
From vladimir@nimbusds.com  Tue Jan  8 03:42:24 2013
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From: "Vladimir Dzhuvinov / NimbusDS" <vladimir@nimbusds.com>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2013 04:42:07 -0700
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Subject: Re: [jose] December 27, 2012 JOSE Release
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Thank you guys for this update. I just released a new version of the=0AJava=
 JOSE+JWT library that incorporates all the latest changes in the=0AJOSE -0=
8 suite as well as the JWT -06 draft:=0A=0Ahttps://bitbucket.org/nimbusds=
=0A=0Ahttp://nimbusds.com/files/jose-jwt/javadoc/=0A=0A=0AI'm still looking=
 for a contributor to help out with the JWE alg=0Aimplementations.=0A=0A=0A=
The JPSK draft looks like a useful development and I intend to code it=0Ain=
to the library eventually.=0A=0ABTW, the [JPSK] ref link in draft-ietf-jose=
-json-web-key-08#section-9.2=0Aappears to be broken.=0A=0A=0ACheers,=0A=0AV=
ladimir=0A=0A=0A--=0AVladimir Dzhuvinov : www.NimbusDS.com : vladimir@nimbu=
sds.com=0A =0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A-------- Original Message --------=0ASubject: =
[jose] December 27, 2012 JOSE Release=0AFrom: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@mic=
rosoft.com>=0ADate: Sat, December 29, 2012 1:07 am=0ATo: "jose@ietf.org" <j=
ose@ietf.org>=0A=0A  New versions of the JOSE specs have been released inco=
rporating=0Afeedback since IETF 85 in Atlanta.  The highlight of this relea=
se is the=0Anew  JSON Private and Symmetric Key spec, which extends JWKs to=
 be able=0Ato represent private and symmetric keys.  These sensitive keys c=
an then=0Abe protected for transmission and storage by JWE encryption of th=
eir JWK=0Arepresentations.=0A  =0A One new feature added to JWK is the abil=
ity to optionally specify which=0Aspecific algorithm the key is intended to=
 be used with.  (This is=0Aalready existing practice for keys in X.509 form=
at.)  For instance, a=0Asymmetric key might be annotated to say that it is =
to be used with the=0A=E2=80=9CHS256=E2=80=9D algorithm.  Because the natur=
al field name for this=0Afunctionality is =E2=80=9Calg=E2=80=9D, the =E2=80=
=9Calg=E2=80=9D name is now used for this=0Apurpose (matching JWS and JWE) =
and the key type (formerly =E2=80=9Calg=E2=80=9D) is=0Anow denoted by the =
=E2=80=9Ckty=E2=80=9D field.=0A  =0A This release incorporates editorial im=
provements suggested by Jeff=0AHodges and Hannes Tschofenig in their review=
s of the JWT specification. =0AMany of these simplified the terminology usa=
ge.  See the Document=0AHistory section of each specification for more deta=
ils about the changes=0Amade.=0A  =0A This release is part of a coordinated=
 release of JOSE, OAuth, and=0AOpenID Connect specifications.  You can read=
 about the other releases=0Ahere:  OAuth Release Notes,  OpenID Connect Rel=
ease Notes.=0A  =0A The new specification versions are:=0A =C2=B7       =0A=
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08=0A =C2=B7 =
      =0Ahttp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08=
=0A =C2=B7        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-0=
8=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-al=
gorithms-08=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-=
jws-json-serialization-04=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://tools.ietf.org/html/dra=
ft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://tools.iet=
f.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00=0A  =0A HTML =
formatted versions are available at:=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://self-issued.=
info/docs/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08.html=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahtt=
p://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08.html=0A =
=C2=B7       =0Ahttp://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-0=
8.html=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-jose-json=
-web-algorithms-08.html=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://self-issued.info/docs/dra=
ft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04.html=0A =C2=B7       =0Ahttp://self=
-issued.info/docs/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04.html=0A =C2=B7=
       =0Ahttp://self-issued.info/docs/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-sy=
mmetric-key-00.html=0A  =0A                                                =
             -- Mike=0A  =0A =0A___________________________________________=
____=0Ajose mailing list=0Ajose@ietf.org=0Ahttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/lis=
tinfo/jose

From odonoghue@isoc.org  Fri Jan 11 12:02:57 2013
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Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2013 15:02:54 -0500
From: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Organization: ISOC
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Subject: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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Folks,

Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the last 
IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and 
algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor 
language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables 
5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones related 
to these documents.

In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" has 
been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and 
"compact JSON object" used in the milestones.

Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would 
like your comments by 18 January if possible.

Thanks,
Karen


Description of Working Group

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization 
of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format is often used 
for serializing and transmitting structured data over a network 
connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF 
and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security services such as 
encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and 
key representations for data that is being carried in JSON format.

Different proposals for providing such security services have already 
been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to 
standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection 
(signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm 
identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security features 
between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group will base its work 
on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit 
input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the 
security functionality in the JSON format is correct.

This group is chartered to work on eight documents:

(1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured 
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data 
structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity 
protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as 
symmetric-key MACs.

(2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured 
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, 
using a compact URL-safe representation.

(3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as 
JSON-structured objects.

(4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm 
identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the 
previous three documents.

(5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured 
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data 
structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  
This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (1).

(6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured 
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, 
using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  This 
document will build upon the concepts and structures in (2).

(7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and 
symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build 
upon the concepts and structures in (3).

(8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of 
protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document 
will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This 
document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by (4).

The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in 
consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for 
these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).

Goals and Milestones

Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document (1) 
as a WG item.

Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document (2) 
as a WG item.

Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG item.

Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON 
object integrity document (1).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON 
object encryption document (2).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format 
document (3).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm 
document (4).

Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG 
for consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to IESG 
for consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for 
consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for 
consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity 
document (5) as a WG item.

Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption 
document (6) as a WG item.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7) 
as a WG item.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document (8) 
as a WG item.

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient 
JSON object integrity document (5).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient 
JSON object encryption document (6).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private and 
symmetric key document (7).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key 
protection application document (8).

Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity 
document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption 
document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document 
(7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application document 
(8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.


From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Jan 11 12:23:38 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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+1

________________________________
From: Karen O'Donoghue
Sent: 1/11/2013 12:03 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter

Folks,

Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the last
IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and
algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor
language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables
5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones related
to these documents.

In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" has
been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and
"compact JSON object" used in the milestones.

Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would
like your comments by 18 January if possible.

Thanks,
Karen


Description of Working Group

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization
of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format is often used
for serializing and transmitting structured data over a network
connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF
and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security services such as
encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and
key representations for data that is being carried in JSON format.

Different proposals for providing such security services have already
been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to
standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection
(signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm
identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security features
between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group will base its work
on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit
input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the
security functionality in the JSON format is correct.

This group is chartered to work on eight documents:

(1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data
structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity
protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as
symmetric-key MACs.

(2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
using a compact URL-safe representation.

(3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as
JSON-structured objects.

(4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm
identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the
previous three documents.

(5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data
structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.
This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (1).

(6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  This
document will build upon the concepts and structures in (2).

(7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and
symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build
upon the concepts and structures in (3).

(8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of
protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document
will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This
document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by (4).

The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in
consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for
these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).

Goals and Milestones

Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document (1)
as a WG item.

Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document (2)
as a WG item.

Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG item.

Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON
object integrity document (1).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON
object encryption document (2).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format
document (3).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm
document (4).

Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG
for consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to IESG
for consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for
consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for
consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity
document (5) as a WG item.

Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption
document (6) as a WG item.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7)
as a WG item.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document (8)
as a WG item.

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient
JSON object integrity document (5).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient
JSON object encryption document (6).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private and
symmetric key document (7).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key
protection application document (8).

Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity
document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption
document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document
(7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application document
(8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

_______________________________________________
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jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,sans-serif; font-size:11pt">&#43;1<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<hr>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">From:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">Karen =
O'Donoghue</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">Sent:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">1/11/2=
013 12:03 PM</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">To:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">jose@i=
etf.org</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">Subject:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">[jose]=
 draft revision to JOSE charter</span><br>
<br>
</div>
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">
<div class=3D"PlainText">Folks,<br>
<br>
Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the last <br=
>
IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and <br>
algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor <br>
language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables <br>
5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones related <b=
r>
to these documents.<br>
<br>
In addition, the phrase &quot;using a compact URL-safe representation&quot;=
 has <br>
been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and <br>
&quot;compact JSON object&quot; used in the milestones.<br>
<br>
Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would <br>
like your comments by 18 January if possible.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Karen<br>
<br>
<br>
Description of Working Group<br>
<br>
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization <b=
r>
of structured data described in RFC 4627.&nbsp; The JSON format is often us=
ed <br>
for serializing and transmitting structured data over a network <br>
connection.&nbsp; With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF=
 <br>
and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security services such as <br=
>
encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and <b=
r>
key representations for data that is being carried in JSON format.<br>
<br>
Different proposals for providing such security services have already <br>
been defined and implemented.&nbsp; This Working Group's task is to <br>
standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection <br>
(signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm <br>
identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security features <br=
>
between protocols that use JSON.&nbsp; The Working Group will base its work=
 <br>
on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit <br=
>
input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the <br>
security functionality in the JSON format is correct.<br>
<br>
This group is chartered to work on eight documents:<br>
<br>
(1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured <br>
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data <br>
structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.&nbsp; &quot;Integrity =
<br>
protection&quot; includes public-key digital signatures as well as <br>
symmetric-key MACs.<br>
<br>
(2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured <b=
r>
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, <b=
r>
using a compact URL-safe representation.<br>
<br>
(3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as <br>
JSON-structured objects.<br>
<br>
(4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm <br>
identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the <br>
previous three documents.<br>
<br>
(5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured <br>
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data <br>
structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.&nbs=
p; <br>
This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (1).<br>
<br>
(6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured <b=
r>
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, <b=
r>
using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.&nbsp; This <br>
document will build upon the concepts and structures in (2).<br>
<br>
(7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and <br>
symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.&nbsp; This document will build <=
br>
upon the concepts and structures in (3).<br>
<br>
(8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of <br>
protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.&nbsp; This document <=
br>
will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).&nbsp; This <br>
document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by (4).<b=
r>
<br>
The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in <br>
consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for <br>
these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).<br>
<br>
Goals and Milestones<br>
<br>
Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Submit compact JSON object integrity document (1) <br>
as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Submit compact JSON object encryption document (2) <br>
as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON <br>
object integrity document (1).<br>
<br>
Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON <br>
object encryption document (2).<br>
<br>
Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format <br>
document (3).<br>
<br>
Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm <br>
document (4).<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG <br>
for consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to IESG <br>
for consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for <br>
consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for <br>
consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity <br>
document (5) as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption <br>
document (6) as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7) <br>
as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Submit JSON key protection application document (8) <br>
as a WG item.<br>
<br>
Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient <br>
JSON object integrity document (5).<br>
<br>
Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient <br>
JSON object encryption document (6).<br>
<br>
Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private and <br>
symmetric key document (7).<br>
<br>
Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key <br>
protection application document (8).<br>
<br>
Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity <br>
document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption <br>
document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON private and symmetric key document <br>
(7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON key protection application document <br>
(8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
jose@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose">https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
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On 1,2,3,5,6:

Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 and 6 are intended to be =
something like the JSON serialization documents, whereas 1, 2, and 3 are =
supposed to be something like the current documents?  If that's the =
case, then we might as well call a spade a spade and remove =
"JSON-structured" from 1, 2, and 3.

I find that sort of back-tracking pretty distasteful, though.  As I've =
said before, it would be better if we could come up with a reasonable =
JSON syntax that would profile down to something compact and URL-safe. =20=



On 4:

This group has agreed time and again that we will not have mandatory to =
implement algorithms.  As Mr. Housley put it, according to the IETF 85 =
minutes, "Each app defines MTI, achieving separation of MTI from =
syntax.".  So the phrase "including mandatory-to-implement algorithms" =
needs to be struck from item (4).


On 7,8:

I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are supposed to entail.  JWE =
already has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).  As above, we should =
strive to get this right the first time instead of doing something =
halfway with a promise to patch it later.


--Richard




On Jan 11, 2013, at 3:02 PM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> =
wrote:

> Folks,
>=20
> Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the =
last IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and =
algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor =
language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables =
5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones related =
to these documents.
>=20
> In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" has =
been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and =
"compact JSON object" used in the milestones.
>=20
> Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would =
like your comments by 18 January if possible.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Karen
>=20
>=20
> Description of Working Group
>=20
> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the =
serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format =
is often used for serializing and transmitting structured data over a =
network connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in =
the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security services =
such as encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes =
(MACs), and key representations for data that is being carried in JSON =
format.
>=20
> Different proposals for providing such security services have already =
been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to =
standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection =
(signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm =
identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security features =
between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group will base its work =
on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit =
input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the =
security functionality in the JSON format is correct.
>=20
> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:
>=20
> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured =
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data =
structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity =
protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as =
symmetric-key MACs.
>=20
> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a =
JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON =
data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.
>=20
> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as =
JSON-structured objects.
>=20
> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm =
identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the =
previous three documents.
>=20
> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured =
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data =
structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  =
This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (1).
>=20
> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a =
JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON =
data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple =
recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures =
in (2).
>=20
> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and =
symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build =
upon the concepts and structures in (3).
>=20
> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of =
protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document =
will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This =
document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by =
(4).
>=20
> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in =
consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for =
these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>=20
> Goals and Milestones
>=20
> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document =
(1) as a WG item.
>=20
> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document =
(2) as a WG item.
>=20
> Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG =
item.
>=20
> Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.
>=20
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON =
object integrity document (1).
>=20
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON =
object encryption document (2).
>=20
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format =
document (3).
>=20
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm =
document (4).
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG =
for consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to =
IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for =
consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for =
consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity =
document (5) as a WG item.
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption =
document (6) as a WG item.
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document =
(7) as a WG item.
>=20
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document =
(8) as a WG item.
>=20
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient =
JSON object integrity document (5).
>=20
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient =
JSON object encryption document (6).
>=20
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private =
and symmetric key document (7).
>=20
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key =
protection application document (8).
>=20
> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity =
document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption =
document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document =
(7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application document =
(8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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Replies inline in green...



-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2013 1:16 PM
To: odonoghue@isoc.org
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter



On 1,2,3,5,6:



Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 and 6 are intended to be someth=
ing like the JSON serialization documents, whereas 1, 2, and 3 are supposed=
 to be something like the current documents?  If that's the case, then we m=
ight as well call a spade a spade and remove "JSON-structured" from 1, 2, a=
nd 3.



I find that sort of back-tracking pretty distasteful, though.  As I've said=
 before, it would be better if we could come up with a reasonable JSON synt=
ax that would profile down to something compact and URL-safe.



Yes, (1), (2), (3) (and (4)) are the deliverables in the present charter (h=
ttp://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/).  The "JSON-structured" wordin=
g is from the current charter.  I suppose it could be changed to "JSON-base=
d" if people prefer that.  But minimizing changes to the existing charter i=
tems also seems like a good goal.  I'd be fine with either the "JSON-struct=
ured" wording from the current charter or "JSON-based".



And yes, (5) and (6) are the JSON serialization documents, which we decided=
 adopt as working group documents and create charter items for at the worki=
ng group meeting in Atlanta.  Consensus to do this is recorded at http://ww=
w.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose.    See http://tools.ietf=
.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04 and http://tools.ietf.=
org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04 for the current version=
s of these documents.



On 4:



This group has agreed time and again that we will not have mandatory to imp=
lement algorithms.  As Mr. Housley put it, according to the IETF 85 minutes=
, "Each app defines MTI, achieving separation of MTI from syntax.".  So the=
 phrase "including mandatory-to-implement algorithms" needs to be struck fr=
om item (4).



