
From john.mattsson@ericsson.com  Mon Sep  6 04:47:21 2010
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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: "iana@iana.org" <iana@iana.org>, "msec@ietf.org" <msec@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2010 13:47:39 +0200
Thread-Topic: Errors in the Multimedia Internet KEYing (Mikey) Payload Name Spaces
Thread-Index: ActNuU5+SQQtbsJxT8GMzO0EYM4f9w==
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Cc: Karl Norrman <karl.norrman@ericsson.com>, Fredrik Lindholm <fredrik.lindholm@ericsson.com>, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@ericsson.com>
Subject: [MSEC] Errors in the Multimedia Internet KEYing (Mikey) Payload Name Spaces
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Dear IANA,

I discovered the following errors in the Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)=
 Payload Name Spaces

http://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-payloads



- The Cache type is listed as an 8-bit field instead of a 2-bit field

  Registry:
  Value    Cache type            Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        No cache              [RFC3830]
  1        Cache                 [RFC3830]
  2        Cache for CSB         [RFC3830]
  3-240    Unassigned
  241-255  Reserved

 It should look like this:

  Registry:
  Value    Cache type            Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        No cache              [RFC3830]
  1        Cache                 [RFC3830]
  2        Cache for CSB         [RFC3830]
  3        Unassigned



- The S type is listed as an 8-bit field instead of a 4-bit field

  Registry:=20
  Value    S type                Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        RSA/PKCS#1/1.5        [RFC3830]
  1        RSA/PSS               [RFC3830]
  2-240    Unassigned
  241-255  Reserved=20

 It should look like this:

  Registry:=20
  Value    S type                Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        RSA/PKCS#1/1.5        [RFC3830]
  1        RSA/PSS               [RFC3830]
  2-15     Unassigned



- The Key Data Type is listed as being between 0-16 instead of 0-15. That t=
he name space is between 0-16 is stated in the IANA Considerations section =
of RFC 3830, but this is obviously wrong as the field is only 4-bit.

  Registry:
  Value    Type                  Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        TGK                   [RFC3830]
  1        TGK+SALT              [RFC3830]
  2        TEK                   [RFC3830]
  3        TEK+SALT              [RFC3830]
  4        GTGK                  [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticket-05]
  5        GTGK+SALT             [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticket-05]
  6        MPK                   [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticket-05]
  7-16     Unassigned      =20

 It should look like this:

  Registry:
  Value    Type                  Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        TGK                   [RFC3830]
  1        TGK+SALT              [RFC3830]
  2        TEK                   [RFC3830]
  3        TEK+SALT              [RFC3830]
  4        GTGK                  [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticket-05]
  5        GTGK+SALT             [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticket-05]
  6        MPK                   [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticket-05]
  7-15     Unassigned      =20



- The KV Type is listed as being between 0-16 instead of 0-15. That the nam=
e space is between 0-16 is stated in the IANA Considerations section of RFC=
 3830, but this is obviously wrong as the field is only 4-bit.

  Registry:
  Value    KV                    Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        Null                  [RFC3830]
  1        SPI                   [RFC3830]
  2        Interval              [RFC3830]
  3-16     Unassigned      =20

 It should look like this:

  Registry:
  Value    KV                    Reference
  -------  --------------------  ---------
  0        Null                  [RFC3830]
  1        SPI                   [RFC3830]
  2        Interval              [RFC3830]
  3-15     Unassigned      =20



- The MIKEY registry often uses 'Reserved' to mean 'Private use'. According=
 to RFC 5226, Section 4 these to terms mean completely different things. In=
 most cases it is stated in the Registration Procedures that the range of v=
alues is 'Reserved for Private Use'.=20

  Registry Name: Key data transport payload name spaces
  Reference: [RFC3830]
  Range      Registration Procedures          Notes
  ---------  -------------------------------  -------
  0-240      IETF consensus
  241-255    Reserved for Private Use

  Registry:
  Value    Encr alg         Section in Document  Reference
  -------  ---------------  -------------------  ---------
  0        NULL             4.2.3                [RFC3830]
  1        AES-CM-128       4.2.3                [RFC3830]
  2        AES-KW-128       4.2.3                [RFC3830]
  3        AES-CM-256       6.2                  [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticket=
-05]
  4-240    Unassigned
  241-255  Reserved

But in some cases this not done (This should probably also be fixed). The r=
ange 112-127 below should be Private Use:
=20
  Sub-registry: PRF Func
  Reference: [RFC3830]
  Registration Procedures: IETF Consensus

  Registry:
  Value    PRF func          Section in Document  Reference
  -------  ----------------  -------------------  ---------
  0        MIKEY-1           4.1.3                [RFC3830]
  1        PRF-HMAC-SHA-256  6.1                  [RFC-mattsson-mikey-ticke=
t-05]
  2-111    Unassigned
  112-127  Reserved      =20

 And in some registries 'Reserved' is used for both Reserved and Private Us=
e:

  Registry:
  Value    OMA BCAST Types         Comment                   Reference
  -------  ----------------------  ------------------------  ---------
  0        Reserved                                          [RFC4909]
  1        LTKM                                              [RFC4909]
  2        STKM                                              [RFC4909]
  3        LTKM Reporting                                    [RFC5410]
  4        Parental Control                                  [RFC5410]
  5-191    Unassigned
  192-255  Reserved


I think this should be changed so that the 'Reserved' is not used for value=
s that are Private Use.


