you cannot get the data and
the SOA in the same response. I am not sure how to make that
uncomfortable feeling go away, but perhaps Edward's suggestion to add a
note on this is enough.


Best regards,
  Matthijs



On 04/02/2014 09:14 PM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
> 
> All,
> 
> This is the beginning of the Working Group Last Call on Child To Parent
> Synchronization in DNS.
> The London update showed that this work is complete and ready to move
> forward.
> 
> The document can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization/
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization-00.txt
> 
> Please take a moment to review the final versions and send up any comments.
> 
> This document willhave a 2 week period for comments, closing on April
> 16th, 2014.
> 
> thanks
> tim
> 
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


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Thanks for the clarification. I will use these classifications for names
and rewrote the draft with these.

If I understand correctly, your last remark is: Suppose a resolver proceeds
to a resolution using a search list L= label-1, label-2, ...,  label-n. The
resolution goes from label-i to label-j only and only if the returned codes
are SERFVAIL or NOTIMP or NOERROR or NO DATA (I assume NO DATA is
NXDomain).

Is that correct to understand search continuation as going from one label
to another? More specifically, it does not mean to switch from search list
resolution to DNS resolution.

In addition, this also means that a 1) NOERROR does not necessarily end the
resolution. and 2) other RCODEs ends the resolution. Is that correct?

Thanks!
Daniel




On Tue, Apr 15, 2014 at 4:20 AM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:

>
> In message <CADZyTkn2Wau99zfQR+jjwHVr4Jnq3Eo=Ht+OEScbvKBLc=
> 7e2w@mail.gmail.com>
> , Daniel Migault writes:
> >
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > Please find draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt [1]  This
> draft
> > comes in the context of generic TLD with possible naming collision. In
> > order to keep naming resolution stable and reliable, it describes 1) how
> > resolver should generate their search list, 2) how resolver should
> > distinguish a name resolution that needs to be associated with a search
> > list and 3) how a resolver should perform a resolution involving search
> > list.
> >
> > Feel free to comment/review.
> >
> > BR,
> > Daniel
> >
> > [1]
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00
> >
> > --
> > Daniel Migault
> > Orange Labs -- Security
> > +33 6 70 72 69 58
> >
>
> Firstly there is unqualified, partially qualified, fully qualified and
> absolutely names in use today.
>
>         unqualified - single label
>         partially qualified  - multi label intended to be fully qualified
>                         by use of searching.
>         fully qualified - multi label not intended to be fully qualified
>                         by the use of searching.
>         absolutely qualified - period at the end (not supported by all
>                         protocol elements)
>
>         ndots is used to distingish which order to treat a multi
>         label input in libresolv/libbind and was added as a response
>         to RFC 1535.
>
>         unqualified - search list then as entered.
>         partially qualified - search list then as entered.
>         fully qualified - as entered then search list.
>         absolutely qualified - as entered.
>
>         Additionall there is search continuation on SERFVAIL, NOTIMP
>         and NOERROR NO DATA responses to consider.
>
> One also needs to look at RFC 1535 which discourages the use of
> automatically constructed search lists.
>
> --
> Mark Andrews, ISC
> 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org
>



-- 
Daniel Migault
Orange Labs -- Security
+33 6 70 72 69 58

--047d7b5d28583a909f04f717852f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Thanks for the clarification. I will use th=
ese classifications for names and rewrote the draft with these.<br><br></di=
v>If I understand correctly, your last remark is: Suppose a resolver procee=
ds to a resolution using a search list L=3D label-1, label-2, ...,=C2=A0 la=
bel-n. The resolution goes from label-i to label-j only and only if the ret=
urned codes are SERFVAIL or NOTIMP or NOERROR or NO DATA (I assume NO DATA =
is NXDomain). <br>
<br>Is that correct to understand search continuation as going from one lab=
el to another? More specifically, it does not mean to switch from search li=
st resolution to DNS resolution.<br><br>In addition, this also means that a=
 1) NOERROR does not necessarily end the resolution. and 2) other RCODEs en=
ds the resolution. Is that correct?<br>
<br></div>Thanks!<br></div>Daniel =C2=A0 <div><div><br><br></div></div></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Apr=
 15, 2014 at 4:20 AM, Mark Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
marka@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">marka@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
In message &lt;CADZyTkn2Wau99zfQR+jjwHVr4Jnq3Eo=3DHt+OEScbvKBLc=3D<a href=
=3D"mailto:7e2w@mail.gmail.com">7e2w@mail.gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<div><div class=3D"h5">, Daniel Migault writes:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi folks,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Please find draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt [1] =C2=A0T=
his draft<br>
&gt; comes in the context of generic TLD with possible naming collision. In=
<br>
&gt; order to keep naming resolution stable and reliable, it describes 1) h=
ow<br>
&gt; resolver should generate their search list, 2) how resolver should<br>
&gt; distinguish a name resolution that needs to be associated with a searc=
h<br>
&gt; list and 3) how a resolver should perform a resolution involving searc=
h<br>
&gt; list.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Feel free to comment/review.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; BR,<br>
&gt; Daniel<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list=
-processing-00" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dns=
op-search-list-processing-00</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; Daniel Migault<br>
&gt; Orange Labs -- Security<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"tel:%2B33%206%2070%2072%2069%2058" value=3D"+33670726958">+=
33 6 70 72 69 58</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div>Firstly there is unqualified, partially qualified, fully qualif=
ied and<br>
absolutely names in use today.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 unqualified - single label<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 partially qualified =C2=A0- multi label intende=
d to be fully qualified<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 by use of searching.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 fully qualified - multi label not intended to b=
e fully qualified<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 by the use of searching.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 absolutely qualified - period at the end (not s=
upported by all<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 protocol elements)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ndots is used to distingish which order to trea=
t a multi<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 label input in libresolv/libbind and was added =
as a response<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 to RFC 1535.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 unqualified - search list then as entered.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 partially qualified - search list then as enter=
ed.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 fully qualified - as entered then search list.<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 absolutely qualified - as entered.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Additionall there is search continuation on SER=
FVAIL, NOTIMP<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 and NOERROR NO DATA responses to consider.<br>
<br>
One also needs to look at RFC 1535 which discourages the use of<br>
automatically constructed search lists.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--<br>
Mark Andrews, ISC<br>
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia<br>
PHONE: <a href=3D"tel:%2B61%202%209871%204742" value=3D"+61298714742">+61 2=
 9871 4742</a> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 INTE=
RNET: <a href=3D"mailto:marka@isc.org">marka@isc.org</a><br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Daniel Mi=
gault<br>Orange Labs -- Security<br>+33 6 70 72 69 58
</div>

--047d7b5d28583a909f04f717852f--


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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt
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On Mon, 14 Apr 2014, Daniel Migault wrote:

> Please find draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt

It states:

   In order to make systems end up with the same search list, here are
    our recommendations:

    - 1)  If the search list results from a manual configuration, then
       DHCP Options MUST NOT automatically affect the search list.  More
       specifically, Domain Name derived from DHCPv4 Domain Name Option
       [RFC2132] or DHCPv6 Client FQDN Option [RFC4704] and DHCP Domain
       Search Option [RFC3397], [RFC3646] are ignored for the concerned
       of search list generation.  This follows the recommendations of
       [RFC3397] and [RFC3646].

    - 2)  If the search list is not manually configured, then DHCP
       Options MAY be considered.  DHCP Domain Search Option [RFC3397],
       [RFC3646] are considered.  If considered, the search list is only
       defined by these options and only these options.

    - 3)  In the absence of DHCP Domain Search Options, the search list
       is derived from the Domain that is the DHCPv4 Domain Name Option
       [RFC2132] or DHCPv6 Client FQDN Option [RFC4704].  If so, the
       search list is only constituted of the Domain name of the host.

    - 4)  If none of these options are provided, then the search list is
       empty and resolution are directly performed over the public DNS.

While I don't disagree that this has been historically the case, with
DNSSEC on the stubs we have new issues to tackle. In the old days, we
could use the DHCP obtained DNS server for resolving, so local names
would just work. Now we don't, so that approach needs additional
configuration. So I do not believe we can keep the above listed old
behaviour intact.

If I hook into a LAN internal.nohats.ca in the office, people expect
that to become part of their search domain. And obviously at a
coffee shop with open wifi, we really do not want to add anything
to the search domain. This is all closely related to interaction with
forwarders, and what we decide to forward (local name to local
nameservers only or everything?).

For a long discussion, see:

https://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/devel/2014-April/197755.html

Paul


From nobody Tue Apr 15 13:28:05 2014
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Subject: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-08.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-08.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2014-04-15

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-08

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-08


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Tue Apr 15 13:28:15 2014
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Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2014 16:28:05 -0400
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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Tue, Apr 15, 2014 at 4:23 AM, Antoin Verschuren
<antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> op 14-04-14 21:18, Warren Kumari schreef:
>
>>> Just checking -- do you want any action *on this doc*? I *think*
>>> that we are generic/non-prescriptive enough that you can
>>> implement whatever policy you want...
>
> Yes, like I said, I would like to have this line deleted in section 6:
>
>   "A parent MUST NOT perform a consistency check between CDS and
>    CDNSKEY (other than for informational / debugging use) resource
>    records."
>
> That's not protocol, but prescriptive language that a parent is
> disallowed to have a policy to verify the records.

Ah. Sorry, was not intentionally ignoring you, I just missed where you
were meaning...

>
> I also think the line just above that:
>
>   "The parent MUST choose to accept either CDS or CDNSKEY resource
>    records (based upon local policy), and MUST NOT expect there to be
>    both."
>
> is mixing up 2 things:
> - -What the parent -accepts-
> - -What the parent -uses- when both are present.
>
> I think it's perfectly fine for a parent to accept both, but it must
> state which it will use when it sees both in the zone to manage
> expectancy.
>
> So suggested text to replace that with:
>
> "The parent MUST choose to use either CDNSKEY or CDS resource records
> as their default updating mechanism.
> The parent MAY only accept either CDNSKEY or CDS, but it MAY also
> accept both, so it can use the other in the absence of the default
> updating mechanism, but it MUST NOT expect there to be both."

DONE!
Nice, thanks for the text...

W



>
> - --
> Antoin Verschuren
>
> Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
> Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands
>
> P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
> Mailto: antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl
> XMPP: antoin.verschuren@jabber.sidn.nl
> HTTP://www.sidn.nl/
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From nobody Tue Apr 15 17:06:50 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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This looks greatly improved from the -03 that started the WG Last Call. =
It clears almost all of my concerns, particularly about the overly-loose =
language.

There is still one assumption being made of the reader that I think can =
cleanly be cleared up. The first paragraph of the introduction says:

   When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate
   their DS record(s) (or DNSKEY(s)) to their parent through some out-
   of-band method to complete the chain of trust.

I think the concept of what is being told to the parent would be much =
clearer as:

   When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate =
their
   keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to =
complete
   the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent, the child =
might
   send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.

--Paul Hoffman=


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Apr 15, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> This looks greatly improved from the -03 that started the WG Last =
Call. It clears almost all of my concerns, particularly about the =
overly-loose language.
>=20
> There is still one assumption being made of the reader that I think =
can cleanly be cleared up. The first paragraph of the introduction says:
>=20
>   When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate
>   their DS record(s) (or DNSKEY(s)) to their parent through some out-
>   of-band method to complete the chain of trust.
>=20
> I think the concept of what is being told to the parent would be much =
clearer as:
>=20
>   When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate =
their
>   keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to =
complete
>   the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent, the =
child might
>   send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.


I agree this text is much better.=20

	Olafur


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Tuesday, April 15, 2014, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> This looks greatly improved from the -03 that started the WG Last Call. It
> clears almost all of my concerns, particularly about the overly-loose
> language.
>
> There is still one assumption being made of the reader that I think can
> cleanly be cleared up. The first paragraph of the introduction says:
>
>    When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate
>    their DS record(s) (or DNSKEY(s)) to their parent through some out-
>    of-band method to complete the chain of trust.
>
> I think the concept of what is being told to the parent would be much
> clearer as:
>
>    When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate
> their
>    keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
> complete
>    the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent, the child
> might
>    send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.



Looks good, thank you for the text, I'll integrate it tomorrow.

W


>
> --Paul Hoffman
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org <javascript:;>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>

--001a11c2283a296d9f04f71f9827
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<br><br>On Tuesday, April 15, 2014, Paul Hoffman &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul=
.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">
This looks greatly improved from the -03 that started the WG Last Call. It =
clears almost all of my concerns, particularly about the overly-loose langu=
age.<br>
<br>
There is still one assumption being made of the reader that I think can cle=
anly be cleared up. The first paragraph of the introduction says:<br>
<br>
=A0 =A0When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate=
<br>
=A0 =A0their DS record(s) (or DNSKEY(s)) to their parent through some out-<=
br>
=A0 =A0of-band method to complete the chain of trust.<br>
<br>
I think the concept of what is being told to the parent would be much clear=
er as:<br>
<br>
=A0 =A0When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate=
 their<br>
=A0 =A0keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to c=
omplete<br>
=A0 =A0the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent, the chil=
d might<br>
=A0 =A0send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.</blockquote><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div>Looks good, thank you for the text, I&#39;ll int=
egrate it tomorrow.</div><div><br></div><div>W<span></span></div><div>=A0</=
div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
--Paul Hoffman<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
DNSOP mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"javascript:;" onclick=3D"_e(event, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;DNSOP@ie=
tf.org&#39;)">DNSOP@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop</a><br>
</blockquote>

--001a11c2283a296d9f04f71f9827--


From nobody Tue Apr 15 20:08:35 2014
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To: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <CADZyTkn2Wau99zfQR+jjwHVr4Jnq3Eo=Ht+OEScbvKBLc=7e2w@mail.gmail.com> <20140415022026.1BE5513BE235@rock.dv.isc.org> <CADZyTk==QG6Yf81pX4K+t5RN7USgZ3xGLW7xiuBEs2DvrS7rhg@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt
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In message <CADZyTk==QG6Yf81pX4K+t5RN7USgZ3xGLW7xiuBEs2DvrS7rhg@mail.gmail.com>, D
aniel Migault writes:
> 
> Thanks for the clarification. I will use these classifications for names
> and rewrote the draft with these.
> 
> If I understand correctly, your last remark is: Suppose a resolver proceeds
> to a resolution using a search list L= label-1, label-2, ...,  label-n. The
> resolution goes from label-i to label-j only and only if the returned codes
> are SERFVAIL or NOTIMP or NOERROR or NO DATA (I assume NO DATA is
> NXDomain).

Searches currently continue on SERFVAIL, NOTIMP, NOERROR (data does not exist)
and NXDOMAIN.  The *only* safe condition to continue on to a additional search
element is NXDOMAIN.  The list I wrote initially was all the bad choices in
current software.

> Is that correct to understand search continuation as going from one label
> to another? More specifically, it does not mean to switch from search list
> resolution to DNS resolution.

