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From: Henrik Ziegeldorf <henrik.ziegeldorf@rwth-aachen.de>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2010 19:01:15 +0100
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Subject: [Hipsec] Host ID Parameter in RFC5201-bis
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--00151750dbe2c8696c049648fab0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi,

I'm currently implementing basic elliptic curve cryptography for HIP
according to RFC5201-bis,
and have some suggestions concerning the Host ID parameter (Sect. 5.2.8).

I'd like to discuss the following points:

1) Self-containment of the host_id parameter: For RSA/DSA identities an
algorithm field is specified, for ECDSA identities there is none.

For RSA and DSA the format of the host identity field is defined as the
DNSKEY format.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             flags             |    protocol   |   algorithm   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               /
   /                          public key                           /
   /                                                               /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|

For ECC, the host identity field format is defined as follows:

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          ECC Curve            |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Public Key                            /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Note, that the format for ECDSA identities has no algorithm field, which
would allow to identify the use of ECDSA algorithm.
This isn't really serious, since we can determine from HIT_SUITE_LIST
parameter which algorithms we use.
However, this leads to the parameter not being self-contained anymore,
since from the host_id parameter alone we cannot distinguish the algorithms
in use, i.e. RSA, DSA or ECDSA.

I see two alternatives to provide for self-containment (and make it easier
to implement):


a) Adapt the format of the ECC HI field to the format for RSA and DSA
identities.
   I guess this would make sense, if their is some future usecase in HIP for
the flags and protocol fields.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             flags             |    protocol   |   algorithm   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          ECC Curve            |          Public Key
/
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               /
   /                                                               /
   /                                                               /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


b) Dump the flags and protocol fields (and loose compatibility to DNSKEY
Format as defined in RFC2535 3.1)
   and include algorithm as a fixed field in the host_id parameter, f.e.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |             Type              |             Length            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          HI Length            |DI-type|      DI Length        |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Algorithm   |            Host Identity                      /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /                               |         Domain Identifier     /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /                                               |    Padding    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

To me, this makes more sense, since values for the algorithms are already
defined in Sect. 5.2.8
(but might only be used with the RSA, DSA formats).

        Algorithms       Values

        RESERVED         0
        DSA              3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED)
        RSA              5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
        ECDSA            7 [fundamental-ecc] (RECOMMENDED)

Without an explicit algorithm field, it is unclear where to use the ECDSA
value.

2) If the host_id parameter format was not changed, the following happens:

  - First, we would need HIP_SUITE_LIST to distinguish RSA/DSA and ECDSA.
  - Then, in the RSA/DSA case we would need to peek into the host identity's
algorithm field to distinguish RSA and DSA,
    since HIT_SUITE_LIST does not distinguish between RSA and DSA.

  I think it is nicer and cleaner to have one single field to distinguish
between the RSA, DSA and ECDSA (and other future algorithms),
  instead of having this two-step process to distinguishing algorithms. (And
also, this supports my point above.)


2) Minor editorial change:
   In RFC5201-bis the definition of the ECC host identity gives the
impression,
   that there seem are 2 undefined bytes directly after ECC Curve field.
   Shouldn't the format for ECC HI's be written like this instead:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          ECC Curve            |      Public Key               /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               /
     /                                                               /
     /                                                               /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



Best regards,
Henrik Ziegeldorf

--00151750dbe2c8696c049648fab0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">Hi,</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,=
monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">I&#39;m cur=
rently implementing basic elliptic curve cryptography for HIP according to =
RFC5201-bis,</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">and have some suggestio=
ns concerning the Host ID parameter (Sect. 5.2.8).</span><br style=3D"font-=
family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monos=
pace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">I&#39;d like to discuss=
 the following points:</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospac=
e;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-f=
amily: courier new,monospace;">1) Self-containment of the host_id parameter=
: For RSA/DSA identities an algorithm field is specified, for ECDSA identit=
ies there is none.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">For RSA and DSA the format of the host identity =
field is defined as the DNSKEY format.</span><br style=3D"font-family: cour=
ier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 1=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 2=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 3</span><br style=3D=
"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier n=
ew,monospace;">=A0=A0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6=
 7 8 9 0 1</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"font-f=
amily: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,mono=
space;">=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 flags=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0 protocol=A0=A0 |=A0=A0 algorithm=A0=A0 |</=
span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"font-f=
amily: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,mono=
space;">=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D=
"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 public key=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"f=
ont-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|</span><br style=3D"font-f=
amily: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monosp=
ace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">For ECC, the host ident=
ity field format is defined as follows:</span><br style=3D"font-family: cou=
rier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><spa=
n style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 1=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 2=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 =
3</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 =
8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1</span><br style=3D"font-fam=
ily: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monosp=
ace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 ECC Curve=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |<=
/span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font=
-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+=
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,=
monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Public Key=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"f=
ont-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier n=
ew,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">Note, that the format for ECDSA identities has n=
o algorithm field, which would allow to identify the use of ECDSA algorithm=
.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">This isn&#39;t really s=
erious, since we can determine from HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter which algorith=
ms we use.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span st=
yle=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">However, this leads to the para=
meter not being self-contained anymore,</span><br style=3D"font-family: cou=
rier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">since from the host_id =
parameter alone we cannot distinguish the algorithms in use, i.e. RSA, DSA =
or ECDSA.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span sty=
le=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0 </span><br style=3D"font-fam=
ily: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">I see two alternatives =
to provide for self-containment (and make it easier to implement):</span><b=
r style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: c=
ourier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">a) Adapt the format of the ECC HI field to the f=
ormat for RSA and DSA identities.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier n=
ew,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 I guess this wou=
ld make sense, if their is some future usecase in HIP for the flags and pro=
tocol fields.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br s=
tyle=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 1=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 2=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 3</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=
=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3=
 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1</span><br style=3D"font-family: courie=
r new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"font-f=
amily: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,mono=
space;">=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 flags=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0 protocol=A0=A0 |=A0=A0 algorithm=A0=A0 |</=
span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"font-f=
amily: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,mono=
space;">=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 ECC Curve=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Public Key=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span><br style=3D"f=
ont-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier=
 new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=
 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: c=
ourier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospa=
ce;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-+=
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"f=
ont-family: courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family:=
 courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;=
">b) Dump the flags and protocol fields (and loose compatibility to DNSKEY =
Format as defined in RFC2535 3.1)</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier n=
ew,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 and include algo=
rithm as a fixed field in the host_id parameter, f.e.</span><br style=3D"fo=
nt-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,mo=
nospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 1=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 2=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 3</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><spa=
n style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 0 1 2 3 4 5=
 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1</span><br style=3D"fon=
t-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier ne=
w,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Type=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Len=
gth=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |</span><br style=3D"font-family: cour=
ier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier ne=
w,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 HI Length=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |DI-type|=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 DI Length=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 |</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier ne=
w,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0 Algorithm=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 Host Identity=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier ne=
w,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Dom=
ain Identifier=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,mo=
nospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier ne=
w,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0 Padding=A0=A0=A0 |</span><br style=3D"font-fa=
mily: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,=
monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">To me, this makes more =
sense, since values for the algorithms are already defined in Sect. 5.2.8</=
span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-=
family: courier new,monospace;">(but might only be used with the RSA, DSA f=
ormats).</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Algorithms=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 Values</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br styl=
e=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 R=
ESERVED=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 0</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier n=
ew,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 DSA=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 3 [RFC2536] (REC=
OMMENDED)</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 R=
SA=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)</span><br =
style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: c=
ourier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 ECDSA=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 7 [fundamental-ecc] (RECOMMENDED)</span><br style=3D"font-family:=
 courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">Without an explicit algorithm field, it is uncle=
ar where to use the ECDSA value.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier ne=
w,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">2) If the host_id parameter format was not chang=
ed, the following happens:</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,mono=
space;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">=A0 - First, we would need HIP_SUITE_LIST to dis=
tinguish RSA/DSA and ECDSA.</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,mon=
ospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0 - Then, in the RSA/=
DSA case we would need to peek into the host identity&#39;s algorithm field=
 to distinguish RSA and DSA,</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,mo=
nospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0 since HIT_SUI=
TE_LIST does not distinguish between RSA and DSA.</span><br style=3D"font-f=
amily: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monosp=
ace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0 I think it is=
 nicer and cleaner to have one single field to distinguish between the RSA,=
 DSA and ECDSA (and other future algorithms),</span><br style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0 instead of having t=
his two-step process to distinguishing algorithms. (And also, this supports=
 my point above.)</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><=
br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">2) Minor editorial change:</span><br style=3D"fo=
nt-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,=
monospace;">=A0=A0 In RFC5201-bis the definition of the ECC host identity g=
ives the impression,</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;=
">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0 that there seem =
are 2 undefined bytes directly after ECC Curve field.</span><br style=3D"fo=
nt-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,=
monospace;">=A0=A0 Shouldn&#39;t the format for ECC HI&#39;s be written lik=
e this instead:</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 1=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 2=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 3</span><br =
style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">
<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 0 1 2 3=
 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1</span><br style=3D=
"font-family: courier new,monospace;">
<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><br style=3D"=
font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier ne=
w,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 ECC Curve=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 |=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Public Key=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospa=
ce;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 +-+-+-+-+-=
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: c=
ourier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"fo=
nt-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 /=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 /</span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,m=
onospace;"><span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</span><b=
r style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y: courier new,monospace;">=A0 </span><br style=3D"font-family: courier new=
,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><span style=
=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">Best regards,</span><br style=3D"f=
ont-family: courier new,monospace;">

