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From: Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com>
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: message signing use case
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] message signing use case
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During the last call I volunteered to write a use case that warrants messag=
e signing. After thinking about the problem for a bit, it is no longer abun=
dantly clear to me that message signing needs to be addressed in OAuth (cle=
arly signing a token is a different story).=20

However, here's the use case that I've run into a few times while building =
layered systems. It may help anchor the discussion on message signing.=20

I'd like to hear what the group thinks.

Actors & Background:
1) Protected Resource - A service front-end that crunches data and returns =
results / reports. Processing these reports can take time, depending on com=
plexity and load (seconds to hours). Only subscribed clients can access the=
 service. Clients pay for the amount of time they use the service. The Prot=
ected Resource uses tokens issued by an Authorization Server in order to ac=
cess the Protected Resource. The Protected Resource uses SSL for all inboun=
d connections, but the SSL connection is terminated early (at an appliance)=
.
2) Client - An autonomous client that intermittently requests data / report=
s from the Protected Resource. Before requesting data / reports from the Pr=
otected Resource, the Client must acquire a token from the Authorization Se=
rver.
3) Authorization Server - A service that authenticates Clients and issues t=
okens that eventually grant access to the Protected Resource. The Authoriza=
tion Server uses SSL for all connections with Clients.

Challenge:
The Protected Resource needs to be able to handle processing that takes qui=
te a bit of time, and it can arrive in bursts. When the Protected Resource =
receives a message from a client, it validates the token in the message, pu=
shes authorized requests into a queue for future processing, and returns th=
e client an ID of the job in the queue. An internal system pulls messages f=
rom this queue and processes them. By the time the message is in the queue,=
 it is in clear text and could be tampered with. If a message is tampered w=
ith, all sorts of bad things can happen (easy to imagine possibilities). Th=
e Protected Resource needs a way to guarantee the data hasn't been tampered=
 with after the message is pulled from the queue and before processing.

Possible Solutions:
a) Require the client to sign the message (URI, Token, other headers, and B=
ody) before sending to the Protected Resource. The Protected Resource just =
pushes the message (URI, Token, other headers, Body, signature) into the qu=
eue.
b) The Protected Resource signs the message (or some transformation of it) =
after the message is received and before pushing the message into the queue=
.

Solution (a) has drawbacks. It forces the Protected Resource to know the si=
gning keys (public or symmetric) used when signing the message. It also exp=
oses several parts of the Protected Resource to versioning issues, so if th=
e public API changes (message formats), multiple layers of the system need =
to be aware of the change.

Solution (b) seems more appealing. The Protected Resource front end needs t=
o have a signing key that is shared with the back-end. Customers don't see =
it. Additionally, the back-ends don't necessarily have to be aware of chang=
es in the message format; the front ends can transform the message to a can=
onical format.


--justin

From davidrecordon@facebook.com  Wed Mar  3 14:31:27 2010
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From: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2010 14:29:25 -0800
Thread-Topic: Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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Over the weekend I took a quick stab at what a new draft of an OAuth 2.0 sp=
ec would look like.  I don't have a lot of normative text but wanted to sha=
re what I was thinking about in terms of the specification's structure and =
technical inner-workings.

This comes out of the survey from two weeks ago which Peter Saint-Andre sum=
marized (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01214.html) =
as there being consensus around:
 - OAuth 2.0 taking aspects from both the 1.0 and WRAP specs/drafts with a =
preference toward the WRAP draft
 - we should go back to working on a single document
 - OAuth 2.0 should support signatures as a mechanism for making requests

Documents involved:
 - OAuth 1.0: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10
 - WRAP: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01

Combined document structure:
My goal is that sections one through four are not more than fifteen to twen=
ty pages combined.

0. Abstract

1. Introduction
1.1 Acknowledgments
1.2 Terminology
1.3 Notational Conventions

2. Getting an Access Token
2.1 Web App / JavaScript Profile (in browser)
2.2 Rich App Profile (can open a browser)
2.3 Device Profile (no browser, should be like the Netflix flow)
2.4 Username and Password Profile
2.5 Client key and secret (not in the context of a user)

3. Refreshing an Access Token

4. Accessing a Protected Resource
4.1 Using SSL
4.2 Using a signature

5. Security Considerations


Abstract
    OAuth 2.0 provides a method for an application (Client) to access the P=
rotected Resource hosted on a server on behalf of a Resource Owner (such as=
 a different client or an end-user).  It provides a process for end-users t=
o authorize third-party access to their Protected Resources via a variety o=
f Authorization Profiles which generally do not include having to share the=
ir credentials (typically, a username and password pair).  A server can add=
itionally delegate authorization to one or more authorities (Authorization =
Server) which issue Access Tokens to Clients.

Introduction
 - This section should provide a longer description of the protocol flows a=
nd the evolution from OAuth 1.0.
 - The terminology should be based on updated OAuth 1.0 terminology which i=
s already close to the WRAP terminology as well.  We should err on the side=
 of more generally understood terms.
 - Both OAuth 1.0 and WRAP contain fairly complete introductory sections.  =
I think that the WRAP one is a bit too long and we should shoot for this se=
ction being a little over two pages (including terminology).

Getting an Access Token
 - This section really comes from WRAP.  I believe that a server MUST imple=
ment at least one of the profiles to be considered OAuth compatible.
 - The updated OAuth 1.0 spec could also be useful for more complete langua=
ge around the Web App Profile though we should also draw from Luke Shepard'=
s JavaScript profile (which needs updating) (http://groups.google.com/group=
/oauth-wrap-wg/browse_thread/thread/4840fab6935e6fbc).  I believe the main =
difference is the security characteristics.
 - While the SAML assertion profile has been in WRAP, I haven't seen strong=
 advocates on the mailing list or in the survey for it.  Does someone want =
to argue for keeping it?  Could it be drafted as a separate profile from th=
e core spec?

Refreshing an Access Token
 - In WRAP this functionality is described along with each individual autho=
rization profile.  Some profiles require the client id and secret though no=
t all of them.  In terms of writing more reusable code I imagine that imple=
mentors will write a single refresh_token(client_id, client_secret) functio=
n so breaking this out into its own section will be easier to implement.
 - We could either require the client id and secret for all profiles or kee=
p them as optional for some profiles.  Personally I lean toward consistency=
.

Accessing a Protected Resource
 - This section is really a combination of WRAP and OAuth 1.0.  SSL support=
 will be a MUST and signatures will be optional.
 - Bearer tokens (even short lived) without using SSL or signatures feels l=
ike a poor idea, but given the WRAP draft it seems like the security teams =
at Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! are all comfortable with doing so?  Given t=
hat we'll be adding signatures as an option do we still need unprotected be=
arer tokens?
 - The SSL section basically copies directly from WRAP section #4.  It's ab=
out a page and a half and really easy to implement.
 - We need to agree on the signature method though there is a lot of normat=
ive text in the OAuth 1.0 spec to draw from (http://tools.ietf.org/html/dra=
ft-hammer-oauth-10#section-3.4).   OAuth 1.0 is about three pages of text a=
ssuming people are happy with the mechanism; it would be good to simplify a=
s much as possible.
    - We're missing an access token secret, but I'm wondering if we can tre=
at the refresh token as the access token secret since it's only sent over t=
he wire via SSL?
    - Alternatively we could modify the refresh token request to let the cl=
ient specify that they'd also like an access token secret for that request.=
 This seems like the right way of doing it.
    - Both break the idea that the API endpoint doesn't have access to secr=
ets, but the deployment scenarios I've seen discussed as wanting signatures=
 (at least Facebook and Twitter) won't be separating their architecture any=
way.

Security Considerations
 - I'm the wrong person to write this section.

Misc
 - Rename parameters to oauth_

If I were to spend some time over the next week or two drafting this spec w=
ould folks generally be supportive of it?  If not, what would you change so=
 that you could be supportive of it?  Note well, if you only reply with "I =
don't like it" without a reasonable technical explanation of why then your =
feedback will be disregarded. ;)

One of my goals is getting OAuth 2.0 to the point =96 fairly quickly =96 wh=
ere we can start to architect the next version of OpenID on top of it.  Web=
Finger + OAuth 2.0 + identity would be sweet and finally give us a consiste=
nt story for both authentication and authorization.  I'd love whatever help=
 I could get with all of this as well!

Thanks,
--David

(Cross posted on my blog: http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html)=

From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Wed Mar  3 14:47:05 2010
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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David,

I find this is an excellent starting point, and I share with you the 
urgency to move the work as quickly as possible.

I do think that we need to address a couple of items such as the use 
cases and requirements. The need for those also came quite strongly in 
the surveys. I do not see any problem in developing both in parallel 
(although I do expect that some people would insist on the 
requirements--in support of the use cases--coming first).

One way of addressing this is having the use case requirements sections 
in the document you are putting together. The other would be to work 
them in a separate document.

What is your opinion?

Igor

David Recordon wrote:
> Over the weekend I took a quick stab at what a new draft of an OAuth 2.0 spec would look like.  I don't have a lot of normative text but wanted to share what I was thinking about in terms of the specification's structure and technical inner-workings.
>
> This comes out of the survey from two weeks ago which Peter Saint-Andre summarized (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01214.html) as there being consensus around:
>  - OAuth 2.0 taking aspects from both the 1.0 and WRAP specs/drafts with a preference toward the WRAP draft
>  - we should go back to working on a single document
>  - OAuth 2.0 should support signatures as a mechanism for making requests
>
> Documents involved:
>  - OAuth 1.0: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10
>  - WRAP: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01
>
> Combined document structure:
> My goal is that sections one through four are not more than fifteen to twenty pages combined.
>
> 0. Abstract
>
> 1. Introduction
> 1.1 Acknowledgments
> 1.2 Terminology
> 1.3 Notational Conventions
>
> 2. Getting an Access Token
> 2.1 Web App / JavaScript Profile (in browser)
> 2.2 Rich App Profile (can open a browser)
> 2.3 Device Profile (no browser, should be like the Netflix flow)
> 2.4 Username and Password Profile
> 2.5 Client key and secret (not in the context of a user)
>
> 3. Refreshing an Access Token
>
> 4. Accessing a Protected Resource
> 4.1 Using SSL
> 4.2 Using a signature
>
> 5. Security Considerations
>
>
> Abstract
>     OAuth 2.0 provides a method for an application (Client) to access the Protected Resource hosted on a server on behalf of a Resource Owner (such as a different client or an end-user).  It provides a process for end-users to authorize third-party access to their Protected Resources via a variety of Authorization Profiles which generally do not include having to share their credentials (typically, a username and password pair).  A server can additionally delegate authorization to one or more authorities (Authorization Server) which issue Access Tokens to Clients.
>
> Introduction
>  - This section should provide a longer description of the protocol flows and the evolution from OAuth 1.0.
>  - The terminology should be based on updated OAuth 1.0 terminology which is already close to the WRAP terminology as well.  We should err on the side of more generally understood terms.
>  - Both OAuth 1.0 and WRAP contain fairly complete introductory sections.  I think that the WRAP one is a bit too long and we should shoot for this section being a little over two pages (including terminology).
>
> Getting an Access Token
>  - This section really comes from WRAP.  I believe that a server MUST implement at least one of the profiles to be considered OAuth compatible.
>  - The updated OAuth 1.0 spec could also be useful for more complete language around the Web App Profile though we should also draw from Luke Shepard's JavaScript profile (which needs updating) (http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg/browse_thread/thread/4840fab6935e6fbc).  I believe the main difference is the security characteristics.
>  - While the SAML assertion profile has been in WRAP, I haven't seen strong advocates on the mailing list or in the survey for it.  Does someone want to argue for keeping it?  Could it be drafted as a separate profile from the core spec?
>
> Refreshing an Access Token
>  - In WRAP this functionality is described along with each individual authorization profile.  Some profiles require the client id and secret though not all of them.  In terms of writing more reusable code I imagine that implementors will write a single refresh_token(client_id, client_secret) function so breaking this out into its own section will be easier to implement.
>  - We could either require the client id and secret for all profiles or keep them as optional for some profiles.  Personally I lean toward consistency.
>
> Accessing a Protected Resource
>  - This section is really a combination of WRAP and OAuth 1.0.  SSL support will be a MUST and signatures will be optional.
>  - Bearer tokens (even short lived) without using SSL or signatures feels like a poor idea, but given the WRAP draft it seems like the security teams at Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! are all comfortable with doing so?  Given that we'll be adding signatures as an option do we still need unprotected bearer tokens?
>  - The SSL section basically copies directly from WRAP section #4.  It's about a page and a half and really easy to implement.
>  - We need to agree on the signature method though there is a lot of normative text in the OAuth 1.0 spec to draw from (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10#section-3.4).   OAuth 1.0 is about three pages of text assuming people are happy with the mechanism; it would be good to simplify as much as possible.
>     - We're missing an access token secret, but I'm wondering if we can treat the refresh token as the access token secret since it's only sent over the wire via SSL?
>     - Alternatively we could modify the refresh token request to let the client specify that they'd also like an access token secret for that request. This seems like the right way of doing it.
>     - Both break the idea that the API endpoint doesn't have access to secrets, but the deployment scenarios I've seen discussed as wanting signatures (at least Facebook and Twitter) won't be separating their architecture anyway.
>
> Security Considerations
>  - I'm the wrong person to write this section.
>
> Misc
>  - Rename parameters to oauth_
>
> If I were to spend some time over the next week or two drafting this spec would folks generally be supportive of it?  If not, what would you change so that you could be supportive of it?  Note well, if you only reply with "I don't like it" without a reasonable technical explanation of why then your feedback will be disregarded. ;)
>
> One of my goals is getting OAuth 2.0 to the point – fairly quickly – where we can start to architect the next version of OpenID on top of it.  WebFinger + OAuth 2.0 + identity would be sweet and finally give us a consistent story for both authentication and authorization.  I'd love whatever help I could get with all of this as well!
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> (Cross posted on my blog: http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html)
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>   

From eran@hueniverse.com  Wed Mar  3 18:30:38 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2010 19:30:39 -0700
Thread-Topic: Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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Last week I started doing the same thing only with normative text in RFC fo=
rmat. I took a break the past two days to work on the LRDD and WebFinger sp=
ecs (one published one pending). I plan to spend most of next week getting =
a feature complete draft for OAuth 2.0 based on a similar skeleton. I am go=
ing away on vacation until Monday afternoon so I will leave it up to you if=
 you want to continue working and sync next week to see where we both are, =
or leave it where it is and wait for my attempt. I'm happy to move forward =
either way.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of David Recordon
> Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2010 2:29 PM
> To: OAuth WG
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
>=20
> Over the weekend I took a quick stab at what a new draft of an OAuth 2.0
> spec would look like.  I don't have a lot of normative text but wanted to=
 share
> what I was thinking about in terms of the specification's structure and
> technical inner-workings.
>=20
> This comes out of the survey from two weeks ago which Peter Saint-Andre
> summarized (http://www.ietf.org/mail-
> archive/web/oauth/current/msg01214.html) as there being consensus
> around:
>  - OAuth 2.0 taking aspects from both the 1.0 and WRAP specs/drafts with =
a
> preference toward the WRAP draft
>  - we should go back to working on a single document
>  - OAuth 2.0 should support signatures as a mechanism for making requests
>=20
> Documents involved:
>  - OAuth 1.0: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10
>  - WRAP: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01
>=20
> Combined document structure:
> My goal is that sections one through four are not more than fifteen to
> twenty pages combined.
>=20
> 0. Abstract
>=20
> 1. Introduction
> 1.1 Acknowledgments
> 1.2 Terminology
> 1.3 Notational Conventions
>=20
> 2. Getting an Access Token
> 2.1 Web App / JavaScript Profile (in browser)
> 2.2 Rich App Profile (can open a browser)
> 2.3 Device Profile (no browser, should be like the Netflix flow)
> 2.4 Username and Password Profile
> 2.5 Client key and secret (not in the context of a user)
>=20
> 3. Refreshing an Access Token
>=20
> 4. Accessing a Protected Resource
> 4.1 Using SSL
> 4.2 Using a signature
>=20
> 5. Security Considerations
>=20
>=20
> Abstract
>     OAuth 2.0 provides a method for an application (Client) to access the
> Protected Resource hosted on a server on behalf of a Resource Owner (such
> as a different client or an end-user).  It provides a process for end-use=
rs to
> authorize third-party access to their Protected Resources via a variety o=
f
> Authorization Profiles which generally do not include having to share the=
ir
> credentials (typically, a username and password pair).  A server can
> additionally delegate authorization to one or more authorities (Authoriza=
tion
> Server) which issue Access Tokens to Clients.
>=20
> Introduction
>  - This section should provide a longer description of the protocol flows=
 and
> the evolution from OAuth 1.0.
>  - The terminology should be based on updated OAuth 1.0 terminology which
> is already close to the WRAP terminology as well.  We should err on the s=
ide
> of more generally understood terms.
>  - Both OAuth 1.0 and WRAP contain fairly complete introductory sections.=
  I
> think that the WRAP one is a bit too long and we should shoot for this se=
ction
> being a little over two pages (including terminology).
>=20
> Getting an Access Token
>  - This section really comes from WRAP.  I believe that a server MUST
> implement at least one of the profiles to be considered OAuth compatible.
>  - The updated OAuth 1.0 spec could also be useful for more complete
> language around the Web App Profile though we should also draw from Luke
> Shepard's JavaScript profile (which needs updating)
> (http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-
> wg/browse_thread/thread/4840fab6935e6fbc).  I believe the main
> difference is the security characteristics.
>  - While the SAML assertion profile has been in WRAP, I haven't seen stro=
ng
> advocates on the mailing list or in the survey for it.  Does someone want=
 to
> argue for keeping it?  Could it be drafted as a separate profile from the=
 core
> spec?
>=20
> Refreshing an Access Token
>  - In WRAP this functionality is described along with each individual
> authorization profile.  Some profiles require the client id and secret th=
ough
> not all of them.  In terms of writing more reusable code I imagine that
> implementors will write a single refresh_token(client_id, client_secret)
> function so breaking this out into its own section will be easier to impl=
ement.
>  - We could either require the client id and secret for all profiles or k=
eep them
> as optional for some profiles.  Personally I lean toward consistency.
>=20
> Accessing a Protected Resource
>  - This section is really a combination of WRAP and OAuth 1.0.  SSL suppo=
rt will
> be a MUST and signatures will be optional.
>  - Bearer tokens (even short lived) without using SSL or signatures feels=
 like a
> poor idea, but given the WRAP draft it seems like the security teams at
> Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! are all comfortable with doing so?  Given th=
at
> we'll be adding signatures as an option do we still need unprotected bear=
er
> tokens?
>  - The SSL section basically copies directly from WRAP section #4.  It's =
about a
> page and a half and really easy to implement.
>  - We need to agree on the signature method though there is a lot of
> normative text in the OAuth 1.0 spec to draw from
> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10#section-3.4).   OAuth 1=
.0
> is about three pages of text assuming people are happy with the mechanism=
;
> it would be good to simplify as much as possible.
>     - We're missing an access token secret, but I'm wondering if we can t=
reat
> the refresh token as the access token secret since it's only sent over th=
e wire
> via SSL?
>     - Alternatively we could modify the refresh token request to let the =
client
> specify that they'd also like an access token secret for that request. Th=
is
> seems like the right way of doing it.
>     - Both break the idea that the API endpoint doesn't have access to se=
crets,
> but the deployment scenarios I've seen discussed as wanting signatures (a=
t
> least Facebook and Twitter) won't be separating their architecture anyway=
.
>=20
> Security Considerations
>  - I'm the wrong person to write this section.
>=20
> Misc
>  - Rename parameters to oauth_
>=20
> If I were to spend some time over the next week or two drafting this spec
> would folks generally be supportive of it?  If not, what would you change=
 so
> that you could be supportive of it?  Note well, if you only reply with "I=
 don't
> like it" without a reasonable technical explanation of why then your feed=
back
> will be disregarded. ;)
>=20
> One of my goals is getting OAuth 2.0 to the point - fairly quickly - wher=
e we
> can start to architect the next version of OpenID on top of it.  WebFinge=
r +
> OAuth 2.0 + identity would be sweet and finally give us a consistent stor=
y for
> both authentication and authorization.  I'd love whatever help I could ge=
t
> with all of this as well!
>=20
> Thanks,
> --David
>=20
> (Cross posted on my blog: http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html)
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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<hat type=3D'chair'/>

On 3/3/10 3:29 PM, David Recordon wrote:
> Over the weekend I took a quick stab at what a new draft of an OAuth
> 2.0 spec would look like.

Thanks, David, I think this is very helpful and a great start to more
rapid progress. I know Eran has been thinking along the same lines.
Let's definitely talk about this in tomorrow's conference call.

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2010 22:32:35 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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<hat type=3D'chair'/>

On 3/3/10 3:47 PM, Igor Faynberg wrote:

> I do think that we need to address a couple of items such as the use
> cases and requirements. The need for those also came quite strongly in
> the surveys. I do not see any problem in developing both in parallel
> (although I do expect that some people would insist on the
> requirements--in support of the use cases--coming first).

Although I like requirements and use cases documents as much as the next
person, I think we can work on those in parallel with the protocol
document given that the WG participants have quite a bit of knowledge
about the problem domain (we're not starting from scratch here).

> One way of addressing this is having the use case requirements sections=

> in the document you are putting together. The other would be to work
> them in a separate document.

My personal opinion is that it would be good to have a separate document
that captures and consolidates a wide variety of use cases (preferably
managed by one or two assigned document editors in accordance with RFC
2418), but that is something the WG would need to agree on. I hope we
can have some preliminary discussions about that in tomorrow's
conference call and perhaps come to consensus on the matter in Anaheim
or soon after.

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: "igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com" <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>, David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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What the specification allows in terms of SSL is different than  deployment=
 requirements, so I would not say that Microsoft is generally comfortable i=
n not using SSL. We don't have a specific requirement for signatures.

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of I=
gor Faynberg
Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2010 2:47 PM
To: David Recordon
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0

David,

I find this is an excellent starting point, and I share with you the urgenc=
y to move the work as quickly as possible.

I do think that we need to address a couple of items such as the use cases =
and requirements. The need for those also came quite strongly in the survey=
s. I do not see any problem in developing both in parallel (although I do e=
xpect that some people would insist on the requirements--in support of the =
use cases--coming first).

One way of addressing this is having the use case requirements sections in =
the document you are putting together. The other would be to work them in a=
 separate document.

What is your opinion?

Igor

David Recordon wrote:
> Over the weekend I took a quick stab at what a new draft of an OAuth 2.0 =
spec would look like.  I don't have a lot of normative text but wanted to s=
hare what I was thinking about in terms of the specification's structure an=
d technical inner-workings.
>
> This comes out of the survey from two weeks ago which Peter Saint-Andre s=
ummarized (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01214.html=
) as there being consensus around:
>  - OAuth 2.0 taking aspects from both the 1.0 and WRAP specs/drafts=20
> with a preference toward the WRAP draft
>  - we should go back to working on a single document
>  - OAuth 2.0 should support signatures as a mechanism for making=20
> requests
>
> Documents involved:
>  - OAuth 1.0: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10
>  - WRAP: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01
>
> Combined document structure:
> My goal is that sections one through four are not more than fifteen to tw=
enty pages combined.
>
> 0. Abstract
>
> 1. Introduction
> 1.1 Acknowledgments
> 1.2 Terminology
> 1.3 Notational Conventions
>
> 2. Getting an Access Token
> 2.1 Web App / JavaScript Profile (in browser)
> 2.2 Rich App Profile (can open a browser)
> 2.3 Device Profile (no browser, should be like the Netflix flow)
> 2.4 Username and Password Profile
> 2.5 Client key and secret (not in the context of a user)
>
> 3. Refreshing an Access Token
>
> 4. Accessing a Protected Resource
> 4.1 Using SSL
> 4.2 Using a signature
>
> 5. Security Considerations
>
>
> Abstract
>     OAuth 2.0 provides a method for an application (Client) to access the=
 Protected Resource hosted on a server on behalf of a Resource Owner (such =
as a different client or an end-user).  It provides a process for end-users=
 to authorize third-party access to their Protected Resources via a variety=
 of Authorization Profiles which generally do not include having to share t=
heir credentials (typically, a username and password pair).  A server can a=
dditionally delegate authorization to one or more authorities (Authorizatio=
n Server) which issue Access Tokens to Clients.
>
> Introduction
>  - This section should provide a longer description of the protocol flows=
 and the evolution from OAuth 1.0.
>  - The terminology should be based on updated OAuth 1.0 terminology which=
 is already close to the WRAP terminology as well.  We should err on the si=
de of more generally understood terms.
>  - Both OAuth 1.0 and WRAP contain fairly complete introductory sections.=
  I think that the WRAP one is a bit too long and we should shoot for this =
section being a little over two pages (including terminology).
>
> Getting an Access Token
>  - This section really comes from WRAP.  I believe that a server MUST imp=
lement at least one of the profiles to be considered OAuth compatible.
>  - The updated OAuth 1.0 spec could also be useful for more complete lang=
uage around the Web App Profile though we should also draw from Luke Shepar=
d's JavaScript profile (which needs updating) (http://groups.google.com/gro=
up/oauth-wrap-wg/browse_thread/thread/4840fab6935e6fbc).  I believe the mai=
n difference is the security characteristics.
>  - While the SAML assertion profile has been in WRAP, I haven't seen stro=
ng advocates on the mailing list or in the survey for it.  Does someone wan=
t to argue for keeping it?  Could it be drafted as a separate profile from =
the core spec?
>
> Refreshing an Access Token
>  - In WRAP this functionality is described along with each individual aut=
horization profile.  Some profiles require the client id and secret though =
not all of them.  In terms of writing more reusable code I imagine that imp=
lementors will write a single refresh_token(client_id, client_secret) funct=
ion so breaking this out into its own section will be easier to implement.
>  - We could either require the client id and secret for all profiles or k=
eep them as optional for some profiles.  Personally I lean toward consisten=
cy.
>
> Accessing a Protected Resource
>  - This section is really a combination of WRAP and OAuth 1.0.  SSL suppo=
rt will be a MUST and signatures will be optional.
>  - Bearer tokens (even short lived) without using SSL or signatures feels=
 like a poor idea, but given the WRAP draft it seems like the security team=
s at Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! are all comfortable with doing so?  Given=
 that we'll be adding signatures as an option do we still need unprotected =
bearer tokens?
>  - The SSL section basically copies directly from WRAP section #4.  It's =
about a page and a half and really easy to implement.
>  - We need to agree on the signature method though there is a lot of norm=
ative text in the OAuth 1.0 spec to draw from (http://tools.ietf.org/html/d=
raft-hammer-oauth-10#section-3.4).   OAuth 1.0 is about three pages of text=
 assuming people are happy with the mechanism; it would be good to simplify=
 as much as possible.
>     - We're missing an access token secret, but I'm wondering if we can t=
reat the refresh token as the access token secret since it's only sent over=
 the wire via SSL?
>     - Alternatively we could modify the refresh token request to let the =
client specify that they'd also like an access token secret for that reques=
t. This seems like the right way of doing it.
>     - Both break the idea that the API endpoint doesn't have access to se=
crets, but the deployment scenarios I've seen discussed as wanting signatur=
es (at least Facebook and Twitter) won't be separating their architecture a=
nyway.
>
> Security Considerations
>  - I'm the wrong person to write this section.
>
> Misc
>  - Rename parameters to oauth_
>
> If I were to spend some time over the next week or two drafting this=20
> spec would folks generally be supportive of it?  If not, what would=20
> you change so that you could be supportive of it?  Note well, if you=20
> only reply with "I don't like it" without a reasonable technical=20
> explanation of why then your feedback will be disregarded. ;)
>
> One of my goals is getting OAuth 2.0 to the point - fairly quickly - wher=
e we can start to architect the next version of OpenID on top of it.  WebFi=
nger + OAuth 2.0 + identity would be sweet and finally give us a consistent=
 story for both authentication and authorization.  I'd love whatever help I=
 could get with all of this as well!
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> (Cross posted on my blog:=20
> http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html)
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>  =20
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From davidrecordon@facebook.com  Wed Mar  3 22:30:26 2010
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To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2010 22:30:18 -0800
Thread-Topic: Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
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Awesome; that's great!

My main goal is helping to get an initial draft of 2.0 so collaborating mak=
es far more sense than multiple efforts.  Is there anything I can do to hel=
p you work toward the draft next week?

What have you been thinking about differently from my outline?

Thanks,
--David

On Mar 3, 2010, at 6:30 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:

> Last week I started doing the same thing only with normative text in RFC =
format. I took a break the past two days to work on the LRDD and WebFinger =
specs (one published one pending). I plan to spend most of next week gettin=
g a feature complete draft for OAuth 2.0 based on a similar skeleton. I am =
going away on vacation until Monday afternoon so I will leave it up to you =
if you want to continue working and sync next week to see where we both are=
, or leave it where it is and wait for my attempt. I'm happy to move forwar=
d either way.
>=20
> EHL
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>> Of David Recordon
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2010 2:29 PM
>> To: OAuth WG
>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Working toward an initial draft of OAuth 2.0
>>=20
>> Over the weekend I took a quick stab at what a new draft of an OAuth 2.0
>> spec would look like.  I don't have a lot of normative text but wanted t=
o share
>> what I was thinking about in terms of the specification's structure and
>> technical inner-workings.
>>=20
>> This comes out of the survey from two weeks ago which Peter Saint-Andre
>> summarized (http://www.ietf.org/mail-
>> archive/web/oauth/current/msg01214.html) as there being consensus
>> around:
>> - OAuth 2.0 taking aspects from both the 1.0 and WRAP specs/drafts with =
a
>> preference toward the WRAP draft
>> - we should go back to working on a single document
>> - OAuth 2.0 should support signatures as a mechanism for making requests
>>=20
>> Documents involved:
>> - OAuth 1.0: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10
>> - WRAP: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01
>>=20
>> Combined document structure:
>> My goal is that sections one through four are not more than fifteen to
>> twenty pages combined.
>>=20
>> 0. Abstract
>>=20
>> 1. Introduction
>> 1.1 Acknowledgments
>> 1.2 Terminology
>> 1.3 Notational Conventions
>>=20
>> 2. Getting an Access Token
>> 2.1 Web App / JavaScript Profile (in browser)
>> 2.2 Rich App Profile (can open a browser)
>> 2.3 Device Profile (no browser, should be like the Netflix flow)
>> 2.4 Username and Password Profile
>> 2.5 Client key and secret (not in the context of a user)
>>=20
>> 3. Refreshing an Access Token
>>=20
>> 4. Accessing a Protected Resource
>> 4.1 Using SSL
>> 4.2 Using a signature
>>=20
>> 5. Security Considerations
>>=20
>>=20
>> Abstract
>>    OAuth 2.0 provides a method for an application (Client) to access the
>> Protected Resource hosted on a server on behalf of a Resource Owner (suc=
h
>> as a different client or an end-user).  It provides a process for end-us=
ers to
>> authorize third-party access to their Protected Resources via a variety =
of
>> Authorization Profiles which generally do not include having to share th=
eir
>> credentials (typically, a username and password pair).  A server can
>> additionally delegate authorization to one or more authorities (Authoriz=
ation
>> Server) which issue Access Tokens to Clients.
>>=20
>> Introduction
>> - This section should provide a longer description of the protocol flows=
 and
>> the evolution from OAuth 1.0.
>> - The terminology should be based on updated OAuth 1.0 terminology which
>> is already close to the WRAP terminology as well.  We should err on the =
side
>> of more generally understood terms.
>> - Both OAuth 1.0 and WRAP contain fairly complete introductory sections.=
  I
>> think that the WRAP one is a bit too long and we should shoot for this s=
ection
>> being a little over two pages (including terminology).
>>=20
>> Getting an Access Token
>> - This section really comes from WRAP.  I believe that a server MUST
>> implement at least one of the profiles to be considered OAuth compatible=
.
>> - The updated OAuth 1.0 spec could also be useful for more complete
>> language around the Web App Profile though we should also draw from Luke
>> Shepard's JavaScript profile (which needs updating)
>> (http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-
>> wg/browse_thread/thread/4840fab6935e6fbc).  I believe the main
>> difference is the security characteristics.
>> - While the SAML assertion profile has been in WRAP, I haven't seen stro=
ng
>> advocates on the mailing list or in the survey for it.  Does someone wan=
t to
>> argue for keeping it?  Could it be drafted as a separate profile from th=
e core
>> spec?
>>=20
>> Refreshing an Access Token
>> - In WRAP this functionality is described along with each individual
>> authorization profile.  Some profiles require the client id and secret t=
hough
>> not all of them.  In terms of writing more reusable code I imagine that
>> implementors will write a single refresh_token(client_id, client_secret)
>> function so breaking this out into its own section will be easier to imp=
lement.
>> - We could either require the client id and secret for all profiles or k=
eep them
>> as optional for some profiles.  Personally I lean toward consistency.
>>=20
>> Accessing a Protected Resource
>> - This section is really a combination of WRAP and OAuth 1.0.  SSL suppo=
rt will
>> be a MUST and signatures will be optional.
>> - Bearer tokens (even short lived) without using SSL or signatures feels=
 like a
>> poor idea, but given the WRAP draft it seems like the security teams at
>> Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! are all comfortable with doing so?  Given t=
hat
>> we'll be adding signatures as an option do we still need unprotected bea=
rer
>> tokens?
>> - The SSL section basically copies directly from WRAP section #4.  It's =
about a
>> page and a half and really easy to implement.
>> - We need to agree on the signature method though there is a lot of
>> normative text in the OAuth 1.0 spec to draw from
>> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth-10#section-3.4).   OAuth =
1.0
>> is about three pages of text assuming people are happy with the mechanis=
m;
>> it would be good to simplify as much as possible.
>>    - We're missing an access token secret, but I'm wondering if we can t=
reat
>> the refresh token as the access token secret since it's only sent over t=
he wire
>> via SSL?
>>    - Alternatively we could modify the refresh token request to let the =
client
>> specify that they'd also like an access token secret for that request. T=
his
>> seems like the right way of doing it.
>>    - Both break the idea that the API endpoint doesn't have access to se=
crets,
>> but the deployment scenarios I've seen discussed as wanting signatures (=
at
>> least Facebook and Twitter) won't be separating their architecture anywa=
y.
>>=20
>> Security Considerations
>> - I'm the wrong person to write this section.
>>=20
>> Misc
>> - Rename parameters to oauth_
>>=20
>> If I were to spend some time over the next week or two drafting this spe=
c
>> would folks generally be supportive of it?  If not, what would you chang=
e so
>> that you could be supportive of it?  Note well, if you only reply with "=
I don't
>> like it" without a reasonable technical explanation of why then your fee=
dback
>> will be disregarded. ;)
>>=20
>> One of my goals is getting OAuth 2.0 to the point - fairly quickly - whe=
re we
>> can start to architect the next version of OpenID on top of it.  WebFing=
er +
>> OAuth 2.0 + identity would be sweet and finally give us a consistent sto=
ry for
>> both authentication and authorization.  I'd love whatever help I could g=
et
>> with all of this as well!
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> --David
>>=20
>> (Cross posted on my blog: http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html)
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Mar  4 10:10:38 2010
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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2010 11:10:32 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] meeting reminder
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Just a reminder that we'll hold a conference call in about 50 minutes.
Logistics and agenda here:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01222.html

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01221.html

Talk to you soon!

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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From recordond@gmail.com  Thu Mar  4 10:55:27 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Invalidating access tokens
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Copying over a discussion from comments on my blog...
http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html?thread=1117640#t1117640

Mart Atkins:
> Doing short-lived access tokens in cleartext is not really any different to how most sites
> handle sessions today. A short-lived access token isn't much different than a session key.
>
> However, if access tokens are going to be used in this way it's probably sensible to define
> a mechanism by which a consumer can explicitly invalidate an access token. This means
> that an access token can be tied to the live of a site session: when the user logs in (or,
> when they first do something that needs the access token) use the refresh token to obtain
> a new access token; when the user logs out, terminate all of the active access tokens
> associated with that session.

David Recordon:
> An invalidate method makes sense, though wouldn't this just happen by refreshing the
> token anyway? You'd get a new access token and the old one would stop working.

Mart Atkins:
> Maybe that would work, as long as the new access token is known only to the consumer
> until the next time the user logs in. Obviously the difference with explicit invalidation is
> that when the user isn't around there are no valid access tokens at all for that user.

From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Thu Mar  4 11:01:47 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Recent UMA work that may inform this group's deliberations
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Folks may be interested to see the following experiment being performed =
in the UMA group:

=
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol

This is a proposal for a spec that uses a WRAP-friendly approach to =
solving our use cases.  Please note the final comments in today's UMA =
telecon minutes for cautions about additional requirements we have:

=
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2010-03-04=


	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From romeda@gmail.com  Thu Mar  4 12:01:49 2010
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From: Blaine Cook <romeda@gmail.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.

b.

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Mar  4 12:22:51 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] another good meeting
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I'd like to again thank everyone who participated in the call that just
ended. Rough notes are here:

http://etherpad.com/RZilFVrF2Q

Those notes will be updated once we have the audio recording.

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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--------------ms050308040702030200020601--

From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Thu Mar  4 12:27:50 2010
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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2010 15:27:58 -0500
From: Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Blaine Cook wrote:
> - Why are signatures needed?
>   
1) For authentication

2) For ensuring integrity

3) For non-repudiation
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>   
They protect against

1) Fraudulent access (which, in absence of proper mechanisms, may not 
even even be considered legally fraudulent while making considerable damage)

2) Denial of a previous request.


Igor
>
>   

From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Thu Mar  4 12:30:54 2010
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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2010 15:31:02 -0500
From: Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] another good meeting
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Peter,

Many thanks for your leadership! It was an excellent idea to organize 
the meetings, but it has been a feat in itself actually to run them--and 
run them successfully, at that!

Igor

Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> I'd like to again thank everyone who participated in the call that just
> ended. Rough notes are here:
>
> http://etherpad.com/RZilFVrF2Q
>
> Those notes will be updated once we have the audio recording.
>
> Peter
>
>   
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>   

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Mar  4 12:48:45 2010
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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2010 13:48:44 -0700
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: Fwd: Your recording "OAUTH WG Virtual Meeting-20100304 1905-1" is available for viewing
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This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format.

--------------ms040803060902020507040109
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Here is the link for our recording. Now the chairs need to write up
official minutes for the last three meetings!


Begin forwarded message:

> *From: *messenger@webex.com <mailto:messenger@webex.com>
> *Date: *March 4, 2010 12:18:59 PM PST
> *To: *amorris@amsl.com <mailto:amorris@amsl.com>
> *Subject: **Your recording "OAUTH WG Virtual Meeting-20100304 1905-1"
> is available for viewing*
> *Reply-To: *messenger@webex.com <mailto:messenger@webex.com>
>
> IETF Secretariat,
>
> Your recording is now available on the WebEx service site. Click the
> link below to play it:
>
> https://workgreen.webex.com/workgreen/lsr.php?AT=3Dpb&SP=3DMC&rID=3D411=
9452&rKey=3Dc0024803e45d5b5c
> <https://workgreen.webex.com/workgreen/lsr.php?AT=3Dpb&SP=3DMC&rID=3D41=
19452&rKey=3Dc0024803e45d5b5c>
>
>
> OAUTH WG Virtual Meeting-20100304 1905-1
> Thursday, March 4, 2010 1:05 pm Chicago Time
> 1 Hour 11 Minutes
>
> * You can forward this message to others to allow them to play back
> the recording. *
>
> -------------------------------------
> Additional Options
> -------------------------------------
>
> To edit recording information and playback control options, click the
> link below:
> https://workgreen.webex.com/workgreen/editrd.php?rID=3D4119452&SP=3DMC
> <https://workgreen.webex.com/workgreen/editrd.php?rID=3D4119452&SP=3DMC=
>
>
> To view more options for this recording, such as downloading, click
> the link below:
> https://workgreen.webex.com/workgreen/viewrd.php?rID=3D4119452&SP=3DMC
> <https://workgreen.webex.com/workgreen/viewrd.php?rID=3D4119452&SP=3DMC=
>
>
> To view all your WebEx Meeting Center recordings, click the link below:=

> https://workgreen.webex.com/workgreen/servicerds.php?SP=3DMC
>
> http://www.webex.com




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--------------ms040803060902020507040109--

From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Thu Mar  4 12:52:02 2010
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As requested on today's call, here's a description of the places where =
UMA seems to need "more" than what the WRAP paradigm offers (both =
profiling and extending), based on the proposal at:

=
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol

Cautions in reading this note:

- The mix of likely needed profiles and extensions for our use of the =
OAuth 1.0 paradigm (the existing spec on the UMA site) is quite =
different from the list presented here, and in addition, that spec =
wasn't written with a goal to highlight such items the way this proposal =
was.

- The proposal is currently fairly high-level, and other =
profiling/extension needs may come to light if we proceed down this path =
-- or some of the needs may disappear.  The proposal nonetheless tries =
to document profile and extension points as precisely as possible.

- UMA's terminology is similar but not identical to WRAP's.  The =
proposal tries to be as clear as possible about the distinctions, but =
caveat lector.

- For all of the profile/extension items listed, they may be of interest =
only to UMAnitarians, or they might have wider application as optional =
or required portions of a core OAuth 2.0 spec.  We're not trying to =
prejudice this outcome, just provide useful information for making the =
decision in the wider community.

So, with all that said...  Here is the conception of UMA's use of the =
WRAP paradigm as conceived in the proposal.

1. Currently, WRAP says nothing about how a Protected Resource and an =
Authorization Server "meet" and figure out how to work together.  UMA =
has reason to make the user's choice of authorization management (AM) =
services and hosts of their resources be dynamic and flexible -- that's =
why it's called "user-managed access" -- so the proposal suggests a =
special way to use (an embedded instance of one of the user delegation =
profiles of) WRAP to introduce them, as a "step 1".  (The token thus =
acquired by the host in this step plays a role in "step 3".)

2a. Another of UMA's goals is to allow authorizing users (roughly, =
Resource Owners) to make demands of other parties before granting them =
access rather than just permissioning the connection "silently".  The =
mechanism for making these demands is to require the requesting side to =
provide claims (yes, in the identity claims sense) and even to make this =
process have legal enforceability consequences where possible.  Thus, =
the proposal suggests an extended getting-a-token phase in a "step 2" =
that adds a new third option to the two usual WRAP options (successful =
access token response and unsuccessful access token response): a =
claims-required response.

2b. Due to our analysis of the legal (cough) and UX dimensions of the =
UMA proposition, we've discovered that it's useful to separate =
requesting parties (the legally responsible party "behind" the =
requester/Client) into legal persons vs. natural persons.  This is a way =
in which UMA deviates from OAuth and WRAP entirely, in that we're =
figuring out how to do "person-to-person sharing" (Alice permissions Bob =
to subscribe to a hosted calendar of hers) along with "person-to-service =
sharing" (Alice permissions ECommerce.com to grab her current shipping =
address from her personal datastore).  The current thinking is that it's =
a matter of putting the requester into a user-delegated flow vs. an =
autonomous-client flow as part of getting a token in step 2.

2c. Currently, WRAP doesn't say anything about how to fill the scope =
parameter value.  In this context, an obvious optimization is the "all =
the photos that happen to be in this folder" authorization scenario.  So =
we went ahead and proposed a simple JSON-based format for describing =
both simple access scope and basic wildcarded access scope.

3. The means by which a host interprets an incoming access token is not =
currently specified in WRAP.  Unfortunately, UMA needs to know. :-)  =
There seem to be two options: validating it locally or offloading =
validation.  To avoid putting a signature validation burden on the host, =
we have proposed a strawman where the host can simply ask the AM to do =
the validation for it.  (A personal observation: The local/offload =
choice all depends on various scale and loose coupling factors, but this =
is appealing for lots of reasons.  It not only views the Authorization =
Server as an STS performing a typical token validation function, but =
pretty closely matches the classic access management paradigm where the =
policy enforcement point asks the centralized policy decision point what =
to do.  And other useful info could also ride over this back channel, =
either in extensions or -- as the need arises -- in core OAuth.)

n. Several people at the UMA table continue to be concerned about the =
overall risks in using the WRAP paradigm for controlling access to =
various kinds of sensitive information in various ways.  It may not be =
acceptable in some UMA use cases, e.g., to use replayable tokens.  As I =
promised on the call, I'll work with the UMA group to research this =
issue as precisely as possible in preparation for Anaheim, ideally =
including specific guidance from those who have submitted the most =
sensitive UMA scenarios or have the biggest concerns.

	Eve

On 4 Mar 2010, at 11:01 AM, Eve Maler wrote:

> Folks may be interested to see the following experiment being =
performed in the UMA group:
>=20
> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol
>=20
> This is a proposal for a spec that uses a WRAP-friendly approach to =
solving our use cases.  Please note the final comments in today's UMA =
telecon minutes for cautions about additional requirements we have:
>=20
> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2010-03-04=

>=20
> 	Eve
>=20
> Eve Maler
> eve@xmlgrrl.com
> http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


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To: igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On 2010-03-04, at 12:27 PM, Igor Faynberg wrote:

>=20
>=20
> Blaine Cook wrote:
>> - Why are signatures needed?
>> =20
> 1) For authentication
>=20
> 2) For ensuring integrity
>=20
> 3) For non-repudiation

Those are the general capabilities of signatures. "Why does the Client =
need to sign the request / token?" is the full question.

Which party are we worried about authenticating? What are we trying to =
ensure the integrity of? What statement is requires non-repudiation?


>> - What do signatures need to protect?
>> =20
> They protect against
>=20
> 1) Fraudulent access (which, in absence of proper mechanisms, may not =
even even be considered legally fraudulent while making considerable =
damage)
>=20
> 2) Denial of a previous request.

I am confused by this statement. Would you elaborate?=

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On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 12:00 PM, Blaine Cook <romeda@gmail.com> wrote:
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.

Luke summarized Facebook's use cases for signatures earlier:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01049.html

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Mar  4 14:29:52 2010
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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2010 15:29:49 -0700
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Anaheim agenda, v0.1
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<hat type=3D'chair'/>

Based on our discussion in the conference call earlier today, here is a
rough agenda for our 2-hour session in Anaheim.

***

0. Administrivia (chairs, 5 mins)

1. OAuth intro (David Recordon, 15 mins)

2. WRAP (Dick Hardt, 15 mins)

3. Mixed approach (Eran Hammer-Lahav / David Recordon, 25 mins)

4. Open issues with mixed approach (moderated discussion, 45 mins)

5. Use cases / scenarios as WG item (5 mins)

6. Summary / action items (10 mins)

***

Bash away!

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 10:55 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
> Mart Atkins:
>> Doing short-lived access tokens in cleartext is not really any different to how most sites
>> handle sessions today. A short-lived access token isn't much different than a session key.

Yep.  This is not an accident, and the pattern extends way beyond the
web.  You see it in pretty much every trusted third-party
authentication system.

>> However, if access tokens are going to be used in this way it's probably sensible to define
>> a mechanism by which a consumer can explicitly invalidate an access token. This means
>> that an access token can be tied to the live of a site session: when the user logs in (or,
>> when they first do something that needs the access token) use the refresh token to obtain
>> a new access token; when the user logs out, terminate all of the active access tokens
>> associated with that session.

I'm sure an invalidate method would be useful for refresh tokens,
though not essential.

I suspect most WRAP deployments won't be able to do server-side
invalidation of access tokens; they'll be implemented without
server-side state.  It does turn out that the WRAP refresh
token/access token pattern does make server-side invalidation fairly
efficient to implement if deployments decide to care.

>> An invalidate method makes sense, though wouldn't this just happen by refreshing the
>> token anyway? You'd get a new access token and the old one would stop working.

I don't think this is a good idea.  There's no guarantee that the old
access tokens are not still being used at the time that the new access
token is minted.

Cheers,
Brian

From eran@hueniverse.com  Thu Mar  4 16:06:36 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2010 17:06:27 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Invalidating access tokens
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I don't buy the argument that future security should be modelled after =20
the broken security we have today.

EHL

On Mar 4, 2010, at 10:55, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> Copying over a discussion from comments on my blog...
> http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html?thread=3D1117640#t1117640
>
> Mart Atkins:
>> Doing short-lived access tokens in cleartext is not really any =20
>> different to how most sites
>> handle sessions today. A short-lived access token isn't much =20
>> different than a session key.
>>
>> However, if access tokens are going to be used in this way it's =20
>> probably sensible to define
>> a mechanism by which a consumer can explicitly invalidate an access =20
>> token. This means
>> that an access token can be tied to the live of a site session: =20
>> when the user logs in (or,
>> when they first do something that needs the access token) use the =20
>> refresh token to obtain
>> a new access token; when the user logs out, terminate all of the =20
>> active access tokens
>> associated with that session.
>
> David Recordon:
>> An invalidate method makes sense, though wouldn't this just happen =20
>> by refreshing the
>> token anyway? You'd get a new access token and the old one would =20
>> stop working.
>
> Mart Atkins:
>> Maybe that would work, as long as the new access token is known =20
>> only to the consumer
>> until the next time the user logs in. Obviously the difference with =20
>> explicit invalidation is
>> that when the user isn't around there are no valid access tokens at =20
>> all for that user.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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Cool.  Happy to share my intro time with Eran/Chris/Blain if they'd
like as well.

On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 2:29 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> wrote:
> <hat type='chair'/>
>
> Based on our discussion in the conference call earlier today, here is a
> rough agenda for our 2-hour session in Anaheim.
>
> ***
>
> 0. Administrivia (chairs, 5 mins)
>
> 1. OAuth intro (David Recordon, 15 mins)
>
> 2. WRAP (Dick Hardt, 15 mins)
>
> 3. Mixed approach (Eran Hammer-Lahav / David Recordon, 25 mins)
>
> 4. Open issues with mixed approach (moderated discussion, 45 mins)
>
> 5. Use cases / scenarios as WG item (5 mins)
>
> 6. Summary / action items (10 mins)
>
> ***
>
> Bash away!
>
> Peter
>
> --
> Peter Saint-Andre
> https://stpeter.im/
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
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>
>

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Hi Eve

Looking at the WRAP oriented comments in the spec, here are some =
comments / questions:

Note
WRAP doesn't seem to say HTTPS is required for the user authorization =
URL; is this a bug in the WRAP spec? If not, is it a good idea for us to =
profile it in this way? Finally, is this the right place to say HTTPS is =
required for all these URLs?

Dick: an HTTPS requirement is prohibitive at times. See =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg/browse_thread/thread/821e73bc=
bd8033dd?hl=3Den# for a recent discussion on this.

Note
Need lots of examples for all of this. Also, note that WRAP forces =
clients to use POST on access token URLs and refresh token URLs; can we =
use GET in the way described here?

Dick: why do you want GET? There are security issues with using GET to =
the AS.

Note
Obviously this is just the highest-level sketch of what needs to happen! =
This needs to be fleshed out. (E.g., the wrap_scope format could be =
reused here, without any wildcards.)
Also, are we concerned that a malicious host could lie about the =
attempted resource and method? The only consequence seems to be "false =
negatives" in managing authorized access, in which case the user would =
get unhappy pretty quickly.

Dick: it was envisioned that the scope of a function of scope would be =
embedded in the Access Token. Or perhaps I don't understand the issue.


On 2010-03-04, at 11:01 AM, Eve Maler wrote:

> Folks may be interested to see the following experiment being =
performed in the UMA group:
>=20
> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol
>=20
> This is a proposal for a spec that uses a WRAP-friendly approach to =
solving our use cases.  Please note the final comments in today's UMA =
telecon minutes for cautions about additional requirements we have:
>=20
> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2010-03-04=

>=20
> 	Eve
>=20
> Eve Maler
> eve@xmlgrrl.com
> http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>Hi Eve</div><div><br></div><div>Looking at the WRAP oriented =
comments in the spec, here are some comments / =
questions:</div><div><br></div><div><b>Note</b><br>WRAP doesn't seem to =
say HTTPS is required for the user authorization URL; is this a bug in =
the WRAP spec? If not, is it a good idea for us to profile it in this =
way? Finally, is this the right place to say HTTPS is required for all =
these URLs?</div><div><br></div><div>Dick: an HTTPS requirement is =
prohibitive at times. See&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg/browse_thread/thread/=
821e73bcbd8033dd?hl=3Den#">http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg/br=
owse_thread/thread/821e73bcbd8033dd?hl=3Den#</a> for a recent discussion =
on this.</div><div><br></div><div><b>Note</b><br>Need lots of examples =
for all of this. Also, note that WRAP forces clients to use POST on =
access token URLs and refresh token URLs; can we use GET in the way =
described here?</div><div><br></div><div>Dick: why do you want GET? =
There are security issues with using GET to the =
AS.</div><div><br></div><div><b>Note</b><br>Obviously this is just the =
highest-level sketch of what needs to happen! This needs to be fleshed =
out. (E.g., the wrap_scope format could be reused here, without any =
wildcards.)<br>Also, are we concerned that a malicious host could lie =
about the attempted resource and method? The only consequence seems to =
be "false negatives" in managing authorized access, in which case the =
user would get unhappy pretty quickly.</div><div><br></div><div>Dick: it =
was envisioned that the scope of a function of scope would be embedded =
in the Access Token. Or perhaps I don't understand the =
issue.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div>On 2010-03-04, at =
11:01 AM, Eve Maler wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>Folks =
may be interested to see the following experiment being performed in the =
UMA group:<br><br><a =
href=3D"http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.prote=
ctnetwork.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol">http://kantarainitiative=
.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwork.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1=
.0+Core+Protocol</a><br><br>This is a proposal for a spec that uses a =
WRAP-friendly approach to solving our use cases. &nbsp;Please note the =
final comments in today's UMA telecon minutes for cautions about =
additional requirements we =
have:<br><br>http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telec=
on+2010-03-04<br><br><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Eve<br><br>Eve =
Maler<br>eve@xmlgrrl.com<br>http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog<br><br>___________=
____________________________________<br>OAuth mailing =
list<br>OAuth@ietf.org<br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br><=
/div></blockquote></div><br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail-13--464138611--

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Thanks Eve, comments inserted ...=20

On 2010-03-04, at 12:51 PM, Eve Maler wrote:

> As requested on today's call, here's a description of the places where =
UMA seems to need "more" than what the WRAP paradigm offers (both =
profiling and extending), based on the proposal at:
>=20
> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol
>=20
> Cautions in reading this note:
>=20
> - The mix of likely needed profiles and extensions for our use of the =
OAuth 1.0 paradigm (the existing spec on the UMA site) is quite =
different from the list presented here, and in addition, that spec =
wasn't written with a goal to highlight such items the way this proposal =
was.
>=20
> - The proposal is currently fairly high-level, and other =
profiling/extension needs may come to light if we proceed down this path =
-- or some of the needs may disappear.  The proposal nonetheless tries =
to document profile and extension points as precisely as possible.
>=20
> - UMA's terminology is similar but not identical to WRAP's.  The =
proposal tries to be as clear as possible about the distinctions, but =
caveat lector.
>=20
> - For all of the profile/extension items listed, they may be of =
interest only to UMAnitarians, or they might have wider application as =
optional or required portions of a core OAuth 2.0 spec.  We're not =
trying to prejudice this outcome, just provide useful information for =
making the decision in the wider community.
>=20
> So, with all that said...  Here is the conception of UMA's use of the =
WRAP paradigm as conceived in the proposal.
>=20
> 1. Currently, WRAP says nothing about how a Protected Resource and an =
Authorization Server "meet" and figure out how to work together.