Continuation is between search list elements and to/from as entered.
 
> In addition, this also means that a 1) NOERROR does not necessarily end the
> resolution. and 2) other RCODEs ends the resolution. Is that correct?

NOERROR should ALWAYS stop searches.  It currently doesn't.
NXDOMAIN should be the only rcode which causes a search to continue as
apposed to finding a working nameserver (REFUSED, NOTIMP, SERVFAIL are
all good reasons to move to a different nameserver).
 
> Thanks!
> Daniel
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Apr 15, 2014 at 4:20 AM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
> 
> >
> > In message <CADZyTkn2Wau99zfQR+jjwHVr4Jnq3Eo=Ht+OEScbvKBLc=
> > 7e2w@mail.gmail.com>
> > , Daniel Migault writes:
> > >
> > > Hi folks,
> > >
> > > Please find draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt [1]  This
> > draft
> > > comes in the context of generic TLD with possible naming collision. In
> > > order to keep naming resolution stable and reliable, it describes 1) how
> > > resolver should generate their search list, 2) how resolver should
> > > distinguish a name resolution that needs to be associated with a search
> > > list and 3) how a resolver should perform a resolution involving search
> > > list.
> > >
> > > Feel free to comment/review.
> > >
> > > BR,
> > > Daniel
> > >
> > > [1]
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00
> > >
> > > --
> > > Daniel Migault
> > > Orange Labs -- Security
> > > +33 6 70 72 69 58
> > >
> >
> > Firstly there is unqualified, partially qualified, fully qualified and
> > absolutely names in use today.
> >
> >         unqualified - single label
> >         partially qualified  - multi label intended to be fully qualified
> >                         by use of searching.
> >         fully qualified - multi label not intended to be fully qualified
> >                         by the use of searching.
> >         absolutely qualified - period at the end (not supported by all
> >                         protocol elements)
> >
> >         ndots is used to distingish which order to treat a multi
> >         label input in libresolv/libbind and was added as a response
> >         to RFC 1535.
> >
> >         unqualified - search list then as entered.
> >         partially qualified - search list then as entered.
> >         fully qualified - as entered then search list.
> >         absolutely qualified - as entered.
> >
> >         Additionall there is search continuation on SERFVAIL, NOTIMP
> >         and NOERROR NO DATA responses to consider.
> >
> > One also needs to look at RFC 1535 which discourages the use of
> > automatically constructed search lists.
> >
> > --
> > Mark Andrews, ISC
> > 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> > PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org
> >
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Daniel Migault
> Orange Labs -- Security
> +33 6 70 72 69 58
> 
> --047d7b5d28583a909f04f717852f
> Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> 
> <div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Thanks for the clarification. I will use th=
> ese classifications for names and rewrote the draft with these.<br><br></di=
> v>If I understand correctly, your last remark is: Suppose a resolver procee=
> ds to a resolution using a search list L=3D label-1, label-2, ...,=C2=A0 la=
> bel-n. The resolution goes from label-i to label-j only and only if the ret=
> urned codes are SERFVAIL or NOTIMP or NOERROR or NO DATA (I assume NO DATA =
> is NXDomain). <br>
> <br>Is that correct to understand search continuation as going from one lab=
> el to another? More specifically, it does not mean to switch from search li=
> st resolution to DNS resolution.<br><br>In addition, this also means that a=
>  1) NOERROR does not necessarily end the resolution. and 2) other RCODEs en=
> ds the resolution. Is that correct?<br>
> <br></div>Thanks!<br></div>Daniel =C2=A0 <div><div><br><br></div></div></di=
> v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Apr=
>  15, 2014 at 4:20 AM, Mark Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
> marka@isc.org" target=3D"_blank">marka@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
> <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
> x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
> In message &lt;CADZyTkn2Wau99zfQR+jjwHVr4Jnq3Eo=3DHt+OEScbvKBLc=3D<a href=
> =3D"mailto:7e2w@mail.gmail.com">7e2w@mail.gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
> <div><div class=3D"h5">, Daniel Migault writes:<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; Hi folks,<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; Please find draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list-processing-00.txt [1] =C2=A0T=
> his draft<br>
> &gt; comes in the context of generic TLD with possible naming collision. In=
> <br>
> &gt; order to keep naming resolution stable and reliable, it describes 1) h=
> ow<br>
> &gt; resolver should generate their search list, 2) how resolver should<br>
> &gt; distinguish a name resolution that needs to be associated with a searc=
> h<br>
> &gt; list and 3) how a resolver should perform a resolution involving searc=
> h<br>
> &gt; list.<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; Feel free to comment/review.<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; BR,<br>
> &gt; Daniel<br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; [1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dnsop-search-list=
> -processing-00" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-dns=
> op-search-list-processing-00</a><br>
> &gt;<br>
> &gt; --<br>
> &gt; Daniel Migault<br>
> &gt; Orange Labs -- Security<br>
> &gt; <a href=3D"tel:%2B33%206%2070%2072%2069%2058" value=3D"+33670726958">+=
> 33 6 70 72 69 58</a><br>
> &gt;<br>
> <br>
> </div></div>Firstly there is unqualified, partially qualified, fully qualif=
> ied and<br>
> absolutely names in use today.<br>
> <br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 unqualified - single label<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 partially qualified =C2=A0- multi label intende=
> d to be fully qualified<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
> =A0 =C2=A0 by use of searching.<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 fully qualified - multi label not intended to b=
> e fully qualified<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
> =A0 =C2=A0 by the use of searching.<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 absolutely qualified - period at the end (not s=
> upported by all<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
> =A0 =C2=A0 protocol elements)<br>
> <br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ndots is used to distingish which order to trea=
> t a multi<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 label input in libresolv/libbind and was added =
> as a response<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 to RFC 1535.<br>
> <br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 unqualified - search list then as entered.<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 partially qualified - search list then as enter=
> ed.<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 fully qualified - as entered then search list.<=
> br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 absolutely qualified - as entered.<br>
> <br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Additionall there is search continuation on SER=
> FVAIL, NOTIMP<br>
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 and NOERROR NO DATA responses to consider.<br>
> <br>
> One also needs to look at RFC 1535 which discourages the use of<br>
> automatically constructed search lists.<br>
> <span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
> --<br>
> Mark Andrews, ISC<br>
> 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia<br>
> PHONE: <a href=3D"tel:%2B61%202%209871%204742" value=3D"+61298714742">+61 2=
>  9871 4742</a> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 INTE=
> RNET: <a href=3D"mailto:marka@isc.org">marka@isc.org</a><br>
> </font></span></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Daniel Mi=
> gault<br>Orange Labs -- Security<br>+33 6 70 72 69 58
> </div>
> 
> --047d7b5d28583a909f04f717852f--
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From nobody Wed Apr 16 00:34:41 2014
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Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2014 09:34:28 +0200
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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    > When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate their
    > keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to complete



And changing opening sentence to:

	The first time a DNS operator signs the zone, they need to
	communicate the keying ..."

Make it even more clear.

	jaap (nitpicking mode)


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On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 3:34 AM, Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>
>     > When a DNS operator first signs their zone, they need to communicate their
>     > keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to complete
>
>
>
> And changing opening sentence to:
>
>         The first time a DNS operator signs the zone, they need to
>         communicate the keying ..."
>
> Make it even more clear.

Thank you.
I think I made it even clearer:
The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.

Good?
W


>
>         jaap (nitpicking mode)
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Wed Apr 16 05:03:34 2014
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-09.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2014-04-16

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-09


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Wed Apr 16 06:19:24 2014
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On Apr 16, 2014, at 8:02 AM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net<mailto:warren=
@kumari.net>>
 wrote:

I think I made it even clearer:
The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.

Good?

Looks good to me.    The whole document is looking very good.  I've been re=
ading the conversation and initially had some concerns but others already a=
ddressed the points (and so I felt no need to add to the queue of messages)=
.

Dan

--
Dan York
Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society
york@isoc.org<mailto:york@isoc.org>   +1-802-735-1624
Jabber: york@jabber.isoc.org<mailto:york@jabber.isoc.org>
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<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space; ">
<br>
<div apple-content-edited=3D"true">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); position: static; z-index: auto; ">
On Apr 16, 2014, at 8:02 AM, Warren Kumari &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:warren@kum=
ari.net">warren@kumari.net</a>&gt;</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>&nbsp;wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type=3D"cite">I think I made it even clearer:<br>
The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate<br>
the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to<br>
complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,<br>
the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.<br>
<br>
Good?<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
<div>Looks good to me. &nbsp; &nbsp;The whole document is looking very good=
. &nbsp;I've been reading the conversation and initially had some concerns =
but others already addressed the points (and so I felt no need to add to th=
e queue of messages).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Dan</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div apple-content-edited=3D"true">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
--</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Dan York</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Senior Content Strategist, Internet Socie=
ty</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif"><a href=3D"mailto:york@isoc.org">york@iso=
c.org</a> &nbsp; &#43;1-802-735-1624</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Jabber: <a href=3D"mailto:york@jabber.iso=
c.org">york@jabber.isoc.org</a>&nbsp;</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Skype: danyork &nbsp; <a href=3D"http://t=
witter.com/danyork">
http://twitter.com/danyork</a></font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); position: static; z-index: auto; ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif"><a href=3D"http://www.internetsociety.org=
/deploy360/">http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/</a>&nbsp;</font></di=
v>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</body>
</html>

--_000_5E7F747125C740378A52EBF45E5F4845isocorg_--


From nobody Wed Apr 16 09:32:56 2014
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2014-04-16

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain.  The technique described is aimed at
   delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from
   the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Wed Apr 16 09:40:47 2014
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On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 9:19 AM, Dan York <york@isoc.org> wrote:
>
> On Apr 16, 2014, at 8:02 AM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
>  wrote:
>
> I think I made it even clearer:
> The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
> the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
> complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
> the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.
>
> Good?
>
>
> Looks good to me.    The whole document is looking very good.  I've been
> reading the conversation and initially had some concerns but others already
> addressed the points (and so I felt no need to add to the queue of
> messages).

... and I got an off-list comment pointing out that:
"Section 6.1
         If the Parental Agent displays the contents
        of the CDS / CDSNKEY to the user and gets confirmation that
        this represents their key, the Parental Agent MAY use this for
        initial enrolment (when the Parent zone does not contain the DS
        for this delgation).

But in section 4.1 you say
   o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
       current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."

One of the two must be reworded."

Doh! So, I have updated the "Signer" rule to be:
o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
    current DNSKEY and DS RRset's" (unless the parent validates the
    CDS / CDNSKEY though some other means (see Section 6.1 and the
    Security Considerations.))

Any (major) objections?

This time for sure,
W



>
> Dan
>
> --
> Dan York
> Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society
> york@isoc.org   +1-802-735-1624
> Jabber: york@jabber.isoc.org
> Skype: danyork   http://twitter.com/danyork
>
> http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
>
>


From nobody Wed Apr 16 15:59:54 2014
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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/


All

Please take a look at version -10 of this draft. I believe that the 
authors have addressed all the issues that were raised during the very 
comment period.

I believe that draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10 has 
reach working group consensus.  I urge folks to give it one last look 
and if there is anything you wish to raise, please raise directly, 
otherwise silence is agreement.

I want to thank all the individuals who contributed comments and feedback.


tim


From nobody Thu Apr 17 01:46:29 2014
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Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 10:46:11 +0200
From: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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To: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On 04/16/2014 06:40 PM, Warren Kumari wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 9:19 AM, Dan York <york@isoc.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Apr 16, 2014, at 8:02 AM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
>>  wrote:
>>
>> I think I made it even clearer:
>> The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
>> the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
>> complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
>> the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.
>>
>> Good?
>>
>>
>> Looks good to me.    The whole document is looking very good.  I've been
>> reading the conversation and initially had some concerns but others already
>> addressed the points (and so I felt no need to add to the queue of
>> messages).
> 
> ... and I got an off-list comment pointing out that:
> "Section 6.1
>          If the Parental Agent displays the contents
>         of the CDS / CDSNKEY to the user and gets confirmation that
>         this represents their key, the Parental Agent MAY use this for
>         initial enrolment (when the Parent zone does not contain the DS
>         for this delgation).
> 
> But in section 4.1 you say
>    o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>        current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
> 
> One of the two must be reworded."
> 
> Doh! So, I have updated the "Signer" rule to be:
> o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>     current DNSKEY and DS RRset's" (unless the parent validates the
>     CDS / CDNSKEY though some other means (see Section 6.1 and the
>     Security Considerations.))
> 
> Any (major) objections?

Yes:)

The comment in 6.1 is meant for a way to use this technique for initial
enrollment. So I would rather see that the rewording in 4.1 also
reflects that: I don't want the regular maintenance to be susceptible to
'other means validation'. Suggestion:

(unless the parent uses the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset for initial enrollment,
in that case the parent validates the CDS / CDNSKEY though some other
means (see Section 6.1 and the Security Considerations.))

Best regards,
  Matthijs

> 
> This time for sure,
> W
> 
> 
> 
>>
>> Dan
>>
>> --
>> Dan York
>> Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society
>> york@isoc.org   +1-802-735-1624
>> Jabber: york@jabber.isoc.org
>> Skype: danyork   http://twitter.com/danyork
>>
>> http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
>>
>>
> 
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 


From nobody Thu Apr 17 01:52:33 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Final shepherding comments for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10
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Hi,

By adding text on using this technique for bootstrapping the chain of
trust, there are some inconsistencies:

1.
In the Abstract it says:

   "This document does not address the initial configuration of
   trust anchors for a domain."

But now it does (minimally).

2.
In Section 4.1:
I would like to see a different rewording for the Signer rule to reflect
the initial enrollment scenario (see other mail). I'll repeat it here:

(unless the parent uses the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset for initial enrollment,
in that case the parent validates the CDS / CDNSKEY though some other
means (see Section 6.1 and the Security Considerations.))

3.
In Section 6.1:
Two typos: enrolment -> enrollment, delgation -> delegation.


Best regards,
  Matthijs


On 04/17/2014 12:58 AM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
> 
> 
> 
> All
> 
> Please take a look at version -10 of this draft. I believe that the
> authors have addressed all the issues that were raised during the very
> comment period.
> 
> I believe that draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10 has
> reach working group consensus.  I urge folks to give it one last look
> and if there is anything you wish to raise, please raise directly,
> otherwise silence is agreement.
> 
> I want to thank all the individuals who contributed comments and feedback.
> 
> 
> tim
> 
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


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At Wed, 16 Apr 2014 18:58:45 -0400,
Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

> Please take a look at version -10 of this draft. I believe that the
> authors have addressed all the issues that were raised during the very
> comment period.
>
> I believe that draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10 has
> reach working group consensus.  I urge folks to give it one last look
> and if there is anything you wish to raise, please raise directly,
> otherwise silence is agreement.

