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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-00.txt
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FYI...


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

Begin forwarded message:

> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-00.txt
> Date: February 1, 2013 10:59:03 AM MST
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
>=20
>=20
> 	Title           : Using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) for Protecting =
JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects
> 	Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
> 	Filename        : draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-00.txt
> 	Pages           : 14
> 	Date            : 2013-02-01
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies an approach to protecting JSON Web Key (JWK)
>   objects using JSON Web Encryption (JWE).  This document also
>   specifies a set of algorithms for encrypting content using password-
>   based cryptography.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-00
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


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From odonoghue@isoc.org  Mon Feb  4 06:48:31 2013
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Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2013 09:48:34 -0500
From: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Organization: ISOC
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Subject: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Folks,

I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of 
criticality of headers. For background, please review the current 
specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the 
mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether 
implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to 
come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.

As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, 
the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 
2013.

Thanks,
Karen

*******************
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to 
understand?

YES – All header fields must continue to be understood by 
implementations or the input must be rejected.

NO – A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely 
ignored should be defined.

********************
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text 
like the following be added? “Implementation Note: The requirement to 
understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole – 
not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE 
library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the 
processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers 
that the JOSE library didn’t understand, the responsibility for 
fulfilling the ‘MUST understand’ requirement for the remaining headers 
would then fall to the application.”

YES – Add the text clarifying that the “MUST understand” requirement is 
a requirement on the system as a whole – not specifically on JOSE libraries.

NO – Don’t add the clarifying text.

************************
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax 
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored 
if not understood?

A – Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be 
safely ignored if not understood.

B – Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all 
fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second.

C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)

From tonynad@microsoft.com  Wed Feb  6 05:33:19 2013
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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 13:31:08 +0000
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kar=
en O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 4, 2013 6:49 AM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

Folks,

I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality=
 of headers. For background, please review the current specification text, =
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especial=
ly the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must unde=
rstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue i=
n order to progress the specifications.

As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the f=
ollowing polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.

Thanks,
Karen

*******************
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to und=
erstand?

YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations o=
r the input must be rejected.

NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored s=
hould be defined.

********************
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text like=
 the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to understan=
d all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole - not on any =
particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could pr=
ocess the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of the =
rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE library=
 didn't understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand'=
 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application."

YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement is a r=
equirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE libraries.

NO - Don't add the clarifying text.

************************
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax would=
 you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not un=
derstood?

A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safe=
ly ignored if not understood.

B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all fi=
elds in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second.

C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) __________________________________=
_____________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose




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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
In-Reply-To: <510FCA42.5000704@isoc.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 06:40:48 -0700
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Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  NO
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of =
Karen O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 4, 2013 6:49 AM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

Folks,

I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of =
criticality of headers. For background, please review the current =
specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the =
mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether =
implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to =
come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.

As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, =
the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February =
2013.

Thanks,
Karen

*******************
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to =
understand?

YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by =
implementations or the input must be rejected.

NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely =
ignored should be defined.

********************
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text =
like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to =
understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole - =
not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE =
library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the =
processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers =
that the JOSE library didn't understand, the responsibility for =
fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for the remaining headers =
would then fall to the application."

YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement is =
a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE =
libraries.

NO - Don't add the clarifying text.

************************
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax =
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored =
if not understood?

A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be =
safely ignored if not understood.

B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all =
fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the =
second.

C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) =
_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



On 2013-02-04, at 7:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote:

> Folks,
>=20
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of =
criticality of headers. For background, please review the current =
specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the =
mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether =
implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to =
come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>=20
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, =
the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February =
2013.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Karen
>=20
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations =
to understand?
>=20
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by =
implementations or the input must be rejected.
>=20
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely =
ignored should be defined.
>=20
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text =
like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to =
understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96=
 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE =
library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the =
processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers =
that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for =
fulfilling the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining =
headers would then fall to the application.=94
>=20
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 =
requirement is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not =
specifically on JOSE libraries.
>=20
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>=20
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax =
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored =
if not understood?
>=20
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may =
be safely ignored if not understood.
>=20
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand =
all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the =
second.
>=20
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: "<odonoghue@isoc.org>" <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 15:27:38 +0000
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations =
to understand?


NO


> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text =
like the following be added?=20

YES


> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax =
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored =
if not understood?

A


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Feb 4, 2013, at 7:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote:

> Folks,
>=20
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of =
criticality of headers. For background, please review the current =
specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the =
mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether =
implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to =
come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>=20
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, =
the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February =
2013.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Karen
>=20
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations =
to understand?
>=20
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by =
implementations or the input must be rejected.
>=20
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely =
ignored should be defined.
>=20
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text =
like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to =
understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96=
 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE =
library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the =
processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers =
that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for =
fulfilling the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining =
headers would then fall to the application.=94
>=20
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 =
requirement is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not =
specifically on JOSE libraries.
>=20
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>=20
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax =
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored =
if not understood?
>=20
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may =
be safely ignored if not understood.
>=20
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand =
all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the =
second.
>=20
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kar=
en O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 04, 2013 6:49 AM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

Folks,

I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality=
 of headers. For background, please review the current specification text, =
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especial=
ly the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must unde=
rstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue i=
n order to progress the specifications.

As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the f=
ollowing polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.

Thanks,
Karen

*******************
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to und=
erstand?

YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations o=
r the input must be rejected.

NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored s=
hould be defined.

********************
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text like=
 the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to understan=
d all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole - not on any =
particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could pr=
ocess the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of the =
rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE library=
 didn't understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand'=
 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application."

YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement is a r=
equirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE libraries.

NO - Don't add the clarifying text.

************************
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax would=
 you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not un=
derstood?

A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safe=
ly ignored if not understood.

B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all fi=
elds in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second.

C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) __________________________________=
_____________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Wed Feb  6 09:03:20 2013
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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To: odonoghue@isoc.org
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL: Yes

SECOND POLL: YES

THIRD POLL: B

On Feb 4, 2013, at 6:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote:

> Folks,
>=20
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of =
criticality of headers. For background, please review the current =
specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the =
mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether =
implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to =
come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>=20
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, =
the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February =
2013.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Karen
>=20
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations =
to understand?
>=20
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by =
implementations or the input must be rejected.
>=20
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely =
ignored should be defined.
>=20
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text =
like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to =
understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96=
 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE =
library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the =
processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers =
that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for =
fulfilling the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining =
headers would then fall to the application.=94
>=20
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 =
requirement is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not =
specifically on JOSE libraries.
>=20
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>=20
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax =
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored =
if not understood?
>=20
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may =
be safely ignored if not understood.
>=20
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand =
all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the =
second.
>=20
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL: Yes

SECOND POLL: YES

THIRD POLL: B

On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 9:03 AM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> FIRST POLL: Yes
>
> SECOND POLL: YES
>
> THIRD POLL: B
>
> On Feb 4, 2013, at 6:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote:
>
>> Folks,
>>
>> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of critical=
ity of headers. For background, please review the current specification tex=
t, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (espec=
ially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must u=
nderstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issu=
e in order to progress the specifications.
>>
>> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, th=
e following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Karen
>>
>> *******************
>> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to =
understand?
>>
>> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementati=
ons or the input must be rejected.
>>
>> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely igno=
red should be defined.
>>
>> ********************
>> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text l=
ike the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to unde=
rstand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not =
on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library c=
ould process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing =
of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE =
library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST =
understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the =
application.=94
>>
>> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requireme=
nt is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE l=
ibraries.
>>
>> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>>
>> ************************
>> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax wo=
uld you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not=
 understood?
>>
>> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be=
 safely ignored if not understood.
>>
>> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand a=
ll fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the sec=
ond.
>>
>> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



--=20
--Breno

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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Clarification:

I only support THIRD POLL: B if the new header can be omitted, so that
3-component JWTs are still valid. I don't support this option if
backwards-incompatible.

On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Breno de Medeiros <breno@google.com> wrote:
> FIRST POLL: Yes
>
> SECOND POLL: YES
>
> THIRD POLL: B
>
> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 9:03 AM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>> FIRST POLL: Yes
>>
>> SECOND POLL: YES
>>
>> THIRD POLL: B
>>
>> On Feb 4, 2013, at 6:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of critica=
lity of headers. For background, please review the current specification te=
xt, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (espe=
cially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must =
understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this iss=
ue in order to progress the specifications.
>>>
>>> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, t=
he following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 201=
3.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Karen
>>>
>>> *******************
>>> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to=
 understand?
>>>
>>> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementat=
ions or the input must be rejected.
>>>
>>> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ign=
ored should be defined.
>>>
>>> ********************
>>> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text =
like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to und=
erstand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not=
 on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library =
could process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing=
 of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE=
 library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST=
 understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the=
 application.=94
>>>
>>> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requirem=
ent is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE =
libraries.
>>>
>>> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>>>
>>> ************************
>>> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax w=
ould you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if no=
t understood?
>>>
>>> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may b=
e safely ignored if not understood.
>>>
>>> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand =
all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the se=
cond.
>>>
>>> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
>
> --
> --Breno



--=20
--Breno

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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--------------080709050101050706070009
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FIRST POLL:  NO
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

On 2/4/13 9:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of 
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current 
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and 
> the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: 
> Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We 
> need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the 
> specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, 
> the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 
> February 2013.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations 
> to understand?
>
> YES â€“ All header fields must continue to be understood by 
> implementations or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO â€“ A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely 
> ignored should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text 
> like the following be added? â€śImplementation Note: The requirement to 
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole 
> â€“ not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a 
> JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then 
> leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For 
> those headers that the JOSE library didnâ€™t understand, the 
> responsibility for fulfilling the â€�MUST understandâ€™ requirement for 
> the remaining headers would then fall to the application.â€ť
>
> YES â€“ Add the text clarifying that the â€śMUST understandâ€ť requirement 
> is a requirement on the system as a whole â€“ not specifically on JOSE 
> libraries.
>
> NO â€“ Donâ€™t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax 
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored 
> if not understood?
>
> A â€“ Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be 
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B â€“ Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand 
> all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in 
> the second.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

-- 
George Fletcher <http://connect.me/gffletch>

--------------080709050101050706070009
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--------------090601070802010508010802
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <pre wrap="">FIRST POLL:  NO
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

</pre>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/4/13 9:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:510FCA42.5000704@isoc.org" type="cite">Folks,
      <br>
      <br>
      I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
      criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
      specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85),
      and the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with
      (Subj: Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header
      fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue in order to
      progress the specifications.
      <br>
      <br>
      As a tool to gather further information on determining a way
      forward, the following polls have been created. Please respond
      before 11 February 2013.
      <br>
      <br>
      Thanks,
      <br>
      Karen
      <br>
      <br>
      *******************
      <br>
      FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for
      implementations to understand?
      <br>
      <br>
      YES â€“ All header fields must continue to be understood by
      implementations or the input must be rejected.
      <br>
      <br>
      NO â€“ A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely
      ignored should be defined.
      <br>
      <br>
      ********************
      <br>
      SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should
      text like the following be added? â€śImplementation Note: The
      requirement to understand all header fields is a requirement on
      the system as a whole â€“ not on any particular level of library
      software. For instance, a JOSE library could process the headers
      that it understands and then leave the processing of the rest of
      them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE
      library didnâ€™t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the
      â€�MUST understandâ€™ requirement for the remaining headers would then
      fall to the application.â€ť
      <br>
      <br>
      YES â€“ Add the text clarifying that the â€śMUST understandâ€ť
      requirement is a requirement on the system as a whole â€“ not
      specifically on JOSE libraries.
      <br>
      <br>
      NO â€“ Donâ€™t add the clarifying text.
      <br>
      <br>
      ************************
      <br>
      THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which
      syntax would you prefer for designating the header fields that may
      be ignored if not understood?
      <br>
      <br>
      A â€“ Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that
      may be safely ignored if not understood.
      <br>
      <br>
      B â€“ Introduce a second header, where implementations must
      understand all fields in the first but they may ignore
      not-understood fields in the second.
      <br>
      <br>
      C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
      <br>
      _______________________________________________
      <br>
      jose mailing list
      <br>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a>
      <br>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
      <a href="http://connect.me/gffletch" title="View full card on
        Connect.Me"><img src="cid:part1.06010200.00080502@aol.com"
          alt="George Fletcher" height="113" width="359"></a></div>
  </body>
</html>

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--------------090601070802010508010802--

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 09:40:33 -0800
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To: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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I misunderstood the Third Poll options.

I was thinking that all properties to be ignored would be a property of =
the header object. ie. all ignorable properties are sub property of a =
"ignorable" property.

eg. all "ign" properties can be ignored

{ "alg": "ES256"
, "ign":=20
	{  "notes":"this property can be ignored" }
}


So I am voting C for the third poll, a different option.

btw: I continue to be surprised that we are using JSON and only doing =
name/value pairs.

-- Dick

On Feb 6, 2013, at 9:03 AM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:

> FIRST POLL: Yes
>=20
> SECOND POLL: YES
>=20
> THIRD POLL: B
>=20
> On Feb 4, 2013, at 6:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Folks,
>>=20
>> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of =
criticality of headers. For background, please review the current =
specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the =
mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether =
implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to =
come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>>=20
>> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, =
the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February =
2013.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> Karen
>>=20
>> *******************
>> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations =
to understand?
>>=20
>> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by =
implementations or the input must be rejected.
>>=20
>> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely =
ignored should be defined.
>>=20
>> ********************
>> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should =
text like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The =
requirement to understand all header fields is a requirement on the =
system as a whole =96 not on any particular level of library software. =
For instance, a JOSE library could process the headers that it =
understands and then leave the processing of the rest of them up to the =
application. For those headers that the JOSE library didn=92t =
understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST understand=92 =
requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the =
application.=94
>>=20
>> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 =
requirement is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not =
specifically on JOSE libraries.
>>=20
>> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>>=20
>> ************************
>> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax =
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored =
if not understood?
>>=20
>> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may =
be safely ignored if not understood.
>>=20
>> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must =
understand all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood =
fields in the second.
>>=20
>> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20


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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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---334495122-1380098797-1360173102=:86943
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FIRST POLL:  YES=0ASECOND POLL:  YES=0ATHIRD POLL:  A=0A=0A=0A=0A__________=
______________________=0AFrom: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>=0ATo: =
jose@ietf.org=0ASent: Mon, February 4, 2013 6:48:35 AM=0ASubject: [jose] PO=
LL(s): header criticality=0A=0AFolks,=0A=0AI am wrestling with how to help =
drive consensus on the topic of criticality of =0Aheaders. For background, =
please review the current specification text, the =0Aminutes to the Atlanta=
 meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especially the =0Adiscussion in De=
cember with (Subj: Whether implementations must understand all =0AJOSE head=
er fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue in order to =0Aprogre=
ss the specifications.=0A=0AAs a tool to gather further information on dete=
rmining a way forward, the =0Afollowing polls have been created. Please res=
pond before 11 February 2013.=0A=0AThanks,=0AKaren=0A=0A*******************=
=0AFIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to =
=0Aunderstand?=0A=0AYES =E2=80=93 All header fields must continue to be und=
erstood by implementations or the =0Ainput must be rejected.=0A=0ANO =E2=80=
=93 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored sh=
ould =0Abe defined.=0A=0A********************=0ASECOND POLL: Should the res=
ult of the first poll be "YES", should text like the =0Afollowing be added?=
 =E2=80=9CImplementation Note: The requirement to understand all =0Aheader =
fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =E2=80=93 not on any parti=
cular =0Alevel of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could proc=
ess the =0Aheaders that it understands and then leave the processing of the=
 rest of them up =0Ato the application. For those headers that the JOSE lib=
rary didn=E2=80=99t understand, =0Athe responsibility for fulfilling the =
=E2=80=98MUST understand=E2=80=99 requirement for the =0Aremaining headers =
would then fall to the application.=E2=80=9D=0A=0AYES =E2=80=93 Add the tex=
t clarifying that the =E2=80=9CMUST understand=E2=80=9D requirement is a =
=0Arequirement on the system as a whole =E2=80=93 not specifically on JOSE =
libraries.=0A=0ANO =E2=80=93 Don=E2=80=99t add the clarifying text.=0A=0A**=
**********************=0ATHIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be=
 "NO", which syntax would you =0Aprefer for designating the header fields t=
hat may be ignored if not understood?=0A=0AA =E2=80=93 Define a header fiel=
d that explicitly lists the fields that may be safely =0Aignored if not und=
erstood.=0A=0AB =E2=80=93 Introduce a second header, where implementations =
must understand all fields =0Ain the first but they may ignore not-understo=
od fields in the second.=0A=0AC - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)=0A__=
_____________________________________________=0Ajose mailing list=0Ajose@ie=
tf.org=0Ahttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose=0A
---334495122-1380098797-1360173102=:86943
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<html><head><style type=3D"text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></he=
ad><body><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,new york,times,serif;font-size:10=
pt"><div>FIRST POLL:&nbsp; YES<br>SECOND POLL:&nbsp; YES<br>THIRD POLL:&nbs=
p; A</div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma, new york, times, serif;font-siz=
e:10pt"><br><div style=3D"font-family:arial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-siz=
e:10pt"><font face=3D"Tahoma" size=3D"2"><hr size=3D"1"><b><span style=3D"f=
ont-weight: bold;">From:</span></b> Karen O'Donoghue &lt;odonoghue@isoc.org=
&gt;<br><b><span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> jose@ietf.org<=
br><b><span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Mon, February 4, =
2013 6:48:35 AM<br><b><span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b=
> [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br></font><br>Folks,<br><br>I am wrest=
ling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality of header=
s. For background, please review the current specification text, the minute=
s to the
 Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especially the discussion =
in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must understand all JOSE he=
ader fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue in order to progres=
s the specifications.<br><br>As a tool to gather further information on det=
ermining a way forward, the following polls have been created. Please respo=
nd before 11 February 2013.<br><br>Thanks,<br>Karen<br><br>****************=
***<br>FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations=
 to understand?<br><br>YES =E2=80=93 All header fields must continue to be =
understood by implementations or the input must be rejected.<br><br>NO =E2=
=80=93 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored=
 should be defined.<br><br>********************<br>SECOND POLL: Should the =
result of the first poll be "YES", should text like the following be added?=
 =E2=80=9CImplementation Note: The requirement to understand all header fie=
lds is a
 requirement on the system as a whole =E2=80=93 not on any particular level=
 of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could process the header=
s that it understands and then leave the processing of the rest of them up =
to the application. For those headers that the JOSE library didn=E2=80=99t =
understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =E2=80=98MUST understand=
=E2=80=99 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the appl=
ication.=E2=80=9D<br><br>YES =E2=80=93 Add the text clarifying that the =E2=
=80=9CMUST understand=E2=80=9D requirement is a requirement on the system a=
s a whole =E2=80=93 not specifically on JOSE libraries.<br><br>NO =E2=80=93=
 Don=E2=80=99t add the clarifying text.<br><br>************************<br>=
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax would=
 you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not un=
derstood?<br><br>A =E2=80=93 Define a header field that explicitly lists th=
e fields that may be safely ignored if not understood.<br><br>B
 =E2=80=93 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand=
 all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the s=
econd.<br><br>C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)<br>_________________=
______________________________<br>jose mailing list<br><a ymailto=3D"mailto=
:jose@ietf.org" href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a href=
=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br></div></div>=0A=0A=0A=0A</div></bo=
dy></html>
---334495122-1380098797-1360173102=:86943--

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FIRST POLL: YES
SECOND POLL: YES
THIRD POLL : A

Regards.
S=E9bastien.

>-----Original Message-----
>From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>Karen O'Donoghue
>Sent: Monday, February 04, 2013 6:49 AM
>To: jose@ietf.org
>Subject: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
>
>Folks,
>
>I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
>criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
>specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the
>mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether
>implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come
>to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
>As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
>following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.
>
>Thanks,
>Karen
>
>*******************
>FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
>understand?
>
>YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations
>or the input must be rejected.
>
>NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored
>should be defined.
>
>********************
>SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
>like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to
>understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole -
>not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE
>library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the
>processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers
>that the JOSE library didn't understand, the responsibility for
>fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for the remaining headers
>would then fall to the application."
>
>YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement is a
>requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE libraries.
>
>NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
>
>************************
>THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
>would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if
>not understood?
>
>A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
>safely ignored if not understood.
>
>B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all
>fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the
>second.
>
>C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
>_______________________________________________
>jose mailing list
>jose@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


___________________________________________________________________________=
______________________________________________

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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Wed Feb  6 10:00:18 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 17:59:42 +0000
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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For what it's worth, I believe that Dick's proposed syntax, where the may-b=
e-ignored-if-not-understood header fields are in JSON object under a specif=
ic member of the header, is compatible with the intent of the wording of "A=
 - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood".  He's proposing to actually put the values of=
 those additional header fields under a defined header field, rather than u=
sing a syntax like this one:

    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":["notes"],
     "notes":" this property can be ignored"
    }

He's right that it's cleaner JSON.  The counter-argument is that then some =
header fields are in the top-level JSON object and some are not, which is a=
n asymmetry.  I could personally live with either syntax for ignorable head=
er fields.  A working group discussion on which syntax people prefer seems =
like it would be useful.

				Cheers,
				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dic=
k Hardt
Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 9:41 AM
To: odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

I misunderstood the Third Poll options.

I was thinking that all properties to be ignored would be a property of the=
 header object. ie. all ignorable properties are sub property of a "ignorab=
le" property.

eg. all "ign" properties can be ignored

{ "alg": "ES256"
, "ign":=20
	{  "notes":"this property can be ignored" } }


So I am voting C for the third poll, a different option.

btw: I continue to be surprised that we are using JSON and only doing name/=
value pairs.

-- Dick

On Feb 6, 2013, at 9:03 AM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:

> FIRST POLL: Yes
>=20
> SECOND POLL: YES
>=20
> THIRD POLL: B
>=20
> On Feb 4, 2013, at 6:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote:
>=20
>> Folks,
>>=20
>> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of critical=
ity of headers. For background, please review the current specification tex=
t, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (espec=
ially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must u=
nderstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issu=
e in order to progress the specifications.
>>=20
>> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, th=
e following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> Karen
>>=20
>> *******************
>> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to =
understand?
>>=20
>> YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by implementation=
s or the input must be rejected.
>>=20
>> NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignore=
d should be defined.
>>=20
>> ********************
>> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text l=
ike the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to unders=
tand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole - not on a=
ny particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could=
 process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of t=
he rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE libr=
ary didn't understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understa=
nd' requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the applicatio=
n."
>>=20
>> YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement is =
a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE libraries=
.
>>=20
>> NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
>>=20
>> ************************
>> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax wo=
uld you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not=
 understood?
>>=20
>> A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be s=
afely ignored if not understood.
>>=20
>> B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all=
 fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the secon=
d.
>>=20
>> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20

_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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--e89a8f2346bb02a92504d512bd2a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

FIRST POLL:  NO
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A




On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 7:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote=
:

> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the
> mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether
> implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come
> to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementatio=
ns
> or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignor=
ed
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
> like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96
> not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE
> library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the
> processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers
> that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfill=
ing
> the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would the=
n fall
> to the application.=94
>
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librari=
es.
>
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if
> not understood?
>
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> ______________________________**_________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/jose<https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
/listinfo/jose>
>

--e89a8f2346bb02a92504d512bd2a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">FIRST POLL: =A0NO<br>
SECOND POLL: =A0YES<br>
THIRD POLL: =A0A<br><br><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 7:48 AM, Karen O&#39;Donoghue <=
span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org" target=3D"_blank=
">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Folks,<br>
<br>
I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality=
 of headers. For background, please review the current specification text, =
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especial=
ly the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must unde=
rstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue i=
n order to progress the specifications.<br>


<br>
As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the f=
ollowing polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.<b=
r>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Karen<br>
<br>
*******************<br>
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to und=
erstand?<br>
<br>
YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations=
 or the input must be rejected.<br>
<br>
NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored=
 should be defined.<br>
<br>
********************<br>
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;YES&quot;, should=
 text like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement =
to understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE l=
ibrary could process the headers that it understands and then leave the pro=
cessing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers that t=
he JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =
=91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall=
 to the application.=94<br>


<br>
YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requirement =
is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE libr=
aries.<br>
<br>
NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.<br>
<br>
************************<br>
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;NO&quot;, which sy=
ntax would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored=
 if not understood?<br>
<br>
A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be sa=
fely ignored if not understood.<br>
<br>
B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all =
fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second=
.<br>
<br>
C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--e89a8f2346bb02a92504d512bd2a--

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Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 11:47:47 -0700
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From: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
To: odonoghue@isoc.org
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  NO
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

2013/2/4 Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>

> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the
> mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether
> implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come
> to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementatio=
ns
> or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignor=
ed
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
> like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96
> not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE
> library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the
> processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers
> that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfill=
ing
> the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would the=
n fall
> to the application.=94
>
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librari=
es.
>
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if
> not understood?
>
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> ______________________________**_________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/jose<https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
/listinfo/jose>
>



--=20
Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en

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<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
8px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">FIRST POLL: =A0NO</span><br style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:18px;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<div class=3D"im" style=3D"color:rgb(80,0,80);font-family:arial,sans-serif;=
font-size:18px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">SECOND POLL: =A0YES<br>TH=
IRD POLL: =A0A</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2013/2/4 Karen O&#39;Don=
oghue <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org" target=3D=
"_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&gt;</span><br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Folks,<br>
<br>
I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality=
 of headers. For background, please review the current specification text, =
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especial=
ly the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must unde=
rstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue i=
n order to progress the specifications.<br>

<br>
As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the f=
ollowing polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.<b=
r>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Karen<br>
<br>
*******************<br>
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to und=
erstand?<br>
<br>
YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations=
 or the input must be rejected.<br>
<br>
NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored=
 should be defined.<br>
<br>
********************<br>
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;YES&quot;, should=
 text like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement =
to understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE l=
ibrary could process the headers that it understands and then leave the pro=
cessing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers that t=
he JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =
=91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall=
 to the application.=94<br>

<br>
YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requirement =
is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE libr=
aries.<br>
<br>
NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.<br>
<br>
************************<br>
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;NO&quot;, which sy=
ntax would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored=
 if not understood?<br>
<br>
A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be sa=
fely ignored if not understood.<br>
<br>
B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all =
fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second=
.<br>
<br>
C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Nat Sakimura=
 (=3Dnat)<div>Chairman, OpenID Foundation<br><a href=3D"http://nat.sakimura=
.org/" target=3D"_blank">http://nat.sakimura.org/</a><br>@_nat_en</div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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tl;dr:
FIRST POLL:   NO
SECOND POLL:  NO
THIRD POLL:   B

Further notes:

On SECOND POLL: Voting "Yes" on the SECOND POLL is equivalent to voting
"NO" on the FIRST POLL.  If the requirement isn't placed on any particular
element of the system, then nobody will implement it, and there will be no
control.

On THIRD POLL: I don't care all that much about the specific syntax, but I
have a strong preference that these non-critical fields be excluded from
the integrity check that is applied to the header.  So I would prefer
something like what Dick suggested, but encoded as a separate element of a
JW* object.  As Breno notes, this can be done in a backwards compatible
way.  (I voted "B" because I understood "A" to imply something like Mike's
earlier proposal, which would have just had a list of field names.)

In any case, I would encourage the chairs to focus on the first poll, and
view any results in the second and third as informative for further
discussion of wording or syntax.



On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote:

> FIRST POLL:  NO
> SECOND POLL:  YES
> THIRD POLL:  A
>
> 2013/2/4 Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
>
>> Folks,
>>
>> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
>> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
>> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the
>> mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether
>> implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to com=
e
>> to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>>
>> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, th=
e
>> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 201=
3.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Karen
>>
>> *******************
>> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
>> understand?
>>
>> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementati=
ons
>> or the input must be rejected.
>>
>> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely igno=
red
>> should be defined.
>>
>> ********************
>> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
>> like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to
>> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96
>> not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE
>> library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the
>> processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers
>> that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfil=
ling
>> the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would th=
en fall
>> to the application.=94
>>
>> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requireme=
nt is a
>> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librar=
ies.
>>
>> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>>
>> ************************
>> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
>> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored i=
f
>> not understood?
>>
>> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
>> safely ignored if not understood.
>>
>> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand a=
ll
>> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the sec=
ond.
>>
>> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
>> ______________________________**_________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/jose<https://www.ietf.org/mailma=
n/listinfo/jose>
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">tl;dr: <br>FIRST POLL: =A0 NO<br>SECOND POLL: =A0NO<br>THI=
RD POLL: =A0 B<br><br>Further notes:<br><br>On SECOND POLL: Voting &quot;Ye=
s&quot; on the SECOND POLL is equivalent to voting &quot;NO&quot; on the FI=
RST POLL. =A0If the requirement isn&#39;t placed on any particular element =
of the system, then nobody will implement it, and there will be no control.=
<br>
<br>On THIRD POLL: I don&#39;t care all that much about the specific syntax=
, but I have a strong preference that these non-critical fields be excluded=
 from the integrity check that is applied to the header. =A0So I would pref=
er something like what Dick suggested, but encoded as a separate element of=
 a JW* object. =A0As Breno notes, this can be done in a backwards compatibl=
e way. =A0(I voted &quot;B&quot; because I understood &quot;A&quot; to impl=
y something like Mike&#39;s earlier proposal, which would have just had a l=
ist of field names.)<br>
<br>In any case, I would encourage the chairs to focus on the first poll, a=
nd view any results in the second and third as informative for further disc=
ussion of wording or syntax.<div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Nat Saki=
mura <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com" target=3D"=
_blank">sakimura@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">
<div class=3D"im HOEnZb"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-size:18px;=
font-family:arial,sans-serif">FIRST POLL: =A0NO</span><br style=3D"color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-size:18px;font-family:arial,sans-serif">
<div style=3D"color:rgb(80,0,80);font-size:18px;font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f">SECOND POLL: =A0YES<br>THIRD POLL: =A0A</div><br></div><div class=3D"HOE=
nZb"><div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2013/2/4 Karen O&#39;Dono=
ghue <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org" target=3D"=
_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&gt;</span><br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Folks,<br>
<br>
I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality=
 of headers. For background, please review the current specification text, =
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especial=
ly the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must unde=
rstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue i=
n order to progress the specifications.<br>


<br>
As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the f=
ollowing polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.<b=
r>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Karen<br>
<br>
*******************<br>
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to und=
erstand?<br>
<br>
YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations=
 or the input must be rejected.<br>
<br>
NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored=
 should be defined.<br>
<br>
********************<br>
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;YES&quot;, should=
 text like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement =
to understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE l=
ibrary could process the headers that it understands and then leave the pro=
cessing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers that t=
he JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =
=91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall=
 to the application.=94<br>


<br>
YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requirement =
is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE libr=
aries.<br>
<br>
NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.<br>
<br>
************************<br>
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;NO&quot;, which sy=
ntax would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored=
 if not understood?<br>
<br>
A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be sa=
fely ignored if not understood.<br>
<br>
B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all =
fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second=
.<br>
<br>
C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div></div></div><span c=
lass=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">-- <br>Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)<div>Ch=
airman, OpenID Foundation<br><a href=3D"http://nat.sakimura.org/" target=3D=
"_blank">http://nat.sakimura.org/</a><br>
@_nat_en</div>
</font></span><br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 11:08:44 -0800
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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1. NO
2. NO
3, B

-Ekr


On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrote=
:

> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the
> mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether
> implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come
> to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementatio=
ns
> or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignor=
ed
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
> like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96
> not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE
> library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the
> processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers
> that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfill=
ing
> the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would the=
n fall
> to the application.=94
>
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librari=
es.
>
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if
> not understood?
>
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> ______________________________**_________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/jose<https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
/listinfo/jose>
>

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1. NO<div>2. NO</div><div>3, B</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:48 AM, K=
aren O&#39;Donoghue <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:odonoghue@isoc.=
org" target=3D"_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Folks,<br>
<br>
I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality=
 of headers. For background, please review the current specification text, =
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especial=
ly the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must unde=
rstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue i=
n order to progress the specifications.<br>


<br>
As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the f=
ollowing polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.<b=
r>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Karen<br>
<br>
*******************<br>
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to und=
erstand?<br>
<br>
YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations=
 or the input must be rejected.<br>
<br>
NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored=
 should be defined.<br>
<br>
********************<br>
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;YES&quot;, should=
 text like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement =
to understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE l=
ibrary could process the headers that it understands and then leave the pro=
cessing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers that t=
he JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =
=91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall=
 to the application.=94<br>


<br>
YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requirement =
is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE libr=
aries.<br>
<br>
NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.<br>
<br>
************************<br>
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;NO&quot;, which sy=
ntax would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored=
 if not understood?<br>
<br>
A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be sa=
fely ignored if not understood.<br>
<br>
B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all =
fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second=
.<br>
<br>
C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*
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Dear JOSE,

tl;dr: Let's please add a simple JSON encoding to the base JW* specs.

I've been complaining for a while that the JW* documents aren't JSON, and
that the JSON serialization documents are too complex (because of the
integrity check issues).  So I thought it was about time that I made an
actual proposal for encoding the base JOSE object as JSON objects.  The
approach would be essentially the same as in the JSON serialization
documents, except with a focus on single objects.

JWE and JWS objects currently have the following form

jws = header.data.signature
jwe = header.key.iv.ciphertext.mac

The JSON encoding of a JWE/JWS would just take each of these Base64-encoded
pieces and assign them a name in a JSON structure.

jws = {
    "header": header,
    "data": data,
    "signature": signature
}

jwe = {
    "header": header,
    "key": key,
    "iv": iv,
    "data": ciphertext,
    "mac": mac
}

It seems to me that these encodings are simple enough that they could be
handled in a short section, in parallel to what I would call the "text
serialization" in the current documents.  So I would like to propose that
they be added to the base JWE and JWS documents.

Thanks,
--Richard

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Dear JOSE,</div><div><br></div><div>tl;dr: Let&#39;s =
please add a simple JSON encoding to the base JW* specs.<br></div><div><br>=
</div><div>I&#39;ve been complaining for a while that the JW* documents are=
n&#39;t JSON, and that the JSON serialization documents are too complex (be=
cause of the integrity check issues). =A0So I thought it was about time tha=
t I made an actual proposal for encoding the base JOSE object as JSON objec=
ts. =A0The approach would be essentially the same as in the JSON serializat=
ion documents, except with a focus on single objects.</div>
<div><br></div><div>JWE and JWS objects currently have the following form</=
div><div><br></div><div>jws =3D header.data.signature</div><div>jwe =3D hea=
der.key.iv.ciphertext.mac</div><div><br></div><div>The JSON encoding of a J=
WE/JWS would just take each of these Base64-encoded pieces and assign them =
a name in a JSON structure.</div>
<div><br></div><div>jws =3D {</div><div>=A0 =A0 &quot;header&quot;: header,=
</div><div>=A0 =A0 &quot;data&quot;: data,</div><div>=A0 =A0 &quot;signatur=
e&quot;: signature</div><div>}</div><div><br></div><div>jwe =3D {</div><div=
>=A0 =A0 &quot;header&quot;: header,</div>
<div>=A0 =A0 &quot;key&quot;: key,</div><div>=A0 =A0 &quot;iv&quot;: iv,</d=
iv><div>=A0 =A0 &quot;data&quot;: ciphertext,</div><div>=A0 =A0 &quot;mac&q=
uot;: mac</div><div>}</div><div><br></div><div>It seems to me that these en=
codings are simple enough that they could be handled in a short section, in=
 parallel to what I would call the &quot;text serialization&quot; in the cu=
rrent documents. =A0So I would like to propose that they be added to the ba=
se JWE and JWS documents.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>--Richard</div></div>

--bcaec5555590e03b3d04d51354d5--

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*
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+1


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Feb 6, 2013, at 12:28 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Dear JOSE,
> 
> tl;dr: Let's please add a simple JSON encoding to the base JW* specs.
> 
> I've been complaining for a while that the JW* documents aren't JSON, and
> that the JSON serialization documents are too complex (because of the
> integrity check issues).  So I thought it was about time that I made an
> actual proposal for encoding the base JOSE object as JSON objects.  The
> approach would be essentially the same as in the JSON serialization
> documents, except with a focus on single objects.
> 
> JWE and JWS objects currently have the following form
> 
> jws = header.data.signature
> jwe = header.key.iv.ciphertext.mac
> 
> The JSON encoding of a JWE/JWS would just take each of these Base64-encoded
> pieces and assign them a name in a JSON structure.
> 
> jws = {
>    "header": header,
>    "data": data,
>    "signature": signature
> }
> 
> jwe = {
>    "header": header,
>    "key": key,
>    "iv": iv,
>    "data": ciphertext,
>    "mac": mac
> }
> 
> It seems to me that these encodings are simple enough that they could be
> handled in a short section, in parallel to what I would call the "text
> serialization" in the current documents.  So I would like to propose that
> they be added to the base JWE and JWS documents.
> 
> Thanks,
> --Richard
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*
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Subject: Re: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*
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I'll note that these are nearly identical to the JSON Serialization encodin=
gs already specified in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-jso=
n-serialization-04 and http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json=
-serialization-04, other than you're precluding multiple recipients.  The s=
yntax:

     {"recipients":[
       {"header":"<header 1 contents>",
        "signature":"<signature 1 contents>"},
       ...
       {"header":"<header N contents>",
        "signature":"<signature N contents>"}],
      "payload":"<payload contents>"
     }

really isn't far from what you're proposing below.  It just has an array of=
 per-recipient header fields, since accommodating multiple recipients is al=
so a working group goal.

Once the rechartering is done, we'll have working group JSON serialization =
specifications.  It's a separate question whether to combine the compact an=
d JSON serializations into the same document or to leave them separate.  Th=
e revised charter will allow us to do either.

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 11:29 AM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*

Dear JOSE,

tl;dr: Let's please add a simple JSON encoding to the base JW* specs.

I've been complaining for a while that the JW* documents aren't JSON, and t=
hat the JSON serialization documents are too complex (because of the integr=
ity check issues).  So I thought it was about time that I made an actual pr=
oposal for encoding the base JOSE object as JSON objects.  The approach wou=
ld be essentially the same as in the JSON serialization documents, except w=
ith a focus on single objects.

JWE and JWS objects currently have the following form

jws =3D header.data.signature
jwe =3D header.key.iv.ciphertext.mac

The JSON encoding of a JWE/JWS would just take each of these Base64-encoded=
 pieces and assign them a name in a JSON structure.

jws =3D {
    "header": header,
    "data": data,
    "signature": signature
}

jwe =3D {
    "header": header,
    "key": key,
    "iv": iv,
    "data": ciphertext,
    "mac": mac
}

It seems to me that these encodings are simple enough that they could be ha=
ndled in a short section, in parallel to what I would call the "text serial=
ization" in the current documents.  So I would like to propose that they be=
 added to the base JWE and JWS documents.

Thanks,
--Richard

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I&#8217;ll note that thes=
e are nearly identical to the JSON Serialization encodings already specifie=
d in
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serializati=
on-04">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-0=
4</a> and
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serializati=
on-04">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-0=
4</a>, other than you&#8217;re precluding multiple recipients.&nbsp; The sy=
ntax:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;recipients&quot;:[<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;header&quot;:&quot;&lt;header 1 contents&g=
t;&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;signature&quot;:&quot;&lt;signature 1=
 contents&gt;&quot;},<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ...<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;header&quot;:&quot;&lt;header N contents&g=
t;&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;signature&quot;:&quot;&lt;signature N=
 contents&gt;&quot;}],<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;payload&quot;:&quot;&lt;payload contents&gt;&quot=
;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"page-break-before:always"><span lang=3D"EN"=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">really isn&#8217;t far fr=
om what you&#8217;re proposing below.&nbsp; It just has an array of per-rec=
ipient header fields, since accommodating multiple recipients is also a wor=
king
 group goal.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Once the rechartering is =
done, we&#8217;ll have working group JSON serialization specifications.&nbs=
p; It&#8217;s a separate question whether to combine the compact and JSON
 serializations into the same document or to leave them separate.&nbsp; The=
 revised charter will allow us to do either.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 11:29 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Dear JOSE,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">tl;dr: Let's please add a simple JSON encoding to th=
e base JW* specs.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I've been complaining for a while that the JW* docum=
ents aren't JSON, and that the JSON serialization documents are too complex=
 (because of the integrity check issues). &nbsp;So I thought it was about t=
ime that I made an actual proposal for
 encoding the base JOSE object as JSON objects. &nbsp;The approach would be=
 essentially the same as in the JSON serialization documents, except with a=
 focus on single objects.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">JWE and JWS objects currently have the following for=
m<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jws =3D header.data.signature<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jwe =3D header.key.iv.ciphertext.mac<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The JSON encoding of a JWE/JWS would just take each =
of these Base64-encoded pieces and assign them a name in a JSON structure.<=
o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jws =3D {<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;header&quot;: header,<o:p></o:p>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;data&quot;: data,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;signature&quot;: signature<o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">}<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jwe =3D {<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;header&quot;: header,<o:p></o:p>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;key&quot;: key,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;iv&quot;: iv,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;data&quot;: ciphertext,<o:p></o:=
p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &quot;mac&quot;: mac<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">}<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">It seems to me that these encodings are simple enoug=
h that they could be handled in a short section, in parallel to what I woul=
d call the &quot;text serialization&quot; in the current documents. &nbsp;S=
o I would like to propose that they be added to the
 base JWE and JWS documents.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B16804296739436741806ETK5EX14MBXC284r_--

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FIRST POLL: NO
SECOND POLL:  NO
THIRD POLL:  A



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Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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YES
YES
A

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kar=
en O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 04, 2013 3:49 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

Folks,

I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality=
 of headers. For background, please review the current specification text, =
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list (especial=
ly the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations must unde=
rstand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this issue i=
n order to progress the specifications.

As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the f=
ollowing polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.

Thanks,
Karen

*******************
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to und=
erstand?

YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations o=
r the input must be rejected.

NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored s=
hould be defined.

********************
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text like=
 the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to understan=
d all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole - not on any =
particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could pr=
ocess the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of the =
rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE library=
 didn't understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand'=
 requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application."

YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement is a r=
equirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE libraries.

NO - Don't add the clarifying text.

************************
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax would=
 you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not un=
derstood?

A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safe=
ly ignored if not understood.

B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all fi=
elds in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second.

C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) __________________________________=
_____________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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Subject: Re: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*
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--e0cb4efe3572c95d7204d514190b
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No disagreement. The main proposal here is to put JSON into the base specs.
It's developer friendly, and compliant with the charter!


On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 2:49 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wro=
te:

>  I=92ll note that these are nearly identical to the JSON Serialization
> encodings already specified in
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04 and
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04,
> other than you=92re precluding multiple recipients.  The syntax:****
>
> ** **
>
>      {"recipients":[****
>
>        {"header":"<header 1 contents>",****
>
>         "signature":"<signature 1 contents>"},****
>
>        ...****
>
>        {"header":"<header N contents>",****
>
>         "signature":"<signature N contents>"}],****
>
>       "payload":"<payload contents>"****
>
>      }****
>
> ** **
>
> really isn=92t far from what you=92re proposing below.  It just has an ar=
ray
> of per-recipient header fields, since accommodating multiple recipients i=
s
> also a working group goal.****
>
> ** **
>
> Once the rechartering is done, we=92ll have working group JSON serializat=
ion
> specifications.  It=92s a separate question whether to combine the compac=
t
> and JSON serializations into the same document or to leave them separate.
> The revised charter will allow us to do either.****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 06, 2013 11:29 AM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*****
>
> ** **
>
> Dear JOSE,****
>
> ** **
>
> tl;dr: Let's please add a simple JSON encoding to the base JW* specs.****
>
> ** **
>
> I've been complaining for a while that the JW* documents aren't JSON, and
> that the JSON serialization documents are too complex (because of the
> integrity check issues).  So I thought it was about time that I made an
> actual proposal for encoding the base JOSE object as JSON objects.  The
> approach would be essentially the same as in the JSON serialization
> documents, except with a focus on single objects.****
>
> ** **
>
> JWE and JWS objects currently have the following form****
>
> ** **
>
> jws =3D header.data.signature****
>
> jwe =3D header.key.iv.ciphertext.mac****
>
> ** **
>
> The JSON encoding of a JWE/JWS would just take each of these
> Base64-encoded pieces and assign them a name in a JSON structure.****
>
> ** **
>
> jws =3D {****
>
>     "header": header,****
>
>     "data": data,****
>
>     "signature": signature****
>
> }****
>
> ** **
>
> jwe =3D {****
>
>     "header": header,****
>
>     "key": key,****
>
>     "iv": iv,****
>
>     "data": ciphertext,****
>
>     "mac": mac****
>
> }****
>
> ** **
>
> It seems to me that these encodings are simple enough that they could be
> handled in a short section, in parallel to what I would call the "text
> serialization" in the current documents.  So I would like to propose that
> they be added to the base JWE and JWS documents.****
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks,****
>
> --Richard****
>

--e0cb4efe3572c95d7204d514190b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px=
">No disagreement. The main proposal here is to put JSON into the base spec=
s. It&#39;s developer friendly, and compliant with the charter! =A0=A0</spa=
n><br>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed,=
 Feb 6, 2013 at 2:49 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com=
</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I=92ll note that these ar=
e nearly identical to the JSON Serialization encodings already specified in
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serializati=
on-04" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-js=
on-serialization-04</a> and
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serializati=
on-04" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-js=
on-serialization-04</a>, other than you=92re precluding multiple recipients=
.=A0 The syntax:<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;recipients&quot;:[<u></u><=
u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;header&quot;:&quot;&=
lt;header 1 contents&gt;&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;signature&quot;:&q=
uot;&lt;signature 1 contents&gt;&quot;},<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 ...<u></u><u></u></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;header&quot;:&quot;&=
lt;header N contents&gt;&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;signature&quot;:&q=
uot;&lt;signature N contents&gt;&quot;}],<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;payload&quot;:&quot;&lt;=
payload contents&gt;&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">really isn=92t far from w=
hat you=92re proposing below.=A0 It just has an array of per-recipient head=
er fields, since accommodating multiple recipients is also a working
 group goal.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Once the rechartering is =
done, we=92ll have working group JSON serialization specifications.=A0 It=
=92s a separate question whether to combine the compact and JSON
 serializations into the same document or to leave them separate.=A0 The re=
vised charter will allow us to do either.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-=
bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 11:29 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*<u></u><u></u></=
span></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Dear JOSE,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">tl;dr: Let&#39;s please add a simple JSON encoding t=
o the base JW* specs.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I&#39;ve been complaining for a while that the JW* d=
ocuments aren&#39;t JSON, and that the JSON serialization documents are too=
 complex (because of the integrity check issues). =A0So I thought it was ab=
out time that I made an actual proposal for
 encoding the base JOSE object as JSON objects. =A0The approach would be es=
sentially the same as in the JSON serialization documents, except with a fo=
cus on single objects.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">JWE and JWS objects currently have the following for=
m<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jws =3D header.data.signature<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jwe =3D header.key.iv.ciphertext.mac<u></u><u></u></=
p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The JSON encoding of a JWE/JWS would just take each =
of these Base64-encoded pieces and assign them a name in a JSON structure.<=
u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jws =3D {<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;header&quot;: header,<u></u><u></u></p=
>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;data&quot;: data,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;signature&quot;: signature<u></u><u></=
u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">}<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">jwe =3D {<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;header&quot;: header,<u></u><u></u></p=
>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;key&quot;: key,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;iv&quot;: iv,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;data&quot;: ciphertext,<u></u><u></u><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 &quot;mac&quot;: mac<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">}<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">It seems to me that these encodings are simple enoug=
h that they could be handled in a short section, in parallel to what I woul=
d call the &quot;text serialization&quot; in the current documents. =A0So I=
 would like to propose that they be added to the
 base JWE and JWS documents.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--e0cb4efe3572c95d7204d514190b--

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
Thread-Topic: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*
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Subject: Re: [jose] A modest proposal for JSON-izing JW*
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Subject: [jose] SPI proposal
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an
SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
from having to re-send the same parameters.

The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS
(just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.

Feedback welcome,
--Richard

-----BEGIN-----
Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter

The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque
byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will
be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.

Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table of
cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose header
contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the following
values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
-- Contents of the JWE header
-- Encrypted Key
-- Initialization Vector

If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then it
MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header,
key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE
can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.
 If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process
MUST fail.
-----END-----


[9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9

--e0cb4efe3572f07fb104d5159cee
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some propo=
sed text for an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;security =
parameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is that in=
 cases where the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this wou=
ld save the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.<div>
<br></div><div style>The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could=
 be adapted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Simila=
r text is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verificatio=
n sections.</div>
<div><br></div><div style>Feedback welcome,</div><div style>--Richard</div>=
<div><br></div><div>-----BEGIN-----</div><div style>Section 4.1.X. &quot;sp=
i&quot; Header Parameter</div><div style><br></div><div style>The &quot;spi=
&quot; (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque byte=
 string that labels a set of security parameters. =A0This index is designed=
 to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will be re-us=
ing the same security parameters for several messages.<br>
</div><div style><br></div><div style>Entities supporting the use of the &q=
uot;spi&quot; parameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters=
. =A0When an entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi=
&quot; and &quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values =
from the JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:</div>
<div style>-- Contents of the JWE header</div><div style>-- Encrypted Key</=
div><div style>-- Initialization Vector</div><div style><br></div><div styl=
e>If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&quo=
t; parameter, then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization V=
ector. =A0That is, it will have the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integrity_=
value&quot;. =A0When a recipient receives such an object, it uses the &quot=
;spi&quot; value to retrieve cached header, key, and initialization vector =
and reconstructs a full JWE. =A0This full JWE can then be further processed=
 according to the normal JWE processing rules. =A0If the recipient has no c=
ached parameters for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.</div=
>
<div>-----END-----<br><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>[9]=A0<a href=3D"h=
ttp://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/t=
rac/ticket/9</a></div></div></div>

--e0cb4efe3572f07fb104d5159cee--

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] SPI proposal
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Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 22:26:31 +0000
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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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Thanks for writing this up, Richard.  I believe that captures the intent fa=
irly well.

As we'd discussed off-list, I believe that it would be more consistent if, =
in the case were you are using a previously cached "spi" value, that the he=
ader contained "alg":"spi" and "spi":spi-value.  That would maintain the in=
variant that implementations always use the "alg" value to determine what t=
he rest of the structure is - albeit in this case, via an indirection.

Also, then we'd register "spi" like any other "alg" value.  Other algorithm=
s specify the use of particular header parameters.  This one would be no ex=
ception.  Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear that it i=
s up to implementations whether to support it or not.

I don't feel super-strongly about this, but I always try for consistency, w=
here reasonable.  I think that this is such a case.

Again, thanks for the write-up to help move this forward.

                                                            Cheers,
                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] SPI proposal

To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an S=
PI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index", borro=
wing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same crypto pa=
rameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having=
 to re-send the same parameters.

The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS (=
just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably need=
ed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.

Feedback welcome,
--Richard

-----BEGIN-----
Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter

The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque b=
yte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is designe=
d to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will be re-u=
sing the same security parameters for several messages.

Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table of=
 cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose heade=
r contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the following va=
lues from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
-- Contents of the JWE header
-- Encrypted Key
-- Initialization Vector

If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then it =
MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it wi=
ll have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient rec=
eives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE ca=
n then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.  =
If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process =
MUST fail.
-----END-----


[9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Thanks for writing this u=
p, Richard.&nbsp; I believe that captures the intent fairly well.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As we&#8217;d discussed o=
ff-list, I believe that it would be more consistent if, in the case were yo=
u are using a previously cached &#8220;spi&#8221; value, that the header co=
ntained
 &#8220;alg&#8221;:&#8221;spi&#8221; and &#8220;spi&#8221;:<i>spi-value</i>=
.&nbsp; That would maintain the invariant that implementations always use t=
he &#8220;alg&#8221; value to determine what the rest of the structure is &=
#8211; albeit in this case, via an indirection.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Also, then we&#8217;d reg=
ister &#8220;spi&#8221; like any other &#8220;alg&#8221; value.&nbsp; Other=
 algorithms specify the use of particular header parameters.&nbsp; This one=
 would be no exception.&nbsp;
 Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear that it is up to i=
mplementations whether to support it or not.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I don&#8217;t feel super-=
strongly about this, but I always try for consistency, where reasonable.&nb=
sp; I think that this is such a case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Again, thanks for the wri=
te-up to help move this forward.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] SPI proposal<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some=
 proposed text for an SPI [1] field. &nbsp;To recall, SPI stands for &quot;=
security parameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. &nbsp;The ide=
a is that in cases where the same crypto parameters are
 being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having to re-send =
the same parameters.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but cou=
ld be adapted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). &nbsp;S=
imilar text is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verifi=
cation sections.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Feedback welcome,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) head=
er parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of security p=
arameters. &nbsp;This index is designed to enable the use of smaller header=
s in cases where entities will be re-using the same
 security parameters for several messages.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; p=
arameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. &nbsp;When an=
 entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &=
quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the
 JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Contents of the JWE header<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Encrypted Key<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Initialization Vector<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter=
 but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Ke=
y or Initialization Vector. &nbsp;That is, it will have the form &quot;head=
er.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. &nbsp;When a recipient receives such
 an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. &nbsp;This full J=
WE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rul=
es. &nbsp;If the recipient has no cached parameters
 for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-----<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">[9]&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/tr=
ac/ticket/9">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Wed Feb  6 14:29:06 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] SPI proposal
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BTW, what JSON data type did you intend to be used for the "spi" value?  A =
JSON string?  A string with any structure, or an unconstrained Unicode stri=
ng?  A base64url-encoded byte sequence?

                                                            -- Mike

From: Mike Jones
Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:27 PM
To: 'Richard Barnes'; jose@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [jose] SPI proposal

Thanks for writing this up, Richard.  I believe that captures the intent fa=
irly well.

As we'd discussed off-list, I believe that it would be more consistent if, =
in the case were you are using a previously cached "spi" value, that the he=
ader contained "alg":"spi" and "spi":spi-value.  That would maintain the in=
variant that implementations always use the "alg" value to determine what t=
he rest of the structure is - albeit in this case, via an indirection.

Also, then we'd register "spi" like any other "alg" value.  Other algorithm=
s specify the use of particular header parameters.  This one would be no ex=
ception.  Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear that it i=
s up to implementations whether to support it or not.

I don't feel super-strongly about this, but I always try for consistency, w=
here reasonable.  I think that this is such a case.

Again, thanks for the write-up to help move this forward.

                                                            Cheers,
                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] SPI proposal

To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an S=
PI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index", borro=
wing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same crypto pa=
rameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having=
 to re-send the same parameters.

The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS (=
just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably need=
ed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.

Feedback welcome,
--Richard

-----BEGIN-----
Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter

The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque b=
yte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is designe=
d to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will be re-u=
sing the same security parameters for several messages.

Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table of=
 cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose heade=
r contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the following va=
lues from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
-- Contents of the JWE header
-- Encrypted Key
-- Initialization Vector

If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then it =
MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it wi=
ll have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient rec=
eives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE ca=
n then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.  =
If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process =
MUST fail.
-----END-----


[9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">BTW, what JSON data type =
did you intend to be used for the &#8220;spi&#8221; value?&nbsp; A JSON str=
ing?&nbsp; A string with any structure, or an unconstrained Unicode string?=
&nbsp; A
 base64url-encoded byte sequence?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Mike Jon=
es
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:27 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> 'Richard Barnes'; jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: [jose] SPI proposal<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Thanks for writing this u=
p, Richard.&nbsp; I believe that captures the intent fairly well.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As we&#8217;d discussed o=
ff-list, I believe that it would be more consistent if, in the case were yo=
u are using a previously cached &#8220;spi&#8221; value, that the header co=
ntained
 &#8220;alg&#8221;:&#8221;spi&#8221; and &#8220;spi&#8221;:<i>spi-value</i>=
.&nbsp; That would maintain the invariant that implementations always use t=
he &#8220;alg&#8221; value to determine what the rest of the structure is &=
#8211; albeit in this case, via an indirection.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Also, then we&#8217;d reg=
ister &#8220;spi&#8221; like any other &#8220;alg&#8221; value.&nbsp; Other=
 algorithms specify the use of particular header parameters.&nbsp; This one=
 would be no exception.&nbsp;
 Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear that it is up to i=
mplementations whether to support it or not.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I don&#8217;t feel super-=
strongly about this, but I always try for consistency, where reasonable.&nb=
sp; I think that this is such a case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Again, thanks for the wri=
te-up to help move this forward.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] SPI proposal<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some=
 proposed text for an SPI [1] field. &nbsp;To recall, SPI stands for &quot;=
security parameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. &nbsp;The ide=
a is that in cases where the same crypto parameters are
 being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having to re-send =
the same parameters.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but cou=
ld be adapted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). &nbsp;S=
imilar text is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verifi=
cation sections.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Feedback welcome,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) head=
er parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of security p=
arameters. &nbsp;This index is designed to enable the use of smaller header=
s in cases where entities will be re-using the same
 security parameters for several messages.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; p=
arameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. &nbsp;When an=
 entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &=
quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the
 JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Contents of the JWE header<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Encrypted Key<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Initialization Vector<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter=
 but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Ke=
y or Initialization Vector. &nbsp;That is, it will have the form &quot;head=
er.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. &nbsp;When a recipient receives such
 an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. &nbsp;This full J=
WE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rul=
es. &nbsp;If the recipient has no cached parameters
 for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-----<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">[9]&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/tr=
ac/ticket/9">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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--f46d04089151b2ac1204d515e24a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I was thinking base64-encoded binary.
--Richard


On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 5:28 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wro=
te:

>  BTW, what JSON data type did you intend to be used for the =93spi=94 val=
ue?
> A JSON string?  A string with any structure, or an unconstrained Unicode
> string?  A base64url-encoded byte sequence?****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* Mike Jones
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:27 PM
> *To:* 'Richard Barnes'; jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* RE: [jose] SPI proposal****
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks for writing this up, Richard.  I believe that captures the intent
> fairly well.****
>
> ** **
>
> As we=92d discussed off-list, I believe that it would be more consistent =
if,
> in the case were you are using a previously cached =93spi=94 value, that =
the
> header contained =93alg=94:=94spi=94 and =93spi=94:*spi-value*.  That wou=
ld maintain
> the invariant that implementations always use the =93alg=94 value to dete=
rmine
> what the rest of the structure is =96 albeit in this case, via an indirec=
tion.
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> Also, then we=92d register =93spi=94 like any other =93alg=94 value.  Oth=
er
> algorithms specify the use of particular header parameters.  This one wou=
ld
> be no exception.  Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear
> that it is up to implementations whether to support it or not.****
>
> ** **
>
> I don=92t feel super-strongly about this, but I always try for consistenc=
y,
> where reasonable.  I think that this is such a case.****
>
> ** **
>
> Again, thanks for the write-up to help move this forward.****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             Cheers,****
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org<jose-bounces@=
ietf.org>]
> *On Behalf Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] SPI proposal****
>
> ** **
>
> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an
> SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
> borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
> crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
> from having to re-send the same parameters.****
>
> ** **
>
> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS
> (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
> needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.****
>
> ** **
>
> Feedback welcome,****
>
> --Richard****
>
> ** **
>
> -----BEGIN-----****
>
> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter****
>
> ** **
>
> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque
> byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
> designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities wil=
l
> be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.****
>
> ** **
>
> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:****
>
> -- Contents of the JWE header****
>
> -- Encrypted Key****
>
> -- Initialization Vector****
>
> ** **
>
> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then i=
t
> MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
> will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
> receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached heade=
r,
> key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JW=
E
> can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rule=
s.
>  If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the proce=
ss
> MUST fail.****
>
> -----END-----****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9****
>

--f46d04089151b2ac1204d515e24a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I was thinking base64-encoded binary.=A0<div style>--Richa=
rd</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
>On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 5:28 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@mic=
rosoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">BTW, what JSON data type =
did you intend to be used for the =93spi=94 value?=A0 A JSON string?=A0 A s=
tring with any structure, or an unconstrained Unicode string?=A0 A
 base64url-encoded byte sequence?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Mike Jon=
es
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:27 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> &#39;Richard Barnes&#39;; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: [jose] SPI proposal<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div><div class=3D"im">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Thanks for writing this u=
p, Richard.=A0 I believe that captures the intent fairly well.<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">As we=92d discussed off-l=
ist, I believe that it would be more consistent if, in the case were you ar=
e using a previously cached =93spi=94 value, that the header contained
 =93alg=94:=94spi=94 and =93spi=94:<i>spi-value</i>.=A0 That would maintain=
 the invariant that implementations always use the =93alg=94 value to deter=
mine what the rest of the structure is =96 albeit in this case, via an indi=
rection.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Also, then we=92d registe=
r =93spi=94 like any other =93alg=94 value.=A0 Other algorithms specify the=
 use of particular header parameters.=A0 This one would be no exception.=A0
 Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear that it is up to i=
mplementations whether to support it or not.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I don=92t feel super-stro=
ngly about this, but I always try for consistency, where reasonable.=A0 I t=
hink that this is such a case.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Again, thanks for the wri=
te-up to help move this forward.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 Cheers,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@iet=
f.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">mailt=
o:jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] SPI proposal<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div><div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some=
 proposed text for an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;sec=
urity parameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is t=
hat in cases where the same crypto parameters are
 being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having to re-send =
the same parameters.<u></u><u></u></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but cou=
ld be adapted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Simi=
lar text is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verificat=
ion sections.<u></u><u></u></p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Feedback welcome,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<u></=
u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) head=
er parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of security p=
arameters. =A0This index is designed to enable the use of smaller headers i=
n cases where entities will be re-using the same
 security parameters for several messages.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; p=
arameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. =A0When an en=
tity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &quo=
t;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the
 JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Contents of the JWE header<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Encrypted Key<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Initialization Vector<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter=
 but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Ke=
y or Initialization Vector. =A0That is, it will have the form &quot;header.=
ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. =A0When a recipient receives such
 an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. =A0This full JWE =
can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.=
 =A0If the recipient has no cached parameters
 for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-----<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">[9]=A0<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/=
ticket/9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a>=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--f46d04089151b2ac1204d515e24a--

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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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Including this as an "alg" value would pollute the definition of "alg".
 Right now, "alg" values tell you how the key is wrapped, and any full
header MUST have one.  SPI has a completely different semantic.  The
proposed text uses the presence of "alg" as a signal that a full header was
present, providing a very simple state machine for SPI processing:

if (alg && !spi) { /* normal */ }
else if (alg && spi) { /* add to cache */ }
else if (!alg && spi) { /* pull from cache */ }




On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 5:26 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wro=
te:

>  Thanks for writing this up, Richard.  I believe that captures the intent
> fairly well.****
>
> ** **
>
> As we=92d discussed off-list, I believe that it would be more consistent =
if,
> in the case were you are using a previously cached =93spi=94 value, that =
the
> header contained =93alg=94:=94spi=94 and =93spi=94:*spi-value*.  That wou=
ld maintain
> the invariant that implementations always use the =93alg=94 value to dete=
rmine
> what the rest of the structure is =96 albeit in this case, via an indirec=
tion.
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> Also, then we=92d register =93spi=94 like any other =93alg=94 value.  Oth=
er
> algorithms specify the use of particular header parameters.  This one wou=
ld
> be no exception.  Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear
> that it is up to implementations whether to support it or not.****
>
> ** **
>
> I don=92t feel super-strongly about this, but I always try for consistenc=
y,
> where reasonable.  I think that this is such a case.****
>
> ** **
>
> Again, thanks for the write-up to help move this forward.****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             Cheers,****
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] SPI proposal****
>
> ** **
>
> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an
> SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
> borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
> crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
> from having to re-send the same parameters.****
>
> ** **
>
> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS
> (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
> needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.****
>
> ** **
>
> Feedback welcome,****
>
> --Richard****
>
> ** **
>
> -----BEGIN-----****
>
> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter****
>
> ** **
>
> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque
> byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
> designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities wil=
l
> be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.****
>
> ** **
>
> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:****
>
> -- Contents of the JWE header****
>
> -- Encrypted Key****
>
> -- Initialization Vector****
>
> ** **
>
> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then i=
t
> MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
> will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
> receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached heade=
r,
> key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JW=
E
> can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rule=
s.
>  If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the proce=
ss
> MUST fail.****
>
> -----END-----****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9****
>

--bcaec5555590fa49ed04d515ebce
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Including this as an &quot;alg&quot; value would pollute t=
he definition of &quot;alg&quot;. =A0Right now, &quot;alg&quot; values tell=
 you how the key is wrapped, and any full header MUST have one. =A0SPI has =
a completely different semantic. =A0The proposed text uses the presence of =
&quot;alg&quot; as a signal that a full header was present, providing a ver=
y simple state machine for SPI processing:<div>
<br></div><div style>if (alg &amp;&amp; !spi) { /* normal */ }</div><div st=
yle>else if (alg &amp;&amp; spi) { /* add to cache */ }</div><div style>els=
e if (!alg &amp;&amp; spi) { /* pull from cache */ }</div><div style><br>
</div><div style><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 5:26 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">=
Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Thanks for writing this u=
p, Richard.=A0 I believe that captures the intent fairly well.<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">As we=92d discussed off-l=
ist, I believe that it would be more consistent if, in the case were you ar=
e using a previously cached =93spi=94 value, that the header contained
 =93alg=94:=94spi=94 and =93spi=94:<i>spi-value</i>.=A0 That would maintain=
 the invariant that implementations always use the =93alg=94 value to deter=
mine what the rest of the structure is =96 albeit in this case, via an indi=
rection.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Also, then we=92d registe=
r =93spi=94 like any other =93alg=94 value.=A0 Other algorithms specify the=
 use of particular header parameters.=A0 This one would be no exception.=A0
 Registering it as an algorithm would also make it clear that it is up to i=
mplementations whether to support it or not.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I don=92t feel super-stro=
ngly about this, but I always try for consistency, where reasonable.=A0 I t=
hink that this is such a case.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Again, thanks for the wri=
te-up to help move this forward.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 Cheers,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-=
bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 06, 2013 2:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] SPI proposal<u></u><u></u></span></p><div><div class=
=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some=
 proposed text for an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;sec=
urity parameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is t=
hat in cases where the same crypto parameters are
 being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having to re-send =
the same parameters.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but cou=
ld be adapted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Simi=
lar text is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verificat=
ion sections.<u></u><u></u></p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Feedback welcome,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<u></=
u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) head=
er parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of security p=
arameters. =A0This index is designed to enable the use of smaller headers i=
n cases where entities will be re-using the same
 security parameters for several messages.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; p=
arameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. =A0When an en=
tity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &quo=
t;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the
 JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Contents of the JWE header<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Encrypted Key<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Initialization Vector<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter=
 but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Ke=
y or Initialization Vector. =A0That is, it will have the form &quot;header.=
ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. =A0When a recipient receives such
 an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. =A0This full JWE =
can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.=
 =A0If the recipient has no cached parameters
 for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-----<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">[9]=A0<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/=
ticket/9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a>=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--bcaec5555590fa49ed04d515ebce--

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Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 11:07:54 +0900
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From: hideki nara <hdknr@ic-tact.co.jp>
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Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

---
hideki nara

2013/2/4 Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticali=
ty
> of headers. For background, please review the current specification text,
> the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list
> (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementation=
s
> must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on t=
his
> issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementatio=
ns or
> the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignor=
ed
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text li=
ke
> the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to unders=
tand
> all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not on an=
y
> particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could
> process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of =
the
> rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE libra=
ry
> didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST unders=
tand=92
> requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application.=
=94
>
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librari=
es.
>
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax wou=
ld
> you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not
> understood?
>
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL: NO
SECOND POLL: YES
THIRD POLL: A

2013/2/4 Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticali=
ty
> of headers. For background, please review the current specification text,
> the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list
> (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementation=
s
> must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on t=
his
> issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementatio=
ns or
> the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignor=
ed
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text li=
ke
> the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to unders=
tand
> all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not on an=
y
> particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could
> process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of =
the
> rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE libra=
ry
> didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST unders=
tand=92
> requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application.=
=94
>
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librari=
es.
>
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax wou=
ld
> you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not
> understood?
>
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



--=20
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Ryo Ito
Email : ritou.06@gmail.com
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Wed Feb  6 22:32:15 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Hi Karen,

thanks for running this poll.

My problem with answering your questions is the following:

The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle 
extensions. While it is easy to say that all the features in 
specification X must be implemented it is not even clear which 
specifications you are actually referring to with question #1.

So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone 
answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:

a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a 
federation) that defines what values need to be present, or

b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is required.

I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with 
YES since they are thinking that they will just write that specification 
as part of OpenID Connect.

If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid 
raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work 
provides.

If there is a different plan then please let me know.

Ciao
Hannes


On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the
> mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether
> implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to
> come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward,
> the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February
> 2013.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES – All header fields must continue to be understood by
> implementations or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO – A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely
> ignored should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
> like the following be added? “Implementation Note: The requirement to
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole –
> not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE
> library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the
> processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers
> that the JOSE library didn’t understand, the responsibility for
> fulfilling the ‘MUST understand’ requirement for the remaining headers
> would then fall to the application.”
>
> YES – Add the text clarifying that the “MUST understand” requirement is
> a requirement on the system as a whole – not specifically on JOSE
> libraries.
>
> NO – Don’t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored
> if not understood?
>
> A – Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B – Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the
> second.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Wed Feb  6 22:35:14 2013
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Cc: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] SPI - KID conflict -- Re:  SPI proposal
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Hi Richard,

when I tried to use the JW* specifications in OAuth my assumption was 
that the kid (key id) provides exactly the purpose you outline below 
(and call spi). (Btw, I prefer kid rather than SPI).

The only problem with the KID, as I raised on the list before, is that 
it should be in the header and not in the body (since otherwise it would 
not be visible when the data inside the body is encrypted.

Ciao
Hannes

On 02/07/2013 12:11 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for
> an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters
> index", borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where
> the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save
> the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.
>
> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for
> JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is
> probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.
>
> Feedback welcome,
> --Richard
>
> -----BEGIN-----
> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>
> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an
> opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index
> is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities
> will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>
> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
> -- Contents of the JWE header
> -- Encrypted Key
> -- Initialization Vector
>
> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then
> it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is,
> it will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a
> recipient receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve
> cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full
> JWE.  This full JWE can then be further processed according to the
> normal JWE processing rules.  If the recipient has no cached parameters
> for the "spi" value, the process MUST fail.
> -----END-----
>
>
> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>


From roland.hedberg@adm.umu.se  Wed Feb  6 23:04:35 2013
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From: Roland Hedberg <roland.hedberg@adm.umu.se>
To: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 08:04:28 +0100
Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

4 feb 2013 kl. 15:48 skrev Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>:

> Folks,
>=20
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of=20
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current=20
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the=
=20
> mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether=20
> implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to=20
> come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>=20
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward,=20
> the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February=
=20
> 2013.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Karen
>=20
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to=20
> understand?
>=20
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by=20
> implementations or the input must be rejected.
>=20
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely=20
> ignored should be defined.
>=20
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text=20
> like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to=20
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =
=96=20
> not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE=20
> library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the=
=20
> processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers=20
> that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for=20
> fulfilling the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining header=
s=20
> would then fall to the application.=94
>=20
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is=20
> a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE libra=
ries.
>=20
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>=20
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax=20
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored=20
> if not understood?
>=20
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be=
=20
> safely ignored if not understood.
>=20
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l=20
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>=20
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

-- Roland
------------------------------------------------------
Roland Hedberg
IT Architect/Senior Researcher
ICT Services and System Development (ITS)=20
Ume=E5 University=20
SE-901 87 Ume=E5, Sweden=09
Phone +46 90 786 68 44
Mobile +46 70 696 68 44=20
www.its.umu.se=20


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Hi Hannes,

One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery and/o=
r negotiation.  (This fits into your (b) - there is another higher layer sp=
ecification that says what is required.)  For instance, if two parties come=
 to understand through discovery that both support an extension, then they =
are free to use it between themselves.

For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover what alg=
orithms and other features are supported and then use only those that are i=
mplemented by both communicating parties.  I can't imagine that this is the=
 only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.

When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don't have to ig=
nore not-understood features, because none would be used in the first place=
.

				Best wishes,
				-- Mike

P.S.  Yes, you're right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could be used in=
 some cases too.  For instance, OAuth deployments almost all employ out-of-=
band agreements.

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Han=
nes Tschofenig
Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM
To: odonoghue@isoc.org
Cc: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

Hi Karen,

thanks for running this poll.

My problem with answering your questions is the following:

The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle extensions. =
While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must be im=
plemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually referr=
ing to with question #1.

So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone answer=
s question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:

a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a
federation) that defines what values need to be present, or

b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is required.

I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with YES s=
ince they are thinking that they will just write that specification as part=
 of OpenID Connect.

If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid raisin=
g wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work provides.

If there is a different plan then please let me know.

Ciao
Hannes


On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of=20
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current=20
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and=20
> the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj:=20
> Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We=20
> need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specificat=
ions.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward,=20
> the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11=20
> February 2013.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations=20
> to understand?
>
> YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by=20
> implementations or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely=20
> ignored should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text=20
> like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to=20
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole=20
> - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a=20
> JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then=20
> leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For=20
> those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the=20
> responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for=20
> the remaining headers would then fall to the application."
>
> YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement=20
> is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE=20
> libraries.
>
> NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax=20
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored=20
> if not understood?
>
> A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be=20
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand=20
> all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in=20
> the second.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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X-OriginalArrivalTime: 07 Feb 2013 08:36:02.0188 (UTC) FILETIME=[295BB4C0:01CE050E]
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------060008080904080105060404
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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <pre wrap="">FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

Charles Marais.
</pre>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Le 07/02/2013 03:07, hideki nara a
      écrit :<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAAAkSUFNO_1o0orUgfwvE3AjruNQcrz5Z5a5Z_vg6z6ycC3f3w@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

---
hideki nara

2013/2/4 Karen O'Donoghue <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org">&lt;odonoghue@isoc.org&gt;</a>:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">Folks,

I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticality
of headers. For background, please review the current specification text,
the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list
(especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementations
must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on this
issue in order to progress the specifications.

As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013.

Thanks,
Karen

*******************
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
understand?

YES – All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations or
the input must be rejected.

NO – A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored
should be defined.

********************
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text like
the following be added? “Implementation Note: The requirement to understand
all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole – not on any
particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could
process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of the
rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE library
didn’t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the ‘MUST understand’
requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application.”

YES – Add the text clarifying that the “MUST understand” requirement is a
requirement on the system as a whole – not specifically on JOSE libraries.

NO – Don’t add the clarifying text.

************************
THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax would
you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not
understood?

A – Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
safely ignored if not understood.

B – Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all
fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second.

C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
      <font face="TIMES"><font size="2">
          <img src="cid:part1.00000703.08060001@orange.com">
          <br>
          <font color="BLACK">
            <b> MARAIS Charles</b></font><br>
          <b> FT/OLNC/OLPS/ASE/IDEA/UED </b><br>
          Tel : 02.96.05.24.18<br>
          <a href="mailto:charles.marais@orange.com">charles.marais@orange.com</a><br>
          WF004Bis / R&amp;D Lannion / 2, avenue Pierre Marzin / 22307
          LANNION Cedex - France
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From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Thu Feb  7 00:51:02 2013
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Hi Mike, 

whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to describe this in the document since other specifications have followed a different approach. 

Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this extensibility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications. 

I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past. My understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the mandatory to implement functionality is defined in the specification and additional specifications indicate what additional extensions have to be used. Is my understanding correct? 

Ciao
Hannes

-------- Original-Nachricht --------
> Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 +0000
> Von: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
> An: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>
> CC: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
> Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

> Hi Hannes,
> 
> One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery
> and/or negotiation.  (This fits into your (b) - there is another higher layer
> specification that says what is required.)  For instance, if two parties
> come to understand through discovery that both support an extension, then they
> are free to use it between themselves.
> 
> For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover what
> algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those that are
> implemented by both communicating parties.  I can't imagine that this is
> the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.
> 
> When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don't have to
> ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the first
> place.
> 
> 				Best wishes,
> 				-- Mike
> 
> P.S.  Yes, you're right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could be used
> in some cases too.  For instance, OAuth deployments almost all employ
> out-of-band agreements.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM
> To: odonoghue@isoc.org
> Cc: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net; jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
> 
> Hi Karen,
> 
> thanks for running this poll.
> 
> My problem with answering your questions is the following:
> 
> The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle extensions.
> While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must be
> implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually
> referring to with question #1.
> 
> So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone
> answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:
> 
> a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a
> federation) that defines what values need to be present, or
> 
> b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is required.
> 
> I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with YES
> since they are thinking that they will just write that specification as
> part of OpenID Connect.
> 
> If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid
> raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work provides.
> 
> If there is a different plan then please let me know.
> 
> Ciao
> Hannes
> 
> 
> On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> > Folks,
> >
> > I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of 
> > criticality of headers. For background, please review the current 
> > specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and 
> > the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: 
> > Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We 
> > need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the
> specifications.
> >
> > As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, 
> > the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 
> > February 2013.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Karen
> >
> > *******************
> > FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations 
> > to understand?
> >
> > YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by 
> > implementations or the input must be rejected.
> >
> > NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely 
> > ignored should be defined.
> >
> > ********************
> > SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text 
> > like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to 
> > understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole 
> > - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a 
> > JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then 
> > leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For 
> > those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the 
> > responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for 
> > the remaining headers would then fall to the application."
> >
> > YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement 
> > is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE 
> > libraries.
> >
> > NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
> >
> > ************************
> > THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax 
> > would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored 
> > if not understood?
> >
> > A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be 
> > safely ignored if not understood.
> >
> > B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand 
> > all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in 
> > the second.
> >
> > C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) 
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> 
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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Date: Thu, 07 Feb 2013 11:36:41 +0100
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

-- 
-- Casper


On Thu, 2013-02-07 at 08:04 +0100, Roland Hedberg wrote:
> FIRST POLL:  YES
> SECOND POLL:  YES
> THIRD POLL:  A
> 
> 4 feb 2013 kl. 15:48 skrev Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>:
> 
> > Folks,
> > 
> > I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of 
> > criticality of headers. For background, please review the current 
> > specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the 
> > mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether 
> > implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to 
> > come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
> > 
> > As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, 
> > the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 
> > 2013.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Karen
> > 
> > *******************
> > FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to 
> > understand?
> > 
> > YES â€“ All header fields must continue to be understood by 
> > implementations or the input must be rejected.
> > 
> > NO â€“ A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely 
> > ignored should be defined.
> > 
> > ********************
> > SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text 
> > like the following be added? â€śImplementation Note: The requirement to 
> > understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole â€“ 
> > not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE 
> > library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the 
> > processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers 
> > that the JOSE library didnâ€™t understand, the responsibility for 
> > fulfilling the â€�MUST understandâ€™ requirement for the remaining headers 
> > would then fall to the application.â€ť
> > 
> > YES â€“ Add the text clarifying that the â€śMUST understandâ€ť requirement is 
> > a requirement on the system as a whole â€“ not specifically on JOSE libraries.
> > 
> > NO â€“ Donâ€™t add the clarifying text.
> > 
> > ************************
> > THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax 
> > would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored 
> > if not understood?
> > 
> > A â€“ Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be 
> > safely ignored if not understood.
> > 
> > B â€“ Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all 
> > fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second.
> > 
> > C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> 
> -- Roland
> ------------------------------------------------------
> Roland Hedberg
> IT Architect/Senior Researcher
> ICT Services and System Development (ITS) 
> UmeĂĄ University 
> SE-901 87 UmeĂĄ, Sweden	
> Phone +46 90 786 68 44
> Mobile +46 70 696 68 44 
> www.its.umu.se 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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References: <CAL02cgSt7w5CrP+DXo7bz_+YsxKsVMoRbZLNWa6EHjnAyScWMg@mail.gmail.com> <51134B1B.6010109@gmx.net>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 09:40:21 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] SPI - KID conflict -- Re:  SPI proposal
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As I understood it, 'kid' identifies a key, not the whole collection of
security parameters.  But if that's not the case, sure, we can use 'kid'.

In either case, apparently the spec needs to be clarified.


On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 1:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
> wrote:

> Hi Richard,
>
> when I tried to use the JW* specifications in OAuth my assumption was that
> the kid (key id) provides exactly the purpose you outline below (and call
> spi). (Btw, I prefer kid rather than SPI).
>
> The only problem with the KID, as I raised on the list before, is that it
> should be in the header and not in the body (since otherwise it would not
> be visible when the data inside the body is encrypted.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> On 02/07/2013 12:11 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>
>> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for
>> an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters
>> index", borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where
>> the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save
>> the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.
>>
>> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for
>> JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is
>> probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/**verification
>> sections.
>>
>> Feedback welcome,
>> --Richard
>>
>> -----BEGIN-----
>> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>>
>> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an
>> opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index
>> is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities
>> will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>>
>> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
>> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
>> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
>> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
>> -- Contents of the JWE header
>> -- Encrypted Key
>> -- Initialization Vector
>>
>> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then
>> it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is,
>> it will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_**value".  When a
>> recipient receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve
>> cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full
>> JWE.  This full JWE can then be further processed according to the
>> normal JWE processing rules.  If the recipient has no cached parameters
>> for the "spi" value, the process MUST fail.
>> -----END-----
>>
>>
>> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/**trac/ticket/9<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9>
>>
>>
>> ______________________________**_________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/jose<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose>
>>
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">As I understood it, &#39;kid&#39; identifies a key, not th=
e whole collection of security parameters. =A0But if that&#39;s not the cas=
e, sure, we can use &#39;kid&#39;.<div><br></div><div style>In either case,=
 apparently the spec needs to be clarified.</div>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu,=
 Feb 7, 2013 at 1:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.=
net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Richard,<br>
<br>
when I tried to use the JW* specifications in OAuth my assumption was that =
the kid (key id) provides exactly the purpose you outline below (and call s=
pi). (Btw, I prefer kid rather than SPI).<br>
<br>
The only problem with the KID, as I raised on the list before, is that it s=
hould be in the header and not in the body (since otherwise it would not be=
 visible when the data inside the body is encrypted.<br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
On 02/07/2013 12:11 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for<br>
an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;security parameters<br=
>
index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is that in cases wher=
e<br>
the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save<br>
the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.<br>
<br>
The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for<br>
JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Similar text is<br>
probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/<u></u>verification s=
ections.<br>
<br>
Feedback welcome,<br>
--Richard<br>
<br>
-----BEGIN-----<br>
Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<br>
<br>
The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains a=
n<br>
opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters. =A0This index<=
br>
is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities<br=
>
will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.<br>
<br>
Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; parameter MUST maintain =
a table<br>
of cached security parameters. =A0When an entity receives an object whose<b=
r>
header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &quot;alg&quot; values, then it MU=
ST cache the<br>
following values from the JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:<br>
-- Contents of the JWE header<br>
-- Encrypted Key<br>
-- Initialization Vector<br>
<br>
If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&quot;=
 parameter, then<br>
it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector. =A0That is,<=
br>
it will have the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integrity_<u></u>value&quot;.=
 =A0When a<br>
recipient receives such an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to ret=
rieve<br>
cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full<br>
JWE. =A0This full JWE can then be further processed according to the<br>
normal JWE processing rules. =A0If the recipient has no cached parameters<b=
r>
for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<br>
-----END-----<br>
<br>
<br>
[9] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" target=3D"_blan=
k">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/<u></u>trac/ticket/9</a><br>
<br>
<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:42:31 -0700
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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind it
but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the receiver
protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index collision? And for
distributed environments, it seems supporting this could be very cumbersome.








On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an
> SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
> borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
> crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
> from having to re-send the same parameters.
>
> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS
> (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
> needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.
>
> Feedback welcome,
> --Richard
>
> -----BEGIN-----
> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>
> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque
> byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
> designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will
> be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>
> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
> -- Contents of the JWE header
> -- Encrypted Key
> -- Initialization Vector
>
> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then it
> MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
> will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
> receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header,
> key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE
> can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.
>  If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process
> MUST fail.
> -----END-----
>
>
> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--90e6ba5bba1dad17f404d523752f
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Admittedly I&#39;m not really up on this spi issue or=
 the motivation behind it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw th=
is. How does the receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? An=
d index collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting th=
is could be very cumbersome.<br>

<br><br><br></div><br><div><br><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard B=
arnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank"=
>rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">To move us toward closing I=
ssue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall,=
 SPI stands for &quot;security parameters index&quot;, borrowing a term fro=
m IPsec. =A0The idea is that in cases where the same crypto parameters are =
being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having to re-send t=
he same parameters.<div>


<br></div><div>The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be ad=
apted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Similar text=
 is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sect=
ions.</div>


<div><br></div><div>Feedback welcome,</div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>-----BEGIN-----</div><div>Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Par=
ameter</div><div><br></div><div>The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters In=
dex) header parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of s=
ecurity parameters. =A0This index is designed to enable the use of smaller =
headers in cases where entities will be re-using the same security paramete=
rs for several messages.<br>


</div><div><br></div><div>Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot=
; parameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. =A0When an=
 entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &=
quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the JWE=
, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:</div>


<div>-- Contents of the JWE header</div><div>-- Encrypted Key</div><div>-- =
Initialization Vector</div><div><br></div><div>If an object containing an &=
quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT=
 contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector. =A0That is, it will hav=
e the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. =A0When a recipie=
nt receives such an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve c=
ached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. =
=A0This full JWE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE =
processing rules. =A0If the recipient has no cached parameters for the &quo=
t;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.</div>


<div>-----END-----<br><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>[9]=A0<a href=3D"h=
ttp://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.=
ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a></div></div></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--90e6ba5bba1dad17f404d523752f--

From rlb@ipv.sx  Thu Feb  7 06:52:21 2013
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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The motivation here is not very deep.  A lot of the current design (e.g.,
the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size.  The SPI
proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities will be
exchanging many JOSE objects.  I understood from some discussions with
OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.

Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this stuff
(cf. IKE for IPsec).  Whatever application is using this would need to
figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as things like
what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI.  (I don't think
collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the sender just ensures
uniqueness.)  The idea of this basic proposal is to establish the basic
behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced management.

--Richard


On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>wrote:

> Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind it
> but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the receiver
> protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index collision? And for
> distributed environments, it seems supporting this could be very cumbersome.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
>> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an
>> SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
>> borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
>> crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
>> from having to re-send the same parameters.
>>
>> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS
>> (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
>> needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.
>>
>> Feedback welcome,
>> --Richard
>>
>> -----BEGIN-----
>> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>>
>> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque
>> byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
>> designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will
>> be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>>
>> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
>> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
>> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
>> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
>> -- Contents of the JWE header
>> -- Encrypted Key
>> -- Initialization Vector
>>
>> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then
>> it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
>> will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
>> receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header,
>> key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE
>> can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.
>>  If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process
>> MUST fail.
>> -----END-----
>>
>>
>> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">The motivation here is not very deep. =A0A lot of the curr=
ent design (e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header siz=
e. =A0The SPI proposal further compresses header size in cases where two en=
tities will be exchanging many JOSE objects. =A0I understood from some disc=
ussions with OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.=
<div>
<br></div><div style>Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol=
 around this stuff (cf. IKE for IPsec). =A0Whatever application is using th=
is would need to figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well a=
s things like what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI. =A0=
(I don&#39;t think collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the s=
ender just ensures uniqueness.) =A0The idea of this basic proposal is to es=
tablish the basic behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced =
management. =A0</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>--Richard</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Bri=
an Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.=
com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Admittedly I&#39;m not=
 really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind it but a couple quest=
ions came to mind when I saw this. How does the receiver protect against un=
bounded growth of the cache? And index collision? And for distributed envir=
onments, it seems supporting this could be very cumbersome.<br>


<br><br><br></div><br><div><br><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><div class=3D"h5">On Wed, Feb 6, 201=
3 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ip=
v.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text=
 for an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;security paramete=
rs index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is that in cases w=
here the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save =
the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.<div>



<br></div><div>The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be ad=
apted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Similar text=
 is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sect=
ions.</div>



<div><br></div><div>Feedback welcome,</div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>-----BEGIN-----</div><div>Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Par=
ameter</div><div><br></div><div>The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters In=
dex) header parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of s=
ecurity parameters. =A0This index is designed to enable the use of smaller =
headers in cases where entities will be re-using the same security paramete=
rs for several messages.<br>



</div><div><br></div><div>Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot=
; parameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. =A0When an=
 entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &=
quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the JWE=
, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:</div>



<div>-- Contents of the JWE header</div><div>-- Encrypted Key</div><div>-- =
Initialization Vector</div><div><br></div><div>If an object containing an &=
quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT=
 contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector. =A0That is, it will hav=
e the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. =A0When a recipie=
nt receives such an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve c=
ached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. =
=A0This full JWE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE =
processing rules. =A0If the recipient has no cached parameters for the &quo=
t;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.</div>



<div>-----END-----<br><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>[9]=A0<a href=3D"h=
ttp://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.=
ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a></div></div></div>
<br></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Hannes,

I share your concern. If JOSE is to be used more widely than in the 
OpenID context, then it
probably is not a good idea to rely on constructs/conventions from that 
context re extensions.

Steve

On 2/7/13 3:50 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Hi Mike,
>
> whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to describe this in the document since other specifications have followed a different approach.
>
> Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this extensibility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.
>
> I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past. My understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the mandatory to implement functionality is defined in the specification and additional specifications indicate what additional extensions have to be used. Is my understanding correct?
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
Thread-Topic: [jose] SPI - KID conflict -- Re:  SPI proposal
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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI - KID conflict -- Re:  SPI proposal
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Yes, "kid" is used to identify keys.

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:40 AM
To: Hannes Tschofenig
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] SPI - KID conflict -- Re: SPI proposal

As I understood it, 'kid' identifies a key, not the whole collection of sec=
urity parameters.  But if that's not the case, sure, we can use 'kid'.

In either case, apparently the spec needs to be clarified.

On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 1:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.ne=
t<mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>> wrote:
Hi Richard,

when I tried to use the JW* specifications in OAuth my assumption was that =
the kid (key id) provides exactly the purpose you outline below (and call s=
pi). (Btw, I prefer kid rather than SPI).

The only problem with the KID, as I raised on the list before, is that it s=
hould be in the header and not in the body (since otherwise it would not be=
 visible when the data inside the body is encrypted.

Ciao
Hannes

On 02/07/2013 12:11 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for
an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters
index", borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where
the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save
the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.

The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for
JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is
probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections=
.

Feedback welcome,
--Richard

-----BEGIN-----
Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter

The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an
opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index
is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities
will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.

Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
-- Contents of the JWE header
-- Encrypted Key
-- Initialization Vector

If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then
it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is,
it will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a
recipient receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve
cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full
JWE.  This full JWE can then be further processed according to the
normal JWE processing rules.  If the recipient has no cached parameters
for the "spi" value, the process MUST fail.
-----END-----


[9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Yes, &#8220;kid&#8221; is=
 used to identify keys.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, February 07, 2013 6:40 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Hannes Tschofenig<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] SPI - KID conflict -- Re: SPI proposal<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As I understood it, 'kid' identifies a key, not the =
whole collection of security parameters. &nbsp;But if that's not the case, =
sure, we can use 'kid'.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">In either case, apparently the spec needs to be clar=
ified.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 1:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tsc=
hofenig@gmx.net</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Richard,<br>
<br>
when I tried to use the JW* specifications in OAuth my assumption was that =
the kid (key id) provides exactly the purpose you outline below (and call s=
pi). (Btw, I prefer kid rather than SPI).<br>
<br>
The only problem with the KID, as I raised on the list before, is that it s=
hould be in the header and not in the body (since otherwise it would not be=
 visible when the data inside the body is encrypted.<br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
On 02/07/2013 12:11 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">To move us toward clo=
sing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for<br>
an SPI [1] field. &nbsp;To recall, SPI stands for &quot;security parameters=
<br>
index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. &nbsp;The idea is that in cases w=
here<br>
the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save<br>
the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.<br>
<br>
The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for<br>
JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). &nbsp;Similar text is<br>
probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections=
.<br>
<br>
Feedback welcome,<br>
--Richard<br>
<br>
-----BEGIN-----<br>
Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<br>
<br>
The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains a=
n<br>
opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters. &nbsp;This ind=
ex<br>
is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities<br=
>
will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.<br>
<br>
Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; parameter MUST maintain =
a table<br>
of cached security parameters. &nbsp;When an entity receives an object whos=
e<br>
header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &quot;alg&quot; values, then it MU=
ST cache the<br>
following values from the JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:<br>
-- Contents of the JWE header<br>
-- Encrypted Key<br>
-- Initialization Vector<br>
<br>
If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&quot;=
 parameter, then<br>
it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector. &nbsp;That i=
s,<br>
it will have the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. &nbsp;=
When a<br>
recipient receives such an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to ret=
rieve<br>
cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full<br>
JWE. &nbsp;This full JWE can then be further processed according to the<br>
normal JWE processing rules. &nbsp;If the recipient has no cached parameter=
s<br>
for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<br>
-----END-----<br>
<br>
<br>
[9] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" target=3D"_blan=
k">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a><br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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I'll second James' vote:

1. NO
2. NO
3. C -- one critical field; the definition of each value for this
field implies what else you need to understand; if you want to add a
new field that MUST be understood, just use a new value for the one
critical field.

Cheers,

Dirkjan

On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Manger, James H
<James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> 1. NO
>
> 2. NO
>
> 3. C -- one critical field; the definition of each value for this field
> implies what else you need to understand; if you want to add a new field
> that MUST be understood, just use a new value for the one critical field.
>
>
>
>
>
> I second Richard's comment about YES to 2.
>
> What would a JOSE library API look like if all fields MUST be understood =
by
> =E2=80=9Cthe system=E2=80=9D? Does the =E2=80=9Ctop=E2=80=9D layer tell t=
he library what it understands;
> does the library return a list of unrecognized fields?
>
>
>
> --
>
> James Manger
>
>
>
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Richard Barnes
> Sent: Thursday, 7 February 2013 6:02 AM
> To: odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
>
>
> Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
>
>
>
> tl;dr:
>
> FIRST POLL:   NO
> SECOND POLL:  NO
> THIRD POLL:   B
>
> Further notes:
>
> On SECOND POLL: Voting "Yes" on the SECOND POLL is equivalent to voting "=
NO"
> on the FIRST POLL.  If the requirement isn't placed on any particular
> element of the system, then nobody will implement it, and there will be n=
o
> control.
>
> On THIRD POLL: I don't care all that much about the specific syntax, but =
I
> have a strong preference that these non-critical fields be excluded from =
the
> integrity check that is applied to the header.  So I would prefer somethi=
ng
> like what Dick suggested, but encoded as a separate element of a JW* obje=
ct.
> As Breno notes, this can be done in a backwards compatible way.  (I voted
> "B" because I understood "A" to imply something like Mike's earlier
> proposal, which would have just had a list of field names.)
>
> In any case, I would encourage the chairs to focus on the first poll, and
> view any results in the second and third as informative for further
> discussion of wording or syntax.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> FIRST POLL:  NO
>
> SECOND POLL:  YES
> THIRD POLL:  A
>
>
>
> 2013/2/4 Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
>
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticali=
ty
> of headers. For background, please review the current specification text,
> the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list
> (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementation=
s
> must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on t=
his
> issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =E2=80=93 All header fields must continue to be understood by impleme=
ntations or
> the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =E2=80=93 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely=
 ignored
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text li=
ke
> the following be added? =E2=80=9CImplementation Note: The requirement to =
understand
> all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =E2=80=93 not=
 on any
> particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could
> process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of =
the
> rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE libra=
ry
> didn=E2=80=99t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =E2=80=
=98MUST understand=E2=80=99
> requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application.=
=E2=80=9D
>
> YES =E2=80=93 Add the text clarifying that the =E2=80=9CMUST understand=
=E2=80=9D requirement is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =E2=80=93 not specifically on JOSE l=
ibraries.
>
> NO =E2=80=93 Don=E2=80=99t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax wou=
ld
> you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not
> understood?
>
> A =E2=80=93 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that m=
ay be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =E2=80=93 Introduce a second header, where implementations must underst=
and all
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)
>
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Thu Feb  7 18:06:19 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 23:08:09 -0500
Message-ID: <CAL02cgSCPMY9PWU9A8st0ZUhOC7D6OCapXtWKuEg1gr3riMOHQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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One might note that TLS does not require that all headers be understood.
 You can send SNI, say, without the risk of breaking interop with older
servers.