This was explicitly out of scope for WRAP. There are scale and privacy =
advantages to the PR and AR not meeting. The PR needs to trust the AR =
the issued the Access Token (and of course be able to verify the Access =
Token was issued by the AR), but the AR does NOT need to be aware of the =
PR. In this way, WRAP=20

>  UMA has reason to make the user's choice of authorization management =
(AM) services and hosts of their resources be dynamic and flexible -- =
that's why it's called "user-managed access" -- so the proposal suggests =
a special way to use (an embedded instance of one of the user delegation =
profiles of) WRAP to introduce them, as a "step 1".  (The token thus =
acquired by the host in this step plays a role in "step 3".)

Interesting use of WRAP. I don't see a hole in WRAP for you to do this. =
Is there some functionality missing?

>=20
> 2a. Another of UMA's goals is to allow authorizing users (roughly, =
Resource Owners) to make demands of other parties before granting them =
access rather than just permissioning the connection "silently".  The =
mechanism for making these demands is to require the requesting side to =
provide claims (yes, in the identity claims sense) and even to make this =
process have legal enforceability consequences where possible.  Thus, =
the proposal suggests an extended getting-a-token phase in a "step 2" =
that adds a new third option to the two usual WRAP options (successful =
access token response and unsuccessful access token response): a =
claims-required response.

I can see it being useful in a standard return parameter that can =
contain an value undefined by WRAP (similar to the scope parameter), =
that is used by the AS to communicate to the Client what else the Client =
needs to be granted an Access Token. Is this what you are asking for?

>=20
> 2b. Due to our analysis of the legal (cough) and UX dimensions of the =
UMA proposition, we've discovered that it's useful to separate =
requesting parties (the legally responsible party "behind" the =
requester/Client) into legal persons vs. natural persons.  This is a way =
in which UMA deviates from OAuth and WRAP entirely, in that we're =
figuring out how to do "person-to-person sharing" (Alice permissions Bob =
to subscribe to a hosted calendar of hers) along with "person-to-service =
sharing" (Alice permissions ECommerce.com to grab her current shipping =
address from her personal datastore).  The current thinking is that it's =
a matter of putting the requester into a user-delegated flow vs. an =
autonomous-client flow as part of getting a token in step 2.

Is there something missing in WRAP to do this?

>=20
> 2c. Currently, WRAP doesn't say anything about how to fill the scope =
parameter value.  In this context, an obvious optimization is the "all =
the photos that happen to be in this folder" authorization scenario.  So =
we went ahead and proposed a simple JSON-based format for describing =
both simple access scope and basic wildcarded access scope.

Different scenarios will require different scope values. We thought it =
useful to define the parameter so that it would  be easier library =
providers and specs like UMA to define the value without also having to =
define the parameter.

>=20
> 3. The means by which a host interprets an incoming access token is =
not currently specified in WRAP.  Unfortunately, UMA needs to know. :-)  =
There seem to be two options: validating it locally or offloading =
validation.  To avoid putting a signature validation burden on the host, =
we have proposed a strawman where the host can simply ask the AM to do =
the validation for it.  (A personal observation: The local/offload =
choice all depends on various scale and loose coupling factors, but this =
is appealing for lots of reasons.  It not only views the Authorization =
Server as an STS performing a typical token validation function, but =
pretty closely matches the classic access management paradigm where the =
policy enforcement point asks the centralized policy decision point what =
to do.  And other useful info could also ride over this back channel, =
either in extensions or -- as the need arises -- in core OAuth.)

When developing WRAP, we envisioned that the PR would verify and =
interpret locally.

>=20
> n. Several people at the UMA table continue to be concerned about the =
overall risks in using the WRAP paradigm for controlling access to =
various kinds of sensitive information in various ways.  It may not be =
acceptable in some UMA use cases, e.g., to use replayable tokens.  As I =
promised on the call, I'll work with the UMA group to research this =
issue as precisely as possible in preparation for Anaheim, ideally =
including specific guidance from those who have submitted the most =
sensitive UMA scenarios or have the biggest concerns.

Posting what you find to the list prior to Anaheim would be useful for =
the rest of us to have a chance to digest and then we can discuss in =
detail at Anaheim.

-- Dick


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I could have some commentary on the mixed approach as well.

I've been contemplating extending the WRAP draft to include signatures =
once the requirements / capabilities of signatures was clear.

-- Dick

On 2010-03-04, at 4:48 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> Cool.  Happy to share my intro time with Eran/Chris/Blain if they'd
> like as well.
>=20
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 2:29 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> =
wrote:
>> <hat type=3D'chair'/>
>>=20
>> Based on our discussion in the conference call earlier today, here is =
a
>> rough agenda for our 2-hour session in Anaheim.
>>=20
>> ***
>>=20
>> 0. Administrivia (chairs, 5 mins)
>>=20
>> 1. OAuth intro (David Recordon, 15 mins)
>>=20
>> 2. WRAP (Dick Hardt, 15 mins)
>>=20
>> 3. Mixed approach (Eran Hammer-Lahav / David Recordon, 25 mins)
>>=20
>> 4. Open issues with mixed approach (moderated discussion, 45 mins)
>>=20
>> 5. Use cases / scenarios as WG item (5 mins)
>>=20
>> 6. Summary / action items (10 mins)
>>=20
>> ***
>>=20
>> Bash away!
>>=20
>> Peter
>>=20
>> --
>> Peter Saint-Andre
>> https://stpeter.im/
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think there are probably going to be more instances of providers =20
> needing this than otherwise. The current Username and Password =20
> profile is not a solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is =20=

> a need for a secure protocol where you can validate that the client =20=

> is who they say they are in a profile such as on a phone or desktop =20=

> application.
>
> ~/Jason Hullinger
>
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> =20=

> wrote:
> Is Facebook the only one who needs this?
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The spec allows the AS to define additional parameters, so for =20
>> these specialized use cases, Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony =20=

>> to include an identifier in the request.
>>
>> Is that adequate?
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon =20
>> <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily
>> where we envision using the username/password profile.
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =20
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:
>> >
>> >> On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger =
<sshjason@gmail.com=20
>> > wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier
>> >>>> wrap_username - Required. The User=E2=80=99s username
>> >>>> wrap_password - Required. The User=E2=80=99s password
>> >>>> wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values defined by =20
>> the server
>> >>>> Additional parameters - Any additional parameter defined by the
>> >>>> authorization server
>> >>>>
>> >>>> =46rom the above parameters there is no way of insuring that a =20=

>> client is ever
>> >>>> who they say they are because a user could easily obtain the =20
>> wrap_client_id
>> >>>> and make requests using that. Does anyone have an =20
>> implementation of this or
>> >>>> any recommended additional parameters?
>> >>>
>> >>> I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any way, =20=

>> the
>> >>> user trusted the client and provided his/her username and =20
>> password,
>> >>> that's all that counts. The should just verify these =20
>> credentials and
>> >>> then issue refresh and access tokens.
>> >>
>> >> It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate =20
>> who the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have =20
>> pretty strict restrictions on the ability for apps to take user =20
>> credentials directly and we need to be able to enforce those =20
>> restrictions. I would like to see the ability to authenticate the =20
>> app as well in this profile.
>> >
>> > This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where =20=

>> redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a =20
>> phone.
>> >
>> > Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with =20
>> current platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep =20
>> secrets from malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret =20=

>> from the user, but use of this profile by a web app does not seem =20
>> to make sense.
>> >
>> > -- Dick
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the =20
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>> >
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<html><body bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div><div>+ietf =
list</div><div><br></div><div><br>On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason =
Hullinger &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com"><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a></a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>I think =
there are probably going to be more instances of providers needing this =
than otherwise. The current Username and Password profile is not a =
solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is a need for a secure =
protocol where you can validate that the client is who they say they are =
in a profile such as on a phone or desktop application.<br>
<br>~/Jason Hullinger<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 4, =
2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com"><a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com">lshepard@facebook.com</a></a>&gt;</s=
pan> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0pt =
0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: =
1ex;">
<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div>Is Facebook the only one who needs =
this?<br><br>Sent from my iPhone</div><div><div></div><div =
class=3D"h5"><div><br>On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com"><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a></a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
<br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>The spec allows the =
AS to define additional parameters, so for these specialized use cases, =
Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony to include an identifier in the =
request.<br>
<br>Is that adequate?<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com"><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a></a>&gt;</span>=
 wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid =
rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily<br>
where we envision using the username/password profile.<br>
<div><div></div><div><br>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com"><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a></a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com"><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a></a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_username - Required. The User=E2=80=99s =
username<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_password - Required. The User=E2=80=99s =
password<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values =
defined by the server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Additional parameters - Any additional parameter =
defined by the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =46rom the above parameters there is no way of insuring =
that a client is ever<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; who they say they are because a user could easily =
obtain the wrap_client_id<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and make requests using that. Does anyone have an =
implementation of this or<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; any recommended additional parameters?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any =
way, the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; user trusted the client and provided his/her username and =
password,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that's all that counts. The should just verify these =
credentials and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; then issue refresh and access tokens.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate =
who the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty =
strict restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials =
directly and we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would =
like to see the ability to authenticate the app as well in this =
profile.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where =
redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a =
phone.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with current =
platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets from =
malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the user, =
but use of this profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; -- Dick<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; --<br>
<div><div></div><div>&gt; You received this message because you are =
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&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

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From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Thu Mar  4 21:31:13 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Dick Hardt wrote:
> On 2010-03-04, at 12:27 PM, Igor Faynberg wrote:
> ...
>>> - Why are signatures needed?
>>>  
>>>       
>> 1) For authentication
>>
>> 2) For ensuring integrity
>>
>> 3) For non-repudiation
>>     
>
> Those are the general capabilities of signatures. "Why does the Client need to sign the request / token?" is the full question.
>   

Yes, these are the benefits of using signatures. As Brian has already 
pointed, there have been cases on the record. I tried to summarize the 
benefits in a short answer, but I don't mind elaborating.
> Which party are we worried about authenticating? 
>   

The Client, of course. And it is not simply that we are authenticating 
the Client, we a) authenticate the token and b) ensure that it has not 
been modified. Say, a rogue Client through some sort of phishing 
pretends to the end user to be legitimate in accessing the user's data 
and--to the server (i.e., service provider) it pretends to be a 
legitimate partner. A lot of bad things may happen. Yet, if the request 
for *temporary credentials* is denied when the signature is  verified 
and found wrong, nothing would proceed. Here, only a legitimate client 
can even start a transaction.

And then, later the request for *token credentials* also needs to be 
signed (and differently) to ensure   that of all the legitimate Clients 
only the Client authorized by the end user can access the record.

> What are we trying to ensure the integrity of?

The request, of course. Incidentally, this feature would come "for free" anyway if the client signs the hash of the request and sends it along with the request itself. (And throwing in a nonce into the hash would prevent replay.)

>  What statement is requires non-repudiation?
The mere transaction request, as far as I am concerned. If the Client later claims that no such request had been made, the Server will show the signed request. (Of course, here the best way to effect this is to use the private key for signature; otherwise a solution may become hairy--requiring a third party.)

Igor

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2010 21:37:29 -0800
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To: oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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As was discussed on the OAuth list, desktop apps can NOT be secured, so =
there is no way to ensure it really is the desktop app you think it is. =
For most phone platforms, this is also the case. For totally locked =
platforms where the app is part of the OS (xbox, PS3, some phones, =
settop boxes) -- then one can have high confidence the app is the app. =
So far I consider these the exception rather than the rule.

-- Dick

On 2010-03-04, at 8:37 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> +ietf list
>=20
>=20
> On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> I think there are probably going to be more instances of providers =
needing this than otherwise. The current Username and Password profile =
is not a solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is a need for =
a secure protocol where you can validate that the client is who they say =
they are in a profile such as on a phone or desktop application.
>>=20
>> ~/Jason Hullinger
>>=20
>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> =
wrote:
>> Is Facebook the only one who needs this?
>>=20
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>=20
>> On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> The spec allows the AS to define additional parameters, so for these =
specialized use cases, Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony to include =
an identifier in the request.
>>>=20
>>> Is that adequate?
>>>=20
>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>> Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily
>>> where we envision using the username/password profile.
>>>=20
>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>> >
>>> > On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:
>>> >
>>> >> On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger =
<sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier
>>> >>>> wrap_username - Required. The User=92s username
>>> >>>> wrap_password - Required. The User=92s password
>>> >>>> wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values defined by =
the server
>>> >>>> Additional parameters - Any additional parameter defined by the
>>> >>>> authorization server
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> =46rom the above parameters there is no way of insuring that a =
client is ever
>>> >>>> who they say they are because a user could easily obtain the =
wrap_client_id
>>> >>>> and make requests using that. Does anyone have an =
implementation of this or
>>> >>>> any recommended additional parameters?
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any way, =
the
>>> >>> user trusted the client and provided his/her username and =
password,
>>> >>> that's all that counts. The should just verify these credentials =
and
>>> >>> then issue refresh and access tokens.
>>> >>
>>> >> It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate who =
the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty strict =
restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials directly =
and we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would like to =
see the ability to authenticate the app as well in this profile.
>>> >
>>> > This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where =
redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a phone.
>>> >
>>> > Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with current =
platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets from =
malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the user, =
but use of this profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.
>>> >
>>> > -- Dick
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>> > To post to this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>> > For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>> >
>>> >
>>>=20
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
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>>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> --=20
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
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>>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>=20
>>=20
>> --=20
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>=20
>>=20
>> --=20
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
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>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
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> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.


--Apple-Mail-18--450042960
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">As =
was discussed on the OAuth list, desktop apps can NOT be secured, so =
there is no way to ensure it really is the desktop app you think it is. =
For most phone platforms, this is also the case. For totally locked =
platforms where the app is part of the OS (xbox, PS3, some phones, =
settop boxes) -- then one can have high confidence the app is the app. =
So far I consider these the exception rather than the =
rule.<div><br></div><div>-- Dick<br><div><br><div><div>On 2010-03-04, at =
8:37 PM, David Recordon wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div><div>+ietf list</div><div><br></div><div><br>On =
Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>I think =
there are probably going to be more instances of providers needing this =
than otherwise. The current Username and Password profile is not a =
solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is a need for a secure =
protocol where you can validate that the client is who they say they are =
in a profile such as on a phone or desktop application.<br>
<br>~/Jason Hullinger<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 4, =
2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com">lshepard@facebook.com</a>&gt;</span>=
 wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0pt 0pt =
0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: =
1ex;">
<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div>Is Facebook the only one who needs =
this?<br><br>Sent from my iPhone</div><div><div></div><div =
class=3D"h5"><div><br>On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
<br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>The spec allows the =
AS to define additional parameters, so for these specialized use cases, =
Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony to include an identifier in the =
request.<br>
<br>Is that adequate?<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid =
rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily<br>
where we envision using the username/password profile.<br>
<div><div></div><div><br>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_username - Required. The User=92s username<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_password - Required. The User=92s password<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values =
defined by the server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Additional parameters - Any additional parameter =
defined by the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =46rom the above parameters there is no way of insuring =
that a client is ever<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; who they say they are because a user could easily =
obtain the wrap_client_id<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and make requests using that. Does anyone have an =
implementation of this or<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; any recommended additional parameters?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any =
way, the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; user trusted the client and provided his/her username and =
password,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that's all that counts. The should just verify these =
credentials and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; then issue refresh and access tokens.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate =
who the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty =
strict restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials =
directly and we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would =
like to see the ability to authenticate the app as well in this =
profile.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where =
redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a =
phone.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with current =
platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets from =
malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the user, =
but use of this profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.<br>


&gt;<br>
&gt; -- Dick<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; --<br>
<div><div></div><div>&gt; You received this message because you are =
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&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
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s.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den</a>.<br>


</blockquote></div><br></div></div></body></html>=

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On 2010-03-04, at 9:31 PM, Igor Faynberg wrote:

>=20
>=20
> Dick Hardt wrote:
>> On 2010-03-04, at 12:27 PM, Igor Faynberg wrote:
>> ...
>>>> - Why are signatures needed?
>>>>      =20
>>> 1) For authentication
>>>=20
>>> 2) For ensuring integrity
>>>=20
>>> 3) For non-repudiation
>>>   =20
>>=20
>> Those are the general capabilities of signatures. "Why does the =
Client need to sign the request / token?" is the full question.
>> =20
>=20
> Yes, these are the benefits of using signatures. As Brian has already =
pointed, there have been cases on the record. I tried to summarize the =
benefits in a short answer, but I don't mind elaborating.
>> Which party are we worried about authenticating?  =20
>=20
> The Client, of course. And it is not simply that we are authenticating =
the Client, we a) authenticate the token and b) ensure that it has not =
been modified. Say, a rogue Client through some sort of phishing =
pretends to the end user to be legitimate in accessing the user's data =
and--to the server (i.e., service provider) it pretends to be a =
legitimate partner. A lot of bad things may happen. Yet, if the request =
for *temporary credentials* is denied when the signature is  verified =
and found wrong, nothing would proceed. Here, only a legitimate client =
can even start a transaction.

What makes a client legitamate? In a rich application, all Client =
secrets can be discovered.

>=20
> And then, later the request for *token credentials* also needs to be =
signed (and differently) to ensure   that of all the legitimate Clients =
only the Client authorized by the end user can access the record.
>=20
>> What are we trying to ensure the integrity of?
>=20
> The request, of course. Incidentally, this feature would come "for =
free" anyway if the client signs the hash of the request and sends it =
along with the request itself. (And throwing in a nonce into the hash =
would prevent replay.)

Throwing in a nonce also introduces a requirement to the PR to maintain =
state.

...

So far, you are explaining security 101.=20

If there is a secure channel between the Client and the PR, and the =
token is only accepted at one Client. What other advantages are there to =
the Client signing that you don't get from a bearer token?

-- Dick=

From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Thu Mar  4 22:23:04 2010
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Dick Hardt wrote:
> ...
> If there is a secure channel between the Client and the PR, and the token is only accepted at one Client. What other advantages are there to the Client signing that you don't get from a bearer token?
> ...
The secure channel can only protect a session, not the data that need to 
be re-used later.

The secure channel only delivers a request (or a token). But there is no 
proof of authentication (or the means for non-repudiation) in the token 
itself, unless the whole session has been recorded (and the key for it 
has been stored).

Igor



From beaton@google.com  Thu Mar  4 22:41:01 2010
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On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 10:18 PM, Igor Faynberg
<igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com> wrote:
> The secure channel only delivers a request (or a token). But there is no
> proof of authentication (or the means for non-repudiation) in the token
> itself, unless the whole session has been recorded (and the key for it has
> been stored).

The non-repudiation goal is the most interesting, because it is the
only one in your list that is not met by WRAP over https.

Non-repudiation can, sort of, be achieved by some OAuth 1.0a
deployments.  But not most of them.

The "token auth" drafts that Eran sent out earlier explicitly remove
the client secret from being used to sign resource requests, which
would even further restrict the number of OAuth deployments that could
claim something resembling non-repudiation.

I'd also note that non-repudiation was not a security goal of OAuth
1.0a, and as a consequence probably shouldn't be relied on for
non-repudiation.   For example, OAuth 1.0a doesn't use a trusted
timestamping service; if a key leaks, all documents signed with that
key are suspect.

There are existing schemes for non-repudiation that may be better
suited for your use cases.  Have you looked at alternatives to OAuth
signing?

But I have to admit I'm still unsure of your use cases.  For example,
do you have three players (client, server, user), or just two (client,
server)?  Which players are making statements that need the
non-repudiation property?

Cheers,
Brian

From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Thu Mar  4 22:54:34 2010
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Hi all,
> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>
> - Why are signatures needed?
>    
- end2end message-level security (w/ or w/o HTTPS) in order to prevent 
intermediaries from tampering messages - in such a scenario encryption 
should also be considered
- sender authentication - a signature based on the token secret might be 
used to prove legitimate ownership of the token
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>    
regards,
Torsten.
> b.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    



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Quick feedback...

On 4 Mar 2010, at 5:42 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:

> Hi Eve
>=20
> Looking at the WRAP oriented comments in the spec, here are some =
comments / questions:
>=20
> Note
> WRAP doesn't seem to say HTTPS is required for the user authorization =
URL; is this a bug in the WRAP spec? If not, is it a good idea for us to =
profile it in this way? Finally, is this the right place to say HTTPS is =
required for all these URLs?
>=20
> Dick: an HTTPS requirement is prohibitive at times. See =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg/browse_thread/thread/821e73bc=
bd8033dd?hl=3Den# for a recent discussion on this.
>=20

Okay.

> Note
> Need lots of examples for all of this. Also, note that WRAP forces =
clients to use POST on access token URLs and refresh token URLs; can we =
use GET in the way described here?
>=20
> Dick: why do you want GET? There are security issues with using GET to =
the AS.

We can probably do away with the GET we have, I'm guessing.  We'll =
discuss.

>=20
> Note
> Obviously this is just the highest-level sketch of what needs to =
happen! This needs to be fleshed out. (E.g., the wrap_scope format could =
be reused here, without any wildcards.)
> Also, are we concerned that a malicious host could lie about the =
attempted resource and method? The only consequence seems to be "false =
negatives" in managing authorized access, in which case the user would =
get unhappy pretty quickly.
>=20
> Dick: it was envisioned that the scope of a function of scope would be =
embedded in the Access Token. Or perhaps I don't understand the issue.

I can see three places a description of scope may need to appear.

1. Initial request for token sent by client/requester to AM/AS, so that =
the right kind of token can be created - this presumably has to be =
in-band in the protocol. (This is why there's a wrap_scope parameter on =
the request and nowhere else, right?) This is what we defined it in the =
proposed UMA step 2.
2. In the token itself. Indeed this is out of band of the protocol =
itself.
3. If the protected resource/host outsources token validation (such that =
the token is opaque to the host as well as the client/requester), then =
the host would need to supply a description of the attempted access made =
by the client/requester along with sending the token for validation. The =
note you're responding to just above is this third case.

	Eve

>=20
>=20
> On 2010-03-04, at 11:01 AM, Eve Maler wrote:
>=20
>> Folks may be interested to see the following experiment being =
performed in the UMA group:
>>=20
>> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol
>>=20
>> This is a proposal for a spec that uses a WRAP-friendly approach to =
solving our use cases.  Please note the final comments in today's UMA =
telecon minutes for cautions about additional requirements we have:
>>=20
>> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2010-03-04=

>>=20
>> 	Eve
>>=20
>> Eve Maler
>> eve@xmlgrrl.com
>> http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>Quick feedback...</div><br><div><div>On 4 Mar 2010, at 5:42 PM, =
Dick Hardt wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: =
space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div>Hi =
Eve</div><div><br></div><div>Looking at the WRAP oriented comments in =
the spec, here are some comments / =
questions:</div><div><br></div><div><b>Note</b><br>WRAP doesn't seem to =
say HTTPS is required for the user authorization URL; is this a bug in =
the WRAP spec? If not, is it a good idea for us to profile it in this =
way? Finally, is this the right place to say HTTPS is required for all =
these URLs?</div><div><br></div><div>Dick: an HTTPS requirement is =
prohibitive at times. See&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg/browse_thread/thread/=
821e73bcbd8033dd?hl=3Den#">http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg/br=
owse_thread/thread/821e73bcbd8033dd?hl=3Den#</a> for a recent discussion =
on =
this.</div><div><br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Okay.</di=
v><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div><b>Note</b><br>Need lots of examples for all of this. Also, note =
that WRAP forces clients to use POST on access token URLs and refresh =
token URLs; can we use GET in the way described =
here?</div><div><br></div><div>Dick: why do you want GET? There are =
security issues with using GET to the =
AS.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We can probably do away =
with the GET we have, I'm guessing. &nbsp;We'll =
discuss.</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"word-wrap: =
break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space; "><div><br></div><div><b>Note</b><br>Obviously this =
is just the highest-level sketch of what needs to happen! This needs to =
be fleshed out. (E.g., the wrap_scope format could be reused here, =
without any wildcards.)<br>Also, are we concerned that a malicious host =
could lie about the attempted resource and method? The only consequence =
seems to be "false negatives" in managing authorized access, in which =
case the user would get unhappy pretty =
quickly.</div><div><br></div><div>Dick: it was envisioned that the scope =
of a function of scope would be embedded in the Access Token. Or perhaps =
I don't understand the =
issue.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I can see three =
places a description of scope may need to =
appear.</div><div><br></div><div>1. Initial request for token sent by =
client/requester to AM/AS, so that the right kind of token can be =
created - this presumably has to be in-band in the protocol. (This is =
why there's a wrap_scope parameter on the request and nowhere else, =
right?)&nbsp;This is what we defined it in the proposed UMA step =
2.</div><div>2. In the token itself. Indeed this is out of band of the =
protocol itself.</div><div>3. If the protected resource/host outsources =
token validation (such that the token is opaque to the host as well as =
the client/requester), then the host would need to supply a description =
of the attempted access made by the client/requester along with sending =
the token for validation. The note you're responding to just above is =
this third case.</div><div><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Eve</div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: =
space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div>On 2010-03-04, at 11:01 AM, =
Eve Maler wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div>Folks may be interested to see the following =
experiment being performed in the UMA group:<br><br><a =
href=3D"http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.prote=
ctnetwork.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol">http://kantarainitiative=
.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwork.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1=
.0+Core+Protocol</a><br><br>This is a proposal for a spec that uses a =
WRAP-friendly approach to solving our use cases. &nbsp;Please note the =
final comments in today's UMA telecon minutes for cautions about =
additional requirements we have:<br><br><a =
href=3D"http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+20=
10-03-04">http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+=
2010-03-04</a><br><br><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Eve<br><br>Eve =
Maler<br>eve@xmlgrrl.com<br>http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog<br><br>___________=
____________________________________<br>OAuth mailing =
list<br>OAuth@ietf.org<br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br><=
/div></blockquote></div><br></div></blockquote></div><br><div>
<span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; =
font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: =
auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Courier; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: =
auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">Eve Maler</div><div><a =
href=3D"mailto:eve@xmlgrrl.com">eve@xmlgrrl.com</a></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog">http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog</a></div>=
</span></span>
</div>
<br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail-452--444613403--

From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Thu Mar  4 23:38:28 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Brian,

You are asking many interesting questions--maybe we should continue this 
when we meet in Anaheim. (The nights are getting shorter...)

In short, yes, non-repudiation, in general, is a very tough thing. We 
had been having long discussions with Steve Bellovin about that in 
PINT/SPIRITS times, and really, in the absence of private key signatures 
there, the only solution is some kind of a third-party interference.

You are right, non-repudiation was not an objective of OAuth 1.0, and I 
do not insist that non-repudiation be a requirement in OAuth, period. I 
merely pointed out that a private-key signature solves this problem too, 
while answering a question on why signatures are needed.

But your questions naturally make me think about the non-repudiation use 
case. I suspect that both the end-user and the Client would be involved 
because this is a three-way transaction. Of course, the case I alluded 
to dealt ONLY with the non-repudiation of the Client's request... 
Anyway, this is a very interesting and, I suspect, complex problem.

Let us talk with a piece of paper when we meet?

Igor

Brian Eaton wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 10:18 PM, Igor Faynberg
> <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com> wrote:
>   
>> The secure channel only delivers a request (or a token). But there is no
>> proof of authentication (or the means for non-repudiation) in the token
>> itself, unless the whole session has been recorded (and the key for it has
>> been stored).
>>     
>
> The non-repudiation goal is the most interesting, because it is the
> only one in your list that is not met by WRAP over https.
>
> Non-repudiation can, sort of, be achieved by some OAuth 1.0a
> deployments.  But not most of them.
>
> The "token auth" drafts that Eran sent out earlier explicitly remove
> the client secret from being used to sign resource requests, which
> would even further restrict the number of OAuth deployments that could
> claim something resembling non-repudiation.
>
> I'd also note that non-repudiation was not a security goal of OAuth
> 1.0a, and as a consequence probably shouldn't be relied on for
> non-repudiation.   For example, OAuth 1.0a doesn't use a trusted
> timestamping service; if a key leaks, all documents signed with that
> key are suspect.
>
> There are existing schemes for non-repudiation that may be better
> suited for your use cases.  Have you looked at alternatives to OAuth
> signing?
>
> But I have to admit I'm still unsure of your use cases.  For example,
> do you have three players (client, server, user), or just two (client,
> server)?  Which players are making statements that need the
> non-repudiation property?
>
> Cheers,
> Brian
>   

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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If it's impossible to validate who a client is for even one particular
protocol in the spec, doesn't this leave a provider's web service open to
anyone making an authentication/login request to that implemented profile i=
n
the spec? Unless I'm missing something, this is a problem because a provide=
r
would be opening themselves up to likely phishing attacks, and no way to
stop it except by shutting down the entire protocol that allowed it. Perhap=
s
this is just a documentation issue because implementing this portion of the
spec could potentially make a provider less secure with no real way of
stopping it after it's implemented.

~/Jason Hullinger

On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 9:37 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:

> As was discussed on the OAuth list, desktop apps can NOT be secured, so
> there is no way to ensure it really is the desktop app you think it is. F=
or
> most phone platforms, this is also the case. For totally locked platforms
> where the app is part of the OS (xbox, PS3, some phones, settop boxes) --
> then one can have high confidence the app is the app. So far I consider
> these the exception rather than the rule.
>
> -- Dick
>
>
> On 2010-03-04, at 8:37 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>
> +ietf list
>
>
> On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason Hullinger < <sshjason@gmail.com>
> sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I think there are probably going to be more instances of providers needin=
g
> this than otherwise. The current Username and Password profile is not a
> solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is a need for a secure
> protocol where you can validate that the client is who they say they are =
in
> a profile such as on a phone or desktop application.
>
> ~/Jason Hullinger
>
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard < <lshepard@facebook.com><ls=
hepard@facebook.com>
> lshepard@facebook.com> wrote:
>
>> Is Facebook the only one who needs this?
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" < <dick.hardt@gmail.com><dick.h=
ardt@gmail.com>
>> dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> The spec allows the AS to define additional parameters, so for these
>> specialized use cases, Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony to include =
an
>> identifier in the request.
>>
>> Is that adequate?
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon < <recordond@gmail.com><r=
ecordond@gmail.com><recordond@gmail.com>
>> recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily
>>> where we envision using the username/password profile.
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt < <dick.hardt@gmail.com><dic=
k.hardt@gmail.com><dick.hardt@gmail.com>
>>> dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:
>>> >
>>> >> On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger <<sshjason@gmail.c=
om><sshjason@gmail.com><sshjason@gmail.com>
>>> sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier
>>> >>>> wrap_username - Required. The User=92s username
>>> >>>> wrap_password - Required. The User=92s password
>>> >>>> wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values defined by the
>>> server
>>> >>>> Additional parameters - Any additional parameter defined by the
>>> >>>> authorization server
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> From the above parameters there is no way of insuring that a clien=
t
>>> is ever
>>> >>>> who they say they are because a user could easily obtain the
>>> wrap_client_id
>>> >>>> and make requests using that. Does anyone have an implementation o=
f
>>> this or
>>> >>>> any recommended additional parameters?
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any way, the
>>> >>> user trusted the client and provided his/her username and password,
>>> >>> that's all that counts. The should just verify these credentials an=
d
>>> >>> then issue refresh and access tokens.
>>> >>
>>> >> It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate who th=
e
>>> client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty strict
>>> restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials directly =
and
>>> we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would like to see t=
he
>>> ability to authenticate the app as well in this profile.
>>> >
>>> > This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where
>>> redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a phone.
>>> >
>>> > Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with current
>>> platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets from
>>> malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the user, b=
ut
>>> use of this profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.
>>> >
>>> > -- Dick
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > --
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--001636e906f35fb664048109575d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

If it&#39;s impossible to validate who a client is for even one particular =
protocol in the spec, doesn&#39;t this leave a provider&#39;s web service o=
pen to anyone making an authentication/login request to that implemented pr=
ofile in the spec? Unless I&#39;m missing something, this is a problem beca=
use a provider would be opening themselves up to likely phishing attacks, a=
nd no way to stop it except by shutting down the entire protocol that allow=
ed it. Perhaps this is just a documentation issue because implementing this=
 portion of the spec=A0could potentially make a provider less secure with n=
o real way of stopping it after it&#39;s implemented.<div>
<div><br></div><div>~/Jason Hullinger<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 9:37 PM, Dick Hardt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">As was discussed on the OAuth list, des=
ktop apps can NOT be secured, so there is no way to ensure it really is the=
 desktop app you think it is. For most phone platforms, this is also the ca=
se. For totally locked platforms where the app is part of the OS (xbox, PS3=
, some phones, settop boxes) -- then one can have high confidence the app i=
s the app. So far I consider these the exception rather than the rule.<div>
<br></div><div><font color=3D"#888888">-- Dick</font><div><div></div><div c=
lass=3D"h5"><br><div><br><div><div>On 2010-03-04, at 8:37 PM, David Recordo=
n wrote:</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div><=
div>
+ietf list</div><div><br></div><div><br>On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason H=
ullinger &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a=
 href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">sshjason@gmail.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>I think there are proba=
bly going to be more instances of providers needing this than otherwise. Th=
e current Username and Password profile is not a solution in a for every se=
nse, and there clearly is a need for a secure protocol where you can valida=
te that the client is who they say they are in a profile such as on a phone=
 or desktop application.<br>

<br>~/Jason Hullinger<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 4, 2010=
 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lshepard@=
facebook.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com=
" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com" target=3D"=
_blank">lshepard@facebook.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div>Is Facebook the only one who needs this?<br><=
br>Sent from my iPhone</div><div><div></div><div><div><br>On Mar 4, 2010, a=
t 6:41 PM, &quot;Dick Hardt&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.co=
m" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"=
_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dick.=
hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

<br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>The spec allows the AS =
to define additional parameters, so for these specialized use cases, Facebo=
ok could ask Microsoft and Sony to include an identifier in the request.<br=
>

<br>Is that adequate?<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:re=
cordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.=
com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D=
"_blank">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left:1px solid rgb(204, 2=
04, 204);margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex">
Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily<br>
where we envision using the username/password profile.<br>
<div><div></div><div><br>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt=
@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk"></a><a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dick.hard=
t@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:sshj=
ason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com"=
 target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_username - Required. The User=92s username<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_password - Required. The User=92s password<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values defined =
by the server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Additional parameters - Any additional parameter defined b=
y the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; From the above parameters there is no way of insuring that=
 a client is ever<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; who they say they are because a user could easily obtain t=
he wrap_client_id<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and make requests using that. Does anyone have an implemen=
tation of this or<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; any recommended additional parameters?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I don&#39;t think you need to trust this client itself in any =
way, the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; user trusted the client and provided his/her username and pass=
word,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that&#39;s all that counts. The should just verify these crede=
ntials and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; then issue refresh and access tokens.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; It&#39;s pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate =
who the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty strict=
 restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials directly and=
 we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would like to see the =
ability to authenticate the app as well in this profile.<br>



&gt;<br>
&gt; This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where redir=
ection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a phone.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with current pla=
tforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets from malicious =
users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the user, but use of this=
 profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.<br>



&gt;<br>
&gt; -- Dick<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; --<br>
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bed to the Google Groups &quot;OAuth WRAP WG&quot; group.<br>
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&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2010 00:22:35 -0800
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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You are correct. If a AS, supports the username and password profile, =
that means it can be used by any client. Clearly the user has made a =
trust decision about the client in this case, assuming there really is a =
user running the client.

One option for a provider to minimize their exposure is they may not =
issue Access Tokens that have as much power to Clients using the =
Username and Password profile.

This is a good point to call out in the currently un-written security =
considerations.

-- Dick

On 2010-03-05, at 12:17 AM, Jason Hullinger wrote:

> If it's impossible to validate who a client is for even one particular =
protocol in the spec, doesn't this leave a provider's web service open =
to anyone making an authentication/login request to that implemented =
profile in the spec? Unless I'm missing something, this is a problem =
because a provider would be opening themselves up to likely phishing =
attacks, and no way to stop it except by shutting down the entire =
protocol that allowed it. Perhaps this is just a documentation issue =
because implementing this portion of the spec could potentially make a =
provider less secure with no real way of stopping it after it's =
implemented.
>=20
> ~/Jason Hullinger
>=20
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 9:37 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
> As was discussed on the OAuth list, desktop apps can NOT be secured, =
so there is no way to ensure it really is the desktop app you think it =
is. For most phone platforms, this is also the case. For totally locked =
platforms where the app is part of the OS (xbox, PS3, some phones, =
settop boxes) -- then one can have high confidence the app is the app. =
So far I consider these the exception rather than the rule.
>=20
> -- Dick
>=20
>=20
> On 2010-03-04, at 8:37 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>=20
>> +ietf list
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> I think there are probably going to be more instances of providers =
needing this than otherwise. The current Username and Password profile =
is not a solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is a need for =
a secure protocol where you can validate that the client is who they say =
they are in a profile such as on a phone or desktop application.
>>>=20
>>> ~/Jason Hullinger
>>>=20
>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> =
wrote:
>>> Is Facebook the only one who needs this?
>>>=20
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>=20
>>> On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> The spec allows the AS to define additional parameters, so for =
these specialized use cases, Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony to =
include an identifier in the request.
>>>>=20
>>>> Is that adequate?
>>>>=20
>>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon =
<recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily
>>>> where we envision using the username/password profile.
>>>>=20
>>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> >> On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
>>>> >>
>>>> >>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger =
<sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>> wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier
>>>> >>>> wrap_username - Required. The User=92s username
>>>> >>>> wrap_password - Required. The User=92s password
>>>> >>>> wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values defined by =
the server
>>>> >>>> Additional parameters - Any additional parameter defined by =
the
>>>> >>>> authorization server
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>> =46rom the above parameters there is no way of insuring that a =
client is ever
>>>> >>>> who they say they are because a user could easily obtain the =
wrap_client_id
>>>> >>>> and make requests using that. Does anyone have an =
implementation of this or
>>>> >>>> any recommended additional parameters?
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any way, =
the
>>>> >>> user trusted the client and provided his/her username and =
password,
>>>> >>> that's all that counts. The should just verify these =
credentials and
>>>> >>> then issue refresh and access tokens.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate =
who the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty =
strict restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials =
directly and we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would =
like to see the ability to authenticate the app as well in this profile.
>>>> >
>>>> > This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where =
redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a phone.
>>>> >
>>>> > Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with =
current platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets =
from malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the =
user, but use of this profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.
>>>> >
>>>> > -- Dick
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > --
>>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the =
Google Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>>> > To post to this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>>> > For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>>=20
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> --=20
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> --=20
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> --=20
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>=20
>>=20
>> --=20
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =
Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to =
oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at =
http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.


--Apple-Mail-11--440137021
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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	charset=windows-1252

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">You =
are correct. If a AS, supports the username and password profile, that =
means it can be used by any client. Clearly the user has made a trust =
decision about the client in this case, assuming there really is a user =
running the client.<div><br></div><div>One option for a provider to =
minimize their exposure is they may not issue Access Tokens that have as =
much power to Clients using the Username and Password =
profile.</div><div><br></div><div>This is a good point to call out in =
the currently un-written security =
considerations.</div><div><br></div><div>-- =
Dick</div><div><br><div><div>On 2010-03-05, at 12:17 AM, Jason Hullinger =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">If it's impossible to validate who a client is for even =
one particular protocol in the spec, doesn't this leave a provider's web =
service open to anyone making an authentication/login request to that =
implemented profile in the spec? Unless I'm missing something, this is a =
problem because a provider would be opening themselves up to likely =
phishing attacks, and no way to stop it except by shutting down the =
entire protocol that allowed it. Perhaps this is just a documentation =
issue because implementing this portion of the spec&nbsp;could =
potentially make a provider less secure with no real way of stopping it =
after it's implemented.<div>
<div><br></div><div>~/Jason Hullinger<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On=
 Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 9:37 PM, Dick Hardt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">As was discussed on the OAuth list, =
desktop apps can NOT be secured, so there is no way to ensure it really =
is the desktop app you think it is. For most phone platforms, this is =
also the case. For totally locked platforms where the app is part of the =
OS (xbox, PS3, some phones, settop boxes) -- then one can have high =
confidence the app is the app. So far I consider these the exception =
rather than the rule.<div>
<br></div><div><font color=3D"#888888">-- =
Dick</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br><div><br><div><div>On =
2010-03-04, at 8:37 PM, David Recordon wrote:</div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div><div>
+ietf list</div><div><br></div><div><br>On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, =
Jason Hullinger &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank"></a><a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>I think there are =
probably going to be more instances of providers needing this than =
otherwise. The current Username and Password profile is not a solution =
in a for every sense, and there clearly is a need for a secure protocol =
where you can validate that the client is who they say they are in a =
profile such as on a phone or desktop application.<br>

<br>~/Jason Hullinger<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 4, =
2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com" =
target=3D"_blank">lshepard@facebook.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0pt 0pt 0pt =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div>Is Facebook the only one who needs =
this?<br><br>Sent from my iPhone</div><div><div></div><div><div><br>On =
Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

<br></div><div></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>The spec allows the =
AS to define additional parameters, so for these specialized use cases, =
Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony to include an identifier in the =
request.<br>

<br>Is that adequate?<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204, 204, 204);margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex">
Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily<br>
where we envision using the username/password profile.<br>
<div><div></div><div><br>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"></a><a =
href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_username - Required. The User=92s username<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_password - Required. The User=92s password<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values =
defined by the server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Additional parameters - Any additional parameter =
defined by the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization server<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =46rom the above parameters there is no way of insuring =
that a client is ever<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; who they say they are because a user could easily =
obtain the wrap_client_id<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and make requests using that. Does anyone have an =
implementation of this or<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; any recommended additional parameters?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any =
way, the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; user trusted the client and provided his/her username and =
password,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that's all that counts. The should just verify these =
credentials and<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; then issue refresh and access tokens.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate =
who the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty =
strict restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials =
directly and we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would =
like to see the ability to authenticate the app as well in this =
profile.<br>



&gt;<br>
&gt; This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where =
redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a =
phone.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with current =
platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets from =
malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the user, =
but use of this profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.<br>



&gt;<br>
&gt; -- Dick<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; --<br>
<div><div></div><div>&gt; You received this message because you are =
subscribed to the Google Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.<br>
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&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
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<br>
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From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Fri Mar  5 06:58:14 2010
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More below...

On 4 Mar 2010, at 5:43 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:

> Thanks Eve, comments inserted ...=20
>=20
> On 2010-03-04, at 12:51 PM, Eve Maler wrote:
>=20
>> As requested on today's call, here's a description of the places =
where UMA seems to need "more" than what the WRAP paradigm offers (both =
profiling and extending), based on the proposal at:
>>=20
>> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol
>>=20
>> Cautions in reading this note:
>>=20
>> - The mix of likely needed profiles and extensions for our use of the =
OAuth 1.0 paradigm (the existing spec on the UMA site) is quite =
different from the list presented here, and in addition, that spec =
wasn't written with a goal to highlight such items the way this proposal =
was.
>>=20
>> - The proposal is currently fairly high-level, and other =
profiling/extension needs may come to light if we proceed down this path =
-- or some of the needs may disappear.  The proposal nonetheless tries =
to document profile and extension points as precisely as possible.
>>=20
>> - UMA's terminology is similar but not identical to WRAP's.  The =
proposal tries to be as clear as possible about the distinctions, but =
caveat lector.
>>=20
>> - For all of the profile/extension items listed, they may be of =
interest only to UMAnitarians, or they might have wider application as =
optional or required portions of a core OAuth 2.0 spec.  We're not =
trying to prejudice this outcome, just provide useful information for =
making the decision in the wider community.
>>=20
>> So, with all that said...  Here is the conception of UMA's use of the =
WRAP paradigm as conceived in the proposal.
>>=20
>> 1. Currently, WRAP says nothing about how a Protected Resource and an =
Authorization Server "meet" and figure out how to work together.
>=20
> This was explicitly out of scope for WRAP. There are scale and privacy =
advantages to the PR and AR not meeting. The PR needs to trust the AR =
the issued the Access Token (and of course be able to verify the Access =
Token was issued by the AR), but the AR does NOT need to be aware of the =
PR. In this way, WRAP=20

(Unfinished sentence?)

As noted above, it's fine for this to be out of scope for WRAP itself, =
but it's in UMA's scope.

>=20
>> UMA has reason to make the user's choice of authorization management =
(AM) services and hosts of their resources be dynamic and flexible -- =
that's why it's called "user-managed access" -- so the proposal suggests =
a special way to use (an embedded instance of one of the user delegation =
profiles of) WRAP to introduce them, as a "step 1".  (The token thus =
acquired by the host in this step plays a role in "step 3".)
>=20
> Interesting use of WRAP. I don't see a hole in WRAP for you to do =
this. Is there some functionality missing?

I don't understand the comment/question.  Are you suggesting the WRAP =
pattern (same as the three-legged OAuth pattern, which our current spec =
uses) can't be applied to new use cases?  It's pretty much a vanilla =
application of the pattern.  If it's not interesting as a generic =
solution and the problem space is only UMA's, that's certainly okay with =
us.

>=20
>>=20
>> 2a. Another of UMA's goals is to allow authorizing users (roughly, =
Resource Owners) to make demands of other parties before granting them =
access rather than just permissioning the connection "silently".  The =
mechanism for making these demands is to require the requesting side to =
provide claims (yes, in the identity claims sense) and even to make this =
process have legal enforceability consequences where possible.  Thus, =
the proposal suggests an extended getting-a-token phase in a "step 2" =
that adds a new third option to the two usual WRAP options (successful =
access token response and unsuccessful access token response): a =
claims-required response.
>=20
> I can see it being useful in a standard return parameter that can =
contain an value undefined by WRAP (similar to the scope parameter), =
that is used by the AS to communicate to the Client what else the Client =
needs to be granted an Access Token. Is this what you are asking for?

I'm not sure if we're technically "asking for" anything, just floating =
the use case and pointing out that if we were to layer on WRAP as it's =
written today, we'd have to extend the possible responses to token =
requests somehow.  Maybe a new parameter that flags a need for more info =
from the client/requester is a good idea, but if it's just another =
undefined parameter, I'd rather have a clean definition of an "extension =
point" for how others could add parameters (or response types?).  Lots =
of undefined fields in a core spec doesn't seem interop-friendly.

>=20
>>=20
>> 2b. Due to our analysis of the legal (cough) and UX dimensions of the =
UMA proposition, we've discovered that it's useful to separate =
requesting parties (the legally responsible party "behind" the =
requester/Client) into legal persons vs. natural persons.  This is a way =
in which UMA deviates from OAuth and WRAP entirely, in that we're =
figuring out how to do "person-to-person sharing" (Alice permissions Bob =
to subscribe to a hosted calendar of hers) along with "person-to-service =
sharing" (Alice permissions ECommerce.com to grab her current shipping =
address from her personal datastore).  The current thinking is that it's =
a matter of putting the requester into a user-delegated flow vs. an =
autonomous-client flow as part of getting a token in step 2.
>=20
> Is there something missing in WRAP to do this?

I'm not sure.  If WRAP has the same assumption OAuth does about the =
"same person" operating the client app as is logging into the protected =
resource/AS/SP/server, then that's a conceptual difference.  But I don't =
think we saw any need (yet) for syntax changes in this area to support =
what we want to do.

>=20
>>=20
>> 2c. Currently, WRAP doesn't say anything about how to fill the scope =
parameter value.  In this context, an obvious optimization is the "all =
the photos that happen to be in this folder" authorization scenario.  So =
we went ahead and proposed a simple JSON-based format for describing =
both simple access scope and basic wildcarded access scope.
>=20
> Different scenarios will require different scope values. We thought it =
useful to define the parameter so that it would  be easier library =
providers and specs like UMA to define the value without also having to =
define the parameter.

I'd like to learn more about the other use cases.  If common cases exist =
and can be sedimented in for more universal support, that would be cool. =
 (If not, okay.)  But along the lines of my earlier comment on extension =
points, I'm not sure standardizing the field is valuable without =
standardizing any values at all -- it may just confuse people about =
whether they're supposed to stuff a bunch of different things into the =
one parameter if they seem vaguely "scope"-related, or invent their own, =
or whatever.  And then you have to worry about how to stuff incompatible =
scope values into the same parameter side by side for hybrid use cases =
that use multiple extensions.  Etc.

>=20
>>=20
>> 3. The means by which a host interprets an incoming access token is =
not currently specified in WRAP.  Unfortunately, UMA needs to know. :-)  =
There seem to be two options: validating it locally or offloading =
validation.  To avoid putting a signature validation burden on the host, =
we have proposed a strawman where the host can simply ask the AM to do =
the validation for it.  (A personal observation: The local/offload =
choice all depends on various scale and loose coupling factors, but this =
is appealing for lots of reasons.  It not only views the Authorization =
Server as an STS performing a typical token validation function, but =
pretty closely matches the classic access management paradigm where the =
policy enforcement point asks the centralized policy decision point what =
to do.  And other useful info could also ride over this back channel, =
either in extensions or -- as the need arises -- in core OAuth.)
>=20
> When developing WRAP, we envisioned that the PR would verify and =
interpret locally.

It's probably worth mentioning that at least two UMA scenarios (health =
data, and distributed social networking services with "data =
portability") envision applications that frequently serve as both =
hosts/PRs and requesters/clients, so if processing burdens are removed =
from the client but placed on the PR, it may not help us all that much.  =
This is an area where I hope others can chime in with use cases and =
constraints to figure out which "scaling" options suits them best.  (And =
if WRAP/OAuth remains silent on the issue, it seems UMA could still =
define this loop as an extension.)

>=20
>>=20
>> n. Several people at the UMA table continue to be concerned about the =
overall risks in using the WRAP paradigm for controlling access to =
various kinds of sensitive information in various ways.  It may not be =
acceptable in some UMA use cases, e.g., to use replayable tokens.  As I =
promised on the call, I'll work with the UMA group to research this =
issue as precisely as possible in preparation for Anaheim, ideally =
including specific guidance from those who have submitted the most =
sensitive UMA scenarios or have the biggest concerns.
>=20
> Posting what you find to the list prior to Anaheim would be useful for =
the rest of us to have a chance to digest and then we can discuss in =
detail at Anaheim.
>=20
> -- Dick

Thanks for your feedback on these points.  I look forward to continuing =
the dialogue.

	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


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As copied from http://etherpad.com/RZilFVrF2Q (one of these days I hope
we'll get a chance to listen to the recording and correct the notes)...

***

OAuth WG Interim Meeting, 2010-03-04

* NOTE WELL: http://www.ietf.org/about/note-well.html

* Collective note-taking via EtherPad: http://etherpad.com/RZilFVrF2Q

*  Agenda bashing

None.

* Intro

Peter starts the meeting. Talks about the survey Eran had sent out and
the feedback being provided. David and Eran provided a proposal for the
way forward based on the feedback. Peter liked that.

* Chair announcement

 Peter can't serve as co-chair going  forward because he was named Area
Director, so the search is on to  replace him as co-chair with Blaine.

* Discussion of the "WG Survey" thread and results

Eran believes that people got confused with the different draft pieces.
People are waiting for a document "OAuth 2.0" to look at and to review.

Eran says that a number of people want signatures although he is not
compley sure why. The details about what has to be signed has to be
investigated.

Eran is working on a merged specification (the existing spec with the
WRAP spec) with David. Eran tries to preserve the roles because OAuth
1.0 has a couple of roles combined. Eran wants to have a draft ready for
Anaheim. He will miss the deadline but it will be ready for the meeting.

Peter: perhaps Eran and David can present about this at Anaheim

Eran: will work toward having a presentation

Hannes: I don't think that the scenarios presented provided enough
information to help us make decisions about security considerations
(signature methods etc.)

Eve: sounds like we need use cases as a way of drilling down into
security considerations, see also UMA work on exploring how to do UMA
over WRAP

Hannes/Eve: perhaps need to differentiate between use cases / scenarios
and design constraints

Dick: Could you clarify whether there are some scenarios that cannot be
covered by WRAP?

Eve: This is covered. We have 4 entities that are interworking - 2
interworking WRAP profiles. A single instance of WRAP would not be
sufficient.

Dirk: I am not sure what you do not have in WRAP and we should discuss
them on the list.

Peter: It might be helpful for the meeting in Anaheim to have some
presentations on the overview on the space and the history (OAuth 1.0 ->
WRAP, etc.). It would give those a bit of context for the discussion who
have not been involved in the work so far.

Dirk would be happy to talk about WRAP at the meeting.
David would give a presentation about the history.

Hannes: what has been settled regarding security mechanisms?

Eran: looking at 1.0, plaintext replaced by bearer token

Plaintext goes away -> replaced by WRAP bearer token
HMAC + RSA signature mechanism from OAuth 1.0.
Normalization ?(missed that part)? [we can listen to the recording]

TLS: OAuth 1.0 already requires TLS for transport of plaintext credential=
s.

Most crypto libraries will do things like SHA-256 and HMAC

Eran: if we take everything that WRAP has and the two signature methods
from 1.0, what use cases would that not solve?

Justin: Has anyone expressed a use case that requires a message to get
signed? I posted a use case but I am not convinced. Why do we need
signatures and not just TLS?

Eran: We require TLS anyway. Some people claim performance in a mass
scale deployment. I don't have the performance data. I have  a use case
for the asymmetric signature. [Where is it?] I don't see the benefit of
having an HMAC instead of using a plaintext token over TLS.

-- Discussion about OpenID --

Justin: Do we have scenarios that really need signed messages?

Dick: Keep in mind that the server is signing and not the server. So,
the comparison is different.

Eve: concern in the UMA community about relying only on SSL and would
like the option of signing the message

Dick: that would be useful because we would have clear requirements

Eve: as one example, outsourcing resource access (e.g., bookkeepers,
health data)

Dick: is there a secrecy requirement as opposed to a signing requirement?=


Wolfgang: Encoding policy information into the data?

Eve: Privacy, security, and access control

Dick: Confidentiality of request and response?

Wolfgang: what is the holder of the token allowed to do?

Eve: Holder-of-the-Key assertion equivalent would be needed here too
(reference to the NIST level).

Brian: Thanks for the reference to the Holder-of-the-Key assertion.

Brian: do you need confidentiality in addition to integrity?

Hannes: you have a pointer to the key and the sender of the assertion
has the corresponding key that is mentioned in the assertion

Brian: if using SSL + bearer token, there are caes when insufficient:
=2E.. intermediaries that can access cleartext in the middle, don't want
tampering (need holder-of-key token)

Hannes: that's a separate question, a few ways to solve it: (1)
holder-of-key token (2) authorization step afterwards

Brian: are we going to do everything that WS-* provides in terms of
confidentiality?

Hannes: but this is going to introduce complexity

Eve: removing signatures takes away an existing capability

Brian: the requirements people have here seem to be more complex than
are handled by OAuth 1.0

Blaine: the use case I have in mind comes from looking at actual
deployments that are using signatures right now

Brian: but I think that is a fundamentally different requirement than
what Eve is talking about

Blaine: States that people inthe survey say that they want to keep the
signature mechanisms but then they do not have good use cases for them.