Just from a quick scan, I'm afraid this point wasn't addressed:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11648.html

If it's based on a consensus that it's not worth noting, I'm fine with
that (after all, I now understand the rationale, so my comment is for
helping future readers, not me), but as far as I know there was not
even any followup/discussion on it, so I guess it was simply buried in
the volume of the recent traffic.

--
JINMEI, Tatuya


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Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 13:08:19 -0400
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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 4:46 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
> On 04/16/2014 06:40 PM, Warren Kumari wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 9:19 AM, Dan York <york@isoc.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Apr 16, 2014, at 8:02 AM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
>>>  wrote:
>>>
>>> I think I made it even clearer:
>>> The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
>>> the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
>>> complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
>>> the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.
>>>
>>> Good?
>>>
>>>
>>> Looks good to me.    The whole document is looking very good.  I've been
>>> reading the conversation and initially had some concerns but others already
>>> addressed the points (and so I felt no need to add to the queue of
>>> messages).
>>
>> ... and I got an off-list comment pointing out that:
>> "Section 6.1
>>          If the Parental Agent displays the contents
>>         of the CDS / CDSNKEY to the user and gets confirmation that
>>         this represents their key, the Parental Agent MAY use this for
>>         initial enrolment (when the Parent zone does not contain the DS
>>         for this delgation).
>>
>> But in section 4.1 you say
>>    o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>>        current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>>
>> One of the two must be reworded."
>>
>> Doh! So, I have updated the "Signer" rule to be:
>> o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>>     current DNSKEY and DS RRset's" (unless the parent validates the
>>     CDS / CDNSKEY though some other means (see Section 6.1 and the
>>     Security Considerations.))
>>
>> Any (major) objections?
>
> Yes:)
>
> The comment in 6.1 is meant for a way to use this technique for initial
> enrollment. So I would rather see that the rewording in 4.1 also
> reflects that: I don't want the regular maintenance to be susceptible to
> 'other means validation'. Suggestion:
>
> (unless the parent uses the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset for initial enrollment,
> in that case the parent validates the CDS / CDNSKEY though some other
> means (see Section 6.1 and the Security Considerations.))

Oooh! Nice.
I was unable to come up with a succinct way of saying that. Changed.
I also fixed a typo / thinko in the Acknowledgements section.

*This* time for sure,
W




>
> Best regards,
>   Matthijs
>
>>
>> This time for sure,
>> W
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Dan
>>>
>>> --
>>> Dan York
>>> Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society
>>> york@isoc.org   +1-802-735-1624
>>> Jabber: york@jabber.isoc.org
>>> Skype: danyork   http://twitter.com/danyork
>>>
>>> http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> DNSOP mailing list
>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>>
>


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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Final shepherding comments for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10
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On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 4:52 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> By adding text on using this technique for bootstrapping the chain of
> trust, there are some inconsistencies:
>
> 1.
> In the Abstract it says:
>
>    "This document does not address the initial configuration of
>    trust anchors for a domain."
>
> But now it does (minimally).

True.
I updated it to be "This document does not address the initial
configuration of trust anchors for a domain in depth", but that
sounded stupid, so I just yanked it out.
Thanks.

>
> 2.
> In Section 4.1:
> I would like to see a different rewording for the Signer rule to reflect
> the initial enrollment scenario (see other mail). I'll repeat it here:
>
> (unless the parent uses the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset for initial enrollment,
> in that case the parent validates the CDS / CDNSKEY though some other
> means (see Section 6.1 and the Security Considerations.))

Thanks.


>
> 3.
> In Section 6.1:
> Two typos: enrolment -> enrollment, delgation -> delegation.

Doh! I just ran spellcheck and it found a bunch of other typos too --
one day I'll learn to type...

>
>
> Best regards,
>   Matthijs
>
>
> On 04/17/2014 12:58 AM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
>>
>>
>>
>> All
>>
>> Please take a look at version -10 of this draft. I believe that the
>> authors have addressed all the issues that were raised during the very
>> comment period.
>>
>> I believe that draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10 has
>> reach working group consensus.  I urge folks to give it one last look
>> and if there is anything you wish to raise, please raise directly,
>> otherwise silence is agreement.
>>
>> I want to thank all the individuals who contributed comments and feedback.
>>
>>
>> tim
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> DNSOP mailing list
>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Thu Apr 17 10:11:23 2014
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2014-04-17

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  The technique described is aimed at delegations in which it
   is currently hard to move information from the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Fri Apr 18 07:18:46 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Final shepherding comments for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10
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Thanks Matthijs and Jinmei for the final review, and Warren for the 
final edits.

I'm taking that latest version:
	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

is the latest and apparently the last version.  I'll submit this to the 
IESG unless I hear any major protest, as we appear to be back in consensus.

tim

On 4/17/14, 1:08 PM, Warren Kumari wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 4:52 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> By adding text on using this technique for bootstrapping the chain of
>> trust, there are some inconsistencies:
>>
>> 1.
>> In the Abstract it says:
>>
>>     "This document does not address the initial configuration of
>>     trust anchors for a domain."
>>
>> But now it does (minimally).
>
> True.
> I updated it to be "This document does not address the initial
> configuration of trust anchors for a domain in depth", but that
> sounded stupid, so I just yanked it out.
> Thanks.
>
>>
>> 2.
>> In Section 4.1:
>> I would like to see a different rewording for the Signer rule to reflect
>> the initial enrollment scenario (see other mail). I'll repeat it here:
>>
>> (unless the parent uses the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset for initial enrollment,
>> in that case the parent validates the CDS / CDNSKEY though some other
>> means (see Section 6.1 and the Security Considerations.))
>
> Thanks.
>
>
>>
>> 3.
>> In Section 6.1:
>> Two typos: enrolment -> enrollment, delgation -> delegation.
>
> Doh! I just ran spellcheck and it found a bunch of other typos too --
> one day I'll learn to type...
>
>>
>>
>> Best regards,
>>    Matthijs
>>
>>
>> On 04/17/2014 12:58 AM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
>>>
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> All
>>>
>>> Please take a look at version -10 of this draft. I believe that the
>>> authors have addressed all the issues that were raised during the very
>>> comment period.
>>>
>>> I believe that draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10 has
>>> reach working group consensus.  I urge folks to give it one last look
>>> and if there is anything you wish to raise, please raise directly,
>>> otherwise silence is agreement.
>>>
>>> I want to thank all the individuals who contributed comments and feedback.
>>>
>>>
>>> tim
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> DNSOP mailing list
>>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> DNSOP mailing list
>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>


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From: Antoin Verschuren <antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Final shepherding comments for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

op 18-04-14 16:18, Tim Wicinski schreef:
> Thanks Matthijs and Jinmei for the final review, and Warren for
> the final edits.
> 
> I'm taking that latest version: 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/
>
> 
> 
> is the latest and apparently the last version.  I'll submit this to
> the IESG unless I hear any major protest, as we appear to be back
> in consensus.

Tim,

This isn't major protest, but just due to too little time to put my
thoughts into writing after reviewing so many changes over the last
week (sorry, I also have a day job).

On of the things I haven't reviewed thoroughly enough is the
detection/polling/pushing methods in the draft.
The way it is described now in the draft feels like "we're in a hurry
so we don't care, you might as well just push a freaky proprietary
button somewhere but we're not going to tell you which one"
I think we can do better than that.

I would have expected somebody to mention "notify" as a detection
method that I think would be of great help for the detection of
CDNSKEY/CDS changes.
I just haven't gotten around to phrasing the correct words on how
notify could be used to have a parental agent detect CNDSKEY/CDS
changes to be pulled.

But we do use examples in the draft that I think are freakier than
notify, and I feel they give too much bad advise on methods that could
be used. It's not described well enough that a detection mechanism for
CDNSKEY/CDS changes is just as important for adoption of this idea to
be automated. I think we should either mention a standardized method
in the draft, or write a separate draft on how to notify a parental
agent for CDNSKEY/CDS changes and mention that in this draft, or this
will not be widely implemented.
This based on feedback I got from registrars.

So I think the wording on detecting/pushing/polling are not clear and
unbiased enough, I just did't have time to send text.
I hope someone with more time during Easter agrees.

- -- 
Antoin Verschuren

Technical Policy Advisor SIDN
Meander 501, PO Box 5022, 6802 EA Arnhem, The Netherlands

P: +31 26 3525500  M: +31 6 23368970
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From nobody Fri Apr 18 08:46:38 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Final shepherding comments for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-10
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On Apr 18, 2014, at 8:06 AM, Antoin Verschuren =
<Antoin.Verschuren@sidn.nl> wrote:

> On of the things I haven't reviewed thoroughly enough is the
> detection/polling/pushing methods in the draft.
> The way it is described now in the draft feels like "we're in a hurry
> so we don't care, you might as well just push a freaky proprietary
> button somewhere but we're not going to tell you which one"
> I think we can do better than that.

Maybe, but I don't. If we have a standardized version of that button, it =
will probably over HTTP. For that, we would need to have a discovery =
mechanism for "where is my parent's web site with the button", which is =
very hard. It is possible, and could even be signaled in the DNS with a =
URL RR (thank you Patrik!), but that will take a lot more discussion. I =
propose that if people want to do that, it be done as a update to this =
document.

> I would have expected somebody to mention "notify" as a detection
> method that I think would be of great help for the detection of
> CDNSKEY/CDS changes.

The question is the same as above: notify whom?

> I just haven't gotten around to phrasing the correct words on how
> notify could be used to have a parental agent detect CNDSKEY/CDS
> changes to be pulled.
>=20
> But we do use examples in the draft that I think are freakier than
> notify, and I feel they give too much bad advise on methods that could
> be used. It's not described well enough that a detection mechanism for
> CDNSKEY/CDS changes is just as important for adoption of this idea to
> be automated. I think we should either mention a standardized method
> in the draft, or write a separate draft on how to notify a parental
> agent for CDNSKEY/CDS changes and mention that in this draft, or this
> will not be widely implemented.
> This based on feedback I got from registrars.

To me, the polling option is well-described and the most likely one to =
be used because it takes so much less new stuff.

--Paul Hoffman=


From nobody Mon Apr 21 06:34:19 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On 16 Apr 2014, at 8:02, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

> I think I made it even clearer:
> The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
> the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
> complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
> the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.

I don't think you mean "the first time a DNS operator signs a zone". =
You're making an assumption that a zone, once signed, will never be =
unsigned. In fact, a zone can be signed, then unsigned, any number of =
times.

"Whenever a zone's insecure delegation is replaced by a secure =
delegation, the DNS operator needs to communicate the keying =
material..."


Joe=


From nobody Mon Apr 21 11:00:16 2014
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Subject: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15
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Dear colleagues,

I read draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15.  I have a few comments.  These
are primarily editorial or even nits.  By and large, I think this
draft is fine and ready to go and we should Just Publish It.  We're
supposed to be an operations WG, and I don't think every bit of advice
needs to be absolutely perfect before we send it, so long as we are
sure we are offering good advice.  Note that I have _not_ checked the
arithmetic in the document.  I did once before some time ago, and it
was right then.

I think the expansion for DO is "DNSSEC OK" and the reference likely
should be RFC 3225.

RRset (or RRSet) should refer to 2181.  1035 actually didn't define
this.  There is a definition of RRSet in 2181 and RRset in 2136, but I
guess 2181 is preferable since it was an explicit clarification of DNS
protocols.

   The EDNS protocol extension starting with version 0 permits larger
   responses by mutual agreement of the initiator and responder (see
   Section 4.3 and Section 6.2 of [RFC6891]), and it is recommended to
   support EDNS.  

I read that as having an antecedent for "it" of "the EDNS protocol
extension", which is clearly not what is meant.  Perhaps

   The EDNS protocol extension starting with version 0 permits larger
   responses by mutual agreement of the initiator and responder (see
   Section 4.3 and Section 6.2 of [RFC6891]).  For practical reasons,
   DNS servers and resolvers are recommended to support EDNS.

The most recent measurements in the document are from 2012.  Is there
anything more recent?  Does it matter?

   Even in scenarios where EDNS support in initiators and responders can
   be assumed, e.g. in the case of messages exchanged using DNSSEC, or
   at some future time where EDNS deployment can be considered
   ubiquitous, there will still be cases when MTU limitations or IP
   fragmentation/reassembly problems in firewalls and other middleboxes
   will cause EDNS failures which lead to non-extended DNS retries.  

That sentence is kind of hard to follow.  Perhaps

   Even in scenarios where EDNS support in initiators and responders
   can be assumed (e.g. in the case of messages exchanged using
   DNSSEC, or at some future time where EDNS deployment can be
   considered ubiquitous), there will still be cases when MTU
   limitations or IP fragmentation/reassembly problems in firewalls
   and other middleboxes will cause EDNS failures; such cases will
   lead to non-extended DNS retries.

I don't understand this sentence:

   Anycast [RFC3258] [RFC4786] is a useful technique for improving
   performance and below the zone cut being described by a delegation is
   responses.

The paragraph

   We assume a medium query name size of 64 since that is the typical
   size seen in trace data at the time of this writing.  If
   Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) or any other technology that
   results in larger query names be deployed significantly in advance of
   EDNS, then new measurements and new estimates will have to be made.

suggests that re-measurement is necessary in the face of IDNA.  Does
this mean it's time to do that measurement, since in fact we have a
number of IDNA TLDs now?

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com


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Sorry for the delayed reply...

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> wrote:

Your comments on the draft are very good and I agree with them. Minor
quibble, though:

> Note also that "required" and "necessary" are used in the draft but
> never defined. In a referral, the only RRset (for non-DNSSEC answers)
> which is really required is the NS set. Glue records are not required
> (you can always make a specific request for them: it means one more
> RTT but it will work).

I don't think this is right: if you ask a parent zone name server for a
glue record, you will get a referral to the child just as if you asked for
any other record in the child zone. So glue records have to be present in
referrals.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
South Biscay: Variable 4 becoming cyclonic then mainly westerly 5 or 6. Slight
or moderate. Occasional rain or showers. Moderate or good, occasionally poor.


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On 15.4.2014 10:46, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
> 2.1.1.1. The SOA Serial Field
> First, this document talks about serial being greater than... It might
> be good to reference RFC 1982 serial number arithmetic that defines
> serial comparison.
>
> Second, I don't like having a special value of 0 to indicate something.
> 0 is a valid serial number, which is now not allowed to be used in
> restrictions. Perhaps it is better to define a new flag in the Flags
> Field that says a serial restriction is being advertised.
I support this proposal.

Couple nits I have noticed:

- Term "DNS Publisher" is not used in the whole text except it's definition 
and section 5. Acknowledgments :-)


- I'm bit nervous about "should be processed" in section:
2.2.2. CSYNC Record Types
    This document defines how the following record types may be processed
    if the CSYNC Type Bit Map field indicates they should be processed.

Did you mean SHOULD? Or maybe MUST?


- Document structure seems a bit too nested to me.