More to the point, unless you're going to actually define a negotiation
mechanism, saying that one would help is not all that constructive. This
group needs to either define a negotiation mechanism, or else not add
features for which negotiation is a absolute requirement.  And I would
strongly oppose the former, as an unnecessary expansion of scope.

--Richard


On Thursday, February 7, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:

>  I agree that this should be described in the document.
>
> One common application that uses discovery/negotiation to decide what
> algorithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).
>
> Cheers,
> -- Mike
>
>  *From:* Hannes Tschofenig
> *Sent:* February 7, 2013 12:51 AM
> *To:* Mike Jones, odonoghue@isoc.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'odonoghue@isoc.org');>, hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net <javascript:_e({},
> 'cvml', 'hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net');>
> *CC:* jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>
> *Subject:* Re: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
>
> Hi Mike,
>
> whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to
> describe this in the document since other specifications have followed a
> different approach.
>
> Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this
> extensibility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.
>
> I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past.
> My understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the
> mandatory to implement functionality is defined in the specification and
> additional specifications indicate what additional extensions have to be
> used. Is my understanding correct?
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> -------- Original-Nachricht --------
> > Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 +0000
> > Von: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'Michael.Jones@microsoft.com');>>
> > An: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net <javascript:_e({},
> 'cvml', 'hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net');>>, "odonoghue@isoc.org<javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'odonoghue@isoc.org');>"
> <odonoghue@isoc.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'odonoghue@isoc.org');>>
> > CC: "jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>" <
> jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>>
> > Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
>
> > Hi Hannes,
> >
> > One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery
> > and/or negotiation.  (This fits into your (b) - there is another higher
> layer
> > specification that says what is required.)  For instance, if two parties
> > come to understand through discovery that both support an extension,
> then they
> > are free to use it between themselves.
> >
> > For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover what
> > algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those that
> are
> > implemented by both communicating parties.  I can't imagine that this is
> > the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.
> >
> > When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don't have to
> > ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the first
> > place.
> >
> >     Best wishes,
> >     -- Mike
> >
> > P.S.  Yes, you're right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could be used
> > in some cases too.  For instance, OAuth deployments almost all employ
> > out-of-band agreements.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: jose-bounces@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'jose-bounces@ietf.org');> [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org<javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose-bounces@ietf.org');>]
> On Behalf Of
> > Hannes Tschofenig
> > Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM
> > To: odonoghue@isoc.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'odonoghue@isoc.org');>
> > Cc: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net');>; jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'jose@ietf.org');>
> > Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
> >
> > Hi Karen,
> >
> > thanks for running this poll.
> >
> > My problem with answering your questions is the following:
> >
> > The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle
> extensions.
> > While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must be
> > implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually
> > referring to with question #1.
> >
> > So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone
> > answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:
> >
> > a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a
> > federation) that defines what values need to be present, or
> >
> > b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is
> required.
> >
> > I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with YES
> > since they are thinking that they will just write that specification as
> > part of OpenID Connect.
> >
> > If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid
> > raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work
> provides.
> >
> > If there is a different plan then please let me know.
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> >
> > On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> > > Folks,
> > >
> > > I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> > > criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> > > specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and
> > > the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj:
> > > Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We
> > > need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the
> > specifications.
> > >
> > > As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward,
> > > the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11
> > > February 2013.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Karen
> > >
> > > *******************
> > > FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations
> > > to understand?
> > >
> > > YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by
> > > implementations or the input must be rejected.
> > >
> > > NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely
> > > ignored should be defined.
> > >
> > > ********************
> > > SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
> > > like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to
> > > understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole
> > > - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a
> > > JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then
> > > leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For
> > > those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the
> > > responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for
> > > the remaining headers would then fall to the application."
> > >
> > > YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement
> > > is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE
> > > libraries.
> > >
> > > NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
> > >
> > > ************************
> > > THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> > > would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored
> > > if not understood?
> > >
> > > A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> > > safely ignored if not understood.
> > >
> > > B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand
> > > all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in
> > > the second.
> > >
> > > C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > jose mailing list
> > > jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

--e0cb4efe2b0e0e551b04d52eb54b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

One might note that TLS does not require that all headers be understood. =
=A0You can send SNI, say, without the risk of breaking interop with=A0older=
 servers.=A0<div><br></div><div>More to the point, unless you&#39;re going =
to actually define a negotiation mechanism, saying that one would help is n=
ot all that constructive. This group needs to either define a negotiation m=
echanism, or else not add features for which negotiation is a absolute requ=
irement. =A0And I would strongly oppose the former, as an unnecessary expan=
sion of scope.=A0<br>
<br>--Richard<span></span><br><br><br>On Thursday, February 7, 2013, Mike J=
ones  wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">



<div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,Meiryo,&quot;Microso=
ft YaHei UI&quot;,&quot;Microsoft JhengHei UI&quot;,&quot;Malgun Gothic&quo=
t;,&quot;Khmer UI&quot;,&quot;Nirmala UI&quot;,Tunga,&quot;Lao UI&quot;,Ebr=
ima,sans-serif;font-size:16px">

<div>I agree that this should be described in the document.</div>
<div>=A0</div>
<div>One common application that uses discovery/negotiation to decide what =
algorithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).</div>
<div>=A0</div>
<div>Cheers,</div>
<div>-- Mike</div>
<div>=A0</div>
<div style=3D"border-top-color:rgb(229,229,229);border-top-width:2px;border=
-top-style:solid">
<strong>From:</strong>=A0Hannes Tschofenig<br>
<strong>Sent:</strong>=A0February 7, 2013 12:51 AM<br>
<strong>To:</strong>=A0Mike Jones, <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#=
39;, &#39;odonoghue@isoc.org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</=
a>, <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;hannes.tschofenig@gmx=
.net&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a><br>

<strong>CC:</strong>=A0<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jo=
se@ietf.org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<strong>Subject:</strong>=A0Re: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br>
</div>
<div>=A0</div>
Hi Mike, <br>
<br>
whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to d=
escribe this in the document since other specifications have followed a dif=
ferent approach.
<br>
<br>
Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this extensib=
ility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.
<br>
<br>
I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past. My=
 understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the mandator=
y to implement functionality is defined in the specification and additional=
 specifications indicate what additional
 extensions have to be used. Is my understanding correct? <br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
-------- Original-Nachricht --------<br>
&gt; Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 +0000<br>
&gt; Von: Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;=
Michael.Jones@microsoft.com&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microso=
ft.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; An: Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;,=
 &#39;hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig=
@gmx.net</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;o=
donoghue@isoc.org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&quot; &l=
t;<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;odonoghue@isoc.org&#39;=
);" target=3D"_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&gt;<br>

&gt; CC: &quot;<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.=
org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"javasc=
ript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">jo=
se@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>

&gt; Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br>
<br>
&gt; Hi Hannes,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery<=
br>
&gt; and/or negotiation.=A0 (This fits into your (b) - there is another hig=
her layer<br>
&gt; specification that says what is required.)=A0 For instance, if two par=
ties<br>
&gt; come to understand through discovery that both support an extension, t=
hen they<br>
&gt; are free to use it between themselves.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover wha=
t<br>
&gt; algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those th=
at are<br>
&gt; implemented by both communicating parties.=A0 I can&#39;t imagine that=
 this is<br>
&gt; the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don&#39;t h=
ave to<br>
&gt; ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the firs=
t<br>
&gt; place.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =A0=A0=A0=A0Best wishes,<br>
&gt; =A0=A0=A0=A0-- Mike<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; P.S.=A0 Yes, you&#39;re right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could=
 be used<br>
&gt; in some cases too.=A0 For instance, OAuth deployments almost all emplo=
y<br>
&gt; out-of-band agreements.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose-bounces@i=
etf.org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=
=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose-bounces@ietf.org&#39;);" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of<br>

&gt; Hannes Tschofenig<br>
&gt; Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM<br>
&gt; To: <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;odonoghue@isoc.o=
rg&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</a><br>
&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;hannes.tschofeni=
g@gmx.net&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>; <a href=
=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.org&#39;);" target=3D"=
_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>

&gt; Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Hi Karen,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; thanks for running this poll.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; My problem with answering your questions is the following:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle extensi=
ons.<br>
&gt; While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must =
be<br>
&gt; implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually=
<br>
&gt; referring to with question #1.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone<b=
r>
&gt; answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a<br=
>
&gt; federation) that defines what values need to be present, or<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is requi=
red.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with =
YES<br>
&gt; since they are thinking that they will just write that specification a=
s<br>
&gt; part of OpenID Connect.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; If that&#39;s the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avo=
id<br>
&gt; raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work =
provides.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; If there is a different plan then please let me know.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Ciao<br>
&gt; Hannes<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O&#39;Donoghue wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Folks,<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of <=
br>
&gt; &gt; criticality of headers. For background, please review the current=
 <br>
&gt; &gt; specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), =
and <br>
&gt; &gt; the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Sub=
j: <br>
&gt; &gt; Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)).=
 We <br>
&gt; &gt; need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the<br=
>
&gt; specifications.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forw=
ard, <br>
&gt; &gt; the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 <=
br>
&gt; &gt; February 2013.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; &gt; Karen<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; *******************<br>
&gt; &gt; FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementati=
ons <br>
&gt; &gt; to understand?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by <br>
&gt; &gt; implementations or the input must be rejected.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely=
 <br>
&gt; &gt; ignored should be defined.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ********************<br>
&gt; &gt; SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;YES&quo=
t;, should text <br>
&gt; &gt; like the following be added? &quot;Implementation Note: The requi=
rement to <br>
&gt; &gt; understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a =
whole <br>
&gt; &gt; - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, =
a <br>
&gt; &gt; JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and th=
en <br>
&gt; &gt; leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. F=
or <br>
&gt; &gt; those headers that the JOSE library didn&#39;t understand, the <b=
r>
&gt; &gt; responsibility for fulfilling the &#39;MUST understand&#39; requi=
rement for <br>
&gt; &gt; the remaining headers would then fall to the application.&quot;<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; YES - Add the text clarifying that the &quot;MUST understand&quot=
; requirement <br>
&gt; &gt; is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on J=
OSE <br>
&gt; &gt; libraries.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; NO - Don&#39;t add the clarifying text.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ************************<br>
&gt; &gt; THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;NO&quot;=
, which syntax <br>
&gt; &gt; would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ig=
nored <br>
&gt; &gt; if not understood?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that m=
ay be <br>
&gt; &gt; safely ignored if not understood.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must underst=
and <br>
&gt; &gt; all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields=
 in <br>
&gt; &gt; the second.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) <br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.org&#=
39;);" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.org&#39;);=
" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>

--e0cb4efe2b0e0e551b04d52eb54b--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Thu Feb  7 22:32:55 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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I agree with you that we don't need to define a negotiation mechanism.  As =
I believe Hannes correctly observed, either negotiation or out-of-band agre=
ement will typically be used to agree on parameters to be used, but it's no=
t the job of this working group to define them.  In fact, the right choices=
 are typically dependent upon the particular use case.

I know of three publicly known systems built using the current JOSE specs (=
Mozilla Persona, a system Dick Hardt is building for the province of BC, an=
d OpenID Connect) where one of these techniques are applied.  None of them =
needs to ignore parameters, to my knowledge.  See http://openid.net/specs/o=
penid-connect-discovery-1_0.html for the discovery system used by latter.

My main point is that just because we don't define a discovery mechanism, t=
hat doesn't mean that one won't be used, when appropriate.

                                                            -- Mike

From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2013 8:08 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: Karen O'Donoghue; Hannes Tschofenig; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

One might note that TLS does not require that all headers be understood.  Y=
ou can send SNI, say, without the risk of breaking interop with older serve=
rs.

More to the point, unless you're going to actually define a negotiation mec=
hanism, saying that one would help is not all that constructive. This group=
 needs to either define a negotiation mechanism, or else not add features f=
or which negotiation is a absolute requirement.  And I would strongly oppos=
e the former, as an unnecessary expansion of scope.

--Richard


On Thursday, February 7, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:
I agree that this should be described in the document.

One common application that uses discovery/negotiation to decide what algor=
ithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).

Cheers,
-- Mike

From: Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: February 7, 2013 12:51 AM
To: Mike Jones, odonoghue@isoc.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odono=
ghue@isoc.org');>, hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml'=
,%20'hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net');>
CC: jose@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');>
Subject: Re: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

Hi Mike,

whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to d=
escribe this in the document since other specifications have followed a dif=
ferent approach.

Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this extensib=
ility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.

I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past. My=
 understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the mandator=
y to implement functionality is defined in the specification and additional=
 specifications indicate what additional extensions have to be used. Is my =
understanding correct?

Ciao
Hannes

-------- Original-Nachricht --------
> Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 +0000
> Von: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvm=
l',%20'Michael.Jones@microsoft.com');>>
> An: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20=
'cvml',%20'hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net');>>, "odonoghue@isoc.org<javascript:_=
e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odonoghue@isoc.org');>" <odonoghue@isoc.org<javascri=
pt:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odonoghue@isoc.org');>>
> CC: "jose@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');>" =
<jose@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');>>
> Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

> Hi Hannes,
>
> One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery
> and/or negotiation.  (This fits into your (b) - there is another higher l=
ayer
> specification that says what is required.)  For instance, if two parties
> come to understand through discovery that both support an extension, then=
 they
> are free to use it between themselves.
>
> For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover what
> algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those that =
are
> implemented by both communicating parties.  I can't imagine that this is
> the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.
>
> When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don't have to
> ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the first
> place.
>
>     Best wishes,
>     -- Mike
>
> P.S.  Yes, you're right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could be used
> in some cases too.  For instance, OAuth deployments almost all employ
> out-of-band agreements.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose-bounc=
es@ietf.org');> [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml=
',%20'jose-bounces@ietf.org');>] On Behalf Of
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM
> To: odonoghue@isoc.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odonoghue@isoc.=
org');>
> Cc: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'hannes.t=
schofenig@gmx.net');>; jose@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jos=
e@ietf.org');>
> Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
>
> Hi Karen,
>
> thanks for running this poll.
>
> My problem with answering your questions is the following:
>
> The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle extensions=
.
> While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must be
> implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually
> referring to with question #1.
>
> So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone
> answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:
>
> a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a
> federation) that defines what values need to be present, or
>
> b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is required=
.
>
> I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with YES
> since they are thinking that they will just write that specification as
> part of OpenID Connect.
>
> If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid
> raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work pro=
vides.
>
> If there is a different plan then please let me know.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> > Folks,
> >
> > I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> > criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> > specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and
> > the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj:
> > Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We
> > need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the
> specifications.
> >
> > As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward,
> > the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11
> > February 2013.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Karen
> >
> > *******************
> > FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations
> > to understand?
> >
> > YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by
> > implementations or the input must be rejected.
> >
> > NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely
> > ignored should be defined.
> >
> > ********************
> > SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
> > like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to
> > understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole
> > - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a
> > JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then
> > leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For
> > those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the
> > responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for
> > the remaining headers would then fall to the application."
> >
> > YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement
> > is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE
> > libraries.
> >
> > NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
> >
> > ************************
> > THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> > would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored
> > if not understood?
> >
> > A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> > safely ignored if not understood.
> >
> > B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand
> > all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in
> > the second.
> >
> > C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');>
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I agree with you that we =
don&#8217;t need to define a negotiation mechanism.&nbsp; As I believe Hann=
es correctly observed, either negotiation or out-of-band agreement
 will typically be used to agree on parameters to be used, but it&#8217;s n=
ot the job of this working group to define them.&nbsp; In fact, the right c=
hoices are typically dependent upon the particular use case.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I know of three publicly =
known systems built using the current JOSE specs (Mozilla Persona, a system=
 Dick Hardt is building for the province of BC, and OpenID
 Connect) where one of these techniques are applied.&nbsp; None of them nee=
ds to ignore parameters, to my knowledge.&nbsp; See
<a href=3D"http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html">http:=
//openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html</a> for the discovery =
system used by latter.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">My main point is that jus=
t because we don&#8217;t define a discovery mechanism, that doesn&#8217;t m=
ean that one won&#8217;t be used, when appropriate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, February 07, 2013 8:08 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Karen O'Donoghue; Hannes Tschofenig; jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">One might note that TLS does not require that all he=
aders be understood. &nbsp;You can send SNI, say, without the risk of break=
ing interop with&nbsp;older servers.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">More to the point, unless you're going to actually d=
efine a negotiation mechanism, saying that one would help is not all that c=
onstructive. This group needs to either define a negotiation mechanism, or =
else not add features for which negotiation
 is a absolute requirement. &nbsp;And I would strongly oppose the former, a=
s an unnecessary expansion of scope.&nbsp;<br>
<br>
--Richard<br>
<br>
<br>
On Thursday, February 7, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">I agree that this should be described in the document.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">One common application that uses discovery/negotiation t=
o decide what algorithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">-- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E5E5E5 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0i=
n 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quo=
t;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></strong><span style=3D"font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;Hannes Tschofenig<br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">Sent:</span></strong>&nbsp;February 7, 2013 12:51 AM<br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">To:</span></strong>&nbsp;Mike Jones,
<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odonoghue@isoc.org');" target=
=3D"_blank">
odonoghue@isoc.org</a>, <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'hanne=
s.tschofenig@gmx.net');" target=3D"_blank">
hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a><br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">CC:</span></strong>&nbsp;<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'=
jose@ietf.org');" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">Subject:</span></strong>&nbsp;Re: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticalit=
y<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">Hi Mike, <br>
<br>
whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to d=
escribe this in the document since other specifications have followed a dif=
ferent approach.
<br>
<br>
Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this extensib=
ility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.
<br>
<br>
I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past. My=
 understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the mandator=
y to implement functionality is defined in the specification and additional=
 specifications indicate what additional
 extensions have to be used. Is my understanding correct? <br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
-------- Original-Nachricht --------<br>
&gt; Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 &#43;0000<br>
&gt; Von: Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'Mich=
ael.Jones@microsoft.com');" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</=
a>&gt;<br>
&gt; An: Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%2=
0'hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net');" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net=
</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odonoghue@iso=
c.org');" target=3D"_blank">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"jav=
ascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odonoghue@isoc.org');" target=3D"_blank">od=
onoghue@isoc.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; CC: &quot;<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org'=
);" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"javascript:_e(=
%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>&=
gt;<br>
&gt; Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br>
<br>
&gt; Hi Hannes,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery<=
br>
&gt; and/or negotiation.&nbsp; (This fits into your (b) - there is another =
higher layer<br>
&gt; specification that says what is required.)&nbsp; For instance, if two =
parties<br>
&gt; come to understand through discovery that both support an extension, t=
hen they<br>
&gt; are free to use it between themselves.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover wha=
t<br>
&gt; algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those th=
at are<br>
&gt; implemented by both communicating parties.&nbsp; I can't imagine that =
this is<br>
&gt; the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don't have =
to<br>
&gt; ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the firs=
t<br>
&gt; place.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Best wishes,<br>
&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;-- Mike<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; P.S.&nbsp; Yes, you're right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could =
be used<br>
&gt; in some cases too.&nbsp; For instance, OAuth deployments almost all em=
ploy<br>
&gt; out-of-band agreements.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose-bounces@ietf.=
org');" target=3D"_blank">
jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml'=
,%20'jose-bounces@ietf.org');" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]=
 On Behalf Of<br>
&gt; Hannes Tschofenig<br>
&gt; Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM<br>
&gt; To: <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'odonoghue@isoc.org')=
;" target=3D"_blank">
odonoghue@isoc.org</a><br>
&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'hannes.tschofenig@gm=
x.net');" target=3D"_blank">
hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>; <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%2=
0'jose@ietf.org');" target=3D"_blank">
jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Hi Karen,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; thanks for running this poll.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; My problem with answering your questions is the following:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle extensi=
ons.<br>
&gt; While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must =
be<br>
&gt; implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually=
<br>
&gt; referring to with question #1.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone<b=
r>
&gt; answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a<br=
>
&gt; federation) that defines what values need to be present, or<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is requi=
red.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with =
YES<br>
&gt; since they are thinking that they will just write that specification a=
s<br>
&gt; part of OpenID Connect.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid<b=
r>
&gt; raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work =
provides.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; If there is a different plan then please let me know.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Ciao<br>
&gt; Hannes<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Folks,<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of <=
br>
&gt; &gt; criticality of headers. For background, please review the current=
 <br>
&gt; &gt; specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), =
and <br>
&gt; &gt; the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Sub=
j: <br>
&gt; &gt; Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)).=
 We <br>
&gt; &gt; need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the<br=
>
&gt; specifications.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forw=
ard, <br>
&gt; &gt; the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 <=
br>
&gt; &gt; February 2013.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; &gt; Karen<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; *******************<br>
&gt; &gt; FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementati=
ons <br>
&gt; &gt; to understand?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by <br>
&gt; &gt; implementations or the input must be rejected.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely=
 <br>
&gt; &gt; ignored should be defined.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ********************<br>
&gt; &gt; SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;YES&quo=
t;, should text <br>
&gt; &gt; like the following be added? &quot;Implementation Note: The requi=
rement to <br>
&gt; &gt; understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a =
whole <br>
&gt; &gt; - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, =
a <br>
&gt; &gt; JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and th=
en <br>
&gt; &gt; leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. F=
or <br>
&gt; &gt; those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the <br>
&gt; &gt; responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement f=
or <br>
&gt; &gt; the remaining headers would then fall to the application.&quot;<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; YES - Add the text clarifying that the &quot;MUST understand&quot=
; requirement <br>
&gt; &gt; is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on J=
OSE <br>
&gt; &gt; libraries.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; NO - Don't add the clarifying text.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ************************<br>
&gt; &gt; THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;NO&quot;=
, which syntax <br>
&gt; &gt; would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ig=
nored <br>
&gt; &gt; if not understood?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that m=
ay be <br>
&gt; &gt; safely ignored if not understood.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must underst=
and <br>
&gt; &gt; all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields=
 in <br>
&gt; &gt; the second.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) <br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');" t=
arget=3D"_blank">
jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');" target=
=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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The comparison with TLS is a bit tricky since JOSE is not a =
multi-roundtrip protocol but rather a one-shot message (similar to XML =
digital signature and XML encryption, CMS, or PSKC).=20

There is an IAB document that is relevant to this discussion, namely =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6709

Interestingly Appendix A.3 talks about TLS extensions and makes a few =
remarks that are relevant to this discussion (see =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6709#appendix-A.3):

"
   It has turned out that many SSLv3 and TLS implementations that do not
   support TLS extensions did not ignore the unknown extensions, as
   required by the protocol specifications, but instead failed to
   establish connections.
"

At a minimum I expect that the document describe a story for how =
extensions are behind handled.

Ciao
Hannes

On Feb 8, 2013, at 6:08 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:

> One might note that TLS does not require that all headers be =
understood.  You can send SNI, say, without the risk of breaking interop =
with older servers.=20
>=20
> More to the point, unless you're going to actually define a =
negotiation mechanism, saying that one would help is not all that =
constructive. This group needs to either define a negotiation mechanism, =
or else not add features for which negotiation is a absolute =
requirement.  And I would strongly oppose the former, as an unnecessary =
expansion of scope.=20
>=20
> --Richard
>=20
>=20
> On Thursday, February 7, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:
> I agree that this should be described in the document.
> =20
> One common application that uses discovery/negotiation to decide what =
algorithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).
> =20
> Cheers,
> -- Mike
> =20
> From: Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: February 7, 2013 12:51 AM
> To: Mike Jones, odonoghue@isoc.org, hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
> CC: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
> =20
> Hi Mike,=20
>=20
> whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important =
to describe this in the document since other specifications have =
followed a different approach.=20
>=20
> Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this =
extensibility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.=20
>=20
> I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the =
past. My understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where =
the mandatory to implement functionality is defined in the specification =
and additional specifications indicate what additional extensions have =
to be used. Is my understanding correct?=20
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
> -------- Original-Nachricht --------
> > Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 +0000
> > Von: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
> > An: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, =
"odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>
> > CC: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
> > Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
>=20
> > Hi Hannes,
> >=20
> > One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through =
discovery
> > and/or negotiation.  (This fits into your (b) - there is another =
higher layer
> > specification that says what is required.)  For instance, if two =
parties
> > come to understand through discovery that both support an extension, =
then they
> > are free to use it between themselves.
> >=20
> > For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover =
what
> > algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those =
that are
> > implemented by both communicating parties.  I can't imagine that =
this is
> > the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or =
negotiation.
> >=20
> > When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don't =
have to
> > ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the =
first
> > place.
> >=20
> >     Best wishes,
> >     -- Mike
> >=20
> > P.S.  Yes, you're right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could be =
used
> > in some cases too.  For instance, OAuth deployments almost all =
employ
> > out-of-band agreements.
> >=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of
> > Hannes Tschofenig
> > Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM
> > To: odonoghue@isoc.org
> > Cc: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net; jose@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
> >=20
> > Hi Karen,
> >=20
> > thanks for running this poll.
> >=20
> > My problem with answering your questions is the following:
> >=20
> > The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle =
extensions.
> > While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X =
must be
> > implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are =
actually
> > referring to with question #1.
> >=20
> > So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone
> > answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:
> >=20
> > a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a
> > federation) that defines what values need to be present, or
> >=20
> > b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is =
required.
> >=20
> > I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question =
with YES
> > since they are thinking that they will just write that specification =
as
> > part of OpenID Connect.
> >=20
> > If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid
> > raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this =
work provides.
> >=20
> > If there is a different plan then please let me know.
> >=20
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >=20
> >=20
> > On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> > > Folks,
> > >
> > > I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of=20
> > > criticality of headers. For background, please review the current=20=

> > > specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), =
and=20
> > > the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with =
(Subj:=20
> > > Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). =
We=20
> > > need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the
> > specifications.
> > >
> > > As a tool to gather further information on determining a way =
forward,=20
> > > the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11=20
> > > February 2013.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Karen
> > >
> > > *******************
> > > FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for =
implementations=20
> > > to understand?
> > >
> > > YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by=20
> > > implementations or the input must be rejected.
> > >
> > > NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely=20=

> > > ignored should be defined.
> > >
> > > ********************
> > > SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should =
text=20
> > > like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement =
to=20
> > > understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a =
whole=20
> > > - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a=20=

> > > JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and =
then=20
> > > leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. =
For=20
> > > those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the=20
> > > responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement =
for=20
> > > the remaining headers would then fall to the application."
> > >
> > > YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" =
requirement=20
> > > is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on =
JOSE=20
> > > libraries.
> > >
> > > NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
> > >
> > > ************************
> > > THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which =
syntax=20
> > > would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be =
ignored=20
> > > if not understood?
> > >
> > > A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that =
may be=20
> > > safely ignored if not understood.
> > >
> > > B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must =
understand=20
> > > all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields =
in=20
> > > the second.
> > >
> > > C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)=20
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > jose mailing list
> > > jose@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Fri Feb  8 00:06:49 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI - KID conflict -- Re:  SPI proposal
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Yes, it needs to be clarified in the text that it also refers to the =
algorithms associated with that key.=20

And: I noticed that the kid is now a header parameter (which is good).=20=


On Feb 7, 2013, at 4:40 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:

> As I understood it, 'kid' identifies a key, not the whole collection =
of security parameters.  But if that's not the case, sure, we can use =
'kid'.
>=20
> In either case, apparently the spec needs to be clarified.
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 1:35 AM, Hannes Tschofenig =
<hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>=20
> when I tried to use the JW* specifications in OAuth my assumption was =
that the kid (key id) provides exactly the purpose you outline below =
(and call spi). (Btw, I prefer kid rather than SPI).
>=20
> The only problem with the KID, as I raised on the list before, is that =
it should be in the header and not in the body (since otherwise it would =
not be visible when the data inside the body is encrypted.
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
> On 02/07/2013 12:11 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for
> an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters
> index", borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where
> the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save
> the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.
>=20
> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for
> JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is
> probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification =
sections.
>=20
> Feedback welcome,
> --Richard
>=20
> -----BEGIN-----
> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>=20
> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an
> opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This =
index
> is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where =
entities
> will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>=20
> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a =
table
> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object =
whose
> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
> -- Contents of the JWE header
> -- Encrypted Key
> -- Initialization Vector
>=20
> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, =
then
> it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That =
is,
> it will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a
> recipient receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve
> cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full
> JWE.  This full JWE can then be further processed according to the
> normal JWE processing rules.  If the recipient has no cached =
parameters
> for the "spi" value, the process MUST fail.
> -----END-----
>=20
>=20
> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
>=20


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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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The question around the header-size is independent of the kid vs. spi =
proposal. In both cases the content could be the same, i.e., the key =
name are the same.=20

In the context of OAuth (and OpenID connect) there is actually a key =
distribution protocol build around it and that's, for example, what the =
MAC specification does.=20

On Feb 7, 2013, at 4:52 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:

> The motivation here is not very deep.  A lot of the current design =
(e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size.  The =
SPI proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities =
will be exchanging many JOSE objects.  I understood from some =
discussions with OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use =
cases.
>=20
> Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this =
stuff (cf. IKE for IPsec).  Whatever application is using this would =
need to figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as =
things like what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI.  =
(I don't think collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the =
sender just ensures uniqueness.)  The idea of this basic proposal is to =
establish the basic behavior, around which you could then wrap more =
advanced management. =20
>=20
> --Richard
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
> Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation =
behind it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does =
the receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index =
collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this =
could be very cumbersome.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for =
an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters =
index", borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where =
the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save =
the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.
>=20
> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for =
JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is =
probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification =
sections.
>=20
> Feedback welcome,
> --Richard
>=20
> -----BEGIN-----
> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>=20
> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an =
opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index =
is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities =
will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>=20
> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a =
table of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object =
whose header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache =
the following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
> -- Contents of the JWE header
> -- Encrypted Key
> -- Initialization Vector
>=20
> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, =
then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  =
That is, it will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  =
When a recipient receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to =
retrieve cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs =
a full JWE.  This full JWE can then be further processed according to =
the normal JWE processing rules.  If the recipient has no cached =
parameters for the "spi" value, the process MUST fail.
> -----END-----
>=20
>=20
> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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--e89a8f2346bb3fa6f904d537481c
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Seems to me that, in the absence of more advanced management, the use of
spi is potentially very very fragile. And that, in many cases, such
advanced management would be a lot more trouble than it's worth. But maybe
I'm missing the bigger picture.

My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar) and the
JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another thought a web
browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation doesn't lend itself
well to use of spi or even easily creating some management protocol around
it.

WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but there's
not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?

Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But I'd
like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity or
potential operational or security issues when doing so.






On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> The motivation here is not very deep.  A lot of the current design (e.g.,
> the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size.  The SPI
> proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities will be
> exchanging many JOSE objects.  I understood from some discussions with
> OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.
>
> Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this stuff
> (cf. IKE for IPsec).  Whatever application is using this would need to
> figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as things like
> what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI.  (I don't think
> collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the sender just ensures
> uniqueness.)  The idea of this basic proposal is to establish the basic
> behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced management.
>
> --Richard
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com
> > wrote:
>
>> Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind
>> it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the
>> receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index
>> collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this could
>> be very cumbersome.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>
>>> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for
>>> an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
>>> borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
>>> crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
>>> from having to re-send the same parameters.
>>>
>>> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for
>>> JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
>>> needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.
>>>
>>> Feedback welcome,
>>> --Richard
>>>
>>> -----BEGIN-----
>>> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>>>
>>> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an
>>> opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
>>> designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will
>>> be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>>>
>>> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
>>> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
>>> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
>>> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
>>> -- Contents of the JWE header
>>> -- Encrypted Key
>>> -- Initialization Vector
>>>
>>> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then
>>> it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
>>> will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
>>> receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header,
>>> key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE
>>> can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.
>>>  If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process
>>> MUST fail.
>>> -----END-----
>>>
>>>
>>> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>
>>>
>>
>

--e89a8f2346bb3fa6f904d537481c
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Seems to me that, in the absence of more ad=
vanced management, the use of spi is potentially very very fragile. And tha=
t, in many cases, such advanced management would be a lot more trouble than=
 it&#39;s worth. But maybe I&#39;m missing the bigger picture.<br>


<br></div>My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar)=
 and the JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another thought =
a web browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation doesn&#39;t len=
d itself well to use of spi or even easily creating some management protoco=
l around it.<br>


<br></div>WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but t=
here&#39;s not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?<br><br></=
div>Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But I&=
#39;d like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity or=
 potential operational or security issues when doing so. <br>

<div><br>=A0<br><div><br><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">


<div dir=3D"ltr">The motivation here is not very deep. =A0A lot of the curr=
ent design (e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header siz=
e. =A0The SPI proposal further compresses header size in cases where two en=
tities will be exchanging many JOSE objects. =A0I understood from some disc=
ussions with OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.=
<div>



<br></div><div>Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol aroun=
d this stuff (cf. IKE for IPsec). =A0Whatever application is using this wou=
ld need to figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as thin=
gs like what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI. =A0(I don=
&#39;t think collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the sender =
just ensures uniqueness.) =A0The idea of this basic proposal is to establis=
h the basic behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced manage=
ment. =A0</div>


<span><font color=3D"#888888">
<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div></font></span></div><div><div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at =
9:42 AM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@p=
ingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br>



<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Adm=
ittedly I&#39;m not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind it=
 but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the receiver=
 protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index collision? And fo=
r distributed environments, it seems supporting this could be very cumberso=
me.<br>





<br><br><br></div><br><div><br><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><div>On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM,=
 Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=
=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>





</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed=
 text for an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;security par=
ameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is that in ca=
ses where the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would =
save the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.<div>






<br></div><div>The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be ad=
apted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Similar text=
 is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sect=
ions.</div>






<div><br></div><div>Feedback welcome,</div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>-----BEGIN-----</div><div>Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Par=
ameter</div><div><br></div><div>The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters In=
dex) header parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of s=
ecurity parameters. =A0This index is designed to enable the use of smaller =
headers in cases where entities will be re-using the same security paramete=
rs for several messages.<br>






</div><div><br></div><div>Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot=
; parameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. =A0When an=
 entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &=
quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the JWE=
, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:</div>






<div>-- Contents of the JWE header</div><div>-- Encrypted Key</div><div>-- =
Initialization Vector</div><div><br></div><div>If an object containing an &=
quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT=
 contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector. =A0That is, it will hav=
e the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. =A0When a recipie=
nt receives such an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve c=
ached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. =
=A0This full JWE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE =
processing rules. =A0If the recipient has no cached parameters for the &quo=
t;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.</div>






<div>-----END-----<br><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>[9]=A0<a href=3D"h=
ttp://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.=
ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a></div></div></div>
<br></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--e89a8f2346bb3fa6f904d537481c--

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL: YES, but only for top level keys.
SECOND POLL: YES
THIRD POLL: C, +1 for defining a ignorable parameters container key as =
Dick proposed.

On 2013/02/07, at 2:40, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:

> I misunderstood the Third Poll options.
>=20
> I was thinking that all properties to be ignored would be a property =
of the header object. ie. all ignorable properties are sub property of a =
"ignorable" property.
>=20
> eg. all "ign" properties can be ignored
>=20
> { "alg": "ES256"
> , "ign":=20
> 	{  "notes":"this property can be ignored" }
> }
>=20
>=20
> So I am voting C for the third poll, a different option.
>=20
> btw: I continue to be surprised that we are using JSON and only doing =
name/value pairs.
>=20
> -- Dick
>=20
> On Feb 6, 2013, at 9:03 AM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> FIRST POLL: Yes
>>=20
>> SECOND POLL: YES
>>=20
>> THIRD POLL: B
>>=20
>> On Feb 4, 2013, at 6:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> Folks,
>>>=20
>>> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of =
criticality of headers. For background, please review the current =
specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the =
mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether =
implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to =
come to closure on this issue in order to progress the specifications.
>>>=20
>>> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way =
forward, the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 =
February 2013.
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>> Karen
>>>=20
>>> *******************
>>> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations =
to understand?
>>>=20
>>> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by =
implementations or the input must be rejected.
>>>=20
>>> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely =
ignored should be defined.
>>>=20
>>> ********************
>>> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should =
text like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The =
requirement to understand all header fields is a requirement on the =
system as a whole =96 not on any particular level of library software. =
For instance, a JOSE library could process the headers that it =
understands and then leave the processing of the rest of them up to the =
application. For those headers that the JOSE library didn=92t =
understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST understand=92 =
requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the =
application.=94
>>>=20
>>> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 =
requirement is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not =
specifically on JOSE libraries.
>>>=20
>>> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>>>=20
>>> ************************
>>> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which =
syntax would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be =
ignored if not understood?
>>>=20
>>> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that =
may be safely ignored if not understood.
>>>=20
>>> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must =
understand all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood =
fields in the second.
>>>=20
>>> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Subject: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be =
worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  =
A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One =
impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and =
potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK =
object.  However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX =
certificate JWK would solve some problems.

Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to =
start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.


Thoughts?

- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com> =
wrote:

> I could also see it like the following:
>=20
> {
>  "kty":"RSA",
>  "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
>  "n":".....",
>  "e":"AQAB",
>  "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
>  // and/or "x5c":[....]
> }
>=20
> Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in =
XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
>=20
> Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
>=20
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
> On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
>=20
>> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind =
of X509
>> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as =
many
>> days.
>>=20
>> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it =
seems like
>> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
>> overcome such pity objections?
>>=20
>> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John =
has in
>> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than =
just a
>> formality.
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>>>=20
>>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>>>=20
>>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for =
signing.
>>>=20
>>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain =
it is a
>>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy =
way to
>>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>>>=20
>>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a =
single
>>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>>>=20
>>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being =
sent
>>> in band.
>>>=20
>>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same =
thing.
>>>=20
>>> John B.
>>>=20
>>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" =
<mamille2@cisco.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful =
and
>>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it =
would be
>>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? =
Which
>>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that =
might be
>>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" =
question but
>>> I
>>>>> digress...
>>>>=20
>>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>>>>=20
>>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs =
can be
>>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>>>>=20
>>>> {
>>>> "kty":"X509",
>>>> "x5c": [....]
>>>> }
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> - m&m
>>>>=20
>>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>>>=20
>>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient =
decrypts
>>> with a
>>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender =
used to
>>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though =
a
>>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping =
its
>>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is =
to
>>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Thanks Brian
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> John B.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>>>>=20
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition =
that
>>> struck
>>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> From
>>>>>>=20
>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted
>>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public =
key
>>> of
>>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the =
entity
>>> that
>>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]
>>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
>>> missing
>>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
>>> chain?
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix=
-B>of
>>> [
>>>>>> JWS<
>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>>>> ]
>>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which =
is
>>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better =
to
>>> just
>>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously,
>>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>>> there's
>>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>>> identify its
>>>>>> own key.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 19:00:23 +0100
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=us-ascii"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=us-ascii"><div style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">FIRST POLL:&nbsp; YES<o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">SECOND POLL:&nbsp; YES<o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">THIRD POLL:&nbsp; A</div></div></body></html>
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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:56:22 -0700
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References: <CA+k3eCRbkefo3M+7QK_anM+H-VQLj2b+Jvw+8EXKPnSuc4Y_7Q@mail.gmail.com> <DAD9D0F9-1889-41B8-8F87-2FC689E9397B@ve7jtb.com> <CA+k3eCQqTpiTdDwdkqFNU9UApM8H4TjjkKq+XupSQuhLkbjRsg@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED94115109840@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <0BC322C1-A6C5-46B8-BC2A-3A7E000952EF@ve7jtb.com> <CA+k3eCTi1Ss2grSALqZngtnCfv8ks0xRm_uXaeA7cdngua4_VQ@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED9411510A1F3@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED9411511DB49@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com>
To: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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I agree that being able to include a x5c or reference a x5u form a JWK =
allows for more consistency around key references and key use.

I support developing an ID to discuss this.

John B.
On 2013-02-08, at 11:47 AM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" =
<mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:

> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be =
worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  =
A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One =
impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and =
potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK =
object.  However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX =
certificate JWK would solve some problems.
>=20
> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to =
start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>=20
>=20
> Thoughts?
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
> On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) =
<mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:
>=20
>> I could also see it like the following:
>>=20
>> {
>> "kty":"RSA",
>> "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
>> "n":".....",
>> "e":"AQAB",
>> "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
>> // and/or "x5c":[....]
>> }
>>=20
>> Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in =
XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
>>=20
>> Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
>>=20
>>=20
>> - m&m
>>=20
>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>=20
>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>=20
>>> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind =
of X509
>>> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as =
many
>>> days.
>>>=20
>>> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it =
seems like
>>> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
>>> overcome such pity objections?
>>>=20
>>> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John =
has in
>>> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than =
just a
>>> formality.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>>>>=20
>>>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>>>>=20
>>>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for =
signing.
>>>>=20
>>>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain =
it is a
>>>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no =
easy way to
>>>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>>>>=20
>>>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a =
single
>>>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>>>>=20
>>>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being =
sent
>>>> in band.
>>>>=20
>>>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same =
thing.
>>>>=20
>>>> John B.
>>>>=20
>>>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" =
<mamille2@cisco.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more =
meaningful and
>>>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it =
would be
>>>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? =
Which
>>>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that =
might be
>>>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" =
question but
>>>> I
>>>>>> digress...
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs =
can be
>>>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>>>>>=20
>>>>> {
>>>>> "kty":"X509",
>>>>> "x5c": [....]
>>>>> }
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> - m&m
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>>>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient =
decrypts
>>>> with a
>>>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender =
used to
>>>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference =
though a
>>>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping =
its
>>>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is =
to
>>>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> Thanks Brian
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> John B.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition =
that
>>>> struck
>>>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> From
>>>>>>>=20
>>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted
>>>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the =
public key
>>>> of
>>>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the =
entity
>>>> that
>>>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]
>>>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe =
I'm
>>>> missing
>>>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own =
certificate
>>>> chain?
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix=
-B>of
>>>> [
>>>>>>> JWS<
>>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>>>>> ]
>>>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, =
which is
>>>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be =
better to
>>>> just
>>>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously,
>>>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>>>> there's
>>>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>>>> identify its
>>>>>>> own key.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 12:43:35 -0700
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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I also support it (though I guess that's kind of obvious huh?).


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> I agree that being able to include a x5c or reference a x5u form a JWK
> allows for more consistency around key references and key use.
>
> I support developing an ID to discuss this.
>
> John B.
> On 2013-02-08, at 11:47 AM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
> wrote:
>
> > After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be
> worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  A
> couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One impact, I
> think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and
> "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object.  However, a few of
> us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some
> problems.
> >
> > Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to
> start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
> >
> >
> > Thoughts?
> >
> > - m&m
> >
> > Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> > Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >
> > On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> I could also see it like the following:
> >>
> >> {
> >> "kty":"RSA",
> >> "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
> >> "n":".....",
> >> "e":"AQAB",
> >> "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
> >> // and/or "x5c":[....]
> >> }
> >>
> >> Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in
> XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
> >>
> >> Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
> >>
> >>
> >> - m&m
> >>
> >> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> >> Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >>
> >> On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com
> >
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of
> X509
> >>> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as
> many
> >>> days.
> >>>
> >>> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems
> like
> >>> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
> >>> overcome such pity objections?
> >>>
> >>> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has
> in
> >>> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than
> just a
> >>> formality.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
> >>>>
> >>>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
> >>>>
> >>>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for
> signing.
> >>>>
> >>>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it
> is a
> >>>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy
> way to
> >>>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
> >>>>
> >>>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a
> single
> >>>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
> >>>>
> >>>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being
> sent
> >>>> in band.
> >>>>
> >>>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same
> thing.
> >>>>
> >>>> John B.
> >>>>
> >>>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <
> mamille2@cisco.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <
> bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful
> and
> >>>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it
> would be
> >>>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right?
> Which
> >>>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that
> might be
> >>>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question
> but
> >>>> I
> >>>>>> digress...
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can
> be
> >>>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> {
> >>>>> "kty":"X509",
> >>>>> "x5c": [....]
> >>>>> }
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - m&m
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> >>>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts
> >>>> with a
> >>>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender
> used to
> >>>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
> >>>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping
> its
> >>>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
> >>>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Thanks Brian
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> John B.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <
> bcampbell@pingidentity.com
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
> >>>> struck
> >>>>>>> me as maybe not right.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> From
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that
> encrypted
> >>>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public
> key
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity
> >>>> that
> >>>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to
> [RFC5280]
> >>>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
> >>>> missing
> >>>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
> >>>> chain?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
> >>>>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B
> >of
> >>>> [
> >>>>>>> JWS<
> >>>>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
> >>>>> ]
> >>>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which
> is
> >>>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better
> to
> >>>> just
> >>>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out
> previously,
> >>>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
> >>>> there's
> >>>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
> >>>> identify its
> >>>>>>> own key.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>> jose mailing list
> >>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
> >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> jose mailing list
> >>>>>> jose@ietf.org
> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> jose mailing list
> >> jose@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I also support it (though I guess that&#39;s kind of obvio=
us huh?).<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</=
span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I agree that being able to include a x5c or =
reference a x5u form a JWK allows for more consistency around key reference=
s and key use.<br>



<br>
I support developing an ID to discuss this.<br>
<br>
John B.<br>
<div><div>On 2013-02-08, at 11:47 AM, &quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&quot; &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.co=
m</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be wo=
rthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. =A0A c=
ouple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. =A0One impact, I =
think, is that anywhere we currently have &quot;x5c&quot; (and potentially =
&quot;x5t&quot; and &quot;x5u&quot;) are effectively replaced by an actual =
JWK object. =A0However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX certi=
ficate JWK would solve some problems.<br>



&gt;<br>
&gt; Unless there&#39;s strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely t=
o start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thoughts?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I could also see it like the following:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; {<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;kty&quot;:&quot;RSA&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;kid&quot;:&quot;juliet@capulet.lit&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;n&quot;:&quot;.....&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;e&quot;:&quot;AQAB&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;x5u&quot;:&quot;<a href=3D"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt</a>&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt; // and/or &quot;x5c&quot;:[....]<br>
&gt;&gt; }<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Having a &quot;X509&quot; JWK type might solve one problem I can s=
ee having in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the ab=
ove.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_=
blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a=
>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some=
 kind of X509<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice=
 in as many<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; days.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, =
it seems like<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it&#39;d be useful=
 enough to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; overcome such pity objections?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Though, to be fair, Matt&#39;s idea is pretty different than w=
hat John has in<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more =
than just a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; formality.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the li=
st.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements=
 to jwk.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover=
 for signing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a ve=
rt chain it is a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there =
is no easy way to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can=
 have a single<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; keyid and key use that apples to both formats.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it=
 is being sent<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in band.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking=
 the same thing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, &quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&qu=
ot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@ci=
sco.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingide=
ntity.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot=
 more meaningful and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for=
 JWE. But it would be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; about the encrypting party or sender&#39;s certs i=
n that case, right? Which<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would be different than how it&#39;s currently bei=
ng used. And that might be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; another argument for not having it in JWE right no=
w.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Of course that starts to beg the &quot;must unders=
tand headers&quot; question but<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; digress...<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I was starting to come to similar conclusions.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x=
.509 certs can be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrapped into a JSON Web Key?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; {<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;kty&quot;:&quot;X509&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;x5c&quot;: [....]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; }<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a=
>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) th=
e recipoient decrypts<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; with a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; secret. =A0I would expect a kid in the header.=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I suppose they if the recipient published a x5=
c that the sender used to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; encrypt with then you could include the x5c as=
 a reference though a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient i=
s probably keeping its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; private keys in a key-store of some sort.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In any event we would minimally want to change=
 that to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public ke=
y of the entity that is to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate.=
&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks Brian<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@=
pingidentity.com</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE&#=
39;s x5c definition that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; struck<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; me as maybe not right.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; From<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json=
-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public ke=
y of the entity that encrypted<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot; -=
 but it&#39;s not the public key<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the entity that encrypted, is it? It&#39;s the=
 public key of the entity<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; will decrypt. The other entity.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The recipient MUST verify the certificat=
e chain according to [RFC5280]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and reject the JWE if any validation failure o=
ccurs.&quot; - maybe I&#39;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; missing<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; something but why would the recipient verify i=
t&#39;s own certificate<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; chain?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; And the first hyperlink in &quot;See Appendix =
B&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json=
-web-encryption-08#appendix-B" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html=
/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B</a>&gt;of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; [<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; JWS&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json=
-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/dr=
aft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; for an example &quot;x5c&quot; value&quot; tak=
es you to Appendix B of JWE, which is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text =
would suggest.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So all those little nits could be fixed. But m=
aybe it&#39;d be better to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; just<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard p=
ointed out previously,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/jose/current/msg01434.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-ar=
chive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html</a>,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; there&#39;s<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; really no point in sending a whole chain to he=
lp the recipient<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; identify its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; own key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ______________________________________________=
_<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_bl=
ank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin=
fo/jose" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/j=
ose" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</=
a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_=
blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><b=
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<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in	JWE]
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+1

 

From: Brian Campbell [mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com] 
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 2:44 PM
To: John Bradley
Cc: jose@ietf.org; Matt Miller (mamille2)
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in
JWE]

 

I also support it (though I guess that's kind of obvious huh?).

 

On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

I agree that being able to include a x5c or reference a x5u form a JWK
allows for more consistency around key references and key use.

I support developing an ID to discuss this.

John B.

On 2013-02-08, at 11:47 AM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
wrote:

> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be
worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  A
couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One impact, I
think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and
"x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object.  However, a few of
us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some
problems.
>
> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to start
work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>
>
> Thoughts?
>
> - m&m
>
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>
> On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com>
wrote:
>
>> I could also see it like the following:
>>
>> {
>> "kty":"RSA",
>> "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
>> "n":".....",
>> "e":"AQAB",
>> "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
>> // and/or "x5c":[....]
>> }
>>
>> Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in
XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
>>
>> Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
>>
>>
>> - m&m
>>
>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>
>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of
X509
>>> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as
many
>>> days.
>>>
>>> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems
like
>>> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
>>> overcome such pity objections?
>>>
>>> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has
in
>>> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just
a
>>> formality.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>>>>
>>>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>>>>
>>>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing.
>>>>
>>>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it
is a
>>>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy
way to
>>>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>>>>
>>>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a
single
>>>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>>>>
>>>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being
sent
>>>> in band.
>>>>
>>>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same
thing.
>>>>
>>>> John B.
>>>>
>>>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)"
<mamille2@cisco.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful
and
>>>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would
be
>>>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right?
Which
>>>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might
be
>>>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question
but
>>>> I
>>>>>> digress...
>>>>>
>>>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>>>>>
>>>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can
be
>>>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>> "kty":"X509",
>>>>> "x5c": [....]
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - m&m
>>>>>
>>>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>>>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts
>>>> with a
>>>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used
to
>>>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
>>>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its
>>>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
>>>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks Brian
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> John B.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
>>>> struck
>>>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From
>>>>>>>
>>>>
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.
1.9
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that
encrypted
>>>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public
key
>>>> of
>>>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity
>>>> that
>>>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to
[RFC5280]
>>>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
>>>> missing
>>>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
>>>> chain?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>>>>
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B
>of
>>>> [
>>>>>>> JWS<
>>>>
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>>>>> ]
>>>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
>>>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to
>>>> just
>>>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
>>>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>>>> there's
>>>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>>>> identify its
>>>>>>> own key.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>+1<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Brian Campbell [mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> =
Friday, February 08, 2013 2:44 PM<br><b>To:</b> John =
Bradley<br><b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org; Matt Miller =
(mamille2)<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? =
[WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I also =
support it (though I guess that's kind of obvious =
huh?).<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Bradley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>I agree that being able to include a x5c or reference =
a x5u form a JWK allows for more consistency around key references and =
key use.<br><br>I support developing an ID to discuss this.<br><br>John =
B.<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>On 2013-02-08, at 11:47 AM, &quot;Matt =
Miller (mamille2)&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br>&gt; After =
some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be worthwhile =
to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. &nbsp;A =
couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. &nbsp;One =
impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have &quot;x5c&quot; (and =
potentially &quot;x5t&quot; and &quot;x5u&quot;) are effectively =
replaced by an actual JWK object. &nbsp;However, a few of us have other =
use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some =
problems.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Unless there's strong objection, Brian =
Campbell and I are likely to start work on a new I-D that documents our =
musings.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Thoughts?<br>&gt;<br>&gt; - =
m&amp;m<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a =
href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>&gt; Cisco Systems, =
Inc.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; =
I could also see it like the following:<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; =
{<br>&gt;&gt; &quot;kty&quot;:&quot;RSA&quot;,<br>&gt;&gt; =
&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;<a =
href=3D"mailto:juliet@capulet.lit">juliet@capulet.lit</a>&quot;,<br>&gt;&=
gt; &quot;n&quot;:&quot;.....&quot;,<br>&gt;&gt; =
&quot;e&quot;:&quot;AQAB&quot;,<br>&gt;&gt; &quot;x5u&quot;:&quot;<a =
href=3D"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt" =
target=3D"_blank">https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt</a>&quot;<br>&gt;&gt; =
// and/or &quot;x5c&quot;:[....]<br>&gt;&gt; }<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; =
Having a &quot;X509&quot; JWK type might solve one problem I can see =
having in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the =
above.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; Then again, I could be completely off in =
the weeds.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; - =
m&amp;m<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a =
href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, =
Inc.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" =
target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; =
wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, =
the general idea of some kind of X509<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; support in JWK has =
now independently come up in my world twice in as many<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =
days.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; I must say that, from a general =
design of things perspective, it seems like<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; a total =
abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough =
to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; overcome such pity =
objections?<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Though, to be fair, Matt's =
idea is pretty different than what John has in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; mind. =
Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just =
a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =
formality.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; On Thu, Jan =
31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Brian and I were discussing a =
couple of options off the list.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to =
jwk.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In Connect we are looking =
at how to deal with key rollover for =
signing.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; The problem with =
specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is =
a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; single cert chain, so you need to have multiple =
and there is no easy way to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; have the same keyid for =
a jwk key and a x5u key.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; My idea =
was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a =
single<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; keyid and key use that apples to both =
formats.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I can see a use for x5c =
in jwk as well especially where it is being sent<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in =
band.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So while it may sound =
crazy a number of us may be thinking the same =
thing.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; John =
B.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, =
&quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&quot; &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" =
target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Seems to me =
that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful =
and<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; useful for a possible future ECDH-SS =
algorithm for JWE. But it would be<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; about the =
encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? =
Which<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would be different than how it's =
currently being used. And that might be<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
another argument for not having it in JWE right =
now.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Of course =
that starts to beg the &quot;must understand headers&quot; question =
but<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
digress...<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I was =
starting to come to similar =
conclusions.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; This =
probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can =
be<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrapped into a JSON Web =
Key?<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
{<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&quot;kty&quot;:&quot;X509&quot;,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&quot;x5c&quot;: [....]<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
}<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 - m&amp;m<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Matt Miller =
&lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Yes =
for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient =
decrypts<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; with a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
secret. &nbsp;I would expect a kid in the =
header.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used =
to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; encrypt with then you could include =
the x5c as a reference though a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping =
its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; private keys in a key-store of some =
sort.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In =
any event we would minimally want to change that =
to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&quot;The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is =
to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; decrypt the JWE MUST be the first =
certificate.&quot;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks =
Brian<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
John =
B.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" =
target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<=
br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I =
just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition =
that<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; struck<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; me as =
maybe not =
right.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
From<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08=
#section-4.1.9" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-enc=
ryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of =
the entity that encrypted<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the JWE MUST =
be the first certificate.&quot; - but it's not the public =
key<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; of<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the entity =
that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the =
entity<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; that<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; will =
decrypt. The other =
entity.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&quot;The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and reject the JWE if any =
validation failure occurs.&quot; - maybe I'm<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
missing<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; something but why would the =
recipient verify it's own certificate<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
chain?<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
And the first hyperlink in &quot;See Appendix B&lt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
<a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08=
#appendix-B" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-enc=
ryption-08#appendix-B</a>&gt;of<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
[<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; JWS&lt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08=
#ref-JWS" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-enc=
ryption-08#ref-JWS</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
]<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; for an example &quot;x5c&quot; =
value&quot; takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which =
is<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as =
the text would =
suggest.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better =
to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; just<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; remove x5c =
from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01=
434.html</a>,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
there's<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; really no point in sending a =
whole chain to help the recipient<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; identify =
its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; own =
key.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt; jose mailing list<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t; jose mailing list<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
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From stpeter@stpeter.im  Fri Feb  8 12:15:58 2013
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Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2013 13:15:47 -0700
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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On 2/8/13 11:47 AM, Matt Miller (mamille2) wrote:
> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would
> be worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON
> Web Key.  A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do
> this. One impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c"
> (and potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an
> actual JWK object.  However, a few of us have other use cases where
> a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some problems.
> 
> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely
> to start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.

Sounds like a good idea.

Not that you need anyone's permission to work on a non-WG
Internet-Draft. :-)

Peter

- -- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/


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From prateek.mishra@oracle.com  Fri Feb  8 13:07:41 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL : Yes

- cause JOSE headers are security artifacts; when present, they must not 
be ignored by a processor of JOSE objects

SECOND POLL: Yes

- the language here is a bit confusing, i think the distinction sought 
here is between a deployment instance versus a static component 
(library). If I understand the intent here,
the suggestion is that a deployment instance of a JOSE processor should 
treat JOSE-defined headers as critical.

THIRD POLL: C

- high-level list of ignorable headers (vs. adding annotation to each 
header)

> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of 
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current 
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and 
> the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: 
> Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We 
> need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the 
> specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, 
> the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 
> February 2013.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations 
> to understand?
>
> YES – All header fields must continue to be understood by 
> implementations or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO – A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely 
> ignored should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text 
> like the following be added? “Implementation Note: The requirement to 
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole 
> – not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a 
> JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then 
> leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For 
> those headers that the JOSE library didn’t understand, the 
> responsibility for fulfilling the ‘MUST understand’ requirement for 
> the remaining headers would then fall to the application.”
>
> YES – Add the text clarifying that the “MUST understand” requirement 
> is a requirement on the system as a whole – not specifically on JOSE 
> libraries.
>
> NO – Don’t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax 
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored 
> if not understood?
>
> A – Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be 
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B – Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand 
> all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in 
> the second.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From rlb@ipv.sx  Fri Feb  8 13:56:42 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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As Hannes points out, there are already a couple of examples of key
management protocols that are being built around JWT (and thus JWS/JWE).

I would actually be OK stripping away the protocol-like bits of the SPI
proposal (i.e., the part about putting things into the cache).  We could
just say: If a host uses an external process for agreeing on cryptographic
parameters for use with JOSE objects, then it MUST maintain a table,
indexed by SPI, and [reconstruct a full JWE before processing].  That way,
the key management protocols could focus on how to get stuff associated
with an SPI (including things like lifetimes, scoping, etc.).

That also provides a neat taxonomy to JOSE use cases:
1. The parties have engaged in pre-negotiation and agreed on all
parameters, so they just use SPI
2. The parties have only exchanged keys, so everything else needs to be
explicitly indicated.






On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 9:21 AM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>wrote:

> Seems to me that, in the absence of more advanced management, the use of
> spi is potentially very very fragile. And that, in many cases, such
> advanced management would be a lot more trouble than it's worth. But maybe
> I'm missing the bigger picture.
>
> My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar) and the
> JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another thought a web
> browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation doesn't lend itself
> well to use of spi or even easily creating some management protocol around
> it.
>
> WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but there's
> not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?
>
> Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But I'd
> like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity or
> potential operational or security issues when doing so.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
>> The motivation here is not very deep.  A lot of the current design (e.g.,
>> the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size.  The SPI
>> proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities will be
>> exchanging many JOSE objects.  I understood from some discussions with
>> OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.
>>
>> Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this stuff
>> (cf. IKE for IPsec).  Whatever application is using this would need to
>> figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as things like
>> what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI.  (I don't think
>> collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the sender just ensures
>> uniqueness.)  The idea of this basic proposal is to establish the basic
>> behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced management.
>>
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell <
>> bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind
>>> it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the
>>> receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index
>>> collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this could
>>> be very cumbersome.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>>
>>>> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for
>>>> an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
>>>> borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
>>>> crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
>>>> from having to re-send the same parameters.
>>>>
>>>> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for
>>>> JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
>>>> needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.
>>>>
>>>> Feedback welcome,
>>>> --Richard
>>>>
>>>> -----BEGIN-----
>>>> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>>>>
>>>> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an
>>>> opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
>>>> designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will
>>>> be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>>>>
>>>> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a
>>>> table of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object
>>>> whose header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
>>>> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
>>>> -- Contents of the JWE header
>>>> -- Encrypted Key
>>>> -- Initialization Vector
>>>>
>>>> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then
>>>> it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
>>>> will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
>>>> receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header,
>>>> key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE
>>>> can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.
>>>>  If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process
>>>> MUST fail.
>>>> -----END-----
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> jose mailing list
>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>

--bcaec553feb45367a204d53da26b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">As Hannes points out, there are already a couple of exampl=
es of key management protocols that are being built around JWT (and thus JW=
S/JWE). =A0<div><br></div><div style>I would actually be OK stripping away =
the protocol-like bits of the SPI proposal (i.e., the part about putting th=
ings into the cache). =A0We could just say: If a host uses an external proc=
ess for agreeing on cryptographic parameters for use with JOSE objects, the=
n it MUST maintain a table, indexed by SPI, and [reconstruct a full JWE bef=
ore processing]. =A0That way, the key management protocols could focus on h=
ow to get stuff associated with an SPI (including things like lifetimes, sc=
oping, etc.).</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>That also provides a neat taxonomy to JOSE =
use cases:</div><div style>1. The parties have engaged in pre-negotiation a=
nd agreed on all parameters, so they just use SPI</div><div style>2. The pa=
rties have only exchanged keys, so everything else needs to be explicitly i=
ndicated.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style><br></div><div style><br></div><div style><=
br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 9:21 AM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingi=
dentity.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Seems to me =
that, in the absence of more advanced management, the use of spi is potenti=
ally very very fragile. And that, in many cases, such advanced management w=
ould be a lot more trouble than it&#39;s worth. But maybe I&#39;m missing t=
he bigger picture.<br>



<br></div>My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar)=
 and the JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another thought =
a web browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation doesn&#39;t len=
d itself well to use of spi or even easily creating some management protoco=
l around it.<br>



<br></div>WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but t=
here&#39;s not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?<br><br></=
div>Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But I&=
#39;d like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity or=
 potential operational or security issues when doing so. <br>
<div><div class=3D"h5">

<div><br>=A0<br><div><br><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">



<div dir=3D"ltr">The motivation here is not very deep. =A0A lot of the curr=
ent design (e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header siz=
e. =A0The SPI proposal further compresses header size in cases where two en=
tities will be exchanging many JOSE objects. =A0I understood from some disc=
ussions with OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.=
<div>




<br></div><div>Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol aroun=
d this stuff (cf. IKE for IPsec). =A0Whatever application is using this wou=
ld need to figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as thin=
gs like what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI. =A0(I don=
&#39;t think collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the sender =
just ensures uniqueness.) =A0The idea of this basic proposal is to establis=
h the basic behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced manage=
ment. =A0</div>



<span><font color=3D"#888888">
<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div></font></span></div><div><div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at =
9:42 AM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@p=
ingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br>




<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Adm=
ittedly I&#39;m not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind it=
 but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the receiver=
 protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index collision? And fo=
r distributed environments, it seems supporting this could be very cumberso=
me.<br>






<br><br><br></div><br><div><br><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><div>On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM,=
 Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=
=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>






</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed=
 text for an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;security par=
ameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is that in ca=
ses where the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would =
save the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.<div>







<br></div><div>The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be ad=
apted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Similar text=
 is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sect=
ions.</div>







<div><br></div><div>Feedback welcome,</div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>-----BEGIN-----</div><div>Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Par=
ameter</div><div><br></div><div>The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters In=
dex) header parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of s=
ecurity parameters. =A0This index is designed to enable the use of smaller =
headers in cases where entities will be re-using the same security paramete=
rs for several messages.<br>







</div><div><br></div><div>Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot=
; parameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. =A0When an=
 entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &=
quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the JWE=
, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:</div>







<div>-- Contents of the JWE header</div><div>-- Encrypted Key</div><div>-- =
Initialization Vector</div><div><br></div><div>If an object containing an &=
quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT=
 contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector. =A0That is, it will hav=
e the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. =A0When a recipie=
nt receives such an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve c=
ached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. =
=A0This full JWE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE =
processing rules. =A0If the recipient has no cached parameters for the &quo=
t;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.</div>







<div>-----END-----<br><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>[9]=A0<a href=3D"h=
ttp://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.=
ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a></div></div></div>
<br></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 17:22:38 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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So you're saying that if any of these systems wants to define an optional
parameter, they need to coordinate with all of the others.

For example: The Persona verification process is largely server-based.
 Suppose the Persona spec wanted to include an optional attribute 'vsf'
that has the key fingerprint of the server that should be used to verify
the assertion.  Not mandatory, because you can still fall back to PKIX and
domain-based verification, but adds another layer of security.  Suddenly,
Persona cannot use the same JOSE library that OpenID Connect uses.

What benefit do you think comes from forcing all of these entities to
upgrade in lock-step?

--Richard




On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:02 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wro=
te:

>  I agree with you that we don=92t need to define a negotiation mechanism.
> As I believe Hannes correctly observed, either negotiation or out-of-band
> agreement will typically be used to agree on parameters to be used, but
> it=92s not the job of this working group to define them.  In fact, the ri=
ght
> choices are typically dependent upon the particular use case.****
>
> ** **
>
> I know of three publicly known systems built using the current JOSE specs
> (Mozilla Persona, a system Dick Hardt is building for the province of BC,
> and OpenID Connect) where one of these techniques are applied.  None of
> them needs to ignore parameters, to my knowledge.  See
> http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html for the
> discovery system used by latter.****
>
> ** **
>
> My main point is that just because we don=92t define a discovery mechanis=
m,
> that doesn=92t mean that one won=92t be used, when appropriate.****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 07, 2013 8:08 PM
> *To:* Mike Jones
> *Cc:* Karen O'Donoghue; Hannes Tschofenig; jose@ietf.org
>
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality****
>
> ** **
>
> One might note that TLS does not require that all headers be understood.
>  You can send SNI, say, without the risk of breaking interop with older
> servers. ****
>
> ** **
>
> More to the point, unless you're going to actually define a negotiation
> mechanism, saying that one would help is not all that constructive. This
> group needs to either define a negotiation mechanism, or else not add
> features for which negotiation is a absolute requirement.  And I would
> strongly oppose the former, as an unnecessary expansion of scope.
>
> --Richard
>
>
> On Thursday, February 7, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:****
>
> I agree that this should be described in the document.****
>
>  ****
>
> One common application that uses discovery/negotiation to decide what
> algorithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).****
>
>  ****
>
> Cheers,****
>
> -- Mike****
>
>  ****
>
> *From:* Hannes Tschofenig
> *Sent:* February 7, 2013 12:51 AM
> *To:* Mike Jones, odonoghue@isoc.org, hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
> *CC:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality****
>
>  ****
>
> Hi Mike,
>
> whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to
> describe this in the document since other specifications have followed a
> different approach.
>
> Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this
> extensibility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.
>
> I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past.
> My understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the
> mandatory to implement functionality is defined in the specification and
> additional specifications indicate what additional extensions have to be
> used. Is my understanding correct?
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> -------- Original-Nachricht --------
> > Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 +0000
> > Von: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
> > An: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "odonoghue@isoc.org"
> <odonoghue@isoc.org>
> > CC: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
> > Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
>
> > Hi Hannes,
> >
> > One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery
> > and/or negotiation.  (This fits into your (b) - there is another higher
> layer
> > specification that says what is required.)  For instance, if two partie=
s
> > come to understand through discovery that both support an extension,
> then they
> > are free to use it between themselves.
> >
> > For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover what
> > algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those tha=
t
> are
> > implemented by both communicating parties.  I can't imagine that this i=
s
> > the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.
> >
> > When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don't have t=
o
> > ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the first
> > place.
> >
> >     Best wishes,
> >     -- Mike
> >
> > P.S.  Yes, you're right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could be use=
d
> > in some cases too.  For instance, OAuth deployments almost all employ
> > out-of-band agreements.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> > Hannes Tschofenig
> > Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM
> > To: odonoghue@isoc.org
> > Cc: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net; jose@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
> >
> > Hi Karen,
> >
> > thanks for running this poll.
> >
> > My problem with answering your questions is the following:
> >
> > The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle
> extensions.
> > While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must b=
e
> > implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually
> > referring to with question #1.
> >
> > So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone
> > answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:
> >
> > a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a
> > federation) that defines what values need to be present, or
> >
> > b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is
> required.
> >
> > I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with Y=
ES
> > since they are thinking that they will just write that specification as
> > part of OpenID Connect.
> >
> > If that's the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avoid
> > raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work
> provides.
> >
> > If there is a different plan then please let me know.
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> >
> > On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> > > Folks,
> > >
> > > I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> > > criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> > > specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and
> > > the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj:
> > > Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We
> > > need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the
> > specifications.
> > >
> > > As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward,
> > > the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11
> > > February 2013.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Karen
> > >
> > > *******************
> > > FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations
> > > to understand?
> > >
> > > YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by
> > > implementations or the input must be rejected.
> > >
> > > NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely
> > > ignored should be defined.
> > >
> > > ********************
> > > SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should tex=
t
> > > like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to
> > > understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whol=
e
> > > - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a
> > > JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then
> > > leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For
> > > those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the
> > > responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for
> > > the remaining headers would then fall to the application."
> > >
> > > YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement
> > > is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE
> > > libraries.
> > >
> > > NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
> > >
> > > ************************
> > > THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> > > would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignore=
d
> > > if not understood?
> > >
> > > A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may b=
e
> > > safely ignored if not understood.
> > >
> > > B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand
> > > all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in
> > > the second.
> > >
> > > C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > jose mailing list
> > > jose@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose****
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--bcaec54eea2437870304d53dff6f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">So you&#39;re saying that if any of these systems wants to=
 define an optional parameter, they need to coordinate with all of the othe=
rs. =A0<div><br></div><div>For example: The Persona verification process is=
 largely server-based. =A0Suppose the Persona spec wanted to include an opt=
ional attribute &#39;vsf&#39; that has the key fingerprint of the server th=
at should be used to verify the assertion. =A0Not mandatory, because you ca=
n still fall back to PKIX and domain-based verification, but adds another l=
ayer of security. =A0Suddenly, Persona cannot use the same JOSE library tha=
t OpenID Connect uses.</div>
<div><br></div><div>What benefit do you think comes from forcing all of the=
se entities to upgrade in lock-step?</div><div><br></div><div style>--Richa=
rd</div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote">
On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:02 AM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@micros=
oft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">






<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I agree with you that we =
don=92t need to define a negotiation mechanism.=A0 As I believe Hannes corr=
ectly observed, either negotiation or out-of-band agreement
 will typically be used to agree on parameters to be used, but it=92s not t=
he job of this working group to define them.=A0 In fact, the right choices =
are typically dependent upon the particular use case.<u></u><u></u></span><=
/p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I know of three publicly =
known systems built using the current JOSE specs (Mozilla Persona, a system=
 Dick Hardt is building for the province of BC, and OpenID
 Connect) where one of these techniques are applied.=A0 None of them needs =
to ignore parameters, to my knowledge.=A0 See
<a href=3D"http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html</a> =
for the discovery system used by latter.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">My main point is that jus=
t because we don=92t define a discovery mechanism, that doesn=92t mean that=
 one won=92t be used, when appropriate.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</=
a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, February 07, 2013 8:08 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Karen O&#39;Donoghue; Hannes Tschofenig; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@=
ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a></span></p><div><div class=3D"=
h5"><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<u></u><u></u></div><=
/div><p></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">One might note that TLS does not require that all he=
aders be understood. =A0You can send SNI, say, without the risk of breaking=
 interop with=A0older servers.=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">More to the point, unless you&#39;re going to actual=
ly define a negotiation mechanism, saying that one would help is not all th=
at constructive. This group needs to either define a negotiation mechanism,=
 or else not add features for which negotiation
 is a absolute requirement. =A0And I would strongly oppose the former, as a=
n unnecessary expansion of scope.=A0<br>
<br>
--Richard<br>
<br>
<br>
On Thursday, February 7, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">I agree that this should be described in the document.<u=
></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">=A0<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">One common application that uses discovery/negotiation t=
o decide what algorithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).<u></u><u>=
</u></span></p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">=A0<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">Cheers,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">-- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">=A0<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #e5e5e5 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0i=
n 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quo=
t;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></strong><span style=3D"font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">=A0Hannes Tschofenig<br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">Sent:</span></strong>=A0February 7, 2013 12:51 AM<br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">To:</span></strong>=A0Mike Jones,
<a>
odonoghue@isoc.org</a>, <a>
hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a><br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">CC:</span></strong>=A0<a>jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<strong><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;">Subject:</span></strong>=A0Re: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<u=
></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">=A0<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;">Hi Mike, <br>
<br>
whatever story the group comes up with I believe it would be important to d=
escribe this in the document since other specifications have followed a dif=
ferent approach.
<br>
<br>
Knowing you guys I had already expected that you try to solve this extensib=
ility issue using additional OpenID Connect specifications.
<br>
<br>
I am wondering what approach other specifications have used in the past. My=
 understanding is that XML, CMS, and PSKC follow a model where the mandator=
y to implement functionality is defined in the specification and additional=
 specifications indicate what additional
 extensions have to be used. Is my understanding correct? <br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
-------- Original-Nachricht --------<br>
&gt; Datum: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 07:20:32 +0000<br>
&gt; Von: Mike Jones &lt;<a>Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; An: Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a>hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>&gt;, &quot;=
<a>odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a>odonoghue@isoc.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; CC: &quot;<a>jose@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a>jose@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Betreff: RE: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br>
<br>
&gt; Hi Hannes,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; One tried-and-true method of enabling extensions is through discovery<=
br>
&gt; and/or negotiation.=A0 (This fits into your (b) - there is another hig=
her layer<br>
&gt; specification that says what is required.)=A0 For instance, if two par=
ties<br>
&gt; come to understand through discovery that both support an extension, t=
hen they<br>
&gt; are free to use it between themselves.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; For instance, yes, in OpenID Connect, implementations can discover wha=
t<br>
&gt; algorithms and other features are supported and then use only those th=
at are<br>
&gt; implemented by both communicating parties.=A0 I can&#39;t imagine that=
 this is<br>
&gt; the only JOSE use case that will employ discovery and/or negotiation.<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; When discovery and/or negotiation is used, implementations don&#39;t h=
ave to<br>
&gt; ignore not-understood features, because none would be used in the firs=
t<br>
&gt; place.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =A0=A0=A0=A0Best wishes,<br>
&gt; =A0=A0=A0=A0-- Mike<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; P.S.=A0 Yes, you&#39;re right that (a) - out-of-band agreement - could=
 be used<br>
&gt; in some cases too.=A0 For instance, OAuth deployments almost all emplo=
y<br>
&gt; out-of-band agreements.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: <a>
jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a>jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf O=
f<br>
&gt; Hannes Tschofenig<br>
&gt; Sent: Wednesday, February 06, 2013 10:32 PM<br>
&gt; To: <a>
odonoghue@isoc.org</a><br>
&gt; Cc: <a>
hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>; <a>
jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Hi Karen,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; thanks for running this poll.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; My problem with answering your questions is the following:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The question you are raising deals with how you want to handle extensi=
ons.<br>
&gt; While it is easy to say that all the features in specification X must =
be<br>
&gt; implemented it is not even clear which specifications you are actually=
<br>
&gt; referring to with question #1.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So, I am wondering how you plan to handle any extension when someone<b=
r>
&gt; answers question #1 with YES. I see only the following ways:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; a) there is an out-of-band agreement (for a specific system, such a<br=
>
&gt; federation) that defines what values need to be present, or<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; b) there is another higher layer specification that says what is requi=
red.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I assume that many of the OAuth folks have answered the question with =
YES<br>
&gt; since they are thinking that they will just write that specification a=
s<br>
&gt; part of OpenID Connect.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; If that&#39;s the plan I think it should be clearly articulated to avo=
id<br>
&gt; raising wrong expectations of the level of interoperability this work =
provides.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; If there is a different plan then please let me know.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Ciao<br>
&gt; Hannes<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On 02/04/2013 04:48 PM, Karen O&#39;Donoghue wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Folks,<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of <=
br>
&gt; &gt; criticality of headers. For background, please review the current=
 <br>
&gt; &gt; specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), =
and <br>
&gt; &gt; the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Sub=
j: <br>
&gt; &gt; Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)).=
 We <br>
&gt; &gt; need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the<br=
>
&gt; specifications.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forw=
ard, <br>
&gt; &gt; the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 <=
br>
&gt; &gt; February 2013.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; &gt; Karen<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; *******************<br>
&gt; &gt; FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementati=
ons <br>
&gt; &gt; to understand?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by <br>
&gt; &gt; implementations or the input must be rejected.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely=
 <br>
&gt; &gt; ignored should be defined.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ********************<br>
&gt; &gt; SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;YES&quo=
t;, should text <br>
&gt; &gt; like the following be added? &quot;Implementation Note: The requi=
rement to <br>
&gt; &gt; understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a =
whole <br>
&gt; &gt; - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, =
a <br>
&gt; &gt; JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and th=
en <br>
&gt; &gt; leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. F=
or <br>
&gt; &gt; those headers that the JOSE library didn&#39;t understand, the <b=
r>
&gt; &gt; responsibility for fulfilling the &#39;MUST understand&#39; requi=
rement for <br>
&gt; &gt; the remaining headers would then fall to the application.&quot;<b=
r>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; YES - Add the text clarifying that the &quot;MUST understand&quot=
; requirement <br>
&gt; &gt; is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on J=
OSE <br>
&gt; &gt; libraries.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; NO - Don&#39;t add the clarifying text.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ************************<br>
&gt; &gt; THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be &quot;NO&quot;=
, which syntax <br>
&gt; &gt; would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ig=
nored <br>
&gt; &gt; if not understood?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that m=
ay be <br>
&gt; &gt; safely ignored if not understood.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must underst=
and <br>
&gt; &gt; all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields=
 in <br>
&gt; &gt; the second.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.) <br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a>
jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a>jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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Yes
Yes
No strong opinion

-----Original Message-----
From: Prateek Mishra [mailto:prateek.mishra@oracle.com]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 4:08 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality

FIRST POLL : Yes

- cause JOSE headers are security artifacts; when present, they must not be 
ignored by a processor of JOSE objects

SECOND POLL: Yes

- the language here is a bit confusing, i think the distinction sought here is 
between a deployment instance versus a static component (library). If I 
understand the intent here, the suggestion is that a deployment instance of a 
JOSE processor should treat JOSE-defined headers as critical.

THIRD POLL: C

- high-level list of ignorable headers (vs. adding annotation to each
header)

> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and
> the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj:
> Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We
> need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the
> specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward,
> the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11
> February 2013.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations
> to understand?
>
> YES - All header fields must continue to be understood by
> implementations or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO - A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely
> ignored should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text
> like the following be added? "Implementation Note: The requirement to
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole
> - not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a
> JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then
> leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For
> those headers that the JOSE library didn't understand, the
> responsibility for fulfilling the 'MUST understand' requirement for
> the remaining headers would then fall to the application."
>
> YES - Add the text clarifying that the "MUST understand" requirement
> is a requirement on the system as a whole - not specifically on JOSE
> libraries.
>
> NO - Don't add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored
> if not understood?
>
> A - Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B - Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand
> all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in
> the second.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 15:45:47 -0700
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To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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But just a non-objection from Peter Saint-Andre is very valuable in its own
right ;)


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:15 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 2/8/13 11:47 AM, Matt Miller (mamille2) wrote:
> > After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would
> > be worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON
> > Web Key.  A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do
> > this. One impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c"
> > (and potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an
> > actual JWK object.  However, a few of us have other use cases where
> > a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some problems.
> >
> > Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely
> > to start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>
> Sounds like a good idea.
>
> Not that you need anyone's permission to work on a non-WG
> Internet-Draft. :-)
>
> Peter
>
> - --
> Peter Saint-Andre
> https://stpeter.im/
>
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">But just a non-objection from Peter Saint-Andre is very va=
luable in its own right ;)<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:15 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <s=
pan dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stpeter@stpeter.im" target=3D"_blank"=
>stpeter@stpeter.im</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----<br>
Hash: SHA1<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
On 2/8/13 11:47 AM, Matt Miller (mamille2) wrote:<br>
&gt; After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would<br>
&gt; be worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON<br>
&gt; Web Key. =A0A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do<br>
&gt; this. One impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have &quot;x5=
c&quot;<br>
&gt; (and potentially &quot;x5t&quot; and &quot;x5u&quot;) are effectively =
replaced by an<br>
&gt; actual JWK object. =A0However, a few of us have other use cases where<=
br>
&gt; a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some problems.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Unless there&#39;s strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely<b=
r>
&gt; to start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.<br>
<br>
</div>Sounds like a good idea.<br>
<br>
Not that you need anyone&#39;s permission to work on a non-WG<br>
Internet-Draft. :-)<br>
<br>
Peter<br>
<br>
- --<br>
Peter Saint-Andre<br>
<a href=3D"https://stpeter.im/" target=3D"_blank">https://stpeter.im/</a><b=
r>
<br>
<br>
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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 17:48:37 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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Wouldn't it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over to JWK,
and leave them out of the base object altogether?

That actually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design.  And
it wouldn't require writing another draft!


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2)
<mamille2@cisco.com>wrote:

> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be
> worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  A
> couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One impact, I
> think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and
> "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object.  However, a few of
> us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some
> problems.
>
> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to start
> work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>
>
> Thoughts?
>
> - m&m
>
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>
> On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com>
> wrote:
>
> > I could also see it like the following:
> >
> > {
> >  "kty":"RSA",
> >  "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
> >  "n":".....",
> >  "e":"AQAB",
> >  "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
> >  // and/or "x5c":[....]
> > }
> >
> > Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in
> XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
> >
> > Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
> >
> >
> > - m&m
> >
> > Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> > Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >
> > On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of
> X509
> >> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as
> many
> >> days.
> >>
> >> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems
> like
> >> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
> >> overcome such pity objections?
> >>
> >> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has
> in
> >> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just
> a
> >> formality.
> >>
> >>
> >> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
> >>>
> >>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
> >>>
> >>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing.
> >>>
> >>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it
> is a
> >>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy
> way to
> >>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
> >>>
> >>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a
> single
> >>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
> >>>
> >>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being
> sent
> >>> in band.
> >>>
> >>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same
> thing.
> >>>
> >>> John B.
> >>>
> >>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <
> mamille2@cisco.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <
> bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful
> and
> >>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would
> be
> >>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right?
> Which
> >>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that
> might be
> >>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question
> but
> >>> I
> >>>>> digress...
> >>>>
> >>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
> >>>>
> >>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can
> be
> >>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
> >>>>
> >>>> {
> >>>> "kty":"X509",
> >>>> "x5c": [....]
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> - m&m
> >>>>
> >>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> >>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts
> >>> with a
> >>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender
> used to
> >>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
> >>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its
> >>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
> >>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Thanks Brian
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> John B.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <
> bcampbell@pingidentity.com
> >>>>
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
> >>> struck
> >>>>>> me as maybe not right.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> From
> >>>>>>
> >>>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that
> encrypted
> >>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public
> key
> >>> of
> >>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity
> >>> that
> >>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to
> [RFC5280]
> >>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
> >>> missing
> >>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
> >>> chain?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
> >>>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B
> >of
> >>> [
> >>>>>> JWS<
> >>>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
> >>>> ]
> >>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
> >>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to
> >>> just
> >>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
> >>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
> >>> there's
> >>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
> >>> identify its
> >>>>>> own key.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> jose mailing list
> >>>>>> jose@ietf.org
> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> jose mailing list
> >>>>> jose@ietf.org
> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--bcaec553feb42b8ebd04d53e5c49
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px=
">Wouldn&#39;t it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over t=
o JWK, and leave them out of the base object altogether? =A0</span><div sty=
le=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">
<br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">That a=
ctually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design. =A0And it =
wouldn&#39;t require writing another draft!</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Mil=
ler (mamille2) <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">
After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be worthwh=
ile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. =A0A couple=
 of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. =A0One impact, I think=
, is that anywhere we currently have &quot;x5c&quot; (and potentially &quot=
;x5t&quot; and &quot;x5u&quot;) are effectively replaced by an actual JWK o=
bject. =A0However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX certificat=
e JWK would solve some problems.<br>

<br>
Unless there&#39;s strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to sta=
rt work on a new I-D that documents our musings.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thoughts?<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</=
a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:m=
amille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I could also see it like the following:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; {<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;kty&quot;:&quot;RSA&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;juliet@capulet.lit&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;n&quot;:&quot;.....&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;e&quot;:&quot;AQAB&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;x5u&quot;:&quot;<a href=3D"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt</a>&quot;<br>
&gt; =A0// and/or &quot;x5c&quot;:[....]<br>
&gt; }<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Having a &quot;X509&quot; JWK type might solve one problem I can see h=
aving in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.=
com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcam=
pbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kin=
d of X509<br>
&gt;&gt; support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in =
as many<br>
&gt;&gt; days.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it s=
eems like<br>
&gt;&gt; a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it&#39;d be useful eno=
ugh to<br>
&gt;&gt; overcome such pity objections?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Though, to be fair, Matt&#39;s idea is pretty different than what =
John has in<br>
&gt;&gt; mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than=
 just a<br>
&gt;&gt; formality.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.<=
br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to =
jwk.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for=
 signing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert c=
hain it is a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is n=
o easy way to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can hav=
e a single<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; keyid and key use that apples to both formats.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is =
being sent<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; in band.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the=
 same thing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, &quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&quot; =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot mor=
e meaningful and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE=
. But it would be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; about the encrypting party or sender&#39;s certs in th=
at case, right? Which<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would be different than how it&#39;s currently being u=
sed. And that might be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; another argument for not having it in JWE right now.<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Of course that starts to beg the &quot;must understand=
 headers&quot; question but<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; digress...<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I was starting to come to similar conclusions.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509=
 certs can be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrapped into a JSON Web Key?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; {<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;kty&quot;:&quot;X509&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;x5c&quot;: [....]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; }<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mam=
ille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the re=
cipoient decrypts<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; with a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; secret. =A0I would expect a kid in the header.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c th=
at the sender used to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a r=
eference though a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is pr=
obably keeping its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; private keys in a key-store of some sort.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In any event we would minimally want to change tha=
t to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of=
 the entity that is to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quo=
t;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks Brian<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a><b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE&#39;s=
 x5c definition that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; struck<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; me as maybe not right.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; From<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#section-4.1.9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of=
 the entity that encrypted<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot; - but=
 it&#39;s not the public key<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the entity that encrypted, is it? It&#39;s the pub=
lic key of the entity<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; will decrypt. The other entity.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The recipient MUST verify the certificate ch=
ain according to [RFC5280]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and reject the JWE if any validation failure occur=
s.&quot; - maybe I&#39;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; missing<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; something but why would the recipient verify it&#3=
9;s own certificate<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; chain?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; And the first hyperlink in &quot;See Appendix B&lt=
;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#appendix-B" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/dra=
ft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B</a>&gt;of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; JWS&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#ref-JWS" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-=
ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; for an example &quot;x5c&quot; value&quot; takes y=
ou to Appendix B of JWE, which is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text woul=
d suggest.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe=
 it&#39;d be better to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; just<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard point=
ed out previously,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jo=
se/current/msg01434.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archiv=
e/web/jose/current/msg01434.html</a>,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; there&#39;s<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; really no point in sending a whole chain to help t=
he recipient<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; identify its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; own key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/j=
ose" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--bcaec553feb42b8ebd04d53e5c49--

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From: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 14:49:01 -0800
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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAL02cgS8Bc2Sosba41w_D_V8txE-Jb8ZOz2Dhs33GCQWLSwvFQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 15:54:20 -0700
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References: <CA+k3eCRbkefo3M+7QK_anM+H-VQLj2b+Jvw+8EXKPnSuc4Y_7Q@mail.gmail.com> <DAD9D0F9-1889-41B8-8F87-2FC689E9397B@ve7jtb.com> <CA+k3eCQqTpiTdDwdkqFNU9UApM8H4TjjkKq+XupSQuhLkbjRsg@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED94115109840@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <0BC322C1-A6C5-46B8-BC2A-3A7E000952EF@ve7jtb.com> <CA+k3eCTi1Ss2grSALqZngtnCfv8ks0xRm_uXaeA7cdngua4_VQ@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED9411510A1F3@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED9411511DB49@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <CAL02cgS8Bc2Sosba41w_D_V8txE-Jb8ZOz2Dhs33GCQWLSwvFQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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I think Matt has need of the x5c outside of the JWK.

Though if you could represent a link to a x5u and a x5c object in a JWK =
then I guess you might be able to remove them from the base spec.

I think that is probably part of the discussion we need to have.

John B.

On 2013-02-08, at 3:48 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Wouldn't it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over to =
JWK, and leave them out of the base object altogether? =20
>=20
> That actually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design. =
 And it wouldn't require writing another draft!
>=20
>=20
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) =
<mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:
> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be =
worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  =
A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One =
impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and =
potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK =
object.  However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX =
certificate JWK would solve some problems.
>=20
> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to =
start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>=20
>=20
> Thoughts?
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
> On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) =
<mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:
>=20
> > I could also see it like the following:
> >
> > {
> >  "kty":"RSA",
> >  "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
> >  "n":".....",
> >  "e":"AQAB",
> >  "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
> >  // and/or "x5c":[....]
> > }
> >
> > Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in =
XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
> >
> > Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
> >
> >
> > - m&m
> >
> > Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> > Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >
> > On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind =
of X509
> >> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in =
as many
> >> days.
> >>
> >> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it =
seems like
> >> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough =
to
> >> overcome such pity objections?
> >>
> >> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John =
has in
> >> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than =
just a
> >> formality.
> >>
> >>
> >> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
> >>
> >>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
> >>>
> >>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
> >>>
> >>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for =
signing.
> >>>
> >>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain =
it is a
> >>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no =
easy way to
> >>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
> >>>
> >>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a =
single
> >>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
> >>>
> >>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is =
being sent
> >>> in band.
> >>>
> >>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the =
same thing.
> >>>
> >>> John B.
> >>>
> >>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" =
<mamille2@cisco.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more =
meaningful and
> >>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it =
would be
> >>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, =
right? Which
> >>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that =
might be
> >>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" =
question but
> >>> I
> >>>>> digress...
> >>>>
> >>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
> >>>>
> >>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs =
can be
> >>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
> >>>>
> >>>> {
> >>>> "kty":"X509",
> >>>> "x5c": [....]
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> - m&m
> >>>>
> >>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> >>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley =
<ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient =
decrypts
> >>> with a
> >>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender =
used to
> >>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference =
though a
> >>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably =
keeping its
> >>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
is to
> >>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Thanks Brian
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> John B.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com
> >>>>
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition =
that
> >>> struck
> >>>>>> me as maybe not right.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> From
> >>>>>>
> >>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted
> >>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the =
public key
> >>> of
> >>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the =
entity
> >>> that
> >>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]
> >>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe =
I'm
> >>> missing
> >>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own =
certificate
> >>> chain?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
> >>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix=
-B>of
> >>> [
> >>>>>> JWS<
> >>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
> >>>> ]
> >>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, =
which is
> >>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be =
better to
> >>> just
> >>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously,
> >>>>>> =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
> >>> there's
> >>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
> >>> identify its
> >>>>>> own key.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> jose mailing list
> >>>>>> jose@ietf.org
> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> jose mailing list
> >>>>> jose@ietf.org
> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=iso-8859-1"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">I think Matt has need of the x5c outside of the JWK.<div><br></div><div>Though if you could represent a link to a x5u and a x5c object in a JWK then I guess you might be able to remove them from the base spec.</div><div><br></div><div>I think that is probably part of the discussion we need to have.</div><div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-08, at 3:48 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href="mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">Wouldn't it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over to JWK, and leave them out of the base object altogether? &nbsp;</span><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">
<br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">That actually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design. &nbsp;And it wouldn't require writing another draft!</div></div><div class="gmail_extra">
<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target="_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. &nbsp;A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. &nbsp;One impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object. &nbsp;However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some problems.<br>

<br>
Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thoughts?<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href="mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) &lt;<a href="mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I could also see it like the following:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; {<br>
&gt; &nbsp;"kty":"RSA",<br>
&gt; &nbsp;"kid":"<a href="mailto:juliet@capulet.lit">juliet@capulet.lit</a>",<br>
&gt; &nbsp;"n":".....",<br>
&gt; &nbsp;"e":"AQAB",<br>
&gt; &nbsp;"x5u":"<a href="https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt" target="_blank">https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt</a>"<br>
&gt; &nbsp;// and/or "x5c":[....]<br>
&gt; }<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href="mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href="mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of X509<br>
&gt;&gt; support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as many<br>
&gt;&gt; days.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems like<br>
&gt;&gt; a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to<br>
&gt;&gt; overcome such pity objections?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has in<br>
&gt;&gt; mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just a<br>
&gt;&gt; formality.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley &lt;<a href="mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy way to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a single<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; keyid and key use that apples to both formats.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being sent<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; in band.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same thing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" &lt;<a href="mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href="mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? Which<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; another argument for not having it in JWE right now.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question but<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; digress...<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I was starting to come to similar conclusions.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrapped into a JSON Web Key?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; {<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; "kty":"X509",<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; "x5c": [....]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; }<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href="mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a href="mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; with a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; secret. &nbsp;I would expect a kid in the header.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; private keys in a key-store of some sort.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In any event we would minimally want to change that to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks Brian<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href="mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; struck<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; me as maybe not right.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; From<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9" target="_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; will decrypt. The other entity.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; missing<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; chain?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B" target="_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B</a>&gt;of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; JWS&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS" target="_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; just<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html" target="_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html</a>,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; there's<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; identify its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; own key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 16:01:15 -0700
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Subject: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over
the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from
operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe
strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail,
the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base
JOSE WG drafts.

As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be
submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and
analysis that I think it needs.

Thanks,
Brian

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on=
 the SPI proposal over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run=
 the gamut from operational complexity and fragility to security problems. =
I believe strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specificati=
on detail, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the cur=
rent base JOSE WG drafts.<br>


<br></div>As an alternative I&#39;d like to request/propose that the SPI st=
uff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion a=
nd analysis that I think it needs.<br><div><br></div><div>Thanks,<br>Brian<=
br>

</div><div><br>[1] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/cur=
rent/msg01500.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/=
jose/current/msg01500.html</a><br>
</div></div>

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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Hm.  I would be interested in what the use case would be for having x5u
outside of a JWK.  If you don't have a JWK, you don't have a public key, so
why would you care about a cert?