Peter: We need to have a discussion on the list about the use cases and
to determine what signatures technologies are needed. We need this input
till Anaheim.

Dick: we were not suggesting to pull the signature stuff, but understand
what the goals are, let's get clear on why people think they need signatu=
res

Eran: Is the requirement for accessing without TLS a real use case? Is
the argument that TLS requests for resource request too expensive and is
it indeed more lightweight? I don't know the answer to that. This seems
the main reason why signatures come back.

We need to have a discussion about this aspect on the list.

Dick: In the WRAP spec the requirement for the TLS is between the client
and the authz server  (and not anywhere else).

Eran: Someone has to raise a hand and say that they want to use a token
with a signature mechanism without using TLS. Has there been any study
on how they are planning to do it?

Peter: There might be use cases where people though they couldn't do the
TLS case. And, are there other use cases where some people need the
signature based mechanism together with TLS (as Brian mentioned).

Eran: We have already a requirement that TLS will be required for some
pieces of the protocol. Do we need a way of presenting the token without
TLS usage?

Zachary: so, is there consensus that signature is an option without TLS?

Hannes: that's in 1.0, yes -- the question is do we need that going forwa=
rd?

Zachary: I think it should be an option in OAuth 2.0

Hannes: but we need to be clear on why that's needed

Blaine just sent a mail to the list with the questions about the
signature mechanisms.

Zachary: Has some scenarios and will send a pointer to the list.

Peter: would it be helpful to have a scenarios document?

Zachary: yes

Eran: it would be helpful to have requirements and scenarios written
down, because if you can't write it down then you don't have a real
requirement

Peter: Asked to have 2 persons to volunteer for such a scenario document.=


* Discussion of possible goals for Anaheim meeting and possible agenda it=
ems

AGENDA ideas:
(1) history / 1.0 (David, 10 minutes?)
(2) WRAP (Dick, 10 minutes?)
(3) melding of approaches (Eran/David, 20-30 minutes?)
(4) discussion about technical and security issues
(5) use cases / scenarios as WG item (5-10 minutes)

* Other business?

None

Action Items:

(a) Blaine to post to the list about signature methods (done)
(b) chairs to post rough agenda
(c) chairs to post about scenarios document and possible editors
(d) Eve to post about gap between UMA needs and existing WRAP
(e) Eran and David to work on slides about merged approach
(f) WG participants to log their technical/security issues on the list
for discussion in Anaheim

***

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Before I get started, let me say that this should be taken with a very
large grain of salt. I am not a technical expert in these areas. I've
only done a fair amount of reading and following along with standards
efforts. Conclusions here should be questioned thoroughly and
corrected as necessary, but since no one else seems to be willing to
systematically look into the performance argument for signatures vs.
SSL/TLS, I thought I'd just sit down for a couple of hours and pound
it out. The following is the result of that work.

** Resource access without SSL/TLS - Signatures vs. Bearer-tokens **

The crux of the trade-off comes down to this: In the case of signed
authorization information (with a nonce), a Man in the Middle (MITM)
attacker owns the individual message. The MITM can do the following:

1. Decline to deliver the message
2. Hold the message and deliver it later (subject to constraints on
timestamp validity - so this is a limited attack)
3. Deliver the message with altered contents (only if the contents
themselves are not signed)

In the case of bearer-token authorization, a MITM owns the entire
connection. The MITM can do the following:

1. Decline to deliver the message
2. Hold the message and deliver it later
3. Change the timestamp (if one is used at all)
4. Change the contents of the message
5. Create an arbitrary number of new messages with arbitrary contents
using the bearer-token and deliver those (subject to bearer-token
invalidation)

In my opinion, #5 makes bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS unusable in
nearly all use cases. Any use case where spam is a threat, for
example, is not an acceptable use case because of this attack because
any MITM can send an arbitrary number of spam messages that the
provider application will show as coming directly from the user. If
you think Twitter direct-message spam is bad now...

Because of this and other possible attacks (successfully impersonating
a provider gets you the bearer-token, for example), I think that
bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS are not worth considering further for
the vast majority of use cases.

** So what about SSL/TLS? Can't we just use that for everything and
forget about signatures? **

Yes, but there are tradeoffs.

The most important and unavoidable tradeoff is performance. The
performance tradeoff comes in two flavors:

1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the
asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)
2. Processing to encrypt requests (from the symmetric/private-key
encryption operations)

Connection latency is incurred to the public-key cryptography
operations that are used to facilitate the exchange of a shared
secret, which can then be used in the much more efficient
private/symmetric key cryptography used to encrypt the individual
messages. Research (1) indicates that, on the web server, SSL
introduces approximately a 70% overhead over basic HTTP for small
requests and that of this overhead almost 90% is incurred in the
public key operations.

As request size increases, the public key operation overhead remains
constant while the private key operations to encrypt the request
scales linearly with request size. As a result, the actual act of
encrypting the request becomes the limiting factor relatively quickly
for large requests.

Keep in mind, this is additional latency on the web server, not on the
client. Other research (2) indicates that clients may be even more
resource-bound for these types of operations, resulting in even more
severe latency problems.

It's important to note that these two types of performance impact
become problematic under different use cases.

** When SSL makes sense and when it doesn't **

SSL has negative performance impacts which will result in real user
experience impacts in certain situations. Service providers can use
specialized hardware to significantly accelerate the necessary
cryptography operations, but any client smaller than a medium-sized
web application provider will not be able to afford the cost of such
infrastructure. As such, these clients will suffer a user experience
impact from the required use of SSL/TLS connections in some
situations.

What are these situations?

Connection latency is an issue when new connections must be
established for most operations. This is the case for intermittent API
requests. Some use cases where this could be an issue (keeping in mind
that even an extra fraction of a second of wait-time is a
user-experience penalty that many applications may be unhappy paying):

1. Display statistics in a rich/desktop app in response to a user
request (Ego app on iPhone requesting statistics from Google
Analytics, for instance)
2. Check for new messages in a rich/desktop in response to a user
request (Dashboard widget, for example)
3. Request data within a web application from a little-used
third-party provider in response to a user request (web app like
youcalc.com with ability to connect to arbitrary OAuth-enabled
datastores)

Meanwhile, encryption of the request becomes an issue for large
request uploads and download especially. Some examples:

1. Video and media file access requests, including streaming
2. Google Docs document list API upload/download requests

In both of the situations outlined above, SSL/TLS imposes a
performance overhead that should theoretically have user experience
implications. As I've been thinking about this issue, the following
matrix has proven helpful in visualizing the problem space and helping
to show that SSL/TLS is a clear winner in only a limited (but
admittedly very common) portion of the problem space.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                   | Sensitive to connection latency | Not sensitive
to connection latency |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Large requests    | SSL/TLS not a good option       | SSL/TLS may be
an option            |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| No large requests | SSL/TLS may be an option        | SSL/TLS is a
good option            |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

** How does signing address these use cases? **

The answer to this question depends on the form that signing ends up
taking. If only the authentication parameters are signed, then we are
in a situation similar to OAuth 1.0a in which latency is minimal
because the hash operation used in the signing is cheap and is
executed on a very small amount of data. Further, performance is
unrelated to request size because only the authentication parameters
are signed and the length of these parameters are unrelated to the
request payload.

If full message signing is required, then we start to run into the
encryption penalty, as effort to calculate the hash of the entire
payload should scale more or less linearly with the size of the
payload. However, connection latency should remain minimal for small
requests.

Of course, using signatures without transport-layer security brings
with it a whole new matrix of known security considerations. As
mentioned at the beginning of this little essay, from a security
perspective, signing appears to be at least as good in all respects as
bearer tokens sent in the clear.

** Conclusion **

There are theoretical and currently deployed use-cases in which
dispensing with SSL/TLS and signing at least the authentication
parameters of a request makes sense. These are use cases in which
SSL/TLS has an undesirable user experience impact and in which leaving
the request payload in the clear does not have significant negative
security impacts. For this reason, and because the signing approach is
the predominant deployed OAuth method (even though SSL/TLS with a
bearer token is an option), we should maintain a signature method in
the current draft.

** References **

1. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.62.8589&rep=rep1&type=pdf
- Anatomy and Performance of SSL Processing - Li Zhao, Ravi Iyer,
Srihari Makineni, Laxmi Bhuyan - p. 4 is the meat

2. http://iweb.tntech.edu/hexb/publications/https-STAR-03122003.pdf -
A Performance Analysis of Secure HTTP Protocol - Xubin He

On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 2:00 PM, Blaine Cook <romeda@gmail.com> wrote:
> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>
> - Why are signatures needed?
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>
> b.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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Thanks for the comment.  I am not an expert either, but:

On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 9:24 AM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:

> Before I get started, let me say that this should be taken with a very
> large grain of salt. I am not a technical expert in these areas. I've
> only done a fair amount of reading and following along with standards
> efforts. Conclusions here should be questioned thoroughly and
> corrected as necessary, but since no one else seems to be willing to
> systematically look into the performance argument for signatures vs.
> SSL/TLS, I thought I'd just sit down for a couple of hours and pound
> it out. The following is the result of that work.
>
> ** Resource access without SSL/TLS - Signatures vs. Bearer-tokens **
>
> The crux of the trade-off comes down to this: In the case of signed
> authorization information (with a nonce), a Man in the Middle (MITM)
> attacker owns the individual message. The MITM can do the following:
>
> 1. Decline to deliver the message
> 2. Hold the message and deliver it later (subject to constraints on
> timestamp validity - so this is a limited attack)
> 3. Deliver the message with altered contents (only if the contents
> themselves are not signed)
>
> In the case of bearer-token authorization, a MITM owns the entire
> connection. The MITM can do the following:
>
> 1. Decline to deliver the message
> 2. Hold the message and deliver it later
> 3. Change the timestamp (if one is used at all)
> 4. Change the contents of the message
> 5. Create an arbitrary number of new messages with arbitrary contents
> using the bearer-token and deliver those (subject to bearer-token
> invalidation)
>
> In my opinion, #5 makes bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS unusable in
> nearly all use cases. Any use case where spam is a threat, for
> example, is not an acceptable use case because of this attack because
> any MITM can send an arbitrary number of spam messages that the
> provider application will show as coming directly from the user. If
> you think Twitter direct-message spam is bad now...
>

You can make the token short-lived if this is a concern.  (Short lived
meaning minutes.)  And presumably the user is rate limited in the first
place, so there is an upper bound on the damage that can be done.

It's possible to come up with scenarios where short lived bearer tokens
won't work for #5.  I'm struggling to come up with any scenarios that really
wouldn't want TLS as well.

Note that TLS also takes care of the reverse trip -- the MITM cannot lie to
the client about what happened, or feed it false information.  None of the
signature options under discussion sign responses IIRC.


>
> Because of this and other possible attacks (successfully impersonating
> a provider gets you the bearer-token, for example), I think that
> bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS are not worth considering further for
> the vast majority of use cases.
>
> ** So what about SSL/TLS? Can't we just use that for everything and
> forget about signatures? **
>
> Yes, but there are tradeoffs.
>
> The most important and unavoidable tradeoff is performance. The
> performance tradeoff comes in two flavors:
>
> 1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the
> asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)
> 2. Processing to encrypt requests (from the symmetric/private-key
> encryption operations)
>
> Connection latency is incurred to the public-key cryptography
> operations that are used to facilitate the exchange of a shared
> secret, which can then be used in the much more efficient
> private/symmetric key cryptography used to encrypt the individual
> messages. Research (1) indicates that, on the web server, SSL
> introduces approximately a 70% overhead over basic HTTP for small
> requests and that of this overhead almost 90% is incurred in the
> public key operations.
>

I was excited to look at (1) a bit as I think actual research and numbers
would be good.  It appears that this paper was also published in "IEEE
International Symposium on Performance Analysis of Systems and Software
(ISPASS), Austin Texas, Mar 2005," so the measurements are about 6 years old
at this point.

I also noticed that they did not mention HTTP keep-alive connections in
conjunction with SSL performance.  If you are doing a high volume of server
to server requests, this would be an obvious optimization in any case, and
would amortize the public key operation overhead over a lot of transactions
(IIUC).

Below you mention the intermittent request case, where you have surprise
requests from any of a large number of clients that hit your server (and so
there's a cold-start penalty each time).  This is a worst case scenario for
SSL connections.  I wonder what the overhead of SSL is for modern client
hardware in these situations (and I'm thinking that in a thin client world,
this is a very good use for silicon on the client.)

They also didn't really go into the effects of specialized server hardware
for SSL, which may not have been as available in 2004(?).


>
> As request size increases, the public key operation overhead remains
> constant while the private key operations to encrypt the request
> scales linearly with request size. As a result, the actual act of
> encrypting the request becomes the limiting factor relatively quickly
> for large requests.
>

For today's realistic request traffic, I've been told that the public key
setup is typically the limiting factor.  And in fact even with keep-alives
turned on the main thing you'd need capacity for at scale is a cold start of
your service under load (worst case scenario).  The public key operations
would be a major issue then.

Note that a possible workaround for these large-request situations is to use
an SSL-secure API to retrieve a one-time bearer token for use with a
subsequent large request (a video upload, say).  Since it's one time it
can't be used to replay anything.  Since it's a large request the overhead
of an initial small request is nearly irrelevant.


>
> Keep in mind, this is additional latency on the web server, not on the
> client. Other research (2) indicates that clients may be even more
> resource-bound for these types of operations, resulting in even more
> severe latency problems.
>
> It's important to note that these two types of performance impact
> become problematic under different use cases.
>
> ** When SSL makes sense and when it doesn't **
>
> SSL has negative performance impacts which will result in real user
> experience impacts in certain situations. Service providers can use
> specialized hardware to significantly accelerate the necessary
> cryptography operations, but any client smaller than a medium-sized
> web application provider will not be able to afford the cost of such
> infrastructure. As such, these clients will suffer a user experience
> impact from the required use of SSL/TLS connections in some
> situations.
>
> What are these situations?
>
> Connection latency is an issue when new connections must be
> established for most operations. This is the case for intermittent API
> requests. Some use cases where this could be an issue (keeping in mind
> that even an extra fraction of a second of wait-time is a
> user-experience penalty that many applications may be unhappy paying):
>
> 1. Display statistics in a rich/desktop app in response to a user
> request (Ego app on iPhone requesting statistics from Google
> Analytics, for instance)
> 2. Check for new messages in a rich/desktop in response to a user
> request (Dashboard widget, for example)
>

May be better served by a push mechanism in any case...


> 3. Request data within a web application from a little-used
> third-party provider in response to a user request (web app like
> youcalc.com with ability to connect to arbitrary OAuth-enabled
> datastores)
>
> Meanwhile, encryption of the request becomes an issue for large
> request uploads and download especially. Some examples:
>
> 1. Video and media file access requests, including streaming
> 2. Google Docs document list API upload/download requests
>
> In both of the situations outlined above, SSL/TLS imposes a
> performance overhead that should theoretically have user experience
> implications. As I've been thinking about this issue, the following
> matrix has proven helpful in visualizing the problem space and helping
> to show that SSL/TLS is a clear winner in only a limited (but
> admittedly very common) portion of the problem space.
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> |                   | Sensitive to connection latency | Not sensitive
> to connection latency |
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | Large requests    | SSL/TLS not a good option       | SSL/TLS may be
> an option            |
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> | No large requests | SSL/TLS may be an option        | SSL/TLS is a
> good option            |
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> ** How does signing address these use cases? **
>
> The answer to this question depends on the form that signing ends up
> taking. If only the authentication parameters are signed, then we are
> in a situation similar to OAuth 1.0a in which latency is minimal
> because the hash operation used in the signing is cheap and is
> executed on a very small amount of data. Further, performance is
> unrelated to request size because only the authentication parameters
> are signed and the length of these parameters are unrelated to the
> request payload.
>
> If full message signing is required, then we start to run into the
> encryption penalty, as effort to calculate the hash of the entire
> payload should scale more or less linearly with the size of the
> payload. However, connection latency should remain minimal for small
> requests.
>



>
> Of course, using signatures without transport-layer security brings
> with it a whole new matrix of known security considerations. As
> mentioned at the beginning of this little essay, from a security
> perspective, signing appears to be at least as good in all respects as
> bearer tokens sent in the clear.
>
> ** Conclusion **
>
> There are theoretical and currently deployed use-cases in which
> dispensing with SSL/TLS and signing at least the authentication
> parameters of a request makes sense. These are use cases in which
> SSL/TLS has an undesirable user experience impact and in which leaving
> the request payload in the clear does not have significant negative
> security impacts. For this reason, and because the signing approach is
> the predominant deployed OAuth method (even though SSL/TLS with a
> bearer token is an option), we should maintain a signature method in
> the current draft.
>

Thanks for writing all of this up.  It would be good to get some general
quantification of user experience latency impact (if everyone agrees that's
the main issue) and compare it against the known interoperability issues
with signatures.  (There's a user experience impact there too.)


>
> ** References **
>
> 1.
> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.62.8589&rep=rep1&type=pdf
> - Anatomy and Performance of SSL Processing - Li Zhao, Ravi Iyer,
> Srihari Makineni, Laxmi Bhuyan - p. 4 is the meat
>
> 2. http://iweb.tntech.edu/hexb/publications/https-STAR-03122003.pdf -
> A Performance Analysis of Secure HTTP Protocol - Xubin He
>
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 2:00 PM, Blaine Cook <romeda@gmail.com> wrote:
> > One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> > and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> > signatures?
> >
> > - Why are signatures needed?
> > - What do signatures need to protect?
> >
> > Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> > a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
> >
> > b.
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div>Thanks for the comment. =A0I am not an expert either, but:</div><div><=
br></div>On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 9:24 AM, Ethan Jewett <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wr=
ote:<br>

<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">Before I get sta=
rted, let me say that this should be taken with a very<br>
large grain of salt. I am not a technical expert in these areas. I&#39;ve<b=
r>
only done a fair amount of reading and following along with standards<br>
efforts. Conclusions here should be questioned thoroughly and<br>
corrected as necessary, but since no one else seems to be willing to<br>
systematically look into the performance argument for signatures vs.<br>
SSL/TLS, I thought I&#39;d just sit down for a couple of hours and pound<br=
>
it out. The following is the result of that work.<br>
<br>
** Resource access without SSL/TLS - Signatures vs. Bearer-tokens **<br>
<br>
The crux of the trade-off comes down to this: In the case of signed<br>
authorization information (with a nonce), a Man in the Middle (MITM)<br>
attacker owns the individual message. The MITM can do the following:<br>
<br>
1. Decline to deliver the message<br>
2. Hold the message and deliver it later (subject to constraints on<br>
timestamp validity - so this is a limited attack)<br>
3. Deliver the message with altered contents (only if the contents<br>
themselves are not signed)<br>
<br>
In the case of bearer-token authorization, a MITM owns the entire<br>
connection. The MITM can do the following:<br>
<br>
1. Decline to deliver the message<br>
2. Hold the message and deliver it later<br>
3. Change the timestamp (if one is used at all)<br>
4. Change the contents of the message<br>
5. Create an arbitrary number of new messages with arbitrary contents<br>
using the bearer-token and deliver those (subject to bearer-token<br>
invalidation)<br>
<br>
In my opinion, #5 makes bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS unusable in<br>
nearly all use cases. Any use case where spam is a threat, for<br>
example, is not an acceptable use case because of this attack because<br>
any MITM can send an arbitrary number of spam messages that the<br>
provider application will show as coming directly from the user. If<br>
you think Twitter direct-message spam is bad now...<br></blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div>You can make the token short-lived if this is a concern. =A0(S=
hort lived meaning minutes.) =A0And presumably the user is rate limited in =
the first place, so there is an upper bound on the damage that can be done.=
</div>

<div><br></div><div>It&#39;s possible to come up with scenarios where short=
 lived bearer tokens won&#39;t work for #5. =A0I&#39;m struggling to come u=
p with any scenarios that really wouldn&#39;t want TLS as well.</div><div>

<br></div><div>Note that TLS also takes care of the reverse trip -- the MIT=
M cannot lie to the client about what happened, or feed it false informatio=
n. =A0None of the signature options under discussion sign responses IIRC.</=
div>

<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
Because of this and other possible attacks (successfully impersonating<br>
a provider gets you the bearer-token, for example), I think that<br>
bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS are not worth considering further for<br>
the vast majority of use cases.<br>
<br>
** So what about SSL/TLS? Can&#39;t we just use that for everything and<br>
forget about signatures? **<br>
<br>
Yes, but there are tradeoffs.<br>
<br>
The most important and unavoidable tradeoff is performance. The<br>
performance tradeoff comes in two flavors:<br>
<br>
1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the<br>
asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)<br>
2. Processing to encrypt requests (from the symmetric/private-key<br>
encryption operations)<br>
<br>
Connection latency is incurred to the public-key cryptography<br>
operations that are used to facilitate the exchange of a shared<br>
secret, which can then be used in the much more efficient<br>
private/symmetric key cryptography used to encrypt the individual<br>
messages. Research (1) indicates that, on the web server, SSL<br>
introduces approximately a 70% overhead over basic HTTP for small<br>
requests and that of this overhead almost 90% is incurred in the<br>
public key operations.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I was excited to=
 look at (1) a bit as I think actual research and numbers would be good. =
=A0It appears that this paper was also published in &quot;<span class=3D"Ap=
ple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;Times New Roman&#39;; font-size:=
 16px; ">IEEE International Symposium on Performance Analysis of Systems an=
d Software (ISPASS), Austin Texas, Mar 2005,&quot; so the measurements are =
about 6 years old at this point.</span></div>

<div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;Times New =
Roman&#39;; font-size: 16px; "><br></span></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-s=
tyle-span" face=3D"&#39;Times New Roman&#39;" size=3D"4"><span class=3D"App=
le-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 16px;">I also noticed that they did not =
mention HTTP keep-alive connections in conjunction with SSL performance. =
=A0If you are doing a high volume of server to server requests, this would =
be an obvious optimization in any case, and would amortize the public key o=
peration overhead over a lot of transactions (IIUC). =A0</span></font></div=
>

<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;Times New Roman&#39;" si=
ze=3D"4"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 16px;"><br></=
span></font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;Times =
New Roman&#39;" size=3D"4"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-s=
ize: 16px;">Below you mention the intermittent request case, where you have=
 surprise requests from any of a large number of clients that hit your serv=
er (and so there&#39;s a cold-start penalty each time). =A0This is a worst =
case scenario for SSL connections. =A0I wonder what the overhead of SSL is =
for modern client hardware in these situations (and I&#39;m thinking that i=
n a thin client world, this is a very good use for silicon on the client.)<=
/span></font></div>

<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;Times New Roman&#39;" si=
ze=3D"4"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 16px;"><br></=
span></font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;Times =
New Roman&#39;" size=3D"4"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-s=
ize: 16px;">They also didn&#39;t really go into the effects of specialized =
server hardware for SSL, which may not have been as available in 2004(?).</=
span></font></div>

<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
As request size increases, the public key operation overhead remains<br>
constant while the private key operations to encrypt the request<br>
scales linearly with request size. As a result, the actual act of<br>
encrypting the request becomes the limiting factor relatively quickly<br>
for large requests.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>For today&#39;s rea=
listic request traffic, I&#39;ve been told that the public key setup is typ=
ically the limiting factor. =A0And in fact even with keep-alives turned on =
the main thing you&#39;d need capacity for at scale is a cold start of your=
 service under load (worst case scenario). =A0The public key operations wou=
ld be a major issue then.</div>

<div><br></div><div>Note that a possible workaround for these large-request=
 situations is to use an SSL-secure API to retrieve a one-time bearer token=
 for use with a subsequent large request (a video upload, say). =A0Since it=
&#39;s one time it can&#39;t be used to replay anything. =A0Since it&#39;s =
a large request the overhead of an initial small request is nearly irreleva=
nt.</div>

<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
Keep in mind, this is additional latency on the web server, not on the<br>
client. Other research (2) indicates that clients may be even more<br>
resource-bound for these types of operations, resulting in even more<br>
severe latency problems.<br>
<br>
It&#39;s important to note that these two types of performance impact<br>
become problematic under different use cases.<br>
<br>
** When SSL makes sense and when it doesn&#39;t **<br>
<br>
SSL has negative performance impacts which will result in real user<br>
experience impacts in certain situations. Service providers can use<br>
specialized hardware to significantly accelerate the necessary<br>
cryptography operations, but any client smaller than a medium-sized<br>
web application provider will not be able to afford the cost of such<br>
infrastructure. As such, these clients will suffer a user experience<br>
impact from the required use of SSL/TLS connections in some<br>
situations.<br>
<br>
What are these situations?<br>
<br>
Connection latency is an issue when new connections must be<br>
established for most operations. This is the case for intermittent API<br>
requests. Some use cases where this could be an issue (keeping in mind<br>
that even an extra fraction of a second of wait-time is a<br>
user-experience penalty that many applications may be unhappy paying):<br>
<br>
1. Display statistics in a rich/desktop app in response to a user<br>
request (Ego app on iPhone requesting statistics from Google<br>
Analytics, for instance)<br>
2. Check for new messages in a rich/desktop in response to a user<br>
request (Dashboard widget, for example)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>May be better served by a push mechanism in any case...</div><div>=A0</div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">


3. Request data within a web application from a little-used<br>
third-party provider in response to a user request (web app like<br>
<a href=3D"http://youcalc.com" target=3D"_blank">youcalc.com</a> with abili=
ty to connect to arbitrary OAuth-enabled<br>
datastores)<br>
<br>
Meanwhile, encryption of the request becomes an issue for large<br>
request uploads and download especially. Some examples:<br>
<br>
1. Video and media file access requests, including streaming<br>
2. Google Docs document list API upload/download requests<br>
<br>
In both of the situations outlined above, SSL/TLS imposes a<br>
performance overhead that should theoretically have user experience<br>
implications. As I&#39;ve been thinking about this issue, the following<br>
matrix has proven helpful in visualizing the problem space and helping<br>
to show that SSL/TLS is a clear winner in only a limited (but<br>
admittedly very common) portion of the problem space.<br>
<br>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------------<br>
| =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 | Sensitive to connection latency | N=
ot sensitive<br>
to connection latency |<br>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------------<br>
| Large requests =A0 =A0| SSL/TLS not a good option =A0 =A0 =A0 | SSL/TLS m=
ay be<br>
an option =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0|<br>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------------<br>
| No large requests | SSL/TLS may be an option =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| SSL/TLS is =
a<br>
good option =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0|<br>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------------<br>
<br>
** How does signing address these use cases? **<br>
<br>
The answer to this question depends on the form that signing ends up<br>
taking. If only the authentication parameters are signed, then we are<br>
in a situation similar to OAuth 1.0a in which latency is minimal<br>
because the hash operation used in the signing is cheap and is<br>
executed on a very small amount of data. Further, performance is<br>
unrelated to request size because only the authentication parameters<br>
are signed and the length of these parameters are unrelated to the<br>
request payload.<br>
<br>
If full message signing is required, then we start to run into the<br>
encryption penalty, as effort to calculate the hash of the entire<br>
payload should scale more or less linearly with the size of the<br>
payload. However, connection latency should remain minimal for small<br>
requests.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex;">
<br>
Of course, using signatures without transport-layer security brings<br>
with it a whole new matrix of known security considerations. As<br>
mentioned at the beginning of this little essay, from a security<br>
perspective, signing appears to be at least as good in all respects as<br>
bearer tokens sent in the clear.<br>
<br>
** Conclusion **<br>
<br>
There are theoretical and currently deployed use-cases in which<br>
dispensing with SSL/TLS and signing at least the authentication<br>
parameters of a request makes sense. These are use cases in which<br>
SSL/TLS has an undesirable user experience impact and in which leaving<br>
the request payload in the clear does not have significant negative<br>
security impacts. For this reason, and because the signing approach is<br>
the predominant deployed OAuth method (even though SSL/TLS with a<br>
bearer token is an option), we should maintain a signature method in<br>
the current draft.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks for writing a=
ll of this up. =A0It would be good to get some general quantification of us=
er experience latency impact (if everyone agrees that&#39;s the main issue)=
 and compare it against the known interoperability issues with signatures. =
=A0(There&#39;s a user experience impact there too.)</div>

<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
** References **<br>
<br>
1. <a href=3D"http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=3D10.1.1.62=
.8589&amp;rep=3Drep1&amp;type=3Dpdf" target=3D"_blank">http://citeseerx.ist=
.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=3D10.1.1.62.8589&amp;rep=3Drep1&amp;type=3Dpd=
f</a><br>
- Anatomy and Performance of SSL Processing - Li Zhao, Ravi Iyer,<br>
Srihari Makineni, Laxmi Bhuyan - p. 4 is the meat<br>
<br>
2. <a href=3D"http://iweb.tntech.edu/hexb/publications/https-STAR-03122003.=
pdf" target=3D"_blank">http://iweb.tntech.edu/hexb/publications/https-STAR-=
03122003.pdf</a> -<br>
A Performance Analysis of Secure HTTP Protocol - Xubin He<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 2:00 PM, Blaine Cook &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:romeda@gm=
ail.com">romeda@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; One of the things that&#39;s been a primary focus of both today&#39;s =
WG call<br>
&gt; and last week&#39;s call is what are the specific use cases for<br>
&gt; signatures?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - Why are signatures needed?<br>
&gt; - What do signatures need to protect?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Let&#39;s try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we =
have<br>
&gt; a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; b.<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

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From john@jkemp.net  Sun Mar  7 11:40:01 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On Mar 7, 2010, at 12:24 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:

[...]

> In my opinion, #5 makes bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS unusable in
> nearly all use cases.

Just to point out that there are many use-cases which are today solved =
*only* with "bearer tokens" - namely any authentication method which =
uses regular Web cookies.

Cookies are often sent over an insecure channel. They are usually not =
signed. And any request which comes with a valid "session cookie" is =
assumed to be from a legitimate requester, even though with cross-site =
attacks through browsers, this is often a devastatingly wrong assumption =
(hence the need for a browser same-origin policy).=20

But the world has not collapsed.=20

> Any use case where spam is a threat, for
> example, is not an acceptable use case because of this attack because
> any MITM can send an arbitrary number of spam messages that the
> provider application will show as coming directly from the user. If
> you think Twitter direct-message spam is bad now...

You are talking about the /impact/ of an attack, and the impact of an =
attack on a system secured only with bearer tokens is often high. There =
is usually at least one other factor in security threat analysis, =
however - the /risk/ of a threat.=20

The risk of an attack on bearer tokens seems to be empirically low, =
despite the relative ease of such an attack.
=20
The risk can also be mitigated by making bearer tokens expire quickly, =
or have one-time use semantics.=20

In short, bearer tokens work for quite a large set of use-cases.

>=20
> Because of this and other possible attacks (successfully impersonating
> a provider gets you the bearer-token, for example), I think that
> bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS are not worth considering further for
> the vast majority of use cases.

I disagree, but I'm not sure it matters anyway for the purposes of =
deciding what features OAuth should support.

OAuth will support bearer (ie. unsigned) tokens sent over SSL. So it =
will support bearer tokens. It's just a question of whether the spec. =
should allow implementations to send bearer tokens over any other =
channel than an SSL/TLS channel.=20

If someone wishes to do the risk analysis and decides that a particular =
security feature is sufficient for what they want to do, why shouldn't =
they be allowed to do it? Someone who gets it wrong, shoots him- or =
her-self (and no-one else, as the whole community, or that company's =
partners don't have to play along) in the foot, right?=20

Make bearer+SSL/TLS mandatory to implement, but don't rule out bearer =
tokens being sent over insecure channels, and we should all be able to =
implement what we need to implement in peace.

Cheers,

- johnk




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Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2010 14:08:55 -0600
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From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
To: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Thanks for your comments. I'm mostly interested in watching the
discussion unfold, but there are a couple of things to add:

On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 1:23 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com> wrote:

> You can make the token short-lived if this is a concern. =A0(Short lived
> meaning minutes.) =A0And presumably the user is rate limited in the first
> place, so there is an upper bound on the damage that can be done.
> It's possible to come up with scenarios where short lived bearer tokens
> won't work for #5. =A0I'm struggling to come up with any scenarios that r=
eally
> wouldn't want TLS as well.
> Note that TLS also takes care of the reverse trip -- the MITM cannot lie =
to
> the client about what happened, or feed it false information. =A0None of =
the
> signature options under discussion sign responses IIRC.

All true, but the upper bound of damage that can be done is definitely
higher than with a signature over an insecure connection. I'm just
very hesitant to take away signatures and provide only a less secure
method (or no method at all) over an insecure connection.

> I was excited to look at (1) a bit as I think actual research and numbers
> would be good. =A0It appears that this paper was also published in "IEEE
> International Symposium on Performance Analysis of Systems and Software
> (ISPASS), Austin Texas, Mar 2005," so the measurements are about 6 years =
old
> at this point.
> I also noticed that they did not mention HTTP keep-alive connections in
> conjunction with SSL performance. =A0If you are doing a high volume of se=
rver
> to server requests, this would be an obvious optimization in any case, an=
d
> would amortize the public key operation overhead over a lot of transactio=
ns
> (IIUC).
> Below you mention the intermittent request case, where you have surprise
> requests from any of a large number of clients that hit your server (and =
so
> there's a cold-start penalty each time). =A0This is a worst case scenario=
 for
> SSL connections. =A0I wonder what the overhead of SSL is for modern clien=
t
> hardware in these situations (and I'm thinking that in a thin client worl=
d,
> this is a very good use for silicon on the client.)
> They also didn't really go into the effects of specialized server hardwar=
e
> for SSL, which may not have been as available in 2004(?).

I recognize that the research I reference is dated. Unfortunately I do
not have much access to good research article search or to
subscription services for most journals. If someone with that access
would do the leg-work to find more recent articles, I'd be delighted
:-)

That said, on non-specialized hardware, I don't think crypto
operations have gotten much faster over the last 6 years aside from
the Moore's law speedups that apply to everything, so I think the
percentage estimates are probably OK.

> For today's realistic request traffic, I've been told that the public key
> setup is typically the limiting factor. =A0And in fact even with keep-ali=
ves
> turned on the main thing you'd need capacity for at scale is a cold start=
 of
> your service under load (worst case scenario). =A0The public key operatio=
ns
> would be a major issue then.

Actually, the finding that the private key operations are at least as
intensive at the public key operations for requests over 64Kb in size
was one of the things that most surprised me in this paper! I too was
under the impression that the main limiting factor was the public-key
operation and I didn't even think about the large-request case until I
started researching.

> Note that a possible workaround for these large-request situations is to =
use
> an SSL-secure API to retrieve a one-time bearer token for use with a
> subsequent large request (a video upload, say). =A0Since it's one time it
> can't be used to replay anything. =A0Since it's a large request the overh=
ead
> of an initial small request is nearly irrelevant.

True. That sounds like a good idea. This is not part of either the
OAuth 1.0a or WRAP spec for bearer tokens. It would have to be added
(and perhaps should be).

> Thanks for writing all of this up. =A0It would be good to get some genera=
l
> quantification of user experience latency impact (if everyone agrees that=
's
> the main issue) and compare it against the known interoperability issues
> with signatures. =A0(There's a user experience impact there too.)

Agreed, that sounds like the right approach. I don't have the
expertise or time to do that quantitative testing. Maybe a large
provider would be willing to contribute a sampling of their test data.

Ethan

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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John,

Yes, I overstepped in the first section. I'll retract all the stuff
about bearer-tokens over an insecure channel not having a use-case.
Clearly they're used all over the place. Whether or not this is a good
idea is another question entirely and you've outlined a good way to
approach it.

My point is only that bearer-tokens over an insecure channel seem to
be always *less* secure or *as* secure (but never *more* secure) than
using a signature approach over an insecure channel. As such, I'm
uncomfortable taking away an existing, widely implemented, and usually
more secure approach for authentication over an insecure channel
(OAuth 1.0a signing) and replacing it with a less secure approach
(bearer tokens w/o SSL/TLS).

Ethan

On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 1:40 PM, John Kemp <john@jkemp.net> wrote:
> On Mar 7, 2010, at 12:24 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:
>
> [...]
>
>> In my opinion, #5 makes bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS unusable in
>> nearly all use cases.
>
> Just to point out that there are many use-cases which are today solved *o=
nly* with "bearer tokens" - namely any authentication method which uses reg=
ular Web cookies.
>
> Cookies are often sent over an insecure channel. They are usually not sig=
ned. And any request which comes with a valid "session cookie" is assumed t=
o be from a legitimate requester, even though with cross-site attacks throu=
gh browsers, this is often a devastatingly wrong assumption (hence the need=
 for a browser same-origin policy).
>
> But the world has not collapsed.
>
>> Any use case where spam is a threat, for
>> example, is not an acceptable use case because of this attack because
>> any MITM can send an arbitrary number of spam messages that the
>> provider application will show as coming directly from the user. If
>> you think Twitter direct-message spam is bad now...
>
> You are talking about the /impact/ of an attack, and the impact of an att=
ack on a system secured only with bearer tokens is often high. There is usu=
ally at least one other factor in security threat analysis, however - the /=
risk/ of a threat.
>
> The risk of an attack on bearer tokens seems to be empirically low, despi=
te the relative ease of such an attack.
>
> The risk can also be mitigated by making bearer tokens expire quickly, or=
 have one-time use semantics.
>
> In short, bearer tokens work for quite a large set of use-cases.
>
>>
>> Because of this and other possible attacks (successfully impersonating
>> a provider gets you the bearer-token, for example), I think that
>> bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS are not worth considering further for
>> the vast majority of use cases.
>
> I disagree, but I'm not sure it matters anyway for the purposes of decidi=
ng what features OAuth should support.
>
> OAuth will support bearer (ie. unsigned) tokens sent over SSL. So it will=
 support bearer tokens. It's just a question of whether the spec. should al=
low implementations to send bearer tokens over any other channel than an SS=
L/TLS channel.
>
> If someone wishes to do the risk analysis and decides that a particular s=
ecurity feature is sufficient for what they want to do, why shouldn't they =
be allowed to do it? Someone who gets it wrong, shoots him- or her-self (an=
d no-one else, as the whole community, or that company's partners don't hav=
e to play along) in the foot, right?
>
> Make bearer+SSL/TLS mandatory to implement, but don't rule out bearer tok=
ens being sent over insecure channels, and we should all be able to impleme=
nt what we need to implement in peace.
>
> Cheers,
>
> - johnk
>
>
>
>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Ethan,

On Mar 7, 2010, at 3:13 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:

> John,
>=20
> Yes, I overstepped in the first section. I'll retract all the stuff
> about bearer-tokens over an insecure channel not having a use-case.
> Clearly they're used all over the place. Whether or not this is a good
> idea is another question entirely and you've outlined a good way to
> approach it.
>=20
> My point is only that bearer-tokens over an insecure channel seem to
> be always *less* secure or *as* secure (but never *more* secure) than
> using a signature approach over an insecure channel.

Agreed, there is a spectrum of security requirements and associated =
methods of meeting those requirements.

Bearer tokens are a relatively weak source of authentication, whereas =
cryptographic signatures can better provide that property.

> As such, I'm
> uncomfortable taking away an existing, widely implemented, and usually
> more secure approach for authentication over an insecure channel
> (OAuth 1.0a signing) and replacing it with a less secure approach
> (bearer tokens w/o SSL/TLS).

I would certainly not suggest that we replace a relatively secure =
authentication mechanism (signatures using an appropriately-handled =
secret key) with a relatively insecure authentication mechanism (bearer =
tokens in the clear).=20

SSL/TLS (or equivalent) provides another property of security =
(confidentiality).=20

Any of these mechanisms might find an appropriate place in real-world =
implementations.

Cheers,

- johnk

>=20
> Ethan
>=20
> On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 1:40 PM, John Kemp <john@jkemp.net> wrote:
>> On Mar 7, 2010, at 12:24 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:
>>=20
>> [...]
>>=20
>>> In my opinion, #5 makes bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS unusable in
>>> nearly all use cases.
>>=20
>> Just to point out that there are many use-cases which are today =
solved *only* with "bearer tokens" - namely any authentication method =
which uses regular Web cookies.
>>=20
>> Cookies are often sent over an insecure channel. They are usually not =
signed. And any request which comes with a valid "session cookie" is =
assumed to be from a legitimate requester, even though with cross-site =
attacks through browsers, this is often a devastatingly wrong assumption =
(hence the need for a browser same-origin policy).
>>=20
>> But the world has not collapsed.
>>=20
>>> Any use case where spam is a threat, for
>>> example, is not an acceptable use case because of this attack =
because
>>> any MITM can send an arbitrary number of spam messages that the
>>> provider application will show as coming directly from the user. If
>>> you think Twitter direct-message spam is bad now...
>>=20
>> You are talking about the /impact/ of an attack, and the impact of an =
attack on a system secured only with bearer tokens is often high. There =
is usually at least one other factor in security threat analysis, =
however - the /risk/ of a threat.
>>=20
>> The risk of an attack on bearer tokens seems to be empirically low, =
despite the relative ease of such an attack.
>>=20
>> The risk can also be mitigated by making bearer tokens expire =
quickly, or have one-time use semantics.
>>=20
>> In short, bearer tokens work for quite a large set of use-cases.
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Because of this and other possible attacks (successfully =
impersonating
>>> a provider gets you the bearer-token, for example), I think that
>>> bearer-tokens without SSL/TLS are not worth considering further for
>>> the vast majority of use cases.
>>=20
>> I disagree, but I'm not sure it matters anyway for the purposes of =
deciding what features OAuth should support.
>>=20
>> OAuth will support bearer (ie. unsigned) tokens sent over SSL. So it =
will support bearer tokens. It's just a question of whether the spec. =
should allow implementations to send bearer tokens over any other =
channel than an SSL/TLS channel.
>>=20
>> If someone wishes to do the risk analysis and decides that a =
particular security feature is sufficient for what they want to do, why =
shouldn't they be allowed to do it? Someone who gets it wrong, shoots =
him- or her-self (and no-one else, as the whole community, or that =
company's partners don't have to play along) in the foot, right?
>>=20
>> Make bearer+SSL/TLS mandatory to implement, but don't rule out bearer =
tokens being sent over insecure channels, and we should all be able to =
implement what we need to implement in peace.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>>=20
>> - johnk
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20


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From: Leif Johansson <leifj@mnt.se>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On 03/04/2010 09:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>
> - Why are signatures needed?
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.

After reviewing the rest of the replies to this I'll offer up
something I believe is missing.

The hidden assumption of the questions is (I think) that the channel
is secure, yes? In that case: Signatures will protect you against 
failing to get your channel protection right - so will channel bindings btw!

	Cheers Leif

From beaton@google.com  Sun Mar  7 21:22:08 2010
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Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2010 21:22:06 -0800
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 9:24 AM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> Before I get started, let me say that this should be taken with a very
> large grain of salt. I am not a technical expert in these areas. I've
> only done a fair amount of reading and following along with standards
> efforts. Conclusions here should be questioned thoroughly and
> corrected as necessary, but since no one else seems to be willing to
> systematically look into the performance argument for signatures vs.
> SSL/TLS, I thought I'd just sit down for a couple of hours and pound
> it out. The following is the result of that work.

<snip>

A couple of quick notes on this.

1) Amortized analysis is really important when you are looking at
https connection overhead.  The first document you reference seems to
assume that each SSL session is used for exactly one HTTP request.
That's not the common case, though it certainly can happen in real
world environments.

Overhead from https is highly dependent on deployment scenarios, with
real world costs ranging from "free" to "ridiculously expensive",
depending on the details of the clients and servers and usage
patterns.

2) Your analysis of the overhead of OAuth 1.0a signing assumes that
HMAC is used rather than RSA.  You get very different numbers for RSA.

3) Security arguments for "signing" in OAuth can be fairly subtle.
Different people are using signing in different ways for different
reasons, with corresponding different requirements in terms of key
distribution and use of transport layer encryption.

4) I think "from a security perspective, signing appears to be at
least as good in all respects as bearer tokens sent in the clear"
overstates the case.  It depends on the bearer token,  the signature
scheme, and the security goals.  Check out the security considerations
of the digest auth spec (RFC 2617) for some of the trade-offs here.

Cheers,
Brian

From BeckW@telekom.de  Mon Mar  8 04:36:22 2010
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I've added a use case page and a terminology comparison table to the =
tools wiki. The latter needs some review, given the differences between =
Oauth 1.0a, draft-oauth, and WRAP.

http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/OauthTerms


Wolfgang


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Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2010 06:04:04 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] I-D deadline today
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Just a reminder that the deadline for submitting Internet-Drafts before
Anaheim occurs about 12 hours from now.

http://www.ietf.org/meeting/cutoff-dates-2010.html#IETF77

Peter

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From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Mon Mar  8 05:04:49 2010
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Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2010 14:04:50 +0100
From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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I would like to add another use case:

In the "How to get a token" scenario, usage of public key consumer  
authentication would require to use signatures in order to prove  
private key ownership.




From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Mon Mar  8 05:38:29 2010
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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Hi Ethan,

<snip>
>
> The most important and unavoidable tradeoff is performance. The

IMHO the comparison is asymmetric. You compare SSL, which offers  
various security
measures, with just signatures on plain HTTP requests. Sure, validating a
(HMAC) signature is cheap, but signatures only give you sender  
authentication and
(depending on what has been included in the digest computation)
message integrity protection. But any attacker might replay the  
messages, so what
about replay prevention?

Replay prevention over unsecure connections is typically (as in OAuth  
1.0 and OpenId)
implemented using nounces and timestamps. Validating nounces requires  
server-side,
cluster-wide state (transient or database). All requests must be validated
against this state in serialized order. So you end up with
a) scalability issues and
b) performance impacts.

SSL scales both linearly and horicontally.

Not to forget, a HTTP request may be cached by any proxy on the way  
from end user
device to target service. Care has to be taken in order to prevent  
proxies from
caching sensible requests.

> performance tradeoff comes in two flavors:
>
> 1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the
> asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)

Bootstrapping a SSL sessions is expensive. But every session can be
used for multiple HTTPS-Connections. Thus an application can establish  
the first
HTTPS connection in the background before any user interaction takes place and
reuse the session for further communication.

> 2. Processing to encrypt requests (from the symmetric/private-key
> encryption operations)

TLS is powerful and expensive. That's true. I sometimes wish to have something
more lightweight and flexible where I could decide on a per-message  
base which security
features to use. But this is hugh story.

 From my point of view, the working group should decide what OAuth 2.0  
should be:

1) a standard for token-based authentication and authorization or
2) a standard for HTTP security including token-based authentication  
and authorization

In the first case, token holder authentication (Holder of Key in SAML  
and WS-Trust) based on signing
a nounce should suffice.

In the later case, the standard should provide a (large) subset of SSL  
protection features,
e.g. message integrity, message confidentiality, server  
authentication, replay prevention.

regards,
Torsten.







From jpanzer@google.com  Mon Mar  8 09:59:33 2010
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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 09:58:49 -0800
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To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 5:38 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net
> wrote:

> ...
>> 1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the
>> asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)
>>
>
> Bootstrapping a SSL sessions is expensive. But every session can be
> used for multiple HTTPS-Connections. Thus an application can establish the
> first
> HTTPS connection in the background before any user interaction takes place
> and
> reuse the session for further communication.


I think this point is worth calling out (and doing a bit of prototyping on)
-- if the use case is a latency-sensitive client app that wishes to avoid
cold-start HTTP(s) connections, then a warmup connect() or just an
idempotent GET while the app is starting up / coming to the foreground could
be a very good idea.  Good even without SSL, due to DNS overhead, and even
more useful with SSL.  This could allow many apps to hide the latency hit
from the user almost completely.

If this is true, then it may mean that the SSL overhead would be a problem
in far fewer cases than it might appear at first glance.

--001485ea3c14648e9304814dd2a3
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On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 5:38 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;</=
span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

<div class=3D"im"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">...<br>
1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the<br>
asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
Bootstrapping a SSL sessions is expensive. But every session can be<br>
used for multiple HTTPS-Connections. Thus an application can establish the =
first<br>
HTTPS connection in the background before any user interaction takes place =
and<br>
reuse the session for further communication.</blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>I think this point is worth calling out (and doing a bit of prototyping o=
n) -- if the use case is a latency-sensitive client app that wishes to avoi=
d cold-start HTTP(s) connections, then a warmup connect() or just an idempo=
tent GET while the app is starting up / coming to the foreground could be a=
 very good idea. =A0Good even without SSL, due to DNS overhead, and even mo=
re useful with SSL. =A0This could allow many apps to hide the latency hit f=
rom the user almost completely.</div>

<div><br></div><div>If this is true, then it may mean that the SSL overhead=
 would be a problem in far fewer cases than it might appear at first glance=
.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>

--001485ea3c14648e9304814dd2a3--

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From: Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
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Correction: I meant to say that popping open a browser does NOT protect the
user from malicious rich apps. If the user downloaded and installed the
malicious app on their system, its too late already.

Allen


On 3/7/10 7:25 PM, "Allen Tom" <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:

> 
> However, for rich apps, requiring the app to pop open a browser does protect
> the user from malicious apps,
> 
> 
> 


>>>>>>> 


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<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt=
'>Correction: I meant to say that popping open a browser does NOT protect th=
e user from malicious rich apps. If the user downloaded and installed the ma=
licious app on their system, its too late already.<BR>
<BR>
Allen<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 3/7/10 7:25 PM, &quot;Allen Tom&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"atom@yahoo-inc.com">a=
tom@yahoo-inc.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
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<BR>
<BR>
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This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich client apps,
where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user already
downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is not going
to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a malicious app
could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.

Under no circumstances should web applications use the username/password
profile. Obviously, a browser is available in this scenario.

However, for rich apps, requiring the app to pop open a browser does protec=
t
the user from malicious apps, and that=B9s why it is OK for these apps to
directly ask the user for their password. However, it=B9s generally much
better to invoke a browser =AD for instance, CAPTCHA and other anti-password
cracking defenses and be deployed without having to rewrite clients that ar=
e
already in the field. Also, some users may need to authenticate with more
than just a password =AD for instance users might have hardware/sms tokens or
might need to answer a secret question.