This statement makes no sense, as our current charter already *requires* us=
 to produce "A Standards Track document specifying mandatory-to-implement a=
lgorithms for the other three documents".  The rechartering is about adding=
 the new deliverables 5-8 - not changing our existing deliverables, of whic=
h this is one already one.



On 7,8:



I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are supposed to entail.  JWE already=
 has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).  As above, we should strive to=
 get this right the first time instead of doing something halfway with a pr=
omise to patch it later.



I'm surprised that you say that don't understand 7 and 8, as you were in th=
e Friday morning meeting in Atlanta that was organized by Joe Hildebrand an=
d Jim Schaad that defined them.  The minutes of that meeting are at http://=
www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html.  Deliverable (A) =
in the minutes is charter item (7).  Deliverable (B) in the minutes is char=
ter item (8).



(7) extends (3) to define JSON representations for private and symmetric ke=
ys (whereas (3) only defines representations for public keys).  See http://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00 for =
a draft that does this.



As we discussed at that meeting, while JWE uses wrapped key *values* (wrapp=
ed CMKs), this new document that Matt is writing will enable us to wrap bot=
h key values and associated key properties.  It wraps a JWK representation =
(which per (7), may represent private and symmetric keys), including potent=
ial key properties as the key's "alg" and "kid" values, as well as others t=
hat may be used.  It's intentionally more general than the wrapped CMK valu=
e used in JWE, again, as discussed during the Friday meeting in Atlanta.



--Richard



                                                                Best wishes=
,

                                                                -- Mike



On Jan 11, 2013, at 3:02 PM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org<mailto:od=
onoghue@isoc.org>> wrote:



> Folks,

>

> Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the last I=
ETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and algorithm i=
dentifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor language updates =
in the general section, the addition of deliverables 5-8, and the addition =
and modification of a number of milestones related to these documents.

>

> In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" has bee=
n added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and "compact JSON=
 object" used in the milestones.

>

> Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would like=
 your comments by 18 January if possible.

>

> Thanks,

> Karen

>

>

> Description of Working Group

>

> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization =
of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format is often used fo=
r serializing and transmitting structured data over a network connection.  =
With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, th=
ere is now a desire to offer security services such as encryption, digital =
signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and key representations fo=
r data that is being carried in JSON format.

>

> Different proposals for providing such security services have already bee=
n defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to standardize fou=
r kinds of security services, integrity protection (signature and MAC), enc=
ryption, key representations, and algorithm identifiers, in order to increa=
se interoperability of security features between protocols that use JSON.  =
The Working Group will base its work on well-known message security primiti=
ves (e.g., CMS), and will solicit input from the rest of the IETF Security =
Area to be sure that the security functionality in the JSON format is corre=
ct.

>

> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:

>

> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured in=
tegrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data struct=
ures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity protection" incl=
udes public-key digital signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.

>

> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured =
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, us=
ing a compact URL-safe representation.

>

> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as JS=
ON-structured objects.

>

> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm identi=
fiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the previous three d=
ocuments.

>

> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured in=
tegrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data struct=
ures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  This doc=
ument will build upon the concepts and structures in (1).

>

> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured =
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, us=
ing a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document wi=
ll build upon the concepts and structures in (2).

>

> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and symme=
tric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build upon the co=
ncepts and structures in (3).

>

> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of protecti=
ng private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document will build upo=
n the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This document may register a=
dditional algorithms in registries defined by (4).

>

> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in co=
nsolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for these goa=
ls will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).

>

> Goals and Milestones

>

> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document (1) a=
s a WG item.

>

> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document (2) =
as a WG item.

>

> Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG item.

>

> Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.

>

> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON objec=
t integrity document (1).

>

> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON objec=
t encryption document (2).

>

> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format do=
cument (3).

>

> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm doc=
ument (4).

>

> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG fo=
r consideration as Standards Track document.

>

> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to IESG f=
or consideration as Standards Track document.

>

> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for cons=
ideration as Standards Track document.

>

> Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for consi=
deration as Standards Track document.

>

> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity documen=
t (5) as a WG item.

>

> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption docume=
nt (6) as a WG item.

>

> Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7) a=
s a WG item.

>

> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document (8) =
as a WG item.

>

> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient JS=
ON object integrity document (5).

>

> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient JS=
ON object encryption document (6).

>

> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private and s=
ymmetric key document (7).

>

> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key protectio=
n application document (8).

>

> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity docum=
ent (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

>

> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption docu=
ment (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

>

> Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7)=
 to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

>

> Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application document (8=
) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

>

> _______________________________________________

> jose mailing list

> jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>

> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



_______________________________________________

jose mailing list

jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>

https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Replies inline in <span style=3D"color:#00B050">g=
reen</span>&#8230;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">-----Original Message-----<br>
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes<br>
Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2013 1:16 PM<br>
To: odonoghue@isoc.org<br>
Cc: jose@ietf.org<br>
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter</p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">On 1,2,3,5,6:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 and 6=
 are intended to be something like the JSON serialization documents, wherea=
s 1, 2, and 3 are supposed to be something like the current documents?&nbsp=
; If that's the case, then we might as
 well call a spade a spade and remove &quot;JSON-structured&quot; from 1, 2=
, and 3.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I find that sort of back-tracking pretty distaste=
ful, though.&nbsp; As I've said before, it would be better if we could come=
 up with a reasonable JSON syntax that would profile down to something comp=
act and URL-safe.&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">Yes, (1), (2), (3) =
(and (4)) are the deliverables in the present charter (</span><span style=
=3D"color:black"><a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/">h=
ttp://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/</a></span><span style=3D"color:=
#00B050">).&nbsp;
 The &#8220;JSON-structured&#8221; wording is from the current charter.&nbs=
p; I suppose it could be changed to &#8220;JSON-based&#8221; if people pref=
er that.&nbsp; But minimizing changes to the existing charter items also se=
ems like a good goal.&nbsp; I&#8217;d be fine with either the &#8220;JSON-s=
tructured&#8221;
 wording from the current charter or &#8220;JSON-based&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">And yes, (5) and (6=
) are the JSON serialization documents, which we decided adopt as working g=
roup documents and create charter items for at the working group meeting in=
 Atlanta.&nbsp; Consensus to do this is recorded
 at <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose">=
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose</a>.&nbsp; &nbsp=
;&nbsp;See
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serializati=
on-04">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-0=
4</a> and
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serializati=
on-04">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-0=
4</a> for the current versions of these documents.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">On 4:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">This group has agreed time and again that we will=
 not have mandatory to implement algorithms.&nbsp; As Mr. Housley put it, a=
ccording to the IETF 85 minutes, &quot;Each app defines MTI, achieving sepa=
ration of MTI from syntax.&quot;.&nbsp; So the phrase
 &quot;including mandatory-to-implement algorithms&quot; needs to be struck=
 from item (4).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">This statement make=
s no sense, as our current charter already *<b>requires</b>* us to produce =
&#8220;A Standards Track document
<b>specifying mandatory-to-implement algorithms</b> for the other three doc=
uments&#8221;. &nbsp;The rechartering is about adding the new deliverables =
5-8 &#8211; not changing our existing deliverables, of which this is one al=
ready one.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">On 7,8:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are suppos=
ed to entail.&nbsp; JWE already has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).=
&nbsp; As above, we should strive to get this right the first time instead =
of doing something halfway with a promise to
 patch it later.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">I&#8217;m surprised=
 that you say that don&#8217;t understand 7 and 8, as you were in the Frida=
y morning meeting in Atlanta that was organized by Joe Hildebrand and Jim S=
chaad that defined them.&nbsp; The minutes of that meeting
 are at </span><span style=3D"color:black"><a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/m=
ail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archiv=
e/web/jose/current/msg01337.html</a></span><span style=3D"color:#00B050">.&=
nbsp; Deliverable (A) in the minutes is charter
 item (7).&nbsp; Deliverable (B) in the minutes is charter item (8).<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">(7) extends (3) to =
define JSON representations for private and symmetric keys (whereas (3) onl=
y defines representations for public keys). &nbsp;See
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-sym=
metric-key-00">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-=
00</a> for a draft that does this.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">As we discussed at =
that meeting, while JWE uses wrapped key *<b>values</b>* (wrapped CMKs), th=
is new document that Matt is writing will enable us to wrap both key values=
 and associated key properties.&nbsp; It
 wraps a JWK representation (which per (7), may represent private and symme=
tric keys), including potential key properties as the key&#8217;s &#8220;al=
g&#8221; and &#8220;kid&#8221; values, as well as others that may be used.&=
nbsp; It&#8217;s intentionally more general than the wrapped CMK value used
 in JWE, again, as discussed during the Friday meeting in Atlanta.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Best wishes,<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">On Jan 11, 2013, at 3:02 PM, Karen O'Donoghue &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org"><span style=3D"color:windowtext;text=
-decoration:none">odonoghue@isoc.org</span></a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Folks,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Below is a draft update to our charter based=
 on discussions at the last IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key re=
presentations and algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes=
 some minor language updates in the general
 section, the addition of deliverables 5-8, and the addition and modificati=
on of a number of milestones related to these documents.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; In addition, the phrase &quot;using a compac=
t URL-safe representation&quot; has been added to the descriptions of the f=
irst two deliverables and &quot;compact JSON object&quot; used in the miles=
tones.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jim and I will be submitting a revised chart=
er shortly, and we would like your comments by 18 January if possible.<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Karen<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Description of Working Group<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text =
format for the serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.&nbsp=
; The JSON format is often used for serializing and transmitting structured=
 data over a network connection.&nbsp; With the
 increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is n=
ow a desire to offer security services such as encryption, digital signatur=
es, message authentication codes (MACs), and key representations for data t=
hat is being carried in JSON format.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Different proposals for providing such secur=
ity services have already been defined and implemented.&nbsp; This Working =
Group's task is to standardize four kinds of security services, integrity p=
rotection (signature and MAC), encryption,
 key representations, and algorithm identifiers, in order to increase inter=
operability of security features between protocols that use JSON.&nbsp; The=
 Working Group will base its work on well-known message security primitives=
 (e.g., CMS), and will solicit input
 from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the security funct=
ionality in the JSON format is correct.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; This group is chartered to work on eight doc=
uments:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (1) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not=
 limited to) JSON data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.=
&nbsp; &quot;Integrity protection&quot; includes public-key
 digital signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (2) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply a JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited=
 to) JSON data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.<o:p></o=
:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (3) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to encode public keys as JSON-structured objects.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (4) A Standards Track document specifying al=
gorithms and algorithm identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algori=
thms for the previous three documents.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (5) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not=
 limited to) JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting m=
ultiple recipients.&nbsp; This document will
 build upon the concepts and structures in (1).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (6) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply a JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited=
 to) JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple =
recipients.&nbsp; This document will build
 upon the concepts and structures in (2).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (7) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to encode private and symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.&nbsp; Th=
is document will build upon the concepts and structures in (3).<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (8) A Standards Track application document s=
pecifying a means of protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.&=
nbsp; This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and =
(7).&nbsp; This document may register additional
 algorithms in registries defined by (4).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; The working group may decide to address comb=
inations of these goals in consolidated document(s), in which case the conc=
rete milestones for these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated docum=
ent(s).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Goals and Milestones<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit compact JSON object integ=
rity document (1) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit compact JSON object encry=
ption document (2) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON key format document =
(3) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jan 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON algorithm document (=
4) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 compact JSON object integrity document (1).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 compact JSON object encryption document (2).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 JSON key format document (3).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Feb 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 JSON algorithm document (4).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON object integrity document =
(1) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON object encryption document=
 (2) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON key format document (3) to=
 IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to =
IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSON object int=
egrity document (5) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSON object enc=
ryption document (6) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON private and symmetric key =
document (7) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Mar 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON key protection application=
 document (8) as a WG item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 multi-recipient JSON object integrity document (5).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 multi-recipient JSON object encryption document (6).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 JSON private and symmetric key document (7).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jun 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Start Working Group Last Call on=
 JSON key protection application document (8).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSO=
N object integrity document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Trac=
k document.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit multi-recipient JSO=
N object encryption document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Tra=
ck document.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Submit JSON private and sy=
mmetric key document (7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track docum=
ent.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Jul 2013&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Submit JSON key protection=
 application document (8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track docu=
ment.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; ____________________________________________=
___<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; jose mailing list<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org"><span style=
=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">jose@ietf.org</span></a><o:p></o=
:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/list=
info/jose"><span style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">https://ww=
w.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</span></a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">_______________________________________________<o=
:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">jose mailing list<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org"><span style=3D"c=
olor:windowtext;text-decoration:none">jose@ietf.org</span></a><o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
jose"><span style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">https://www.iet=
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Inline


> -----
> On 1,2,3,5,6:
> =20
> Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 and 6 are intended to be =
something like the JSON serialization documents, whereas 1, 2, and 3 are =
supposed to be something like the current documents?  If that's the =
case, then we might as well call a spade a spade and remove =
"JSON-structured" from 1, 2, and 3.
> =20
> I find that sort of back-tracking pretty distasteful, though.  As I've =
said before, it would be better if we could come up with a reasonable =
JSON syntax that would profile down to something compact and URL-safe.=20=

> =20
> Yes, (1), (2), (3) (and (4)) are the deliverables in the present =
charter (http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/).  The =
=93JSON-structured=94 wording is from the current charter.  I suppose it =
could be changed to =93JSON-based=94 if people prefer that.  But =
minimizing changes to the existing charter items also seems like a good =
goal.  I=92d be fine with either the =93JSON-structured=94 wording from =
the current charter or =93JSON-based=94.
> =20
> And yes, (5) and (6) are the JSON serialization documents, which we =
decided adopt as working group documents and create charter items for at =
the working group meeting in Atlanta.  Consensus to do this is recorded =
at http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose.    See =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04 =
andhttp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04 =
for the current versions of these documents.

I just don't see any reason for us to have separate documents for a =
"JSON serialization".  It's what we should have done in the first place =
-- make something "JSON-structured".  Rather than having separate =
documents/milestones, let's just put the JSON stuff in the base spec.  =
It will help ensure coherence between the formats, and it's really not =
that much text.

If we make the explicit decision not to include a JSON format in our =
base deliverables, then we should just strike "JSON" altogether.  JW* is =
as much "ASN.1-based" as it is "JSON-based" -- it contains =
base64-serialized objects of both types.


> On 4:
> =20
> This group has agreed time and again that we will not have mandatory =
to implement algorithms.  As Mr. Housley put it, according to the IETF =
85 minutes, "Each app defines MTI, achieving separation of MTI from =
syntax.".  So the phrase "including mandatory-to-implement algorithms" =
needs to be struck from item (4).
> =20
> This statement makes no sense, as our current charter already =
*requires* us to produce =93A Standards Track document specifying =
mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the other three documents=94.  The =
rechartering is about adding the new deliverables 5-8 =96 not changing =
our existing deliverables, of which this is one already one.

You want to deviate from the first three milestones, I want to deviate =
from this one :)

There have been clear consensus calls at the last few IETF meetings that =
run against this milestone.  If the chairs would like to have an =
explicit call on removing "mandatory to implement" from this milestone, =
then I would support that.


> On 7,8:
> =20
> I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are supposed to entail.  JWE =
already has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).  As above, we should =
strive to get this right the first time instead of doing something =
halfway with a promise to patch it later.
> =20
> I=92m surprised that you say that don=92t understand 7 and 8, as you =
were in the Friday morning meeting in Atlanta that was organized by Joe =
Hildebrand and Jim Schaad that defined them.  The minutes of that =
meeting are at =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html.  =
Deliverable (A) in the minutes is charter item (7).  Deliverable (B) in =
the minutes is charter item (8).
> =20
> (7) extends (3) to define JSON representations for private and =
symmetric keys (whereas (3) only defines representations for public =
keys).  See =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key=
-00 for a draft that does this.
> =20
> As we discussed at that meeting, while JWE uses wrapped key *values* =
(wrapped CMKs), this new document that Matt is writing will enable us to =
wrap both key values and associated key properties.  It wraps a JWK =
representation (which per (7), may represent private and symmetric =
keys), including potential key properties as the key=92s =93alg=94 and =
=93kid=94 values, as well as others that may be used.  It=92s =
intentionally more general than the wrapped CMK value used in JWE, =
again, as discussed during the Friday meeting in Atlanta.