<span style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">Henrik Ziegeldorf</span=
><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family=
: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"=
><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family:=
 courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">=
<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family:=
 courier new,monospace;">

<br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family:=
 courier new,monospace;"><br style=3D"font-family: courier new,monospace;">

--00151750dbe2c8696c049648fab0--

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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Host ID Parameter in RFC5201-bis
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Hello Henrik, 

thanks for the input. Short version: I think you comments are good and the HI parameter should be self-contained. I agree with removing the DNSKEY format.

More comments in line.

Am 30.11.2010 um 19:01 schrieb Henrik Ziegeldorf:

> Hi,
> 
> I'm currently implementing basic elliptic curve cryptography for HIP according to RFC5201-bis,
> and have some suggestions concerning the Host ID parameter (Sect. 5.2.8).
> 
> I'd like to discuss the following points:
> 
> 1) Self-containment of the host_id parameter: For RSA/DSA identities an algorithm field is specified, for ECDSA identities there is none.
> 
> For RSA and DSA the format of the host identity field is defined as the DNSKEY format.
> 
>    0                   1                   2                   3
>    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |             flags             |    protocol   |   algorithm   |
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |                                                               /
>    /                          public key                           /
>    /                                                               /
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
> 
> For ECC, the host identity field format is defined as follows:
> 
>    0                   1                   2                   3
>    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |          ECC Curve            |                               |
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |                         Public Key                            /
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> 
> Note, that the format for ECDSA identities has no algorithm field, which would allow to identify the use of ECDSA algorithm.
> This isn't really serious, since we can determine from HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter which algorithms we use.
> However, this leads to the parameter not being self-contained anymore,
> since from the host_id parameter alone we cannot distinguish the algorithms in use, i.e. RSA, DSA or ECDSA.
>   
> I see two alternatives to provide for self-containment (and make it easier to implement):
> 
> 
> a) Adapt the format of the ECC HI field to the format for RSA and DSA identities.
>    I guess this would make sense, if their is some future usecase in HIP for the flags and protocol fields.
> 
>    0                   1                   2                   3
>    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |             flags             |    protocol   |   algorithm   |
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |          ECC Curve            |          Public Key           /               
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               /
>    /                                                               /
>    /                                                               /
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> 
After some thinking, I would not favor this alternative although there are efforts to define DNSKEY for ECC. First, I don't know if it is a good plan to attach to these ongoing efforts because they have different goals than HIP (e.g., http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04 only defines p-256 and p-384, no lower - we would not have a curve for low-power devices). We could try to ask for lower curves but I think it is not likely to have DNSKEY documents for all curves (e.g., binary curves, etc.) that might be needed for different HIP use cases.

If we wouldn't attach to these efforts and define our own curves but reuse the DNSKEY format and description we would need our own algorithm numbers assigned to be compatible with DNSKEY. I don't think this is useful in terms of standardization of DNSKEY. Hence, I would prefer the alternative mentioned below and define DNSKEY mappings for HIs instead. That way, one could still pull the keys from DNS and apply minor conversions to generate a HI from it.