Allen

On 3/5/10 12:17 AM, "Jason Hullinger" <sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:

> If it's impossible to validate who a client is for even one particular
> protocol in the spec, doesn't this leave a provider's web service open to
> anyone making an authentication/login request to that implemented profile=
 in
> the spec? Unless I'm missing something, this is a problem because a provi=
der
> would be opening themselves up to likely phishing attacks, and no way to =
stop
> it except by shutting down the entire protocol that allowed it. Perhaps t=
his
> is just a documentation issue because implementing this portion of the
> spec=A0could potentially make a provider less secure with no real way of
> stopping it after it's implemented.
>=20
> ~/Jason Hullinger
>=20
> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 9:37 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>> As was discussed on the OAuth list, desktop apps can NOT be secured, so =
there
>> is no way to ensure it really is the desktop app you think it is. For mo=
st
>> phone platforms, this is also the case. For totally locked platforms whe=
re
>> the app is part of the OS (xbox, PS3, some phones, settop boxes) -- then=
 one
>> can have high confidence the app is the app. So far I consider these the
>> exception rather than the rule.
>>=20
>> -- Dick
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 2010-03-04, at 8:37 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>>=20
>>> +ietf list
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason Hullinger < <mailto:sshjason@gmail.co=
m>
>>> sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> I think there are probably going to be more instances of providers nee=
ding
>>>> this than otherwise. The current Username and Password profile is not =
a
>>>> solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is a need for a secur=
e
>>>> protocol where you can validate that the client is who they say they a=
re in
>>>> a profile such as on a phone or desktop application.
>>>>=20
>>>> ~/Jason Hullinger
>>>>=20
>>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard <
>>>> <mailto:lshepard@facebook.com>  <mailto:lshepard@facebook.com>
>>>> lshepard@facebook.com> wrote:
>>>>> Is Facebook the only one who needs this?
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, "Dick Hardt" < <mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.c=
om>
>>>>> <mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com> dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> The spec allows the AS to define additional parameters, so for these
>>>>>> specialized use cases, Facebook could ask Microsoft and Sony to incl=
ude
>>>>>> an identifier in the request.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Is that adequate?
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon <
>>>>>> <mailto:recordond@gmail.com>  <mailto:recordond@gmail.com>
>>>>>> <mailto:recordond@gmail.com> recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets which is primarily
>>>>>>> where we envision using the username/password profile.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt <
>>>>>>> <mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com>  <mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> <mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com> dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> >> On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>> >>> On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger <
>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:sshjason@gmail.com>  <mailto:sshjason@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:sshjason@gmail.com> sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> wrap_username - Required. The User=B9s username
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> wrap_password - Required. The User=B9s password
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values defined =
by
>>>>>>>>>>> the server
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> Additional parameters - Any additional parameter defined b=
y the
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> authorization server
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> From the above parameters there is no way of insuring that=
 a
>>>>>>>>>>> client is ever
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> who they say they are because a user could easily obtain t=
he
>>>>>>>>>>> wrap_client_id
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> and make requests using that. Does anyone have an
>>>>>>>>>>> implementation of this or
>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> any recommended additional parameters?
>>>>>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>>>>>> >>> I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any wa=
y,
the
>>>>>>>>>> >>> user trusted the client and provided his/her username and
>>>>>>>>>> password,
>>>>>>>>>> >>> that's all that counts. The should just verify these credent=
ials
and
>>>>>>>>>> >>> then issue refresh and access tokens.
>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>> >> It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate =
who
>>>>>>>>> the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty
>>>>>>>>> strict restrictions on the ability for apps to take user credenti=
als
>>>>>>>>> directly and we need to be able to enforce those restrictions. I =
would
>>>>>>>>> like to see the ability to authenticate the app as well in this
>>>>>>>>> profile.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where
>>>>>>>> redirection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a ph=
one.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with curre=
nt
>>>>>>>> platforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets fro=
m
>>>>>>>> malicious users. A web app of course can keep a secret from the us=
er,
>>>>>>>> but use of this profile by a web app does not seem to make sense.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > -- Dick
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > --
>>>>>>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Goog=
le
>>>>>>>> Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>>>>>>> > To post to this group, send email to
>>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com> oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups=
.com.
>>>>>>>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscribe@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>>> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>>>>>>> > For more options, visit this group at
>>>>>>>> <http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den>
>>>>>>>> <http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den>
>>>>>>>> <http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den>
>>>>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>>>>> Groups "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to
>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com> oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.=
com.
>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscribe@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>> <mailto:oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com>
>>>>>>> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>>>>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>>>>>> <http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den>
>>>>>>> <http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den>
>>>>>>> <http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den>
>>>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20


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<HTML>
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<TITLE>Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt=
'>This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich client apps=
, where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user already down=
loaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is not going to pr=
otect the user from a malicious app &#8211; for instance, a malicious app co=
uld have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.<BR>
<BR>
Under no circumstances should web applications use the username/password pr=
ofile. Obviously, a browser is available in this scenario.<BR>
<BR>
However, for rich apps, requiring the app to pop open a browser does protec=
t the user from malicious apps, and that&#8217;s why it is OK for these apps=
 to directly ask the user for their password. However, it&#8217;s generally =
much better to invoke a browser &#8211; for instance, CAPTCHA and other anti=
-password cracking defenses and be deployed without having to rewrite client=
s that are already in the field. Also, some users may need to authenticate w=
ith more than just a password &#8211; for instance users might have hardware=
/sms tokens or might need to answer a secret question.<BR>
<BR>
Allen<BR>
<BR>
On 3/5/10 12:17 AM, &quot;Jason Hullinger&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"sshjason@gmail=
.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>If it's impossible to validate who a client is f=
or even one particular protocol in the spec, doesn't this leave a provider's=
 web service open to anyone making an authentication/login request to that i=
mplemented profile in the spec? Unless I'm missing something, this is a prob=
lem because a provider would be opening themselves up to likely phishing att=
acks, and no way to stop it except by shutting down the entire protocol that=
 allowed it. Perhaps this is just a documentation issue because implementing=
 this portion of the spec=A0could potentially make a provider less secure with=
 no real way of stopping it after it's implemented.<BR>
<BR>
~/Jason Hullinger<BR>
<BR>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 9:37 PM, Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"dick.hardt@gmail.co=
m">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>As was discussed on the OAuth list, desktop apps=
 can NOT be secured, so there is no way to ensure it really is the desktop a=
pp you think it is. For most phone platforms, this is also the case. For tot=
ally locked platforms where the app is part of the OS (xbox, PS3, some phone=
s, settop boxes) -- then one can have high confidence the app is the app. So=
 far I consider these the exception rather than the rule.<BR>
<BR>
<FONT COLOR=3D"#888888">-- Dick<BR>
</FONT><BR>
<BR>
On 2010-03-04, at 8:37 PM, David Recordon wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>+ietf list<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On Mar 4, 2010, at 8:16 PM, Jason Hullinger &lt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sshjas=
on@gmail.com">mailto:sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; <a href=3D"sshjason@gmail.com"=
>sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>I think there are probably going to be more inst=
ances of providers needing this than otherwise. The current Username and Pas=
sword profile is not a solution in a for every sense, and there clearly is a=
 need for a secure protocol where you can validate that the client is who th=
ey say they are in a profile such as on a phone or desktop application.<BR>
<BR>
~/Jason Hullinger<BR>
<BR>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 7:30 PM, Luke Shepard &lt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lshep=
ard@facebook.com">mailto:lshepard@facebook.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:lshepard@facebook.com">mailto:lshepard@facebook.com</a>&gt; <a href=3D"ls=
hepard@facebook.com">lshepard@facebook.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>Is Facebook the only one who needs this?<BR>
<BR>
Sent from my iPhone<BR>
<BR>
On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:41 PM, &quot;Dick Hardt&quot; &lt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:dick.hardt@gmail.com">mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; <a href=3D"=
dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>The spec allows the AS to define additional para=
meters, so for these specialized use cases, Facebook could ask Microsoft and=
 Sony to include an identifier in the request.<BR>
<BR>
Is that adequate?<BR>
<BR>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 6:28 PM, David Recordon &lt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rec=
ordond@gmail.com">mailto:recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:recordond@gmail.com">mailto:recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">mailto:recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; <a href=3D"re=
cordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>Devices such as an XBox or PS3 can keep secrets =
which is primarily<BR>
where we envision using the username/password profile.<BR>
<BR>
On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Dick Hardt &lt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.ha=
rdt@gmail.com">mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;&lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:dick.hardt@gmail.com">mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; <a href=3D"=
dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; On 2010-03-04, at 3:58 PM, Luke Shepard wrote:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Jason Hullinger &lt; &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com">mailto:sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com">mailto:sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; &nbsp;=
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sshjason@gmail.com">mailto:sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; <a=
 href=3D"sshjason@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_client_id - Required. The client identifier<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_username - Required. The User&#8217;s username<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_password - Required. The User&#8217;s password<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; wrap_scope - Optional. Authorization scope values defined =
by the server<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Additional parameters - Any additional parameter defined b=
y the<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization server<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; From the above parameters there is no way of insuring that=
 a client is ever<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; who they say they are because a user could easily obtain t=
he wrap_client_id<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and make requests using that. Does anyone have an implemen=
tation of this or<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; any recommended additional parameters?<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I don't think you need to trust this client itself in any way,=
 the<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; user trusted the client and provided his/her username and pass=
word,<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that's all that counts. The should just verify these credentia=
ls and<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; then issue refresh and access tokens.<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; It's pretty important to Facebook that we be able to validate who =
the client is when they pass in user credentials. We have pretty strict rest=
rictions on the ability for apps to take user credentials directly and we ne=
ed to be able to enforce those restrictions. I would like to see the ability=
 to authenticate the app as well in this profile.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; This profile was motivated by the use case of rich clients where redir=
ection of a browser is challenging. ie. a twitter app on a phone.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; Per previous discussions in OAuth, it is not feasible with current pla=
tforms for an app running on a user machine to keep secrets from malicious u=
sers. A web app of course can keep a secret from the user, but use of this p=
rofile by a web app does not seem to make sense.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; -- Dick<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; --<BR>
&gt; You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Gro=
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&gt;<BR>
<BR>
--<BR>
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups &=
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<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial">=
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From jo.hiller@googlemail.com  Mon Mar  8 11:21:31 2010
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From: Jochen Hiller <jo.hiller@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 20:21:03 +0100
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 6:58 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 5:38 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>
>> ...
>>>
>>> 1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the
>>> asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)
>>>
>>
>> Bootstrapping a SSL sessions is expensive. But every session can be
>> used for multiple HTTPS-Connections. Thus an application can establish the
>> first
>> HTTPS connection in the background before any user interaction takes place
>> and
>> reuse the session for further communication.
>>
>
> I think this point is worth calling out (and doing a bit of prototyping on)
> -- if the use case is a latency-sensitive client app that wishes to avoid
> cold-start HTTP(s) connections, then a warmup connect() or just an
> idempotent GET while the app is starting up / coming to the foreground could
> be a very good idea.  Good even without SSL, due to DNS overhead, and even
> more useful with SSL.  This could allow many apps to hide the latency hit
> from the user almost completely.
>
> If this is true, then it may mean that the SSL overhead would be a problem
> in far fewer cases than it might appear at first glance.
>
>
I am developing Android apps using a Security Token Service which forces use
of SSL. I ran exactly into the issue that the first request is expensive,
due to establish the SSL session between the Android app and the server. To
reduce the latency time for the first HTTPS request with user interaction, I
did exactly what you described: I run a simple GET request during app
startup, in background, reuse the HttpClient for further requests. The
required time has been reduced about 1 sec (exact time depends on device and
hardware capabilities), resulting in absolute processing times in range of
about 100-200 ms, not seconds (depends mainly on server and token
requirements).

I agree, that SSL simplifies the requirements for the client and client
developer. Every library on client you do NOT need, reduces complexity and
dependencies to other 3rd party libraries. Even generating nounces and
timestamps on client requires additional state to be maintained somewhere
within your app.

Cheers, Jochen

--0016e6d77e3e83cd5f04814ef858
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 6:58 PM, John Panzer <spa=
n dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jpanzer@google.com">jpanzer@google.com<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 5:38 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodders=
tedt.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">



<div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">...<div class=3D"im"><br>
1. Connection latency to bootstrap the connection (from the<br>
asymmetric/public-key encryption operations)<br>
</div></blockquote>
<br></div><div class=3D"im">
Bootstrapping a SSL sessions is expensive. But every session can be<br>
used for multiple HTTPS-Connections. Thus an application can establish the =
first<br>
HTTPS connection in the background before any user interaction takes place =
and<br>
reuse the session for further communication.</div></blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>I think this point is worth calling out (and doing a bit of prototy=
ping on) -- if the use case is a latency-sensitive client app that wishes t=
o avoid cold-start HTTP(s) connections, then a warmup connect() or just an =
idempotent GET while the app is starting up / coming to the foreground coul=
d be a very good idea. =A0Good even without SSL, due to DNS overhead, and e=
ven more useful with SSL. =A0This could allow many apps to hide the latency=
 hit from the user almost completely.</div>



<div><br></div><div>If this is true, then it may mean that the SSL overhead=
 would be a problem in far fewer cases than it might appear at first glance=
.</div><div><br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am developin=
g Android apps using a Security Token Service which forces use of SSL. I ra=
n exactly into the issue that the first request is expensive, due to establ=
ish the SSL session between the Android app and the server. To reduce the l=
atency time for the first HTTPS request with user interaction, I did exactl=
y what you described: I run a simple GET request during app startup, in bac=
kground, reuse the HttpClient for further requests. The required time has b=
een reduced about 1 sec (exact time depends on device and hardware capabili=
ties), resulting in absolute processing times in range of about 100-200 ms,=
 not seconds (depends mainly on server and token requirements).</div>

<div><br></div><div>I agree, that SSL simplifies the requirements for the c=
lient and client developer. Every library on client you do NOT need, reduce=
s complexity and dependencies to other 3rd party libraries. Even generating=
 nounces and timestamps on client requires additional state to be maintaine=
d somewhere within your app.</div>

<div><br></div><div>Cheers, Jochen</div><div><br></div></div>

--0016e6d77e3e83cd5f04814ef858--

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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 11:46:10 -0800
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On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 11:21 AM, Jochen Hiller <jo.hiller@googlemail.com> wrote:
> The
> required time has been reduced about 1 sec (exact time depends on device and
> hardware capabilities), resulting in absolute processing times in range of
> about 100-200 ms, not seconds (depends mainly on server and token
> requirements).

How much of the time savings was due to reducing network latency?  My
guess is most of it, but if you saw differently that would be very
interesting.

From jo.hiller@googlemail.com  Mon Mar  8 12:06:04 2010
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From: Jochen Hiller <jo.hiller@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 21:05:14 +0100
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To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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--0016e6d6454e8097d004814f9652
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Hi Brian,

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:46 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 11:21 AM, Jochen Hiller <jo.hiller@googlemail.com>
> wrote:
> > The
> > required time has been reduced about 1 sec (exact time depends on device
> and
> > hardware capabilities), resulting in absolute processing times in range
> of
> > about 100-200 ms, not seconds (depends mainly on server and token
> > requirements).
>
> How much of the time savings was due to reducing network latency?  My
> guess is most of it, but if you saw differently that would be very
> interesting.
>

You are right: I forgot to mention "depends on network" for time reduction.

I do not (yet) have a regression test regarding performance measurements and
HTTPS. But that would be a good idea to get a better understanding where
time will be spent.

I will setup a simple JUnit testcase which takes performance measurements,
and keep you informed.

Bye, Jochen

--0016e6d6454e8097d004814f9652
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Hi Brian,<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:46 PM,=
 Brian Eaton <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:beaton@google.com">bea=
ton@google.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

<div class=3D"im">On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 11:21 AM, Jochen Hiller &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:jo.hiller@googlemail.com">jo.hiller@googlemail.com</a>&gt; wrot=
e:<br>
&gt; The<br>
&gt; required time has been reduced about 1 sec (exact time depends on devi=
ce and<br>
&gt; hardware capabilities), resulting in absolute processing times in rang=
e of<br>
&gt; about 100-200 ms, not seconds (depends mainly on server and token<br>
&gt; requirements).<br>
<br>
</div>How much of the time savings was due to reducing network latency? =A0=
My<br>
guess is most of it, but if you saw differently that would be very<br>
interesting.<br>
</blockquote></div><div><br></div><meta charset=3D"utf-8">You are right: I =
forgot to mention &quot;depends on network&quot; for time reduction.<div><b=
r><div>I do not (yet) have a regression test regarding performance measurem=
ents and HTTPS. But that would be a good idea to get a better understanding=
 where time will be spent.</div>

<div><br></div><div>I will setup a simple JUnit testcase which takes perfor=
mance measurements, and keep you informed.</div><div><br></div><div>Bye, Jo=
chen</div></div>

--0016e6d6454e8097d004814f9652--

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Mon Mar  8 12:35:37 2010
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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On 2010-03-07, at 12:13 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:

> My point is only that bearer-tokens over an insecure channel seem to
> be always *less* secure or *as* secure (but never *more* secure) than
> using a signature approach over an insecure channel. As such, I'm
> uncomfortable taking away an existing, widely implemented, and usually
> more secure approach for authentication over an insecure channel
> (OAuth 1.0a signing) and replacing it with a less secure approach
> (bearer tokens w/o SSL/TLS).


This prompts me to argue that allowing signatures is worse than bearer =
tokens. (I'm adding to the conversation here, I don't consider myself a =
security expert)


1) The server needs to manage state for the nonces, and properly =
implement nonce management. This added complexity can lead to additional =
security holes in the server. I'd be curious on what penetration testing =
has been done on existing OAuth deployments.

2) Client signed tokens are no more secure in MITM attacks than bearer =
tokens for on-the-fly attacks. If the attacker can disrupt the channel, =
the attacker can take the signed token and use it to make a valid call =
just as if it was a bearer token. Imagine the attacker disrupting every =
other request, and using the valid token to make an API call. The Client =
does not know an attack is going on it thinks it is having to repeat =
every other call, and the Server likely thinks the connection is flaky.

3) Deployments are made assuming there is more security than bearer =
tokens. People deploy OAuth in situations where they would not deploy a =
bearer token architecture because they think the signatures prevent =
attacks.

-- Dick=

From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Mon Mar  8 13:01:29 2010
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Dick Hardt wrote:
> 2) Client signed tokens are no more secure in MITM attacks than bearer tokens for on-the-fly attacks. If the attacker can disrupt the channel, the attacker can take the signed token and use it to make a valid call just as if it was a bearer token. 

I don't understand. How will MITM be authenticated in this case? To 
determine whether the call is *valid*, the signature need to be checked 
against the identity of the presenter of the token.

Igor

From john@jkemp.net  Mon Mar  8 13:09:00 2010
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On Mar 8, 2010, at 3:35 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:
>=20
>=20
> 2) Client signed tokens are no more secure in MITM attacks than bearer =
tokens for on-the-fly attacks. If the attacker can disrupt the channel, =
the attacker can take the signed token and use it to make a valid call =
just as if it was a bearer token. Imagine the attacker disrupting every =
other request, and using the valid token to make an API call.=20

I think that what you mean here is that the MITM steals (at least the =
signed portion of) the request as well as the token.=20

If the MITM has to sign a request it created itself, even with a stolen =
token, it will (or should) not have access to the secret key assigned to =
a properly-provisioned client, and thus cannot authenticate correctly to =
the recipient.

Regards,

- johnk


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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On 2010-03-08, at 1:09 PM, John Kemp wrote:

>=20
> On Mar 8, 2010, at 3:35 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>> 2) Client signed tokens are no more secure in MITM attacks than =
bearer tokens for on-the-fly attacks. If the attacker can disrupt the =
channel, the attacker can take the signed token and use it to make a =
valid call just as if it was a bearer token. Imagine the attacker =
disrupting every other request, and using the valid token to make an API =
call.=20
>=20
> I think that what you mean here is that the MITM steals (at least the =
signed portion of) the request as well as the token.=20

yes

>=20
> If the MITM has to sign a request it created itself, even with a =
stolen token, it will (or should) not have access to the secret key =
assigned to a properly-provisioned client, and thus cannot authenticate =
correctly to the recipient.

correct=

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Mon Mar  8 14:21:52 2010
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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To: Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Recent UMA work that may inform this group's deliberations
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On 2010-03-05, at 6:57 AM, Eve Maler wrote:

> More below...
>=20
> On 4 Mar 2010, at 5:43 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:
>=20
>> Thanks Eve, comments inserted ...=20
>>=20
>> On 2010-03-04, at 12:51 PM, Eve Maler wrote:
>>=20
>>> As requested on today's call, here's a description of the places =
where UMA seems to need "more" than what the WRAP paradigm offers (both =
profiling and extending), based on the proposal at:
>>>=20
>>> =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/~xmlgrrl@idp.protectnetwor=
k.org/Proposal+for+UMA+1.0+Core+Protocol
>>>=20
>>> Cautions in reading this note:
>>>=20
>>> - The mix of likely needed profiles and extensions for our use of =
the OAuth 1.0 paradigm (the existing spec on the UMA site) is quite =
different from the list presented here, and in addition, that spec =
wasn't written with a goal to highlight such items the way this proposal =
was.
>>>=20
>>> - The proposal is currently fairly high-level, and other =
profiling/extension needs may come to light if we proceed down this path =
-- or some of the needs may disappear.  The proposal nonetheless tries =
to document profile and extension points as precisely as possible.
>>>=20
>>> - UMA's terminology is similar but not identical to WRAP's.  The =
proposal tries to be as clear as possible about the distinctions, but =
caveat lector.
>>>=20
>>> - For all of the profile/extension items listed, they may be of =
interest only to UMAnitarians, or they might have wider application as =
optional or required portions of a core OAuth 2.0 spec.  We're not =
trying to prejudice this outcome, just provide useful information for =
making the decision in the wider community.
>>>=20
>>> So, with all that said...  Here is the conception of UMA's use of =
the WRAP paradigm as conceived in the proposal.
>>>=20
>>> 1. Currently, WRAP says nothing about how a Protected Resource and =
an Authorization Server "meet" and figure out how to work together.
>>=20
>> This was explicitly out of scope for WRAP. There are scale and =
privacy advantages to the PR and AR not meeting. The PR needs to trust =
the AR the issued the Access Token (and of course be able to verify the =
Access Token was issued by the AR), but the AR does NOT need to be aware =
of the PR. In this way, WRAP=20
>=20
> (Unfinished sentence?)

D'oh ... In this way WRAP is a claims based model.

>=20
> As noted above, it's fine for this to be out of scope for WRAP itself, =
but it's in UMA's scope.


>=20
>>=20
>>> UMA has reason to make the user's choice of authorization management =
(AM) services and hosts of their resources be dynamic and flexible -- =
that's why it's called "user-managed access" -- so the proposal suggests =
a special way to use (an embedded instance of one of the user delegation =
profiles of) WRAP to introduce them, as a "step 1".  (The token thus =
acquired by the host in this step plays a role in "step 3".)
>>=20
>> Interesting use of WRAP. I don't see a hole in WRAP for you to do =
this. Is there some functionality missing?
>=20
> I don't understand the comment/question.  Are you suggesting the WRAP =
pattern (same as the three-legged OAuth pattern, which our current spec =
uses) can't be applied to new use cases?  It's pretty much a vanilla =
application of the pattern.  If it's not interesting as a generic =
solution and the problem space is only UMA's, that's certainly okay with =
us.
>=20

I have no issue with WRAP being used in this way. I have not seen the =
pattern before. Perhaps once UMA is well known, others will want to use =
the same pattern and we can standardize it.

>>=20
>>>=20
>>> 2a. Another of UMA's goals is to allow authorizing users (roughly, =
Resource Owners) to make demands of other parties before granting them =
access rather than just permissioning the connection "silently".  The =
mechanism for making these demands is to require the requesting side to =
provide claims (yes, in the identity claims sense) and even to make this =
process have legal enforceability consequences where possible.  Thus, =
the proposal suggests an extended getting-a-token phase in a "step 2" =
that adds a new third option to the two usual WRAP options (successful =
access token response and unsuccessful access token response): a =
claims-required response.
>>=20
>> I can see it being useful in a standard return parameter that can =
contain an value undefined by WRAP (similar to the scope parameter), =
that is used by the AS to communicate to the Client what else the Client =
needs to be granted an Access Token. Is this what you are asking for?
>=20
> I'm not sure if we're technically "asking for" anything, just floating =
the use case and pointing out that if we were to layer on WRAP as it's =
written today, we'd have to extend the possible responses to token =
requests somehow.  Maybe a new parameter that flags a need for more info =
from the client/requester is a good idea, but if it's just another =
undefined parameter, I'd rather have a clean definition of an "extension =
point" for how others could add parameters (or response types?).  Lots =
of undefined fields in a core spec doesn't seem interop-friendly.

I don't see if as being widely used enough to standardize in the spec. =
Having UMA standardize it makes sense to me. As mentioned, standardizing =
the name similar to the wrap_scope parameter would make it easier for =
libraries.

>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> 2b. Due to our analysis of the legal (cough) and UX dimensions of =
the UMA proposition, we've discovered that it's useful to separate =
requesting parties (the legally responsible party "behind" the =
requester/Client) into legal persons vs. natural persons.  This is a way =
in which UMA deviates from OAuth and WRAP entirely, in that we're =
figuring out how to do "person-to-person sharing" (Alice permissions Bob =
to subscribe to a hosted calendar of hers) along with "person-to-service =
sharing" (Alice permissions ECommerce.com to grab her current shipping =
address from her personal datastore).  The current thinking is that it's =
a matter of putting the requester into a user-delegated flow vs. an =
autonomous-client flow as part of getting a token in step 2.
>>=20
>> Is there something missing in WRAP to do this?
>=20
> I'm not sure.  If WRAP has the same assumption OAuth does about the =
"same person" operating the client app as is logging into the protected =
resource/AS/SP/server, then that's a conceptual difference.  But I don't =
think we saw any need (yet) for syntax changes in this area to support =
what we want to do.
>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> 2c. Currently, WRAP doesn't say anything about how to fill the scope =
parameter value.  In this context, an obvious optimization is the "all =
the photos that happen to be in this folder" authorization scenario.  So =
we went ahead and proposed a simple JSON-based format for describing =
both simple access scope and basic wildcarded access scope.
>>=20
>> Different scenarios will require different scope values. We thought =
it useful to define the parameter so that it would  be easier library =
providers and specs like UMA to define the value without also having to =
define the parameter.
>=20
> I'd like to learn more about the other use cases.  If common cases =
exist and can be sedimented in for more universal support, that would be =
cool.  (If not, okay.)  But along the lines of my earlier comment on =
extension points, I'm not sure standardizing the field is valuable =
without standardizing any values at all -- it may just confuse people =
about whether they're supposed to stuff a bunch of different things into =
the one parameter if they seem vaguely "scope"-related, or invent their =
own, or whatever.  And then you have to worry about how to stuff =
incompatible scope values into the same parameter side by side for =
hybrid use cases that use multiple extensions.  Etc.

The feedback we received from library writers was standardizing the =
syntax was useful. There was little agreement on what the value of =
wrap_scope would be across implementors, but all agreed a standard =
parameter for scope was useful. We could add to the spec to clarify how =
the scope parameter should be used. It could make sense for UMA to =
standardize what the scope values are.


>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> 3. The means by which a host interprets an incoming access token is =
not currently specified in WRAP.  Unfortunately, UMA needs to know. :-)  =
There seem to be two options: validating it locally or offloading =
validation.  To avoid putting a signature validation burden on the host, =
we have proposed a strawman where the host can simply ask the AM to do =
the validation for it.  (A personal observation: The local/offload =
choice all depends on various scale and loose coupling factors, but this =
is appealing for lots of reasons.  It not only views the Authorization =
Server as an STS performing a typical token validation function, but =
pretty closely matches the classic access management paradigm where the =
policy enforcement point asks the centralized policy decision point what =
to do.  And other useful info could also ride over this back channel, =
either in extensions or -- as the need arises -- in core OAuth.)
>>=20
>> When developing WRAP, we envisioned that the PR would verify and =
interpret locally.
>=20
> It's probably worth mentioning that at least two UMA scenarios (health =
data, and distributed social networking services with "data =
portability") envision applications that frequently serve as both =
hosts/PRs and requesters/clients, so if processing burdens are removed =
from the client but placed on the PR, it may not help us all that much.  =
This is an area where I hope others can chime in with use cases and =
constraints to figure out which "scaling" options suits them best.  (And =
if WRAP/OAuth remains silent on the issue, it seems UMA could still =
define this loop as an extension.)

I'm confused by your comments. The Client does not do any processing of =
the Access Token. Would you clarify who you are trying to offload Access =
Token validation from and to?



From esjewett@gmail.com  Mon Mar  8 18:39:51 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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I'm glad I managed to prompt some discussion on the topic!

In order to avoid responding to several individual messages in this
thread, I'll compile points:

Use cases: The request was for use cases where signatures a la OAuth
1.0a might be required. I've tried to provide some, along with
reasoning on how to identify use cases based on an understanding of
how requiring SSL/TLS results in certain performance changes. I think
the fact that there are a lot of use cases where signature schemes
don't provide an advantage in performance don't take anything away
from the argument that there are use cases where performance is worse.
There may be other use cases that have nothing to do with performance,
but we needed to get the topic on the table.

Amortization or priming of the SSL/TLS connection: Priming and
amortization are possible in a lot of circumstances though I've tried
to pick some where it is difficult. Whether priming is desirable at
all is another question. Is it really more developer friendly to have
to use this trick than to use an OAuth library to sign your requests?
Regardless, priming does not address use cases affected by the
symmetric/private encryption penalty (which is apparently
significant), or use cases where it is difficult to prime a connection
or amortize the connection penalty over a large number of requests.

RSA vs. HMAC: I really have no idea. On the other hand, Google is the
only existing provider I am aware of that supports the RSA method, and
Google quickly adopted HMAC as well. If the only use-case for the RSA
method is to establish similar security properties to those provided
by SSL/TLS with no performance or implementation advantage, then we
should get rid of it. I think we already had this discussion and I
have no personal interest in rehashing it.

Signing (a la OAuth 1.0a) over an insecure connection is as good as or
better than bearer-tokens over an insecure connection: I'll stand by
this, especially after reviewing RFC 2617 (1), which seems to
reinforce the position.

Request hijacking: I actually significantly understated the protection
against request hijacking that that the HMAC-SHA1 method of OAuth 1.0a
provides. In the worst case, a MITM can hijack a request but cannot
change the request method, URL, query parameters, nonce, or timestamp.
In the best case (a single-part form-encoded request body or a request
consisting only of query parameters), the MITM cannot modify the
request at all because it is fully signed. It is not true, as Dick
contends, that a MITM who has captured a signed OAuth 1.0a request can
use a signed access token as if it were a bearer token. It is far more
limited in the worst case, and useless in the best case.

To be clear: I want a bearer-token over SSL/TLS method in OAuth. I'm
not arguing against that. I'm simply trying to establish that there is
a use-case for a signature method.

Thanks,
Ethan

(1) http://www.apps.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2617.html#sec-4

From esjewett@gmail.com  Mon Mar  8 18:51:48 2010
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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 21:51:48 -0500
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From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich client app=
s,
> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user already
> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is not goin=
g
> to protect the user from a malicious app =96 for instance, a malicious ap=
p
> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.

I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on which
I can install a rich client application and be confident that it will
not be able to recover my username and password when I type them into
my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:

1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by default=
)

On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
token.

Ethan

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Mon Mar  8 19:30:03 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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On 2010-03-08, at 6:39 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:

> Request hijacking: I actually significantly understated the protection
> against request hijacking that that the HMAC-SHA1 method of OAuth 1.0a
> provides. In the worst case, a MITM can hijack a request but cannot
> change the request method, URL, query parameters, nonce, or timestamp.
> In the best case (a single-part form-encoded request body or a request
> consisting only of query parameters), the MITM cannot modify the
> request at all because it is fully signed. It is not true, as Dick
> contends, that a MITM who has captured a signed OAuth 1.0a request can
> use a signed access token as if it were a bearer token. It is far more
> limited in the worst case, and useless in the best case.

After reviewing the 3.4 of draft-hammer-oauth I see that the query =
string is part of the string being signed, minimizing the attack =
surface. Thanks for pointing out my misunderstanding.

-- Dick



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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Though not of course the body of a POST, unless it is form encoded
data, which merely pushes the problem of canonicalization (and thus
interoperability) outside the spec.

On Monday, March 8, 2010, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 2010-03-08, at 6:39 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:
>
>> Request hijacking: I actually significantly understated the protection
>> against request hijacking that that the HMAC-SHA1 method of OAuth 1.0a
>> provides. In the worst case, a MITM can hijack a request but cannot
>> change the request method, URL, query parameters, nonce, or timestamp.
>> In the best case (a single-part form-encoded request body or a request
>> consisting only of query parameters), the MITM cannot modify the
>> request at all because it is fully signed. It is not true, as Dick
>> contends, that a MITM who has captured a signed OAuth 1.0a request can
>> use a signed access token as if it were a bearer token. It is far more
>> limited in the worst case, and useless in the best case.
>
> After reviewing the 3.4 of draft-hammer-oauth I see that the query string is part of the string being signed, minimizing the attack surface. Thanks for pointing out my misunderstanding.
>
> -- Dick
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

-- 
--
John Panzer / Google
jpanzer@google.com / abstractioneer.org / @jpanzer

From atom@yahoo-inc.com  Mon Mar  8 20:02:02 2010
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Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2010 20:01:20 -0800
From: Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <C7BB0810.26496%atom@yahoo-inc.com>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Hi Ethan -

In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a very
small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under contract=
,
and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We
strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely that
it'll ever be a public interface.

We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a browser
window for the user to authorize the app.

Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
username/password profile.

Allen




On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
>> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich client ap=
ps,
>> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user already
>> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is not goi=
ng
>> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a malicious app
>> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
>=20
> I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on which
> I can install a rich client application and be confident that it will
> not be able to recover my username and password when I type them into
> my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
>=20
> 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
> 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
> 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by defau=
lt)
>=20
> On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
> username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
> losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
> text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
> token.
>=20
> Ethan


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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 20:22:57 -0800
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From: Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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--001636e0a75b4a5f48048156896c
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
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If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners from
connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?

~/Jason

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:

> Hi Ethan -
>
> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a very
> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
> contract,
> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We
> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely that
> it'll ever be a public interface.
>
> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a browser
> window for the user to authorize the app.
>
> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
> username/password profile.
>
> Allen
>
>
>
>
> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> >> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich client
> apps,
> >> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user already
> >> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is not
> going
> >> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a malicious=
 app
> >> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
> >
> > I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on which
> > I can install a rich client application and be confident that it will
> > not be able to recover my username and password when I type them into
> > my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
> >
> > 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
> > 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
> > 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by
> default)
> >
> > On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
> > username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
> > losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
> > text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
> > token.
> >
> > Ethan
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--001636e0a75b4a5f48048156896c
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla usernam=
e/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners from connecti=
ng to a provider who has implemented this profile?<br><br>~/Jason<br><br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <span =
dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:atom@yahoo-inc.com">atom@yahoo-inc.com</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0=
pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: =
1ex;">
Hi Ethan -<br>
<br>
In Yahoo&#39;s case, we only allow the username/password profile for a very=
<br>
small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under contract=
,<br>
and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We<br>
strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it&#39;s unlikely tha=
t<br>
it&#39;ll ever be a public interface.<br>
<br>
We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a browser<br>
window for the user to authorize the app.<br>
<br>
Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent<br>
username/password profile.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Allen<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, &quot;Ethan Jewett&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:esjewett@=
gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:atom@=
yahoo-inc.com">atom@yahoo-inc.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich cli=
ent apps,<br>
&gt;&gt; where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user alre=
ady<br>
&gt;&gt; downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is n=
ot going<br>
&gt;&gt; to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a malic=
ious app<br>
&gt;&gt; could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on which=
<br>
&gt; I can install a rich client application and be confident that it will<=
br>
&gt; not be able to recover my username and password when I type them into<=
br>
&gt; my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)<br>
&gt; 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system<br>
&gt; 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by de=
fault)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the<br>
&gt; username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby<br>
&gt; losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of<br>
&gt; text, so the client could embed the username and password into the<br>
&gt; token.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Ethan<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

--001636e0a75b4a5f48048156896c--

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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Cc: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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You wouldn't.  The profile should include the client secret as well in
the initial request.  You could always issue a client a different
secret for use with this profile as well.

--David

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
> If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
> username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners from
> connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?
>
> ~/Jason
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Ethan -
>>
>> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a very
>> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
>> contract,
>> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We
>> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely that
>> it'll ever be a public interface.
>>
>> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a browser
>> window for the user to authorize the app.
>>
>> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
>> username/password profile.
>>
>> Allen
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
>> >> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich client
>> >> apps,
>> >> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user already
>> >> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is not
>> >> going
>> >> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a maliciou=
s
>> >> app
>> >> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
>> >
>> > I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on which
>> > I can install a rich client application and be confident that it will
>> > not be able to recover my username and password when I type them into
>> > my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
>> >
>> > 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
>> > 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
>> > 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by
>> > default)
>> >
>> > On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
>> > username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
>> > losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
>> > text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
>> > token.
>> >
>> > Ethan
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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From: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 20:53:39 -0800
Thread-Topic: The verification URL and CAPTCHA responses for username/password profile?
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] The verification URL and CAPTCHA responses for username/password profile?
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I'm spending some time with the spec this evening and am having a hard time=
 understanding the need for the verification URL and CAPTCHA responses whic=
h are part of the username and password profile.

My criteria for using this profile is that 1) the authorization server gene=
rally trusts the client to temporarily collect the end-user's username and =
password and 2) it is impossible to use one of the other authorization prof=
iles.  This means that the client cannot interact with or embed a web brows=
er.  Given that...

The client would not be able to send the user to the verification URL in th=
e response anyway (otherwise they would have picked the rich app profile). =
If the client were to encourage the user to use a nearby computer, then it =
could use the upcoming device API which should be based on the Netflix flow=
.

The CAPTCHA response verifies that there is a human, not that it is the hum=
an who the username and password belong to. Wouldn't bot attacks be mitigat=
ed via aggressive rate limiting techniques which reject authorization reque=
sts?  This response seems to be more complex than the benefit and hasn't be=
en successfully implemented at scale AFAIK.

--David=

From sshjason@gmail.com  Mon Mar  8 21:12:42 2010
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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 21:12:29 -0800
Message-ID: <255af2241003082112w3a0684eei39b1b442872c652f@mail.gmail.com>
From: Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
To: oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=00504502cc2f74f3670481573a69
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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--00504502cc2f74f3670481573a69
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In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) it say'=
s
to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:

wrap_client_id (the clients id)
wrap_username (the users username)
wrap_password (the users password)
wrap_scope (optional scope defined by the provider)

Are we talking about the same profile?

~/Jason

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> You wouldn't.  The profile should include the client secret as well in
> the initial request.  You could always issue a client a different
> secret for use with this profile as well.
>
> --David
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
> > username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners fr=
om
> > connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?
> >
> > ~/Jason
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi Ethan -
> >>
> >> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a ver=
y
> >> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
> >> contract,
> >> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We
> >> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely th=
at
> >> it'll ever be a public interface.
> >>
> >> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a browse=
r
> >> window for the user to authorize the app.
> >>
> >> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
> >> username/password profile.
> >>
> >> Allen
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> > On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
> wrote:
> >> >> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich clie=
nt
> >> >> apps,
> >> >> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user alrea=
dy
> >> >> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is no=
t
> >> >> going
> >> >> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a malici=
ous
> >> >> app
> >> >> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
> >> >
> >> > I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on whi=
ch
> >> > I can install a rich client application and be confident that it wil=
l
> >> > not be able to recover my username and password when I type them int=
o
> >> > my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
> >> >
> >> > 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
> >> > 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
> >> > 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by
> >> > default)
> >> >
> >> > On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
> >> > username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
> >> > losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
> >> > text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
> >> > token.
> >> >
> >> > Ethan
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Grou=
ps
> > "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> > oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com<oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscribe@=
googlegroups.com>
> .
> > For more options, visit this group at
> > http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
> >
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--00504502cc2f74f3670481573a69
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In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) it say&=
#39;s to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:<br=
><br>wrap_client_id (the clients id)<br>wrap_username (the users username)<=
br>
wrap_password (the users password)<br>wrap_scope (optional scope defined by=
 the provider)<br><br>Are we talking about the same profile?<br><br>~/Jason=
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Re=
cordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordo=
nd@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; borde=
r-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">You wouldn&#39;t.=
 =A0The profile should include the client secret as well in<br>
the initial request. =A0You could always issue a client a different<br>
secret for use with this profile as well.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--David<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sshja=
son@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla<br=
>
&gt; username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners f=
rom<br>
&gt; connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ~/Jason<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:atom@y=
ahoo-inc.com">atom@yahoo-inc.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hi Ethan -<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; In Yahoo&#39;s case, we only allow the username/password profile f=
or a very<br>
&gt;&gt; small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under=
<br>
&gt;&gt; contract,<br>
&gt;&gt; and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. =
We<br>
&gt;&gt; strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it&#39;s unl=
ikely that<br>
&gt;&gt; it&#39;ll ever be a public interface.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a br=
owser<br>
&gt;&gt; window for the user to authorize the app.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent=
<br>
&gt;&gt; username/password profile.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Allen<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, &quot;Ethan Jewett&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:atom@yahoo-inc.com">atom@yahoo-inc.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; This is why the username/password profile is intended for=
 rich client<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; apps,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the =
user already<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a bro=
wser is not<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; going<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance=
, a malicious<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; app<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; could have installed a keylogger before invoking the brow=
ser.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms=
 on which<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I can install a rich client application and be confident that=
 it will<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; not be able to recover my username and password when I type t=
hem into<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrat=
ors by<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; default)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing t=
he<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (the=
reby<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any stri=
ng of<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; text, so the client could embed the username and password int=
o the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; token.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Ethan<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; --<br>
<div class=3D"im">&gt; You received this message because you are subscribed=
 to the Google Groups<br>
&gt; &quot;OAuth WRAP WG&quot; group.<br>
&gt; To post to this group, send email to <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@g=
ooglegroups.com">oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com</a>.<br>
&gt; To unsubscribe from this group, send email to<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscribe@googlegroups.com">oauth-=
wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com</a>.<br>
&gt; For more options, visit this group at<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den</a>.<br>
&gt;<br>
</div><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">___________________________________=
____________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

--00504502cc2f74f3670481573a69--

From recordond@gmail.com  Mon Mar  8 22:33:05 2010
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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 22:33:00 -0800
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Yes.  I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
have the client secret added to the request. :)

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
> In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) it sa=
y's
> to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:
>
> wrap_client_id (the clients id)
> wrap_username (the users username)
> wrap_password (the users password)
> wrap_scope (optional scope defined by the provider)
>
> Are we talking about the same profile?
>
> ~/Jason
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>>
>> You wouldn't. =A0The profile should include the client secret as well in
>> the initial request. =A0You could always issue a client a different
>> secret for use with this profile as well.
>>
>> --David
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> > If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
>> > username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners
>> > from
>> > connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?
>> >
>> > ~/Jason
>> >
>> > On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Hi Ethan -
>> >>
>> >> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a ve=
ry
>> >> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
>> >> contract,
>> >> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We
>> >> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely
>> >> that
>> >> it'll ever be a public interface.
>> >>
>> >> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a brows=
er
>> >> window for the user to authorize the app.
>> >>
>> >> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
>> >> username/password profile.
>> >>
>> >> Allen
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
>> >> > wrote:
>> >> >> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich
>> >> >> client
>> >> >> apps,
>> >> >> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user
>> >> >> already
>> >> >> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is n=
ot
>> >> >> going
>> >> >> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a malic=
ious
>> >> >> app
>> >> >> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
>> >> >
>> >> > I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on
>> >> > which
>> >> > I can install a rich client application and be confident that it wi=
ll
>> >> > not be able to recover my username and password when I type them in=
to
>> >> > my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
>> >> >
>> >> > 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
>> >> > 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
>> >> > 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by
>> >> > default)
>> >> >
>> >> > On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
>> >> > username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
>> >> > losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
>> >> > text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
>> >> > token.
>> >> >
>> >> > Ethan
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>> > Groups
>> > "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> > To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> > oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>> > For more options, visit this group at
>> > http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>> >
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>

From hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com  Mon Mar  8 23:27:29 2010
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Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] The verification URL and CAPTCHA responses for username/password profile?
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From: "Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
To: "ext David Recordon" <davidrecordon@facebook.com>, "OAuth WG" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] The verification URL and CAPTCHA responses for username/password profile?
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I agree with your statements below. I would remove the CAPTCHA concept
from the document.=20

Ciao
Hannes

>-----Original Message-----
>From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org]=20
>On Behalf Of ext David Recordon
>Sent: 09 March, 2010 06:54
>To: OAuth WG
>Subject: [OAUTH-WG] The verification URL and CAPTCHA responses=20
>for username/password profile?
>
>I'm spending some time with the spec this evening and am=20
>having a hard time understanding the need for the verification=20
>URL and CAPTCHA responses which are part of the username and=20
>password profile.
>
>My criteria for using this profile is that 1) the=20
>authorization server generally trusts the client to=20
>temporarily collect the end-user's username and password and=20
>2) it is impossible to use one of the other authorization=20
>profiles.  This means that the client cannot interact with or=20
>embed a web browser.  Given that...
>
>The client would not be able to send the user to the=20
>verification URL in the response anyway (otherwise they would=20
>have picked the rich app profile). If the client were to=20
>encourage the user to use a nearby computer, then it could use=20
>the upcoming device API which should be based on the Netflix flow.
>
>The CAPTCHA response verifies that there is a human, not that=20
>it is the human who the username and password belong to.=20
>Wouldn't bot attacks be mitigated via aggressive rate limiting=20
>techniques which reject authorization requests?  This response=20
>seems to be more complex than the benefit and hasn't been=20
>successfully implemented at scale AFAIK.
>
>--David
>_______________________________________________
>OAuth mailing list
>OAuth@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From sshjason@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 00:04:00 2010
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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 00:03:59 -0800
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From: Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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--00504502c539cca56d0481599f62
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Ah, gotcha, sorry for the misunderstanding. :)

One thing I had thought of to mitigate the risk to the client, or at least
allow the client the ability to see what data is going to be sent to the
provider as "them" would be this: The user connects as 5.3 specifies, upon
success the user is given a token. If the provider and client agree that th=
e
user now has authority to act as though all requests are coming from the
client, the token is an access token. Otherwise, the client is given the
option of being a proxy to all requests. The proxy would be an HTTP post
from server to server in which the requested data would include the token
the user received and the client's id and password. The client would then
have the option of inspecting the data and allowing or denying requests tha=
t
will be assumed to be made upon the clients behalf.

I realize that this is probably far more complex than desired. If, however,
it is agreed that there is no way to assure that the client is ever who the=
y
say they are with this profile, at least giving the client the last
authority on what is requested on their behalf could be optionally included=
.

~/Jason

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 10:33 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote=
:

> Yes.  I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
> have the client secret added to the request. :)
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) it
> say's
> > to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:
> >
> > wrap_client_id (the clients id)
> > wrap_username (the users username)
> > wrap_password (the users password)
> > wrap_scope (optional scope defined by the provider)
> >
> > Are we talking about the same profile?
> >
> > ~/Jason
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> You wouldn't.  The profile should include the client secret as well in
> >> the initial request.  You could always issue a client a different
> >> secret for use with this profile as well.
> >>
> >> --David
> >>
> >> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >> > If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
> >> > username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners
> >> > from
> >> > connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?
> >> >
> >> > ~/Jason
> >> >
> >> > On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote=
:
> >> >>
> >> >> Hi Ethan -
> >> >>
> >> >> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a
> very
> >> >> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
> >> >> contract,
> >> >> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. W=
e
> >> >> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely
> >> >> that
> >> >> it'll ever be a public interface.
> >> >>
> >> >> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a
> browser
> >> >> window for the user to authorize the app.
> >> >>
> >> >> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
> >> >> username/password profile.
> >> >>
> >> >> Allen
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> > On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >> >> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich
> >> >> >> client
> >> >> >> apps,
> >> >> >> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user
> >> >> >> already
> >> >> >> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is
> not
> >> >> >> going
> >> >> >> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a
> malicious
> >> >> >> app
> >> >> >> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on
> >> >> > which
> >> >> > I can install a rich client application and be confident that it
> will
> >> >> > not be able to recover my username and password when I type them
> into
> >> >> > my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
> >> >> > 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
> >> >> > 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators =
by
> >> >> > default)
> >> >> >
> >> >> > On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
> >> >> > username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
> >> >> > losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string o=
f
> >> >> > text, so the client could embed the username and password into th=
e
> >> >> > token.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Ethan
> >> >>
> >> >> _______________________________________________
> >> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> >> > Groups
> >> > "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> >> > To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> >> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> >> > oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com<oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscri=
be@googlegroups.com>
> .
> >> > For more options, visit this group at
> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
> >> >
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Grou=
ps
> > "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> > oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com<oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscribe@=
googlegroups.com>
> .
> > For more options, visit this group at
> > http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
> >
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--00504502c539cca56d0481599f62
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<span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: arial, sans-serif; f=
ont-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; ">Ah, gotcha, sorry for the misu=
nderstanding. :)<div><br></div><div>One thing I had thought of to mitigate =
the risk to the client, or at least allow the client the ability to see wha=
t data is going to be sent to the provider as &quot;them&quot; would be thi=
s: The user connects as 5.3 specifies, upon success the user is given a tok=
en. If the provider and client agree that the user now has authority to act=
 as though all requests are coming from the client, the token is an access =
token. Otherwise, the client is given the option of being a proxy to all re=
quests. The proxy would be an HTTP post from server to server in which the =
requested data would include the token the user received and the client&#39=
;s id and password. The client would then have the option of inspecting the=
 data and allowing or denying requests that will be assumed to be made upon=
 the clients behalf.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I realize that this is probably far more complex than d=
esired. If, however, it is agreed that there is no way to assure that the c=
lient is ever who they say they are with this profile, at least giving the =
client the last authority on what is requested on their behalf could be opt=
ionally included.</div>
<div><br></div><div>~/Jason</div></span><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Mar 8, 2010 at 10:33 PM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
r><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Yes. =A0I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile<br>
have the client secret added to the request. :)<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sshja=
son@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) it=
 say&#39;s<br>
&gt; to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; wrap_client_id (the clients id)<br>
&gt; wrap_username (the users username)<br>
&gt; wrap_password (the users password)<br>
&gt; wrap_scope (optional scope defined by the provider)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Are we talking about the same profile?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ~/Jason<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Recordon &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:r=
ecordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; You wouldn&#39;t. =A0The profile should include the client secret =
as well in<br>
&gt;&gt; the initial request. =A0You could always issue a client a differen=
t<br>
&gt;&gt; secret for use with this profile as well.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; --David<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:sshjason@gmail.com">sshjason@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the v=
anilla<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-p=
artners<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; from<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?<br=
>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; ~/Jason<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:atom@yahoo-inc.com">atom@yahoo-inc.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Hi Ethan -<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; In Yahoo&#39;s case, we only allow the username/password =
profile for a very<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partn=
ers under<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; contract,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or de=
sirable. We<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it&=
#39;s unlikely<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; that<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; it&#39;ll ever be a public interface.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; We have a very strong preference that rich client apps in=
voke a browser<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; window for the user to authorize the app.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Other Service Providers have similar policies for their e=
quivalent<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; username/password profile.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Allen<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, &quot;Ethan Jewett&quot; &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:atom@yahoo-inc.com">atom@yahoo-inc.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; This is why the username/password profile is int=
ended for rich<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; client<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; apps,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given =
that the user<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; already<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; downloaded and installed the rich app, popping o=
pen a browser is not<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; going<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for=
 instance, a malicious<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; app<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; could have installed a keylogger before invoking=
 the browser.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; I disagree. There are a large and growing number of =
platforms on<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; which<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; I can install a rich client application and be confi=
dent that it will<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; not be able to recover my username and password when=
 I type them into<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:<=
br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as ad=
ministrators by<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; default)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; On a related note - What stops a provider from imple=
menting the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or =
WRAP (thereby<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much=
 any string of<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; text, so the client could embed the username and pas=
sword into the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; token.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; Ethan<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; --<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; You received this message because you are subscribed to the G=
oogle<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Groups<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &quot;OAuth WRAP WG&quot; group.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; To post to this group, send email to <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-=
wrap-wg@googlegroups.com">oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com</a>.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; To unsubscribe from this group, send email to<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscribe@googlegroups.co=
m">oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com</a>.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; For more options, visit this group at<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3D=
en" target=3D"_blank">http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den<=
/a>.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Gro=
ups<br>
&gt; &quot;OAuth WRAP WG&quot; group.<br>
&gt; To post to this group, send email to <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-wrap-wg@g=
ooglegroups.com">oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com</a>.<br>
&gt; To unsubscribe from this group, send email to<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-wrap-wg%2Bunsubscribe@googlegroups.com">oauth-=
wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com</a>.<br>
&gt; For more options, visit this group at<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den</a>.<br>
&gt;<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

--00504502c539cca56d0481599f62--

From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar  9 06:04:11 2010
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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Hi Ethan,
> I'm glad I managed to prompt some discussion on the topic!
>    
Thank you very much for initiating this discussion! It will help to 
establish a common understanding
of what is required/feasible for the upcoming standard.
> RSA vs. HMAC: I really have no idea. On the other hand, Google is the
> only existing provider I am aware of that supports the RSA method, and
> Google quickly adopted HMAC as well. If the only use-case for the RSA
> method is to establish similar security properties to those provided
> by SSL/TLS with no performance or implementation advantage, then we
> should get rid of it. I think we already had this discussion and I
> have no personal interest in rehashing it.
>    
I really like RSA because of its adavantages from an operational 
security standpoint. A receiver does
not need to store any private data in order to authenticate the sender 
of a message. Therefore I see RSA
as a promising option to authenticate consumers on the OAuth 
authorization server (how to
get a token). One could even use hardware security moduls for 
authentication!

I don't consider RSA a good option for signing requests from consumer to 
resources because of its performance
characteristics. Symmetric algorithms like HMAC are by magnitudes 
faster. I did some benachmarking in
a project in 2006. The measurements have been taken on a Windows PC  
(Intel Pentium M 1,7 GHz/1GB)
with Java 1.5.

HMAC-MD5: 33000/s (sign and verify)
RSA/512:  434/s (sign), 3300/s (verify)
RSA/1024:  70/s (sign), 1250/s (verify)

As you can see, there is a factor of 10 (verify) to 300 (sign) between 
RSA and HMAC-MD5. Today one would use
HMAC-SHA and probably RSA/2048 so I don't expect the proportions to be 
better for RSA.

I think request signing can always be performed using a (symmetric) 
token secret issued by the OAuth authorization server.

regards,
Torsten.


From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Tue Mar  9 07:06:04 2010
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From: Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com>
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Thanks for your further feedback.  Just a couple of comments back =
(eliding other portions of the thread):

On 8 Mar 2010, at 2:21 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:
> On 2010-03-05, at 6:57 AM, Eve Maler wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>> 2c. Currently, WRAP doesn't say anything about how to fill the =
scope parameter value.  In this context, an obvious optimization is the =
"all the photos that happen to be in this folder" authorization =
scenario.  So we went ahead and proposed a simple JSON-based format for =
describing both simple access scope and basic wildcarded access scope.
>>>=20
>>> Different scenarios will require different scope values. We thought =
it useful to define the parameter so that it would  be easier library =
providers and specs like UMA to define the value without also having to =
define the parameter.
>>=20
>> I'd like to learn more about the other use cases.  If common cases =
exist and can be sedimented in for more universal support, that would be =
cool.  (If not, okay.)  But along the lines of my earlier comment on =
extension points, I'm not sure standardizing the field is valuable =
without standardizing any values at all -- it may just confuse people =
about whether they're supposed to stuff a bunch of different things into =
the one parameter if they seem vaguely "scope"-related, or invent their =
own, or whatever.  And then you have to worry about how to stuff =
incompatible scope values into the same parameter side by side for =
hybrid use cases that use multiple extensions.  Etc.
>=20
> The feedback we received from library writers was standardizing the =
syntax was useful. There was little agreement on what the value of =
wrap_scope would be across implementors, but all agreed a standard =
parameter for scope was useful. We could add to the spec to clarify how =
the scope parameter should be used. It could make sense for UMA to =
standardize what the scope values are.

It's a good idea to give guidance on how the scope parameter should be =
used.  That way, it will help avoid "abuse" of the parameter for other =
purposes, and clashes if different deployments are using it in different =
ways.  (I suspect that the tradeoff here is making it (superficially?) =
appealing for implementers vs. making it more interoperable for =
deployers.)

>=20
>>>> 3. The means by which a host interprets an incoming access token is =
not currently specified in WRAP.  Unfortunately, UMA needs to know. :-)  =
There seem to be two options: validating it locally or offloading =
validation.  To avoid putting a signature validation burden on the host, =
we have proposed a strawman where the host can simply ask the AM to do =
the validation for it.  (A personal observation: The local/offload =
choice all depends on various scale and loose coupling factors, but this =
is appealing for lots of reasons.  It not only views the Authorization =
Server as an STS performing a typical token validation function, but =
pretty closely matches the classic access management paradigm where the =
policy enforcement point asks the centralized policy decision point what =
to do.  And other useful info could also ride over this back channel, =
either in extensions or -- as the need arises -- in core OAuth.)
>>>=20
>>> When developing WRAP, we envisioned that the PR would verify and =
interpret locally.
>>=20
>> It's probably worth mentioning that at least two UMA scenarios =
(health data, and distributed social networking services with "data =
portability") envision applications that frequently serve as both =
hosts/PRs and requesters/clients, so if processing burdens are removed =
from the client but placed on the PR, it may not help us all that much.  =
This is an area where I hope others can chime in with use cases and =
constraints to figure out which "scaling" options suits them best.  (And =
if WRAP/OAuth remains silent on the issue, it seems UMA could still =
define this loop as an extension.)
>=20
> I'm confused by your comments. The Client does not do any processing =
of the Access Token. Would you clarify who you are trying to offload =
Access Token validation from and to?

Right, the Client doesn't do this processing.  However, if the point of =
making tokens opaque to "the Client" is to save them trouble, I wanted =
to point out that some of our use cases have the same overall =
application deploying a Client along with also being a Protected =
Resource, and that it could be reasonable to want to save such an app as =
much trouble as possible in the aggregate.  WRAP today assumes that "the =
Protected Resource" validates a signature locally.  However, this could =
be expensive (in the sense of requiring PKI infrastructure).  Another =
option is to have it offload validation to the Authorization Server as a =
back-channel operation, which has its own pros and cons.  For now, in =
UMA we're thinking of defining the back-channel loop as an extension =
(which could be completely opaque to the core protocol underneath).

	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 08:00:07 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Recent UMA work that may inform this group's deliberations
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On 2010-03-09, at 7:05 AM, Eve Maler wrote:
>=20
> It's a good idea to give guidance on how the scope parameter should be =
used.  That way, it will help avoid "abuse" of the parameter for other =
purposes, and clashes if different deployments are using it in different =
ways.  (I suspect that the tradeoff here is making it (superficially?) =
appealing for implementers vs. making it more interoperable for =
deployers.)

Thanks. Will add to list of edits.

> Right, the Client doesn't do this processing.  However, if the point =
of making tokens opaque to "the Client" is to save them trouble, I =
wanted to point out that some of our use cases have the same overall =
application deploying a Client along with also being a Protected =
Resource, and that it could be reasonable to want to save such an app as =
much trouble as possible in the aggregate.  WRAP today assumes that "the =
Protected Resource" validates a signature locally.  However, this could =
be expensive (in the sense of requiring PKI infrastructure).  Another =
option is to have it offload validation to the Authorization Server as a =
back-channel operation, which has its own pros and cons.  For now, in =
UMA we're thinking of defining the back-channel loop as an extension =
(which could be completely opaque to the core protocol underneath).

Understood. We could add to the spec that the validation could happen at =
a service instead of locally.