Compare draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization-00:

  1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
      1.1.  Terminology Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
    2.  Definition of the CSYNC RRType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
      2.1.  The CSYNC Resource Record Format . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
        2.1.1.  The CSYNC Resource Record Wire Format  . . . . . . . .  4
        2.1.2.  The CSYNC Presentation Format  . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
        2.1.3.  CSYNC RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
      2.2.  CSYNC Data Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
        2.2.1.  Processing Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
            2.2.2.1. The NS type
           ^^^^^ 4th level is not in TOC but is present in the text

... with draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11:
    1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
      1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
      1.2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
    2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
      2.1.  DNS Delegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
      2.2.  Relationship Between Parent and Child DNS Operator  . . .   5
        2.2.1.  Solution Space  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
        2.2.2.  DNSSEC key change process . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
    3.  CDS / CDNSKEY (Child DS/ Child DNSKEY) Record Definitions . .   7
      3.1.  CDS Resource Record Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
      3.2.  CDNSKEY Resource Record Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
    4.  Automating DS Maintainance With CDS/CDNSKEY records . . . . .   8
      4.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
    5.  CDS / CDNSKEY Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
    6.  Parent Side CDS / CDNSKEY Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
      6.1.  Detecting a Changed CDS / CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
        6.1.1.  CDS / CDNSKEY Polling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
        6.1.2.  Other Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
      6.2.  Using the New CDS / CDNSKEY Records . . . . . . . . . . .  11
        6.2.1.  Parent Calculates DS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
    7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12


IMHO moving section  2.2.  CSYNC Data Processing and 2.3.  Operational 
Considerations to top-level sections (3., 4.) would make it more readable.


- Typo: "I.e,"

Have a nice day!

-- 
Petr^2 Spacek


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From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
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Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> writes:

Sorry for the delay in getting to this discussion, it's been a busy few
weeks and I'm just catching up.

> The following paragraph:
>
>    Some resource records (RRs) in a parent zone are typically expected
>    to be in-sync with the source data in the child's zone.  The most
>    common records, to date, that should match are the nameserver (NS)
>    records and any necessary associated address "glue" records (A and
>    AAAA).  These records are referred to as "delegation records".
>
> does not make much sense, because parent zone, today, is already
> free to update glue by itself. That is, if multiple child zones
> sharing an NS report different glues, the parent zone must check
> the current most information.

Sure, the parent zone is in control of what it publishes so it can.  But
there is no indication to a separated parent and child that the parent
*should* be updating the records.

I'm not sure why you're saying the paragraph doesn't make sense because
the parent "is already free to update glue by itself".  I didn't say it
wasn't, but generally that most parent/child relationships today don't
make the assumption that the data in the child should be copied to the
parent (let alone, making sure it's signed and correct).

The CSYNC record is simply a signaling mechanism saying "yep, these
(signature-verified) records are for production use; please copy
upward".

> The problem is a little more serious. That is, in case when a
> child zone do not provide glue and another provide false glue,
> the parent zone MUST always check and provide the current most
> glue information.

The CSYNC record should only be copying glue from in-zone glue
records.  Updating glue that falls outside the child zone is not
something that is under the perview of current parent/child
relationships today and this document doesn't propose to change that.

> Moreover, though the draft says:
>
>    Clients deploying
>    CSYNC MUST ensure their zones are signed, current and properly linked
>    to the parent zone with a DS record that points to an appropriate
>    DNSKEY of the child's zone.
>
> it is more difficult than making referral NSes and glues up to date.

Right, but it's a bootstrap requirement.  The zone must be secure for
CSYNC to operate properly in a protected fashion.

The CDS record should be used to update the DS record.

> I feel terminology of "agent" in the draft is annoying. "parent
> zone" or "parent zone administrator" should be more consistent
> with the terminology of rfc1034.

That wording is actually borrowed from the CDS document
(draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance), and I understand it's
a new term it is important to note that the entity updating the zone
records for the child may not be the parent zone itself.  In the RRR
model it is the registrar, and the parent zone administrator is the
registry.  So "parental agent" refers to "whomever is handling the data
updates for the parent zone", which may or may not be the zone
administrator.

-- 
Wes Hardaker
Parsons


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Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> writes:

>> I feel terminology of "agent" in the draft is annoying.
>
> I strongly agree with that.  Parental =E2=80=9CAgent=E2=80=9D is too broa=
d.

The choice was to keep consistent terminology with:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance=
-11

I don't think we want these terminology sets to deviate.
--=20
Wes Hardaker
Parsons


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From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> writes:

> 1. Introduction, last paragraph.
> To me, the mentioning of not addressing DNSSEC bootstrapping comes out
> the blue. One sentence later it mentions it is not intended for DNSSEC
> synchronization at all. I'd prefer a rewrite of this last paragraph:
>
>     "This specification was not designed to synchronize DNSSEC
>      security records, such as DS RRsets. For such a solution, see the
>      complimentary solution [REF] for maintaining security delegation
>      information. In addition, this specification does not address how
>      to perform bootstrapping operations, including to get the required
>      initial DNSSEC-secured operating environment in place."

I've used your wording, thank you for it!

I'll get to your other comments a bit later.
-- 
Wes Hardaker
Parsons


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In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 22 Apr 2014 15:49:02 +0100." <alpine.LSU.2.00.1404221533450.16298@hermes-1.csi.cam.ac.uk>
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In message <alpine.LSU.2.00.1404221533450.16298@hermes-1.csi.cam.ac.uk>, Tony Finch writes:
> Sorry for the delayed reply...
> 
> Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> wrote:
> 
> Your comments on the draft are very good and I agree with them. Minor
> quibble, though:
> 
> > Note also that "required" and "necessary" are used in the draft but
> > never defined. In a referral, the only RRset (for non-DNSSEC answers)
> > which is really required is the NS set. Glue records are not required
> > (you can always make a specific request for them: it means one more
> > RTT but it will work).
> 
> I don't think this is right: if you ask a parent zone name server for a
> glue record, you will get a referral to the child just as if you asked for
> any other record in the child zone. So glue records have to be present in
> referrals.

Correct.  Glue is not optional.  Failure to fit glue should result
in TC=1.  It is a mis-reading of RFC 1034 that all additional records
are optional.  Only data added at Section 4.3.2, step 6 is optional.
Note the word "attempt".  All other data is required including that
added at Section 4.3.2, step 3b.

   6. Using local data only, attempt to add other RRs which may be
      useful to the additional section of the query.  Exit.

There are secure referrals where the authority section leaves no
space for additional records with EDNS@512.  Named sets TC=1 for
these when the <QNAME,QTYPE> matches a glue.  Without TC=1 being
set resolution failures occur.  It would be much simpler to do it
whenever glue does not fit independent of QNAME or QTYPE however
this would result in every COM and NET referral from the root setting
TC=1 for plain DNS.

Mark
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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Subject: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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For discussion.

   DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path
   between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
   can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
   protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
   misdirection of the subsequent connection.

   To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
   proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS,
   to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
   DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
   reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The proposed
   mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an
   alternate port.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls

-d


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On Apr 23, 2014, at 6:47 AM, Dan Wing <dan@danwing.org> wrote:

> For discussion.
>=20
>   DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the =
path
>   between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
>   can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
>   protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
>   misdirection of the subsequent connection.
>=20
>   To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
>   proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for =
DNS,
>   to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
>   DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
>   reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The =
proposed
>   mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an
>   alternate port.
>=20
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls

This proposes to run a binary protocol (DTLS) over port 53. It says "A =
DNS client or server that does not implement this specification will not =
respond to the incoming DTLS packets because they don't parse as DNS =
packets (the DNS Opcode would be 15, which is undefined)."

Has anyone run any tests against currently deployed recursive resolvers =
and authoritative servers to see what they do when sent the initial DTLS =
packet?

--Paul Hoffman=


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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--001a11c339e615e0c204f7b71116
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

TLS seems like a poor choice for any new cryptographic transport, it is a
very complicated protocol with a considerable amount of implementation
complexity, computational and network costs. DTLS seems poorer still, as it
is an adaptation of primitives never intended for datagram transmission.

But feedback on the draft:

   * It's unclear how your protocol would really mitigate an active
attacker sending bogus responses. Won't the attacker still be able to
disrupt the DTLS session? Allowing session multiplexing by query-id likely
amplifies this risk.

   * In DTLS, the ClientHello is in the plain - this presents opportunities
for downgrade attacks and inference making. Considering the proposal
advocates for hardcoding the certificate, why not just use a key from the
off?

   * Some nameservers definitely don't just "not respond" when they get
messages they don't understand :/

   * Is the entire protocol subject to the simplest downgrade attack of
all? Just cause the first server response to be dropped and regular DNS
will be used?

   * How long should session state persist?

   * The network costs of certificate transmission probably pale in
comparison to the computational costs of key negotiation. How should
trivial key-exchange ddos attacks be prevented?

   * TLS Heartbeat messages do not permit asymmetric MTU discovery.

On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 6:47 AM, Dan Wing <dan@danwing.org> wrote:

> For discussion.
>
>    DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path
>    between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
>    can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
>    protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
>    misdirection of the subsequent connection.
>
>    To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
>    proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS,
>    to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
>    DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
>    reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The proposed
>    mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an
>    alternate port.
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls
>
> -d
>
> _______________________________________________
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-- 
Colm

--001a11c339e615e0c204f7b71116
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div>TLS seems like a poor choice for any new cryptogr=
aphic transport, it is a very complicated protocol with a considerable amou=
nt of implementation complexity, computational and network costs. DTLS seem=
s poorer still, as it is an adaptation of primitives never intended for dat=
agram transmission.</div>
<div><br></div><div>But feedback on the draft:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0* It&#39;s unclear how your protocol would really mitigate an act=
ive attacker sending bogus responses. Won&#39;t the attacker still be able =
to disrupt the DTLS session? Allowing session multiplexing by query-id like=
ly amplifies this risk.=C2=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0* In DTLS, the ClientHello is in the plain=
 - this presents opportunities for downgrade attacks and inference making. =
Considering the proposal advocates for hardcoding the certificate, why not =
just use a key from the off?</div>
<div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0* Some nameservers definitely don&#39;t ju=
st &quot;not respond&quot; when they get messages they don&#39;t understand=
 :/</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0* Is the entire protocol subject =
to the simplest downgrade attack of all? Just cause the first server respon=
se to be dropped and regular DNS will be used?=C2=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0* How long should session state persist?=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0* The network costs of certifi=
cate transmission probably pale in comparison to the computational costs of=
 key negotiation. How should trivial key-exchange ddos attacks be prevented=
?</div>
<div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0* TLS Heartbeat messages do not permit asy=
mmetric MTU discovery.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 6:47 AM, Dan Wing <span dir=3D"ltr=
">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dan@danwing.org" target=3D"_blank">dan@danwing.org<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">For discussion.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on t=
he path<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0between the DNS client and its server. =C2=A0These queries and=
 responses<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0protect. =C2=A0An active attacker can send bogus responses cau=
sing<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0misdirection of the subsequent connection.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) f=
or DNS,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0to protect against passive listeners and certain active attack=
s. =C2=A0As<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechani=
sms to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size. =C2=A0=
The proposed<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over=
 an<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0alternate port.<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls" target=3D"=
_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls</a><br>
<br>
-d<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
DNSOP mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:DNSOP@ietf.org">DNSOP@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Colm
</div></div>

--001a11c339e615e0c204f7b71116--


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From: Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Apr 23, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> On Apr 23, 2014, at 6:47 AM, Dan Wing <dan@danwing.org> wrote:
>=20
>> For discussion.
>>=20
>>  DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the =
path
>>  between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
>>  can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
>>  protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
>>  misdirection of the subsequent connection.
>>=20
>>  To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
>>  proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for =
DNS,
>>  to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
>>  DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
>>  reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The =
proposed
>>  mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an
>>  alternate port.
>>=20
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls
>=20
> This proposes to run a binary protocol (DTLS) over port 53. It says "A =
DNS client or server that does not implement this specification will not =
respond to the incoming DTLS packets because they don't parse as DNS =
packets (the DNS Opcode would be 15, which is undefined)."
>=20
> Has anyone run any tests against currently deployed recursive =
resolvers and authoritative servers to see what they do when sent the =
initial DTLS packet?

Paul,
  openssl s_client -dtls1 -connect 1.2.3.4:53 -debug
substituting 1.2.3.4 for the server you want to test, and in another =
window do tcpdump port 53.

-d


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Apr 23, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com> wrote:

> On Apr 23, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> =
wrote:
>=20
>> On Apr 23, 2014, at 6:47 AM, Dan Wing <dan@danwing.org> wrote:
>>=20
>>> For discussion.
>>>=20
>>> DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the =
path
>>> between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
>>> can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
>>> protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
>>> misdirection of the subsequent connection.
>>>=20
>>> To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
>>> proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for =
DNS,
>>> to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
>>> DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
>>> reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The =
proposed
>>> mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an
>>> alternate port.
>>>=20
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls
>>=20
>> This proposes to run a binary protocol (DTLS) over port 53. It says =
"A DNS client or server that does not implement this specification will =
not respond to the incoming DTLS packets because they don't parse as DNS =
packets (the DNS Opcode would be 15, which is undefined)."
>>=20
>> Has anyone run any tests against currently deployed recursive =
resolvers and authoritative servers to see what they do when sent the =
initial DTLS packet?
>=20
> Paul,
>  openssl s_client -dtls1 -connect 1.2.3.4:53 -debug
> substituting 1.2.3.4 for the server you want to test, and in another =
window do tcpdump port 53.

Sure. What were the results of your testing?

--Paul Hoffman=


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On Apr 23, 2014, at 6:47 AM, Dan Wing <dan@danwing.org> wrote:

> For discussion.
>=20
>   DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the =
path
>   between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
>   can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
>   protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
>   misdirection of the subsequent connection.
>=20
>   To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
>   proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for =
DNS,
>   to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
>   DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
>   reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The =
proposed
>   mechanism runs over the default DNS port and can also run over an
>   alternate port.
>=20
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls

a:  With the need to do all the handshaking, you gain only a little from =
doing dTLS over UDP rather than TLS over TCP.  So why use UDP with all =
its headaches?  Just use TCP and conventional TLS rather than DTLS, =
especially when you are talking about mucking with the handshake.

b:  DO NOT USE PORT 53 for this:  There are far far too many networks =
(1%+) that reinterpret DNS requests or just outright block all DNS to =
non-approved servers, and more still which block non-DNS over DNS.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From: Jacques Latour <jacques.latour@cira.ca>
To: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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"The Child may also remove old  keys, but this document does not support re=
moving all keys."
"When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the CDS / CDNSKEY resource records, t=
he Child DNS Operator MAY delete the CDS / CDNSKEY record(s);"

Read the whole thing a couple of times and it's not clear to me how to remo=
ve one or more DS? Once "in-sync", If the parental agent polling/mechanism =
detect a CDS for an existing DS, or a CDNSKEY for a matching DS, then you r=
emove the DS but not if it's the last one? Right? Or there's a "ADD/DELETE"=
 parameter to the proposed CDS and CDNSKEY resource records to instruct the=
 parental agent on the type of operation to perform?