I was at that meeting, and I did not leave convinced that having a =
separate document was the correct path, as opposed to doing wrapped keys =
right the first time.

JWE already has a mechanism for wrapping keys.  Instead of inventing =
some separate syntax, we should consolidate the "wrapped key" bits of =
JWE into an object ("JSON Wrapped Key", or JWK :) ), and give that =
object a way to protect attributes.  If there are no attributes, then =
this just looks like what's already in JWE. I can send a more thorough =
proposal to the list if you like.

In any case, I oppose adding these two milestones based on the above.  =
If we are going to handle this separately, then 7 and 8 should be =
combined, since the format for symmetric/private keys will have to have =
a protection mechanism.

--Richard




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From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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On Jan 18, 2013, at 8:21 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:

> Inline
>=20
>=20
>> -----
>> On 1,2,3,5,6:
>>=20
>> Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 and 6 are intended to be som=
ething like the JSON serialization documents, whereas 1, 2, and 3 are suppo=
sed to be something like the current documents?  If that's the case, then w=
e might as well call a spade a spade and remove "JSON-structured" from 1, 2=
, and 3.
>>=20
>> I find that sort of back-tracking pretty distasteful, though.  As I've s=
aid before, it would be better if we could come up with a reasonable JSON s=
yntax that would profile down to something compact and URL-safe.=20
>>=20
>> Yes, (1), (2), (3) (and (4)) are the deliverables in the present charter=
 (http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/).  The =93JSON-structured=94=
 wording is from the current charter.  I suppose it could be changed to =93=
JSON-based=94 if people prefer that.  But minimizing changes to the existin=
g charter items also seems like a good goal.  I=92d be fine with either the=
 =93JSON-structured=94 wording from the current charter or =93JSON-based=94=
.
>>=20
>> And yes, (5) and (6) are the JSON serialization documents, which we deci=
ded adopt as working group documents and create charter items for at the wo=
rking group meeting in Atlanta.  Consensus to do this is recorded at http:/=
/www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose.    See http://tools.i=
etf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04 andhttp://tools.iet=
f.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04 for the current versi=
ons of these documents.
>=20
> I just don't see any reason for us to have separate documents for a "JSON=
 serialization".  It's what we should have done in the first place -- make =
something "JSON-structured".  Rather than having separate documents/milesto=
nes, let's just put the JSON stuff in the base spec.  It will help ensure c=
oherence between the formats, and it's really not that much text.
>=20
> If we make the explicit decision not to include a JSON format in our base=
 deliverables, then we should just strike "JSON" altogether.  JW* is as muc=
h "ASN.1-based" as it is "JSON-based" -- it contains base64-serialized obje=
cts of both types.
>=20
>=20
>> On 4:
>>=20
>> This group has agreed time and again that we will not have mandatory to =
implement algorithms.  As Mr. Housley put it, according to the IETF 85 minu=
tes, "Each app defines MTI, achieving separation of MTI from syntax.".  So =
the phrase "including mandatory-to-implement algorithms" needs to be struck=
 from item (4).
>>=20
>> This statement makes no sense, as our current charter already *requires*=
 us to produce =93A Standards Track document specifying mandatory-to-implem=
ent algorithms for the other three documents=94.  The rechartering is about=
 adding the new deliverables 5-8 =96 not changing our existing deliverables=
, of which this is one already one.
>=20
> You want to deviate from the first three milestones, I want to deviate fr=
om this one :)
>=20
> There have been clear consensus calls at the last few IETF meetings that =
run against this milestone.  If the chairs would like to have an explicit c=
all on removing "mandatory to implement" from this milestone, then I would =
support that.
>=20
>=20
>> On 7,8:
>>=20
>> I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are supposed to entail.  JWE alre=
ady has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).  As above, we should strive=
 to get this right the first time instead of doing something halfway with a=
 promise to patch it later.
>>=20
>> I=92m surprised that you say that don=92t understand 7 and 8, as you wer=
e in the Friday morning meeting in Atlanta that was organized by Joe Hildeb=
rand and Jim Schaad that defined them.  The minutes of that meeting are at =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html.  Deliverab=
le (A) in the minutes is charter item (7).  Deliverable (B) in the minutes =
is charter item (8).
>>=20
>> (7) extends (3) to define JSON representations for private and symmetric=
 keys (whereas (3) only defines representations for public keys).  See http=
://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00 f=
or a draft that does this.
>>=20
>> As we discussed at that meeting, while JWE uses wrapped key *values* (wr=
apped CMKs), this new document that Matt is writing will enable us to wrap =
both key values and associated key properties.  It wraps a JWK representati=
on (which per (7), may represent private and symmetric keys), including pot=
ential key properties as the key=92s =93alg=94 and =93kid=94 values, as wel=
l as others that may be used.  It=92s intentionally more general than the w=
rapped CMK value used in JWE, again, as discussed during the Friday meeting=
 in Atlanta.
>=20
> I was at that meeting, and I did not leave convinced that having a separa=
te document was the correct path, as opposed to doing wrapped keys right th=
e first time.
>=20
> JWE already has a mechanism for wrapping keys.  Instead of inventing some=
 separate syntax, we should consolidate the "wrapped key" bits of JWE into =
an object ("JSON Wrapped Key", or JWK :) ), and give that object a way to p=
rotect attributes.  If there are no attributes, then this just looks like w=
hat's already in JWE. I can send a more thorough proposal to the list if yo=
u like.
>=20
> In any case, I oppose adding these two milestones based on the above.  If=
 we are going to handle this separately, then 7 and 8 should be combined, s=
ince the format for symmetric/private keys will have to have a protection m=
echanism.

Both the W3C WebCrypto and HTML media groups have use-cases for an unprotec=
ted representation of a symmetric key. In the WebCrypto case for export of =
such keys (where that is allowed according to the key properties) and for a=
 representation that includes attributes which could then be wrapped (with =
AES Key Wrap, for example). In the HTML media group they would like to use =
this format for the "clearkey" key system for encrypted media, where the re=
quirement is again just for a clear unprotected representation of the key a=
nd associated attributes.

So (7) at least has stand-alone use-cases.

=85Mark

>=20
> --Richard
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20


From rbarnes@bbn.com  Fri Jan 18 09:27:53 2013
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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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Hey Mark,

>>> On 7,8:
>>>=20
>>> I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are supposed to entail.  JWE =
already has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).  As above, we should =
strive to get this right the first time instead of doing something =
halfway with a promise to patch it later.
>>>=20
>>> I=92m surprised that you say that don=92t understand 7 and 8, as you =
were in the Friday morning meeting in Atlanta that was organized by Joe =
Hildebrand and Jim Schaad that defined them.  The minutes of that =
meeting are at =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html.  =
Deliverable (A) in the minutes is charter item (7).  Deliverable (B) in =
the minutes is charter item (8).
>>>=20
>>> (7) extends (3) to define JSON representations for private and =
symmetric keys (whereas (3) only defines representations for public =
keys).  See =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key=
-00 for a draft that does this.
>>>=20
>>> As we discussed at that meeting, while JWE uses wrapped key *values* =
(wrapped CMKs), this new document that Matt is writing will enable us to =
wrap both key values and associated key properties.  It wraps a JWK =
representation (which per (7), may represent private and symmetric =
keys), including potential key properties as the key=92s =93alg=94 and =
=93kid=94 values, as well as others that may be used.  It=92s =
intentionally more general than the wrapped CMK value used in JWE, =
again, as discussed during the Friday meeting in Atlanta.
>>=20
>> I was at that meeting, and I did not leave convinced that having a =
separate document was the correct path, as opposed to doing wrapped keys =
right the first time.
>>=20
>> JWE already has a mechanism for wrapping keys.  Instead of inventing =
some separate syntax, we should consolidate the "wrapped key" bits of =
JWE into an object ("JSON Wrapped Key", or JWK :) ), and give that =
object a way to protect attributes.  If there are no attributes, then =
this just looks like what's already in JWE. I can send a more thorough =
proposal to the list if you like.
>>=20
>> In any case, I oppose adding these two milestones based on the above. =
 If we are going to handle this separately, then 7 and 8 should be =
combined, since the format for symmetric/private keys will have to have =
a protection mechanism.
>=20
> Both the W3C WebCrypto and HTML media groups have use-cases for an =
unprotected representation of a symmetric key. In the WebCrypto case for =
export of such keys (where that is allowed according to the key =
properties) and for a representation that includes attributes which =
could then be wrapped (with AES Key Wrap, for example). In the HTML =
media group they would like to use this format for the "clearkey" key =
system for encrypted media, where the requirement is again just for a =
clear unprotected representation of the key and associated attributes.
>=20
> So (7) at least has stand-alone use-cases.
>=20
> =85Mark

Just to clarify: I certainly agree that need to solve the problem.  I'm =
just not really convinced in needs a separate document (as opposed to an =
upgrade to JWK).

Cheers,
--Richard=

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Jan 18 13:40:02 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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I'll observe that the primary purpose of the rechartering is to authorize a=
dditional work to occur within the JOSE working group.  A secondary artifac=
t of doing the restructuring is listing possible delivery vehicles for the =
outputs of the working group.  I'll note that the rechartering text *explic=
itly allows* the working group to combine deliverables if it chooses to; it=
 says "The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals =
in consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for thes=
e goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s)".  So I would ass=
ert that arguments against the current rechartering text of the kind "deliv=
erables X and Y should be combined" should not carry much weight, as the wo=
rking group is free to make explicit decisions down the road to combine del=
iverables if it so sees fit.



Whereas, allowing them to be separate in the charter gives the working grou=
p more flexibility.  Given that in Atlanta several working group members sp=
oke up for keeping each of these deliverables separate, I don't think there=
's general agreement to combine them.  Thus, moving forward with recharteri=
ng them as separate items let the work of the working group continue, while=
 leaving open the possibility of combining deliverables, should there be co=
nsensus to do so.  I believe we should proceed on that basis.



Other working groups, including OAuth, W3C WebCrypto, and OpenID Connect ar=
e all depending upon us to produce our specifications in a timely fashion. =
 We owe it to them and ourselves to continue making timely progress.  Recha=
rtering is necessary to enable the progress that they're counting on.



Other comments inline in green...



-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com]
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2013 8:21 AM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter



Inline





> -----

> On 1,2,3,5,6:

>

> Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 and 6 are intended to be some=
thing like the JSON serialization documents, whereas 1, 2, and 3 are suppos=
ed to be something like the current documents?  If that's the case, then we=
 might as well call a spade a spade and remove "JSON-structured" from 1, 2,=
 and 3.

>

> I find that sort of back-tracking pretty distasteful, though.  As I've sa=
id before, it would be better if we could come up with a reasonable JSON sy=
ntax that would profile down to something compact and URL-safe.

>

> Yes, (1), (2), (3) (and (4)) are the deliverables in the present charter =
(http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/).  The "JSON-structured" word=
ing is from the current charter.  I suppose it could be changed to "JSON-ba=
sed" if people prefer that.  But minimizing changes to the existing charter=
 items also seems like a good goal.  I'd be fine with either the "JSON-stru=
ctured" wording from the current charter or "JSON-based".

>

> And yes, (5) and (6) are the JSON serialization documents, which we decid=
ed adopt as working group documents and create charter items for at the wor=
king group meeting in Atlanta.  Consensus to do this is recorded at http://=
www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose.    See http://tools.ie=
tf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04 andhttp://tools.ietf=
.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04 for the current versio=
ns of these documents.



I just don't see any reason for us to have separate documents for a "JSON s=
erialization".  It's what we should have done in the first place -- make so=
mething "JSON-structured".  Rather than having separate documents/milestone=
s, let's just put the JSON stuff in the base spec.  It will help ensure coh=
erence between the formats, and it's really not that much text.



This is one of the places that you make the argument that we should block r=
echartering unless we combine deliverables.  As already discussed, we alrea=
dy have the freedom to combine deliverables later, so this doesn't seem lik=
e a reasonable basis for not proceeding with the rechartering.



If we make the explicit decision not to include a JSON format in our base d=
eliverables, then we should just strike "JSON" altogether.  JW* is as much =
"ASN.1-based" as it is "JSON-based" -- it contains base64-serialized object=
s of both types.



The reason that the original charter said "JSON-structured" rather than "JS=
ON" was exactly to allow URL-safe representations (since JSON is not URL-sa=
fe).  The header is represented as JSON object - hence meeting the JSON-str=
uctured criteria in the current charter.  (Again, if you prefer "JSON-based=
" over "JSON-structured", I'm OK with that wording change, as is doesn't ch=
ange the meaning of the text.)



We *did* make an explicit decision to also include JSON representations in =
our output, Karen's consensus call for which is recorded in the Atlanta min=
utes.  Hence, the need for deliverables (5) and (6).



> On 4:

>

> This group has agreed time and again that we will not have mandatory to i=
mplement algorithms.  As Mr. Housley put it, according to the IETF 85 minut=
es, "Each app defines MTI, achieving separation of MTI from syntax.".  So t=
he phrase "including mandatory-to-implement algorithms" needs to be struck =
from item (4).

>

> This statement makes no sense, as our current charter already *requires* =
us to produce "A Standards Track document specifying mandatory-to-implement=
 algorithms for the other three documents".  The rechartering is about addi=
ng the new deliverables 5-8 - not changing our existing deliverables, of wh=
ich this is one already one.



You want to deviate from the first three milestones, I want to deviate from=
 this one :)



No, I don't want to deviate from the first three milestones.  We already ha=
ve working group drafts fulfilling them.



There have been clear consensus calls at the last few IETF meetings that ru=
n against this milestone.  If the chairs would like to have an explicit cal=
l on removing "mandatory to implement" from this milestone, then I would su=
pport that.



Those consensus calls have not occurred in this working group, nor do they =
apply to the output of this working group, to my knowledge.  Decisions that=
 may be right on one application context may not be the right ones in diffe=
rent application contexts.  Nor do I think we should delay rechartering to =
possibly tweak this existing deliverable.  We need the new work items to be=
 able to make the progress that others are counting on us for.



Further, I believe the IETF in general likes to have enough features be man=
datory-to-implement such that interoperable implementations result.  That's=
 the reason for the existing charter language, as I understand it.



> On 7,8:

>

> I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are supposed to entail.  JWE alrea=
dy has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).  As above, we should strive =
to get this right the first time instead of doing something halfway with a =
promise to patch it later.

>

> I'm surprised that you say that don't understand 7 and 8, as you were in =
the Friday morning meeting in Atlanta that was organized by Joe Hildebrand =
and Jim Schaad that defined them.  The minutes of that meeting are at http:=
//www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html.  Deliverable (A=
) in the minutes is charter item (7).  Deliverable (B) in the minutes is ch=
arter item (8).

>

> (7) extends (3) to define JSON representations for private and symmetric =
keys (whereas (3) only defines representations for public keys).  See http:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00 fo=
r a draft that does this.

>

> As we discussed at that meeting, while JWE uses wrapped key *values* (wra=
pped CMKs), this new document that Matt is writing will enable us to wrap b=
oth key values and associated key properties.  It wraps a JWK representatio=
n (which per (7), may represent private and symmetric keys), including pote=
ntial key properties as the key's "alg" and "kid" values, as well as others=
 that may be used.  It's intentionally more general than the wrapped CMK va=
lue used in JWE, again, as discussed during the Friday meeting in Atlanta.



I was at that meeting, and I did not leave convinced that having a separate=
 document was the correct path, as opposed to doing wrapped keys right the =
first time.



I believe that this is another instance of you trying to make the argument =
that we should block rechartering unless we combine deliverables, which aga=
in, I believe isn't a valid reason not to proceed.



