From nobody Fri Apr 14 20:35:39 2017 Return-Path: X-Original-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D16E12940F for ; Fri, 14 Apr 2017 20:35:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.999 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lFF2gw4DCrip for ; Fri, 14 Apr 2017 20:35:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wr0-x231.google.com (mail-wr0-x231.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c0c::231]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9A11A126CC7 for ; Fri, 14 Apr 2017 20:35:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-wr0-x231.google.com with SMTP id z109so58263373wrb.1 for ; Fri, 14 Apr 2017 20:35:35 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:subject:to:message-id:date:user-agent:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=Sw9WGd7Wrocg9J0wK9TVpw40ghSs9J6dd2V+cUdEVbg=; b=N6C1un2z51bcVB5dBYSKJ1ahZXa7uqQjzVTbheEtGE1fHZsXCkYv6M1KlEv5FwXqgM ZkOUsdqgQ8518/YC6GEUmtl2HinPbYXsaZ3vq9dz+Raw6XNSG4Ou5RUvo3F6pC4nevEb keR+fOIMFr6gnqOMkH0QbhlQVQRPrjLhquLz2Eyo7lIuZm5waTfb28ahVkLyyo15MpLn IIbBG6YlWzckQfFRdvetW1mYrNLGtzC8ZS9AK9a3NwXvJTMiUng9cH5KTWO2MZinYKav eIt0t6r8UPyOpNPuSD1szLxnXEdGl8Q3ZH6DTZRY5xLfcv1Dm99gkBjQpXhFO+V+vmkr 0lDQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:subject:to:message-id:date:user-agent :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Sw9WGd7Wrocg9J0wK9TVpw40ghSs9J6dd2V+cUdEVbg=; b=bz2QVbBIcZdjrg7Iht+X3i+C8efV2jmbJu6HsYS5+V0vBHU97F4lLBP2O4pcxyXgsv DCDOtX6Lu9nAKwmyqTn7iXWomsInFVg4Z6GE94pYMarIUwlY+9I2bdTPGWNMbkVYGsXl qRZ1PKriU+s8r0mAqfRcxcrOOQVBWTCQsYMk2PaoO8uENpwHAFh9Xht3n+/NXtel/9Tr rVN3acEyWRsVb+Xd/N89d5W5aAQcR8mmj2Dop6JHZUub459u74w3ctU5eIfwauBnRyNM yJrp957qRLLk/D7ErxBzfNjtlL88ARcIT27g9GoZ9Xv9mO7iKsLVgPVrsjM9nk+EUFMd Qw2w== X-Gm-Message-State: AN3rC/6XYUwJ0JD+b3LfvzNwnnPR/tYDiXklWGuuQvQ8HWPvwdg8PkOU gnIWUQYRKAKjAA== X-Received: by 10.223.151.80 with SMTP id r74mr9681993wrb.6.1492227334197; Fri, 14 Apr 2017 20:35:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.79] (124.25.176.95.rev.sfr.net. [95.176.25.124]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id o123sm898767wmg.16.2017.04.14.20.35.32 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 14 Apr 2017 20:35:33 -0700 (PDT) From: Anders Rundgren To: "jose@ietf.org" Message-ID: <26f4c52e-ff8c-a56c-6d9b-a615b8124ad5@gmail.com> Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2017 05:35:30 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: [jose] Activities outside of the IETF dealing with "Signed JSON" X-BeenThere: jose@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: Javascript Object Signing and Encryption List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2017 03:35:37 -0000 Hi All, As predicted the "Market" (or whatever we like to call it), working with applications like payments [1] have begun testing alternatives to JWS [2] in order to avoid dressing their precious messages in Base64. Yes, there are specifications [3,4,5] adapting JWS for such uses by moving parts of the signature generation and validation processes into the application space. Now, if you actually have a working JSON "Canonicalization" scheme [6], does it really make sense only using it for "Data" when it (by definition) should be equally applicable to "Headers"? In addition, these applications typically rely on "Enveloped" signatures (for keeping message structure intact also after signing), making it straightforward providing "Human readable" header information as a part of an embedded signature object. However, the JOSE stack of standards represents a truly amazing piece of work so it would of course be extremely cool if you could re(use) the JOSE "Core" rather than reinventing the wheel. What's then the core of JOSE? That's for sure debatable, but IMO, based on related work performed on multiple and quite different platforms, implementing support for the cryptographic algorithms (JWA) including JWK is the by far most difficult [7] part of JOSE. Yes, "Input