Jack

> -----Original Message-----
> From: DNSOP [mailto:dnsop-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Joe Abley
> Sent: April-21-14 9:34 AM
> To: Warren Kumari
> Cc: dnsop; Paul Hoffman
> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-
> delegation-trust-maintainance
>=20
>=20
> On 16 Apr 2014, at 8:02, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>=20
> > I think I made it even clearer:
> > The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
> > the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
> > complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
> > the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.
>=20
> I don't think you mean "the first time a DNS operator signs a zone". You'=
re
> making an assumption that a zone, once signed, will never be unsigned. In
> fact, a zone can be signed, then unsigned, any number of times.
>=20
> "Whenever a zone's insecure delegation is replaced by a secure delegation=
,
> the DNS operator needs to communicate the keying material..."
>=20
>=20
> Joe
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


From nobody Wed Apr 23 11:41:25 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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for reasons well-spoken up-thread, if we're going to add a dns
transport, i'd like it to be RFC 6013 style TCP (in which session
context can be compressed and retained after FIN for full-window-size
restart, and which permits the query to be bundled into the SYN packet),
or at a minimum, SCTP.

DTLS does not solve any of the problems described at
<https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2578510>.

vixie


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On Wed, 23 Apr 2014, Nicholas Weaver wrote:

> b:  DO NOT USE PORT 53 for this:  There are far far too many networks (1%+) that reinterpret DNS requests or just outright block all DNS to non-approved servers, and more still which block non-DNS over DNS.

Yes, I fully agree with this. It was a major objection for me to CurveDNS
as well

No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance at
working these days than a random other newly assigned port.

I'll go get a comfort coffee now.....

Paul
ps. leaning towards "custom crypto that fits in DNS formats"


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On Apr 23, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance =
at
> working these days than a random other newly assigned port.

Not true.  Port 53 is far more molested than "random":  INBOUND firewall =
rules prevent you from running new services without firewall rule =
modifications, but outbound blocking is far less common.  (Our test port =
for this is TCP 1947 with Netalyzr).


--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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I agree that DTLS does not solve any problems for DNS. The basic
problem is that DTLS is still based around the notion of a session
where the server stores per connection state. So you might as well use
TLS for this application.

But TLS is not the only option available. Or rather using TLS to
secure DNS is not the only option possible. If we use TLS to do a
kerberos like key exchange, we can generate a shared secret and a
ticket which can then be used to secure all future communications
without changing from UDP.

We can't run over port 53 (trust me, I tried). But we can nominate the
ports to use in the key exchange setup.

The resulting protocol works in about 93-98% of network situations
(depending on how you measure). So you still need a Web Service
backup. But it does work pretty well.




On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 2:41 PM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:
> for reasons well-spoken up-thread, if we're going to add a dns
> transport, i'd like it to be RFC 6013 style TCP (in which session
> context can be compressed and retained after FIN for full-window-size
> restart, and which permits the query to be bundled into the SYN packet),
> or at a minimum, SCTP.
>
> DTLS does not solve any of the problems described at
> <https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2578510>.
>
> vixie
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop



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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On 23 Apr 2014, at 18:32, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

> We can't run over port 53 (trust me, I tried).

You have doubts about the approach described in =
draft-hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns-00? Those would be interesting to hear; I =
find that draft (and the accompanying t-dns technical report) to be =
quite compelling.

If you have doubts, are you mainly concerned about transactions between =
recursive and authority servers, or between stub resolvers and recursive =
servers?


Joe=


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 7:11 PM, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:
>
> On 23 Apr 2014, at 18:32, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> We can't run over port 53 (trust me, I tried).
>
> You have doubts about the approach described in draft-hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns-00? Those would be interesting to hear; I find that draft (and the accompanying t-dns technical report) to be quite compelling.
>
> If you have doubts, are you mainly concerned about transactions between recursive and authority servers, or between stub resolvers and recursive servers?

I meant Port 53 UDP. There is just too much middlebox stuff that gets
in the way.

Port 53 TCP might be viable.



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


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On Wed, 23 Apr 2014, Nicholas Weaver wrote:

> On Apr 23, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>> No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance at
>> working these days than a random other newly assigned port.
>
> Not true.  Port 53 is far more molested than "random":  INBOUND firewall rules prevent you from running new services without firewall rule modifications, but outbound blocking is far less common.  (Our test port for this is TCP 1947 with Netalyzr).

Provided you use "traditional DNS" perhaps? Once you account for roaming
around different network, I think you will see port 53 us regularly 
transparently proxied to a local DNS server. When those see something
they don't understand because its not "traditional DNS", you'll lose.

Paul


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In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 23 Apr 2014 21:46:59 -0400." <alpine.LFD.2.10.1404232145120.4391@bofh.nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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In message <alpine.LFD.2.10.1404232145120.4391@bofh.nohats.ca>, Paul Wouters writes:
> On Wed, 23 Apr 2014, Nicholas Weaver wrote:
> 
> > On Apr 23, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> >> No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance at
> >> working these days than a random other newly assigned port.
> >
> > Not true.  Port 53 is far more molested than "random":  INBOUND firewall rules prevent you from running new services without firewall rule modifications
> , but outbound blocking is far less common.  (Our test port for this is TCP 1947 with Netalyzr).
> 
> Provided you use "traditional DNS" perhaps? Once you account for roaming
> around different network, I think you will see port 53 us regularly 
> transparently proxied to a local DNS server. When those see something
> they don't understand because its not "traditional DNS", you'll lose.
> 
> Paul

Which doesn't handle RD=0 queries and often doesn't handle DNSSEC.

This still isn't a reason to not use port 53.  It is a reason to
write "Transparent DNS Proxies Considered Harmful".

It is a reason to have a DHCP{v6} option for "hotspot registration".

Mark
 
> _______________________________________________
> dns-privacy mailing list
> dns-privacy@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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To: Jacques Latour <jacques.latour@cira.ca>, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Cc: Stuart Olmstead-Wilcox <stuart.olmstead-wilcox@cira.ca>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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Hi Jacques,

On 04/23/2014 06:57 PM, Jacques Latour wrote:
> "The Child may also remove old  keys, but this document does not
> support removing all keys." "When the Parent DS is "in-sync" with the
> CDS / CDNSKEY resource records, the Child DNS Operator MAY delete the
> CDS / CDNSKEY record(s);"
> 
> Read the whole thing a couple of times and it's not clear to me how
> to remove one or more DS? Once "in-sync", If the parental agent

By removing the corresponding CDS/CDNSKEY from the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset.

> polling/mechanism detect a CDS for an existing DS, or a CDNSKEY for a
> matching DS, then you remove the DS but not if it's the last one?

No: The parent would never remove a DS when it sees a CDS/CDNSKEY for an
existing DS.

> Right? Or there's a "ADD/DELETE" parameter to the proposed CDS and
> CDNSKEY resource records to instruct the parental agent on the type
> of operation to perform?

Let me try to rephrase:

The child can signal its desire to add DS records by publishing
corresponding records in the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset.

The child can also signal its desire to remove DS records by removing
the corresponding records from the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset again.

If the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset is in-sync with the DS RRset at the parent, the
child MAY remove the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset from its zone.

If the parent sees no CDS/CDNSKEY RRset published in the child's zone,
this means there is no action to perform for the parent. Hence, this
document does not support removing all DS records from the parent.

Best regards,
  Matthijs

> 
> Jack
> 
>> -----Original Message----- From: DNSOP
>> [mailto:dnsop-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Joe Abley Sent:
>> April-21-14 9:34 AM To: Warren Kumari Cc: dnsop; Paul Hoffman 
>> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop- 
>> delegation-trust-maintainance
>> 
>> 
>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 8:02, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>> 
>>> I think I made it even clearer: The first time a DNS operator
>>> signs a zone, they need to communicate the keying material to
>>> their parent through some out-of-band method to complete the
>>> chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent, the child
>>> might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.
>> 
>> I don't think you mean "the first time a DNS operator signs a
>> zone". You're making an assumption that a zone, once signed, will
>> never be unsigned. In fact, a zone can be signed, then unsigned,
>> any number of times.
>> 
>> "Whenever a zone's insecure delegation is replaced by a secure
>> delegation, the DNS operator needs to communicate the keying
>> material..."
>> 
>> 
>> Joe _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing
>> list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 
> _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list 
> DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 


From nobody Wed Apr 23 23:13:30 2014
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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 08:11:28 +0200
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Cc: dns-privacy@ietf.org, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 09:16:29AM -0700,
 Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote 
 a message of 39 lines which said:

> Sure. What were the results of your testing?

I quickly tested with .FR authoritative name servers and both NSD and
BIND seem to silently ignore the incoming request. No response is seen
coming back.

08:08:44.460710 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8611, offset 0, flags [DF],
proto UDP (17), length 192)
    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
    [0q] 0/0/0 (164)
08:08:45.459519 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8612, offset 0, flags [DF],
proto UDP (17), length 192)
    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
    [0q] 0/0/256 ar:
    ^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-"n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M-=M-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^TM-@^JM-@"M-@!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^OM-@^E^@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-@^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^_M-@^^^@3^@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A^A.[|domain]
08:08:47.459513 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8613, offset 0, flags [DF],
proto UDP (17), length 192)
    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
    [0q] 0/0/512 ar:
    ^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-"n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M-=M-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^TM-@^JM-@"M-@!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^OM-@^E^@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-@^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^_M-@^^^@3^@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A^A.[|domain]


From nobody Thu Apr 24 06:52:41 2014
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From: Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de>
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 15:52:20 +0200
To: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/ssgyGzgdHDu4cyBuecqi4bld4wo
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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Moin!


On 24.04.2014, at 15:28, "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com> w=
rote:

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: dns-privacy [mailto:dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Nich=
olas
>> Weaver
>> Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 1:58 AM
>> To: Paul Wouters
>> Cc: dnsop; Nicholas Weaver; dns-privacy@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On Apr 23, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>> No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance
>>> at working these days than a random other newly assigned port.
>=20
> On the contrary, Firewalls are configured today to permit UDP port 53 and b=
lock TCP port 53. Why should firewalls change their configuration ?
I know lots of firewalls that also allow TCP/53, but the real problem with a=
ll these middle boxes that make changing DNS hard is that they believe to un=
derstand the full protocol and only pass what they think is right. So everyt=
hing new we come up will be dropped (Been there, done that). We have to be v=
ery careful with changes to the DNS protocol if we want them to be deployed =
=20

So long
Ralf=20

Sent from my iPhone=


From nobody Thu Apr 24 07:19:48 2014
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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 07:19:14 -0700
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References: <11620EF1-D80F-4B2E-87CB-DE65EB35D672@danwing.org> <491D9439-C6A9-4B38-8754-A9CBCA642C40@vpnc.org> <C9F41760-EBC0-4ECF-8762-3DEAC93E1C31@cisco.com> <63843A6C-33AF-4A65-87FA-281FF9E996CC@vpnc.org> <20140424061128.GA27677@nic.fr>
To: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
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Cc: dns-privacy@ietf.org, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Apr 23, 2014, at 11:11 PM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> =
wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 09:16:29AM -0700,
> Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote=20
> a message of 39 lines which said:
>=20
>> Sure. What were the results of your testing?
>=20
> I quickly tested with .FR authoritative name servers and both NSD and
> BIND seem to silently ignore the incoming request. No response is seen
> coming back.
>=20
> 08:08:44.460710 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8611, offset 0, flags [DF],
> proto UDP (17), length 192)
>    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
>    [0q] 0/0/0 (164)
> 08:08:45.459519 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8612, offset 0, flags [DF],
> proto UDP (17), length 192)
>    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
>    [0q] 0/0/256 ar:
>    =
^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-"n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M-=3D=
M-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^TM-@^JM-@"M-@!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^OM-@^E^=
@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-@^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^_M-@^^^@3^=
@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-=
^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A^A.[|domain]
> 08:08:47.459513 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8613, offset 0, flags [DF],
> proto UDP (17), length 192)
>    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
>    [0q] 0/0/512 ar:
>    =
^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-"n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M-=3D=
M-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^TM-@^JM-@"M-@!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^OM-@^E^=
@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-@^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^_M-@^^^@3^=
@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-=
^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A^A.[|domain]

Thanks, this is the kind of data I was looking for. The draft seems to =
assume that the server will give an error, not no response.

--Paul Hoffman=


From nobody Thu Apr 24 07:53:22 2014
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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 10:53:08 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwhOuCpaNivzqcBdHRpfxdL=qizdiErhsJwxU1RS8O4hYQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de> wrote:
> Moin!
>
>
> On 24.04.2014, at 15:28, "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.co=
m> wrote:
>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: dns-privacy [mailto:dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ni=
cholas
>>> Weaver
>>> Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 1:58 AM
>>> To: Paul Wouters
>>> Cc: dnsop; Nicholas Weaver; dns-privacy@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Apr 23, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>>> No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance
>>>> at working these days than a random other newly assigned port.
>>
>> On the contrary, Firewalls are configured today to permit UDP port 53 an=
d block TCP port 53. Why should firewalls change their configuration ?
> I know lots of firewalls that also allow TCP/53, but the real problem wit=
h all these middle boxes that make changing DNS hard is that they believe t=
o understand the full protocol and only pass what they think is right. So e=
verything new we come up will be dropped (Been there, done that). We have t=
o be very careful with changes to the DNS protocol if we want them to be de=
ployed

+1

If you want to use TLS with DNS then use port 443. One of the effects
of firewalls is that we now only have three ports for all protocols:

Port 80/UDP: Non SSL traffic
Port 443/TCP: SSL traffic
Port 53/UDP: DNS

Which is why the HTTP/2.0 crowd have adopted 'always TLS', not for
encryption, they want to bypass firewalls. And the reason some of us
are pushing back on that is that some of them propose weakening TLS to
make this practical.

Now this approach is of course reprehensible. People are deploying
firewalls for legitimate reasons. And there are some circumstances in
which your traffic not getting out is exactly what should happen.

There are also circumstances where censorship bypass is important and
legitimate.


If you want to run DNS over TCP then I suggest that you simply build a
mechanism to advise on the port to use into whatever upgrade mechanism
you attempt. Then you can use 443, 8443, whatever works.

But the result is rather Rube-Goldberg. My version of digg exploded
from a few hundred kb to 2Mb because it now has the whole of OpenSSL
embedded. (Although the same might well happen if I implemented
DNSSEC)

I don't like that approach. TLS is optimized for a particular purpose
and DNS is a very different problem. We end up using only a fraction
of the features. And as heartbleed shows, an unused feature can still
cause failure. In fact its always been the underused parts of TLS
where problems have emerged - client auth, renegotiation, heartbeat.


I would prefer to separate out the key negotiation from the DNS
protocol. The complex part is the key negotiation. Applying crypo to
messages is pretty easy (albeit not foolproof as heartbeat shows).