> 
> b) Dump the flags and protocol fields (and loose compatibility to DNSKEY Format as defined in RFC2535 3.1)
>    and include algorithm as a fixed field in the host_id parameter, f.e.
> 
>       0                   1                   2                   3
>       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>      |             Type              |             Length            |
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>      |          HI Length            |DI-type|      DI Length        |
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>      |   Algorithm   |            Host Identity                      /
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>      /                               |         Domain Identifier     /
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>      /                                               |    Padding    |
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> 
> To me, this makes more sense, since values for the algorithms are already defined in Sect. 5.2.8
> (but might only be used with the RSA, DSA formats).
> 
>         Algorithms       Values
> 
>         RESERVED         0
>         DSA              3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED)
>         RSA              5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
>         ECDSA            7 [fundamental-ecc] (RECOMMENDED)
> 
> Without an explicit algorithm field, it is unclear where to use the ECDSA value.

To me it makes sense. Anyone on the list with good reasons not to do this?

> 
> 2) If the host_id parameter format was not changed, the following happens:
> 
>   - First, we would need HIP_SUITE_LIST to distinguish RSA/DSA and ECDSA.
>   - Then, in the RSA/DSA case we would need to peek into the host identity's algorithm field to distinguish RSA and DSA,
>     since HIT_SUITE_LIST does not distinguish between RSA and DSA.
> 
>   I think it is nicer and cleaner to have one single field to distinguish between the RSA, DSA and ECDSA (and other future algorithms),
>   instead of having this two-step process to distinguishing algorithms. (And also, this supports my point above.)

Yes, self-containment is essential - also for storing and passing on the HIs.
> 
> 
> 2) Minor editorial change:
>    In RFC5201-bis the definition of the ECC host identity gives the impression,
>    that there seem are 2 undefined bytes directly after ECC Curve field.
>    Shouldn't the format for ECC HI's be written like this instead:
> 
>       0                   1                   2                   3
>       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>      |          ECC Curve            |      Public Key               /
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               /
>      /                                                               /
>      /                                                               /
>      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> 
ACK.

Tobias
-- 
Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
tel: +49 241 80 207 76
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From gonzalo.camarillo@ericsson.com  Sun Dec  5 07:49:52 2010
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Subject: [Hipsec] WGLC: draft-ietf-hip-cert-06
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Folks,

we hereby start the WGLC on the following draft. This WGLC will end on
December 20th.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-cert/

Please, send your comments to this list.

Thanks,

Gonzalo
HIP co-chair


From heer@informatik.rwth-aachen.de  Tue Dec  7 09:00:06 2010
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Hello Henrik,

I implemented your comments in RFC5201-bis. Do you think your comments are addressed adequately?

The new text on the HI looks like this:

5.2.8.  HOST_ID

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |             Type              |             Length            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          HI Length            |DI-type|      DI Length        |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |         Algorithm             |         Host Identity         /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /                               |         Domain Identifier     /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /                                               |    Padding    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type              705
     Length            length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
                       Padding
     HI Length         length of the Host Identity in octets
     DI-type           type of the following Domain Identifier field
     Algorithm         index to the employed algorithm
     DI Length         length of the FQDN or NAI in octets
     Host Identity     actual Host Identity
     Domain Identifier the identifier of the sender

   The Host Identity is derived from the DNSKEY format for RSA and DSA.
   For these, the Public Key field of the RDATA part from RFC 4034
   [RFC4034] is used.  For ECC we distinguish two different profiles:
   ECDSA and ECDSA_LOW.  ECC contains curves approved by NIST and
   defined in RFC 4754 [RFC4754].  ECDSA_LOW is defined for devices with
   low computational capabilities and uses shorter curves from SECG
   [SECG].

        Algorithm
        profiles         Values

        RESERVED         0
        DSA              3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED)
        RSA              5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
        ECDSA            7 [RFC4754] (RECOMMENDED)
        ECDSA_LOW        9 [SECG]    (RECOMMENDED)

   For ECDSA and ECDSA_LOW Host Identities is represented by the
   following fields:


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          ECC Curve            |                               /
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     /                         Public Key                            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     ECC Curve     Curve label
     Public Key    Represented in Octet-string format
                   [I-D.mcgrew-fundamental-ecc]

   For hosts that implement ECDSA as algorithm the following ECC curves
   are required:

        Algorithm    Curve            Values

        ECDSA        RESERVED         0

        ECDSA        NIST-P-256   1 [RFC4754]
        ECDSA        NIST-P-384   2 [RFC4754]

   For hosts that implement the ECC_LOW algorithm profile, the following
   curve is required:

        Algorithm    Curve            Values

        ECDSA_LOW    RESERVED         0

        ECDSA_LOW    SECP160R1        1 [SECG]

   The following DI-types have been defined:

         Type                    Value
         none included           0
         FQDN                    1
         NAI                     2


         FQDN            Fully Qualified Domain Name, in binary format.
         NAI             Network Access Identifier

   The format for the FQDN is defined in RFC 1035 [RFC1035] Section 3.1.
   The format for NAI is defined in [RFC4282]

   If there is no Domain Identifier, i.e., the DI-type field is zero,
   the DI Length field is set to zero as well.



Best regards,

Tobias


Am 02.12.2010 um 17:14 schrieb Tobias Heer:

> Hello Henrik, 
> 
> thanks for the input. Short version: I think you comments are good and the HI parameter should be self-contained. I agree with removing the DNSKEY format.
> 
> More comments in line.
> 
> Am 30.11.2010 um 19:01 schrieb Henrik Ziegeldorf:
> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> I'm currently implementing basic elliptic curve cryptography for HIP according to RFC5201-bis,
>> and have some suggestions concerning the Host ID parameter (Sect. 5.2.8).
>> 
>> I'd like to discuss the following points:
>> 
>> 1) Self-containment of the host_id parameter: For RSA/DSA identities an algorithm field is specified, for ECDSA identities there is none.
>> 
>> For RSA and DSA the format of the host identity field is defined as the DNSKEY format.
>> 
>>   0                   1                   2                   3
>>   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>   |             flags             |    protocol   |   algorithm   |
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>   |                                                               /
>>   /                          public key                           /
>>   /                                                               /
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
>> 
>> For ECC, the host identity field format is defined as follows:
>> 
>>   0                   1                   2                   3
>>   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>   |          ECC Curve            |                               |
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>   |                         Public Key                            /
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>> 
>> Note, that the format for ECDSA identities has no algorithm field, which would allow to identify the use of ECDSA algorithm.
>> This isn't really serious, since we can determine from HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter which algorithms we use.
>> However, this leads to the parameter not being self-contained anymore,
>> since from the host_id parameter alone we cannot distinguish the algorithms in use, i.e. RSA, DSA or ECDSA.
>> 
>> I see two alternatives to provide for self-containment (and make it easier to implement):
>> 
>> 
>> a) Adapt the format of the ECC HI field to the format for RSA and DSA identities.
>>   I guess this would make sense, if their is some future usecase in HIP for the flags and protocol fields.
>> 
>>   0                   1                   2                   3
>>   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>   |             flags             |    protocol   |   algorithm   |
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>   |          ECC Curve            |          Public Key           /               
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               /
>>   /                                                               /
>>   /                                                               /
>>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>> 
> After some thinking, I would not favor this alternative although there are efforts to define DNSKEY for ECC. First, I don't know if it is a good plan to attach to these ongoing efforts because they have different goals than HIP (e.g., http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04 only defines p-256 and p-384, no lower - we would not have a curve for low-power devices). We could try to ask for lower curves but I think it is not likely to have DNSKEY documents for all curves (e.g., binary curves, etc.) that might be needed for different HIP use cases.
> 
> If we wouldn't attach to these efforts and define our own curves but reuse the DNSKEY format and description we would need our own algorithm numbers assigned to be compatible with DNSKEY. I don't think this is useful in terms of standardization of DNSKEY. Hence, I would prefer the alternative mentioned below and define DNSKEY mappings for HIs instead. That way, one could still pull the keys from DNS and apply minor conversions to generate a HI from it.
> 
>> 
>> b) Dump the flags and protocol fields (and loose compatibility to DNSKEY Format as defined in RFC2535 3.1)
>>   and include algorithm as a fixed field in the host_id parameter, f.e.
>> 
>>      0                   1                   2                   3
>>      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>     |             Type              |             Length            |
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>     |          HI Length            |DI-type|      DI Length        |
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>     |   Algorithm   |            Host Identity                      /
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>     /                               |         Domain Identifier     /
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>     /                                               |    Padding    |
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>> 
>> To me, this makes more sense, since values for the algorithms are already defined in Sect. 5.2.8
>> (but might only be used with the RSA, DSA formats).
>> 
>>        Algorithms       Values
>> 
>>        RESERVED         0
>>        DSA              3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED)
>>        RSA              5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
>>        ECDSA            7 [fundamental-ecc] (RECOMMENDED)
>> 
>> Without an explicit algorithm field, it is unclear where to use the ECDSA value.
> 
> To me it makes sense. Anyone on the list with good reasons not to do this?
> 
>> 
>> 2) If the host_id parameter format was not changed, the following happens:
>> 
>>  - First, we would need HIP_SUITE_LIST to distinguish RSA/DSA and ECDSA.
>>  - Then, in the RSA/DSA case we would need to peek into the host identity's algorithm field to distinguish RSA and DSA,
>>    since HIT_SUITE_LIST does not distinguish between RSA and DSA.
>> 
>>  I think it is nicer and cleaner to have one single field to distinguish between the RSA, DSA and ECDSA (and other future algorithms),
>>  instead of having this two-step process to distinguishing algorithms. (And also, this supports my point above.)
> 
> Yes, self-containment is essential - also for storing and passing on the HIs.
>> 
>> 
>> 2) Minor editorial change:
>>   In RFC5201-bis the definition of the ECC host identity gives the impression,
>>   that there seem are 2 undefined bytes directly after ECC Curve field.
>>   Shouldn't the format for ECC HI's be written like this instead:
>> 
>>      0                   1                   2                   3
>>      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>>     |          ECC Curve            |      Public Key               /
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               /
>>     /                                                               /
>>     /                                                               /
>>     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>> 
> ACK.
> 
> Tobias
> -- 
> Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
> Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys
> RWTH Aachen University, Germany
> tel: +49 241 80 207 76
> web: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
> blog: http://dtobi.wordpress.com/
> card: http://card.ly/dtobi
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Hipsec mailing list
> Hipsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec

-- 
Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
tel: +49 241 80 207 76
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Hello,

we have consolidated the set of algorithms to be used in RFC5201 and would like
to present it to the list and ask for feedback.

We have three HIT Suites.  The HIT Suites define the algorithms that are used
for generating a HIT/Orchid.  It also defines which HMAC flavor will be used in
HIP control packets.


     HIT Suite              ID
     RESERVED                0
     RSA,DSA/SHA-1           1    (REQUIRED)
     ECDSA/SHA-384           2    (RECOMMENDED)
     ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1         3    (RECOMMENDED)

RSA,DSA/SHA-1 represent the class of HITs we have today with HIP version 1.  All
contained Algorithms (RSA and DSA) must be supported by hosts that implement
this suite.

ECDSA/SHA-384 bundles two ECC curves (NIST P-256 and P-384) with SHA-384.  Both
curves must be implemented by hosts that implement HIT this HIT suite.

ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 is meant for devices with limited computation capabilities.  It
uses the SECP160R curve from SECG.

If we want to make a bold move towards ECC cryptography (and make packet
fragmentation, etc.  less likely) we could change the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED
tags so that we REQUIRE the ECDSA/SHA-384 HIT SUITE and make the other two
recommended.  Any comments on this?


The ECDH groups look similar:

 Group                Value
 Reserved             0
 DEPRECATED           1
 DEPRECATED           2
 1536-bit MODP group  3 [RFC3526]
 3072-bit MODP group  4 [RFC3526]
 DEPRECATED           5
 DEPRECATED           6
 NIST P-256           7 [RFC4753]
 NIST P-384           8 [RFC4753]
 NIST P-521           9 [RFC4753]
 SECP160R1           10 [SECG]

Groups 7 to 10 are new in RFC5201-bis.  Again, group 10 is meant for devices
with low computation capabilities and should be used only if long-term
confidentiality is not required.

The DEPRECATED values are groups present in RFC5201 but have been removed in
RFC5201-bis.  They have to be removed before we finish the document.

Are there any comments regarding the selection of algorithms?  With the selected
ECC curves, we tried to stay as close to other Internet standards IKE, TLS that
use ECC already.