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 5:54 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> I think Matt has need of the x5c outside of the JWK.
>
> Though if you could represent a link to a x5u and a x5c object in a JWK
> then I guess you might be able to remove them from the base spec.
>
> I think that is probably part of the discussion we need to have.
>
> John B.
>
> On 2013-02-08, at 3:48 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> Wouldn't it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over to
> JWK, and leave them out of the base object altogether?
>
> That actually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design.
>  And it wouldn't require writing another draft!
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com
> > wrote:
>
>> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be
>> worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  A
>> couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One impact, I
>> think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and
>> "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object.  However, a few of
>> us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some
>> problems.
>>
>> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to start
>> work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>>
>>
>> Thoughts?
>>
>> - m&m
>>
>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>
>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > I could also see it like the following:
>> >
>> > {
>> >  "kty":"RSA",
>> >  "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
>> >  "n":".....",
>> >  "e":"AQAB",
>> >  "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
>> >  // and/or "x5c":[....]
>> > }
>> >
>> > Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in
>> XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
>> >
>> > Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
>> >
>> >
>> > - m&m
>> >
>> > Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> > Cisco Systems, Inc.
>> >
>> > On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>> >
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of
>> X509
>> >> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as
>> many
>> >> days.
>> >>
>> >> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems
>> like
>> >> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
>> >> overcome such pity objections?
>> >>
>> >> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has
>> in
>> >> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than
>> just a
>> >> formality.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>> >>>
>> >>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>> >>>
>> >>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for
>> signing.
>> >>>
>> >>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it
>> is a
>> >>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy
>> way to
>> >>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>> >>>
>> >>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a
>> single
>> >>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>> >>>
>> >>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being
>> sent
>> >>> in band.
>> >>>
>> >>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same
>> thing.
>> >>>
>> >>> John B.
>> >>>
>> >>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <
>> mamille2@cisco.com>
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <
>> bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful
>> and
>> >>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it
>> would be
>> >>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right?
>> Which
>> >>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that
>> might be
>> >>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question
>> but
>> >>> I
>> >>>>> digress...
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can
>> be
>> >>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> {
>> >>>> "kty":"X509",
>> >>>> "x5c": [....]
>> >>>> }
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> - m&m
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> >>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts
>> >>> with a
>> >>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender
>> used to
>> >>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
>> >>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping
>> its
>> >>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
>> >>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Thanks Brian
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> John B.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <
>> bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>> >>>>
>> >>>>>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
>> >>> struck
>> >>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> From
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that
>> encrypted
>> >>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public
>> key
>> >>> of
>> >>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity
>> >>> that
>> >>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to
>> [RFC5280]
>> >>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
>> >>> missing
>> >>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
>> >>> chain?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>> >>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B
>> >of
>> >>> [
>> >>>>>> JWS<
>> >>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>> >>>> ]
>> >>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which
>> is
>> >>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better
>> to
>> >>> just
>> >>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out
>> previously,
>> >>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>> >>> there's
>> >>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>> >>> identify its
>> >>>>>> own key.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>> jose mailing list
>> >>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>> jose mailing list
>> >>>>> jose@ietf.org
>> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > jose mailing list
>> > jose@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hm. =A0I would be interested in what the use case would be=
 for having x5u outside of a JWK. =A0If you don&#39;t have a JWK, you don&#=
39;t have a public key, so why would you care about a cert?</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 5:54 PM, John Bra=
dley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_=
blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex">
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">I think Matt has need of the x5c outsid=
e of the JWK.<div><br></div><div>Though if you could represent a link to a =
x5u and a x5c object in a JWK then I guess you might be able to remove them=
 from the base spec.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I think that is probably part of the discussion we need=
 to have.</div><div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div><div class=3D"h5"><div=
><br><div><div>On 2013-02-08, at 3:48 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">Wouldn&#39;t it be simpler just to push the=
 x5u and x5c attributes over to JWK, and leave them out of the base object =
altogether? =A0</span><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
13px">

<br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">That a=
ctually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design. =A0And it =
wouldn&#39;t require writing another draft!</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Mil=
ler (mamille2) <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">

After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be worthwh=
ile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. =A0A couple=
 of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. =A0One impact, I think=
, is that anywhere we currently have &quot;x5c&quot; (and potentially &quot=
;x5t&quot; and &quot;x5u&quot;) are effectively replaced by an actual JWK o=
bject. =A0However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX certificat=
e JWK would solve some problems.<br>


<br>
Unless there&#39;s strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to sta=
rt work on a new I-D that documents our musings.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thoughts?<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">ma=
mille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:m=
amille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I could also see it like the following:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; {<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;kty&quot;:&quot;RSA&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:juliet@capulet.lit" target=
=3D"_blank">juliet@capulet.lit</a>&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;n&quot;:&quot;.....&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;e&quot;:&quot;AQAB&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;x5u&quot;:&quot;<a href=3D"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt</a>&quot;<br>
&gt; =A0// and/or &quot;x5c&quot;:[....]<br>
&gt; }<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Having a &quot;X509&quot; JWK type might solve one problem I can see h=
aving in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcam=
pbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kin=
d of X509<br>
&gt;&gt; support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in =
as many<br>
&gt;&gt; days.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it s=
eems like<br>
&gt;&gt; a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it&#39;d be useful eno=
ugh to<br>
&gt;&gt; overcome such pity objections?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Though, to be fair, Matt&#39;s idea is pretty different than what =
John has in<br>
&gt;&gt; mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than=
 just a<br>
&gt;&gt; formality.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.<=
br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to =
jwk.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for=
 signing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert c=
hain it is a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is n=
o easy way to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can hav=
e a single<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; keyid and key use that apples to both formats.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is =
being sent<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; in band.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the=
 same thing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, &quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&quot; =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.=
com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentit=
y.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot mor=
e meaningful and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE=
. But it would be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; about the encrypting party or sender&#39;s certs in th=
at case, right? Which<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would be different than how it&#39;s currently being u=
sed. And that might be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; another argument for not having it in JWE right now.<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Of course that starts to beg the &quot;must understand=
 headers&quot; question but<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; digress...<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I was starting to come to similar conclusions.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509=
 certs can be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrapped into a JSON Web Key?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; {<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;kty&quot;:&quot;X509&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;x5c&quot;: [....]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; }<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the re=
cipoient decrypts<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; with a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; secret. =A0I would expect a kid in the header.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c th=
at the sender used to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a r=
eference though a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is pr=
obably keeping its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; private keys in a key-store of some sort.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In any event we would minimally want to change tha=
t to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of=
 the entity that is to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quo=
t;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks Brian<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@ping=
identity.com</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE&#39;s=
 x5c definition that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; struck<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; me as maybe not right.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; From<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#section-4.1.9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of=
 the entity that encrypted<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot; - but=
 it&#39;s not the public key<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the entity that encrypted, is it? It&#39;s the pub=
lic key of the entity<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; will decrypt. The other entity.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The recipient MUST verify the certificate ch=
ain according to [RFC5280]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and reject the JWE if any validation failure occur=
s.&quot; - maybe I&#39;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; missing<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; something but why would the recipient verify it&#3=
9;s own certificate<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; chain?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; And the first hyperlink in &quot;See Appendix B&lt=
;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#appendix-B" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/dra=
ft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B</a>&gt;of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; JWS&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#ref-JWS" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-=
ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; for an example &quot;x5c&quot; value&quot; takes y=
ou to Appendix B of JWE, which is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text woul=
d suggest.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe=
 it&#39;d be better to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; just<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard point=
ed out previously,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jo=
se/current/msg01434.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archiv=
e/web/jose/current/msg01434.html</a>,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; there&#39;s<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; really no point in sending a whole chain to help t=
he recipient<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; identify its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; own key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
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&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
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&gt;<br>
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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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I have no such need for an x5c outside of a JWK. Hence my suggestion for =
a JWK specifically for wrapping PKIX.  In fact, I personally have a =
strong preference for removing anything key-related from the base =
headers that isn't "jwk" or "kid" (or now possibly "spi").

I'd much rather see this in the JWK spec; I only suggested a new draft =
to help frame such a discussion.


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Feb 8, 2013, at 3:54 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
 wrote:

> I think Matt has need of the x5c outside of the JWK.
>=20
> Though if you could represent a link to a x5u and a x5c object in a =
JWK then I guess you might be able to remove them from the base spec.
>=20
> I think that is probably part of the discussion we need to have.
>=20
> John B.
>=20
> On 2013-02-08, at 3:48 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>=20
>> Wouldn't it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over =
to JWK, and leave them out of the base object altogether? =20
>>=20
>> That actually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current =
design.  And it wouldn't require writing another draft!
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) =
<mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:
>> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be =
worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  =
A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One =
impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and =
potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK =
object.  However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX =
certificate JWK would solve some problems.
>>=20
>> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to =
start work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>>=20
>>=20
>> Thoughts?
>>=20
>> - m&m
>>=20
>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>=20
>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) =
<mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> I could also see it like the following:
>>>=20
>>> {
>>> "kty":"RSA",
>>> "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
>>> "n":".....",
>>> "e":"AQAB",
>>> "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
>>> // and/or "x5c":[....]
>>> }
>>>=20
>>> Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in =
XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
>>>=20
>>> Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> - m&m
>>>=20
>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>>=20
>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind =
of X509
>>>> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in =
as many
>>>> days.
>>>>=20
>>>> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it =
seems like
>>>> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough =
to
>>>> overcome such pity objections?
>>>>=20
>>>> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John =
has in
>>>> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than =
just a
>>>> formality.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for =
signing.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain =
it is a
>>>>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no =
easy way to
>>>>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a =
single
>>>>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is =
being sent
>>>>> in band.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the =
same thing.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> John B.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" =
<mamille2@cisco.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more =
meaningful and
>>>>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it =
would be
>>>>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, =
right? Which
>>>>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that =
might be
>>>>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" =
question but
>>>>> I
>>>>>>> digress...
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs =
can be
>>>>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> "kty":"X509",
>>>>>> "x5c": [....]
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> - m&m
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>>>>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley =
<ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient =
decrypts
>>>>> with a
>>>>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender =
used to
>>>>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference =
though a
>>>>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably =
keeping its
>>>>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
is to
>>>>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Thanks Brian
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> John B.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition =
that
>>>>> struck
>>>>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> From
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-=
4.1.9
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that =
encrypted
>>>>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the =
public key
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the =
entity
>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to =
[RFC5280]
>>>>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe =
I'm
>>>>> missing
>>>>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own =
certificate
>>>>> chain?
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>>>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix=
-B>of
>>>>> [
>>>>>>>> JWS<
>>>>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>>>>>> ]
>>>>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, =
which is
>>>>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be =
better to
>>>>> just
>>>>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out =
previously,
>>>>>>>> =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>>>>> identify its
>>>>>>>> own key.
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20


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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 16:07:04 -0700
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE]
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There are definitely a number of different ways to skin the X509/PKIX in
JWK cat. This I-D isn't necessarily intended to be the final solution but
hopefully a way to start the productive conversation.


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 3:48 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Wouldn't it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over to
> JWK, and leave them out of the base object altogether?
>
> That actually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design.
>  And it wouldn't require writing another draft!
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com
> > wrote:
>
>> After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be
>> worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key.  A
>> couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this.  One impact, I
>> think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and
>> "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object.  However, a few of
>> us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some
>> problems.
>>
>> Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to start
>> work on a new I-D that documents our musings.
>>
>>
>> Thoughts?
>>
>> - m&m
>>
>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>
>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <mamille2@cisco.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > I could also see it like the following:
>> >
>> > {
>> >  "kty":"RSA",
>> >  "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
>> >  "n":".....",
>> >  "e":"AQAB",
>> >  "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
>> >  // and/or "x5c":[....]
>> > }
>> >
>> > Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in
>> XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.
>> >
>> > Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.
>> >
>> >
>> > - m&m
>> >
>> > Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> > Cisco Systems, Inc.
>> >
>> > On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>> >
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of
>> X509
>> >> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as
>> many
>> >> days.
>> >>
>> >> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems
>> like
>> >> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
>> >> overcome such pity objections?
>> >>
>> >> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has
>> in
>> >> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than
>> just a
>> >> formality.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>> >>>
>> >>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>> >>>
>> >>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for
>> signing.
>> >>>
>> >>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it
>> is a
>> >>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy
>> way to
>> >>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>> >>>
>> >>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a
>> single
>> >>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>> >>>
>> >>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being
>> sent
>> >>> in band.
>> >>>
>> >>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same
>> thing.
>> >>>
>> >>> John B.
>> >>>
>> >>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <
>> mamille2@cisco.com>
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <
>> bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful
>> and
>> >>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it
>> would be
>> >>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right?
>> Which
>> >>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that
>> might be
>> >>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question
>> but
>> >>> I
>> >>>>> digress...
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can
>> be
>> >>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> {
>> >>>> "kty":"X509",
>> >>>> "x5c": [....]
>> >>>> }
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> - m&m
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> >>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts
>> >>> with a
>> >>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender
>> used to
>> >>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
>> >>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping
>> its
>> >>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
>> >>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Thanks Brian
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> John B.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <
>> bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>> >>>>
>> >>>>>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
>> >>> struck
>> >>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> From
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that
>> encrypted
>> >>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public
>> key
>> >>> of
>> >>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity
>> >>> that
>> >>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to
>> [RFC5280]
>> >>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
>> >>> missing
>> >>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
>> >>> chain?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>> >>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B
>> >of
>> >>> [
>> >>>>>> JWS<
>> >>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>> >>>> ]
>> >>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which
>> is
>> >>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better
>> to
>> >>> just
>> >>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out
>> previously,
>> >>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>> >>> there's
>> >>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>> >>> identify its
>> >>>>>> own key.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>>> jose mailing list
>> >>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>> jose mailing list
>> >>>>> jose@ietf.org
>> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > jose mailing list
>> > jose@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>

--e89a8f2346bbfca23d04d53e9f67
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">There are definitely a number of different ways to skin th=
e X509/PKIX in JWK cat. This I-D isn&#39;t necessarily intended to be the f=
inal solution but hopefully a way to start the productive conversation.<br>

</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri,=
 Feb 8, 2013 at 3:48 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex">

<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px=
">Wouldn&#39;t it be simpler just to push the x5u and x5c attributes over t=
o JWK, and leave them out of the base object altogether? =A0</span><div sty=
le=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">


<br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">That a=
ctually seems a lot more sensible to me than the current design. =A0And it =
wouldn&#39;t require writing another draft!</div></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb=
">

<div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Matt Mil=
ler (mamille2) <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">


After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be worthwh=
ile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. =A0A couple=
 of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. =A0One impact, I think=
, is that anywhere we currently have &quot;x5c&quot; (and potentially &quot=
;x5t&quot; and &quot;x5u&quot;) are effectively replaced by an actual JWK o=
bject. =A0However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX certificat=
e JWK would solve some problems.<br>



<br>
Unless there&#39;s strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to sta=
rt work on a new I-D that documents our musings.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thoughts?<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">ma=
mille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:m=
amille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I could also see it like the following:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; {<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;kty&quot;:&quot;RSA&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;juliet@capulet.lit&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;n&quot;:&quot;.....&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;e&quot;:&quot;AQAB&quot;,<br>
&gt; =A0&quot;x5u&quot;:&quot;<a href=3D"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt</a>&quot;<br>
&gt; =A0// and/or &quot;x5c&quot;:[....]<br>
&gt; }<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Having a &quot;X509&quot; JWK type might solve one problem I can see h=
aving in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcam=
pbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kin=
d of X509<br>
&gt;&gt; support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in =
as many<br>
&gt;&gt; days.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it s=
eems like<br>
&gt;&gt; a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it&#39;d be useful eno=
ugh to<br>
&gt;&gt; overcome such pity objections?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Though, to be fair, Matt&#39;s idea is pretty different than what =
John has in<br>
&gt;&gt; mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than=
 just a<br>
&gt;&gt; formality.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.<=
br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to =
jwk.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for=
 signing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert c=
hain it is a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is n=
o easy way to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can hav=
e a single<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; keyid and key use that apples to both formats.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is =
being sent<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; in band.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the=
 same thing.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, &quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&quot; =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.=
com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentit=
y.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot mor=
e meaningful and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE=
. But it would be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; about the encrypting party or sender&#39;s certs in th=
at case, right? Which<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would be different than how it&#39;s currently being u=
sed. And that might be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; another argument for not having it in JWE right now.<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Of course that starts to beg the &quot;must understand=
 headers&quot; question but<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; digress...<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I was starting to come to similar conclusions.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509=
 certs can be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrapped into a JSON Web Key?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; {<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;kty&quot;:&quot;X509&quot;,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;x5c&quot;: [....]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; }<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the re=
cipoient decrypts<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; with a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; secret. =A0I would expect a kid in the header.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c th=
at the sender used to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a r=
eference though a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is pr=
obably keeping its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; private keys in a key-store of some sort.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; In any event we would minimally want to change tha=
t to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of=
 the entity that is to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quo=
t;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks Brian<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; John B.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@ping=
identity.com</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE&#39;s=
 x5c definition that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; struck<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; me as maybe not right.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; From<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#section-4.1.9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The certificate containing the public key of=
 the entity that encrypted<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the JWE MUST be the first certificate.&quot; - but=
 it&#39;s not the public key<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the entity that encrypted, is it? It&#39;s the pub=
lic key of the entity<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; will decrypt. The other entity.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;The recipient MUST verify the certificate ch=
ain according to [RFC5280]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and reject the JWE if any validation failure occur=
s.&quot; - maybe I&#39;m<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; missing<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; something but why would the recipient verify it&#3=
9;s own certificate<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; chain?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; And the first hyperlink in &quot;See Appendix B&lt=
;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#appendix-B" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/dra=
ft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B</a>&gt;of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; JWS&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web=
-encryption-08#ref-JWS" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-=
ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ]<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; for an example &quot;x5c&quot; value&quot; takes y=
ou to Appendix B of JWE, which is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text woul=
d suggest.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe=
 it&#39;d be better to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; just<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard point=
ed out previously,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jo=
se/current/msg01434.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archiv=
e/web/jose/current/msg01434.html</a>,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; there&#39;s<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; really no point in sending a whole chain to help t=
he recipient<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; identify its<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; own key.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/j=
ose" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jos=
e@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><b=
r>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--e89a8f2346bbfca23d04d53e9f67--

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
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Subject: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go
ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial
tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as
follows:

No: 10
Yes: 14

What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted "Yes"
on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who
thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library
should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means
that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to
RFC 2119.

So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE and
JWS:
-----BEGIN-JWE-----
   4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
        understood and supported.
-----END-JWE-----
-----BEGIN-JWS-----
   4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
       parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
       understood and supported.
-----END-JWS-----

Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be
REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an
unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.

--Richard



-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
1       2       3    Name:
N       -       -    Bradley
N       -       -    Ito
N       N       A    Yee
N       N       B    Barnes
N       N       B    Rescorla
N       N       C    Manger
N       N       C    Octman
N       Y       A    Fletcher
N       Y       A    Miller
N       Y       A    Sakimura
Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
Y       Y       A    Biering
Y       Y       A    Brault
Y       Y       A    Hedberg
Y       Y       A    Jay
Y       Y       A    Jones
Y       Y       A    Marais
Y       Y       A    Nadalin
Y       Y       A    Nara
Y       Y       A    Nennker
Y       Y       A    Solberg
Y       Y       B    Hardt
Y       Y       B    Medeiros
Y       Y       C    Matake
Y       Y       C    Mishra
-----END-Tabulation-----

--f46d04089151b4c59d04d53eaf1e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">We&#39;re 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I =
thought I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.=
 =A0My initial tabulation is below. =A0The result on the FIRST POLL (the ma=
in one) is as follows:<div>
<br></div><div style>No: 10</div><div style>Yes: 14</div><div style><br></d=
iv><div style>What I find striking, however, is that every single person th=
at voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on th=
e SECOND POLL. =A0So nobody who thinks that all headers should be critical =
thinks that a JOSE library should actually be required to enforce this cons=
traint. =A0And that means that enforcing that all headers are supported can=
not be a MUST according to RFC 2119.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>So I wonder if there&#39;s consensus to rem=
ove the following text from JWE and JWS:</div><div style>-----BEGIN-JWE----=
-</div><div style><div>=A0 =A04. =A0 The resulting JWE Header MUST be valid=
ated to only include</div>
<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are b=
oth</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 understood and supported.</div></div><div sty=
le>-----END-JWE-----</div><div style>-----BEGIN-JWS-----</div><div style><d=
iv>=A0 =A04. =A0The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include<=
/div>
<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are bo=
th</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0understood and supported.</div></div><div style=
>-----END-JWS-----</div><div style><br></div><div style>Otherewise, a JOSE =
library conforming to these specifications would be REQUIRED (a synonym to =
MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an unknown header, contradi=
cting all those &quot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND POLL.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>--Richard</div><div style><br></div><div st=
yle><br></div><div style><br></div><div style>-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----</d=
iv><div style><div>1 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0 =A0 3 =A0 =A0Name: =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0=A0</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0=A0</div>
<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</d=
iv><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Yee =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0=
</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Barnes =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<=
/div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Rescorla =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</di=
v><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Manger =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div=
>
<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Octman =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Fletcher =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div=
>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Miller =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>=
N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Sakimura =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>Y =
=A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0D&#39;Agostino =A0 =A0 =A0</div>
<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Biering =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Brault =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Hedberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jay =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>=
<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jones =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
>
<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Marais =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nadalin =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nara =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nennker =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Solberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>
<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
><div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Medeiros =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Matake =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Mishra =A0 =A0</div></div><div style=
>-----END-Tabulation-----</div>
</div>

--f46d04089151b4c59d04d53eaf1e--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Feb  8 15:20:22 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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I think you're missing the point of the second poll question.  It's there t=
o clarify that the requirement to validate the headers is one placed on the=
 system as a whole - not solely on particular pieces of an implementation. =
 Indeed, it's my understanding that IETF specs almost universally place req=
uirements only on the protocol behaviors - not on how implementations must =
be factored.  In other words, it's normal for IETF specs to place constrain=
ts on the behavior of the system as a whole.  The text in the second poll q=
uestion would just reinforce that this is so in this particular case.

Hope everyone has a good weekend!

                                                                -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go ah=
ead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial tabulati=
on is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as follows:

No: 10
Yes: 14

What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted "Yes"=
 on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who thin=
ks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library should ac=
tually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means that enforci=
ng that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.

So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE and =
JWS:
-----BEGIN-JWE-----
   4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
        understood and supported.
-----END-JWE-----
-----BEGIN-JWS-----
   4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
       parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
       understood and supported.
-----END-JWS-----

Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be REQU=
IRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an unkno=
wn header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.

--Richard



-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
1       2       3    Name:
N       -       -    Bradley
N       -       -    Ito
N       N       A    Yee
N       N       B    Barnes
N       N       B    Rescorla
N       N       C    Manger
N       N       C    Octman
N       Y       A    Fletcher
N       Y       A    Miller
N       Y       A    Sakimura
Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
Y       Y       A    Biering
Y       Y       A    Brault
Y       Y       A    Hedberg
Y       Y       A    Jay
Y       Y       A    Jones
Y       Y       A    Marais
Y       Y       A    Nadalin
Y       Y       A    Nara
Y       Y       A    Nennker
Y       Y       A    Solberg
Y       Y       B    Hardt
Y       Y       B    Medeiros
Y       Y       C    Matake
Y       Y       C    Mishra
-----END-Tabulation-----

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I think you&#8217;re miss=
ing the point of the second poll question.&nbsp; It&#8217;s there to clarif=
y that the requirement to validate the headers is one placed on the system
 as a whole &#8211; not solely on particular pieces of an implementation.&n=
bsp; Indeed, it&#8217;s my understanding that IETF specs almost universally=
 place requirements only on the protocol behaviors &#8211; not on how imple=
mentations must be factored.&nbsp; In other words, it&#8217;s normal
 for IETF specs to place constraints on the behavior of the system as a who=
le.&nbsp; The text in the second poll question would just reinforce that th=
is is so in this particular case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Hope everyone has a good =
weekend!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so =
I thought I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping u=
p. &nbsp;My initial tabulation is below. &nbsp;The result on the FIRST POLL=
 (the main one) is as follows:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">No: 10<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Yes: 14<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">What I find striking, however, is that every single =
person that voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&qu=
ot; on the SECOND POLL. &nbsp;So nobody who thinks that all headers should =
be critical thinks that a JOSE library should actually be required
 to enforce this constraint. &nbsp;And that means that enforcing that all h=
eaders are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the follo=
wing text from JWE and JWS:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp; The resulting JWE Header MUST=
 be validated to only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; parameters and values wh=
ose syntax and semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; understood and supported=
.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp;The resulting JWS Header MUST =
be validated to only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;parameters and values who=
se syntax and semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;understood and supported.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these speci=
fications would be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS=
 that contains an unknown header, contradicting all those &quot;Yes&quot; v=
otes on the SECOND POLL.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 2 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 3 &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Name: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Bradley &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Ito &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Yee &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Barnes &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Rescorla &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Manger &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Octman &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Fletcher &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Miller &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Sakimura &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbs=
p; &nbsp;D'Agostino &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Biering &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Brault &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Hedberg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Jay &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Jones &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Marais &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Nadalin &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Nara &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Nennker &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Solberg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Hardt &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Medeiros &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Matake &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Mishra &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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--90e6ba309926ff0a4e04d53edef3
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology for
IETF documents:
"
1. MUST   This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the
   definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.
"

By that definition, a system that implements JWE is absolutely required to
throw out an object that contains an unknown header.  That requirement
applies to any system that implements JWE -- JUST JWE, not some overall
system that uses JWE.  (And likewise JWS.)

So yes, the current language applies very specifically to a JOSE library,
not to a more general system.  If you want to do that, write a BCP on
"Guidelines for Usage of JOSE".

--Richard





On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wro=
te:

>  I think you=92re missing the point of the second poll question.  It=92s
> there to clarify that the requirement to validate the headers is one plac=
ed
> on the system as a whole =96 not solely on particular pieces of an
> implementation.  Indeed, it=92s my understanding that IETF specs almost
> universally place requirements only on the protocol behaviors =96 not on =
how
> implementations must be factored.  In other words, it=92s normal for IETF
> specs to place constraints on the behavior of the system as a whole.  The
> text in the second poll question would just reinforce that this is so in
> this particular case.****
>
> ** **
>
> Hope everyone has a good weekend!****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                                 -- Mike**=
*
> *
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?****
>
> ** **
>
> We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go
> ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial
> tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as
> follows:****
>
> ** **
>
> No: 10****
>
> Yes: 14****
>
> ** **
>
> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted
> "Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody w=
ho
> thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library
> should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means
> that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according =
to
> RFC 2119.****
>
> ** **
>
> So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE an=
d
> JWS:****
>
> -----BEGIN-JWE-----****
>
>    4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include****
>
>         parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both****
>
>         understood and supported.****
>
> -----END-JWE-----****
>
> -----BEGIN-JWS-----****
>
>    4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include****
>
>        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both****
>
>        understood and supported.****
>
> -----END-JWS-----****
>
> ** **
>
> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be
> REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an
> unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.**=
*
> *
>
> ** **
>
> --Richard****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----****
>
> 1       2       3    Name:           ****
>
> N       -       -    Bradley         ****
>
> N       -       -    Ito             ****
>
> N       N       A    Yee             ****
>
> N       N       B    Barnes          ****
>
> N       N       B    Rescorla        ****
>
> N       N       C    Manger          ****
>
> N       N       C    Octman          ****
>
> N       Y       A    Fletcher        ****
>
> N       Y       A    Miller          ****
>
> N       Y       A    Sakimura        ****
>
> Y       Y       -    D'Agostino      ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Biering         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Brault          ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Hedberg         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Jay             ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Jones           ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Marais          ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nadalin         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nara            ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nennker         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Solberg         ****
>
> Y       Y       B    Hardt           ****
>
> Y       Y       B    Medeiros        ****
>
> Y       Y       C    Matake          ****
>
> Y       Y       C    Mishra    ****
>
> -----END-Tabulation-----****
>

--90e6ba309926ff0a4e04d53edef3
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements=
 terminology for IETF documents:<div>&quot;</div><div><div>1. MUST =A0 This=
 word, or the terms &quot;REQUIRED&quot; or &quot;SHALL&quot;, mean that th=
e</div>
<div>=A0 =A0definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.</di=
v></div><div>&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>By that definition, a system t=
hat implements JWE is absolutely required to throw out an object that conta=
ins an unknown header. =A0That requirement applies to any system that imple=
ments JWE -- JUST JWE, not some overall system that uses JWE. =A0(And likew=
ise JWS.)</div>
<div><br></div><div>So yes, the current language applies very specifically =
to a JOSE library, not to a more general system. =A0If you want to do that,=
 write a BCP on &quot;Guidelines for Usage of JOSE&quot;.</div><div><br></d=
iv>
<div style>--Richard</div><div style><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri=
, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(31,73,125)">I think you=92re missing the point of the second poll=
 question.=A0 It=92s there to clarify that the requirement to validate the =
headers is one placed on the system
 as a whole =96 not solely on particular pieces of an implementation.=A0 In=
deed, it=92s my understanding that IETF specs almost universally place requ=
irements only on the protocol behaviors =96 not on how implementations must=
 be factored.=A0 In other words, it=92s normal
 for IETF specs to place constraints on the behavior of the system as a who=
le.=A0 The text in the second poll question would just reinforce that this =
is so in this particular case.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(31,73,125)"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(31,73,125)">Hope everyone has a good weekend!<u></u><u></u></span=
></p>
<p class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(31,73,125)"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 -- Mike<u><=
/u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(31,73,125)"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D""><b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-seri=
f">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-se=
rif"> <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounc=
es@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"=
_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<u></u><u></u=
></span></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"">We&#39;re 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I tho=
ught I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up. =
=A0My initial tabulation is below. =A0The result on the FIRST POLL (the mai=
n one) is as follows:<u></u><u></u></p>

<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">No: 10<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Yes: 14<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">What I find striking, however, is that every single person th=
at voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on th=
e SECOND POLL. =A0So nobody who thinks that all headers should be critical =
thinks that a JOSE library should actually be required
 to enforce this constraint. =A0And that means that enforcing that all head=
ers are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">So I wonder if there&#39;s consensus to remove the following =
text from JWE and JWS:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">-----BEGIN-JWE-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">=A0 =A04. =A0 The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to o=
nly include<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 parameters and values whose syntax and semant=
ics are both<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 understood and supported.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">-----END-JWE-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">-----BEGIN-JWS-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">=A0 =A04. =A0The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to on=
ly include<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0parameters and values whose syntax and semanti=
cs are both<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0understood and supported.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">-----END-JWS-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications=
 would be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that con=
tains an unknown header, contradicting all those &quot;Yes&quot; votes on t=
he SECOND POLL.<u></u><u></u></p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D""><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">1 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0 =A0 3 =A0 =A0Name: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Yee =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Barnes =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Rescorla =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Manger =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Octman =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Fletcher =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Miller =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Sakimura =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0D&#39;Agostino =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Biering =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Brault =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Hedberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jay =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jones =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Marais =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nadalin =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nara =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nennker =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Solberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Medeiros =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Matake =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Mishra =A0 =A0<u></u><u>=
</u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"">-----END-Tabulation-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--90e6ba309926ff0a4e04d53edef3--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Feb  8 15:34:27 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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I'm not going to spend a lot of time arguing semantics, but there are lots =
of ways to meet this requirement in a library and still allow extensions to=
 be used by the system as a whole that are not understood by the library.

One would be to have the caller pass a list of header parameter values to t=
he library informing it to allow the use of particular parameters not under=
stood by the library.  For instance, the list ["notes", "vsf"] might be pas=
sed in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the "notes" and "v=
sf" header parameters, since they are understood by the caller.

A dual of this is to have the library return a list of header parameters pr=
esent in the input that it did not understand to the caller, letting the ca=
ller decide whether the input needs to be rejected.

I don't see the word "library" anywhere in RFC 2199. :)

                                                                Cheers,
                                                                -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology for =
IETF documents:
"
1. MUST   This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the
   definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.
"

By that definition, a system that implements JWE is absolutely required to =
throw out an object that contains an unknown header.  That requirement appl=
ies to any system that implements JWE -- JUST JWE, not some overall system =
that uses JWE.  (And likewise JWS.)

So yes, the current language applies very specifically to a JOSE library, n=
ot to a more general system.  If you want to do that, write a BCP on "Guide=
lines for Usage of JOSE".

--Richard




On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<mai=
lto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:
I think you're missing the point of the second poll question.  It's there t=
o clarify that the requirement to validate the headers is one placed on the=
 system as a whole - not solely on particular pieces of an implementation. =
 Indeed, it's my understanding that IETF specs almost universally place req=
uirements only on the protocol behaviors - not on how implementations must =
be factored.  In other words, it's normal for IETF specs to place constrain=
ts on the behavior of the system as a whole.  The text in the second poll q=
uestion would just reinforce that this is so in this particular case.

Hope everyone has a good weekend!

                                                                -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go ah=
ead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial tabulati=
on is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as follows:

No: 10
Yes: 14

What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted "Yes"=
 on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who thin=
ks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library should ac=
tually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means that enforci=
ng that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.

So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE and =
JWS:
-----BEGIN-JWE-----
   4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
        understood and supported.
-----END-JWE-----
-----BEGIN-JWS-----
   4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
       parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
       understood and supported.
-----END-JWS-----

Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be REQU=
IRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an unkno=
wn header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.

--Richard



-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
1       2       3    Name:
N       -       -    Bradley
N       -       -    Ito
N       N       A    Yee
N       N       B    Barnes
N       N       B    Rescorla
N       N       C    Manger
N       N       C    Octman
N       Y       A    Fletcher
N       Y       A    Miller
N       Y       A    Sakimura
Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
Y       Y       A    Biering
Y       Y       A    Brault
Y       Y       A    Hedberg
Y       Y       A    Jay
Y       Y       A    Jones
Y       Y       A    Marais
Y       Y       A    Nadalin
Y       Y       A    Nara
Y       Y       A    Nennker
Y       Y       A    Solberg
Y       Y       B    Hardt
Y       Y       B    Medeiros
Y       Y       C    Matake
Y       Y       C    Mishra
-----END-Tabulation-----


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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I&#8217;m not going to sp=
end a lot of time arguing semantics, but there are lots of ways to meet thi=
s requirement in a library and still allow extensions to be used
 by the system as a whole that are not understood by the library.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">One would be to have the =
caller pass a list of header parameter values to the library informing it t=
o allow the use of particular parameters not understood
 by the library.&nbsp; For instance, the list [&#8220;notes&#8221;, &#8220;=
vsf&#8221;] might be passed in, informing the library not to reject inputs =
using the &#8220;notes&#8221; and &#8220;vsf&#8221; header parameters, sinc=
e they are understood by the caller.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">A dual of this is to have=
 the library return a list of header parameters present in the input that i=
t did not understand to the caller, letting the caller decide
 whether the input needs to be rejected.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I don&#8217;t see the wor=
d &#8220;library&#8221; anywhere in RFC 2199.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cheers,<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requir=
ements terminology for IETF documents:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1. MUST &nbsp; This word, or the terms &quot;REQUIRE=
D&quot; or &quot;SHALL&quot;, mean that the<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp;definition is an absolute requirement o=
f the specification.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">By that definition, a system that implements JWE is =
absolutely required to throw out an object that contains an unknown header.=
 &nbsp;That requirement applies to any system that implements JWE -- JUST J=
WE, not some overall system that uses JWE.
 &nbsp;(And likewise JWS.)<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So yes, the current language applies very specifical=
ly to a JOSE library, not to a more general system. &nbsp;If you want to do=
 that, write a BCP on &quot;Guidelines for Usage of JOSE&quot;.<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@m=
icrosoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I think you&#8217;re missing the point =
of the second poll question.&nbsp; It&#8217;s there to clarify that the req=
uirement
 to validate the headers is one placed on the system as a whole &#8211; not=
 solely on particular pieces of an implementation.&nbsp; Indeed, it&#8217;s=
 my understanding that IETF specs almost universally place requirements onl=
y on the protocol behaviors &#8211; not on how implementations
 must be factored.&nbsp; In other words, it&#8217;s normal for IETF specs t=
o place constraints on the behavior of the system as a whole.&nbsp; The tex=
t in the second poll question would just reinforce that this is so in this =
particular case.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Hope everyone has a good weekend!</span=
><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,=
&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@iet=
f.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?</span><o:p><=
/o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I wo=
uld go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up. &nbsp;My in=
itial tabulation is below. &nbsp;The result on
 the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as follows:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">No: 10<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Yes: 14<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">What I find striking, however, is that every single person that vo=
ted &quot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the SEC=
OND POLL. &nbsp;So nobody who thinks that all headers should
 be critical thinks that a JOSE library should actually be required to enfo=
rce this constraint. &nbsp;And that means that enforcing that all headers a=
re supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from=
 JWE and JWS:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----BEGIN-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp; The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated =
to only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; parameters and values whose syntax and=
 semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; understood and supported.<o:p></o:p></=
p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----END-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----BEGIN-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp;The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated t=
o only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;parameters and values whose syntax and =
semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;understood and supported.<o:p></o:p></p=
>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----END-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications woul=
d be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains=
 an unknown header, contradicting all
 those &quot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND POLL.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">1 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 2 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 3 &nbsp; &nbsp;Name:=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp;Bradl=
ey &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp;Ito &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Yee &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Barne=
s &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Resco=
rla &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Mange=
r &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Octma=
n &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Fletc=
her &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Mille=
r &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Sakim=
ura &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp;D'Ago=
stino &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Bieri=
ng &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Braul=
t &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Hedbe=
rg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Jay &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Jones=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Marai=
s &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Nadal=
in &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Nara =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Nennk=
er &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Solbe=
rg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Hardt=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Medei=
ros &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Matak=
e &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Mishr=
a &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----END-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394367421DEDTK5EX14MBXC284r_--

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 16:34:41 -0700
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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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--f46d0402a9afaa362604d53f028a
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FWIW, I didn't see my name on the tabulation but I did 'vote'
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go
> ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial
> tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as
> follows:
>
> No: 10
> Yes: 14
>
> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted
> "Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who
> thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library
> should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means
> that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to
> RFC 2119.
>
> So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE and
> JWS:
> -----BEGIN-JWE-----
>    4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
>         parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>         understood and supported.
> -----END-JWE-----
> -----BEGIN-JWS-----
>    4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
>        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>        understood and supported.
> -----END-JWS-----
>
> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be
> REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an
> unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.
>
> --Richard
>
>
>
> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
> 1       2       3    Name:
> N       -       -    Bradley
> N       -       -    Ito
> N       N       A    Yee
> N       N       B    Barnes
> N       N       B    Rescorla
> N       N       C    Manger
> N       N       C    Octman
> N       Y       A    Fletcher
> N       Y       A    Miller
> N       Y       A    Sakimura
> Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
> Y       Y       A    Biering
> Y       Y       A    Brault
> Y       Y       A    Hedberg
> Y       Y       A    Jay
> Y       Y       A    Jones
> Y       Y       A    Marais
> Y       Y       A    Nadalin
> Y       Y       A    Nara
> Y       Y       A    Nennker
> Y       Y       A    Solberg
> Y       Y       B    Hardt
> Y       Y       B    Medeiros
> Y       Y       C    Matake
> Y       Y       C    Mishra
> -----END-Tabulation-----
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--f46d0402a9afaa362604d53f028a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">FWIW, I didn&#39;t see my name on the tabulation but I did=
 &#39;vote&#39; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curren=
t/msg01461.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461=
.html</a><br>

</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri,=
 Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex">

<div dir=3D"ltr">We&#39;re 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I =
thought I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.=
 =A0My initial tabulation is below. =A0The result on the FIRST POLL (the ma=
in one) is as follows:<div>


<br></div><div>No: 10</div><div>Yes: 14</div><div><br></div><div>What I fin=
d striking, however, is that every single person that voted &quot;Yes&quot;=
 on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the SECOND POLL. =A0So nob=
ody who thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE libra=
ry should actually be required to enforce this constraint. =A0And that mean=
s that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according =
to RFC 2119.</div>


<div><br></div><div>So I wonder if there&#39;s consensus to remove the foll=
owing text from JWE and JWS:</div><div>-----BEGIN-JWE-----</div><div><div>=
=A0 =A04. =A0 The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include</d=
iv>


<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are b=
oth</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 understood and supported.</div></div><div>---=
--END-JWE-----</div><div>-----BEGIN-JWS-----</div><div><div>=A0 =A04. =A0Th=
e resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include</div>


<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are bo=
th</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0understood and supported.</div></div><div>-----=
END-JWS-----</div><div><br></div><div>Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming=
 to these specifications would be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to r=
eject a JWE/JWS that contains an unknown header, contradicting all those &q=
uot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND POLL.</div>


<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----</div><div><div>1 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0=
 =A0 3 =A0 =A0Name: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =
=A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>
<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</d=
iv><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Yee =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0=
</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Barnes =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<=
/div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Rescorla =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</di=
v><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Manger =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div=
>


<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Octman =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Fletcher =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div=
>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Miller =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>=
N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Sakimura =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>Y =
=A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0D&#39;Agostino =A0 =A0 =A0</div>


<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Biering =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Brault =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Hedberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jay =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>=
<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jones =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
>


<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Marais =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nadalin =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nara =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nennker =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Solberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>


<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
><div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Medeiros =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Matake =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Mishra =A0 =A0</div></div><div>-----=
END-Tabulation-----</div>


</div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--f46d0402a9afaa362604d53f028a--

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Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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It seems to me that without the "build up a table" language, there's no
risk in the SPI proposal at all (see revised text below).  Fails safe: If
you get an SPI you don't know, you reject the object.  The only risk is in
the design of the key management protocols, which is a separate topic.
 Think of it like this split between RFC 4303 (ESP) and RFC 4306 (IKEv2,
the key management protocol).

And I'm not sure how having it in an I-D makes any difference at all.

--Richard


-----BEGIN-----
Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter

The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains a
base64url-encoded opaque byte string that labels a set of security
parameters.  This index is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in
cases where entities use an out-of-band mechanism to negotiate
cryptographic parameters.

Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter maintain a table of
cached security parameters.  The maintenance of this table, e.g., how
entries are added or removed, is done by the out-of-band key management
protocol.  Each entry in the table is indexed by an SPI value, and contains
the following cryptographic parameters
-- JWE header fields
-- Encrypted Key
-- Initialization Vector

A JWE whose header contains an SPI value MUST NOT contain Encrypted Key or
Initialization Vector components.  It will thus have two base64url-encoded
components, the header and the encrypted data.  An entity receiving such a
JWE reconstructs the full JWE by adding the cached header fields to the
header, and adding the Encrypted Key and Initialization Vector components
to the JWE.  The reconstructed JWE is then processed as normal.  If a JWE
object contains an unrecognized SPI value, then the recipient MUST consider
it invalid.
-----END-----



On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:01 PM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>wrote:

> Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal
> over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from
> operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe
> strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail,
> the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base
> JOSE WG drafts.
>
> As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be
> submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and
> analysis that I think it needs.
>
> Thanks,
> Brian
>
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">It seems to me that without the &quot;build up a table&quo=
t; language, there&#39;s no risk in the SPI proposal at all (see revised te=
xt below). =A0Fails safe: If you get an SPI you don&#39;t know, you reject =
the object. =A0The only risk is in the design of the key management protoco=
ls, which is a separate topic. =A0Think of it like this split between RFC 4=
303 (ESP) and RFC 4306 (IKEv2, the key management protocol).<div>
<br></div><div>And I&#39;m not sure how having it in an I-D makes any diffe=
rence at all.</div><div><br></div><div style>--Richard</div><div style><br>=
</div><div><br></div><div><div>-----BEGIN-----</div><div>Section 4.1.X. &qu=
ot;<span class=3D"">spi</span>&quot; Header Parameter</div>
<div><br></div><div>The &quot;<span class=3D"">spi</span>&quot; (Security P=
arameters Index) header parameter contains a base64url-encoded opaque byte =
string that labels a set of security parameters. =A0This index is designed =
to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities use an out-of-=
band mechanism to negotiate cryptographic parameters.<br>
</div><div><br></div><div style>Entities supporting the use of the &quot;sp=
i&quot; parameter maintain a table of cached security parameters. =A0The ma=
intenance of this table, e.g., how entries are added or removed, is done by=
 the out-of-band key management protocol. =A0Each entry in the table is ind=
exed by an SPI value, and contains the following cryptographic parameters</=
div>
<div style>-- JWE header fields</div><div style>-- Encrypted Key</div><div =
style>-- Initialization Vector</div><div><br></div><div style>A JWE whose h=
eader contains an SPI value MUST NOT contain Encrypted Key or Initializatio=
n Vector components. =A0It will thus have two base64url-encoded components,=
 the header and the encrypted data. =A0An entity receiving such a JWE recon=
structs the full JWE by adding the cached header fields to the header, and =
adding the Encrypted Key and Initialization Vector components to the JWE. =
=A0The reconstructed JWE is then processed as normal. =A0If a JWE object co=
ntains an unrecognized SPI value, then the recipient MUST consider it inval=
id.</div>
<div><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">-----END--=
---</span><br></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:13px"><br></span></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">
On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:01 PM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingide=
ntity.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Maybe this was apparent from my comm=
ents/questions on the SPI proposal over the last couple days[1] but I have =
concerns that run the gamut from operational complexity and fragility to se=
curity problems. I believe strongly that, without considerably more analysi=
s and specification detail, the current SPI work is much too risky to consi=
der go in the current base JOSE WG drafts.<br>




<br></div>As an alternative I&#39;d like to request/propose that the SPI st=
uff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion a=
nd analysis that I think it needs.<br><div><br></div><div>Thanks,<br>Brian<=
br>



</div><div><br>[1] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/cur=
rent/msg01500.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/=
jose/current/msg01500.html</a><br>
</div></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Sorry about that!  But you're in the "No" camp anyway, so it doesn't really
change the outcome here.


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:34 PM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>wrote:

> FWIW, I didn't see my name on the tabulation but I did 'vote'
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
>> We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go
>> ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial
>> tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as
>> follows:
>>
>> No: 10
>> Yes: 14
>>
>> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted
>> "Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who
>> thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library
>> should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means
>> that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to
>> RFC 2119.
>>
>> So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE
>> and JWS:
>> -----BEGIN-JWE-----
>>    4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
>>         parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>>         understood and supported.
>> -----END-JWE-----
>> -----BEGIN-JWS-----
>>    4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
>>        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>>        understood and supported.
>> -----END-JWS-----
>>
>> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be
>> REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an
>> unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.
>>
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>>
>> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
>> 1       2       3    Name:
>> N       -       -    Bradley
>> N       -       -    Ito
>> N       N       A    Yee
>> N       N       B    Barnes
>> N       N       B    Rescorla
>> N       N       C    Manger
>> N       N       C    Octman
>> N       Y       A    Fletcher
>> N       Y       A    Miller
>> N       Y       A    Sakimura
>> Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
>> Y       Y       A    Biering
>> Y       Y       A    Brault
>> Y       Y       A    Hedberg
>> Y       Y       A    Jay
>> Y       Y       A    Jones
>> Y       Y       A    Marais
>> Y       Y       A    Nadalin
>> Y       Y       A    Nara
>> Y       Y       A    Nennker
>> Y       Y       A    Solberg
>> Y       Y       B    Hardt
>> Y       Y       B    Medeiros
>> Y       Y       C    Matake
>> Y       Y       C    Mishra
>> -----END-Tabulation-----
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Sorry about that! =A0But you&#39;re in the &quot;No&quot; =
camp anyway, so it doesn&#39;t really change the outcome here.</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 =
at 6:34 PM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbel=
l@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;</s=
pan> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">FWIW, I didn&#39;t see my n=
ame on the tabulation but I did &#39;vote&#39; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.o=
rg/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html" target=3D"_blank">http://ww=
w.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html</a><br>


</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><d=
iv class=3D"h5">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5">

<div dir=3D"ltr">We&#39;re 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I =
thought I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.=
 =A0My initial tabulation is below. =A0The result on the FIRST POLL (the ma=
in one) is as follows:<div>



<br></div><div>No: 10</div><div>Yes: 14</div><div><br></div><div>What I fin=
d striking, however, is that every single person that voted &quot;Yes&quot;=
 on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the SECOND POLL. =A0So nob=
ody who thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE libra=
ry should actually be required to enforce this constraint. =A0And that mean=
s that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according =
to RFC 2119.</div>



<div><br></div><div>So I wonder if there&#39;s consensus to remove the foll=
owing text from JWE and JWS:</div><div>-----BEGIN-JWE-----</div><div><div>=
=A0 =A04. =A0 The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include</d=
iv>



<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are b=
oth</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 understood and supported.</div></div><div>---=
--END-JWE-----</div><div>-----BEGIN-JWS-----</div><div><div>=A0 =A04. =A0Th=
e resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include</div>



<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are bo=
th</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0understood and supported.</div></div><div>-----=
END-JWS-----</div><div><br></div><div>Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming=
 to these specifications would be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to r=
eject a JWE/JWS that contains an unknown header, contradicting all those &q=
uot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND POLL.</div>



<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----</div><div><div>1 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0=
 =A0 3 =A0 =A0Name: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =
=A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>
<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</d=
iv><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Yee =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0=
</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Barnes =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<=
/div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Rescorla =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</di=
v><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Manger =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div=
>



<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Octman =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Fletcher =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div=
>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Miller =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>=
N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Sakimura =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>Y =
=A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0D&#39;Agostino =A0 =A0 =A0</div>



<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Biering =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Brault =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Hedberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jay =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>=
<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jones =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
>



<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Marais =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nadalin =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nara =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nennker =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Solberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>



<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
><div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Medeiros =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Matake =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Mishra =A0 =A0</div></div><div>-----=
END-Tabulation-----</div>



</div>
<br></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 16:48:17 -0700
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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Narrows the gap by 1...


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:46 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Sorry about that!  But you're in the "No" camp anyway, so it doesn't
> really change the outcome here.
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:34 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com
> > wrote:
>
>> FWIW, I didn't see my name on the tabulation but I did 'vote'
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>
>>> We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go
>>> ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial
>>> tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as
>>> follows:
>>>
>>> No: 10
>>> Yes: 14
>>>
>>> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted
>>> "Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who
>>> thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library
>>> should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means
>>> that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to
>>> RFC 2119.
>>>
>>> So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE
>>> and JWS:
>>> -----BEGIN-JWE-----
>>>    4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
>>>         parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>>>         understood and supported.
>>> -----END-JWE-----
>>> -----BEGIN-JWS-----
>>>    4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
>>>        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>>>        understood and supported.
>>> -----END-JWS-----
>>>
>>> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be
>>> REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an
>>> unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.
>>>
>>> --Richard
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
>>> 1       2       3    Name:
>>> N       -       -    Bradley
>>> N       -       -    Ito
>>> N       N       A    Yee
>>> N       N       B    Barnes
>>> N       N       B    Rescorla
>>> N       N       C    Manger
>>> N       N       C    Octman
>>> N       Y       A    Fletcher
>>> N       Y       A    Miller
>>> N       Y       A    Sakimura
>>> Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
>>> Y       Y       A    Biering
>>> Y       Y       A    Brault
>>> Y       Y       A    Hedberg
>>> Y       Y       A    Jay
>>> Y       Y       A    Jones
>>> Y       Y       A    Marais
>>> Y       Y       A    Nadalin
>>> Y       Y       A    Nara
>>> Y       Y       A    Nennker
>>> Y       Y       A    Solberg
>>> Y       Y       B    Hardt
>>> Y       Y       B    Medeiros
>>> Y       Y       C    Matake
>>> Y       Y       C    Mishra
>>> -----END-Tabulation-----
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>
>>>
>>
>

--e89a8f2346bb4d177904d53f331a
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Narrows the gap by 1... <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:46 PM, Richa=
rd Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_bl=
ank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Sorry about that! =A0But yo=
u&#39;re in the &quot;No&quot; camp anyway, so it doesn&#39;t really change=
 the outcome here.</div>

<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:34 PM, Brian Campbell <=
span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=
=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">FWIW, I didn&#39;t see my n=
ame on the tabulation but I did &#39;vote&#39; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.o=
rg/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html" target=3D"_blank">http://ww=
w.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html</a><br>




</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><d=
iv>On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrot=
e:<br>


</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>

<div dir=3D"ltr">We&#39;re 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I =
thought I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.=
 =A0My initial tabulation is below. =A0The result on the FIRST POLL (the ma=
in one) is as follows:<div>





<br></div><div>No: 10</div><div>Yes: 14</div><div><br></div><div>What I fin=
d striking, however, is that every single person that voted &quot;Yes&quot;=
 on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the SECOND POLL. =A0So nob=
ody who thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE libra=
ry should actually be required to enforce this constraint. =A0And that mean=
s that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according =
to RFC 2119.</div>





<div><br></div><div>So I wonder if there&#39;s consensus to remove the foll=
owing text from JWE and JWS:</div><div>-----BEGIN-JWE-----</div><div><div>=
=A0 =A04. =A0 The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include</d=
iv>





<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are b=
oth</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 understood and supported.</div></div><div>---=
--END-JWE-----</div><div>-----BEGIN-JWS-----</div><div><div>=A0 =A04. =A0Th=
e resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include</div>





<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are bo=
th</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0understood and supported.</div></div><div>-----=
END-JWS-----</div><div><br></div><div>Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming=
 to these specifications would be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to r=
eject a JWE/JWS that contains an unknown header, contradicting all those &q=
uot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND POLL.</div>





<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----</div><div><div>1 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0=
 =A0 3 =A0 =A0Name: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =
=A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>
<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</d=
iv><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Yee =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0=
</div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Barnes =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<=
/div><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Rescorla =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</di=
v><div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Manger =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div=
>





<div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Octman =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Fletcher =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div=
>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Miller =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>=
N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Sakimura =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><div>Y =
=A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0D&#39;Agostino =A0 =A0 =A0</div>





<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Biering =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Brault =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Hedberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jay =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>=
<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jones =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
>





<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Marais =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nadalin =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nara =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><=
div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nennker =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Solberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div>





<div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</div=
><div>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Medeiros =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><d=
iv>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Matake =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0</div><di=
v>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Mishra =A0 =A0</div></div><div>-----=
END-Tabulation-----</div>





</div>
<br></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
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tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Suppose I write a JOSE library.  It can encrypt and decrypt JWEs, sign and
verify JWSs.  It does not check that every header in an object is
supported.  Should it be considered to implement the JWE and JWS specs or
not?

The answer to that question has to be "Yes" or "No".  No cheating :)

--Richard


On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wro=
te:

>  I=92m not going to spend a lot of time arguing semantics, but there are
> lots of ways to meet this requirement in a library and still allow
> extensions to be used by the system as a whole that are not understood by
> the library.****
>
> ** **
>
> One would be to have the caller pass a list of header parameter values to
> the library informing it to allow the use of particular parameters not
> understood by the library.  For instance, the list [=93notes=94, =93vsf=
=94] might
> be passed in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the =93not=
es=94
> and =93vsf=94 header parameters, since they are understood by the caller.=
****
>
> ** **
>
> A dual of this is to have the library return a list of header parameters
> present in the input that it did not understand to the caller, letting th=
e
> caller decide whether the input needs to be rejected.****
>
> ** **
>
> I don=92t see the word =93library=94 anywhere in RFC 2199. J****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                                 Cheers,**=
*
> *
>
>                                                                 -- Mike**=
*
> *
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM
> *To:* Mike Jones
> *Cc:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?****
>
> ** **
>
> Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology fo=
r
> IETF documents:****
>
> "****
>
> 1. MUST   This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the***=
*
>
>    definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.****
>
> "****
>
> ** **
>
> By that definition, a system that implements JWE is absolutely required t=
o
> throw out an object that contains an unknown header.  That requirement
> applies to any system that implements JWE -- JUST JWE, not some overall
> system that uses JWE.  (And likewise JWS.)****
>
> ** **
>
> So yes, the current language applies very specifically to a JOSE library,
> not to a more general system.  If you want to do that, write a BCP on
> "Guidelines for Usage of JOSE".****
>
> ** **
>
> --Richard****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
> wrote:****
>
> I think you=92re missing the point of the second poll question.  It=92s t=
here
> to clarify that the requirement to validate the headers is one placed on
> the system as a whole =96 not solely on particular pieces of an
> implementation.  Indeed, it=92s my understanding that IETF specs almost
> universally place requirements only on the protocol behaviors =96 not on =
how
> implementations must be factored.  In other words, it=92s normal for IETF
> specs to place constraints on the behavior of the system as a whole.  The
> text in the second poll question would just reinforce that this is so in
> this particular case.****
>
>  ****
>
> Hope everyone has a good weekend!****
>
>  ****
>
>                                                                 -- Mike**=
*
> *
>
>  ****
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?****
>
>  ****
>
> We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go
> ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial
> tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as
> follows:****
>
>  ****
>
> No: 10****
>
> Yes: 14****
>
>  ****
>
> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted
> "Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody w=
ho
> thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library
> should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means
> that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according =
to
> RFC 2119.****
>
>  ****
>
> So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE an=
d
> JWS:****
>
> -----BEGIN-JWE-----****
>
>    4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include****
>
>         parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both****
>
>         understood and supported.****
>
> -----END-JWE-----****
>
> -----BEGIN-JWS-----****
>
>    4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include****
>
>        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both****
>
>        understood and supported.****
>
> -----END-JWS-----****
>
>  ****
>
> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be
> REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an
> unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.**=
*
> *
>
>  ****
>
> --Richard****
>
>  ****
>
>  ****
>
>  ****
>
> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----****
>
> 1       2       3    Name:           ****
>
> N       -       -    Bradley         ****
>
> N       -       -    Ito             ****
>
> N       N       A    Yee             ****
>
> N       N       B    Barnes          ****
>
> N       N       B    Rescorla        ****
>
> N       N       C    Manger          ****
>
> N       N       C    Octman          ****
>
> N       Y       A    Fletcher        ****
>
> N       Y       A    Miller          ****
>
> N       Y       A    Sakimura        ****
>
> Y       Y       -    D'Agostino      ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Biering         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Brault          ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Hedberg         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Jay             ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Jones           ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Marais          ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nadalin         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nara            ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nennker         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Solberg         ****
>
> Y       Y       B    Hardt           ****
>
> Y       Y       B    Medeiros        ****
>
> Y       Y       C    Matake          ****
>
> Y       Y       C    Mishra    ****
>
> -----END-Tabulation-----****
>
> ** **
>

--e0cb4efe2b0e55af9204d53f47ff
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Suppose I write a JOSE library. =A0It can encrypt and decr=
ypt JWEs, sign and verify JWSs. =A0It does not check that every header in a=
n object is supported. =A0Should it be considered to implement the JWE and =
JWS specs or not?<div>
<br></div><div>The answer to that question has to be &quot;Yes&quot; or &qu=
ot;No&quot;. =A0No cheating :)</div><div><br></div><div>--Richard<br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013=
 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jon=
es@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I=92m not going to spend =
a lot of time arguing semantics, but there are lots of ways to meet this re=
quirement in a library and still allow extensions to be used
 by the system as a whole that are not understood by the library.<u></u><u>=
</u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">One would be to have the =
caller pass a list of header parameter values to the library informing it t=
o allow the use of particular parameters not understood
 by the library.=A0 For instance, the list [=93notes=94, =93vsf=94] might b=
e passed in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the =93notes=
=94 and =93vsf=94 header parameters, since they are understood by the calle=
r.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">A dual of this is to have=
 the library return a list of header parameters present in the input that i=
t did not understand to the caller, letting the caller decide
 whether the input needs to be rejected.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I don=92t see the word =
=93library=94 anywhere in RFC 2199.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1f497d"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Cheers,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-=
bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<u></u><u=
></u></span></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requir=
ements terminology for IETF documents:<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1. MUST =A0 This word, or the terms &quot;REQUIRED&q=
uot; or &quot;SHALL&quot;, mean that the<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0definition is an absolute requirement of the =
specification.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">By that definition, a system that implements JWE is =
absolutely required to throw out an object that contains an unknown header.=
 =A0That requirement applies to any system that implements JWE -- JUST JWE,=
 not some overall system that uses JWE.
 =A0(And likewise JWS.)<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So yes, the current language applies very specifical=
ly to a JOSE library, not to a more general system. =A0If you want to do th=
at, write a BCP on &quot;Guidelines for Usage of JOSE&quot;.<u></u><u></u><=
/p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@m=
icrosoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I think you=92re missing =
the point of the second poll question.=A0 It=92s there to clarify that the =
requirement
 to validate the headers is one placed on the system as a whole =96 not sol=
ely on particular pieces of an implementation.=A0 Indeed, it=92s my underst=
anding that IETF specs almost universally place requirements only on the pr=
otocol behaviors =96 not on how implementations
 must be factored.=A0 In other words, it=92s normal for IETF specs to place=
 constraints on the behavior of the system as a whole.=A0 The text in the s=
econd poll question would just reinforce that this is so in this particular=
 case.</span><u></u><u></u></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Hope everyone has a good =
weekend!</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 -- Mike</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@iet=
f.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?</span><u></u=
><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We&#39;re 24 votes into the header criticality poll,=
 so I thought I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shapi=
ng up. =A0My initial tabulation is below. =A0The result on
 the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as follows:<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">No: 10<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Yes: 14<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">What I find striking, however, is that every single =
person that voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&qu=
ot; on the SECOND POLL. =A0So nobody who thinks that all headers should
 be critical thinks that a JOSE library should actually be required to enfo=
rce this constraint. =A0And that means that enforcing that all headers are =
supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So I wonder if there&#39;s consensus to remove the f=
ollowing text from JWE and JWS:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-JWE-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A04. =A0 The resulting JWE Header MUST be valid=
ated to only include<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 parameters and values whose syntax a=
nd semantics are both<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 understood and supported.<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-JWE-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-JWS-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A04. =A0The resulting JWS Header MUST be valida=
ted to only include<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0parameters and values whose syntax an=
d semantics are both<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0understood and supported.<u></u><u></=
u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-JWS-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these speci=
fications would be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS=
 that contains an unknown header, contradicting all
 those &quot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND POLL.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0 =A0 3 =A0 =A0Name: =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Yee =A0 =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Barnes =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Rescorla =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Manger =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Octman =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Fletcher =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Miller =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Sakimura =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0D&#39;Agostino =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Biering =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Brault =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Hedberg =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jay =A0 =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jones =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Marais =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nadalin =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nara =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nennker =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Solberg =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Medeiros =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Matake =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Mishra =A0 =A0<=
u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-Tabulation-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--e0cb4efe2b0e55af9204d53f47ff--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Feb  8 16:03:10 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
Thread-Index: Ac4GWLOZ9hZEJ+UxRO2oUv+d3yPW5g==
Date: Sat, 9 Feb 2013 00:02:37 +0000
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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FWIW, I believe that John Bradley's, Ryo Ito's, and Dick Hardt's responses =
are also incorrectly tallied below, the caveats on Breno de Medeiros' "B" a=
re missing, and Chuck Mortimore's response is missing.  I believe that thei=
r responses were:

N       Y       A    Campbell
N       Y       A    Bradley
N       Y       A    Ito
Y       Y       C    Hardt           (Dick changed his answer on 3)
Y       Y       B*    de Medeiros         (*B if the new header can be omit=
ted, so that 3-component JWTs are still valid. I don't support this option =
if backwards-incompatible.)
Y       Y       A    Mortimore

By my count, this would bring the answers to date on the first question to:

16 "yes"
10 "no"

FWIW

And yes, the IETF doesn't vote... :)  I'm sure we'll have an interesting di=
scussion after the polling period is over on Monday.  As for me, I have bee=
n actively thinking about how to meet everyone's perceived needs, but will =
hold off on that until after Monday.

                                                                Take care,
                                                                -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Brian Campbell
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:35 PM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

FWIW, I didn't see my name on the tabulation but I did 'vote' http://www.ie=
tf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html

On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<mailto:rlb@ipv.s=
x>> wrote:
We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go ah=
ead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial tabulati=
on is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as follows:

No: 10
Yes: 14

What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted "Yes"=
 on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who thin=
ks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library should ac=
tually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means that enforci=
ng that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.

So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE and =
JWS:
-----BEGIN-JWE-----
   4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
        understood and supported.
-----END-JWE-----
-----BEGIN-JWS-----
   4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
       parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
       understood and supported.
-----END-JWS-----

Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be REQU=
IRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an unkno=
wn header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.

--Richard



-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
1       2       3    Name:
N       -       -    Bradley
N       -       -    Ito
N       N       A    Yee
N       N       B    Barnes
N       N       B    Rescorla
N       N       C    Manger
N       N       C    Octman
N       Y       A    Fletcher
N       Y       A    Miller
N       Y       A    Sakimura
Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
Y       Y       A    Biering
Y       Y       A    Brault
Y       Y       A    Hedberg
Y       Y       A    Jay
Y       Y       A    Jones
Y       Y       A    Marais
Y       Y       A    Nadalin
Y       Y       A    Nara
Y       Y       A    Nennker
Y       Y       A    Solberg
Y       Y       B    Hardt
Y       Y       B    Medeiros
Y       Y       C    Matake
Y       Y       C    Mishra
-----END-Tabulation-----

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">FWIW, I believe that John=
 Bradley&#8217;s, Ryo Ito&#8217;s, and Dick Hardt&#8217;s responses are als=
o incorrectly tallied below, the caveats on Breno de Medeiros&#8217; &#8220=
;B&#8221; are missing,
 and Chuck Mortimore&#8217;s response is missing.&nbsp; I believe that thei=
r responses were:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Campbell &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Bradley &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Ito &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Hardt &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;(Dick changed his an=
swer on 3)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B* &nb=
sp; &nbsp;de Medeiros &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;(*B if the new heade=
r can be omitted, so that 3-component JWTs are still valid. I don't support=
 this option if backwards-incompatible.)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Mortimore &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:=
p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">By my count, this would b=
ring the answers to date on the first question to:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">16 &#8220;yes&#8221;<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">10 &#8220;no&#8221;<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">FWIW<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">And yes, the IETF doesn&#=
8217;t vote&#8230;
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; I&#8217;m sure we&#8217;ll have =
an interesting discussion after the polling period is over on Monday.&nbsp;=
 As
 for me, I have been actively thinking about how to meet everyone&#8217;s p=
erceived needs, but will hold off on that until after Monday.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Take care,<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:35 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">FWIW, I didn't see my name on the tabulation but I d=
id 'vote'
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html"=
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html</a><o:p></=
o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so =
I thought I would go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping u=
p. &nbsp;My initial tabulation is below. &nbsp;The result on the FIRST POLL=
 (the main one) is as follows:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">No: 10<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Yes: 14<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">What I find striking, however, is that every single =
person that voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&qu=
ot; on the SECOND POLL. &nbsp;So nobody who thinks that all headers should =
be critical thinks that a JOSE library should actually be required
 to enforce this constraint. &nbsp;And that means that enforcing that all h=
eaders are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the follo=
wing text from JWE and JWS:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp; The resulting JWE Header MUST=
 be validated to only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; parameters and values wh=
ose syntax and semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; understood and supported=
.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp;The resulting JWS Header MUST =
be validated to only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;parameters and values who=
se syntax and semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;understood and supported.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these speci=
fications would be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS=
 that contains an unknown header, contradicting all those &quot;Yes&quot; v=
otes on the SECOND POLL.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 2 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 3 &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Name: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Bradley &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Ito &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Yee &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Barnes &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Rescorla &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Manger &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Octman &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Fletcher &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Miller &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Sakimura &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbs=
p; &nbsp;D'Agostino &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Biering &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Brault &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Hedberg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Jay &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Jones &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Marais &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Nadalin &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Nara &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Nennker &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Solberg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Hardt &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Medeiros &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Matake &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbs=
p; &nbsp;Mishra &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Feb  8 16:05:16 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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It implements part of them.  That's the truth. :)

From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:54 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

Suppose I write a JOSE library.  It can encrypt and decrypt JWEs, sign and =
verify JWSs.  It does not check that every header in an object is supported=
.  Should it be considered to implement the JWE and JWS specs or not?

The answer to that question has to be "Yes" or "No".  No cheating :)

--Richard

On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<mai=
lto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:
I'm not going to spend a lot of time arguing semantics, but there are lots =
of ways to meet this requirement in a library and still allow extensions to=
 be used by the system as a whole that are not understood by the library.

One would be to have the caller pass a list of header parameter values to t=
he library informing it to allow the use of particular parameters not under=
stood by the library.  For instance, the list ["notes", "vsf"] might be pas=
sed in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the "notes" and "v=
sf" header parameters, since they are understood by the caller.

A dual of this is to have the library return a list of header parameters pr=
esent in the input that it did not understand to the caller, letting the ca=
ller decide whether the input needs to be rejected.

I don't see the word "library" anywhere in RFC 2199. :)

                                                                Cheers,
                                                                -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology for =
IETF documents:
"
1. MUST   This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the
   definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.
"

By that definition, a system that implements JWE is absolutely required to =
throw out an object that contains an unknown header.  That requirement appl=
ies to any system that implements JWE -- JUST JWE, not some overall system =
that uses JWE.  (And likewise JWS.)

So yes, the current language applies very specifically to a JOSE library, n=
ot to a more general system.  If you want to do that, write a BCP on "Guide=
lines for Usage of JOSE".

--Richard




On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<mai=
lto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:
I think you're missing the point of the second poll question.  It's there t=
o clarify that the requirement to validate the headers is one placed on the=
 system as a whole - not solely on particular pieces of an implementation. =
 Indeed, it's my understanding that IETF specs almost universally place req=
uirements only on the protocol behaviors - not on how implementations must =
be factored.  In other words, it's normal for IETF specs to place constrain=
ts on the behavior of the system as a whole.  The text in the second poll q=
uestion would just reinforce that this is so in this particular case.

Hope everyone has a good weekend!

                                                                -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go ah=
ead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial tabulati=
on is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as follows:

No: 10
Yes: 14

What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted "Yes"=
 on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody who thin=
ks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library should ac=
tually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means that enforci=
ng that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.

So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE and =
JWS:
-----BEGIN-JWE-----
   4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
        understood and supported.
-----END-JWE-----
-----BEGIN-JWS-----
   4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
       parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
       understood and supported.
-----END-JWS-----

Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be REQU=
IRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an unkno=
wn header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.

--Richard



-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
1       2       3    Name:
N       -       -    Bradley
N       -       -    Ito
N       N       A    Yee
N       N       B    Barnes
N       N       B    Rescorla
N       N       C    Manger
N       N       C    Octman
N       Y       A    Fletcher
N       Y       A    Miller
N       Y       A    Sakimura
Y       Y       -    D'Agostino
Y       Y       A    Biering
Y       Y       A    Brault
Y       Y       A    Hedberg
Y       Y       A    Jay
Y       Y       A    Jones
Y       Y       A    Marais
Y       Y       A    Nadalin
Y       Y       A    Nara
Y       Y       A    Nennker
Y       Y       A    Solberg
Y       Y       B    Hardt
Y       Y       B    Medeiros
Y       Y       C    Matake
Y       Y       C    Mishra
-----END-Tabulation-----



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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">It implements part of the=
m.&nbsp; That&#8217;s the truth.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:54 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Suppose I write a JOSE library. &nbsp;It can encrypt=
 and decrypt JWEs, sign and verify JWSs. &nbsp;It does not check that every=
 header in an object is supported. &nbsp;Should it be considered to impleme=
nt the JWE and JWS specs or not?<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The answer to that question has to be &quot;Yes&quot=
; or &quot;No&quot;. &nbsp;No cheating :)<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@m=
icrosoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I&#8217;m not going to spend a lot of t=
ime arguing semantics, but there are lots of ways to meet this requirement
 in a library and still allow extensions to be used by the system as a whol=
e that are not understood by the library.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">One would be to have the caller pass a =
list of header parameter values to the library informing it
 to allow the use of particular parameters not understood by the library.&n=
bsp; For instance, the list [&#8220;notes&#8221;, &#8220;vsf&#8221;] might =
be passed in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the &#8220;n=
otes&#8221; and &#8220;vsf&#8221; header parameters, since they are underst=
ood by the
 caller.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">A dual of this is to have the library r=
eturn a list of header parameters present in the input that
 it did not understand to the caller, letting the caller decide whether the=
 input needs to be rejected.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I don&#8217;t see the word &#8220;libra=
ry&#8221; anywhere in RFC 2199.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cheers,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,=
&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@iet=
f.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements termino=
logy for IETF documents:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">1. MUST &nbsp; This word, or the terms &quot;REQUIRED&quot; or &qu=
ot;SHALL&quot;, mean that the<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp;definition is an absolute requirement of the specific=
ation.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">By that definition, a system that implements JWE is absolutely req=
uired to throw out an object that contains an unknown header. &nbsp;That re=
quirement applies to any system that implements
 JWE -- JUST JWE, not some overall system that uses JWE. &nbsp;(And likewis=
e JWS.)<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">So yes, the current language applies very specifically to a JOSE l=
ibrary, not to a more general system. &nbsp;If you want to do that, write a=
 BCP on &quot;Guidelines for Usage of JOSE&quot;.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0p=
t">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:M=
ichael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I think you&#8217;re missing the point =
of the second poll question.&nbsp; It&#8217;s there to clarify that the req=
uirement
 to validate the headers is one placed on the system as a whole &#8211; not=
 solely on particular pieces of an implementation.&nbsp; Indeed, it&#8217;s=
 my understanding that IETF specs almost universally place requirements onl=
y on the protocol behaviors &#8211; not on how implementations
 must be factored.&nbsp; In other words, it&#8217;s normal for IETF specs t=
o place constraints on the behavior of the system as a whole.&nbsp; The tex=
t in the second poll question would just reinforce that this is so in this =
particular case.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Hope everyone has a good weekend!</span=
><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,=
&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@iet=
f.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?</span><o:p><=
/o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I wo=
uld go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up. &nbsp;My in=
itial tabulation is below. &nbsp;The result on
 the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as follows:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">No: 10<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Yes: 14<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">What I find striking, however, is that every single person that vo=
ted &quot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the SEC=
OND POLL. &nbsp;So nobody who thinks that all headers should
 be critical thinks that a JOSE library should actually be required to enfo=
rce this constraint. &nbsp;And that means that enforcing that all headers a=
re supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from=
 JWE and JWS:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----BEGIN-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp; The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated =
to only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; parameters and values whose syntax and=
 semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; understood and supported.<o:p></o:p></=
p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----END-JWE-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----BEGIN-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp;4. &nbsp;The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated t=
o only include<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;parameters and values whose syntax and =
semantics are both<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;understood and supported.<o:p></o:p></p=
>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----END-JWS-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications woul=
d be REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains=
 an unknown header, contradicting all
 those &quot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND POLL.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">1 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 2 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 3 &nbsp; &nbsp;Name:=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp;Bradl=
ey &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp;Ito &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Yee &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Barne=
s &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Resco=
rla &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Mange=
r &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Octma=
n &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Fletc=
her &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Mille=
r &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">N &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Sakim=
ura &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - &nbsp; &nbsp;D'Ago=
stino &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Bieri=
ng &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Braul=
t &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Hedbe=
rg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Jay &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Jones=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Marai=
s &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Nadal=
in &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Nara =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Nennk=
er &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; A &nbsp; &nbsp;Solbe=
rg &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Hardt=
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; B &nbsp; &nbsp;Medei=
ros &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Matak=
e &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Y &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; C &nbsp; &nbsp;Mishr=
a &nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">-----END-Tabulation-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 19:08:39 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Thanks for the revisions, but the absolute numbers really don't matter.
 The important feature is that nobody voted Yes on 1 and No on 2.



On Friday, February 8, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:

>  FWIW, I believe that John Bradley=92s, Ryo Ito=92s, and Dick Hardt=92s
> responses are also incorrectly tallied below, the caveats on Breno de
> Medeiros=92 =93B=94 are missing, and Chuck Mortimore=92s response is miss=
ing.  I
> believe that their responses were:****
>
> ** **
>
> N       Y       A    Campbell         ****
>
> N       Y       A    Bradley         ****
>
> N       Y       A    Ito             ****
>
> Y       Y       C    Hardt           (Dick changed his answer on 3)****
>
> Y       Y       B*    de Medeiros         (*B if the new header can be
> omitted, so that 3-component JWTs are still valid. I don't support this
> option if backwards-incompatible.)****
>
> Y       Y       A    Mortimore             ****
>
> ** **
>
> By my count, this would bring the answers to date on the first question t=
o:
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> 16 =93yes=94****
>
> 10 =93no=94****
>
> ** **
>
> FWIW****
>
> ** **
>
> And yes, the IETF doesn=92t vote=85 J  I=92m sure we=92ll have an interes=
ting
> discussion after the polling period is over on Monday.  As for me, I have
> been actively thinking about how to meet everyone=92s perceived needs, bu=
t
> will hold off on that until after Monday.****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                                 Take care=
,
> ****
>
>                                                                 -- Mike**=
*
> *
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'jose-bounces@ietf.org');> [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org<javascript:_e({}=
, 'cvml', 'jose-bounces@ietf.org');>]
> *On Behalf Of *Brian Campbell
> *Sent:* Friday, February 08, 2013 3:35 PM
> *To:* Richard Barnes
> *Cc:* jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?****
>
> ** **
>
> FWIW, I didn't see my name on the tabulation but I did 'vote'
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html****
>
> ** **
>
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<javascript:_e(=
{}, 'cvml', 'rlb@ipv.sx');>>
> wrote:****
>
> We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go
> ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial
> tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as
> follows:****
>
> ** **
>
> No: 10****
>
> Yes: 14****
>
> ** **
>
> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted
> "Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody w=
ho
> thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE library
> should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And that means
> that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a MUST according =
to
> RFC 2119.****
>
> ** **
>
> So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE an=
d
> JWS:****
>
> -----BEGIN-JWE-----****
>
>    4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include****
>
>         parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both****
>
>         understood and supported.****
>
> -----END-JWE-----****
>
> -----BEGIN-JWS-----****
>
>    4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include****
>
>        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both****
>
>        understood and supported.****
>
> -----END-JWS-----****
>
> ** **
>
> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be
> REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an
> unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND POLL.**=
*
> *
>
> ** **
>
> --Richard****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----****
>
> 1       2       3    Name:           ****
>
> N       -       -    Bradley         ****
>
> N       -       -    Ito             ****
>
> N       N       A    Yee             ****
>
> N       N       B    Barnes          ****
>
> N       N       B    Rescorla        ****
>
> N       N       C    Manger          ****
>
> N       N       C    Octman          ****
>
> N       Y       A    Fletcher        ****
>
> N       Y       A    Miller          ****
>
> N       Y       A    Sakimura        ****
>
> Y       Y       -    D'Agostino      ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Biering         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Brault          ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Hedberg         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Jay             ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Jones           ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Marais          ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nadalin         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nara            ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Nennker         ****
>
> Y       Y       A    Solberg         ****
>
> Y       Y       B    Hardt           ****
>
> Y       Y       B    Medeiros        ****
>
> Y       Y       C    Matake          ****
>
> Y       Y       C    Mishra    ****
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose****
>
> ** **
>

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Thanks for the revisions, but the absolute numbers really don&#39;t matter.=
 =A0The important feature=A0<span></span>is that nobody voted Yes on 1 and =
No on 2.=A0<div><br></div><div><br><br>On Friday, February 8, 2013, Mike Jo=
nes  wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">FWIW, I believe that John=
 Bradley=92s, Ryo Ito=92s, and Dick Hardt=92s responses are also incorrectl=
y tallied below, the caveats on Breno de Medeiros=92 =93B=94 are missing,
 and Chuck Mortimore=92s response is missing.=A0 I believe that their respo=
nses were:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Campbell =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0=
 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0=A0(Dick changed his answer on 3)<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B* =A0 =A0de Medeiros =
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0(*B if the new header can be omitted, so that 3-component=
 JWTs are still valid. I don&#39;t support this option if backwards-incompa=
tible.)<u></u><u></u></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Mortimore =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">By my count, this would b=
ring the answers to date on the first question to:<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">16 =93yes=94<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">10 =93no=94<u></u><u></u>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">FWIW<u></u><u></u></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">And yes, the IETF doesn=
=92t vote=85
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1f497d"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 I=92m sure we=92ll have an interest=
ing discussion after the polling period is over on Monday.=A0 As
 for me, I have been actively thinking about how to meet everyone=92s perce=
ived needs, but will hold off on that until after Monday.<u></u><u></u></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Take care,<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose-bounces@ietf.org&#39=
;);" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"javascript:_e(=
{}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose-bounces@ietf.org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">ma=
ilto:jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:35 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.org&=
#39;);" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<u></u><u=
></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">FWIW, I didn&#39;t see my name on the tabulation but=
 I did &#39;vote&#39;
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01461.html"=
 target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg014=
61.html</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<=
a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;rlb@ipv.sx&#39;);" target=
=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p>We&#39;re 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I woul=
d go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up. =A0My initial=
 tabulation is below. =A0The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as =
follows:<u></u><u></u></p>

<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>No: 10<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Yes: 14<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted &q=
uot;Yes&quot; on the FIRST POLL also voted &quot;Yes&quot; on the SECOND PO=
LL. =A0So nobody who thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that=
 a JOSE library should actually be required
 to enforce this constraint. =A0And that means that enforcing that all head=
ers are supported cannot be a MUST according to RFC 2119.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>So I wonder if there&#39;s consensus to remove the following text from J=
WE and JWS:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>-----BEGIN-JWE-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p>=A0 =A04. =A0 The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are bot=
h<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 understood and supported.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p>-----END-JWE-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>-----BEGIN-JWS-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p>=A0 =A04. =A0The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include<=
u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0understood and supported.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p>-----END-JWS-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be R=
EQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains an un=
known header, contradicting all those &quot;Yes&quot; votes on the SECOND P=
OLL.<u></u><u></u></p>

</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>-----BEGIN-Tabulation-----<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p>1 =A0 =A0 =A0 2 =A0 =A0 =A0 3 =A0 =A0Name: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u>=
<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Bradley =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0Ito =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></=
u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Yee =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></=
u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Barnes =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Rescorla =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Manger =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 N =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Octman =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Fletcher =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Miller =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>N =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Sakimura =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 - =A0 =A0D&#39;Agostino =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Biering =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Brault =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Hedberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jay =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></=
u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Jones =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u>=
<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Marais =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nadalin =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nara =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u>=
<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Nennker =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 A =A0 =A0Solberg =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Hardt =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0<u></u>=
<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 B =A0 =A0Medeiros =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Matake =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Y =A0 =A0 =A0 Y =A0 =A0 =A0 C =A0 =A0Mishra =A0 =A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br=
>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.org&#39;);" tar=
get=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>

--e0cb4efe3572679f2304d53f7a2c--

From rlb@ipv.sx  Fri Feb  8 16:16:41 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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So your answer is "No".

Conversely, if it DOES reject headers it doesn't recognize, it is also out
of compliance, because they might be recognized at a higher layer.

So you're saying that nothing can implement this spec besides a complete
system that can never have anything layered on top of it. Of course, you
can always layer something on top, so you can actually never implement this
spec.

This is what I meant about the "whole system" language bein meaningless.
You have to draw a line somewhere.

--Richard






On Friday, February 8, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:

>  It implements part of them.  That=92s the truth. J****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml',
> 'rlb@ipv.sx');>]
> *Sent:* Friday, February 08, 2013 3:54 PM
> *To:* Mike Jones
> *Cc:* jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?****
>
> ** **
>
> Suppose I write a JOSE library.  It can encrypt and decrypt JWEs, sign an=
d
> verify JWSs.  It does not check that every header in an object is
> supported.  Should it be considered to implement the JWE and JWS specs or
> not?****
>
> ** **
>
> The answer to that question has to be "Yes" or "No".  No cheating :)****
>
> ** **
>
> --Richard****
>
> ** **
>
> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
> wrote:****
>
> I=92m not going to spend a lot of time arguing semantics, but there are l=
ots
> of ways to meet this requirement in a library and still allow extensions =
to
> be used by the system as a whole that are not understood by the library.*=
*
> **
>
>  ****
>
> One would be to have the caller pass a list of header parameter values to
> the library informing it to allow the use of particular parameters not
> understood by the library.  For instance, the list [=93notes=94, =93vsf=
=94] might
> be passed in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the =93not=
es=94
> and =93vsf=94 header parameters, since they are understood by the caller.=
****
>
>  ****
>
> A dual of this is to have the library return a list of header parameters
> present in the input that it did not understand to the caller, letting th=
e
> caller decide whether the input needs to be rejected.****
>
>  ****
>
> I don=92t see the word =93library=94 anywhere in RFC 2199. J****
>
>  ****
>
>                                                                 Cheers,**=
*
> *
>
>                                                                 -- Mike**=
*
> *
>
>  ****
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM
> *To:* Mike Jones
> *Cc:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?****
>
>  ****
>
> Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology fo=
r
> IETF documents:****
>
> "****
>
> 1. MUST   This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the***=
*
>
>    definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.****
>
> "****
>
>  ****
>
> By that definition, a system that imp
>

--bcaec554da74f489a304d53f96cc
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

So your answer is &quot;No&quot;. =A0<div><br></div><div>Conversely, if it =
DOES reject headers it doesn&#39;t recognize, it is also out of compliance,=
 because they might be recognized at a higher layer. =A0</div><div><br></di=
v>
<div>So you&#39;re saying that nothing can implement this spec besides a co=
mplete system that can never have anything layered on top of it. Of course,=
 you can always layer something on top, so you can actually never implement=
 this spec.=A0</div>
<div><br></div>This is what I meant about the &quot;whole system&quot; lang=
uage bein meaningless. You have to draw a line somewhere.=A0<div><br></div>=
<div>--Richard<span></span><br><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
>
<div><br></div><div><br><br>On Friday, February 8, 2013, Mike Jones  wrote:=
<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-lef=
t:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">It implements part of the=
m.=A0 That=92s the truth.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1f497d"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:<a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;rlb@ipv.sx=
&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:54 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@ietf.org&=
#39;);" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<u></u><u=
></u></span></p>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p>Suppose I write a JOSE library. =A0It can encrypt and decrypt JWEs, sign=
 and verify JWSs. =A0It does not check that every header in an object is su=
pported. =A0Should it be considered to implement the JWE and JWS specs or n=
ot?<u></u><u></u></p>

<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>The answer to that question has to be &quot;Yes&quot; or &quot;No&quot;.=
 =A0No cheating :)<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p>On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a>Michael.Jones@microsof=
t.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I=92m not going to spend a lot of time arguin=
g semantics, but there are lots of ways to meet this requirement
 in a library and still allow extensions to be used by the system as a whol=
e that are not understood by the library.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">One would be to have the caller pass a list o=
f header parameter values to the library informing it
 to allow the use of particular parameters not understood by the library.=
=A0 For instance, the list [=93notes=94, =93vsf=94] might be passed in, inf=
orming the library not to reject inputs using the =93notes=94 and =93vsf=94=
 header parameters, since they are understood by the
 caller.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">A dual of this is to have the library return =
a list of header parameters present in the input that
 it did not understand to the caller, letting the caller decide whether the=
 input needs to be rejected.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I don=92t see the word =93library=94 anywhere=
 in RFC 2199.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1f497d"=
>J</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Cheer=
s,</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 -- Mi=
ke</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;=
sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a>jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a>jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a>jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?</span><u=
></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p>=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p>Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology f=
or IETF documents:<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p>&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p>1. MUST =A0 This word, or the terms &quot;REQUIRED&quot; or &quot;SHALL&=
quot;, mean that the<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>=A0 =A0definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.<u></u=
><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p>&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>By that definition, a system that imp</p></div></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div></div></div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div>

--bcaec554da74f489a304d53f96cc--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Fri Feb  8 16:22:37 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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--_000_4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394367422146TK5EX14MBXC284r_
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See my answer in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01523=
.html.  There are several ways to layer solutions and easily meet the inten=
t of the specs.

Out of respect for everyone else's time, who probably don't want to continu=
e reading ongoing minutiae of semantic arguments that don't seem to be conv=
erging, maybe we could let this topic go until Monday? ;-)

Enjoy your weekend.

                                                                -- Mike

From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 4:17 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Header criticality -- hidden consensus?

So your answer is "No".

Conversely, if it DOES reject headers it doesn't recognize, it is also out =
of compliance, because they might be recognized at a higher layer.

So you're saying that nothing can implement this spec besides a complete sy=
stem that can never have anything layered on top of it. Of course, you can =
always layer something on top, so you can actually never implement this spe=
c.

This is what I meant about the "whole system" language bein meaningless. Yo=
u have to draw a line somewhere.

--Richard






On Friday, February 8, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:
It implements part of them.  That's the truth. :)

From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'=
rlb@ipv.sx');>]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:54 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org<javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?



Suppose I write a JOSE library.  It can encrypt and decrypt JWEs, sign and =
verify JWSs.  It does not check that every header in an object is supported=
.  Should it be considered to implement the JWE and JWS specs or not?



The answer to that question has to be "Yes" or "No".  No cheating :)



--Richard



On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<mai=
lto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:

I'm not going to spend a lot of time arguing semantics, but there are lots =
of ways to meet this requirement in a library and still allow extensions to=
 be used by the system as a whole that are not understood by the library.



One would be to have the caller pass a list of header parameter values to t=
he library informing it to allow the use of particular parameters not under=
stood by the library.  For instance, the list ["notes", "vsf"] might be pas=
sed in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the "notes" and "v=
sf" header parameters, since they are understood by the caller.



A dual of this is to have the library return a list of header parameters pr=
esent in the input that it did not understand to the caller, letting the ca=
ller decide whether the input needs to be rejected.



I don't see the word "library" anywhere in RFC 2199. :)



                                                                Cheers,

                                                                -- Mike



From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?



Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology for =
IETF documents:

"

1. MUST   This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the

   definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.

"



By that definition, a system that imp

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
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<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01523.html"=
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01523.html</a>.&nbsp;=
 There are several ways to layer solutions and easily meet the intent of th=
e specs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Out of respect for everyo=
ne else&#8217;s time, who probably don&#8217;t want to continue reading ong=
oing minutiae of semantic arguments that don&#8217;t seem to be converging,
 maybe we could let this topic go until Monday? ;-)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Enjoy your weekend.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 4:17 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Header criticality -- hidden consensus?<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So your answer is &quot;No&quot;. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Conversely, if it DOES reject headers it doesn't rec=
ognize, it is also out of compliance, because they might be recognized at a=
 higher layer. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So you're saying that nothing can implement this spe=
c besides a complete system that can never have anything layered on top of =
it. Of course, you can always layer something on top, so you can actually n=
ever implement this spec.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This is what I meant about the &quot;whole system&qu=
ot; language bein meaningless. You have to draw a line somewhere.&nbsp;<o:p=
></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
On Friday, February 8, 2013, Mike Jones wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">It implements part of them.&nbsp; That&=
#8217;s the truth.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,=
&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard Barnes [mailto=
:<a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'rlb@ipv.sx');" target=3D"_bl=
ank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:54 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"javascript:_e(%7b%7d,%20'cvml',%20'jose@ietf.org');" =
target=3D"_blank">
jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>
<p>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p>Suppose I write a JOSE library. &nbsp;It can encrypt and decrypt JWEs, s=
ign and verify JWSs. &nbsp;It does not check that every header in an object=
 is supported. &nbsp;Should it be considered to implement the JWE and JWS s=
pecs or not?<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>The answer to that question has to be &quot;Yes&quot; or &quot;No&quot;.=
 &nbsp;No cheating :)<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p>On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael=
.Jones@microsoft.com">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p>=
</p>
<div>
<div>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I&#8217;m not going to spend a lot of time ar=
guing semantics, but there are lots of ways to meet this requirement in a l=
ibrary and still allow extensions to be used by the system as
 a whole that are not understood by the library.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">One would be to have the caller pass a list o=
f header parameter values to the library informing it to allow the use of p=
articular parameters not understood by the library.&nbsp; For
 instance, the list [&#8220;notes&#8221;, &#8220;vsf&#8221;] might be passe=
d in, informing the library not to reject inputs using the &#8220;notes&#82=
21; and &#8220;vsf&#8221; header parameters, since they are understood by t=
he caller.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">A dual of this is to have the library return =
a list of header parameters present in the input that it did not understand=
 to the caller, letting the caller decide whether the
 input needs to be rejected.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I don&#8217;t see the word &#8220;library&#82=
21; anywhere in RFC 2199.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cheers,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;=
sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 08, 2013 3:25 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p>Allow me to quote RFC 2119, which defines the requirements terminology f=
or IETF documents:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p>1. MUST &nbsp; This word, or the terms &quot;REQUIRED&quot; or &quot;SHA=
LL&quot;, mean that the<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>&nbsp; &nbsp;definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>By that definition, a system that imp<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: [jose] SPI proposal
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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I also think that this would be very  cumbersome to support and needs much =
more thought

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bri=
an Campbell
Sent: Thursday, February 7, 2013 6:43 AM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal

Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind it =
but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the receiver =
protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index collision? And for=
 distributed environments, it seems supporting this could be very cumbersom=
e.





On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<mailto:rlb@ipv.s=
x>> wrote:
To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for an S=
PI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index", borro=
wing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same crypto pa=
rameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having=
 to re-send the same parameters.

The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for JWS (=
just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably need=
ed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.

Feedback welcome,
--Richard

-----BEGIN-----
Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter

The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an opaque b=
yte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is designe=
d to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will be re-u=
sing the same security parameters for several messages.

Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table of=
 cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose heade=
r contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the following va=
lues from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
-- Contents of the JWE header
-- Encrypted Key
-- Initialization Vector

If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then it =
MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it wi=
ll have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient rec=
eives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE ca=
n then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.  =
If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process =
MUST fail.
-----END-----


[9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9

_______________________________________________
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jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I also think that this wo=
uld be very &nbsp;cumbersome to support and needs much more thought
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497=
D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></a></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-=
size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-b=
ounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, February 7, 2013 6:43 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] SPI proposal<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Admittedly I'm not re=
ally up on this spi issue or the motivation behind it but a couple question=
s came to mind when I saw this. How does the receiver protect against unbou=
nded growth of the cache? And index
 collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this coul=
d be very cumbersome.<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some=
 proposed text for an SPI [1] field. &nbsp;To recall, SPI stands for &quot;=
security parameters index&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. &nbsp;The ide=
a is that in cases where the same crypto parameters are
 being used repeatedly, this would save the parties from having to re-send =
the same parameters.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but cou=
ld be adapted for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). &nbsp;S=
imilar text is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verifi=
cation sections.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Feedback welcome,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----BEGIN-----<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) head=
er parameter contains an opaque byte string that labels a set of security p=
arameters. &nbsp;This index is designed to enable the use of smaller header=
s in cases where entities will be re-using the same
 security parameters for several messages.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; p=
arameter MUST maintain a table of cached security parameters. &nbsp;When an=
 entity receives an object whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &=
quot;alg&quot; values, then it MUST cache the following values from the
 JWE, indexed by the &quot;spi&quot; value:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Contents of the JWE header<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Encrypted Key<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Initialization Vector<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter=
 but no &quot;alg&quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Ke=
y or Initialization Vector. &nbsp;That is, it will have the form &quot;head=
er.ciphertext.integrity_value&quot;. &nbsp;When a recipient receives such
 an object, it uses the &quot;spi&quot; value to retrieve cached header, ke=
y, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. &nbsp;This full J=
WE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rul=
es. &nbsp;If the recipient has no cached parameters
 for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-----END-----<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">[9]&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/tr=
ac/ticket/9" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9<=
/a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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+1 I think a new I-D would be appropriate as this give us additional time t=
o review, discuss and process

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bri=
an Campbell
Sent: Friday, February 8, 2013 3:01 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal

Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over=
 the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operat=
ional complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly tha=
t, without considerably more analysis and specification detail, the current=
 SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG draf=
ts.
As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be submitt=
ed as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and analysis th=
at I think it needs.