One of the features you will note in both CBOR and JSON-B is that we
both use byte length markers to specify the length of binary and text
fields but we don't use them to denote lists or structures.

There is a good reason for that, using byte counts to measure
structures is inherently ambiguous if the inner lengths are larger
than the outer.


Just finishing up a draft. Got to get over this cold first.

--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


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From: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]   DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On 24 Apr 2014, at 10:53, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

> If you want to use TLS with DNS then use port 443. One of the effects
> of firewalls is that we now only have three ports for all protocols:
>=20
> Port 80/UDP: Non SSL traffic
> Port 443/TCP: SSL traffic
> Port 53/UDP: DNS

I think it's important to frame the problem space. I suspect that the =
firewall challenges you cite most often apply to communications between =
stub resolvers and recursive resolvers, for hosts that are using an =
off-net resolver (directly, or via a proxy).

I also suspect that any ISP who has ever decided to install firewalls or =
other packet-mangling middleware in front of their resolver service (and =
is still in business) has by now collected many reasons not to do that, =
and that the network path between ISP resolver and authority servers is =
very likely to be clean. For ISP, read campus, enterprise, etc as =
appropriate.

I have no science to back up my suspicions, here. Given that others =
apparently have different suspicions, equally plausible, perhaps science =
is needed. However, I'll note that the conversations surrounding the =
problem statement in London all seemed to support separating these two =
uses of the protocol.

I don't think it's worth butchering the protocol if it turns out that we =
have an easy and clean solution that works for a significant part of the =
problem space (resolvers talking to authority servers), which is what =
t-dns/draft-hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns looks like to me.

This compartmentalisation of the problem space reminds me of RFC 4409, =
and makes me wonder whether there's a way to replace stub-resolver =
communications with something new without breaking everything. After =
all, in a very real sense we really only have two edge platforms to =
worry about (Android and iOS).


Joe=


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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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Cc: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, "Tirumaleswar Reddy \(tireddy\)" <tireddy@cisco.com>, Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de>, "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 11:19 AM, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:
>
> On 24 Apr 2014, at 10:53, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> If you want to use TLS with DNS then use port 443. One of the effects
>> of firewalls is that we now only have three ports for all protocols:
>>
>> Port 80/UDP: Non SSL traffic
>> Port 443/TCP: SSL traffic
>> Port 53/UDP: DNS
>
> I think it's important to frame the problem space. I suspect that the fir=
ewall challenges you cite most often apply to communications between stub r=
esolvers and recursive resolvers, for hosts that are using an off-net resol=
ver (directly, or via a proxy).
>
> I also suspect that any ISP who has ever decided to install firewalls or =
other packet-mangling middleware in front of their resolver service (and is=
 still in business) has by now collected many reasons not to do that, and t=
hat the network path between ISP resolver and authority servers is very lik=
ely to be clean. For ISP, read campus, enterprise, etc as appropriate.

My interest at the start was censorship prevention so my interest is
almost exclusively client-resolver. It does look like a totally
different protocol to resolver-authoritative though.

Since what we are concerned with here is (also) privacy, I agree that
the resolver-authoritative loop is also in play. But that is a vastly
lower priority than the client-resolver loop. If you don't solve that,
you don't have any solution.

The two problems are completely separate from a trust point of view.
For key management in the Resolver-Authoritative loop you almost
certainly want to use DNSSEC. But in the client-resolver loop you
might well want to use WebPKI because you would want accountability.


> I have no science to back up my suspicions, here. Given that others appar=
ently have different suspicions, equally plausible, perhaps science is need=
ed. However, I'll note that the conversations surrounding the problem state=
ment in London all seemed to support separating these two uses of the proto=
col.
>
> I don't think it's worth butchering the protocol if it turns out that we =
have an easy and clean solution that works for a significant part of the pr=
oblem space (resolvers talking to authority servers), which is what t-dns/d=
raft-hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns looks like to me.

You know when people use loaded terms like 'butchering the protocol'
to mean 'do it a different way to me' I start to get a little cross.

For me the idea of putting TLS traffic over the same port as non TLS
traffic without careful attention to how the upgrade is achieved would
be 'butchering the protocol'. Changing the port number to one that is
known to work is a cleaner approach.


--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


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To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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At Thu, 24 Apr 2014 07:55:52 +0200,
Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:

> The child can also signal its desire to remove DS records by removing
> the corresponding records from the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset again.

...unless that would make the resulting CDS/CDNSKEY RRset empty.
Otherwise it can contradict this one:

> If the parent sees no CDS/CDNSKEY RRset published in the child's zone,
> this means there is no action to perform for the parent. Hence, this
> document does not support removing all DS records from the parent.

I guess this discussions is essentially the same as what I asked a few
months ago:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11051.html

and while I thought revised versions of the draft were clear about
this point, but the fact that we still have this discussion seems to
suggest it's probably not sufficiently clear.  Perhaps the problem is
that many of us already knows how it works and it's difficult for us
to see how it could be interpreted by first-time readers.  So, while
it may look redundant, it may help if we show a specific example of
how the child adds/removes CDS/CDNSKEY and how it works at the parent:

0. the child becomes signed from unsigned, tells the parent its
   DNSKEY (say KSK1), the parent has a DS.  this step is out of scope
   of CDS/CDNSKEY:
   child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
1. the child adds the corresponding CDS in the child zone:
   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)
2. the child adds a new DNSKEY (KSK2) and corresponding CDS in the
   child zone:
   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)
   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)
3. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
   finds there's a new CDS (for KSK2) that doesn't match its set of
   CDS, and adds a new DS corresponding to that one:
   child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
   child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
4. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized, and removes
   the old DNSKEY (KSK1) and corresponding CDS:
   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)
5. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
   finds a CDS (for KSK1) that currently matches one of its DS's is
   now removed.  the parent removes the corresponding DS:
   child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
6. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized.  at this
   point, it MAY remove the remaining CDS for the reason explained in
   Section 4.1 of draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11:
   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
   (no CDS records)
7. the parent notices the change in the child, but does nothing since
   there's no CDS record in the child:
   child.example. DS ....(for KSK2) ; still exist
8. eventually the child might go unsigned again.  all of its DNSKEYs
   will be removed, but the child needs to tell the parent about the
   change and have them remove the DS records in some other way than
   CDS/CDNSKEY.  removing all CDS records can't be used since it
   doesn't make any change at the parent as shown in steps 6 and 7.

--
JINMEI, Tatuya


From nobody Thu Apr 24 08:52:36 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Apr 24, 2014, at 8:39 AM, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) =
<tireddy@cisco.com> wrote:

> No, the draft states that the DNS server will send no response. Please =
refer to section 5 of the draft =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dnsodtls-00#section-5=20
>=20
> <snip>
>=20
>   After performing the above steps, the host should determine if the
>   DNS server supports DNSoD by sending a DTLS ClientHello message.  A
>   DNS server that does not support DNSoD will not respond to
>   ClientHello messages sent by the client, because they are not valid
>   DNS requests (specifically, the DNS Opcode is invalid).
>=20
> </snip>

Sorry, you are right, and I had misread that.

--Paul Hoffman=


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Cc: "Prashanth Patil \(praspati\)" <praspati@cisco.com>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Vixie [mailto:paul@redbarn.org]
> Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 12:11 AM
> To: Dan Wing
> Cc: dnsop@ietf.org; dns-privacy@ietf.org; Prashanth Patil (praspati);
> Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
> Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
>=20
> for reasons well-spoken up-thread, if we're going to add a dns transport,=
 i'd like
> it to be RFC 6013 style TCP (in which session context can be compressed a=
nd
> retained after FIN for full-window-size restart, and which permits the qu=
ery to
> be bundled into the SYN packet), or at a minimum, SCTP.

SCTP has problems with Firewall and NAT traversal, hence WebRTC is using SC=
TP over DTLS over DNS (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-data-ch=
annel-08). DNSoD does not require server-side DTLS state, this is achieved =
by the server sending ticket to the DTLS client using the mechanism explain=
ed in RFC 5077.

-Tiru

>=20
> DTLS does not solve any of the problems described at
> <https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3D2578510>.
>=20
> vixie


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From: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Thread-Topic: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 13:28:44 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: dns-privacy [mailto:dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Nich=
olas
> Weaver
> Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 1:58 AM
> To: Paul Wouters
> Cc: dnsop; Nicholas Weaver; dns-privacy@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
>=20
>=20
> On Apr 23, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> > No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance
> > at working these days than a random other newly assigned port.

On the contrary, Firewalls are configured today to permit UDP port 53 and b=
lock TCP port 53. Why should firewalls change their configuration ?
DNSoD does not require any changes to the Firewall configuration. Browsers =
already support DTLS because of WebRTC (SRTP-DTLS for media streams, SCTP o=
ver DTLS over UDP for data channels).

Cheers,
-Tiru

>=20
> Not true.  Port 53 is far more molested than "random":  INBOUND firewall =
rules
> prevent you from running new services without firewall rule modifications=
, but
> outbound blocking is far less common.  (Our test port for this is TCP 194=
7 with
> Netalyzr).
>=20
>=20
> --
> Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
> nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
> 510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
> PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
Thread-Topic: [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: dns-privacy [mailto:dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul
> Hoffman
> Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 7:49 PM
> To: Stephane Bortzmeyer
> Cc: dns-privacy@ietf.org; dnsop; Dan Wing (dwing)
> Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
>=20
> On Apr 23, 2014, at 11:11 PM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
> wrote:
>=20
> > On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 09:16:29AM -0700, Paul Hoffman
> > <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote a message of 39 lines which said:
> >
> >> Sure. What were the results of your testing?
> >
> > I quickly tested with .FR authoritative name servers and both NSD and
> > BIND seem to silently ignore the incoming request. No response is seen
> > coming back.
> >
> > 08:08:44.460710 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8611, offset 0, flags [DF],
> > proto UDP (17), length 192)
> >    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
> >    [0q] 0/0/0 (164)
> > 08:08:45.459519 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8612, offset 0, flags [DF],
> > proto UDP (17), length 192)
> >    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
> >    [0q] 0/0/256 ar:
> >
> > ^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-
> "n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M
> > -=3DM-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^TM-@^JM-@"M-
> @!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^O
> > M-@^E^@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-
> @^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^
> > _M-@^^^@3^@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-
> ^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@
> > ^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A^A.[|domain]
> > 08:08:47.459513 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8613, offset 0, flags [DF],
> > proto UDP (17), length 192)
> >    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
> >    [0q] 0/0/512 ar:
> >
> > ^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-
> "n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M
> > -=3DM-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^TM-@^JM-@"M-
> @!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^O
> > M-@^E^@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-
> @^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^
> > _M-@^^^@3^@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-
> ^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@
> > ^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A^A.[|domain]
>=20
> Thanks, this is the kind of data I was looking for. The draft seems to as=
sume that
> the server will give an error, not no response.

No, the draft states that the DNS server will send no response. Please refe=
r to section 5 of the draft http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wing-dnsop-dns=
odtls-00#section-5=20

<snip>

   After performing the above steps, the host should determine if the
   DNS server supports DNSoD by sending a DTLS ClientHello message.  A
   DNS server that does not support DNSoD will not respond to
   ClientHello messages sent by the client, because they are not valid
   DNS requests (specifically, the DNS Opcode is invalid).

</snip>

-Tiru

>=20
> --Paul Hoffman
> _______________________________________________
> dns-privacy mailing list
> dns-privacy@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy


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From: "John Levine" <johnl@taugh.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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>Thanks, this is the kind of data I was looking for. The draft seems to assume that the server will give an error, not no response.

I'd think no response would be pretty much mandatory these days to
avoid being a DDoS reflector.  

This is also consistent with rants I've seen about EDNS0, in which one
of the interop problems is that old servers that don't understand it
(of which there still are a few) often ignore requests that have it,
making it hard to tell whether or when to fall back.

R's,
John


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From: okTurtles <hi@okturtles.com>
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Subject: [DNSOP] DNSChain 0.1.0 adds DANE/TLSA support for blockchain + canonical DNS
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Hi list!

Just published this to NPM and thought it might interest this list.

DNSChain is a DNS + HTTP(S) + Blockchain-proxy hybrid server designed to =
serve as a decentralized and distributed secure replacement for =
Certificate Authorities and X.509 PKI.

It's also designed to act as a secure public key distribution system for =
both websites and identity systems.

Today, with the help of various contributors, we released version 0.1.0:

New Features:
DANE/TLSA support for BOTH canonical DNS and blockchain DNS!
Added NO_OLD_DNS option for oldDNSMethod (refuses all non-blockchain =
queries)
Improvements:
Redesigned dns.coffee and improved its structure
Accurate ttl values now returned for namecoin DNS queries based on =
expires_in field
Updated contributors, code and config examples in README.md
Improved EDNS support
Improved handling of ANY queries
Updated dependencies to latest versions
native-dns is now fetched from the dnschain branch of our fork.
Comments added all over the place (to native-dns & related projects =
also!)
Many other code improvements both to DNSChain and the NodeJS native-dns =
module
Some performance improvements
Fixes:
Fixed broken grunt example
Fixed some uncaught exceptions (issues #1 and #2)
Fixed broken NAPTR support
Changes:
DNSChain license is now MPL-2.0 (applies to version 0.1.0 onward)
Default logging level is now info

It's compatible with most UNIX-like systems (including OS X) and can be =
installed via the NPM package manager or manually via Git.