Best regards,

Tobias

  



-- 
Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
tel: +49 241 80 207 76
web: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
blog: http://dtobi.wordpress.com/
card: http://card.ly/dtobi


From mkomu@cs.hut.fi  Thu Dec  9 05:29:59 2010
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Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2010 15:31:26 +0200
From: Miika Komu <mkomu@cs.hut.fi>
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] HIT Suites and algorithms used in RFC5201-bis
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Hi,

On 12/09/2010 12:26 PM, Tobias Heer wrote:
> Hello,
>
> we have consolidated the set of algorithms to be used in RFC5201 and would like
> to present it to the list and ask for feedback.
>
> We have three HIT Suites.  The HIT Suites define the algorithms that are used
> for generating a HIT/Orchid.  It also defines which HMAC flavor will be used in
> HIP control packets.
>
>
>       HIT Suite              ID
>       RESERVED                0
>       RSA,DSA/SHA-1           1    (REQUIRED)
>       ECDSA/SHA-384           2    (RECOMMENDED)
>       ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1         3    (RECOMMENDED)
>
> RSA,DSA/SHA-1 represent the class of HITs we have today with HIP version 1.  All
> contained Algorithms (RSA and DSA) must be supported by hosts that implement
> this suite.
>
> ECDSA/SHA-384 bundles two ECC curves (NIST P-256 and P-384) with SHA-384.  Both
> curves must be implemented by hosts that implement HIT this HIT suite.
>
> ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 is meant for devices with limited computation capabilities.  It
> uses the SECP160R curve from SECG.
>
> If we want to make a bold move towards ECC cryptography (and make packet
> fragmentation, etc.  less likely) we could change the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED
> tags so that we REQUIRE the ECDSA/SHA-384 HIT SUITE and make the other two
> recommended.  Any comments on this?
>
>
> The ECDH groups look similar:
>
>   Group                Value
>   Reserved             0
>   DEPRECATED           1
>   DEPRECATED           2
>   1536-bit MODP group  3 [RFC3526]
>   3072-bit MODP group  4 [RFC3526]
>   DEPRECATED           5
>   DEPRECATED           6
>   NIST P-256           7 [RFC4753]
>   NIST P-384           8 [RFC4753]
>   NIST P-521           9 [RFC4753]
>   SECP160R1           10 [SECG]
>
> Groups 7 to 10 are new in RFC5201-bis.  Again, group 10 is meant for devices
> with low computation capabilities and should be used only if long-term
> confidentiality is not required.
>
> The DEPRECATED values are groups present in RFC5201 but have been removed in
> RFC5201-bis.  They have to be removed before we finish the document.
>
> Are there any comments regarding the selection of algorithms?  With the selected
> ECC curves, we tried to stay as close to other Internet standards IKE, TLS that
> use ECC already.
>
> Best regards,

seems fine to me.

From henrik.ziegeldorf@googlemail.com  Thu Dec  9 06:11:42 2010
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] HIT Suites and algorithms used in RFC5201-bis
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--000e0cd6a81a6b3b140496fad517
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hello,

On 9 December 2010 11:26, Tobias Heer <heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> we have consolidated the set of algorithms to be used in RFC5201 and would
> like
> to present it to the list and ask for feedback.
>
> We have three HIT Suites.  The HIT Suites define the algorithms that are
> used
> for generating a HIT/Orchid.  It also defines which HMAC flavor will be
> used in
> HIP control packets.
>
>
>     HIT Suite              ID
>     RESERVED                0
>     RSA,DSA/SHA-1           1    (REQUIRED)
>     ECDSA/SHA-384           2    (RECOMMENDED)
>     ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1         3    (RECOMMENDED)
>
> RSA,DSA/SHA-1 represent the class of HITs we have today with HIP version 1.
>  All
> contained Algorithms (RSA and DSA) must be supported by hosts that
> implement
> this suite.
>
> ECDSA/SHA-384 bundles two ECC curves (NIST P-256 and P-384) with SHA-384.
>  Both
> curves must be implemented by hosts that implement HIT this HIT suite.
>
> ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 is meant for devices with limited computation capabilities.
>  It
> uses the SECP160R curve from SECG.
>

These comments are quite helpful to clarify and justify the use of ECDSA_LOW
as a seperate algorithm identifier.
I think it would make sense to include them in the RFC, too.

But what about an implementation that implements the ECDSA/SHA-384 suite? It
should implement the ECDSA_LOW profile, too, I think.


>
> If we want to make a bold move towards ECC cryptography (and make packet
> fragmentation, etc.  less likely) we could change the REQUIRED and
> RECOMMENDED
> tags so that we REQUIRE the ECDSA/SHA-384 HIT SUITE and make the other two
> recommended.  Any comments on this?
>
>
> The ECDH groups look similar:
>
>  Group                Value
>  Reserved             0
>  DEPRECATED           1
>  DEPRECATED           2
>  1536-bit MODP group  3 [RFC3526]
>  3072-bit MODP group  4 [RFC3526]
>  DEPRECATED           5
>  DEPRECATED           6
>  NIST P-256           7 [RFC4753]
>  NIST P-384           8 [RFC4753]
>  NIST P-521           9 [RFC4753]
>  SECP160R1           10 [SECG]
>
> Groups 7 to 10 are new in RFC5201-bis.  Again, group 10 is meant for
> devices
> with low computation capabilities and should be used only if long-term
> confidentiality is not required.
>
> The DEPRECATED values are groups present in RFC5201 but have been removed
> in
> RFC5201-bis.  They have to be removed before we finish the document.
>
> Are there any comments regarding the selection of algorithms?  With the
> selected
> ECC curves, we tried to stay as close to other Internet standards IKE, TLS
> that
> use ECC already.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Tobias
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
>

Best regards,
Henrik

> Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys
> RWTH Aachen University, Germany
> tel: +49 241 80 207 76
> web: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
> blog: http://dtobi.wordpress.com/
> card: http://card.ly/dtobi
>
> _______________________________________________
> Hipsec mailing list
> Hipsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec
>

--000e0cd6a81a6b3b140496fad517
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hello,<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 9 December 2010 11:26, Tobias H=
eer <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de">heer@cs=
.rwth-aachen.de</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8=
ex; padding-left: 1ex;">

Hello,<br>
<br>
we have consolidated the set of algorithms to be used in RFC5201 and would =
like<br>
to present it to the list and ask for feedback.<br>
<br>
We have three HIT Suites. =A0The HIT Suites define the algorithms that are =
used<br>
for generating a HIT/Orchid. =A0It also defines which HMAC flavor will be u=
sed in<br>
HIP control packets.<br>
<br>
<br>
 =A0 =A0 HIT Suite =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0ID<br>
 =A0 =A0 RESERVED =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A00<br>
 =A0 =A0 RSA,DSA/SHA-1 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 1 =A0 =A0(REQUIRED)<br>
 =A0 =A0 ECDSA/SHA-384 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0(RECOMMENDED)<br>
 =A0 =A0 ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 3 =A0 =A0(RECOMMENDED)<br>
<br>
RSA,DSA/SHA-1 represent the class of HITs we have today with HIP version 1.=
 =A0All<br>
contained Algorithms (RSA and DSA) must be supported by hosts that implemen=
t<br>
this suite.<br>
<br>
ECDSA/SHA-384 bundles two ECC curves (NIST P-256 and P-384) with SHA-384. =
=A0Both<br>
curves must be implemented by hosts that implement HIT this HIT suite.<br>
<br>
ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 is meant for devices with limited computation capabilities.=
 =A0It<br>
uses the SECP160R curve from SECG.<br></blockquote><div><br>These comments =
are quite helpful to clarify and justify the use of ECDSA_LOW as a seperate=
 algorithm identifier.<br>I think it would make sense to include them in th=
e RFC, too.<br>