-- Dick


From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Tue Mar  9 08:24:31 2010
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
> ...
> I don't consider RSA a good option for signing requests from consumer 
> to resources because of its performance
> characteristics. Symmetric algorithms like HMAC are by magnitudes 
> faster. I did some benachmarking in
> a project in 2006. The measurements have been taken on a Windows PC  
> (Intel Pentium M 1,7 GHz/1GB)
> with Java 1.5.
>
> HMAC-MD5: 33000/s (sign and verify)
> RSA/512:  434/s (sign), 3300/s (verify)
> RSA/1024:  70/s (sign), 1250/s (verify)
>
> As you can see, there is a factor of 10 (verify) to 300 (sign) between 
> RSA and HMAC-MD5. Today one would use
> HMAC-SHA and probably RSA/2048 so I don't expect the proportions to be 
> better for RSA.
>
>
As I mentioned sometime before, I believe that we should refer to 
private-key signing rather than RSA, which is just one algorithm that 
performs public/private key encryption. (For instance, ECC is another 
algorithm, and it is much faster.)

One advantage of using private-key (over symmetric key) signatures is 
that they automatically provide non-repudiation, and I would just like 
to keep this in the perspective.

And, with many thanks to Torsten for providing the measurements--always 
a good thing!--I am puzzled by an apparent reversal in the duration of 
signing and verification times.  Typically, for the encryption, the RSA 
keys are chosen to be small so that public key operations are fast; that 
results in the private key operations being slow. It appears to me that 
the same choice makes sense for signatures. One party spends time ONCE 
signing something, and then verification, performed by others, is fast.

And so my question here is: What was the reason for choosing a private 
key short here?

With thanks,

Igor



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From: Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com>
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Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Part of the motivation behind that profile was to allow an autonomous clien=
t (no end-user identity passed to the AS) the ability to access a web servi=
ce. In that case, I don't see what the client secret (along with the userna=
me and password) would be adding.

Ethan - assuming the token is signed by the authorization server, how can t=
he client add data to it?

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of D=
avid Recordon
Sent: Monday, March 08, 2010 10:33 PM
To: oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile

Yes.  I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
have the client secret added to the request. :)

On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> wrote:
> In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) it sa=
y's
> to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:
>
> wrap_client_id (the clients id)
> wrap_username (the users username)
> wrap_password (the users password)
> wrap_scope (optional scope defined by the provider)
>
> Are we talking about the same profile?
>
> ~/Jason
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>>
>> You wouldn't. =A0The profile should include the client secret as well in
>> the initial request. =A0You could always issue a client a different
>> secret for use with this profile as well.
>>
>> --David
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> > If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
>> > username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners
>> > from
>> > connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?
>> >
>> > ~/Jason
>> >
>> > On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Hi Ethan -
>> >>
>> >> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a ve=
ry
>> >> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
>> >> contract,
>> >> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We
>> >> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely
>> >> that
>> >> it'll ever be a public interface.
>> >>
>> >> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a brows=
er
>> >> window for the user to authorize the app.
>> >>
>> >> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
>> >> username/password profile.
>> >>
>> >> Allen
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
>> >> > wrote:
>> >> >> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich
>> >> >> client
>> >> >> apps,
>> >> >> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user
>> >> >> already
>> >> >> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is n=
ot
>> >> >> going
>> >> >> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a malic=
ious
>> >> >> app
>> >> >> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
>> >> >
>> >> > I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on
>> >> > which
>> >> > I can install a rich client application and be confident that it wi=
ll
>> >> > not be able to recover my username and password when I type them in=
to
>> >> > my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
>> >> >
>> >> > 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
>> >> > 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
>> >> > 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators by
>> >> > default)
>> >> >
>> >> > On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
>> >> > username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
>> >> > losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
>> >> > text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
>> >> > token.
>> >> >
>> >> > Ethan
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>> > Groups
>> > "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> > To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> > oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>> > For more options, visit this group at
>> > http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>> >
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
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To: Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 08:29:37 -0800
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Can you clarify what you mean by autonomous? Isn't the wrap_username =20
an end user identity?

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 9, 2010, at 8:25 AM, "Justin Smith" <justinsm@microsoft.com> =20
wrote:

> Part of the motivation behind that profile was to allow an =20
> autonomous client (no end-user identity passed to the AS) the =20
> ability to access a web service. In that case, I don't see what the =20
> client secret (along with the username and password) would be adding.
>
> Ethan - assuming the token is signed by the authorization server, =20
> how can the client add data to it?
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On =20
> Behalf Of David Recordon
> Sent: Monday, March 08, 2010 10:33 PM
> To: oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
>
> Yes.  I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
> have the client secret added to the request. :)
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> =20
> wrote:
>> In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) =20
>> it say's
>> to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:
>>
>> wrap_client_id (the clients id)
>> wrap_username (the users username)
>> wrap_password (the users password)
>> wrap_scope (optional scope defined by the provider)
>>
>> Are we talking about the same profile?
>>
>> ~/Jason
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Recordon =20
>> <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> You wouldn't.  The profile should include the client secret as =20
>>> well in
>>> the initial request.  You could always issue a client a different
>>> secret for use with this profile as well.
>>>
>>> --David
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>> If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
>>>> username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-=20
>>>> partners
>>>> from
>>>> connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?
>>>>
>>>> ~/Jason
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> =20
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Ethan -
>>>>>
>>>>> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for =20
>>>>> a very
>>>>> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
>>>>> contract,
>>>>> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or =20
>>>>> desirable. We
>>>>> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's =20
>>>>> unlikely
>>>>> that
>>>>> it'll ever be a public interface.
>>>>>
>>>>> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a =20
>>>>> browser
>>>>> window for the user to authorize the app.
>>>>>
>>>>> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
>>>>> username/password profile.
>>>>>
>>>>> Allen
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich
>>>>>>> client
>>>>>>> apps,
>>>>>>> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user
>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser =20
>>>>>>> is not
>>>>>>> going
>>>>>>> to protect the user from a malicious app  for instance, a =20
>>>>>>> malicious
>>>>>>> app
>>>>>>> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> I can install a rich client application and be confident that =20
>>>>>> it will
>>>>>> not be able to recover my username and password when I type =20
>>>>>> them into
>>>>>> my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
>>>>>> 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
>>>>>> 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as =20
>>>>>> administrators by
>>>>>> default)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
>>>>>> username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
>>>>>> losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string =20
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> text, so the client could embed the username and password into =20
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> token.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ethan
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups
>>>> "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-=20
>>>> wg@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google =20
>> Groups
>> "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>
> _______________________________________________
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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 09:24:30 -0800
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 10:33 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote=
:
> Yes. =A0I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
> have the client secret added to the request. :)

Just so we're clear on use cases...  is the primary use case here DRM,
verifying software on client machines?

Or do folks want to use this for server-to-server calls?

I am not an expert on DRM, but if we're going to try to do DRM in WRAP
I think we should
a) learn from prior experience
   and
b) get experts involved to write that section of the spec
   and
c) call it out as a separate use case and profile, so that people
don't get confused and misuse the spec in dangerous ways.

Cheers,
Brian

From recordond@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 09:46:16 2010
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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 09:46:17 -0800
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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@Justin, there's a separate client key and secret profile for making
requests not within the context of a given user.

@Brain, I'm not focused on using this profile for DRM.  Rather for
trusted devices (ideally with TPM) which do not open web browsers
(such as the XBox).

--David

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 9:24 AM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 10:33 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wro=
te:
>> Yes. =A0I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
>> have the client secret added to the request. :)
>
> Just so we're clear on use cases... =A0is the primary use case here DRM,
> verifying software on client machines?
>
> Or do folks want to use this for server-to-server calls?
>
> I am not an expert on DRM, but if we're going to try to do DRM in WRAP
> I think we should
> a) learn from prior experience
> =A0 and
> b) get experts involved to write that section of the spec
> =A0 and
> c) call it out as a separate use case and profile, so that people
> don't get confused and misuse the spec in dangerous ways.
>
> Cheers,
> Brian
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups=
 "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@g=
ooglegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/oaut=
h-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>
>

From justinsm@microsoft.com  Tue Mar  9 10:01:32 2010
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From: Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com>
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Yep - mistake on my part. I the discussion was around section 5.1 and 5.2 o=
n OAuth WRAP v0.9.7.2.

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of D=
avid Recordon
Sent: Tuesday, March 09, 2010 9:46 AM
To: oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com; oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile

@Justin, there's a separate client key and secret profile for making
requests not within the context of a given user.

@Brain, I'm not focused on using this profile for DRM.  Rather for
trusted devices (ideally with TPM) which do not open web browsers
(such as the XBox).

--David

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 9:24 AM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 10:33 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wro=
te:
>> Yes. =A0I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
>> have the client secret added to the request. :)
>
> Just so we're clear on use cases... =A0is the primary use case here DRM,
> verifying software on client machines?
>
> Or do folks want to use this for server-to-server calls?
>
> I am not an expert on DRM, but if we're going to try to do DRM in WRAP
> I think we should
> a) learn from prior experience
> =A0 and
> b) get experts involved to write that section of the spec
> =A0 and
> c) call it out as a separate use case and profile, so that people
> don't get confused and misuse the spec in dangerous ways.
>
> Cheers,
> Brian
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups=
 "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@g=
ooglegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/oaut=
h-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>
>
_______________________________________________
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The problem with using a client secret for trusted devices is that these
secrets usually get extracted over time. For obvious reasons, I'd rather no=
t
get into the details, but there are many examples of devices whose secrets
are not secret.

The motivation for deliberately excluding the client secret from the
username/password profile was to prevent having the illusion that clients
can be authenticated.

I personally have no objection to adding a client secret to the
username/password profile, however, as we've seen with OAuth, doing so will
give the illusion that downloadable apps can be authenticated.

Allen


On 3/9/10 9:46 AM, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> @Justin, there's a separate client key and secret profile for making
> requests not within the context of a given user.
>=20
> @Brain, I'm not focused on using this profile for DRM.  Rather for
> trusted devices (ideally with TPM) which do not open web browsers
> (such as the XBox).
>=20
> --David
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 9:24 AM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 10:33 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wr=
ote:
>>> Yes. =A0I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
>>> have the client secret added to the request. :)
>>=20
>> Just so we're clear on use cases... =A0is the primary use case here DRM,
>> verifying software on client machines?
>>=20
>> Or do folks want to use this for server-to-server calls?
>>=20
>> I am not an expert on DRM, but if we're going to try to do DRM in WRAP
>> I think we should
>> a) learn from prior experience
>> =A0 and
>> b) get experts involved to write that section of the spec
>> =A0 and
>> c) call it out as a separate use case and profile, so that people
>> don't get confused and misuse the spec in dangerous ways.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> Brian
>>=20
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Group=
s
>> "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>=20
>>=20


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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 11:07:42 -0800
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 9:46 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
> @Brain, I'm not focused on using this profile for DRM. =A0Rather for
> trusted devices (ideally with TPM) which do not open web browsers
> (such as the XBox).

That sounds a lot like DRM + hardware support.  And other folks on
this thread have mentioned platforms with no hardware support.

Note that the proposal to use a client secret is not compatible with a
TPM.  To make this work with a TPM you'd need to use public key
cryptography.

Cheers,
Brian

From recordond@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 12:02:19 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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I'd rather support the client secret and document the hell out of the
security considerations for the profile.

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 10:57 AM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> The problem with using a client secret for trusted devices is that these
> secrets usually get extracted over time. For obvious reasons, I'd rather =
not
> get into the details, but there are many examples of devices whose secret=
s
> are not secret.
>
> The motivation for deliberately excluding the client secret from the
> username/password profile was to prevent having the illusion that clients
> can be authenticated.
>
> I personally have no objection to adding a client secret to the
> username/password profile, however, as we've seen with OAuth, doing so wi=
ll
> give the illusion that downloadable apps can be authenticated.
>
> Allen
>
>
> On 3/9/10 9:46 AM, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> @Justin, there's a separate client key and secret profile for making
>> requests not within the context of a given user.
>>
>> @Brain, I'm not focused on using this profile for DRM. =A0Rather for
>> trusted devices (ideally with TPM) which do not open web browsers
>> (such as the XBox).
>>
>> --David
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 9:24 AM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 10:33 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> w=
rote:
>>>> Yes. =A0I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
>>>> have the client secret added to the request. :)
>>>
>>> Just so we're clear on use cases... =A0is the primary use case here DRM=
,
>>> verifying software on client machines?
>>>
>>> Or do folks want to use this for server-to-server calls?
>>>
>>> I am not an expert on DRM, but if we're going to try to do DRM in WRAP
>>> I think we should
>>> a) learn from prior experience
>>> =A0 and
>>> b) get experts involved to write that section of the spec
>>> =A0 and
>>> c) call it out as a separate use case and profile, so that people
>>> don't get confused and misuse the spec in dangerous ways.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Brian
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Grou=
ps
>>> "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>>
>>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar  9 12:02:34 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Hi Igor,
>> I don't consider RSA a good option for signing requests from consumer 
>> to resources because of its performance
>> characteristics. Symmetric algorithms like HMAC are by magnitudes 
>> faster. I did some benachmarking in
>> a project in 2006. The measurements have been taken on a Windows PC  
>> (Intel Pentium M 1,7 GHz/1GB)
>> with Java 1.5.
>>
>> HMAC-MD5: 33000/s (sign and verify)
>> RSA/512:  434/s (sign), 3300/s (verify)
>> RSA/1024:  70/s (sign), 1250/s (verify)
>>
>> As you can see, there is a factor of 10 (verify) to 300 (sign) 
>> between RSA and HMAC-MD5. Today one would use
>> HMAC-SHA and probably RSA/2048 so I don't expect the proportions to 
>> be better for RSA.
>>
>>
> ...
> As I mentioned sometime before, I believe that we should refer to 
> private-key signing rather than RSA, which is just one algorithm that 
> performs public/private key encryption. (For instance, ECC is another 
> algorithm, and it is much faster.)
>
I know that, but the discussion was about RSA. So I refered to this 
term. Everything I said about RSA also holds for other public key 
algorithms. In fact I did the same benchmarking for ECC with comparable 
results. In my experiences, ECC mainly has the advantage of using much 
shorter keys then RSA.
> <snip>
> And, with many thanks to Torsten for providing the 
> measurements--always a good thing!--I am puzzled by an apparent 
> reversal in the duration of signing and verification times.  
> Typically, for the encryption, the RSA keys are chosen to be small so 
> that public key operations are fast; that results in the private key 
> operations being slow. It appears to me that the same choice makes 
> sense for signatures. One party spends time ONCE signing something, 
> and then verification, performed by others, is fast.
> And so my question here is: What was the reason for choosing a private 
> key short here?
I don't understand your point. I measured the number of sign/verify 
operations per second and the results show verification (the public key 
operation) is significantly faster then signing.

regards,
Torsten.
> With thanks,
>
> Igor
>
>



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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Ah, now I think I figured it out: x/s means x operations per second. 
(Initially, I thought x was the time it took to perform an operation, 
and /s was some time measured in one or other fraction of a second.)

Thanks!

Igor

P.S.:Just to state my preferences: I am actually very much for the 
public-key cryptography as the means of solving IdM problems. We have on 
the record the whole nation (Estonia) having moved to PKI, where people 
sign their votes with their private keys. That convinces me that it sort 
of scales, although I know that there are opinions.

Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
>>>
>>> RSA/1024:  70/s (sign), 1250/s (verify)
>>>
>>
>> And so my question here is: What was the reason for choosing a 
>> private key short here?
> I don't understand your point. I measured the number of sign/verify 
> operations per second and the results show verification (the public 
> key operation) is significantly faster then signing.
>
>>
>>
>>
>
>

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References: <68f4a0e81003081851k796bb880p7538c71589647690@mail.gmail.com> <C7BB0810.26496%atom@yahoo-inc.com> <255af2241003082022r542910b1t3231af4f47fc19cf@mail.gmail.com> <fd6741651003082037j2a445dcfu835f46d1bbd644cf@mail.gmail.com> <255af2241003082112w3a0684eei39b1b442872c652f@mail.gmail.com> <fd6741651003082233pf0dfdb3gf94539c5ce7dffb4@mail.gmail.com> <191F411E00E19F4E943ECDB6D65C6085168BA8A3@TK5EX14MBXC113.redmond.corp.microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 18:09:16 -0500
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From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
To: Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com>
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Cc: "oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com" <oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Sorry, I jumped the gun on my "related note". I don't think I really
understood what was being discussed. So ... er ... ignore that
suggestion please.

Ethan

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 11:23 AM, Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com> wrot=
e:
> Part of the motivation behind that profile was to allow an autonomous cli=
ent (no end-user identity passed to the AS) the ability to access a web ser=
vice. In that case, I don't see what the client secret (along with the user=
name and password) would be adding.
>
> Ethan - assuming the token is signed by the authorization server, how can=
 the client add data to it?
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 David Recordon
> Sent: Monday, March 08, 2010 10:33 PM
> To: oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
>
> Yes. =A0I was agreeing with your point and suggesting that the profile
> have the client secret added to the request. :)
>
> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>> In the Spec (as of 0.9.7.2) for 5.3 (Username and Password profile) it s=
ay's
>> to make an HTTPS request using POST with the following parameters:
>>
>> wrap_client_id (the clients id)
>> wrap_username (the users username)
>> wrap_password (the users password)
>> wrap_scope (optional scope defined by the provider)
>>
>> Are we talking about the same profile?
>>
>> ~/Jason
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:37 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wro=
te:
>>>
>>> You wouldn't. =A0The profile should include the client secret as well i=
n
>>> the initial request. =A0You could always issue a client a different
>>> secret for use with this profile as well.
>>>
>>> --David
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:22 PM, Jason Hullinger <sshjason@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> > If one were to obtain the client id of a partner, under the vanilla
>>> > username/password profile, how would a provider prevent non-partners
>>> > from
>>> > connecting to a provider who has implemented this profile?
>>> >
>>> > ~/Jason
>>> >
>>> > On Mon, Mar 8, 2010 at 8:01 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Hi Ethan -
>>> >>
>>> >> In Yahoo's case, we only allow the username/password profile for a v=
ery
>>> >> small number of applications written by Yahoo or by partners under
>>> >> contract,
>>> >> and only when opening a web browser is not feasible or desirable. We
>>> >> strongly discourage apps from using this profile, and it's unlikely
>>> >> that
>>> >> it'll ever be a public interface.
>>> >>
>>> >> We have a very strong preference that rich client apps invoke a brow=
ser
>>> >> window for the user to authorize the app.
>>> >>
>>> >> Other Service Providers have similar policies for their equivalent
>>> >> username/password profile.
>>> >>
>>> >> Allen
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> On 3/8/10 6:51 PM, "Ethan Jewett" <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> > On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 10:25 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> >> >> This is why the username/password profile is intended for rich
>>> >> >> client
>>> >> >> apps,
>>> >> >> where invoking a browser is not feasible. Given that the user
>>> >> >> already
>>> >> >> downloaded and installed the rich app, popping open a browser is =
not
>>> >> >> going
>>> >> >> to protect the user from a malicious app =AD for instance, a mali=
cious
>>> >> >> app
>>> >> >> could have installed a keylogger before invoking the browser.
>>> >> >
>>> >> > I disagree. There are a large and growing number of platforms on
>>> >> > which
>>> >> > I can install a rich client application and be confident that it w=
ill
>>> >> > not be able to recover my username and password when I type them i=
nto
>>> >> > my web browser. To name a few that I use every day:
>>> >> >
>>> >> > 1. My iPod Touch (non-jail-broken, admittedly)
>>> >> > 2. Adobe AIR on my Windows XP system
>>> >> > 3. Mac OS X (users and applications do not run as administrators b=
y
>>> >> > default)
>>> >> >
>>> >> > On a related note - What stops a provider from implementing the
>>> >> > username/password pattern on top of normal OAuth or WRAP (thereby
>>> >> > losing my business ;-)? The token can be pretty much any string of
>>> >> > text, so the client could embed the username and password into the
>>> >> > token.
>>> >> >
>>> >> > Ethan
>>> >>
>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>> >> OAuth mailing list
>>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> > Groups
>>> > "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>>> > To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>> > oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>>> > For more options, visit this group at
>>> > http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>> >
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Group=
s
>> "OAuth WRAP WG" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> oauth-wrap-wg+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/oauth-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From recordond@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 15:50:34 2010
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
varchar in MySQL).  Is this an issue for anyone?

The OAuth 1.0 protocol specifically states:
Clients should avoid making assumptions about the size of tokens and
other server-generated values, which are left undefined by this
specification.

That seems like a poor idea when it comes to implementability of the
technology.  Why did OAuth 1.0 make that decision?

--David

From cmortimore@salesforce.com  Tue Mar  9 15:57:59 2010
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From: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 15:57:59 -0800
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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--_000_C7BC20872032cmortimoresalesforcecom_
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No issue, and there is certainly precedent. SAML 2.0 specifies the followin=
g about persistent name identifiers, which would be similar is use and form=
factor:

Persistent name identifier values MUST NOT exceed a length of 256 character=
s

-cmort


On 3/9/10 3:50 PM, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
varchar in MySQL).  Is this an issue for anyone?

The OAuth 1.0 protocol specifically states:
Clients should avoid making assumptions about the size of tokens and
other server-generated values, which are left undefined by this
specification.

That seems like a poor idea when it comes to implementability of the
technology.  Why did OAuth 1.0 make that decision?

--David
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


--_000_C7BC20872032cmortimoresalesforcecom_
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Lucida Grande"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>No issue, and t=
here is certainly precedent. SAML 2.0 specifies the following about persist=
ent name identifiers, which would be similar is use and formfactor:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><FONT SIZE=3D"1"><FONT FACE=3D"Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-siz=
e:7.5pt'>Persistent name identifier values MUST NOT exceed a length of 256 =
characters<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></FONT><FONT FACE=3D"Lucida Grande"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
11pt'><BR>
-cmort<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 3/9/10 3:50 PM, &quot;David Recordon&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"recordond@gmai=
l.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Lucida Grande"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-=
size:11pt'>Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as we=
ll as<BR>
client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte<BR>
varchar in MySQL). &nbsp;Is this an issue for anyone?<BR>
<BR>
The OAuth 1.0 protocol specifically states:<BR>
Clients should avoid making assumptions about the size of tokens and<BR>
other server-generated values, which are left undefined by this<BR>
specification.<BR>
<BR>
That seems like a poor idea when it comes to implementability of the<BR>
technology. &nbsp;Why did OAuth 1.0 make that decision?<BR>
<BR>
--David<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
OAuth mailing list<BR>
<a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.or=
g/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
</BODY>
</HTML>


--_000_C7BC20872032cmortimoresalesforcecom_--

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From: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 16:23:23 -0800
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 3:50 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
> varchar in MySQL).

Add verification codes to the list as well.


>=A0Is this an issue for anyone?

Not sure if anyone really wants to do this, but long tokens would
allow you to implement a stateless authorization server. A refresh
token can encrypt all the information needed to issue an access toke,
similar for a verification code. Such a server could either not deal
with revocations and replays, or track state only for revoked refresh
tokens and used verification codes.

That being said, I don't see a problem with limiting the lengths.


Marius

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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 16:44:19 -0800
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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I believe that Google wishes to encode information within access
tokens so that they can be verified in a stateless manner.  Brian, how
many characters do you need?


On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 4:23 PM, Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com> wr=
ote:
> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 3:50 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
>> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
>> varchar in MySQL).
>
> Add verification codes to the list as well.
>
>
>>=A0Is this an issue for anyone?
>
> Not sure if anyone really wants to do this, but long tokens would
> allow you to implement a stateless authorization server. A refresh
> token can encrypt all the information needed to issue an access toke,
> similar for a verification code. Such a server could either not deal
> with revocations and replays, or track state only for revoked refresh
> tokens and used verification codes.
>
> That being said, I don't see a problem with limiting the lengths.
>
>
> Marius
>

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 17:14:59 2010
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On 2010-03-09, at 4:23 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 3:50 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
>> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
>> varchar in MySQL).
>=20
>>  Is this an issue for anyone?
>=20
> That being said, I don't see a problem with limiting the lengths.

I would not want to limit them anymore than they need to be.
When editing OAuth WRAP, we looked into size issues. Current limits are =
HTTP header size limitations, which are 4-8K total.

Given the ability to put all the claims needed into the Access Token, I =
can see Access Tokens being 1-2K and being really useful.

-- Dick=

From esjewett@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 18:24:59 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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Agreed. I've heard tell of Yahoo access tokens with encoded
information weighing in at up to 800 characters. I don't see anything
necessarily wrong with this and I don't think there's much reason to
limit it in the spec. It could incur a significant bandwidth cost, but
since the provider is going to shoulder most of this cost the provider
in a good position to make the tradeoff calculation.

I think it would make sense to advise client library and application
programmers to provide for the possibility of and storage of large
tokens. We should probably reference examples of tokens seen in the
wild and mention the technical limitations on token length from the
HTTP protocol (with Dick outlines). I'm not sure where in the spec
this would go, but it sounds like a good thing to include.

Ethan

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 8:14 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 2010-03-09, at 4:23 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 3:50 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wro=
te:
>>> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
>>> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
>>> varchar in MySQL).
>>
>>> =A0Is this an issue for anyone?
>>
>> That being said, I don't see a problem with limiting the lengths.
>
> I would not want to limit them anymore than they need to be.
> When editing OAuth WRAP, we looked into size issues. Current limits are H=
TTP header size limitations, which are 4-8K total.
>
> Given the ability to put all the claims needed into the Access Token, I c=
an see Access Tokens being 1-2K and being really useful.
>
> -- Dick
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On 2010-03-09, at 6:24 PM, Ethan Jewett wrote:

> I think it would make sense to advise client library and application
> programmers to provide for the possibility of and storage of large
> tokens. We should probably reference examples of tokens seen in the
> wild and mention the technical limitations on token length from the
> HTTP protocol (with Dick outlines). I'm not sure where in the spec
> this would go, but it sounds like a good thing to include.

In the WRAP spec, we had a section entitled "Parameter Considerations".

-- Dick

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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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The challenge is that client developers (who we really want to make
OAuth dead simple for) will be forced to use less optimal storage for
tokens (blobs versus shorter and indexable types such as varchars).
They also won't be able to build any assumptions around token length
into their database design.  Any DBA cringes when they see the blob
type for multiple columns within a table (access token and refresh
token per user).

Some OAuth servers will have short tokens which a client might
integrate with first and decide that a varchar(255) is reasonable to
hold tokens.  They'll then run across a server with longer tokens, not
realize it, and be confused why their client isn't working when it's
due to their database silently truncating tokens after 255 characters.

--David

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 6:24 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> Agreed. I've heard tell of Yahoo access tokens with encoded
> information weighing in at up to 800 characters. I don't see anything
> necessarily wrong with this and I don't think there's much reason to
> limit it in the spec. It could incur a significant bandwidth cost, but
> since the provider is going to shoulder most of this cost the provider
> in a good position to make the tradeoff calculation.
>
> I think it would make sense to advise client library and application
> programmers to provide for the possibility of and storage of large
> tokens. We should probably reference examples of tokens seen in the
> wild and mention the technical limitations on token length from the
> HTTP protocol (with Dick outlines). I'm not sure where in the spec
> this would go, but it sounds like a good thing to include.
>
> Ethan
>
> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 8:14 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 2010-03-09, at 4:23 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 3:50 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wr=
ote:
>>>> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
>>>> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
>>>> varchar in MySQL).
>>>
>>>> =A0Is this an issue for anyone?
>>>
>>> That being said, I don't see a problem with limiting the lengths.
>>
>> I would not want to limit them anymore than they need to be.
>> When editing OAuth WRAP, we looked into size issues. Current limits are =
HTTP header size limitations, which are 4-8K total.
>>
>> Given the ability to put all the claims needed into the Access Token, I =
can see Access Tokens being 1-2K and being really useful.
>>
>> -- Dick
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 19:25:05 2010
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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 19:25:03 -0800
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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--001485e7c8060ef92c048169d81d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

I understand the desire to set a max length that can easily fit into a DB.
There are lots of other items I think the developer is storing that can be
long as well, like URLs -- so I don't see it as a huge issue.

I do see the need to make it clear that it can be a few K or something like
that so that people don't assume it is shorter than it might be.

-- Dick

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 7:16 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> The challenge is that client developers (who we really want to make
> OAuth dead simple for) will be forced to use less optimal storage for
> tokens (blobs versus shorter and indexable types such as varchars).
> They also won't be able to build any assumptions around token length
> into their database design.  Any DBA cringes when they see the blob
> type for multiple columns within a table (access token and refresh
> token per user).
>
> Some OAuth servers will have short tokens which a client might
> integrate with first and decide that a varchar(255) is reasonable to
> hold tokens.  They'll then run across a server with longer tokens, not
> realize it, and be confused why their client isn't working when it's
> due to their database silently truncating tokens after 255 characters.
>
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 6:24 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Agreed. I've heard tell of Yahoo access tokens with encoded
> > information weighing in at up to 800 characters. I don't see anything
> > necessarily wrong with this and I don't think there's much reason to
> > limit it in the spec. It could incur a significant bandwidth cost, but
> > since the provider is going to shoulder most of this cost the provider
> > in a good position to make the tradeoff calculation.
> >
> > I think it would make sense to advise client library and application
> > programmers to provide for the possibility of and storage of large
> > tokens. We should probably reference examples of tokens seen in the
> > wild and mention the technical limitations on token length from the
> > HTTP protocol (with Dick outlines). I'm not sure where in the spec
> > this would go, but it sounds like a good thing to include.
> >
> > Ethan
> >
> > On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 8:14 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 2010-03-09, at 4:23 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:
> >>
> >>> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 3:50 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
> >>>> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
> >>>> varchar in MySQL).
> >>>
> >>>>  Is this an issue for anyone?
> >>>
> >>> That being said, I don't see a problem with limiting the lengths.
> >>
> >> I would not want to limit them anymore than they need to be.
> >> When editing OAuth WRAP, we looked into size issues. Current limits are
> HTTP header size limitations, which are 4-8K total.
> >>
> >> Given the ability to put all the claims needed into the Access Token, I
> can see Access Tokens being 1-2K and being really useful.
> >>
> >> -- Dick
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
>

--001485e7c8060ef92c048169d81d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I understand the desire to set a max length that can easily fit into a DB. =
There are lots of other items I think the developer is storing that can be =
long as well, like URLs -- so I don&#39;t see it as a huge issue.=A0<div><b=
r>
</div><div>I do see the need to make it clear that it can be a few K or som=
ething like that so that people don&#39;t assume it is shorter than it migh=
t be.</div><div><br></div><div>-- Dick<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 7:16 PM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
The challenge is that client developers (who we really want to make<br>
OAuth dead simple for) will be forced to use less optimal storage for<br>
tokens (blobs versus shorter and indexable types such as varchars).<br>
They also won&#39;t be able to build any assumptions around token length<br=
>
into their database design. =A0Any DBA cringes when they see the blob<br>
type for multiple columns within a table (access token and refresh<br>
token per user).<br>
<br>
Some OAuth servers will have short tokens which a client might<br>
integrate with first and decide that a varchar(255) is reasonable to<br>
hold tokens. =A0They&#39;ll then run across a server with longer tokens, no=
t<br>
realize it, and be confused why their client isn&#39;t working when it&#39;=
s<br>
due to their database silently truncating tokens after 255 characters.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--David<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 6:24 PM, Ethan Jewett &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:esjewett=
@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Agreed. I&#39;ve heard tell of Yahoo access tokens with encoded<br>
&gt; information weighing in at up to 800 characters. I don&#39;t see anyth=
ing<br>
&gt; necessarily wrong with this and I don&#39;t think there&#39;s much rea=
son to<br>
&gt; limit it in the spec. It could incur a significant bandwidth cost, but=
<br>
&gt; since the provider is going to shoulder most of this cost the provider=
<br>
&gt; in a good position to make the tradeoff calculation.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I think it would make sense to advise client library and application<b=
r>
&gt; programmers to provide for the possibility of and storage of large<br>
&gt; tokens. We should probably reference examples of tokens seen in the<br=
>
&gt; wild and mention the technical limitations on token length from the<br=
>
&gt; HTTP protocol (with Dick outlines). I&#39;m not sure where in the spec=
<br>
&gt; this would go, but it sounds like a good thing to include.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Ethan<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 8:14 PM, Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.=
hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On 2010-03-09, at 4:23 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 3:50 PM, David Recordon &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Ideally we&#39;d limit the length of access and refresh to=
kens as well as<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a =
one byte<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; varchar in MySQL).<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0Is this an issue for anyone?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; That being said, I don&#39;t see a problem with limiting the l=
engths.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I would not want to limit them anymore than they need to be.<br>
&gt;&gt; When editing OAuth WRAP, we looked into size issues. Current limit=
s are HTTP header size limitations, which are 4-8K total.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Given the ability to put all the claims needed into the Access Tok=
en, I can see Access Tokens being 1-2K and being really useful.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; -- Dick<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001485e7c8060ef92c048169d81d--

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From: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 19:25:02 -0800
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 7:16 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
> The challenge is that client developers (who we really want to make
> OAuth dead simple for) will be forced to use less optimal storage for
> tokens (blobs versus shorter and indexable types such as varchars).
> They also won't be able to build any assumptions around token length
> into their database design. =A0Any DBA cringes when they see the blob
> type for multiple columns within a table (access token and refresh
> token per user).

Why would you index the refresh token column? I think it is enough to
lookup by user id and just retrieve the token.

Also, quite likely that you don't need to store the access token in the
SQL database at all and just make it a session attribute. Not sure what
is reasonable for session data, a large set slows down replication, but
a typical access token should be OK I think.


> Some OAuth servers will have short tokens which a client might
> integrate with first and decide that a varchar(255) is reasonable to
> hold tokens. =A0They'll then run across a server with longer tokens, not
> realize it, and be confused why their client isn't working when it's
> due to their database silently truncating tokens after 255 characters.

Well, silently truncating data is a different issue altogether.


Marius

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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 19:50:33 -0800
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 7:25 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> I understand the desire to set a max length that can easily fit into a DB=
.
> There are lots of other items I think the developer is storing that can b=
e
> long as well, like URLs -- so I don't see it as a huge issue.
> I do see the need to make it clear that it can be a few K or something li=
ke
> that so that people don't assume it is shorter than it might be.
> -- Dick

Why would the URLs be stored in a database?  Wouldn't they be in
configuration files given that OAuth doesn't support discovery of new
servers?  Yes, developers do store URLs in databases but it's
generally not very optimized.


On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 7:25 PM, Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com> wr=
ote:
> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 7:16 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>> The challenge is that client developers (who we really want to make
>> OAuth dead simple for) will be forced to use less optimal storage for
>> tokens (blobs versus shorter and indexable types such as varchars).
>> They also won't be able to build any assumptions around token length
>> into their database design. =A0Any DBA cringes when they see the blob
>> type for multiple columns within a table (access token and refresh
>> token per user).
>
> Why would you index the refresh token column? I think it is enough to
> lookup by user id and just retrieve the token.

Agreed, you shouldn't need to assuming that you only have one access
token per server/user combination.  Ignoring indicies, in MySQL a
varchar up to 255 characters takes one byte whereas a blob (or a
varchar over 255 characters) is the number of bytes for the string
plus two extra bytes.

In MySQL allowing tokens over 255 characters triples your storage
requirement in the best case. We're not talking about a lot of data
here, but it is worth noting that this design decision has a direct
impact on implementors.


> Also, quite likely that you don't need to store the access token in the
> SQL database at all and just make it a session attribute. Not sure what
> is reasonable for session data, a large set slows down replication, but
> a typical access token should be OK I think.

That's true if all access tokens expire frequently.  We plan to also
offer long lived access tokens.


>> Some OAuth servers will have short tokens which a client might
>> integrate with first and decide that a varchar(255) is reasonable to
>> hold tokens. =A0They'll then run across a server with longer tokens, not
>> realize it, and be confused why their client isn't working when it's
>> due to their database silently truncating tokens after 255 characters.
>
> Well, silently truncating data is a different issue altogether.

Sure, but standards can't just work in theory. :)


> Marius
>

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar  9 20:02:24 2010
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On 2010-03-09, at 7:50 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 7:25 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>> I understand the desire to set a max length that can easily fit into =
a DB.
>> There are lots of other items I think the developer is storing that =
can be
>> long as well, like URLs -- so I don't see it as a huge issue.
>> I do see the need to make it clear that it can be a few K or =
something like
>> that so that people don't assume it is shorter than it might be.
>> -- Dick
>=20
> Why would the URLs be stored in a database? =20

Same reason an Access Token would be. Was that a trick question?
My point was that there are other arbitrary pieces of data that =
developers store and need to retrieve.

> Wouldn't they be in
> configuration files given that OAuth doesn't support discovery of new
> servers?

yet


From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar  9 20:44:21 2010
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Hi David,

I wouldn't restrict the length of a tokens to 255 characters, especially 
for access tokens.

Our proprietary token service today uses a token type combination 
similar to OAUTH refresh and access tokens. Based on our experiences I 
would assume the following characteristics of a large-scale OAuth 2.0 
implementation.

Access tokens: Autonomous (w/o callback to authorization server) token 
validation and access control on the service side requires to put all 
relevant user/consumer data into the access token. So access token would 
contain the following data: User Id, Consumer id, context(s), validity, 
authentication methods, user attributes, user permissions, digital 
signature, token id

For our token format, access token length would vary between 200 and 700 
Bytes.

Refresh tokens: in order to refuse refreshing requests for outdated 
tokens early and w/o database access, an authorization server would 
probably put a lot of data into refresh tokens: User Id, Consumer id, 
context(s), validity, authentication methods, digital signature

For our token format, refresh tokens length would be about 200 Bytes. 
 From my perspective, refresh tokens are a typical candidates for 
long-therm database storage on the consumer side. So limiting the length 
would be acceptable, if there is a real benefit. Length limitations 
could also be beneficially for the authorization server since it needs 
to lookup refresh tokens often.

Regarding request payload length: For GET request there is the typical 
header length limitation. POST requests may contain an virtually 
unlimited size of data, even SAML assertion of > 10 Kb could be passed 
w/o any problem :-)

Limiting the length of the client key is ok.

The length of client secrets is somehow related to the algorithms used 
for consumer authentication. So a 255-chars restriction would probably 
raise issues when using public key crypthography.

regards,
Torsten.
> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
> varchar in MySQL).  Is this an issue for anyone?
>
> The OAuth 1.0 protocol specifically states:
> Clients should avoid making assumptions about the size of tokens and
> other server-generated values, which are left undefined by this
> specification.
>
> That seems like a poor idea when it comes to implementability of the
> technology.  Why did OAuth 1.0 make that decision?
>
> --David
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    



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From: Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com>
To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 21:10:16 -0800
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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Whoa- are we seriously saying we need more than 255 characters to encode a =
token? (By the way, that's 10^396 combinations, with letters and numbers.)

Having short tokens makes the whole protocol much simpler, more approachabl=
e, easy to use for developers. I will push hard to keep them short and swee=
t.

For example, here's what would be needed in a naive, stateless Facebook acc=
ess token:
 - 32-char api_key (client identifier)
 - 42-char session key
 - 20-char user id (max)
 - 20-char signature

All that comes to 114 characters max, which I still consider to be way too =
long. With a few additional optimizations (cut the signature length, base c=
onvert the app ID), it becomes closer to 70 characters, and I haven't even =
started trying to compress it or anything yet.

Here's what that URL would look like:

	http://example.com/oauth_endpoint?wrap_access_token=3D2m2zpk2w|2.5ybrE_bzY=
Cp6A7_pK5PDVA__.3600.1268200800-2901279|aCe23FSrNM.

For comparison, here's a URL with a 255-character access token:

	http://example.com/oauth_endpoint?9295730172112|2.5ybrE_bzYCp6A7_pK5PDVA__=
.3600.1268200800-2901279|zpssaSxclo9eWs7Jw1Hga3FSrN9295730172112|2.5ybrE_bz=
YCp6A7_pK5PDVA__.3600.1268200800-2901279|zpssaSxclo9eWs7Jw1Hga3FSrNM9295730=
172112|2.5ybrE_bzYCp6A7_pK5PDVA__.3600.1268200800-2901279|zpcloMM'

Isn't that ugly? At least in my email window, the first URL fits on one lin=
e while the other stretches to three. This is starting to remind me of some=
 OpenID URLs I've seen.

Torsten just replied:

>  So access token would=20
> contain the following data: User Id, Consumer id, context(s), validity,=20
> authentication methods, user attributes, user permissions, digital=20
> signature, token id ... length would vary between 200 and 700 Bytes.


Can you give a representative example of that? I find it hard to believe th=
at even all of those attributes couldn't fit into a much shorter token, if =
smartly sized.

Thanks,
Luke


From beaton@google.com  Tue Mar  9 21:15:38 2010
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On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 4:44 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
> I believe that Google wishes to encode information within access
> tokens so that they can be verified in a stateless manner. =A0Brian, how
> many characters do you need?

I think it would be OK to make request tokens short.  They are
service-specific passwords, and can/should be treated as such.

For authorization servers: store cryptographically strong one-way
hashes.  No need to salt the hashes, because they are very
high-entropy already.

For clients: store them in a DB that is locked down as tight as you
can get it.  Plan on changing your client secret when the DBA leaves
the company.

(hrm, I just saw that Torsten has a use case for refresh token =3D=3D
encrypted blob.  I am deeply suspicious.)

For most deployments, access tokens are basically like session
cookies.  Some deployments use self-verifying cookies with keys stored
server-side, other people store sessions in databases or in-memory.
There are lots of fun trade-offs here.  The choices you make have
fundamental impacts on every facet of your systems, ranging from DNS,
to load balancers, to frontends, to backend servers.  The choice
ripples out to impact scalability, security, latency, and availability
*everywhere*.

It would be a mistake for the spec to say that access tokens have to
be short - that one decision impacts way too many other things.

The non-opaque access token use cases (SWT, claims in access tokens)
are interesting, and for those use cases access tokens can't be short
either.

Cheers,
Brian

From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar  9 21:25:53 2010
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Hi,
> Whoa- are we seriously saying we need more than 255 characters to encode a token? (By the way, that's 10^396 combinations, with letters and numbers.)
>
>    
yes. As I said, in our approach we put permissions and attributes into 
the tokens.
> Having short tokens makes the whole protocol much simpler, more approachable, easy to use for developers. I will push hard to keep them short and sweet.
>    
why make short tokens the protocol simpler?

regards,
Torsten.


From beaton@google.com  Tue Mar  9 21:32:23 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 12:02 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
> I'd rather support the client secret and document the hell out of the
> security considerations for the profile.

Thinking out loud... what if we called it the "server you trust to use
username and password profile" instead of the client app profile?

That would actually meet the xbox use case, as follows:

1) Microsoft uses magic security sauce to authenticate the xbox to
their servers.
    This magic security sauce will be obscure, will probably change
frequently, and is probably going to rely on hardware security
modules.  It makes no sense to standardize this, because the goal is
specifically to avoid interoperable implementations. =)

2) Their servers hold the client secret, and use it to authenticate to
whatever service they are using for password validation.
    Note that they can actually change this secret, because it is
stored server-side.

I'm sure that people are going to run off and use this profile to
hard-code secrets in their iphone apps, and if the secrets are
important they will be reverse-engineered and abused.  But that's what
happens when you take a profile intended for one kind of deployment
environment and use it in a very, very different environment.

(Also note that the user experience/completion rate for the
browser-redirect flows on thick clients can actually be pretty good.
We've done usability studies, and it works:
http://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/UXFedLogin/desktopapps.  For
trusted partners you can customize the login and approval screen as
well.)

Cheers,
Brian

From david@alkaline-solutions.com  Tue Mar  9 22:33:22 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On Mar 9, 2010, at 8:16 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> The challenge is that client developers (who we really want to make
> OAuth dead simple for) will be forced to use less optimal storage for
> tokens (blobs versus shorter and indexable types such as varchars).
> They also won't be able to build any assumptions around token length
> into their database design.  Any DBA cringes when they see the blob
> type for multiple columns within a table (access token and refresh
> token per user).

To throw another opinion on the fire - access tokens shouldn't be =
required to be over an order of magnitude smaller than browser cookies =
or HTTP headers, and nearly an order of magnitude smaller than a URL. In =
fact, 256 characters is only barely long enough to hold the longest =
allowed domain name.

To parallel browser cookies, HTTP headers and URLs, there are accepted =
'minimum maximums' out there - which the minimum size that user agents =
are expected to support, and the maximum size the server will assume be =
supported by an arbitrary agent. I don't believe all of these are =
formalized, but they all exist.

> Some OAuth servers will have short tokens which a client might
> integrate with first and decide that a varchar(255) is reasonable to
> hold tokens.  They'll then run across a server with longer tokens, not
> realize it, and be confused why their client isn't working when it's
> due to their database silently truncating tokens after 255 characters.

Sounds like they should consider picking a different database vendor.

-DW=

From lshepard@facebook.com  Tue Mar  9 23:02:04 2010
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From: Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com>
To: David Waite <david@alkaline-solutions.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 23:02:00 -0800
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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I'd still like to see someone construct an example access token that is lon=
ger than 255 characters that would be reasonably used. If there are real, l=
egitimate use cases that REQUIRE more than that many characters, then let's=
 hear them. I don't think that appealing to "it might be useful" is a good =
enough argument.

>  nearly an order of magnitude smaller than a URL

I'd hope so, given that it is supposed to be a single URL parameter, and it=
 has to share that URL length with other parameters to actual API calls.

> I don't believe all of these are formalized, but they all exist.

The lack of formalized URL length limits has been a headache for us, since =
we end up testing each browser and coding to the most restrictive. I'd like=
 to avoid the need for OAuth clients to do the same.

On Mar 9, 2010, at 10:33 PM, David Waite wrote:

> On Mar 9, 2010, at 8:16 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>=20
>> The challenge is that client developers (who we really want to make
>> OAuth dead simple for) will be forced to use less optimal storage for
>> tokens (blobs versus shorter and indexable types such as varchars).
>> They also won't be able to build any assumptions around token length
>> into their database design.  Any DBA cringes when they see the blob
>> type for multiple columns within a table (access token and refresh
>> token per user).
>=20
> To throw another opinion on the fire - access tokens shouldn't be require=
d to be over an order of magnitude smaller than browser cookies or HTTP hea=
ders, and nearly an order of magnitude smaller than a URL. In fact, 256 cha=
racters is only barely long enough to hold the longest allowed domain name.
>=20
> To parallel browser cookies, HTTP headers and URLs, there are accepted 'm=
inimum maximums' out there - which the minimum size that user agents are ex=
pected to support, and the maximum size the server will assume be supported=
 by an arbitrary agent. I don't believe all of these are formalized, but th=
ey all exist.
>=20
>> Some OAuth servers will have short tokens which a client might
>> integrate with first and decide that a varchar(255) is reasonable to
>> hold tokens.  They'll then run across a server with longer tokens, not
>> realize it, and be confused why their client isn't working when it's
>> due to their database silently truncating tokens after 255 characters.
>=20
> Sounds like they should consider picking a different database vendor.
>=20
> -DW
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From beaton@google.com  Tue Mar  9 23:35:21 2010
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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2010 23:35:20 -0800
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 11:02 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> wrote:
> I'd still like to see someone construct an example access token that is
> longer than 255 characters that would be reasonably used. If there
> are real, legitimate use cases that REQUIRE more than that many
> characters, then let's hear them. I don't think that appealing to
> "it might be useful" is a good enough argument.

Cached group memberships and other user attributes are what typically
blow out the cookie size in enterprise environments.

If you browse around the web for a bit you'll see various sites that
set very large cookies after users log in.  They are caching state in
the cookie.  It's all fair game for API tokens as well.

Cheers,
Brian

From justinsm@microsoft.com  Wed Mar 10 00:00:35 2010
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From: Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com>
To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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References: <fd6741651003091550t5a464496r57aae9a60c516599@mail.gmail.com> <74caaad21003091623i8b7c343jc3bb806fe327492d@mail.gmail.com> <12ED1FAC-B9C6-47C1-AC01-AB33D110EF8C@gmail.com> <68f4a0e81003091824n5453cf4cp151f313de5fd9c5e@mail.gmail.com> <fd6741651003091916o4c3b3a3ao4dc7871ddf7df23b@mail.gmail.com> <C39B5264-75E2-456A-ABB7-D1530660BA99@alkaline-solutions.com> <D3BC6FD4-0530-4677-91C8-8B060C5DCEE3@facebook.com> <daf5b9571003092335r5443fb27taf7e9f774b7c4ad1@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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Along those lines, here's an access token (SWT w/o URL encoding) that has s=
ome role and attribute data. I think it is representative of how customers =
are using the OAuth WRAP implementation in AppFabric.

Role=3Duser,superuser,administrator&Action=3Dcreate,retrieve,update,delete&=
CustomerID=3D123456789&Issuer=3Dhttps://acsinteropdemo.accesscontrol.window=
s.net/&Audience=3Dhttp://acsinteropdemo.appspot.com/orders&ExpiresOn=3D1268=
207444&HMACSHA256=3D0p1PPgCcox7uRw1ETtUTlpwBgfGAF3UhTFaHUPaprik=3D


--justin

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of B=
rian Eaton
Sent: Tuesday, March 09, 2010 11:35 PM
To: Luke Shepard
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?

On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 11:02 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> wrote=
:
> I'd still like to see someone construct an example access token that is
> longer than 255 characters that would be reasonably used. If there
> are real, legitimate use cases that REQUIRE more than that many
> characters, then let's hear them. I don't think that appealing to
> "it might be useful" is a good enough argument.

Cached group memberships and other user attributes are what typically
blow out the cookie size in enterprise environments.

If you browse around the web for a bit you'll see various sites that
set very large cookies after users log in.  They are caching state in
the cookie.  It's all fair game for API tokens as well.

Cheers,
Brian
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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On Mar 9, 2010, at 6:50 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> Ideally we'd limit the length of access and refresh tokens as well as
> client keys and secrets to no more than 255 characters (a one byte
> varchar in MySQL).  Is this an issue for anyone?

Yes.=20

Why would we want to encode such a specific implementation decision into =
the OAuth standard (where I'm sure there are lots of folks who don't use =
MySQL to log tokens)?

> The OAuth 1.0 protocol specifically states:
> Clients should avoid making assumptions about the size of tokens and
> other server-generated values, which are left undefined by this
> specification.
>=20
> That seems like a poor idea when it comes to implementability of the
> technology.

Can you explain why this is a poor idea?=20

It seems to me that such a statement leaves it open to implementations =
to create tokens that make sense for their usage and which work with =
their clients and partners.=20

>  Why did OAuth 1.0 make that decision?

One reason I can imagine is to make it possible to encode information =
into the token itself so that the token can be "self-contained" =
(mentioned also by others on this list).=20

A good reason to limit token length would be if there were issues in the =
client implementation which meant that tokens might get truncated by =
particular implementations - but I would guess that these would again be =
implementation-specific, and not something which should be standardized =
generally.=20

Regards,

- johnk=

From maisel@sipgate.de  Wed Mar 10 08:17:02 2010
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On 03/10/2010 04:42 PM, John Kemp wrote:
> One reason I can imagine is to make it possible to encode information into the token itself so that the token can be "self-contained" (mentioned also by others on this list). 
>   

Though thats an interesting option, compatibility of implementations
might be easier to achieve by strict specifications like "maximum of 256
characters".

Just to get an idea about the situation: Is the mentioned
"self-contained token" a common scenario / popular demand that needs to
be covered?

Regards,
Moritz

-- 
sipgate GmbH - Gladbacher Str. 74 - 40219 Düsseldorf
HRB Düsseldorf 39841 - Geschäftsführer: Thilo Salmon, Tim Mois
Steuernummer: 106/5724/7147, Umsatzsteuer-ID: DE219349391

www.sipgate.de - www.sipgate.at - www.sipgate.co.uk


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On Mar 10, 2010, at 11:16 AM, Moritz Maisel wrote:

> On 03/10/2010 04:42 PM, John Kemp wrote:
>> One reason I can imagine is to make it possible to encode information =
into the token itself so that the token can be "self-contained" =
(mentioned also by others on this list).=20
>>=20
>=20
> Though thats an interesting option, compatibility of implementations
> might be easier to achieve by strict specifications like "maximum of =
256
> characters".

Could you explain why you need to standardize a maximum token length, or =
why you would want to standardize on implementations of a token store =
rather than a token-exchange protocol here?=20

>=20
> Just to get an idea about the situation: Is the mentioned
> "self-contained token" a common scenario / popular demand that needs =
to
> be covered?

Yes it is. Several people on this list have already mentioned it.=20

Regards,

- johnk

>=20
> Regards,
> Moritz
>=20
> --=20
> sipgate GmbH - Gladbacher Str. 74 - 40219 D=FCsseldorf
> HRB D=FCsseldorf 39841 - Gesch=E4ftsf=FChrer: Thilo Salmon, Tim Mois
> Steuernummer: 106/5724/7147, Umsatzsteuer-ID: DE219349391
>=20
> www.sipgate.de - www.sipgate.at - www.sipgate.co.uk
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From atom@yahoo-inc.com  Wed Mar 10 08:52:50 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2010 08:51:54 -0800
From: Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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+1

I'd like to keep the existing username/password profile as it currently is,
with the understanding that Service Providers may add additional proprietary
parameters and secret sauce to authenticate the client.

Allen


On 3/9/10 9:32 PM, "Brian Eaton" <beaton@google.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 12:02 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I'd rather support the client secret and document the hell out of the
>> security considerations for the profile.
> 
> Thinking out loud... what if we called it the "server you trust to use
> username and password profile" instead of the client app profile?
> 
> That would actually meet the xbox use case, as follows:
> 
> 1) Microsoft uses magic security sauce to authenticate the xbox to
> their servers.
>     This magic security sauce will be obscure, will probably change
> frequently, and is probably going to rely on hardware security
> modules.  It makes no sense to standardize this, because the goal is
> specifically to avoid interoperable implementations. =)
> 
> 2) Their servers hold the client secret, and use it to authenticate to
> whatever service they are using for password validation.
>     Note that they can actually change this secret, because it is
> stored server-side.
> 
> I'm sure that people are going to run off and use this profile to
> hard-code secrets in their iphone apps, and if the secrets are
> important they will be reverse-engineered and abused.  But that's what
> happens when you take a profile intended for one kind of deployment
> environment and use it in a very, very different environment.
> 
> (Also note that the user experience/completion rate for the
> browser-redirect flows on thick clients can actually be pretty good.
> We've done usability studies, and it works:
> http://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/UXFedLogin/desktopapps.  For
> trusted partners you can customize the login and approval screen as
> well.)
> 
> Cheers,
> Brian


From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Wed Mar 10 08:55:48 2010
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+1

On 2010-03-10, at 8:51 AM, Allen Tom wrote:

> +1
>=20
> I'd like to keep the existing username/password profile as it =
currently is,
> with the understanding that Service Providers may add additional =
proprietary
> parameters and secret sauce to authenticate the client.
>=20
> Allen
>=20
>=20
> On 3/9/10 9:32 PM, "Brian Eaton" <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 12:02 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>> I'd rather support the client secret and document the hell out of =
the
>>> security considerations for the profile.
>>=20
>> Thinking out loud... what if we called it the "server you trust to =
use
>> username and password profile" instead of the client app profile?
>>=20
>> That would actually meet the xbox use case, as follows:
>>=20
>> 1) Microsoft uses magic security sauce to authenticate the xbox to
>> their servers.
>>    This magic security sauce will be obscure, will probably change
>> frequently, and is probably going to rely on hardware security
>> modules.  It makes no sense to standardize this, because the goal is
>> specifically to avoid interoperable implementations. =3D)
>>=20
>> 2) Their servers hold the client secret, and use it to authenticate =
to
>> whatever service they are using for password validation.
>>    Note that they can actually change this secret, because it is
>> stored server-side.
>>=20
>> I'm sure that people are going to run off and use this profile to
>> hard-code secrets in their iphone apps, and if the secrets are
>> important they will be reverse-engineered and abused.  But that's =
what
>> happens when you take a profile intended for one kind of deployment
>> environment and use it in a very, very different environment.
>>=20
>> (Also note that the user experience/completion rate for the
>> browser-redirect flows on thick clients can actually be pretty good.
>> We've done usability studies, and it works:
>> http://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/UXFedLogin/desktopapps.  For
>> trusted partners you can customize the login and approval screen as
>> well.)
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> Brian
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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To: "oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com" <oauth-wrap-wg@googlegroups.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2010 09:00:32 -0800
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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Cc: David, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [WRAP] Username and Password Profile
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That seems reasonable to me. We should make sure to distill this discussion=
 into a "security considerations" section for that profile.