Free public servers (including ones that support DNSCrypt), along with =
instructions for installing and running DNSChain, is available on its =
GitHub page:

https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain

Cheers,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_FAE2EBE2-7197-48D9-A594-125E4B8EDFF9
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Hi =
list!<br><div><br></div><div>Just published this to NPM and thought it =
might interest this list.</div><div><br></div>DNSChain is a DNS + =
HTTP(S) + Blockchain-proxy hybrid server designed to serve as a =
decentralized and distributed secure replacement for Certificate =
Authorities and X.509 PKI.<div><br></div><div>It's also designed to act =
as a secure public key distribution system for both websites and =
identity systems.<div><br></div><div>Today, with the help of&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain#Contributors">various =
contributors</a>, we released version =
0.1.0:</div><div><br></div><div><ul><li><strong>New =
Features:</strong><ul><li>DANE/TLSA support =
for&nbsp;<em>BOTH</em>&nbsp;canonical DNS and blockchain =
DNS!</li><li>Added&nbsp;<code>NO_OLD_DNS</code>&nbsp;option =
for&nbsp;<code>oldDNSMethod</code>&nbsp;(refuses all non-blockchain =
queries)</li></ul></li><li><strong>Improvements:</strong><ul><li>Redesigne=
d&nbsp;<code>dns.coffee</code>&nbsp;and improved its =
structure</li><li>Accurate&nbsp;<code>ttl</code>&nbsp;values now =
returned for namecoin DNS queries based =
on&nbsp;<code>expires_in</code>&nbsp;field</li><li>Updated contributors, =
code and config examples in&nbsp;<code>README.md</code></li><li>Improved =
EDNS support</li><li>Improved handling of ANY queries</li><li>Updated =
dependencies to latest versions</li><li><code>native-dns</code>&nbsp;is =
now fetched from the&nbsp;<code>dnschain</code>&nbsp;branch of&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://github.com/okTurtles/node-dns/tree/dnschain">our =
fork</a>.</li><li>Comments added all over the place =
(to&nbsp;<code>native-dns</code>&nbsp;&amp; related projects =
also!)</li><li>Many other code improvements both to DNSChain and the =
NodeJS&nbsp;<code>native-dns</code>&nbsp;module</li><li>Some performance =
improvements</li></ul></li><li><strong>Fixes:</strong><ul><li>Fixed =
broken&nbsp;<code>grunt example</code></li><li>Fixed some uncaught =
exceptions (issues #1 and #2)</li><li>Fixed broken NAPTR =
support</li></ul></li><li><strong>Changes:</strong><ul><li>DNSChain =
license is now MPL-2.0 (applies to version 0.1.0 onward)</li><li>Default =
logging level is =
now&nbsp;<code>info</code></li></ul></li></ul><div><br></div></div><div>It=
's compatible with most UNIX-like systems (including OS X) and can be =
installed via the NPM package manager or manually via =
Git.</div><div><br></div><div>Free public servers (including ones that =
support DNSCrypt), along with instructions for installing and running =
DNSChain, is available on its GitHub page:</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain">https://github.com/okTurtle=
s/dnschain</a></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Greg =
Slepak</div></div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br></body></html>=

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From nobody Thu Apr 24 15:59:34 2014
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From: John Heidemann <johnh@isi.edu>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Thu, 24 Apr 2014 11:32:12 -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: 
>...
>
>For me the idea of putting TLS traffic over the same port as non TLS
>traffic without careful attention to how the upgrade is achieved would
>be 'butchering the protocol'. Changing the port number to one that is
>known to work is a cleaner approach.
>
>...

Agreed that TLS upgrade must be done carefully.

Fortunately we have a number of protocools that have survived a TLS
retrofit:  IMAP, STMP, POP3, FTP, XMPP, LDAP, NNTP (according to 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STARTTLS).

Several of these protocols are used over WANs, although I would guess
DNS has far more frequent "help" from transparent middleboxes than they
do, so YMMV.  I think SMTP is a pretty compelling argument that the
World May Not End to do STARTTLS, though.

It is true that a new port "solves" the "oh noes, something changed and
I, the firewall/middlebox, hate you" problem.  However, it solves that
by by turning it into the "oh noes, why should I, the firewall, ever
open this new port for you".  (As as been pointed out.)  It seems like a
trade-off about which pain one wants to endure.

   -John


From nobody Thu Apr 24 21:44:57 2014
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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <11620EF1-D80F-4B2E-87CB-DE65EB35D672@danwing.org> <491D9439-C6A9-4B38-8754-A9CBCA642C40@vpnc.org> <C9F41760-EBC0-4ECF-8762-3DEAC93E1C31@cisco.com> <63843A6C-33AF-4A65-87FA-281FF9E996CC@vpnc.org> <20140424061128.GA27677@nic.fr> <995CF19C-6E1E-4282-BEA1-9991214E6653@vpnc.org>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 24 Apr 2014 07:19:14 -0700." <995CF19C-6E1E-4282-BEA1-9991214E6653@vpnc.org>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:44:41 +1000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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If you want a response "QR" needs to be zero.  Note the "*" which
indicates the packet is a response (QR=1).

In message <995CF19C-6E1E-4282-BEA1-9991214E6653@vpnc.org>, Paul Hoffman writes:
> On Apr 23, 2014, at 11:11 PM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 09:16:29AM -0700,
> > Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote 
> > a message of 39 lines which said:
> > 
> >> Sure. What were the results of your testing?
> > 
> > I quickly tested with .FR authoritative name servers and both NSD and
> > BIND seem to silently ignore the incoming request. No response is seen
> > coming back.
> > 
> > 08:08:44.460710 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8611, offset 0, flags [DF],
> > proto UDP (17), length 192)
> >    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
> >    [0q] 0/0/0 (164)
> > 08:08:45.459519 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8612, offset 0, flags [DF],
> > proto UDP (17), length 192)
> >    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
> >    [0q] 0/0/256 ar:
> >    ^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-"n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M-=M-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^
> TM-@^JM-@"M-@!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^OM-@^E^@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-@^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^_
> M-@^^^@3^@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A
> ^A.[|domain]
> > 08:08:47.459513 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 8613, offset 0, flags [DF],
> > proto UDP (17), length 192)
> >    192.168.1.10.48864 > 194.0.9.1.53: [udp sum ok] 5886 zoneRef*-|
> >    [0q] 0/0/512 ar:
> >    ^A^@^@M-^K^@^@^@^@^@^@^@M-^KM-~M-^?SXM-*l^P^^^TM-"n4^gs^OM-ylMM-S0M-9M-=M-^F_^D^V4^NM-us{^^:^@^@^@XM-@^
> TM-@^JM-@"M-@!^@9^@8^@M-^H^@M-^GM-@^OM-@^E^@5^@M-^DM-@^RM-@^HM-@^\M-@^[^@^V^@^SM-@^MM-@^C^@^JM-@^SM-@^IM-@^_
> M-@^^^@3^@2^@M-^Z^@M-^Y^@E^@DM-@^NM-@^D^@/^@M-^V^@A^@^U^@^R^@^I^@^T^@^Q^@^H^@^F^@M-^?^A^@^@^I^@#^@^@^@^O^@^A
> ^A.[|domain]
> 
> Thanks, this is the kind of data I was looking for. The draft seems to assume that the server will give an e
> rror, not no response.
> 
> --Paul Hoffman
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 08:28:56 +0200
From: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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Hi,

On 04/24/2014 05:41 PM, ç¥žæ˜Žé�”å“‰ wrote:
> At Thu, 24 Apr 2014 07:55:52 +0200,
> Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
> 
>> The child can also signal its desire to remove DS records by removing
>> the corresponding records from the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset again.
> 
> ...unless that would make the resulting CDS/CDNSKEY RRset empty.
> Otherwise it can contradict this one:

Of course. I tried to rephrase it in four short lines. That does not
mean that one line that stands alone is the absolute truth: you have to
consider the complete context.


>> If the parent sees no CDS/CDNSKEY RRset published in the child's zone,
>> this means there is no action to perform for the parent. Hence, this
>> document does not support removing all DS records from the parent.
> 
> I guess this discussions is essentially the same as what I asked a few
> months ago:
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11051.html
> 
> and while I thought revised versions of the draft were clear about
> this point, but the fact that we still have this discussion seems to
> suggest it's probably not sufficiently clear.  Perhaps the problem is
> that many of us already knows how it works and it's difficult for us
> to see how it could be interpreted by first-time readers.  So, while
> it may look redundant, it may help if we show a specific example of
> how the child adds/removes CDS/CDNSKEY and how it works at the parent:

I am indeed pretty clear about how this should work and I think the
draft reflects that. But indeed: there is nothing wrong with adding an
appendix with some examples. Some remarks below:

> 0. the child becomes signed from unsigned, tells the parent its
>    DNSKEY (say KSK1), the parent has a DS.  this step is out of scope
>    of CDS/CDNSKEY:
>    child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
> 1. the child adds the corresponding CDS in the child zone:
>    child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
>    child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)

The child does not necessarily need to add the CDS now: The parent
already has the correct DS RRset (step 0) and no rollover has happened
since then.


> 2. the child adds a new DNSKEY (KSK2) and corresponding CDS in the
>    child zone:
>    child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
>    child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>    child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)
>    child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)

Depending on the type of rollover, the child might not want to add the
CDS directly (Double-Signature KSK Rollover) or might want to add the
CDS before adding the DNSKEY (Double-DS KSK Rollover).


> 3. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
>    finds there's a new CDS (for KSK2) that doesn't match its set of
>    CDS, and adds a new DS corresponding to that one:
>    child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
>    child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
> 4. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized, and removes
>    the old DNSKEY (KSK1) and corresponding CDS:
>    child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>    child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)

You want to remove DNSKEY and CDS for KSK1 here.

Again: The old CDS may be removed earlier, at the time of adding the CDS
for KSK2 (Double-Signature) or later (Double-DS).


> 5. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
>    finds a CDS (for KSK1) that currently matches one of its DS's is
>    now removed.  the parent removes the corresponding DS:
>    child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
> 6. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized.  at this
>    point, it MAY remove the remaining CDS for the reason explained in
>    Section 4.1 of draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11:
>    child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>    (no CDS records)
> 7. the parent notices the change in the child, but does nothing since
>    there's no CDS record in the child:
>    child.example. DS ....(for KSK2) ; still exist
> 8. eventually the child might go unsigned again.  all of its DNSKEYs
>    will be removed, but the child needs to tell the parent about the
>    change and have them remove the DS records in some other way than
>    CDS/CDNSKEY.  removing all CDS records can't be used since it
>    doesn't make any change at the parent as shown in steps 6 and 7.

Other than that, I think these examples are very clear, and I support
adding them as an appendix.

Best regards,
  Matthijs


> 
> --
> JINMEI, Tatuya
> 


From nobody Fri Apr 25 06:48:52 2014
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To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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On Apr 25, 2014, at 2:28 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> =
wrote:

> Hi,
>=20
> On 04/24/2014 05:41 PM, =E7=A5=9E=E6=98=8E=E9=81=94=E5=93=89 wrote:
>> At Thu, 24 Apr 2014 07:55:52 +0200,
>> Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>>=20
>>> The child can also signal its desire to remove DS records by =
removing
>>> the corresponding records from the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset again.
>>=20
>> ...unless that would make the resulting CDS/CDNSKEY RRset empty.
>> Otherwise it can contradict this one:
>=20
> Of course. I tried to rephrase it in four short lines. That does not
> mean that one line that stands alone is the absolute truth: you have =
to
> consider the complete context.
>=20
>=20
>>> If the parent sees no CDS/CDNSKEY RRset published in the child's =
zone,
>>> this means there is no action to perform for the parent. Hence, this
>>> document does not support removing all DS records from the parent.
>>=20
>> I guess this discussions is essentially the same as what I asked a =
few
>> months ago:
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11051.html
>>=20
>> and while I thought revised versions of the draft were clear about
>> this point, but the fact that we still have this discussion seems to
>> suggest it's probably not sufficiently clear.  Perhaps the problem is
>> that many of us already knows how it works and it's difficult for us
>> to see how it could be interpreted by first-time readers.  So, while
>> it may look redundant, it may help if we show a specific example of
>> how the child adds/removes CDS/CDNSKEY and how it works at the =
parent:
>=20
> I am indeed pretty clear about how this should work and I think the
> draft reflects that. But indeed: there is nothing wrong with adding an
> appendix with some examples. Some remarks below:
>=20
>> 0. the child becomes signed from unsigned, tells the parent its
>>   DNSKEY (say KSK1), the parent has a DS.  this step is out of scope
>>   of CDS/CDNSKEY:
>>   child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
>> 1. the child adds the corresponding CDS in the child zone:
>>   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
>>   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)
>=20
> The child does not necessarily need to add the CDS now: The parent
> already has the correct DS RRset (step 0) and no rollover has happened
> since then.
>=20
>=20
>> 2. the child adds a new DNSKEY (KSK2) and corresponding CDS in the
>>   child zone:
>>   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
>>   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>>   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)
>>   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)
>=20
> Depending on the type of rollover, the child might not want to add the
> CDS directly (Double-Signature KSK Rollover) or might want to add the
> CDS before adding the DNSKEY (Double-DS KSK Rollover).
>=20
>=20
>> 3. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
>>   finds there's a new CDS (for KSK2) that doesn't match its set of
>>   CDS, and adds a new DS corresponding to that one:
>>   child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
>>   child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
>> 4. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized, and =
removes
>>   the old DNSKEY (KSK1) and corresponding CDS:
>>   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>>   child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)
>=20
> You want to remove DNSKEY and CDS for KSK1 here.
>=20
> Again: The old CDS may be removed earlier, at the time of adding the =
CDS
> for KSK2 (Double-Signature) or later (Double-DS).
>=20
>=20
>> 5. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
>>   finds a CDS (for KSK1) that currently matches one of its DS's is
>>   now removed.  the parent removes the corresponding DS:
>>   child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
>> 6. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized.  at this
>>   point, it MAY remove the remaining CDS for the reason explained in
>>   Section 4.1 of draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11:
>>   child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>>   (no CDS records)
>> 7. the parent notices the change in the child, but does nothing since
>>   there's no CDS record in the child:
>>   child.example. DS ....(for KSK2) ; still exist
>> 8. eventually the child might go unsigned again.  all of its DNSKEYs
>>   will be removed, but the child needs to tell the parent about the
>>   change and have them remove the DS records in some other way than
>>   CDS/CDNSKEY.  removing all CDS records can't be used since it
>>   doesn't make any change at the parent as shown in steps 6 and 7.
>=20
> Other than that, I think these examples are very clear, and I support
> adding them as an appendix.
>=20
> Best regards,
>  Matthijs
>=20

I'm willing add an appendix that has Double DS KSK rollover to the =
appendix with reference to RFC6781 figure 7, as an example.=20
I will think about the dual KSK example.=20

Tim tell me if you DO NOT want this added to the document.=20

	Olafur=20


From nobody Fri Apr 25 07:24:43 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) <tireddy@cisco.com> wrote:
>
> Any specific reason for the firewalls to permit TCP/53 other than for zone transfer ?

RFC 5966

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
South Utsire, Northeast Forties: Easterly 4 or 5, increasing 6 or 7. Slight or
moderate. Fair. Good.


From nobody Fri Apr 25 07:47:16 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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Moin!

On 25 Apr 2014, at 16:22, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) =
<tireddy@cisco.com> wrote:
> Any specific reason for the firewalls to permit TCP/53 other than for =
zone transfer ?
Wat? Because it is defined in the RFC. RFC1035 may not been totally =
clear on that. IMHO=20
the language is strong enough, but if not there is RFC5966:
	"All general-purpose DNS implementations MUST support both UDP =
and TCP transport."
Any more questions?! Also all this new DNS stuff like DNSSEC and =
mitigating DNS=20
amplification attack with RRL or similar techniques require that the TCP =
transport works.

So long
-Ralf


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 10:46 AM, Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de> wrote:
> Moin!
>
> On 25 Apr 2014, at 16:22, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) <tireddy@cisco.com> wrote:
>> Any specific reason for the firewalls to permit TCP/53 other than for zone transfer ?
> Wat? Because it is defined in the RFC. RFC1035 may not been totally clear on that. IMHO
> the language is strong enough, but if not there is RFC5966:
>         "All general-purpose DNS implementations MUST support both UDP and TCP transport."
> Any more questions?! Also all this new DNS stuff like DNSSEC and mitigating DNS
> amplification attack with RRL or similar techniques require that the TCP transport works.
>
> So long

Yes and RFC 8888 quite definitely says that I get a pony.