validation" (as recently mentioned on this list) is also crucial. Creating a clear text signature container OTOH, is close to trivial. Here is a revised attempt combining the best of two worlds: https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/research/jwa.jwk.es6-signature.html Thanx, Anders Rundgren 1] French Payment Standards proposal: https://api.scailine.org/ext/useCaseOnlinePisp.pdf using the LDS scheme [2]: 2] Linked Data Signatures: https://w3c-dvcg.github.io/ld-signatures/ 3] JWS Unencoded Payload option: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7797 4] JWS Detached Content: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#appendix-F 5] Signature scheme using an "Implicit" JWS container: https://w3c-dvcg.github.io/lds-rsa2017/ 6] ES6 Serialization appears to be a good candidate since it is already featured in billions of devices 7] Cryptographic subsystems differ quite a bit in capabilities and usage between platforms like .NET, Java, Python, Node.js, etc. From nobody Wed Apr 19 02:44:33 2017 Return-Path: X-Original-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 560AE12947D for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 02:44:32 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.8 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.8 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rSUQrpfCJRB1 for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 02:44:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from p3plsmtpa06-03.prod.phx3.secureserver.net (p3plsmtpa06-03.prod.phx3.secureserver.net [173.201.192.104]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 54EC612943B for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 02:44:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.3.46.2] ([80.120.160.35]) by :SMTPAUTH: with SMTP id 0m9VdWvwLMWFD0m9Wd2gp4; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 02:44:00 -0700 To: "jose@ietf.org" From: Vladimir Dzhuvinov Organization: Connect2id Ltd. Message-ID: Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 12:43:57 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha-256; boundary="------------ms010507060807090604020707" X-CMAE-Envelope: MS4wfPPaZTp3EaaXqBENF9TOlBNxAoZQO/Zzuh3WcwnSVwGy+LBHpoMCInWSsmdaVVHbxqu1mEKUnwPMnFKzHXnsoG6FyTZCGBVxb2c3rbjHFsxx2Z9k29bO TAWqUEZdI15xcBPSfAlhDXawMqXEJM/PvJJUmKEmUiYvLMfu9AnOi8XR Archived-At: Subject: [jose] Preventing invalid curve attacks at EC JWK construction / parse time X-BeenThere: jose@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: Javascript Object Signing and Encryption List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 09:44:32 -0000 This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms010507060807090604020707 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable JOSE lib maintainers could consider adding a curve check at EC JWK construction / parse time. This will stop an invalid curve attack early in its tracks, when the JWE message is being parsed, so the invalid EC JWK will not even reach the ECDH-ES decryption phase. This extra validation is now included in Nimbus JOSE+JWT v4.36. I suppose it could also prevent other issues with having invalid EC JWK around an app. Cheers, Vladimir --------------ms010507060807090604020707 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExDzANBglghkgBZQMEAgEFADCABgkqhkiG9w0BBwEAAKCC CfwwggSvMIIDl6ADAgECAhEA4CPLFRKDU4mtYW56VGdrITANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBvMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJTRTEUMBIGA1UEChMLQWRkVHJ1c3QgQUIxJjAkBgNVBAsTHUFkZFRydXN0IEV4 dGVybmFsIFRUUCBOZXR3b3JrMSIwIAYDVQQDExlBZGRUcnVzdCBFeHRlcm5hbCBDQSBSb290 MB4XDTE0MTIyMjAwMDAwMFoXDTIwMDUzMDEwNDgzOFowgZsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMRswGQYD VQQIExJHcmVhdGVyIE1hbmNoZXN0ZXIxEDAOBgNVBAcTB1NhbGZvcmQxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUNP TU9ETyBDQSBMaW1pdGVkMUEwPwYDVQQDEzhDT01PRE8gU0hBLTI1NiBDbGllbnQgQXV0aGVu