On Mar 10, 2010, at 8:55 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:

> +1
>=20
> On 2010-03-10, at 8:51 AM, Allen Tom wrote:
>=20
>> +1
>>=20
>> I'd like to keep the existing username/password profile as it currently =
is,
>> with the understanding that Service Providers may add additional proprie=
tary
>> parameters and secret sauce to authenticate the client.
>>=20
>> Allen
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 3/9/10 9:32 PM, "Brian Eaton" <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Tue, Mar 9, 2010 at 12:02 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> w=
rote:
>>>> I'd rather support the client secret and document the hell out of the
>>>> security considerations for the profile.
>>>=20
>>> Thinking out loud... what if we called it the "server you trust to use
>>> username and password profile" instead of the client app profile?
>>>=20
>>> That would actually meet the xbox use case, as follows:
>>>=20
>>> 1) Microsoft uses magic security sauce to authenticate the xbox to
>>> their servers.
>>>   This magic security sauce will be obscure, will probably change
>>> frequently, and is probably going to rely on hardware security
>>> modules.  It makes no sense to standardize this, because the goal is
>>> specifically to avoid interoperable implementations. =3D)
>>>=20
>>> 2) Their servers hold the client secret, and use it to authenticate to
>>> whatever service they are using for password validation.
>>>   Note that they can actually change this secret, because it is
>>> stored server-side.
>>>=20
>>> I'm sure that people are going to run off and use this profile to
>>> hard-code secrets in their iphone apps, and if the secrets are
>>> important they will be reverse-engineered and abused.  But that's what
>>> happens when you take a profile intended for one kind of deployment
>>> environment and use it in a very, very different environment.
>>>=20
>>> (Also note that the user experience/completion rate for the
>>> browser-redirect flows on thick clients can actually be pretty good.
>>> We've done usability studies, and it works:
>>> http://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/UXFedLogin/desktopapps.  For
>>> trusted partners you can customize the login and approval screen as
>>> well.)
>>>=20
>>> Cheers,
>>> Brian
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20
> --=20
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups=
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h-wrap-wg?hl=3Den.
>=20


From lindner@inuus.com  Wed Mar 10 12:47:33 2010
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To: John Kemp <john@jkemp.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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Standards have size limits to overcome operational issues all the time.  =
For an extreme example look at the backflips that MIME goes through to =
insure that mail can be delivered by even the most hostile relay.  =
(Including systems using EBCDIC, and systems that mangle payloads!)

If there are no bounds on the size of a token the end result is that =
some parts of the protocol move from MAY to MUST.  For example, many =
firewall/proxy services in the wild will truncate URLs and even HTTP =
headers  much shorter than the 4k normally assumed.    Ergo, POST =
support is now a MUST.


On Mar 10, 2010, at 8:30 AM, John Kemp wrote:

> On Mar 10, 2010, at 11:16 AM, Moritz Maisel wrote:
>=20
>> On 03/10/2010 04:42 PM, John Kemp wrote:
>>> One reason I can imagine is to make it possible to encode =
information into the token itself so that the token can be =
"self-contained" (mentioned also by others on this list).=20
>>>=20
>>=20
>> Though thats an interesting option, compatibility of implementations
>> might be easier to achieve by strict specifications like "maximum of =
256
>> characters".
>=20
> Could you explain why you need to standardize a maximum token length, =
or why you would want to standardize on implementations of a token store =
rather than a token-exchange protocol here?=20
>=20
>>=20
>> Just to get an idea about the situation: Is the mentioned
>> "self-contained token" a common scenario / popular demand that needs =
to
>> be covered?
>=20
> Yes it is. Several people on this list have already mentioned it.=20
>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> - johnk
>=20
>>=20
>> Regards,
>> Moritz
>>=20
>> --=20
>> sipgate GmbH - Gladbacher Str. 74 - 40219 D=FCsseldorf
>> HRB D=FCsseldorf 39841 - Gesch=E4ftsf=FChrer: Thilo Salmon, Tim Mois
>> Steuernummer: 106/5724/7147, Umsatzsteuer-ID: DE219349391
>>=20
>> www.sipgate.de - www.sipgate.at - www.sipgate.co.uk
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From stpeter@stpeter.im  Wed Mar 10 13:57:50 2010
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On 3/4/10 6:46 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:
> I could have some commentary on the mixed approach as well.

For sure. I think we'll have a lively discussion. :)

I'll upload the draft agenda soon in a more official capacity...

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2010 15:21:56 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] draft agenda
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<hat type=3D'chair'/>

I've uploaded a draft agenda for our meeting at IETF 77:

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/10mar/agenda/oauth.txt

Agenda bashing is welcome on the list.

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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From john@jkemp.net  Wed Mar 10 14:24:03 2010
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From: John Kemp <john@jkemp.net>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On Mar 10, 2010, at 3:47 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:

> Standards have size limits to overcome operational issues all the =
time.

Standards usually standardize on the things necessary for =
interoperability, and token size isn't a necessity for interoperability =
unless we make it one. No-one has explained the benefit of doing that =
yet.=20

>  For an extreme example look at the backflips that MIME goes through =
to insure that mail can be delivered by even the most hostile relay.  =
(Including systems using EBCDIC, and systems that mangle payloads!)
>=20
> If there are no bounds on the size of a token the end result is that =
some parts of the protocol move from MAY to MUST.  For example, many =
firewall/proxy services in the wild will truncate URLs and even HTTP =
headers  much shorter than the 4k normally assumed.    Ergo, POST =
support is now a MUST.

And in environments without such intermediaries, tokens of much larger =
sizes may be sent without problems.=20

I agree that implementation considerations such as URL length and so on =
may be relevant in some environments, but I would oppose some mandatory =
limit in OAuth on token size.=20

It's fine, however, to say that if we rely on HTTP as a substrate that =
we should be governed by any relevant and documented standard HTTP (or =
other relevant specifications) limits, and provide implementation advice =
to suggest that in some environments where implementations don't follow =
the standards, URLs may be truncated by *some implementations* (for =
example).=20

Regards,

- johnk

>=20
> On Mar 10, 2010, at 8:30 AM, John Kemp wrote:
>=20
>> On Mar 10, 2010, at 11:16 AM, Moritz Maisel wrote:
>>=20
>>> On 03/10/2010 04:42 PM, John Kemp wrote:
>>>> One reason I can imagine is to make it possible to encode =
information into the token itself so that the token can be =
"self-contained" (mentioned also by others on this list).=20
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Though thats an interesting option, compatibility of implementations
>>> might be easier to achieve by strict specifications like "maximum of =
256
>>> characters".
>>=20
>> Could you explain why you need to standardize a maximum token length, =
or why you would want to standardize on implementations of a token store =
rather than a token-exchange protocol here?=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Just to get an idea about the situation: Is the mentioned
>>> "self-contained token" a common scenario / popular demand that needs =
to
>>> be covered?
>>=20
>> Yes it is. Several people on this list have already mentioned it.=20
>>=20
>> Regards,
>>=20
>> - johnk
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Regards,
>>> Moritz
>>>=20
>>> --=20
>>> sipgate GmbH - Gladbacher Str. 74 - 40219 D=FCsseldorf
>>> HRB D=FCsseldorf 39841 - Gesch=E4ftsf=FChrer: Thilo Salmon, Tim Mois
>>> Steuernummer: 106/5724/7147, Umsatzsteuer-ID: DE219349391
>>>=20
>>> www.sipgate.de - www.sipgate.at - www.sipgate.co.uk
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20


From lindner@inuus.com  Wed Mar 10 14:47:41 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2010 14:47:42 -0800
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From: Paul Lindner <lindner@inuus.com>
To: John Kemp <john@jkemp.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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--00504502c5a30f749b04817a16eb
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RFC 2822 <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2822.txt> provides an apropos
example in sections 2.1.1:

There are two limits that this standard places on the number of
characters in a line. Each line of characters MUST be no more than
998 characters, and SHOULD be no more than 78 characters, excluding
the CRLF.


RFC 2821 <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2821.txt> has a whole section on
size limits in section 5.4.3.1.

Good reading....

OAuth  has it's own transport related issues, so our MUST limit would
probably be determined by HTTP or other transport considerations.  As a
community we can hopefully come to an agreement on what SHOULD value makes
sense...

I also suggest that error handling around this condition (and everything
else) be nailed down so things don't just break in mysterious ways.
 Remember to SMTP a 500 error is 'line too long'..

On Wed, Mar 10, 2010 at 2:23 PM, John Kemp <john@jkemp.net> wrote:

> On Mar 10, 2010, at 3:47 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:
>
> > Standards have size limits to overcome operational issues all the time.
>
> Standards usually standardize on the things necessary for interoperabilit=
y,
> and token size isn't a necessity for interoperability unless we make it o=
ne.
> No-one has explained the benefit of doing that yet.
>
> >  For an extreme example look at the backflips that MIME goes through to
> insure that mail can be delivered by even the most hostile relay.
>  (Including systems using EBCDIC, and systems that mangle payloads!)
> >
> > If there are no bounds on the size of a token the end result is that so=
me
> parts of the protocol move from MAY to MUST.  For example, many
> firewall/proxy services in the wild will truncate URLs and even HTTP head=
ers
>  much shorter than the 4k normally assumed.    Ergo, POST support is now =
a
> MUST.
>
> And in environments without such intermediaries, tokens of much larger
> sizes may be sent without problems.
>
> I agree that implementation considerations such as URL length and so on m=
ay
> be relevant in some environments, but I would oppose some mandatory limit=
 in
> OAuth on token size.
>
> It's fine, however, to say that if we rely on HTTP as a substrate that we
> should be governed by any relevant and documented standard HTTP (or other
> relevant specifications) limits, and provide implementation advice to
> suggest that in some environments where implementations don't follow the
> standards, URLs may be truncated by *some implementations* (for example).
>
> Regards,
>
> - johnk
>
> >
> > On Mar 10, 2010, at 8:30 AM, John Kemp wrote:
> >
> >> On Mar 10, 2010, at 11:16 AM, Moritz Maisel wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 03/10/2010 04:42 PM, John Kemp wrote:
> >>>> One reason I can imagine is to make it possible to encode informatio=
n
> into the token itself so that the token can be "self-contained" (mentione=
d
> also by others on this list).
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Though thats an interesting option, compatibility of implementations
> >>> might be easier to achieve by strict specifications like "maximum of
> 256
> >>> characters".
> >>
> >> Could you explain why you need to standardize a maximum token length, =
or
> why you would want to standardize on implementations of a token store rat=
her
> than a token-exchange protocol here?
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Just to get an idea about the situation: Is the mentioned
> >>> "self-contained token" a common scenario / popular demand that needs =
to
> >>> be covered?
> >>
> >> Yes it is. Several people on this list have already mentioned it.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> - johnk
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>> Moritz
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> sipgate GmbH - Gladbacher Str. 74 - 40219 D=FCsseldorf
> >>> HRB D=FCsseldorf 39841 - Gesch=E4ftsf=FChrer: Thilo Salmon, Tim Mois
> >>> Steuernummer: 106/5724/7147, Umsatzsteuer-ID: DE219349391
> >>>
> >>> www.sipgate.de - www.sipgate.at - www.sipgate.co.uk
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> OAuth mailing list
> >>> OAuth@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
>
>

--00504502c5a30f749b04817a16eb
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<a href=3D"http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2822.txt">RFC 2822</a> provides=
 an apropos example in sections 2.1.1:<div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span"=
 style=3D"font-family: monospace; font-size: medium; white-space: pre-wrap;=
 "><br>
</span></div><blockquote class=3D"webkit-indent-blockquote" style=3D"margin=
: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
There are two limits that this standard places on the number of</div></div>=
<div>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">characters in a line. Each line of characters MU=
ST be no more than</div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">998 character=
s, and SHOULD be no more than 78 characters, excluding</div></div><div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">
the CRLF.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><a href=3D"http://www.rfc-=
editor.org/rfc/rfc2821.txt">RFC 2821</a> has a whole section on size limits=
 in section 5.4.3.1.<div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div>Good reading.=
...<div>
<br></div><div>OAuth =A0has it&#39;s own transport related issues, so our M=
UST limit would probably be determined by HTTP or other transport considera=
tions. =A0As a community we can hopefully come to an agreement on what SHOU=
LD value makes sense...</div>
<div><br></div><div>I also suggest that error handling around this conditio=
n (and everything else) be nailed down so things don&#39;t just break in my=
sterious ways. =A0Remember to SMTP a 500 error is &#39;line too long&#39;..=
</div>
<div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br>On Wed, Mar 10, 2010 at 2:23 =
PM, John Kemp <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:john@jkemp.net">john@=
jkemp.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On Mar 10, 2010, at 3:47 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Standards have size limits to overcome operational issues all the time=
.<br>
<br>
</div>Standards usually standardize on the things necessary for interoperab=
ility, and token size isn&#39;t a necessity for interoperability unless we =
make it one. No-one has explained the benefit of doing that yet.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; =A0For an extreme example look at the backflips that MIME goes through=
 to insure that mail can be delivered by even the most hostile relay. =A0(I=
ncluding systems using EBCDIC, and systems that mangle payloads!)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If there are no bounds on the size of a token the end result is that s=
ome parts of the protocol move from MAY to MUST. =A0For example, many firew=
all/proxy services in the wild will truncate URLs and even HTTP headers =A0=
much shorter than the 4k normally assumed. =A0 =A0Ergo, POST support is now=
 a MUST.<br>

<br>
</div>And in environments without such intermediaries, tokens of much large=
r sizes may be sent without problems.<br>
<br>
I agree that implementation considerations such as URL length and so on may=
 be relevant in some environments, but I would oppose some mandatory limit =
in OAuth on token size.<br>
<br>
It&#39;s fine, however, to say that if we rely on HTTP as a substrate that =
we should be governed by any relevant and documented standard HTTP (or othe=
r relevant specifications) limits, and provide implementation advice to sug=
gest that in some environments where implementations don&#39;t follow the s=
tandards, URLs may be truncated by *some implementations* (for example).<br=
>

<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
- johnk<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mar 10, 2010, at 8:30 AM, John Kemp wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 10, 2010, at 11:16 AM, Moritz Maisel wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 03/10/2010 04:42 PM, John Kemp wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; One reason I can imagine is to make it possible to encode =
information into the token itself so that the token can be &quot;self-conta=
ined&quot; (mentioned also by others on this list).<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Though thats an interesting option, compatibility of implement=
ations<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; might be easier to achieve by strict specifications like &quot=
;maximum of 256<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; characters&quot;.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Could you explain why you need to standardize a maximum token leng=
th, or why you would want to standardize on implementations of a token stor=
e rather than a token-exchange protocol here?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Just to get an idea about the situation: Is the mentioned<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;self-contained token&quot; a common scenario / popular d=
emand that needs to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; be covered?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Yes it is. Several people on this list have already mentioned it.<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - johnk<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Moritz<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; --<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; sipgate GmbH - Gladbacher Str. 74 - 40219 D=FCsseldorf<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; HRB D=FCsseldorf 39841 - Gesch=E4ftsf=FChrer: Thilo Salmon, Ti=
m Mois<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Steuernummer: 106/5724/7147, Umsatzsteuer-ID: DE219349391<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.sipgate.de" target=3D"_blank">www.sipgat=
e.de</a> - <a href=3D"http://www.sipgate.at" target=3D"_blank">www.sipgate.=
at</a> - <a href=3D"http://www.sipgate.co.uk" target=3D"_blank">www.sipgate=
.co.uk</a><br>

&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div>

--00504502c5a30f749b04817a16eb--

From recordond@gmail.com  Wed Mar 10 23:58:05 2010
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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Has anyone else put some thought into what secrets are used within the
signature algorithm for OAuth 2.0?

OAuth 1.0 combines the client secret and the token secret with an
ampersand in the middle.  WRAP doesn't support signatures and relies
on the fact that access tokens should remain secret via SSL or are
extremely short lived and thus lower risk.

Here are the options as far as I'm aware (without making changes to
WRAP's assumptions):

1) Sign using the client secret.  Doesn't work because the access
token would be sent over the wire in plaintext and some servers will
make them long lived in 2.0.

2) Issue an access token secret if an optional parameter is specified
by the client during the authorization profile request(s).  Doesn't
work for the same reason as #1 assuming that the same access token can
be used via SSL.

3) Instead of adding an optional parameter to each authorization
profile, have the client immediately refresh the access token and
support an optional parameter to request an access token secret.  This
lessons the impact of supporting signatures on most implementors when
reading the spec and given that most signature use cases have longer
lived tokens, the overhead of the extra HTTP request should be
infrequent compared to the number of protected resource requests
you'll make with it.  Doesn't work for the same reason as #1 assuming
that the same access token can be used via SSL.

While I'm not a crypto expert, it seems impossible to treat the same
access token as potentially public when using signatures but secret
when using SSL.  I believe that authorization servers will need to
keep track of the access tokens that the client has requested a secret
for and from that point on only allow the use of that particular
access token 1) via signatures or 2) via SSL when the access token
secret is passed in as well.

Thoughts?

Thanks,
--David

From brent@facebook.com  Thu Mar 11 02:28:26 2010
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From: Brent Goldman <brent@facebook.com>
To: "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2010 02:27:53 -0800
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Over the past couple days, Luke Shepard, David Recordon, and I have been br=
ainstorming an OAuth profile for standardizing the flow that devices such a=
s game consoles and entertainment centers use to hook up with services such=
 as Netflix and iTunes. The basic flow is that a device can gain authorizat=
ion by directing the user to visit a URL on their computer and to enter a v=
erification code copied from the device's screen.

A draft spec is attached to this email. Any thoughts or feedback?

Note: this is one of the many profiles going into the OAuth 2.0 draft that =
David is writing (http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html).

-Brent



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From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Mar 11 11:00:05 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] The verification URL and CAPTCHA responses for	username/password profile?
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<hat type=3D'individual'/>

Agreed.

On 3/9/10 12:26 AM, Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) wrote:
> I agree with your statements below. I would remove the CAPTCHA concept
> from the document.=20
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org]=20
>> On Behalf Of ext David Recordon
>> Sent: 09 March, 2010 06:54
>> To: OAuth WG
>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] The verification URL and CAPTCHA responses=20
>> for username/password profile?
>>
>> I'm spending some time with the spec this evening and am=20
>> having a hard time understanding the need for the verification=20
>> URL and CAPTCHA responses which are part of the username and=20
>> password profile.
>>
>> My criteria for using this profile is that 1) the=20
>> authorization server generally trusts the client to=20
>> temporarily collect the end-user's username and password and=20
>> 2) it is impossible to use one of the other authorization=20
>> profiles.  This means that the client cannot interact with or=20
>> embed a web browser.  Given that...
>>
>> The client would not be able to send the user to the=20
>> verification URL in the response anyway (otherwise they would=20
>> have picked the rich app profile). If the client were to=20
>> encourage the user to use a nearby computer, then it could use=20
>> the upcoming device API which should be based on the Netflix flow.
>>
>> The CAPTCHA response verifies that there is a human, not that=20
>> it is the human who the username and password belong to.=20
>> Wouldn't bot attacks be mitigated via aggressive rate limiting=20
>> techniques which reject authorization requests?  This response=20
>> seems to be more complex than the benefit and hasn't been=20
>> successfully implemented at scale AFAIK.
>>
>> --David
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>


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From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Thu Mar 11 12:48:07 2010
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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2010 21:38:58 +0100
From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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Hi David,

let me first explain my thoughts in general before I fill in my replies 
to your questions.

In my opinion, all four combinations of transport and signature are 
valid and can be used in different scenarios:

-bearer token/http - comparable to session cockies over http (possibly 
very short token lifetime or/and token is a random number)
-signature/http - already discussed
-bearer token/https - already discussed
-signature/https - signature additionaly provides a) end-2-end 
message-level security b) holder of key verification

Thus I would not assume a dependency between token secret and http(s) 
communication.

 From my point of view, a service should define which combinations it 
supports/requires and announce this as part of the client discovery 
process (e.g. as properties of the WWW-Authenticate response). A client 
then requests a suitable access token w/ or w/o secrets from the 
authorization server. Services definitely need to know the corresponding 
secret in order to verify signatures. But there are different strategies 
I can imagine how it gets access to the secrets (e.g. shared database, 
add encrypted secret to token like Kerberos, push secrets to target 
services). Therefore I would suggest to left this point open to OAuth 
implementations.

I would suggest only to issue shared secrets because I don't see any 
need for public-key crypto here.
> Has anyone else put some thought into what secrets are used within the
> signature algorithm for OAuth 2.0?
>
> OAuth 1.0 combines the client secret and the token secret with an
> ampersand in the middle.  WRAP doesn't support signatures and relies
> on the fact that access tokens should remain secret via SSL or are
> extremely short lived and thus lower risk.
>
> Here are the options as far as I'm aware (without making changes to
> WRAP's assumptions):
>
> 1) Sign using the client secret.  Doesn't work because the access
> token would be sent over the wire in plaintext and some servers will
> make them long lived in 2.0.
>    
Usage of client secrets to sign resource requests is one of the major 
issues in OAuth 1.0a from operation security and performance 
perspective. So I would discourage from this option.
> 2) Issue an access token secret if an optional parameter is specified
> by the client during the authorization profile request(s).  Doesn't
> work for the same reason as #1 assuming that the same access token can
> be used via SSL.
>    
I would vote for this option. Can you please clarify why you think this 
option won't work?
> 3) Instead of adding an optional parameter to each authorization
> profile, have the client immediately refresh the access token and
> support an optional parameter to request an access token secret.  This
> lessons the impact of supporting signatures on most implementors when
> reading the spec and given that most signature use cases have longer
> lived tokens, the overhead of the extra HTTP request should be
> infrequent compared to the number of protected resource requests
> you'll make with it.  Doesn't work for the same reason as #1 assuming
> that the same access token can be used via SSL.
>    
Why do you expect signature based use cases to have long-living tokens?
> While I'm not a crypto expert, it seems impossible to treat the same
> access token as potentially public when using signatures but secret
> when using SSL.  I believe that authorization servers will need to
> keep track of the access tokens that the client has requested a secret
> for and from that point on only allow the use of that particular
> access token 1) via signatures or 2) via SSL when the access token
> secret is passed in as well.
>
>    
I don't think an authorization server can (and should) enforce usage of 
access token secrets. It should just issue such secrets and ensure 
services get to know it. Whether the secret is required is a decision of 
the target service. To exaggerate a bit: a client could even request an 
access token w/ secret and just throw the secret away if the target 
service does not require signed requests.

regards,
Torsten.
> Thoughts?
>
> Thanks,
> --David
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    



From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Mar 11 19:20:20 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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<hat type=3D'chair'/>

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>=20
> - Why are signatures needed?
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>=20
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.

This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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--------------ms050405040004080808040609--

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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I volunteer to write it up.
> <hat type='chair'/>
>
> On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>    
>> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
>> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>> signatures?
>>
>> - Why are signatures needed?
>> - What do signatures need to protect?
>>
>> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
>> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>      
> This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
> the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>
> Peter
>
>    
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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I volunteer to write it up.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:4B99B2DD.3000405@stpeter.im" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">&lt;hat type='chair'/&gt;

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap="">
This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

  </pre>
  <pre wrap="">
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From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Fri Mar 12 10:23:24 2010
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Here is some late input to this thread.  The UMA group had a F2F meeting =
on Wednesday, for which draft minutes are written up here:

=
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2010-03-10=


I had taken an action from the last OAuth telecon to collect UMA use =
cases that related to the "signature question(s)".  I have reproduced =
the various meeting notes on this point below. In essence, the UMA group =
continued to agree that message signing should remain an option, even =
with SSL in the picture, for authentication and auditing reasons.

Note that Tom Holodnik of Intuit took away an action item to formally =
write up and submit the small-business UMA scenarios he's been referring =
to in our ongoing work (hinted at below), so we expect those soon. The =
health-data scenario at =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/hdata_scenario is =
also likely to have higher security and service-authentication =
requirements that could end up demanding message signing.  Other =
submitted scenarios, so far, seem to have security requirements that are =
less stringent.

(I'll send another message in a moment on our discussion of the token =
validation question.)

	Eve

=3D=3D=3D=3D
Signing: Using today's WRAP, an UMA authorizing user can't be absolutely =
sure (based on a signed message) who accessed his protected resource, =
other than the client's IP address. It's only indirectly known by the =
AM, and that's only if a user policy made the AM demand some claim from =
the requester, and even so the authentication is at a "higher" level of =
the stack. So wherever there's a use case that requires that the access =
token be bound to the requester who wields it, we need signatures.

This nets out to the requesting party (person or company seeking access) =
having an incentive to say "It's really me accessing this", such that it =
mitigates the risk that the requester (client) will hand off both the =
access token and the signing secret to a third party. Online banking =
might rise to this level. But if you install TurboTax on your PC, is it =
likelier that you the requesting user would sign something that gets =
bound to your TurboTax instance, or sign something that gets handed to =
your TurboTax instance as a bearer token that they use on your behalf =
without the binding? TomH feels that, yes, it's quite possible for this =
to be a value-add provided by something like TurboTax as a "trusted =
computing" offering.

It was observed that the argument in the OAuth community about token =
size seems to be related to token signing, thusly: those who are willing =
to require the Authorization Server to be stateless need large =
meaningful tokens and want them signed; those who can use a stateful =
Authorization Server can use small opaque tokens that don't need =
signing.


On 11 Mar 2010, at 9:56 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:

> I volunteer to write it up.
>> <hat type=3D'chair'/>
>>=20
>> On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>  =20
>>> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG =
call
>>> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>>> signatures?
>>>=20
>>> - Why are signatures needed?
>>> - What do signatures need to protect?
>>>=20
>>> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we =
have
>>> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>>    =20
>> This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary =
of
>> the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>=20
>> Peter


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>Here is some late input to this thread. &nbsp;The UMA group had a =
F2F meeting on Wednesday, for which draft minutes are written up =
here:</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+20=
10-03-10">http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+=
2010-03-10</a></div><div><br></div><div>I had taken an action from the =
last OAuth telecon to collect UMA use cases that related to the =
"signature question(s)". &nbsp;I have reproduced the various meeting =
notes on this point below. In essence, the UMA group continued to agree =
that message signing should remain an option, even with SSL in the =
picture, for authentication and auditing =
reasons.</div><div><br></div><div>Note that Tom Holodnik of Intuit took =
away an action item to formally write up and submit the small-business =
UMA scenarios he's been referring to in our ongoing work (hinted at =
below), so we expect those soon. The health-data scenario at&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/hdata_scenario=
">http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/hdata_scenario</a> =
is also likely to have higher security and service-authentication =
requirements that could end up demanding message signing. &nbsp;Other =
submitted scenarios, so far, seem to have security requirements that are =
less stringent.</div><div><br></div><div>(I'll send another message in a =
moment on our discussion of the token validation =
question.)</div><div><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>Eve</div><div><br></div><div>=3D=3D=3D=3D</div><div><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica, Arial, =
sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 17px; "><p style=3D"font-size: =
10pt; line-height: 13pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-weight: normal; =
margin-top: 10px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-left: =
0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; =
padding-left: 0px; "><b>Signing:</b>&nbsp;Using today's WRAP, an UMA =
authorizing user can't be absolutely sure (based on a signed message) =
who accessed his protected resource, other than the client's IP address. =
It's only indirectly known by the AM, and that's only if a user policy =
made the AM demand some claim from the requester, and even so the =
authentication is at a "higher" level of the stack. So wherever there's =
a use case that requires that the access token be bound to the requester =
who wields it, we need signatures.</p><p style=3D"font-size: 10pt; =
line-height: 13pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-weight: normal; margin-top: =
10px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-left: 0px; =
padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: =
0px; ">This nets out to the requesting party (person or company seeking =
access) having an incentive to say "It's really me accessing this", such =
that it mitigates the risk that the requester (client) will hand off =
both the access token and the signing secret to a third party. Online =
banking might rise to this level. But if you install TurboTax on your =
PC, is it likelier that you the requesting user would sign something =
that gets bound to&nbsp;<em>your</em>&nbsp;TurboTax instance, or sign =
something that gets handed to your TurboTax instance as a bearer token =
that they use on your behalf without the binding? TomH feels that, yes, =
it's quite possible for this to be a value-add provided by something =
like TurboTax as a "trusted computing" offering.</p><p style=3D"font-size:=
 10pt; line-height: 13pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-weight: normal; =
margin-top: 10px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-left: =
0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; =
padding-left: 0px; ">It was observed that the argument in the OAuth =
community about token size seems to be related to token signing, thusly: =
those who are willing to require the Authorization Server to be =
stateless need large meaningful tokens and want them signed; those who =
can use a stateful Authorization Server can use small opaque tokens that =
don't need signing.</p></span></div><br><div><div>On 11 Mar 2010, at =
9:56 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff" text=3D"#000000">
I volunteer to write it up.<br>
<blockquote cite=3D"mid:4B99B2DD.3000405@stpeter.im" type=3D"cite">
  <pre wrap=3D"">&lt;hat type=3D'chair'/&gt;

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
  </pre>
  <blockquote type=3D"cite">
    <pre wrap=3D"">One of the things that's been a primary focus of both =
today's WG call
and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=3D"">This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write =
up a summary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter
</pre></blockquote></div></blockquote></div><br><div>
<span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: Courier; =
font-size: 12px; "><div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">Eve =
Maler</div><div><a =
href=3D"mailto:eve@xmlgrrl.com">eve@xmlgrrl.com</a></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog">http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog</a></div>=
</span>
</div>
<br></body></html>=

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From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Fri Mar 12 10:39:26 2010
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In the recent thread here:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01234.html
Subject: "Recent UMA work that may inform this group's deliberations"

...Dick and I had a bit of discussion around UMA's proposal for a =
back-channel method of token validation that a Protected Resource could =
use at an Authorization Server.  (In UMA terms, it would be a =
Host->Authorization Manager interaction, and indeed if this channel is =
inappropriate for core OAuth 2.0, UMA might define it as a separate =
subordinate protocol.)

At the UMA F2F held Wednesday, we discussed this proposition in some =
detail, and continued to find the back channel interesting in our =
loosely coupled environment.  Below I have reproduced the portion of =
meeting notes (from =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2010-03-10=
 ) where we discussed this. I hope it's useful/interesting.

	Eve


=3D=3D=3D=3D
Back channel for token validation: Our "token validation URL" proposal =
is just a strawman. There are quite a few motivations for wanting this =
back channel, though:

It allows for building a very lightweight host that can do token =
validation at request-time.
The AM is the best entity to judge the token's suitability.
Once this channel is enabled, the host can use it send audit log data to =
the AM for more interesting analytics.
Or the AM could (at leisure after step 1 is done) dynamically provision =
the host with the ability to do local token validation (which ends up =
looking like a hybrid remote/local means of validation).


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


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<html><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">In the recent thread =
here:<div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01234.html">=
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01234.html</a></div>=
<div>Subject: "Recent UMA work that may inform this group's =
deliberations"</div><div><br></div><div>...Dick and I had a bit of =
discussion around UMA's proposal for a back-channel method of token =
validation that a Protected Resource could use at an Authorization =
Server. &nbsp;(In UMA terms, it would be a Host-&gt;Authorization =
Manager interaction, and indeed if this channel is inappropriate for =
core OAuth 2.0, UMA might define it as a separate subordinate =
protocol.)</div><div><br></div><div>At the UMA F2F held Wednesday, we =
discussed this proposition in some detail, and continued to find the =
back channel interesting in our loosely coupled environment. &nbsp;Below =
I have reproduced the portion of meeting notes (from&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+20=
10-03-10">http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+=
2010-03-10</a>&nbsp;) where we discussed this. I hope it's =
useful/interesting.</div><div><br></div><div><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>Eve</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=3D=3D=3D=3D</div><div>=
<span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica, Arial, =
sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 17px; "><p style=3D"font-size: =
10pt; line-height: 13pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-weight: normal; =
margin-top: 10px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-left: =
0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; =
padding-left: 0px; "><b>Back channel for token validation:</b>&nbsp;Our =
"token validation URL" proposal is just a strawman. There are quite a =
few motivations for wanting this back channel, though:</p><ul =
style=3D"font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; list-style-type: disc; =
"><li style=3D"font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; margin-top: 0px; =
margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: =
0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; ">It =
allows for building a very lightweight host that can do token validation =
at request-time.</li><li style=3D"font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; =
margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: =
0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; =
padding-left: 0px; ">The AM is the best entity to judge the token's =
suitability.</li><li style=3D"font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; =
margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: =
0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; =
padding-left: 0px; ">Once this channel is enabled, the host can use it =
send audit log data to the AM for more interesting analytics.</li><li =
style=3D"font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; margin-top: 0px; =
margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: =
0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; ">Or =
the AM could (at leisure after step 1 is done) dynamically provision the =
host with the ability to do local token validation (which ends up =
looking like a hybrid remote/local means of =
validation).</li></ul></span><div><br></div><div><br>Eve Maler<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:eve@xmlgrrl.com">eve@xmlgrrl.com</a><br>http://www.xmlgrrl.=
com/blog<br></div><br></div></body></html>=

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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On 2010-03-12, at 10:22 AM, Eve Maler wrote:

> This nets out to the requesting party (person or company seeking =
access) having an incentive to say "It's really me accessing this", such =
that it mitigates the risk that the requester (client) will hand off =
both the access token and the signing secret to a third party.


Note I am NOT a security expert, and would appreciate an education on =
where I am wrong.

When I look at this, I question if there really is that much more value =
in the Client having two secret items over one secret item.=20

I can see an advantage with something like using RAS, in that only the =
Client should have the private key, and if the private key can be used =
for lots of things, then there is some difference between a token and =
the private key. With symmetric keys, multiple parties have the keys, so =
non-repudiation is not possible.

-- Dick=

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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><br><div><div>On 2010-03-12, at 10:22 AM, Eve Maler wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: =
auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; =
line-height: 17px; ">This nets out to the requesting party (person or =
company seeking access) having an incentive to say "It's really me =
accessing this", such that it mitigates the risk that the requester =
(client) will hand off both the access token and the signing secret to a =
third party.</span></span></blockquote></div><div><br></div>Note I am =
NOT a security expert, and would appreciate an education on where I am =
wrong.<div><br><div>When I look at this, I question if there really is =
that much more value in the Client having two secret items over one =
secret item.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>I can see an advantage with =
something like using RAS, in that only the Client should have the =
private key, and if the private key can be used for lots of things, then =
there is some difference between a token and the private key. With =
symmetric keys, multiple parties have the keys, so non-repudiation is =
not possible.</div><div><br></div><div>-- Dick</div></div></body></html>=

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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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On Fri, Mar 12, 2010 at 10:22 AM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
> It was observed that the argument in the OAuth community about token size
> seems to be related to token signing, thusly: those who are willing to
> require the Authorization Server to be stateless need large meaningful
> tokens and want them signed; those who can use a stateful Authorization
> Server can use small opaque tokens that don't need signing.

This seems orthogonal.  The confusion in this working group has not,
for the most part, been about whether access tokens should be signed.

The debate has been more about whether clients need to use signatures
when requesting access tokens, or when using access tokens.  On one
side there are people who would prefer bearer tokens, and on the other
side there are folks who want crypto in various bits of the protocol
to meet different use cases.

Cheers,
Brian

From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Fri Mar 12 11:38:52 2010
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Dick,

The trick here is THE THIRD PARTY (referred to in the last words of 
Eve's message), who is effectively a witness to the transaction. (This 
works pretty much like when you want to switch your telephone provider. 
You would be transferred to the third party to confirm your request.) 
Absent of the private-key signature, this is the only known way to 
ensure non-repudiation.

Igor

Dick Hardt wrote:
>
> On 2010-03-12, at 10:22 AM, Eve Maler wrote:
>
>> This nets out to the requesting party (person or company seeking 
>> access) having an incentive to say "It's really me accessing this", 
>> such that it mitigates the risk that the requester (client) will hand 
>> off both the access token and the signing secret to a third party.
>
> Note I am NOT a security expert, and would appreciate an education on 
> where I am wrong.
>
> When I look at this, I question if there really is that much more 
> value in the Client having two secret items over one secret item. 
>
> I can see an advantage with something like using RAS, in that only the 
> Client should have the private key, and if the private key can be used 
> for lots of things, then there is some difference between a token and 
> the private key. With symmetric keys, multiple parties have the keys, 
> so non-repudiation is not possible.
>
> -- Dick
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>   

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Fri Mar 12 11:46:32 2010
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Hi Igor

Thanks for explanation. Unfortunately I am more  confused. How does the =
third party know who the Client is?

I don't understand how an Access Token plus a signing secret gives any =
more assurance than an Access Token unless I get the Access Token from a =
different place than the signing secret. Is that what I am missing?

-- Dick

On 2010-03-12, at 11:38 AM, Igor Faynberg wrote:

> Dick,
>=20
> The trick here is THE THIRD PARTY (referred to in the last words of =
Eve's message), who is effectively a witness to the transaction. (This =
works pretty much like when you want to switch your telephone provider. =
You would be transferred to the third party to confirm your request.) =
Absent of the private-key signature, this is the only known way to =
ensure non-repudiation.
>=20
> Igor
>=20
> Dick Hardt wrote:
>>=20
>> On 2010-03-12, at 10:22 AM, Eve Maler wrote:
>>=20
>>> This nets out to the requesting party (person or company seeking =
access) having an incentive to say "It's really me accessing this", such =
that it mitigates the risk that the requester (client) will hand off =
both the access token and the signing secret to a third party.
>>=20
>> Note I am NOT a security expert, and would appreciate an education on =
where I am wrong.
>>=20
>> When I look at this, I question if there really is that much more =
value in the Client having two secret items over one secret item.=20
>> I can see an advantage with something like using RAS, in that only =
the Client should have the private key, and if the private key can be =
used for lots of things, then there is some difference between a token =
and the private key. With symmetric keys, multiple parties have the =
keys, so non-repudiation is not possible.
>>=20
>> -- Dick
>> =
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> =20


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Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 12:42:21 -0800
Message-ID: <fd6741651003121242n5b24ef4cib75b4357e1a0f62@mail.gmail.com>
From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=0016e65ae5d6771d520481a091b8
Cc: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Twitter signature delegation use case
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Was catching up with Raffi from Twitter yesterday and he pointed me to
http://mehack.com/oauth-echo-delegation-in-identity-verificatio.  PDF also
attached.

--0016e65ae5d6771d420481a091b6
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Was catching up with Raffi from Twitter yesterday and he pointed me to=A0<a=
 href=3D"http://mehack.com/oauth-echo-delegation-in-identity-verificatio">h=
ttp://mehack.com/oauth-echo-delegation-in-identity-verificatio</a>. =A0PDF =
also attached.

--0016e65ae5d6771d420481a091b6--
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Content-Type: application/pdf; name="oauth-delegation-20100210.pdf"
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="oauth-delegation-20100210.pdf"
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To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Yes, the third-party-based non-repudiation with symmetric cryptography 
is a complex thing.  The way I would apply it to the Client request  is 
as follows:

1)  The Client sends the token request, R, to the Third Party (and, you 
are right, the Third Party must know who the client is, and so  one 
shared secret is needed right there, given that there is no public key 
cryptography; so this secret is used to sign R);

2) The Third Party hashes the request using a secret that *only the 
Third Party knows* and sends this quantity, Q, back to the Client;

3) Now the Client sends to the server (R, Q).

The server could now go back to the Third Party and ask if Q is indeed 
what it had given. To eliminate this step, the Third Party can either 
encrypt (R, Q) with the secret shared with the server, or sign it with 
its secret, and return the resulting quantity, Q', to the Client.

The requirement her is that the Third Party must be trusted  by both the 
Client and the Server and--in addition--it must be trusted by the court, 
which could verify with the Third Party that it indeed has computed Q. 
(Verification, I understand, should be done involving a real person 
because, in general, escrowing signature keys makes signatures invalid.)

Igor

Dick Hardt wrote:
> Hi Igor
>
> Thanks for explanation. Unfortunately I am more  confused. How does the third party know who the Client is?
>
> I don't understand how an Access Token plus a signing secret gives any more assurance than an Access Token unless I get the Access Token from a different place than the signing secret. Is that what I am missing?
>
> -- Dick
>
> On 2010-03-12, at 11:38 AM, Igor Faynberg wrote:
>
>   
>> Dick,
>>
>> The trick here is THE THIRD PARTY (referred to in the last words of Eve's message), who is effectively a witness to the transaction. (This works pretty much like when you want to switch your telephone provider. You would be transferred to the third party to confirm your request.) Absent of the private-key signature, this is the only known way to ensure non-repudiation.
>>
>> Igor
>>
>> Dick Hardt wrote:
>>     
>>> On 2010-03-12, at 10:22 AM, Eve Maler wrote:
>>>
>>>       
>>>> This nets out to the requesting party (person or company seeking access) having an incentive to say "It's really me accessing this", such that it mitigates the risk that the requester (client) will hand off both the access token and the signing secret to a third party.
>>>>         
>>> Note I am NOT a security expert, and would appreciate an education on where I am wrong.
>>>
>>> When I look at this, I question if there really is that much more value in the Client having two secret items over one secret item. 
>>> I can see an advantage with something like using RAS, in that only the Client should have the private key, and if the private key can be used for lots of things, then there is some difference between a token and the private key. With symmetric keys, multiple parties have the keys, so non-repudiation is not possible.
>>>
>>> -- Dick
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>  
>>>       
>
>   

From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Fri Mar 12 14:09:24 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Agreed that token signing is separate from message signing as a =
proposition.  I just happened to stick all of our "signing" =
conversations into one bucket of notes...  Sorry that was confusing.

	Eve

On 12 Mar 2010, at 11:06 AM, Brian Eaton wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 12, 2010 at 10:22 AM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
>> It was observed that the argument in the OAuth community about token =
size
>> seems to be related to token signing, thusly: those who are willing =
to
>> require the Authorization Server to be stateless need large =
meaningful
>> tokens and want them signed; those who can use a stateful =
Authorization
>> Server can use small opaque tokens that don't need signing.
>=20
> This seems orthogonal.  The confusion in this working group has not,
> for the most part, been about whether access tokens should be signed.
>=20
> The debate has been more about whether clients need to use signatures
> when requesting access tokens, or when using access tokens.  On one
> side there are people who would prefer bearer tokens, and on the other
> side there are folks who want crypto in various bits of the protocol
> to meet different use cases.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Brian


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com  Mon Mar 15 11:08:46 2010
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From: "Zeltsan, Zachary (Zachary)" <zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com>
To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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My highlights of the points raised on this thread are as follows:

A Client needs to sign a request for the temporary credentials to:
* Authenticate to the server
* Provide means for ensuring that a request has not been modified

A Client needs to sign a request for the token credentials to:
* Ensure that of all the legitimate Clients only the Client authorized by t=
he Resource Owner can access the resource
* Provide means for ensuring that a request has not been modified

If a request is signed with the client's private key it can be used for pro=
viding non-repudiation; an alternative solution for non-repudiation would r=
equire involvement of a third party.

There are use cases where non-repudiation is needed.

TLS protects only a session, not the data that need to be re-used later. Un=
less the whole session has been recorded and its key has been stored, the T=
LS does not provide non-repudiation.

It appears that there is a consensus in UMA community that signing should r=
emain an option for enabling authentication and auditing.

There are use cases for which performance of a TLS-based solution would be =
worse than that of the signature-based solution.

The signatures are widely used for providing security over the insecure cha=
nnels in today's implementations. There is a view that the signature-based =
method should remain an option for providing security over an insecure chan=
nel.

Zachary

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of P=
eter Saint-Andre
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 10:20 PM
To: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?

<hat type=3D'chair'/>

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>
> - Why are signatures needed?
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.

This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

--
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/





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>
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<font face=3D"Courier New, monospace" size=3D"2">
<div>My highlights of the points raised on this thread are as follows:</div=
>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>A Client needs to sign a request for the temporary credentials to:</di=
v>
<div>* Authenticate to the server</div>
<div>* Provide means for ensuring that a request has not been modified</div=
>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>A Client needs to sign a request for the token credentials to:</div>
<div>* Ensure that of all the legitimate Clients only the Client authorized=
 by the Resource Owner can access the resource</div>
<div>* Provide means for ensuring that a request has not been modified</div=
>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>If a request is signed with the client&#8217;s private key it can be u=
sed for providing non-repudiation; an alternative solution for non-repudiat=
ion would require involvement of a third party.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>There are use cases where non-repudiation is needed.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>TLS protects only a session, not the data that need to be re-used late=
r. Unless the whole session has been recorded and its key has been stored, =
the TLS does not provide non-repudiation.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>It appears that there is a consensus in UMA community that signing sho=
uld remain an option for enabling authentication and auditing.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>There are use cases for which performance of a TLS-based solution woul=
d be worse than that of the signature-based solution.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>The signatures are widely used for providing security over the insecur=
e channels in today&#8217;s implementations. There is a view that the signa=
ture-based method should remain an option for providing security over an in=
secure channel.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Zachary</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>-----Original Message-----<br>

From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">mai=
lto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Peter Saint-Andre<br>

Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 10:20 PM<br>

To: oauth@ietf.org<br>

Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&lt;hat type=3D'chair'/&gt;</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:</div>
<div>&gt; One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG =
call</div>
<div>&gt; and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for</div>
<div>&gt; signatures?</div>
<div>&gt; </div>
<div>&gt; - Why are signatures needed?</div>
<div>&gt; - What do signatures need to protect?</div>
<div>&gt; </div>
<div>&gt; Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we=
 have</div>
<div>&gt; a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.</=
div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary o=
f</div>
<div>the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Peter</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>-- </div>
<div>Peter Saint-Andre</div>
<div><a href=3D"https://stpeter.im/">https://stpeter.im/</a></div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</font>
</body>
</html>

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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] User Story - User Denying access.
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While considering what goes into OAuth 2.0 I'd like to incorporate this user
story:

Application redirects user to Authorization page.  User presses
[Cancel|Deny| etc.]

In this case the behavior is undefined by the spec.  In actual practice we
have:

* Twitter redirect to the callback URL with a denied GET parameter
* Hyves sends back an access token with an error property and a request URL
* LinkedIn redirects the user to a specific App-supplied URL.

It seems that redirecting and setting error states from the OAuth Error
Reporting extension would be the best way to go.  Thoughts?

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While considering what goes into OAuth 2.0 I&#39;d like to incorporate this=
 user story:<div><br></div><div>Application redirects user to Authorization=
 page. =A0User presses [Cancel|Deny| etc.]</div><div><br></div>
<div>In this case the behavior is undefined by the spec. =A0In actual pract=
ice we have:</div><div><br></div><div>* Twitter redirect to the callback UR=
L with a denied GET parameter</div><div>* Hyves sends back an access token =
with an error property and a request URL</div>
<div>* LinkedIn redirects the user to a specific App-supplied URL.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>It seems that redirecting and setting error states from th=
e OAuth Error Reporting extension would be the best way to go. =A0Thoughts?=
</div>
<div><br></div>

--000e0cd328bea007100481dcea09--

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Hi all,

I composed a detailed summary at 
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy. Please 
review it.

@Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.

regards,
Torsten.
> I volunteer to write it up.
>> <hat type='chair'/>
>>
>> On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>    
>>> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
>>> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>>> signatures?
>>>
>>> - Why are signatures needed?
>>> - What do signatures need to protect?
>>>
>>> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
>>> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>>      
>> This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
>> the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>
>> Peter
>>
>>    
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>    
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    


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<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
Hi all,<br>
<br>
I composed a detailed summary at
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy</a>. Please
review it.<br>
<br>
@Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.<br>
<br>
regards,<br>
Torsten.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:4B99D783.1090905@lodderstedt.net" type="cite">
  <meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  <title></title>
I volunteer to write it up.<br>
  <blockquote cite="mid:4B99B2DD.3000405@stpeter.im" type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">&lt;hat type='chair'/&gt;

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
  </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
    </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

  </pre>
    <pre wrap=""><fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
 href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
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 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
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  </blockquote>
  <br>
  <pre wrap="">
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
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From beaton@google.com  Mon Mar 15 17:19:46 2010
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Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 16:19:29 -0800
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>, Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Twitter signature delegation use case
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On Fri, Mar 12, 2010 at 12:42 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
> Was catching up with Raffi from Twitter yesterday and he pointed me
> to=A0http://mehack.com/oauth-echo-delegation-in-identity-verificatio. =A0=
PDF
> also attached.

My read is that this is basically creating temporary passwords for users.

It works well when if all of the twitter relying parties trust each other.

It doesn't work if they don't trust each other (in the same way that
sharing passwords with sites that don't trust each other is bad.)

Have I understood it properly?

Cheers,
Brian

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--001485f9139618021b0481e50769
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I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:

"Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and payload when
communicating over unsecure channel"

I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will protect
the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions on the request
types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with form-encoded data variables only.

If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide integrity for
arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL, authority, and HTTP
method:   I would like to see at least one concrete proposal that will
accomplish this.   IIRC there's only one that I think is possibly
implementable in an interoperable way, and it supports only JSON payloads.
 In other words, anyone using body signing would need to wrap their data in
JSON to do it.  (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of
course, but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
cons.)

On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:

>  Hi all,
>
> I composed a detailed summary at
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy. Please review
> it.
>
> @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
>  I volunteer to write it up.
>
> <hat type='chair'/>
>
> On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>
>
>  One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>
> - Why are signatures needed?
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>
>
>  This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
> the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>
> Peter
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

--001485f9139618021b0481e50769
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I&#39;m confused by one &quot;pro&quot; for signatures:<div><br></div><div>=
&quot;P<span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;Times Ne=
w Roman&#39;, times, serif; font-size: 18px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spac=
ing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; ">rotect integrity of whole=
 request - authorization data and payload when communicating over unsecure =
channel&quot;</span></div>

<div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;Times New =
Roman&#39;, times, serif; font-size: 18px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacin=
g: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; "><br></span></div><div>I do =
not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will protect the wh=
ole request, unless you add additional restrictions on the request types --=
 e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with form-encoded data variables only.</div>

<div><br></div><div>If the assertion is that signatures will actually provi=
de integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL, authorit=
y, and HTTP method: =A0 I would like to see at least one concrete proposal =
that will accomplish this. =A0 IIRC there&#39;s only one that I think is po=
ssibly implementable in an interoperable way, and it supports only JSON pay=
loads. =A0In other words, anyone using body signing would need to wrap thei=
r data in JSON to do it. =A0(This is not necessarily the worst thing in the=
 world, of course, but it is something to be taken into account when listin=
g pros and cons.)</div>

<div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, T=
orsten Lodderstedt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderst=
edt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex;">




 =20

<div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff" text=3D"#000000">
Hi all,<br>
<br>
I composed a detailed summary at
<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy" tar=
get=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy<=
/a>. Please
review it.<br>
<br>
@Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.<br>
<br>
regards,<br><font color=3D"#888888">
Torsten.</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
 =20
 =20
I volunteer to write it up.<br>
  <blockquote type=3D"cite">
    <pre>&lt;hat type=3D&#39;chair&#39;/&gt;

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
  </pre>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <pre>One of the things that&#39;s been a primary focus of both today&=
#39;s WG call
and last week&#39;s call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let&#39;s try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
    </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre>This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summa=
ry of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

  </pre>
    <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
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<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <br>
  <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
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ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
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</blockquote>
<br>
</div></div></div>

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On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com> wrote:
> I would like to see at least one concrete proposal that will
> accomplish this.

I think this goes for pretty much any of the requirements that have
been discussed. =)

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What about
http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html ?

That's in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite some time.

That draft adds protection of the body -- I don't know of any draft that
covers signing the headers...


On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com> wrote:

> I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
>
> "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and payload when
> communicating over unsecure channel"
>
> I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will protect
> the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions on the request
> types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with form-encoded data variables only.
>
> If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide integrity for
> arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL, authority, and HTTP
> method:   I would like to see at least one concrete proposal that will
> accomplish this.   IIRC there's only one that I think is possibly
> implementable in an interoperable way, and it supports only JSON payloads.
>  In other words, anyone using body signing would need to wrap their data in
> JSON to do it.  (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of
> course, but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
> cons.)
>
> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>
>>  Hi all,
>>
>> I composed a detailed summary at
>> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy. Please
>> review it.
>>
>> @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>>  I volunteer to write it up.
>>
>> <hat type='chair'/>
>>
>> On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>
>>
>>  One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
>> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>> signatures?
>>
>> - Why are signatures needed?
>> - What do signatures need to protect?
>>
>> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
>> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>
>>
>>  This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
>> the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>
>> Peter
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
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>
> _______________________________________________
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--00504502c09cdb8aa00481e523f4
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What about=A0<meta charset=3D"utf-8"><a href=3D"http://oauth.googlecode.com=
/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html">http://oauth.googlecode.com=
/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html</a>=A0?<div><br></div><div>T=
hat&#39;s in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite some time.</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>That draft adds protection of the body -- I don&#39;t k=
now of any draft that covers signing the headers...</div><div><br><div><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <s=
pan dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jpanzer@google.com">jpanzer@google.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">I&#39;m confused by one &quot;pro&quot; for=
 signatures:<div><br></div><div>&quot;P<span style=3D"font-family:&#39;Time=
s New Roman&#39;, times, serif;font-size:18px">rotect integrity of whole re=
quest - authorization data and payload when communicating over unsecure cha=
nnel&quot;</span></div>


<div><span style=3D"font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;, times, serif;fon=
t-size:18px"><br></span></div><div>I do not believe there is an existing co=
ncrete proposal that will protect the whole request, unless you add additio=
nal restrictions on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with f=
orm-encoded data variables only.</div>


<div><br></div><div>If the assertion is that signatures will actually provi=
de integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL, authorit=
y, and HTTP method: =A0 I would like to see at least one concrete proposal =
that will accomplish this. =A0 IIRC there&#39;s only one that I think is po=
ssibly implementable in an interoperable way, and it supports only JSON pay=
loads. =A0In other words, anyone using body signing would need to wrap thei=
r data in JSON to do it. =A0(This is not necessarily the worst thing in the=
 world, of course, but it is something to be taken into account when listin=
g pros and cons.)</div>


<div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, T=
orsten Lodderstedt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderst=
edt.net" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





 =20

<div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff" text=3D"#000000">
Hi all,<br>
<br>
I composed a detailed summary at
<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy" tar=
get=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy<=
/a>. Please
review it.<br>
<br>
@Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.<br>
<br>
regards,<br><font color=3D"#888888">
Torsten.</font><div><div></div><div><br>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
 =20
 =20
I volunteer to write it up.<br>
  <blockquote type=3D"cite">
    <pre>&lt;hat type=3D&#39;chair&#39;/&gt;

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
  </pre>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <pre>One of the things that&#39;s been a primary focus of both today&=
#39;s WG call
and last week&#39;s call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let&#39;s try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
    </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre>This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summa=
ry of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

  </pre>
    <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <br>
  <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
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ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div></div></div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
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From igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com  Mon Mar 15 23:48:24 2010
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That's what I have been thinking. Why is it important to sign the 
headers?  (I am not against signing them, but I cannot see the need in 
the specific cases we had discussed. In other words, if I had signed the 
body of the request, I probably would not care if someone changed the 
headers.)