Thanks,
Brian

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#43;1 I think a new I-D =
would be appropriate as this give us additional time to review, discuss and=
 process<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497=
D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></a></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-=
size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-b=
ounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 8, 2013 3:01 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Maybe this was appare=
nt from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over the last couple days=
[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operational complexity and =
fragility to security problems. I believe
 strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail=
, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base=
 JOSE WG drafts.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that t=
he SPI stuff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional dis=
cussion and analysis that I think it needs.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<br>
Brian<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.h=
tml" target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_bc77a9d8f8e44d25b669d7eac5a7e45fBY2PR03MB041namprd03pro_--

From vladimir@nimbusds.com  Fri Feb  8 22:35:14 2013
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From: "Vladimir Dzhuvinov / NimbusDS" <vladimir@nimbusds.com>
To: "Richard Barnes" <rlb@ipv.sx>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2013 23:35:01 -0700
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Subject: Re: [jose] =?utf-8?q?Header_criticality_--_hidden_consensus=3F?=
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Hi Richard,=0A=0AI understand your concern. With some bit of interface engi=
neering we=0Amanaged to have this requirement covered at library level, by =
allowing=0Aclient apps to specify additional accepted parameters. If the JO=
SE=0Alibrary encounters a header with an unexpected name, it will mark the=
=0Amessage as bad on the spot, so it won't be passed on to the app code at=
=0Aall.=0A=0AYou can take a look at the interface Javadocs here:=0A=0Ahttp:=
//nimbusds.com/files/jose-jwt/javadoc/com/nimbusds/jose/HeaderFilter.html=
=0A=0AAnd the actual code at the Git repo:=0A=0Ahttps://bitbucket.org/nimbu=
sds/nimbus-jose-jwt/src/bef49c225aae194b6c40a376aee36b9af37a5da6/src/main/j=
ava/com/nimbusds/jose/HeaderFilter.java?at=3Dmaster=0A=0A=0A=0AWhat's more,=
 this interface allows even certain standard headers from=0Athe JWS/JWE spe=
c to not be denied (say if the client app doesn't want to=0Aaccept X509 cer=
t URLs, etc).=0A=0A=0AI hope this helps,=0A=0AVladimir=0A=0A=0A--=0AVladimi=
r Dzhuvinov : www.NimbusDS.com : vladimir@nimbusds.com=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A------=
-- Original Message --------=0ASubject: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden=
 consensus?=0AFrom: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>=0ADate: Fri, February 08, 2=
013 11:11 pm=0ATo: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>=0A=0AWe're 24 votes into=
 the header criticality poll, so I thought I would go=0Aahead and take a lo=
ok at how the results are shaping up.  My initial=0Atabulation is below.  T=
he result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as=0Afollows: =0A=0ANo: 10=0A=
Yes: 14=0A=0A=0AWhat I find striking, however, is that every single person =
that voted=0A"Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  =
So nobody=0Awho thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JO=
SE=0Alibrary should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And=
=0Athat means that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a=0AM=
UST according to RFC 2119.=0A=0A=0ASo I wonder if there's consensus to remo=
ve the following text from JWE=0Aand JWS:=0A-----BEGIN-JWE-----=0A   4.   T=
he resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include=0A        paramet=
ers and values whose syntax and semantics are both=0A        understood and=
 supported.=0A=0A-----END-JWE-----=0A-----BEGIN-JWS-----=0A   4.  The resul=
ting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include=0A       parameters and v=
alues whose syntax and semantics are both=0A       understood and supported=
.=0A=0A-----END-JWS-----=0A=0A=0AOtherewise, a JOSE library conforming to t=
hese specifications would be=0AREQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reje=
ct a JWE/JWS that contains=0Aan unknown header, contradicting all those "Ye=
s" votes on the SECOND=0APOLL.=0A=0A=0A--Richard=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A-----B=
EGIN-Tabulation-----=0A1       2       3    Name:           =0AN       -   =
    -    Bradley         =0AN       -       -    Ito             =0AN      =
 N       A    Yee             =0AN       N       B    Barnes          =0AN =
      N       B    Rescorla        =0AN       N       C    Manger          =
=0AN       N       C    Octman          =0AN       Y       A    Fletcher   =
     =0AN       Y       A    Miller          =0AN       Y       A    Sakimu=
ra        =0AY       Y       -    D'Agostino      =0AY       Y       A    B=
iering         =0AY       Y       A    Brault          =0AY       Y       A=
    Hedberg         =0AY       Y       A    Jay             =0AY       Y   =
    A    Jones           =0AY       Y       A    Marais          =0AY      =
 Y       A    Nadalin         =0AY       Y       A    Nara            =0AY =
      Y       A    Nennker         =0AY       Y       A    Solberg         =
=0AY       Y       B    Hardt           =0AY       Y       B    Medeiros   =
     =0AY       Y       C    Matake          =0AY       Y       C    Mishra=
    =0A=0A-----END-Tabulation-----=0A=0A___________________________________=
____________=0Ajose mailing list=0Ajose@ietf.org=0Ahttps://www.ietf.org/mai=
lman/listinfo/jose

From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Sat Feb  9 03:45:16 2013
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Hi Brian,=20

keys need to have a name.=20

Whether you call it SPI, key id, or something else does not really =
matter.=20

It also does not matter whether the keys (and the associated parameters) =
are established manually, or using some key management.=20

In the context of OAuth there are actually various keys flying around =
and therefore they need to have different names.=20
I was referring to the key used between the client and the resource =
server when used with=20

I believe even without Richard's proposal the necessary pieces are =
already in the current document; what is need is to further clarify =
them.=20
Ciao
Hannes

On Feb 8, 2013, at 4:21 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:

> Seems to me that, in the absence of more advanced management, the use =
of spi is potentially very very fragile. And that, in many cases, such =
advanced management would be a lot more trouble than it's worth. But =
maybe I'm missing the bigger picture.
>=20
> My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar) and =
the JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another thought a =
web browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation doesn't lend =
itself well to use of spi or even easily creating some management =
protocol around it.
>=20
> WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but =
there's not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?
>=20
> Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But =
I'd like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity =
or potential operational or security issues when doing so.=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> The motivation here is not very deep.  A lot of the current design =
(e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size.  The =
SPI proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities =
will be exchanging many JOSE objects.  I understood from some =
discussions with OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use =
cases.
>=20
> Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this =
stuff (cf. IKE for IPsec).  Whatever application is using this would =
need to figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as =
things like what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI.  =
(I don't think collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the =
sender just ensures uniqueness.)  The idea of this basic proposal is to =
establish the basic behavior, around which you could then wrap more =
advanced management. =20
>=20
> --Richard
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
> Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation =
behind it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does =
the receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index =
collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this =
could be very cumbersome.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for =
an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters =
index", borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where =
the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save =
the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.
>=20
> The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for =
JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is =
probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification =
sections.
>=20
> Feedback welcome,
> --Richard
>=20
> -----BEGIN-----
> Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
>=20
> The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an =
opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index =
is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities =
will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
>=20
> Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a =
table of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object =
whose header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache =
the following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
> -- Contents of the JWE header
> -- Encrypted Key
> -- Initialization Vector
>=20
> If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, =
then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  =
That is, it will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  =
When a recipient receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to =
retrieve cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs =
a full JWE.  This full JWE can then be further processed according to =
the normal JWE processing rules.  If the recipient has no cached =
parameters for the "spi" value, the process MUST fail.
> -----END-----
>=20
>=20
> [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?
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Richard,=20

I am wondering whether it wouldn't make more sense to let the chairs =
judge the consensus call and to propose the next steps. They asked the =
question and I am sure they had a specific reason to frame the questions =
in that particular way.=20

Ciao
Hannes

On Feb 9, 2013, at 1:11 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:

> We're 24 votes into the header criticality poll, so I thought I would =
go ahead and take a look at how the results are shaping up.  My initial =
tabulation is below.  The result on the FIRST POLL (the main one) is as =
follows:
>=20
> No: 10
> Yes: 14
>=20
> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that voted =
"Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL.  So nobody =
who thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE =
library should actually be required to enforce this constraint.  And =
that means that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a =
MUST according to RFC 2119.
>=20
> So I wonder if there's consensus to remove the following text from JWE =
and JWS:
> -----BEGIN-JWE-----
>    4.   The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
>         parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>         understood and supported.
> -----END-JWE-----
> -----BEGIN-JWS-----
>    4.  The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
>        parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
>        understood and supported.
> -----END-JWS-----
>=20
> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to these specifications would be =
REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to reject a JWE/JWS that contains =
an unknown header, contradicting all those "Yes" votes on the SECOND =
POLL.
>=20
> --Richard
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----
> 1       2       3    Name:          =20
> N       -       -    Bradley        =20
> N       -       -    Ito            =20
> N       N       A    Yee            =20
> N       N       B    Barnes         =20
> N       N       B    Rescorla       =20
> N       N       C    Manger         =20
> N       N       C    Octman         =20
> N       Y       A    Fletcher       =20
> N       Y       A    Miller         =20
> N       Y       A    Sakimura       =20
> Y       Y       -    D'Agostino     =20
> Y       Y       A    Biering        =20
> Y       Y       A    Brault         =20
> Y       Y       A    Hedberg        =20
> Y       Y       A    Jay            =20
> Y       Y       A    Jones          =20
> Y       Y       A    Marais         =20
> Y       Y       A    Nadalin        =20
> Y       Y       A    Nara           =20
> Y       Y       A    Nennker        =20
> Y       Y       A    Solberg        =20
> Y       Y       B    Hardt          =20
> Y       Y       B    Medeiros       =20
> Y       Y       C    Matake         =20
> Y       Y       C    Mishra   =20
> -----END-Tabulation-----
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Sat Feb  9 05:39:35 2013
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Date: Sat, 9 Feb 2013 15:39:29 +0200
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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I would suggest that we forget the SPI proposal and fix the text for the =
key id proposal in the three proposals.=20
kid and spi are actually doing the same.=20

The requirements for key naming are:=20
 * The value is used to select the key
 * It has to uniquely select the key.
 * If you cannot find the key corresponding then this must lead to an =
error.

Here is from example text about key naming from RFC 4962:=20

      Uniquely named keys

         AAA key management proposals require a robust key naming
         scheme, particularly where key caching is supported.  The key
         name provides a way to refer to a key in a protocol so that it
         is clear to all parties which key is being referenced.  Objects
         that cannot be named cannot be managed.  All keys MUST be
         uniquely named, and the key name MUST NOT directly or
         indirectly disclose the keying material.  If the key name is
         not based on the keying material, then one can be sure that it
         cannot be used to assist in a search for the key value.


Here is the text from draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08:=20

4.1.10.  "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter

   The "kid" (key ID) header parameter is a hint indicating which key
   was used to encrypt the JWE; this can be used to determine the
   private key needed to decrypt the JWE.  This parameter allows
   originators to explicitly signal a change of key to recipients.
   Should the recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the
   "kid" value, they SHOULD treat that condition as an error.  The
   interpretation of the "kid" value is unspecified.  Its value MUST be
   a string.  Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.

   When used with a JWK, the "kid" value MAY be used to match a JWK
   "kid" parameter value.


My proposal would be:=20

----
4.1.10.  "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter

   The "kid" (key ID) header parameter indicates which key and =20
   associated parameters were used to encrypt the JWE. =20
   This parameter also allows
   originators to explicitly signal a change of key to recipients.
   Should the recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the
   "kid" value, they MUST treat that condition as an error. =20

   The value in the "kid" MUST be treated as a a case sensitive string.
   Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.

----

Here is the text from draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08:

4.1.7.  "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter

   The "kid" (key ID) header parameter is a hint indicating which key
   was used to secure the JWS.  This parameter allows originators to
   explicitly signal a change of key to recipients.  Should the
   recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the "kid" value,
   they SHOULD treat that condition as an error.  The interpretation of
   the "kid" value is unspecified.  Its value MUST be a string.  Use of
   this header parameter is OPTIONAL.

   When used with a JWK, the "kid" value MAY be used to match a JWK
   "kid" parameter value.

My proposal would be:=20

----
4.1.7.  "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter

   The "kid" (key ID) header parameter is a hint indicating which key
   was used to secure the JWS.  This parameter allows originators to
   explicitly signal a change of key to recipients.  Should the
   recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the "kid" value,
   they SHOULD treat that condition as an error.  The interpretation of
   the "kid" value is unspecified.  Its value MUST be a string.  Use of
   this header parameter is OPTIONAL.

   The "kid" (key ID) header parameter indicates which key and =20
   associated parameters were used for the digital signature and =20
   the keyed message digest computation of the JWS.  =20
   This parameter also allows
   originators to explicitly signal a change of key to recipients.
   Should the recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the
   "kid" value, they MUST treat that condition as an error. =20

   The value in the "kid" MUST be treated as a a case sensitive string. =20=

   Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
----

Here is the text from draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08:=20

4.4.  "kid" (Key ID) Parameter

   The "kid" (key ID) member can be used to match a specific key.  This
   can be used, for instance, to choose among a set of keys within a JWK
   Set during key rollover.  The interpretation of the "kid" value is
   unspecified.  Key ID values within a JWK Set need not be unique.  The
   "kid" value is a case sensitive string.  Use of this member is
   OPTIONAL.

   When used with JWS or JWE, the "kid" value MAY be used to match a JWS
   or JWE "kid" header parameter value.

   In some contexts, different keys using the same Key ID value might be
   present, with the keys being disambiguated using other information,
   such as the "kty" or "use" values.  For example, imagine "kid" values
   like "Current", "Upcoming", and "Deprecated", used for key rollover
   guidance.  One could apply a label to all keys where the
   classification fits.  If there are multiple "Current" keys, then in
   this example, they might be differentiated either by having different
   "kty" or "use" values, or some combination of both.  As one example,
   there might only be one current RSA signing key and one current
   Elliptic Curve signing key, but both would be "Current".

My proposal would be:=20

----

4.4.  "kid" (Key ID) Parameter

   The "kid" (key ID) header parameter indicates the name of the key.  =
The key=20
   id must be unique for the specific context so that the recipient is =
able to=20
   determine what key to use for a cryptographic operation without =
additional information.=20
   This parameter also allows  originators to explicitly signal a change =
of=20
   key to recipients. Should the recipient be unable to locate a key =
corresponding to the
   "kid" value, they MUST treat that condition as an error. =20

   When the JSON Web Key payload is used together with a JWS or a JWE
   and the "kid" value matches the value in the JWS
   or JWE "kid" header parameter value then a key transport mechanism is
  used, i.e., the key itself is attached to the JWS or the JWE payload. =20=


-----

Notice that I changed the description for the JSON Web Key quite a bit =
since this non-uniqueness description was a bit of nonsense.=20
If you have the ability to uniquely name the key using a kid then why =
wouldn't you want to do it. This simplifies implementations.=20

Ciao
Hannes


On Feb 9, 2013, at 1:01 AM, Brian Campbell wrote:

> Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal =
over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from =
operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe =
strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification =
detail, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the =
current base JOSE WG drafts.
>=20
> As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be =
submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and =
analysis that I think it needs.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Brian
>=20
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Sun Feb 10 10:43:27 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  no opinion

Am 04.02.2013 15:48, schrieb Karen O'Donoghue:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of 
> criticality of headers. For background, please review the current 
> specification text, the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and 
> the mailing list (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: 
> Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header fields)). We 
> need to come to closure on this issue in order to progress the 
> specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, 
> the following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 
> February 2013.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations 
> to understand?
>
> YES – All header fields must continue to be understood by 
> implementations or the input must be rejected.
>
> NO – A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely 
> ignored should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text 
> like the following be added? “Implementation Note: The requirement to 
> understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole 
> – not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a 
> JOSE library could process the headers that it understands and then 
> leave the processing of the rest of them up to the application. For 
> those headers that the JOSE library didn’t understand, the 
> responsibility for fulfilling the ‘MUST understand’ requirement for 
> the remaining headers would then fall to the application.”
>
> YES – Add the text clarifying that the “MUST understand” requirement 
> is a requirement on the system as a whole – not specifically on JOSE 
> libraries.
>
> NO – Don’t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax 
> would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored 
> if not understood?
>
> A – Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be 
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B – Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand 
> all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in 
> the second.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From housley@vigilsec.com  Sun Feb 10 15:01:45 2013
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:   NO
SECOND POLL:  NO
THIRD POLL:   C

First, when designing CMS we discussed this field criticality topic to =
death.  I'm sad that we are exploring the same ratholes in even greater =
detail yet again.

If an implementation supports key agreement, then it needs to understand =
all of the key agreement headers, but it might ignore fields associated =
with other recipient that are using other key management approaches.

If an implementation supports key transport, then it needs to understand =
all of the key transport headers, but it might ignore fields associated =
with other recipient that are using other key management approaches.

If an implementation supports password-based encryption then it needs to =
understand all of thepassword-based encryption headers, but it might =
ignore fields associated with other recipient that are using other key =
management approaches.

And so on.

Russ


On Feb 4, 2013, at 9:48 AM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:

> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations =
to understand?
>=20
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by =
implementations or the input must be rejected.
>=20
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely =
ignored should be defined.
>=20
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text =
like the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to =
understand all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96=
 not on any particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE =
library could process the headers that it understands and then leave the =
processing of the rest of them up to the application. For those headers =
that the JOSE library didn=92t understand, the responsibility for =
fulfilling the =91MUST understand=92 requirement for the remaining =
headers would then fall to the application.=94
>=20
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 =
requirement is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not =
specifically on JOSE libraries.
>=20
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>=20
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax =
would you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored =
if not understood?
>=20
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may =
be safely ignored if not understood.
>=20
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand =
all fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the =
second.
>=20
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
>=20


From vladimir@nimbusds.com  Sun Feb 10 23:48:08 2013
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From: "Vladimir Dzhuvinov / NimbusDS" <vladimir@nimbusds.com>
To: "Manger,  James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:47:56 -0700
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Hi James,=0A=0AYes, the three JWS validators (MAC/RSA/EC) that we have in t=
he crypto=0Aalgs package are intended to be extended. They do just the basi=
c=0Asignature validation and accept only the "alg", "typ" and "cty"=0Aparam=
eters. They could serve as a starting point for creating more=0Acomplex val=
idators, e.g. a validator that uses the "kid" to look up the=0AMAC key in a=
 database.=0A=0AWe will probably add extended validators with key lookup su=
pport as we=0Aprogress into our OIDC server implementation (the part which =
deals with=0Asigned OpenID request objects).=0A=0AInside the crypto package=
 there's also a hidden JWSHeaderFilter=0Aimplementation, we'll probably mak=
e it public, as an aid to other=0Adevelopers who choose to write their own =
extended validators.=0A=0Ahttps://bitbucket.org/nimbusds/nimbus-jose-jwt/sr=
c/bef49c225aae/src/main/java/com/nimbusds/jose/crypto/DefaultJWSHeaderFilte=
r.java?at=3Dmaster=0A=0A=0AVladimir=0A=0A--=0AVladimir Dzhuvinov : www.Nimb=
usDS.com : vladimir@nimbusds.com=0A=0A=0A=0A-------- Original Message -----=
---=0ASubject: Re: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?=0AFrom: "=
Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>=0ADate: Sun, February 10=
, 2013 10:14 pm=0ATo: Vladimir Dzhuvinov / NimbusDS <vladimir@nimbusds.com>=
,=0A"jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>=0A=0A=0AVladimir,=0A=0AIt is useful to =
see actual APIs and code trying to implement this=0AMUST-understand-everyth=
ing rule.=0A=0AI can't quite see how your API allows a caller to indicate t=
hat is=0Aunderstands a new header parameter. Your HeaderFilter lets the cal=
ler=0A*see* which field names the library "understands". JWSHeaderFilter go=
es=0Afurther and allows the caller to *set* the accepted algorithms. I=0Aco=
uldn't find, say, setAcceptedParameters(...).=0A=0APerhaps you are supposed=
 to extend, say, MACVerifier with your own class=0Athat lists an extra fiel=
d?=0A=0A=0A--=0AJames Manger=0A=0A> -----Original Message-----=0A> From: jo=
se-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=0A> Vladimi=
r Dzhuvinov / NimbusDS=0A> Sent: Saturday, 9 February 2013 5:35 PM=0A> To: =
Richard Barnes; jose@ietf.org=0A> Subject: Re: [jose] Header criticality --=
 hidden consensus?=0A> =0A> Hi Richard,=0A> =0A> I understand your concern.=
 With some bit of interface engineering we=0A> managed to have this require=
ment covered at library level, by allowing=0A> client apps to specify addit=
ional accepted parameters. If the JOSE=0A> library encounters a header with=
 an unexpected name, it will mark the=0A> message as bad on the spot, so it=
 won't be passed on to the app code at=0A> all.=0A> =0A> You can take a loo=
k at the interface Javadocs here:=0A> =0A> http://nimbusds.com/files/jose-=
=0A> jwt/javadoc/com/nimbusds/jose/HeaderFilter.html=0A> =0A> And the actua=
l code at the Git repo:=0A> =0A> https://bitbucket.org/nimbusds/nimbus-jose=
-=0A> jwt/src/bef49c225aae194b6c40a376aee36b9af37a5da6/src/main/java/com/ni=
mb=0A> usds/jose/HeaderFilter.java?at=3Dmaster=0A> =0A> =0A> =0A> What's mo=
re, this interface allows even certain standard headers from=0A> the JWS/JW=
E spec to not be denied (say if the client app doesn't want=0A> to=0A> acce=
pt X509 cert URLs, etc).=0A> =0A> =0A> I hope this helps,=0A> =0A> Vladimir=
=0A> =0A> =0A> --=0A> Vladimir Dzhuvinov : www.NimbusDS.com : vladimir@nimb=
usds.com=0A> =0A> =0A> =0A> =0A> -------- Original Message --------=0A> Sub=
ject: [jose] Header criticality -- hidden consensus?=0A> From: Richard Barn=
es <rlb@ipv.sx>=0A> Date: Fri, February 08, 2013 11:11 pm=0A> To: "jose@iet=
f.org" <jose@ietf.org>=0A> =0A> We're 24 votes into the header criticality =
poll, so I thought I would=0A> go=0A> ahead and take a look at how the resu=
lts are shaping up. My initial=0A> tabulation is below. The result on the F=
IRST POLL (the main one) is as=0A> follows:=0A> =0A> No: 10=0A> Yes: 14=0A>=
 =0A> =0A> What I find striking, however, is that every single person that =
voted=0A> "Yes" on the FIRST POLL also voted "Yes" on the SECOND POLL. So n=
obody=0A> who thinks that all headers should be critical thinks that a JOSE=
=0A> library should actually be required to enforce this constraint. And=0A=
> that means that enforcing that all headers are supported cannot be a=0A> =
MUST according to RFC 2119.=0A> =0A> =0A> So I wonder if there's consensus =
to remove the following text from JWE=0A> and JWS:=0A> -----BEGIN-JWE-----=
=0A> 4. The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include=0A> para=
meters and values whose syntax and semantics are both=0A> understood and su=
pported.=0A> =0A> -----END-JWE-----=0A> -----BEGIN-JWS-----=0A> 4. The resu=
lting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include=0A> parameters and value=
s whose syntax and semantics are both=0A> understood and supported.=0A> =0A=
> -----END-JWS-----=0A> =0A> =0A> Otherewise, a JOSE library conforming to =
these specifications would be=0A> REQUIRED (a synonym to MUST in 2119) to r=
eject a JWE/JWS that contains=0A> an unknown header, contradicting all thos=
e "Yes" votes on the SECOND=0A> POLL.=0A> =0A> =0A> --Richard=0A> =0A> =0A>=
 =0A> =0A> =0A> =0A> -----BEGIN-Tabulation-----=0A> 1 2 3 Name:=0A> N - - B=
radley=0A> N - - Ito=0A> N N A Yee=0A> N N B Barnes=0A> N N B Rescorla=0A> =
N N C Manger=0A> N N C Octman=0A> N Y A Fletcher=0A> N Y A Miller=0A> N Y A=
 Sakimura=0A> Y Y - D'Agostino=0A> Y Y A Biering=0A> Y Y A Brault=0A> Y Y A=
 Hedberg=0A> Y Y A Jay=0A> Y Y A Jones=0A> Y Y A Marais=0A> Y Y A Nadalin=
=0A> Y Y A Nara=0A> Y Y A Nennker=0A> Y Y A Solberg=0A> Y Y B Hardt=0A> Y Y=
 B Medeiros=0A> Y Y C Matake=0A> Y Y C Mishra=0A> =0A> -----END-Tabulation-=
----=0A> =0A> _______________________________________________=0A> jose mail=
ing list=0A> jose@ietf.org=0A> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose=
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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 08:24:13 -0700
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Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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I believe the "kid" Key ID header parameter already meets the need for
named keys.


On Sat, Feb 9, 2013 at 4:45 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
> wrote:

> Hi Brian,
>
> keys need to have a name.
>
> Whether you call it SPI, key id, or something else does not really matter.
>
> It also does not matter whether the keys (and the associated parameters)
> are established manually, or using some key management.
>
> In the context of OAuth there are actually various keys flying around and
> therefore they need to have different names.
> I was referring to the key used between the client and the resource server
> when used with
>
> I believe even without Richard's proposal the necessary pieces are already
> in the current document; what is need is to further clarify them.
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> On Feb 8, 2013, at 4:21 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
>
> > Seems to me that, in the absence of more advanced management, the use of
> spi is potentially very very fragile. And that, in many cases, such
> advanced management would be a lot more trouble than it's worth. But maybe
> I'm missing the bigger picture.
> >
> > My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar) and
> the JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another thought a web
> browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation doesn't lend itself
> well to use of spi or even easily creating some management protocol around
> it.
> >
> > WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but there's
> not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?
> >
> > Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But I'd
> like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity or
> potential operational or security issues when doing so.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> > The motivation here is not very deep.  A lot of the current design
> (e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size.  The SPI
> proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities will be
> exchanging many JOSE objects.  I understood from some discussions with
> OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.
> >
> > Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this stuff
> (cf. IKE for IPsec).  Whatever application is using this would need to
> figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as things like
> what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI.  (I don't think
> collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the sender just ensures
> uniqueness.)  The idea of this basic proposal is to establish the basic
> behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced management.
> >
> > --Richard
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell <
> bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
> > Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation behind
> it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the
> receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index
> collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this could
> be very cumbersome.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> > To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for
> an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters index",
> borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where the same
> crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the parties
> from having to re-send the same parameters.
> >
> > The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for
> JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is probably
> needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.
> >
> > Feedback welcome,
> > --Richard
> >
> > -----BEGIN-----
> > Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
> >
> > The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an
> opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index is
> designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities will
> be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
> >
> > Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a table
> of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object whose
> header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache the
> following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
> > -- Contents of the JWE header
> > -- Encrypted Key
> > -- Initialization Vector
> >
> > If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, then
> it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  That is, it
> will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  When a recipient
> receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header,
> key, and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE.  This full JWE
> can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing rules.
>  If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" value, the process
> MUST fail.
> > -----END-----
> >
> >
> > [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--90e6ba5bbe132b493b04d57482c6
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I believe the &quot;kid&quot; Key ID header parameter alre=
ady meets the need for named keys.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 9, 2013 at 4:45 AM, Hannes Tscho=
fenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Brian,<br>
<br>
keys need to have a name.<br>
<br>
Whether you call it SPI, key id, or something else does not really matter.<=
br>
<br>
It also does not matter whether the keys (and the associated parameters) ar=
e established manually, or using some key management.<br>
<br>
In the context of OAuth there are actually various keys flying around and t=
herefore they need to have different names.<br>
I was referring to the key used between the client and the resource server =
when used with<br>
<br>
I believe even without Richard&#39;s proposal the necessary pieces are alre=
ady in the current document; what is need is to further clarify them.<br>
Ciao<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">Hannes<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Feb 8, 2013, at 4:21 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Seems to me that, in the absence of more advanced management, the use =
of spi is potentially very very fragile. And that, in many cases, such adva=
nced management would be a lot more trouble than it&#39;s worth. But maybe =
I&#39;m missing the bigger picture.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar) and =
the JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another thought a web=
 browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation doesn&#39;t lend its=
elf well to use of spi or even easily creating some management protocol aro=
und it.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but there&=
#39;s not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But I=
&#39;d like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity o=
r potential operational or security issues when doing so.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes &lt;rlb@ipv.sx&gt; wrot=
e:<br>
&gt; The motivation here is not very deep. =A0A lot of the current design (=
e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size. =A0The SP=
I proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities will =
be exchanging many JOSE objects. =A0I understood from some discussions with=
 OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use cases.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this stu=
ff (cf. IKE for IPsec). =A0Whatever application is using this would need to=
 figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as things like wh=
at happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI. =A0(I don&#39;t thi=
nk collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the sender just ensur=
es uniqueness.) =A0The idea of this basic proposal is to establish the basi=
c behavior, around which you could then wrap more advanced management.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:b=
campbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Admittedly I&#39;m not really up on this spi issue or the motivation b=
ehind it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does the =
receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index collision=
? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this could be very =
cumbersome.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;rlb@ipv.sx&gt; wrot=
e:<br>
&gt; To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text for=
 an SPI [1] field. =A0To recall, SPI stands for &quot;security parameters i=
ndex&quot;, borrowing a term from IPsec. =A0The idea is that in cases where=
 the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save the =
parties from having to re-send the same parameters.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted for =
JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). =A0Similar text is probab=
ly needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification sections.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; Feedback welcome,<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----BEGIN-----<br>
&gt; Section 4.1.X. &quot;spi&quot; Header Parameter<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The &quot;spi&quot; (Security Parameters Index) header parameter conta=
ins an opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters. =A0This=
 index is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where enti=
ties will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.<br=
>


&gt;<br>
&gt; Entities supporting the use of the &quot;spi&quot; parameter MUST main=
tain a table of cached security parameters. =A0When an entity receives an o=
bject whose header contains both &quot;spi&quot; and &quot;alg&quot; values=
, then it MUST cache the following values from the JWE, indexed by the &quo=
t;spi&quot; value:<br>


&gt; -- Contents of the JWE header<br>
&gt; -- Encrypted Key<br>
&gt; -- Initialization Vector<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If an object containing an &quot;spi&quot; parameter but no &quot;alg&=
quot; parameter, then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initializatio=
n Vector. =A0That is, it will have the form &quot;header.ciphertext.integri=
ty_value&quot;. =A0When a recipient receives such an object, it uses the &q=
uot;spi&quot; value to retrieve cached header, key, and initialization vect=
or and reconstructs a full JWE. =A0This full JWE can then be further proces=
sed according to the normal JWE processing rules. =A0If the recipient has n=
o cached parameters for the &quot;spi&quot; value, the process MUST fail.<b=
r>


&gt; -----END-----<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [9] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" target=3D"=
_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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On 2/7/13 9:05 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
> I agree that this should be described in the document.
> One common application that uses discovery/negotiation to decide what 
> algorithms are supported and to use is TLS (https).
> Cheers,
> -- Mike
>
That's not quite accurate. TLS specifies mandatory to implement algs. 
Clients and servers can
use the handshake to discover/negotiate algs, but they always know that 
the mandatory to implement
algs are available.

Steve

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    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    On 2/7/13 9:05 PM, Mike Jones wrote:<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B16804296739436741E22F@TK5EX14MBXC284.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=ISO-8859-1">
      <div style="font-family:Calibri,&quot;Segoe
        UI&quot;,Meiryo,&quot;Microsoft YaHei UI&quot;,&quot;Microsoft
        JhengHei UI&quot;,&quot;Malgun Gothic&quot;,&quot;Khmer
        UI&quot;,&quot;Nirmala UI&quot;,Tunga,&quot;Lao
        UI&quot;,Ebrima,sans-serif;font-size:16px;">
        <div>I agree that this should be described in the document.</div>
        <div>&nbsp;</div>
        <div>One common application that uses discovery/negotiation to
          decide what algorithms are supported and to use is TLS
          (https).</div>
        <div>&nbsp;</div>
        <div data-focusfrompointer="true">Cheers,</div>
        <div data-focusfrompointer="true">-- Mike</div>
        <br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    That's not quite accurate. TLS specifies mandatory to implement
    algs. Clients and servers can<br>
    use the handshake to discover/negotiate algs, but they always know
    that the mandatory to implement<br>
    algs are available.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 15:01:32 -0300
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References: <CAL02cgSt7w5CrP+DXo7bz_+YsxKsVMoRbZLNWa6EHjnAyScWMg@mail.gmail.com> <CA+k3eCQ_bsTxYq6u5BVe_Xk1ycOhAwWe=ebfAwk+66JavJJQfA@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgRvUvf39RyDOStRXZ1Ne6p9gLrAxjtH8kfmdhE4kWG-3w@mail.gmail.com> <CA+k3eCSgXXit3KbK0XHzbhadyXTOGxvrRBm6ha8XJQhieoY0nQ@mail.gmail.com> <DAD30B11-CE37-45A1-B764-C30D91F70390@gmx.net> <CA+k3eCS=8F_zJsDE2ueU0YnNWXg7nwvUhxMbmzhk3oLGRqR2Wg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] SPI proposal
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I am also quite sure that kid is the thing we should use for naming keys =
as is the current case.

The question is if we want to be able to pass other combinations of =
header parameters by reference rather than by value.   Sort of the JOSE =
equivalent of OAuth scope.

The concern I have is that the sender of a JWE is not verifiable (unless =
we how mown a known rat hole)  without that you have a global name =
problem, and potentially others.

I would prefer to not have consideration of this optimization hold up =
the overall spec.

John B.

On 2013-02-11, at 12:24 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> I believe the "kid" Key ID header parameter already meets the need for =
named keys.
>=20
>=20
> On Sat, Feb 9, 2013 at 4:45 AM, Hannes Tschofenig =
<hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
> Hi Brian,
>=20
> keys need to have a name.
>=20
> Whether you call it SPI, key id, or something else does not really =
matter.
>=20
> It also does not matter whether the keys (and the associated =
parameters) are established manually, or using some key management.
>=20
> In the context of OAuth there are actually various keys flying around =
and therefore they need to have different names.
> I was referring to the key used between the client and the resource =
server when used with
>=20
> I believe even without Richard's proposal the necessary pieces are =
already in the current document; what is need is to further clarify =
them.
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
> On Feb 8, 2013, at 4:21 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
>=20
> > Seems to me that, in the absence of more advanced management, the =
use of spi is potentially very very fragile. And that, in many cases, =
such advanced management would be a lot more trouble than it's worth. =
But maybe I'm missing the bigger picture.
> >
> > My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar) =
and the JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another =
thought a web browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation =
doesn't lend itself well to use of spi or even easily creating some =
management protocol around it.
> >
> > WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but =
there's not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?
> >
> > Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. But =
I'd like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of complexity =
or potential operational or security issues when doing so.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> > The motivation here is not very deep.  A lot of the current design =
(e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header size.  The =
SPI proposal further compresses header size in cases where two entities =
will be exchanging many JOSE objects.  I understood from some =
discussions with OpenID folks that this was often the case for their use =
cases.
> >
> > Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this =
stuff (cf. IKE for IPsec).  Whatever application is using this would =
need to figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well as =
things like what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI.  =
(I don't think collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; the =
sender just ensures uniqueness.)  The idea of this basic proposal is to =
establish the basic behavior, around which you could then wrap more =
advanced management.
> >
> > --Richard
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
> > Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation =
behind it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does =
the receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index =
collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this =
could be very cumbersome.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> > To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text =
for an SPI [1] field.  To recall, SPI stands for "security parameters =
index", borrowing a term from IPsec.  The idea is that in cases where =
the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, this would save =
the parties from having to re-send the same parameters.
> >
> > The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted =
for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv).  Similar text is =
probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification =
sections.
> >
> > Feedback welcome,
> > --Richard
> >
> > -----BEGIN-----
> > Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter
> >
> > The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an =
opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters.  This index =
is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where entities =
will be re-using the same security parameters for several messages.
> >
> > Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a =
table of cached security parameters.  When an entity receives an object =
whose header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST cache =
the following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:
> > -- Contents of the JWE header
> > -- Encrypted Key
> > -- Initialization Vector
> >
> > If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, =
then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector.  =
That is, it will have the form "header.ciphertext.integrity_value".  =
When a recipient receives such an object, it uses the "spi" value to =
retrieve cached header, key, and initialization vector and reconstructs =
a full JWE.  This full JWE can then be further processed according to =
the normal JWE processing rules.  If the recipient has no cached =
parameters for the "spi" value, the process MUST fail.
> > -----END-----
> >
> >
> > [9] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Diso-8859-1"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">I am =
also quite sure that kid is the thing we should use for naming keys as =
is the current case.<div><br></div><div>The question is if we want to be =
able to pass other combinations of header parameters by reference rather =
than by value. &nbsp; Sort of the JOSE equivalent of OAuth =
scope.</div><div><br></div><div>The concern I have is that the sender of =
a JWE is not verifiable (unless we how mown a known rat hole) =
&nbsp;without that you have a global name problem, and potentially =
others.</div><div><br></div><div>I would prefer to not have =
consideration of this optimization hold up the overall =
spec.</div><div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div><br><div><div>On =
2013-02-11, at 12:24 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">I believe the "kid" Key ID header =
parameter already meets the need for named keys.<br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 9, =
2013 at 4:45 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" =
target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Brian,<br>
<br>
keys need to have a name.<br>
<br>
Whether you call it SPI, key id, or something else does not really =
matter.<br>
<br>
It also does not matter whether the keys (and the associated parameters) =
are established manually, or using some key management.<br>
<br>
In the context of OAuth there are actually various keys flying around =
and therefore they need to have different names.<br>
I was referring to the key used between the client and the resource =
server when used with<br>
<br>
I believe even without Richard's proposal the necessary pieces are =
already in the current document; what is need is to further clarify =
them.<br>
Ciao<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">Hannes<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Feb 8, 2013, at 4:21 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Seems to me that, in the absence of more advanced management, the =
use of spi is potentially very very fragile. And that, in many cases, =
such advanced management would be a lot more trouble than it's worth. =
But maybe I'm missing the bigger picture.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; My own applications of JOSE are in OpenID and OAuth (and similar) =
and the JOSE message is generally sent from one entity to another =
thought a web browser user agent as an intermediary. That situation =
doesn't lend itself well to use of spi or even easily creating some =
management protocol around it.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; WRT collision and scoping to sender, I had the same thought but =
there's not, AFAIK, a reliable way to identify the sender. No?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Anyway, I get the point of just establishing the basic behavior. =
But I'd like to be careful not to inadvertently impose a lot of =
complexity or potential operational or security issues when doing =
so.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:52 AM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; The motivation here is not very deep. &nbsp;A lot of the current =
design (e.g., the three-letter names) is focused on reducing header =
size. &nbsp;The SPI proposal further compresses header size in cases =
where two entities will be exchanging many JOSE objects. &nbsp;I =
understood from some discussions with OpenID folks that this was often =
the case for their use cases.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; Obviously, you could build a whole management protocol around this =
stuff (cf. IKE for IPsec). &nbsp;Whatever application is using this =
would need to figure out how to deal with the issues you note, as well =
as things like what happens when an object shows up with an unknown SPI. =
&nbsp;(I don't think collision is an issue, if you can scope to sender; =
the sender just ensures uniqueness.) &nbsp;The idea of this basic =
proposal is to establish the basic behavior, around which you could then =
wrap more advanced management.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Admittedly I'm not really up on this spi issue or the motivation =
behind it but a couple questions came to mind when I saw this. How does =
the receiver protect against unbounded growth of the cache? And index =
collision? And for distributed environments, it seems supporting this =
could be very cumbersome.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 3:11 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; To move us toward closing Issue #9 [9], here is some proposed text =
for an SPI [1] field. &nbsp;To recall, SPI stands for "security =
parameters index", borrowing a term from IPsec. &nbsp;The idea is that =
in cases where the same crypto parameters are being used repeatedly, =
this would save the parties from having to re-send the same =
parameters.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; The below text is designed for the JWE spec, but could be adapted =
for JWS (just keep header, ignore part about key/iv). &nbsp;Similar text =
is probably needed for the encryption/decryption/signing/verification =
sections.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; Feedback welcome,<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----BEGIN-----<br>
&gt; Section 4.1.X. "spi" Header Parameter<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The "spi" (Security Parameters Index) header parameter contains an =
opaque byte string that labels a set of security parameters. &nbsp;This =
index is designed to enable the use of smaller headers in cases where =
entities will be re-using the same security parameters for several =
messages.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; Entities supporting the use of the "spi" parameter MUST maintain a =
table of cached security parameters. &nbsp;When an entity receives an =
object whose header contains both "spi" and "alg" values, then it MUST =
cache the following values from the JWE, indexed by the "spi" value:<br>


&gt; -- Contents of the JWE header<br>
&gt; -- Encrypted Key<br>
&gt; -- Initialization Vector<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If an object containing an "spi" parameter but no "alg" parameter, =
then it MUST NOT contain an Encrypted Key or Initialization Vector. =
&nbsp;That is, it will have the form =
"header.ciphertext.integrity_value". &nbsp;When a recipient receives =
such an object, it uses the "spi" value to retrieve cached header, key, =
and initialization vector and reconstructs a full JWE. &nbsp;This full =
JWE can then be further processed according to the normal JWE processing =
rules. &nbsp;If the recipient has no cached parameters for the "spi" =
value, the process MUST fail.<br>


&gt; -----END-----<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [9] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/jose<br></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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From ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com  Mon Feb 11 11:45:31 2013
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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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I agree that doing it as a new I-D is better than trying to fit it in =
without sufficient thought.

John B.

On 2013-02-08, at 8:01 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal =
over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from =
operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe =
strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification =
detail, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the =
current base JOSE WG drafts.
>=20
> As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be =
submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and =
analysis that I think it needs.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Brian
>=20
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=iso-8859-1"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">I agree that doing it as a new I-D is better than trying to fit it in without sufficient thought.<div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-08, at 8:01 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href="mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div>Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG drafts.<br>


<br></div>As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and analysis that I think it needs.<br><div><br></div><div>Thanks,<br>Brian<br>

</div><div><br>[1] <a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html" target="_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><br>
</div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing list<br><a href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose<br></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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+1 to SPI being a separate I-D, for discussion purposes.

Having thought about this, I feel like there are a number unanswered questi=
ons about this proposal, and that writing it up concretely would be useful =
to help the working group identify and address them and determine the best =
path forward.

These questions/issues include:
  - What are the security implications of repeatedly reusing the same CMK a=
nd IV and how can/should they be mitigated?
  - Is having the absence of an "alg" field, paired with the presence of an=
 "spi" field the best way to handle this?
  - What are the complexity implications of having JWEs no longer contain a=
 fixed set of field?
  - Would JWSs similarly have a different number of fields?
  - Indeed, is the proposal even applicable in the JWS case, or does it onl=
y make sense for JWEs?
  - What are the motivating use cases for this functionality?
  - What syntax would be used for the "spi" parameter?  Unrestricted Unicod=
e strings?  Base64url-encoded byte strings?  UUIDs? ...

                                                                Thanks,
                                                                -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Joh=
n Bradley
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2013 11:45 AM
To: Brian Campbell
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal

I agree that doing it as a new I-D is better than trying to fit it in witho=
ut sufficient thought.

John B.

On 2013-02-08, at 8:01 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com<mailt=
o:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>> wrote:


Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over=
 the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operat=
ional complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly tha=
t, without considerably more analysis and specification detail, the current=
 SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG draf=
ts.
As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be submitt=
ed as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and analysis th=
at I think it needs.

Thanks,
Brian

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html
_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#43;1 to SPI being a sep=
arate I-D, for discussion purposes.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Having thought about this=
, I feel like there are a number unanswered questions about this proposal, =
and that writing it up concretely would be useful to help
 the working group identify and address them and determine the best path fo=
rward.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">These questions/issues in=
clude:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What are the sec=
urity implications of repeatedly reusing the same CMK and IV and how can/sh=
ould they be mitigated?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - Is having the ab=
sence of an &#8220;alg&#8221; field, paired with the presence of an &#8220;=
spi&#8221; field the best way to handle this?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What are the com=
plexity implications of having JWEs no longer contain a fixed set of field?=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - Would JWSs simil=
arly have a different number of fields?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - Indeed, is the p=
roposal even applicable in the JWS case, or does it only make sense for JWE=
s?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What are the mot=
ivating use cases for this functionality?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What syntax woul=
d be used for the &#8220;spi&#8221; parameter?&nbsp; Unrestricted Unicode s=
trings?&nbsp; Base64url-encoded byte strings?&nbsp; UUIDs? &#8230;<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Thanks,<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>John Bradley<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 11, 2013 11:45 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I agree that doing it as a new I-D is better than tr=
ying to fit it in without sufficient thought.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">John B.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 2013-02-08, at 8:01 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Maybe this was appare=
nt from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over the last couple days=
[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operational complexity and =
fragility to security problems. I believe
 strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail=
, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base=
 JOSE WG drafts.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that t=
he SPI stuff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional dis=
cussion and analysis that I think it needs.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<br>
Brian<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.h=
tml" target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose">https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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+1 for new I-D.






________________________________
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Sent: Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM
Subject: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal


Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over the 
last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operational 
complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly that, without 
considerably more analysis and specification detail, the current SPI work is 
much too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG drafts.

As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be submitted as 
new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and analysis that I think 
it needs.


Thanks,
Brian


[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html

---6906265-962908578-1360628984=:83146
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii

<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:tahoma,new york,times,serif;font-size:10pt"><div>+1 for new I-D.<br><br><br></div><div style="font-family:tahoma, new york, times, serif;font-size:10pt"><br><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><font face="Tahoma" size="2"><hr size="1"><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">From:</span></b> Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell@pingidentity.com&gt;<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> "jose@ietf.org" &lt;jose@ietf.org&gt;<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b> [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal<br></font><br><div dir="ltr"><div>Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operational complexity
 and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG drafts.<br>


<br></div>As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and analysis that I think it needs.<br><div><br></div><div>Thanks,<br>Brian<br>

</div><div><br>[1] <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><br>
</div></div>
</div></div>



</div></body></html>
---6906265-962908578-1360628984=:83146--

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From: "HAYASHI, Tatsuya" <lef.mutualauth@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:13:03 +0900
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] POLL(s): header criticality
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FIRST POLL:  YES
SECOND POLL:  YES
THIRD POLL:  A

--
HAYASHI, Tatsuya
Lepidum Co. Ltd.

On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrot=
e:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticali=
ty
> of headers. For background, please review the current specification text,
> the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list
> (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementation=
s
> must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on t=
his
> issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementatio=
ns or
> the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignor=
ed
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text li=
ke
> the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to unders=
tand
> all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not on an=
y
> particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could
> process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of =
the
> rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE libra=
ry
> didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST unders=
tand=92
> requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application.=
=94
>
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librari=
es.
>
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax wou=
ld
> you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not
> understood?
>
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



--=20
HAYASHI, Tatsuya
Lepidum Co. Ltd.

On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 11:48 PM, Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org> wrot=
e:
> Folks,
>
> I am wrestling with how to help drive consensus on the topic of criticali=
ty
> of headers. For background, please review the current specification text,
> the minutes to the Atlanta meeting (IETF85), and the mailing list
> (especially the discussion in December with (Subj: Whether implementation=
s
> must understand all JOSE header fields)). We need to come to closure on t=
his
> issue in order to progress the specifications.
>
> As a tool to gather further information on determining a way forward, the
> following polls have been created. Please respond before 11 February 2013=
.
>
> Thanks,
> Karen
>
> *******************
> FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
> understand?
>
> YES =96 All header fields must continue to be understood by implementatio=
ns or
> the input must be rejected.
>
> NO =96 A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignor=
ed
> should be defined.
>
> ********************
> SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "YES", should text li=
ke
> the following be added? =93Implementation Note: The requirement to unders=
tand
> all header fields is a requirement on the system as a whole =96 not on an=
y
> particular level of library software. For instance, a JOSE library could
> process the headers that it understands and then leave the processing of =
the
> rest of them up to the application. For those headers that the JOSE libra=
ry
> didn=92t understand, the responsibility for fulfilling the =91MUST unders=
tand=92
> requirement for the remaining headers would then fall to the application.=
=94
>
> YES =96 Add the text clarifying that the =93MUST understand=94 requiremen=
t is a
> requirement on the system as a whole =96 not specifically on JOSE librari=
es.
>
> NO =96 Don=92t add the clarifying text.
>
> ************************
> THIRD POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax wou=
ld
> you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not
> understood?
>
> A =96 Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood.
>
> B =96 Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand al=
l
> fields in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the seco=
nd.
>
> C - Other??? (Please specify in detail.)
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



--
HAYASHI, Tatsuya
Lepidum Co. Ltd.

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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FYI...


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

Begin forwarded message:

> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
>=20
>=20
> 	Title           : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates
> 	Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
>                          Brian Campbell
> 	Filename        : draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> 	Pages           : 7
> 	Date            : 2013-02-12
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX
>   certificate chains.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
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> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


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Subject: [jose] JWK-specific key fingerprints?
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Is there an interest here in defining a standard way to canonicalize and
fingerprint (sha-256 hash) JWKs? You would take out the kid, encode the JWK
with bencode or canonical json, and hash.

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<div dir="ltr">Is there an interest here in defining a standard way to canonicalize and fingerprint (sha-256 hash) JWKs? You would take out the kid, encode the JWK with bencode or canonical json, and hash.<br></div>

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From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Tue Feb 12 11:09:58 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] JWK-specific key fingerprints?
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On 02/12/2013 06:56 PM, Daniel Holth wrote:
> Is there an interest here in defining a standard way to canonicalize and
> fingerprint (sha-256 hash) JWKs? You would take out the kid, encode the JWK
> with bencode or canonical json, and hash.

If you do that, please do it compatibly with e.g. DANE.

Or (self promotion:-) if it worked for you, you could
use [1] :-) which is in the RFC editor's queue.

S.

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-farrell-decade-ni

> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
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On 12 February 2013 10:56, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
> ... canonical json ....

Isn't mention of canonical JSON a swear-jar offense?  Something needs
canonicalization, but JSON seems a poor candidate.

From dholth@gmail.com  Tue Feb 12 12:01:23 2013
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From: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] JWK-specific key fingerprints?
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On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 2:53 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>wrote:

> On 12 February 2013 10:56, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
> > ... canonical json ....
>
> Isn't mention of canonical JSON a swear-jar offense?  Something needs
> canonicalization, but JSON seems a poor candidate.
>

There is something called Canonical JSON. They take out all the whitespace,
sort keys lexicographically, and only quote the " inside strings. It is
used in the wild by the OLPC project I think.

bencode is an easier to implement protocol that is used in bittorrent and
yields a tiny write-only implementation if all you want to do is get unique
hashes for the subset of JSON used by JWK.

--f46d044287921155c804d58c7dcf
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
ue, Feb 12, 2013 at 2:53 PM, Martin Thomson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">martin.thomson@gmail=
.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 12 February 2013 10:56, Daniel Holth &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com">dholth@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; ... canonical json ....<br>
<br>
Isn&#39;t mention of canonical JSON a swear-jar offense? =A0Something needs=
<br>
canonicalization, but JSON seems a poor candidate.<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">There is something =
called Canonical JSON. They take out all the whitespace, sort keys lexicogr=
aphically, and only quote the &quot; inside strings. It is used in the wild=
 by the OLPC project I think.<br>
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">bencode is an easier to implement prot=
ocol that is used in bittorrent and yields a tiny write-only implementation=
 if all you want to do is get unique hashes for the subset of JSON used by =
JWK.<br>
</div></div>

--f46d044287921155c804d58c7dcf--

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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looking at JWK to be just a bag and =
now its to hold a certificate or certificate chain which are much more that=
 keys

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mat=
t Miller (mamille2)
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt

FYI...


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

Begin forwarded message:

> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
>=20
>=20
> 	Title           : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates
> 	Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
>                          Brian Campbell
> 	Filename        : draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> 	Pages           : 7
> 	Date            : 2013-02-12
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX
>   certificate chains.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or=20
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt



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Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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"Abuse" is a strong word Tony.


On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>wrote:

> This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looking at JWK to be just a bag and
> now its to hold a certificate or certificate chain which are much more that
> keys
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Matt Miller (mamille2)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
>
> FYI...
>
>
> - m&m
>
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> > Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> > Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST
> > To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> > Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> >
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> >
> >
> >       Title           : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates
> >       Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
> >                          Brian Campbell
> >       Filename        : draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> >       Pages           : 7
> >       Date            : 2013-02-12
> >
> > Abstract:
> >   This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX
> >   certificate chains.
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key
> >
> > There's also a htmlized version available at:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00
> >
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > I-D-Announce mailing list
> > I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> > Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

--14dae93410a55b781a04d58fd0f4
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<div dir=3D"ltr">&quot;Abuse&quot; is a strong word Tony. <br></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 12, 2013=
 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tonyna=
d@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">tonynad@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looki=
ng at JWK to be just a bag and now its to hold a certificate or certificate=
 chain which are much more that keys<br>


<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [m=
ailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] O=
n Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
<br>
FYI...<br>
<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</=
a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
Begin forwarded message:<br>
<br>
&gt; From: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@=
ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
&gt; Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST<br>
&gt; To: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.org=
</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Reply-To: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-dra=
fts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Ce=
rtificates<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Author(s) =A0 =A0 =A0 : Matthew Miller<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Brian Campbell<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.tx=
t<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 7<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2013-02-12<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt; =A0 This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX<br>
&gt; =A0 certificate chains.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key=
" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix=
-key</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00" t=
arget=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00</=
a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank">ftp:=
//ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; I-D-Announce mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:I-D-Announce@ietf.org">I-D-Announce@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce</a><br>
&gt; Internet-Draft directories: <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html=
" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html</a> or<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt" target=3D"_blank=
">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt</a><br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--14dae93410a55b781a04d58fd0f4--

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Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 23:27:21 -0300
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References: <20130212183947.3748.46497.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED94115134D2C@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <5cc6c8726d01457187a6206e4aa5c6fd@BY2PR03MB041.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <CA+k3eCTxdR2MSASDXR-_khhAysj5BOeEosq1fOA4Sx0JUaQSPg@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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Wether it is abuse depends on you perspective I suppose.

If only we could kill x509 and move on:)

Unfortunately that isn't going to happen any time soon.  There are a lot =
of tools out there for dealing with PEM encoded certificates.

One thing developers told us ion Connect was that even if they are =
dealing with raw keys it is easier for them to import self signed certs.

The problem we have is we have no way to provide a single key identifier =
for both x509 and JWK.

In SAML meta-data and even that other ancient WS metadata format someone =
named Tony may be responsible for there is a way to include a PEM =
encoded cert alongside a raw key representation.

Having a single document that can contain the raw key info along with =
the meta data and also reference a x509 format that some people may =
prefer for import has some attraction.

If you wanted to limit it to a single self signed pen encoded vert I =
could probably live with that, but others may want to validate the vert =
chain etc.

What we have now for treating JWK and x509 separately is a mess for =
developers to figure out.

In Connect I would like to have the server point to a single file that =
contains info about key identifiers, key use, perhaps expires, and the =
import information in raw and PEM.

Now I have to admit they Tony has a very small point in that we need to =
be clear on how conflicting info from the cert and JSON are treated.  =
However I don't think that is insurmountable. =20
I do think it is better than what we have now where we have no way to =
roll over x509 keys and you have to publish each key in two completely =
separate ways.

So while it may be a bag it is I think a useful one.

John B.

On 2013-02-12, at 8:58 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> "Abuse" is a strong word Tony.=20
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin =
<tonynad@microsoft.com> wrote:
> This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looking at JWK to be just a bag =
and now its to hold a certificate or certificate chain which are much =
more that keys
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Matt Miller (mamille2)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
>=20
> FYI...
>=20
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
> Begin forwarded message:
>=20
> > From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> > Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> > Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST
> > To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> > Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> >
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> >
> >
> >       Title           : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates
> >       Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
> >                          Brian Campbell
> >       Filename        : draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> >       Pages           : 7
> >       Date            : 2013-02-12
> >
> > Abstract:
> >   This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX
> >   certificate chains.
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key
> >
> > There's also a htmlized version available at:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00
> >
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > I-D-Announce mailing list
> > I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> > Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


--Apple-Mail=_6F3AF520-BE6D-45B0-80E1-F9FC9BC8697F
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=iso-8859-1

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Diso-8859-1"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
">Wether it is abuse depends on you perspective I =
suppose.<div><br></div><div>If only we could kill x509 and move =
on:)</div><div><br></div><div>Unfortunately that isn't going to happen =
any time soon. &nbsp;There are a lot of tools out there for dealing with =
PEM encoded certificates.</div><div><br></div><div>One thing developers =
told us ion Connect was that even if they are dealing with raw keys it =
is easier for them to import self signed =
certs.</div><div><br></div><div>The problem we have is we have no way to =
provide a single key identifier for both x509 and =
JWK.</div><div><br></div><div>In SAML meta-data and even that other =
ancient WS metadata format someone named Tony may be responsible for =
there is a way to include a PEM encoded cert alongside a raw key =
representation.</div><div><br></div><div>Having a single document that =
can contain the raw key info along with the meta data and also reference =
a x509 format that some people may prefer for import has some =
attraction.</div><div><br></div><div>If you wanted to limit it to a =
single self signed pen encoded vert I could probably live with that, but =
others may want to validate the vert chain =
etc.</div><div><br></div><div>What we have now for treating JWK and x509 =
separately is a mess for developers to figure =
out.</div><div><br></div><div>In Connect I would like to have the server =
point to a single file that contains info about key identifiers, key =
use, perhaps expires, and the import information in raw and =
PEM.</div><div><br></div><div>Now I have to admit they Tony has a very =
small point in that we need to be clear on how conflicting info from the =
cert and JSON are treated. &nbsp;However I don't think that is =
insurmountable. &nbsp;</div><div>I do think it is better than what we =
have now where we have no way to roll over x509 keys and you have to =
publish each key in two completely separate =
ways.</div><div><br></div><div>So while it may be a bag it is I think a =
useful one.</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br></div><div><div><div>On 2013-02-12, at 8:58 PM, Brian =
Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">"Abuse" is a strong word Tony. =
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On=
 Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tonynad@microsoft.com" =
target=3D"_blank">tonynad@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">This seems to abuse =
JWK, as we are now looking at JWK to be just a bag and now its to hold a =
certificate or certificate chain which are much more that keys<br>


<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> =
[mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On =
Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
<br>
FYI...<br>
<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a =
href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
Begin forwarded message:<br>
<br>
&gt; From: &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<=
br>
&gt; Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
&gt; Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST<br>
&gt; To: &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Reply-To: &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<=
br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Title &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : =
JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Author(s) &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : Matthew =
Miller<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Brian Campbell<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Filename &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: =
draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Pages &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : =
7<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Date &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;: 2013-02-12<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt; &nbsp; This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap =
PKIX<br>
&gt; &nbsp; certificate chains.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key" =
target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-=
key</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There's also a htmlized version available at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00=
</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
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target=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt</a><br>
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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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Well it turns JWK into a bag that is no longer strictly holding keys. It no=
w holds PEM encoded certificate chains

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bri=
an Campbell
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 3:59 PM
To: Anthony Nadalin
Cc: jose@ietf.org; Matt Miller (mamille2)
Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt

"Abuse" is a strong word Tony.

On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com<mai=
lto:tonynad@microsoft.com>> wrote:
This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looking at JWK to be just a bag and =
now its to hold a certificate or certificate chain which are much more that=
 keys

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamil=
le2)
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt

FYI...


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com<mailto:mamille2@cisco.com> >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

Begin forwarded message:

> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org<mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>>
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org<mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org>>
> Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org<mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>>
>
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
>
>
>       Title           : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates
>       Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
>                          Brian Campbell
>       Filename        : draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
>       Pages           : 7
>       Date            : 2013-02-12
>
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX
>   certificate chains.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00
>
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org<mailto:I-D-Announce@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Well it turns JWK into a =
bag that is no longer strictly holding keys. It now holds PEM encoded certi=
ficate chains<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497=
D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></a></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-=
size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-b=
ounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 12, 2013 3:59 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Anthony Nadalin<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org; Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;Abuse&quot; is a strong word Tony. <o:p></o:p>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:tonynad@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">tonynad@microso=
ft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looking at JW=
K to be just a bag and now its to hold a certificate or certificate chain w=
hich are much more that keys<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [m=
ailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] O=
n Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
<br>
FYI...<br>
<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</=
a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
Begin forwarded message:<br>
<br>
&gt; From: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@=
ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
&gt; Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST<br>
&gt; To: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.org=
</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Reply-To: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-dra=
fts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Title &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : JSON W=
eb Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Author(s) &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : Matthew Miller<b=
r>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Brian Campbell<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Filename &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: draft-mille=
r-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Pages &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : 7<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Date &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: 2=
013-02-12<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt; &nbsp; This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX<=
br>
&gt; &nbsp; certificate chains.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key=
" target=3D"_blank">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There's also a htmlized version available at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00" t=
arget=3D"_blank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank">ftp:=
//ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; I-D-Announce mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:I-D-Announce@ietf.org">I-D-Announce@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce</a><br>
&gt; Internet-Draft directories: <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html=
" target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html</a> or<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt" target=3D"_blank=
">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt</a><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
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From ietf@augustcellars.com  Wed Feb 13 10:28:36 2013
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From: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this (really
me).

 

At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following
documents to become working group documents:

 

Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases
<http://www.myfitnesspal.com/foohttp:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-
jose-use-cases/>  - Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Object Signing and
Encryption (JOSE)

 

Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization
<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization/>
- JSON Web Encryption JSON Serialization (JWE-JS)

 

Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization
<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization/>
- JSON Web Signature JSON Serialization (JWS-JS)

 

 

The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt these
three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta.  Thus you
only need to reply if you object to these documents being adopted.  This
call will end 27 February.

 

(Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the Orlando
meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)

 

Jim

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>The chairs =
of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this (really =
me).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for =
the following documents to become working group =
documents:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><a =
href=3D"http://www.myfitnesspal.com/foohttp:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dra=
ft-barnes-jose-use-cases/">Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases</a> &#8211; Use =
Cases and Requirements for JSON Object Signing and Encryption =
(JOSE)<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><a =
href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-seriali=
zation/">Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization</a> &#8211; JSON Web =
Encryption JSON Serialization (JWE-JS)<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><a =
href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-seriali=
zation/">Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization</a> &#8211; JSON Web =
Signature JSON Serialization (JWS-JS)<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The chairs =
are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt these three =
documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta. &nbsp;Thus =
you only need to reply if you object to these documents being =
adopted.&nbsp; This call will end 27 February.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>(Note that =
we will be looking at the private key drafts during the Orlando meeting =
and issuing an adoption call shortly after that =
meeting.)<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Jim<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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From: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: <jose@ietf.org>
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The chairs are starting to build the agenda for the meeting in Orlando.  If
you want to give a presently please let us know with the following
information:

 

Document to be addressed

Who is doing the presentation

Desired amount of time for the presentation.

 

After the meeting we will be issuing a call for adoption on the new items in
the charter dealing with private key operations.  We would especially
solicit presentations on this topic if you do not believe that the candidate
documents correctly address the problems.

 

For people who are doing presentations, the chairs would like to see
(preliminary) slides no later than 6 March with final slides to the chairs
on Tuesday 12 March.  This will allow us to get the slides up on the web for
those who are remote.

 

Jim

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>The chairs =
are starting to build the agenda for the meeting in Orlando.&nbsp; If =
you want to give a presently please let us know with the following =
information:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Document to be addressed<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Who is doing the presentation<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Desired amount of time for the =
presentation.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>After the meeting we will be issuing a call for =
adoption on the new items in the charter dealing with private key =
operations.&nbsp; We would especially solicit presentations on this =
topic if you do not believe that the candidate documents correctly =
address the problems.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>For people =
who are doing presentations, the chairs would like to see (preliminary) =
slides no later than 6 March with final slides to the chairs on Tuesday =
12 March.&nbsp; This will allow us to get the slides up on the web for =
those who are remote.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Jim<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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From bcampbell@pingidentity.com  Wed Feb 13 15:37:50 2013
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References: <20130212183947.3748.46497.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED94115134D2C@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <5cc6c8726d01457187a6206e4aa5c6fd@BY2PR03MB041.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <CA+k3eCTxdR2MSASDXR-_khhAysj5BOeEosq1fOA4Sx0JUaQSPg@mail.gmail.com> <257fc91ee2e1404492d2e3abe01a845a@BY2PR03MB041.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 16:29:16 -0700
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
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It's an extremely useful bag.


On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 8:05 PM, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>wrote:

>  Well it turns JWK into a bag that is no longer strictly holding keys. It
> now holds PEM encoded certificate chains****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Brian Campbell
> *Sent:* Tuesday, February 12, 2013 3:59 PM
> *To:* Anthony Nadalin
> *Cc:* jose@ietf.org; Matt Miller (mamille2)
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt****
>
> ** **
>
> "Abuse" is a strong word Tony. ****
>
> ** **
>
> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
> wrote:****
>
> This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looking at JWK to be just a bag and
> now its to hold a certificate or certificate chain which are much more that
> keys****
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Matt Miller (mamille2)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
>
> FYI...
>
>
> - m&m
>
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> > Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> > Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST
> > To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> > Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> >
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> >
> >
> >       Title           : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates
> >       Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
> >                          Brian Campbell
> >       Filename        : draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt
> >       Pages           : 7
> >       Date            : 2013-02-12
> >
> > Abstract:
> >   This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX
> >   certificate chains.
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key
> >
> > There's also a htmlized version available at:
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00
> >
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > I-D-Announce mailing list
> > I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> > Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>
> ****
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose****
>
>  ** **
>

--14dae93410a580387804d5a384c5
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<div dir=3D"ltr">It&#39;s an extremely useful bag.<br></div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 8:05=
 PM, Anthony Nadalin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tonynad@micros=
oft.com" target=3D"_blank">tonynad@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Well it turns JWK into a =
bag that is no longer strictly holding keys. It now holds PEM encoded certi=
ficate chains<u></u><u></u></span></p>


<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"13cd1841330b0959__MailEndCompose"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&q=
uot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></a></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-=
size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a hre=
f=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org<=
/a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose=
-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 12, 2013 3:59 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Anthony Nadalin<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a>; Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;Abuse&quot; is a strong word Tony. <u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Anthony Nadalin &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:tonynad@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">tonynad@microso=
ft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This seems to abuse JWK, as we are now looking at JW=
K to be just a bag and now its to hold a certificate or certificate chain w=
hich are much more that keys<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounc=
es@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"=
_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:46 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br=
>
Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
<br>
FYI...<br>
<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">ma=
mille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
Begin forwarded message:<br>
<br>
&gt; From: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.txt<br>
&gt; Date: February 12, 2013 11:39:47 AM MST<br>
&gt; To: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">i-d=
-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; Reply-To: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_b=
lank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Ce=
rtificates<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Author(s) =A0 =A0 =A0 : Matthew Miller<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Brian Campbell<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00.tx=
t<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 7<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2013-02-12<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt; =A0 This document defines a JSON Web Key (JWK) object to wrap PKIX<br>
&gt; =A0 certificate chains.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key=
" target=3D"_blank">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00" t=
arget=3D"_blank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-00</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank">ftp:=
//ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; I-D-Announce mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:I-D-Announce@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">I-D-Announc=
e@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce</a><br>
&gt; Internet-Draft directories: <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html=
" target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html</a> or<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt" target=3D"_blank=
">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt</a><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--14dae93410a580387804d5a384c5--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Wed Feb 13 17:30:23 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Steffen Yount <syount@wideorbit.com>, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Can you extend json-web-signature to bind a list of mixed objects under one signature?
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Subject: Re: [jose] Can you extend json-web-signature to bind a list of mixed objects under one signature?
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Hi Steffen,

Rather than putting this in the header, I'd put it in the payload.  I'd do =
that by using a JSON array or object as the payload, with array elements fo=
r each of the objects that you want to include under the signature.  Those =
that are binary would need to be base64url encoded in the JSON object.  You=
 might also want metadata about each member to say what it is.

I'm imagining a payload something like this:

[
 {"type":"number", "value":123},
 {"type":"binary", "value":"A-z_4ME"},
 {"type":"string", "value":"Live long and prosper."}
]

The only thing I might do in the header is define a "cty" value to say that=
 the content-type is one of these arrays.

Hope this is useful...

				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: Steffen Yount [mailto:syount@wideorbit.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:19 PM
To: Mike Jones; John Bradley; Nat Sakimura; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Can you extend json-web-signature to bind a list of mixed objects =
under one signature?

Hi,

I'm looking for a standard way to bind a list of mixed objects (some are js=
on and some are binary) in a token under a single signature.

I looked at the draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature to see if JWS could work=
.=20

Unfortunately, the draft doesn't provide a standard way to pack a list of m=
ixed objects into a JWS token.

I could do something like tar these objects together beforehand, but buildi=
ng the untar handler for that in JavaScript seems like it'll be a pita...

My preferred JWS based solution could be to extend the JWS header to descri=
be the list of mixed objects, then concatenate their base64url encoded outp=
uts together with the dot separator, and the ship this concatenation to the=
 signing engine.

The header describing this payload could look something like:

{
  "typ":"JWS",
  "alg":"RS256",
  "pld":[
    {"id":"oauth2",
      "cty":"JWT"},
    {"id":"saml2",
      "cty":"application/samlassertion+xml"},
    {"id":"myauthz-claims",
      "cty":"application/vnd.myauthz-claims+json"}
  ]
}

The signed token in this example would be output with 5 parts: HEAD.PLD0.PL=
D1.PLD2.SIG



Do you agree that multi-object support in JWS is worthwhile?=20

Can you outline of a better solution?

Will you update JWS to provide a standard way to pack a list of mixed objec=
ts into a JWS token?


Thanks for your consideration,
-Steffen


From rlb@ipv.sx  Wed Feb 13 19:23:56 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] Call for adoption
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--e89a8fb1f4f4e41ea204d5a6c936
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I support the adoption of the use cases draft.  Clearer use cases will help
this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.

I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents.  A JSON
serialization should be part of the base documents. I have already made a
proposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially the same as
the one in the JSON serialization documents.  It would have a small impact
on the base specs, and make the base format much more usable.
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html

--Richard



On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:

> The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this (reall=
y
> me).****
>
> ** **
>
> At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following
> documents to become working group documents:****
>
> ** **
>
> Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases<http://www.myfitnesspal.com/foohttp:/datatrac=
ker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases/>=96 Use Cases and Requirement=
s for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization/>=96 JSON Web Encryption JSON Serial=
ization (JWE-JS)
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization/>=96 JSON Web Signature JSON Seriali=
zation (JWS-JS)
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt thes=
e
> three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta.  Thus y=
ou
> only need to reply if you object to these documents being adopted.  This
> call will end 27 February.****
>
> ** **
>
> (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the Orland=
o
> meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)****
>
> ** **
>
> Jim****
>
> ** **
>

--e89a8fb1f4f4e41ea204d5a6c936
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I support the adoption of the use cases draft. =A0Clearer use cases will he=
lp this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.=A0<div><b=
r></div><div>I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization docume=
nts. =A0A JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have a=
lready made a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially=
 the same as the one in the JSON serialization documents. =A0It would have =
a small impact on the base specs, and make the base format much more usable=
.=A0</div>
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html"=
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html</a><div><b=
r></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div><span></span><br><br>On Wed=
nesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad  wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"p=
urple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">The chairs of the JOSE working group hav=
e dropped the ball on this (really me).<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">At the l=
ast face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following documents to be=
come working group documents:<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"http://www.myfitnesspal.com/foohttp:/data=
tracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases/" target=3D"_blank">Draft-=
barnes-jose-use-cases</a> =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Object Si=
gning and Encryption (JOSE)<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=
=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization=
/" target=3D"_blank">Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization</a> =96 JSON W=
eb Encryption JSON Serialization (JWE-JS)<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=
=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization=
/" target=3D"_blank">Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization</a> =96 JSON W=
eb Signature JSON Serialization (JWS-JS)<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">The chairs are going to assume that th=
e working group wants to adopt these three documents as that was the overwh=
elming response in Atlanta. =A0Thus you only need to reply if you object to=
 these documents being adopted.=A0 This call will end 27 February.<u></u><u=
></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">(Note th=
at we will be looking at the private key drafts during the Orlando meeting =
and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)<u></u><u></u></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">
<u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Jim<u></u><u></u></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div></div></blockquote></div>

--e89a8fb1f4f4e41ea204d5a6c936--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Wed Feb 13 22:23:23 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] Call for adoption
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Richard, I believe that your response is conflating two largely orthogonal =
things:  whether there should be a JSON serialization and whether it should=
 be in the same document as the compact serialization.  The working group h=
as been clear that it also wants a JSON serialization and that it wants the=
 JSON serialization to enable multiple recipients.  The individual submissi=
on documents in question accomplish those goals and incorporate working gro=
up feedback received along the way.  I believe it represents forward progre=
ss to adopt them.

As was clarified during the rechartering discussion, the working group is f=
ree to combine deliverables.  If the working group decides to combine the c=
ompact serialization and the JSON serialization into a single deliverable, =
so be it.  But them not being combined at present shouldn't be grounds to t=
hwart the working group's clear intent to support both serializations.

Once the JSON serialization is under working group control, feel free to le=
ad a crusade to combine both serializations into one document. :)

Anyway, that's how I see it.  Looking forward to seeing you in Orlando...

                                                            Best wishes,
                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2013 7:24 PM
To: Jim Schaad
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] Call for adoption

I support the adoption of the use cases draft.  Clearer use cases will help=
 this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.

I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents.  A JSON =
serialization should be part of the base documents. I have already made a p=
roposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially the same as th=
e one in the JSON serialization documents.  It would have a small impact on=
 the base specs, and make the base format much more usable.
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html

--Richard



On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:
The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this (really =
me).

At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following documen=
ts to become working group documents:

Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases<http://www.myfitnesspal.com/foohttp:/datatracke=
r.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases/> - Use Cases and Requirements f=
or JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)

Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dra=
ft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization/> - JSON Web Encryption JSON Serializa=
tion (JWE-JS)

Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dra=
ft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization/> - JSON Web Signature JSON Serializat=
ion (JWS-JS)


The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt these =
three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta.  Thus you=
 only need to reply if you object to these documents being adopted.  This c=
all will end 27 February.

(Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the Orlando =
meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)

Jim


--_000_4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B16804296739436744813ETK5EX14MBXC285r_
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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Richard, I believe that y=
our response is conflating two largely orthogonal things:&nbsp; whether the=
re should be a JSON serialization and whether it should be in
 the same document as the compact serialization.&nbsp; The working group ha=
s been clear that it also wants a JSON serialization and that it wants the =
JSON serialization to enable multiple recipients.&nbsp; The individual subm=
ission documents in question accomplish those
 goals and incorporate working group feedback received along the way.&nbsp;=
 I believe it represents forward progress to adopt them.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As was clarified during t=
he rechartering discussion, the working group is free to combine deliverabl=
es.&nbsp; If the working group decides to combine the compact
 serialization and the JSON serialization into a single deliverable, so be =
it.&nbsp; But them not being combined at present shouldn&#8217;t be grounds=
 to thwart the working group&#8217;s clear intent to support both serializa=
tions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Once the JSON serializati=
on is under working group control, feel free to lead a crusade to combine b=
oth serializations into one document.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Anyway, that&#8217;s how =
I see it.&nbsp; Looking forward to seeing you in Orlando&#8230;<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Best wishes,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 13, 2013 7:24 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Jim Schaad<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Call for adoption<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I support the adoption of the use cases draft. &nbsp=
;Clearer use cases will help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are =
floating around.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I do not support the adoption of the JSON serializat=
ion documents. &nbsp;A JSON serialization should be part of the base docume=
nts. I have already made a proposal to the list for how to do this, which i=
s essentially the same as the one in the
 JSON serialization documents. &nbsp;It would have a small impact on the ba=
se specs, and make the base format much more usable.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose=
/current/msg01465.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/m=
sg01465.html</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this=
 (really me).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the followin=
g documents to become working group documents:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><a href=3D"http://www.myfitnesspal.com/foohttp:/datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases/" target=3D"_blank">Draft-barnes-jose-us=
e-cases</a> &#8211; Use Cases and Requirements
 for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jwe-js=
on-serialization/" target=3D"_blank">Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serializatio=
n</a> &#8211; JSON Web Encryption JSON Serialization
 (JWE-JS)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jws-js=
on-serialization/" target=3D"_blank">Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serializatio=
n</a> &#8211; JSON Web Signature JSON Serialization
 (JWS-JS)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to ado=
pt these three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta. =
&nbsp;Thus you only need to reply if you
 object to these documents being adopted.&nbsp; This call will end 27 Febru=
ary.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">(Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the=
 Orlando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)<=
o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Jim<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B16804296739436744813ETK5EX14MBXC285r_--

From hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net  Thu Feb 14 00:04:08 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] Call for adoption
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Hi Jim,=20

I agree with Richard on the serialization documents.=20

On the use cases I have a mixed view. As we have seen in the OAuth =
working group with use cases it is easy to get the group to add a new =
use case document but very difficult to get others to find reviewers to =
get it finished. I am not sure what the target audience would be with =
such a document.=20

Let's assume that the audience for the document is the JOSE group. =
First, the requirements are not really adding a lot to the discussion =
since they are really basic (more or less what can be found in the =
charter). The use cases in Section 4 are out-of-date and are typically =
better described in the referenced documents. One of the four use cases =
is obsolete by now: the ATOCA use case is gone with the decisions from =
the last IETF meeting since the group entire group got trashed. ALTO =
IMHO does not seem to go anywhere either.

Sorry if I do not get excited anymore about the value of use case (and =
requirements) documents. The main challenges are that=20

a) you don't want to describe use cases that relate to work where it =
hasn't even been decided to use the specific technology (in this case =
JSON), and=20
b) when a use case of interest to the group is found that requires =
additional functionality then a new extension/solution is defined in a =
separate document that typically provides a better description than in =
the use case document itself.

Consequently, the value of separate use case document goes close to =
zero.=20

Ciao
Hannes


On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:23 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:

> I support the adoption of the use cases draft.  Clearer use cases will =
help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.=20
>=20
> I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents.  A =
JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have already =
made a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially the =
same as the one in the JSON serialization documents.  It would have a =
small impact on the base specs, and make the base format much more =
usable.=20
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html
>=20
> --Richard
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:
> The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this =
(really me).
>=20
> =20
>=20
> At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following =
documents to become working group documents:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON =
Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Encryption JSON =
Serialization (JWE-JS)
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Signature JSON =
Serialization (JWS-JS)
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt =
these three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta.  =
Thus you only need to reply if you object to these documents being =
adopted.  This call will end 27 February.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the =
Orlando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that =
meeting.)
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Jim
>=20
> =20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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--90e6ba5bba1d5edc5f04d5af2b77
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For better or worse, I think Hannes' assessment of the value of use case
documents is spot on. And as such, I think it's legitimate to question the
inclusion of the JOSE use cases as a working group document.

Perhaps a case in point, I'd never actually read the use case document and
thought maybe I should at least take a glance before spouting off any
opinions here. So I went to find the doc in via the links in the original
message in this thread only to find that the use cases link was bad.


On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 1:03 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <
hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi Jim,
>
> I agree with Richard on the serialization documents.
>
> On the use cases I have a mixed view. As we have seen in the OAuth workin=
g
> group with use cases it is easy to get the group to add a new use case
> document but very difficult to get others to find reviewers to get it
> finished. I am not sure what the target audience would be with such a
> document.
>
> Let's assume that the audience for the document is the JOSE group. First,
> the requirements are not really adding a lot to the discussion since they
> are really basic (more or less what can be found in the charter). The use
> cases in Section 4 are out-of-date and are typically better described in
> the referenced documents. One of the four use cases is obsolete by now: t=
he
> ATOCA use case is gone with the decisions from the last IETF meeting sinc=
e
> the group entire group got trashed. ALTO IMHO does not seem to go anywher=
e
> either.
>
> Sorry if I do not get excited anymore about the value of use case (and
> requirements) documents. The main challenges are that
>
> a) you don't want to describe use cases that relate to work where it
> hasn't even been decided to use the specific technology (in this case
> JSON), and
> b) when a use case of interest to the group is found that requires
> additional functionality then a new extension/solution is defined in a
> separate document that typically provides a better description than in th=
e
> use case document itself.
>
> Consequently, the value of separate use case document goes close to zero.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:23 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>
> > I support the adoption of the use cases draft.  Clearer use cases will
> help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.
> >
> > I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents.  A
> JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have already
> made a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially the
> same as the one in the JSON serialization documents.  It would have a sma=
ll
> impact on the base specs, and make the base format much more usable.
> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html
> >
> > --Richard
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:
> > The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this
> (really me).
> >
> >
> >
> > At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following
> documents to become working group documents:
> >
> >
> >
> > Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Obj=
ect
> Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
> >
> >
> >
> > Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Encryption JSON
> Serialization (JWE-JS)
> >
> >
> >
> > Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Signature JSON
> Serialization (JWS-JS)
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt
> these three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta.
>  Thus you only need to reply if you object to these documents being
> adopted.  This call will end 27 February.
> >
> >
> >
> > (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the
> Orlando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)
> >
> >
> >
> > Jim
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

--90e6ba5bba1d5edc5f04d5af2b77
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>For better or worse, I think Hannes&#39; assessment o=
f the value of use case documents is spot on. And as such, I think it&#39;s=
 legitimate to question the inclusion of the JOSE use cases as a working gr=
oup document.<br>

<br></div>Perhaps a case in point, I&#39;d never actually read the use case=
 document and thought maybe I should at least take a glance before spouting=
 off any opinions here. So I went to find the doc in via the links in the o=
riginal message in this thread only to find that the use cases link was bad=
.<br>

<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 1=
4, 2013 at 1:03 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Jim,<br>
<br>
I agree with Richard on the serialization documents.<br>
<br>
On the use cases I have a mixed view. As we have seen in the OAuth working =
group with use cases it is easy to get the group to add a new use case docu=
ment but very difficult to get others to find reviewers to get it finished.=
 I am not sure what the target audience would be with such a document.<br>


<br>
Let&#39;s assume that the audience for the document is the JOSE group. Firs=
t, the requirements are not really adding a lot to the discussion since the=
y are really basic (more or less what can be found in the charter). The use=
 cases in Section 4 are out-of-date and are typically better described in t=
he referenced documents. One of the four use cases is obsolete by now: the =
ATOCA use case is gone with the decisions from the last IETF meeting since =
the group entire group got trashed. ALTO IMHO does not seem to go anywhere =
either.<br>


<br>
Sorry if I do not get excited anymore about the value of use case (and requ=
irements) documents. The main challenges are that<br>
<br>
a) you don&#39;t want to describe use cases that relate to work where it ha=
sn&#39;t even been decided to use the specific technology (in this case JSO=
N), and<br>
b) when a use case of interest to the group is found that requires addition=
al functionality then a new extension/solution is defined in a separate doc=
ument that typically provides a better description than in the use case doc=
ument itself.<br>


<br>
Consequently, the value of separate use case document goes close to zero.<b=
r>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:23 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I support the adoption of the use cases draft. =A0Clearer use cases wi=
ll help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents. =A0=
A JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have already m=
ade a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially the sam=
e as the one in the JSON serialization documents. =A0It would have a small =
impact on the base specs, and make the base format much more usable.<br>


&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.=
html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/m=
sg01465.html</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:<br>
&gt; The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this (re=
ally me).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following do=
cuments to become working group documents:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Ob=
ject Signing and Encryption (JOSE)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Encryption JSON S=
erialization (JWE-JS)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Signature JSON Se=
rialization (JWS-JS)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt t=
hese three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta. =A0T=
hus you only need to reply if you object to these documents being adopted. =
=A0This call will end 27 February.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the Orl=
ando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Jim<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--90e6ba5bba1d5edc5f04d5af2b77--

From ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com  Thu Feb 14 05:50:14 2013
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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Can you extend json-web-signature to bind a list of mixed objects under one signature?
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The design if JWS is that you can do anything you like with the body as =
long as it winds up as a bas64url encoded segment.

I don't think changing the header is the right answer.

The best thing to do is define a "cry" value and then have the index as =
part of the body.

You can make it a zip file or some other structure.

John B.
On 2013-02-13, at 11:42 PM, Steffen Yount <syount@wideorbit.com> wrote:

> Hi Mike,
>=20
> Base64url encoding the binary parts to make them strings in a json =
document first would work.=20
>=20
> The down side to this scheme though is that these binary parts are =
then being doubly base64url encoded to form the JWS token. That means =
all the binary parts take up %178 (4/3 * 4/3) of their original space =
instead of just %133 (4/3) of their original space. =20
>=20
> Extending the definition of "cty" to allow for an array of values =
indicating multiple payload parts and their content-types would be =
better.
>=20
> I could then use the first of these payload parts to supply an index =
into the other parts if required. The JWS header could then look =
something like:
>=20
> {
>  "typ":"JWS",
>  "alg":"RS256",
>  "cty":[
> 	"application/vnd.myindex+json",
>      "JWT",
>      "application/samlassertion+xml",
>      "application/vnd.myauthz-claims+json"]
> }
>=20
> The signed token in this example would then be output with 6 parts: =
HEAD.PLD0IDX.PLD1.PLD2.PLD3.SIG
>=20
>=20
> Is that a design change you would be willing to include in the JWS =
spec?
>=20
>=20
> Thanks,
> -Steffen
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Mike Jones
> Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:29 PM
> To: Steffen Yount; John Bradley; Nat Sakimura; jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [jose] Can you extend json-web-signature to bind a list =
of mixed objects under one signature?
>=20
> Hi Steffen,
>=20
> Rather than putting this in the header, I'd put it in the payload.  =
I'd do that by using a JSON array or object as the payload, with array =
elements for each of the objects that you want to include under the =
signature.  Those that are binary would need to be base64url encoded in =
the JSON object.  You might also want metadata about each member to say =
what it is.
>=20
> I'm imagining a payload something like this:
>=20
> [
> {"type":"number", "value":123},
> {"type":"binary", "value":"A-z_4ME"},
> {"type":"string", "value":"Live long and prosper."} ]
>=20
> The only thing I might do in the header is define a "cty" value to say =
that the content-type is one of these arrays.
>=20
> Hope this is useful...
>=20
> 				-- Mike
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Steffen Yount [mailto:syount@wideorbit.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:19 PM
> To: Mike Jones; John Bradley; Nat Sakimura; jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Can you extend json-web-signature to bind a list of mixed =
objects under one signature?
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> I'm looking for a standard way to bind a list of mixed objects (some =
are json and some are binary) in a token under a single signature.
>=20
> I looked at the draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature to see if JWS could =
work.=20
>=20
> Unfortunately, the draft doesn't provide a standard way to pack a list =
of mixed objects into a JWS token.
>=20
> I could do something like tar these objects together beforehand, but =
building the untar handler for that in JavaScript seems like it'll be a =
pita...
>=20
> My preferred JWS based solution could be to extend the JWS header to =
describe the list of mixed objects, then concatenate their base64url =
encoded outputs together with the dot separator, and the ship this =
concatenation to the signing engine.
>=20
> The header describing this payload could look something like:
>=20
> {
>  "typ":"JWS",
>  "alg":"RS256",
>  "pld":[
>    {"id":"oauth2",
>      "cty":"JWT"},
>    {"id":"saml2",
>      "cty":"application/samlassertion+xml"},
>    {"id":"myauthz-claims",
>      "cty":"application/vnd.myauthz-claims+json"}
>  ]
> }
>=20
> The signed token in this example would be output with 5 parts: =
HEAD.PLD0.PLD1.PLD2.SIG
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Do you agree that multi-object support in JWS is worthwhile?=20
>=20
> Can you outline of a better solution?
>=20
> Will you update JWS to provide a standard way to pack a list of mixed =
objects into a JWS token?
>=20
>=20
> Thanks for your consideration,
> -Steffen
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20


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Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 11:24:53 -0300
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References: <02b601ce0a17$db6c3370$92449a50$@augustcellars.com> <CAL02cgSFe=Sphj9PL-GF56-F_G_1JtpZ2OzMW3JiFgzRCUkxTA@mail.gmail.com> <EADF8FEF-7C0F-4C7A-8336-23AC2782B975@gmx.net> <CA+k3eCTqWncm1=wt_p36NdsdfzHWx-cj3MQNfiuiKKGe9JvUag@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] Call for adoption
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To be fair the reason the use-cased are hard to find is that they are =
not WG documents.

If we adopt the documents at least we can find them.   I think the use =
cases can hep us get on the sam page in the group something we haves had =
a challenge with on occasion

So I agree with Richard that draft-barnes-jose-use-cases (link included =
for Brian) become a WG item.

Not to suck up to Richard too much:)

I also agree with Mike that the two other documents =
Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization and =
Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization become WG items, and fight it =
out later on the question of merging them with the base specs which may =
be a good idea.

I don't agree with Hannes just because:)

John B.



On 2013-02-14, at 10:23 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> For better or worse, I think Hannes' assessment of the value of use =
case documents is spot on. And as such, I think it's legitimate to =
question the inclusion of the JOSE use cases as a working group =
document.
>=20
> Perhaps a case in point, I'd never actually read the use case document =
and thought maybe I should at least take a glance before spouting off =
any opinions here. So I went to find the doc in via the links in the =
original message in this thread only to find that the use cases link was =
bad.
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 1:03 AM, Hannes Tschofenig =
<hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
> Hi Jim,
>=20
> I agree with Richard on the serialization documents.
>=20
> On the use cases I have a mixed view. As we have seen in the OAuth =
working group with use cases it is easy to get the group to add a new =
use case document but very difficult to get others to find reviewers to =
get it finished. I am not sure what the target audience would be with =
such a document.
>=20
> Let's assume that the audience for the document is the JOSE group. =
First, the requirements are not really adding a lot to the discussion =
since they are really basic (more or less what can be found in the =
charter). The use cases in Section 4 are out-of-date and are typically =
better described in the referenced documents. One of the four use cases =
is obsolete by now: the ATOCA use case is gone with the decisions from =
the last IETF meeting since the group entire group got trashed. ALTO =
IMHO does not seem to go anywhere either.
>=20
> Sorry if I do not get excited anymore about the value of use case (and =
requirements) documents. The main challenges are that
>=20
> a) you don't want to describe use cases that relate to work where it =
hasn't even been decided to use the specific technology (in this case =
JSON), and
> b) when a use case of interest to the group is found that requires =
additional functionality then a new extension/solution is defined in a =
separate document that typically provides a better description than in =
the use case document itself.
>=20
> Consequently, the value of separate use case document goes close to =
zero.
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
>=20
> On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:23 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>=20
> > I support the adoption of the use cases draft.  Clearer use cases =
will help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.
> >
> > I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents.  =
A JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have =
already made a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is =
essentially the same as the one in the JSON serialization documents.  It =
would have a small impact on the base specs, and make the base format =
much more usable.
> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html
> >
> > --Richard
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:
> > The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this =
(really me).
> >
> >
> >
> > At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following =
documents to become working group documents:
> >
> >
> >
> > Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON =
Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
> >
> >
> >
> > Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Encryption JSON =
Serialization (JWE-JS)
> >
> >
> >
> > Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Signature JSON =
Serialization (JWS-JS)
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt =
these three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta.  =
Thus you only need to reply if you object to these documents being =
adopted.  This call will end 27 February.
> >
> >
> >
> > (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the =
Orlando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that =
meeting.)
> >
> >
> >
> > Jim
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">To be =
fair the reason the use-cased are hard to find is that they are not WG =
documents.<div><br></div><div>If we adopt the documents at least we can =
find them. &nbsp; I think the use cases can hep us get on the sam page =
in the group something we haves had a challenge with on =
occasion</div><div><br></div><div>So I agree with Richard that&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases/">draf=
t-barnes-jose-use-cases</a>&nbsp;(link included for Brian) become a WG =
item.</div><div><br></div><div>Not to suck up to Richard too =
much:)</div><div><br></div><div>I also agree with Mike that the two =
other documents&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serializ=
ation/" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; =
color: purple; =
">Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serializ=
ation/" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; =
color: purple; ">Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization</a>&nbsp;become =
WG items, and fight it out later on the question of merging them with =
the base specs which may be a good idea.</div><div><br></div><div>I =
don't agree with Hannes just because:)</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-14, at =
10:23 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>For better or worse, I think Hannes' =
assessment of the value of use case documents is spot on. And as such, I =
think it's legitimate to question the inclusion of the JOSE use cases as =
a working group document.<br>

<br></div>Perhaps a case in point, I'd never actually read the use case =
document and thought maybe I should at least take a glance before =
spouting off any opinions here. So I went to find the doc in via the =
links in the original message in this thread only to find that the use =
cases link was bad.<br>

<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, =
Feb 14, 2013 at 1:03 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" =
target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Jim,<br>
<br>
I agree with Richard on the serialization documents.<br>
<br>
On the use cases I have a mixed view. As we have seen in the OAuth =
working group with use cases it is easy to get the group to add a new =
use case document but very difficult to get others to find reviewers to =
get it finished. I am not sure what the target audience would be with =
such a document.<br>


<br>
Let's assume that the audience for the document is the JOSE group. =
First, the requirements are not really adding a lot to the discussion =
since they are really basic (more or less what can be found in the =
charter). The use cases in Section 4 are out-of-date and are typically =
better described in the referenced documents. One of the four use cases =
is obsolete by now: the ATOCA use case is gone with the decisions from =
the last IETF meeting since the group entire group got trashed. ALTO =
IMHO does not seem to go anywhere either.<br>


<br>
Sorry if I do not get excited anymore about the value of use case (and =
requirements) documents. The main challenges are that<br>
<br>
a) you don't want to describe use cases that relate to work where it =
hasn't even been decided to use the specific technology (in this case =
JSON), and<br>
b) when a use case of interest to the group is found that requires =
additional functionality then a new extension/solution is defined in a =
separate document that typically provides a better description than in =
the use case document itself.<br>


<br>
Consequently, the value of separate use case document goes close to =
zero.<br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:23 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I support the adoption of the use cases draft. &nbsp;Clearer use =
cases will help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating =
around.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents. =
&nbsp;A JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have =
already made a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is =
essentially the same as the one in the JSON serialization documents. =
&nbsp;It would have a small impact on the base specs, and make the base =
format much more usable.<br>


&gt; <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg014=
65.html</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:<br>
&gt; The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this =
(really me).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following =
documents to become working group documents:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON =
Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Encryption =
JSON Serialization (JWE-JS)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Signature JSON =
Serialization (JWS-JS)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to =
adopt these three documents as that was the overwhelming response in =
Atlanta. &nbsp;Thus you only need to reply if you object to these =
documents being adopted. &nbsp;This call will end 27 February.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the =
Orlando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that =
meeting.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Jim<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/jose<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></body></html>=

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References: <02b601ce0a17$db6c3370$92449a50$@augustcellars.com> <CAL02cgSFe=Sphj9PL-GF56-F_G_1JtpZ2OzMW3JiFgzRCUkxTA@mail.gmail.com> <EADF8FEF-7C0F-4C7A-8336-23AC2782B975@gmx.net> <CA+k3eCTqWncm1=wt_p36NdsdfzHWx-cj3MQNfiuiKKGe9JvUag@mail.gmail.com> <427CDD8C-BAD1-4D33-B2F7-BF0B983C73DB@ve7jtb.com>
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 08:51:49 -0700
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Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
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Contrary to what you might believe John, I am actually capable of finding
the document myself. In fact, it's right there on the WG page so not
exactly hard to find. I wasn't asking for help tracking it down but rather
trying to show by example how, despite best intentions, the use case docs
tend to get second class treatment.

I should have learned by now that subtlety is lost on Bradley though ;)

We're all busy people and time is a real scarcity.  A use case document is
great in theory but rarely gets the attention it needs to be truly useful.










