
From ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org  Fri Nov  1 20:01:10 2013
Return-Path: <ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A54111E80E7 for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  1 Nov 2013 20:01:10 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.099
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.500, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZnTY5TpigXxI for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  1 Nov 2013 20:01:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [149.20.68.7]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9369921F9AE7 for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Fri,  1 Nov 2013 20:01:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [149.20.68.7]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2AFA386D773 for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Sat,  2 Nov 2013 03:00:58 +0000 (UTC)
X-Original-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Delivered-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Received: from mail1.ntp.org (mail1.ntp.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff7:1::5]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22D6B86D333 for <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>; Fri,  1 Nov 2013 23:55:06 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from pool-173-76-231-254.bstnma.fios.verizon.net ([173.76.231.254] helo=[192.168.1.6]) by mail1.ntp.org with esmtpsa (TLSv1:CAMELLIA256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <mayer@ntp.org>) id 1VcOYI-000PU0-BZ; Fri, 01 Nov 2013 23:54:57 +0000
Message-ID: <52743F31.3090809@ntp.org>
Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2013 19:54:25 -0400
From: Danny Mayer <mayer@ntp.org>
Organization: NTP
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Brian Haberman <brian@innovationslab.net>,  Greg Dowd <gdowd@symmetricom.com>, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>,  "mills@udel.edu" <mills@udel.edu>, "jrmii@isc.org" <jrmii@isc.org>,  "jack.burbank@jhuapl.edu" <jack.burbank@jhuapl.edu>, "william.kasch@jhuapl.edu" <william.kasch@jhuapl.edu>,  "ted.lemon@nominum.com" <ted.lemon@nominum.com>, "odonoghue@isoc.org" <odonoghue@isoc.org>
References: <20130517162852.7C5D06210B@rfc-editor.org>	<52700B6A.5040204@innovationslab.net> <26FBD265CD8D234EAF41115A180F92BB6ED692B4@SJC-MBX-01.symmetricom.com> <527014D6.20105@ntp.org> <527018E7.3000406@innovationslab.net>
In-Reply-To: <527018E7.3000406@innovationslab.net>
X-Enigmail-Version: 1.6
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 173.76.231.254
X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: brian@innovationslab.net, gdowd@symmetricom.com, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, mills@udel.edu, jrmii@isc.org, jack.burbank@jhuapl.edu, william.kasch@jhuapl.edu, ted.lemon@nominum.com, odonoghue@isoc.org, ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: mayer@ntp.org
X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on mail1.ntp.org)
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 02 Nov 2013 03:00:41 +0000
Cc: "ntpwg@lists.ntp.org" <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>
Subject: Re: [ntpwg] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5905 (3627)
X-BeenThere: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mayer@ntp.org
List-Id: IETF Working Group for Network Time Protocol <ntpwg.lists.ntp.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/options/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.ntp.org/pipermail/ntpwg>
List-Post: <mailto:ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org
Sender: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org

I forgot to send you a link to the draft that I tried to update
RFC5905 for this issue. Here it is:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mizrahi-ntp-extension-field-02