JWE already has a mechanism for wrapping keys.  Instead of inventing some s=
eparate syntax, we should consolidate the "wrapped key" bits of JWE into an=
 object ("JSON Wrapped Key", or JWK :) ), and give that object a way to pro=
tect attributes.  If there are no attributes, then this just looks like wha=
t's already in JWE. I can send a more thorough proposal to the list if you =
like.



I'll note that you're expressing agreement with the need to define a wrappe=
d key representation, so that means that you support us producing deliverab=
le (8).  The charter mostly is about "what".  We can continue to refine "ho=
w" in the working group after the charter authorizes the work.



In any case, I oppose adding these two milestones based on the above.  If w=
e are going to handle this separately, then 7 and 8 should be combined, sin=
ce the format for symmetric/private keys will have to have a protection mec=
hanism.



Again, given that the working group can combine deliverables if it sees fit=
, arguing not to enumerate those deliverables in the rechartering because t=
hey have not been combined doesn't seem like a reasonable position.



--Richard

                                                                Cheers,

                                                                -- Mike





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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">I&#8217;ll observe =
that the primary purpose of the rechartering is to authorize additional wor=
k to occur within the JOSE working group.&nbsp; A secondary artifact of doi=
ng the restructuring is listing possible delivery
 vehicles for the outputs of the working group.&nbsp; I&#8217;ll note that =
the rechartering text
<b>*explicitly allows*</b> the working group to combine deliverables if it =
chooses to; it says &#8220;</span>The working group may decide to address c=
ombinations of these goals in consolidated document(s), in which case the c=
oncrete milestones for these goals will
 be satisfied by the consolidated document(s)<span style=3D"color:#00B050">=
&#8221;.&nbsp; So I would assert that arguments against the current rechart=
ering text of the kind &#8220;deliverables X and Y should be combined&#8221=
; should not carry much weight, as the working group is free
 to make explicit decisions down the road to combine deliverables if it so =
sees fit.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">Whereas, allowing t=
hem to be separate in the charter gives the working group more flexibility.=
&nbsp; Given that in Atlanta several working group members spoke up for kee=
ping each of these deliverables separate,
 I don&#8217;t think there&#8217;s general agreement to combine them.&nbsp;=
 Thus, moving forward with rechartering them as separate items let the work=
 of the working group continue, while leaving open the possibility of combi=
ning deliverables, should there be consensus to do
 so.&nbsp; I believe we should proceed on that basis.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">Other working group=
s, including OAuth, W3C WebCrypto, and OpenID Connect are all depending upo=
n us to produce our specifications in a timely fashion.&nbsp; We owe it to =
them and ourselves to continue making timely
 progress.&nbsp; Rechartering is necessary to enable the progress that they=
&#8217;re counting on.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">Other comments inli=
ne in green...<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com] <br>
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2013 8:21 AM<br>
To: Mike Jones<br>
Cc: odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org<br>
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter</p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Inline<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; -----<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; On 1,2,3,5,6:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 =
and 6 are intended to be something like the JSON serialization documents, w=
hereas 1, 2, and 3 are supposed to be something like the current documents?=
&nbsp; If that's the case, then we might as
 well call a spade a spade and remove &quot;JSON-structured&quot; from 1, 2=
, and 3.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; I find that sort of back-tracking pretty dis=
tasteful, though.&nbsp; As I've said before, it would be better if we could=
 come up with a reasonable JSON syntax that would profile down to something=
 compact and URL-safe.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Yes, (1), (2), (3) (and (4)) are the deliver=
ables in the present charter (<a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jos=
e/charter/"><span style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">http://da=
tatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/</span></a>).&nbsp;
 The &#8220;JSON-structured&#8221; wording is from the current charter.&nbs=
p; I suppose it could be changed to &#8220;JSON-based&#8221; if people pref=
er that.&nbsp; But minimizing changes to the existing charter items also se=
ems like a good goal.&nbsp; I&#8217;d be fine with either the &#8220;JSON-s=
tructured&#8221;
 wording from the current charter or &#8220;JSON-based&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; And yes, (5) and (6) are the JSON serializat=
ion documents, which we decided adopt as working group documents and create=
 charter items for at the working group meeting in Atlanta.&nbsp; Consensus=
 to do this is recorded at
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose"><spa=
n style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">http://www.ietf.org/proce=
edings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose</span></a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; See
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serializati=
on-04"><span style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">http://tools.i=
etf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04</span></a> andhttp:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04
 for the current versions of these documents.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I just don't see any reason for us to have separa=
te documents for a &quot;JSON serialization&quot;.&nbsp; It's what we shoul=
d have done in the first place -- make something &quot;JSON-structured&quot=
;.&nbsp; Rather than having separate documents/milestones, let's
 just put the JSON stuff in the base spec.&nbsp; It will help ensure cohere=
nce between the formats, and it's really not that much text.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">This is one of the =
places that you make the argument that we should block rechartering unless =
we combine deliverables.&nbsp; As already discussed, we already have the fr=
eedom to combine deliverables later, so this
 doesn&#8217;t seem like a reasonable basis for not proceeding with the rec=
hartering.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">If we make the explicit decision not to include a=
 JSON format in our base deliverables, then we should just strike &quot;JSO=
N&quot; altogether.&nbsp; JW* is as much &quot;ASN.1-based&quot; as it is &=
quot;JSON-based&quot; -- it contains base64-serialized objects of both
 types.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">The reason that the=
 original charter said &#8220;JSON-structured&#8221; rather than &#8220;JSO=
N&#8221; was exactly to allow URL-safe representations (since JSON is not U=
RL-safe).&nbsp; The header is represented as JSON object &#8211; hence
 meeting the JSON-structured criteria in the current charter.&nbsp; (Again,=
 if you prefer &#8220;JSON-based&#8221; over &#8220;JSON-structured&#8221;,=
 I&#8217;m OK with that wording change, as is doesn&#8217;t change the mean=
ing of the text.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">We *<b>did</b>* mak=
e an explicit decision to also include JSON representations in our output, =
Karen&#8217;s consensus call for which is recorded in the Atlanta minutes.&=
nbsp; Hence, the need for deliverables (5) and
 (6).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; On 4:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; This group has agreed time and again that we=
 will not have mandatory to implement algorithms.&nbsp; As Mr. Housley put =
it, according to the IETF 85 minutes, &quot;Each app defines MTI, achieving=
 separation of MTI from syntax.&quot;.&nbsp; So the phrase
 &quot;including mandatory-to-implement algorithms&quot; needs to be struck=
 from item (4).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; This statement makes no sense, as our curren=
t charter already *requires* us to produce &#8220;A Standards Track documen=
t specifying mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the other three document=
s&#8221;.&nbsp; The rechartering is about adding the new
 deliverables 5-8 &#8211; not changing our existing deliverables, of which =
this is one already one.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">You want to deviate from the first three mileston=
es, I want to deviate from this one :)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">No, I don&#8217;t w=
ant to deviate from the first three milestones.&nbsp; We already have worki=
ng group drafts fulfilling them.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">There have been clear consensus calls at the last=
 few IETF meetings that run against this milestone.&nbsp; If the chairs wou=
ld like to have an explicit call on removing &quot;mandatory to implement&q=
uot; from this milestone, then I would support that.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">Those consensus cal=
ls have not occurred in this working group, nor do they apply to the output=
 of this working group, to my knowledge.&nbsp; Decisions that may be right =
on one application context may not be the
 right ones in different application contexts.&nbsp; Nor do I think we shou=
ld delay rechartering to possibly tweak this existing deliverable.&nbsp; We=
 need the new work items to be able to make the progress that others are co=
unting on us for.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">Further, I believe =
the IETF in general likes to have enough features be mandatory-to-implement=
 such that interoperable implementations result.&nbsp; That&#8217;s the rea=
son for the existing charter language, as I understand
 it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; On 7,8:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are s=
upposed to entail.&nbsp; JWE already has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for =
MAC).&nbsp; As above, we should strive to get this right the first time ins=
tead of doing something halfway with a promise
 to patch it later.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; I&#8217;m surprised that you say that don&#8=
217;t understand 7 and 8, as you were in the Friday morning meeting in Atla=
nta that was organized by Joe Hildebrand and Jim Schaad that defined them.&=
nbsp; The minutes of that meeting are at
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html"=
><span style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">http://www.ietf.org/=
mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html</span></a>.&nbsp; Deliverable (=
A) in the minutes is charter item (7).&nbsp; Deliverable
 (B) in the minutes is charter item (8).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (7) extends (3) to define JSON representatio=
ns for private and symmetric keys (whereas (3) only defines representations=
 for public keys).&nbsp; See
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-sym=
metric-key-00">
<span style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">http://tools.ietf.org=
/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00</span></a> for a d=
raft that does this.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; As we discussed at that meeting, while JWE u=
ses wrapped key *values* (wrapped CMKs), this new document that Matt is wri=
ting will enable us to wrap both key values and associated key properties.&=
nbsp; It wraps a JWK representation (which
 per (7), may represent private and symmetric keys), including potential ke=
y properties as the key&#8217;s &#8220;alg&#8221; and &#8220;kid&#8221; val=
ues, as well as others that may be used.&nbsp; It&#8217;s intentionally mor=
e general than the wrapped CMK value used in JWE, again, as discussed durin=
g
 the Friday meeting in Atlanta.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I was at that meeting, and I did not leave convin=
ced that having a separate document was the correct path, as opposed to doi=
ng wrapped keys right the first time.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">I believe that this=
 is another instance of you trying to make the argument that we should bloc=
k rechartering unless we combine deliverables, which again, I believe isn&#=
8217;t a valid reason not to proceed.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">JWE already has a mechanism for wrapping keys.&nb=
sp; Instead of inventing some separate syntax, we should consolidate the &q=
uot;wrapped key&quot; bits of JWE into an object (&quot;JSON Wrapped Key&qu=
ot;, or JWK :) ), and give that object a way to protect attributes.&nbsp;
 If there are no attributes, then this just looks like what's already in JW=
E. I can send a more thorough proposal to the list if you like.<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">I&#8217;ll note tha=
t you&#8217;re expressing agreement with the need to define a wrapped key r=
epresentation, so that means that you support us producing deliverable (8).=
&nbsp; The charter mostly is about &#8220;what&#8221;.&nbsp; We can continu=
e
 to refine &#8220;how&#8221; in the working group after the charter authori=
zes the work. <o:p>
</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">In any case, I oppose adding these two milestones=
 based on the above.&nbsp; If we are going to handle this separately, then =
7 and 8 should be combined, since the format for symmetric/private keys wil=
l have to have a protection mechanism.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">Again, given that t=
he working group can combine deliverables if it sees fit, arguing not to en=
umerate those deliverables in the rechartering because they have not been c=
ombined doesn&#8217;t seem like a reasonable
 position.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cheers,<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"color:#00B050"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394366A50300TK5EX14MBXC284r_--

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Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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I agree that we should work on moving the docs to completion.  I just =
submitted a set of issues that I've been collecting for a little while, =
meaning to submit.

Given that we're free to combine use documents, I guess I'll let most of =
the below slide.  For the deliverables I thought should be combined, I =
will propose some ways forward in the next few days.

Chairs: I would like to request a consensus call on whether we should =
take the following two actions:=20
(1) Update item 4 in the charter to remove the string ", including =
mandatory-to-implement algorithms", and=20
(2) Update draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms to remove requirements =
levels (namely, the "Implementation Requirements" columns)

--Richard



On Jan 18, 2013, at 4:39 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> =
wrote:

> I=92ll observe that the primary purpose of the rechartering is to =
authorize additional work to occur within the JOSE working group.  A =
secondary artifact of doing the restructuring is listing possible =
delivery vehicles for the outputs of the working group.  I=92ll note =
that the rechartering text *explicitly allows* the working group to =
combine deliverables if it chooses to; it says =93The working group may =
decide to address combinations of these goals in consolidated =
document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for these goals will =
be satisfied by the consolidated document(s)=94.  So I would assert that =
arguments against the current rechartering text of the kind =
=93deliverables X and Y should be combined=94 should not carry much =
weight, as the working group is free to make explicit decisions down the =
road to combine deliverables if it so sees fit.
> =20
> Whereas, allowing them to be separate in the charter gives the working =
group more flexibility.  Given that in Atlanta several working group =
members spoke up for keeping each of these deliverables separate, I =
don=92t think there=92s general agreement to combine them.  Thus, moving =
forward with rechartering them as separate items let the work of the =
working group continue, while leaving open the possibility of combining =
deliverables, should there be consensus to do so.  I believe we should =
proceed on that basis.
> =20
> Other working groups, including OAuth, W3C WebCrypto, and OpenID =
Connect are all depending upon us to produce our specifications in a =
timely fashion.  We owe it to them and ourselves to continue making =
timely progress.  Rechartering is necessary to enable the progress that =
they=92re counting on.
> =20
> Other comments inline in green...
> =20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com]=20
> Sent: Friday, January 18, 2013 8:21 AM
> To: Mike Jones
> Cc: odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
> =20
> Inline
> =20
> =20
> > -----
> > On 1,2,3,5,6:
> >=20
> > Do I understand correctly that milestones 5 and 6 are intended to be =
something like the JSON serialization documents, whereas 1, 2, and 3 are =
supposed to be something like the current documents?  If that's the =
case, then we might as well call a spade a spade and remove =
"JSON-structured" from 1, 2, and 3.
> >=20
> > I find that sort of back-tracking pretty distasteful, though.  As =
I've said before, it would be better if we could come up with a =
reasonable JSON syntax that would profile down to something compact and =
URL-safe.
> >=20
> > Yes, (1), (2), (3) (and (4)) are the deliverables in the present =
charter (http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/).  The =
=93JSON-structured=94 wording is from the current charter.  I suppose it =
could be changed to =93JSON-based=94 if people prefer that.  But =
minimizing changes to the existing charter items also seems like a good =
goal.  I=92d be fine with either the =93JSON-structured=94 wording from =
the current charter or =93JSON-based=94.
> >=20
> > And yes, (5) and (6) are the JSON serialization documents, which we =
decided adopt as working group documents and create charter items for at =
the working group meeting in Atlanta.  Consensus to do this is recorded =
at http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-jose.    See =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04 =
andhttp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04 =
for the current versions of these documents.
> =20
> I just don't see any reason for us to have separate documents for a =
"JSON serialization".  It's what we should have done in the first place =
-- make something "JSON-structured".  Rather than having separate =
documents/milestones, let's just put the JSON stuff in the base spec.  =
It will help ensure coherence between the formats, and it's really not =
that much text.
> =20
> This is one of the places that you make the argument that we should =
block rechartering unless we combine deliverables.  As already =
discussed, we already have the freedom to combine deliverables later, so =
this doesn=92t seem like a reasonable basis for not proceeding with the =
rechartering.
> =20
> If we make the explicit decision not to include a JSON format in our =
base deliverables, then we should just strike "JSON" altogether.  JW* is =
as much "ASN.1-based" as it is "JSON-based" -- it contains =
base64-serialized objects of both types.
> =20
> The reason that the original charter said =93JSON-structured=94 rather =
than =93JSON=94 was exactly to allow URL-safe representations (since =
JSON is not URL-safe).  The header is represented as JSON object =96 =
hence meeting the JSON-structured criteria in the current charter.  =
(Again, if you prefer =93JSON-based=94 over =93JSON-structured=94, I=92m =
OK with that wording change, as is doesn=92t change the meaning of the =
text.)
> =20
> We *did* make an explicit decision to also include JSON =
representations in our output, Karen=92s consensus call for which is =
recorded in the Atlanta minutes.  Hence, the need for deliverables (5) =
and (6).
> =20
> > On 4:
> >=20
> > This group has agreed time and again that we will not have mandatory =
to implement algorithms.  As Mr. Housley put it, according to the IETF =
85 minutes, "Each app defines MTI, achieving separation of MTI from =
syntax.".  So the phrase "including mandatory-to-implement algorithms" =
needs to be struck from item (4).
> >=20
> > This statement makes no sense, as our current charter already =
*requires* us to produce =93A Standards Track document specifying =
mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the other three documents=94.  The =
rechartering is about adding the new deliverables 5-8 =96 not changing =
our existing deliverables, of which this is one already one.
> =20
> You want to deviate from the first three milestones, I want to deviate =
from this one :)
> =20
> No, I don=92t want to deviate from the first three milestones.  We =
already have working group drafts fulfilling them.
> =20
> There have been clear consensus calls at the last few IETF meetings =
that run against this milestone.  If the chairs would like to have an =
explicit call on removing "mandatory to implement" from this milestone, =
then I would support that.
> =20
> Those consensus calls have not occurred in this working group, nor do =
they apply to the output of this working group, to my knowledge.  =
Decisions that may be right on one application context may not be the =
right ones in different application contexts.  Nor do I think we should =
delay rechartering to possibly tweak this existing deliverable.  We need =
the new work items to be able to make the progress that others are =
counting on us for.
> =20
> Further, I believe the IETF in general likes to have enough features =
be mandatory-to-implement such that interoperable implementations =
result.  That=92s the reason for the existing charter language, as I =
understand it.
> =20
> > On 7,8:
> >=20
> > I have no idea what milestones 7 and 8 are supposed to entail.  JWE =
already has wrapped keys, and JWS should (for MAC).  As above, we should =
strive to get this right the first time instead of doing something =
halfway with a promise to patch it later.
> >=20
> > I=92m surprised that you say that don=92t understand 7 and 8, as you =
were in the Friday morning meeting in Atlanta that was organized by Joe =
Hildebrand and Jim Schaad that defined them.  The minutes of that =
meeting are at =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01337.html.  =
Deliverable (A) in the minutes is charter item (7).  Deliverable (B) in =
the minutes is charter item (8).
> >=20
> > (7) extends (3) to define JSON representations for private and =
symmetric keys (whereas (3) only defines representations for public =
keys).  See =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key=
-00 for a draft that does this.
> >=20
> > As we discussed at that meeting, while JWE uses wrapped key *values* =
(wrapped CMKs), this new document that Matt is writing will enable us to =
wrap both key values and associated key properties.  It wraps a JWK =
representation (which per (7), may represent private and symmetric =
keys), including potential key properties as the key=92s =93alg=94 and =
=93kid=94 values, as well as others that may be used.  It=92s =
intentionally more general than the wrapped CMK value used in JWE, =
again, as discussed during the Friday meeting in Atlanta.
> =20
> I was at that meeting, and I did not leave convinced that having a =
separate document was the correct path, as opposed to doing wrapped keys =
right the first time.
> =20
> I believe that this is another instance of you trying to make the =
argument that we should block rechartering unless we combine =
deliverables, which again, I believe isn=92t a valid reason not to =
proceed.
> =20
> JWE already has a mechanism for wrapping keys.  Instead of inventing =
some separate syntax, we should consolidate the "wrapped key" bits of =
JWE into an object ("JSON Wrapped Key", or JWK :) ), and give that =
object a way to protect attributes.  If there are no attributes, then =
this just looks like what's already in JWE. I can send a more thorough =
proposal to the list if you like.
> =20
> I=92ll note that you=92re expressing agreement with the need to define =
a wrapped key representation, so that means that you support us =
producing deliverable (8).  The charter mostly is about =93what=94.  We =
can continue to refine =93how=94 in the working group after the charter =
authorizes the work.
> =20
> In any case, I oppose adding these two milestones based on the above.  =
If we are going to handle this separately, then 7 and 8 should be =
combined, since the format for symmetric/private keys will have to have =
a protection mechanism.
> =20
> Again, given that the working group can combine deliverables if it =
sees fit, arguing not to enumerate those deliverables in the =
rechartering because they have not been combined doesn=92t seem like a =
reasonable position.
> =20
> --Richard
>                                                                 =
Cheers,
>                                                                 -- =
Mike
> =20
> =20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Subject: [jose]  #2: No key management for MAC
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#2: No key management for MAC