The existing DNS works as far as the people running their firewalls
are concerned. The failure of TCP fallback in practice has been an
understood problem for 20+ years.

If people want to design a protocol that is going to be usable, they
are going to end up having to accept some constraints that are not in
the specs.



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/


From nobody Fri Apr 25 08:50:52 2014
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From: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
To: Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de>
Thread-Topic: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ralf Weber [mailto:dns@fl1ger.de]
> Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 7:22 PM
> To: Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
> Cc: Nicholas Weaver; Paul Wouters; dnsop; dns-privacy@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
>=20
> Moin!
>=20
>=20
> On 24.04.2014, at 15:28, "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.co=
m>
> wrote:
>=20
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: dns-privacy [mailto:dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> >> Nicholas Weaver
> >> Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2014 1:58 AM
> >> To: Paul Wouters
> >> Cc: dnsop; Nicholas Weaver; dns-privacy@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Apr 23, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> >>> No, I fully disagree with this. Port 53 TCP has a much better chance
> >>> at working these days than a random other newly assigned port.
> >
> > On the contrary, Firewalls are configured today to permit UDP port 53 a=
nd
> block TCP port 53. Why should firewalls change their configuration ?
> I know lots of firewalls that also allow TCP/53,=20

Any specific reason for the firewalls to permit TCP/53 other than for zone =
transfer ?

> but the real problem with all
> these middle boxes that make changing DNS hard is that they believe to
> understand the full protocol and only pass what they think is right. So e=
verything
> new we come up will be dropped (Been there, done that). We have to be ver=
y
> careful with changes to the DNS protocol if we want them to be deployed

Agreed, It totally depends on the environment in which the firewall is depl=
oyed, it's capability and configuration.=20

For example
[1] For firewalls  deployed in Enterprise network and the I.T realizing the=
 importance of privacy then FW could be configured to permit DNSoD over 53.=
 Similarly I don't see any problem with the firewall deployed in the Home n=
etwork.
[2] It could be a problem with firewalls deployed in airports, coffee shops=
,  where I.T may not care about privacy, and the  firewall configured could=
 block non-DNS traffic on port 53. In such environments if a user wants pri=
vacy then it's probably better to go with DNS servers that the user trusts.=
 For example DNSCrypt uses UDP/443 by default and if the connectivity with =
the DNS servers fails then it resorts to TCP/443 and it works on UDP/53 too=
. I guess With {D}TLS we will need a similar approach where client tries co=
nnectivity using multiple ports, L4 protocols etc.

Firewalls today are already capable of inspecting the TLS handshake and can=
 also act as {D}TLS proxy.  DTLS is already deployed and used today to secu=
re WebRTC media, data channels and CoAP protocol in IOT environments. Firew=
alls are catching up with these emerging protocols to make sure it works wi=
th them.

Cheers,
-Tiru

>=20
> So long
> Ralf
>=20
> Sent from my iPhone


From nobody Fri Apr 25 11:57:04 2014
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From: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy]  DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
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On 25 Apr 2014, at 11:14, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

> The existing DNS works as far as the people running their firewalls
> are concerned. The failure of TCP fallback in practice has been an
> understood problem for 20+ years.

Understood, perhaps; measured and understood, not so much.

What is sorely missing from most/all protocol evolution discussions is a =
rigorous study of the actual impact of larger response sizes, =
fragmentation, interception/middebox-mangling, TCP fallback and TCP =
pipelining in the real world in at least two problem domains, =
recursive-authority and stub-recursive.

> If people want to design a protocol that is going to be usable, they
> are going to end up having to accept some constraints that are not in
> the specs.

And it would be great if we could describe those constraints with =
confidence.

There was concern that signing ORG might cause resolution problems due =
to larger responses, or might cause TCP fallback on a scale not seen =
before. The former were not apparent. The latter happened (due to a =
defect in the signer used for ORG) but did not cause any obvious =
problems.

There was widespread expectation that DNSSEC in the root zone would =
impact resolvers' ability to prime, hence the DURZ, global netops =
meeting roadshow, LTQC, etc. No issues were identified.

We will get much further, much more quickly if we know more about what =
problems are likely and which ones are unlikely. Being afraid of every =
possible negative outcome is just a recipe for doing nothing. No useful =
risk analysis is possible without data.


Joe=


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From: Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 19:46:59 -0700
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/ZAMNzzb8fa9z1M11NXQUlGBgn4w
Cc: Stuart Olmstead-Wilcox <stuart.olmstead-wilcox@cira.ca>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, Jacques Latour <jacques.latour@cira.ca>, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last call for draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance
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Olafur

Please add this. I'll get caught back up on the rest of this by the time war=
ren returns from his walkabout.=20

Sent from my Hi-Tech Gadget.=20

> On Apr 25, 2014, at 6:48, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>> On Apr 25, 2014, at 2:28 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wro=
te:
>>=20
>> Hi,
>>=20
>>> On 04/24/2014 05:41 PM, =E7=A5=9E=E6=98=8E=E9=81=94=E5=93=89 wrote:
>>> At Thu, 24 Apr 2014 07:55:52 +0200,
>>> Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> The child can also signal its desire to remove DS records by removing
>>>> the corresponding records from the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset again.
>>>=20
>>> ...unless that would make the resulting CDS/CDNSKEY RRset empty.
>>> Otherwise it can contradict this one:
>>=20
>> Of course. I tried to rephrase it in four short lines. That does not
>> mean that one line that stands alone is the absolute truth: you have to
>> consider the complete context.
>>=20
>>=20
>>>> If the parent sees no CDS/CDNSKEY RRset published in the child's zone,
>>>> this means there is no action to perform for the parent. Hence, this
>>>> document does not support removing all DS records from the parent.
>>>=20
>>> I guess this discussions is essentially the same as what I asked a few
>>> months ago:
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg11051.html
>>>=20
>>> and while I thought revised versions of the draft were clear about
>>> this point, but the fact that we still have this discussion seems to
>>> suggest it's probably not sufficiently clear.  Perhaps the problem is
>>> that many of us already knows how it works and it's difficult for us
>>> to see how it could be interpreted by first-time readers.  So, while
>>> it may look redundant, it may help if we show a specific example of
>>> how the child adds/removes CDS/CDNSKEY and how it works at the parent:
>>=20
>> I am indeed pretty clear about how this should work and I think the
>> draft reflects that. But indeed: there is nothing wrong with adding an
>> appendix with some examples. Some remarks below:
>>=20
>>> 0. the child becomes signed from unsigned, tells the parent its
>>>  DNSKEY (say KSK1), the parent has a DS.  this step is out of scope
>>>  of CDS/CDNSKEY:
>>>  child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
>>> 1. the child adds the corresponding CDS in the child zone:
>>>  child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
>>>  child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)
>>=20
>> The child does not necessarily need to add the CDS now: The parent
>> already has the correct DS RRset (step 0) and no rollover has happened
>> since then.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> 2. the child adds a new DNSKEY (KSK2) and corresponding CDS in the
>>>  child zone:
>>>  child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK1)
>>>  child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>>>  child.example. CDS ....(for KSK1)
>>>  child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)
>>=20
>> Depending on the type of rollover, the child might not want to add the
>> CDS directly (Double-Signature KSK Rollover) or might want to add the
>> CDS before adding the DNSKEY (Double-DS KSK Rollover).
>>=20
>>=20
>>> 3. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
>>>  finds there's a new CDS (for KSK2) that doesn't match its set of
>>>  CDS, and adds a new DS corresponding to that one:
>>>  child.example. DS ....(for KSK1)
>>>  child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
>>> 4. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized, and removes
>>>  the old DNSKEY (KSK1) and corresponding CDS:
>>>  child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>>>  child.example. CDS ....(for KSK2)
>>=20
>> You want to remove DNSKEY and CDS for KSK1 here.
>>=20
>> Again: The old CDS may be removed earlier, at the time of adding the CDS
>> for KSK2 (Double-Signature) or later (Double-DS).
>>=20
>>=20
>>> 5. the parent notices or is notified of a change in the child, and
>>>  finds a CDS (for KSK1) that currently matches one of its DS's is
>>>  now removed.  the parent removes the corresponding DS:
>>>  child.example. DS ....(for KSK2)
>>> 6. the child confirms the DS and CDS are now synchronized.  at this
>>>  point, it MAY remove the remaining CDS for the reason explained in
>>>  Section 4.1 of draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11:
>>>  child.example. DNSKEY ....(for KSK2)
>>>  (no CDS records)
>>> 7. the parent notices the change in the child, but does nothing since
>>>  there's no CDS record in the child:
>>>  child.example. DS ....(for KSK2) ; still exist
>>> 8. eventually the child might go unsigned again.  all of its DNSKEYs
>>>  will be removed, but the child needs to tell the parent about the
>>>  change and have them remove the DS records in some other way than
>>>  CDS/CDNSKEY.  removing all CDS records can't be used since it
>>>  doesn't make any change at the parent as shown in steps 6 and 7.
>>=20
>> Other than that, I think these examples are very clear, and I support
>> adding them as an appendix.
>>=20
>> Best regards,
>> Matthijs
>=20
> I'm willing add an appendix that has Double DS KSK rollover to the appendi=
x with reference to RFC6781 figure 7, as an example.=20
> I will think about the dual KSK example.=20
>=20
> Tim tell me if you DO NOT want this added to the document.=20
>=20
>    Olafur=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop


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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] terminology in Re: Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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On 4/22/14, 6:43 PM, Wes Hardaker wrote:
> Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> writes:
>
>>> I feel terminology of "agent" in the draft is annoying.
>>
>> I strongly agree with that.  Parental â€œAgentâ€� is too broad.
>
> The choice was to keep consistent terminology with:
>
>    http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-11
>
> I don't think we want these terminology sets to deviate.
>

We don't want the terminology to deviate, nor do we want the 
Capitalization to deviate either.   I have an editor note to go back 
over the draft verifying this.

tim


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From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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References: <20140406140606.GA5961@laperouse.bortzmeyer.org> <alpine.LSU.2.00.1404221533450.16298@hermes-1.csi.cam.ac.uk> <20140423003438.6BC4C143CE48@rock.dv.isc.org>
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Cc: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>, dnsop@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Review of draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15
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On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 10:34:38AM +1000,
 Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote 
 a message of 46 lines which said:

> Correct.  Glue is not optional. 

OK, sorry for my mistake and thanks to Tony and you for noticing it.

This error, IMHO, reinforces my remark that we need a definition of
what is "required" data. I suggested "data is required if its absence
would stop the name resolution process" and it seems to fit well here.


From nobody Mon Apr 28 06:04:44 2014
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Cc: DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net>, Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] terminology in Re: Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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On Apr 27, 2014, at 7:37, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 4/22/14, 6:43 PM, Wes Hardaker wrote:
>> Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> writes:
>>=20
>>>> I feel terminology of "agent" in the draft is annoying.
>>>=20
>>> I strongly agree with that.  Parental =93Agent=94 is too broad.
>>=20
>> The choice was to keep consistent terminology with:
>>=20
>>   =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-=
11
>>=20
>> I don't think we want these terminology sets to deviate.
>>=20
> We don't want the terminology to deviate, nor do we want the =
Capitalization to deviate either.   I have an editor note to go back =
over the draft verifying this.

Is it better for a draft intended for standards track be terminology =
consistent with a draft headed for informational or consistent with de =
jure operations terminology?

(I=92m not saying =93use my wording=94 I am saying that parental agent =
is not a term of art in practice.  A term used in practice would be =
better.  I used parent provisioning system but there may be another =
term.)=


From nobody Mon Apr 28 11:55:43 2014
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : AS112 Nameserver Operations
        Authors         : Joe Abley
                          William F. Maton
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc6304bis-01.txt
	Pages           : 27
	Date            : 2014-04-28

Abstract:
   Many sites connected to the Internet make use of IPv4 addresses that
   are not globally-unique.  Examples are the addresses designated in
   RFC 1918 for private use within individual sites.

   Devices in such environments may occasionally originate Domain Name
   System (DNS) queries (so-called "reverse lookups") corresponding to
   those private-use addresses.  Since the addresses concerned have only
   local significance, it is good practice for site administrators to
   ensure that such queries are answered locally.  However, it is not
   uncommon for such queries to follow the normal delegation path in the
   public DNS instead of being answered within the site.

   It is not possible for public DNS servers to give useful answers to
   such queries.  In addition, due to the wide deployment of private-use
   addresses and the continuing growth of the Internet, the volume of
   such queries is large and growing.  The AS112 project aims to provide
   a distributed sink for such queries in order to reduce the load on
   the corresponding authoritative servers.  The AS112 project is named
   after the Autonomous System Number (ASN) that was assigned to it.

   RFC6304 described the steps required to install a new AS112 node, and
   offered advice relating to such a node's operation.  This document
   updates that advice to facilitate the addition and removal of zones
   for which query traffic will be sunk at AS112 nodes, using DNAME,
   whilst still supporting direct delegations to AS112 name servers.

   This document obsoletes RFC6304.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc6304bis/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc6304bis-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc6304bis-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Mon Apr 28 13:02:03 2014
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] terminology in Re: Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dnsop-child-syncronization
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On 28 Apr 2014, at 9:04, Edward Lewis <edlewis.subscriber@cox.net> =
wrote:

> (I=92m not saying =93use my wording=94 I am saying that parental agent =
is not a term of art in practice.  A term used in practice would be =
better.  I used parent provisioning system but there may be another =
term.)

I think there's quite probably no existing term for "the entity you as =
the registrant of a particular zone interact with in order to effect =
changes in the delegation of that zone".

Given that the taxonomy here is wide (we could mean a domain registry, =
or a zone administrator, or a sponsoring registrar, or a reseller of a =
sponsoring registrar, or ...) it makes sense to define a pithy term and =
use it.

"Parental agent" seems fine to me. "Parent provisioning system" seems =
like it must mean something different from that, since it looks like the =
name of a system rather than an entity (i.e. it looks like it refers to =
machinery operated by or for a parent, rather than the parent itself).


Joe=


From nobody Mon Apr 28 14:56:02 2014
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On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 02:22:03PM +0000, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) wrote:
> 
> Any specific reason for the firewalls to permit TCP/53 other than for zone transfer ?

"Because DNS uses TCP in lots of cases, and always has"?  Anyone who
is still configuring firewalls to deny TCP/53 as a matter of course
ought to have his or her Internet license revoked.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com


From nobody Mon Apr 28 15:10:55 2014
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Subject: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-12.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
        Authors         : Warren Kumari
                          Olafur Gudmundsson
                          George Barwood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-12.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2014-04-28

Abstract:
   This document describes a method to allow DNS operators to more
   easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as communication
   channel.  The technique described is aimed at delegations in which it
   is currently hard to move information from the child to parent.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-12

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-trust-maintainance-12


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