Danny

On 10/29/2013 4:21 PM, Brian Haberman wrote:
> Danny, Having a new document that updates 5905 for this is fine. 
> The question that Greg's statement raises is whether this erratum 
> is valid given it seems to miss details in other sections of the 
> RFC.  Do we need the erratum if we are going to be publishing a
> new RFC that specifies the extension field behavior?  I am
> assuming that this new document will be marked as updating 5905.
> 
> Regards, Brian
> 
> On 10/29/13 4:04 PM, Danny Mayer wrote:
>> I put into the extension field draft wording to update RFC 5905 
>> when dealing with the MAC making it clear that it is optional. 
>> That document is standards track. Tal did this errata as an 
>> additional item.
>> 
>> Danny
>> 
>> On 10/29/2013 3:58 PM, Greg Dowd wrote:
>>> I don't think this is a bad idea per se but I think this
>>> errata entry is incomplete and ambiguous.  There are other
>>> places in 5905 which call out MAC and extensions which should
>>> also be addressed.  I have a little heartburn with the fact
>>> that it is using 5906, an informational RFC, as an argument for
>>> modifying a standards track document.  Also, it is disingenuous
>>> to present 5906 as logic for removing MAC requirement.  5906
>>> is entirely predicated on the requirement that a MAC be
>>> present whenever extensions are present.
>>> 
>>> In conclusion, I like the idea of clarifying the extension/MAC 
>>> relationship but I think the errata should consider 2
>>> elements, first a complete review of 5905 for MAC/extensions
>>> details for consistency, including a better argument justifying
>>> the change, and second, an informal review of future-proofing
>>> the MAC by size since I see that Tal has allocated what appears
>>> to be 4 more bytes than absolutely necessary perhaps as a
>>> placeholder for a different MAC schema?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message----- From: 
>>> ntpwg-bounces+gdowd=symmetricom.com@lists.ntp.org 
>>> [mailto:ntpwg-bounces+gdowd=symmetricom.com@lists.ntp.org] On 
>>> Behalf Of Brian Haberman Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2013 12:24 
>>> PM To: RFC Errata System; mills@udel.edu; jrmii@isc.org; 
>>> jack.burbank@jhuapl.edu; william.kasch@jhuapl.edu; 
>>> ted.lemon@nominum.com; odonoghue@isoc.org Cc: 
>>> ntpwg@lists.ntp.org Subject: Re: [ntpwg] [Technical Errata 
>>> Reported] RFC5905 (3627)
>>> 
>>> Hi Tal,
>>> 
>>> On 5/17/13 12:28 PM, RFC Errata System wrote:
>>>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5905, 
>>>> "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms 
>>>> Specification".
>>>> 
>>>> -------------------------------------- You may review the 
>>>> report below and at: 
>>>> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=5905&eid=3627
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 
--------------------------------------
>>>> Type: Technical Reported by: Tal Mizrahi <talmi@marvell.com>
>>>> 
>>>> Section: 7.5
>>>> 
>>>> Original Text ------------- In NTPv4, one or more extension 
>>>> fields can be inserted after the header and before the MAC, 
>>>> which is always present when an extension field is present.
>>>> 
>>>> Corrected Text -------------- In NTPv4, one or more
>>>> extension fields can be inserted after the header and before
>>>> the MAC, if a MAC is present. If a MAC is not present, one or
>>>> more extension fields can be inserted after the header,
>>>> according to the following rules: o If the packet includes a
>>>> single extension field, the length of the extension field
>>>> MUST be at least 7 words, i.e., at least 28 octets. o If the
>>>> packet includes more than one extension field, the length of
>>>> the last extension field MUST be at least 28 octets. The
>>>> length of the other extension fields in this case MUST be at
>>>> least 16 octets each.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Notes ----- The usage of NTP extension fields without 
>>>> authentication is aligned with Section 10 of RFC 5906:
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> While the text you quote below is correct, it does not include 
>>> the sentence immediately precedes it.  That sentence states:
>>> 
>>> "One or more extension fields follow the NTP packet header and 
>>> the last followed by the MAC."
>>> 
>>> I don't think that changes the intent of your text, but it
>>> does leave that text lacking in clarity saying that a MAC must
>>> be added after the extension if it is not present.
>>> 
>>> Regards, Brian
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________ ntpwg mailing 
>>> list ntpwg@lists.ntp.org http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg
>>> 
>>> 
> 

_______________________________________________
ntpwg mailing list
ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg

From ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org  Mon Nov  4 16:19:17 2013
Return-Path: <ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B78BD21E80C9 for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  4 Nov 2013 16:19:17 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -104.932
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-104.932 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.667, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id O450Q0sv5hSZ for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  4 Nov 2013 16:19:13 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [149.20.68.7]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66B0B21E8303 for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Mon,  4 Nov 2013 16:19:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [149.20.68.7]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADF7E86D75D for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Tue,  5 Nov 2013 00:19:08 +0000 (UTC)
X-Original-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Delivered-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Received: from mail1.ntp.org (mail1.ntp.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff7:1::5]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C76786D33D for <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>; Tue,  5 Nov 2013 00:18:48 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from smtp146.dfw.emailsrvr.com ([67.192.241.146]) by mail1.ntp.org with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <odonoghue@isoc.org>) id 1VdUM3-000L2w-5k for ntpwg@lists.ntp.org; Tue, 05 Nov 2013 00:18:48 +0000
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp31.relay.dfw1a.emailsrvr.com (SMTP Server) with ESMTP id 6E96A50FD0; Mon,  4 Nov 2013 19:18:41 -0500 (EST)
X-Virus-Scanned: OK
Received: by smtp31.relay.dfw1a.emailsrvr.com (Authenticated sender: odonoghue-AT-isoc.org) with ESMTPSA id 2319850D7D;  Mon,  4 Nov 2013 19:18:41 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <52783960.7040004@isoc.org>
Date: Mon, 04 Nov 2013 16:18:40 -0800
From: Karen O'Donoghue <odonoghue@isoc.org>
Organization: ISOC
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.8; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.1.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: NTP Working Group <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>,  "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------070301000202080404010909"
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 67.192.241.146
X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: odonoghue@isoc.org
X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on mail1.ntp.org)
Subject: [ntpwg] Joint NTP and TICTOC WGs meeting, Tuesday, 5 November 2013, 1420-1550 PST
X-BeenThere: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14
Precedence: list
Reply-To: odonoghue@isoc.org
List-Id: IETF Working Group for Network Time Protocol <ntpwg.lists.ntp.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/options/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.ntp.org/pipermail/ntpwg>
List-Post: <mailto:ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=subscribe>
Errors-To: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org
Sender: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------070301000202080404010909
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Folks,

I am really late sending this out, but below is the draft agenda for 
tomorrow's joint ntp and tictoc meeting. The meeting is scheduled for:

Tuesday, 5 November 2013, 1420-1550 PST (2220-2350 UTC) in Georgia A

The agenda is currently in both working group areas but the slides are 
in the respective working groups.

Regards,
Karen


--------------070301000202080404010909
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8;
 name="tictoc-ntp-agenda-nov2013.txt"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
 filename="tictoc-ntp-agenda-nov2013.txt"