dGljYXRpb24gYW5kIFNlY3VyZSBFbWFpbCBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCC 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NO X-Spam-Score: -4.199 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HK_RANDOM_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-2.8, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM=0.5, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WGxAPh9k8FC2 for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 04:57:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com (mail-io0-f182.google.com [209.85.223.182]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 574D11294E7 for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 04:57:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-io0-f182.google.com with SMTP id k87so19189875ioi.0 for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 04:57:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=rv4/emren+l/uHOjhTU6Bc2NonkQp/K0BY9uFSCO0T4=; b=J1qDDlGv9xJ4fgX4V4dsfOP0wFaZXlKsHHishc1q3HtaYbIwOoArWANSus0KWsKCHf nLhpFXhmacJSyajwJNXHELLN1oHBvfHiLds12PBIvkHydAQu3dxyUx55uVjfJUlAklRK ByoHJVVUGiBmCMZ5iDzsoQP9r9pvAJOhOlWpJFkY+IonOL499lSzg2ZgRjjJNbZBS5c7 Go9bxM0tjhRxi7qxQMZ+qtvkEgIBkedIB9A7nsTrxxX+uvgw45CAmYKhkDP12LlAdE2J Psq2sn0/mNjph6o8kaovX3M8kdnvMCkjYYuNYupKISOpjgwGUKq4kO5slGCO5n8pwhWE hpZQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AN3rC/4xs+RCUN8Dc3DIELpWxVimQmsJTAmbHz8ZooIXSCNLqSxpfUrL s9H9rtiRyXLFH8mKo+6jmdxMYpumXnYbVjU= X-Received: by 10.107.146.139 with SMTP id u133mr2896204iod.160.1492603064537; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 04:57:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.2.66 with HTTP; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 04:57:44 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Nathaniel McCallum Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 07:57:44 -0400 Message-ID: To: Vladimir Dzhuvinov Cc: "jose@ietf.org" Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Archived-At: Subject: Re: [jose] Preventing invalid curve attacks at EC JWK construction / parse time X-BeenThere: jose@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: Javascript Object Signing and Encryption List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 11:57:47 -0000 http://github.com/latchset/jose does exactly this. I also recommend other implementations do the same. On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:43 AM, Vladimir Dzhuvinov wrote: > JOSE lib maintainers could consider adding a curve check at EC JWK > construction / parse time. This will stop an invalid curve attack early > in its tracks, when the JWE message is being parsed, so the invalid EC > JWK will not even reach the ECDH-ES decryption phase. > > This extra validation is now included in Nimbus JOSE+JWT v4.36. I > suppose it could also prevent other issues with having invalid EC JWK > around an app. > > Cheers, > > Vladimir > > > > > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > jose@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose > From nobody Wed Apr 26 08:27:00 2017 Return-Path: X-Original-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6BAB512EC99 for ; Wed, 26 Apr 2017 08:26:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kiJghjCpqyPB for ; Wed, 26 Apr 2017 08:26:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wr0-x242.google.com (mail-wr0-x242.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c0c::242]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 87E6D12EC8E for ; Wed, 26 Apr 2017 08:26:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-wr0-x242.google.com with SMTP id g12so487863wrg.2 for ; Wed, 26 Apr 2017 08:26:56 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=to:from:subject:message-id:date:user-agent:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=QSTr2DIG0T70P+1xzbsYygCuM3UlcLjFYyxvVMTerm8=; b=GKcrdbCv/JJn5GQfOj98e4BLq7/4XTyjzWSdUr+SJ34DgQ4LnEBMds+dCfko5FVKMA 3WFczrylPNRzvcIJRbGmanj+oxvTMVvcDXyNpwRM7n/+tFAKqky7d4kkMywLfCHUlu2/ VZxUvzgxsFQCqPu+uO4hAg775gmAEK18sMG4o92tMqopZRwf4if/oK86PCzfugvD11IZ 