 The current JWS format does not provide real key management (key agreement
 / key wrapping) for MAC-protected objects.  MAC can only be done  directly
 under a pre-shared key.  JWS needs to add key management functions for
 this case.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  signature@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  critical     |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  signature              |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/2>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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Subject: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data
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#4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data

 Because the integrity check includes the wrapped key, all header
 parameters must be repeated for each recipient.  It is not possible to
 send ciphertext, then deliver wrapped keys (as in the XMPP use case),
 because the ciphertext must be different for each recipient (because the
 ICV is different).  In addition, in these asynchronous use cases, the
 sender must cache the plaintext of the message, rather than just the key
 (for wrapping to new recipients).  There has been no demonstrated security
 benefit to offset the added cost and risk.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  encryption             |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#5: Unclear instructions for key management

 The document uses the phrases “When key agreement is employed...” and
 “When key wrapping, key encryption, or key agreement with wrapping are
 employed...” without telling the recipient how to tell which case he’s in.
 Apparently this should be based on the "alg" parameter, but nowhere is it
 specified which "alg" values fall into which bin.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  encryption             |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/5>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#3: Concat used outside of key agreement

 Concat is specified in NIST SP800-56A, specifically for the purpose of key
 agreement.  JWE uses it outside of that context, so implementations will
 not be FIPS-compliant.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  encryption             |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/3>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#7: Algorithm identifiers/parameters incompatible with WebCrypto

 The way that algorithms and parameters are specified is semantically
 equivalent to the WebCrypto spec, but syntactically different.  This
 hinders interoperability.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  algorithms@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  algorithms             |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/7>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#6: Unclear requirements levels on fields

 Most of the fields in JWE and JWS are listed as OPTIONAL, even though they
 are REQUIRED in some cases.  For example, when "alg" is a key agreement
 algorithm, "epk" MUST be present.  The document should elaborate the
 requirements so that implementations can know whether they have a complete
 object.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  encryption             |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/6>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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Subject: [jose]  #8: Direct mode for key agreement needs security analysis
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#8: Direct mode for key agreement needs security analysis

 JWE specifies a "direct encryption" method, in which the output of key
 agreement is used for content encryption instead of key wrapping.  This
 scheme is not used in other IETF security protocols that use key
 agreement, e.g., CMS or IPsec.  CMS uses the agreed key for wrapping.
 IPsec uses it to key the IKE SA, which covers further key agreement.  The
 security considerations needs to justify why this scheme is secure, and
 any relevant constraints (e.g., lifetime of DH keys).

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  encryption             |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/8>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#9: Add "spi" field

 Add an optional "spi" field, containing an opaque identifier for the
 security parameters (algorithms, content keys, etc.) associated with this
 JOSE object.  When an entity receives an object containing an "spi" field
 as well as security parameters, it adds the parameters to a cache, indexed
 by the "spi" value.  When an entity receives an object with an "spi" field
 and no parameters, and it has that "spi" value in cache, then it uses the
 cached parameters to process the object.  If an entity receives an object
 of the latter type, and it does not have the "spi" value in cache, then it
 is unable to process the object.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  signature@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
  signature              |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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Subject: Re: [jose] #7: Algorithm identifiers/parameters incompatible with WebCrypto
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#7: Algorithm identifiers/parameters incompatible with WebCrypto


Comment (by michael.jones@microsoft.com):

 I believe that the consensus call to represent JOSE algorithms as simple
 strings, as recorded at http://www.ietf.org/mail-
 archive/web/jose/current/msg01219.html, is pertinent here.

 W3C WebCrypto is free to use different representations, should they
 choose.  It's a different level of specification than JOSE, as explicitly
 recognized by the WebCrypto high-level/low-level distinction.  It's not
 necessarily appropriate that the low-level algorithm identifiers be the
 same as those in the high-level spec, where simplifying assumptions are
 intentially being made.

 In any event, I don't believe that this is an issue that JOSE needs to
 solve.  I'd suggest that it be filed in the W3C WebCrypto issue tracker
 instead, if you'd like to see it be resolved.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  algorithms@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  algorithms             |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/7#comment:1>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#7: Algorithm identifiers/parameters incompatible with WebCrypto


Comment (by rbarnes@bbn.com):

 I do not believe the result of that consensus call applies here, since it
 predates the interaction between the two groups.

 The high/low distinction is meaningless.  JOSE provides octets, WebCrypto
 processes them.

 This is an issue for WebCrypto AND JOSE.  It takes two to compromise.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  algorithms@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  algorithms             |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/7#comment:2>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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Subject: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
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--e89a8f2346bbde0a2f04d3e47f95
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain to me?

How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key to
encrypt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling work
then? An an encrypting party would need to a priori know all potential
x5u's of the decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the
decrypting party signal a desired change of keys?

Am I missing something obvious here?

--e89a8f2346bbde0a2f04d3e47f95
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Is there a concrete use case for this that someo=
ne could explain to me?<br><br></div>How does an encrypting party know what=
 URL to use to get the key to encrypt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. =
How would key rolling work then? An an encrypting party would need to a pri=
ori know all potential x5u&#39;s of the decrypting party? Which seems dubio=
us. And how would the decrypting party signal a desired change of keys?=A0 =
<br>

<br></div>Am I missing something obvious here?=A0 <br><br><br><br><br><br><=
br></div>

--e89a8f2346bbde0a2f04d3e47f95--

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 15:42:44 -0800
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Cc: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org, jose@ietf.org, rbarnes@bbn.com
Subject: Re: [jose] #8: Direct mode for key agreement needs security analysis
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If I am understanding the document correctly, you're talkinbg about the
mechanism in S 5.1, bullet #4, in which the shared symmetric key is
used directly to encrypt the content?

I'm generally not super-excited about modes like this, for a number of
reasons:

1. They place an enormous amount of stress on the IV mechanism.
As a concrete example, if you use GCM with fresh keys for every
message then a low-entropy nonce is safe (thogh bad practive).
However, if you ever reuse a key, then low entropy becomes
a serious issue.

2. As Richard says, it's not standard practice.

Is there a performance or such-like reason to allow this mode?

-Ekr

On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:24 PM, jose issue tracker <
trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org> wrote:

> #8: Direct mode for key agreement needs security analysis
>
>  JWE specifies a "direct encryption" method, in which the output of key
>  agreement is used for content encryption instead of key wrapping.  This
>  scheme is not used in other IETF security protocols that use key
>  agreement, e.g., CMS or IPsec.  CMS uses the agreed key for wrapping.
>  IPsec uses it to key the IKE SA, which covers further key agreement.  The
>  security considerations needs to justify why this scheme is secure, and
>  any relevant constraints (e.g., lifetime of DH keys).
>
> --
> -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>  Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
>   rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
>      Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
>  Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
> Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
>   encryption             |   Keywords:
>  Severity:  Active WG    |
>   Document               |
> -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>
> Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/8>
> jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>
>
>

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<div>If I am understanding the document correctly, you&#39;re talkinbg abou=
t the</div><div>mechanism in S 5.1, bullet #4, in which the shared symmetri=
c key is</div><div>used directly to encrypt the content?</div><div><br></di=
v>

<div>I&#39;m generally not super-excited about modes like this, for a numbe=
r of</div><div>reasons:</div><div><br></div><div>1. They place an enormous =
amount of stress on the IV mechanism.</div><div>As a concrete example, if y=
ou use GCM with fresh keys for every</div>

<div>message then a low-entropy nonce is safe (thogh bad practive).</div><d=
iv>However, if you ever reuse a key, then low entropy becomes</div><div>a s=
erious issue.</div><div><br></div><div>2. As Richard says, it&#39;s not sta=
ndard practice.</div>

<div><br></div><div>Is there a performance or such-like reason to allow thi=
s mode?</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:24 PM, jose issue tracker <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org" target=3D"=
_blank">trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">#8: Direct mode for key agreement needs secu=
rity analysis<br>
<br>
=A0JWE specifies a &quot;direct encryption&quot; method, in which the outpu=
t of key<br>
=A0agreement is used for content encryption instead of key wrapping. =A0Thi=
s<br>
=A0scheme is not used in other IETF security protocols that use key<br>
=A0agreement, e.g., CMS or IPsec. =A0CMS uses the agreed key for wrapping.<=
br>
=A0IPsec uses it to key the IKE SA, which covers further key agreement. =A0=
The<br>
=A0security considerations needs to justify why this scheme is secure, and<=
br>
=A0any relevant constraints (e.g., lifetime of DH keys).<br>
<br>
--<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
=A0Reporter: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 =A0Owner: =A0draft-ietf-=
jose-json-web-<br>
=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0|=
 =A0<a href=3D"mailto:encryption@tools.ietf.org">encryption@tools.ietf.org<=
/a><br>
=A0 =A0 =A0Type: =A0defect =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 Status: =A0new<br>
=A0Priority: =A0major =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| =A0Milestone:<br>
Component: =A0json-web- =A0 =A0| =A0 =A0Version:<br>
=A0 encryption =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 Keywords:<br>
=A0Severity: =A0Active WG =A0 =A0|<br>
=A0 Document =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 |<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
<br>
Ticket URL: &lt;<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/8=
" target=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/8</a>&gt=
;<br>
jose &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/jose/" target=3D"_blank">http://t=
ools.ietf.org/jose/</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--f46d0444ee23c2092904d3e92446--

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 15:48:50 -0800
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Subject: Re: [jose] #2: No key management for MAC
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I tend to agree with this, if only for symmetry reasons.

On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:23 PM, jose issue tracker <
trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org> wrote:

> #2: No key management for MAC
>
>  The current JWS format does not provide real key management (key agreement
>  / key wrapping) for MAC-protected objects.  MAC can only be done  directly
>  under a pre-shared key.  JWS needs to add key management functions for
>  this case.
>
> --
> -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>  Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
>   rbarnes@bbn.com        |  signature@tools.ietf.org
>      Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
>  Priority:  critical     |  Milestone:
> Component:  json-web-    |    Version:
>   signature              |   Keywords:
>  Severity:  Active WG    |
>   Document               |
> -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>
> Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/2>
> jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

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I tend to agree with this, if only for symmetry reasons.=A0<br><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:23 PM, jose issue tracker <spa=
n dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">#2: No key management for MAC<br>
<br>
=A0The current JWS format does not provide real key management (key agreeme=
nt<br>
=A0/ key wrapping) for MAC-protected objects. =A0MAC can only be done =A0di=
rectly<br>
=A0under a pre-shared key. =A0JWS needs to add key management functions for=
<br>
=A0this case.<br>
<br>
--<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
=A0Reporter: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 =A0Owner: =A0draft-ietf-=
jose-json-web-<br>
=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0|=
 =A0<a href=3D"mailto:signature@tools.ietf.org">signature@tools.ietf.org</a=
><br>
=A0 =A0 =A0Type: =A0defect =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 Status: =A0new<br>
=A0Priority: =A0critical =A0 =A0 | =A0Milestone:<br>
Component: =A0json-web- =A0 =A0| =A0 =A0Version:<br>
=A0 signature =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| =A0 Keywords:<br>
=A0Severity: =A0Active WG =A0 =A0|<br>
=A0 Document =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 |<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
<br>
Ticket URL: &lt;<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/2=
" target=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/2</a>&gt=
;<br>
jose &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/jose/" target=3D"_blank">http://t=
ools.ietf.org/jose/</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br>

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From hhalpin@w3.org  Wed Jan 23 03:18:35 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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I'd just like to note that the W3C Web Crypto WG (of which Mike Jones is 
a member) have been informally liasoning. However, as we enter Last Call 
we may need to formalize this relationship more.

  I expect the Web Crypto WG to give a formal review of JOSE specs when 
they hit Last Call. We probably don't need to sync charters (as that 
would delay JOSE and we'd prefer JOSE to be stable *before* we hit Last 
Call), but we do need to review and may need to ask for changes. If that 
is necessary to note in the rechartering, please do so.