RHJhZnQgQWdlbmRhIGZvciBqb2ludCBtZWV0aW5nIG9mIFRJQ1RPQyBhbmQgTlRQIFdHcyAt
IElFVEYgODgNCj09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09
PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09DQpUdWVzZGF5LCA1IE5vdmVtYmVyIDIwMTMsIDE0MjAtMTU1
MCBQU1QgKDIyMjAtMjM1MCBVVEMpDQoNCjEuICAgQWRtaW5pc3RyaXZpYSBhbmQgQWdlbmRh
IEJhc2hpbmcgIChDaGFpcnMpICAoMSBtaW4pDQoKMi4gICBOVFAgV0cgc3RhdHVzIChDaGFp
cnMpICAoMiBtaW4pDQoNCjMuICAgTmV0d29yayBUaW1lIFNlY3VyaXR5IChTaWJvbGQpICgx
NSBtaW4pCiAgICAgZHJhZnQtaWV0Zi1udHAtbmV0d29yay10aW1lLXNlY3VyaXR5LTAxCgo0
LiAgIFRJQ1RPQyBXRyBzdGF0dXMgKENoYWlycykgICgyIG1pbikKCjUuICAgSUVFRSAxNTg4
IHVwZGF0ZSAoQXJub2xkKSAgKDUgbWluKQoKNi4gICBJVFUtVCBTRzE1L1ExMyB1cGRhdGUg
KE8nRG9ub2dodWUgZm9yIFJ1ZmZpbmkpICAoNSBtaW4pIAoKNy4gICBFbnRlcnByaXNlIHBy
b2ZpbGUgZm9yIElFRUUgMTU4OCAoQXJub2xkKSAgKDE1IG1pbikKICAgICBodHRwOi8vd3d3
LmlldGYub3JnL21haWwtYXJjaGl2ZS93ZWIvdGljdG9jL2N1cnJlbnQvbXNnMDE1MTguaHRt
bA0KICAgICAodXBkYXRlZCBkcmFmdCB0byBiZSBwb3N0ZWQgYWZ0ZXIgZHJhZnQgcG9zdGlu
ZyByZW9wZW5zKSAKCjguICAgUmVzaWRlbmNlIFRpbWUgTWVhc3VyZW1lbnQgKE1pcnNreSkg
ICgxNSBtaW4pDQogICAgIGRyYWZ0LW1pcnNreS1tcGxzLXJlc2lkZW5jZS10aW1lLTAwLnR4
dAoKOS4gICBNUExTIGFuZCBUaW1pbmcgV2F5IEZvcndhcmQgKENoYWlycykgKDI1IG1pbikg
CgoxMC4gIFVzYWdlIG9mIE5UUCBmb3IgdGhlIFBETSBET0ggSVB2NiBFeHRlbnNpb24gSGVh
ZGVyICAoNSBtaW4pCiAgICAgZHJhZnQtYWNrZXJtYW5uLXRpY3RvYy1wZG0tbnRwLXVzYWdl
LTAwCg0KMTEuICBXcmFwLXVwIChDaGFpcnMpCg==
--------------070301000202080404010909
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

_______________________________________________
ntpwg mailing list
ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg
--------------070301000202080404010909--

From ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org  Sun Nov 10 12:16:15 2013
Return-Path: <ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 964BE11E8145 for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 10 Nov 2013 12:16:15 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -5.932
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.932 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.667, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2P9hN8JWPAhl for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 10 Nov 2013 12:16:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff7:1::7]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C730311E812A for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Sun, 10 Nov 2013 12:16:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [149.20.68.7]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF50186D85F for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Sun, 10 Nov 2013 20:16:08 +0000 (UTC)
X-Original-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Delivered-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Received: from mail1.ntp.org (mail1.ntp.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff7:1::5]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4108A86D4E1 for <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>; Sun, 10 Nov 2013 20:15:51 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from pool-173-76-231-254.bstnma.fios.verizon.net ([173.76.231.254] helo=[192.168.1.4]) by mail1.ntp.org with esmtpsa (TLSv1:CAMELLIA256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <mayer@ntp.org>) id 1VfbQA-000GKp-0g; Sun, 10 Nov 2013 20:15:48 +0000
Message-ID: <527FE956.1050107@ntp.org>
Date: Sun, 10 Nov 2013 15:15:18 -0500
From: Danny Mayer <mayer@ntp.org>
Organization: NTP
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.1.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "David L. Mills" <mills@udel.edu>, Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
References: <51FAC820.3090401@udel.edu> <20130803174008.GA17578@roeckx.be> <52019C7B.9070602@udel.edu>
In-Reply-To: <52019C7B.9070602@udel.edu>
X-Enigmail-Version: 1.6
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 173.76.231.254
X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: mills@udel.edu, kurt@roeckx.be, ntpwg@lists.ntp.org, tictoc@ietf.org
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: mayer@ntp.org
X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on mail1.ntp.org)
Cc: NTP Working Group <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>, "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [ntpwg] security ID submitted for review
X-BeenThere: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mayer@ntp.org
List-Id: IETF Working Group for Network Time Protocol <ntpwg.lists.ntp.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/options/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.ntp.org/pipermail/ntpwg>
List-Post: <mailto:ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org
Sender: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org

Dave,

I'm of the opinion that we should retire the MAC altogether and create a
MAC extension field instead. A lot of logic has been going into working
out whether or not we have an extension field or the MAC. The MAC
extension field could be REQUIRED to be the last extension field. That
way you know the length of each extension field and you could put
additional information in the MAC extension field indicating the type of
computation needed for the MAC. This makes a MAC easily extensible.