<br>But what about an implementation that implements the ECDSA/SHA-384 suit=
e? It should implement the ECDSA_LOW profile, too, I think.<br>=A0</div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204=
, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">


<br>
If we want to make a bold move towards ECC cryptography (and make packet<br=
>
fragmentation, etc. =A0less likely) we could change the REQUIRED and RECOMM=
ENDED<br>
tags so that we REQUIRE the ECDSA/SHA-384 HIT SUITE and make the other two<=
br>
recommended. =A0Any comments on this?<br>
<br>
<br>
The ECDH groups look similar:<br>
<br>
=A0Group =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Value<br>
=A0Reserved =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 0<br>
=A0DEPRECATED =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 1<br>
=A0DEPRECATED =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 2<br>
=A01536-bit MODP group =A03 [RFC3526]<br>
=A03072-bit MODP group =A04 [RFC3526]<br>
=A0DEPRECATED =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 5<br>
=A0DEPRECATED =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 6<br>
=A0NIST P-256 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 7 [RFC4753]<br>
=A0NIST P-384 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 8 [RFC4753]<br>
=A0NIST P-521 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 9 [RFC4753]<br>
=A0SECP160R1 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 10 [SECG]<br>
<br>
Groups 7 to 10 are new in RFC5201-bis. =A0Again, group 10 is meant for devi=
ces<br>
with low computation capabilities and should be used only if long-term<br>
confidentiality is not required.<br>
<br>
The DEPRECATED values are groups present in RFC5201 but have been removed i=
n<br>
RFC5201-bis. =A0They have to be removed before we finish the document.<br>
<br>
Are there any comments regarding the selection of algorithms? =A0With the s=
elected<br>
ECC curves, we tried to stay as close to other Internet standards IKE, TLS =
that<br>
use ECC already.<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
<br>
Tobias<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
--<br>
Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student<br></blockquote><div><br>Best rega=
rds,<br>Henrik <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-=
left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left=
: 1ex;">


Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys<br>
RWTH Aachen University, Germany<br>
tel: +49 241 80 207 76<br>
web: <a href=3D"http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer" target=3D"_blank"=
>http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer</a><br>
blog: <a href=3D"http://dtobi.wordpress.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://dtob=
i.wordpress.com/</a><br>
card: <a href=3D"http://card.ly/dtobi" target=3D"_blank">http://card.ly/dto=
bi</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Hipsec mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Hipsec@ietf.org">Hipsec@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br>

--000e0cd6a81a6b3b140496fad517--

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From: "Henderson, Thomas R" <thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com>
To: "'Tobias Heer'" <heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de>, "hipsec@ietf.org" <hipsec@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 08:31:46 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Hipsec] HIT Suites and algorithms used in RFC5201-bis
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: hipsec-bounces@ietf.org
> [mailto:hipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Tobias Heer
> Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2010 2:27 AM
> To: hipsec@ietf.org
> Subject: [Hipsec] HIT Suites and algorithms used in RFC5201-bis
>
> Hello,
>
> we have consolidated the set of algorithms to be used in
> RFC5201 and would like
> to present it to the list and ask for feedback.
>
> We have three HIT Suites.  The HIT Suites define the
> algorithms that are used
> for generating a HIT/Orchid.  It also defines which HMAC
> flavor will be used in
> HIP control packets.
>
>
>      HIT Suite              ID
>      RESERVED                0
>      RSA,DSA/SHA-1           1    (REQUIRED)
>      ECDSA/SHA-384           2    (RECOMMENDED)
>      ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1         3    (RECOMMENDED)
>
> RSA,DSA/SHA-1 represent the class of HITs we have today with
> HIP version 1.  All
> contained Algorithms (RSA and DSA) must be supported by hosts
> that implement
> this suite.
>
> ECDSA/SHA-384 bundles two ECC curves (NIST P-256 and P-384)
> with SHA-384.  Both
> curves must be implemented by hosts that implement HIT this HIT suite.
>
> ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 is meant for devices with limited computation
> capabilities.  It
> uses the SECP160R curve from SECG.
>
> If we want to make a bold move towards ECC cryptography (and
> make packet
> fragmentation, etc.  less likely) we could change the
> REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED
> tags so that we REQUIRE the ECDSA/SHA-384 HIT SUITE and make
> the other two
> recommended.  Any comments on this?

Has anyone checked into the availability of these suites in cryptographic l=
ibraries and hardware?

Can you clarify what you believe are the implications that you hint at ("pa=
cket fragmentation, etc.")?

>
>
> The ECDH groups look similar:
>
>  Group                Value
>  Reserved             0
>  DEPRECATED           1
>  DEPRECATED           2
>  1536-bit MODP group  3 [RFC3526]
>  3072-bit MODP group  4 [RFC3526]
>  DEPRECATED           5
>  DEPRECATED           6
>  NIST P-256           7 [RFC4753]
>  NIST P-384           8 [RFC4753]
>  NIST P-521           9 [RFC4753]
>  SECP160R1           10 [SECG]
>
> Groups 7 to 10 are new in RFC5201-bis.  Again, group 10 is
> meant for devices
> with low computation capabilities and should be used only if long-term
> confidentiality is not required.
>
> The DEPRECATED values are groups present in RFC5201 but have
> been removed in
> RFC5201-bis.  They have to be removed before we finish the document.
>
> Are there any comments regarding the selection of algorithms?
>  With the selected
> ECC curves, we tried to stay as close to other Internet
> standards IKE, TLS that
> use ECC already.
>

I don't have other comments and agree with trying to stay close to the pred=
ecessors.