Igor

Paul Lindner wrote:
> What about  
> http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html ? 
>
>
> That's in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite some time.
>
> That draft adds protection of the body -- I don't know of any draft 
> that covers signing the headers...
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com 
> <mailto:jpanzer@google.com>> wrote:
>
>     I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
>
>     "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and
>     payload when communicating over unsecure channel"
>
>     I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will
>     protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions
>     on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with
>     form-encoded data variables only.
>
>     If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide
>     integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,
>     authority, and HTTP method:   I would like to see at least one
>     concrete proposal that will accomplish this.   IIRC there's only
>     one that I think is possibly implementable in an interoperable
>     way, and it supports only JSON payloads.  In other words, anyone
>     using body signing would need to wrap their data in JSON to do it.
>      (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of course,
>     but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
>     cons.)
>
>     On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt
>     <torsten@lodderstedt.net <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>
>         Hi all,
>
>         I composed a detailed summary at
>         http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy.
>         Please review it.
>
>         @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>
>         regards,
>         Torsten.
>
>>         I volunteer to write it up.
>>>         <hat type='chair'/>
>>>
>>>         On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>>           
>>>>         One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
>>>>         and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>>>>         signatures?
>>>>
>>>>         - Why are signatures needed?
>>>>         - What do signatures need to protect?
>>>>
>>>>         Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
>>>>         a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>>>             
>>>         This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
>>>         the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>>
>>>         Peter
>>>
>>>           
>>>
>>>
>>>         _______________________________________________
>>>         OAuth mailing list
>>>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>           
>>
>>
>>         _______________________________________________
>>         OAuth mailing list
>>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>           
>
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         OAuth mailing list
>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
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From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar 16 07:02:41 2010
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I think signing Authorization Headers would make sense.

regards,
Torsten.

Am 16.03.2010 07:48, schrieb Igor Faynberg:
> That's what I have been thinking. Why is it important to sign the 
> headers?  (I am not against signing them, but I cannot see the need in 
> the specific cases we had discussed. In other words, if I had signed 
> the body of the request, I probably would not care if someone changed 
> the headers.)
>
> Igor
>
> Paul Lindner wrote:
>> What about  
>> http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html 
>> ?
>>
>> That's in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite some time.
>>
>> That draft adds protection of the body -- I don't know of any draft 
>> that covers signing the headers...
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com 
>> <mailto:jpanzer@google.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
>>
>>     "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and
>>     payload when communicating over unsecure channel"
>>
>>     I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will
>>     protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions
>>     on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with
>>     form-encoded data variables only.
>>
>>     If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide
>>     integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,
>>     authority, and HTTP method:   I would like to see at least one
>>     concrete proposal that will accomplish this.   IIRC there's only
>>     one that I think is possibly implementable in an interoperable
>>     way, and it supports only JSON payloads.  In other words, anyone
>>     using body signing would need to wrap their data in JSON to do it.
>>      (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of course,
>>     but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
>>     cons.)
>>
>>     On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt
>> <torsten@lodderstedt.net <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>>
>>         Hi all,
>>
>>         I composed a detailed summary at
>>         http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy.
>>         Please review it.
>>
>>         @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>>
>>         regards,
>>         Torsten.
>>
>>>         I volunteer to write it up.
>>>> <hat type='chair'/>
>>>>
>>>>         On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>>>>         One of the things that's been a primary focus of both 
>>>>> today's WG call
>>>>>         and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>>>>>         signatures?
>>>>>
>>>>>         - Why are signatures needed?
>>>>>         - What do signatures need to protect?
>>>>>
>>>>>         Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so 
>>>>> that we have
>>>>>         a good idea of what they are as we move towards the 
>>>>> Anaheim WG.
>>>>         This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up 
>>>> a summary of
>>>>         the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>>>
>>>>         Peter
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>         _______________________________________________
>>>>         OAuth mailing list
>>>>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>>
>>>         _______________________________________________
>>>         OAuth mailing list
>>>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>>         _______________________________________________
>>         OAuth mailing list
>>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>>
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>>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
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On Mar 16, 2010, at 8:48 AM, Igor Faynberg wrote:

> That's what I have been thinking. Why is it important to sign the =
headers?  (I am not against signing them, but I cannot see the need in =
the specific cases we had discussed. In other words, if I had signed the =
body of the request, I probably would not care if someone changed the =
headers.)

Would you care if some proxy or other intermediary changed the contents =
of the Authorization HTTP header? How about if they changed the URL path =
passed or the HTTP method from GET to POST? Which other HTTP headers =
might you wish to be carried through intermediaries with the property of =
integrity?=20

Regards,

- johnk

>=20
> Igor
>=20
> Paul Lindner wrote:
>> What about  =
http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html =
?=20
>>=20
>> That's in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite some =
time.
>>=20
>> That draft adds protection of the body -- I don't know of any draft =
that covers signing the headers...
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com =
<mailto:jpanzer@google.com>> wrote:
>>=20
>>  I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
>>=20
>>  "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and
>>  payload when communicating over unsecure channel"
>>=20
>>  I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will
>>  protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions
>>  on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with
>>  form-encoded data variables only.
>>=20
>>  If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide
>>  integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,
>>  authority, and HTTP method:   I would like to see at least one
>>  concrete proposal that will accomplish this.   IIRC there's only
>>  one that I think is possibly implementable in an interoperable
>>  way, and it supports only JSON payloads.  In other words, anyone
>>  using body signing would need to wrap their data in JSON to do it.
>>   (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of course,
>>  but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
>>  cons.)
>>=20
>>  On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt
>>  <torsten@lodderstedt.net <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>>=20
>>      Hi all,
>>=20
>>      I composed a detailed summary at
>>      http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy.
>>      Please review it.
>>=20
>>      @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>>=20
>>      regards,
>>      Torsten.
>>=20
>>>      I volunteer to write it up.
>>>>      <hat type=3D'chair'/>
>>>>=20
>>>>      On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>>      One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's =
WG call
>>>>>      and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>>>>>      signatures?
>>>>>=20
>>>>>      - Why are signatures needed?
>>>>>      - What do signatures need to protect?
>>>>>=20
>>>>>      Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so =
that we have
>>>>>      a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim =
WG.
>>>>>=20
>>>>      This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a =
summary of
>>>>      the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>>>=20
>>>>      Peter
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>      _______________________________________________
>>>>      OAuth mailing list
>>>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>      _______________________________________________
>>>      OAuth mailing list
>>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>      _______________________________________________
>>      OAuth mailing list
>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>  _______________________________________________
>>  OAuth mailing list
>>  OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>>=20
>> =
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
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> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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Hi John,

following your arguments, I could add "integrity protection of complete 
HTTP requests in an interoperable way" the the "pro HTTPS" section?

regards,
Torsten.

Am 16.03.2010 07:22, schrieb John Panzer:
> I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
>
> "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and payload 
> when communicating over unsecure channel"
>
> I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will 
> protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions on 
> the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with form-encoded 
> data variables only.
>
> If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide integrity 
> for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL, authority, and 
> HTTP method:   I would like to see at least one concrete proposal that 
> will accomplish this.   IIRC there's only one that I think is possibly 
> implementable in an interoperable way, and it supports only JSON 
> payloads.  In other words, anyone using body signing would need to 
> wrap their data in JSON to do it.  (This is not necessarily the worst 
> thing in the world, of course, but it is something to be taken into 
> account when listing pros and cons.)
>
> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt 
> <torsten@lodderstedt.net <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>
>     Hi all,
>
>     I composed a detailed summary at
>     http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy.
>     Please review it.
>
>     @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>
>     regards,
>     Torsten.
>
>>     I volunteer to write it up.
>>>     <hat type='chair'/>
>>>
>>>     On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>>        
>>>>     One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
>>>>     and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>>>>     signatures?
>>>>
>>>>     - Why are signatures needed?
>>>>     - What do signatures need to protect?
>>>>
>>>>     Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
>>>>     a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>>>          
>>>     This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
>>>     the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>>
>>>     Peter
>>>
>>>        
>>>
>>>
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     OAuth mailing list
>>>     OAuth@ietf.org  <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>        
>>
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     OAuth mailing list
>>     OAuth@ietf.org  <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>        
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     OAuth mailing list
>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>


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Hi John,<br>
&nbsp;<br>
following your arguments, I could add "integrity protection of complete
HTTP requests in an interoperable way" the the "pro HTTPS" section?<br>
<br>
regards,<br>
Torsten.<br>
<br>
Am 16.03.2010 07:22, schrieb John Panzer:
<blockquote
 cite="mid:cb5f7a381003152322m5c6ec744nb8336e329860439e@mail.gmail.com"
 type="cite">I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
  <div><br>
  </div>
  <div>"P<span class="Apple-style-span"
 style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',times,serif; font-size: 18px;">rotect
integrity of whole request - authorization data and payload when
communicating over unsecure channel"</span></div>
  <div><span class="Apple-style-span"
 style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',times,serif; font-size: 18px;"><br>
  </span></div>
  <div>I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that
will protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions
on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with form-encoded
data variables only.</div>
  <div><br>
  </div>
  <div>If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide
integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,
authority, and HTTP method: &nbsp; I would like to see at least one concrete
proposal that will accomplish this. &nbsp; IIRC there's only one that I
think is possibly implementable in an interoperable way, and it
supports only JSON payloads. &nbsp;In other words, anyone using body signing
would need to wrap their data in JSON to do it. &nbsp;(This is not
necessarily the worst thing in the world, of course, but it is
something to be taken into account when listing pros and cons.)</div>
  <div>
  <div><br>
  <div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten
Lodderstedt <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;</span>
wrote:<br>
  <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
 style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
    <div bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">Hi all,<br>
    <br>
I composed a detailed summary at
    <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy"
 target="_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy</a>.
Please
review it.<br>
    <br>
@Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.<br>
    <br>
regards,<br>
    <font color="#888888">Torsten.</font>
    <div>
    <div class="h5"><br>
    <blockquote type="cite"> I volunteer to write it up.<br>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre>&lt;hat type='chair'/&gt;

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
  </pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre>One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
    </pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre>This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

  </pre>
        <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
    <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
    <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
    <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
    <br>
  </blockquote>
  </div>
  <br>
  </div>
  </div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>

--------------030504040105090404070708--


From esjewett@gmail.com  Tue Mar 16 07:45:49 2010
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Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 10:45:32 -0400
Message-ID: <68f4a0e81003160745l160cde86lc2ff9fb8e81c7590@mail.gmail.com>
From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Thanks Thorsten, this is good.

The "Pro Signature" section seemed a little thin to me (pro HTTPS too,
though most security pros are included obliquely in the "Powerful"
bullet). I changed the "Pro Signature" section to:

 * Low latency and computational costs (HMAC)
 * Provides for authentication of request by proving possession of a
secret that is bound to an account (in OAuth 1.0a)
 * Can provide message integrity (in OAuth 1.0a for single-part
form-encoded requests, for query strings, and for request bodies under
the body-signing extension)
 * Can provide replay protection via signed nonces (in OAuth 1.0a)
 * Can provide expiration via signed timestamps (in OAuth 1.0a)

Ethan

On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 6:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I composed a detailed summary at
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy. Please review
> it.
>
> @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> I volunteer to write it up.
>
> <hat type='chair'/>
>
> On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>
>
> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>
> - Why are signatures needed?
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>
>
> This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
> the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>
> Peter
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

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Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 10:51:04 -0700
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On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I composed a detailed summary at
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy. Please review
> it.

We didn't talk about the signed identity claims use case.  Some
background on that is in this thread:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg00530.html

Paul - does OpenSocial still need signed identity claims?

Eve - does UMA still need signed identity claims, or are you handling
that outside of the OAuth spec?

Cheers,
Brian

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Tue Mar 16 10:59:44 2010
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Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 11:59:51 -0600
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] room change in Anaheim!
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FYI, the room for our session on Monday has been changed from California
B to Redondo. Please make a note of this if you will be in Anaheim!

/psa

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: OAUTH - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF 77
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 10:57:39 -0700 (PDT)
From: IETF Secretariat <agenda@ietf.org>
To: stpeter@stpeter.im
CC:
romeda@gmail.com,lisa.dusseault@gmail.com,alexey.melnikov@isode.com,sessi=
on-request@ietf.org

Dear Peter Saint-Andre,

The sessions that you have requested have been scheduled.
Below is the scheduled session information followed by
the information of sessions that you have requested.

OAUTH Session 1 (2 hours)
Monday, Afternoon Session I 1300-1500
Room Name: Redondo
----------------------------------------------

Special Note: Room changed from California B




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--------------ms060901090301030507060905--

From jpanzer@google.com  Tue Mar 16 11:05:14 2010
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From: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 10:58:48 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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SGTM -- I think the tradeoff is interoperable and simple hop-based integrity
protection (assuming existing TLS libraries exist) vs. more complicated but
full end to end integrity protection (and libraries need to be written).

On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 7:11 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:

>  Hi John,
>
> following your arguments, I could add "integrity protection of complete
> HTTP requests in an interoperable way" the the "pro HTTPS" section?
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 16.03.2010 07:22, schrieb John Panzer:
>
> I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
>
>  "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and payload when
> communicating over unsecure channel"
>
>  I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will protect
> the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions on the request
> types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with form-encoded data variables only.
>
>  If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide integrity for
> arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL, authority, and HTTP
> method:   I would like to see at least one concrete proposal that will
> accomplish this.   IIRC there's only one that I think is possibly
> implementable in an interoperable way, and it supports only JSON payloads.
>  In other words, anyone using body signing would need to wrap their data in
> JSON to do it.  (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of
> course, but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
> cons.)
>
> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I composed a detailed summary at
>> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy. Please
>> review it.
>>
>> @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>>  I volunteer to write it up.
>>
>> <hat type='chair'/>
>>
>> On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>
>>
>>  One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
>> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>> signatures?
>>
>> - Why are signatures needed?
>> - What do signatures need to protect?
>>
>> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
>> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>
>>
>>  This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
>> the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>
>> Peter
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>
>

--000e0cd32f50e434af0481eecc1f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

SGTM -- I think the tradeoff is interoperable and simple hop-based integrit=
y protection (assuming existing TLS libraries exist) vs. more complicated b=
ut full end to end integrity protection (and libraries need to be written).=
<br>

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 7:11 AM, Torsten Lod=
derstedt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">t=
orsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex;">




 =20

<div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff" text=3D"#000000">
Hi John,<br>
=A0<br>
following your arguments, I could add &quot;integrity protection of complet=
e
HTTP requests in an interoperable way&quot; the the &quot;pro HTTPS&quot; s=
ection?<br>
<br>
regards,<br>
Torsten.<br>
<br>
Am 16.03.2010 07:22, schrieb John Panzer:
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><blockquote type=3D"cite">I&#39;m confuse=
d by one &quot;pro&quot; for signatures:
  <div><br>
  </div>
  <div>&quot;P<span style=3D"font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,times,se=
rif;font-size:18px">rotect
integrity of whole request - authorization data and payload when
communicating over unsecure channel&quot;</span></div>
  <div><span style=3D"font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;,times,serif;fon=
t-size:18px"><br>
  </span></div>
  <div>I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that
will protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions
on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with form-encoded
data variables only.</div>
  <div><br>
  </div>
  <div>If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide
integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,
authority, and HTTP method: =A0 I would like to see at least one concrete
proposal that will accomplish this. =A0 IIRC there&#39;s only one that I
think is possibly implementable in an interoperable way, and it
supports only JSON payloads. =A0In other words, anyone using body signing
would need to wrap their data in JSON to do it. =A0(This is not
necessarily the worst thing in the world, of course, but it is
something to be taken into account when listing pros and cons.)</div>
  <div>
  <div><br>
  <div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten
Lodderstedt <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net=
" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;</span>
wrote:<br>
  <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left:1px solid rgb(204,=
 204, 204);margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex">
    <div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff" text=3D"#000000">Hi all,<br>
    <br>
I composed a detailed summary at
    <a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy"=
 target=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/Signatures=
Why</a>.
Please
review it.<br>
    <br>
@Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.<br>
    <br>
regards,<br>
    <font color=3D"#888888">Torsten.</font>
    <div>
    <div><br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"> I volunteer to write it up.<br>
      <blockquote type=3D"cite">
        <pre>&lt;hat type=3D&#39;chair&#39;/&gt;

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
  </pre>
        <blockquote type=3D"cite">
          <pre>One of the things that&#39;s been a primary focus of both to=
day&#39;s WG call
and last week&#39;s call is what are the specific use cases for
signatures?

- Why are signatures needed?
- What do signatures need to protect?

Let&#39;s try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
    </pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre>This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a s=
ummary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

  </pre>
        <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <pre><fieldset></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
    <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
    <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><=
br>
    <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
    <br>
  </blockquote>
  </div>
  <br>
  </div>
  </div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div></div></div>

</blockquote></div><br>

--000e0cd32f50e434af0481eecc1f--

From recordond@gmail.com  Tue Mar 16 11:15:13 2010
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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Kevin Marks has been bugging me for awhile to understand how
OpenSocial makes use of two-legged OAuth.  I reached out to the team
and here's their description (via Evan Gilbert).  In general it seems
like they're more making use of OAuth's RSA signature mechanism rather
than the user authorization and access token flows.

1. Developer (let's say iLike) creates a gadget that runs in multiple
containers.
2. User Bob is views iLike gadget on MySpace and the iLike gadget
needs to make a request back to iLike's home server to get private
data (let's say the user's favorite bands)
3. iLike gadget makes a JavaScript call to get this data from iLike
servers. This call uses a gadgets API (gadgets.io.makeRequest) that
proxies the request through MySpace servers.
4. MySpace adds validated URL parameters to the request - most
importantly opensocial_viewer_id and opensocial_app_url. MySpace then
signs the request and then forwards on the request to iLike's servers.
4.5 iLike can choose to sign request with MySpace's private key or
with a shared secret between iLike & MySpace.
6. iLike verifies the signed request, using MySpace's public key or
the shared secret.
7. iLike checks verifies opensocial_app_url to make sure this isn't a
different gadget asking for data.
8. Lastly iLike looks up user data based on opensocial_viewer_id and
returns it back to the gadget.

Intro to signed requests:
http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=Introduction_To_Signed_Requests
Validation of signed requests:
http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=Validating_Signed_Requests

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On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 11:12 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
> Kevin Marks has been bugging me for awhile to understand how
> OpenSocial makes use of two-legged OAuth. =A0I reached out to the team
> and here's their description (via Evan Gilbert). =A0In general it seems
> like they're more making use of OAuth's RSA signature mechanism rather
> than the user authorization and access token flows.

It's not just opensocial.  This is more or less what Microsoft is
doing with Simple Web Tokens, and there are some other Google use
cases as well.

Cheers,
Brian

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--0016e68e8ba51b6b810481ef4a7e
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Here is one of the original writeups of OpenSocial + 2LO with a scanned
napkin drawing :-)

http://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/2leggedoauth/2opensocialrestapi

On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 11:12 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>wrote:

> Kevin Marks has been bugging me for awhile to understand how
> OpenSocial makes use of two-legged OAuth.  I reached out to the team
> and here's their description (via Evan Gilbert).  In general it seems
> like they're more making use of OAuth's RSA signature mechanism rather
> than the user authorization and access token flows.
>
> 1. Developer (let's say iLike) creates a gadget that runs in multiple
> containers.
> 2. User Bob is views iLike gadget on MySpace and the iLike gadget
> needs to make a request back to iLike's home server to get private
> data (let's say the user's favorite bands)
> 3. iLike gadget makes a JavaScript call to get this data from iLike
> servers. This call uses a gadgets API (gadgets.io.makeRequest) that
> proxies the request through MySpace servers.
> 4. MySpace adds validated URL parameters to the request - most
> importantly opensocial_viewer_id and opensocial_app_url. MySpace then
> signs the request and then forwards on the request to iLike's servers.
> 4.5 iLike can choose to sign request with MySpace's private key or
> with a shared secret between iLike & MySpace.
> 6. iLike verifies the signed request, using MySpace's public key or
> the shared secret.
> 7. iLike checks verifies opensocial_app_url to make sure this isn't a
> different gadget asking for data.
> 8. Lastly iLike looks up user data based on opensocial_viewer_id and
> returns it back to the gadget.
>
> Intro to signed requests:
> http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=Introduction_To_Signed_Requests
> Validation of signed requests:
> http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=Validating_Signed_Requests
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--0016e68e8ba51b6b810481ef4a7e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<div>Here is one of the original writeups of OpenSocial + 2LO with a scanne=
d napkin drawing :-)</div><div><br></div><a href=3D"http://sites.google.com=
/site/oauthgoog/2leggedoauth/2opensocialrestapi">http://sites.google.com/si=
te/oauthgoog/2leggedoauth/2opensocialrestapi</a><br>
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 11:12 AM, David Reco=
rdon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordond=
@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Kevin Marks has been bugging me for awhile to understand how<br>
OpenSocial makes use of two-legged OAuth. =A0I reached out to the team<br>
and here&#39;s their description (via Evan Gilbert). =A0In general it seems=
<br>
like they&#39;re more making use of OAuth&#39;s RSA signature mechanism rat=
her<br>
than the user authorization and access token flows.<br>
<br>
1. Developer (let&#39;s say iLike) creates a gadget that runs in multiple<b=
r>
containers.<br>
2. User Bob is views iLike gadget on MySpace and the iLike gadget<br>
needs to make a request back to iLike&#39;s home server to get private<br>
data (let&#39;s say the user&#39;s favorite bands)<br>
3. iLike gadget makes a JavaScript call to get this data from iLike<br>
servers. This call uses a gadgets API (gadgets.io.makeRequest) that<br>
proxies the request through MySpace servers.<br>
4. MySpace adds validated URL parameters to the request - most<br>
importantly opensocial_viewer_id and opensocial_app_url. MySpace then<br>
signs the request and then forwards on the request to iLike&#39;s servers.<=
br>
4.5 iLike can choose to sign request with MySpace&#39;s private key or<br>
with a shared secret between iLike &amp; MySpace.<br>
6. iLike verifies the signed request, using MySpace&#39;s public key or<br>
the shared secret.<br>
7. iLike checks verifies opensocial_app_url to make sure this isn&#39;t a<b=
r>
different gadget asking for data.<br>
8. Lastly iLike looks up user data based on opensocial_viewer_id and<br>
returns it back to the gadget.<br>
<br>
Intro to signed requests:<br>
<a href=3D"http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=3DIntroduction_To_Sig=
ned_Requests" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=
=3DIntroduction_To_Signed_Requests</a><br>
Validation of signed requests:<br>
<a href=3D"http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=3DValidating_Signed_R=
equests" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=3DVal=
idating_Signed_Requests</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br>

--0016e68e8ba51b6b810481ef4a7e--

From zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com  Tue Mar 16 11:50:22 2010
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From: "Zeltsan, Zachary (Zachary)" <zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com>
To: John Kemp <john@jkemp.net>, "Faynberg, Igor (Igor)" <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 13:50:25 -0500
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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References: <d37b4b431003041200n1fc6cc5au83194aca28763b0d@mail.gmail.com> <4B99B2DD.3000405@stpeter.im>	<4B99D783.1090905@lodderstedt.net> <4B9EB99F.1050609@lodderstedt.net> <cb5f7a381003152322m5c6ec744nb8336e329860439e@mail.gmail.com> <b71cdca91003152330p74409dc5ua34fb4ef06702a15@mail.gmail.com> <4B9F29BC.3010709@alcatel-lucent.com> <C39FEB3C-4975-4DEB-9D42-E0AF3F143FC7@jkemp.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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>Would you care if some proxy or other intermediary changed the contents of=
 >the Authorization HTTP header?=20

In OAuth 1.0 the oauth_ parameters can be transmitted in the HTTP Authoriza=
tion header - this is one of the options (and is the preferred one). In tha=
t case protection of the Authorization header's content is needed, but it i=
s already provided by the signature. The parameter oauth_signature contains=
 a signature over a string that includes the OAuth protocol parameters (exc=
luding "oauth_signature").

>How about if they changed the URL path passed or the HTTP method from GET =
>to POST?=20

GET and POST (they are not parts of the HTTP headers) are also included in =
the signature base string in OAuth 1.0

I believe that when OAuth parameters are transmitted in the Authorization h=
eader, OAuth 1.0 provides an adequate protection of that header's contents.

Zachary
-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of J=
ohn Kemp
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 9:45 AM
To: Faynberg, Igor (Igor)
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?

On Mar 16, 2010, at 8:48 AM, Igor Faynberg wrote:

> That's what I have been thinking. Why is it important to sign the headers=
?  (I am not against signing them, but I cannot see the need in the specifi=
c cases we had discussed. In other words, if I had signed the body of the r=
equest, I probably would not care if someone changed the headers.)

Would you care if some proxy or other intermediary changed the contents of =
the Authorization HTTP header? How about if they changed the URL path passe=
d or the HTTP method from GET to POST? Which other HTTP headers might you w=
ish to be carried through intermediaries with the property of integrity?=20

Regards,

- johnk

>=20
> Igor
>=20
> Paul Lindner wrote:
>> What about  http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/draft=
s/1/spec.html ?=20
>>=20
>> That's in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite some time.
>>=20
>> That draft adds protection of the body -- I don't know of any draft that=
 covers signing the headers...
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com <mailt=
o:jpanzer@google.com>> wrote:
>>=20
>>  I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
>>=20
>>  "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and
>>  payload when communicating over unsecure channel"
>>=20
>>  I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will
>>  protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions
>>  on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with
>>  form-encoded data variables only.
>>=20
>>  If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide
>>  integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,
>>  authority, and HTTP method:   I would like to see at least one
>>  concrete proposal that will accomplish this.   IIRC there's only
>>  one that I think is possibly implementable in an interoperable
>>  way, and it supports only JSON payloads.  In other words, anyone
>>  using body signing would need to wrap their data in JSON to do it.
>>   (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of course,
>>  but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
>>  cons.)
>>=20
>>  On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt
>>  <torsten@lodderstedt.net <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>>=20
>>      Hi all,
>>=20
>>      I composed a detailed summary at
>>      http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy.
>>      Please review it.
>>=20
>>      @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
>>=20
>>      regards,
>>      Torsten.
>>=20
>>>      I volunteer to write it up.
>>>>      <hat type=3D'chair'/>
>>>>=20
>>>>      On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>>      One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG=
 call
>>>>>      and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
>>>>>      signatures?
>>>>>=20
>>>>>      - Why are signatures needed?
>>>>>      - What do signatures need to protect?
>>>>>=20
>>>>>      Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that w=
e have
>>>>>      a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
>>>>>=20
>>>>      This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summ=
ary of
>>>>      the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
>>>>=20
>>>>      Peter
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>      _______________________________________________
>>>>      OAuth mailing list
>>>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>      _______________________________________________
>>>      OAuth mailing list
>>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>      _______________________________________________
>>      OAuth mailing list
>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>  _______________________________________________
>>  OAuth mailing list
>>  OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>>=20
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

From jpanzer@google.com  Tue Mar 16 12:13:07 2010
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References: <d37b4b431003041200n1fc6cc5au83194aca28763b0d@mail.gmail.com>  <4B99B2DD.3000405@stpeter.im> <4B99D783.1090905@lodderstedt.net>  <4B9EB99F.1050609@lodderstedt.net> <cb5f7a381003152322m5c6ec744nb8336e329860439e@mail.gmail.com>  <b71cdca91003152330p74409dc5ua34fb4ef06702a15@mail.gmail.com>  <4B9F29BC.3010709@alcatel-lucent.com> <C39FEB3C-4975-4DEB-9D42-E0AF3F143FC7@jkemp.net>  <5710F82C0E73B04FA559560098BF95B124F0B2C232@USNAVSXCHMBSA3.ndc.alcatel-lucent.com>
From: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 12:05:33 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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--0016e68ea020afb9d10481efc981
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

I would imagine that things like Content-Length: , Content-Encoding: and
Cache-Control: would be targets for attacks if they were not protected.
 There are also a lot of custom X- headers out there with unknown semantics.

BTW, another advantage of TLS is that it handles integrity of the HTTP
response as well.  I don't think the signing proposals include the response,
do they?

On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 11:50 AM, Zeltsan, Zachary (Zachary) <
zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com> wrote:

>
> >Would you care if some proxy or other intermediary changed the contents of
> >the Authorization HTTP header?
>
> In OAuth 1.0 the oauth_ parameters can be transmitted in the HTTP
> Authorization header - this is one of the options (and is the preferred
> one). In that case protection of the Authorization header's content is
> needed, but it is already provided by the signature. The parameter
> oauth_signature contains a signature over a string that includes the OAuth
> protocol parameters (excluding "oauth_signature").
>
> >How about if they changed the URL path passed or the HTTP method from GET
> >to POST?
>
> GET and POST (they are not parts of the HTTP headers) are also included in
> the signature base string in OAuth 1.0
>
> I believe that when OAuth parameters are transmitted in the Authorization
> header, OAuth 1.0 provides an adequate protection of that header's contents.
>
> Zachary
> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> John Kemp
> Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 9:45 AM
> To: Faynberg, Igor (Igor)
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
>
> On Mar 16, 2010, at 8:48 AM, Igor Faynberg wrote:
>
> > That's what I have been thinking. Why is it important to sign the
> headers?  (I am not against signing them, but I cannot see the need in the
> specific cases we had discussed. In other words, if I had signed the body of
> the request, I probably would not care if someone changed the headers.)
>
> Would you care if some proxy or other intermediary changed the contents of
> the Authorization HTTP header? How about if they changed the URL path passed
> or the HTTP method from GET to POST? Which other HTTP headers might you wish
> to be carried through intermediaries with the property of integrity?
>
> Regards,
>
> - johnk
>
> >
> > Igor
> >
> > Paul Lindner wrote:
> >> What about
> http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html?
> >>
> >> That's in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite some time.
> >>
> >> That draft adds protection of the body -- I don't know of any draft that
> covers signing the headers...
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com<mailto:
> jpanzer@google.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >>  I'm confused by one "pro" for signatures:
> >>
> >>  "Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data and
> >>  payload when communicating over unsecure channel"
> >>
> >>  I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that will
> >>  protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictions
> >>  on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with
> >>  form-encoded data variables only.
> >>
> >>  If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide
> >>  integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,
> >>  authority, and HTTP method:   I would like to see at least one
> >>  concrete proposal that will accomplish this.   IIRC there's only
> >>  one that I think is possibly implementable in an interoperable
> >>  way, and it supports only JSON payloads.  In other words, anyone
> >>  using body signing would need to wrap their data in JSON to do it.
> >>   (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of course,
> >>  but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros and
> >>  cons.)
> >>
> >>  On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> >>  <torsten@lodderstedt.net <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >>      Hi all,
> >>
> >>      I composed a detailed summary at
> >>      http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy.
> >>      Please review it.
> >>
> >>      @Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.
> >>
> >>      regards,
> >>      Torsten.
> >>
> >>>      I volunteer to write it up.
> >>>>      <hat type='chair'/>
> >>>>
> >>>>      On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>>      One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG
> call
> >>>>>      and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> >>>>>      signatures?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>      - Why are signatures needed?
> >>>>>      - What do signatures need to protect?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>      Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that
> we have
> >>>>>      a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.
> >>>>>
> >>>>      This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a
> summary of
> >>>>      the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?
> >>>>
> >>>>      Peter
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>      _______________________________________________
> >>>>      OAuth mailing list
> >>>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >>>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>      _______________________________________________
> >>>      OAuth mailing list
> >>>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >>>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>      _______________________________________________
> >>      OAuth mailing list
> >>      OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >>      https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  _______________________________________________
> >>  OAuth mailing list
> >>  OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--0016e68ea020afb9d10481efc981
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I would imagine that things like Content-Length: , Content-Encoding: and Ca=
che-Control: would be targets for attacks if they were not protected. =A0Th=
ere are also a lot of custom X- headers out there with unknown semantics.<d=
iv>

<br></div><div>BTW, another advantage of TLS is that it handles integrity o=
f the HTTP response as well. =A0I don&#39;t think the signing proposals inc=
lude the response, do they?<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 1=
6, 2010 at 11:50 AM, Zeltsan, Zachary (Zachary) <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com">zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lu=
cent.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt;Would you care if some proxy or other intermediary changed the contents=
 of &gt;the Authorization HTTP header?<br>
<br>
</div>In OAuth 1.0 the oauth_ parameters can be transmitted in the HTTP Aut=
horization header - this is one of the options (and is the preferred one). =
In that case protection of the Authorization header&#39;s content is needed=
, but it is already provided by the signature. The parameter oauth_signatur=
e contains a signature over a string that includes the OAuth protocol param=
eters (excluding &quot;oauth_signature&quot;).<br>


<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt;How about if they changed the URL path passed or the HTTP method from G=
ET &gt;to POST?<br>
<br>
</div>GET and POST (they are not parts of the HTTP headers) are also includ=
ed in the signature base string in OAuth 1.0<br>
<br>
I believe that when OAuth parameters are transmitted in the Authorization h=
eader, OAuth 1.0 provides an adequate protection of that header&#39;s conte=
nts.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Zachary<br>
</font><div class=3D"im">-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a> =
[mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a=
>] On Behalf Of John Kemp<br>
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 9:45 AM<br>
To: Faynberg, Igor (Igor)<br>
Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org">oauth@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?<br>
<br>
</div><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">On Mar 16, 2010, at 8:48 AM, Igor F=
aynberg wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; That&#39;s what I have been thinking. Why is it important to sign the =
headers? =A0(I am not against signing them, but I cannot see the need in th=
e specific cases we had discussed. In other words, if I had signed the body=
 of the request, I probably would not care if someone changed the headers.)=
<br>


<br>
Would you care if some proxy or other intermediary changed the contents of =
the Authorization HTTP header? How about if they changed the URL path passe=
d or the HTTP method from GET to POST? Which other HTTP headers might you w=
ish to be carried through intermediaries with the property of integrity?<br=
>


<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
- johnk<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Igor<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Paul Lindner wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; What about =A0<a href=3D"http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/spec/ext/=
body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html" target=3D"_blank">http://oauth.googlecode=
.com/svn/spec/ext/body_hash/1.0/drafts/1/spec.html</a> ?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; That&#39;s in use and has been implemented in shindig for quite so=
me time.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; That draft adds protection of the body -- I don&#39;t know of any =
draft that covers signing the headers...<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:22 PM, John Panzer &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:jpanzer@google.com">jpanzer@google.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:j=
panzer@google.com">jpanzer@google.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0I&#39;m confused by one &quot;pro&quot; for signatures:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0&quot;Protect integrity of whole request - authorization data a=
nd<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0payload when communicating over unsecure channel&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0I do not believe there is an existing concrete proposal that wi=
ll<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0protect the whole request, unless you add additional restrictio=
ns<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0on the request types -- e.g., only HTTP GET or POST with<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0form-encoded data variables only.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0If the assertion is that signatures will actually provide<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0integrity for arbitrary HTTP request bodies as well as the URL,=
<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0authority, and HTTP method: =A0 I would like to see at least on=
e<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0concrete proposal that will accomplish this. =A0 IIRC there&#39=
;s only<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0one that I think is possibly implementable in an interoperable<=
br>
&gt;&gt; =A0way, and it supports only JSON payloads. =A0In other words, any=
one<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0using body signing would need to wrap their data in JSON to do =
it.<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 (This is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, of cour=
se,<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0but it is something to be taken into account when listing pros =
and<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0cons.)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 3:50 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderst=
edt.net</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@l=
odderstedt.net</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0Hi all,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0I composed a detailed summary at<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wik=
i/SignaturesWhy" target=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac=
/wiki/SignaturesWhy</a>.<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0Please review it.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0@Zachary: I also added some of your recent notes.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0regards,<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0Torsten.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0I volunteer to write it up.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0&lt;hat type=3D&#39;chair&#39;/&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0One of the things that&#39;s been a primary=
 focus of both today&#39;s WG call<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0and last week&#39;s call is what are the sp=
ecific use cases for<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0signatures?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0- Why are signatures needed?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0- What do signatures need to protect?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0Let&#39;s try to outline the use cases! Ple=
ase reply here, so that we have<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0a good idea of what they are as we move tow=
ards the Anaheim WG.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone cou=
ld write up a summary of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0the points raised, either on the list or at the=
 wiki?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0Peter<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0_______________________________________________=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.or=
g</a> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinf=
o/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><=
br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0_______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a=
> &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oa=
uth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0_______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a> &l=
t;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
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&gt;&gt; =A0_______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a> &lt;mailto=
:<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------=
------<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
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<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
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_______________________________________________<br>
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From: "Shafi, Saleem" <mshafi@paypal.com>
To: Brent Goldman <brent@facebook.com>, "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 12:19:48 -0700
Thread-Topic: Device Profile
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
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Hello..
=20
Is there any interest in being able to respond with multiple oauth_verifica=
tion_url values?  I can forsee the possibility of the Authorization Server =
being able to support browser-based user verification (http/https) or text =
messages (assuming we could authenticate the user on sending the SMS)..  Le=
tting the authorization server return multiple URLs could give the client/u=
ser more options..
=20
Also, would there be room in this profile for a scenario where the user ver=
ification code isn't returned to the client, but rather sent to the user di=
rectly?  If the initial request that the client makes includes some identif=
ier for the user and the authorization server has contact information for t=
hat user, could the AS inform the user (via email, sms, IVR, etc) of a one-=
time user code that they would enter into the device*?  It's sort of the re=
verse model, but it should still establish a connection between the device,=
 AS and user..  This profile might make sense where the device has very sim=
ple data entry options and the user might not be near a browser-capable dev=
ice..
=20
Saleem.

*Eve points out that this is somewhat simliar to the verification_code addi=
tion in the Oauth 1.0a spec to protect against session-fixation attacks (ht=
tp://hueniverse.com/2009/04/explaining-the-oauth-session-fixation-attack/),=
 especially the way it's communicated in WRAP's Rich App profile when the a=
pp in question can't be contacted by the AS with a URL..


-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of B=
rent Goldman
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:28 AM
To: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile

Over the past couple days, Luke Shepard, David Recordon, and I have been br=
ainstorming an OAuth profile for standardizing the flow that devices such a=
s game consoles and entertainment centers use to hook up with services such=
 as Netflix and iTunes. The basic flow is that a device can gain authorizat=
ion by directing the user to visit a URL on their computer and to enter a v=
erification code copied from the device's screen.

A draft spec is attached to this email. Any thoughts or feedback?

Note: this is one of the many profiles going into the OAuth 2.0 draft that =
David is writing (http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html).

-Brent



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From: Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com>
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To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Hi Brian,

On 16 Mar 2010, at 10:51 AM, Brian Eaton wrote:
> We didn't talk about the signed identity claims use case.  Some
> background on that is in this thread:
>=20
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg00530.html
>=20
> Paul - does OpenSocial still need signed identity claims?
>=20
> Eve - does UMA still need signed identity claims, or are you handling
> that outside of the OAuth spec?

UMA's core protocol is agnostic as to the format of the claims, though =
negotiating a desired claim format does have a few core-protocol =
implications.  We anticipate that a couple of different formats are =
likely (strong interest has been expressed in SAML and JSON so far).

We do have use cases for third-party-asserted claims as well as =
self-asserted claims, and we anticipate that the former would be most =
easily solved (maybe "easily" should be in scare quotes) with =
signatures.  The use cases requiring this do tend to be for =
higher-security, higher-sensitivity applications (health, =
financial/insurance, etc.).

Note that by "claims", I'm referring here to the access authorization =
claims that an authorization manager would ask a requester to produce in =
order to prove suitability for getting access.  (The authorizing user =
might be delegating access to some protected web resource that contains =
identity claims about themselves; this is well outside the UMA core =
protocol.)

	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog=

From brent@facebook.com  Wed Mar 17 04:43:17 2010
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From: Brent Goldman <brent@facebook.com>
To: "Shafi, Saleem" <mshafi@paypal.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2010 04:42:53 -0700
Thread-Topic: Device Profile
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Cc: "OAuth WG \(oauth@ietf.org\)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
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On Mar 16, 2010, at 12:19 PM, Shafi, Saleem wrote:

> Is there any interest in being able to respond with multiple oauth_verifi=
cation_url values?  I can forsee the possibility of the Authorization Serve=
r being able to support browser-based user verification (http/https) or tex=
t messages (assuming we could authenticate the user on sending the SMS)..  =
Letting the authorization server return multiple URLs could give the client=
/user more options..

Authenticating the user via text message is an awesome idea, but we can't r=
eally communicate that to the device as another oauth_verification_url. Thi=
s is probably worthy of another profile. Using SMS to auth could also be us=
eful at an untrusted computer at an internet cafe -- maybe you don't want t=
o authenticate yourself with the AS via password in case a keylogger is ins=
talled.

> Also, would there be room in this profile for a scenario where the user v=
erification code isn't returned to the client, but rather sent to the user =
directly?  If the initial request that the client makes includes some ident=
ifier for the user and the authorization server has contact information for=
 that user, could the AS inform the user (via email, sms, IVR, etc) of a on=
e-time user code that they would enter into the device*?  It's sort of the =
reverse model, but it should still establish a connection between the devic=
e, AS and user..  This profile might make sense where the device has very s=
imple data entry options and the user might not be near a browser-capable d=
evice..

I'm not sure I like the reverse of this scenario. What stops other people f=
rom entering my identifier into their device, thus causing the AS to ping m=
e via email or SMS? Also, the Device Profile was created as the reverse of =
OAuth, so the reverse of the Device Profile is just a variation on regular =
OAuth! Maybe this could be developed into yet another profile.

-Brent


> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Brent Goldman
> Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:28 AM
> To: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
>=20
> Over the past couple days, Luke Shepard, David Recordon, and I have been =
brainstorming an OAuth profile for standardizing the flow that devices such=
 as game consoles and entertainment centers use to hook up with services su=
ch as Netflix and iTunes. The basic flow is that a device can gain authoriz=
ation by directing the user to visit a URL on their computer and to enter a=
 verification code copied from the device's screen.
>=20
> A draft spec is attached to this email. Any thoughts or feedback?
>=20
> Note: this is one of the many profiles going into the OAuth 2.0 draft tha=
t David is writing (http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html).
>=20
> -Brent
>=20
>=20


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From: "Shafi, Saleem" <mshafi@paypal.com>
To: Brent Goldman <brent@facebook.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2010 13:44:48 -0700
Thread-Topic: Device Profile
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Cc: "OAuth WG \(oauth@ietf.org\)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
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> Authenticating the user via text message is an awesome idea, but we can't=
 really communicate that to the device as another
> oauth_verification_url. This is probably worthy of another profile. Using=
 SMS to auth could also be useful at an untrusted
> computer at an internet cafe -- maybe you don't want to authenticate your=
self with the AS via password in case a keylogger
> is installed.=20

I'm not sure I understand why we couldn't use the oauth_verification_url fo=
r this..  Following RFC 5724 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5724), couldn't=
 we have something like this:

    HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

    oauth_device_code=3D74tq5miHKB&oauth_user_code=3D94248&oauth_verificati=
on_url=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fdevice&oauth_verification_url=
=3Dsms%3A%2B180080080000

Then the client could display the option to the user to either visit http:/=
/www.example.com/device or send an SMS to 1-800-800-8000

> I'm not sure I like the reverse of this scenario. What stops other people=
 from entering my identifier into their device,
> thus causing the AS to ping me via email or SMS? Also, the Device Profile=
 was created as the reverse of OAuth, so the reverse
> of the Device Profile is just a variation on regular OAuth! Maybe this co=
uld be developed into yet another profile.

You're right, spam could be a problem, but it would be a user annoyance iss=
ue that could be mitigated by the Authorization Server much like any other =
spam filter might..  E.g., users could opt-out/opt-in to the entire process=
, or allow only certain devices/clients to communicate with them, etc..  In=
 any case, I don't think it would pose a security risk since I simply would=
n't enter the code I received into the device if I wasn't the one that init=
iated it and am probably not physically at the device anyway..

Perhaps it doesn't make sense to lump this in with the device profile you'v=
e defined since the process is different enough, but I think the use cases =
overlap..  The only difference really is that in your flow, the user code t=
ravels from the AS to the client to the user and back to the AS; whereas in=
 the flow I've described, it flows from the AS to the user to the client ba=
ck to the AS..  Which direction the code travels depends on what kind of in=
put options are available and the relationship between the AS and user..


Saleem.


-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Goldman [mailto:brent@facebook.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 6:43 AM
To: Shafi, Saleem
Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
Subject: Re: Device Profile

On Mar 16, 2010, at 12:19 PM, Shafi, Saleem wrote:

> Is there any interest in being able to respond with multiple oauth_verifi=
cation_url values?  I can forsee the possibility of the Authorization Serve=
r being able to support browser-based user verification (http/https) or tex=
t messages (assuming we could authenticate the user on sending the SMS)..  =
Letting the authorization server return multiple URLs could give the client=
/user more options..

Authenticating the user via text message is an awesome idea, but we can't r=
eally communicate that to the device as another oauth_verification_url. Thi=
s is probably worthy of another profile. Using SMS to auth could also be us=
eful at an untrusted computer at an internet cafe -- maybe you don't want t=
o authenticate yourself with the AS via password in case a keylogger is ins=
talled.

> Also, would there be room in this profile for a scenario where the user v=
erification code isn't returned to the client, but rather sent to the user =
directly?  If the initial request that the client makes includes some ident=
ifier for the user and the authorization server has contact information for=
 that user, could the AS inform the user (via email, sms, IVR, etc) of a on=
e-time user code that they would enter into the device*?  It's sort of the =
reverse model, but it should still establish a connection between the devic=
e, AS and user..  This profile might make sense where the device has very s=
imple data entry options and the user might not be near a browser-capable d=
evice..

I'm not sure I like the reverse of this scenario. What stops other people f=
rom entering my identifier into their device, thus causing the AS to ping m=
e via email or SMS? Also, the Device Profile was created as the reverse of =
OAuth, so the reverse of the Device Profile is just a variation on regular =
OAuth! Maybe this could be developed into yet another profile.

-Brent


> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf=20
> Of Brent Goldman
> Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:28 AM
> To: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
>=20
> Over the past couple days, Luke Shepard, David Recordon, and I have been =
brainstorming an OAuth profile for standardizing the flow that devices such=
 as game consoles and entertainment centers use to hook up with services su=
ch as Netflix and iTunes. The basic flow is that a device can gain authoriz=
ation by directing the user to visit a URL on their computer and to enter a=
 verification code copied from the device's screen.
>=20
> A draft spec is attached to this email. Any thoughts or feedback?
>=20
> Note: this is one of the many profiles going into the OAuth 2.0 draft tha=
t David is writing (http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html).
>=20
> -Brent
>=20
>=20


From brent@facebook.com  Wed Mar 17 13:59:23 2010
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From: Brent Goldman <brent@facebook.com>
To: "Shafi, Saleem" <mshafi@paypal.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2010 13:57:50 -0700
Thread-Topic: Device Profile
Thread-Index: AcrGFJQB8LjbDEftRpqh0KwbwMKS/g==
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Cc: "OAuth WG \(oauth@ietf.org\)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
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I wasn't aware of RFC 5724; using URLs to represent SMS numbers is pretty s=
weet. It sounds like we should be able to work that into the spec.

Text messages reminded me of another way for the user to communicate the ve=
rification code to the AS -- mobile apps. E.g., if the user initiates a lin=
k on their Roku device to Netflix, then instead of loading up netflix.com/r=
oku (or whatever the URL is) to enter the code, they can just load up the N=
etflix iPhone app. I don't think this can be represented with URLs, but per=
haps can be expressed if there was a text field in the response to be displ=
ayed to the user (e.g., "Use the Netflix iPhone app instead!").

-Brent

On Mar 17, 2010, at 1:44 PM, Shafi, Saleem wrote:

>> Authenticating the user via text message is an awesome idea, but we can'=
t really communicate that to the device as another
>> oauth_verification_url. This is probably worthy of another profile. Usin=
g SMS to auth could also be useful at an untrusted
>> computer at an internet cafe -- maybe you don't want to authenticate you=
rself with the AS via password in case a keylogger
>> is installed.=20
>=20
> I'm not sure I understand why we couldn't use the oauth_verification_url =
for this..  Following RFC 5724 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5724), couldn=
't we have something like this:
>=20
>    HTTP/1.1 200 OK
>    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>=20
>    oauth_device_code=3D74tq5miHKB&oauth_user_code=3D94248&oauth_verificat=
ion_url=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fdevice&oauth_verification_url=
=3Dsms%3A%2B180080080000
>=20
> Then the client could display the option to the user to either visit http=
://www.example.com/device or send an SMS to 1-800-800-8000
>=20
>> I'm not sure I like the reverse of this scenario. What stops other peopl=
e from entering my identifier into their device,
>> thus causing the AS to ping me via email or SMS? Also, the Device Profil=
e was created as the reverse of OAuth, so the reverse
>> of the Device Profile is just a variation on regular OAuth! Maybe this c=
ould be developed into yet another profile.
>=20
> You're right, spam could be a problem, but it would be a user annoyance i=
ssue that could be mitigated by the Authorization Server much like any othe=
r spam filter might..  E.g., users could opt-out/opt-in to the entire proce=
ss, or allow only certain devices/clients to communicate with them, etc..  =
In any case, I don't think it would pose a security risk since I simply wou=
ldn't enter the code I received into the device if I wasn't the one that in=
itiated it and am probably not physically at the device anyway..
>=20
> Perhaps it doesn't make sense to lump this in with the device profile you=
've defined since the process is different enough, but I think the use case=
s overlap..  The only difference really is that in your flow, the user code=
 travels from the AS to the client to the user and back to the AS; whereas =
in the flow I've described, it flows from the AS to the user to the client =
back to the AS..  Which direction the code travels depends on what kind of =
input options are available and the relationship between the AS and user..
>=20
>=20
> Saleem.
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brent Goldman [mailto:brent@facebook.com]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 6:43 AM
> To: Shafi, Saleem
> Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
> Subject: Re: Device Profile
>=20
> On Mar 16, 2010, at 12:19 PM, Shafi, Saleem wrote:
>=20
>> Is there any interest in being able to respond with multiple oauth_verif=
ication_url values?  I can forsee the possibility of the Authorization Serv=
er being able to support browser-based user verification (http/https) or te=
xt messages (assuming we could authenticate the user on sending the SMS).. =
 Letting the authorization server return multiple URLs could give the clien=
t/user more options..
>=20
> Authenticating the user via text message is an awesome idea, but we can't=
 really communicate that to the device as another oauth_verification_url. T=
his is probably worthy of another profile. Using SMS to auth could also be =
useful at an untrusted computer at an internet cafe -- maybe you don't want=
 to authenticate yourself with the AS via password in case a keylogger is i=
nstalled.
>=20
>> Also, would there be room in this profile for a scenario where the user =
verification code isn't returned to the client, but rather sent to the user=
 directly?  If the initial request that the client makes includes some iden=
tifier for the user and the authorization server has contact information fo=
r that user, could the AS inform the user (via email, sms, IVR, etc) of a o=
ne-time user code that they would enter into the device*?  It's sort of the=
 reverse model, but it should still establish a connection between the devi=
ce, AS and user..  This profile might make sense where the device has very =
simple data entry options and the user might not be near a browser-capable =
device..
>=20
> I'm not sure I like the reverse of this scenario. What stops other people=
 from entering my identifier into their device, thus causing the AS to ping=
 me via email or SMS? Also, the Device Profile was created as the reverse o=
f OAuth, so the reverse of the Device Profile is just a variation on regula=
r OAuth! Maybe this could be developed into yet another profile.
>=20
> -Brent
>=20
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf=20
>> Of Brent Goldman
>> Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:28 AM
>> To: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)
>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
>>=20
>> Over the past couple days, Luke Shepard, David Recordon, and I have been=
 brainstorming an OAuth profile for standardizing the flow that devices suc=
h as game consoles and entertainment centers use to hook up with services s=
uch as Netflix and iTunes. The basic flow is that a device can gain authori=
zation by directing the user to visit a URL on their computer and to enter =
a verification code copied from the device's screen.
>>=20
>> A draft spec is attached to this email. Any thoughts or feedback?
>>=20
>> Note: this is one of the many profiles going into the OAuth 2.0 draft th=
at David is writing (http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html).
>>=20
>> -Brent
>>=20
>>=20
>=20


From esachs@google.com  Wed Mar 17 17:45:21 2010
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Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2010 17:45:26 -0700
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Cc: "OAuth WG \(oauth@ietf.org\)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Device Profile
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--0016e648fc7a018a4a0482088c25
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Google has a similar requirement to move these types of devices to
OAuth/WRAP and away from our older "ClientLogin" protocol where the user is
prompted for their username/password.  The proposed profile looks fine, but
we are a few weeks from being able to do specific work on it, so we may have
more feedback at that time.

If the device can accept some user input, then there are some security
advantages to requiring the user to get the code from their computer and
then enter it into the device.  In particular, it makes it easier to protect
against a DOS attack targeted at the service-provider to request a large #
of codes.  That method also reduces the risk of a phishing/session-fixation
type attack.  However we agree that some profile is needed for devices with
no user input.  We also expect it will be easier to get these device vendors
to use a common industry technique, so we are fine with prioritizing our
support for this profile.  Longer term the community could define a profile
where the code is displayed on the computer.