I'm not convinced that a server needs to authenticate a client except in
the context of an autokey dance. Then you only need to recognized the
key type presented and process according to that key type. I don't think
it's practical for the server to maintain state unless in the context of
an association. Drive-by NTP packets just are not worth the effort involved.

Danny

On 8/6/2013 9:01 PM, David L. Mills wrote:
> The more I think of it, the better I like a design where the existing
> MAC is replaced by a single extension field computed as the signature of
> the header.  I previously suggested this for broadcast mode, but I think
> this could be useful in other modes as well.  It would be hightly
> interesting to determine the overhead for such a signature using modern
> processors.  An experiment could be designed for the current NTP
> implementation.  It would consist of an adaptor routine that matches an
> OpenSSL signature routine to the authencrypt/authdecrypt interface
> routine.  I would do this myself, but with my current vision condition,
> it would not be practical.  For someone with knowledge of the NTP
> programming style, this would be an interesting weekend project.
> 
> In theis proposed design a busy server could be presented with thousands
> of signed client requests, each requiring  a signed server response. 
> However, the server might ignore the client request signature on the
> expectation that the  server response could be reliably determined. 
> Actually, the NTP on-wire protocol is very good for this.  As an aside,
> the protocol analysis and simulation described in the white paper at the
> NTP project page could be done for PTP as well.
> 
> Dave
> 
> Kurt Roeckx wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 01, 2013 at 08:42:08PM +0000, David L. Mills wrote:
>>   
>>> Guys,
>>>
>>> Here are some general comments on the ID.  I apologize if they are a
>>> little rough as I have to dictate this message instead of my usual
>>> polished wordsmithing.
>>>
>>> format.
>>> The ID does not specify an extension field format.
>>>     
>>
>> The draft only seems to specify the the general idea of how it
>> should work and doesn't seem to go into detail how this should
>> work at the protocol level.  I assume he first wants to know if
>> the solution is something that can work and that others see
>> as a good solution before he works out the details.
>>
>>   
>>> In particular, the private key for the message
>>> authentication code (MAC) , if used, must be known beforehand.  This
>>> is where the "cookie snatcher" issue comes up as described in
>>> previous messages.  In particular, an important constraint for
>>> normal operation is that extension fields are not used unless
>>> required for cookie determination.
>>>     
>>
>> I'm not sure I understand your remark.  As far as I know the
>> "cookie snatcher" you talk about is the normal "man in the middle"
>> attack.  As I understand we would change the verification by
>> replacing it by the normal X.509 verification as done for instance
>> SSL/TLS.
>>
>> I assume you meant public key and note private key.
>>
>>   
>>> Glaring vulnerability exists when using extension fields, as the key
>>> value is public and must be known in advance.  This invites a
>>> cut-and-paste attack, as well as header changes, even if
>>> subsequently detected by the on-wire protocol.
>>>     
>>
>> I've seen this cut-and-paste attack mentioned before, but I've
>> never really understood it.  As I understand things, the MAC
>> is generated over the NTP + extensions.  I don't see how you
>> can take the extension from 1 packet into an other and still
>> have a valid MAC.  Or are you saying that you do something
>> with a packet even when it doesn't have a valid MAC?
>>
>>   
>>> certificate.
>>> Both RFC 5906 and the ID require the server certificate.  The server
>>> certificate can be conveyed, either off-line, or directly or
>>> indirectly via a certificate trail as described in RFC 5906 or the
>>> ID.  If obtained via the trail, there is a hazzard due to a
>>> middle-man attack and masquerade.
>>>     
>>
>> I really don't understand how such a man in the middle attack
>> can work.  Either the certificate + the chain validate, or they
>> don't.  It is of course important to you check that the CommonName
>> in the certificate matches the server you're trying to reach,
>> and that the root CA is in your list of trusted CAs.  But there
>> really isn't anything new or hard about this.
>>
>>   
>>> In broadcast mode, the protocols described in RFC 5906 and the ID
>>> are messy and with several possible vulnerabilities.  Here is a
>>> suggestion that might be useful.  Define a new broadcast packet
>>> format as the NTP header followed by one extension field
>>> representing the MAC.  The extension field represents the signature
>>> of the header computed using the private key of the server and can
>>> be verified by the client using the public key in the server
>>> certificate.  Originally, this was considered an unacceptable
>>> dilution of accuracy due to the variability of the signature
>>> computing time and the length of the signature.  However, at least
>>> in modern NTP, the interleaved broadcast mode can be used to correct
>>> for this overhead.  This assumes that the overhead for either the
>>> server or client is reduced using fast modern processors.
>>>     
>>
>> I think that in all cases where it's no problem to keep track of
>> all clients you should use the interleaved mode, and we can use
>> something like the Diffie-Hellman key agreement for those.
>>
>> But there clearly is also a need for servers that can't keep
>> the state of each client, and we need something else for that.
>> So maybe we need to define 2 ways of working.
>>
>>
>>
>> Kurt
>>
>>   
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> ntpwg mailing list
> ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
> http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg
> 