22jfL6y5N7ViBV12lL0UueO0C+GVHdEvS4Ie3u7g5A41zVpIalfWAJ5RKbStnZy94B22 zKrDObdp0/3e3SIG0IbQmoBle2fvGy1w6XyYRqXl9ddj1p/Gy7J4V4Dxvb8oO0rY2fOc db4Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:to:from:subject:message-id:date:user-agent :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=QSTr2DIG0T70P+1xzbsYygCuM3UlcLjFYyxvVMTerm8=; b=Qy9oQmIZJ6PgR2G65IPPVF6PBnHTSROtGLVae2NcX4aK2wMG2XpNDSs2OOalBVr9x6 vRfrrUwwoETwfkOSbzjez3F+5gQWOYOGovSSQdeLc9MfItMWc8gA0Wbvio8wavmHimMH I9oSUI39C5ixSCRc7hTbPr3VKWJZ0WbuxkNTiMsaMGJoiAtv1BF+WXfnhbhMoj0SkZAY 0AbXsxdVpxsA+bCrldKAZ3iVRBmvQc20WLlRPjbMcx7i6STaCCOKViAnjfP2wmq0UQzG jxdoiLAMFBvo/9WcyIDcEUkIDO9C64EdW6kMBzpTCm3fZXdbhgKYEKOYOP3eSLIZjG9m 0DLw== X-Gm-Message-State: AN3rC/4N7pEfTspQl/O8RwR94chx/cuHcqfO7bgIC/HPrzUD/E4Tn84W SN5VlIiHZpSpZA== X-Received: by 10.223.142.213 with SMTP id q79mr241635wrb.25.1493220414211; Wed, 26 Apr 2017 08:26:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.79] (124.25.176.95.rev.sfr.net. [95.176.25.124]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id l27sm506951wrb.65.2017.04.26.08.26.52 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 26 Apr 2017 08:26:52 -0700 (PDT) To: "jose@ietf.org" From: Anders Rundgren Message-ID: Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2017 17:26:50 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: [jose] JEF (JSON Encryption Format) adoption of JWK X-BeenThere: jose@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: Javascript Object Signing and Encryption List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2017 15:26:58 -0000 Although JEF [1] doesn't offer as many advantages [2] as JCS [3] it shares a common characteristic: Removing the need for dressing protected headers in Base64Url thanks to the use of ES6 serialization for creating AAD. Also in similarity with JCS, JEF runs flawlessly on some of the most popular platforms there are including Chrome, Android, Java, Node.js. To make JEF more compliant with JOSE it nowadays builds on a subset of JWA and JWK. Notation using JEF (JSON Encryption Format): { "algorithm": "A128CBC-HS256", "encryptedKey": { "algorithm": "ECDH-ES", "keyId": "20170101:mybank:ec", "ephemeralKey": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "ZuESJhuxPPTuloRigAh0aWZrgfFpBgjKQO3qzPFKiKs", "y": "_SwkU496ZCpmwiN2WvVVGFMfUstH1mGSZIbcvTtzdtc" } }, "iv": "FwpBD07mlfkaoIcrEZouig", "tag": "MQYMFMpDtjmlxPop42hoQg", "cipherText": "ito6qBV4xYTIv7C4-vNs3d95NNRpCZLC6dhkInrWn8M" } Notation using JWE (JSON Web Encryption): { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYn JhbmR5YnVja0BidWNrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6Ik VDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqan FWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZFlvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUz Q2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6Ik ExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ", "iv": "yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg", "ciphertext": "BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4O PKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEs DIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_evAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolq ZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7-IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl2 4j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI-sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIA fsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7MsFfI_K767G9C9A zp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ6195_JGG2m9 Csg", "tag": "WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg" } Anders 1] https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jef.html 2] Non-intrusive enveloped signatures can simplify the design, debugging and documentation of message oriented JSON/JavaScript based systems. 3] https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jcs.html