On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 7:24 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> To be fair the reason the use-cased are hard to find is that they are not
> WG documents.
>
> If we adopt the documents at least we can find them.   I think the use
> cases can hep us get on the sam page in the group something we haves had =
a
> challenge with on occasion
>
> So I agree with Richard that draft-barnes-jose-use-cases<http://datatrack=
er.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases/> (link
> included for Brian) become a WG item.
>
> Not to suck up to Richard too much:)
>
> I also agree with Mike that the two other documents
> Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization/>
>  and Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization<http://datatracker.ietf.org/=
doc/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization/> become
> WG items, and fight it out later on the question of merging them with the
> base specs which may be a good idea.
>
> I don't agree with Hannes just because:)
>
> John B.
>
>
>
> On 2013-02-14, at 10:23 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
>
> For better or worse, I think Hannes' assessment of the value of use case
> documents is spot on. And as such, I think it's legitimate to question th=
e
> inclusion of the JOSE use cases as a working group document.
>
> Perhaps a case in point, I'd never actually read the use case document an=
d
> thought maybe I should at least take a glance before spouting off any
> opinions here. So I went to find the doc in via the links in the original
> message in this thread only to find that the use cases link was bad.
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 1:03 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <
> hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
>
>> Hi Jim,
>>
>> I agree with Richard on the serialization documents.
>>
>> On the use cases I have a mixed view. As we have seen in the OAuth
>> working group with use cases it is easy to get the group to add a new us=
e
>> case document but very difficult to get others to find reviewers to get =
it
>> finished. I am not sure what the target audience would be with such a
>> document.
>>
>> Let's assume that the audience for the document is the JOSE group. First=
,
>> the requirements are not really adding a lot to the discussion since the=
y
>> are really basic (more or less what can be found in the charter). The us=
e
>> cases in Section 4 are out-of-date and are typically better described in
>> the referenced documents. One of the four use cases is obsolete by now: =
the
>> ATOCA use case is gone with the decisions from the last IETF meeting sin=
ce
>> the group entire group got trashed. ALTO IMHO does not seem to go anywhe=
re
>> either.
>>
>> Sorry if I do not get excited anymore about the value of use case (and
>> requirements) documents. The main challenges are that
>>
>> a) you don't want to describe use cases that relate to work where it
>> hasn't even been decided to use the specific technology (in this case
>> JSON), and
>> b) when a use case of interest to the group is found that requires
>> additional functionality then a new extension/solution is defined in a
>> separate document that typically provides a better description than in t=
he
>> use case document itself.
>>
>> Consequently, the value of separate use case document goes close to zero=
.
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>
>> On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:23 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>>
>> > I support the adoption of the use cases draft.  Clearer use cases will
>> help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.
>> >
>> > I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents.  A
>> JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have already
>> made a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially the
>> same as the one in the JSON serialization documents.  It would have a sm=
all
>> impact on the base specs, and make the base format much more usable.
>> > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.html
>> >
>> > --Richard
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:
>> > The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this
>> (really me).
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following
>> documents to become working group documents:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON
>> Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Encryption JSON
>> Serialization (JWE-JS)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Signature JSON
>> Serialization (JWS-JS)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt
>> these three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta.
>>  Thus you only need to reply if you object to these documents being
>> adopted.  This call will end 27 February.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the
>> Orlando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.=
)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Jim
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > jose mailing list
>> > jose@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--e89a8f2346bb6e963304d5b13ed0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Contrary to what you might believe John, I am ac=
tually capable of finding the document myself. In fact, it&#39;s right ther=
e on the WG page so not exactly hard to find. I wasn&#39;t asking for help =
tracking it down but rather trying to show by example how, despite best int=
entions, the use case docs tend to get second class treatment. <br>

<br></div>I should have learned by now that subtlety is lost on Bradley tho=
ugh ;)<br><br></div>We&#39;re all busy people and time is a real scarcity.=
=A0 A use case document is great in theory but rarely gets the attention it=
 needs to be truly useful.<br>

<div><br><br><br><br><br>=A0 <br><div><br><br>
</div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote">On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 7:24 AM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&=
gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">To be fa=
ir the reason the use-cased are hard to find is that they are not WG docume=
nts.<div>

<br></div><div>If we adopt the documents at least we can find them. =A0 I t=
hink the use cases can hep us get on the sam page in the group something we=
 haves had a challenge with on occasion</div><div><br></div><div>So I agree=
 with Richard that=A0<a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barne=
s-jose-use-cases/" target=3D"_blank">draft-barnes-jose-use-cases</a>=A0(lin=
k included for Brian) become a WG item.</div>

<div><br></div><div>Not to suck up to Richard too much:)</div><div><br></di=
v><div>I also agree with Mike that the two other documents=A0<a href=3D"htt=
p://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization/" styl=
e=3D"font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:11pt;color:purple" target=3D"=
_blank">Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization</a>=A0and=A0<a href=3D"http=
://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization/" style=
=3D"font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:11pt;color:purple" target=3D"_=
blank">Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization</a>=A0become WG items, and f=
ight it out later on the question of merging them with the base specs which=
 may be a good idea.</div>

<div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t agree with Hannes just because:)</div><div>=
<br></div><div>John B.</div><div><div class=3D"h5"><div><br><div><br></div>=
<div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-14, at 10:23 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingiden=
tity.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>

<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>For better or worse, I =
think Hannes&#39; assessment of the value of use case documents is spot on.=
 And as such, I think it&#39;s legitimate to question the inclusion of the =
JOSE use cases as a working group document.<br>



<br></div>Perhaps a case in point, I&#39;d never actually read the use case=
 document and thought maybe I should at least take a glance before spouting=
 off any opinions here. So I went to find the doc in via the links in the o=
riginal message in this thread only to find that the use cases link was bad=
.<br>



<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 1=
4, 2013 at 1:03 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net" target=3D"_blank">hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>



<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Jim,<br>
<br>
I agree with Richard on the serialization documents.<br>
<br>
On the use cases I have a mixed view. As we have seen in the OAuth working =
group with use cases it is easy to get the group to add a new use case docu=
ment but very difficult to get others to find reviewers to get it finished.=
 I am not sure what the target audience would be with such a document.<br>




<br>
Let&#39;s assume that the audience for the document is the JOSE group. Firs=
t, the requirements are not really adding a lot to the discussion since the=
y are really basic (more or less what can be found in the charter). The use=
 cases in Section 4 are out-of-date and are typically better described in t=
he referenced documents. One of the four use cases is obsolete by now: the =
ATOCA use case is gone with the decisions from the last IETF meeting since =
the group entire group got trashed. ALTO IMHO does not seem to go anywhere =
either.<br>




<br>
Sorry if I do not get excited anymore about the value of use case (and requ=
irements) documents. The main challenges are that<br>
<br>
a) you don&#39;t want to describe use cases that relate to work where it ha=
sn&#39;t even been decided to use the specific technology (in this case JSO=
N), and<br>
b) when a use case of interest to the group is found that requires addition=
al functionality then a new extension/solution is defined in a separate doc=
ument that typically provides a better description than in the use case doc=
ument itself.<br>




<br>
Consequently, the value of separate use case document goes close to zero.<b=
r>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<div><div><br>
<br>
On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:23 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I support the adoption of the use cases draft. =A0Clearer use cases wi=
ll help this group refine a lot of the ideas that are floating around.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I do not support the adoption of the JSON serialization documents. =A0=
A JSON serialization should be part of the base documents. I have already m=
ade a proposal to the list for how to do this, which is essentially the sam=
e as the one in the JSON serialization documents. =A0It would have a small =
impact on the base specs, and make the base format much more usable.<br>




&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01465.=
html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/m=
sg01465.html</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Wednesday, February 13, 2013, Jim Schaad wrote:<br>
&gt; The chairs of the JOSE working group have dropped the ball on this (re=
ally me).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At the last face-to-face meeting there was a call for the following do=
cuments to become working group documents:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-barnes-jose-use-cases =96 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Ob=
ject Signing and Encryption (JOSE)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Encryption JSON S=
erialization (JWE-JS)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization =96 JSON Web Signature JSON Se=
rialization (JWS-JS)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The chairs are going to assume that the working group wants to adopt t=
hese three documents as that was the overwhelming response in Atlanta. =A0T=
hus you only need to reply if you object to these documents being adopted. =
=A0This call will end 27 February.<br>




&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (Note that we will be looking at the private key drafts during the Orl=
ando meeting and issuing an adoption call shortly after that meeting.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Jim<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
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Matt,

 

Here are some comments to be considered.

 

1.        There is the possibility of confusion in the first sentence of the
introduction about the transport of symmetric keys.  One place where one
transports symmetric keys but not in this method is in JWE itself.  I think
that it would make more sense to talk about transporting private key
information and define that as including both the private portion of an
asymmetric key as well as a binary value that can be used either as a
symmetric key or a MAC key.  This draft would be used when that is the
primary aim of what is happening, but the necessary security properties
might not be provided by the methods of transport used. 

2.       Make the paragraph on defining a password based algorithm separate
and lengthen it a bit to justify why it is being done.

3.       JSON is not a well-known TLA - it needs to be expanded on first use
(including in the title).

4.       I don't understand the end of the sentence in section 3.2, para 2.
What input limits are we talking about here?

5.       I would suggest adding an optional "hint" parameter to PBKDF2 which
can contain a hint for the user about what the password is.

6.       Suggested/mandated seed and iteration lengths should be in section
6.1.1 and 6.1.2 respectively and not in the security considerations (if you
want you can duplicate).  These should be where people are going to see them
and remember them and not in a section that they might or might not read.

7.       You should have text in the section to state the registry that you
are asking IANA to register things into.

8.       What steps should I as a programmer take to enforce the protocol
requirements in section 8.1?

9.       Section 8.2 - That is nice, why is it a security consideration?
What actions should I be taking as a programmer to deal with this?

10.   Section 8.3 - I can understand why there is a recommendation of being
bigger than the derived key length, but you should have some justification
pointer for being smaller than the PRF block size.  What is the effect of
this being ideal vs RECOMMENDED?

 

 

Jim

 


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style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span><![endif]>&nbsp;There is the possibility of confusion in =
the first sentence of the introduction about the transport of symmetric =
keys.&nbsp; One place where one transports symmetric keys but not in =
this method is in JWE itself. &nbsp;I think that it would make more =
sense to talk about transporting private key information and define that =
as including both the private portion of an asymmetric key as well as a =
binary value that can be used either as a symmetric key or a MAC key. =
&nbsp;This draft would be used when that is the <b>primary aim</b> of =
what is happening, but the necessary security properties might not be =
provided by the methods of transport used. <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
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style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span><![endif]>Make the paragraph on defining a password based =
algorithm separate and lengthen it a bit to justify why it is being =
done.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.<span =
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span><![endif]>JSON is not a well-known TLA &#8211; it needs to =
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2.&nbsp; What input limits are we talking about here?<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>5.<span =
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span><![endif]>I =
would suggest adding an optional &#8220;hint&#8221; parameter to PBKDF2 =
which can contain a hint for the user about what the password =
is.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>6.<span =
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span><![endif]>Suggested/mandated seed and iteration lengths =
should be in section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 respectively and not in the =
security considerations (if you want you can duplicate).&nbsp; These =
should be where people are going to see them and remember them and not =
in a section that they might or might not read.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>7.<span =
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span><![endif]>You =
should have text in the section to state the registry that you are =
asking IANA to register things into.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>8.<span =
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span><![endif]>What steps should I as a programmer take to =
enforce the protocol requirements in section 8.1?<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>9.<span =
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span><![endif]>Section 8.2 &#8211; That is nice, why is it a =
security consideration?&nbsp; What actions should I be taking as a =
programmer to deal with this?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>10.<span =
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span><![endif]>Section 8.3 &#8211; I can understand why there =
is a recommendation of being bigger than the derived key length, but you =
should have some justification pointer for being smaller than the PRF =
block size. &nbsp;What is the effect of this being ideal vs =
RECOMMENDED?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'margin-left:0in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'margin-left:0in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'margin-left:0in'>Jim<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'margin-left:0in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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Subject: Re: [jose] JWK-specific key fingerprints?
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Citation for Canonical JSON:
<http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON>

I have implemented this in python.  It is surprisingly easy [1].
 Canonicalization has been anathema to this group, but I suspect largely
because people have been bitten by XML canonicalization, rather than
because JSON canonicalization has been tried and found difficult.

If we're going to go down this path, I would prefer Canonical JSON to
bencode, if only because bencode is an entirely different format to
implement.

Personally, given how easy canonicalization is to implement (it actually
requires fewer lines in my experience than base64!), it seems like a
sensible choice in general.  In particular, for the JSON serialization, it
would save some unnecessary base64 encoding that is currently required.  I
would be glad to contr

--Richard

[1] My own canonicalization, not sure if it matches the one linked above <
http://pastebin.com/ptUfn0c3>



On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 3:01 PM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 2:53 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> On 12 February 2013 10:56, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > ... canonical json ....
>>
>> Isn't mention of canonical JSON a swear-jar offense?  Something needs
>> canonicalization, but JSON seems a poor candidate.
>>
>
> There is something called Canonical JSON. They take out all the
> whitespace, sort keys lexicographically, and only quote the " inside
> strings. It is used in the wild by the OLPC project I think.
>
> bencode is an easier to implement protocol that is used in bittorrent and
> yields a tiny write-only implementation if all you want to do is get unique
> hashes for the subset of JSON used by JWK.
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Citation for Canonical JSON:<div>&lt;<a href=3D"http://wik=
i.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON">http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON</a=
>&gt;</div><div><br></div><div style>I have implemented this in python. =A0=
It is surprisingly easy [1]. =A0Canonicalization has been anathema to this =
group, but I suspect largely because people have been bitten by XML canonic=
alization, rather than because JSON canonicalization has been tried and fou=
nd difficult.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>If we&#39;re going to go down this path, I =
would prefer Canonical JSON to bencode, if only because bencode is an entir=
ely different format to implement.</div><div style><br></div><div style>
Personally, given how easy canonicalization is to implement (it actually re=
quires fewer lines in my experience than base64!), it seems like a sensible=
 choice in general. =A0In particular, for the JSON serialization, it would =
save some unnecessary base64 encoding that is currently required. =A0I woul=
d be glad to contr</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>--Richard</div><div style><br></div><div st=
yle>[1] My own canonicalization, not sure if it matches the one linked abov=
e &lt;<a href=3D"http://pastebin.com/ptUfn0c3">http://pastebin.com/ptUfn0c3=
</a>&gt;</div>
<div style><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 3:01 PM, Daniel Holth <span dir=3D"lt=
r">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dholth@gmail.c=
om</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"im"><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 2:53 P=
M, Martin Thomson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martin.thomson@gm=
ail.com" target=3D"_blank">martin.thomson@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
r>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 12 February 2013 10:56, Daniel Holth &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dholth@gmail.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br>

&gt; ... canonical json ....<br>
<br>
Isn&#39;t mention of canonical JSON a swear-jar offense? =A0Something needs=
<br>
canonicalization, but JSON seems a poor candidate.<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">There is some=
thing called Canonical JSON. They take out all the whitespace, sort keys le=
xicographically, and only quote the &quot; inside strings. It is used in th=
e wild by the OLPC project I think.<br>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">bencode is an easier to implement prot=
ocol that is used in bittorrent and yields a tiny write-only implementation=
 if all you want to do is get unique hashes for the subset of JSON used by =
JWK.<br>

</div></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--e89a8ff1ce46c0cadc04d60360c2--

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From: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, jose <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] JWK-specific key fingerprints?
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--047d7b450e0aaa26eb04d6044500
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 12:51 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Citation for Canonical JSON:
> <http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON>
>
> I have implemented this in python.  It is surprisingly easy [1].
>  Canonicalization has been anathema to this group, but I suspect largely
> because people have been bitten by XML canonicalization, rather than
> because JSON canonicalization has been tried and found difficult.
>
> If we're going to go down this path, I would prefer Canonical JSON to
> bencode, if only because bencode is an entirely different format to
> implement.
>
> Personally, given how easy canonicalization is to implement (it actually
> requires fewer lines in my experience than base64!), it seems like a
> sensible choice in general.  In particular, for the JSON serialization, it
> would save some unnecessary base64 encoding that is currently required.  I
> would be glad to contr
>
> --Richard
>
> [1] My own canonicalization, not sure if it matches the one linked above <
> http://pastebin.com/ptUfn0c3>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 3:01 PM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 2:53 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> On 12 February 2013 10:56, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> > ... canonical json ....
>>>
>>> Isn't mention of canonical JSON a swear-jar offense?  Something needs
>>> canonicalization, but JSON seems a poor candidate.
>>>
>>
>> There is something called Canonical JSON. They take out all the
>> whitespace, sort keys lexicographically, and only quote the " inside
>> strings. It is used in the wild by the OLPC project I think.
>>
>> bencode is an easier to implement protocol that is used in bittorrent and
>> yields a tiny write-only implementation if all you want to do is get unique
>> hashes for the subset of JSON used by JWK.
>>
>
Especially if you are not worried about the CJSON corner cases (which go
away when your data is all printable ASCII) it is stupidly simple. The rest
of the spec would be to exclude the members of the JWK that are not used by
the crypto math (need a better way to say this) and to give it a name like
"hash kid" -> "hkid".

--047d7b450e0aaa26eb04d6044500
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 12:51 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr">Citation for Canonical JSON:<div>&lt;<a href=3D"http://wik=
i.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.laptop.org/go=
/Canonical_JSON</a>&gt;</div><div><br></div><div>I have implemented this in=
 python. =A0It is surprisingly easy [1]. =A0Canonicalization has been anath=
ema to this group, but I suspect largely because people have been bitten by=
 XML canonicalization, rather than because JSON canonicalization has been t=
ried and found difficult.</div>

<div><br></div><div>If we&#39;re going to go down this path, I would prefer=
 Canonical JSON to bencode, if only because bencode is an entirely differen=
t format to implement.</div><div><br></div><div>
Personally, given how easy canonicalization is to implement (it actually re=
quires fewer lines in my experience than base64!), it seems like a sensible=
 choice in general. =A0In particular, for the JSON serialization, it would =
save some unnecessary base64 encoding that is currently required. =A0I woul=
d be glad to contr</div>

<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div>[1] My own canonical=
ization, not sure if it matches the one linked above &lt;<a href=3D"http://=
pastebin.com/ptUfn0c3" target=3D"_blank">http://pastebin.com/ptUfn0c3</a>&g=
t;</div>

<div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote"><div><div class=3D"h5">On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 3:01 PM, Daniel Holt=
h <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">dholth@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Feb 12, 2013 at 2:53 PM, Martin Thomson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">martin.thomson@gmail.com<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 12 February 2013 10:56, Daniel Holth &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dholth@gmail.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br>


&gt; ... canonical json ....<br>
<br>
Isn&#39;t mention of canonical JSON a swear-jar offense? =A0Something needs=
<br>
canonicalization, but JSON seems a poor candidate.<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">There is some=
thing called Canonical JSON. They take out all the whitespace, sort keys le=
xicographically, and only quote the &quot; inside strings. It is used in th=
e wild by the OLPC project I think.<br>


<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">bencode is an easier to implement prot=
ocol that is used in bittorrent and yields a tiny write-only implementation=
 if all you want to do is get unique hashes for the subset of JSON used by =
JWK.<br>


</div></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra" style>Especially if you are not worried about the CJSON c=
orner cases (which go away when your data is all printable ASCII) it is stu=
pidly simple. The rest of the spec would be to exclude the members of the J=
WK that are not used by the crypto math (need a better way to say this) and=
 to give it a name like &quot;hash kid&quot; -&gt; &quot;hkid&quot;.</div>
</div>

--047d7b450e0aaa26eb04d6044500--

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From: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:

> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote (
> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can=92t handle floating point
> numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if a string
> includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars [\u0000-\u001f]; use
> normalized scientific notation for numbers) and it might be worth
> considering.****
>
> ** **
>
> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the first o=
f
> which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It can then be
> packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to be
> HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>

I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not employ
DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point numbers.

--f46d0434bea693b23204d61434dc
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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com" target=3D"_=
blank">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-A=
U" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;color:#1f497d">A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one =
you quote (<a href=3D"http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON" target=3D"_=
blank">http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON</a>) can=92t handle floatin=
g point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if a st=
ring includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars [\u0000-\u001f]; use=
 normalized scientific notation for numbers) and it might be worth consider=
ing.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Defining JOSE calculat=
ions in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the first of which is a UTF-8-encod=
ed JSON header, would be useful. It can then be packaged as dot-separated b=
ase64url-encoded segments to be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a sing=
le JSON object to be programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be ef=
ficient.</span></p>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>I am only proposing a ke=
y fingerprinting specification that does not employ DER encoding. JWKs do n=
ot contain tabs or floating point numbers.</div></div></div></div>

--f46d0434bea693b23204d61434dc--

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Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?

INPUT: JWK
1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with {"kty",
"n", "e"}
2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form
3. Compute digest over canonical form

That seems generally agreeable to me.

For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are covered
in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or, alternatively, you
could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are grouped into a "meta"
sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.

For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization than
CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes from RFC
4627:
-- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
-- No white space allowed
-- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
-- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
-- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
-- Strings: All characters must be escaped
ISTM that those changes are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON
problems that have been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree
over the string aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things
like exempt printable ASCII.




On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>
>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote (
>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can=92t handle floating point
>> numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if a string
>> includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars [\u0000-\u001f]; use
>> normalized scientific notation for numbers) and it might be worth
>> considering.****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the first
>> of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It can then be
>> packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to be
>> HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>
>
> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not
> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point numbers.
>

--bcaec54b4aa2fe91aa04d61516c4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the =
following?<div><br></div><div style>INPUT: JWK</div><div style>1. Remove &q=
uot;metadata&quot; fields. =A0So, for RSA, you would be left with {&quot;kt=
y&quot;, &quot;n&quot;, &quot;e&quot;}</div>
<div style>2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form</div><div style>3. Com=
pute digest over canonical form</div><div style><br></div><div style>That s=
eems generally agreeable to me. =A0</div><div style><br></div><div style>
For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are covered i=
n the fingerprint for each key type (&quot;kty&quot; value). =A0Or, alterna=
tively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are grouped into =
a &quot;meta&quot; sub-dict. =A0Which might be nice anyway.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>For (2), I agree that there is probably a b=
etter canonicalization than CJSON. =A0The code I pasted earlier implements =
the following changes from RFC 4627:</div><div style><div>-- Object fields =
must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name</div>
<div>-- No white space allowed</div><div>-- Numbers: Exponent part must use=
 &#39;e&#39;</div><div>-- Numbers: Exponent part must not use &#39;+&#39;</=
div><div>-- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros</div><div>
-- Strings: All characters must be escaped</div><div style>ISTM that those =
changes are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have =
been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string aspect=
; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt printable ASC=
II.</div>
<div><br></div></div><div style><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel =
Holth <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com" target=3D"_=
blank">dholth@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"im">On Tue, F=
eb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com" target=3D"_blank">James.H.Manger@team=
.telstra.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"im"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
><div lang=3D"EN-AU" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;=
sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">A canonical form of JSON might be fairly ea=
sy, but the one you quote (<a href=3D"http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_J=
SON" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON</a>) can=92=
t handle floating point numbers (or very large integers), and produces inva=
lid JSON if a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars [\u0=
000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers) and it might b=
e worth considering.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Defining JOSE calculat=
ions in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the first of which is a UTF-8-encod=
ed JSON header, would be useful. It can then be packaged as dot-separated b=
ase64url-encoded segments to be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a sing=
le JSON object to be programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be ef=
ficient.</span></p>

</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>I am only proposing a ke=
y fingerprinting specification that does not employ DER encoding. JWKs do n=
ot contain tabs or floating point numbers.</div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--bcaec54b4aa2fe91aa04d61516c4--

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Comments on draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-00
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Thanks very much for the comments, Jim.


On Feb 15, 2013, at 6:14 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> Matt,
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Here are some comments to be considered.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> 1.        There is the possibility of confusion in the first sentence of =
the
> introduction about the transport of symmetric keys.  One place where one
> transports symmetric keys but not in this method is in JWE itself.  I thi=
nk
> that it would make more sense to talk about transporting private key
> information and define that as including both the private portion of an
> asymmetric key as well as a binary value that can be used either as a
> symmetric key or a MAC key.  This draft would be used when that is the
> primary aim of what is happening, but the necessary security properties
> might not be provided by the methods of transport used.=20
>=20

Will change for next revision.  Also, should I change "symmetric key" to "s=
hared secret" in said definition?

> 2.       Make the paragraph on defining a password based algorithm separa=
te
> and lengthen it a bit to justify why it is being done.
>=20

Will add in next revision.

> 3.       JSON is not a well-known TLA - it needs to be expanded on first =
use
> (including in the title).
>=20

I guess I didn't think it necessary since I've seen a number of drafts rece=
ntly omit it; the next revision will include JSON expanded.

> 4.       I don't understand the end of the sentence in section 3.2, para =
2.
> What input limits are we talking about here?
>=20

Here, "inputs limits" means "plaintext length limit".  Will rephrase in nex=
t revision.


> 5.       I would suggest adding an optional "hint" parameter to PBKDF2 wh=
ich
> can contain a hint for the user about what the password is.
>=20
> 6.       Suggested/mandated seed and iteration lengths should be in secti=
on
> 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 respectively and not in the security considerations (if y=
ou
> want you can duplicate).  These should be where people are going to see t=
hem
> and remember them and not in a section that they might or might not read.
>=20

I went back and forth on that myself.  I'll move to 6.1.x in next revision.

> 7.       You should have text in the section to state the registry that y=
ou
> are asking IANA to register things into.
>=20

Will add in next revision.

> 8.       What steps should I as a programmer take to enforce the protocol
> requirements in section 8.1?
>=20

Good point; this isn't realistically enforceable as written.  I'll try to c=
ome up with some alternative text.


> 9.       Section 8.2 - That is nice, why is it a security consideration?
> What actions should I be taking as a programmer to deal with this?
>=20

This seemed similar to a concern in XMPP-E2E about offline messages, and so=
 seemed appropriate to add here also.  I will try to come up with some sugg=
ested actions one might take. Alternatively, I can remove it if there's con=
sensus this is not a worthwhile concern.

> 10.   Section 8.3 - I can understand why there is a recommendation of bei=
ng
> bigger than the derived key length, but you should have some justificatio=
n
> pointer for being smaller than the PRF block size.  What is the effect of
> this being ideal vs RECOMMENDED?
>=20

There is text in RFC 2898 that I can incorporate here.  I can also change t=
o the more normative RECOMMENDED.


Thanks again,


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.


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Subject: [jose] IPR Disclosure: Certicom Corporation's Statement about IPR related to	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-08
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Dear Michael Jones:

 An IPR disclosure that pertains to your Internet-Draft entitled "JSON Web
Algorithms (JWA)" (draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms) was submitted to the
IETF Secretariat on 2013-02-19 and has been posted on the "IETF Page of
Intellectual Property Rights Disclosures"
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1962/). The title of the IPR disclosure is
"Certicom Corporation's Statement about IPR related to draft-ietf-jose-json=
-web-
algorithms-08."");

The IETF Secretariat


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Subject: [jose] IPR Disclosure: Certicom Corporation's Statement about IPR related to	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08
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Dear Nat Sakimura, Michael Jones, John Bradley:

 An IPR disclosure that pertains to your Internet-Draft entitled "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)" (draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature) was submitted to the =
IETF
Secretariat on 2013-02-19 and has been posted on the "IETF Page of Intellec=
tual
Property Rights Disclosures" (https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1963/). The =
title
of the IPR disclosure is "Certicom Corporation's Statement about IPR relate=
d to
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08."");

The IETF Secretariat


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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: [jose] canonical JSON
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Cc: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, jose <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but I =
can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.

I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less thril=
led limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.  I can=
 see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I think that=
 would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.

By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems like=
 a good thing to bring up there.


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1

On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
>=20
> INPUT: JWK
> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with {"kty",
> "n", "e"}
> 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form
> 3. Compute digest over canonical form
>=20
> That seems generally agreeable to me.
>=20
> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are covered
> in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or, alternatively, y=
ou
> could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are grouped into a "meta"
> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
>=20
> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization than
> CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes from R=
FC
> 4627:
> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
> -- No white space allowed
> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped
> ISTM that those changes are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON
> problems that have been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree
> over the string aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things
> like exempt printable ASCII.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote (
>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can=92t handle floating point
>>> numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if a string
>>> includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars [\u0000-\u001f]; use
>>> normalized scientific notation for numbers) and it might be worth
>>> considering.****
>>>=20
>>> ** **
>>>=20
>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the first
>>> of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It can then b=
e
>>> packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to be
>>> HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
>>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>>=20
>>=20
>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not
>> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point numbers.
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Thread-Topic: [jose] canonical JSON
Thread-Index: AQHODm6A6D/j5gtDMEa/+fG4zzAaRJiBNOgAgAARsYCAAF3PgIAAA2Pg
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 20:48:01 +0000
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Cc: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, jose <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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[Repeating this on the correct thread...]

I'm strongly against canonicalization.  The XML canonicalization experience=
 was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other aspect of XM=
L DSIG, XML ENC, etc.  Let's not repeat the mistakes of our elders. ;-)

I also haven't seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that can'=
t be more easily solved another way.

				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mat=
t Miller (mamille2)
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 12:35 PM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON

I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but I =
can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.

I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less thril=
led limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.  I can=
 see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I think that=
 would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.

By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems like=
 a good thing to bring up there.


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1

On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
>=20
> INPUT: JWK
> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with=20
> {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3. Compute=20
> digest over canonical form
>=20
> That seems generally agreeable to me.
>=20
> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are=20
> covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,=20
> alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are grou=
ped into a "meta"
> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
>=20
> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization than=20
> CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes=20
> from RFC
> 4627:
> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
> -- No white space allowed
> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes are=20
> fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have been=20
> discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string=20
> aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt=20
> printable ASCII.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <=20
>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote=20
>>> (
>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating=20
>>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if=20
>>> a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars=20
>>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers) and=20
>>> it might be worth
>>> considering.****
>>>=20
>>> ** **
>>>=20
>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the=20
>>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It=20
>>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to=20
>>> be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be=20
>>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>>=20
>>=20
>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not=20
>> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point numbers.
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

_______________________________________________
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Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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My instinct, as the author of a reasonably popular library that generates
canonical XML, is that JSON ought to be quite a bit easier.  But that=92s
only interesting if Mike is wrong and there aren=92t better alternatives. -=
T


On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>w=
rote:

> [Repeating this on the correct thread...]
>
> I'm strongly against canonicalization.  The XML canonicalization
> experience was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other
> aspect of XML DSIG, XML ENC, etc.  Let's not repeat the mistakes of our
> elders. ;-)
>
> I also haven't seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that
> can't be more easily solved another way.
>
>                                 -- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Matt Miller (mamille2)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 12:35 PM
> To: Richard Barnes
> Cc: Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
> Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
>
> I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but =
I
> can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.
>
> I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less
> thrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.
>  I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I
> think that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.
>
> By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems
> like a good thing to bring up there.
>
>
> - m&m
>
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>
> PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1
>
> On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> > So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
> >
> > INPUT: JWK
> > 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with
> > {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3. Compute
> > digest over canonical form
> >
> > That seems generally agreeable to me.
> >
> > For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are
> > covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,
> > alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are
> grouped into a "meta"
> > sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
> >
> > For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization than
> > CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes
> > from RFC
> > 4627:
> > -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
> > -- No white space allowed
> > -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
> > -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
> > -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
> > -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes are
> > fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have been
> > discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string
> > aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt
> > printable ASCII.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
> >> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote
> >>> (
> >>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating
> >>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if
> >>> a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars
> >>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers) and
> >>> it might be worth
> >>> considering.****
> >>>
> >>> ** **
> >>>
> >>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the
> >>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It
> >>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to
> >>> be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
> >>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
> >>>
> >>
> >> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not
> >> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point number=
s.
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">My instinct, as the author of a reasonably popular library=
 that generates canonical XML, is that JSON ought to be quite a bit easier.=
=A0 But that=92s only interesting if Mike is wrong and there aren=92t bette=
r alternatives. -T<br>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Feb 19, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.c=
om</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">[Repeating this on the correct thread...]<br=
>
<br>
I&#39;m strongly against canonicalization. =A0The XML canonicalization expe=
rience was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other aspect=
 of XML DSIG, XML ENC, etc. =A0Let&#39;s not repeat the mistakes of our eld=
ers. ;-)<br>

<br>
I also haven&#39;t seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that =
can&#39;t be more easily solved another way.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 -- Mike<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [m=
ailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] O=
n Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 12:35 PM<br>
To: Richard Barnes<br>
Cc: Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose<br>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON<br>
<br>
I know I&#39;m still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, bu=
t I can put that aside. =A0It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.<br>
<br>
I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I&#39;m less t=
hrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that. =
=A0I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I th=
ink that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.<br>

<br>
By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems like=
 a good thing to bring up there.<br>
<br>
<br>
- m&amp;m<br>
<br>
Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</=
a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
<br>
PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1<br>
<br>
On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes &lt;rlb@ipv.sx&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; INPUT: JWK<br>
&gt; 1. Remove &quot;metadata&quot; fields. =A0So, for RSA, you would be le=
ft with<br>
&gt; {&quot;kty&quot;, &quot;n&quot;, &quot;e&quot;} 2. Convert stripped JW=
K to canonical form 3. Compute<br>
&gt; digest over canonical form<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That seems generally agreeable to me.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are<br>
&gt; covered in the fingerprint for each key type (&quot;kty&quot; value). =
=A0Or,<br>
&gt; alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are g=
rouped into a &quot;meta&quot;<br>
&gt; sub-dict. =A0Which might be nice anyway.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization than=
<br>
&gt; CJSON. =A0The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes<b=
r>
&gt; from RFC<br>
&gt; 4627:<br>
&gt; -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name<=
br>
&gt; -- No white space allowed<br>
&gt; -- Numbers: Exponent part must use &#39;e&#39;<br>
&gt; -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use &#39;+&#39;<br>
&gt; -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros<br>
&gt; -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes are=
<br>
&gt; fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have been<br=
>
&gt; discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string<br>
&gt; aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt<br=
>
&gt; printable ASCII.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dh=
olth@gmail.com">dholth@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H &lt;<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com">James.H.Manger@=
team.telstra.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you=
 quote<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; (<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON" target=3D=
"_blank">http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON</a>) can&#39;t handle flo=
ating<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid J=
SON if<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for number=
s) and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; it might be worth<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; considering.****<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ** **<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, =
the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful=
. It<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segmen=
ts to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object t=
o be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does n=
ot<br>
&gt;&gt; employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point nu=
mbers.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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References: <CAG8k2+4xaAUBPs=Kw-=eBHZNyOMs6VYByPEb1jnAv1aGjLupng@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnWzdoo6b0ZymF0cv_v9zOjJKTWuUhkWuxiA-cM9qgu0jg@mail.gmail.com> <CAG8k2+47GQXHhWBdqd82UEAPZUfAigYE-vwxpaMJm4F5i8098A@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgQ3Oh1D9qHW7XWAZqzmfnE5T6-FjNydjpMEMhaHf2d7Xw@mail.gmail.com> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E1150757902D@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <CAG8k2+5mVYJ6TgQHJ9juXEaWkfMteG6gV8w_dCoShP4-9fPqMA@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgRZkf8rR=gAuR6ZT61WCah3aWQNAq8d+GLWweehH7jN6A@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED9411513E85D@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B1680429673943674774DA@TK5EX14MBXC284.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> <CAHBU6iu3soqk92j3tKpXNErFsgLm6SZ8V30A=Gf7DcbZCYFqkA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com>
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Cc: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, jose <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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I think JSON canonicalization and potential transforms could be a =
limiting factor in adoption. In terms of technical challenges (outside =
deciding on string normalization), I suspect some JSON implementations =
might break due to the use of integer types to represent =
non-floating-point numbers in their parsed data. =20

As an example, the integer 9007199254740993 can't be represented in a =
Javascript Number type, as numbers are actually doubles. A 64-bit =
integer would have no problem representing it, however.

-David Waite

On Feb 19, 2013, at 1:50 PM, Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com> wrote:

> My instinct, as the author of a reasonably popular library that =
generates canonical XML, is that JSON ought to be quite a bit easier.  =
But that=92s only interesting if Mike is wrong and there aren=92t better =
alternatives. -T
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Mike Jones =
<Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> wrote:
> [Repeating this on the correct thread...]
>=20
> I'm strongly against canonicalization.  The XML canonicalization =
experience was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other =
aspect of XML DSIG, XML ENC, etc.  Let's not repeat the mistakes of our =
elders. ;-)
>=20
> I also haven't seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that =
can't be more easily solved another way.
>=20
>                                 -- Mike


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>I think JSON canonicalization and potential transforms could be a =
limiting factor in adoption. In terms of technical challenges (outside =
deciding on string normalization), I suspect some JSON implementations =
might break due to the use of integer types to represent =
non-floating-point numbers in their parsed data. =
&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>As an example, the =
integer&nbsp;9007199254740993 can't be represented in a Javascript =
Number type, as numbers are actually doubles. A 64-bit integer would =
have no problem representing it, however.</div><div><br></div>-David =
Waite<div><br><div><div>On Feb 19, 2013, at 1:50 PM, Tim Bray &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tbray@textuality.com">tbray@textuality.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">My instinct, as the author of a =
reasonably popular library that generates canonical XML, is that JSON =
ought to be quite a bit easier.&nbsp; But that=92s only interesting if =
Mike is wrong and there aren=92t better alternatives. -T<br>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" =
target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; =
border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); =
border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: static; z-index: =
auto; ">[Repeating this on the correct thread...]<br>
<br>
I'm strongly against canonicalization. &nbsp;The XML canonicalization =
experience was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other =
aspect of XML DSIG, XML ENC, etc. &nbsp;Let's not repeat the mistakes of =
our elders. ;-)<br>

<br>
I also haven't seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that =
can't be more easily solved another way.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; -- Mike<br>
=
</font></span></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></body=
></html>=

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 19:15:56 -0300
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References: <CAG8k2+4xaAUBPs=Kw-=eBHZNyOMs6VYByPEb1jnAv1aGjLupng@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnWzdoo6b0ZymF0cv_v9zOjJKTWuUhkWuxiA-cM9qgu0jg@mail.gmail.com> <CAG8k2+47GQXHhWBdqd82UEAPZUfAigYE-vwxpaMJm4F5i8098A@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgQ3Oh1D9qHW7XWAZqzmfnE5T6-FjNydjpMEMhaHf2d7Xw@mail.gmail.com> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E1150757902D@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <CAG8k2+5mVYJ6TgQHJ9juXEaWkfMteG6gV8w_dCoShP4-9fPqMA@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgRZkf8rR=gAuR6ZT61WCah3aWQNAq8d+GLWweehH7jN6A@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED9411513E85D@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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I suspect that a way to fingerprint a subset of a JWK is what is =
desired.  e.g. probably font want to include "kid" as you may want to =
use the fingerprint for that.

I suspect that is possible without trying to come up with a general =
method to canonicallise JSON.

One might be to ASN1 encode it:)  No that is crazy speak.

I do empathize for the desire to have fingerprints without resorting to =
DER encoding.

If we scope the problem down to having a canonical representation for a =
limited set of jwk elements that may be worth pursuing.


John  B.
On 2013-02-19, at 5:35 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com> =
wrote:

> I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, =
but I can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.
>=20
> I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less =
thrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with =
that.  I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, =
but I think that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.
>=20
> By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems =
like a good thing to bring up there.
>=20
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
> PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1
>=20
> On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>=20
>> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
>>=20
>> INPUT: JWK
>> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with =
{"kty",
>> "n", "e"}
>> 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form
>> 3. Compute digest over canonical form
>>=20
>> That seems generally agreeable to me.
>>=20
>> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are =
covered
>> in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or, =
alternatively, you
>> could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are grouped into a =
"meta"
>> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
>>=20
>> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization =
than
>> CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes =
from RFC
>> 4627:
>> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
>> -- No white space allowed
>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
>> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
>> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped
>> ISTM that those changes are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the =
CJSON
>> problems that have been discussed above. Reasonably people can =
disagree
>> over the string aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do =
things
>> like exempt printable ASCII.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
>>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you =
quote (
>>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can=92t handle floating =
point
>>>> numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if a =
string
>>>> includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars [\u0000-\u001f]; =
use
>>>> normalized scientific notation for numbers) and it might be worth
>>>> considering.****
>>>>=20
>>>> ** **
>>>>=20
>>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the =
first
>>>> of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It can =
then be
>>>> packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to be
>>>> HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
>>>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not
>>> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point =
numbers.
>>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Tue Feb 19 14:20:05 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] canonical JSON
Thread-Index: AQHODm6A6D/j5gtDMEa/+fG4zzAaRJiBNOgAgAARsYCAAF3PgIAAHBsAgAAAqLA=
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 22:19:24 +0000
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Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, jose <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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A SHA-256 hash of the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation of JWK=
 seems like a fine fingerprint that requires no canonicalization.

				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Joh=
n Bradley
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:16 PM
To: Matt Miller (mamille2)
Cc: Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON

I suspect that a way to fingerprint a subset of a JWK is what is desired.  =
e.g. probably font want to include "kid" as you may want to use the fingerp=
rint for that.

I suspect that is possible without trying to come up with a general method =
to canonicallise JSON.

One might be to ASN1 encode it:)  No that is crazy speak.

I do empathize for the desire to have fingerprints without resorting to DER=
 encoding.

If we scope the problem down to having a canonical representation for a lim=
ited set of jwk elements that may be worth pursuing.


John  B.
On 2013-02-19, at 5:35 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com> wr=
ote:

> I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but =
I can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.
>=20
> I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less thr=
illed limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.  I c=
an see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I think th=
at would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.
>=20
> By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems li=
ke a good thing to bring up there.
>=20
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
> PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1
>=20
> On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>=20
>> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
>>=20
>> INPUT: JWK
>> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with=20
>> {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3.=20
>> Compute digest over canonical form
>>=20
>> That seems generally agreeable to me.
>>=20
>> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are=20
>> covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,=20
>> alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are gro=
uped into a "meta"
>> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
>>=20
>> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization=20
>> than CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following=20
>> changes from RFC
>> 4627:
>> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
>> -- No white space allowed
>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
>> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
>> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes=20
>> are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have=20
>> been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string=20
>> aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt=20
>> printable ASCII.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <=20
>>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you=20
>>>> quote (
>>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating=20
>>>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON=20
>>>> if a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars=20
>>>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers)=20
>>>> and it might be worth
>>>> considering.****
>>>>=20
>>>> ** **
>>>>=20
>>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the=20
>>>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It=20
>>>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to=20
>>>> be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be=20
>>>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not=20
>>> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point numbers=
.
>>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mitre.org>
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Cc: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, jose <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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Since JWKs are passed around as JSON documents, and 
order/spacing/formatting of JSON documents isn't guaranteed, this 
approach won't work.

  -- Justin

On 02/19/2013 05:19 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
> A SHA-256 hash of the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation of JWK seems like a fine fingerprint that requires no canonicalization.
>
> 				-- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Bradley
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:16 PM
> To: Matt Miller (mamille2)
> Cc: Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
> Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
>
> I suspect that a way to fingerprint a subset of a JWK is what is desired.  e.g. probably font want to include "kid" as you may want to use the fingerprint for that.
>
> I suspect that is possible without trying to come up with a general method to canonicallise JSON.
>
> One might be to ASN1 encode it:)  No that is crazy speak.
>
> I do empathize for the desire to have fingerprints without resorting to DER encoding.
>
> If we scope the problem down to having a canonical representation for a limited set of jwk elements that may be worth pursuing.
>
>
> John  B.
> On 2013-02-19, at 5:35 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:
>
>> I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but I can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.
>>
>> I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less thrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.  I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I think that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.
>>
>> By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems like a good thing to bring up there.
>>
>>
>> - m&m
>>
>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>
>> PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1
>>
>> On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>
>>> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
>>>
>>> INPUT: JWK
>>> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with
>>> {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3.
>>> Compute digest over canonical form
>>>
>>> That seems generally agreeable to me.
>>>
>>> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are
>>> covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,
>>> alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are grouped into a "meta"
>>> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
>>>
>>> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization
>>> than CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following
>>> changes from RFC
>>> 4627:
>>> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
>>> -- No white space allowed
>>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
>>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
>>> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
>>> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes
>>> are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have
>>> been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string
>>> aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt
>>> printable ASCII.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
>>>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you
>>>>> quote (
>>>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating
>>>>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON
>>>>> if a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars
>>>>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers)
>>>>> and it might be worth
>>>>> considering.****
>>>>>
>>>>> ** **
>>>>>
>>>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the
>>>>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It
>>>>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to
>>>>> be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
>>>>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>>>>
>>>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not
>>>> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point numbers.
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Subject: [jose] TTL for JWK
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I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the
base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 that
defines parameters common to all key types [1].

The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data
and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be
safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't
want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to help
facility efficient and error free caching.

OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their
keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryption,
there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to
encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strikes
me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other
contexts.
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the
specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work well
as the value for a "ttl" parameter.

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4

[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to float the idea of introducing a time to li=
ve parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a sub=
section of =A74 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].<br><br=
>

The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data a=
nd a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be safely=
 cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don&#39;t wan=
t it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to help fac=
ility efficient and error free caching.<br>

<br>OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish thei=
r keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryptio=
n, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to e=
ncrypt. Of course, this isn&#39;t the only way to skin that cat but it stri=
kes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other co=
ntexts.<br>

JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric value r=
epresenting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the spec=
ified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it could be co-opted to work well=
 as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; parameter.<br>

<br>[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-=
08#section-4">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#se=
ction-4</a><br><br>[2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oau=
th-json-web-token-06#section-2">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth=
-json-web-token-06#section-2</a><br>

</div>

--047d7b621b1465839504d61c6a36--

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Thread-Topic: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Is this a key expiration time parameter or is there a subtle distinction th=
at I'm missing?  If it is an expiration time, I'd recommend that if we do t=
his, that we reuse the name "exp" from the JWT spec.  (We actually stopped =
using this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago exactly so we cou=
ld use it for this purpose.)

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bri=
an Campbell
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] TTL for JWK

I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the b=
ase JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 that =
defines parameters common to all key types [1].

The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data a=
nd a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be safely=
 cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't want it=
 to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to help facilit=
y efficient and error free caching.

OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their ke=
ys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryption, t=
here needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to encry=
pt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strikes me a=
s a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other contexts.
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value repres=
enting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the specified=
 UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work well as the va=
lue for a "ttl" parameter.

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4

[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2

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	{mso-style-priority:99;
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	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	color:#1F497D;}
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	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Is this a key expiration =
time parameter or is there a subtle distinction that I&#8217;m missing?&nbs=
p; If it is an expiration time, I&#8217;d recommend that if we do this, tha=
t
 we reuse the name &#8220;exp&#8221; from the JWT spec.&nbsp; (We actually =
stopped using this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago exactly s=
o we could use it for this purpose.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] TTL for JWK<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to =
live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a s=
ubsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].<br>
<br>
The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data a=
nd a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be safely=
 cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't want it=
 to be a hard expiration date for
 the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error free cachin=
g.<br>
<br>
OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their ke=
ys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryption, t=
here needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to encry=
pt. Of course, this isn't the only
 way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way and one that might pr=
ovide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric value r=
epresenting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the spec=
ified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it could be co-opted to work well=
 as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; parameter.<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#s=
ection-4">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br=
>
<br>
[2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-0=
6#section-2">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a>=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Justin Richer <jricher@mitre.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] canonical JSON
Thread-Index: AQHODm6A6D/j5gtDMEa/+fG4zzAaRJiBNOgAgAARsYCAAF3PgIAAHBsAgAAAqLCAAAZNAIAAGiyw
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References: <CAG8k2+4xaAUBPs=Kw-=eBHZNyOMs6VYByPEb1jnAv1aGjLupng@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnWzdoo6b0ZymF0cv_v9zOjJKTWuUhkWuxiA-cM9qgu0jg@mail.gmail.com> <CAG8k2+47GQXHhWBdqd82UEAPZUfAigYE-vwxpaMJm4F5i8098A@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgQ3Oh1D9qHW7XWAZqzmfnE5T6-FjNydjpMEMhaHf2d7Xw@mail.gmail.com> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E1150757902D@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <CAG8k2+5mVYJ6TgQHJ9juXEaWkfMteG6gV8w_dCoShP4-9fPqMA@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgRZkf8rR=gAuR6ZT61WCah3aWQNAq8d+GLWweehH7jN6A@mail.gmail.com> <BF7E36B9C495A6468E8EC573603ED9411513E85D@xmb-aln-x11.cisco.com> <7E415CBD-BA54-4E6A-8D16-2CE52C407260@ve7jtb.com> <4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B1680429673943674777ED@TK5EX14MBXC284.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> <5123FF72.9060206@mitre.org>
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Cc: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, jose <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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Nothing's preventing people from using the JWK as the payload of a JWS if y=
ou want to sign/MAC it - just like Matt's draft uses it as the payload of a=
 JWE.  Problem solved. ;-)

				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jus=
tin Richer
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:41 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: Daniel Holth; Richard Barnes; jose; Matt Miller (mamille2); John Bradle=
y; Manger, James H
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON

Since JWKs are passed around as JSON documents, and order/spacing/formattin=
g of JSON documents isn't guaranteed, this approach won't work.

  -- Justin

On 02/19/2013 05:19 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
> A SHA-256 hash of the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation of J=
WK seems like a fine fingerprint that requires no canonicalization.
>
> 				-- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf=20
> Of John Bradley
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:16 PM
> To: Matt Miller (mamille2)
> Cc: Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
> Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
>
> I suspect that a way to fingerprint a subset of a JWK is what is desired.=
  e.g. probably font want to include "kid" as you may want to use the finge=
rprint for that.
>
> I suspect that is possible without trying to come up with a general metho=
d to canonicallise JSON.
>
> One might be to ASN1 encode it:)  No that is crazy speak.
>
> I do empathize for the desire to have fingerprints without resorting to D=
ER encoding.
>
> If we scope the problem down to having a canonical representation for a l=
imited set of jwk elements that may be worth pursuing.
>
>
> John  B.
> On 2013-02-19, at 5:35 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com> =
wrote:
>
>> I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but=
 I can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.
>>
>> I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less th=
rilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.  I =
can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I think t=
hat would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.
>>
>> By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems l=
ike a good thing to bring up there.
>>
>>
>> - m&m
>>
>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>
>> PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1
>>
>> On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>
>>> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
>>>
>>> INPUT: JWK
>>> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with=20
>>> {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3.
>>> Compute digest over canonical form
>>>
>>> That seems generally agreeable to me.
>>>
>>> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are=20
>>> covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,=20
>>> alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are gr=
ouped into a "meta"
>>> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
>>>
>>> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization=20
>>> than CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following=20
>>> changes from RFC
>>> 4627:
>>> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field=20
>>> name
>>> -- No white space allowed
>>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
>>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
>>> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
>>> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes=20
>>> are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have=20
>>> been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string=20
>>> aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt=20
>>> printable ASCII.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <=20
>>>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you=20
>>>>> quote (
>>>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating=20
>>>>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON=20
>>>>> if a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars=20
>>>>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers)=20
>>>>> and it might be worth
>>>>> considering.****
>>>>>
>>>>> ** **
>>>>>
>>>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the=20
>>>>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It=20
>>>>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments=20
>>>>> to be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to=20
>>>>> be programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>>>>
>>>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does=20
>>>> not employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point nu=
mbers.
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

_______________________________________________
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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--047d7b344142a9faae04d61d05fa
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The subtle (and maybe unimportant) distinction I was trying to make was
that this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be cached/used
with a reasonable expectation that things would still work. I tend to think
of key expiration as being something more like any use of the key after the
time should be considered invalid. I wanted to avoid requiring message
rejection if expiration checks failed (as is the case with exp in JWT).  I
remember the change to RSA to free up "exp" and was going to propose just
using that. But after thinking about it a bit, to me anyway, "ttl" conveyed
that idea better than "exp." I'd be fine with either parameter name though.

Does that make sense?


On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wr=
ote:

>  Is this a key expiration time parameter or is there a subtle distinction
> that I=92m missing?  If it is an expiration time, I=92d recommend that if=
 we do
> this, that we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the JWT spec.  (We actually s=
topped
> using this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago exactly so we
> could use it for this purpose.)****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Brian Campbell
> *Sent:* Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] TTL for JWK****
>
> ** **
>
> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the
> base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 th=
at
> defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>
> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data
> and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be
> safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't
> want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to hel=
p
> facility efficient and error free caching.
>
> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their
> keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryptio=
n,
> there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to
> encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strik=
es
> me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other
> contexts.
> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the
> specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work wel=
l
> as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>
> [2]
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2**=
*
> *
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--047d7b344142a9faae04d61d05fa
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">The subtle (and maybe unimportant) distinction I was tryin=
g to make was that this was more of a indicator about how long a key could =
be cached/used with a reasonable expectation that things would still work. =
I tend to think of key expiration as being something more like any use of t=
he key after the time should be considered invalid. I wanted to avoid requi=
ring message rejection if expiration checks failed (as is the case with exp=
 in JWT).=A0 I remember the change to RSA to free up &quot;exp&quot; and wa=
s going to propose just using that. But after thinking about it a bit, to m=
e anyway, &quot;ttl&quot; conveyed that idea better than &quot;exp.&quot; I=
&#39;d be fine with either parameter name though.<br>

<br>Does that make sense?<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:sans-s=
erif;font-size:13px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:norma=
l;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:19.1875px;text-align:left;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);display:inline!important;float:none"><br>

</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@mic=
rosoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Is this a key expiration =
time parameter or is there a subtle distinction that I=92m missing?=A0 If i=
t is an expiration time, I=92d recommend that if we do this, that
 we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the JWT spec.=A0 (We actually stopped usi=
ng this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago exactly so we could =
use it for this purpose.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-=
bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] TTL for JWK<u></u><u></u></span></p><div><div class=
=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I&#39;d like to float the idea of introducing a time=
 to live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as=
 a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].<=
br>


<br>
The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data a=
nd a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be safely=
 cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don&#39;t wan=
t it to be a hard expiration date for
 the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error free cachin=
g.<br>
<br>
OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their ke=
ys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryption, t=
here needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to encry=
pt. Of course, this isn&#39;t the only
 way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way and one that might pr=
ovide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric value r=
epresenting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the spec=
ified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it could be co-opted to work well=
 as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; parameter.<br>


<br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#s=
ection-4" target=3D"_blank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br=
>
<br>
[2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-0=
6#section-2" target=3D"_blank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a>=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 00:12:32 -0300
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References: <CA+k3eCTZ4KeC7ZH41OWkjkLCp0RiRBkze=4NpFO7AG5zVq-bJQ@mail.gmail.com> <4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394367477CB0@TK5EX14MBXC284.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> <CA+k3eCTbKzWaSr0cmSKTgfs2WMwfGjxatCMjFJekf+8E5SRjXQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Yes ttl and exp are different.    ttl probably should apply to a JWK set =
as a whole rather than the individual JWK where exp is certainly a per =
key value.

Mike, this is a bit like the distinction in DNS.

John B.

On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> The subtle (and maybe unimportant) distinction I was trying to make =
was that this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be =
cached/used with a reasonable expectation that things would still work. =
I tend to think of key expiration as being something more like any use =
of the key after the time should be considered invalid. I wanted to =
avoid requiring message rejection if expiration checks failed (as is the =
case with exp in JWT).  I remember the change to RSA to free up "exp" =
and was going to propose just using that. But after thinking about it a =
bit, to me anyway, "ttl" conveyed that idea better than "exp." I'd be =
fine with either parameter name though.
>=20
> Does that make sense?
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones =
<Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> wrote:
> Is this a key expiration time parameter or is there a subtle =
distinction that I=92m missing?  If it is an expiration time, I=92d =
recommend that if we do this, that we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the =
JWT spec.  (We actually stopped using this name as an RSA parameter name =
a few drafts ago exactly so we could use it for this purpose.)
>=20
> =20
>=20
>                                                             -- Mike
>=20
> =20
>=20
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Brian Campbell
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] TTL for JWK
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to =
the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74=
 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>=20
> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK =
data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could =
be safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I =
don't want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint =
to help facility efficient and error free caching.
>=20
> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish =
their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and =
encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public =
key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat =
but it strikes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for =
JWK in other contexts.
> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value =
representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the =
specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work =
well as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>=20
> [1] =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>=20
> [2] =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Yes =
ttl and exp are different. &nbsp; &nbsp;ttl probably should apply to a =
JWK set as a whole rather than the individual JWK where exp is certainly =
a per key value.<div><br></div><div>Mike, this is a bit like the =
distinction in DNS.</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell =
&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">The subtle (and maybe unimportant) =
distinction I was trying to make was that this was more of a indicator =
about how long a key could be cached/used with a reasonable expectation =
that things would still work. I tend to think of key expiration as being =
something more like any use of the key after the time should be =
considered invalid. I wanted to avoid requiring message rejection if =
expiration checks failed (as is the case with exp in JWT).&nbsp; I =
remember the change to RSA to free up "exp" and was going to propose =
just using that. But after thinking about it a bit, to me anyway, "ttl" =
conveyed that idea better than "exp." I'd be fine with either parameter =
name though.<br>

<br>Does that make sense?<span style=3D"font-family: sans-serif; =
font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 19.1875px; text-align: =
left; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline =
!important; float: none; "><br>

</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" =
target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d">Is this a key expiration time parameter or is =
there a subtle distinction that I=92m missing?&nbsp; If it is an =
expiration time, I=92d recommend that if we do this, that
 we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the JWT spec.&nbsp; (We actually =
stopped using this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago =
exactly so we could use it for this purpose.)<u></u><u></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&=
quot;">From:</span></b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&=
quot;"> <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] TTL for JWK<u></u><u></u></span></p><div><div =
class=3D"h5"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I'd like to float the idea of introducing a =
time to live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably =
fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to all key =
types [1].<br>


<br>
The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK =
data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could =
be safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I =
don't want it to be a hard expiration date for
 the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error free =
caching.<br>
<br>
OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their =
keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and =
encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public =
key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only
 way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way and one that might =
provide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value =
representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the =
specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work =
well as the value for a "ttl" parameter.<br>


<br>
[1] <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section=
-4" target=3D"_blank">
=
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><b=
r>
<br>
[2] <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#sect=
ion-2" target=3D"_blank">
=
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a=
><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 03:21:32 +0000
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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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I think applying the ttl to the individual JWK makes more sense.  I can def=
initely see where a JWK set would hold one key, then be updated with a new =
alternate (roll-over) key with a long ttl (since it's the new replacement) =
but with a short ttl on the original (because it's going to actually go liv=
e any day/minute/second now).  When the new key is fully deployed, the JWK =
set is updated to remove it.

As with implied comparisons to DNS, the ttl there is on the individual reso=
urce records, not the entire answer.

- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Feb 19, 2013, at 8:12 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
 wrote:

> Yes ttl and exp are different.    ttl probably should apply to a JWK set =
as a whole rather than the individual JWK where exp is certainly a per key =
value.
>=20
> Mike, this is a bit like the distinction in DNS.
>=20
> John B.
>=20
> On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wr=
ote:
>=20
>> The subtle (and maybe unimportant) distinction I was trying to make was =
that this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be cached/used=
 with a reasonable expectation that things would still work. I tend to thin=
k of key expiration as being something more like any use of the key after t=
he time should be considered invalid. I wanted to avoid requiring message r=
ejection if expiration checks failed (as is the case with exp in JWT).  I r=
emember the change to RSA to free up "exp" and was going to propose just us=
ing that. But after thinking about it a bit, to me anyway, "ttl" conveyed t=
hat idea better than "exp." I'd be fine with either parameter name though.
>>=20
>> Does that make sense?
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com=
> wrote:
>> Is this a key expiration time parameter or is there a subtle distinction=
 that I=92m missing?  If it is an expiration time, I=92d recommend that if =
we do this, that we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the JWT spec.  (We actual=
ly stopped using this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago exactl=
y so we could use it for this purpose.)
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>                                                            -- Mike
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of =
Brian Campbell
>> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
>> To: jose@ietf.org
>> Subject: [jose] TTL for JWK
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to th=
e base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 th=
at defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>>=20
>> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK dat=
a and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be saf=
ely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't want=
 it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to help faci=
lity efficient and error free caching.
>>=20
>> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their=
 keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryption=
, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to en=
crypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strikes m=
e as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other context=
s.
>> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value rep=
resenting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the specif=
ied UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work well as the=
 value for a "ttl" parameter.
>>=20
>> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>>=20
>> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#sectio=
n-2
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Tue Feb 19 19:32:10 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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So sort of "may cache until"?

I don't think TTL is the right term for this. When am IP packet's ttl value=
 reaches 0, the packet is discarded.

-- Mike

________________________________
From: John Bradley
Sent: 2/19/2013 7:14 PM
To: Brian Campbell
Cc: Mike Jones; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK

Yes ttl and exp are different.    ttl probably should apply to a JWK set as=
 a whole rather than the individual JWK where exp is certainly a per key va=
lue.

Mike, this is a bit like the distinction in DNS.

John B.

On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com<mailt=
o:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>> wrote:

The subtle (and maybe unimportant) distinction I was trying to make was tha=
t this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be cached/used wi=
th a reasonable expectation that things would still work. I tend to think o=
f key expiration as being something more like any use of the key after the =
time should be considered invalid. I wanted to avoid requiring message reje=
ction if expiration checks failed (as is the case with exp in JWT).  I reme=
mber the change to RSA to free up "exp" and was going to propose just using=
 that. But after thinking about it a bit, to me anyway, "ttl" conveyed that=
 idea better than "exp." I'd be fine with either parameter name though.

Does that make sense?


On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<ma=
ilto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:
Is this a key expiration time parameter or is there a subtle distinction th=
at I=92m missing?  If it is an expiration time, I=92d recommend that if we =
do this, that we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the JWT spec.  (We actually =
stopped using this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago exactly s=
o we could use it for this purpose.)

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Brian Campbell
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] TTL for JWK

I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the b=
ase JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 that =
defines parameters common to all key types [1].

The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data a=
nd a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be safely=
 cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't want it=
 to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to help facilit=
y efficient and error free caching.

OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their ke=
ys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryption, t=
here needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to encry=
pt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strikes me a=
s a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other contexts.
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value repres=
enting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the specified=
 UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work well as the va=
lue for a "ttl" parameter.

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4

[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2

_______________________________________________
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space;">
<div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">So sort of=
 &quot;may cache until&quot;?<br>
<br>
I don't think TTL is the right term for this. When am IP packet's ttl value=
 reaches 0, the packet is discarded.<br>
<br>
-- Mike<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<hr>
<span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-weight=
: bold;">From:
</span><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Joh=
n Bradley</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-weight=
: bold;">Sent:
</span><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">2/1=
9/2013 7:14 PM</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-weight=
: bold;">To:
</span><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Bri=
an Campbell</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-weight=
: bold;">Cc:
</span><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Mik=
e Jones; jose@ietf.org</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; font-weight=
: bold;">Subject:
</span><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Re:=
 [jose] TTL for JWK</span><br>
<br>
Yes ttl and exp are different. &nbsp; &nbsp;ttl probably should apply to a =
JWK set as a whole rather than the individual JWK where exp is certainly a =
per key value.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Mike, this is a bit like the distinction in DNS.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>John B.</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampb=
ell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div dir=3D"ltr">The subtle (and maybe unimportant) distinction I was tryin=
g to make was that this was more of a indicator about how long a key could =
be cached/used with a reasonable expectation that things would still work. =
I tend to think of key expiration
 as being something more like any use of the key after the time should be c=
onsidered invalid. I wanted to avoid requiring message rejection if expirat=
ion checks failed (as is the case with exp in JWT).&nbsp; I remember the ch=
ange to RSA to free up &quot;exp&quot; and was
 going to propose just using that. But after thinking about it a bit, to me=
 anyway, &quot;ttl&quot; conveyed that idea better than &quot;exp.&quot; I'=
d be fine with either parameter name though.<br>
<br>
Does that make sense?<span style=3D"font: 13px/19.18px sans-serif; text-ali=
gn: left; text-transform: none; text-indent: 0px; letter-spacing: normal; w=
ord-spacing: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important; white-space: nor=
mal; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; background-color: rgb(25=
5, 255, 255);"><br>
</span></div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones <spa=
n dir=3D"ltr">
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michae=
l.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex; border-l=
eft-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-width: 1px; border-left-style: s=
olid;" class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:=
 &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; font-size: 11pt;">Is this a ke=
y expiration time parameter or is there a subtle distinction that I=92m mis=
sing?&nbsp; If it is an expiration time, I=92d recommend that if
 we do this, that we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the JWT spec.&nbsp; (We =
actually stopped using this name as an RSA parameter name a few drafts ago =
exactly so we could use it for this purpose.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:=
 &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; font-size: 11pt;"><u></u>&nbsp=
;<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:=
 &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; font-size: 11pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:=
 &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; font-size: 11pt;"><u></u>&nbsp=
;<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font=
-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@iet=
f.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] TTL for JWK<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to =
live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a s=
ubsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].<br>
<br>
The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data a=
nd a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be safely=
 cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't want it=
 to be a hard expiration date for
 the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error free cachin=
g.<br>
<br>
OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their ke=
ys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryption, t=
here needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to encry=
pt. Of course, this isn't the only
 way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way and one that might pr=
ovide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric value r=
epresenting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the spec=
ified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it could be co-opted to work well=
 as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; parameter.<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#s=
ection-4" target=3D"_blank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br=
>
<br>
[2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-0=
6#section-2" target=3D"_blank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a>=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<br>
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Sorry I was thinking of the caching for secondary servers rather than =
the per record ttl.  I suppose DNS has both.

If a jku contains a set is the caching the shortest value?   I am not =
against doing it per jwk as that is potentially more flexible and avoids =
a new element in jwk set.

If we were only talking about jku files then http caching might work, =
but has limitations.

John B.
On 2013-02-20, at 12:21 AM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" =
<mamille2@cisco.com> wrote:

> I think applying the ttl to the individual JWK makes more sense.  I =
can definitely see where a JWK set would hold one key, then be updated =
with a new alternate (roll-over) key with a long ttl (since it's the new =
replacement) but with a short ttl on the original (because it's going to =
actually go live any day/minute/second now).  When the new key is fully =
deployed, the JWK set is updated to remove it.
>=20
> As with implied comparisons to DNS, the ttl there is on the individual =
resource records, not the entire answer.
>=20
> - m&m
>=20
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>=20
> On Feb 19, 2013, at 8:12 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
> wrote:
>=20
>> Yes ttl and exp are different.    ttl probably should apply to a JWK =
set as a whole rather than the individual JWK where exp is certainly a =
per key value.
>>=20
>> Mike, this is a bit like the distinction in DNS.
>>=20
>> John B.
>>=20
>> On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> The subtle (and maybe unimportant) distinction I was trying to make =
was that this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be =
cached/used with a reasonable expectation that things would still work. =
I tend to think of key expiration as being something more like any use =
of the key after the time should be considered invalid. I wanted to =
avoid requiring message rejection if expiration checks failed (as is the =
case with exp in JWT).  I remember the change to RSA to free up "exp" =
and was going to propose just using that. But after thinking about it a =
bit, to me anyway, "ttl" conveyed that idea better than "exp." I'd be =
fine with either parameter name though.
>>>=20
>>> Does that make sense?
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Mike Jones =
<Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>> Is this a key expiration time parameter or is there a subtle =
distinction that I=92m missing?  If it is an expiration time, I=92d =
recommend that if we do this, that we reuse the name =93exp=94 from the =
JWT spec.  (We actually stopped using this name as an RSA parameter name =
a few drafts ago exactly so we could use it for this purpose.)
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>                                                           -- Mike
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Brian Campbell
>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
>>> To: jose@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [jose] TTL for JWK
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter =
to the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =
=A74 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>>>=20
>>> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK =
data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could =
be safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I =
don't want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint =
to help facility efficient and error free caching.
>>>=20
>>> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish =
their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and =
encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public =
key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat =
but it strikes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for =
JWK in other contexts.
>>> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value =
representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the =
specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work =
well as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>>>=20
>>> [1] =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>>>=20
>>> [2] =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20


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From Axel.Nennker@telekom.de  Tue Feb 19 22:07:35 2013
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Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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Mike is right. Canonicalization is "evil".
Axel

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Tim=
 Bray
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 9:50 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose; Matt Miller (mamil=
le2)
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON

My instinct, as the author of a reasonably popular library that generates c=
anonical XML, is that JSON ought to be quite a bit easier.  But that's only=
 interesting if Mike is wrong and there aren't better alternatives. -T

On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<m=
ailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:
[Repeating this on the correct thread...]

I'm strongly against canonicalization.  The XML canonicalization experience=
 was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other aspect of XM=
L DSIG, XML ENC, etc.  Let's not repeat the mistakes of our elders. ;-)

I also haven't seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that can'=
t be more easily solved another way.

                                -- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamil=
le2)
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 12:35 PM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON

I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but I =
can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.

I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less thril=
led limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.  I can=
 see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I think that=
 would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.

By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems like=
 a good thing to bring up there.


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com<mailto:mamille2@cisco.com> >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1

On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>>=
 wrote:

> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
>
> INPUT: JWK
> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with
> {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3. Compute
> digest over canonical form
>
> That seems generally agreeable to me.
>
> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are
> covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,
> alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are grou=
ped into a "meta"
> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
>
> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization than
> CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes
> from RFC
> 4627:
> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
> -- No white space allowed
> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes are
> fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have been
> discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string
> aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt
> printable ASCII.
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com<mailto:dh=
olth@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com<mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>>=
 wrote:
>>
>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote
>>> (
>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating
>>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if
>>> a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars
>>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers) and
>>> it might be worth
>>> considering.****
>>>
>>> ** **
>>>
>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the
>>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It
>>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to
>>> be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
>>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
>>>
>>
>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not
>> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point numbers.
>>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Mike is r=
ight. Canonicalization is &#8220;evil&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:#1F497D'>Axel<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> jose-bounces@ietf.org [=
mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Bray<br><b>Sent:</b> =
Tuesday, February 19, 2013 9:50 PM<br><b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br><b>Cc:</b> R=
ichard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose; Matt Miller (mamille2)<=
br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] canonical JSON<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>My instinct, as=
 the author of a reasonably popular library that generates canonical XML, i=
s that JSON ought to be quite a bit easier.&nbsp; But that&#8217;s only int=
eresting if Mike is wrong and there aren&#8217;t better alternatives. -T<o:=
p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 12:4=
8 PM, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=
=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal>[Repeating this on the correct thread...]<br><br>I'm strongl=
y against canonicalization. &nbsp;The XML canonicalization experience was h=
orrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other aspect of XML DSIG=
, XML ENC, etc. &nbsp;Let's not repeat the mistakes of our elders. ;-)<br><=
br>I also haven't seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that c=
an't be more easily solved another way.<br><span style=3D'color:#888888'><b=
r><span class=3Dhoenzb>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nb=
sp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; -- Mike</span><=
/span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>-----Original Messa=
ge-----<br>From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf=
.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf=
.org</a>] On Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>Sent: Tuesday, February 19=
, 2013 12:35 PM<br>To: Richard Barnes<br>Cc: Daniel Holth; Manger, James H;=
 jose<br>Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON<br><br>I know I'm still reeling=
 from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but I can put that aside. &nbs=
p;It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.<br><br>I can see value in ea=
ch JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less thrilled limiting metadata=
 to a specific place, but could live with that. &nbsp;I can see where exclu=
ding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I think that would mean havi=
ng a much more robust c14n approach.<br><br>By the way, there is going to b=
e a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems like a good thing to bring up there=
.<br><br><br>- m&amp;m<br><br>Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@c=
isco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a> &gt;<br>Cisco Systems, Inc.<br><br>PS: 42 =
vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1<br><br>On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br>&gt; So your f=
ingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?<br>&gt;<br>&gt;=
 INPUT: JWK<br>&gt; 1. Remove &quot;metadata&quot; fields. &nbsp;So, for RS=
A, you would be left with<br>&gt; {&quot;kty&quot;, &quot;n&quot;, &quot;e&=
quot;} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3. Compute<br>&gt; digest =
over canonical form<br>&gt;<br>&gt; That seems generally agreeable to me.<b=
r>&gt;<br>&gt; For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which field=
s are<br>&gt; covered in the fingerprint for each key type (&quot;kty&quot;=
 value). &nbsp;Or,<br>&gt; alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that=
 metadata fields are grouped into a &quot;meta&quot;<br>&gt; sub-dict. &nbs=
p;Which might be nice anyway.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; For (2), I agree that there i=
s probably a better canonicalization than<br>&gt; CJSON. &nbsp;The code I p=
asted earlier implements the following changes<br>&gt; from RFC<br>&gt; 462=
7:<br>&gt; -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field=
 name<br>&gt; -- No white space allowed<br>&gt; -- Numbers: Exponent part m=
ust use 'e'<br>&gt; -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'<br>&gt; -- N=
umbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros<br>&gt; -- Strings: All =
characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes are<br>&gt; fairly minim=
al, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have been<br>&gt; discussed a=
bove. Reasonably people can disagree over the string<br>&gt; aspect; if you=
 want less expansion, you could do things like exempt<br>&gt; printable ASC=
II.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM=
, Daniel Holth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com">dholth@gmail.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, Ja=
mes H &lt;<br>&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com">J=
ames.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; A=
 canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt; (<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_J=
SON" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON</a>) can't =
handle floating<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; point numbers (or very large integers), and=
 produces invalid JSON if<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; a string includes a tab! Fix thos=
e (escaping control chars<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized s=
cientific notation for numbers) and<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; it might be worth<br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt; considering.****<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; ** **<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byt=
e arrays, the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header=
, would be useful. It<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; can then be packaged as dot-separated=
 base64url-encoded segments to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; be HTTP-header-friendly, or =
packaged as a single JSON object to be<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; programmer-friendly,=
 or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&=
gt;&gt; I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does no=
t<br>&gt;&gt; employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating poi=
nt numbers.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt; ___________________________________________=
____<br>&gt; jose mailing list<br>&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jos=
e@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jos=
e" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br><br>=
_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.i=
etf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailm=
an/listinfo/jose</a><br>_______________________________________________<br>=
jose mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>=
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></body></html>=

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 07:37:17 -0700
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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To Mike's comment on the ttl of an IP packet - I did extensive research on
wikipedia that suggests a TTL can either be a counter or a time-stamp. The
idea is the same - discard or stop using at such and such a point. TTL may
not be right but it seemed closer than exp for what I was aiming for.

To James and John's comment on JWK Set and HTTP, I was thinking a per key
usage but the way I was envisioning it does ultimately result in the whole
JWK Set being refreshed (re-fetched?) and that would argue for it being at
the JWK Set level. And yeah, at that point it'd make sense to just use HTTP
cache control. I'd been trying to avoid that because of a suspicion that
the HTTP headers would likely be set wrong or ignored by some. But using
that as a justification to reinvent the concept at another layer sounds
rather silly when I say (er type) it out loud. So, I dunno, maybe this
isn't such a great idea after all and using HTTP level caching mechanisms
to address my particular problem is a better approach.

To James' other comment on "MUST-understand-everything" - I don't always
answer rhetorical questions in a public forum but, what the heck, it'd be
more than just awkward. It'd be darn near impossible for any deployments
that had more than just single bilateral relationships. You're point is
taken (though I already fall in the not-MUST-understand camp) but I don't
believe the must-understand requirement applies to JWK as the drafts are
currently written, does it?







On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 5:27 AM, Manger, James H <
James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:

> This feature sounds so close in function to an HTTP Cache-Control header.
> Surely we can just use this existing mechanism? Particularly as the real
> use case mentioned in getting a JWK from an HTTPS URI.****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> P.S. If we do defer specifying =93TTL for JWK=94 now, but after a few yea=
rs
> experience of rolling keys in OpenID Connect decide it would be good, the=
n
> I wonder how awkward deploying it would be due to the
> MUST-understand-everything rule?****
>
> ** **
>
> --****
>
> James Manger****
>
> ** **
>
> On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:****
>
> ** **
>
> =85this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be cached/used
> with a reasonable expectation that things would still work=85 ****
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Brian Campbell
> *Sent:* Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] TTL for JWK****
>
> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the
> base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 th=
at
> defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>
> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data
> and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be
> safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't
> want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to hel=
p
> facility efficient and error free caching.
>
> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their
> keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryptio=
n,
> there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to
> encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strik=
es
> me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other
> contexts.
> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the
> specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work wel=
l
> as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>
> [2]
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2**=
*
> *
>
> ** **
>

--e89a8f646d15df9b5404d628e675
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>To Mike&#39;s comment on the ttl of an IP packet=
 - I did extensive research on wikipedia that suggests a TTL can either be =
a counter or a time-stamp. The idea is the same - discard or stop using at =
such and such a point. TTL may not be right but it seemed closer than exp f=
or what I was aiming for.<br>

<br></div>To James and John&#39;s comment on JWK Set and HTTP, I was thinki=
ng a per key usage but the way I was envisioning it does ultimately result =
in the whole JWK Set being refreshed (re-fetched?) and that would argue for=
 it being at the JWK Set level. And yeah, at that point it&#39;d make sense=
 to just use HTTP cache control. I&#39;d been trying to avoid that because =
of a suspicion that the HTTP headers would likely be set wrong or ignored b=
y some. But using that as a justification to reinvent the concept at anothe=
r layer sounds rather silly when I say (er type) it out loud. So, I dunno, =
maybe this isn&#39;t such a great idea after all and using HTTP level cachi=
ng mechanisms to address my particular problem is a better approach.=A0 <br=
>

<br></div>To James&#39; other comment on &quot;MUST-understand-everything&q=
uot; - I don&#39;t always answer rhetorical questions in a public forum but=
, what the heck, it&#39;d be more than just awkward. It&#39;d be darn near =
impossible for any deployments that had more than just single bilateral rel=
ationships. You&#39;re point is taken (though I already fall in the not-MUS=
T-understand camp) but I don&#39;t believe the must-understand requirement =
applies to JWK as the drafts are currently written, does it?<br>

<br><br><div><br><br><div><br></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 5:27 AM, Manger,=
 James H <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstr=
a.com" target=3D"_blank">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"=
EN-AU"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">This feature =
sounds so close in function to an HTTP Cache-Control header. Surely we can =
just use this existing mechanism? Particularly as the real use case mention=
ed in getting a JWK from an HTTPS URI.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></spa=
n></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">P.S. If we do defer speci=
fying =93TTL for JWK=94 now, but after a few years experience of rolling ke=
ys in OpenID Connect decide it would be good, then I wonder how awkward dep=
loying it would be due to the MUST-understand-everything rule?<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">--<u></u><u></u><=
/span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">James Manger<u></u><u></u=
></span></p></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;fo=
nt-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=
=A0<u></u></span></p>

<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt"><div><div><div class=3D"im"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 2013-02-1=
9, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.=
com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u><=
/u></p>

</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1f497d">=85</span>this was more of a indicat=
or about how long a key could be cached/used with a reasonable expectation =
that things would still work<span style=3D"color:#1f497d">=85</span><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&q=
uot;;color:#1f497d" lang=3D"EN-US">=A0</span><span style=3D"color:#1f497d" =
lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u><u></u></span></p>

</div><div class=3D"im"><div><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span=
 style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&=
quot;" lang=3D"EN-US">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;" lang=3D"EN-US"> <a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-=
bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>

<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"ma=
ilto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> =
[jose] TTL for JWK</span><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u><u></u></span></p><div=
>
<div>
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">I&#39;d like to float the =
idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the base JWK document, whic=
h could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters com=
mon to all key types [1].<br>

<br>The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK da=
ta and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be sa=
fely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don&#39;t=
 want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to help=
 facility efficient and error free caching.<br>

<br>OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish thei=
r keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryptio=
n, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to e=
ncrypt. Of course, this isn&#39;t the only way to skin that cat but it stri=
kes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other co=
ntexts.<br>

JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric value r=
epresenting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the spec=
ified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it could be co-opted to work well=
 as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; parameter.<br>

<br>[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-=
08#section-4" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-=
json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br><br>[2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2" target=3D"_blank">http://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a><u></u>=
<u></u></span></p>

</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div=
>

--e89a8f646d15df9b5404d628e675--

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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Shouldn't this be a part of a key management layer distinct from JWK?

I was under the impression that JWK was limited to

[quote]

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
    structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
    defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
    representing a set of JWKs.

[\quote]

- prateek
> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to 
> the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of 
> §4 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>
> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK 
> data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key 
> could be safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK 
> source. I don't want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but 
> rather a hint to help facility efficient and error free caching.
>
> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish 
> their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and 
> encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public 
> key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that 
> cat but it strikes me as a good way and one that might provide utility 
> for JWK in other contexts.
> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value 
> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until 
> the specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to 
> work well as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>
> [2] 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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    Shouldn't this be a part of a key management layer distinct from
    JWK? <br>
    <br>
    I was under the impression that JWK was limited to <br>
    <br>
    [quote]<br>
    <pre style="font-family: monospace; line-height: 1.2em; margin: 0px; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
   structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
   defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
   representing a set of JWKs. </pre>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">[\quote]<br>
      <br>
      - prateek<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CA+k3eCTZ4KeC7ZH41OWkjkLCp0RiRBkze=4NpFO7AG5zVq-bJQ@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to
        live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably
        fit in as a subsection of &sect;4 that defines parameters common to
        all key types [1].<br>
        <br>
        The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of
        JWK data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long
        a key could be safely cached and used without needing to recheck
        the JWK source. I don't want it to be a hard expiration date for
        the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error
        free caching.<br>
        <br>
        OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities
        publish their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key
        rotation and encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate
        the TTL of a public key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't
        the only way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way
        and one that might provide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
        JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric
        value representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
        UTC until the specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could
        be co-opted to work well as the value for a "ttl" parameter.<br>
        <br>
        [1] <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br>
        <br>
        [2] <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a><br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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Cc: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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I don't think that JWK itself  has a MUST understand.

If you are including a JWK in the header of a JWE for say ECDH-ES then =
that element (the JWK content of epk) needs to be understood by the =
recipient.  =20

I think the question of how MUST understand applies to elements of a top =
level claims probably needs more clarification once we get over the =
poll.

I don't know that ttl as part of epk is sensible,  perhaps exp might =
make sense but including ether of them in epk is probably mot helpful.

The limitation of the http caching approach is that it requires a pull,  =
but logically if the endpoint is going to do something to refresh the =
key it needs to have something to pull from.

Now what I don't know is if in Matt's work using xmpp if there is a need =
for a refresh mechanism to refresh encryption keys, that can't use http =
caching.

John B.





On 2013-02-20, at 11:37 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:

> To Mike's comment on the ttl of an IP packet - I did extensive =
research on wikipedia that suggests a TTL can either be a counter or a =
time-stamp. The idea is the same - discard or stop using at such and =
such a point. TTL may not be right but it seemed closer than exp for =
what I was aiming for.
>=20
> To James and John's comment on JWK Set and HTTP, I was thinking a per =
key usage but the way I was envisioning it does ultimately result in the =
whole JWK Set being refreshed (re-fetched?) and that would argue for it =
being at the JWK Set level. And yeah, at that point it'd make sense to =
just use HTTP cache control. I'd been trying to avoid that because of a =
suspicion that the HTTP headers would likely be set wrong or ignored by =
some. But using that as a justification to reinvent the concept at =
another layer sounds rather silly when I say (er type) it out loud. So, =
I dunno, maybe this isn't such a great idea after all and using HTTP =
level caching mechanisms to address my particular problem is a better =
approach. =20
>=20
> To James' other comment on "MUST-understand-everything" - I don't =
always answer rhetorical questions in a public forum but, what the heck, =
it'd be more than just awkward. It'd be darn near impossible for any =
deployments that had more than just single bilateral relationships. =
You're point is taken (though I already fall in the not-MUST-understand =
camp) but I don't believe the must-understand requirement applies to JWK =
as the drafts are currently written, does it?
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 5:27 AM, Manger, James H =
<James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> This feature sounds so close in function to an HTTP Cache-Control =
header. Surely we can just use this existing mechanism? Particularly as =
the real use case mentioned in getting a JWK from an HTTPS URI.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> P.S. If we do defer specifying =93TTL for JWK=94 now, but after a few =
years experience of rolling keys in OpenID Connect decide it would be =
good, then I wonder how awkward deploying it would be due to the =
MUST-understand-everything rule?
>=20
> =20
>=20
> --
>=20
> James Manger
>=20
> =20
>=20
> On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =85this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be =
cached/used with a reasonable expectation that things would still work=85=20=

>=20
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Brian Campbell
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] TTL for JWK
>=20
> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to =
the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74=
 that defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>=20
> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK =
data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could =
be safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I =
don't want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint =
to help facility efficient and error free caching.
>=20
> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish =
their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and =
encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public =
key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat =
but it strikes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for =
JWK in other contexts.
> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value =
representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the =
specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work =
well as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>=20
> [1] =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>=20
> [2] =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2
>=20
> =20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


--Apple-Mail=_BE69C255-5801-4B76-9D6F-A4648B15BA09
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=windows-1252

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">I =
don't think that JWK itself &nbsp;has a MUST =
understand.<div><br></div><div>If you are including a JWK in the header =
of a JWE for say ECDH-ES then that element (the JWK content of epk) =
needs to be understood by the recipient. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>I think the question of how MUST =
understand applies to elements of a top level claims probably needs more =
clarification once we get over the poll.</div><div><br></div><div>I =
don't know that ttl as part of epk is sensible, &nbsp;perhaps exp might =
make sense but including ether of them in epk is probably mot =
helpful.</div><div><br></div><div>The limitation of the http caching =
approach is that it requires a pull, &nbsp;but logically if the endpoint =
is going to do something to refresh the key it needs to have something =
to pull from.</div><div><br></div><div>Now what I don't know is if in =
Matt's work using xmpp if there is a need for a refresh mechanism to =
refresh encryption keys, that can't use http =
caching.</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><=
br><div><div>On 2013-02-20, at 11:37 AM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>To Mike's comment on the ttl of =
an IP packet - I did extensive research on wikipedia that suggests a TTL =
can either be a counter or a time-stamp. The idea is the same - discard =
or stop using at such and such a point. TTL may not be right but it =
seemed closer than exp for what I was aiming for.<br>

<br></div>To James and John's comment on JWK Set and HTTP, I was =
thinking a per key usage but the way I was envisioning it does =
ultimately result in the whole JWK Set being refreshed (re-fetched?) and =
that would argue for it being at the JWK Set level. And yeah, at that =
point it'd make sense to just use HTTP cache control. I'd been trying to =
avoid that because of a suspicion that the HTTP headers would likely be =
set wrong or ignored by some. But using that as a justification to =
reinvent the concept at another layer sounds rather silly when I say (er =
type) it out loud. So, I dunno, maybe this isn't such a great idea after =
all and using HTTP level caching mechanisms to address my particular =
problem is a better approach.&nbsp; <br>

<br></div>To James' other comment on "MUST-understand-everything" - I =
don't always answer rhetorical questions in a public forum but, what the =
heck, it'd be more than just awkward. It'd be darn near impossible for =
any deployments that had more than just single bilateral relationships. =
You're point is taken (though I already fall in the not-MUST-understand =
camp) but I don't believe the must-understand requirement applies to JWK =
as the drafts are currently written, does it?<br>

<br><br><div><br><br><div><br></div></div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, =
2013 at 5:27 AM, Manger, James H <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com" =
target=3D"_blank">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div link=3D"blue" =
vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-AU"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d">This feature sounds so close in function to an =
HTTP Cache-Control header. Surely we can just use this existing =
mechanism? Particularly as the real use case mentioned in getting a JWK =
from an HTTPS URI.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d">P.S. If we do defer specifying =93TTL for JWK=94 =
now, but after a few years experience of rolling keys in OpenID Connect =
decide it would be good, then I wonder how awkward deploying it would be =
due to the MUST-understand-everything rule?<u></u><u></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d">--<u></u><u></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d">James Manger<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p>

<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 4.0pt"><div><div class=3D"im"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On =
2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" =
target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>

</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1f497d">=85</span>this was =
more of a indicator about how long a key could be cached/used with a =
reasonable expectation that things would still work<span =
style=3D"color:#1f497d">=85</span><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1f497d" lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D"color:#1f497d" lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u><u></u></span></p>

</div><div class=3D"im"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&=
quot;" lang=3D"EN-US">From:</span></b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&=
quot;" lang=3D"EN-US"> <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian =
Campbell<br>

<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [jose] TTL for =
JWK</span><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u><u></u></span></p><div>
<div>
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">I'd like to float the =
idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the base JWK document, =
which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines =
parameters common to all key types [1].<br>

<br>The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK =
data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could =
be safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I =
don't want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint =
to help facility efficient and error free caching.<br>

<br>OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish =
their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and =
encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public =
key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat =
but it strikes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for =
JWK in other contexts.<br>

JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value =
representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the =
specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work =
well as the value for a "ttl" parameter.<br>

<br>[1] <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section=
-4" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-=
08#section-4</a><br><br>[2] <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#sect=
ion-2" =
target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-tok=
en-06#section-2</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>

</div></div></div></div></div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p></div></div></blockquote></div=
><br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a =
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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A fair question Prateek, but if you take that to it's logical end, it might
suggest that "use", "kid" and "alg" be removed from JWK as well.

But my resolve for this proposal is weakening so it's not worth arguing
about.


On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek Mishra
<prateek.mishra@oracle.com>wrote:

>  Shouldn't this be a part of a key management layer distinct from JWK?
>
> I was under the impression that JWK was limited to
>
> [quote]
>
>
> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
>    structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
>    defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
>    representing a set of JWKs.
>
> [\quote]
>
> - prateek
>
> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the
> base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 th=
at
> defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>
> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data
> and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be
> safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't
> want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to hel=
p
> facility efficient and error free caching.
>
> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their
> keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryptio=
n,
> there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to
> encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strik=
es
> me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other
> contexts.
> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the
> specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work wel=
l
> as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>
> [2]
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing listjose@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>A fair question Prateek, but if you take that to it&#=
39;s logical end, it might suggest that &quot;use&quot;, &quot;kid&quot; an=
d &quot;alg&quot; be removed from JWK as well. <br><br></div>But my resolve=
 for this proposal is weakening so it&#39;s not worth arguing about.<br>

</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed,=
 Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek Mishra <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:prateek.mishra@oracle.com" target=3D"_blank">prateek.mishra@oracle.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Shouldn&#39;t this be a part of a key management layer distinct from
    JWK? <br>
    <br>
    I was under the impression that JWK was limited to <br>
    <br>
    [quote]<br>
    <pre style=3D"text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-variant:normal=
;text-align:start;font-style:normal;font-weight:normal;line-height:1.2em;te=
xt-transform:none;font-size:13px;font-family:monospace;margin:0px;word-spac=
ing:0px">

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
   structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
   defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
   representing a set of JWKs. </pre>
    <div>[\quote]<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
      <br>
      - prateek<br>
    </font></span></div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"h5">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to float the idea of introducing a time=
 to
        live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably
        fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to
        all key types [1].<br>
        <br>
        The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of
        JWK data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long
        a key could be safely cached and used without needing to recheck
        the JWK source. I don&#39;t want it to be a hard expiration date fo=
r
        the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error
        free caching.<br>
        <br>
        OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities
        publish their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key
        rotation and encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate
        the TTL of a public key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn&#39;t
        the only way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way
        and one that might provide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
        JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric
        value representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
        UTC until the specified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it coul=
d
        be co-opted to work well as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; paramet=
er.<br>
        <br>
        [1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-=
key-08#section-4" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-j=
ose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br>
        <br>
        [2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web=
-token-06#section-2" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iet=
f-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a><br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      </div></div><div class=3D"im"><pre>__________________________________=
_____________
jose mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>
</pre>
    </div></blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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ditto.

2013/2/11 Edmund Jay <ejay@mgi1.com>

> +1 for new I-D.
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> *To:* "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
> *Sent:* Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM
> *Subject:* [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
>
> Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal
> over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from
> operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe
> strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail,
> the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base
> JOSE WG drafts.
>
> As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be
> submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and
> analysis that I think it needs.
>
> Thanks,
> Brian
>
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>


-- 
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en

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ditto.=A0<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2013/2/11 Edmund Jay <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ejay@mgi1.com" target=3D"_blank">ejay@mgi1.c=
om</a>&gt;</span><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,new york,times,serif;font-size:10pt">=
<div>+1 for new I-D.<br><br><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,new =
york,times,serif;font-size:10pt"><br><div style=3D"font-family:times new ro=
man,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt">
<font face=3D"Tahoma"><hr size=3D"1"><b><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Fr=
om:</span></b> Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.=
com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br><b><span style=
=3D"font-weight:bold">To:</span></b> &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.=
org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Sent:</span></b> Fri, February 8, 2013 =
3:01:51 PM<br><b><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject:</span></b> [jose=
] Proposal about the SPI proposal<br></font><div><div class=3D"h5"><br><div=
 dir=3D"ltr">
<div>Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal=
 over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from o=
perational complexity
 and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly that, without consi=
derably more analysis and specification detail, the current SPI work is muc=
h too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG drafts.<br>


<br></div>As an alternative I&#39;d like to request/propose that the SPI st=
uff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion a=
nd analysis that I think it needs.<br><div><br></div><div>Thanks,<br>Brian<=
br>


</div><div><br>[1] <a rel=3D"nofollow" href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-arc=
hive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/=
mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><br>
</div></div>
</div></div></div></div>



</div></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Nat Saki=
mura (=3Dnat)<div>Chairman, OpenID Foundation<br><a href=3D"http://nat.saki=
mura.org/" target=3D"_blank">http://nat.sakimura.org/</a><br>@_nat_en</div>

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Obviously, this will not be in a -00 draft for Orlando.  So discussion
should continue based on the text proposed to the list.

Does anyone have further technical comments?

--Richard


On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 11:25 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote:

> ditto.
>
> 2013/2/11 Edmund Jay <ejay@mgi1.com>
>
>> +1 for new I-D.
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> *To:* "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
>> *Sent:* Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM
>> *Subject:* [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
>>
>> Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal
>> over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from
>> operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe
>> strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail,
>> the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base
>> JOSE WG drafts.
>>
>> As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be
>> submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and
>> analysis that I think it needs.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Brian
>>
>> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Obviously, this will not be in a -00 draft for Orlando. =
=A0So discussion should continue based on the text proposed to the list.<di=
v><br></div><div style>Does anyone have further technical comments?</div><d=
iv>
<br><div style>--Richard</div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 11:25 AM, Nat Sakimura=
 <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">sakimura@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">ditto.=A0<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
2013/2/11 Edmund Jay <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ejay@mgi1.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">ejay@mgi1.com</a>&gt;</span><br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5">
<div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,new york,times,serif;font-size:10pt">=
<div>+1 for new I-D.<br><br><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,new =
york,times,serif;font-size:10pt"><br><div style=3D"font-family:times new ro=
man,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt">

<font face=3D"Tahoma"><hr size=3D"1"><b><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Fr=
om:</span></b> Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.=
com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br><b><span style=
=3D"font-weight:bold">To:</span></b> &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.=
org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>

<b><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Sent:</span></b> Fri, February 8, 2013 =
3:01:51 PM<br><b><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject:</span></b> [jose=
] Proposal about the SPI proposal<br></font><div><div><br><div dir=3D"ltr">
<div>Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal=
 over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from o=
perational complexity
 and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly that, without consi=
derably more analysis and specification detail, the current SPI work is muc=
h too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG drafts.<br>


<br></div>As an alternative I&#39;d like to request/propose that the SPI st=
uff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion a=
nd analysis that I think it needs.<br><div><br></div><div>Thanks,<br>Brian<=
br>



</div><div><br>[1] <a rel=3D"nofollow" href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-arc=
hive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/=
mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><br>
</div></div>
</div></div></div></div>



</div></div><br></div></div><div class=3D"im">_____________________________=
__________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></div></blockquote></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"=
><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)<div>Chai=
rman, OpenID Foundation<br><a href=3D"http://nat.sakimura.org/" target=3D"_=
blank">http://nat.sakimura.org/</a><br>
@_nat_en</div>
</font></span><br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
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<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Edmund Jay <ejay@mgi1.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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See my questions/issues in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curren=
t/msg01549.html, which were:
  - What are the security implications of repeatedly reusing the same CMK a=
nd IV and how can/should they be mitigated?
  - Is having the absence of an "alg" field, paired with the presence of an=
 "spi" field the best way to handle this?
  - What are the complexity implications of having JWEs no longer contain a=
 fixed set of field?
  - Would JWSs similarly have a different number of fields?
  - Indeed, is the proposal even applicable in the JWS case, or does it onl=
y make sense for JWEs?
  - What are the motivating use cases for this functionality?
  - What syntax would be used for the "spi" parameter?  Unrestricted Unicod=
e strings?  Base64url-encoded byte strings?  UUIDs? ...