_______________________________________________
ntpwg mailing list
ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg

From ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org  Mon Nov 11 08:46:45 2013
Return-Path: <ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F92B21E8211 for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 Nov 2013 08:46:45 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -5.783
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.783 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.816, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wsTz2CeAArNL for <ietfarch-ntp-archives-ahFae6za@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 Nov 2013 08:46:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [149.20.68.7]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B50FA21E8209 for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Mon, 11 Nov 2013 08:46:39 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists.ntp.org (lists.ntp.org [149.20.68.7]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EC8A86D9BE for <ntp-archives-ahFae6za@lists.ietf.org>; Mon, 11 Nov 2013 16:46:39 +0000 (UTC)
X-Original-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Delivered-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
Received: from mail1.ntp.org (mail1.ntp.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff7:1::5]) by lists.ntp.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0543486D4E1 for <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>; Mon, 11 Nov 2013 16:46:24 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from mail5.symmetricom.com ([69.25.98.10]) by mail1.ntp.org with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <btv1==027f196924e==gdowd@symmetricom.com>) id 1Vfud2-0001vt-Ue for ntpwg@lists.ntp.org; Mon, 11 Nov 2013 16:46:24 +0000
X-ASG-Debug-ID: 1384188374-05bdbc0700534270001-dac64w
Received: from SJC-HUB-01.symmetricom.com ([192.168.10.171]) by mail5.symmetricom.com with ESMTP id pcDFyCt2cmzOohis (version=TLSv1 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Mon, 11 Nov 2013 08:46:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Barracuda-Envelope-From: gdowd@symmetricom.com
X-ASG-Whitelist: Client
Received: from SJC-MBX-01.symmetricom.com ([169.254.1.121]) by SJC-HUB-01.symmetricom.com ([::1]) with mapi id 14.01.0289.001; Mon, 11 Nov 2013 08:46:13 -0800
From: Greg Dowd <gdowd@symmetricom.com>
To: "mayer@ntp.org" <mayer@ntp.org>, "David L. Mills" <mills@udel.edu>, Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Thread-Topic: [TICTOC] [ntpwg] security ID submitted for review
X-ASG-Orig-Subj: RE: [TICTOC] [ntpwg] security ID submitted for review
Thread-Index: AQHOjve3DDY/37uOv0mOl0PDW6QZcpmEOGcAgAUyY4CAlqCIAIAAz/iw
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 16:46:13 +0000
Message-ID: <26FBD265CD8D234EAF41115A180F92BB6ED74663@SJC-MBX-01.symmetricom.com>
References: <51FAC820.3090401@udel.edu> <20130803174008.GA17578@roeckx.be> <52019C7B.9070602@udel.edu> <527FE956.1050107@ntp.org>
In-Reply-To: <527FE956.1050107@ntp.org>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [192.168.3.9]
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Barracuda-Connect: UNKNOWN[192.168.10.171]
X-Barracuda-Start-Time: 1384188374
X-Barracuda-Encrypted: AES128-SHA
X-Barracuda-URL: http://192.168.10.96:80/cgi-mod/mark.cgi
X-Virus-Scanned: by bsmtpd at symmetricom.com
X-Barracuda-BRTS-Status: 1
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 69.25.98.10
X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: btv1==027f196924e==gdowd@symmetricom.com
X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on mail1.ntp.org)
Cc: NTP Working Group <ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>, "tictoc@ietf.org" <tictoc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [ntpwg] [TICTOC]  security ID submitted for review
X-BeenThere: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF Working Group for Network Time Protocol <ntpwg.lists.ntp.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/options/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.ntp.org/pipermail/ntpwg>
List-Post: <mailto:ntpwg@lists.ntp.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg>, <mailto:ntpwg-request@lists.ntp.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org
Sender: ntpwg-bounces+ntp-archives-ahfae6za=lists.ietf.org@lists.ntp.org