And yes, its via discussions in the WebCrypto WG that the need for 
private and symmetric key JOSE formats was brought up. Our spec is not 
in Last Call, and thus our use of those is not yet set in stone, but it 
does seem like a good idea to add them to the charter as we may need them.

   cheers,
     harry



On 01/11/2013 09:02 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> Folks,
>
> Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the 
> last IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and 
> algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor 
> language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables 
> 5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones 
> related to these documents.
>
> In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" has 
> been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and 
> "compact JSON object" used in the milestones.
>
> Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would 
> like your comments by 18 January if possible.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
>
> Description of Working Group
>
> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the 
> serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON 
> format is often used for serializing and transmitting structured data 
> over a network connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in 
> protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer 
> security services such as encryption, digital signatures, message 
> authentication codes (MACs), and key representations for data that is 
> being carried in JSON format.
>
> Different proposals for providing such security services have already 
> been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to 
> standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection 
> (signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm 
> identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security 
> features between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group will base 
> its work on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and 
> will solicit input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure 
> that the security functionality in the JSON format is correct.
>
> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:
>
> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured 
> integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data 
> structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity 
> protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as 
> symmetric-key MACs.
>
> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a 
> JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) 
> JSON data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.
>
> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as 
> JSON-structured objects.
>
> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm 
> identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the 
> previous three documents.
>
> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured 
> integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data 
> structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple 
> recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures 
> in (1).
>
> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a 
> JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) 
> JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple 
> recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures 
> in (2).
>
> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and 
> symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build 
> upon the concepts and structures in (3).
>
> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of 
> protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document 
> will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This 
> document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by (4).
>
> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in 
> consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for 
> these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>
> Goals and Milestones
>
> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document 
> (1) as a WG item.
>
> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document 
> (2) as a WG item.
>
> Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG item.
>
> Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.
>
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON 
> object integrity document (1).
>
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON 
> object encryption document (2).
>
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format 
> document (3).
>
> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm 
> document (4).
>
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG 
> for consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to 
> IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for 
> consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for 
> consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity 
> document (5) as a WG item.
>
> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption 
> document (6) as a WG item.
>
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document 
> (7) as a WG item.
>
> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document 
> (8) as a WG item.
>
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient 
> JSON object integrity document (5).
>
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient 
> JSON object encryption document (6).
>
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private 
> and symmetric key document (7).
>
> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key 
> protection application document (8).
>
> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity 
> document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption 
> document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document 
> (7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application document 
> (8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From tlr@w3.org  Thu Jan 24 23:44:13 2013
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Cc: public-ietf-w3c@w3.org, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, jose@ietf.org, odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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=46rom a process perspective, my recommendation would be for Web Crypto =
to review the JOSE deliverables *before* they hit last call. =20

What would be a good time for that from the Jose WG's perspective?

Thanks,
--=20
Thomas Roessler, W3C <tlr@w3.org> (@roessler)



On 2013-01-23, at 12:18 +0100, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:

> I'd just like to note that the W3C Web Crypto WG (of which Mike Jones =
is a member) have been informally liasoning. However, as we enter Last =
Call we may need to formalize this relationship more.
>=20
> I expect the Web Crypto WG to give a formal review of JOSE specs when =
they hit Last Call. We probably don't need to sync charters (as that =
would delay JOSE and we'd prefer JOSE to be stable *before* we hit Last =
Call), but we do need to review and may need to ask for changes. If that =
is necessary to note in the rechartering, please do so.
>=20
> And yes, its via discussions in the WebCrypto WG that the need for =
private and symmetric key JOSE formats was brought up. Our spec is not =
in Last Call, and thus our use of those is not yet set in stone, but it =
does seem like a good idea to add them to the charter as we may need =
them.
>=20
>  cheers,
>    harry
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 01/11/2013 09:02 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
>> Folks,
>>=20
>> Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the =
last IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and =
algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor =
language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables =
5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones related =
to these documents.
>>=20
>> In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" has =
been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and =
"compact JSON object" used in the milestones.
>>=20
>> Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would =
like your comments by 18 January if possible.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> Karen
>>=20
>>=20
>> Description of Working Group
>>=20
>> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the =
serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format =
is often used for serializing and transmitting structured data over a =
network connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in =
the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security services =
such as encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes =
(MACs), and key representations for data that is being carried in JSON =
format.
>>=20
>> Different proposals for providing such security services have already =
been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to =
standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection =
(signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm =
identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security features =
between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group will base its work =
on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit =
input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the =
security functionality in the JSON format is correct.
>>=20
>> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:
>>=20
>> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply =
JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not limited =
to) JSON data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  =
"Integrity protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as =
symmetric-key MACs.
>>=20
>> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a =
JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON =
data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.
>>=20
>> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys =
as JSON-structured objects.
>>=20
>> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm =
identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the =
previous three documents.
>>=20
>> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply =
JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not limited =
to) JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting =
multiple recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and =
structures in (1).
>>=20
>> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a =
JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON =
data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple =
recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures =
in (2).
>>=20
>> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and =
symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build =
upon the concepts and structures in (3).
>>=20
>> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of =
protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document =
will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This =
document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by =
(4).
>>=20
>> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals =
in consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for =
these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>>=20
>> Goals and Milestones
>>=20
>> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document =
(1) as a WG item.
>>=20
>> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document =
(2) as a WG item.
>>=20
>> Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG =
item.
>>=20
>> Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG =
item.
>>=20
>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON =
object integrity document (1).
>>=20
>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON =
object encryption document (2).
>>=20
>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key =
format document (3).
>>=20
>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm =
document (4).
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to =
IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to =
IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for =
consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for =
consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity =
document (5) as a WG item.
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption =
document (6) as a WG item.
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document =
(7) as a WG item.
>>=20
>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document =
(8) as a WG item.
>>=20
>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on =
multi-recipient JSON object integrity document (5).
>>=20
>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on =
multi-recipient JSON object encryption document (6).
>>=20
>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private =
and symmetric key document (7).
>>=20
>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key =
protection application document (8).
>>=20
>> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity =
document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption =
document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document =
(7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application =
document (8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
>=20


From rbarnes@bbn.com  Fri Jan 25 08:28:42 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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In my view as a humble participant, now.

It seems that there is a fair bit of disagreement about what exactly =
should be the relationship between WebCrypto and JOSE, as evidenced by a =
recent thread on the WebCrypto mailing list [1].  It would be good to =
find out sooner rather than later what the requirements are for JOSE =
from WebCrypto, and whether the current specs meet these requirements.

--Richard


[1] =
<http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2013Jan/0024.html>



On Jan 25, 2013, at 2:44 AM, Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org> wrote:

> =46rom a process perspective, my recommendation would be for Web =
Crypto to review the JOSE deliverables *before* they hit last call. =20
>=20
> What would be a good time for that from the Jose WG's perspective?
>=20
> Thanks,
> --=20
> Thomas Roessler, W3C <tlr@w3.org> (@roessler)
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 2013-01-23, at 12:18 +0100, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
>=20
>> I'd just like to note that the W3C Web Crypto WG (of which Mike Jones =
is a member) have been informally liasoning. However, as we enter Last =
Call we may need to formalize this relationship more.
>>=20
>> I expect the Web Crypto WG to give a formal review of JOSE specs when =
they hit Last Call. We probably don't need to sync charters (as that =
would delay JOSE and we'd prefer JOSE to be stable *before* we hit Last =
Call), but we do need to review and may need to ask for changes. If that =
is necessary to note in the rechartering, please do so.
>>=20
>> And yes, its via discussions in the WebCrypto WG that the need for =
private and symmetric key JOSE formats was brought up. Our spec is not =
in Last Call, and thus our use of those is not yet set in stone, but it =
does seem like a good idea to add them to the charter as we may need =
them.
>>=20
>> cheers,
>>   harry
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 01/11/2013 09:02 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
>>> Folks,
>>>=20
>>> Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the =
last IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and =
algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor =
language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables =
5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones related =
to these documents.
>>>=20
>>> In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" =
has been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and =
"compact JSON object" used in the milestones.
>>>=20
>>> Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would =
like your comments by 18 January if possible.
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>> Karen
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Description of Working Group
>>>=20
>>> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the =
serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format =
is often used for serializing and transmitting structured data over a =
network connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in =
the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security services =
such as encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes =
(MACs), and key representations for data that is being carried in JSON =
format.
>>>=20
>>> Different proposals for providing such security services have =
already been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to =
standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection =
(signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm =
identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security features =
between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group will base its work =
on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit =
input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the =
security functionality in the JSON format is correct.
>>>=20
>>> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:
>>>=20
>>> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply =
JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not limited =
to) JSON data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  =
"Integrity protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as =
symmetric-key MACs.
>>>=20
>>> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a =
JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON =
data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.
>>>=20
>>> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys =
as JSON-structured objects.
>>>=20
>>> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm =
identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the =
previous three documents.
>>>=20
>>> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply =
JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not limited =
to) JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting =
multiple recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and =
structures in (1).
>>>=20
>>> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a =
JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON =
data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple =
recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures =
in (2).
>>>=20
>>> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and =
symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build =
upon the concepts and structures in (3).
>>>=20
>>> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of =
protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document =
will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This =
document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by =
(4).
>>>=20
>>> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals =
in consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for =
these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>>>=20
>>> Goals and Milestones
>>>=20
>>> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document =
(1) as a WG item.
>>>=20
>>> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document =
(2) as a WG item.
>>>=20
>>> Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG =
item.
>>>=20
>>> Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG =
item.
>>>=20
>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON =
object integrity document (1).
>>>=20
>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON =
object encryption document (2).
>>>=20
>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key =
format document (3).
>>>=20
>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON =
algorithm document (4).
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to =
IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to =
IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for =
consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for =
consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity =
document (5) as a WG item.
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption =
document (6) as a WG item.
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document =
(7) as a WG item.
>>>=20
>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document =
(8) as a WG item.
>>>=20
>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on =
multi-recipient JSON object integrity document (5).
>>>=20
>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on =
multi-recipient JSON object encryption document (6).
>>>=20
>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private =
and symmetric key document (7).
>>>=20
>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key =
protection application document (8).
>>>=20
>>> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity =
document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption =
document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key =
document (7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application =
document (8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>=20
>=20


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Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
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AFAICT, the X.509 fields in JWE are pretty useless.

If you're using key transport (i.e., wrapping the symmetric key in a =
public key), then you would use the "jwk" or "jku" fields to reference =
the key pair you used to do the wrapping.  The only function of the =
public key crypto fields in a JWE is to let the recipient know which =
private key to use for decryption.  The recipient already needs to have =
the private key, since it obviously won't be in the message.

The question of how the encrypting party figures out which public key to =
use for a given recipient (and in particular, roll-over), is an =
application-layer question, not something that JWE would address.  See =
the XMPP end-to-end security doc for an example; they use a separate =
exchange to associate a JWK with an XMPP ID.
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e>

--Richard




On Jan 22, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain to =
me?
>=20
> How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key to =
encrypt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling work =
then? An an encrypting party would need to a priori know all potential =
x5u's of the decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the =
decrypting party signal a desired change of keys? =20
>=20
> Am I missing something obvious here? =20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Jan 25 09:44:45 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
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They're there exactly to let the recipient known which private key to use f=
or decryption.  Hardly useless...

				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 8:36 AM
To: Brian Campbell
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?

AFAICT, the X.509 fields in JWE are pretty useless.

If you're using key transport (i.e., wrapping the symmetric key in a public=
 key), then you would use the "jwk" or "jku" fields to reference the key pa=
ir you used to do the wrapping.  The only function of the public key crypto=
 fields in a JWE is to let the recipient know which private key to use for =
decryption.  The recipient already needs to have the private key, since it =
obviously won't be in the message.

The question of how the encrypting party figures out which public key to us=
e for a given recipient (and in particular, roll-over), is an application-l=
ayer question, not something that JWE would address.  See the XMPP end-to-e=
nd security doc for an example; they use a separate exchange to associate a=
 JWK with an XMPP ID.
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e>

--Richard




On Jan 22, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wr=
ote:

> Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain to me?
>=20
> How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key to encry=
pt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling work then? An=
 an encrypting party would need to a priori know all potential x5u's of the=
 decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the decrypting party =
signal a desired change of keys? =20
>=20
> Am I missing something obvious here? =20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
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Ok, that sort of makes sense. =20

Note that in that case, there's no point to sending a cert chain =
('x5c'), since it's the recipient's cert you're talking about.  Even =
'x5u' is kind of overkill; all you really need is 'x5t'.




On Jan 25, 2013, at 12:43 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> =
wrote:

> They're there exactly to let the recipient known which private key to =
use for decryption.  Hardly useless...
>=20
> 				-- Mike
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Richard Barnes
> Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 8:36 AM
> To: Brian Campbell
> Cc: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
>=20
> AFAICT, the X.509 fields in JWE are pretty useless.
>=20
> If you're using key transport (i.e., wrapping the symmetric key in a =
public key), then you would use the "jwk" or "jku" fields to reference =
the key pair you used to do the wrapping.  The only function of the =
public key crypto fields in a JWE is to let the recipient know which =
private key to use for decryption.  The recipient already needs to have =
the private key, since it obviously won't be in the message.
>=20
> The question of how the encrypting party figures out which public key =
to use for a given recipient (and in particular, roll-over), is an =
application-layer question, not something that JWE would address.  See =
the XMPP end-to-end security doc for an example; they use a separate =
exchange to associate a JWK with an XMPP ID.
> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e>
>=20
> --Richard
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Jan 22, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain to =
me?
>>=20
>> How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key to =
encrypt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling work =
then? An an encrypting party would need to a priori know all potential =
x5u's of the decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the =
decrypting party signal a desired change of keys? =20
>>=20
>> Am I missing something obvious here? =20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
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Yes of course signaling to the recipient which private key to use for
decryption is useful. Though it is unclear to me why one would use x5u or
x5c in the context of encryption rather than x5t or jku and/or kid. It
seems the later ones provide the same functionality in simpler and or more
concise ways.

The intent of my original post to the list wasn't to question the inclusion
of x5u or x5c in JWE (although I do think it's a fair question) but rather
to try and better understand what folks had envisioned doing with x5u and
encryption.  As Richard said, the key identification and roll-over are
typically application-layer questions. And I'm trying to work though those
very questions for OpenID Connect[1] right now. JWE dose provide some lower
level constructs to facilitate it at the app layer though (like jku, jwk,
x5u, x5t, x5c and kid) and, frankly, I didn't fully understand how some of
them were intended to be used so wanted to ask this group where they had
originated.

I haven't yet but will take a look at xmpp-e2e and see if there are any
concepts that can be borrowed.