Best Regards
John Mattsson=20
=20


From mbaugher@cisco.com  Mon Sep  6 17:53:19 2010
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Subject: [MSEC] Comments on draft-ietf-msec-gdoi-update-06
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I took some time this weekend to review draft-ietf-msec-gdoi-update-06.  =
I thought it was a good job with several improvements over RFC 3547.  I =
think I found a few problems that you might want to consider changing.  =
And I have a number of other comments for your consideration.

Sec. 1.4: "A future RTP security protocol may benefit from using GDOI to =
establish group SAs" is now an anachronism since RFC 3711 was published =
after RFC 3547.  In fact, SRTP has had a GDOI data security I-D and even =
an implementation.  This work has not been completed since other means =
of keying SRTP are being standardized and published in the IETF.  I =
would remove this sentence.

Appendix B:  SA GAP is arguably a significant change that probably =
should be in your list.  Harmonization of GDOI with RFC 5374 might also =
be worthy of mention.

Sec. 3.1: If we no longer have a Phase 2 CERT and POP payloads, then I =
think you might consider making the SHOULD into a MUST. =20

Sec 1.3: This section defines terms used in Sec 1.0, the Introduction, =
which uses terms (e.g. rekey SA) without defining them or pointing to =
where they are defined in the document.

Sec 1.0:  The last paragraph contains two paragraphs:  The sentence that =
begins "In summary" should start a new paragraph.

Sec 1.0, bottom of page 3: I don't understand this sentence from point =
2, "It is treated as a ISAKMP phase 2 protocol, where the "phase 1" =
cryptographic policy and keying material is included in the group policy =
distributed by the GCKS in the GROUPKEY-PULL exchange."

Sec 1.0, top of page 4: "exchange, all authorized group members have =
received and installed updates to group policy" reads strange to me =
since this process is not ack'd and it is possible that some authorized =
grup members have not received or have not installed the updates due to =
e.g. network partition.

Sec 1.3:  Ten years ago, it could be argued that GDOI is applicable to =
video broadcast key management.  But it was not picked up by anyone for =
this application over the years including the IPTV Forum ATIS and the =
previously-mentioned SRTP.  I do know that it is used in large-scale =
VPNs and it is probably more likely to be used for managing a large =
number of CPEs like settop boxes than it is for protecting video =
broadcast.  I think that shipped has sailed and the more real and more =
promising applications might be mentioned instead.

Sec 1.3, last sentence: "In all cases, the relevant policy is defined on =
the GCKS and relayed to group members. Specific policy choices possible =
by the GCKS depends on each application and further discussion of policy =
is beyond the scope of this memo" is a little misleading since there is =
a lot of policy including the new SA GAP that is defined in the memo.

Sec 3.3: "If the KD payload included an LKH array of keys, the initiator =
takes the last key in the array as the group KEK. The array is then =
stored without further processing."  Ten years ago we were optimistic =
that group member management would emerge as an important application.  =
This has not matured but we have done some LKH prototyping IIRC, but =
there is no published specification for how to do this.  The problem I =
have with the LKH normative language is that there is no specification =
or best practices to guide implementers.  It's not clear to me how to =
implement LKH based on RFC 3547 or this update.

Sec 4.0, second paragraph: The delete payload is used here but defined =
below.  This happens several times in this document.  It would help the =
reader to define the terms when they are used, or to at least reference =
them (RFC 2409 in this case).

Sec 4.0: "If the SA defines an LKH KEK array or single KEK, KD contains =
a KEK or KEK array for a new Re-key SA, which has a new cookie pair" =
seems to be a normative statement but does not use normative language.

Sec 5.4.1: "If a group member receives a TEK with an ATD value, but =
discovers that it has no current SAs matching the policy in the TEK, =
then it SHOULD create and install SAs from the TEK immediately."  I =
don't understand this.  Doesn't the SA GAP precede the TEK that it =
applies to?

Sec 5.4.2: The relationship between ATD and DTD is not mentioned.  Is =
the DTD value the number of seconds of activation?  Does DTD start when =
the SA is activated, in which case the de-activation time is ATD + DTD =
or not?

Sec 5.4.3.1: How does a GCKS allocate all possible SID values if the =
number space is up to 2^256?

cheers, Mark




From sheela@cisco.com  Thu Sep  9 08:25:08 2010
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From: "Sheela Rowles (sheela)" <sheela@cisco.com>
To: "David McGrew (mcgrew)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Subject: [MSEC] Question about your comments from IETF-78
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Hi David,

=20

I've been looking over the minutes from the proceedings and need some
clarification on the below comments:

=20

"

David: SIG ALG RSA, it will be nice to use with SHA256?