I agree.  After the last thread about MAC recognition and extensions, I took a look back through the source of various versions and saw that the length check is being worked to keep up with digest mechanisms and is about to be capped by the extension draft minimum at 28.  I even went as far as looking up the ASN.1 encoding of hash OID and blob and it is reasonably efficient, adding less than a dozen bytes for mac'd frames in addition to the hmac IIRC.  If we do this, we need to consider as well the "keepouts" presented by Autokey's current implementation.  If the next autokey rev is not backwards compatible, it would be nice to update the autokey packets to use a TLV structure more amenable to sharing the association.


-----Original Message-----
From: tictoc-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tictoc-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Danny Mayer
Sent: Sunday, November 10, 2013 12:15 PM
To: David L. Mills; Kurt Roeckx
Cc: NTP Working Group; tictoc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TICTOC] [ntpwg] security ID submitted for review

Dave,

I'm of the opinion that we should retire the MAC altogether and create a
MAC extension field instead. A lot of logic has been going into working
out whether or not we have an extension field or the MAC. The MAC
extension field could be REQUIRED to be the last extension field. That
way you know the length of each extension field and you could put
additional information in the MAC extension field indicating the type of
computation needed for the MAC. This makes a MAC easily extensible.

I'm not convinced that a server needs to authenticate a client except in
the context of an autokey dance. Then you only need to recognized the
key type presented and process according to that key type. I don't think
it's practical for the server to maintain state unless in the context of
an association. Drive-by NTP packets just are not worth the effort involved.