I don't think a number of them have been answered.

                                                            Thanks,
                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Wednesday, February 20, 2013 10:04 AM
To: Nat Sakimura
Cc: Brian Campbell; jose@ietf.org; Edmund Jay
Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal

Obviously, this will not be in a -00 draft for Orlando.  So discussion shou=
ld continue based on the text proposed to the list.

Does anyone have further technical comments?

--Richard

On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 11:25 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com<mailto:s=
akimura@gmail.com>> wrote:
ditto.
2013/2/11 Edmund Jay <ejay@mgi1.com<mailto:ejay@mgi1.com>>
+1 for new I-D.


________________________________
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com<mailto:bcampbell@pingident=
ity.com>>
To: "jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>" <jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.o=
rg>>
Sent: Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM
Subject: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal

Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over=
 the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operat=
ional complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe strongly tha=
t, without considerably more analysis and specification detail, the current=
 SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base JOSE WG draf=
ts.
As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be submitt=
ed as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and analysis th=
at I think it needs.

Thanks,
Brian

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html

_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose



--
Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en

_______________________________________________
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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">See my questions/issues i=
n
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01549.html"=
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01549.html</a>, which=
 were:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What are the sec=
urity implications of repeatedly reusing the same CMK and IV and how can/sh=
ould they be mitigated?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - Is having the ab=
sence of an &#8220;alg&#8221; field, paired with the presence of an &#8220;=
spi&#8221; field the best way to handle this?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What are the com=
plexity implications of having JWEs no longer contain a fixed set of field?=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - Would JWSs simil=
arly have a different number of fields?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - Indeed, is the p=
roposal even applicable in the JWS case, or does it only make sense for JWE=
s?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What are the mot=
ivating use cases for this functionality?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp; - What syntax woul=
d be used for the &#8220;spi&#8221; parameter?&nbsp; Unrestricted Unicode s=
trings?&nbsp; Base64url-encoded byte strings?&nbsp; UUIDs? &#8230;<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I don&#8217;t think a num=
ber of them have been answered.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 20, 2013 10:04 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Nat Sakimura<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Brian Campbell; jose@ietf.org; Edmund Jay<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Obviously, this will not be in a -00 draft for Orlan=
do. &nbsp;So discussion should continue based on the text proposed to the l=
ist.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Does anyone have further technical comments?<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 11:25 AM, Nat Sakimura &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">sakimura@gmail.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">ditto.&nbsp;<o:p></o:=
p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2013/2/11 Edmund Jay &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ejay@mgi1=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ejay@mgi1.com</a>&gt;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&#43;1 fo=
r new I-D.<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ta=
homa&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center"><span=
 style=3D"font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<hr size=3D"1" width=3D"100%" align=3D"center">
</span></div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&qu=
ot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Tahom=
a&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcamp=
bell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;=
<br>
<b>To:</b> &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ie=
tf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jos=
e@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal</span><o:p></o:p></p=
>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Maybe this was appare=
nt from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over the last couple days=
[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operational complexity and =
fragility to security problems. I believe
 strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail=
, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base=
 JOSE WG drafts.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that t=
he SPI stuff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional dis=
cussion and analysis that I think it needs.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<br>
Brian<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.h=
tml" target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">_____________________=
__________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#888888"><br>
<br clear=3D"all">
<span class=3D"hoenzb"><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span class=3D"hoenzb"><span style=3D"color:#888888"=
>-- </span></span><span style=3D"color:#888888"><br>
<span class=3D"hoenzb">Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)</span></span><span class=3D"ho=
enzb"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#888888">Chairman, OpenID Found=
ation<br>
<a href=3D"http://nat.sakimura.org/" target=3D"_blank">http://nat.sakimura.=
org/</a><br>
@_nat_en</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 18:24:02 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Yeah, even after reading the thread, this proposal seems really unclear.

Now, my first thought on reading Brian's initial mail was, "oh, it looks
like we're creeping back toward X.509!"  Which I don't mean as a bad thing.
 After all, a lot of the fields we already have in JWK are analogous to
PKIX fields, and what are certificates but a key, some attributes, and a
signature over that package.  If we were going to go down that path
(PKIJ?), then this sort of attribute would completely make sense,
especially if it were phrased as an absolute time, like the PKIX notAfter.

But if we are going to go down that path, I think we need a recharter...

--Richard






On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.co=
m
> wrote:

> A fair question Prateek, but if you take that to it's logical end, it
> might suggest that "use", "kid" and "alg" be removed from JWK as well.
>
> But my resolve for this proposal is weakening so it's not worth arguing
> about.
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek Mishra <prateek.mishra@oracle.co=
m
> > wrote:
>
>>  Shouldn't this be a part of a key management layer distinct from JWK?
>>
>> I was under the impression that JWK was limited to
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>>
>> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
>>    structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
>>    defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
>>    representing a set of JWKs.
>>
>> [\quote]
>>
>> - prateek
>>
>> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to th=
e
>> base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 t=
hat
>> defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>>
>> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK dat=
a
>> and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be
>> safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don'=
t
>> want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to he=
lp
>> facility efficient and error free caching.
>>
>> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their
>> keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encrypti=
on,
>> there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to
>> encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it stri=
kes
>> me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other
>> contexts.
>> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
>> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the
>> specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work we=
ll
>> as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>>
>> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>>
>> [2]
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing listjose@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Yeah, even after reading the thread, this proposal seems r=
eally unclear.<div><br></div><div style>Now, my first thought on reading Br=
ian&#39;s initial mail was, &quot;oh, it looks like we&#39;re creeping back=
 toward X.509!&quot; =A0Which I don&#39;t mean as a bad thing. =A0After all=
, a lot of the fields we already have in JWK are analogous to PKIX fields, =
and what are certificates but a key, some attributes, and a signature over =
that package. =A0If we were going to go down that path (PKIJ?), then this s=
ort of attribute would completely make sense, especially if it were phrased=
 as an absolute time, like the PKIX notAfter.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>But if we are going to go down that path, I=
 think we need a recharter...</div><div style><br></div><div style>--Richar=
d</div><div style><br></div><div style><br></div><div style><br></div><div =
style>
<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pi=
ngidentity.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>A fair question Pratee=
k, but if you take that to it&#39;s logical end, it might suggest that &quo=
t;use&quot;, &quot;kid&quot; and &quot;alg&quot; be removed from JWK as wel=
l. <br>
<br></div>But my resolve for this proposal is weakening so it&#39;s not wor=
th arguing about.<br>

</div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek M=
ishra <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:prateek.mishra@oracle.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">prateek.mishra@oracle.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Shouldn&#39;t this be a part of a key management layer distinct from
    JWK? <br>
    <br>
    I was under the impression that JWK was limited to <br>
    <br>
    [quote]<br>
    <pre style=3D"text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-variant:normal=
;text-align:start;font-style:normal;font-weight:normal;line-height:1.2em;te=
xt-transform:none;font-size:13px;font-family:monospace;margin:0px;word-spac=
ing:0px">

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
   structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
   defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
   representing a set of JWKs. </pre>
    <div>[\quote]<span><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
      <br>
      - prateek<br>
    </font></span></div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to float the idea of introducing a time=
 to
        live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably
        fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to
        all key types [1].<br>
        <br>
        The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of
        JWK data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long
        a key could be safely cached and used without needing to recheck
        the JWK source. I don&#39;t want it to be a hard expiration date fo=
r
        the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error
        free caching.<br>
        <br>
        OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities
        publish their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key
        rotation and encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate
        the TTL of a public key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn&#39;t
        the only way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way
        and one that might provide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
        JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric
        value representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
        UTC until the specified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it coul=
d
        be co-opted to work well as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; paramet=
er.<br>
        <br>
        [1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-=
key-08#section-4" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-j=
ose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br>
        <br>
        [2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web=
-token-06#section-2" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iet=
f-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a><br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      </div></div><div><pre>_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>
</pre>
    </div></blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 18:33:14 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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+1 for removing that one too.

On Wednesday, February 20, 2013, Manger, James H wrote:

> > I don't believe the must-understand requirement applies to JWK as the
> drafts are currently written, does it?****
>
> ** **
>
> It certainly does.****
>
> draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08 section 4 =93JSON Web Key (JWK) Format=94=
.****
>
> ** **
>
>    Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST**=
*
> *
>
>    be understood by implementations using them.****
>
> ** **
>
> --****
>
> James Manger****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* Brian Campbell [mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com<javascript:_e({=
}, 'cvml', 'bcampbell@pingidentity.com');>]
>
> *Sent:* Thursday, 21 February 2013 1:37 AM
> *To:* Manger, James H
> *Cc:* jose@ietf.org <javascript:_e({}, 'cvml', 'jose@ietf.org');>
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] TTL for JWK****
>
> ** **
>
> To Mike's comment on the ttl of an IP packet - I did extensive research o=
n
> wikipedia that suggests a TTL can either be a counter or a time-stamp. Th=
e
> idea is the same - discard or stop using at such and such a point. TTL ma=
y
> not be right but it seemed closer than exp for what I was aiming for.****
>
> To James and John's comment on JWK Set and HTTP, I was thinking a per key
> usage but the way I was envisioning it does ultimately result in the whol=
e
> JWK Set being refreshed (re-fetched?) and that would argue for it being a=
t
> the JWK Set level. And yeah, at that point it'd make sense to just use HT=
TP
> cache control. I'd been trying to avoid that because of a suspicion that
> the HTTP headers would likely be set wrong or ignored by some. But using
> that as a justification to reinvent the concept at another layer sounds
> rather silly when I say (er type) it out loud. So, I dunno, maybe this
> isn't such a great idea after all and using HTTP level caching mechanisms
> to address my particular problem is a better approach.  ****
>
> To James' other comment on "MUST-understand-everything" - I don't always
> answer rhetorical questions in a public forum but, what the heck, it'd be
> more than just awkward. It'd be darn near impossible for any deployments
> that had more than just single bilateral relationships. You're point is
> taken (though I already fall in the not-MUST-understand camp) but I don't
> believe the must-understand requirement applies to JWK as the drafts are
> currently written, does it?
>
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 5:27 AM, Manger, James H <
> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:****
>
> This feature sounds so close in function to an HTTP Cache-Control header.
> Surely we can just use this existing mechanism? Particularly as the real
> use case mentioned in getting a JWK from an HTTPS URI.****
>
>  ****
>
>  ****
>
> P.S. If we do defer specifying =93TTL for JWK=94 now, but after a few yea=
rs
> experience of rolling keys in OpenID Connect decide it would be good, the=
n
> I wonder how awkward deploying it would be due to the
> MUST-understand-everything rule?****
>
>  ****
>
> --****
>
> James Manger****
>
>  ****
>
> On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:****
>
>  ****
>
> =85this was more of a indicator about how long a key could be cached/used
> with a reasonable expectation that things would still work=85 ****
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Brian Campbell
> *Sent:* Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] TTL for JWK****
>
> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to the
> base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =A74 th=
at
> defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>
> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK data
> and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be
> safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don't
> want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to hel=
p
> facility efficient and error free caching.
>
> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish their
> keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryptio=
n,
> there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to
> encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it strik=
es
> me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other
> contexts.
> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the
> specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work wel=
l
> as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>
> [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-tok<http://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2>
>

--f46d0444e849d2a12804d6306114
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

+1 for removing that one too.=A0<span></span><br><br>On Wednesday, February=
 20, 2013, Manger, James H  wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div lang=3D"EN-AU" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al">&gt; I don&#39;t believe the must-understand requirement applies to JWK=
 as the drafts are currently written, does it?<span style=3D"font-size:11.0=
pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u=
></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">It certainly does.<u><=
/u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">draft-ietf-jose-json-web-=
key-08 section 4 =93JSON Web Key (JWK) Format=94.<u></u><u></u></span></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal">
<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-=
serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=A0=A0 Additional me=
mbers MAY be present in the JWK.=A0 If present, they MUST<u></u><u></u></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">=
=A0=A0 be understood by implementations using them.<u></u><u></u></span></p=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">--<u></u><u></u></span></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;=
Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">James Manger<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p><div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0=
cm 4.0pt">
<div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt=
 0cm 0cm 0cm"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-=
size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</s=
pan></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ta=
homa&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Brian Campbell [mailto:<a href=3D"javas=
cript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;bcampbell@pingidentity.com&#39;);" target=
=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 February 2013 1:37 AM<br><b>To:</b> Manger, James=
 H<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"javascript:_e({}, &#39;cvml&#39;, &#39;jose@iet=
f.org&#39;);" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [j=
ose] TTL for JWK<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><div><div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">To Mike&#39;s comment on =
the ttl of an IP packet - I did extensive research on wikipedia that sugges=
ts a TTL can either be a counter or a time-stamp. The idea is the same - di=
scard or stop using at such and such a point. TTL may not be right but it s=
eemed closer than exp for what I was aiming for.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">To James and Jo=
hn&#39;s comment on JWK Set and HTTP, I was thinking a per key usage but th=
e way I was envisioning it does ultimately result in the whole JWK Set bein=
g refreshed (re-fetched?) and that would argue for it being at the JWK Set =
level. And yeah, at that point it&#39;d make sense to just use HTTP cache c=
ontrol. I&#39;d been trying to avoid that because of a suspicion that the H=
TTP headers would likely be set wrong or ignored by some. But using that as=
 a justification to reinvent the concept at another layer sounds rather sil=
ly when I say (er type) it out loud. So, I dunno, maybe this isn&#39;t such=
 a great idea after all and using HTTP level caching mechanisms to address =
my particular problem is a better approach.=A0 <u></u><u></u></p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">To James&#39; o=
ther comment on &quot;MUST-understand-everything&quot; - I don&#39;t always=
 answer rhetorical questions in a public forum but, what the heck, it&#39;d=
 be more than just awkward. It&#39;d be darn near impossible for any deploy=
ments that had more than just single bilateral relationships. You&#39;re po=
int is taken (though I already fall in the not-MUST-understand camp) but I =
don&#39;t believe the must-understand requirement applies to JWK as the dra=
fts are currently written, does it?<br>
<br><u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12=
.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p=
></div></div></div><div><p style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u>=
</p><div><p>
On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 5:27 AM, Manger, James H &lt;<a>James.H.Manger@team=
.telstra.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p><div><div><p><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color=
:#1f497d">This feature sounds so close in function to an HTTP Cache-Control=
 header. Surely we can just use this existing mechanism? Particularly as th=
e real use case mentioned in getting a JWK from an HTTPS URI.</span><u></u>=
<u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p><p><span style=3D=
"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;co=
lor:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">P.S. If we do defer specifying =93TTL for JWK=
=94 now, but after a few years experience of rolling keys in OpenID Connect=
 decide it would be good, then I wonder how awkward deploying it would be d=
ue to the MUST-understand-everything rule?</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p><div><p><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quo=
t;;color:#1f497d">--</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">James Manger</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><p=
><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans=
-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt"><div><div><div><div><p>On 2013-02-19, at 9:26 PM, Brian Campbell &lt=
;<a>bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><p>=A0=
<u></u><u></u></p>
</div><div><p><span style=3D"color:#1f497d">=85</span>this was more of a in=
dicator about how long a key could be cached/used with a reasonable expecta=
tion that things would still work<span style=3D"color:#1f497d">=85</span><s=
pan lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot=
;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p>
</div><div><div><div><div><div><p><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-siz=
e:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span=
></b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahom=
a&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a>jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a>jo=
se-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Brian Campbell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 3:43 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a>jose@ietf.=
org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [jose] TTL for JWK</span><u></u><u></u></p><div>=
<div><div><p><span lang=3D"EN-US">I&#39;d like to float the idea of introdu=
cing a time to live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probabl=
y fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to all key =
types [1].<br>
<br>The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK da=
ta and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could be sa=
fely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don&#39;t=
 want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to help=
 facility efficient and error free caching.<br>
<br>OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish thei=
r keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encryptio=
n, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to e=
ncrypt. Of course, this isn&#39;t the only way to skin that cat but it stri=
kes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other co=
ntexts.<br>
JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric value r=
epresenting the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the spec=
ified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it could be co-opted to work well=
 as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; parameter.<br>
<br>[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-=
08#section-4" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-=
json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br><br>[2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2" target=3D"_blank">http://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-tok</a></span></p>
</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></d=
iv></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>

--f46d0444e849d2a12804d6306114--

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References: <CA+k3eCTZ4KeC7ZH41OWkjkLCp0RiRBkze=4NpFO7AG5zVq-bJQ@mail.gmail.com> <5124E39C.2030804@oracle.com> <CA+k3eCSGPfpUbeBkSCMTh+jAJgxMP8BWsgdLPt_CqsvkaXASCQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgShtAZssKzX_jiTroFczsepG=d=QaV_8=1kYoTk9UiHmg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 16:58:53 -0700
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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Prateek Mishra <prateek.mishra@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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I was specifically trying to avoid "creeping back toward X.509" and that
was a big part of the distinction I was trying to make in calling it TTL
and treating it as some kind of cache duration hint while not wanting it to
be a hard expiration date that had to be validated.

But, again, I think it's moot because I've been swayed here into thinking
that this proposal isn't fully baked and that I can use other means to
address the immediate problem I'm trying to solve.

Thanks to everyone for the input though. It's been valuable (to me at
least) to help clarify some thinking around these concepts.


On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Yeah, even after reading the thread, this proposal seems really unclear.
>
> Now, my first thought on reading Brian's initial mail was, "oh, it looks
> like we're creeping back toward X.509!"  Which I don't mean as a bad thin=
g.
>  After all, a lot of the fields we already have in JWK are analogous to
> PKIX fields, and what are certificates but a key, some attributes, and a
> signature over that package.  If we were going to go down that path
> (PKIJ?), then this sort of attribute would completely make sense,
> especially if it were phrased as an absolute time, like the PKIX notAfter=
.
>
> But if we are going to go down that path, I think we need a recharter...
>
> --Richard
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Brian Campbell <
> bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>
>> A fair question Prateek, but if you take that to it's logical end, it
>> might suggest that "use", "kid" and "alg" be removed from JWK as well.
>>
>> But my resolve for this proposal is weakening so it's not worth arguing
>> about.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek Mishra <
>> prateek.mishra@oracle.com> wrote:
>>
>>>  Shouldn't this be a part of a key management layer distinct from JWK?
>>>
>>> I was under the impression that JWK was limited to
>>>
>>> [quote]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
>>>    structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
>>>    defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
>>>    representing a set of JWKs.
>>>
>>> [\quote]
>>>
>>> - prateek
>>>
>>> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to
>>> the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =
=A74
>>> that defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>>>
>>> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK
>>> data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key could=
 be
>>> safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I don=
't
>>> want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to h=
elp
>>> facility efficient and error free caching.
>>>
>>> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish thei=
r
>>> keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and encrypt=
ion,
>>> there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public key used to
>>> encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat but it str=
ikes
>>> me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in other
>>> contexts.
>>> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
>>> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until the
>>> specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work w=
ell
>>> as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>>>
>>> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-=
4
>>>
>>> [2]
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing listjose@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jos=
e
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>I was specifically trying to avoid &quot;creepin=
g back toward X.509&quot; and that was a big part of the distinction I was =
trying to make in calling it TTL and treating it as some kind of cache dura=
tion hint while not wanting it to be a hard expiration date that had to be =
validated. <br>

<br></div>But, again, I think it&#39;s moot because I&#39;ve been swayed he=
re into thinking that this proposal isn&#39;t fully baked and that I can us=
e other means to address the immediate problem I&#39;m trying to solve.<br>

<br></div>Thanks to everyone for the input though. It&#39;s been valuable (=
to me at least) to help clarify some thinking around these concepts.<br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Fe=
b 20, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Yeah, even after reading th=
e thread, this proposal seems really unclear.<div><br></div><div>Now, my fi=
rst thought on reading Brian&#39;s initial mail was, &quot;oh, it looks lik=
e we&#39;re creeping back toward X.509!&quot; =A0Which I don&#39;t mean as =
a bad thing. =A0After all, a lot of the fields we already have in JWK are a=
nalogous to PKIX fields, and what are certificates but a key, some attribut=
es, and a signature over that package. =A0If we were going to go down that =
path (PKIJ?), then this sort of attribute would completely make sense, espe=
cially if it were phrased as an absolute time, like the PKIX notAfter.</div=
>


<div><br></div><div>But if we are going to go down that path, I think we ne=
ed a recharter...</div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div>=
<br></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>

<div>
<br></div></font></span></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, 20=
13 at 10:19 AM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcam=
pbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>A fair question Pratee=
k, but if you take that to it&#39;s logical end, it might suggest that &quo=
t;use&quot;, &quot;kid&quot; and &quot;alg&quot; be removed from JWK as wel=
l. <br>


<br></div>But my resolve for this proposal is weakening so it&#39;s not wor=
th arguing about.<br>

</div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek Mishra <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:prateek.mishra@oracle.com" target=3D"_blank">prateek.mishra=
@oracle.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>




<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Shouldn&#39;t this be a part of a key management layer distinct from
    JWK? <br>
    <br>
    I was under the impression that JWK was limited to <br>
    <br>
    [quote]<br>
    <pre style=3D"text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-variant:normal=
;text-align:start;font-style:normal;font-weight:normal;line-height:1.2em;te=
xt-transform:none;font-size:13px;font-family:monospace;margin:0px;word-spac=
ing:0px">


JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
   structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
   defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
   representing a set of JWKs. </pre>
    <div>[\quote]<span><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
      <br>
      - prateek<br>
    </font></span></div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to float the idea of introducing a time=
 to
        live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably
        fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to
        all key types [1].<br>
        <br>
        The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of
        JWK data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long
        a key could be safely cached and used without needing to recheck
        the JWK source. I don&#39;t want it to be a hard expiration date fo=
r
        the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error
        free caching.<br>
        <br>
        OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities
        publish their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key
        rotation and encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate
        the TTL of a public key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn&#39;t
        the only way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way
        and one that might provide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
        JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric
        value representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
        UTC until the specified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it coul=
d
        be co-opted to work well as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; paramet=
er.<br>
        <br>
        [1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-=
key-08#section-4" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-j=
ose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br>
        <br>
        [2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web=
-token-06#section-2" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iet=
f-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a><br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      </div></div><div><pre>_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>
</pre>
    </div></blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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Doh, you got me with an RTFID!  ;)

I guess it's safe to say my nascent JOSE implementation doesn't enforce the
MUST-understand for JWK. Actually, it doesn't for anything at the moment.
For whatever that's worth...

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Doh, you got me with an RTFID!=A0 ;)<br><br></div>I g=
uess it&#39;s safe to say my nascent JOSE implementation doesn&#39;t enforc=
e the MUST-understand for JWK. Actually, it doesn&#39;t for anything at the=
 moment. For whatever that&#39;s worth...<br>

</div>

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Prateek Mishra <prateek.mishra@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] TTL for JWK
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One thing to note, though: If all fields weren't critical, then Brian could
just add this to his JWKs and the parsers wouldn't choke.  This is actually
a nice example of a non-critical field.

Thanks,
--Richard



On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com>wrote:

> I was specifically trying to avoid "creeping back toward X.509" and that
> was a big part of the distinction I was trying to make in calling it TTL
> and treating it as some kind of cache duration hint while not wanting it =
to
> be a hard expiration date that had to be validated.
>
> But, again, I think it's moot because I've been swayed here into thinking
> that this proposal isn't fully baked and that I can use other means to
> address the immediate problem I'm trying to solve.
>
> Thanks to everyone for the input though. It's been valuable (to me at
> least) to help clarify some thinking around these concepts.
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
>> Yeah, even after reading the thread, this proposal seems really unclear.
>>
>> Now, my first thought on reading Brian's initial mail was, "oh, it looks
>> like we're creeping back toward X.509!"  Which I don't mean as a bad thi=
ng.
>>  After all, a lot of the fields we already have in JWK are analogous to
>> PKIX fields, and what are certificates but a key, some attributes, and a
>> signature over that package.  If we were going to go down that path
>> (PKIJ?), then this sort of attribute would completely make sense,
>> especially if it were phrased as an absolute time, like the PKIX notAfte=
r.
>>
>> But if we are going to go down that path, I think we need a recharter...
>>
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Brian Campbell <
>> bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>>
>>> A fair question Prateek, but if you take that to it's logical end, it
>>> might suggest that "use", "kid" and "alg" be removed from JWK as well.
>>>
>>> But my resolve for this proposal is weakening so it's not worth arguing
>>> about.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek Mishra <
>>> prateek.mishra@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>  Shouldn't this be a part of a key management layer distinct from JWK?
>>>>
>>>> I was under the impression that JWK was limited to
>>>>
>>>> [quote]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
>>>>    structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
>>>>    defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
>>>>    representing a set of JWKs.
>>>>
>>>> [\quote]
>>>>
>>>> - prateek
>>>>
>>>> I'd like to float the idea of introducing a time to live parameter to
>>>> the base JWK document, which could probably fit in as a subsection of =
=A74
>>>> that defines parameters common to all key types [1].
>>>>
>>>> The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of JWK
>>>> data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long a key coul=
d be
>>>> safely cached and used without needing to recheck the JWK source. I do=
n't
>>>> want it to be a hard expiration date for the key but rather a hint to =
help
>>>> facility efficient and error free caching.
>>>>
>>>> OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities publish
>>>> their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key rotation and
>>>> encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate the TTL of a public=
 key
>>>> used to encrypt. Of course, this isn't the only way to skin that cat b=
ut it
>>>> strikes me as a good way and one that might provide utility for JWK in
>>>> other contexts.
>>>> JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is "A JSON numeric value
>>>> representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z UTC until th=
e
>>>> specified UTC date/time" that seems like it could be co-opted to work =
well
>>>> as the value for a "ttl" parameter.
>>>>
>>>> [1]
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-08#section-4
>>>>
>>>> [2]
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-=
2
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> jose mailing listjose@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jo=
se
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> jose mailing list
>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>
>>>
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">One thing to note, though: If all fields weren&#39;t criti=
cal, then Brian could just add this to his JWKs and the parsers wouldn&#39;=
t choke. =A0This is actually a nice example of a non-critical field.<div><b=
r>
</div><div style>Thanks,</div><div style>--Richard</div><div style><br></di=
v></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On We=
d, Feb 20, 2013 at 6:58 PM, Brian Campbell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentit=
y.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>I was specificall=
y trying to avoid &quot;creeping back toward X.509&quot; and that was a big=
 part of the distinction I was trying to make in calling it TTL and treatin=
g it as some kind of cache duration hint while not wanting it to be a hard =
expiration date that had to be validated. <br>


<br></div>But, again, I think it&#39;s moot because I&#39;ve been swayed he=
re into thinking that this proposal isn&#39;t fully baked and that I can us=
e other means to address the immediate problem I&#39;m trying to solve.<br>


<br></div>Thanks to everyone for the input though. It&#39;s been valuable (=
to me at least) to help clarify some thinking around these concepts.<br></d=
iv><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Richard Barnes =
<span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@i=
pv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Yeah, even after reading th=
e thread, this proposal seems really unclear.<div><br></div><div>Now, my fi=
rst thought on reading Brian&#39;s initial mail was, &quot;oh, it looks lik=
e we&#39;re creeping back toward X.509!&quot; =A0Which I don&#39;t mean as =
a bad thing. =A0After all, a lot of the fields we already have in JWK are a=
nalogous to PKIX fields, and what are certificates but a key, some attribut=
es, and a signature over that package. =A0If we were going to go down that =
path (PKIJ?), then this sort of attribute would completely make sense, espe=
cially if it were phrased as an absolute time, like the PKIX notAfter.</div=
>



<div><br></div><div>But if we are going to go down that path, I think we ne=
ed a recharter...</div><span><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div><div>--=
Richard</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>

<div>
<br></div></font></span></div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 10:19 AM, Brian Campbell=
 <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=
=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>



<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>A fair question Pratee=
k, but if you take that to it&#39;s logical end, it might suggest that &quo=
t;use&quot;, &quot;kid&quot; and &quot;alg&quot; be removed from JWK as wel=
l. <br>



<br></div>But my resolve for this proposal is weakening so it&#39;s not wor=
th arguing about.<br>

</div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Prateek Mishra <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:prateek.mishra@oracle.com" target=3D"_blank">prateek.mishra=
@oracle.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>





<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Shouldn&#39;t this be a part of a key management layer distinct from
    JWK? <br>
    <br>
    I was under the impression that JWK was limited to <br>
    <br>
    [quote]<br>
    <pre style=3D"text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-variant:normal=
;text-align:start;font-style:normal;font-weight:normal;line-height:1.2em;te=
xt-transform:none;font-size:13px;font-family:monospace;margin:0px;word-spac=
ing:0px">


JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data
   structure that represents a public key.  This specification also
   defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for
   representing a set of JWKs. </pre>
    <div>[\quote]<span><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
      <br>
      - prateek<br>
    </font></span></div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to float the idea of introducing a time=
 to
        live parameter to the base JWK document, which could probably
        fit in as a subsection of =A74 that defines parameters common to
        all key types [1].<br>
        <br>
        The motivation is that many uses of JWKs will involve caching of
        JWK data and a TTL parameter could be used to indicate how long
        a key could be safely cached and used without needing to recheck
        the JWK source. I don&#39;t want it to be a hard expiration date fo=
r
        the key but rather a hint to help facility efficient and error
        free caching.<br>
        <br>
        OpenID Connect has a real use case for this where entities
        publish their keys via a JWK Set at an HTTPS URL. To support key
        rotation and encryption, there needs to be some way to indicate
        the TTL of a public key used to encrypt. Of course, this isn&#39;t
        the only way to skin that cat but it strikes me as a good way
        and one that might provide utility for JWK in other contexts.<br>
        JSON Web Token [2] defines a data type that is &quot;A JSON numeric
        value representing the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
        UTC until the specified UTC date/time&quot; that seems like it coul=
d
        be co-opted to work well as the value for a &quot;ttl&quot; paramet=
er.<br>
        <br>
        [1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-=
key-08#section-4" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-j=
ose-json-web-key-08#section-4</a><br>
        <br>
        [2] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web=
-token-06#section-2" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iet=
f-oauth-json-web-token-06#section-2</a><br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      </div></div><div><pre>_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a>
</pre>
    </div></blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Axel.Nennker@telekom.de
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Cc: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>, Michael Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, tbray@textuality.com, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Matthew Miller <mamille2@cisco.com>, James Manger <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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Axel,
This comment is not very helpful without a technical argument.
--Richard


On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 1:07 AM, <Axel.Nennker@telekom.de> wrote:

> Mike is right. Canonicalization is =93evil=94.****
>
> Axel****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Tim Bray
> *Sent:* Tuesday, February 19, 2013 9:50 PM
> *To:* Mike Jones
> *Cc:* Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose; Matt Miller
> (mamille2)
>
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] canonical JSON****
>
> ** **
>
> My instinct, as the author of a reasonably popular library that generates
> canonical XML, is that JSON ought to be quite a bit easier.  But that=92s
> only interesting if Mike is wrong and there aren=92t better alternatives.=
 -T
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com=
>
> wrote:****
>
> [Repeating this on the correct thread...]
>
> I'm strongly against canonicalization.  The XML canonicalization
> experience was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other
> aspect of XML DSIG, XML ENC, etc.  Let's not repeat the mistakes of our
> elders. ;-)
>
> I also haven't seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves that
> can't be more easily solved another way.
>
>                                 -- Mike****
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Matt Miller (mamille2)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 12:35 PM
> To: Richard Barnes
> Cc: Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
> Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
>
> I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, but =
I
> can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.
>
> I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less
> thrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.
>  I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I
> think that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.
>
> By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems
> like a good thing to bring up there.
>
>
> - m&m
>
> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>
> PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1
>
> On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> > So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
> >
> > INPUT: JWK
> > 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with
> > {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3. Compute
> > digest over canonical form
> >
> > That seems generally agreeable to me.
> >
> > For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are
> > covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,
> > alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are
> grouped into a "meta"
> > sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
> >
> > For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization than
> > CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes
> > from RFC
> > 4627:
> > -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field name
> > -- No white space allowed
> > -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
> > -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
> > -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
> > -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes are
> > fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have been
> > discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string
> > aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt
> > printable ASCII.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
> >> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote
> >>> (
> >>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating
> >>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON if
> >>> a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars
> >>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers) and
> >>> it might be worth
> >>> considering.****
> >>>
> >>> ** **
> >>>
> >>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the
> >>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It
> >>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to
> >>> be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to be
> >>> programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
> >>>
> >>
> >> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does not
> >> employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point number=
s.
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose****
>
> ** **
>

--e89a8ff255d4817b4204d63faad4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div style>Axel,</div>This comment is not very helpful wit=
hout a technical argument.<div style>--Richard</div></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 1:07 A=
M,  <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Axel.Nennker@telekom.de" target=
=3D"_blank">Axel.Nennker@telekom.de</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"p=
urple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Mike is right=
. Canonicalization is =93evil=94.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Axel<u></u><u></u></span>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quo=
t;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-=
bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Bray<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 19, 2013 9:50 PM<br><b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br=
><b>Cc:</b> Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose; Matt Mille=
r (mamille2)</span></p><div><div class=3D"h5"><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose=
] canonical JSON<u></u><u></u></div>
</div><p></p><div><div class=3D"h5"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u=
></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">My instinct, as the author of a reasonably=
 popular library that generates canonical XML, is that JSON ought to be qui=
te a bit easier.=A0 But that=92s only interesting if Mike is wrong and ther=
e aren=92t better alternatives. -T<u></u><u></u></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0=
<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Mi=
ke Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">[Repeating this on the correct thread...]<br><br>I&#=
39;m strongly against canonicalization. =A0The XML canonicalization experie=
nce was horrible and resulted in more interop bugs than any other aspect of=
 XML DSIG, XML ENC, etc. =A0Let&#39;s not repeat the mistakes of our elders=
. ;-)<br>
<br>I also haven&#39;t seen a clear use case that canonicalization solves t=
hat can&#39;t be more easily solved another way.<br><span style=3D"color:#8=
88888"><br><span>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 -- Mike</span></span><u></u><u></u></p>
<div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>-----Original Message-----<br>From: <a=
 href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.=
org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">=
jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 12:35 PM<br>To: Richard Barnes<br>Cc: Dani=
el Holth; Manger, James H; jose<br>Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON<br><b=
r>I know I&#39;m still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML, =
but I can put that aside. =A0It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.<b=
r>
<br>I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I&#39;m le=
ss thrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that=
. =A0I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I =
think that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.<br>
<br>By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems =
like a good thing to bring up there.<br><br><br>- m&amp;m<br><br>Matt Mille=
r &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">mamille2@cis=
co.com</a> &gt;<br>
Cisco Systems, Inc.<br><br>PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1<br><br>On Feb 19, 2013,=
 at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_bl=
ank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br>&gt; So your fingerprint algorithm wo=
uld be something like the following?<br>
&gt;<br>&gt; INPUT: JWK<br>&gt; 1. Remove &quot;metadata&quot; fields. =A0S=
o, for RSA, you would be left with<br>&gt; {&quot;kty&quot;, &quot;n&quot;,=
 &quot;e&quot;} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3. Compute<br>&gt=
; digest over canonical form<br>
&gt;<br>&gt; That seems generally agreeable to me.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; For (1) =
to be possible, you would need to define which fields are<br>&gt; covered i=
n the fingerprint for each key type (&quot;kty&quot; value). =A0Or,<br>&gt;=
 alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are group=
ed into a &quot;meta&quot;<br>
&gt; sub-dict. =A0Which might be nice anyway.<br>&gt;<br>&gt; For (2), I ag=
ree that there is probably a better canonicalization than<br>&gt; CJSON. =
=A0The code I pasted earlier implements the following changes<br>&gt; from =
RFC<br>
&gt; 4627:<br>&gt; -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted =
by field name<br>&gt; -- No white space allowed<br>&gt; -- Numbers: Exponen=
t part must use &#39;e&#39;<br>&gt; -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use =
&#39;+&#39;<br>
&gt; -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros<br>&gt; -- Stri=
ngs: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes are<br>&gt; fai=
rly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have been<br>&gt; di=
scussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string<br>
&gt; aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt<br=
>&gt; printable ASCII.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt;<br>&gt; On Tue, Feb =
19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dholth@gmail.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">dholth@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H &lt;<br>&=
gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com" target=3D"_blank=
">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt=
; A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you quote<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; (<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonic=
al_JSON" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON</a>) ca=
n&#39;t handle floating<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; point numbers (or very large intege=
rs), and produces invalid JSON if<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt; [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for number=
s) and<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; it might be worth<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; considering.****<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; ** **<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Defining=
 JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; f=
irst of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt; can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments to<=
br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object t=
o be<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be ef=
ficient.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; I am only proposing a key =
fingerprinting specification that does not<br>
&gt;&gt; employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point nu=
mbers.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt; _______________________________________________<=
br>&gt; jose mailing list<br>&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br><br>__________________=
_____________________________<br>jose mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jos=
e@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>___________________________=
____________________<br>jose mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.or=
g" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><=
/div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></div></=
div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--e89a8ff255d4817b4204d63faad4--

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Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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That doesn't solve the problem.  The point of a fingerprint is to have an
identifier for the key that is shorter than the key itself. So a JWS with a
JWK payload is irrelevant.  Likewise, any solution that requires
base64-encoding is also irrelevant, since you would need to carry the
encoded version along in order to interpret the fingerprint.

--Richard


On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 7:15 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wrote:

> Nothing's preventing people from using the JWK as the payload of a JWS if
> you want to sign/MAC it - just like Matt's draft uses it as the payload of
> a JWE.  Problem solved. ;-)
>
>                                 -- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Justin Richer
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:41 PM
> To: Mike Jones
> Cc: Daniel Holth; Richard Barnes; jose; Matt Miller (mamille2); John
> Bradley; Manger, James H
> Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
>
> Since JWKs are passed around as JSON documents, and
> order/spacing/formatting of JSON documents isn't guaranteed, this approach
> won't work.
>
>   -- Justin
>
> On 02/19/2013 05:19 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
> > A SHA-256 hash of the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation of
> JWK seems like a fine fingerprint that requires no canonicalization.
> >
> >                               -- Mike
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> > Of John Bradley
> > Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:16 PM
> > To: Matt Miller (mamille2)
> > Cc: Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose
> > Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
> >
> > I suspect that a way to fingerprint a subset of a JWK is what is
> desired.  e.g. probably font want to include "kid" as you may want to use
> the fingerprint for that.
> >
> > I suspect that is possible without trying to come up with a general
> method to canonicallise JSON.
> >
> > One might be to ASN1 encode it:)  No that is crazy speak.
> >
> > I do empathize for the desire to have fingerprints without resorting to
> DER encoding.
> >
> > If we scope the problem down to having a canonical representation for a
> limited set of jwk elements that may be worth pursuing.
> >
> >
> > John  B.
> > On 2013-02-19, at 5:35 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> I know I'm still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues in XML,
> but I can put that aside.  It would be nice to have JWK fingerprinting.
> >>
> >> I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I'm less
> thrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with that.
>  I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, but I
> think that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.
> >>
> >> By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n seems
> like a good thing to bring up there.
> >>
> >>
> >> - m&m
> >>
> >> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
> >> Cisco Systems, Inc.
> >>
> >> PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1
> >>
> >> On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> >>
> >>> So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the following?
> >>>
> >>> INPUT: JWK
> >>> 1. Remove "metadata" fields.  So, for RSA, you would be left with
> >>> {"kty", "n", "e"} 2. Convert stripped JWK to canonical form 3.
> >>> Compute digest over canonical form
> >>>
> >>> That seems generally agreeable to me.
> >>>
> >>> For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields are
> >>> covered in the fingerprint for each key type ("kty" value).  Or,
> >>> alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fields are
> grouped into a "meta"
> >>> sub-dict.  Which might be nice anyway.
> >>>
> >>> For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalization
> >>> than CJSON.  The code I pasted earlier implements the following
> >>> changes from RFC
> >>> 4627:
> >>> -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by field
> >>> name
> >>> -- No white space allowed
> >>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must use 'e'
> >>> -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use '+'
> >>> -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros
> >>> -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those changes
> >>> are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that have
> >>> been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the string
> >>> aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like exempt
> >>> printable ASCII.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H <
> >>>> James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the one you
> >>>>> quote (
> >>>>> http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON) can't handle floating
> >>>>> point numbers (or very large integers), and produces invalid JSON
> >>>>> if a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping control chars
> >>>>> [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation for numbers)
> >>>>> and it might be worth
> >>>>> considering.****
> >>>>>
> >>>>> ** **
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte arrays, the
> >>>>> first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would be useful. It
> >>>>> can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encoded segments
> >>>>> to be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JSON object to
> >>>>> be programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be efficient.
> >>>>>
> >>>> I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification that does
> >>>> not employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or floating point
> numbers.
> >>>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> jose mailing list
> >>> jose@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> jose mailing list
> >> jose@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> > _______________________________________________
> > jose mailing list
> > jose@ietf.org
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>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">That doesn&#39;t solve the problem. =A0The point of a fing=
erprint is to have an identifier for the key that is shorter than the key i=
tself. So a JWS with a JWK payload is irrelevant. =A0Likewise, any solution=
 that requires base64-encoding is also irrelevant, since you would need to =
carry the encoded version along in order to interpret the fingerprint.<div>
<br></div><div style>--Richard</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 7:15 PM, Mike Jones <s=
pan dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=
=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Nothing&#39;s preventing people from using t=
he JWK as the payload of a JWS if you want to sign/MAC it - just like Matt&=
#39;s draft uses it as the payload of a JWE. =A0Problem solved. ;-)<br>

<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 -- Mike<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [m=
ailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>] O=
n Behalf Of Justin Richer<br>
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:41 PM<br>
To: Mike Jones<br>
Cc: Daniel Holth; Richard Barnes; jose; Matt Miller (mamille2); John Bradle=
y; Manger, James H<br>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON<br>
<br>
Since JWKs are passed around as JSON documents, and order/spacing/formattin=
g of JSON documents isn&#39;t guaranteed, this approach won&#39;t work.<br>
<br>
=A0 -- Justin<br>
<br>
On 02/19/2013 05:19 PM, Mike Jones wrote:<br>
&gt; A SHA-256 hash of the base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation o=
f JWK seems like a fine fingerprint that requires no canonicalization.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 -- Mike<br=
>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a>] On Behalf<br>
&gt; Of John Bradley<br>
&gt; Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 2:16 PM<br>
&gt; To: Matt Miller (mamille2)<br>
&gt; Cc: Richard Barnes; Daniel Holth; Manger, James H; jose<br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I suspect that a way to fingerprint a subset of a JWK is what is desir=
ed. =A0e.g. probably font want to include &quot;kid&quot; as you may want t=
o use the fingerprint for that.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I suspect that is possible without trying to come up with a general me=
thod to canonicallise JSON.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; One might be to ASN1 encode it:) =A0No that is crazy speak.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I do empathize for the desire to have fingerprints without resorting t=
o DER encoding.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If we scope the problem down to having a canonical representation for =
a limited set of jwk elements that may be worth pursuing.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; John =A0B.<br>
&gt; On 2013-02-19, at 5:35 PM, &quot;Matt Miller (mamille2)&quot; &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@cisco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I know I&#39;m still reeling from canonicalization (c14n) issues i=
n XML, but I can put that aside. =A0It would be nice to have JWK fingerprin=
ting.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I can see value in each JWK type defining what is canonical; I&#39=
;m less thrilled limiting metadata to a specific place, but could live with=
 that. =A0I can see where excluding metadata can get us in trouble later, b=
ut I think that would mean having a much more robust c14n approach.<br>

&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; By the way, there is going to be a JSON BoF in Orlando, and c14n s=
eems like a good thing to bring up there.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - m&amp;m<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Matt Miller &lt; <a href=3D"mailto:mamille2@cisco.com">mamille2@ci=
sco.com</a> &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Cisco Systems, Inc.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; PS: 42 vs 4.2e0 vs 4.2e1<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Feb 19, 2013, at 7:59 AM, Richard Barnes &lt;rlb@ipv.sx&gt; wro=
te:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; So your fingerprint algorithm would be something like the foll=
owing?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; INPUT: JWK<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; 1. Remove &quot;metadata&quot; fields. =A0So, for RSA, you wou=
ld be left with<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; {&quot;kty&quot;, &quot;n&quot;, &quot;e&quot;} 2. Convert str=
ipped JWK to canonical form 3.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Compute digest over canonical form<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; That seems generally agreeable to me.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; For (1) to be possible, you would need to define which fields =
are<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; covered in the fingerprint for each key type (&quot;kty&quot; =
value). =A0Or,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; alternatively, you could restructure JWK so that metadata fiel=
ds are grouped into a &quot;meta&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; sub-dict. =A0Which might be nice anyway.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; For (2), I agree that there is probably a better canonicalizat=
ion<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; than CJSON. =A0The code I pasted earlier implements the follow=
ing<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; changes from RFC<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; 4627:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; -- Object fields must be in lexicographic order, sorted by fie=
ld<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; name<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; -- No white space allowed<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; -- Numbers: Exponent part must use &#39;e&#39;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; -- Numbers: Exponent part must not use &#39;+&#39;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; -- Numbers: Fraction part must not have trailing zeros<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; -- Strings: All characters must be escaped ISTM that those cha=
nges<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; are fairly minimal, and avoid some of the CJSON problems that =
have<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; been discussed above. Reasonably people can disagree over the =
string<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; aspect; if you want less expansion, you could do things like e=
xempt<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; printable ASCII.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Daniel Holth &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:dholth@gmail.com">dholth@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 1:57 AM, Manger, James H &lt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com">James.H=
.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; A canonical form of JSON might be fairly easy, but the=
 one you<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; quote (<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON" t=
arget=3D"_blank">http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON</a>) can&#39;t ha=
ndle floating<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; point numbers (or very large integers), and produces i=
nvalid JSON<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; if a string includes a tab! Fix those (escaping contro=
l chars<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; [\u0000-\u001f]; use normalized scientific notation fo=
r numbers)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and it might be worth<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; considering.****<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ** **<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Defining JOSE calculations in terms of 1 or more byte =
arrays, the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; first of which is a UTF-8-encoded JSON header, would b=
e useful. It<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; can then be packaged as dot-separated base64url-encode=
d segments<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; to be HTTP-header-friendly, or packaged as a single JS=
ON object to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; be programmer-friendly, or packaged as raw bytes to be=
 efficient.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I am only proposing a key fingerprinting specification tha=
t does<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; not employ DER encoding. JWKs do not contain tabs or float=
ing point numbers.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_=
blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; jose mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, jose <jose@ietf.org>, "Matt Miller \(mamille2\)" <mamille2@cisco.com>, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, Justin Richer <jricher@mitre.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] canonical JSON
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On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 12:50 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> That doesn't solve the problem.  The point of a fingerprint is to have an
> identifier for the key that is shorter than the key itself. So a JWS with a
> JWK payload is irrelevant.  Likewise, any solution that requires
> base64-encoding is also irrelevant, since you would need to carry the
> encoded version along in order to interpret the fingerprint.
>

Impressed by the c14n can of worms. The one advantage of a bencode c14n
scheme is that it would obviously be crazy to rearchitect an entire JSON
crypto scheme around it. Subset-of-CJSON-only-defined-for-JWK is enough.

There is a system called The Update Framework that pre-dates JOSE and is
used to secure software updates. The root document is a very long list of
RSA key fingerprints trusted to sign some sub-document. Each sub-document
includes the entire RSA key. If the sub-document's signature is valid and
the key fingerprint matches then the sub-document can be trusted. The root
document would be too big if it had to include the whole keys instead of
fingerprints.

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 12:50 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr">That doesn&#39;t solve the problem. =A0The point of a fing=
erprint is to have an identifier for the key that is shorter than the key i=
tself. So a JWS with a JWK payload is irrelevant. =A0Likewise, any solution=
 that requires base64-encoding is also irrelevant, since you would need to =
carry the encoded version along in order to interpret the fingerprint.</div=
>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Impressed by the c14n can of worms. =
The one advantage of a bencode c14n scheme is that it would obviously be cr=
azy to rearchitect an entire JSON crypto scheme around it. Subset-of-CJSON-=
only-defined-for-JWK is enough.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>There is a system called The Update Framewo=
rk that pre-dates JOSE and is used to secure software updates. The root doc=
ument is a very long list of RSA key fingerprints trusted to sign some sub-=
document. Each sub-document includes the entire RSA key. If the sub-documen=
t&#39;s signature is valid and the key fingerprint matches then the sub-doc=
ument can be trusted. The root document would be too big if it had to inclu=
de the whole keys instead of fingerprints.</div>
</div></div></div>

--f46d043be1300bb77904d63fee23--

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-01.txt
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Subject: [jose] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-01.txt
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FYI ... I believe this incorporates most (if not all) of Jim Schaad's comme=
nts, or at least another pass at them.

Begin forwarded message:

> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-01.txt
> Date: February 21, 2013 8:03:43 PM MST
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
>=20
>=20
> 	Title           : Using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Encryption=
 (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects
> 	Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
> 	Filename        : draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-01.txt
> 	Pages           : 16
> 	Date            : 2013-02-21
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies an approach to protecting a private key
>   formatted as a JavaScript Syntax Object Notation (JSON) Web Key (JWK)
>   object using JSON Web Encryption (JWE).  This document also specifies
>   a set of algorithms for protecting such content using password-based
>   cryptography.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-01
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk-01
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt

- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.


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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-01.txt
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Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2013 03:20:30 +0000
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FYI ... fixing minor nits; but it's still leaving it as a useful bag (-;

Begin forwarded message:

> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-01.txt
> Date: February 21, 2013 8:14:28 PM MST
> To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
>=20
>=20
> 	Title           : JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Key (JWK) for Pu=
blic Key Infrastructure (X.509) (PKIX) Certificates
> 	Author(s)       : Matthew Miller
>                          Brian Campbell
> 	Filename        : draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-01.txt
> 	Pages           : 7
> 	Date            : 2013-02-21
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Key
>   (JWK) object to wrap Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) (PKIX)
>   certificate chains, to allow for some interoperability between
>   existing PKIX-based systems and newer JOSE-based systems.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-jose-pkix-key-01
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-miller-jose-pkix-key-01
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt

- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.


From ietf@augustcellars.com  Sun Feb 24 12:33:31 2013
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From: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: <jose@ietf.org>
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2013 12:32:52 -0800
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Subject: [jose] Proposed Text - MUST understand
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I am going to venture some proposed text to try and advance the discussion
about the MUST understand all fields in the current document.  I acknowledge
that the text is written from the point of view that I espouse, however I
think that perhaps it does give a sufficient amount of credence to the point
of view of other that it might provide a good starting point for
discussions.

This text is written standalone and as such I have not yet tried to
incorporate it into the different documents and in the different locations.
It is possible that the text will need to be somewhat repurposed when it
appears in each of the different documents.

*************************************************************

Applications which use this specification SHOULD ensure that all of the
fields in the header are used in either in making the trust decision or
determining how to use the content.  IETF applications MUST have  default
position of requiring that all fields in the header are known to and used by
the application.  IETF applications which allow for fields in the header to
be ignored MUST include a justification of why this decision was made and
looking at the security trade-offs of the decision.

The reason why the default position is that applications need to understand
and process all of the headers can be seen in the following example.  <Jones
et al provide a non-trivial example that demonstrates the security problem
associated with ignoring header fields.>

******************************************************************



From housley@vigilsec.com  Sun Feb 24 14:17:54 2013
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] Proposed Text - MUST understand
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How is an IETF application different than any other application?

The Datatracker, rfcdiff, and xml2rfc will probably never need to use =
jose, so I know that is not the intended meaning.  ;-)

Russ


On Feb 24, 2013, at 3:32 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:

> I am going to venture some proposed text to try and advance the =
discussion
> about the MUST understand all fields in the current document.  I =
acknowledge
> that the text is written from the point of view that I espouse, =
however I
> think that perhaps it does give a sufficient amount of credence to the =
point
> of view of other that it might provide a good starting point for
> discussions.
>=20
> This text is written standalone and as such I have not yet tried to
> incorporate it into the different documents and in the different =
locations.
> It is possible that the text will need to be somewhat repurposed when =
it
> appears in each of the different documents.
>=20
> *************************************************************
>=20
> Applications which use this specification SHOULD ensure that all of =
the
> fields in the header are used in either in making the trust decision =
or
> determining how to use the content.  IETF applications MUST have  =
default
> position of requiring that all fields in the header are known to and =
used by
> the application.  IETF applications which allow for fields in the =
header to
> be ignored MUST include a justification of why this decision was made =
and
> looking at the security trade-offs of the decision.
>=20
> The reason why the default position is that applications need to =
understand
> and process all of the headers can be seen in the following example.  =
<Jones
> et al provide a non-trivial example that demonstrates the security =
problem
> associated with ignoring header fields.>
>=20
> ******************************************************************


From ietf@augustcellars.com  Sun Feb 24 18:42:06 2013
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From: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>
References: <003901ce12ce$23306460$69912d20$@augustcellars.com> <ED49B299-B099-4A13-9D4A-2A703A3A54EB@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2013 18:41:32 -0800
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Subject: Re: [jose] Proposed Text - MUST understand
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Sorry, I was missing a clause in the text

IETF applications that use the JOSE work MUST

I was trying to say that IETF documents using JOSE must do this, however we
cannot really impose it on non IETF documents.

Jim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2013 2:18 PM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Cc: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [jose] Proposed Text - MUST understand
> 
> How is an IETF application different than any other application?
> 
> The Datatracker, rfcdiff, and xml2rfc will probably never need to use
jose, so
> I know that is not the intended meaning.  ;-)
> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> On Feb 24, 2013, at 3:32 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
> 
> > I am going to venture some proposed text to try and advance the
> > discussion about the MUST understand all fields in the current
> > document.  I acknowledge that the text is written from the point of
> > view that I espouse, however I think that perhaps it does give a
> > sufficient amount of credence to the point of view of other that it
> > might provide a good starting point for discussions.
> >
> > This text is written standalone and as such I have not yet tried to
> > incorporate it into the different documents and in the different
locations.
> > It is possible that the text will need to be somewhat repurposed when
> > it appears in each of the different documents.
> >
> >
> **********************************************************
> ***
> >
> > Applications which use this specification SHOULD ensure that all of
> > the fields in the header are used in either in making the trust
> > decision or determining how to use the content.  IETF applications
> > MUST have  default position of requiring that all fields in the header
> > are known to and used by the application.  IETF applications which
> > allow for fields in the header to be ignored MUST include a
> > justification of why this decision was made and looking at the security
> trade-offs of the decision.
> >
> > The reason why the default position is that applications need to
> > understand and process all of the headers can be seen in the following
> > example.  <Jones et al provide a non-trivial example that demonstrates
> > the security problem associated with ignoring header fields.>
> >
> >
> **********************************************************
> ********


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From: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
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Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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--------------090404010107070304080306
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Folks,

Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header 
criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs 
perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide 
either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the 
poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and 
talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do 
so. So, what next...

First, what I do believe...

I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue 
with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be 
defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered 
non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be 
reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be 
generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move 
forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical 
and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.

In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed 
something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed 
(summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James 
Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of 
requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...

A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, 
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with 
old semantics.

B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of 
*existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations 
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).

C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as 
similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between 
legitimate & malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under 
the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more 
harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the 
good of any new functionality they bring.

E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good 
thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure 
message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that 
people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for 
short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for 
better long-term security.

 From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear 
regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not 
a requirement.

QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are 
trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would 
help drive consensus on the overall approach.

As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where 
we are of two minds:

1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be 
safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't 
going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)

2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and 
leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly 
providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).

I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am 
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second 
approach.

QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 
or approach 2?

In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical 
headers approach.
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the 
non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is 
to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the 
applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? 
To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of text.

I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as 
some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and 
misunderstandings on my part.

Regards,
Karen O'Donoghue


--------------090404010107070304080306
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<html>
  <head>

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    Folks,<br>
    <br>
    Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on
    header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from
    a chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to
    provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after
    analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic
    (multiple times), and talking to a few working group members, I find
    I am not quite able to do so. So, what next... <br>
    <br>
    First, what I do believe...<br>
    <br>
    I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this
    issue with a significant number of members feeling that an approach
    must be defined that safely allows for some header fields to be
    considered non-critical. I think there is general consensus that
    there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the
    approach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the
    working group to move forward with the strategy that all headers
    cannot be considered critical and move on to the discussion of how
    to approach non-critical headers. <br>
    <br>
    In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I
    missed something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed
    (summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James
    Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of
    requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>
    <br>
    A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future,
    without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them
    with old semantics.<br>
    <br>
    B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of
    *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old
    implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics (or
    without the constraints).<br>
    <br>
    C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in
    messages, as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions
    between legitimate &amp; malicious certificates that use weak
    algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
    <br>
    D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep),
    under the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to
    do more harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed
    sporadically) than the good of any new functionality they bring.<br>
    <br>
    E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a
    good thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a
    secure message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason
    is that people are too likely to choose to make an extension
    non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of
    making it critical for better long-term security.<br>
    <br>
    From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am
    unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I
    believe D is not a requirement. <br>
    <br>
    QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we
    are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these
    would help drive consensus on the overall approach. <br>
    <br>
    As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point
    where we are of two minds: <br>
    <br>
    1) Define <span style="color:windowtext">a header field that
      explicitly lists the fields that may be safely ignored if not
      understood</span>. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to
    define a separate header for non-critical elements.) <br>
    <br>
    2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications
    and leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly
    providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE
    specs). <br>
    <br>
    I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
    concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
    approach. <br>
    <br>
    QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach
    1 or approach 2? <br>
    <br>
    In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive: <br>
    1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a
    non-critical headers approach.&nbsp; <br>
    2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving
    the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?). <br>
    3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right
    approach is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer
    to the applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of
    guidance)? To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of
    text. <br>
    <br>
    I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive
    as some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and
    misunderstandings on my part. <br>
    <br>
    Regards,<br>
    Karen O'Donoghue<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------090404010107070304080306--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Mon Feb 25 07:41:50 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the work=
ing group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I'm writing this note pri=
marily as an editor to help inform the working group's discussions, rather =
than as an individual contributor.

First, I want to point out that while we've been discussing criticality of =
header parameters, the specs actually currently have the "MUST be understoo=
d" language in the JWK specification as well, as that's another potential e=
xtension point.  The JWK description says "Additional members MAY be presen=
t in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by implementations using=
 them."  The same language is present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution =
of the issue to be complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that =
a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extens=
ions will occur there.

Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I'll summarize for th=
e list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing t=
his.  One proposal is 2A in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curre=
nt/msg01353.html (which I'll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syn=
tax that Dick Hardt proposed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/c=
urrent/msg01457.html (which I'll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe th=
at it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they =
would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so tha=
t if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we'll know which to u=
se.

FLAT SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":["notes"],
     "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
    }

STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":{
       "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
      }
    }

As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in t=
he same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more regu=
lar.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignore=
d repeats those field names.

As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is repe=
ated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that then some=
 header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the process=
ing rules for header fields more complicated.

Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax=
 or cleaner semantics.  (I'd personally lean towards the simpler processing=
 rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming=
 out either way.)

Finally, I'll point out that I don't believe that your approaches (1) and (=
2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to application=
 specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to =
be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields ma=
y be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where the applica=
tion spec does require that header fields be normally understood.  In fact,=
 one might consider this to fall under the "(possibly providing guidance di=
rected to those applications in the JOSE specs)" that you suggested below.

I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topic.

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kar=
en O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

Folks,

Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll results, reread=
ing all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few working gr=
oup members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next...

First, what I do believe...

I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus that there must be reasonable mechanisms =
for extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. Based on that, I =
would like to ask the working group to move forward with the strategy that =
all headers cannot be considered critical and move on to the discussion of =
how to approach non-critical headers.

In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and =
I have repeated it here...

A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.

B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).

C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate & m=
alicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.

E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of inte=
roperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term security.

>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.

QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.

As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:

1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to de=
fine a separate header for non-critical elements.)

2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).

I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.

QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?

In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals of text.

I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.

Regards,
Karen O'Donoghue

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Thanks for sending this, =
Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your analysis will help the working group reach a re=
solution on this issue soon.&nbsp; I&#8217;m writing this note primarily
 as an editor to help inform the working group&#8217;s discussions, rather =
than as an individual contributor.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">First, I want to point ou=
t that while we&#8217;ve been discussing criticality of header parameters, =
the specs actually currently have the &#8220;MUST be understood&#8221; lang=
uage
 in the JWK specification as well, as that&#8217;s another potential extens=
ion point.&nbsp; The JWK description says &#8220;Additional members MAY be =
present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, they MUST be understood by implementa=
tions using them.&#8221;&nbsp; The same language is present for the
 JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should a=
ddress those uses too.&nbsp; Given that a number of additional JWK fields a=
re being discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Second, if we do decide t=
o go with your approach (1), I&#8217;ll summarize for the list what I belie=
ve the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.&nbsp;
 One proposal is 2A in <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose=
/current/msg01353.html">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</a> (which =
I&#8217;ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hard=
t proposed in
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html"=
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html</a> (which=
 I&#8217;ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be u=
seful for the working group to discuss which
 of those they would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that yo=
u asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we&#82=
17;ll know which to use.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">FLAT SYNTAX:<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot=
;ES256&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:=
[&quot;notes&quot;],<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot=
;:&quot;This header field can be safely ignored&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot=
;ES256&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:=
{<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quo=
t;notes&quot;:&quot;This header field can be safely ignored&quot;<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the flat syntax is all header fields are in the same place.&nbsp; This=
 makes processing header fields easier and is more regular.&nbsp;
 The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignored rep=
eats those field names.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the structured syntax is that nothing is repeated, resulting in cleane=
r JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that then some header
 fields are in one place and some are in another, making the processing rul=
es for header fields more complicated.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Between these two, it see=
ms to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner semantics.&nb=
sp; (I&#8217;d personally lean towards the simpler processing rules
 resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming out e=
ither way.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Finally, I&#8217;ll point=
 out that I don&#8217;t believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutual=
ly exclusive.&nbsp; We could conceivably leave it up to application specifi=
cations
 using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood b=
y default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ign=
ored for use in those application contexts where the application spec does =
require that header fields be normally
 understood.&nbsp; In fact, one might consider this to fall under the &#822=
0;</span>(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications in the=
 JOSE specs)<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#8221; that you suggested below.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I hope the points above h=
elp further a productive discussion of this topic.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:windowtext"> jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.o=
rg]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Karen O'Donoghue<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls<o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Folks,<br>
<br>
Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but
 after analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multipl=
e times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite=
 able to do so. So, what next...
<br>
<br>
First, what I do believe...<br>
<br>
I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus
 that there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the a=
pproach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working gro=
up to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered =
critical and move on to the discussion
 of how to approach non-critical headers. <br>
<br>
In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list
 of requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>
<br>
A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.<br>
<br>
B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>
<br>
C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &am=
p; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
<br>
D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>
<br>
E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension
 non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it=
 critical for better long-term security.<br>
<br>
>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.
<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.
<br>
<br>
As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:
<br>
<br>
1) Define <span style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field that explicitly l=
ists the fields that may be safely ignored if not understood</span>. (Here =
I am assuming that we aren't going to define a separate header for non-crit=
ical elements.)
<br>
<br>
2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
<br>
<br>
I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.
<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?
<br>
<br>
In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive: <br>
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.&nbsp;
<br>
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
<br>
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals
 of text. <br>
<br>
I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.
<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Karen O'Donoghue<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [jose] #2: No key management for MAC
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#2: No key management for MAC


Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):

 I believe this is the same issue as http://www.ietf.org/mail-
 archive/web/jose/current/msg01220.html which is closed.
 If it is not, pleae clarify.

 Here is the copied text from the mail:

 ----

 [jose] CLOSED: Add other than pre-shared MAC key

 From: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue at isoc.org>
 To: jose at ietf.org
 Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:35:37 -0400
 In-reply-to: <4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394366877989 at
 TK5EX14MBXC285.redmond.corp.microsoft.com>
 References: <4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394366877989 at
 TK5EX14MBXC285.redmond.corp.microsoft.com>
 List-id: Javascript Object Signing and Encryption <jose.ietf.org>
 Folks,

 The results of this poll were:
 4 YES - We should add the ability to have a randomly generated MAC key
 protected by a different key
 13 NO - We should not add the ability to have a randomly generated MAC key
 protected by a different key
 4 DISCUSS - More discussion is needed

 Based upon these results, I am making a consensus call that we should not
 add the ability to
 have a randomly generated MAC key protected by a different key.  This
 issue is now closed.

 Thanks to all who participated in this poll.

 Karen O'Donoghue (writing as working group co-chair)

 -----Original Message-----
 From: jose-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf
 Of Jim Schaad
 Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 12:07 AM
 To: jose at ietf.org
 Subject: [jose] POLL: Add other than pre-shared MAC key

 <CHAIR>

 If you voted at the face-2-face please do not vote again.  If you want to
 provide comments please change the title from POLL to DISCUSS.

 Should we add the ability to have a randomly generated MAC key protected
 by a different key?  The other key could be either a pre-shared symmetric
 key or a public key.



 Room vote:  3 yes, 5 no, 3 discuss


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 jose mailing list
 jose at ietf.org
 https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

-- 
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     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  critical     |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
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 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/2#comment:1>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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Subject: Re: [jose] #9: Add "spi" field
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#9: Add "spi" field


Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):

 Per Brian Campbell's [http://www.ietf.org/mail-
 archive/web/jose/current/msg01516.html message] and the subsequent
 discussion, I would like to propose it to be written as a separate draft
 so that the complete meaning of the proposal is clear.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  signature@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  enhancement  |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  signature              |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/9#comment:1>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#7: Algorithm identifiers/parameters incompatible with WebCrypto


Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):

 JOSE is providing small set of pre-determined parameters for use to
 achieve the "easy interoperability" while WebCrypto is trying to be
 generic. They are targeting different requirements.

 If needed, WebCrypto may adopt the JOSE algs names as shorthand, and this
 does not hurt their purpose while adopting the WebCrypto way in JOSE would
 not meet our requirements.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  algorithms@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  algorithms             |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/7#comment:3>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data


Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):

 4.6 Dierct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key of JWA seems to be
 addressing the needs in this ticket.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  encryption             |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4#comment:1>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#3: Concat used outside of key agreement


Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):

 Concatenating the AES key and HMAC key to produce the wrapped key instead
 of using KDF would be simpler for implementers, just like draft-mcgrew-
 aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2 does.

 Hopefully the WG decide soon either to stay with the current draft method
 or switch to a new method that we can stick with.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  encryption             |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/3#comment:1>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


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#5: Unclear instructions for key management


Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):

 Agreed. Need to be clarified.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  encryption             |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/5#comment:1>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>


From turners@ieca.com  Mon Feb 25 13:23:44 2013
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Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2013 16:23:42 -0500
From: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
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Subject: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter sent to IESG)
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I have some comments on the proposed charter that I've embedded below.

On 1/31/13 5:29 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
> Below is the updated charter that has been submitted to the IESG for
> review. Thank you to all who helped with the process.
>
> Regards,
> Karen
>
> Description of JOSE Working Group
>
> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization
> of structured
> data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format is often used for
> serializing and
> transmitting structured data over a network connection.  With the
> increased usage
> of JSON in protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to
> offer
> security services such as encryption, digital signatures, message
> authentication
> codes (MACs), and key representations for data that is being carried in
> JSON format.

I don't think of key representations as a security service and maybe I 
let this through last time but the things listed as services are 
mechanisms.  In most cases, the services are CIA (confidentiality, 
integrity, and authentication).  Let's change the last sentence to:

   With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF
   and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security
   services for JSON with encryption, digital signatures,
   and message authentication codes (MACs).

We can add that the key representations are needed later.

> Different proposals for providing such security services have already
> been defined
> and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to standardize four kinds of
> security services, integrity protection (signature and MAC), encryption,
> key
> representations, and algorithm identifiers, in order to increase
> interoperability of
> security features between protocols that use JSON.

Not sure a key representations is a service and maybe I'm nitpicking but 
I think encryption is a mechanism.  Let's do instead:

  The Working Group will standardize the mechanism for integrity
  protection (signature and MAC) and encryption as well as the format
  for keys and algorithm identifiers to support interoperability of
  security services for protocols that use JSON.

> The Working Group
> will base its
> work on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will
> solicit input
> from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the security
> functionality in
> the JSON format is correct.

"correct" seems like the wrong word.  How about "sound".

> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:

Let's just drop the # in this sentence and change it to:

   This group is chartered to work on the following deliverables:

> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
> integrity
> protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
> including a
> compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity protection" includes
> public-key digital
> signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.
>
> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
> encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
> including a
> compact URL-safe representation.

Because the IESG will look at the diffs, the addition of "including a 
compact URL-safe representation" in (1) and (2) as well as the addition 
of (5) and (6) will no doubt raise questions.

The first will be why are we baking the solution in to the charter? 
Based on recent discussions about and revisions to the proposed httpauth 
charter, baking solutions in or placing constraints on the solution in 
the form or examples/"includings" in the charters isn't going to fly. 
What charters ought to do is say where the WG wants to go and then the 
drafts say how they're getting there.

The second will obviously be why on earth would a WG solution not 
support the same kind of basic functionality that the well-known 
security primitives support.  If the WG decides on more than one 
serialization/representation is needed for whatever reason, then the 
drafts can explain why there's more than one.

Based on all of this, bullets 1 and 2 should remain unchanged and 5 and 
6 need not be added:

(1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data
structures. "Integrity protection" includes public-key digital
signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.

(2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures.

(3) looks fine.

> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as
> JSON-
> structured objects.

I like this (4) better because MTI should be specified by the application.

> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm
> identifiers for
> the previous three documents.

As above for 5 and 6.

> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
> integrity
> protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
> using a JSON
> representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build
> upon the
> concepts and structures in (1).
>
> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
> encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
> using a JSON
> representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build
> upon the
> concepts and structures in (2).

I think these are fine but I can't really think of a reason to not 
combine them.

> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and

r/7/5

> symmetric
> keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build upon the
> concepts and
> structures in (3).
>
> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of protecting

r/8/6

> private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document will build
> upon the
> concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This document may register
> additional
> algorithms in registries defined by (4).

Is "application" needed in in the first sentence?

 From Karen, we'll also add in:

   (7) An Informational document detailing Use Cases and
   Requirements for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).


> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in
> consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for
> these goals will
> be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).

I want to change this as follows because it's not just the WG's decision:

   One or more of these goals may be combined into a single
   document, in which case the concrete milestones for these
   goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).

We also need some additional wording to explain how JOSE isn't going to 
specify everything an application/use case needs to achieve complete 
interop.  I'm basing this on the recent bashing some OAUTH drafts took 
and the way JOSE seems to be shaping up.  I'd suggest something along 
the lines of the following to provide additional lead in:

   As JSON adoption expands, the different applications utilizing
   JSON security services will grow and this leads to the need to
   support different requirements. The WG will develop a generic
   syntax that can be used by applications to secure JSON-data,
   but it will be up to the application to fully specify the use
   of the WG's documents much the same way S/MIME is the
   application of CMS to MIME-based media types.

And we need a draft that tells an application all the things that would 
need to be specified/picked to implement JOSE.  This could go in the use 
cases or in a new document.  You're call.

spt


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FYI, I have updated the requirements document.  I'm ready to submit this as
draft-ietf-jose-use-cases-00 as soon as the window opens back up.
--Richard

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 4:09 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02.txt
To: rlb@ipv.sx



A new version of I-D, draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Richard Barnes and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename:        draft-barnes-jose-use-cases
Revision:        02
Title:           Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Object Signing and
Encryption (JOSE)
Creation date:   2013-02-25
Group:           Individual Submission
Number of pages: 19
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02.txt
Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases
Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02
Diff:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02

Abstract:
   Many Internet applications have a need for object-based security
   mechanisms in addition to security mechanisms at the network layer or
   transport layer.  In the past, the Cryptographic Message Syntax has
   provided a binary secure object format based on ASN.1.  Over time,
   the use of binary object encodings such as ASN.1 has been overtaken
   by text-based encodings, for example JavaScript Object Notation.
   This document defines a set of use cases and requirements for a
   secure object format encoded using JavaScript Object Notation, drawn
   from a variety of application security mechanisms currently in
   development.




The IETF Secretariat

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<div dir=3D"ltr">FYI, I have updated the requirements document. =A0I&#39;m =
ready to submit this as draft-ietf-jose-use-cases-00 as soon as the window =
opens back up.<div style>--Richard</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>
From: <b class=3D"gmail_sendername"></b> <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span><br>=
Date: Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 4:09 PM<br>Subject: New Version Notification for=
 draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02.txt<br>
To: rlb@ipv.sx<br><br><br><br>
A new version of I-D, draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02.txt<br>
has been successfully submitted by Richard Barnes and posted to the<br>
IETF repository.<br>
<br>
Filename: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0draft-barnes-jose-use-cases<br>
Revision: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A002<br>
Title: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Object Signi=
ng and Encryption (JOSE)<br>
Creation date: =A0 2013-02-25<br>
Group: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Individual Submission<br>
Number of pages: 19<br>
URL: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts=
/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02.txt" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/=
internet-drafts/draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02.txt</a><br>
Status: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft=
-barnes-jose-use-cases" target=3D"_blank">http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-barnes-jose-use-cases</a><br>
Htmlized: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes=
-jose-use-cases-02" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barn=
es-jose-use-cases-02</a><br>
Diff: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3D=
draft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdi=
ff?url2=3Ddraft-barnes-jose-use-cases-02</a><br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=A0 =A0Many Internet applications have a need for object-based security<br>
=A0 =A0mechanisms in addition to security mechanisms at the network layer o=
r<br>
=A0 =A0transport layer. =A0In the past, the Cryptographic Message Syntax ha=
s<br>
=A0 =A0provided a binary secure object format based on ASN.1. =A0Over time,=
<br>
=A0 =A0the use of binary object encodings such as ASN.1 has been overtaken<=
br>
=A0 =A0by text-based encodings, for example JavaScript Object Notation.<br>
=A0 =A0This document defines a set of use cases and requirements for a<br>
=A0 =A0secure object format encoded using JavaScript Object Notation, drawn=
<br>
=A0 =A0from a variety of application security mechanisms currently in<br>
=A0 =A0development.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF Secretariat<br>
<br>
</div><br></div></div>

--e89a8ff242ab9b7ad104d6932a4f--

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Cc: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>, Michael Jones <michael.jones@microsoft.com>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] #7: Algorithm identifiers/parameters incompatible with WebCrypto
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> Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):
>
>  JOSE is providing small set of pre-determined parameters for use to
>  achieve the "easy interoperability" while WebCrypto is trying to be
>  generic. They are targeting different requirements.
>

I don't see this "small set of pre-determined parameters" anywhere in the
JOSE charter or use cases.



>  If needed, WebCrypto may adopt the JOSE algs names as shorthand, and this
>  does not hurt their purpose while adopting the WebCrypto way in JOSE would
>  not meet our requirements.
>

Please be specific about which requirements would not be met.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">

Comment (by <a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com">sakimura@gmail.com</a>):<=
br>
<br>
=A0JOSE is providing small set of pre-determined parameters for use to<br>
=A0achieve the &quot;easy interoperability&quot; while WebCrypto is trying =
to be<br>
=A0generic. They are targeting different requirements.<br></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div style>I don&#39;t see this &quot;small set of pre-determine=
d parameters&quot; anywhere in the JOSE charter or use cases. =A0</div><div=
 style>
<br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);b=
order-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
=A0If needed, WebCrypto may adopt the JOSE algs names as shorthand, and thi=
s<br>
=A0does not hurt their purpose while adopting the WebCrypto way in JOSE wou=
ld<br>
=A0not meet our requirements.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Ple=
ase be specific about which requirements would not be met.=A0</div></div></=
div></div>

--f46d04451739ee02a004d6933fa1--

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter sent to IESG)
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Subject: Re: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter sent to IESG)
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I mostly agree with this.  I'll quibble with only one point.  By deleting (=
5) and (6) and leaving (1) and (2) as-is, you're pre-supposing that the exi=
sting compact serializations and the JSON serializations get consolidated i=
nto combined documents.  If instead, you simply changed the phrase "A Stand=
ards Track document specifying how to..." in (1) and (2) to "A Standards Tr=
ack document or documents specifying how to...", we could get the same effe=
ct of having (5) and (6), but without having to pre-decide how the solution=
s should be allocated between documents.



Would that work for you, Sean?



                                                            -- Mike



-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Sea=
n Turner
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 1:24 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter sent =
to IESG)



I have some comments on the proposed charter that I've embedded below.



On 1/31/13 5:29 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:

> Below is the updated charter that has been submitted to the IESG for

> review. Thank you to all who helped with the process.

>

> Regards,

> Karen

>

> Description of JOSE Working Group

>

> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the

> serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON

> format is often used for serializing and transmitting structured data

> over a network connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in

> protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer

> security services such as encryption, digital signatures, message

> authentication codes (MACs), and key representations for data that is

> being carried in JSON format.



I don't think of key representations as a security service and maybe I let =
this through last time but the things listed as services are mechanisms.  I=
n most cases, the services are CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and authent=
ication).  Let's change the last sentence to:



   With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF

   and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security

   services for JSON with encryption, digital signatures,

   and message authentication codes (MACs).



We can add that the key representations are needed later.



> Different proposals for providing such security services have already

> been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to

> standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection

> (signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm

> identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security

> features between protocols that use JSON.



Not sure a key representations is a service and maybe I'm nitpicking but I =
think encryption is a mechanism.  Let's do instead:



  The Working Group will standardize the mechanism for integrity

  protection (signature and MAC) and encryption as well as the format

  for keys and algorithm identifiers to support interoperability of

  security services for protocols that use JSON.



> The Working Group

> will base its

> work on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will

> solicit input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that

> the security functionality in the JSON format is correct.



"correct" seems like the wrong word.  How about "sound".



> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:



Let's just drop the # in this sentence and change it to:



   This group is chartered to work on the following deliverables:



> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured

> integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data

> structures, including a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity

> protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as

> symmetric-key MACs.

>

> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a

> JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to)

> JSON data structures, including a compact URL-safe representation.



Because the IESG will look at the diffs, the addition of "including a compa=
ct URL-safe representation" in (1) and (2) as well as the addition of (5) a=
nd (6) will no doubt raise questions.



The first will be why are we baking the solution in to the charter?

Based on recent discussions about and revisions to the proposed httpauth ch=
arter, baking solutions in or placing constraints on the solution in the fo=
rm or examples/"includings" in the charters isn't going to fly.

What charters ought to do is say where the WG wants to go and then the draf=
ts say how they're getting there.



The second will obviously be why on earth would a WG solution not support t=
he same kind of basic functionality that the well-known security primitives=
 support.  If the WG decides on more than one serialization/representation =
is needed for whatever reason, then the drafts can explain why there's more=
 than one.



Based on all of this, bullets 1 and 2 should remain unchanged and 5 and

6 need not be added:



(1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured inte=
grity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structur=
es. "Integrity protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well a=
s symmetric-key MACs.



(2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured en=
cryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures.



(3) looks fine.



> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as

> JSON-

> structured objects.



I like this (4) better because MTI should be specified by the application.



> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm

> identifiers for the previous three documents.



As above for 5 and 6.



> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured

> integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data

> structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple

> recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures

> in (1).

>

> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a

> JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to)

> JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple

> recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures

> in (2).



I think these are fine but I can't really think of a reason to not combine =
them.



> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and



r/7/5



> symmetric

> keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build upon the

> concepts and structures in (3).

>

> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of

> protecting



r/8/6



> private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document will build

> upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This document may

> register additional algorithms in registries defined by (4).



Is "application" needed in in the first sentence?



>From Karen, we'll also add in:



   (7) An Informational document detailing Use Cases and

   Requirements for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).





> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in

> consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for

> these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).



I want to change this as follows because it's not just the WG's decision:



   One or more of these goals may be combined into a single

   document, in which case the concrete milestones for these

   goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).



We also need some additional wording to explain how JOSE isn't going to spe=
cify everything an application/use case needs to achieve complete interop. =
 I'm basing this on the recent bashing some OAUTH drafts took and the way J=
OSE seems to be shaping up.  I'd suggest something along the lines of the f=
ollowing to provide additional lead in:



   As JSON adoption expands, the different applications utilizing

   JSON security services will grow and this leads to the need to

   support different requirements. The WG will develop a generic

   syntax that can be used by applications to secure JSON-data,

   but it will be up to the application to fully specify the use

   of the WG's documents much the same way S/MIME is the

   application of CMS to MIME-based media types.



And we need a draft that tells an application all the things that would nee=
d to be specified/picked to implement JOSE.  This could go in the use cases=
 or in a new document.  You're call.



spt



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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I mostly agree with this.&nbsp; I'll quibble with=
 only one point.&nbsp; By deleting (5) and (6) and leaving (1) and (2) as-i=
s, you're pre-supposing that the existing compact serializations and the JS=
ON serializations get consolidated into combined
 documents.&nbsp; If instead, you simply changed the phrase &quot;A Standar=
ds Track document specifying how to...&quot; in (1) and (2) to &quot;A Stan=
dards Track document
<b>or documents</b> specifying how to...&quot;, we could get the same effec=
t of having (5) and (6), but without having to pre-decide how the solutions=
 should be allocated between documents.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Would that work for you, Sean?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">-----Original Message-----<br>
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Sea=
n Turner<br>
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 1:24 PM<br>
To: jose@ietf.org<br>
Subject: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter sent =
to IESG)</p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I have some comments on the proposed charter that=
 I've embedded below.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">On 1/31/13 5:29 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:<o:p><=
/o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Below is the updated charter that has been s=
ubmitted to the IESG for
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; review. Thank you to all who helped with the=
 process.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Regards,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Karen<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Description of JOSE Working Group<o:p></o:p>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text =
format for the
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; serialization of structured data described i=
n RFC 4627.&nbsp; The JSON
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; format is often used for serializing and tra=
nsmitting structured data
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; over a network connection.&nbsp; With the in=
creased usage of JSON in
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there i=
s now a desire to offer
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; security services such as encryption, digita=
l signatures, message
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; authentication codes (MACs), and key represe=
ntations for data that is
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; being carried in JSON format.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I don't think of key representations as a securit=
y service and maybe I let this through last time but the things listed as s=
ervices are mechanisms.&nbsp; In most cases, the services are CIA (confiden=
tiality, integrity, and authentication).&nbsp;
 Let's change the last sentence to:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; With the increased usage of JSON in =
protocols in the IETF<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; and elsewhere, there is now a desire=
 to offer security<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; services for JSON with encryption, d=
igital signatures,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; and message authentication codes (MA=
Cs).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">We can add that the key representations are neede=
d later.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; Different proposals for providing such secur=
ity services have already
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; been defined and implemented.&nbsp; This Wor=
king Group's task is to
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; standardize four kinds of security services,=
 integrity protection
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (signature and MAC), encryption, key represe=
ntations, and algorithm
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; identifiers, in order to increase interopera=
bility of security
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; features between protocols that use JSON.<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Not sure a key representations is a service and m=
aybe I'm nitpicking but I think encryption is a mechanism.&nbsp; Let's do i=
nstead:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp; The Working Group will standardize the mec=
hanism for integrity<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp; protection (signature and MAC) and encrypt=
ion as well as the format<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp; for keys and algorithm identifiers to supp=
ort interoperability of<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp; security services for protocols that use J=
SON.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; The Working Group<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; will base its<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; work on well-known message security primitiv=
es (e.g., CMS), and will
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; solicit input from the rest of the IETF Secu=
rity Area to be sure that
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; the security functionality in the JSON forma=
t is correct.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&quot;correct&quot; seems like the wrong word.&nb=
sp; How about &quot;sound&quot;.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; This group is chartered to work on eight doc=
uments:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Let's just drop the # in this sentence and change=
 it to:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; This group is chartered to work on t=
he following deliverables:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (1) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply JSON-structured
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; integrity protection to data, including (but=
 not limited to) JSON data
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; structures, including a compact URL-safe rep=
resentation.&nbsp; &quot;Integrity
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; protection&quot; includes public-key digital=
 signatures as well as
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; symmetric-key MACs.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (2) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply a
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; JSON-structured encryption to data, includin=
g (but not limited to)
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; JSON data structures, including a compact UR=
L-safe representation.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Because the IESG will look at the diffs, the addi=
tion of &quot;including a compact URL-safe representation&quot; in (1) and =
(2) as well as the addition of (5) and (6) will no doubt raise questions.<o=
:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">The first will be why are we baking the solution =
in to the charter?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Based on recent discussions about and revisions t=
o the proposed httpauth charter, baking solutions in or placing constraints=
 on the solution in the form or examples/&quot;includings&quot; in the char=
ters isn't going to fly.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">What charters ought to do is say where the WG wan=
ts to go and then the drafts say how they're getting there.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">The second will obviously be why on earth would a=
 WG solution not support the same kind of basic functionality that the well=
-known security primitives support.&nbsp; If the WG decides on more than on=
e serialization/representation is needed
 for whatever reason, then the drafts can explain why there's more than one=
.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Based on all of this, bullets 1 and 2 should rema=
in unchanged and 5 and<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">6 need not be added:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">(1) A Standards Track document specifying how to =
apply JSON-structured integrity protection to data, including (but not limi=
ted to) JSON data structures. &quot;Integrity protection&quot; includes pub=
lic-key digital signatures as well as symmetric-key
 MACs.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">(2) A Standards Track document specifying how to =
apply a JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to) =
JSON data structures.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">(3) looks fine.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (3) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to encode public keys as<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; JSON-<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; structured objects.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I like this (4) better because MTI should be spec=
ified by the application.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (4) A Standards Track document specifying al=
gorithms and algorithm
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; identifiers for the previous three documents=
.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">As above for 5 and 6.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (5) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply JSON-structured
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; integrity protection to data, including (but=
 not limited to) JSON data
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; structures, using a JSON representation supp=
orting multiple
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; recipients.&nbsp; This document will build u=
pon the concepts and structures
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; in (1).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (6) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to apply a
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; JSON-structured encryption to data, includin=
g (but not limited to)
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; JSON data structures, using a JSON represent=
ation supporting multiple
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; recipients.&nbsp; This document will build u=
pon the concepts and structures
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; in (2).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I think these are fine but I can't really think o=
f a reason to not combine them.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (7) A Standards Track document specifying ho=
w to encode private and<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">r/7/5<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; symmetric<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; keys as JSON-structured objects.&nbsp; This =
document will build upon the
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; concepts and structures in (3).<o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; (8) A Standards Track application document s=
pecifying a means of
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; protecting<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">r/8/6<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; private and symmetric keys via encryption.&n=
bsp; This document will build
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; upon the concepts and structures in (2) and =
(7).&nbsp; This document may
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; register additional algorithms in registries=
 defined by (4).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Is &quot;application&quot; needed in in the first=
 sentence?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">From Karen, we'll also add in:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; (7) An Informational document detail=
ing Use Cases and<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; Requirements for JSON Object Signing=
 and Encryption (JOSE).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; The working group may decide to address comb=
inations of these goals in
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; consolidated document(s), in which case the =
concrete milestones for
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&gt; these goals will be satisfied by the consoli=
dated document(s).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">I want to change this as follows because it's not=
 just the WG's decision:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; One or more of these goals may be co=
mbined into a single<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; document, in which case the concrete=
 milestones for these<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; goals will be satisfied by the conso=
lidated document(s).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">We also need some additional wording to explain h=
ow JOSE isn't going to specify everything an application/use case needs to =
achieve complete interop.&nbsp; I'm basing this on the recent bashing some =
OAUTH drafts took and the way JOSE seems
 to be shaping up.&nbsp; I'd suggest something along the lines of the follo=
wing to provide additional lead in:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; As JSON adoption expands, the differ=
ent applications utilizing<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; JSON security services will grow and=
 this leads to the need to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; support different requirements. The =
WG will develop a generic<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; syntax that can be used by applicati=
ons to secure JSON-data,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; but it will be up to the application=
 to fully specify the use<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; of the WG's documents much the same =
way S/MIME is the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&nbsp;&nbsp; application of CMS to MIME-based med=
ia types.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">And we need a draft that tells an application all=
 the things that would need to be specified/picked to implement JOSE.&nbsp;=
 This could go in the use cases or in a new document.&nbsp; You're call.<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">spt<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">_______________________________________________<o=
:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">jose mailing list<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org"><span style=3D"c=
olor:windowtext;text-decoration:none">jose@ietf.org</span></a><o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
jose"><span style=3D"color:windowtext;text-decoration:none">https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</span></a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
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Subject: Re: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data
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That still doesn't address how the key is transmitted.

A solution for encryption requires (1) a way to encrypt a JWE under a given
key, and (2) a way to transmit wrapped keys.  You are proposing a solution
to (1), with some mechanism for (2).

JWE already solves (1) and (2), just not in a way that the keys are
separable. Because the keys are included under the JWE integrity check, the
JWE integrity check value will be different for each wrapped key.

Your answer already concedes that there is no benefit to including the key
under the JWE integrity check.  We should just make it that way with JWE in
general and the issue will be resolved.





On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 2:19 PM, jose issue tracker <
trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org> wrote:

> #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data
>
>
> Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):
>
>  4.6 Dierct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key of JWA seems to be
>  addressing the needs in this ticket.
>
> --
> -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>  Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
>   rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
>      Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
>  Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
> Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
>   encryption             |  Resolution:
>  Severity:  Active WG    |
>   Document               |
>  Keywords:               |
> -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>
> Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4#comment:1>
> jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">That still doesn&#39;t address how the key is transmitted.=
<div><br></div><div style>A solution for encryption requires (1) a way to e=
ncrypt a JWE under a given key, and (2) a way to transmit wrapped keys. =A0=
You are proposing a solution to (1), with some mechanism for (2).</div>
<div><br></div><div style>JWE already solves (1) and (2), just not in a way=
 that the keys are separable. Because the keys are included under the JWE i=
ntegrity check, the JWE integrity check value will be different for each wr=
apped key.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Your answer already concedes that there is =
no benefit to including the key under the JWE integrity check. =A0We should=
 just make it that way with JWE in general and the issue will be resolved.<=
/div>
<div style><br></div><div style>=A0</div><div style><br></div></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013=
 at 2:19 PM, jose issue tracker <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tra=
c+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org=
</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">#4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from =
encrypted data<br>
<br>
<br>
Comment (by <a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com">sakimura@gmail.com</a>):<=
br>
<br>
=A04.6 Dierct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key of JWA seems to be<br>
=A0addressing the needs in this ticket.<br>
<br>
--<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
=A0Reporter: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 =A0 Owner: =A0draft-ietf=
-jose-json-web-<br>
=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0|=
 =A0<a href=3D"mailto:encryption@tools.ietf.org">encryption@tools.ietf.org<=
/a><br>
=A0 =A0 =A0Type: =A0defect =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 =A0Status: =A0new<br>
=A0Priority: =A0major =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| =A0 Milestone:<br>
Component: =A0json-web- =A0 =A0| =A0 =A0 Version:<br>
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=A0 Document =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 |<br>
=A0Keywords: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 |<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
<br>
Ticket URL: &lt;<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4=
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t/4#comment:1</a>&gt;<br>
jose &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/jose/" target=3D"_blank">http://t=
ools.ietf.org/jose/</a>&gt;<br>
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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Hi Karen,

Thanks for these thoughts.

tl;dr: I'm OK with (1) or (2).  I would propose that we extend (1) by
saying that the non-critical headers would not be covered by the header
integrity check.

Detailed responses inline below.

--Richard

<snip>

> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future,
> without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old
> semantics.
>
> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of
> *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will
> misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>
> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as
> similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &
> malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>
> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under
> the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm
> (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of
> any new functionality they bring.
>
> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good
> thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message
> format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too
> likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of
> interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term
> security.
>
> From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear
> regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a
> requirement.
>
> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are
> trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help
> drive consensus on the overall approach.
>

Here's my take:

A: This is a requirement.  But it is met trivially by having the new format
use new identifier names and marking them critical.

B: This is not a requirement.  It's a bad idea.  Identifiers here are
cheap, so if you want new semantics, just use a new identifier.

C: This is a requirement (and a good point), in the sense that we should
avoid providing channels that an attacker could use to control the
integrity check value on a JW* object.  However, what that argues is that
non-critical fields shouldn't be covered by the integrity check, not that
they should be ruled out altogether.

D: This is not a requirement, for the reasons you give.

E: This is not a requirement.  Couple of clients/servers is an
application-layer issue.




> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we
> are of two minds:
>
> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't
> going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)
>
> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and
> leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing
> guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
>
> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
> concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
> approach.
>

I would personally be OK with either approach.  I would generalize (1)
slightly to say "Define a syntax for indicating which fields are critical /
non-critical", and, in light of (C) above, also propose that that syntax
remove non-critical fields from under the integrity check.

--e89a8fb1f4c401cc2504d693d69d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi Karen,<div><br></div><div>Thanks for these thoughts.=A0</div><div><br></=
div><div>tl;dr: I&#39;m OK with (1) or (2). =A0I would propose that we exte=
nd (1) by saying that the non-critical headers would not be covered by the =
header integrity check.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Detailed responses inline below.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>--Richard</div><div><br>&lt;snip&gt;<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future,
    without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them
    with old semantics.<br>
    <br>
    B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of
    *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old
    implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics (or
    without the constraints).<br>
    <br>
    C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in
    messages, as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions
    between legitimate &amp; malicious certificates that use weak
    algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
    <br>
    D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep),
    under the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to
    do more harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed
    sporadically) than the good of any new functionality they bring.<br>
    <br>
    E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a
    good thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a
    secure message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason
    is that people are too likely to choose to make an extension
    non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of
    making it critical for better long-term security.<br>
    <br>
    From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am
    unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I
    believe D is not a requirement. <br>
    <br>
    QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we
    are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these
    would help drive consensus on the overall approach. <br></div></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>Here&#39;s my take:</div><div><br></div><div>A: Thi=
s is a requirement. =A0But it is met trivially by having the new format use=
 new identifier names and marking them critical.</div>
<div><br></div><div>B: This is not a requirement. =A0It&#39;s a bad idea. =
=A0Identifiers here are cheap, so if you want new semantics, just use a new=
 identifier. =A0</div><div><br></div><div>C: This is a requirement (and a g=
ood point), in the sense that we should avoid providing channels that an at=
tacker could use to control the integrity check value on a JW* object. =A0H=
owever, what that argues is that non-critical fields shouldn&#39;t be cover=
ed by the integrity check, not that they should be ruled out altogether.</d=
iv>
<div><br></div><div>D: This is not a requirement, for the reasons you give.=
</div><div><br></div><div>E: This is not a requirement. =A0Couple of client=
s/servers is an application-layer issue.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=
=3D"#000000">
    As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point
    where we are of two minds: <br>
    <br>
    1) Define <span style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field that
      explicitly lists the fields that may be safely ignored if not
      understood</span>. (Here I am assuming that we aren&#39;t going to
    define a separate header for non-critical elements.) <br>
    <br>
    2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications
    and leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly
    providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE
    specs). <br>
    <br>
    I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
    concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
    approach. <br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I would personally=
 be OK with either approach. =A0I would generalize (1) slightly to say &quo=
t;Define a syntax for indicating which fields are critical / non-critical&q=
uot;, and, in light of (C) above, also propose that that syntax remove non-=
critical fields from under the integrity check.</div>
<div>=A0</div><div><br></div></div></div>

--e89a8fb1f4c401cc2504d693d69d--

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Subject: Re: [jose] Call for Agenda Items
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I would like to request a slot to talk about the updated use cases /
requirements document.