Thanks,
Brian

[1] Two issues submitted against Connect on the general topic and the WG
home page
http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/703/key-publication-needs-to-be-reworked
http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/704/provide-key-rollover-guidance
http://openid.net/wg/connect/




On Fri, Jan 25, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:

> Ok, that sort of makes sense.
>
> Note that in that case, there's no point to sending a cert chain ('x5c'),
> since it's the recipient's cert you're talking about.  Even 'x5u' is kind
> of overkill; all you really need is 'x5t'.
>
>
>
>
> On Jan 25, 2013, at 12:43 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
> wrote:
>
> > They're there exactly to let the recipient known which private key to
> use for decryption.  Hardly useless...
> >
> >                               -- Mike
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Richard Barnes
> > Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 8:36 AM
> > To: Brian Campbell
> > Cc: jose@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
> >
> > AFAICT, the X.509 fields in JWE are pretty useless.
> >
> > If you're using key transport (i.e., wrapping the symmetric key in a
> public key), then you would use the "jwk" or "jku" fields to reference the
> key pair you used to do the wrapping.  The only function of the public key
> crypto fields in a JWE is to let the recipient know which private key to
> use for decryption.  The recipient already needs to have the private key,
> since it obviously won't be in the message.
> >
> > The question of how the encrypting party figures out which public key to
> use for a given recipient (and in particular, roll-over), is an
> application-layer question, not something that JWE would address.  See the
> XMPP end-to-end security doc for an example; they use a separate exchange
> to associate a JWK with an XMPP ID.
> > <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e>
> >
> > --Richard
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Jan 22, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain to me?
> >>
> >> How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key to
> encrypt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling work
> then? An an encrypting party would need to a priori know all potential
> x5u's of the decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the
> decrypting party signal a desired change of keys?
> >>
> >> Am I missing something obvious here?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> jose mailing list
> >> jose@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--14dae93406e3de45d104d422e764
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Yes of course signaling to the recipient which private key to use for decry=
ption is useful. Though it is unclear to me why one would use x5u or x5c in=
 the context of encryption rather than x5t or jku and/or kid. It seems the =
later ones provide the same functionality in simpler and or more concise wa=
ys.=A0 <br>

<br>The intent of my original post to the list wasn&#39;t to question the i=
nclusion of x5u or x5c in JWE (although I do think it&#39;s a fair question=
) but rather to try and better understand what folks had envisioned doing w=
ith x5u and encryption.=A0 As Richard said, the key identification and roll=
-over are typically application-layer questions. And I&#39;m trying to work=
 though those very questions for OpenID Connect[1] right now. JWE dose prov=
ide some lower level constructs to facilitate it at the app layer though (l=
ike jku, jwk, x5u, x5t, x5c and kid) and, frankly, I didn&#39;t fully under=
stand how some of them were intended to be used so wanted to ask this group=
 where they had originated. <br>

<br>I haven&#39;t yet but will take a look at xmpp-e2e and see if there are=
 any concepts that can be borrowed.<br>=A0<br>Thanks,<br>Brian<br><br>[1] T=
wo issues submitted against Connect on the general topic and the WG home pa=
ge<br>

<a href=3D"http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/703/key-publication-needs-to-=
be-reworked">http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/703/key-publication-needs-t=
o-be-reworked</a><br><a href=3D"http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/704/prov=
ide-key-rollover-guidance">http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/704/provide-k=
ey-rollover-guidance</a><br>

<a href=3D"http://openid.net/wg/connect/">http://openid.net/wg/connect/</a>=
 <br><br><br><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Jan 25, 2013 at 11:=
02 AM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">rbarnes@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Ok, that sort of makes sense.<br>
<br>
Note that in that case, there&#39;s no point to sending a cert chain (&#39;=
x5c&#39;), since it&#39;s the recipient&#39;s cert you&#39;re talking about=
. =A0Even &#39;x5u&#39; is kind of overkill; all you really need is &#39;x5=
t&#39;.<br>


<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Jan 25, 2013, at 12:43 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jone=
s@microsoft.com">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; They&#39;re there exactly to let the recipient known which private key=
 to use for decryption. =A0Hardly useless...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 -- Mike<br=
>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a>] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes<br>
&gt; Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 8:36 AM<br>
&gt; To: Brian Campbell<br>
&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; AFAICT, the X.509 fields in JWE are pretty useless.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If you&#39;re using key transport (i.e., wrapping the symmetric key in=
 a public key), then you would use the &quot;jwk&quot; or &quot;jku&quot; f=
ields to reference the key pair you used to do the wrapping. =A0The only fu=
nction of the public key crypto fields in a JWE is to let the recipient kno=
w which private key to use for decryption. =A0The recipient already needs t=
o have the private key, since it obviously won&#39;t be in the message.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; The question of how the encrypting party figures out which public key =
to use for a given recipient (and in particular, roll-over), is an applicat=
ion-layer question, not something that JWE would address. =A0See the XMPP e=
nd-to-end security doc for an example; they use a separate exchange to asso=
ciate a JWK with an XMPP ID.<br>


&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 22, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcam=
pbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain t=
o me?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key t=
o encrypt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling work t=
hen? An an encrypting party would need to a priori know all potential x5u&#=
39;s of the decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the decryp=
ting party signal a desired change of keys?<br>


&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Am I missing something obvious here?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_=
blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

--14dae93406e3de45d104d422e764--

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
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I personally am struggling to find a JWE use-case where x5u is useful.

As far as the XMPP-e2e proposal goes, it basically provides a key =
exchange protocol, where the recipients provide the sender with their =
public key information in order to receive the session CMK.  While it's =
oriented toward "user to user", there might be things to borrow from =
there.


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Jan 25, 2013, at 1:37 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> Yes of course signaling to the recipient which private key to use for
> decryption is useful. Though it is unclear to me why one would use x5u =
or
> x5c in the context of encryption rather than x5t or jku and/or kid. It
> seems the later ones provide the same functionality in simpler and or =
more
> concise ways.
>=20
> The intent of my original post to the list wasn't to question the =
inclusion
> of x5u or x5c in JWE (although I do think it's a fair question) but =
rather
> to try and better understand what folks had envisioned doing with x5u =
and
> encryption.  As Richard said, the key identification and roll-over are
> typically application-layer questions. And I'm trying to work though =
those
> very questions for OpenID Connect[1] right now. JWE dose provide some =
lower
> level constructs to facilitate it at the app layer though (like jku, =
jwk,
> x5u, x5t, x5c and kid) and, frankly, I didn't fully understand how =
some of
> them were intended to be used so wanted to ask this group where they =
had
> originated.
>=20
> I haven't yet but will take a look at xmpp-e2e and see if there are =
any
> concepts that can be borrowed.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Brian
>=20
> [1] Two issues submitted against Connect on the general topic and the =
WG
> home page
> =
http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/703/key-publication-needs-to-be-reworke=
d
> http://hg.openid.net/connect/issue/704/provide-key-rollover-guidance
> http://openid.net/wg/connect/
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Fri, Jan 25, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Ok, that sort of makes sense.
>>=20
>> Note that in that case, there's no point to sending a cert chain =
('x5c'),
>> since it's the recipient's cert you're talking about.  Even 'x5u' is =
kind
>> of overkill; all you really need is 'x5t'.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Jan 25, 2013, at 12:43 PM, Mike Jones =
<Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
>> wrote:
>>=20
>>> They're there exactly to let the recipient known which private key =
to
>> use for decryption.  Hardly useless...
>>>=20
>>>                              -- Mike
>>>=20
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of
>> Richard Barnes
>>> Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 8:36 AM
>>> To: Brian Campbell
>>> Cc: jose@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
>>>=20
>>> AFAICT, the X.509 fields in JWE are pretty useless.
>>>=20
>>> If you're using key transport (i.e., wrapping the symmetric key in a
>> public key), then you would use the "jwk" or "jku" fields to =
reference the
>> key pair you used to do the wrapping.  The only function of the =
public key
>> crypto fields in a JWE is to let the recipient know which private key =
to
>> use for decryption.  The recipient already needs to have the private =
key,
>> since it obviously won't be in the message.
>>>=20
>>> The question of how the encrypting party figures out which public =
key to
>> use for a given recipient (and in particular, roll-over), is an
>> application-layer question, not something that JWE would address.  =
See the
>> XMPP end-to-end security doc for an example; they use a separate =
exchange
>> to associate a JWK with an XMPP ID.
>>> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e>
>>>=20
>>> --Richard
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Jan 22, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain to =
me?
>>>>=20
>>>> How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key to
>> encrypt? I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling =
work
>> then? An an encrypting party would need to a priori know all =
potential
>> x5u's of the decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the
>> decrypting party signal a desired change of keys?
>>>>=20
>>>> Am I missing something obvious here?
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> jose mailing list
>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From hhalpin@w3.org  Tue Jan 29 15:21:34 2013
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Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 00:21:18 +0100
From: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
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To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
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Cc: public-ietf-w3c@w3.org, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, odonoghue@isoc.org, jose@ietf.org, Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] draft revision to JOSE charter
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To clarify, we will organize a formal review from Web Crypto in late 
February/early March before Last Call ideally, and one during Last Call 
if needed.

As WebCrypto will not likely hit Last Call till Fall this year, it is 
always possible new requirements may happen after the proposed Last Call 
dates, but I don't think that will necessitate changes to the draft 
charter.

Do notify us once the charter is updated/approved.

I think Mike has done a great job liasoning between the WGs and Richard 
has gone out of his way to get compatibility better. However, there are 
different requirements in WebCrypto than JOSE for some features and we 
need to make sure the members of the WebCrypto API who aren't also 
members of JOSE (i.e. Mike and Richard) spend the time to clarify their 
requirements before you hit Last Call.

    cheers,
        harry


On 01/25/2013 05:28 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> In my view as a humble participant, now.
>
> It seems that there is a fair bit of disagreement about what exactly should be the relationship between WebCrypto and JOSE, as evidenced by a recent thread on the WebCrypto mailing list [1].  It would be good to find out sooner rather than later what the requirements are for JOSE from WebCrypto, and whether the current specs meet these requirements.
>
> --Richard
>
>
> [1] <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2013Jan/0024.html>
>
>
>
> On Jan 25, 2013, at 2:44 AM, Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org> wrote:
>
>>  From a process perspective, my recommendation would be for Web Crypto to review the JOSE deliverables *before* they hit last call.
>>
>> What would be a good time for that from the Jose WG's perspective?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> -- 
>> Thomas Roessler, W3C <tlr@w3.org> (@roessler)
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2013-01-23, at 12:18 +0100, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I'd just like to note that the W3C Web Crypto WG (of which Mike Jones is a member) have been informally liasoning. However, as we enter Last Call we may need to formalize this relationship more.
>>>
>>> I expect the Web Crypto WG to give a formal review of JOSE specs when they hit Last Call. We probably don't need to sync charters (as that would delay JOSE and we'd prefer JOSE to be stable *before* we hit Last Call), but we do need to review and may need to ask for changes. If that is necessary to note in the rechartering, please do so.
>>>
>>> And yes, its via discussions in the WebCrypto WG that the need for private and symmetric key JOSE formats was brought up. Our spec is not in Last Call, and thus our use of those is not yet set in stone, but it does seem like a good idea to add them to the charter as we may need them.
>>>
>>> cheers,
>>>    harry
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 01/11/2013 09:02 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
>>>> Folks,
>>>>
>>>> Below is a draft update to our charter based on discussions at the last IETF meeting. The key changes are adding key representations and algorithm identifiers to the scope of work. This includes some minor language updates in the general section, the addition of deliverables 5-8, and the addition and modification of a number of milestones related to these documents.
>>>>
>>>> In addition, the phrase "using a compact URL-safe representation" has been added to the descriptions of the first two deliverables and "compact JSON object" used in the milestones.
>>>>
>>>> Jim and I will be submitting a revised charter shortly, and we would like your comments by 18 January if possible.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Karen
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Description of Working Group
>>>>
>>>> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format is often used for serializing and transmitting structured data over a network connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security services such as encryption, digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and key representations for data that is being carried in JSON format.
>>>>
>>>> Different proposals for providing such security services have already been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection (signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security features between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group will base its work on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the security functionality in the JSON format is correct.
>>>>
>>>> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:
>>>>
>>>> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.
>>>>
>>>> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, using a compact URL-safe representation.
>>>>
>>>> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as JSON-structured objects.
>>>>
>>>> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm identifiers, including mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the previous three documents.
>>>>
>>>> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (1).
>>>>
>>>> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (2).
>>>>
>>>> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and symmetric keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (3).
>>>>
>>>> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of protecting private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This document may register additional algorithms in registries defined by (4).
>>>>
>>>> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>>>>
>>>> Goals and Milestones
>>>>
>>>> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object integrity document (1) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Jan 2012              Submit compact JSON object encryption document (2) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON object integrity document (1).
>>>>
>>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on compact JSON object encryption document (2).
>>>>
>>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format document (3).
>>>>
>>>> Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm document (4).
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity document (5) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption document (6) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document (8) as a WG item.
>>>>
>>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient JSON object integrity document (5).
>>>>
>>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient JSON object encryption document (6).
>>>>
>>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private and symmetric key document (7).
>>>>
>>>> Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key protection application document (8).
>>>>
>>>> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity document (5) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption document (6) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application document (8) to IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> jose mailing list
>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>
>>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Subject: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that struck
me as maybe not right.

From
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9

"The certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted the
JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key of the
entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity that will
decrypt. The other entity.

"The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280] and
reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm missing
something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate chain?

And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix
B<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B>of
[
JWS<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS>]
for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.

So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to just
remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html, there's
really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient identify its
own key.

--f46d0402a9aff9a8f404d477fc8d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE&#39;s x5c def=
inition that struck me as maybe not right.<br><div><div><br></div><div>From=
 <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-=
08#section-4.1.9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-j=
ose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>


</div><div><br>&quot;The
   certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted
   the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot; - but it&#39;s not the publ=
ic key of the entity that encrypted, is it? It&#39;s the public key of the =
entity that will decrypt. The other entity.<br><br>&quot;The recipient MUST=
 verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280] and reject the JWE if =
any validation failure occurs.&quot; - maybe I&#39;m missing something but =
why would the recipient verify it&#39;s own certificate chain?<br>


<br></div><div>And the first hyperlink in &quot;See <a href=3D"http://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B" target=3D=
"_blank">Appendix B</a> of [<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iet=
f-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS" title=3D"&quot;JSON Web Signature (J=
WS)&quot;" target=3D"_blank">JWS</a>] for an example &quot;x5c&quot; value&=
quot; takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is Acknowledgements, rather tha=
n JWS as the text would suggest.<br>


<br></div><div>So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it&#39;d =
be better to just remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously, <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/ms=
g01434.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/cu=
rrent/msg01434.html</a>, there&#39;s really no point in sending a whole cha=
in to help the recipient identify its own key.<br>


<br><br><br></div><div><br><br><br></div></div></div>

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts with =
a secret.  I would expect a kid in the header. =20

I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used to =
encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a =
thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its =
private keys in a key-store of some sort.

In any event we would minimally want to change that to=20
> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to =
decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."

Thanks Brian

John B.


On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that =
struck me as maybe not right.
>=20
> =46rom =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
>=20
> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the =
public key of the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of =
the entity that will decrypt. The other entity.
>=20
> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280] and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe =
I'm missing something but why would the recipient verify it's own =
certificate chain?
>=20
> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B of [JWS] for an example =
"x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is Acknowledgements, =
rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>=20
> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to =
just remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously, =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html, there's =
really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient identify =
its own key.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Diso-8859-1"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Yes =
for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts with a =
secret. &nbsp;I would expect a kid in the header. =
&nbsp;<div><br></div><div>I suppose they if the recipient published a =
x5c that the sender used to encrypt with then you could include the x5c =
as a reference though a thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is =
probably keeping its private keys in a key-store of some =
sort.</div><div><br></div><div>In any event we would minimally want to =
change that to&nbsp;</div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr">"The certificate containing the public key of the entity =
that is to decrypt the JWE MUST be the first =
certificate."</div></blockquote><br></div><div>Thanks =
Brian</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, =
Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">I just noticed a couple of things in the =
JWE's x5c definition that struck me as maybe not =
right.<br><div><div><br></div><div>=46rom <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#=
section-4.1.9" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encr=
yption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>


</div><div><br>"The
   certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted
   the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key =
of the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity =
that will decrypt. The other entity.<br><br>"The recipient MUST verify =
the certificate chain according to [RFC5280] and reject the JWE if any =
validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm missing something but why would =
the recipient verify it's own certificate chain?<br>


<br></div><div>And the first hyperlink in "See <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#=
appendix-B" target=3D"_blank">Appendix B</a> of [<a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#=
ref-JWS" title=3D"&quot;JSON Web Signature (JWS)&quot;" =
target=3D"_blank">JWS</a>] for an example "x5c" value" takes you to =
Appendix B of JWE, which is Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the =
text would suggest.<br>


<br></div><div>So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd =
be better to just remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed =
out previously, <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg014=
34.html</a>, there's really no point in sending a whole chain to help =
the recipient identify its own key.<br>


<br><br><br></div><div><br><br><br></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/jose<br></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and
useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would be
about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? Which
would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might be
another argument for not having it in JWE right now.

Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question but I
digress...


On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts with a
> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>
> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used to
> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its
> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>
> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>
> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>
>
> Thanks Brian
>
> John B.
>
>
> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
>
> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that struck
> me as maybe not right.
>
> From
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9
>
> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted
> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key of
> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity that
> will decrypt. The other entity.
>
> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280]
> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm missing
> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate chain?
>
> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B>of [
> JWS<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS>]
> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>
> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to just
> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html, there's
> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient identify its
> own key.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot mo=
re meaningful and useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. B=
ut it would be about the encrypting party or sender&#39;s certs in that cas=
e, right? Which would be different than how it&#39;s currently being used. =
And that might be another argument for not having it in JWE right now.<br>

<br></div>Of course that starts to beg the &quot;must understand headers&qu=
ot; question but I digress...<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <sp=
an dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">v=
e7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">Yes for =
encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts with a secret. =
=A0I would expect a kid in the header. =A0<div>

<br></div><div>I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sen=
der used to encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference thou=
gh a thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its p=
rivate keys in a key-store of some sort.</div>

<div><br></div><div>In any event we would minimally want to change that to=
=A0</div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">&quot;The certific=
ate containing the public key of the entity that is to decrypt the JWE MUST=
 be the first certificate.&quot;</div>

</blockquote><br></div><div>Thanks Brian</div><div><br></div><div>John B.</=
div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div><div class=3D"h5"><div>On 2013-01-29,=
 at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>

<br></div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE&#39;s x5c definition =
that struck me as maybe not right.<br><div><div><br></div><div>From <a href=
=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#secti=
on-4.1.9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json=
-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>




</div><div><br>&quot;The
   certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted
   the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot; - but it&#39;s not the publ=
ic key of the entity that encrypted, is it? It&#39;s the public key of the =
entity that will decrypt. The other entity.<br><br>&quot;The recipient MUST=
 verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280] and reject the JWE if =
any validation failure occurs.&quot; - maybe I&#39;m missing something but =
why would the recipient verify it&#39;s own certificate chain?<br>




<br></div><div>And the first hyperlink in &quot;See <a href=3D"http://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B" target=3D=
"_blank">Appendix B</a> of [<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iet=
f-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS" title=3D"&quot;JSON Web Signature (J=
WS)&quot;" target=3D"_blank">JWS</a>] for an example &quot;x5c&quot; value&=
quot; takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is Acknowledgements, rather tha=
n JWS as the text would suggest.<br>




<br></div><div>So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it&#39;d =
be better to just remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously, <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/ms=
g01434.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/cu=
rrent/msg01434.html</a>, there&#39;s really no point in sending a whole cha=
in to help the recipient identify its own key.<br>




<br><br><br></div><div><br><br><br></div></div></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a hre=
f=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">https://=
www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>

</blockquote></div><br></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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Cc: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and
> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would =
be
> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? =
Which
> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might =
be
> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>=20
> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question =
but I
> digress...

I was starting to come to similar conclusions.

This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can be =
wrapped into a JSON Web Key?

{
  "kty":"X509",
  "x5c": [....]
}


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts =
with a
>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>=20
>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used =
to
>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its
>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>=20
>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>=20
>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>=20
>>=20
>> Thanks Brian
>>=20
>> John B.
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>=20
>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that =
struck
>> me as maybe not right.
>>=20
>> From
>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
>>=20
>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted
>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key =
of
>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity =
that
>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>=20
>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]
>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm =
missing
>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate =
chain?
>>=20
>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix =
B<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#append=
ix-B>of [
>> =
JWS<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-=
JWS>]
>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>=20
>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to =
just
>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html, =
there's
>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient =
identify its
>> own key.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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Cc: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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I know that John had been thinking along the same lines...  It's not beauti=
ful but it may be a practical solution.

				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mat=
t Miller (mamille2)
Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2013 8:42 AM
To: Brian Campbell
Cc: John Bradley; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE


On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wr=
ote:

> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and=20
> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would=20
> be about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right?=20
> Which would be different than how it's currently being used. And that=20
> might be another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>=20
> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question=20
> but I digress...

I was starting to come to similar conclusions.

This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can be wra=
pped into a JSON Web Key?

{
  "kty":"X509",
  "x5c": [....]
}


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts=20
>> with a secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>=20
>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used=20
>> to encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though=20
>> a thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping=20
>> its private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>=20
>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>=20
>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to=20
>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>=20
>>=20
>> Thanks Brian
>>=20
>> John B.
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell=20
>> <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>=20
>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that=20
>> struck me as maybe not right.
>>=20
>> From
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#sec
>> tion-4.1.9
>>=20
>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that=20
>> encrypted the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the=20
>> public key of the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key=20
>> of the entity that will decrypt. The other entity.
>>=20
>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to=20
>> [RFC5280] and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." -=20
>> maybe I'm missing something but why would the recipient verify it's own =
certificate chain?
>>=20
>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix=20
>> B<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#a
>> ppendix-B>of [=20
>> JWS<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08
>> #ref-JWS>] for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of=20
>> JWE, which is Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would=20
>> suggest.
>>=20
>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to=20
>> just remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out=20
>> previously,=20
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,=20
>> there's really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient i=
dentify its own key.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.

One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.

In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing.

The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is =
a single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy =
way to have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.

My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a single =
keyid and key use that apples to both formats.

I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being sent =
in band.

So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same =
thing.

John B.

On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com> =
wrote:

>=20
> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful =
and
>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would =
be
>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? =
Which
>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might =
be
>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>>=20
>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question =
but I
>> digress...
>=20
> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>=20
> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can =
be wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>=20
> {
>  "kty":"X509",
>  "x5c": [....]
> }
>=20
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts =
with a
>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>>=20
>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used =
to
>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its
>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>>=20
>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>>=20
>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Thanks Brian
>>>=20
>>> John B.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that =
struck
>>> me as maybe not right.
>>>=20
>>> From
>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
>>>=20
>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted
>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public =
key of
>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity =
that
>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>>=20
>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]
>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm =
missing
>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate =
chain?
>>>=20
>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix =
B<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#append=
ix-B>of [
>>> =
JWS<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-=
JWS>]
>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>>=20
>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to =
just
>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html, =
there's
>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient =
identify its
>>> own key.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20


From bcampbell@pingidentity.com  Thu Jan 31 13:46:17 2013
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References: <CA+k3eCRbkefo3M+7QK_anM+H-VQLj2b+Jvw+8EXKPnSuc4Y_7Q@mail.gmail.com> <DAD9D0F9-1889-41B8-8F87-2FC689E9397B@ve7jtb.com> <CA+k3eCQqTpiTdDwdkqFNU9UApM8H4TjjkKq+XupSQuhLkbjRsg@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED94115109840@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <0BC322C1-A6C5-46B8-BC2A-3A7E000952EF@ve7jtb.com>
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2013 14:45:43 -0700
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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--90e6ba613aba54624c04d49c8ea4
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John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of X509
support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as many
days.

I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems like
a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
overcome such pity objections?

Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has in
mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just a
formality.


On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>
> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>
> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing.
>
> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is a
> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy way to
> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>
> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a single
> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>
> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being sent
> in band.
>
> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same thing.
>
> John B.
>
> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
> wrote:
>
> >
> > On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and
> >> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would be
> >> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? Which
> >> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might be
> >> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
> >>
> >> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question but
> I
> >> digress...
> >
> > I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
> >
> > This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can be
> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
> >
> > {
> >  "kty":"X509",
> >  "x5c": [....]
> > }
> >
> >
> > - m&m
> >
> > Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> > Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >
> >> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts
> with a
> >>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
> >>>
> >>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used to
> >>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
> >>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its
> >>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
> >>>
> >>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
> >>>
> >>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
> >>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Thanks Brian
> >>>
> >>> John B.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com
> >
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
> struck
> >>> me as maybe not right.
> >>>
> >>> From
> >>>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9
> >>>
> >>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted
> >>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key
> of
> >>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity
> that
> >>> will decrypt. The other entity.
> >>>
> >>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280]
> >>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
> missing
> >>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
> chain?
> >>>
> >>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B>of
> [
> >>> JWS<
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
> >]
> >>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
> >>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
> >>>
> >>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to
> just
> >>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
> >>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
> there's
> >>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
> identify its
> >>> own key.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> jose mailing list
> >>> jose@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> jose mailing list
> >> jose@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >
>
>

--90e6ba613aba54624c04d49c8ea4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general ide=
a of some kind of X509 support in JWK has now independently come up in my w=
orld twice in as many days. <br><br></div>I must say that, from a general d=
esign of things perspective, it seems like a total abomination. But maybe, =
just maybe, it&#39;d be useful enough to overcome such pity objections?<br>

<br>Though, to be fair, Matt&#39;s idea is pretty different than what John =
has in mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than j=
ust a formality.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote">

On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</=
span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">

Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.<br>
<br>
One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.<br>
<br>
In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing.<br>
<br>
The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is a =
single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy way to=
 have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.<br>
<br>
My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a single ke=
yid and key use that apples to both formats.<br>
<br>
I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being sent in=
 band.<br>
<br>
So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same thing.<=
br>
<br>
John B.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, &quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&quot; &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcam=
pbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful=
 and<br>
&gt;&gt; useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it wou=
ld be<br>
&gt;&gt; about the encrypting party or sender&#39;s certs in that case, rig=
ht? Which<br>
&gt;&gt; would be different than how it&#39;s currently being used. And tha=
t might be<br>
&gt;&gt; another argument for not having it in JWE right now.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Of course that starts to beg the &quot;must understand headers&quo=
t; question but I<br>
&gt;&gt; digress...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I was starting to come to similar conclusions.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can b=
e wrapped into a JSON Web Key?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; {<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;kty&quot;:&quot;X509&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;x5c&quot;: [....]<br>
&gt; }<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.=
com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient dec=
rypts with a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; secret. =A0I would expect a kid in the header.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sende=
r used to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference tho=
ugh a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keepi=
ng its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; private keys in a key-store of some sort.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; In any event we would minimally want to change that to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of the entity =
that is to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks Brian<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE&#39;s x5c definit=
ion that struck<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; me as maybe not right.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; From<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#section-4.1.9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of the entity =
that encrypted<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot; - but it&#39;s no=
t the public key of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the entity that encrypted, is it? It&#39;s the public key of t=
he entity that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; will decrypt. The other entity.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain accordin=
g to [RFC5280]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs.&quot; - m=
aybe I&#39;m missing<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; something but why would the recipient verify it&#39;s own cert=
ificate chain?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; And the first hyperlink in &quot;See Appendix B&lt;<a href=3D"=
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-=
B" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-en=
cryption-08#appendix-B</a>&gt;of [<br>


&gt;&gt;&gt; JWS&lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-j=
son-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html=
/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS</a>&gt;]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; for an example &quot;x5c&quot; value&quot; takes you to Append=
ix B of JWE, which is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it&#39;d be=
 better to just<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previ=
ously,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/m=
sg01434.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/c=
urrent/msg01434.html</a>, there&#39;s<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient=
 identify its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; own key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_=
blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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I could also see it like the following:

{
  "kty":"RSA",
  "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
  "n":".....",
  "e":"AQAB",
  "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
  // and/or "x5c":[....]
}

Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in =
XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.

Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
 wrote:

> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of =
X509
> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as =
many
> days.
>=20
> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems =
like
> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
> overcome such pity objections?
>=20
> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has =
in
> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than =
just a
> formality.
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>>=20
>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>>=20
>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for =
signing.
>>=20
>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it =
is a
>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy =
way to
>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>>=20
>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a =
single
>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>>=20
>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being =
sent
>> in band.
>>=20
>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same =
thing.
>>=20
>> John B.
>>=20
>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" =
<mamille2@cisco.com>
>> wrote:
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful =
and
>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it =
would be
>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? =
Which
>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that =
might be
>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>>>>=20
>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question =
but
>> I
>>>> digress...
>>>=20
>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>>>=20
>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can =
be
>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>>>=20
>>> {
>>> "kty":"X509",
>>> "x5c": [....]
>>> }
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> - m&m
>>>=20
>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>>=20
>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient =
decrypts
>> with a
>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender =
used to
>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though =
a
>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping =
its
>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>>>>=20
>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is =
to
>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Thanks Brian
>>>>>=20
>>>>> John B.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>>>=20
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
>> struck
>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> From
>>>>>=20
>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
>>>>>=20
>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted
>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public =
key
>> of
>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the =
entity
>> that
>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]
>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
>> missing
>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
>> chain?
>>>>>=20
>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix=
-B>of
>> [
>>>>> JWS<
>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>>> ]
>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which =
is
>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better =
to
>> just
>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously,
>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>> there's
>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>> identify its
>>>>> own key.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> jose mailing list
>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>=20
>>=20
>>=20


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From odonoghue@isoc.org  Thu Jan 31 14:30:34 2013
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Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2013 17:29:31 -0500
From: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
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Subject: [jose] updated JOSE charter sent to IESG
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Below is the updated charter that has been submitted to the IESG for 
review. Thank you to all who helped with the process.

Regards,
Karen

Description of JOSE Working Group

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization 
of structured
data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format is often used for 
serializing and
transmitting structured data over a network connection.  With the 
increased usage
of JSON in protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to 
offer
security services such as encryption, digital signatures, message 
authentication
codes (MACs), and key representations for data that is being carried in 
JSON format.

Different proposals for providing such security services have already 
been defined
and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to standardize four kinds of
security services, integrity protection (signature and MAC), encryption, 
key
representations, and algorithm identifiers, in order to increase 
interoperability of
security features between protocols that use JSON.  The Working Group 
will base its
work on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will 
solicit input
from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the security 
functionality in
the JSON format is correct.

This group is chartered to work on eight documents:

(1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured 
integrity
protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, 
including a
compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity protection" includes 
public-key digital
signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.

(2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, 
including a
compact URL-safe representation.

(3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as JSON-
structured objects.

(4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm 
identifiers for
the previous three documents.

(5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured 
integrity
protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, 
using a JSON
representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build 
upon the
concepts and structures in (1).

(6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures, 
using a JSON
representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build 
upon the
concepts and structures in (2).

(7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and 
symmetric
keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build upon the 
concepts and
structures in (3).

(8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of protecting
private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document will build 
upon the
concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This document may register 
additional
algorithms in registries defined by (4).

The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in
consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for 
these goals will
be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).

Goals and Milestones

Jan 2012              Submit JSON object integrity document (1) as a WG 
item.

Jan 2012              Submit JSON object encryption document (2) as a WG 
item.

Jan 2012              Submit JSON key format document (3) as a WG item.

Jan 2012              Submit JSON algorithm document (4) as a WG item.

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON object 
integrity document
(1).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON object 
encryption document
(2).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key format 
document (3).

Feb 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON algorithm 
document (4).

Mar 2013             Submit JSON object integrity document (1) to IESG for
consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON object encryption document (2) to IESG for
consideration as Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON key format document (3) to IESG for 
consideration as
Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON algorithm document (4) to IESG for 
consideration as
Standards Track document.

Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity 
document (5) as a WG
item.

Mar 2013             Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption 
document (6) as a
WG item.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON private and symmetric key document (7) 
as a WG
item.

Mar 2013             Submit JSON key protection application document (8) 
as a WG item.

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient 
JSON object
integrity document (5).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on multi-recipient 
JSON object
encryption document (6).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON private and 
symmetric key
document (7).

Jun 2013              Start Working Group Last Call on JSON key 
protection application
document (8).

Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object integrity 
document (5) to IESG
for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit multi-recipient JSON object encryption 
document (6) to
IESG for consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit JSON private and symmetric key document 
(7) to IESG for
consideration as Standards Track document.

Jul 2013               Submit JSON key protection application document 
(8) to IESG for
consideration as Standards Track document.