Danny

On 8/6/2013 9:01 PM, David L. Mills wrote:
> The more I think of it, the better I like a design where the existing
> MAC is replaced by a single extension field computed as the signature of
> the header.  I previously suggested this for broadcast mode, but I think
> this could be useful in other modes as well.  It would be hightly
> interesting to determine the overhead for such a signature using modern
> processors.  An experiment could be designed for the current NTP
> implementation.  It would consist of an adaptor routine that matches an
> OpenSSL signature routine to the authencrypt/authdecrypt interface
> routine.  I would do this myself, but with my current vision condition,
> it would not be practical.  For someone with knowledge of the NTP
> programming style, this would be an interesting weekend project.
> 
> In theis proposed design a busy server could be presented with thousands
> of signed client requests, each requiring  a signed server response. 
> However, the server might ignore the client request signature on the
> expectation that the  server response could be reliably determined. 
> Actually, the NTP on-wire protocol is very good for this.  As an aside,
> the protocol analysis and simulation described in the white paper at the
> NTP project page could be done for PTP as well.
> 
> Dave
> 
> Kurt Roeckx wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 01, 2013 at 08:42:08PM +0000, David L. Mills wrote:
>>   
>>> Guys,
>>>
>>> Here are some general comments on the ID.  I apologize if they are a
>>> little rough as I have to dictate this message instead of my usual
>>> polished wordsmithing.
>>>
>>> format.
>>> The ID does not specify an extension field format.
>>>     
>>
>> The draft only seems to specify the the general idea of how it
>> should work and doesn't seem to go into detail how this should
>> work at the protocol level.  I assume he first wants to know if
>> the solution is something that can work and that others see
>> as a good solution before he works out the details.
>>
>>   
>>> In particular, the private key for the message
>>> authentication code (MAC) , if used, must be known beforehand.  This
>>> is where the "cookie snatcher" issue comes up as described in
>>> previous messages.  In particular, an important constraint for
>>> normal operation is that extension fields are not used unless
>>> required for cookie determination.
>>>     
>>
>> I'm not sure I understand your remark.  As far as I know the
>> "cookie snatcher" you talk about is the normal "man in the middle"
>> attack.  As I understand we would change the verification by
>> replacing it by the normal X.509 verification as done for instance
>> SSL/TLS.
>>
>> I assume you meant public key and note private key.
>>
>>   
>>> Glaring vulnerability exists when using extension fields, as the key
>>> value is public and must be known in advance.  This invites a
>>> cut-and-paste attack, as well as header changes, even if
>>> subsequently detected by the on-wire protocol.
>>>     
>>
>> I've seen this cut-and-paste attack mentioned before, but I've
>> never really understood it.  As I understand things, the MAC
>> is generated over the NTP + extensions.  I don't see how you
>> can take the extension from 1 packet into an other and still
>> have a valid MAC.  Or are you saying that you do something
>> with a packet even when it doesn't have a valid MAC?
>>
>>   
>>> certificate.
>>> Both RFC 5906 and the ID require the server certificate.  The server
>>> certificate can be conveyed, either off-line, or directly or
>>> indirectly via a certificate trail as described in RFC 5906 or the
>>> ID.  If obtained via the trail, there is a hazzard due to a
>>> middle-man attack and masquerade.
>>>     
>>
>> I really don't understand how such a man in the middle attack
>> can work.  Either the certificate + the chain validate, or they
>> don't.  It is of course important to you check that the CommonName
>> in the certificate matches the server you're trying to reach,
>> and that the root CA is in your list of trusted CAs.  But there
>> really isn't anything new or hard about this.
>>
>>   
>>> In broadcast mode, the protocols described in RFC 5906 and the ID
>>> are messy and with several possible vulnerabilities.  Here is a
>>> suggestion that might be useful.  Define a new broadcast packet
>>> format as the NTP header followed by one extension field
>>> representing the MAC.  The extension field represents the signature
>>> of the header computed using the private key of the server and can
>>> be verified by the client using the public key in the server
>>> certificate.  Originally, this was considered an unacceptable
>>> dilution of accuracy due to the variability of the signature
>>> computing time and the length of the signature.  However, at least
>>> in modern NTP, the interleaved broadcast mode can be used to correct
>>> for this overhead.  This assumes that the overhead for either the
>>> server or client is reduced using fast modern processors.
>>>     
>>
>> I think that in all cases where it's no problem to keep track of
>> all clients you should use the interleaved mode, and we can use
>> something like the Diffie-Hellman key agreement for those.
>>
>> But there clearly is also a need for servers that can't keep
>> the state of each client, and we need something else for that.
>> So maybe we need to define 2 ways of working.
>>
>>
>>
>> Kurt
>>
>>   
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> ntpwg mailing list
> ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
> http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg
> 

_______________________________________________
TICTOC mailing list
TICTOC@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tictoc
_______________________________________________
ntpwg mailing list
ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/ntpwg