- Tom

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Hello Tom,

Am 09.12.2010 um 17:31 schrieb Henderson, Thomas R:

> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: hipsec-bounces@ietf.org
>> [mailto:hipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Tobias Heer
>> Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2010 2:27 AM
>> To: hipsec@ietf.org
>> Subject: [Hipsec] HIT Suites and algorithms used in RFC5201-bis
>> 
>> Hello,
>> 

[...]
>> 
>> 
>> ECDSA/SHA-384 bundles two ECC curves (NIST P-256 and P-384)
>> with SHA-384.  Both
>> curves must be implemented by hosts that implement HIT this HIT suite.
>> 
>> ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 is meant for devices with limited computation
>> capabilities.  It
>> uses the SECP160R curve from SECG.
>> 
>> If we want to make a bold move towards ECC cryptography (and
>> make packet
>> fragmentation, etc.  less likely) we could change the
>> REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED
>> tags so that we REQUIRE the ECDSA/SHA-384 HIT SUITE and make
>> the other two
>> recommended.  Any comments on this?
> 
> Has anyone checked into the availability of these suites in cryptographic libraries and hardware?
> 
I have checked that these are available in the widely used openssl library. They all are.

> Can you clarify what you believe are the implications that you hint at ("packet fragmentation, etc.")?

Large RSA/DSA Keys, large RSA signatures and certificates may add up to a considerable amount of data in HIP control packets. Reducing the size of the keys (compared to RSA/DSA) and the size of the signatures (compared to RSA) may reduce the probability of packet fragmentation for HIP control packets - that was my train of thought. Sorry for not making it more obvious.


Tobias

> 
>> 
>> 
>> The ECDH groups look similar:
>> 
>> Group                Value
>> Reserved             0
>> DEPRECATED           1
>> DEPRECATED           2
>> 1536-bit MODP group  3 [RFC3526]
>> 3072-bit MODP group  4 [RFC3526]
>> DEPRECATED           5
>> DEPRECATED           6
>> NIST P-256           7 [RFC4753]
>> NIST P-384           8 [RFC4753]
>> NIST P-521           9 [RFC4753]
>> SECP160R1           10 [SECG]
>> 
>> Groups 7 to 10 are new in RFC5201-bis.  Again, group 10 is
>> meant for devices
>> with low computation capabilities and should be used only if long-term
>> confidentiality is not required.
>> 
>> The DEPRECATED values are groups present in RFC5201 but have
>> been removed in
>> RFC5201-bis.  They have to be removed before we finish the document.
>> 
>> Are there any comments regarding the selection of algorithms?
>> With the selected
>> ECC curves, we tried to stay as close to other Internet
>> standards IKE, TLS that
>> use ECC already.
>> 
> 
> I don't have other comments and agree with trying to stay close to the predecessors.
> 
> - Tom

-- 
Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
tel: +49 241 80 207 76
web: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
blog: http://dtobi.wordpress.com/
card: http://card.ly/dtobi


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Hello Tom,

one more thing I forgot to answer....

Am 09.12.2010 um 17:31 schrieb Henderson, Thomas R:

[...]
> 
> Has anyone checked into the availability of these suites in cryptographic libraries and hardware?

I cannot say much about hardware acceleration for ECC but I know that software support for SECP160R1 is even available in sensor node platforms (TinyECC for TinyOS).

BR,

Tobias

-- 
Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - comsys
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
tel: +49 241 80 207 76
web: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Host Identity Protocol Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Host Identity Protocol Signaling Message Transport Modes
	Author(s)       : A. Keranen
	Filename        : draft-ietf-hip-over-hip-04.txt
	Pages           : 12
	Date            : 2010-12-16

This document specifies two transport modes for Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) signaling messages that allow conveying them over
encrypted connections initiated with the Host Identity Protocol.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-hip-over-hip-04.txt

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Hi all,

The remaining WGLC comment on this draft was that the mobility and 
multihoming part needed clarification and there was a potential problem 
with the TCP mode and reachability checks (if the check failed with the 
TCP mode, TCP connection would have been problematic to handle since it 
would continue re-transmissions).

To fix these issues, I updated the mobility section and now it's defined 
so that the mobility UPDATE packets are never sent on top of TCP. Also, 
I added an example (appendix A) of the signaling flows with mobility and 
multihoming to clarify how it works in practice.

There's also one small normative language change when TCP connection is 
created for ESP-TCP mode (section 4.2.); it used to say that if the TCP 
connection fails and only TCP mode is accepted, one MUST close the HIP 
association, but since one may want to try something else (not defined 
here), now it's only "SHOULD".

And then there's a bunch of editorial fixes.


Cheers,
Ari

On 12/16/2010 04:00 PM, Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Host Identity Protocol Working Group of the IETF.
>
>
> 	Title           : Host Identity Protocol Signaling Message Transport Modes
> 	Author(s)       : A. Keranen
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-hip-over-hip-04.txt
> 	Pages           : 12
> 	Date            : 2010-12-16
>
> This document specifies two transport modes for Host Identity
> Protocol (HIP) signaling messages that allow conveying them over
> encrypted connections initiated with the Host Identity Protocol.
>
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-hip-over-hip-04.txt

From gonzalo.camarillo@ericsson.com  Thu Dec 16 10:55:15 2010
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Hi,

Ari, thanks for putting this new revision together.

All, please review this version and let Ari know if you have further
comments. I intend to request the publication of this draft shortly.

Cheers,

Gonzalo

On 16/12/2010 4:22 PM, Ari Keranen wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> The remaining WGLC comment on this draft was that the mobility and 
> multihoming part needed clarification and there was a potential problem 
> with the TCP mode and reachability checks (if the check failed with the 
> TCP mode, TCP connection would have been problematic to handle since it 
> would continue re-transmissions).
> 
> To fix these issues, I updated the mobility section and now it's defined 
> so that the mobility UPDATE packets are never sent on top of TCP. Also, 
> I added an example (appendix A) of the signaling flows with mobility and 
> multihoming to clarify how it works in practice.
> 
> There's also one small normative language change when TCP connection is 
> created for ESP-TCP mode (section 4.2.); it used to say that if the TCP 
> connection fails and only TCP mode is accepted, one MUST close the HIP 
> association, but since one may want to try something else (not defined 
> here), now it's only "SHOULD".
> 
> And then there's a bunch of editorial fixes.
> 
> 
> Cheers,
> Ari
> 
> On 12/16/2010 04:00 PM, Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Host Identity Protocol Working Group of the IETF.
>>
>>
>> 	Title           : Host Identity Protocol Signaling Message Transport Modes
>> 	Author(s)       : A. Keranen
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-hip-over-hip-04.txt
>> 	Pages           : 12
>> 	Date            : 2010-12-16
>>
>> This document specifies two transport modes for Host Identity
>> Protocol (HIP) signaling messages that allow conveying them over
>> encrypted connections initiated with the Host Identity Protocol.
>>
>> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-hip-over-hip-04.txt
> _______________________________________________
> Hipsec mailing list
> Hipsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec
> 


From gonzalo.camarillo@ericsson.com  Thu Dec 16 11:06:07 2010
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] WGLC: draft-ietf-hip-cert-06
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Hi,

note that you still have a few days to send your comments if you have some.