Brain: MUST be more tightly coupled.

Tim: Pairing  both MUSTs looks good.

David: I think the same.

"

=20

Isn't it sufficient to specify the MUST requirement as is?

=20

                Requirement   KEK Signature Hash Algorithm (notes)

                -----------   ------------------------------------

                MUST          SIG_HASH_SHA256

                SHOULD        SIG_HASH_SHA1 (2)

                SHOULD NOT    SIG_HASH_MD5 (3)

=20

                Requirement   KEK Signature Algorithm (notes)

                -----------   -------------------------------

                MUST          SIG_ALG_RSA with 2048-bit keys

=20

=20

Can you please clarify? =20

=20

Thanks,

Sheela


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<p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi David,<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>I&#8217;ve been looking over the minutes from the
proceedings and need some clarification on the below =
comments:<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&#8220;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>David: SIG ALG RSA, it will be nice to use with =
SHA256?<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Brain: MUST be more tightly coupled.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Tim: Pairing&nbsp; both MUSTs looks =
good.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>David: I think the same.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&#8220;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Isn&#8217;t it sufficient to specify the MUST =
requirement as
is?<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Requirement&nbsp;&nbsp; KEK Signature Hash Algorithm =
(notes)<o:p></o:p></p>

<p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------&nbsp;&nbsp; =
------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></p>

<p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;MUST&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
SIG_HASH_SHA256<o:p></o:p></p>

<p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
SHOULD&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SIG_HASH_SHA1 =
(2)<o:p></o:p></p>

<p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
SHOULD NOT&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SIG_HASH_MD5 (3)<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Requirement&nbsp;&nbsp; KEK Signature Algorithm (notes)<o:p></o:p></p>

<p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------&nbsp;&nbsp; -------------------------------<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;MUST&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
SIG_ALG_RSA with 2048-bit keys<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Can you please clarify?&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Sheela<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

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From sheela@cisco.com  Thu Sep  9 08:28:46 2010
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Hi Tero,

=20

I missed the  IETF-78 meeting but have a question based on the posted
minutes.=20

=20

Can you please clarify this comment:

=20

"We can not use NAT-T with IPsec port 4500 for GDOI.

              It can cause issues.

Brain - If both IKE (500) and GDOI (848) migrate to 4500 It could be an
issue for the receiver to demux to the right key management protocol.

Tero: For IKE traffic, you can use same port 848, for IPsec packets, you
can use NAT-T.=20

"

=20

So my question is - why can't NAT-T be used with GDOI using port 4500?

=20

Thanks,

Sheela


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<p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Tero,<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>I missed the &nbsp;IETF-78 meeting but have a =
question based
on the posted minutes. <o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Can you please clarify this comment:<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&#8220;We can not use NAT-T with IPsec port 4500 =
for GDOI.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;It can
cause issues.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Brain - If both IKE (500) and GDOI (848) migrate to =
4500 It
could be an issue for the receiver to demux to the right key management
protocol.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Tero: For IKE traffic, you can use same port 848, =
for IPsec
packets, you can use NAT-T.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&#8220;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>So my question is &#8211; why can&#8217;t NAT-T be =
used with
GDOI using port 4500?<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Sheela<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</body>

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From root@core3.amsl.com  Fri Sep 10 10:30:03 2010
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Subject: [MSEC] I-D Action:draft-ietf-msec-ipsec-group-counter-modes-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Multicast Security Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Using Counter Modes with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) to Protect Group Traffic
	Author(s)       : D. McGrew, B. Weis
	Filename        : draft-ietf-msec-ipsec-group-counter-modes-06.txt
	Pages           : 14
	Date            : 2010-09-10

Counter modes have been defined for block ciphers such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).  Counter modes use a counter,
which is typically assumed to be incremented by a single sender.
This memo describes the use of counter modes when applied to the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)
in multiple-sender group applications.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
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From wwwrun@core3.amsl.com  Wed Sep 15 09:28:24 2010
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Subject: [MSEC] Protocol Action: 'Using Counter Modes with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) to Protect Group Traffic' to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Using Counter Modes with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
   Authentication Header (AH) to Protect Group Traffic'
  <draft-ietf-msec-ipsec-group-counter-modes-06.txt> as a Proposed
Standard

This document is the product of the Multicast Security Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Tim Polk and Sean Turner.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-msec-ipsec-group-counter-modes/

Technical Summary

Counter modes have been defined for block ciphers such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).  Counter modes use a counter,
which is typically assumed to be incremented by a single sender.
This memo describes the use of counter modes when applied to the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)
in multiple-sender group applications.


Working Group Summary

One of the main comments received (Alfred Hoenes) concerns the
need to make the proposal compatible with any AES-like block ciphers
(it was previously restricted to AES).  It has been addressed.
There was no controversial issue.


Document Quality

The document is small and easy to read.
I am not aware of the existence of an implementation but it's
likely one will be done, if not already the case.

Personnel

Vincent Roca is the shepherd.  Tim Polk is the responsible
Area Director.