I think we should also reserve some time to discuss the outstanding issues,
but I'll leave it up to the chairs as to who should lead that discussion.



On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 1:36 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> The chairs are starting to build the agenda for the meeting in Orlando.
> If you want to give a presently please let us know with the following
> information:****
>
> ** **
>
> Document to be addressed****
>
> Who is doing the presentation****
>
> Desired amount of time for the presentation.****
>
> ** **
>
> After the meeting we will be issuing a call for adoption on the new items
> in the charter dealing with private key operations.  We would especially
> solicit presentations on this topic if you do not believe that the
> candidate documents correctly address the problems.****
>
> ** **
>
> For people who are doing presentations, the chairs would like to see
> (preliminary) slides no later than 6 March with final slides to the chairs
> on Tuesday 12 March.  This will allow us to get the slides up on the web
> for those who are remote.****
>
> ** **
>
> Jim****
>
> ** **
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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I would like to request a slot to talk about the updated use cases / requir=
ements document.<div><br></div><div>I think we should also reserve some tim=
e to discuss the outstanding issues, but I&#39;ll leave it up to the chairs=
 as to who should lead that discussion.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 13, 2013=
 at 1:36 PM, Jim Schaad <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@august=
cellars.com" target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:=
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"p=
urple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">The chairs are starting to build the age=
nda for the meeting in Orlando.=A0 If you want to give a presently please l=
et us know with the following information:<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Document=
 to be addressed<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Who is doing the p=
resentation<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Desired amount of time =
for the presentation.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">After th=
e meeting we will be issuing a call for adoption on the new items in the ch=
arter dealing with private key operations.=A0 We would especially solicit p=
resentations on this topic if you do not believe that the candidate documen=
ts correctly address the problems.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">For peop=
le who are doing presentations, the chairs would like to see (preliminary) =
slides no later than 6 March with final slides to the chairs on Tuesday 12 =
March.=A0 This will allow us to get the slides up on the web for those who =
are remote.<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><u></u><u></u></f=
ont></span></p>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Jim<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></font></span></div></div><br>________________=
_______________________________<br>

jose mailing list<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Oh, and I will have some thoughts on private key formats to present as well.


On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:14 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> I would like to request a slot to talk about the updated use cases /
> requirements document.
>
> I think we should also reserve some time to discuss the outstanding
> issues, but I'll leave it up to the chairs as to who should lead that
> discussion.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 1:36 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>wrote:
>
>> The chairs are starting to build the agenda for the meeting in Orlando.
>> If you want to give a presently please let us know with the following
>> information:****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Document to be addressed****
>>
>> Who is doing the presentation****
>>
>> Desired amount of time for the presentation.****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> After the meeting we will be issuing a call for adoption on the new items
>> in the charter dealing with private key operations.  We would especially
>> solicit presentations on this topic if you do not believe that the
>> candidate documents correctly address the problems.****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> For people who are doing presentations, the chairs would like to see
>> (preliminary) slides no later than 6 March with final slides to the chairs
>> on Tuesday 12 March.  This will allow us to get the slides up on the web
>> for those who are remote.****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Jim****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>

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Oh, and I will have some thoughts on private key formats to present as well=
.<br><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:14 PM, Ri=
chard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"=
_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I would like to request a slot to talk about=
 the updated use cases / requirements document.<div><br></div><div>I think =
we should also reserve some time to discuss the outstanding issues, but I&#=
39;ll leave it up to the chairs as to who should lead that discussion.</div=
>

<div><br></div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><div class=3D"h=
5">On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 1:36 PM, Jim Schaad <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com" target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div lang=
=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">The c=
hairs are starting to build the agenda for the meeting in Orlando.=A0 If yo=
u want to give a presently please let us know with the following informatio=
n:<u></u><u></u></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Document=
 to be addressed<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Who is doing the p=
resentation<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Desired amount of time =
for the presentation.<u></u><u></u></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">After th=
e meeting we will be issuing a call for adoption on the new items in the ch=
arter dealing with private key operations.=A0 We would especially solicit p=
resentations on this topic if you do not believe that the candidate documen=
ts correctly address the problems.<u></u><u></u></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">For peop=
le who are doing presentations, the chairs would like to see (preliminary) =
slides no later than 6 March with final slides to the chairs on Tuesday 12 =
March.=A0 This will allow us to get the slides up on the web for those who =
are remote.<span><font color=3D"#888888"><u></u><u></u></font></span></p>

<span><font color=3D"#888888"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal">Jim<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=A0<u></u></p></font></span></div></div><br></div></div>___________________=
____________________________<br>


jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br>

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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Karen & Mike,

I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is =
some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while =
other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body.  =20
=20
An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which =
needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.
=20
I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter =
that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and =
passed on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass =
meta-data through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having =
to parse it.
=20
Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header =
parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.
=20
There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header =
parameters JOSE processes be possible.
=20
For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best =
solution.  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from =
non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element name.
=20
I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single =
element with an array of element names that are non-critical.
=20
My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:
=20
1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that =
an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.
2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be =
provided to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE =
header.
=20
All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE =
library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.
=20
I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to =
applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That =
is what "aad" is intended to provide.
=20
I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user =
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I =
think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.   =
That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This =
should be a separate discussion.
=20
Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that =
not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header =
parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the =
MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and =
not the sub parameters they may contain.
=20
My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, =
but I think it may address the majority of concerns.
=20
Regards
John B.
On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> =
wrote:

> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the =
working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing this =
note primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s =
discussions, rather than as an individual contributor.
> =20
> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing =
criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =
=93MUST be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as =
that=92s another potential extension point.  The JWK description says =
=93Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST =
be understood by implementations using them.=94  The same language is =
present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution of the issue to be =
complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that a number of =
additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extensions will =
occur there.
> =20
> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize =
for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are =
for doing this.  One proposal is 2A in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which =
I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt =
proposed in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which =
I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful =
for the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in =
parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go =
with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.
> =20
> FLAT SYNTAX:
>     {"alg":"ES256",
>      "ign":["notes"],
>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>     }
> =20
> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
>     {"alg":"ES256",
>      "ign":{
>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>       }
>     }
> =20
> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are =
in the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is =
more regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be =
safely ignored repeats those field names.
> =20
> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is =
repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that =
then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making =
the processing rules for header fields more complicated.
> =20
> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner =
syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler =
processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine =
with this coming out either way.)
> =20
> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches =
(1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to =
application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require =
header fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for =
declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use in those =
application contexts where the application spec does require that header =
fields be normally understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall =
under the =93(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications =
in the JOSE specs)=94 that you suggested below.
> =20
> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.
> =20
>                                                             -- Mike
> =20
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Karen O'Donoghue
> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
> =20
> Folks,
>=20
> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on =
header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a =
chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to =
provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing =
the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and =
talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do =
so. So, what next...=20
>=20
> First, what I do believe...
>=20
> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this =
issue with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must =
be defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered =
non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be =
reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be =
generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move =
forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical =
and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.=20=

>=20
> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed =
something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed =
(summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James =
Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of =
requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>=20
> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics.
>=20
> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of =
*existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>=20
> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, =
as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between =
legitimate & malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>=20
> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), =
under the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do =
more harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than =
the good of any new functionality they bring.
>=20
> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good =
thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure =
message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that =
people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for =
short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for =
better long-term security.
>=20
> =46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am =
unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe =
D is not a requirement.=20
>=20
> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are =
trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would =
help drive consensus on the overall approach.=20
>=20
> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point =
where we are of two minds:=20
>=20
> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be =
safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't =
going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)=20
>=20
> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and =
leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly =
providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).=20
>=20
> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am =
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second =
approach.=20
>=20
> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 =
or approach 2?=20
>=20
> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:=20
> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a =
non-critical headers approach. =20
> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving =
the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).=20
> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach =
is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the =
applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? =
To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of text.=20
>=20
> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as =
some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and =
misunderstandings on my part.=20
>=20
> Regards,
> Karen O'Donoghue
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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-webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">Karen &amp; Mike,</div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><br></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">I think an important issue that Jim and others have =
tried to get at is some information in the header is intended for the =
JOSE library, while other header parameters are essentially additional =
associated data (meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to =
other software layers for processing along with the body. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">An example of =
that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs to be =
processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I suspect a =
point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter that is a =
JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed on with =
the body.&nbsp; This would provide applications a way to pass meta-data =
through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse =
it.<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: =
12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">Once we remove =
a large number of the possible extension header parameters from JOSE =
processing, the problem gets smaller.<o:p></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header =
parameters JOSE processes be possible.<o:p></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best =
solution. &nbsp;That enables a header parameter to be migrated from =
non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element =
name.<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: =
12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I think that a =
large number of people on the list favoured the single element with an =
array of element names that are non-critical.<o:p></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">1 "ign": =
&nbsp;Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an =
application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.<o:p></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">2 "aad": Additional Associated Data -&nbsp;a JSON =
object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if =
present in a JOSE header.<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">All other top =
level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library or produce =
a processing fault resulting in an error.<o:p></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to =
applications. &nbsp;I think that would cause interoperability issues. =
&nbsp; That is what "aad" is intended to provide.<o:p></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user =
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). &nbsp;I =
think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included. =
&nbsp; That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be =
ignored. &nbsp;This should be a separate =
discussion.<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">Finally, for =
JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand elements =
should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is also =
allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in =
JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not the sub =
parameters they may contain.<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">My proposal =
doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I think it =
may address the majority of concerns.<o:p></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">Regards<o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">John =
B.</div><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" =
vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; =
font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
-webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><div class=3D"WordSection1" =
style=3D"page: WordSection1; "><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Thanks for sending this, Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your =
analysis will help the working group reach a resolution on this issue =
soon.&nbsp; I=92m writing this note primarily as an editor to help =
inform the working group=92s discussions, rather than as an individual =
contributor.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">First, I want to point out that while we=92ve =
been discussing criticality of header parameters, the specs actually =
currently have the =93MUST be understood=94 language in the JWK =
specification as well, as that=92s another potential extension =
point.&nbsp; The JWK description says =93Additional members MAY be =
present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, they MUST be understood by =
implementations using them.=94&nbsp; The same language is present for =
the JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it =
should address those uses too.&nbsp; Given that a number of additional =
JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extensions will occur =
there.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Second, if we do decide to go with your =
approach (1), I=92ll summarize for the list what I believe the two =
syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.&nbsp; One proposal is =
2A in<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</a><span=
 class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>(which I=92ll call the =
FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed =
in<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html</a><span=
 class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>(which I=92ll call the =
STRUCTURED SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be useful for the =
working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel to =
discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with =
approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to =
use.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">FLAT SYNTAX:<o:p></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
'Courier New'; color: windowtext; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{"alg":"ES256",<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: =
windowtext; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":["notes"],<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: =
windowtext; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "notes":"This header field can be =
safely ignored"<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: =
windowtext; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">STRUCTURED =
SYNTAX:<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: windowtext; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {"alg":"ES256",<o:p></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
'Courier New'; color: windowtext; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":{<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: windowtext; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "notes":"This header field can be =
safely ignored"<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: =
windowtext; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: windowtext; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax =
is all header fields are in the same place.&nbsp; This makes processing =
header fields easier and is more regular.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that =
the list of fields that may be safely ignored repeats those field =
names.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">As I see it, the advantage of the structured =
syntax is that nothing is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON =
syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that then some header fields are in =
one place and some are in another, making the processing rules for =
header fields more complicated.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Between these two, it =
seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner =
semantics.&nbsp; (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler processing =
rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this =
coming out either way.)<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t =
believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.&nbsp; =
We could conceivably leave it up to application specifications using the =
JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood by =
default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely =
ignored for use in those application contexts where the application spec =
does require that header fields be normally understood.&nbsp; In fact, =
one might consider this to fall under the =93</span>(possibly providing =
guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)<span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">=94 that you suggested =
below.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">I hope the points above help further a =
productive discussion of this topic.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- =
Mike<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div><div style=3D"border-style: =
solid none none; border-top-width: 1pt; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196, =
223); padding: 3pt 0in 0in; "><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><b><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; color: =
windowtext; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; =
font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; color: windowtext; "><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> =
[mailto:jose-<a =
href=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b>On Behalf Of<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Karen =
O'Donoghue<br><b>Sent:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Monday, February 25, 2013 =
3:26 AM<br><b>To:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a=
 href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>[jose] thoughts on header =
criticality from recent polls<o:p></o:p></span></div></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 12pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New =
Roman', serif; ">Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience with me =
regarding the recent polls on header criticality. I realize I have taken =
too long to respond from a chairs perspective with some results and =
direction. I had hoped to provide either a decision or a clear set of =
choices, but after analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email =
traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few working group members, I =
find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next...<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>First, what I do =
believe...<br><br>I think it is clear that the working group remains =
divided on this issue with a significant number of members feeling that =
an approach must be defined that safely allows for some header fields to =
be considered non-critical. I think there is general consensus that =
there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the =
approach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working =
group to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be =
considered critical and move on to the discussion of how to approach =
non-critical headers.<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>In my review of the =
mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed something), I have =
seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Jim Schaad on =
9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In =
particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and =
I have repeated it here...<br><br>A. Want to be able to define messages =
with new semantics in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to =
*redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing* fields in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics (or without the constraints).<br><br>C. Want to prevent =
large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as similar blobs have =
been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &amp; malicious =
certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br><br>D. Want to =
strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the =
philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm =
(by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good =
of any new functionality they bring.<br><br>E. Loosely coupling clients =
and servers is generally considered a good thing; but strongly coupling =
them is more appropriate for a secure message format for [insert a =
reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too likely to choose =
to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of =
interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term =
security.<br><br>=46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a =
requirement. I am unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and =
E, and I believe D is not a requirement.<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>QUESTION: Is there =
working group consensus on the requirements we are trying to address? =
Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive consensus =
on the overall approach.<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>As for possible =
solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we are of two =
minds:<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>1) =
Define<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D"color: windowtext; ">a header field that explicitly lists the =
fields that may be safely ignored if not understood</span>. (Here I am =
assuming that we aren't going to define a separate header for =
non-critical elements.)<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>2) Remain silent on =
header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave it up to the =
various application specifications (possibly providing guidance directed =
to those applications in the JOSE specs).<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>I sense that there =
is more support for the first approach, but I am concerned that there is =
a significant minority that favor the second approach.<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>QUESTION: Can the =
working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or approach 2?<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>In conclusion, I am =
asking three things in this missive:<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>1. I am asking the =
working group to move forward based on a non-critical headers =
approach.&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>2. =
I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the =
non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>3. I am asking the =
working group to decide whether the right approach is to develop a =
specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications with =
appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this =
item, I welcome concise proposals of text.<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>I realize this =
message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some would like, =
and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandings on my =
part.<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br><br>Regards,<br>Karen =
O'Donoghue<o:p></o:p></p></div>___________________________________________=
____<br>jose mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/jose</div></blockquote></div><br></body></html>=

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To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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One addition to Mike=92s notes.  If you are going to have ignorable fields,
it=92d be nice to avoid one of the (many, many) design botches that increas=
ed
the difficulty of doing SOAP; it had a thing where you could specify, in
among the SOAP headers, a MUST-UNDERSTAND rule. The effect was that you
didn=92t know whether you could act on any header until you=92d seen them a=
ll,
because there might be a MUST-UNDERSTAND lurking somewhere.

The "ign" : [ "notes" ] idiom has, to my eye, that drawback.  The
structured one lets you know, as soon as you see a field, whether it=92s OK
to not understand it.  -T


On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wr=
ote:

>  Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the
> working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing this =
note
> primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s discussions,
> rather than as an individual contributor.****
>
> ** **
>
> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing criticality=
 of
> header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =93MUST be
> understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s anot=
her
> potential extension point.  The JWK description says =93Additional member=
s
> MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by
> implementations using them.=94  The same language is present for the JWK =
Set.
>  For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address those
> uses too.  Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being
> discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.****
>
> ** **
>
> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize fo=
r
> the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doi=
ng
> this.  One proposal is 2A in
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which
> I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt
> proposed in
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which
> I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful fo=
r
> the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel
> to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with
> approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.****
>
> ** **
>
> FLAT SYNTAX:****
>
>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>
>      "ign":["notes"],****
>
>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>
>     }****
>
> ** **
>
> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:****
>
>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>
>      "ign":{****
>
>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>
>       }****
>
>     }****
>
> ** **
>
> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in
> the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more
> regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely
> ignored repeats those field names.****
>
> ** **
>
> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is
> repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that the=
n
> some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the
> processing rules for header fields more complicated.****
>
> ** **
>
> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner
> syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler
> processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with
> this coming out either way.)****
>
> ** **
>
> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches (1)=
 and
> (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to
> application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require head=
er
> fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring whi=
ch
> fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where
> the application spec does require that header fields be normally
> understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93(possi=
bly
> providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)=94
> that you suggested below.****
>
> ** **
>
> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topi=
c.
> ****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Karen O'Donoghue
> *Sent:* Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls****
>
> ** **
>
> Folks,
>
> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header
> criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs
> perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide eithe=
r
> a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll result=
s,
> rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few
> working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what
> next...
>
> First, what I do believe...
>
> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue
> with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be
> defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered
> non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be
> reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be
> generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move
> forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical
> and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.
>
> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed
> something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized
> by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct
> 2012). In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very
> helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>
> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future,
> without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old
> semantics.
>
> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of
> *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations wi=
ll
> misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>
> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as
> similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate=
 &
> malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>
> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under
> the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm
> (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good o=
f
> any new functionality they bring.
>
> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good
> thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure messag=
e
> format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are t=
oo
> likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of
> interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term
> security.
>
> From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear
> regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not =
a
> requirement.
>
> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are
> trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help
> drive consensus on the overall approach.
>
> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where w=
e
> are of two minds:
>
> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't
> going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)
>
> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and
> leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing
> guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
>
> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
> concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
> approach.
>
> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or
> approach 2?
>
> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical
> headers approach.
> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the
> non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is
> to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applicatio=
ns
> with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address thi=
s
> item, I welcome concise proposals of text.
>
> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as som=
e
> would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and
> misunderstandings on my part.
>
> Regards,
> Karen O'Donoghue****
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

--20cf307d064edf835504d693e806
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">One addition to Mike=92s notes.=A0 If you are going to hav=
e ignorable fields, it=92d be nice to avoid one of the (many, many) design =
botches that increased the difficulty of doing SOAP; it had a thing where y=
ou could specify, in among the SOAP headers, a MUST-UNDERSTAND rule. The ef=
fect was that you didn=92t know whether you could act on any header until y=
ou=92d seen them all, because there might be a MUST-UNDERSTAND lurking some=
where.=A0 <br>
<br>The &quot;ign&quot; : [ &quot;notes&quot; ] idiom has, to my eye, that =
drawback.=A0 The structured one lets you know, as soon as you see a field, =
whether it=92s OK to not understand it.=A0 -T<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 7:41 AM, Mike Jo=
nes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc=
 solid;padding-left:1ex">






<div bgcolor=3D"white" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Thanks for sending this, =
Karen.=A0 Hopefully your analysis will help the working group reach a resol=
ution on this issue soon.=A0 I=92m writing this note primarily
 as an editor to help inform the working group=92s discussions, rather than=
 as an individual contributor.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">First, I want to point ou=
t that while we=92ve been discussing criticality of header parameters, the =
specs actually currently have the =93MUST be understood=94 language
 in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s another potential extension =
point.=A0 The JWK description says =93Additional members MAY be present in =
the JWK.=A0 If present, they MUST be understood by implementations using th=
em.=94=A0 The same language is present for the
 JWK Set. =A0For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should addr=
ess those uses too.=A0 Given that a number of additional JWK fields are bei=
ng discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.<u></u><u></u></spa=
n></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Second, if we do decide t=
o go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize for the list what I believe t=
he two syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.=A0
 One proposal is 2A in <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose=
/current/msg01353.html" target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</a> (which =
I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt pr=
oposed in
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html"=
 target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg014=
57.html</a> (which I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).=A0 I believe that it=
 would be useful for the working group to discuss which
 of those they would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that yo=
u asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we=92l=
l know which to use.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">FLAT SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&qu=
ot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes=
&quot;],<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This=
 header field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:<u></u>=
<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&qu=
ot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:{<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quo=
t;This header field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the flat syntax is all header fields are in the same place.=A0 This ma=
kes processing header fields easier and is more regular.=A0
 The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignored rep=
eats those field names.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the structured syntax is that nothing is repeated, resulting in cleane=
r JSON syntax.=A0 The disadvantage is that then some header
 fields are in one place and some are in another, making the processing rul=
es for header fields more complicated.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Between these two, it see=
ms to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner semantics.=A0=
 (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler processing rules
 resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming out e=
ither way.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Finally, I=92ll point out=
 that I don=92t believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutually exclu=
sive.=A0 We could conceivably leave it up to application specifications
 using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood b=
y default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ign=
ored for use in those application contexts where the application spec does =
require that header fields be normally
 understood.=A0 In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93</spa=
n>(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE s=
pecs)<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;=
sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=94 that you suggested below.<u></u><u></u>=
</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I hope the points above h=
elp further a productive discussion of this topic.<u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:windowtext"> <a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounce=
s@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Karen O&#39;Donoghue<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls<u><=
/u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Folks,<br>
<br>
Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but
 after analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multipl=
e times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite=
 able to do so. So, what next...
<br>
<br>
First, what I do believe...<br>
<br>
I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus
 that there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the a=
pproach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working gro=
up to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered =
critical and move on to the discussion
 of how to approach non-critical headers. <br>
<br>
In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James&#39; list
 of requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>
<br>
A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.<br>
<br>
B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>
<br>
C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &am=
p; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
<br>
D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>

<br>
E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension
 non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it=
 critical for better long-term security.<br>
<br>
>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.
<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.
<br>
<br>
As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:
<br>
<br>
1) Define <span style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field that explicitly l=
ists the fields that may be safely ignored if not understood</span>. (Here =
I am assuming that we aren&#39;t going to define a separate header for non-=
critical elements.)
<br>
<br>
2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
<br>
<br>
I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.
<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?
<br>
<br>
In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive: <br>
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.=A0
<br>
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
<br>
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals
 of text. <br>
<br>
I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.
<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Karen O&#39;Donoghue<u></u><u></u></p>
</div></div></div>
</div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--20cf307d064edf835504d693e806--

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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Cc: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Worse is that "MUT UNDERSTAND" was never understood in SOAP

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Tim=
 Bray
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 2:18 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org; odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

One addition to Mike's notes.  If you are going to have ignorable fields, i=
t'd be nice to avoid one of the (many, many) design botches that increased =
the difficulty of doing SOAP; it had a thing where you could specify, in am=
ong the SOAP headers, a MUST-UNDERSTAND rule. The effect was that you didn'=
t know whether you could act on any header until you'd seen them all, becau=
se there might be a MUST-UNDERSTAND lurking somewhere.

The "ign" : [ "notes" ] idiom has, to my eye, that drawback.  The structure=
d one lets you know, as soon as you see a field, whether it's OK to not und=
erstand it.  -T

On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<ma=
ilto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:
Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the work=
ing group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I'm writing this note pri=
marily as an editor to help inform the working group's discussions, rather =
than as an individual contributor.

First, I want to point out that while we've been discussing criticality of =
header parameters, the specs actually currently have the "MUST be understoo=
d" language in the JWK specification as well, as that's another potential e=
xtension point.  The JWK description says "Additional members MAY be presen=
t in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by implementations using=
 them."  The same language is present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution =
of the issue to be complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that =
a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extens=
ions will occur there.

Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I'll summarize for th=
e list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing t=
his.  One proposal is 2A in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curre=
nt/msg01353.html (which I'll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syn=
tax that Dick Hardt proposed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/c=
urrent/msg01457.html (which I'll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe th=
at it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they =
would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so tha=
t if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we'll know which to u=
se.

FLAT SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":["notes"],
     "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
    }

STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":{
       "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
      }
    }

As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in t=
he same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more regu=
lar.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignore=
d repeats those field names.

As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is repe=
ated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that then some=
 header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the process=
ing rules for header fields more complicated.

Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax=
 or cleaner semantics.  (I'd personally lean towards the simpler processing=
 rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming=
 out either way.)

Finally, I'll point out that I don't believe that your approaches (1) and (=
2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to application=
 specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to =
be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields ma=
y be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where the applica=
tion spec does require that header fields be normally understood.  In fact,=
 one might consider this to fall under the "(possibly providing guidance di=
rected to those applications in the JOSE specs)" that you suggested below.

I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topic.

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Karen O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

Folks,

Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll results, reread=
ing all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few working gr=
oup members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next...

First, what I do believe...

I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus that there must be reasonable mechanisms =
for extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. Based on that, I =
would like to ask the working group to move forward with the strategy that =
all headers cannot be considered critical and move on to the discussion of =
how to approach non-critical headers.

In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and =
I have repeated it here...

A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.

B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).

C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate & m=
alicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.

E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of inte=
roperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term security.

>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.

QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.

As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:

1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to de=
fine a separate header for non-critical elements.)

2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).

I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.

QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?

In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals of text.

I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.

Regards,
Karen O'Donoghue

_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Worse is that &#8220;MUT =
UNDERSTAND&#8221; was never understood in SOAP<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497=
D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></a></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-=
size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-b=
ounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Bray<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 2:18 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org; odonoghue@isoc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">One addition to Mike&#8217;s notes.&nbsp; If you are=
 going to have ignorable fields, it&#8217;d be nice to avoid one of the (ma=
ny, many) design botches that increased the difficulty of doing SOAP; it ha=
d a thing where you could specify, in among the SOAP
 headers, a MUST-UNDERSTAND rule. The effect was that you didn&#8217;t know=
 whether you could act on any header until you&#8217;d seen them all, becau=
se there might be a MUST-UNDERSTAND lurking somewhere.&nbsp;
<br>
<br>
The &quot;ign&quot; : [ &quot;notes&quot; ] idiom has, to my eye, that draw=
back.&nbsp; The structured one lets you know, as soon as you see a field, w=
hether it&#8217;s OK to not understand it.&nbsp; -T<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@=
microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Thanks for sending this, Karen.&nbsp; H=
opefully your analysis will help the working group reach a resolution
 on this issue soon.&nbsp; I&#8217;m writing this note primarily as an edit=
or to help inform the working group&#8217;s discussions, rather than as an =
individual contributor.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">First, I want to point out that while w=
e&#8217;ve been discussing criticality of header parameters, the
 specs actually currently have the &#8220;MUST be understood&#8221; languag=
e in the JWK specification as well, as that&#8217;s another potential exten=
sion point.&nbsp; The JWK description says &#8220;Additional members MAY be=
 present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, they MUST be understood by
 implementations using them.&#8221;&nbsp; The same language is present for =
the JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it shoul=
d address those uses too.&nbsp; Given that a number of additional JWK field=
s are being discussed, I expect that extensions will
 occur there.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Second, if we do decide to go with your=
 approach (1), I&#8217;ll summarize for the list what I believe
 the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.&nbsp; One propos=
al is 2A in
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html"=
 target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</a> (which =
I&#8217;ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hard=
t proposed in
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html"=
 target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html</a> (which =
I&#8217;ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be us=
eful for the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in p=
arallel to discussing the questions that you
 asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we&#821=
7;ll know which to use.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">FLAT SYNTAX:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</span><o:p></o:p>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes&quot;],</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This header field can b=
e safely ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:</span><o:p></o:p></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</span><o:p></o:p>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:{</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This header=
 field can be safely ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantage of the flat =
syntax is all header fields are in the same place.&nbsp; This makes
 processing header fields easier and is more regular.&nbsp; The disadvantag=
e is that the list of fields that may be safely ignored repeats those field=
 names.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantage of the struc=
tured syntax is that nothing is repeated, resulting in cleaner
 JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that then some header fields are in=
 one place and some are in another, making the processing rules for header =
fields more complicated.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Between these two, it seems to come dow=
n to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner semantics.&nbsp;
 (I&#8217;d personally lean towards the simpler processing rules resulting =
from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming out either way.)=
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Finally, I&#8217;ll point out that I do=
n&#8217;t believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.&=
nbsp;
 We could conceivably leave it up to application specifications using the J=
OSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood by default AN=
D provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use=
 in those application contexts where
 the application spec does require that header fields be normally understoo=
d.&nbsp; In fact, one might consider this to fall under the &#8220;</span>(=
possibly providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE spec=
s)<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;san=
s-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#8221;
 that you suggested below.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I hope the points above help further a =
productive discussion of this topic.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,=
&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@iet=
f.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Karen O'Donoghue<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls</sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0p=
t">Folks,<br>
<br>
Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but
 after analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multipl=
e times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite=
 able to do so. So, what next...
<br>
<br>
First, what I do believe...<br>
<br>
I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus
 that there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the a=
pproach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working gro=
up to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered =
critical and move on to the discussion
 of how to approach non-critical headers. <br>
<br>
In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list
 of requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>
<br>
A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.<br>
<br>
B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>
<br>
C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &am=
p; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
<br>
D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>
<br>
E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension
 non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it=
 critical for better long-term security.<br>
<br>
>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.
<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.
<br>
<br>
As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:
<br>
<br>
1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to de=
fine a separate header for non-critical elements.)
<br>
<br>
2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
<br>
<br>
I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.
<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?
<br>
<br>
In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive: <br>
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.&nbsp;
<br>
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
<br>
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals
 of text. <br>
<br>
I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.
<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Karen O'Donoghue<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [jose] Proposed Text - MUST understand
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Hi Jim,

Thanks for taking a cut at this.  I agree that the "IETF applications"
distinction is not helpful.  Also, I don't think RFC 2119 language is
helpful here.

The security risk here is that an application will make a security decision
based on a field it doesn't understand.  We should focus on that.  (Like
you, I have trouble coming up with an example, but I guess I'm willing to
admit the possibility.

Revised text proposal:

*************************************************************

The JOSE header is extensible to include new header fields that a recipient
may or may not support.  Applications making use of JOSE need to ensure
that security decisions ignore any header fields that are not understood by
an implementation.  An application specification might do this by requiring
that a specific set of header fields be present in every JOSE object (and no
others), or it might specify a decision process in terms of specific fields,
and explicitly require implementations to ignore other fields.

The reason why the default position is that applications need to understand
and process all of the headers can be seen in the following example.  <Jones
et al provide a non-trivial example that demonstrates the security problem
associated with ignoring header fields.>

******************************************************************

On Sun, Feb 24, 2013 at 9:41 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> Sorry, I was missing a clause in the text
>
> IETF applications that use the JOSE work MUST
>
> I was trying to say that IETF documents using JOSE must do this, however we
> cannot really impose it on non IETF documents.
>
> Jim
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2013 2:18 PM
> > To: Jim Schaad
> > Cc: jose@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [jose] Proposed Text - MUST understand
> >
> > How is an IETF application different than any other application?
> >
> > The Datatracker, rfcdiff, and xml2rfc will probably never need to use
> jose, so
> > I know that is not the intended meaning.  ;-)
> >
> > Russ
> >
> >
> > On Feb 24, 2013, at 3:32 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
> >
> > > I am going to venture some proposed text to try and advance the
> > > discussion about the MUST understand all fields in the current
> > > document.  I acknowledge that the text is written from the point of
> > > view that I espouse, however I think that perhaps it does give a
> > > sufficient amount of credence to the point of view of other that it
> > > might provide a good starting point for discussions.
> > >
> > > This text is written standalone and as such I have not yet tried to
> > > incorporate it into the different documents and in the different
> locations.
> > > It is possible that the text will need to be somewhat repurposed when
> > > it appears in each of the different documents.
> > >
> > >
> > **********************************************************
> > ***
> > >
> > > Applications which use this specification SHOULD ensure that all of
> > > the fields in the header are used in either in making the trust
> > > decision or determining how to use the content.  IETF applications
> > > MUST have  default position of requiring that all fields in the header
> > > are known to and used by the application.  IETF applications which
> > > allow for fields in the header to be ignored MUST include a
> > > justification of why this decision was made and looking at the security
> > trade-offs of the decision.
> > >
> > > The reason why the default position is that applications need to
> > > understand and process all of the headers can be seen in the following
> > > example.  <Jones et al provide a non-trivial example that demonstrates
> > > the security problem associated with ignoring header fields.>
> > >
> > >
> > **********************************************************
> > ********
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

--e89a8ff242ab08f0ad04d6941ccc
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Hi Jim,</span></div><div><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br>
</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans=
-serif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Thanks for taking =
a cut at this. =A0I agree that the &quot;IETF applications&quot; distinctio=
n is not helpful. =A0Also, I don&#39;t think RFC 2119 language is helpful h=
ere.</span><span style=3D"font-size:13px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:ar=
ial,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br>
</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans=
-serif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><=
div><font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">The security risk he=
re is that an application will make a security decision based on a field it=
 doesn&#39;t understand. =A0We should focus on that. =A0(Like you, I have t=
rouble coming up with an example, but I guess I&#39;m willing to admit the =
possibility.</font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif"><br></font></div><d=
iv><font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">Revised text proposal=
:</font></div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:13px;color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">**=
****************************</span><span style=3D"font-size:13px;color:rgb(=
34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">*=
*****************************</span><span style=3D"font-size:13px;color:rgb=
(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
*</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size:13px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><font col=
or=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">The JOSE header is extensible to =
include new header fields that a recipient=A0</font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">may or may not supp=
ort. =A0Applications making use of JOSE need to ensure=A0</font></div><div>=
<font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">that security decisions =
ignore any header fields that are not understood by=A0</font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">an implementation. =
=A0An application specification might do this by requiring=A0</font></div><=
div><font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">that a specific set =
of header fields be present in every JOSE object (and no</font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">others), or it migh=
t specify a decision process in terms of specific fields,</font></div><div>=
<font color=3D"#222222" face=3D"arial, sans-serif">and explicitly require i=
mplementations to ignore other fields.</font></div>
<div><br></div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-se=
rif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">The reason why the de=
fault position is that applications need to understand</span><br style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;background-c=
olor:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
3px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">and process all of the headers can b=
e seen in the following example. =A0&lt;Jones</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(=
34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(=
255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
3px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">et al provide a non-trivial example =
that demonstrates the security problem</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255=
,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
3px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">associated with ignoring header fiel=
ds.&gt;</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif=
;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13p=
x;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"=
>******************************</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fo=
nt-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
">******************************</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);f=
ont-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255=
)">******</span><br>
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Feb 24, 2013 at 9:41 PM, Jim Schaad =
<span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com" target=3D"_=
blank">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex">
Sorry, I was missing a clause in the text<br>
<br>
IETF applications that use the JOSE work MUST<br>
<br>
I was trying to say that IETF documents using JOSE must do this, however we=
<br>
cannot really impose it on non IETF documents.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Jim<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Russ Housley [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">hou=
sley@vigilsec.com</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2013 2:18 PM<br>
&gt; To: Jim Schaad<br>
&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [jose] Proposed Text - MUST understand<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; How is an IETF application different than any other application?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The Datatracker, rfcdiff, and xml2rfc will probably never need to use<=
br>
jose, so<br>
&gt; I know that is not the intended meaning. =A0;-)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Russ<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Feb 24, 2013, at 3:32 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I am going to venture some proposed text to try and advance the<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; discussion about the MUST understand all fields in the current<br=
>
&gt; &gt; document. =A0I acknowledge that the text is written from the poin=
t of<br>
&gt; &gt; view that I espouse, however I think that perhaps it does give a<=
br>
&gt; &gt; sufficient amount of credence to the point of view of other that =
it<br>
&gt; &gt; might provide a good starting point for discussions.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; This text is written standalone and as such I have not yet tried =
to<br>
&gt; &gt; incorporate it into the different documents and in the different<=
br>
locations.<br>
&gt; &gt; It is possible that the text will need to be somewhat repurposed =
when<br>
&gt; &gt; it appears in each of the different documents.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; **********************************************************<br>
&gt; ***<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Applications which use this specification SHOULD ensure that all =
of<br>
&gt; &gt; the fields in the header are used in either in making the trust<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; decision or determining how to use the content. =A0IETF applicati=
ons<br>
&gt; &gt; MUST have =A0default position of requiring that all fields in the=
 header<br>
&gt; &gt; are known to and used by the application. =A0IETF applications wh=
ich<br>
&gt; &gt; allow for fields in the header to be ignored MUST include a<br>
&gt; &gt; justification of why this decision was made and looking at the se=
curity<br>
&gt; trade-offs of the decision.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The reason why the default position is that applications need to<=
br>
&gt; &gt; understand and process all of the headers can be seen in the foll=
owing<br>
&gt; &gt; example. =A0&lt;Jones et al provide a non-trivial example that de=
monstrates<br>
&gt; &gt; the security problem associated with ignoring header fields.&gt;<=
br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; **********************************************************<br>
&gt; ********<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)

If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the
header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on what I
said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated by a
signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the
unknown stuff in the header.



On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> Karen & Mike,
>
> I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is
> some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while
> other header parameters are essentially additional associated data
> (meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software
> layers for processing along with the body.   ****
> ** **
> An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which need=
s
> to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.****
> ** **
> I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter
> that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed
> on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass meta-dat=
a
> through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse it=
.
> ****
> ** **
> Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters
> from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.****
> ** **
> There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header
> parameters JOSE processes be possible.****
> ** **
> For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution.
>  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to
> critical without changing its JSON element name.****
> ** **
> I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single
> element with an array of element names that are non-critical.****
> ** **
> My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:=
*
> ***
> ** **
> 1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an
> application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.****
> 2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be provided
> to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE header.****
> ** **
> All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE librar=
y
> or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.****
> ** **
> I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to
> applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That i=
s
> what "aad" is intended to provide.****
> ** **
> I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user
> provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I think
> this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security
> considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.
> That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This
> should be a separate discussion.****
> ** **
> Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand
> elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is
> also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in
> JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not the sub
> parameters they may contain.****
> ** **
> My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but
> I think it may address the majority of concerns.****
> ** **
> Regards****
> John B.
> On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> wrote=
:
>
> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the
> working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing this =
note
> primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s discussions,
> rather than as an individual contributor.****
>
> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing criticality=
 of
> header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =93MUST be
> understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s anot=
her
> potential extension point.  The JWK description says =93Additional member=
s
> MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by
> implementations using them.=94  The same language is present for the JWK =
Set.
>  For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address those
> uses too.  Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being
> discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.****
>
> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize fo=
r
> the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doi=
ng
> this.  One proposal is 2A in
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which
> I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt
> proposed in
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which
> I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful fo=
r
> the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel
> to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with
> approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.****
>
> FLAT SYNTAX:****
>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>      "ign":["notes"],****
>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>     }****
>
> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:****
>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>      "ign":{****
>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>       }****
>     }****
>
> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in
> the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more
> regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely
> ignored repeats those field names.****
>
> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is
> repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that the=
n
> some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the
> processing rules for header fields more complicated.****
>
> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner
> syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler
> processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with
> this coming out either way.)****
>
> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches (1)=
 and
> (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to
> application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require head=
er
> fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring whi=
ch
> fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where
> the application spec does require that header fields be normally
> understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93(possi=
bly
> providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)=94
> that you suggested below.****
>
> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topi=
c.
> ****
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf O=
f
>  *Karen O'Donoghue
> *Sent:* Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
> *To:* jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls****
> ** **
>
> Folks,
>
> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header
> criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs
> perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide eithe=
r
> a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll result=
s,
> rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few
> working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next=
...
>
>
> First, what I do believe...
>
> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue
> with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be
> defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered
> non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be
> reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be
> generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move
> forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical
> and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.
>
> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed
> something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized
> by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct
> 2012). In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very
> helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>
> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future,
> without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old
> semantics.
>
> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of
> *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations wi=
ll
> misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>
> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as
> similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate=
 &
> malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>
> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under
> the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm
> (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good o=
f
> any new functionality they bring.
>
> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good
> thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure messag=
e
> format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are t=
oo
> likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of
> interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term
> security.
>
> From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear
> regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not =
a
> requirement.
>
> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are
> trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help
> drive consensus on the overall approach.
>
> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where w=
e
> are of two minds:
>
> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
> safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't
> going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)
>
> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and
> leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing
> guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
>
> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
> concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
> approach.
>
> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or
> approach 2?
>
> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical
> headers approach.
> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the
> non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is
> to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applicatio=
ns
> with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address thi=
s
> item, I welcome concise proposals of text.
>
> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as som=
e
> would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and
> misunderstandings on my part.
>
> Regards,
> Karen O'Donoghue****
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Sorry, John, no agreement on &quot;aad&quot; =A0:)<div><br></div><div>If yo=
u want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the header =
and mark it as non-critical. =A0I&#39;m willing to step back on what I said=
 in my response to &quot;B&quot;; it can be much more easily mitigated by a=
 signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the un=
known stuff in the header.</div>
<div><br></div><div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div sty=
le=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Rom=
an&#39;,serif">

Karen &amp; Mike,</div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt=
;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><br></div><div style=3D"margi=
n:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,ser=
if">

I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is some=
 information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while other he=
ader parameters are essentially additional associated data (meta-data about=
 the body) and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing=
 along with the body. =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">An exa=
mple of that was the proposed &quot;iat&quot; (issued at) element, which ne=
eds to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.<u><=
/u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I susp=
ect a point of agreement might be having an &quot;aad&quot; header paramete=
r that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed=
 on with the body.=A0 This would provide applications a way to pass meta-da=
ta through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse i=
t.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Once w=
e remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters from JO=
SE processing, the problem gets smaller.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">There =
is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header parameters=
 JOSE processes be possible.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">For th=
at the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution. =A0That=
 enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to critical wi=
thout changing its JSON element name.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I thin=
k that a large number of people on the list favoured the single element wit=
h an array of element names that are non-critical.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">My pro=
posal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:<u></u><=
u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">1 &quo=
t;ign&quot;: =A0Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope tha=
t an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif">2 &quot;aad&quot;: Additional Associated Data -=A0a =
JSON object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if pr=
esent in a JOSE header.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">All ot=
her top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library or pro=
duce a processing fault resulting in an error.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I woul=
d also not want elements listed in &quot;ign&quot; to be passed on to appli=
cations. =A0I think that would cause interoperability issues. =A0 That is w=
hat &quot;aad&quot; is intended to provide.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I know=
 James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provided dat=
a to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). =A0I think this is a s=
eparate issue that needs to be addressed by security considerations to add =
entropy to the header if such data is included. =A0 That may require a new =
&quot;ent&quot; Entropy element that MUST be ignored. =A0This should be a s=
eparate discussion.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Finall=
y, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand element=
s should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is also all=
ows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in JWE/JWS o=
nly allies to the top level parameter&#39;s, and not the sub parameters the=
y may contain.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">My pro=
posal doesn&#39;t neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I t=
hink it may address the majority of concerns.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Regard=
s<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif">John B.</div><div><div><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 7=
:41 AM, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>

<br></div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN=
-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-siz=
e:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-sp=
acing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;tex=
t-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px">

<div><div><div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-fa=
mily:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-fa=
mily:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks for sending this, Kare=
n.=A0 Hopefully your analysis will help the working group reach a resolutio=
n on this issue soon.=A0 I=92m writing this note primarily as an editor to =
help inform the working group=92s discussions, rather than as an individual=
 contributor.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing criti=
cality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =93MUST =
be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s ano=
ther potential extension point.=A0 The JWK description says =93Additional m=
embers MAY be present in the JWK.=A0 If present, they MUST be understood by=
 implementations using them.=94=A0 The same language is present for the JWK=
 Set. =A0For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address =
those uses too.=A0 Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being d=
iscussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.<u></u><u></u></span></=
div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summar=
ize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are f=
or doing this.=A0 One proposal is 2A in<span>=A0</span><a href=3D"http://ww=
w.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" style=3D"color:purp=
le;text-decoration:underline" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-ar=
chive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</a><span>=A0</span>(which I=92ll call =
the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in<sp=
an>=A0</span><a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/m=
sg01457.html" style=3D"color:purple;text-decoration:underline" target=3D"_b=
lank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html</a><s=
pan>=A0</span>(which I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).=A0 I believe that =
it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they wou=
ld prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that i=
f we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to us=
e.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">FLAT SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Courier New&#39;;color:windowtext=
">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes&quo=
t;],<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This hea=
der field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><div st=
yle=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Ro=
man&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12p=
t;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:<u=
></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,=
<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:{<u></u><u></u><=
/span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;Th=
is header field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><=
div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times =
New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Courier New&#39;;color:windo=
wtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0=
.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"=
>=A0</span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">As I see it, the advantage of the flat synta=
x is all header fields are in the same place.=A0 This makes processing head=
er fields easier and is more regular.=A0 The disadvantage is that the list =
of fields that may be safely ignored repeats those field names.<u></u><u></=
u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing=
 is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.=A0 The disadvantage is that=
 then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making t=
he processing rules for header fields more complicated.<u></u><u></u></span=
></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleane=
r syntax or cleaner semantics.=A0 (I=92d personally lean towards the simple=
r processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with=
 this coming out either way.)<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approach=
es (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.=A0 We could conceivably leave it up =
to application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require hea=
der fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring w=
hich fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts whe=
re the application spec does require that header fields be normally underst=
ood.=A0 In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93</span>(possi=
bly providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)<sp=
an style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,1=
25)">=94 that you suggested below.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of thi=
s topic.<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;fo=
nt-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12p=
t;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div><div style=3D"border-st=
yle:solid none none;border-top-width:1pt;border-top-color:rgb(181,196,223);=
padding:3pt 0in 0in">

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,=
sans-serif;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;=
font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif;color:windowtext"><span>=A0</span><a href=3D"=
mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [=
mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank">jose-</a><a href=3D"mailt=
o:bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span>=A0</span>=
<b>On Behalf Of<span>=A0</span></b>Karen O&#39;Donoghue<br>

<b>Sent:</b><span>=A0</span>Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br><b>To:</b>=
<span>=A0</span><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@iet=
f.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b><span>=A0</span>[jose] thoughts on header criti=
cality from recent polls<u></u><u></u></span></div>

</div></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-famil=
y:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times Ne=
w Roman&#39;,serif">

Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent poll=
s on header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a =
chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide =
either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll r=
esults, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a =
few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what ne=
xt...<span>=A0</span><br>

<br>First, what I do believe...<br><br>I think it is clear that the working=
 group remains divided on this issue with a significant number of members f=
eeling that an approach must be defined that safely allows for some header =
fields to be considered non-critical. I think there is general consensus th=
at there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the appr=
oach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group =
to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered cri=
tical and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers=
.<span>=A0</span><br>

<br>In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed =
something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized b=
y Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 201=
2). In particular, I found James&#39; list of requirements to be very helpf=
ul, and I have repeated it here...<br>

<br>A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, wit=
hout any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old sema=
ntics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics=
 of *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>

<br>C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, a=
s similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate=
 &amp; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br><br>

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>

<br>E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good =
thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message =
format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too=
 likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of =
interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term securi=
ty.<br>

<br>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear r=
egarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a r=
equirement.<span>=A0</span><br><br>QUESTION: Is there working group consens=
us on the requirements we are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion=
 clarifying these would help drive consensus on the overall approach.<span>=
=A0</span><br>

<br>As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where=
 we are of two minds:<span>=A0</span><br><br>1) Define<span>=A0</span><span=
 style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field that explicitly lists the fields=
 that may be safely ignored if not understood</span>. (Here I am assuming t=
hat we aren&#39;t going to define a separate header for non-critical elemen=
ts.)<span>=A0</span><br>

<br>2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and l=
eave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing gu=
idance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).<span>=A0</span><b=
r>

<br>I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am con=
cerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.=
<span>=A0</span><br><br>QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to=
 work on approach 1 or approach 2?<span>=A0</span><br>

<br>In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:<span>=A0</span=
><br>1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critic=
al headers approach.=A0<span>=A0</span><br>2. I am asking the working group=
 to clarify the requirements driving the non-critical header discussion (A,=
 B, C, D, E, or ?).<span>=A0</span><br>

3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals of text.<span>=A0</span><br>

<br>I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as s=
ome would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misundersta=
ndings on my part.<span>=A0</span><br><br>Regards,<br>Karen O&#39;Donoghue<=
u></u><u></u></p>

</div></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>jose m=
ailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf=
.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a></div>

</blockquote></div><br></div><br>__________________________________________=
_____<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed =
through and not just discarded. =20

I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored =
is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that =
are not understood..=20

John B.


On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)
>=20
> If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in =
the header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on =
what I said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated =
by a signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before =
the unknown stuff in the header.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
> Karen & Mike,
>=20
> I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is =
some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while =
other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body.  =20
> =20
> An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which =
needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.
> =20
> I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header =
parameter that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library =
and passed on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to =
pass meta-data through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE =
having to parse it.
> =20
> Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header =
parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.
> =20
> There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header =
parameters JOSE processes be possible.
> =20
> For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best =
solution.  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from =
non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element name.
> =20
> I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single =
element with an array of element names that are non-critical.
> =20
> My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:
> =20
> 1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that =
an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.
> 2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be =
provided to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE =
header.
> =20
> All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE =
library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.
> =20
> I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to =
applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That =
is what "aad" is intended to provide.
> =20
> I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user =
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I =
think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.   =
That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This =
should be a separate discussion.
> =20
> Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that =
not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header =
parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the =
MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and =
not the sub parameters they may contain.
> =20
> My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, =
but I think it may address the majority of concerns.
> =20
> Regards
> John B.
> On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help =
the working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing =
this note primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s =
discussions, rather than as an individual contributor.
>> =20
>> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing =
criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =
=93MUST be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as =
that=92s another potential extension point.  The JWK description says =
=93Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST =
be understood by implementations using them.=94  The same language is =
present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution of the issue to be =
complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that a number of =
additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extensions will =
occur there.
>> =20
>> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll =
summarize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the =
table are for doing this.  One proposal is 2A in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which =
I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt =
proposed in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which =
I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful =
for the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in =
parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go =
with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.
>> =20
>> FLAT SYNTAX:
>>     {"alg":"ES256",
>>      "ign":["notes"],
>>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>>     }
>> =20
>> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
>>     {"alg":"ES256",
>>      "ign":{
>>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>>       }
>>     }
>> =20
>> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields =
are in the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and =
is more regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may =
be safely ignored repeats those field names.
>> =20
>> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing =
is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that =
then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making =
the processing rules for header fields more complicated.
>> =20
>> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner =
syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler =
processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine =
with this coming out either way.)
>> =20
>> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches =
(1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to =
application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require =
header fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for =
declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use in those =
application contexts where the application spec does require that header =
fields be normally understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall =
under the =93(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications =
in the JOSE specs)=94 that you suggested below.
>> =20
>> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.
>> =20
>>                                                             -- Mike
>> =20
>> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Karen O'Donoghue
>> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
>> To: jose@ietf.org
>> Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
>> =20
>> Folks,
>>=20
>> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on =
header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a =
chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to =
provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing =
the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and =
talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do =
so. So, what next...=20
>>=20
>> First, what I do believe...
>>=20
>> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this =
issue with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must =
be defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered =
non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be =
reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be =
generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move =
forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical =
and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.=20=

>>=20
>> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I =
missed something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed =
(summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James =
Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of =
requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>>=20
>> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics.
>>=20
>> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of =
*existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>>=20
>> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, =
as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between =
legitimate & malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>>=20
>> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), =
under the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do =
more harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than =
the good of any new functionality they bring.
>>=20
>> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a =
good thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure =
message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that =
people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for =
short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for =
better long-term security.
>>=20
>> =46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am =
unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe =
D is not a requirement.=20
>>=20
>> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are =
trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would =
help drive consensus on the overall approach.=20
>>=20
>> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point =
where we are of two minds:=20
>>=20
>> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be =
safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't =
going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)=20
>>=20
>> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and =
leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly =
providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).=20
>>=20
>> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am =
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second =
approach.=20
>>=20
>> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach =
1 or approach 2?=20
>>=20
>> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:=20
>> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a =
non-critical headers approach. =20
>> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving =
the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).=20
>> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach =
is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the =
applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? =
To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of text.=20
>>=20
>> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as =
some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and =
misunderstandings on my part.=20
>>=20
>> Regards,
>> Karen O'Donoghue
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
>=20


--Apple-Mail=_9FCC5FA4-765C-4332-868E-EDE26D3F8983
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=windows-1252

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">aad =
allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed =
through and not just discarded. &nbsp;<div><br></div><div>I think it =
helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored is a =
problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that are not =
understood..&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, =
Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad" =
&nbsp;:)<div><br></div><div>If you want integrity checking on =
non-critical stuff, just put it in the header and mark it as =
non-critical. &nbsp;I'm willing to step back on what I said in my =
response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated by a signer =
putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the unknown =
stuff in the header.</div>
<div><br></div><div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

Karen &amp; Mike,</div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif"><br></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is =
some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while =
other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">An example =
of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs to be =
processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I suspect a =
point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter that is a =
JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed on with =
the body.&nbsp; This would provide applications a way to pass meta-data =
through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse =
it.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">Once we =
remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters from =
JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">There is =
however, still the requirement that extensions for the header parameters =
JOSE processes be possible.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">For that =
the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution. =
&nbsp;That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical =
to critical without changing its JSON element name.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I think =
that a large number of people on the list favoured the single element =
with an array of element names that are =
non-critical.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">My proposal =
is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">1 "ign": =
&nbsp;Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an =
application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif">2 "aad": Additional Associated Data -&nbsp;a JSON =
object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if =
present in a JOSE header.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">All other =
top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library or =
produce a processing fault resulting in an error.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I would =
also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to applications. =
&nbsp;I think that would cause interoperability issues. &nbsp; That is =
what "aad" is intended to provide.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I know =
James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provided =
data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). &nbsp;I think =
this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included. =
&nbsp; That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be =
ignored. &nbsp;This should be a separate discussion.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">Finally, =
for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand =
elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this =
is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST =
understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not =
the sub parameters they may contain.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">My proposal =
doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I think it =
may address the majority of concerns.<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif">Regards<u></u><u></u></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif">John B.</div><div><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, =
Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" =
target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>

<br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN-US" =
link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" =
style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;te=
xt-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norm=
al;word-spacing:0px">

<div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Thanks for sending this, Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your analysis will =
help the working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.&nbsp; I=92m =
writing this note primarily as an editor to help inform the working =
group=92s discussions, rather than as an individual =
contributor.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing =
criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =
=93MUST be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as =
that=92s another potential extension point.&nbsp; The JWK description =
says =93Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, =
they MUST be understood by implementations using them.=94&nbsp; The same =
language is present for the JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the =
issue to be complete, it should address those uses too.&nbsp; Given that =
a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that =
extensions will occur there.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll =
summarize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the =
table are for doing this.&nbsp; One proposal is 2A =
in<span>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" =
style=3D"color:purple;text-decoration:underline" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg013=
53.html</a><span>&nbsp;</span>(which I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and =
the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in<span>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html" =
style=3D"color:purple;text-decoration:underline" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg014=
57.html</a><span>&nbsp;</span>(which I=92ll call the STRUCTURED =
SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be useful for the working group =
to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel to discussing =
the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) or =
something like it, we=92ll know which to use.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">FLAT SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{"alg":"ES256",<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":["notes"],<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "notes":"This header =
field can be safely ignored"<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{"alg":"ES256",<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":{<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"notes":"This header field can be safely =
ignored"<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields =
are in the same place.&nbsp; This makes processing header fields easier =
and is more regular.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that the list of fields =
that may be safely ignored repeats those field =
names.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing =
is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is =
that then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, =
making the processing rules for header fields more =
complicated.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner =
syntax or cleaner semantics.&nbsp; (I=92d personally lean towards the =
simpler processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be =
fine with this coming out either way.)<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches =
(1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.&nbsp; We could conceivably leave it =
up to application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they =
require header fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax =
for declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use in those =
application contexts where the application spec does require that header =
fields be normally understood.&nbsp; In fact, one might consider this to =
fall under the =93</span>(possibly providing guidance directed to those =
applications in the JOSE specs)<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">=94 that you suggested below.<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">

<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- =
Mike<u></u><u></u></span></div>

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div><div style=3D"border-style:solid none =
none;border-top-width:1pt;border-top-color:rgb(181,196,223);padding:3pt =
0in 0in">

<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif;color:windowtext">Fr=
om:</span></b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif;color:windowtext"><s=
pan>&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank">jose-</a><a =
href=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span>&nbsp;</span><b>On Behalf =
Of<span>&nbsp;</span></b>Karen O'Donoghue<br>

<b>Sent:</b><span>&nbsp;</span>Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 =
AM<br><b>To:</b><span>&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b><span>&nbsp;</span>[=
jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent =
polls<u></u><u></u></span></div>

</div></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif">

Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent =
polls on header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond =
from a chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped =
to provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after =
analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple =
times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not =
quite able to do so. So, what next...<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

<br>First, what I do believe...<br><br>I think it is clear that the =
working group remains divided on this issue with a significant number of =
members feeling that an approach must be defined that safely allows for =
some header fields to be considered non-critical. I think there is =
general consensus that there must be reasonable mechanisms for =
extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. Based on that, I =
would like to ask the working group to move forward with the strategy =
that all headers cannot be considered critical and move on to the =
discussion of how to approach non-critical =
headers.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

<br>In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I =
missed something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed =
(summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James =
Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of =
requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>

<br>A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) =
the semantics of *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old =
implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without =
the constraints).<br>

<br>C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in =
messages, as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions =
between legitimate &amp; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms =
(eg MD5).<br><br>

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under =
the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more =
harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the =
good of any new functionality they bring.<br>

<br>E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a =
good thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure =
message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that =
people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for =
short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for =
better long-term security.<br>

<br>=46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am =
unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe =
D is not a requirement.<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>QUESTION: Is there =
working group consensus on the requirements we are trying to address? =
Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive consensus =
on the overall approach.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

<br>As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point =
where we are of two minds:<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>1) =
Define<span>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field =
that explicitly lists the fields that may be safely ignored if not =
understood</span>. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to define a =
separate header for non-critical elements.)<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

<br>2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications =
and leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly =
providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE =
specs).<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

<br>I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am =
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second =
approach.<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>QUESTION: Can the working group =
agree on whether to work on approach 1 or approach =
2?<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

<br>In conclusion, I am asking three things in this =
missive:<span>&nbsp;</span><br>1. I am asking the working group to move =
forward based on a non-critical headers =
approach.&nbsp;<span>&nbsp;</span><br>2. I am asking the working group =
to clarify the requirements driving the non-critical header discussion =
(A, B, C, D, E, or ?).<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is =
to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the =
applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? =
To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of =
text.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>

<br>I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive =
as some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and =
misunderstandings on my =
part.<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>Regards,<br>Karen =
O'Donoghue<u></u><u></u></p>

</div>_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a></div>

=
</blockquote></div><br></div><br>_________________________________________=
______<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out
header fields.  Why would you do that, instead of just passing on
everything, or nothing?


On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed
> through and not just discarded.
>
> I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored
> is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that are
> not understood..
>
> John B.
>
>
> On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)
>
> If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the
> header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on what I
> said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated by a
> signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the
> unknown stuff in the header.
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>
>> Karen & Mike,
>>
>> I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is
>> some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while
>> other header parameters are essentially additional associated data
>> (meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software
>> layers for processing along with the body.   ****
>> ** **
>> An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which
>> needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful=
.
>> ****
>> ** **
>> I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter
>> that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passe=
d
>> on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass meta-da=
ta
>> through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse i=
t.
>> ****
>> ** **
>> Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header parameter=
s
>> from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.****
>> ** **
>> There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header
>> parameters JOSE processes be possible.****
>> ** **
>> For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution=
.
>>  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to
>> critical without changing its JSON element name.****
>> ** **
>> I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single
>> element with an array of element names that are non-critical.****
>> ** **
>> My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood=
:
>> ****
>> ** **
>> 1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that a=
n
>> application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.****
>> 2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be provide=
d
>> to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE header.****
>> ** **
>> All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE
>> library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.****
>> ** **
>> I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to
>> applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That =
is
>> what "aad" is intended to provide.****
>> ** **
>> I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user
>> provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I thin=
k
>> this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security
>> considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.
>> That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This
>> should be a separate discussion.****
>> ** **
>> Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understan=
d
>> elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this i=
s
>> also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand i=
n
>> JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not the sub
>> parameters they may contain.****
>> ** **
>> My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, bu=
t
>> I think it may address the majority of concerns.****
>> ** **
>> Regards****
>> John B.
>> On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the
>> working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing this=
 note
>> primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s discussions,
>> rather than as an individual contributor.****
>>
>> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing criticalit=
y
>> of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =93MUST be
>> understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s ano=
ther
>> potential extension point.  The JWK description says =93Additional membe=
rs
>> MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by
>> implementations using them.=94  The same language is present for the JWK=
 Set.
>>  For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address those
>> uses too.  Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being
>> discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.****
>>
>> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize f=
or
>> the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for do=
ing
>> this.  One proposal is 2A in
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which
>> I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt
>> proposed in
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which
>> I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful f=
or
>> the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in paralle=
l
>> to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with
>> approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.****
>>
>> FLAT SYNTAX:****
>>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>>      "ign":["notes"],****
>>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>>     }****
>>
>> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:****
>>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>>      "ign":{****
>>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>>       }****
>>     }****
>>
>> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are i=
n
>> the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more
>> regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely
>> ignored repeats those field names.****
>>
>> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is
>> repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that th=
en
>> some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the
>> processing rules for header fields more complicated.****
>>
>> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner
>> syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler
>> processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine wit=
h
>> this coming out either way.)****
>>
>> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches (1=
) and
>> (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to
>> application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require hea=
der
>> fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring wh=
ich
>> fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where
>> the application spec does require that header fields be normally
>> understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93(poss=
ibly
>> providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)=94
>> that you suggested below.****
>>
>> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this
>> topic.****
>>
>>                                                             -- Mike****
>>
>> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
>> Of *Karen O'Donoghue
>> *Sent:* Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
>> *To:* jose@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls****
>> ** **
>>
>> Folks,
>>
>> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header
>> criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs
>> perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide eith=
er
>> a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll resul=
ts,
>> rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few
>> working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what nex=
t...
>>
>>
>> First, what I do believe...
>>
>> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue
>> with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be
>> defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered
>> non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be
>> reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be
>> generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move
>> forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical
>> and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.
>>
>> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed
>> something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarize=
d
>> by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct
>> 2012). In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very
>> helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>>
>> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future,
>> without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with ol=
d
>> semantics.
>>
>> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of
>> *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations w=
ill
>> misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>>
>> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as
>> similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimat=
e &
>> malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>>
>> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under
>> the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more har=
m
>> (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good =
of
>> any new functionality they bring.
>>
>> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good
>> thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure messa=
ge
>> format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are =
too
>> likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease o=
f
>> interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term
>> security.
>>
>> From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear
>> regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not=
 a
>> requirement.
>>
>> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are
>> trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would hel=
p
>> drive consensus on the overall approach.
>>
>> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where
>> we are of two minds:
>>
>> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
>> safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't
>> going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)
>>
>> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and
>> leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providin=
g
>> guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
>>
>> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
>> concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
>> approach.
>>
>> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 o=
r
>> approach 2?
>>
>> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
>> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical
>> headers approach.
>> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the
>> non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
>> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is
>> to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applicati=
ons
>> with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address th=
is
>> item, I welcome concise proposals of text.
>>
>> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as
>> some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and
>> misunderstandings on my part.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Karen O'Donoghue****
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>>
>
>

--e89a8fb1f4c40a9ab404d694c873
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out=
 header fields. =A0Why would you do that, instead of just passing on everyt=
hing, or nothing?<br><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 25, 201=
3 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@v=
e7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">aad allo=
ws you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed through and=
 not just discarded. =A0<div>
<br></div><div>I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x ma=
y be ignored is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on paramete=
rs that are not understood..=A0</div><div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div>
<div class=3D"h5"><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 =
PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@=
ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Sorry, John, no ag=
reement on &quot;aad&quot; =A0:)<div>
<br></div><div>If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just p=
ut it in the header and mark it as non-critical. =A0I&#39;m willing to step=
 back on what I said in my response to &quot;B&quot;; it can be much more e=
asily mitigated by a signer putting something random (and not subject-contr=
olled) before the unknown stuff in the header.</div>

<div><br></div><div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div sty=
le=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Rom=
an&#39;,serif">


Karen &amp; Mike,</div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt=
;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><br></div><div style=3D"margi=
n:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,ser=
if">


I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is some=
 information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while other he=
ader parameters are essentially additional associated data (meta-data about=
 the body) and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing=
 along with the body. =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">An exa=
mple of that was the proposed &quot;iat&quot; (issued at) element, which ne=
eds to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.<u><=
/u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I susp=
ect a point of agreement might be having an &quot;aad&quot; header paramete=
r that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed=
 on with the body.=A0 This would provide applications a way to pass meta-da=
ta through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse i=
t.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Once w=
e remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters from JO=
SE processing, the problem gets smaller.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">There =
is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header parameters=
 JOSE processes be possible.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">For th=
at the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution. =A0That=
 enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to critical wi=
thout changing its JSON element name.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I thin=
k that a large number of people on the list favoured the single element wit=
h an array of element names that are non-critical.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">My pro=
posal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:<u></u><=
u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">1 &quo=
t;ign&quot;: =A0Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope tha=
t an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif">2 &quot;aad&quot;: Additional Associated Data -=A0a =
JSON object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if pr=
esent in a JOSE header.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">All ot=
her top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library or pro=
duce a processing fault resulting in an error.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I woul=
d also not want elements listed in &quot;ign&quot; to be passed on to appli=
cations. =A0I think that would cause interoperability issues. =A0 That is w=
hat &quot;aad&quot; is intended to provide.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I know=
 James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provided dat=
a to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). =A0I think this is a s=
eparate issue that needs to be addressed by security considerations to add =
entropy to the header if such data is included. =A0 That may require a new =
&quot;ent&quot; Entropy element that MUST be ignored. =A0This should be a s=
eparate discussion.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Finall=
y, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand element=
s should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is also all=
ows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in JWE/JWS o=
nly allies to the top level parameter&#39;s, and not the sub parameters the=
y may contain.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">My pro=
posal doesn&#39;t neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I t=
hink it may address the majority of concerns.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Regard=
s<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif">John B.</div><div><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 A=
M, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"=
_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>


<br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN-US" l=
ink=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:medi=
um;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:=
normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-tran=
sform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px">


<div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;=
Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calib=
ri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks for sending this, Karen.=A0 Hope=
fully your analysis will help the working group reach a resolution on this =
issue soon.=A0 I=92m writing this note primarily as an editor to help infor=
m the working group=92s discussions, rather than as an individual contribut=
or.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing criti=
cality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =93MUST =
be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s ano=
ther potential extension point.=A0 The JWK description says =93Additional m=
embers MAY be present in the JWK.=A0 If present, they MUST be understood by=
 implementations using them.=94=A0 The same language is present for the JWK=
 Set. =A0For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address =
those uses too.=A0 Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being d=
iscussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.<u></u><u></u></span></=
div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summar=
ize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are f=
or doing this.=A0 One proposal is 2A in<span>=A0</span><a href=3D"http://ww=
w.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" style=3D"color:purp=
le;text-decoration:underline" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-ar=
chive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</a><span>=A0</span>(which I=92ll call =
the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in<sp=
an>=A0</span><a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/m=
sg01457.html" style=3D"color:purple;text-decoration:underline" target=3D"_b=
lank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html</a><s=
pan>=A0</span>(which I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).=A0 I believe that =
it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they wou=
ld prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that i=
f we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to us=
e.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">FLAT SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Courier New&#39;;color:windowtext=
">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes&quo=
t;],<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This hea=
der field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><div st=
yle=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Ro=
man&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12p=
t;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:<u=
></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,=
<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:{<u></u><u></u><=
/span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;Th=
is header field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><=
div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times =
New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Courier New&#39;;color:windo=
wtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0=
.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"=
>=A0</span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">As I see it, the advantage of the flat synta=
x is all header fields are in the same place.=A0 This makes processing head=
er fields easier and is more regular.=A0 The disadvantage is that the list =
of fields that may be safely ignored repeats those field names.<u></u><u></=
u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing=
 is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.=A0 The disadvantage is that=
 then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making t=
he processing rules for header fields more complicated.<u></u><u></u></span=
></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleane=
r syntax or cleaner semantics.=A0 (I=92d personally lean towards the simple=
r processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with=
 this coming out either way.)<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approach=
es (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.=A0 We could conceivably leave it up =
to application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require hea=
der fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring w=
hich fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts whe=
re the application spec does require that header fields be normally underst=
ood.=A0 In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93</span>(possi=
bly providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)<sp=
an style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,1=
25)">=94 that you suggested below.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of thi=
s topic.<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;fo=
nt-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12p=
t;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div><div style=3D"border-st=
yle:solid none none;border-top-width:1pt;border-top-color:rgb(181,196,223);=
padding:3pt 0in 0in">


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,=
sans-serif;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;=
font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif;color:windowtext"><span>=A0</span><a href=3D"=
mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [=
mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank">jose-</a><a href=3D"mailt=
o:bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span>=A0</span>=
<b>On Behalf Of<span>=A0</span></b>Karen O&#39;Donoghue<br>


<b>Sent:</b><span>=A0</span>Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br><b>To:</b>=
<span>=A0</span><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@iet=
f.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b><span>=A0</span>[jose] thoughts on header criti=
cality from recent polls<u></u><u></u></span></div>


</div></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-famil=
y:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times Ne=
w Roman&#39;,serif">


Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent poll=
s on header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a =
chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide =
either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll r=
esults, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a =
few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what ne=
xt...<span>=A0</span><br>


<br>First, what I do believe...<br><br>I think it is clear that the working=
 group remains divided on this issue with a significant number of members f=
eeling that an approach must be defined that safely allows for some header =
fields to be considered non-critical. I think there is general consensus th=
at there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the appr=
oach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group =
to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered cri=
tical and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers=
.<span>=A0</span><br>


<br>In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed =
something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized b=
y Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 201=
2). In particular, I found James&#39; list of requirements to be very helpf=
ul, and I have repeated it here...<br>


<br>A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, wit=
hout any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old sema=
ntics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics=
 of *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>


<br>C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, a=
s similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate=
 &amp; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br><br>


D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>


<br>E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good =
thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message =
format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too=
 likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of =
interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term securi=
ty.<br>


<br>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear r=
egarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a r=
equirement.<span>=A0</span><br><br>QUESTION: Is there working group consens=
us on the requirements we are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion=
 clarifying these would help drive consensus on the overall approach.<span>=
=A0</span><br>


<br>As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where=
 we are of two minds:<span>=A0</span><br><br>1) Define<span>=A0</span><span=
 style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field that explicitly lists the fields=
 that may be safely ignored if not understood</span>. (Here I am assuming t=
hat we aren&#39;t going to define a separate header for non-critical elemen=
ts.)<span>=A0</span><br>


<br>2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and l=
eave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing gu=
idance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).<span>=A0</span><b=
r>


<br>I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am con=
cerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.=
<span>=A0</span><br><br>QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to=
 work on approach 1 or approach 2?<span>=A0</span><br>


<br>In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:<span>=A0</span=
><br>1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critic=
al headers approach.=A0<span>=A0</span><br>2. I am asking the working group=
 to clarify the requirements driving the non-critical header discussion (A,=
 B, C, D, E, or ?).<span>=A0</span><br>


3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals of text.<span>=A0</span><br>


<br>I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as s=
ome would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misundersta=
ndings on my part.<span>=A0</span><br><br>Regards,<br>Karen O&#39;Donoghue<=
u></u><u></u></p>


</div>_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing list<=
br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>=
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a></div>


</blockquote></div><br></div><br>__________________________________________=
_____<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br>

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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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We are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries.   I don't have any =
reason to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header =
is passed on with the body after verification.

Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a JOSE lib?   =
If that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make sense.

This is a bit more of a challenge without talking about expected API.

John B.

On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively =
stripping out header fields.  Why would you do that, instead of just =
passing on everything, or nothing?
>=20
>=20
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
> aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be =
passed through and not just discarded. =20
>=20
> I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be =
ignored is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters =
that are not understood..=20
>=20
> John B.
>=20
>=20
> On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>=20
>> Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)
>>=20
>> If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in =
the header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on =
what I said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated =
by a signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before =
the unknown stuff in the header.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
>> Karen & Mike,
>>=20
>> I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at =
is some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, =
while other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body.  =20
>> =20
>> An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which =
needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.
>> =20
>> I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header =
parameter that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library =
and passed on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to =
pass meta-data through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE =
having to parse it.
>> =20
>> Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header =
parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.
>> =20
>> There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the =
header parameters JOSE processes be possible.
>> =20
>> For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best =
solution.  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from =
non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element name.
>> =20
>> I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single =
element with an array of element names that are non-critical.
>> =20
>> My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:
>> =20
>> 1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope =
that an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.
>> 2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be =
provided to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE =
header.
>> =20
>> All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE =
library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.
>> =20
>> I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to =
applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That =
is what "aad" is intended to provide.
>> =20
>> I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user =
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I =
think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.   =
That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This =
should be a separate discussion.
>> =20
>> Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that =
not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header =
parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the =
MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and =
not the sub parameters they may contain.
>> =20
>> My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, =
but I think it may address the majority of concerns.
>> =20
>> Regards
>> John B.
>> On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help =
the working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing =
this note primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s =
discussions, rather than as an individual contributor.
>>> =20
>>> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing =
criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =
=93MUST be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as =
that=92s another potential extension point.  The JWK description says =
=93Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST =
be understood by implementations using them.=94  The same language is =
present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution of the issue to be =
complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that a number of =
additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extensions will =
occur there.
>>> =20
>>> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll =
summarize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the =
table are for doing this.  One proposal is 2A in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which =
I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt =
proposed in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which =
I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful =
for the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in =
parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go =
with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.
>>> =20
>>> FLAT SYNTAX:
>>>     {"alg":"ES256",
>>>      "ign":["notes"],
>>>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>>>     }
>>> =20
>>> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
>>>     {"alg":"ES256",
>>>      "ign":{
>>>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>>>       }
>>>     }
>>> =20
>>> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields =
are in the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and =
is more regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may =
be safely ignored repeats those field names.
>>> =20
>>> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing =
is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that =
then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making =
the processing rules for header fields more complicated.
>>> =20
>>> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner =
syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler =
processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine =
with this coming out either way.)
>>> =20
>>> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your =
approaches (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably =
leave it up to application specifications using the JOSE specs whether =
they require header fields to be understood by default AND provide a =
syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use in those =
application contexts where the application spec does require that header =
fields be normally understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall =
under the =93(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications =
in the JOSE specs)=94 that you suggested below.
>>> =20
>>> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.
>>> =20
>>>                                                             -- Mike
>>> =20
>>> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Karen O'Donoghue
>>> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
>>> To: jose@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
>>> =20
>>> Folks,
>>>=20
>>> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on =
header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a =
chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to =
provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing =
the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and =
talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do =
so. So, what next...=20
>>>=20
>>> First, what I do believe...
>>>=20
>>> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this =
issue with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must =
be defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered =
non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be =
reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be =
generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move =
forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical =
and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.=20=

>>>=20
>>> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I =
missed something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed =
(summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James =
Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of =
requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>>>=20
>>> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics.
>>>=20
>>> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of =
*existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>>>=20
>>> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in =
messages, as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions =
between legitimate & malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg =
MD5).
>>>=20
>>> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), =
under the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do =
more harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than =
the good of any new functionality they bring.
>>>=20
>>> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a =
good thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure =
message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that =
people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for =
short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for =
better long-term security.
>>>=20
>>> =46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am =
unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe =
D is not a requirement.=20
>>>=20
>>> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we =
are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would =
help drive consensus on the overall approach.=20
>>>=20
>>> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point =
where we are of two minds:=20
>>>=20
>>> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may =
be safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't =
going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)=20
>>>=20
>>> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications =
and leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly =
providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).=20
>>>=20
>>> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am =
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second =
approach.=20
>>>=20
>>> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach =
1 or approach 2?=20
>>>=20
>>> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:=20
>>> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a =
non-critical headers approach. =20
>>> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving =
the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).=20
>>> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right =
approach is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to =
the applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of =
guidance)? To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of text.=20
>>>=20
>>> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive =
as some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and =
misunderstandings on my part.=20
>>>=20
>>> Regards,
>>> Karen O'Donoghue
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> jose mailing list
>> jose@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>=20
>>=20
>=20
>=20


--Apple-Mail=_2BAC7A1B-B5E8-4F74-B3E6-FD6156A20D60
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=windows-1252

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">We =
are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries. &nbsp; I don't have any =
reason to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header =
is passed on with the body after verification.<div><br></div><div>Is =
that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a JOSE lib? =
&nbsp; If that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make =
sense.</div><div><br></div><div>This is a bit more of a challenge =
without talking about expected API.</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite">You seem =
to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out =
header fields. &nbsp;Why would you do that, instead of just passing on =
everything, or nothing?<br><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, =
Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the =
included parameters be passed through and not just discarded. =
&nbsp;<div>
<br></div><div>I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x =
may be ignored is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on =
parameters that are not understood..&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div>
<div class=3D"h5"><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at =
2:40 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" =
target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad" &nbsp;:)<div>
<br></div><div>If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, =
just put it in the header and mark it as non-critical. &nbsp;I'm willing =
to step back on what I said in my response to "B"; it can be much more =
easily mitigated by a signer putting something random (and not =
subject-controlled) before the unknown stuff in the header.</div>

<div><br></div><div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


Karen &amp; Mike,</div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif"><br></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is =
some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while =
other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">An example =
of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs to be =
processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I suspect a =
point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter that is a =
JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed on with =
the body.&nbsp; This would provide applications a way to pass meta-data =
through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse =
it.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">Once we =
remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters from =
JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">There is =
however, still the requirement that extensions for the header parameters =
JOSE processes be possible.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">For that =
the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution. =
&nbsp;That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical =
to critical without changing its JSON element name.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I think =
that a large number of people on the list favoured the single element =
with an array of element names that are =
non-critical.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">My proposal =
is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">1 "ign": =
&nbsp;Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an =
application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif">2 "aad": Additional Associated Data -&nbsp;a JSON =
object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if =
present in a JOSE header.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">All other =
top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library or =
produce a processing fault resulting in an error.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I would =
also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to applications. =
&nbsp;I think that would cause interoperability issues. &nbsp; That is =
what "aad" is intended to provide.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">I know =
James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provided =
data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). &nbsp;I think =
this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included. =
&nbsp; That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be =
ignored. &nbsp;This should be a separate discussion.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">Finally, =
for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand =
elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this =
is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST =
understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not =
the sub parameters they may contain.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">My proposal =
doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I think it =
may address the majority of concerns.<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif">Regards<u></u><u></u></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif">John B.</div><div><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, =
Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" =
target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>


<br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN-US" =
link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" =
style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;te=
xt-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norm=
al;word-spacing:0px">


<div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Thanks for sending this, Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your analysis will =
help the working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.&nbsp; I=92m =
writing this note primarily as an editor to help inform the working =
group=92s discussions, rather than as an individual =
contributor.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing =
criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =
=93MUST be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as =
that=92s another potential extension point.&nbsp; The JWK description =
says =93Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, =
they MUST be understood by implementations using them.=94&nbsp; The same =
language is present for the JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the =
issue to be complete, it should address those uses too.&nbsp; Given that =
a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that =
extensions will occur there.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll =
summarize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the =
table are for doing this.&nbsp; One proposal is 2A =
in<span>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" =
style=3D"color:purple;text-decoration:underline" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg013=
53.html</a><span>&nbsp;</span>(which I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and =
the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in<span>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html" =
style=3D"color:purple;text-decoration:underline" =
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg014=
57.html</a><span>&nbsp;</span>(which I=92ll call the STRUCTURED =
SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be useful for the working group =
to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel to discussing =
the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) or =
something like it, we=92ll know which to use.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">FLAT SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{"alg":"ES256",<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":["notes"],<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "notes":"This header =
field can be safely ignored"<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{"alg":"ES256",<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":{<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"notes":"This header field can be safely =
ignored"<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:'Courier =
New';color:windowtext">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields =
are in the same place.&nbsp; This makes processing header fields easier =
and is more regular.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that the list of fields =
that may be safely ignored repeats those field =
names.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing =
is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is =
that then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, =
making the processing rules for header fields more =
complicated.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner =
syntax or cleaner semantics.&nbsp; (I=92d personally lean towards the =
simpler processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be =
fine with this coming out either way.)<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches =
(1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.&nbsp; We could conceivably leave it =
up to application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they =
require header fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax =
for declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use in those =
application contexts where the application spec does require that header =
fields be normally understood.&nbsp; In fact, one might consider this to =
fall under the =93</span>(possibly providing guidance directed to those =
applications in the JOSE specs)<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">=94 that you suggested below.<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">


<span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- =
Mike<u></u><u></u></span></div>


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">&nbsp;</span></div><div><div style=3D"border-style:solid none =
none;border-top-width:1pt;border-top-color:rgb(181,196,223);padding:3pt =
0in 0in">


<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times =
New Roman',serif"><b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif;color:windowtext">Fr=
om:</span></b><span =
style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif;color:windowtext"><s=
pan>&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank">jose-</a><a =
href=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span>&nbsp;</span><b>On Behalf =
Of<span>&nbsp;</span></b>Karen O'Donoghue<br>


<b>Sent:</b><span>&nbsp;</span>Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 =
AM<br><b>To:</b><span>&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b><span>&nbsp;</span>[=
jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent =
polls<u></u><u></u></span></div>


</div></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New =
Roman',serif">


Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent =
polls on header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond =
from a chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped =
to provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after =
analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple =
times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not =
quite able to do so. So, what next...<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


<br>First, what I do believe...<br><br>I think it is clear that the =
working group remains divided on this issue with a significant number of =
members feeling that an approach must be defined that safely allows for =
some header fields to be considered non-critical. I think there is =
general consensus that there must be reasonable mechanisms for =
extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. Based on that, I =
would like to ask the working group to move forward with the strategy =
that all headers cannot be considered critical and move on to the =
discussion of how to approach non-critical =
headers.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


<br>In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I =
missed something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed =
(summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James =
Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of =
requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>


<br>A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) =
the semantics of *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old =
implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without =
the constraints).<br>


<br>C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in =
messages, as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions =
between legitimate &amp; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms =
(eg MD5).<br><br>


D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under =
the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more =
harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the =
good of any new functionality they bring.<br>


<br>E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a =
good thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure =
message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that =
people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for =
short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for =
better long-term security.<br>


<br>=46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am =
unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe =
D is not a requirement.<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>QUESTION: Is there =
working group consensus on the requirements we are trying to address? =
Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive consensus =
on the overall approach.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


<br>As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point =
where we are of two minds:<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>1) =
Define<span>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field =
that explicitly lists the fields that may be safely ignored if not =
understood</span>. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to define a =
separate header for non-critical elements.)<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


<br>2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications =
and leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly =
providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE =
specs).<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


<br>I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am =
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second =
approach.<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>QUESTION: Can the working group =
agree on whether to work on approach 1 or approach =
2?<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


<br>In conclusion, I am asking three things in this =
missive:<span>&nbsp;</span><br>1. I am asking the working group to move =
forward based on a non-critical headers =
approach.&nbsp;<span>&nbsp;</span><br>2. I am asking the working group =
to clarify the requirements driving the non-critical header discussion =
(A, B, C, D, E, or ?).<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is =
to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the =
applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? =
To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of =
text.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>


<br>I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive =
as some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and =
misunderstandings on my =
part.<span>&nbsp;</span><br><br>Regards,<br>Karen =
O'Donoghue<u></u><u></u></p>


</div>_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a></div>


=
</blockquote></div><br></div><br>_________________________________________=
______<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2013 18:40:08 -0500
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Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Actually, I would expect a library not to pass on anything from the header.
 OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt function doesn't provide you with any of the crypto
information or protected attributes.  The only thing that gets passed
through to upper layers is the protected body.

ISTM that the appropriate framework here is extension, not layering.
 Suppose I've got an extended JOSE library that does some special,
non-critical stuff.  Is that going to cause the recipient to die?  Or is
the recipient just going to ignore what he doesn't understand?

--Richard



On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:30 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> We are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries.   I don't have any
> reason to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header is
> passed on with the body after verification.
>
> Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a JOSE lib?   I=
f
> that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make sense.
>
> This is a bit more of a challenge without talking about expected API.
>
> John B.
>
> On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping
> out header fields.  Why would you do that, instead of just passing on
> everything, or nothing?
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>
>> aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed
>> through and not just discarded.
>>
>> I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored
>> is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that ar=
e
>> not understood..
>>
>> John B.
>>
>>
>> On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>
>> Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)
>>
>> If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the
>> header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on what I
>> said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated by a
>> signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the
>> unknown stuff in the header.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Karen & Mike,
>>>
>>> I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is
>>> some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while
>>> other header parameters are essentially additional associated data
>>> (meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software
>>> layers for processing along with the body.   ****
>>> ** **
>>> An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which
>>> needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be usefu=
l.
>>> ****
>>> ** **
>>> I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header paramete=
r
>>> that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and pass=
ed
>>> on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass meta-d=
ata
>>> through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse =
it.
>>> ****
>>> ** **
>>> Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header
>>> parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.****
>>> ** **
>>> There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header
>>> parameters JOSE processes be possible.****
>>> ** **
>>> For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best
>>> solution.  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-crit=
ical
>>> to critical without changing its JSON element name.****
>>> ** **
>>> I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single
>>> element with an array of element names that are non-critical.****
>>> ** **
>>> My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understoo=
d:
>>> ****
>>> ** **
>>> 1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that
>>> an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.****
>>> 2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be
>>> provided to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE heade=
r.
>>> ****
>>> ** **
>>> All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE
>>> library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.****
>>> ** **
>>> I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to
>>> applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That=
 is
>>> what "aad" is intended to provide.****
>>> ** **
>>> I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user
>>> provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I thi=
nk
>>> this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security
>>> considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.
>>> That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  Thi=
s
>>> should be a separate discussion.****
>>> ** **
>>> Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that
>>> not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header
>>> parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as th=
e
>>> MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, an=
d
>>> not the sub parameters they may contain.****
>>> ** **
>>> My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers,
>>> but I think it may address the majority of concerns.****
>>> ** **
>>> Regards****
>>> John B.
>>> On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the
>>> working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing thi=
s note
>>> primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s discussions=
,
>>> rather than as an individual contributor.****
>>>
>>> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing criticali=
ty
>>> of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =93MUST be
>>> understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s an=
other
>>> potential extension point.  The JWK description says =93Additional memb=
ers
>>> MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by
>>> implementations using them.=94  The same language is present for the JW=
K Set.
>>>  For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address thos=
e
>>> uses too.  Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being
>>> discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.****
>>>
>>> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize =
for
>>> the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for d=
oing
>>> this.  One proposal is 2A in
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which
>>> I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hard=
t
>>> proposed in
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which
>>> I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful =
for
>>> the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in parall=
el
>>> to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with
>>> approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.****
>>>
>>> FLAT SYNTAX:****
>>>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>>>      "ign":["notes"],****
>>>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>>>     }****
>>>
>>> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:****
>>>     {"alg":"ES256",****
>>>      "ign":{****
>>>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"****
>>>       }****
>>>     }****
>>>
>>> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are
>>> in the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is m=
ore
>>> regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safel=
y
>>> ignored repeats those field names.****
>>>
>>> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is
>>> repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that t=
hen
>>> some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the
>>> processing rules for header fields more complicated.****
>>>
>>> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner
>>> syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simple=
r
>>> processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine wi=
th
>>> this coming out either way.)****
>>>
>>> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches (=
1)
>>> and (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to
>>> application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require he=
ader
>>> fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring w=
hich
>>> fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts wher=
e
>>> the application spec does require that header fields be normally
>>> understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93(pos=
sibly
>>> providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)=94
>>> that you suggested below.****
>>>
>>> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this
>>> topic.****
>>>
>>>                                                             -- Mike****
>>>
>>> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
>>> Of *Karen O'Donoghue
>>> *Sent:* Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
>>> *To:* jose@ietf.org
>>> *Subject:* [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls****
>>> ** **
>>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on heade=
r
>>> criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs
>>> perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide eit=
her
>>> a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll resu=
lts,
>>> rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few
>>> working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what ne=
xt...
>>>
>>>
>>> First, what I do believe...
>>>
>>> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issu=
e
>>> with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be
>>> defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered
>>> non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be
>>> reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be
>>> generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move
>>> forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critica=
l
>>> and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.
>>>
>>> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed
>>> something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summariz=
ed
>>> by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oc=
t
>>> 2012). In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very
>>> helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>>>
>>> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future,
>>> without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with o=
ld
>>> semantics.
>>>
>>> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of
>>> *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will
>>> misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>>>
>>> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, a=
s
>>> similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitima=
te &
>>> malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>>>
>>> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under
>>> the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more ha=
rm
>>> (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good=
 of
>>> any new functionality they bring.
>>>
>>> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good
>>> thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure mess=
age
>>> format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are=
 too
>>> likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease =
of
>>> interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term
>>> security.
>>>
>>> From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear
>>> regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is no=
t a
>>> requirement.
>>>
>>> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are
>>> trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would he=
lp
>>> drive consensus on the overall approach.
>>>
>>> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where
>>> we are of two minds:
>>>
>>> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be
>>> safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't
>>> going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)
>>>
>>> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and
>>> leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providi=
ng
>>> guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
>>>
>>> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
>>> concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
>>> approach.
>>>
>>> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1
>>> or approach 2?
>>>
>>> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
>>> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critica=
l
>>> headers approach.
>>> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving th=
e
>>> non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
>>> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach i=
s
>>> to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applicat=
ions
>>> with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address t=
his
>>> item, I welcome concise proposals of text.
>>>
>>> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as
>>> some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and
>>> misunderstandings on my part.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Karen O'Donoghue****
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> jose@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
>

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Actually, I would expect a library not to pass on anything from the header.=
 =A0OpenSSL&#39;s CMS_decrypt function doesn&#39;t provide you with any of =
the crypto information or protected attributes. =A0The only thing that gets=
 passed through to upper layers is the protected body.<div>
<br></div><div>ISTM that the appropriate framework here is extension, not l=
ayering. =A0Suppose I&#39;ve got an extended JOSE library that does some sp=
ecial, non-critical stuff. =A0Is that going to cause the recipient to die? =
=A0Or is the recipient just going to ignore what he doesn&#39;t understand?=
 =A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div><br><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:30 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7=
jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">We are i=
nterested in interoperable JOSE libraries. =A0 I don&#39;t have any reason =
to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header is passed o=
n with the body after verification.<div>
<br></div><div>Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a =
JOSE lib? =A0 If that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make =
sense.</div><div><br></div><div>This is a bit more of a challenge without t=
alking about expected API.</div>
<div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div><div class=3D"h5"><div><br><div><div>=
On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx"=
 target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><blockquote type=3D"c=
ite">
You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out=
 header fields. =A0Why would you do that, instead of just passing on everyt=
hing, or nothing?<br><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 25, 201=
3 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@v=
e7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">aad allo=
ws you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed through and=
 not just discarded. =A0<div>

<br></div><div>I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x ma=
y be ignored is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on paramete=
rs that are not understood..=A0</div><div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div>

<div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard B=
arnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt=
; wrote:</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Sorry, John, no agreement on &q=
uot;aad&quot; =A0:)<div>

<br></div><div>If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just p=
ut it in the header and mark it as non-critical. =A0I&#39;m willing to step=
 back on what I said in my response to &quot;B&quot;; it can be much more e=
asily mitigated by a signer putting something random (and not subject-contr=
olled) before the unknown stuff in the header.</div>


<div><br></div><div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br>



<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div sty=
le=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Rom=
an&#39;,serif">



Karen &amp; Mike,</div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt=
;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><br></div><div style=3D"margi=
n:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,ser=
if">



I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is some=
 information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while other he=
ader parameters are essentially additional associated data (meta-data about=
 the body) and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing=
 along with the body. =A0=A0<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">An exa=
mple of that was the proposed &quot;iat&quot; (issued at) element, which ne=
eds to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.<u><=
/u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I susp=
ect a point of agreement might be having an &quot;aad&quot; header paramete=
r that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed=
 on with the body.=A0 This would provide applications a way to pass meta-da=
ta through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse i=
t.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Once w=
e remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters from JO=
SE processing, the problem gets smaller.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">There =
is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header parameters=
 JOSE processes be possible.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">For th=
at the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution. =A0That=
 enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to critical wi=
thout changing its JSON element name.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I thin=
k that a large number of people on the list favoured the single element wit=
h an array of element names that are non-critical.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">My pro=
posal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:<u></u><=
u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">1 &quo=
t;ign&quot;: =A0Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope tha=
t an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif">2 &quot;aad&quot;: Additional Associated Data -=A0a =
JSON object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if pr=
esent in a JOSE header.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">All ot=
her top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library or pro=
duce a processing fault resulting in an error.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I woul=
d also not want elements listed in &quot;ign&quot; to be passed on to appli=
cations. =A0I think that would cause interoperability issues. =A0 That is w=
hat &quot;aad&quot; is intended to provide.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">I know=
 James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provided dat=
a to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). =A0I think this is a s=
eparate issue that needs to be addressed by security considerations to add =
entropy to the header if such data is included. =A0 That may require a new =
&quot;ent&quot; Entropy element that MUST be ignored. =A0This should be a s=
eparate discussion.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Finall=
y, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand element=
s should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is also all=
ows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in JWE/JWS o=
nly allies to the top level parameter&#39;s, and not the sub parameters the=
y may contain.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">My pro=
posal doesn&#39;t neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I t=
hink it may address the majority of concerns.<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in =
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">Regard=
s<u></u><u></u></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif">John B.</div><div><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 A=
M, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"=
_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>



<br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN-US" l=
ink=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:medi=
um;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:=
normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-tran=
sform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px">



<div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;=
Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calib=
ri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks for sending this, Karen.=A0 Hope=
fully your analysis will help the working group reach a resolution on this =
issue soon.=A0 I=92m writing this note primarily as an editor to help infor=
m the working group=92s discussions, rather than as an individual contribut=
or.<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing criti=
cality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =93MUST =
be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s ano=
ther potential extension point.=A0 The JWK description says =93Additional m=
embers MAY be present in the JWK.=A0 If present, they MUST be understood by=
 implementations using them.=94=A0 The same language is present for the JWK=
 Set. =A0For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address =
those uses too.=A0 Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being d=
iscussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.<u></u><u></u></span></=
div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summar=
ize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are f=
or doing this.=A0 One proposal is 2A in<span>=A0</span><a href=3D"http://ww=
w.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" style=3D"color:purp=
le;text-decoration:underline" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-ar=
chive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</a><span>=A0</span>(which I=92ll call =
the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in<sp=
an>=A0</span><a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/m=
sg01457.html" style=3D"color:purple;text-decoration:underline" target=3D"_b=
lank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html</a><s=
pan>=A0</span>(which I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).=A0 I believe that =
it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they wou=
ld prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that i=
f we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to us=
e.<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">FLAT SYNTAX:<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Courier New&#39;;color:windowtext=
">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes&quo=
t;],<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This hea=
der field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><div st=
yle=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Ro=
man&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12p=
t;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:<u=
></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0 {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,=
<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;ign&quot;:{<u></u><u></u><=
/span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;Th=
is header field can be safely ignored&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Couri=
er New&#39;;color:windowtext">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><=
div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times =
New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&#39;Courier New&#39;;color:windo=
wtext">=A0=A0=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0=
.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"=
>=A0</span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">As I see it, the advantage of the flat synta=
x is all header fields are in the same place.=A0 This makes processing head=
er fields easier and is more regular.=A0 The disadvantage is that the list =
of fields that may be safely ignored repeats those field names.<u></u><u></=
u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing=
 is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.=A0 The disadvantage is that=
 then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making t=
he processing rules for header fields more complicated.<u></u><u></u></span=
></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleane=
r syntax or cleaner semantics.=A0 (I=92d personally lean towards the simple=
r processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with=
 this coming out either way.)<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approach=
es (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.=A0 We could conceivably leave it up =
to application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require hea=
der fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring w=
hich fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts whe=
re the application spec does require that header fields be normally underst=
ood.=A0 In fact, one might consider this to fall under the =93</span>(possi=
bly providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)<sp=
an style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,1=
25)">=94 that you suggested below.<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of thi=
s topic.<u></u><u></u></span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;fo=
nt-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif">



<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,7=
3,125)">=A0</span></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12p=
t;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></div>



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sa=
ns-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">=A0</span></div><div><div style=3D"border-st=
yle:solid none none;border-top-width:1pt;border-top-color:rgb(181,196,223);=
padding:3pt 0in 0in">



<div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times=
 New Roman&#39;,serif"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma,=
sans-serif;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;=
font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif;color:windowtext"><span>=A0</span><a href=3D"=
mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [=
mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank">jose-</a><a href=3D"mailt=
o:bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span>=A0</span>=
<b>On Behalf Of<span>=A0</span></b>Karen O&#39;Donoghue<br>



<b>Sent:</b><span>=A0</span>Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br><b>To:</b>=
<span>=A0</span><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@iet=
f.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b><span>=A0</span>[jose] thoughts on header criti=
cality from recent polls<u></u><u></u></span></div>



</div></div><div style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-famil=
y:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,serif"><u></u>=A0<u></u></div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 12pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:&#39;Times Ne=
w Roman&#39;,serif">



Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent poll=
s on header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a =
chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide =
either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll r=
esults, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a =
few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what ne=
xt...<span>=A0</span><br>



<br>First, what I do believe...<br><br>I think it is clear that the working=
 group remains divided on this issue with a significant number of members f=
eeling that an approach must be defined that safely allows for some header =
fields to be considered non-critical. I think there is general consensus th=
at there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the appr=
oach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group =
to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered cri=
tical and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers=
.<span>=A0</span><br>



<br>In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed =
something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized b=
y Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 201=
2). In particular, I found James&#39; list of requirements to be very helpf=
ul, and I have repeated it here...<br>



<br>A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, wit=
hout any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old sema=
ntics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics=
 of *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>



<br>C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, a=
s similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate=
 &amp; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br><br>



D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>



<br>E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good =
thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message =
format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too=
 likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of =
interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term securi=
ty.<br>



<br>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear r=
egarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a r=
equirement.<span>=A0</span><br><br>QUESTION: Is there working group consens=
us on the requirements we are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion=
 clarifying these would help drive consensus on the overall approach.<span>=
=A0</span><br>



<br>As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where=
 we are of two minds:<span>=A0</span><br><br>1) Define<span>=A0</span><span=
 style=3D"color:windowtext">a header field that explicitly lists the fields=
 that may be safely ignored if not understood</span>. (Here I am assuming t=
hat we aren&#39;t going to define a separate header for non-critical elemen=
ts.)<span>=A0</span><br>



<br>2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and l=
eave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing gu=
idance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).<span>=A0</span><b=
r>



<br>I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am con=
cerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.=
<span>=A0</span><br><br>QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to=
 work on approach 1 or approach 2?<span>=A0</span><br>



<br>In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:<span>=A0</span=
><br>1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critic=
al headers approach.=A0<span>=A0</span><br>2. I am asking the working group=
 to clarify the requirements driving the non-critical header discussion (A,=
 B, C, D, E, or ?).<span>=A0</span><br>



3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals of text.<span>=A0</span><br>



<br>I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as s=
ome would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misundersta=
ndings on my part.<span>=A0</span><br><br>Regards,<br>Karen O&#39;Donoghue<=
u></u><u></u></p>



</div>_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing list<=
br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>=
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a></div>



</blockquote></div><br></div><br>__________________________________________=
_____<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div=
>

--e89a8fb1f35aa9a7f804d6950fda--

From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Mon Feb 25 16:36:57 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Thread-Topic: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Hi Richard,

Responding to your proposal "that we extend (1) by saying that the non-crit=
ical headers would not be covered by the header integrity check", I'll note=
 that syntactically separating the critical and non-critical headers was op=
tion "B" in the third question of the poll, and would be a pre-requisite to=
 having non-critical members not be covered by the integrity check.  By my =
count, only 10% of the respondents supported that position.  (I know - repe=
at after me - the IETF doesn't vote. :))  Possibly more important than the =
actual numbers, Karen wrote in her reply "I am assuming that we aren't goin=
g to define a separate header for non-critical elements."  So I, as an indi=
vidual, I think that option should be off the table, because I can't see it=
 increasing consensus.