Cheers,

Gonzalo

On 05/12/2010 5:51 PM, Gonzalo Camarillo wrote:
> Folks,
> 
> we hereby start the WGLC on the following draft. This WGLC will end on
> December 20th.
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-cert/
> 
> Please, send your comments to this list.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Gonzalo
> HIP co-chair
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Hipsec mailing list
> Hipsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec
> 


From thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com  Sun Dec 19 19:59:52 2010
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From: "Henderson, Thomas R" <thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com>
To: "'Gonzalo Camarillo'" <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>, HIP <hipsec@ietf.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2010 20:01:32 -0800
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: hipsec-bounces@ietf.org
> [mailto:hipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Gonzalo Camarillo
> Sent: Sunday, December 05, 2010 7:51 AM
> To: HIP
> Subject: [Hipsec] WGLC: draft-ietf-hip-cert-06
>
> Folks,
>
> we hereby start the WGLC on the following draft. This WGLC will end on
> December 20th.
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-cert/
>
> Please, send your comments to this list.
>
> Thanks,
>

Gonzalo, I reread this draft and feel that it is ready to publish, modulo t=
he resolution of a couple of comments below.

At the top of page 6, I believe that the line
    Subject: CN=3Dhit-of-issuer
should read
    Subject: CN=3Dhit-of-subject

In section 8, the second paragraph recommends to not use grouping or hash a=
nd URL encodings when HIP aware middleboxes are anticipated to be on the pa=
th.  First of all, it is not really clear how a HIP host may know about the=
se boxes except via side information.  If the HIP host does know about them=
, then presumably it could also know (via side information) whether they ca=
n support grouping and hash formats, and the host could act accordingly.  S=
econd, it is not clear whether the use of these options by a well-behaved h=
ost would make these devices more prone to attacks, or whether it is rather=
 the use of these options by other malicious hosts that is the real problem=
.  It seems to me that it may be better to defer this issue to a future HIP=
-aware middlebox draft, where it could be specified, for instance, how a mi=
ddlebox that does not want to support these formats may signal to a host th=
at it requires "full credentials" to proceed.  So, I would like to suggest =
for your consideration to remove this paragraph.

- Tom

From samu.varjonen@hiit.fi  Mon Dec 20 02:51:46 2010
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On 20/12/10 06:01, Henderson, Thomas R wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: hipsec-bounces@ietf.org
>> [mailto:hipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Gonzalo Camarillo
>> Sent: Sunday, December 05, 2010 7:51 AM
>> To: HIP
>> Subject: [Hipsec] WGLC: draft-ietf-hip-cert-06
>>
>> Folks,
>>
>> we hereby start the WGLC on the following draft. This WGLC will end on
>> December 20th.
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-cert/
>>
>> Please, send your comments to this list.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>
> Gonzalo, I reread this draft and feel that it is ready to publish, modulo the resolution of a couple of comments below.
>
> At the top of page 6, I believe that the line
>      Subject: CN=hit-of-issuer
> should read
>      Subject: CN=hit-of-subject
>

OK, fixed

> In section 8, the second paragraph recommends to not use grouping or hash and URL encodings when HIP aware middleboxes are anticipated to be on the path.  First of all, it is not really clear how a HIP host may know about these boxes except via side information.  If the HIP host does know about them, then presumably it could also know (via side information) whether they can support grouping and hash formats, and the host could act accordingly.  Second, it is not clear whether the use of these options by a well-behaved host would make these devices more prone to attacks, or whether it is rather the use of these options by other malicious hosts that is the real problem.  It seems to me that it may be better to defer this issue to a future HIP-aware middlebox draft, where it could be specified, for instance, how a middlebox that does not want to support these formats may signal to a host that it requires "full credentials" to proceed.  So, I would like to suggest for your cons
id
>   eration to remove this paragraph.
>

I agree with the comment and agree on leaving the subject to a future draft on 
HIP-aware middleboxes. Anyone against the removal of the paragraph? If not 
consider it removed.

> - Tom
> _______________________________________________
> Hipsec mailing list
> Hipsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec


From rene.hummen@informatik.rwth-aachen.de  Mon Dec 27 06:09:52 2010
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From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Ren=E9_Hummen?= <rene.hummen@cs.rwth-aachen.de>
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] HIT Suites and algorithms used in RFC5201-bis
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Hello Tobias,

On 09.12.2010, at 11:26, Tobias Heer wrote:
> Hello,
>=20
> we have consolidated the set of algorithms to be used in RFC5201 and =
would like
> to present it to the list and ask for feedback.
>=20
> We have three HIT Suites.  The HIT Suites define the algorithms that =
are used
> for generating a HIT/Orchid.  It also defines which HMAC flavor will =
be used in
> HIP control packets.
>=20
>=20
>     HIT Suite              ID
>     RESERVED                0
>     RSA,DSA/SHA-1           1    (REQUIRED)
>     ECDSA/SHA-384           2    (RECOMMENDED)
>     ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1         3    (RECOMMENDED)
>=20
> RSA,DSA/SHA-1 represent the class of HITs we have today with HIP =
version 1.  All
> contained Algorithms (RSA and DSA) must be supported by hosts that =
implement
> this suite.
>=20
> ECDSA/SHA-384 bundles two ECC curves (NIST P-256 and P-384) with =
SHA-384.  Both
> curves must be implemented by hosts that implement HIT this HIT suite.
>=20
> ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 is meant for devices with limited computation =
capabilities.  It
> uses the SECP160R curve from SECG.
>=20
> If we want to make a bold move towards ECC cryptography (and make =
packet
> fragmentation, etc.  less likely) we could change the REQUIRED and =
RECOMMENDED
> tags so that we REQUIRE the ECDSA/SHA-384 HIT SUITE and make the other =
two
> recommended.  Any comments on this?


With either RSA,DSA/SHA-1 or ECDSA/SHA-384 required, how could a HIP =
implementation for low resource devices (only supporting =
ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1) be standard compliant? In this respect, does it make =
sense to only have a a single ECDSA family instead of separating between =
ECDSA and ECDSA_LOW?

BR,
Ren=E9


--
Dipl.-Inform. Rene Hummen, Ph.D. Student
Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
tel: +49 241 80 20772
web: http://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/team/rene-hummen/


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