I think it would be more productive to focus the discussion on how we want =
to handle the (integrity-protected) header parameters that are and aren't c=
ritical to understand, and not try to conflate that with not integrity prot=
ecting some parts of the message.

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ric=
hard Barnes
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 2:12 PM
To: odonoghue@isoc.org
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

Hi Karen,

Thanks for these thoughts.

tl;dr: I'm OK with (1) or (2).  I would propose that we extend (1) by sayin=
g that the non-critical headers would not be covered by the header integrit=
y check.

Detailed responses inline below.

--Richard

<snip>
A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.

B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).

C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate & m=
alicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.

E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of inte=
roperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term security.

>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.

QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.

Here's my take:

A: This is a requirement.  But it is met trivially by having the new format=
 use new identifier names and marking them critical.

B: This is not a requirement.  It's a bad idea.  Identifiers here are cheap=
, so if you want new semantics, just use a new identifier.

C: This is a requirement (and a good point), in the sense that we should av=
oid providing channels that an attacker could use to control the integrity =
check value on a JW* object.  However, what that argues is that non-critica=
l fields shouldn't be covered by the integrity check, not that they should =
be ruled out altogether.

D: This is not a requirement, for the reasons you give.

E: This is not a requirement.  Couple of clients/servers is an application-=
layer issue.



As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:

1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to de=
fine a separate header for non-critical elements.)

2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).

I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.

I would personally be OK with either approach.  I would generalize (1) slig=
htly to say "Define a syntax for indicating which fields are critical / non=
-critical", and, in light of (C) above, also propose that that syntax remov=
e non-critical fields from under the integrity check.



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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Hi Richard,<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Responding to your propos=
al &#8220;</span>that we extend (1) by saying that the non-critical headers=
 would not be covered by the header integrity check<span style=3D"font-size=
:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497=
D">&#8221;,
 I&#8217;ll note that syntactically separating the critical and non-critica=
l headers was option &#8220;B&#8221; in the third question of the poll, and=
 would be a pre-requisite to having non-critical members not be covered by =
the integrity check.&nbsp; By my count, only 10% of the
 respondents supported that position.&nbsp; (I know &#8211; repeat after me=
 &#8211; the IETF doesn&#8217;t vote.
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Wingdings;color:#1F497D"=
>J</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">)&nbsp; Possibly more important than th=
e actual numbers, Karen wrote in her reply &#8220;</span>I am assuming
 that we aren't going to define a separate header for non-critical elements=
.<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans=
-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#8221;&nbsp; So I, as an individual, I think t=
hat option should be off the table, because I can&#8217;t see it increasing
 consensus.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I think it would be more =
productive to focus the discussion on how we want to handle the (integrity-=
protected) header parameters that are and aren&#8217;t critical
 to understand, and not try to conflate that with not integrity protecting =
some parts of the message.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 2:12 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> odonoghue@isoc.org<br>
<b>Cc:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Karen,<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for these thoughts.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">tl;dr: I'm OK with (1) or (2). &nbsp;I would propose=
 that we extend (1) by saying that the non-critical headers would not be co=
vered by the header integrity check.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Detailed responses inline below.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
&lt;snip&gt;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">A. Want to be able to define messages with new seman=
tics in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret=
 them with old semantics.<br>
<br>
B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>
<br>
C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &am=
p; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
<br>
D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>
<br>
E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension
 non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it=
 critical for better long-term security.<br>
<br>
>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.
<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Here's my take:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">A: This is a requirement. &nbsp;But it is met trivia=
lly by having the new format use new identifier names and marking them crit=
ical.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">B: This is not a requirement. &nbsp;It's a bad idea.=
 &nbsp;Identifiers here are cheap, so if you want new semantics, just use a=
 new identifier. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">C: This is a requirement (and a good point), in the =
sense that we should avoid providing channels that an attacker could use to=
 control the integrity check value on a JW* object. &nbsp;However, what tha=
t argues is that non-critical fields shouldn't
 be covered by the integrity check, not that they should be ruled out altog=
ether.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">D: This is not a requirement, for the reasons you gi=
ve.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">E: This is not a requirement. &nbsp;Couple of client=
s/servers is an application-layer issue.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved=
 to the point where we are of two minds:
<br>
<br>
1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to de=
fine a separate header for non-critical elements.)
<br>
<br>
2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).
<br>
<br>
I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would personally be OK with either approach. &nbsp=
;I would generalize (1) slightly to say &quot;Define a syntax for indicatin=
g which fields are critical / non-critical&quot;, and, in light of (C) abov=
e, also propose that that syntax remove non-critical
 fields from under the integrity check.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Mon Feb 25 16:56:13 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Cc: "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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If, as Richard writes, that the appropriate framework here is extension, no=
t layering, then it would seem to me that we do need a mechanism for identi=
fying which extension parameters are ignorable (such as the proposed "ign" =
field list), but we don't need John's proposed "aad" header.  I think I'm w=
ith Richard on this one.

                                                            -- Mike

From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:40 PM
To: John Bradley
Cc: Mike Jones; jose@ietf.org; odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

Actually, I would expect a library not to pass on anything from the header.=
  OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt function doesn't provide you with any of the crypto=
 information or protected attributes.  The only thing that gets passed thro=
ugh to upper layers is the protected body.

ISTM that the appropriate framework here is extension, not layering.  Suppo=
se I've got an extended JOSE library that does some special, non-critical s=
tuff.  Is that going to cause the recipient to die?  Or is the recipient ju=
st going to ignore what he doesn't understand?

--Richard


On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:30 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7=
jtb@ve7jtb.com>> wrote:
We are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries.   I don't have any reaso=
n to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header is passed=
 on with the body after verification.

Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a JOSE lib?   If =
that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make sense.

This is a bit more of a challenge without talking about expected API.

John B.

On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>> w=
rote:


You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out=
 header fields.  Why would you do that, instead of just passing on everythi=
ng, or nothing?

On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7=
jtb@ve7jtb.com>> wrote:
aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed thr=
ough and not just discarded.

I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored is=
 a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that are not=
 understood..

John B.


On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>> w=
rote:


Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)

If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the he=
ader and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on what I said =
in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated by a signer put=
ting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the unknown stuff=
 in the header.



On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7=
jtb@ve7jtb.com>> wrote:
Karen & Mike,

I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is some=
 information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while other he=
ader parameters are essentially additional associated data (meta-data about=
 the body) and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing=
 along with the body.

An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs =
to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.

I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter th=
at is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed on =
with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass meta-data thr=
ough JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse it.

Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters f=
rom JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.

There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header para=
meters JOSE processes be possible.

For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution.  =
That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to critica=
l without changing its JSON element name.

I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single eleme=
nt with an array of element names that are non-critical.

My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:

1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an a=
pplication MUST ignore if it cannot process them.
2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be provided t=
o applications along with the body if present in a JOSE header.

All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library =
or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.

I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to applicati=
ons.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That is what "aad=
" is intended to provide.

I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provid=
ed data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I think this is=
 a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security considerations to =
add entropy to the header if such data is included.   That may require a ne=
w "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This should be a separate di=
scussion.

Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand e=
lements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is al=
so allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in JWE=
/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not the sub parameters t=
hey may contain.

My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I=
 think it may address the majority of concerns.

Regards
John B.
On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<mailto:M=
ichael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:

Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the work=
ing group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I'm writing this note pri=
marily as an editor to help inform the working group's discussions, rather =
than as an individual contributor.

First, I want to point out that while we've been discussing criticality of =
header parameters, the specs actually currently have the "MUST be understoo=
d" language in the JWK specification as well, as that's another potential e=
xtension point.  The JWK description says "Additional members MAY be presen=
t in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by implementations using=
 them."  The same language is present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution =
of the issue to be complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that =
a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extens=
ions will occur there.

Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I'll summarize for th=
e list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing t=
his.  One proposal is 2A in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curre=
nt/msg01353.html (which I'll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syn=
tax that Dick Hardt proposed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/c=
urrent/msg01457.html (which I'll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe th=
at it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they =
would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so tha=
t if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we'll know which to u=
se.

FLAT SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":["notes"],
     "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
    }

STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":{
       "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
      }
    }

As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in t=
he same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more regu=
lar.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignore=
d repeats those field names.

As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is repe=
ated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that then some=
 header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the process=
ing rules for header fields more complicated.

Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax=
 or cleaner semantics.  (I'd personally lean towards the simpler processing=
 rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming=
 out either way.)

Finally, I'll point out that I don't believe that your approaches (1) and (=
2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to application=
 specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to =
be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields ma=
y be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where the applica=
tion spec does require that header fields be normally understood.  In fact,=
 one might consider this to fall under the "(possibly providing guidance di=
rected to those applications in the JOSE specs)" that you suggested below.

I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topic.

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-<mai=
lto:jose->bounces@ietf.org<mailto:bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Karen O'D=
onoghue
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

Folks,

Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll results, reread=
ing all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few working gr=
oup members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next...

First, what I do believe...

I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus that there must be reasonable mechanisms =
for extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. Based on that, I =
would like to ask the working group to move forward with the strategy that =
all headers cannot be considered critical and move on to the discussion of =
how to approach non-critical headers.

In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and =
I have repeated it here...

A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.

B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).

C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate & m=
alicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.

E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of inte=
roperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term security.

>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.

QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.

As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:

1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to de=
fine a separate header for non-critical elements.)

2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).

I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.

QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?

In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals of text.

I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.

Regards,
Karen O'Donoghue
_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


_______________________________________________
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jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose






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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">If, as Richard writes, th=
at the appropriate framework here is extension, not layering, then it would=
 seem to me that we do need a mechanism for identifying
 which extension parameters are ignorable (such as the proposed &#8220;ign&=
#8221; field list), but we don&#8217;t need John&#8217;s proposed &#8220;aa=
d&#8221; header.&nbsp; I think I&#8217;m with Richard on this one.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 3:40 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> John Bradley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Mike Jones; jose@ietf.org; odonoghue@isoc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Actually, I would expect a library not to pass on an=
ything from the header. &nbsp;OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt function doesn't provid=
e you with any of the crypto information or protected attributes. &nbsp;The=
 only thing that gets passed through to upper
 layers is the protected body.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">ISTM that the appropriate framework here is extensio=
n, not layering. &nbsp;Suppose I've got an extended JOSE library that does =
some special, non-critical stuff. &nbsp;Is that going to cause the recipien=
t to die? &nbsp;Or is the recipient just going to
 ignore what he doesn't understand? &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:30 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries. &=
nbsp; I don't have any reason to believe from what we have in the spec that=
 the entire header is passed on with the body after verification.<o:p></o:p=
></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviou=
r for a JOSE lib? &nbsp; If that is the expected behaviour then dropping aa=
d may make sense.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This is a bit more of a challenge without talking ab=
out expected API.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">John B.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">You seem to be implyi=
ng that an implementation is selectively stripping out header fields. &nbsp=
;Why would you do that, instead of just passing on everything, or nothing?<=
br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included p=
arameters be passed through and not just discarded. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think it helps interoperability, simply saying hea=
der x may be ignored is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on =
parameters that are not understood..&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">John B.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Sorry, John, no agreement on &quot;aad&quot; &nbsp;:=
)<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff=
, just put it in the header and mark it as non-critical. &nbsp;I'm willing =
to step back on what I said in my response to &quot;B&quot;; it can be much=
 more easily mitigated by a signer putting something
 random (and not subject-controlled) before the unknown stuff in the header=
.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Karen &amp; Mike,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think an important issue that Jim and others have =
tried to get at is some information in the header is intended for the JOSE =
library, while other header parameters are essentially additional associate=
d data (meta-data about the body)
 and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing along wit=
h the body. &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">An example of that was the proposed &quot;iat&quot; =
(issued at) element, which needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto=
 processing to be useful.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I suspect a point of agreement might be having an &q=
uot;aad&quot; header parameter that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored b=
y the JOSE library and passed on with the body.&nbsp; This would provide ap=
plications a way to pass meta-data through JOSE that
 is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse it.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Once we remove a large number of the possible extens=
ion header parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.<o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">There is however, still the requirement that extensi=
ons for the header parameters JOSE processes be possible.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">For that the list of non-critical header parameters =
is the best solution. &nbsp;That enables a header parameter to be migrated =
from non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element name.<o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think that a large number of people on the list fa=
voured the single element with an array of element names that are non-criti=
cal.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">My proposal is to add two new top level elements tha=
t MUST be understood:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1 &quot;ign&quot;: &nbsp;Ignore - an array of top le=
vel elements in the envelope that an application MUST ignore if it cannot p=
rocess them.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2 &quot;aad&quot;: Additional Associated Data -&nbsp=
;a JSON object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if=
 present in a JOSE header.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">All other top level header parameters MUST be unders=
tood by a JOSE library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would also not want elements listed in &quot;ign&q=
uot; to be passed on to applications. &nbsp;I think that would cause intero=
perability issues. &nbsp; That is what &quot;aad&quot; is intended to provi=
de.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing =
potentially user provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere li=
kely). &nbsp;I think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by=
 security considerations to add entropy
 to the header if such data is included. &nbsp; That may require a new &quo=
t;ent&quot; Entropy element that MUST be ignored. &nbsp;This should be a se=
parate discussion.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just stat=
e that not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK head=
er parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the=
 MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies
 to the top level parameter's, and not the sub parameters they may contain.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of =
the poll answers, but I think it may address the majority of concerns.<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Regards<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">John B.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@micros=
oft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Thanks for sending this, =
Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your analysis will help the working group reach a re=
solution on this issue soon.&nbsp; I&#8217;m writing this note primarily
 as an editor to help inform the working group&#8217;s discussions, rather =
than as an individual contributor.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">First, I want to point ou=
t that while we&#8217;ve been discussing criticality of header parameters, =
the specs actually currently have the &#8220;MUST be understood&#8221; lang=
uage
 in the JWK specification as well, as that&#8217;s another potential extens=
ion point.&nbsp; The JWK description says &#8220;Additional members MAY be =
present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, they MUST be understood by implementa=
tions using them.&#8221;&nbsp; The same language is present for the
 JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should a=
ddress those uses too.&nbsp; Given that a number of additional JWK fields a=
re being discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.</span><o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Second, if we do decide t=
o go with your approach (1), I&#8217;ll summarize for the list what I belie=
ve the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.&nbsp;
 One proposal is 2A in&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web=
/jose/current/msg01353.html" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"color:purple"=
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</span></a>=
&nbsp;(which I&#8217;ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the
 other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www=
.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html" target=3D"_blank"><s=
pan style=3D"color:purple">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curren=
t/msg01457.html</span></a>&nbsp;(which I&#8217;ll call
 the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be useful for the wo=
rking group to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel to disc=
ussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) =
or something like it, we&#8217;ll know which
 to use.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">FLAT SYNTAX:</span><o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes&quot=
;],</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This head=
er field can be safely ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:</span>=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:{</span><o:p></o:=
p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&qu=
ot;This header field can be safely ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the flat syntax is all header fields are in the same place.&nbsp; This=
 makes processing header fields easier and is more regular.&nbsp;
 The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignored rep=
eats those field names.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the structured syntax is that nothing is repeated, resulting in cleane=
r JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that then some header
 fields are in one place and some are in another, making the processing rul=
es for header fields more complicated.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Between these two, it see=
ms to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner semantics.&nb=
sp; (I&#8217;d personally lean towards the simpler processing rules
 resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming out e=
ither way.)</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Finally, I&#8217;ll point=
 out that I don&#8217;t believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutual=
ly exclusive.&nbsp; We could conceivably leave it up to application specifi=
cations
 using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood b=
y default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ign=
ored for use in those application contexts where the application spec does =
require that header fields be normally
 understood.&nbsp; In fact, one might consider this to fall under the &#822=
0;</span>(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications in the=
 JOSE specs)<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#8221; that you suggested below.</s=
pan><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I hope the points above h=
elp further a productive discussion of this topic.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.o=
rg</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank">jose-</a><a href=
=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">bounces@ietf.org</a>]&nbsp;<=
b>On
 Behalf Of&nbsp;</b>Karen O'Donoghue<br>
<b>Sent:</b>&nbsp;Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br>
<b>To:</b>&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@iet=
f.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b>&nbsp;[jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent poll=
s</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Folks,<br>
<br>
Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but
 after analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multipl=
e times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite=
 able to do so. So, what next...&nbsp;<br>
<br>
First, what I do believe...<br>
<br>
I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus
 that there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the a=
pproach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working gro=
up to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered =
critical and move on to the discussion
 of how to approach non-critical headers.&nbsp;<br>
<br>
In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list
 of requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>
<br>
A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.<br>
<br>
B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>
<br>
C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &am=
p; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
<br>
D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>
<br>
E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension
 non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it=
 critical for better long-term security.<br>
<br>
>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.&nbsp;<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.&nbsp;<br>
<br>
As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:&nbsp;<br>
<br>
1) Define&nbsp;a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be =
safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going =
to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)&nbsp;<br>
<br>
2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).&nbsp;<br>
<br>
I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.&nbs=
p;<br>
<br>
QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?&nbsp;<br>
<br>
In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:&nbsp;<br>
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).&nbsp;<br>
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals
 of text.&nbsp;<br>
<br>
I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.&nbsp;<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Karen O'Donoghue<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:13.5pt;font-family:&quot;He=
lvetica&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">_____________________________________=
__________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Mon Feb 25 16:58:49 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
Thread-Topic: Criticality and JWK
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Subject: [jose] Criticality and JWK
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BTW, lest John's point about criticality and JWK be lost, let me reply to i=
t separately (and with a different subject line).  John wrote:

Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand e=
lements should be ignored.

I'm fine with this proposed change.

                                                            -- Mike

From: John Bradley [mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com]
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 2:17 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

Karen & Mike,

I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is some=
 information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while other he=
ader parameters are essentially additional associated data (meta-data about=
 the body) and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing=
 along with the body.

An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs =
to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.

I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter th=
at is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed on =
with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass meta-data thr=
ough JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse it.

Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters f=
rom JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.

There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header para=
meters JOSE processes be possible.

For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution.  =
That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to critica=
l without changing its JSON element name.

I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single eleme=
nt with an array of element names that are non-critical.

My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:

1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an a=
pplication MUST ignore if it cannot process them.
2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be provided t=
o applications along with the body if present in a JOSE header.

All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library =
or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.

I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to applicati=
ons.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That is what "aad=
" is intended to provide.

I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provid=
ed data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I think this is=
 a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security considerations to =
add entropy to the header if such data is included.   That may require a ne=
w "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This should be a separate di=
scussion.

Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand e=
lements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is al=
so allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in JWE=
/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not the sub parameters t=
hey may contain.

My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I=
 think it may address the majority of concerns.

Regards
John B.
On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<mailto:M=
ichael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:


Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the work=
ing group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I'm writing this note pri=
marily as an editor to help inform the working group's discussions, rather =
than as an individual contributor.

First, I want to point out that while we've been discussing criticality of =
header parameters, the specs actually currently have the "MUST be understoo=
d" language in the JWK specification as well, as that's another potential e=
xtension point.  The JWK description says "Additional members MAY be presen=
t in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by implementations using=
 them."  The same language is present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution =
of the issue to be complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that =
a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extens=
ions will occur there.

Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I'll summarize for th=
e list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing t=
his.  One proposal is 2A in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curre=
nt/msg01353.html (which I'll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syn=
tax that Dick Hardt proposed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/c=
urrent/msg01457.html (which I'll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe th=
at it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they =
would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so tha=
t if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we'll know which to u=
se.

FLAT SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":["notes"],
     "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
    }

STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
    {"alg":"ES256",
     "ign":{
       "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
      }
    }

As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in t=
he same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more regu=
lar.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignore=
d repeats those field names.

As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is repe=
ated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that then some=
 header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the process=
ing rules for header fields more complicated.

Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax=
 or cleaner semantics.  (I'd personally lean towards the simpler processing=
 rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming=
 out either way.)

Finally, I'll point out that I don't believe that your approaches (1) and (=
2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to application=
 specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to =
be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields ma=
y be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where the applica=
tion spec does require that header fields be normally understood.  In fact,=
 one might consider this to fall under the "(possibly providing guidance di=
rected to those applications in the JOSE specs)" that you suggested below.

I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topic.

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-boun=
ces@ietf.org<mailto:bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Karen O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
To: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

Folks,

Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll results, reread=
ing all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few working gr=
oup members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next...

First, what I do believe...

I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus that there must be reasonable mechanisms =
for extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. Based on that, I =
would like to ask the working group to move forward with the strategy that =
all headers cannot be considered critical and move on to the discussion of =
how to approach non-critical headers.

In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and =
I have repeated it here...

A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.

B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).

C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate & m=
alicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.

E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of inte=
roperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term security.

>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.

QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.

As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:

1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safel=
y ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to de=
fine a separate header for non-critical elements.)

2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).

I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.

QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?

In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals of text.

I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.

Regards,
Karen O'Donoghue
_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">BTW, lest John&#8217;s po=
int about criticality and JWK be lost, let me reply to it separately (and w=
ith a different subject line).&nbsp; John wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">Finally, for JWK, I belie=
ve that we should just state that not-understand elements should be ignored=
.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I&#8217;m fine with this =
proposed change.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> John Bra=
dley [mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 2:17 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Karen &amp; Mike,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think an important issue that Jim and others have =
tried to get at is some information in the header is intended for the JOSE =
library, while other header parameters are essentially additional associate=
d data (meta-data about the body)
 and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing along wit=
h the body. &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">An example of that was the proposed &quot;iat&quot; =
(issued at) element, which needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto=
 processing to be useful.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I suspect a point of agreement might be having an &q=
uot;aad&quot; header parameter that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored b=
y the JOSE library and passed on with the body.&nbsp; This would provide ap=
plications a way to pass meta-data through JOSE that
 is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse it.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Once we remove a large number of the possible extens=
ion header parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.<o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">There is however, still the requirement that extensi=
ons for the header parameters JOSE processes be possible.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">For that the list of non-critical header parameters =
is the best solution. &nbsp;That enables a header parameter to be migrated =
from non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element name.<o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think that a large number of people on the list fa=
voured the single element with an array of element names that are non-criti=
cal.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">My proposal is to add two new top level elements tha=
t MUST be understood:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1 &quot;ign&quot;: &nbsp;Ignore - an array of top le=
vel elements in the envelope that an application MUST ignore if it cannot p=
rocess them.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2 &quot;aad&quot;: Additional Associated Data -&nbsp=
;a JSON object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if=
 present in a JOSE header.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">All other top level header parameters MUST be unders=
tood by a JOSE library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would also not want elements listed in &quot;ign&q=
uot; to be passed on to applications. &nbsp;I think that would cause intero=
perability issues. &nbsp; That is what &quot;aad&quot; is intended to provi=
de.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing =
potentially user provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere li=
kely). &nbsp;I think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by=
 security considerations to add entropy
 to the header if such data is included. &nbsp; That may require a new &quo=
t;ent&quot; Entropy element that MUST be ignored. &nbsp;This should be a se=
parate discussion.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just stat=
e that not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK head=
er parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the=
 MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies
 to the top level parameter's, and not the sub parameters they may contain.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of =
the poll answers, but I think it may address the majority of concerns.<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Regards<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">John B.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Thanks for sending this, =
Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your analysis will help the working group reach a re=
solution on this issue soon.&nbsp; I&#8217;m writing this note primarily
 as an editor to help inform the working group&#8217;s discussions, rather =
than as an individual contributor.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">First, I want to point ou=
t that while we&#8217;ve been discussing criticality of header parameters, =
the specs actually currently have the &#8220;MUST be understood&#8221; lang=
uage
 in the JWK specification as well, as that&#8217;s another potential extens=
ion point.&nbsp; The JWK description says &#8220;Additional members MAY be =
present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, they MUST be understood by implementa=
tions using them.&#8221;&nbsp; The same language is present for the
 JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should a=
ddress those uses too.&nbsp; Given that a number of additional JWK fields a=
re being discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.</span><o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Second, if we do decide t=
o go with your approach (1), I&#8217;ll summarize for the list what I belie=
ve the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.&nbsp;
 One proposal is 2A in<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a=
 href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html"><=
span style=3D"color:purple">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/curre=
nt/msg01353.html</span></a><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</sp=
an>(which
 I&#8217;ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Har=
dt proposed in<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D=
"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html"><span sty=
le=3D"color:purple">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01=
457.html</span></a><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>(whic=
h
 I&#8217;ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be u=
seful for the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in =
parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go wi=
th approach (1) or something like it, we&#8217;ll
 know which to use.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">FLAT SYNTAX:</span><o:p><=
/o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes&quot=
;],</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This head=
er field can be safely ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">STRUCTURED SYNTAX:</span>=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;ign&quot;:{</span><o:p></o:=
p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&qu=
ot;This header field can be safely ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the flat syntax is all header fields are in the same place.&nbsp; This=
 makes processing header fields easier and is more regular.&nbsp;
 The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignored rep=
eats those field names.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">As I see it, the advantag=
e of the structured syntax is that nothing is repeated, resulting in cleane=
r JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that then some header
 fields are in one place and some are in another, making the processing rul=
es for header fields more complicated.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Between these two, it see=
ms to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner semantics.&nb=
sp; (I&#8217;d personally lean towards the simpler processing rules
 resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming out e=
ither way.)</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Finally, I&#8217;ll point=
 out that I don&#8217;t believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutual=
ly exclusive.&nbsp; We could conceivably leave it up to application specifi=
cations
 using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood b=
y default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ign=
ored for use in those application contexts where the application spec does =
require that header fields be normally
 understood.&nbsp; In fact, one might consider this to fall under the &#822=
0;</span>(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications in the=
 JOSE specs)<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&#8221; that you suggested below.</s=
pan><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I hope the points above h=
elp further a productive discussion of this topic.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span class=3D"apple-=
converted-space"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&q=
uot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;</span></span><span style=3D"font-size:1=
0.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><a href=3D"mai=
lto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a>
 [mailto:jose-<a href=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<spa=
n class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b>On Behalf Of<span class=
=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Karen O'Donoghue<br>
<b>Sent:</b><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Monday, Febr=
uary 25, 2013 3:26 AM<br>
<b>To:</b><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mai=
lto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>[jose] th=
oughts on header criticality from recent polls</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Folks,<br>
<br>
Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header cr=
iticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspec=
tive with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decis=
ion or a clear set of choices, but
 after analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multipl=
e times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite=
 able to do so. So, what next...<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp=
;</span><br>
<br>
First, what I do believe...<br>
<br>
I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue wi=
th a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined=
 that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I=
 think there is general consensus
 that there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the a=
pproach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working gro=
up to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered =
critical and move on to the discussion
 of how to approach non-critical headers.<span class=3D"apple-converted-spa=
ce">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed some=
thing), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Ji=
m Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). =
In particular, I found James' list
 of requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...<br>
<br>
A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without=
 any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantic=
s.<br>
<br>
B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*=
 fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterp=
ret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).<br>
<br>
C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as si=
milar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &am=
p; malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br>
<br>
D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the=
 philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by =
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any =
new functionality they bring.<br>
<br>
E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thin=
g; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message form=
at for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too lik=
ely to choose to make an extension
 non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it=
 critical for better long-term security.<br>
<br>
>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regar=
ding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requi=
rement.<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are tryin=
g to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive =
consensus on the overall approach.<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nb=
sp;</span><br>
<br>
As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we =
are of two minds:<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
1) Define<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>a header field =
that explicitly lists the fields that may be safely ignored if not understo=
od. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to define a separate header fo=
r non-critical elements.)<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span=
><br>
<br>
2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave=
 it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidan=
ce directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).<span class=3D"apple-c=
onverted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concern=
ed that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach.<spa=
n class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or a=
pproach 2?<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:<span class=3D"appl=
e-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical he=
aders approach.&nbsp;<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br=
>
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the no=
n-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).<span class=3D"apple-con=
verted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to=
 develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications w=
ith appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this i=
tem, I welcome concise proposals
 of text.<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some =
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandin=
gs on my part.<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Karen O'Donoghue<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:13.5pt;font-family:&quot;He=
lvetica&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">_____________________________________=
__________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose">https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Mon Feb 25 17:09:35 2013
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, jose issue tracker <trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data
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Cc: "draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data
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Actually, I think Matt's draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk, written in re=
sponse to our new proposed charter item (8), exactly addresses how the key =
is transmitted for separable keys.

                                                            -- Mike

From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 1:36 PM
To: jose issue tracker
Cc: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org; Nat Sakimura; jose@=
ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted d=
ata

That still doesn't address how the key is transmitted.

A solution for encryption requires (1) a way to encrypt a JWE under a given=
 key, and (2) a way to transmit wrapped keys.  You are proposing a solution=
 to (1), with some mechanism for (2).

JWE already solves (1) and (2), just not in a way that the keys are separab=
le. Because the keys are included under the JWE integrity check, the JWE in=
tegrity check value will be different for each wrapped key.

Your answer already concedes that there is no benefit to including the key =
under the JWE integrity check.  We should just make it that way with JWE in=
 general and the issue will be resolved.




On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 2:19 PM, jose issue tracker <trac+jose@trac.tools.i=
etf.org<mailto:trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org>> wrote:
#4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data


Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com<mailto:sakimura@gmail.com>):

 4.6 Dierct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key of JWA seems to be
 addressing the needs in this ticket.

--
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
  rbarnes@bbn.com<mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com>        |  encryption@tools.ietf.o=
rg<mailto:encryption@tools.ietf.org>
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
  encryption             |  Resolution:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4#comment:1>
jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>

_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Actually, I think Matt&#8=
217;s draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk, written in response to our new p=
roposed charter item (8), exactly addresses how the key is transmitted
 for separable keys.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 1:36 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose issue tracker<br>
<b>Cc:</b> draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org; Nat Sakimura=
; jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encr=
ypted data<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">That still doesn't address how the key is transmitte=
d.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">A solution for encryption requires (1) a way to encr=
ypt a JWE under a given key, and (2) a way to transmit wrapped keys. &nbsp;=
You are proposing a solution to (1), with some mechanism for (2).<o:p></o:p=
></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">JWE already solves (1) and (2), just not in a way th=
at the keys are separable. Because the keys are included under the JWE inte=
grity check, the JWE integrity check value will be different for each wrapp=
ed key.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Your answer already concedes that there is no benefi=
t to including the key under the JWE integrity check. &nbsp;We should just =
make it that way with JWE in general and the issue will be resolved.<o:p></=
o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 2:19 PM, jose issue tracker =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trac&#43;jose@trac.tools.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">=
trac&#43;jose@trac.tools.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">#4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypte=
d data<br>
<br>
<br>
Comment (by <a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com">sakimura@gmail.com</a>):<=
br>
<br>
&nbsp;4.6 Dierct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key of JWA seems to be<=
br>
&nbsp;addressing the needs in this ticket.<br>
<br>
--<br>
-------------------------&#43;---------------------------------------------=
----<br>
&nbsp;Reporter: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; | &nbsp; &=
nbsp; &nbsp; Owner: &nbsp;draft-ietf-jose-json-web-<br>
&nbsp; <a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a> &nbsp; &nbsp;=
 &nbsp; &nbsp;| &nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:encryption@tools.ietf.org">encrypti=
on@tools.ietf.org</a><br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Type: &nbsp;defect &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; | &nbsp; &nbsp;=
 &nbsp;Status: &nbsp;new<br>
&nbsp;Priority: &nbsp;major &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;| &nbsp; Milestone:<=
br>
Component: &nbsp;json-web- &nbsp; &nbsp;| &nbsp; &nbsp; Version:<br>
&nbsp; encryption &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; | &nbsp;Resolut=
ion:<br>
&nbsp;Severity: &nbsp;Active WG &nbsp; &nbsp;|<br>
&nbsp; Document &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; |<br>
&nbsp;Keywords: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; |<br>
-------------------------&#43;---------------------------------------------=
----<br>
<br>
Ticket URL: &lt;<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4=
#comment:1" target=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticke=
t/4#comment:1</a>&gt;<br>
jose &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/jose/" target=3D"_blank">http://t=
ools.ietf.org/jose/</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Cc: 'Mike Jones' <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, jose@ietf.org, odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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This would correspond to my expectation.  That the entire header would be
available to the application.

 

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John
Bradley
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:31 PM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: Mike Jones; odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

 

We are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries.   I don't have any reason
to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header is passed on
with the body after verification.

 

Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a JOSE lib?   If
that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make sense.

 

This is a bit more of a challenge without talking about expected API.

 

John B.

 

On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:





You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out
header fields.  Why would you do that, instead of just passing on
everything, or nothing?



On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed
through and not just discarded.  

 

I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored is
a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that are not
understood.. 

 

John B.

 

 

On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:





Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)

 

If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the
header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on what I said
in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated by a signer
putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the unknown
stuff in the header.

 

 

 

On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

Karen & Mike,

 

I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is some
information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while other
header parameters are essentially additional associated data (meta-data
about the body) and need to be passed on to other software layers for
processing along with the body.   

 

An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs
to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.

 

I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter
that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed on
with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass meta-data
through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse it.

 

Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters
from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.

 

There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header
parameters JOSE processes be possible.

 

For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution.
That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to critical
without changing its JSON element name.

 

I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single
element with an array of element names that are non-critical.

 

My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:

 

1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an
application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.

2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be provided to
applications along with the body if present in a JOSE header.

 

All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library
or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.

 

I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to
applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That is
what "aad" is intended to provide.

 

I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I think
this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.   That
may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This should
be a separate discussion.

 

Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand
elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is
also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in
JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not the sub parameters
they may contain.

 

My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I
think it may address the majority of concerns.

 

Regards

John B.

On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> wrote:

 

Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the
working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I'm writing this note
primarily as an editor to help inform the working group's discussions,
rather than as an individual contributor.

 

First, I want to point out that while we've been discussing criticality of
header parameters, the specs actually currently have the "MUST be
understood" language in the JWK specification as well, as that's another
potential extension point.  The JWK description says "Additional members MAY
be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by
implementations using them."  The same language is present for the JWK Set.
For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address those uses
too.  Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I
expect that extensions will occur there.

 

Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I'll summarize for the
list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing
this.  One proposal is 2A in
<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html>
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which I'll
call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed
in  <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html>
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which I'll
call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful for the
working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel to
discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with approach
(1) or something like it, we'll know which to use.

 

FLAT SYNTAX:

    {"alg":"ES256",

     "ign":["notes"],

     "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"

    }

 

STRUCTURED SYNTAX:

    {"alg":"ES256",

     "ign":{

       "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"

      }

    }

 

As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in
the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more
regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely
ignored repeats those field names.

 

As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is
repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that then
some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the
processing rules for header fields more complicated.

 

Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax
or cleaner semantics.  (I'd personally lean towards the simpler processing
rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming
out either way.)

 

Finally, I'll point out that I don't believe that your approaches (1) and
(2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to application
specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be
understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be
safely ignored for use in those application contexts where the application
spec does require that header fields be normally understood.  In fact, one
might consider this to fall under the "(possibly providing guidance directed
to those applications in the JOSE specs)" that you suggested below.

 

I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topic.

 

                                                            -- Mike

 

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Karen O'Donoghue
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

 

Folks,

Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header
criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs
perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a
decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll results,
rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few
working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next...


First, what I do believe...

I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue
with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be
defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered
non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be
reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be
generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move
forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical and
move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers. 

In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed
something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by
Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012).
In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and I
have repeated it here...

A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without
any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics.

B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing*
fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will
misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).

C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as
similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &
malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).

D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the
philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by
adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any
new functionality they bring.

E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good
thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message
format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too
likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of
interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term
security.

>From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear
regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a
requirement. 

QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are trying
to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive
consensus on the overall approach. 

As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we
are of two minds: 

1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safely
ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to
define a separate header for non-critical elements.) 

2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave
it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidance
directed to those applications in the JOSE specs). 

I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second
approach. 

QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or
approach 2? 

In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive: 
1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical
headers approach.  
2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the
non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?). 
3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to
develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications
with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this
item, I welcome concise proposals of text. 

I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some
would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and
misunderstandings on my part. 

Regards,
Karen O'Donoghue

_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

 


_______________________________________________
jose mailing list
jose@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose

 

 

 

 


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style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>This would correspond to my expectation.&nbsp; That the entire header =
would be available to the application.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
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style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of =
</b>John Bradley<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 3:31 =
PM<br><b>To:</b> Richard Barnes<br><b>Cc:</b> Mike Jones; =
odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] thoughts =
on header criticality from recent =
polls<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>We are =
interested in interoperable JOSE libraries. &nbsp; I don't have any =
reason to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header =
is passed on with the body after verification.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour =
for a JOSE lib? &nbsp; If that is the expected behaviour then dropping =
aad may make sense.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>This is a bit more of a challenge without talking =
about expected API.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>John B.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On =
2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>You seem to be implying that an =
implementation is selectively stripping out header fields. &nbsp;Why =
would you do that, instead of just passing on everything, or =
nothing?<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Feb 25, =
2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included =
parameters be passed through and not just discarded. =
&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored =
is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that =
are not understood..&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>John B.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On =
2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" =
target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Sorry, =
John, no agreement on &quot;aad&quot; &nbsp;:)<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, =
just put it in the header and mark it as non-critical. &nbsp;I'm willing =
to step back on what I said in my response to &quot;B&quot;; it can be =
much more easily mitigated by a signer putting something random (and not =
subject-controlled) before the unknown stuff in the =
header.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, =
Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Karen &amp; =
Mike,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is =
some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while =
other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>An example of that was the proposed &quot;iat&quot; =
(issued at) element, which needs to be processed outside of the JOSE =
crypto processing to be useful.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
suspect a point of agreement might be having an &quot;aad&quot; header =
parameter that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library =
and passed on with the body.&nbsp; This would provide applications a way =
to pass meta-data through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE =
having to parse it.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Once we remove a large number of the possible =
extension header parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets =
smaller.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>There is however, still the requirement that =
extensions for the header parameters JOSE processes be =
possible.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>For that the list of non-critical header parameters is =
the best solution. &nbsp;That enables a header parameter to be migrated =
from non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element =
name.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single =
element with an array of element names that are =
non-critical.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>My proposal is to add two new top level elements that =
MUST be understood:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>1 =
&quot;ign&quot;: &nbsp;Ignore - an array of top level elements in the =
envelope that an application MUST ignore if it cannot process =
them.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>2 &quot;aad&quot;: =
Additional Associated Data -&nbsp;a JSON object that MUST be provided to =
applications along with the body if present in a JOSE =
header.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>All other top level header parameters MUST be =
understood by a JOSE library or produce a processing fault resulting in =
an error.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
would also not want elements listed in &quot;ign&quot; to be passed on =
to applications. &nbsp;I think that would cause interoperability issues. =
&nbsp; That is what &quot;aad&quot; is intended to =
provide.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user =
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). &nbsp;I =
think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included. =
&nbsp; That may require a new &quot;ent&quot; Entropy element that MUST =
be ignored. &nbsp;This should be a separate =
discussion.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state =
that not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK =
header parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, =
as the MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level =
parameter's, and not the sub parameters they may =
contain.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of =
the poll answers, but I think it may address the majority of =
concerns.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Regards<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>John B.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" =
target=3D"_blank">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Thanks for sending this, Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your analysis will =
help the working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.&nbsp; =
I&#8217;m writing this note primarily as an editor to help inform the =
working group&#8217;s discussions, rather than as an individual =
contributor.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>First, I want to point out that while we&#8217;ve been discussing =
criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =
&#8220;MUST be understood&#8221; language in the JWK specification as =
well, as that&#8217;s another potential extension point.&nbsp; The JWK =
description says &#8220;Additional members MAY be present in the =
JWK.&nbsp; If present, they MUST be understood by implementations using =
them.&#8221;&nbsp; The same language is present for the JWK Set. =
&nbsp;For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address =
those uses too.&nbsp; Given that a number of additional JWK fields are =
being discussed, I expect that extensions will occur =
there.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I&#8217;ll =
summarize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the =
table are for doing this.&nbsp; One proposal is 2A in&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" =
target=3D"_blank"><span =
style=3D'color:purple'>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/=
msg01353.html</span></a>&nbsp;(which I&#8217;ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) =
and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html" =
target=3D"_blank"><span =
style=3D'color:purple'>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/=
msg01457.html</span></a>&nbsp;(which I&#8217;ll call the STRUCTURED =
SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that it would be useful for the working group =
to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel to discussing =
the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) or =
something like it, we&#8217;ll know which to =
use.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>FLAT SYNTAX:</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&quot;ign&quot;:[&quot;notes&quot;],</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This header field =
can be safely ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>STRUCTURED SYNTAX:</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;ES256&quot;,</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&quot;ign&quot;:{</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;notes&quot;:&quot;This =
header field can be safely =
ignored&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields =
are in the same place.&nbsp; This makes processing header fields easier =
and is more regular.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that the list of fields =
that may be safely ignored repeats those field =
names.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing =
is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is =
that then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, =
making the processing rules for header fields more =
complicated.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner =
syntax or cleaner semantics.&nbsp; (I&#8217;d personally lean towards =
the simpler processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would =
be fine with this coming out either =
way.)</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Finally, I&#8217;ll point out that I don&#8217;t believe that your =
approaches (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.&nbsp; We could =
conceivably leave it up to application specifications using the JOSE =
specs whether they require header fields to be understood by default AND =
provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ignored for =
use in those application contexts where the application spec does =
require that header fields be normally understood.&nbsp; In fact, one =
might consider this to fall under the &#8220;</span>(possibly providing =
guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)<span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&#8221; that you suggested below.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- =
Mike</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank">jose-</a><a =
href=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">bounces@ietf.org</a>]&nbsp;<b>On Behalf =
Of&nbsp;</b>Karen O'Donoghue<br><b>Sent:</b>&nbsp;Monday, February 25, =
2013 3:26 AM<br><b>To:</b>&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b>&nbsp;[jose] =
thoughts on header criticality from recent =
polls</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience =
with me regarding the recent polls on header criticality. I realize I =
have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspective with some =
results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decision or a =
clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll results, rereading =
all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few working =
group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what =
next...&nbsp;<br><br>First, what I do believe...<br><br>I think it is =
clear that the working group remains divided on this issue with a =
significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined =
that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. =
I think there is general consensus that there must be reasonable =
mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. =
Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move forward =
with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical and =
move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical =
headers.&nbsp;<br><br>In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my =
apologies if I missed something), I have seen a number of basic =
approaches proposed (summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the =
response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' =
list of requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it =
here...<br><br>A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics =
in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret =
them with old semantics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or =
constrain) the semantics of *existing* fields in future, without any =
risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics =
(or without the constraints).<br><br>C. Want to prevent large blobs of =
ignored data appearing in messages, as similar blobs have been used to =
create hash collisions between legitimate &amp; malicious certificates =
that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br><br>D. Want to strongly discourage =
future extensions (feature-creep), under the philosophy that even =
well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by adding complexity =
that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any new =
functionality they bring.<br><br>E. Loosely coupling clients and servers =
is generally considered a good thing; but strongly coupling them is more =
appropriate for a secure message format for [insert a reason here]. A =
possible reason is that people are too likely to choose to make an =
extension non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead =
of making it critical for better long-term security.<br><br>From this =
list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regarding =
working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a =
requirement.&nbsp;<br><br>QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on =
the requirements we are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion =
clarifying these would help drive consensus on the overall =
approach.&nbsp;<br><br>As for possible solutions, we appear to have =
evolved to the point where we are of two minds:&nbsp;<br><br>1) =
Define&nbsp;a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be =
safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't =
going to define a separate header for non-critical =
elements.)&nbsp;<br><br>2) Remain silent on header criticality in the =
JOSE specifications and leave it up to the various application =
specifications (possibly providing guidance directed to those =
applications in the JOSE specs).&nbsp;<br><br>I sense that there is more =
support for the first approach, but I am concerned that there is a =
significant minority that favor the second =
approach.&nbsp;<br><br>QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether =
to work on approach 1 or approach 2?&nbsp;<br><br>In conclusion, I am =
asking three things in this missive:&nbsp;<br>1. I am asking the working =
group to move forward based on a non-critical headers =
approach.&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>2. I am asking the working group to clarify the =
requirements driving the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, =
or ?).&nbsp;<br>3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the =
right approach is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to =
defer to the applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level =
of guidance)? To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of =
text.&nbsp;<br><br>I realize this message is long and not as specific or =
prescriptive as some would like, and I apologize in advance for any =
mistakes and misunderstandings on my =
part.&nbsp;<br><br>Regards,<br>Karen O'Donoghue<o:p></o:p></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Helvetica","sans-serif"'>_________=
______________________________________<br>jose mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div></blockquote></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><br>______________________________________=
_________<br>jose mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:=
p></p></div><p =
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From James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com  Mon Feb 25 22:19:41 2013
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From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 17:19:24 +1100
Thread-Topic: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 01:10:16 -0800
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References: <512B4A34.9090305@isoc.org>	<4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B1680429673943674A42FA@TK5EX14MBXC284.redmond.corp.microsoft.com>	<E373F270-B4B0-4FCB-8668-2F8719D72DD7@ve7jtb.com>	<CAL02cgRHE2hQh-dcgT1MMfXssZo8CXVsKvsRhnkBmdhydvxY2g@mail.gmail.com>	<B58D55C9-0082-472D-A704-3917AEA98D2D@ve7jtb.com>	<CAL02cgSKzb3w49iUgi2Gmp3uoTyBMmkpFzWo2Z6gwjR2tG=AgA@mail.gmail.com> <178EF53B-5FB4-46E9-BC4C-1C9DDAE47D96@ve7jtb.com> <011d01ce13bf$b1c0b1c0$15421540$@augustcellars.com>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Cc: 'Richard Barnes' <rlb@ipv.sx>, 'Mike Jones' <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, jose@ietf.org, odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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There seem to be multiple interpretations of the entire header would be =
available to the app.

I think Richard clarified that like CMS the only thing that would be =
returned to the application would be the body, and the method of =
accessing the header would be through JOSE plugins of some sort.

> Actually, I would expect a library not to pass on anything from the =
header.  OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt function doesn't provide you with any of =
the crypto information or protected attributes.  The only thing that =
gets passed through to upper layers is the protected body.

I expect that the application could take the JWE/JWS apart and extract =
parameters from the header before passing it to a lib, but that is sort =
of a hack. =20

Making the info available via extensions to the lib is also posable.

Without some common understanding of what a interoperable JOSE library =
must implement the specifics of criticality are awkward to discuss.

John B.


On 2013-02-25, at 5:22 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> This would correspond to my expectation.  That the entire header would =
be available to the application.
> =20
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of John Bradley
> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:31 PM
> To: Richard Barnes
> Cc: Mike Jones; odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
> =20
> We are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries.   I don't have any =
reason to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header =
is passed on with the body after verification.
> =20
> Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a JOSE lib?  =
 If that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make sense.
> =20
> This is a bit more of a challenge without talking about expected API.
> =20
> John B.
> =20
> On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively =
stripping out header fields.  Why would you do that, instead of just =
passing on everything, or nothing?
>=20
>=20
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
> aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be =
passed through and not just discarded. =20
> =20
> I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be =
ignored is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters =
that are not understood..=20
> =20
> John B.
> =20
> =20
> On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)
> =20
> If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in =
the header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on =
what I said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated =
by a signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before =
the unknown stuff in the header.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> =
wrote:
> Karen & Mike,
> =20
> I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is =
some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while =
other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body.  =20
> =20
> An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which =
needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.
> =20
> I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header =
parameter that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library =
and passed on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to =
pass meta-data through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE =
having to parse it.
> =20
> Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header =
parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.
> =20
> There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header =
parameters JOSE processes be possible.
> =20
> For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best =
solution.  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from =
non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element name.
> =20
> I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single =
element with an array of element names that are non-critical.
> =20
> My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:
> =20
> 1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that =
an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.
> 2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be =
provided to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE =
header.
> =20
> All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE =
library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.
> =20
> I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to =
applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That =
is what "aad" is intended to provide.
> =20
> I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user =
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I =
think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.   =
That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This =
should be a separate discussion.
> =20
> Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that =
not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header =
parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the =
MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and =
not the sub parameters they may contain.
> =20
> My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, =
but I think it may address the majority of concerns.
> =20
> Regards
> John B.
> On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> =
wrote:
> =20
> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the =
working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I=92m writing this =
note primarily as an editor to help inform the working group=92s =
discussions, rather than as an individual contributor.
> =20
> First, I want to point out that while we=92ve been discussing =
criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the =
=93MUST be understood=94 language in the JWK specification as well, as =
that=92s another potential extension point.  The JWK description says =
=93Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST =
be understood by implementations using them.=94  The same language is =
present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution of the issue to be =
complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that a number of =
additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extensions will =
occur there.
> =20
> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize =
for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are =
for doing this.  One proposal is 2A in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which =
I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt =
proposed in =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which =
I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful =
for the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in =
parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go =
with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know which to use.
> =20
> FLAT SYNTAX:
>     {"alg":"ES256",
>      "ign":["notes"],
>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>     }
> =20
> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
>     {"alg":"ES256",
>      "ign":{
>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>       }
>     }
> =20
> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are =
in the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is =
more regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be =
safely ignored repeats those field names.
> =20
> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is =
repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that =
then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making =
the processing rules for header fields more complicated.
> =20
> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner =
syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler =
processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine =
with this coming out either way.)
> =20
> Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t believe that your approaches =
(1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to =
application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require =
header fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for =
declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use in those =
application contexts where the application spec does require that header =
fields be normally understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall =
under the =93(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications =
in the JOSE specs)=94 that you suggested below.
> =20
> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.
> =20
>                                                             -- Mike
> =20
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Karen O'Donoghue
> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
> =20
> Folks,
>=20
> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on =
header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a =
chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to =
provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing =
the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and =
talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do =
so. So, what next...=20
>=20
> First, what I do believe...
>=20
> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this =
issue with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must =
be defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered =
non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be =
reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be =
generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move =
forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical =
and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers.=20=

>=20
> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed =
something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed =
(summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James =
Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of =
requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...
>=20
> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics.
>=20
> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of =
*existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations =
will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
>=20
> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, =
as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between =
legitimate & malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
>=20
> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), =
under the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do =
more harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than =
the good of any new functionality they bring.
>=20
> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good =
thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure =
message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that =
people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for =
short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for =
better long-term security.
>=20
> =46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am =
unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe =
D is not a requirement.=20
>=20
> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are =
trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would =
help drive consensus on the overall approach.=20
>=20
> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point =
where we are of two minds:=20
>=20
> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be =
safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't =
going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.)=20
>=20
> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and =
leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly =
providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs).=20
>=20
> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am =
concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second =
approach.=20
>=20
> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 =
or approach 2?=20
>=20
> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive:=20
> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a =
non-critical headers approach. =20
> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving =
the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?).=20
> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach =
is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the =
applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? =
To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of text.=20
>=20
> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as =
some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and =
misunderstandings on my part.=20
>=20
> Regards,
> Karen O'Donoghue
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
> =20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>=20
> =20
> =20
> =20


--Apple-Mail=_D5C6E7C6-2262-4F38-8E7D-3C223B0F67DA
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"><base href=3D"x-msg://3413/"></head><body =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">There seem to be multiple =
interpretations of the entire header would be available to the =
app.<div><br></div><div>I think Richard clarified that like CMS the only =
thing that would be returned to the application would be the body, and =
the method of accessing the header would be through JOSE plugins of some =
sort.</div><div><br></div><div></div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div>Actually, I would expect a library not to pass on =
anything from the header. &nbsp;OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt function doesn't =
provide you with any of the crypto information or protected attributes. =
&nbsp;The only thing that gets passed through to upper layers is the =
protected body.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I expect that the =
application could take the JWE/JWS apart and extract parameters from the =
header before passing it to a lib, but that is sort of a hack. =
&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Making the info available via extensions =
to the lib is also posable.</div><div><br></div><div>Without some common =
understanding of what a interoperable JOSE library must implement the =
specifics of criticality are awkward to =
discuss.</div><div><br></div><div>John =
B.</div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 2013-02-25, at 5:22 PM, Jim =
Schaad &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
"><div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; "><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">This would correspond to =
my expectation.&nbsp; That the entire header would be available to the =
application.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span></div><div style=3D"border-style: =
none none none solid; border-left-width: 1.5pt; border-left-color: blue; =
padding: 0in 0in 0in 4pt; "><div><div style=3D"border-style: solid none =
none; border-top-width: 1pt; border-top-color: rgb(181, 196, 223); =
padding: 3pt 0in 0in; "><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; "><b><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; =
">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, =
sans-serif; "><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a> =
[mailto:jose-<a =
href=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org">bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b>On Behalf Of<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>John =
Bradley<br><b>Sent:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Monday, February 25, 2013 =
3:31 PM<br><b>To:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Richard =
Barnes<br><b>Cc:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Mike Jones; <a =
href=3D"mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org">odonoghue@isoc.org</a>; <a =
href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Re: [jose] thoughts on =
header criticality from recent =
polls<o:p></o:p></span></div></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">We are =
interested in interoperable JOSE libraries. &nbsp; I don't have any =
reason to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header =
is passed on with the body after verification.<o:p></o:p></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">Is that your interpretation of the expected =
behaviour for a JOSE lib? &nbsp; If that is the expected behaviour then =
dropping aad may make sense.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">This is a bit more of a challenge without talking =
about expected API.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">John =
B.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">On =
2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; ">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><br><br><o:p></o:p></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 12pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">You =
seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out =
header fields. &nbsp;Why would you do that, instead of just passing on =
everything, or nothing?<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; ">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: =
purple; text-decoration: underline; ">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">aad allows you =
to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed through and not =
just discarded. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I =
think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored =
is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that =
are not understood..&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">John B.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: purple; =
text-decoration: underline; ">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><br><br><o:p></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">Sorry, John, =
no agreement on "aad" &nbsp;:)<o:p></o:p></div><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">If =
you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the =
header and mark it as non-critical. &nbsp;I'm willing to step back on =
what I said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated =
by a signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before =
the unknown stuff in the header.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; ">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: =
purple; text-decoration: underline; ">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></div><div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">Karen &amp; =
Mike,<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I =
think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is =
some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while =
other header parameters are essentially additional associated data =
(meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software =
layers for processing along with the body. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">An =
example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs =
to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be =
useful.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I =
suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter =
that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and =
passed on with the body.&nbsp; This would provide applications a way to =
pass meta-data through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE =
having to parse it.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">Once =
we remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters =
from JOSE processing, the problem gets =
smaller.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header =
parameters JOSE processes be possible.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">For that the list of non-critical header parameters =
is the best solution. &nbsp;That enables a header parameter to be =
migrated from non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element =
name.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I =
think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single =
element with an array of element names that are =
non-critical.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">My =
proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be =
understood:<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">1 =
"ign": &nbsp;Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope =
that an application MUST ignore if it cannot process =
them.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">2 "aad": =
Additional Associated Data -&nbsp;a JSON object that MUST be provided to =
applications along with the body if present in a JOSE =
header.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">All =
other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library =
or produce a processing fault resulting in an =
error.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I =
would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to =
applications. &nbsp;I think that would cause interoperability issues. =
&nbsp; That is what "aad" is intended to =
provide.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">I =
know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user =
provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely). &nbsp;I =
think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security =
considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included. =
&nbsp; That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be =
ignored. &nbsp;This should be a separate =
discussion.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that =
not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header =
parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the =
MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and =
not the sub parameters they may contain.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; ">My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of =
the poll answers, but I think it may address the majority of =
concerns.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">Regards<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">John =
B.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">On =
2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt; "><div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Thanks for sending this, =
Karen.&nbsp; Hopefully your analysis will help the working group reach a =
resolution on this issue soon.&nbsp; I=92m writing this note primarily =
as an editor to help inform the working group=92s discussions, rather =
than as an individual =
contributor.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">First, I want to point =
out that while we=92ve been discussing criticality of header parameters, =
the specs actually currently have the =93MUST be understood=94 language =
in the JWK specification as well, as that=92s another potential =
extension point.&nbsp; The JWK description says =93Additional members =
MAY be present in the JWK.&nbsp; If present, they MUST be understood by =
implementations using them.=94&nbsp; The same language is present for =
the JWK Set. &nbsp;For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it =
should address those uses too.&nbsp; Given that a number of additional =
JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extensions will occur =
there.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Second, if we do decide =
to go with your approach (1), I=92ll summarize for the list what I =
believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.&nbsp; =
One proposal is 2A in&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html" =
target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
"><span style=3D"color: purple; =
">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html</span></=
a>&nbsp;(which I=92ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax =
that Dick Hardt proposed in&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html" =
target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
"><span style=3D"color: purple; =
">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html</span></=
a>&nbsp;(which I=92ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).&nbsp; I believe that =
it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they =
would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so =
that if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we=92ll know =
which to use.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); =
">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">FLAT =
SYNTAX:</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{"alg":"ES256",</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":["notes"],</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "notes":"This header field can be safely =
ignored"</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); =
">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">STRUCTURED =
SYNTAX:</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
{"alg":"ES256",</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
"ign":{</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "notes":"This header field can be =
safely ignored"</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', =
serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
}</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); =
">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax =
is all header fields are in the same place.&nbsp; This makes processing =
header fields easier and is more regular.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that =
the list of fields that may be safely ignored repeats those field =
names.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">As I see it, the =
advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is repeated, =
resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.&nbsp; The disadvantage is that then =
some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the =
processing rules for header fields more =
complicated.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Between these two, it =
seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner =
semantics.&nbsp; (I=92d personally lean towards the simpler processing =
rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this =
coming out either way.)</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); =
">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">Finally, I=92ll point out that I don=92t =
believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.&nbsp; =
We could conceivably leave it up to application specifications using the =
JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood by =
default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely =
ignored for use in those application contexts where the application spec =
does require that header fields be normally understood.&nbsp; In fact, =
one might consider this to fall under the =93</span>(possibly providing =
guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)<span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(31, 73, 125); ">=94 that you suggested =
below.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">I hope the points above =
help further a productive discussion of this =
topic.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); =
">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- =
Mike</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-width: 1pt; =
border-top-color: rgb(181, 196, 223); padding: 3pt 0in 0in; "><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; =
font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: =
purple; text-decoration: underline; ">jose-bounces@ietf.org</a><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>[mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:jose-" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: purple; =
text-decoration: underline; ">jose-</a><a href=3D"mailto:bounces@ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
">bounces@ietf.org</a>]&nbsp;<b>On Behalf Of&nbsp;</b>Karen =
O'Donoghue<br><b>Sent:</b>&nbsp;Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 =
AM<br><b>To:</b>&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
">jose@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b>&nbsp;[jose] thoughts on header =
criticality from recent =
polls</span><o:p></o:p></div></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 12pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
">Folks,<br><br>Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent =
polls on header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond =
from a chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped =
to provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after =
analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple =
times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not =
quite able to do so. So, what next...&nbsp;<br><br>First, what I do =
believe...<br><br>I think it is clear that the working group remains =
divided on this issue with a significant number of members feeling that =
an approach must be defined that safely allows for some header fields to =
be considered non-critical. I think there is general consensus that =
there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the =
approach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working =
group to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be =
considered critical and move on to the discussion of how to approach =
non-critical headers.&nbsp;<br><br>In my review of the mailing list =
traffic (and my apologies if I missed something), I have seen a number =
of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 =
with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I =
found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and I have =
repeated it here...<br><br>A. Want to be able to define messages with =
new semantics in future, without any risk that old implementations will =
misinterpret them with old semantics.<br><br>B. Want to be able to =
*redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing* fields in future, =
without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with =
old semantics (or without the constraints).<br><br>C. Want to prevent =
large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as similar blobs have =
been used to create hash collisions between legitimate &amp; malicious =
certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).<br><br>D. Want to =
strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the =
philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm =
(by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good =
of any new functionality they bring.<br><br>E. Loosely coupling clients =
and servers is generally considered a good thing; but strongly coupling =
them is more appropriate for a secure message format for [insert a =
reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too likely to choose =
to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of =
interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term =
security.<br><br>=46rom this list, I believe A is definitely a =
requirement. I am unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and =
E, and I believe D is not a requirement.&nbsp;<br><br>QUESTION: Is there =
working group consensus on the requirements we are trying to address? =
Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive consensus =
on the overall approach.&nbsp;<br><br>As for possible solutions, we =
appear to have evolved to the point where we are of two =
minds:&nbsp;<br><br>1) Define&nbsp;a header field that explicitly lists =
the fields that may be safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am =
assuming that we aren't going to define a separate header for =
non-critical elements.)&nbsp;<br><br>2) Remain silent on header =
criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave it up to the various =
application specifications (possibly providing guidance directed to =
those applications in the JOSE specs).&nbsp;<br><br>I sense that there =
is more support for the first approach, but I am concerned that there is =
a significant minority that favor the second =
approach.&nbsp;<br><br>QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether =
to work on approach 1 or approach 2?&nbsp;<br><br>In conclusion, I am =
asking three things in this missive:&nbsp;<br>1. I am asking the working =
group to move forward based on a non-critical headers =
approach.&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>2. I am asking the working group to clarify the =
requirements driving the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, =
or ?).&nbsp;<br>3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the =
right approach is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to =
defer to the applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level =
of guidance)? To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of =
text.&nbsp;<br><br>I realize this message is long and not as specific or =
prescriptive as some would like, and I apologize in advance for any =
mistakes and misunderstandings on my =
part.&nbsp;<br><br>Regards,<br>Karen O'Donoghue<o:p></o:p></p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><span style=3D"font-size: 13.5pt; font-family: =
Helvetica, sans-serif; =
">_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color:=
 purple; text-decoration: underline; ">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></span></div></=
blockquote></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: =
12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 12pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; =
"><br>_______________________________________________<br>jose mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color:=
 purple; text-decoration: underline; ">jose@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline; =
">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><o:p></o:p></p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div></div></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times =
New Roman', serif; =
"></p></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 14:15:59 -0500
Message-ID: <CAL02cgT_MPQP=rtGYNhz1osebwBEpDYiUnCG_y4AcsxKNq02yw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Cc: "draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org>, jose issue tracker <trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data
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So the proposal is to have two different ways of transmitting protected
keys, one for JWE and one separate?  Why?



On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 8:09 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>wr=
ote:

>  Actually, I think Matt=92s draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk, written =
in
> response to our new proposed charter item (8), exactly addresses how the
> key is transmitted for separable keys.****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* Richard Barnes [mailto:rlb@ipv.sx]
> *Sent:* Monday, February 25, 2013 1:36 PM
> *To:* jose issue tracker
> *Cc:* draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org; Nat Sakimura;
> jose@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from
> encrypted data****
>
> ** **
>
> That still doesn't address how the key is transmitted.****
>
> ** **
>
> A solution for encryption requires (1) a way to encrypt a JWE under a
> given key, and (2) a way to transmit wrapped keys.  You are proposing a
> solution to (1), with some mechanism for (2).****
>
> ** **
>
> JWE already solves (1) and (2), just not in a way that the keys are
> separable. Because the keys are included under the JWE integrity check, t=
he
> JWE integrity check value will be different for each wrapped key.****
>
> ** **
>
> Your answer already concedes that there is no benefit to including the ke=
y
> under the JWE integrity check.  We should just make it that way with JWE =
in
> general and the issue will be resolved.****
>
> ** **
>
>  ****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 2:19 PM, jose issue tracker <
> trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org> wrote:****
>
> #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data
>
>
> Comment (by sakimura@gmail.com):
>
>  4.6 Dierct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key of JWA seems to be
>  addressing the needs in this ticket.
>
> --
> -------------------------+-----------------------------------------------=
--
>  Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
>   rbarnes@bbn.com        |  encryption@tools.ietf.org
>      Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
>  Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
> Component:  json-web-    |     Version:
>   encryption             |  Resolution:
>  Severity:  Active WG    |
>   Document               |
>  Keywords:               |
> -------------------------+-----------------------------------------------=
--
>
> Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4#comment:1>
> jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose****
>
> ** **
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
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So the proposal is to have two different ways of transmitting protected key=
s, one for JWE and one separate? =A0Why?<div><br></div><div><br><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 8:09 PM, Mike Jones <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Actually, I think Matt=92=
s draft-miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk, written in response to our new propo=
sed charter item (8), exactly addresses how the key is transmitted
 for separable keys.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Richard =
Barnes [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</=
a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 25, 2013 1:36 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose issue tracker<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf=
.org" target=3D"_blank">draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption@tools.ietf.org<=
/a>; Nat Sakimura; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@=
ietf.org</a><br>

<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] #4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encr=
ypted data<u></u><u></u></span></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">That still doesn&#39;t address how the key is transm=
itted.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">A solution for encryption requires (1) a way to encr=
ypt a JWE under a given key, and (2) a way to transmit wrapped keys. =A0You=
 are proposing a solution to (1), with some mechanism for (2).<u></u><u></u=
></p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">JWE already solves (1) and (2), just not in a way th=
at the keys are separable. Because the keys are included under the JWE inte=
grity check, the JWE integrity check value will be different for each wrapp=
ed key.<u></u><u></u></p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Your answer already concedes that there is no benefi=
t to including the key under the JWE integrity check. =A0We should just mak=
e it that way with JWE in general and the issue will be resolved.<u></u><u>=
</u></p>

</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 2:19 PM, jose issue tracker =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trac+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">trac=
+jose@trac.tools.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">#4: Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypte=
d data<br>
<br>
<br>
Comment (by <a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">sakimur=
a@gmail.com</a>):<br>
<br>
=A04.6 Dierct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key of JWA seems to be<br>
=A0addressing the needs in this ticket.<br>
<br>
--<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
=A0Reporter: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 =A0 Owner: =A0draft-ietf=
-jose-json-web-<br>
=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">rbarnes@bbn.com</a=
> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| =A0<a href=3D"mailto:encryption@tools.ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">encryption@tools.ietf.org</a><br>
=A0 =A0 =A0Type: =A0defect =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0 =A0 =A0Status: =A0new<br>
=A0Priority: =A0major =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| =A0 Milestone:<br>
Component: =A0json-web- =A0 =A0| =A0 =A0 Version:<br>
=A0 encryption =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | =A0Resolution:<br>
=A0Severity: =A0Active WG =A0 =A0|<br>
=A0 Document =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 |<br>
=A0Keywords: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 |<br>
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------=
<br>
<br>
Ticket URL: &lt;<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4=
#comment:1" target=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticke=
t/4#comment:1</a>&gt;<br>
jose &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/jose/" target=3D"_blank">http://t=
ools.ietf.org/jose/</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--e89a8fb1f2b6e39af004d6a57ce7--

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<chair>

 

The first cut at the agenda for the meeting has been posted.  If anything or
anybody is missing please let me know.

 

https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/86/agenda/jose

 

Jim

 


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class=3DMsoNormal>&lt;chair&gt;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
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cut at the agenda for the meeting has been posted.&nbsp; If anything or =
anybody is missing please let me know.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Where in the agenda are we going to talk about the rechartering and adoptin=
g the additional working group documents enabled by the rechartering?

                                                            -- Mike

From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jim=
 Schaad
Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2013 3:22 PM
To: jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] Agenda Posted

<chair>

The first cut at the agenda for the meeting has been posted.  If anything o=
r anybody is missing please let me know.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/86/agenda/jose

Jim


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Where in the agenda ar=
e we going to talk about the rechartering and adopting the additional worki=
ng group documents enabled by the rechartering?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> jose-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Jim Schaad<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, February 26, 2013 3:22 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> jose@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Agenda Posted<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&lt;chair&gt;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The first cut at the agenda for the meeting has been=
 posted.&nbsp; If anything or anybody is missing please let me know.<o:p></=
o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/86/a=
genda/jose">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/86/agenda/jose</a><o:p></o=
:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Jim<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter sent to IESG)
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On 2/25/13 4:33 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
> I mostly agree with this.  I'll quibble with only one point.  By
> deleting (5) and (6) and leaving (1) and (2) as-is, you're pre-supposing
> that the existing compact serializations and the JSON serializations get
> consolidated into combined documents.  If instead, you simply changed
> the phrase "A Standards Track document specifying how to..." in (1) and
> (2) to "A Standards Track document *or documents* specifying how to...",
> we could get the same effect of having (5) and (6), but without having
> to pre-decide how the solutions should be allocated between documents.
>
> Would that work for you, Sean?

That'd work for me.

spt

>                                                              -- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Sean Turner
> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 1:24 PM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter
> sent to IESG)
>
> I have some comments on the proposed charter that I've embedded below.
>
> On 1/31/13 5:29 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
>
>  > Below is the updated charter that has been submitted to the IESG for
>
>  > review. Thank you to all who helped with the process.
>
>  >
>
>  > Regards,
>
>  > Karen
>
>  >
>
>  > Description of JOSE Working Group
>
>  >
>
>  > JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the
>
>  > serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON
>
>  > format is often used for serializing and transmitting structured data
>
>  > over a network connection.  With the increased usage of JSON in
>
>  > protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer
>
>  > security services such as encryption, digital signatures, message
>
>  > authentication codes (MACs), and key representations for data that is
>
>  > being carried in JSON format.
>
> I don't think of key representations as a security service and maybe I
> let this through last time but the things listed as services are
> mechanisms.  In most cases, the services are CIA (confidentiality,
> integrity, and authentication). Let's change the last sentence to:
>
>     With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF
>
>     and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security
>
>     services for JSON with encryption, digital signatures,
>
>     and message authentication codes (MACs).
>
> We can add that the key representations are needed later.
>
>  > Different proposals for providing such security services have already
>
>  > been defined and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to
>
>  > standardize four kinds of security services, integrity protection
>
>  > (signature and MAC), encryption, key representations, and algorithm
>
>  > identifiers, in order to increase interoperability of security
>
>  > features between protocols that use JSON.
>
> Not sure a key representations is a service and maybe I'm nitpicking but
> I think encryption is a mechanism.  Let's do instead:
>
>    The Working Group will standardize the mechanism for integrity
>
>    protection (signature and MAC) and encryption as well as the format
>
>    for keys and algorithm identifiers to support interoperability of
>
>    security services for protocols that use JSON.
>
>  > The Working Group
>
>  > will base its
>
>  > work on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will
>
>  > solicit input from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that
>
>  > the security functionality in the JSON format is correct.
>
> "correct" seems like the wrong word.  How about "sound".
>
>  > This group is chartered to work on eight documents:
>
> Let's just drop the # in this sentence and change it to:
>
>     This group is chartered to work on the following deliverables:
>
>  > (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
>
>  > integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data
>
>  > structures, including a compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity
>
>  > protection" includes public-key digital signatures as well as
>
>  > symmetric-key MACs.
>
>  >
>
>  > (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a
>
>  > JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to)
>
>  > JSON data structures, including a compact URL-safe representation.
>
> Because the IESG will look at the diffs, the addition of "including a
> compact URL-safe representation" in (1) and (2) as well as the addition
> of (5) and (6) will no doubt raise questions.
>
> The first will be why are we baking the solution in to the charter?
>
> Based on recent discussions about and revisions to the proposed httpauth
> charter, baking solutions in or placing constraints on the solution in
> the form or examples/"includings" in the charters isn't going to fly.
>
> What charters ought to do is say where the WG wants to go and then the
> drafts say how they're getting there.
>
> The second will obviously be why on earth would a WG solution not
> support the same kind of basic functionality that the well-known
> security primitives support.  If the WG decides on more than one
> serialization/representation is needed for whatever reason, then the
> drafts can explain why there's more than one.
>
> Based on all of this, bullets 1 and 2 should remain unchanged and 5 and
>
> 6 need not be added:
>
> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
> integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data
> structures. "Integrity protection" includes public-key digital
> signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.
>
> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
> encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures.
>
> (3) looks fine.
>
>  > (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as
>
>  > JSON-
>
>  > structured objects.
>
> I like this (4) better because MTI should be specified by the application.
>
>  > (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm
>
>  > identifiers for the previous three documents.
>
> As above for 5 and 6.
>
>  > (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
>
>  > integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data
>
>  > structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple
>
>  > recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures
>
>  > in (1).
>
>  >
>
>  > (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a
>
>  > JSON-structured encryption to data, including (but not limited to)
>
>  > JSON data structures, using a JSON representation supporting multiple
>
>  > recipients.  This document will build upon the concepts and structures
>
>  > in (2).
>
> I think these are fine but I can't really think of a reason to not
> combine them.
>
>  > (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and
>
> r/7/5
>
>  > symmetric
>
>  > keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build upon the
>
>  > concepts and structures in (3).
>
>  >
>
>  > (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of
>
>  > protecting
>
> r/8/6
>
>  > private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document will build
>
>  > upon the concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This document may
>
>  > register additional algorithms in registries defined by (4).
>
> Is "application" needed in in the first sentence?
>
>  From Karen, we'll also add in:
>
>     (7) An Informational document detailing Use Cases and
>
>     Requirements for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).
>
>  > The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in
>
>  > consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for
>
>  > these goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>
> I want to change this as follows because it's not just the WG's decision:
>
>     One or more of these goals may be combined into a single
>
>     document, in which case the concrete milestones for these
>
>     goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>
> We also need some additional wording to explain how JOSE isn't going to
> specify everything an application/use case needs to achieve complete
> interop.  I'm basing this on the recent bashing some OAUTH drafts took
> and the way JOSE seems to be shaping up.  I'd suggest something along
> the lines of the following to provide additional lead in:
>
>     As JSON adoption expands, the different applications utilizing
>
>     JSON security services will grow and this leads to the need to
>
>     support different requirements. The WG will develop a generic
>
>     syntax that can be used by applications to secure JSON-data,
>
>     but it will be up to the application to fully specify the use
>
>     of the WG's documents much the same way S/MIME is the
>
>     application of CMS to MIME-based media types.
>
> And we need a draft that tells an application all the things that would
> need to be specified/picked to implement JOSE.  This could go in the use
> cases or in a new document.  You're call.
>
> spt
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> jose mailing list
>
> jose@ietf.org <mailto:jose@ietf.org>
>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

From turners@ieca.com  Wed Feb 27 07:05:31 2013
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Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:05:28 -0500
From: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] AD review of re-charter (was Re: updated JOSE charter sent to IESG)
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Any other comments on the suggested changes?

spt

On 2/25/13 4:23 PM, Sean Turner wrote:
> I have some comments on the proposed charter that I've embedded below.
>
> On 1/31/13 5:29 PM, Karen O'Donoghue wrote:
>> Below is the updated charter that has been submitted to the IESG for
>> review. Thank you to all who helped with the process.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Karen
>>
>> Description of JOSE Working Group
>>
>> JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the serialization
>> of structured
>> data described in RFC 4627.  The JSON format is often used for
>> serializing and
>> transmitting structured data over a network connection.  With the
>> increased usage
>> of JSON in protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is now a desire to
>> offer
>> security services such as encryption, digital signatures, message
>> authentication
>> codes (MACs), and key representations for data that is being carried in
>> JSON format.
>
> I don't think of key representations as a security service and maybe I
> let this through last time but the things listed as services are
> mechanisms.  In most cases, the services are CIA (confidentiality,
> integrity, and authentication).  Let's change the last sentence to:
>
>    With the increased usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF
>    and elsewhere, there is now a desire to offer security
>    services for JSON with encryption, digital signatures,
>    and message authentication codes (MACs).
>
> We can add that the key representations are needed later.
>
>> Different proposals for providing such security services have already
>> been defined
>> and implemented.  This Working Group's task is to standardize four
>> kinds of
>> security services, integrity protection (signature and MAC), encryption,
>> key
>> representations, and algorithm identifiers, in order to increase
>> interoperability of
>> security features between protocols that use JSON.
>
> Not sure a key representations is a service and maybe I'm nitpicking but
> I think encryption is a mechanism.  Let's do instead:
>
>   The Working Group will standardize the mechanism for integrity
>   protection (signature and MAC) and encryption as well as the format
>   for keys and algorithm identifiers to support interoperability of
>   security services for protocols that use JSON.
>
>> The Working Group
>> will base its
>> work on well-known message security primitives (e.g., CMS), and will
>> solicit input
>> from the rest of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the security
>> functionality in
>> the JSON format is correct.
>
> "correct" seems like the wrong word.  How about "sound".
>
>> This group is chartered to work on eight documents:
>
> Let's just drop the # in this sentence and change it to:
>
>    This group is chartered to work on the following deliverables:
>
>> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
>> integrity
>> protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
>> including a
>> compact URL-safe representation.  "Integrity protection" includes
>> public-key digital
>> signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.
>>
>> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
>> encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
>> including a
>> compact URL-safe representation.
>
> Because the IESG will look at the diffs, the addition of "including a
> compact URL-safe representation" in (1) and (2) as well as the addition
> of (5) and (6) will no doubt raise questions.
>
> The first will be why are we baking the solution in to the charter?
> Based on recent discussions about and revisions to the proposed httpauth
> charter, baking solutions in or placing constraints on the solution in
> the form or examples/"includings" in the charters isn't going to fly.
> What charters ought to do is say where the WG wants to go and then the
> drafts say how they're getting there.
>
> The second will obviously be why on earth would a WG solution not
> support the same kind of basic functionality that the well-known
> security primitives support.  If the WG decides on more than one
> serialization/representation is needed for whatever reason, then the
> drafts can explain why there's more than one.
>
> Based on all of this, bullets 1 and 2 should remain unchanged and 5 and
> 6 need not be added:
>
> (1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
> integrity protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data
> structures. "Integrity protection" includes public-key digital
> signatures as well as symmetric-key MACs.
>
> (2) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
> encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures.
>
> (3) looks fine.
>
>> (3) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode public keys as
>> JSON-
>> structured objects.
>
> I like this (4) better because MTI should be specified by the application.
>
>> (4) A Standards Track document specifying algorithms and algorithm
>> identifiers for
>> the previous three documents.
>
> As above for 5 and 6.
>
>> (5) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply JSON-structured
>> integrity
>> protection to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
>> using a JSON
>> representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build
>> upon the
>> concepts and structures in (1).
>>
>> (6) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a JSON-structured
>> encryption to data, including (but not limited to) JSON data structures,
>> using a JSON
>> representation supporting multiple recipients.  This document will build
>> upon the
>> concepts and structures in (2).
>
> I think these are fine but I can't really think of a reason to not
> combine them.
>
>> (7) A Standards Track document specifying how to encode private and
>
> r/7/5
>
>> symmetric
>> keys as JSON-structured objects.  This document will build upon the
>> concepts and
>> structures in (3).
>>
>> (8) A Standards Track application document specifying a means of
>> protecting
>
> r/8/6
>
>> private and symmetric keys via encryption.  This document will build
>> upon the
>> concepts and structures in (2) and (7).  This document may register
>> additional
>> algorithms in registries defined by (4).
>
> Is "application" needed in in the first sentence?
>
>  From Karen, we'll also add in:
>
>    (7) An Informational document detailing Use Cases and
>    Requirements for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).
>
>
>> The working group may decide to address combinations of these goals in
>> consolidated document(s), in which case the concrete milestones for
>> these goals will
>> be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>
> I want to change this as follows because it's not just the WG's decision:
>
>    One or more of these goals may be combined into a single
>    document, in which case the concrete milestones for these
>    goals will be satisfied by the consolidated document(s).
>
> We also need some additional wording to explain how JOSE isn't going to
> specify everything an application/use case needs to achieve complete
> interop.  I'm basing this on the recent bashing some OAUTH drafts took
> and the way JOSE seems to be shaping up.  I'd suggest something along
> the lines of the following to provide additional lead in:
>
>    As JSON adoption expands, the different applications utilizing
>    JSON security services will grow and this leads to the need to
>    support different requirements. The WG will develop a generic
>    syntax that can be used by applications to secure JSON-data,
>    but it will be up to the application to fully specify the use
>    of the WG's documents much the same way S/MIME is the
>    application of CMS to MIME-based media types.
>
> And we need a draft that tells an application all the things that would
> need to be specified/picked to implement JOSE.  This could go in the use
> cases or in a new document.  You're call.
>
> spt
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>

From rlb@ipv.sx  Wed Feb 27 10:50:07 2013
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Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 13:50:03 -0500
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>, Edmund Jay <ejay@mgi1.com>
Subject: Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal
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Ah, sorry I never got around to those.  Responses inline.

  - What are the security implications of repeatedly reusing the same CMK
> and IV and how can/should they be mitigated?
>

Good point.  Re-using IVs is a terrible idea.  SPI should represent some
set of pre-negotiated parameters, where the set of parameters that are
pre-set is part of the pre-negotiation.  So one application might
pre-negotiate algorithms, but pass keys in-band, but another might
pre-negotiate algorithms and keys.  (You could even envision agreeing on an
IV generation procedure...)


> ****
>
>   - Is having the absence of an =93alg=94 field, paired with the presence=
 of
> an =93spi=94 field the best way to handle this?
>

"alg" is an indicator of key wrapping technique.  So if this is one of the
pre-negotiated parameters, then it should be absent.


> ****
>
>   - What are the complexity implications of having JWEs no longer contain
> a fixed set of field?
>

Very little.  SPI would add a little pre-processing to populate the missing
fields in a JWE/JWS


> ****
>
>   - Would JWSs similarly have a different number of fields?
>

Yes.


> ****
>
>   - Indeed, is the proposal even applicable in the JWS case, or does it
> only make sense for JWEs?
>

There's less of a need for JWS.  You could say SPI "1234" indicates that
I'm signing under a given 4096-bit RSA key, saving yourself hundreds of
octets.  So it would be like "jku", with fewer octets and without the
implication that you could go fetch it over the Internet.


> ****
>
>   - What are the motivating use cases for this functionality?
>

As I said before, cases where there's some out-of-band mechanism to
pre-negotiate certain parameters.  For example, the OpenID Connect
discovery process.
<
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderConfigura=
tionRequest
>



> ****
>
>   - What syntax would be used for the =93spi=94 parameter?  Unrestricted
> Unicode strings?  Base64url-encoded byte strings?  UUIDs? =85
>

Doesn't really matter.  Make it the same as "kid" (i.e., string); they're
both opaque identifiers.



> ****
>
> ** **
>
> I don=92t think a number of them have been answered.****
>
> ** **
>
>                                                             Thanks,****
>
>                                                             -- Mike****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 20, 2013 10:04 AM
> *To:* Nat Sakimura
> *Cc:* Brian Campbell; jose@ietf.org; Edmund Jay
> *Subject:* Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal****
>
> ** **
>
> Obviously, this will not be in a -00 draft for Orlando.  So discussion
> should continue based on the text proposed to the list.****
>
> ** **
>
> Does anyone have further technical comments?****
>
> ** **
>
> --Richard****
>
> ** **
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 11:25 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote=
:
> ****
>
> ditto. ****
>
> 2013/2/11 Edmund Jay <ejay@mgi1.com>****
>
> +1 for new I-D.
>
> ****
>
> ** **
>  ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> *To:* "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
> *Sent:* Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM
> *Subject:* [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal****
>
> ** **
>
> Maybe this was apparent from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal
> over the last couple days[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from
> operational complexity and fragility to security problems. I believe
> strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detai=
l,
> the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base
> JOSE WG drafts.****
>
> As an alternative I'd like to request/propose that the SPI stuff be
> submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional discussion and
> analysis that I think it needs.****
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks,
> Brian****
>
>
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html****
>
> ** **
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose****
>
>
>
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> --
> Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)****
>
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en****
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> jose mailing list
> jose@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose****
>
> ** **
>

--e89a8f6436fcf9bffc04d6b93d33
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Ah, sorry I never got around to those. =A0Responses inline.<br><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=
=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div><div class=3D"im">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 - What are the securi=
ty implications of repeatedly reusing the same CMK and IV and how can/shoul=
d they be mitigated?</span></p>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Good point. =A0Re-using =
IVs is a terrible idea. =A0SPI should represent some set of pre-negotiated =
parameters, where the set of parameters that are pre-set is part of the pre=
-negotiation. =A0So one application might pre-negotiate algorithms, but pas=
s keys in-band, but another might pre-negotiate algorithms and keys. =A0(Yo=
u could even envision agreeing on an IV generation procedure...)</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"bl=
ue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><div class=3D"im"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&qu=
ot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 - Is having the absen=
ce of an =93alg=94 field, paired with the presence of an =93spi=94 field th=
e best way to handle this?</span></p>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>&quot;alg&quot; is an in=
dicator of key wrapping technique. =A0So if this is one of the pre-negotiat=
ed parameters, then it should be absent.</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pa=
dding-left:1ex">
<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><div class=3D"im"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 - What are the comple=
xity implications of having JWEs no longer contain a fixed set of field?</s=
pan></p>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Very little. =A0SPI woul=
d add a little pre-processing to populate the missing fields in a JWE/JWS</=
div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><div class=3D"im"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 - Would JWSs similarl=
y have a different number of fields?</span></p></div></div></div></blockquo=
te>
<div><br></div><div>Yes.</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><div class=3D"im"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal">
<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-=
serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 - Indeed, is the prop=
osal even applicable in the JWS case, or does it only make sense for JWEs?<=
/span></p>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s less of a ne=
ed for JWS. =A0You could say SPI &quot;1234&quot; indicates that I&#39;m si=
gning under a given 4096-bit RSA key, saving yourself hundreds of octets. =
=A0So it would be like &quot;jku&quot;, with fewer octets and without the i=
mplication that you could go fetch it over the Internet.</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"bl=
ue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><div class=3D"im"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&qu=
ot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 - What are the motiva=
ting use cases for this functionality?</span></p></div></div></div></blockq=
uote>
<div><br></div><div>As I said before, cases where there&#39;s some out-of-b=
and mechanism to pre-negotiate certain parameters. =A0For example, the Open=
ID Connect discovery process.</div><div>&lt;<a href=3D"http://openid.net/sp=
ecs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderConfigurationRequest">http://=
openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderConfigurationReq=
uest</a>&gt;</div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN=
-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><div class=3D"im"><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quo=
t;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0 - What syntax would b=
e used for the =93spi=94 parameter?=A0 Unrestricted Unicode strings?=A0 Bas=
e64url-encoded byte strings?=A0 UUIDs? =85</span></p>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Doesn&#39;t really matte=
r. =A0Make it the same as &quot;kid&quot; (i.e., string); they&#39;re both =
opaque identifiers.</div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex">
<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><div class=3D"im"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&q=
uot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I don=92t think a n=
umber of them have been answered.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 Thanks,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 -- Mike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> <a href=
=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-bounces@ietf.org</=
a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose-=
bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, February 20, 2013 10:04 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Nat Sakimura<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Brian Campbell; <a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blan=
k">jose@ietf.org</a>; Edmund Jay<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal<u></u><u></u></s=
pan></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Obviously, this will not be in a -00 draft for Orlan=
do. =A0So discussion should continue based on the text proposed to the list=
.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Does anyone have further technical comments?<u></u><=
u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Wed, Feb 20, 2013 at 11:25 AM, Nat Sakimura &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:sakimura@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">sakimura@gmail.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">ditto.=A0<u></u><u></=
u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2013/2/11 Edmund Jay &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ejay@mgi1=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ejay@mgi1.com</a>&gt;<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">+1 for ne=
w I-D.<br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ta=
homa&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center"><span=
 style=3D"font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<hr size=3D"1" width=3D"100%" align=3D"center">
</span></div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&qu=
ot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Tahom=
a&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcamp=
bell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;=
<br>

<b>To:</b> &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ie=
tf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jos=
e@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Fri, February 8, 2013 3:01:51 PM<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [jose] Proposal about the SPI proposal</span><u></u><u></u>=
</p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">Maybe this was appare=
nt from my comments/questions on the SPI proposal over the last couple days=
[1] but I have concerns that run the gamut from operational complexity and =
fragility to security problems. I believe
 strongly that, without considerably more analysis and specification detail=
, the current SPI work is much too risky to consider go in the current base=
 JOSE WG drafts.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As an alternative I&#39;d like to request/propose th=
at the SPI stuff be submitted as new I-D to help facilitate that additional=
 discussion and analysis that I think it needs.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<br>
Brian<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.h=
tml" target=3D"_blank">
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01500.html</a><u></u><=
u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">_____________________=
__________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#888888"><br>
<br clear=3D"all">
<span><u></u><u></u></span></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><span style=3D"color:#888888">-- </span></span=
><span style=3D"color:#888888"><br>
<span>Nat Sakimura (=3Dnat)</span></span><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#888888">Chairman, OpenID Found=
ation<br>
<a href=3D"http://nat.sakimura.org/" target=3D"_blank">http://nat.sakimura.=
org/</a><br>
@_nat_en</span><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
jose mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:jose@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">jose@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br>

--e89a8f6436fcf9bffc04d6b93d33--

From ietf-ipr@ietf.org  Wed Feb 27 13:16:11 2013
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Subject: [jose] IPR Disclosure: Certicom Corporation's Statement about IPR related to	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08 (2)
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Dear Nat Sakimura, Michael Jones, John Bradley:

 An IPR disclosure that pertains to your Internet-Draft entitled "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)" (draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature) was submitted to the =
IETF
Secretariat on 2013-02-20 and has been posted on the "IETF Page of Intellec=
tual
Property Rights Disclosures" (https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1969/). The =
title
of the IPR disclosure is "Certicom Corporation's Statement about IPR relate=
d to
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08 (2)."");

The IETF Secretariat


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Dear Michael Jones:

 An IPR disclosure that pertains to your Internet-Draft entitled "JSON Web
Algorithms (JWA)" (draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms) was submitted to the
IETF Secretariat on 2013-02-20 and has been posted on the "IETF Page of
Intellectual Property Rights Disclosures"
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1966/). The title of the IPR disclosure is
"Certicom Corporation's Statement about IPR related to draft-ietf-jose-json=
-web-
algorithms-08 (2)."");

The IETF Secretariat