On Thu, Mar 11, 2010 at 3:27 AM, Brent Goldman <brent@facebook.com> wrote:

> Over the past couple days, Luke Shepard, David Recordon, and I have been
> brainstorming an OAuth profile for standardizing the flow that devices such
> as game consoles and entertainment centers use to hook up with services such
> as Netflix and iTunes. The basic flow is that a device can gain
> authorization by directing the user to visit a URL on their computer and to
> enter a verification code copied from the device's screen.
>
> A draft spec is attached to this email. Any thoughts or feedback?
>
> Note: this is one of the many profiles going into the OAuth 2.0 draft that
> David is writing (http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html).
>
> -Brent
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

--0016e648fc7a018a4a0482088c25
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Google has a similar requirement to move these types of devices to OAuth/WR=
AP and away from our older &quot;ClientLogin&quot; protocol where the user =
is prompted for their username/password. =A0The proposed profile looks fine=
, but we are a few weeks from being able to do specific work on it, so we m=
ay have more feedback at that time.<div>
<br></div><div>If the device can accept some user input, then there are som=
e security advantages to requiring the user to get the code from their comp=
uter and then enter it into the device. =A0In particular, it makes it easie=
r to protect against a DOS attack targeted at the service-provider to reque=
st a large # of codes. =A0That method also reduces the risk of a phishing/s=
ession-fixation type attack. =A0However we agree that some profile is neede=
d for devices with no user input. =A0We also expect it will be easier to ge=
t these device vendors to use a common industry technique, so we are fine w=
ith prioritizing our support for this profile. =A0Longer term=A0the communi=
ty could define a profile where the code is displayed on the computer.</div=
>
<div><br></div><div>On Thu, Mar 11, 2010 at 3:27 AM, Brent Goldman <span di=
r=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:brent@facebook.com" target=3D"_blank">brent=
@facebook.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:</div><div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">

Over the past couple days, Luke Shepard, David Recordon, and I have been br=
ainstorming an OAuth profile for standardizing the flow that devices such a=
s game consoles and entertainment centers use to hook up with services such=
 as Netflix and iTunes. The basic flow is that a device can gain authorizat=
ion by directing the user to visit a URL on their computer and to enter a v=
erification code copied from the device&#39;s screen.<br>



<br>
A draft spec is attached to this email. Any thoughts or feedback?<br>
<br>
Note: this is one of the many profiles going into the OAuth 2.0 draft that =
David is writing (<a href=3D"http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html"=
 target=3D"_blank">http://daveman692.livejournal.com/349384.html</a>).<br>



<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
-Brent<br>
<br>
<br>
</font><br>_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div>

--0016e648fc7a018a4a0482088c25--

From y.oiwa@aist.go.jp  Fri Mar 19 05:03:32 2010
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To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>, Public-Web-Security Mailing List <public-web-security@w3.org>
From: Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 21:03:38 +0900
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] HTTP auth issues, in Anaheim
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Dear people in OAuth and other HTTP related mailing lists,

Last month I updated the draft for HTTP Mutual Access Authorization
Protocol proposal (draft-oiwa-http-mutualauth-06).
A full announcement has been already sent to OAuth WG mailing list.
If you are interested, please see an article in OAuth ML
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01223.html).

To step forward for next -07 draft, I have a plan to make a separate
draft which covers several extensions to HTTP authentication mechanisms
(not specific to our Mutual proposal), which may include features such
as log-out, redirection depending on authentication status etc.
The next Mutual-auth draft will then refer to that new draft for
required extensions, and will become modular and much simpler.

To realize that, I want to have suggestions from/discussion with other
people who are also working on or interested in this area.

I will visit Anaheim and attend OAuth, httpbis and several other HTTP-related WGs.
If you are interested in improving various HTTP authentication issues
(such as secure authentication, logout and others), please find us in Anaheim,
or contact me on email.  I'm looking very forward to discussing issues there.

Cheers,

-- 
Yutaka OIWA, Ph.D.                                       Research Scientist
                            Research Center for Information Security (RCIS)
    National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
                      Mail addresses: <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>, <yutaka@oiwa.jp>
OpenPGP: id[440546B5] fp[7C9F 723A 7559 3246 229D  3139 8677 9BD2 4405 46B5]

From jbemmel@zonnet.nl  Fri Mar 19 05:44:05 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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Hi,

It appears that people agree excessive token length could be an issue 
for interoperability, but opinions vary on how long tokens 
could/should/must be. Relatively long tokens will occur when encoding 
data associated with the user (access rights, group memberships, etc.), 
and integrity protection / encryption techniques (relevant when tokens 
would be transmitted using plain HTTP) could also lead to long tokens.

Instead of agreeing/standardizing on a limit for token lengths, how 
about specifying a parameter in which the client declares the maximum 
token length it can accept? That way, at least potential interop 
problems due to long tokens can be detected; the Authentication server 
can subsequently return an error response if the token it would issue 
exceeds the client's max length

Regards,
Jeroen

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Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 13:52:22 -0400
Message-ID: <68f4a0e81003191052m7ab778d6n330e58bd58b9f924@mail.gmail.com>
From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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I think 4.5 should read "iLike gadget can choose to sign request with
MySpace's private key or with a shared secret between iLike &
MySpace."

If I'm reading correctly, if the gadget chooses to use the container's
private key, then that is making use of the RSA signature mechanism.
If the gadget chooses to use the container's shared secret, then that
is the HMAC-SHA1 signature mechanism. It looks to me like the
PLAINTEXT method is not supported at all based on the wiki though I
don't see a technical reason why it should not be supported.

Ethan

On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 2:12 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote=
:
> Kevin Marks has been bugging me for awhile to understand how
> OpenSocial makes use of two-legged OAuth. =A0I reached out to the team
> and here's their description (via Evan Gilbert). =A0In general it seems
> like they're more making use of OAuth's RSA signature mechanism rather
> than the user authorization and access token flows.
>
> 1. Developer (let's say iLike) creates a gadget that runs in multiple
> containers.
> 2. User Bob is views iLike gadget on MySpace and the iLike gadget
> needs to make a request back to iLike's home server to get private
> data (let's say the user's favorite bands)
> 3. iLike gadget makes a JavaScript call to get this data from iLike
> servers. This call uses a gadgets API (gadgets.io.makeRequest) that
> proxies the request through MySpace servers.
> 4. MySpace adds validated URL parameters to the request - most
> importantly opensocial_viewer_id and opensocial_app_url. MySpace then
> signs the request and then forwards on the request to iLike's servers.
> 4.5 iLike can choose to sign request with MySpace's private key or
> with a shared secret between iLike & MySpace.
> 6. iLike verifies the signed request, using MySpace's public key or
> the shared secret.
> 7. iLike checks verifies opensocial_app_url to make sure this isn't a
> different gadget asking for data.
> 8. Lastly iLike looks up user data based on opensocial_viewer_id and
> returns it back to the gadget.
>
> Intro to signed requests:
> http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=3DIntroduction_To_Signed_Reque=
sts
> Validation of signed requests:
> http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=3DValidating_Signed_Requests
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From beaton@google.com  Fri Mar 19 11:44:48 2010
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Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 11:44:59 -0700
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 10:52 AM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> If I'm reading correctly, if the gadget chooses to use the container's
> private key, then that is making use of the RSA signature mechanism.
> If the gadget chooses to use the container's shared secret, then that
> is the HMAC-SHA1 signature mechanism.

That's right.

> It looks to me like the
> PLAINTEXT method is not supported at all based on the wiki though I
> don't see a technical reason why it should not be supported.

Plaintext doesn't work in this context, because it sends long-lived
secrets in clear-text to servers that are under the control of the
application author, or, in the case of gadgets, everyone viewing the
gadget.

Cheers,
Brian

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Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 11:45:50 -0700
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On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 11:44 AM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> Plaintext doesn't work in this context, because it sends long-lived
> secrets in clear-text to servers that are under the control of the
> application author, or, in the case of gadgets, everyone viewing the
> gadget.

Ah, the other reason plaintext doesn't work is because one of the
goals is to guarantee the integrity of the identity information passed
in the request - neither the application author nor the viewer of the
application is permitted to tamper with those parameters.

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Fri Mar 19 13:05:34 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] updated Anaheim agenda
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I've updated the agenda to reflect our room change and some adjustments
to presenters and times.

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/10mar/agenda/oauth.txt

Peter

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From esjewett@gmail.com  Fri Mar 19 13:28:31 2010
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Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 16:28:38 -0400
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From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 2:45 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>
> Ah, the other reason plaintext doesn't work is because one of the
> goals is to guarantee the integrity of the identity information passed
> in the request - neither the application author nor the viewer of the
> application is permitted to tamper with those parameters.

I don't think so. In the OpenSocial case, the only "OAuth Consumer"
per se is the OpenSocial container. The gadget is not making signed
requests and is completely trusting the container to represent it
properly to the OAuth Provider. In other words, from an OAuth request
flow perspective, the gadget is pretty much irrelevant.

Because of this, on my reading OpenSocial gadgets will have a hard
time making use of general purpose APIs, because general purpose APIs
will ignore the opensocial_viewer_id parameter, which is the key to
figuring out what application user is making the request.

In other words, the gadget and the OAuth provider must completely
trust the OpenSocial container to correctly represent the user making
the request.

Am I reading it wrong?

Ethan

From esjewett@gmail.com  Fri Mar 19 14:16:07 2010
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Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 17:16:19 -0400
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To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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Accidentally sent the following directly to Brian instead of the list.
I'll try again ....

On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 2:44 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> Plaintext doesn't work in this context, because it sends long-lived
> secrets in clear-text to servers that are under the control of the
> application author, or, in the case of gadgets, everyone viewing the
> gadget.

That's not what I read. In the OpenSocial case the gadget does not
hold the secret as that would be insecure in the manner you describe.
The container holds the secret. The gadget only tells the container
what signing method to use, not what secret to use. How the container
manages to get the secret or keep track of which secret works with
which provider is a mystery to me.

There is not need to send the secret in the clear. OAuth 1.0a says
that the PLAINTEXT method should be used only over a secure channel.

Ethan

From beaton@google.com  Fri Mar 19 15:21:40 2010
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Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 15:21:19 -0700
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 2:16 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 2:44 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>> Plaintext doesn't work in this context, because it sends long-lived
>> secrets in clear-text to servers that are under the control of the
>> application author, or, in the case of gadgets, everyone viewing the
>> gadget.
>
> That's not what I read. In the OpenSocial case the gadget does not
> hold the secret as that would be insecure in the manner you describe.
> The container holds the secret. The gadget only tells the container
> what signing method to use, not what secret to use. How the container
> manages to get the secret or keep track of which secret works with
> which provider is a mystery to me.
>
> There is not need to send the secret in the clear. OAuth 1.0a says
> that the PLAINTEXT method should be used only over a secure channel.

The gadget tells the container *where* to send the request.  So if
OpenSocial gadgets supported PLAINTEXT, a malicious gadget author, or
a malicious user of a gadget (they are pure javascript) could tell the
container "please send a request to
https://www.example.com/log_my_secret".

And the container would then leak the secret to www.example.com.

Note that the encrypted channel doesn't help with this. =)

Also note that the OAuth signing is intended to authenticate the
opensocial_* and oauth_* parameters as having originated with the
container, not the gadget.  If you allow PLAINTEXT, that doesn't work
any longer either.

Cheers,
Brian

From beaton@google.com  Fri Mar 19 15:24:49 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 1:28 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't think so. In the OpenSocial case, the only "OAuth Consumer"
> per se is the OpenSocial container. The gadget is not making signed
> requests and is completely trusting the container to represent it
> properly to the OAuth Provider. In other words, from an OAuth request
> flow perspective, the gadget is pretty much irrelevant.

I think the opensocial use cases are interesting for two reasons.

1) They use signed identity claims.
    MS has done this with SWT.
    Lots of people have done this with OpenID and SAML.
    UMA is using signed tokens with identity claims.

2) They have trusted containers that do OAuth on behalf of applications.
    This is a powerful security tool - the gadgets get short-lived
access to data, the containers hold the long-lived secrets.  WRAP also
lets you do this.

Cheers,
Brian

From davidrecordon@facebook.com  Fri Mar 19 18:31:07 2010
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From: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 18:28:45 -0700
Thread-Topic: First draft of OAuth 2.0
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As I mentioned a few weeks ago [1], I started working on editing the first =
draft of OAuth 2.0 over the past two weeks.  While I realize that it's 6pm =
Friday (sorry about that), I hope to have a solid discussion about it at Mo=
nday's meeting.  You can find the current draft of it =96 plus all of the d=
ocument history =96 on my public GitHub account a thttp://github.com/davema=
n692/OAuth-2.0.  Eran will be doing an initial editing pass before Monday a=
nd then spend more time with it next week.

I've attached both a HTML and TXT copy to this email and plan to officially=
 submit it as an Internet Draft.

The following are highlighted changes from draft-hardt-oauth-01:
   1.  A Web Client flow designed for use within JavaScript.  It also
       supports the use cases of the rich app profile so that they're
       not two separate flows.
   2.  A new device flows which is based on the Netflix/Tivo flow (TV
       shows you a code that you type in on your computer).
       http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01346.html
   3.  Remove captchas from the username/password flow.  They haven't
       been successfully implemented within this context and create
       complexity especially when we use other signals to detect
       compromised accounts.
       http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01293.html
   4.  Don't allow bearer tokens without either SSL and/or signatures.
       While some providers may offer this ability, they should be out
       of spec for doing so though technically it won't break the flows.
   5.  Abstract the refresh token flow out of each profile into its own
       section.  Support the ability to request access token secrets
       when refreshing.
   6.  Support signatures for making API requests but not for getting
       access tokens.  If you want to use signatures, you'll get an
       access token and then make a refresh call where you ask for a
       token secret.  This causes the auth server to mark the token as
       no longer being valid as a bearer token via SSL.  This
       performance tradeoff seems realistic given many use cases focus
       on high-volume API transactions and thus the one additional
       request at the onset should be noise.  The signature mechanism is
       currently from OAuth 1.0.

Obviously I couldn't have made so much progress so quickly if it weren't fo=
r WRAP and I hope that 2.0 both addresses the WRAP use cases as well as tho=
se we all have been discussing here.  I hope that I haven't missed anyone w=
ho contributed to prior work and am happy to add other authors if I have (a=
nd they wish to be added)!

Thanks,
--David

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01225.html


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Content-Description: OAuth2.txt
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From mscurtescu@google.com  Fri Mar 19 21:07:48 2010
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From: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2010 00:07:29 -0400
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To: jbemmel@zonnet.nl
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Defining a maximum token length?
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On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 8:44 AM,  <jbemmel@zonnet.nl> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> It appears that people agree excessive token length could be an issue for
> interoperability, but opinions vary on how long tokens could/should/must be.
> Relatively long tokens will occur when encoding data associated with the
> user (access rights, group memberships, etc.), and integrity protection /
> encryption techniques (relevant when tokens would be transmitted using plain
> HTTP) could also lead to long tokens.
>
> Instead of agreeing/standardizing on a limit for token lengths, how about
> specifying a parameter in which the client declares the maximum token length
> it can accept? That way, at least potential interop problems due to long
> tokens can be detected; the Authentication server can subsequently return an
> error response if the token it would issue exceeds the client's max length

Why can't the client just check the length of the returned token and decide if
it can use it or not? Much simpler than adding one extra parameter and
error code.

Also, the authorization server could specify the length range for its tokens in
its documentation, so clients would know what to expect before implementing
any code.

Marius

From recordond@gmail.com  Sat Mar 20 13:28:12 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Dinner Sunday?
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Not sure how many people will be in Anaheim Sunday evening, but should
we try to put a dinner together?  7pm-ish?

From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Sat Mar 20 14:04:01 2010
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I'm game.  Was planning to go to the welcome reception 5-7pm; should we =
gather there and head out?  We can use the LDP (Lightweight Dinner =
Protocol) -- whoever is there by 7 can come along. ;)

	Eve

On 20 Mar 2010, at 1:28 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> Not sure how many people will be in Anaheim Sunday evening, but should
> we try to put a dinner together?  7pm-ish?


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From maciej.machulak@gmail.com  Sat Mar 20 15:02:45 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] UMA Lexicon
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Hi,

In order to provide some input to the discussion for a clear and
consistent OAuth terminology, I'm sending the terminology used in
User-Managed Access (UMA). A more detailed description can be found
at: http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon

Authorizing User: A web user who configures an Authorization Manager
with policies that control how it makes access decisions when a
Requester attempts to access a Protected Resource at a Host.

Authorization Manager (AM): An UMA-defined variant of a WRAP
Authorization Server that carries out an Authorizing User's policies
governing access to a Protected Resource.

Protected Resource: A resource (at a Host) whose access is restricted.
(Note that this differs from WRAP's definition of the same term.)
Host: An UMA-defined variant of, respectively, a WRAP Protected
Resource and WRAP Client, that enforces access to the Protected
Resources it hosts, as decided by an Authorization Manager.

Token Validation URL: The URL at an Authorization Manager that a Host
uses to validate an access token.

Claim: A statement (in the sense of [IDCclaim]). Claims are conveyed
by a Requester on behalf of a Requesting Party to an Authorization
Manager in an attempt to satisfy user policy. (Protected Resources may
also contain Claims, but this is outside the view of the UMA
protocol.)

Requester: An UMA-defined variant of a WRAP Client that seeks access
to a Protected Resource.

Requesting Party: A web user, or a corporation (or other legal
person), that uses a Requester to seek access to a Protected Resource.


Cheers,
Maciej

-- 
Maciej Machulak
PhD Student, Newcastle University
http://www.trust-economics.org/maciejm

From romeda@gmail.com  Sun Mar 21 07:34:38 2010
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Hi all,

just a heads up that events have conspired such that I won't be at the
meeting in person, but will be participating via webex. Peter will be
present, and with his forthcoming appointment as Apps Area Director,
will be imbued with the moderating powers of ten ordinary Chairs (as
if he wasn't already).

cheers,

b.

From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Sun Mar 21 09:47:12 2010
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Hi Blaine,

will it be possible for everyone to attend the meeting via webex?

regards,
Torsten.
> Hi all,
>
> just a heads up that events have conspired such that I won't be at the
> meeting in person, but will be participating via webex. Peter will be
> present, and with his forthcoming appointment as Apps Area Director,
> will be imbued with the moderating powers of ten ordinary Chairs (as
> if he wasn't already).
>
> cheers,
>
> b.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    



From stpeter@stpeter.im  Sun Mar 21 09:48:59 2010
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Yes. I think I received the details overnight so I will post those as
soon as possible.

On 3/21/10 9:47 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
> Hi Blaine,
>=20
> will it be possible for everyone to attend the meeting via webex?
>=20
> regards,
> Torsten.
>> Hi all,
>>
>> just a heads up that events have conspired such that I won't be at the=

>> meeting in person, but will be participating via webex. Peter will be
>> present, and with his forthcoming appointment as Apps Area Director,
>> will be imbued with the moderating powers of ten ordinary Chairs (as
>> if he wasn't already).
>>
>> cheers,
>>
>> b.


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From stpeter@stpeter.im  Sun Mar 21 10:09:01 2010
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Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2010 10:09:07 -0700
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] WebEx session info
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Information about how to join via WebEx is here:

http://www.ietf.org/meeting/77/webex.html

The direct link for our session is quite long so I'd encourage you to
click through from the URL above.

Peter

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Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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David, great stuff -- thanks for putting this together!  Here are a few =
comments and questions from a quick read on the plane down to Anaheim, =
in spec order (the weight/priority therefore varies widely).

Abstract

- "delegate": The use of this word seems like it's different from how =
it's been used in the past, e.g. in "user delegation".  It's not a big =
deal, but possibly confusing.

Introduction:

- I'm glad there's a hint here of "autonomously or on behalf of an =
end-user", but I notice the distinction between "user delegation flows" =
and "autonomous-client flows" introduced by WRAP seems to have been made =
more implicit in this draft.  UMA has an interest in understanding very =
carefully how flows get distinguished along these lines, and in fact we =
may need to define even more flows and types of flows for our own =
purposes (see our Lexicon at =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon for more).  =
Hope to discuss this a bit tomorrow.  (And see more below in my comments =
on 2.5.)

- "provisioning tokens": I'd say resource owners don't personally =
provision tokens, but rather signal that authorization servers should do =
so on their behalf.

- The use of "server" in the intro is very natural.  See terminology =
comments below for more.

1.3. Terminology

- access token: The client might instead be making requests on behalf of =
itself, not "the user", right?

- authorization server and protected resource: These definitions cry out =
to have a formal definition of "server" (or "protected resource =
server"?) in this section as well, since "server" is already invoked =
quite naturally in a few places to mean the server of a protected =
resource.  Though the definition of protected resource says it's the =
resource served by an HTTP server, a few remaining WRAP-inherited =
instances of the term elsewhere try to force it to be both. I have some =
additional comments below that rely on a nice clean distinction between =
the authorization server and the server of a protected resource, because =
even though they're often colocated in pure-OAuth use cases, UMA makes =
strategic use of the option to separate them.  (Oh, also: s/A HTTP/An =
HTTP/)

- client identifier: s/used used/used/

- resource owner: "such that it issues...": This is a bit awkward.  =
Maybe say "to approve the issuing of an access token to a client"?

1.3.1. Endpoints

- "such as via documentation": FWIW, because UMA goes for dynamic =
introduction of various parties, we're using hostmeta and XRD to do this =
sort of thing.  Is there any wider interest in providing a (perhaps =
merely advisory) method of documentation that involves these =
technologies (or similar), to get greater interop?

- "API request": Because I'm coming from a mindset that sees all web =
resources as possibly being "OAuth-protected", and because we want to =
ensure the option of loose coupling between authorization server and =
protected resource server, I'm struggling to figure out (a) if calling =
this "API request" is too limiting given that maybe every resource on =
the server (e.g. every photo in a directory) is subject to a request for =
access, and (b) if this is something the protected resource server =
itself should advertise (vs. the authorization server), as appropriate.

- "user authorization request": s/resource owners's/resource owner's/g =
(the typo appears in a bunch of places)

2. Getting an Access Token

- "MUST implement at least one...": Are its implementation choices =
something the authorization server should advertise in documentation?

- It would be helpful to give really concrete examples/use cases of all =
of the profiles in the intro, so people can determine from this single =
place which profiles interest them.

2.1. Web Server Flow

- "without acquiring and end-user's credentials": Is this an obliquely =
stated version of "avoiding the 'password anti-pattern'"?  I think it =
could be useful to mention this phrase here somewhere.  Also, it's a =
little confusing to mention the resource owner and an end-user without =
seeming to connect them.

- oauth_callback_url: It says this is required, but what if the =
authorization server already required the client to pre-register this?

- "MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner": Should this be =
followed with "...and seek their approval of the authorization request" =
or similar?  (This whole thing doesn't seem testable since it's outside =
the view of the protocol, so I'm wondering if uppercase MUST is =
warranted.)

- oauth_error_reason: Does "user_denied" mean "the user denied the =
request"?  Since the spec holds out the (slim) possibility of the =
resource owner not being an end-user, should this be =
"resource_owner_denied" or "request_denied" or something?

- I'm thinking oauth_error_reason is where UMA could define an extension =
that gives an error like "claims_required".  I need to sort this out =
with my gang, but provide it here as food for thought.  Should we be =
defining our own parameter instead (and if so, should this spec say =
something about cases where this is done by others)?  Alternatively, =
should this spec allow for extended error codes in some formal fashion?

- "The server must retain the scope...": I *think* this means the =
authorization server, given that it's the one issuing the token, so this =
should be explicitly stated.  Keep in mind that UMA has reason to keep =
the kinds of servers architecturally separate, which means we needed to =
build a way for an UMA host (effectively an OAuth protected resource =
server) to be able to correlate the client's desired scope (as retained =
by the authorization server and baked into the issued token somehow, =
such that it can be validated when presented by the client) and the =
actual type of access attempted by the client.  Actually, I think OAuth =
has this need too, so perhaps UMA isn't all that different.

2.2. Web Client Flow

- s/a mobile device/on a mobile device/

- "the client is downloaded to the resource owner's user-agent": I =
*think* I can make sense of this, but the order just seems weird and =
backwards. :-)  Is the client, in fact, functioning as an HTTP =
user-agent itself?  Or is the client downloaded to the user's physical =
device (in which a separate user-agent is colocated)?

- "SHOULD verify that the callback URI provided ... is valid": Why not =
MUST?  It seems eminently doable.

2.3. Device Flow

- "The client MAY both poll and have...": Cleaner to say "The client =
MUST either poll or have an interface element, or both."

2.4. Username and Password Flow

- "The client MUST discard the resource owner's username...": This is =
obviously very desirable, but seems untestable.  Is the uppercase MUST =
warranted?

- "The authorization server ... MAY verify that the client is authorized =
to use this flow": Why and how would this MAY work?  I'm not quite =
understanding the goal here.

2.5. Client Identifier and Secret Flow

- "This flow is suitable when the client is also the resource owner": I =
think this was supposed to be the "two-legged"/"autonomous-client" =
solution, but this phrase throws that into doubt for me.  What was the =
intent here?  Note that UMA (like a lot of others) is interested in =
solving automated self-registration of an autonomous client at an =
authorization server.  (In case it's of interest, we've been trying to =
sort out the legal implications of parties who are *not* the resource =
owner seeking authorized access; this is where our "claims_required" =
stuff comes in.  Sometimes the client represents "itself", or rather a =
company or org acting on its own behalf; sometimes it represents a =
person different from the resource owner; etc.  See our Lexicon at =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon.)

- Probably this is an effect of needing more time for study, but why =
does this profile not use oauth_error_code like the others do, relying =
only on a 401?

3. Refreshing an Access Token

- "The authorization server MUST verify that the resource owner...": =
This seems untestable.  Is the uppercase MUST warranted?

- "the protected resource MUST NOT allow the user of the corresponding =
access token without its secret": This is a case where "[protected =
resource] server" would work way better than "protected resource", as =
resources don't allow or disallow actions; they just exist.

4.1.2. Client Calls Protected Resource Using URL Query Parameter

- "Prior to making a request": Just FYI, UMA makes use of a key stage =
prior to a client making an access-token-bearing request; the client =
(UMA requester) can hit the resource out of the blue, and in this way =
learns the relevant access token request endpoint from the protected =
resource server (UMA host).

- "the following examples use the HTTP GET method": Should the wording =
here and in the next section ("The client constructs an HTTP 'POST'...") =
be rationalized to be more similar?

Look forward to discussing more tomorrow,

	Eve

On 19 Mar 2010, at 6:28 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> As I mentioned a few weeks ago [1], I started working on editing the =
first draft of OAuth 2.0 over the past two weeks.  While I realize that =
it's 6pm Friday (sorry about that), I hope to have a solid discussion =
about it at Monday's meeting.  You can find the current draft of it =96 =
plus all of the document history =96 on my public GitHub account a =
thttp://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0.  Eran will be doing an initial =
editing pass before Monday and then spend more time with it next week.
>=20
> I've attached both a HTML and TXT copy to this email and plan to =
officially submit it as an Internet Draft.
>=20
> The following are highlighted changes from draft-hardt-oauth-01:
>   1.  A Web Client flow designed for use within JavaScript.  It also
>       supports the use cases of the rich app profile so that they're
>       not two separate flows.
>   2.  A new device flows which is based on the Netflix/Tivo flow (TV
>       shows you a code that you type in on your computer).
>       http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01346.html
>   3.  Remove captchas from the username/password flow.  They haven't
>       been successfully implemented within this context and create
>       complexity especially when we use other signals to detect
>       compromised accounts.
>       http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01293.html
>   4.  Don't allow bearer tokens without either SSL and/or signatures.
>       While some providers may offer this ability, they should be out
>       of spec for doing so though technically it won't break the =
flows.
>   5.  Abstract the refresh token flow out of each profile into its own
>       section.  Support the ability to request access token secrets
>       when refreshing.
>   6.  Support signatures for making API requests but not for getting
>       access tokens.  If you want to use signatures, you'll get an
>       access token and then make a refresh call where you ask for a
>       token secret.  This causes the auth server to mark the token as
>       no longer being valid as a bearer token via SSL.  This
>       performance tradeoff seems realistic given many use cases focus
>       on high-volume API transactions and thus the one additional
>       request at the onset should be noise.  The signature mechanism =
is
>       currently from OAuth 1.0.
>=20
> Obviously I couldn't have made so much progress so quickly if it =
weren't for WRAP and I hope that 2.0 both addresses the WRAP use cases =
as well as those we all have been discussing here.  I hope that I =
haven't missed anyone who contributed to prior work and am happy to add =
other authors if I have (and they wish to be added)!
>=20
> Thanks,
> --David
>=20
> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01225.html
>=20

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From jpanzer@google.com  Sun Mar 21 12:53:48 2010
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+1 to ensuring that dynamic introduction is possible.  I see a lot of
discussions that end up saying that this or that can be spec'd in the
server docs and the client hard coded to the docs; this is fine for
some features but not for very general ones that everybody needs to
use.

On Sunday, March 21, 2010, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
> David, great stuff -- thanks for putting this together! =A0Here are a few=
 comments and questions from a quick read on the plane down to Anaheim, in =
spec order (the weight/priority therefore varies widely).
>
> Abstract
>
> - "delegate": The use of this word seems like it's different from how it'=
s been used in the past, e.g. in "user delegation". =A0It's not a big deal,=
 but possibly confusing.
>
> Introduction:
>
> - I'm glad there's a hint here of "autonomously or on behalf of an end-us=
er", but I notice the distinction between "user delegation flows" and "auto=
nomous-client flows" introduced by WRAP seems to have been made more implic=
it in this draft. =A0UMA has an interest in understanding very carefully ho=
w flows get distinguished along these lines, and in fact we may need to def=
ine even more flows and types of flows for our own purposes (see our Lexico=
n at http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon for more).=
 =A0Hope to discuss this a bit tomorrow. =A0(And see more below in my comme=
nts on 2.5.)
>
> - "provisioning tokens": I'd say resource owners don't personally provisi=
on tokens, but rather signal that authorization servers should do so on the=
ir behalf.
>
> - The use of "server" in the intro is very natural. =A0See terminology co=
mments below for more.
>
> 1.3. Terminology
>
> - access token: The client might instead be making requests on behalf of =
itself, not "the user", right?
>
> - authorization server and protected resource: These definitions cry out =
to have a formal definition of "server" (or "protected resource server"?) i=
n this section as well, since "server" is already invoked quite naturally i=
n a few places to mean the server of a protected resource. =A0Though the de=
finition of protected resource says it's the resource served by an HTTP ser=
ver, a few remaining WRAP-inherited instances of the term elsewhere try to =
force it to be both. I have some additional comments below that rely on a n=
ice clean distinction between the authorization server and the server of a =
protected resource, because even though they're often colocated in pure-OAu=
th use cases, UMA makes strategic use of the option to separate them. =A0(O=
h, also: s/A HTTP/An HTTP/)
>
> - client identifier: s/used used/used/
>
> - resource owner: "such that it issues...": This is a bit awkward. =A0May=
be say "to approve the issuing of an access token to a client"?
>
> 1.3.1. Endpoints
>
> - "such as via documentation": FWIW, because UMA goes for dynamic introdu=
ction of various parties, we're using hostmeta and XRD to do this sort of t=
hing. =A0Is there any wider interest in providing a (perhaps merely advisor=
y) method of documentation that involves these technologies (or similar), t=
o get greater interop?
>
> - "API request": Because I'm coming from a mindset that sees all web reso=
urces as possibly being "OAuth-protected", and because we want to ensure th=
e option of loose coupling between authorization server and protected resou=
rce server, I'm struggling to figure out (a) if calling this "API request" =
is too limiting given that maybe every resource on the server (e.g. every p=
hoto in a directory) is subject to a request for access, and (b) if this is=
 something the protected resource server itself should advertise (vs. the a=
uthorization server), as appropriate.
>
> - "user authorization request": s/resource owners's/resource owner's/g (t=
he typo appears in a bunch of places)
>
> 2. Getting an Access Token
>
> - "MUST implement at least one...": Are its implementation choices someth=
ing the authorization server should advertise in documentation?
>
> - It would be helpful to give really concrete examples/use cases of all o=
f the profiles in the intro, so people can determine from this single place=
 which profiles interest them.
>
> 2.1. Web Server Flow
>
> - "without acquiring and end-user's credentials": Is this an obliquely st=
ated version of "avoiding the 'password anti-pattern'"? =A0I think it could=
 be useful to mention this phrase here somewhere. =A0Also, it's a little co=
nfusing to mention the resource owner and an end-user without seeming to co=
nnect them.
>
> - oauth_callback_url: It says this is required, but what if the authoriza=
tion server already required the client to pre-register this?
>
> - "MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner": Should this be =
followed with "...and seek their approval of the authorization request" or =
similar? =A0(This whole thing doesn't seem testable since it's outside the =
view of the protocol, so I'm wondering if uppercase MUST is warranted.)
>
> - oauth_error_reason: Does "user_denied" mean "the user denied the reques=
t"? =A0Since the spec holds out the (slim) possibility of the resource owne=
r not being an end-user, should this be "resource_owner_denied" or "request=
_denied" or something?
>
> - I'm thinking oauth_error_reason is where UMA could define an extension =
that gives an error like "claims_required". =A0I need to sort this out with=
 my gang, but provide it here as food for thought. =A0Should we be defining=
 our own parameter instead (and if so, should this spec say something about=
 cases where this is done by others)? =A0Alternatively, should this spec al=
low for extended error codes in some formal fashion?
>
> - "The server must retain the scope...": I *think* this means the authori=
zation server, given that it's the one issuing the token, so this should be=
 explicitly stated. =A0Keep in mind that UMA has reason to keep the kinds o=
f servers architecturally separate, which means we needed to build a way fo=
r an UMA host (effectively an OAuth protected resource server) to be able t=
o correlate the client's desired scope (as retained by the authorization se=
rver and baked into the issued token somehow, such that it can be validated=
 when presented by the client) and the actual type of access attempted by t=
he client. =A0Actually, I think OAuth has this need too, so perhaps UMA isn=
't all that different.
>
> 2.2. Web Client Flow
>
> - s/a mobile device/on a mobile device/
>
> - "the client is downloaded to the resource owner's user-agent": I *think=
* I can make sense of this, but the order just seems weird and backwards. :=
-) =A0Is the client, in fact, functioning as an HTTP user-agent itself? =A0=
Or is the client downloaded to the user's physical device (in which a separ=
ate user-agent is colocated)?
>
> - "SHOULD verify that the callback URI provided ... is valid": Why not MU=
ST? =A0It seems eminently doable.
>
> 2.3. Device Flow
>
> - "The client MAY both poll and have...": Cleaner to say "The client MUST=
 either poll or have an interface element, or both."
>
> 2.4. Username and Password Flow
>
> - "The client MUST discard the resource owner's username...": This is obv=
iously very desirable, but seems untestable. =A0Is the uppercase MUST warra=
nted?
>
> - "The authorization server ... MAY verify that the client is authorized =
to use this flow": Why and how would this MAY work? =A0I'm not quite unders=
tanding the goal here.
>
> 2.5. Client Identifier and Secret Flow
>
> - "This flow is suitable when the client is also the resource owner": I t=
hink this was supposed to be the "two-legged"/"autonomous-client" solution,=
 but this phrase throws that into doubt for me. =A0What was the intent here=
? =A0Note that UMA (like a lot of others) is interested in solving automate=
d self-registration of an autonomous client at an authorization server. =A0=
(In case it's of interest, we've been trying to sort out the legal implicat=
ions of parties who are *not* the resource owner seeking authorized access;=
 this is where our "claims_required" stuff comes in. =A0Sometimes the clien=
t represents "itself", or rather a company or org acting on its own behalf;=
 sometimes it represents a person different from the resource owner; etc. =
=A0See our Lexicon at http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/L=
exicon.)
>
> - Probably this is an effect of needing more time for study, but why does=
 this profile not use oauth_error_code like the others do, relying only on =
a 401?
>
> 3. Refreshing an Access Token
>
> - "The authorization server MUST verify that the resource owner...": This=
 seems untestable. =A0Is the uppercase MUST warranted?
>
> - "the protected resource MUST NOT allow the user of the corresponding ac=
cess token without its secret": This is a case where "[protected resource] =
server" would work way better than "protected resource", as resources don't=
 allow or disallow actions; they just exist.
>
> 4.1.2. Client Calls Protected Resource Using URL Query Parameter
>
> - "Prior to making a request": Just FYI, UMA makes use of a key stage pri=
or to a client making an access-token-bearing request; the client (UMA requ=
ester) can hit the resource out of the blue, and in this way learns the rel=
evant access token request endpoint from the protected resource server (UMA=
 host).
>
> - "the following examples use the HTTP GET method": Should the wording he=
re and in the next section ("The client constructs an HTTP 'POST'...") be r=
ationalized to be more similar?
>
> Look forward to discussing more tomorrow,
>
>  =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Eve
>
> On 19 Mar 2010, at 6:28 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>
>> As I mentioned a few weeks ago [1], I started working on editing the fir=
st draft of OAuth 2.0 over the past two weeks. =A0While I realize that it's=
 6pm Friday (sorry about that), I hope to have a solid discussion about it =
at Monday's meeting. =A0You can find the current draft of it =96 plus all o=
f the document history =96 on my public GitHub account a thttp://github.com=
/daveman692/OAuth-2.0. =A0Eran will be doing an initial editing pass before=
 Monday and then spend more time with it next week.
>>
>> I've attached both a HTML and TXT copy to this email and plan to officia=
lly submit it as an Internet Draft.
>>
>> The following are highlighted changes from draft-hardt-oauth-01:
>> =A0 1. =A0A Web Client flow designed for use within JavaScript. =A0It al=
so
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 supports the use cases of the rich app profile so that they'=
re
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 not two separate flows.
>> =A0 2. =A0A new device flows which is based on the Netflix/Tivo flow (TV
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 shows you a code that you type in on your computer).
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01346.=
html
>> =A0 3. =A0Remove captchas from the username/password flow. =A0They haven=
't
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 been successfully implemented within this context and create
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 complexity especially when we use other signals to detect
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 compromised accounts.
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01293.=
html
>> =A0 4. =A0Don't allow bearer tokens without either SSL and/or signatures=
.
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 While some providers may offer this ability, they should be =
out
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 of spec for doing so though technically it won't break the f=
lows.
>> =A0 5. =A0Abstract the refresh token flow out of each profile into its o=
wn
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 section. =A0Support the ability to request access token secr=
ets
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 when refreshing.
>> =A0 6. =A0Support signatures for making API requests but not for getting
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 access tokens. =A0If you want to use signatures, you'll get =
an
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 access token and then make a refresh call where you ask for =
a
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 token secret. =A0This causes the auth server to mark the tok=
en as
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 no longer being valid as a bearer token via SSL. =A0This
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 performance tradeoff seems realistic given many use cases fo=
cus
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 on high-volume API transactions and thus the one additional
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 request at the onset should be noise. =A0The signature mecha=
nism is
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 currently from OAuth 1.0.
>>
>> Obviously I couldn't have made so much progress so quickly if it weren't=
 for WRAP and I hope that 2.0 both addresses the WRAP use cases as well as =
those we all have been discussing here. =A0I hope that I haven't missed any=
one who contributed to prior work and am happy to add other authors if I ha=
ve (and they wish to be added)!
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --David
>>
>> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01225.html
>>
>
> Eve Maler
> eve@xmlgrrl.com
> http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--=20
--
John Panzer / Google
jpanzer@google.com / abstractioneer.org / @jpanzer

From davidrecordon@facebook.com  Sun Mar 21 13:43:32 2010
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From: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>
To: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>, "Eve L. Maler" <eve@xmlgrrl.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2010 13:43:30 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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The goal of the, "the authorization server advertises (such as via document=
ation) the URIs of the following three endpoints" wording was to allow for =
a discovery process that is defined separately from this spec.  Is that unc=
lear?  Have other words to propose?

Eve, thanks for the detailed feedback!  Future email coming with commits or=
 comments for each one.

--David

On Mar 21, 2010, at 12:53 PM, John Panzer wrote:

> +1 to ensuring that dynamic introduction is possible.  I see a lot of
> discussions that end up saying that this or that can be spec'd in the
> server docs and the client hard coded to the docs; this is fine for
> some features but not for very general ones that everybody needs to
> use.
>=20
> On Sunday, March 21, 2010, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
>> David, great stuff -- thanks for putting this together!  Here are a few =
comments and questions from a quick read on the plane down to Anaheim, in s=
pec order (the weight/priority therefore varies widely).
>>=20
>> Abstract
>>=20
>> - "delegate": The use of this word seems like it's different from how it=
's been used in the past, e.g. in "user delegation".  It's not a big deal, =
but possibly confusing.
>>=20
>> Introduction:
>>=20
>> - I'm glad there's a hint here of "autonomously or on behalf of an end-u=
ser", but I notice the distinction between "user delegation flows" and "aut=
onomous-client flows" introduced by WRAP seems to have been made more impli=
cit in this draft.  UMA has an interest in understanding very carefully how=
 flows get distinguished along these lines, and in fact we may need to defi=
ne even more flows and types of flows for our own purposes (see our Lexicon=
 at http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon for more). =
 Hope to discuss this a bit tomorrow.  (And see more below in my comments o=
n 2.5.)
>>=20
>> - "provisioning tokens": I'd say resource owners don't personally provis=
ion tokens, but rather signal that authorization servers should do so on th=
eir behalf.
>>=20
>> - The use of "server" in the intro is very natural.  See terminology com=
ments below for more.
>>=20
>> 1.3. Terminology
>>=20
>> - access token: The client might instead be making requests on behalf of=
 itself, not "the user", right?
>>=20
>> - authorization server and protected resource: These definitions cry out=
 to have a formal definition of "server" (or "protected resource server"?) =
in this section as well, since "server" is already invoked quite naturally =
in a few places to mean the server of a protected resource.  Though the def=
inition of protected resource says it's the resource served by an HTTP serv=
er, a few remaining WRAP-inherited instances of the term elsewhere try to f=
orce it to be both. I have some additional comments below that rely on a ni=
ce clean distinction between the authorization server and the server of a p=
rotected resource, because even though they're often colocated in pure-OAut=
h use cases, UMA makes strategic use of the option to separate them.  (Oh, =
also: s/A HTTP/An HTTP/)
>>=20
>> - client identifier: s/used used/used/
>>=20
>> - resource owner: "such that it issues...": This is a bit awkward.  Mayb=
e say "to approve the issuing of an access token to a client"?
>>=20
>> 1.3.1. Endpoints
>>=20
>> - "such as via documentation": FWIW, because UMA goes for dynamic introd=
uction of various parties, we're using hostmeta and XRD to do this sort of =
thing.  Is there any wider interest in providing a (perhaps merely advisory=
) method of documentation that involves these technologies (or similar), to=
 get greater interop?
>>=20
>> - "API request": Because I'm coming from a mindset that sees all web res=
ources as possibly being "OAuth-protected", and because we want to ensure t=
he option of loose coupling between authorization server and protected reso=
urce server, I'm struggling to figure out (a) if calling this "API request"=
 is too limiting given that maybe every resource on the server (e.g. every =
photo in a directory) is subject to a request for access, and (b) if this i=
s something the protected resource server itself should advertise (vs. the =
authorization server), as appropriate.
>>=20
>> - "user authorization request": s/resource owners's/resource owner's/g (=
the typo appears in a bunch of places)
>>=20
>> 2. Getting an Access Token
>>=20
>> - "MUST implement at least one...": Are its implementation choices somet=
hing the authorization server should advertise in documentation?
>>=20
>> - It would be helpful to give really concrete examples/use cases of all =
of the profiles in the intro, so people can determine from this single plac=
e which profiles interest them.
>>=20
>> 2.1. Web Server Flow
>>=20
>> - "without acquiring and end-user's credentials": Is this an obliquely s=
tated version of "avoiding the 'password anti-pattern'"?  I think it could =
be useful to mention this phrase here somewhere.  Also, it's a little confu=
sing to mention the resource owner and an end-user without seeming to conne=
ct them.
>>=20
>> - oauth_callback_url: It says this is required, but what if the authoriz=
ation server already required the client to pre-register this?
>>=20
>> - "MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner": Should this be=
 followed with "...and seek their approval of the authorization request" or=
 similar?  (This whole thing doesn't seem testable since it's outside the v=
iew of the protocol, so I'm wondering if uppercase MUST is warranted.)
>>=20
>> - oauth_error_reason: Does "user_denied" mean "the user denied the reque=
st"?  Since the spec holds out the (slim) possibility of the resource owner=
 not being an end-user, should this be "resource_owner_denied" or "request_=
denied" or something?
>>=20
>> - I'm thinking oauth_error_reason is where UMA could define an extension=
 that gives an error like "claims_required".  I need to sort this out with =
my gang, but provide it here as food for thought.  Should we be defining ou=
r own parameter instead (and if so, should this spec say something about ca=
ses where this is done by others)?  Alternatively, should this spec allow f=
or extended error codes in some formal fashion?
>>=20
>> - "The server must retain the scope...": I *think* this means the author=
ization server, given that it's the one issuing the token, so this should b=
e explicitly stated.  Keep in mind that UMA has reason to keep the kinds of=
 servers architecturally separate, which means we needed to build a way for=
 an UMA host (effectively an OAuth protected resource server) to be able to=
 correlate the client's desired scope (as retained by the authorization ser=
ver and baked into the issued token somehow, such that it can be validated =
when presented by the client) and the actual type of access attempted by th=
e client.  Actually, I think OAuth has this need too, so perhaps UMA isn't =
all that different.
>>=20
>> 2.2. Web Client Flow
>>=20
>> - s/a mobile device/on a mobile device/
>>=20
>> - "the client is downloaded to the resource owner's user-agent": I *thin=
k* I can make sense of this, but the order just seems weird and backwards. =
:-)  Is the client, in fact, functioning as an HTTP user-agent itself?  Or =
is the client downloaded to the user's physical device (in which a separate=
 user-agent is colocated)?
>>=20
>> - "SHOULD verify that the callback URI provided ... is valid": Why not M=
UST?  It seems eminently doable.
>>=20
>> 2.3. Device Flow
>>=20
>> - "The client MAY both poll and have...": Cleaner to say "The client MUS=
T either poll or have an interface element, or both."
>>=20
>> 2.4. Username and Password Flow
>>=20
>> - "The client MUST discard the resource owner's username...": This is ob=
viously very desirable, but seems untestable.  Is the uppercase MUST warran=
ted?
>>=20
>> - "The authorization server ... MAY verify that the client is authorized=
 to use this flow": Why and how would this MAY work?  I'm not quite underst=
anding the goal here.
>>=20
>> 2.5. Client Identifier and Secret Flow
>>=20
>> - "This flow is suitable when the client is also the resource owner": I =
think this was supposed to be the "two-legged"/"autonomous-client" solution=
, but this phrase throws that into doubt for me.  What was the intent here?=
  Note that UMA (like a lot of others) is interested in solving automated s=
elf-registration of an autonomous client at an authorization server.  (In c=
ase it's of interest, we've been trying to sort out the legal implications =
of parties who are *not* the resource owner seeking authorized access; this=
 is where our "claims_required" stuff comes in.  Sometimes the client repre=
sents "itself", or rather a company or org acting on its own behalf; someti=
mes it represents a person different from the resource owner; etc.  See our=
 Lexicon at http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon.)
>>=20
>> - Probably this is an effect of needing more time for study, but why doe=
s this profile not use oauth_error_code like the others do, relying only on=
 a 401?
>>=20
>> 3. Refreshing an Access Token
>>=20
>> - "The authorization server MUST verify that the resource owner...": Thi=
s seems untestable.  Is the uppercase MUST warranted?
>>=20
>> - "the protected resource MUST NOT allow the user of the corresponding a=
ccess token without its secret": This is a case where "[protected resource]=
 server" would work way better than "protected resource", as resources don'=
t allow or disallow actions; they just exist.
>>=20
>> 4.1.2. Client Calls Protected Resource Using URL Query Parameter
>>=20
>> - "Prior to making a request": Just FYI, UMA makes use of a key stage pr=
ior to a client making an access-token-bearing request; the client (UMA req=
uester) can hit the resource out of the blue, and in this way learns the re=
levant access token request endpoint from the protected resource server (UM=
A host).
>>=20
>> - "the following examples use the HTTP GET method": Should the wording h=
ere and in the next section ("The client constructs an HTTP 'POST'...") be =
rationalized to be more similar?
>>=20
>> Look forward to discussing more tomorrow,
>>=20
>>        Eve
>>=20
>> On 19 Mar 2010, at 6:28 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>>=20
>>> As I mentioned a few weeks ago [1], I started working on editing the fi=
rst draft of OAuth 2.0 over the past two weeks.  While I realize that it's =
6pm Friday (sorry about that), I hope to have a solid discussion about it a=
t Monday's meeting.  You can find the current draft of it =96 plus all of t=
he document history =96 on my public GitHub account a thttp://github.com/da=
veman692/OAuth-2.0.  Eran will be doing an initial editing pass before Mond=
ay and then spend more time with it next week.
>>>=20
>>> I've attached both a HTML and TXT copy to this email and plan to offici=
ally submit it as an Internet Draft.
>>>=20
>>> The following are highlighted changes from draft-hardt-oauth-01:
>>>  1.  A Web Client flow designed for use within JavaScript.  It also
>>>      supports the use cases of the rich app profile so that they're
>>>      not two separate flows.
>>>  2.  A new device flows which is based on the Netflix/Tivo flow (TV
>>>      shows you a code that you type in on your computer).
>>>      http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01346.html
>>>  3.  Remove captchas from the username/password flow.  They haven't
>>>      been successfully implemented within this context and create
>>>      complexity especially when we use other signals to detect
>>>      compromised accounts.
>>>      http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01293.html
>>>  4.  Don't allow bearer tokens without either SSL and/or signatures.
>>>      While some providers may offer this ability, they should be out
>>>      of spec for doing so though technically it won't break the flows.
>>>  5.  Abstract the refresh token flow out of each profile into its own
>>>      section.  Support the ability to request access token secrets
>>>      when refreshing.
>>>  6.  Support signatures for making API requests but not for getting
>>>      access tokens.  If you want to use signatures, you'll get an
>>>      access token and then make a refresh call where you ask for a
>>>      token secret.  This causes the auth server to mark the token as
>>>      no longer being valid as a bearer token via SSL.  This
>>>      performance tradeoff seems realistic given many use cases focus
>>>      on high-volume API transactions and thus the one additional
>>>      request at the onset should be noise.  The signature mechanism is
>>>      currently from OAuth 1.0.
>>>=20
>>> Obviously I couldn't have made so much progress so quickly if it weren'=
t for WRAP and I hope that 2.0 both addresses the WRAP use cases as well as=
 those we all have been discussing here.  I hope that I haven't missed anyo=
ne who contributed to prior work and am happy to add other authors if I hav=
e (and they wish to be added)!
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>> --David
>>>=20
>>> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01225.html
>>>=20
>>=20
>> Eve Maler
>> eve@xmlgrrl.com
>> http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>=20
> --
> --
> John Panzer / Google
> jpanzer@google.com / abstractioneer.org / @jpanzer


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Thanks!  Comments inline and updated the repo
(http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/3193098ff45168dd0a6545633442=
8b20215f848a).

On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 12:03 PM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
> David, great stuff -- thanks for putting this together! =A0Here are a few=
 comments and questions from a quick read on the plane down to Anaheim, in =
spec order (the weight/priority therefore varies widely).
>
> Abstract
>
> - "delegate": The use of this word seems like it's different from how it'=
s been used in the past, e.g. in "user delegation". =A0It's not a big deal,=
 but possibly confusing.

Rephrased a bit, but someone should just rewrite the abstract to begin with=
.


> Introduction:
>
> - I'm glad there's a hint here of "autonomously or on behalf of an end-us=
er", but I notice the distinction between "user delegation flows" and "auto=
nomous-client flows" introduced by WRAP seems to have been made more implic=
it in this draft. =A0UMA has an interest in understanding very carefully ho=
w flows get distinguished along these lines, and in fact we may need to def=
ine even more flows and types of flows for our own purposes (see our Lexico=
n at http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon for more).=
 =A0Hope to discuss this a bit tomorrow. =A0(And see more below in my comme=
nts on 2.5.)

Made it more implicit, but not trying to remove the autonomous-client
flows.  Reworded a little.


> - "provisioning tokens": I'd say resource owners don't personally provisi=
on tokens, but rather signal that authorization servers should do so on the=
ir behalf.

Rephrased, but the entire introduction needs (re)writing.


> - The use of "server" in the intro is very natural. =A0See terminology co=
mments below for more.
>
> 1.3. Terminology
>
> - access token: The client might instead be making requests on behalf of =
itself, not "the user", right?

Thanks, changed.


> - authorization server and protected resource: These definitions cry out =
to have a formal definition of "server" (or "protected resource server"?) i=
n this section as well, since "server" is already invoked quite naturally i=
n a few places to mean the server of a protected resource. =A0Though the de=
finition of protected resource says it's the resource served by an HTTP ser=
ver, a few remaining WRAP-inherited instances of the term elsewhere try to =
force it to be both. I have some additional comments below that rely on a n=
ice clean distinction between the authorization server and the server of a =
protected resource, because even though they're often colocated in pure-OAu=
th use cases, UMA makes strategic use of the option to separate them. =A0(O=
h, also: s/A HTTP/An HTTP/)

Added the OAuth 1.0 definition.  Had it before, but someone convinced
me to remove it.


> - client identifier: s/used used/used/

Thanks!


> - resource owner: "such that it issues...": This is a bit awkward. =A0May=
be say "to approve the issuing of an access token to a client"?

Thanks!


> 1.3.1. Endpoints
>
> - "such as via documentation": FWIW, because UMA goes for dynamic introdu=
ction of various parties, we're using hostmeta and XRD to do this sort of t=
hing. =A0Is there any wider interest in providing a (perhaps merely advisor=
y) method of documentation that involves these technologies (or similar), t=
o get greater interop?

This wording isn't meant to limit future discovery technologies.
Rephrased to "The client discovers the following three URI endpoints
from the server (such as via reading documentation):"


> - "API request": Because I'm coming from a mindset that sees all web reso=
urces as possibly being "OAuth-protected", and because we want to ensure th=
e option of loose coupling between authorization server and protected resou=
rce server, I'm struggling to figure out (a) if calling this "API request" =
is too limiting given that maybe every resource on the server (e.g. every p=
hoto in a directory) is subject to a request for access, and (b) if this is=
 something the protected resource server itself should advertise (vs. the a=
uthorization server), as appropriate.

Changed to "endpoint(s)" and removed "authorization" from the previous
sentence.  I think that we should stick with the "API Request"
wording.


> - "user authorization request": s/resource owners's/resource owner's/g (t=
he typo appears in a bunch of places)

Thanks, fixed three times.


> 2. Getting an Access Token
>
> - "MUST implement at least one...": Are its implementation choices someth=
ing the authorization server should advertise in documentation?

I imagine so, but doing so seems orthogonal to the spec.


> - It would be helpful to give really concrete examples/use cases of all o=
f the profiles in the intro, so people can determine from this single place=
 which profiles interest them.

Each flow starts with one or two sentences trying to describe when
they should be used.  I'm perfectly willing to admin that they might
not be complete.  Happy to accept text from anyone! (Same goes for the
intro.)


> 2.1. Web Server Flow
>
> - "without acquiring and end-user's credentials": Is this an obliquely st=
ated version of "avoiding the 'password anti-pattern'"? =A0I think it could=
 be useful to mention this phrase here somewhere. =A0Also, it's a little co=
nfusing to mention the resource owner and an end-user without seeming to co=
nnect them.

Added.


> - oauth_callback_url: It says this is required, but what if the authoriza=
tion server already required the client to pre-register this?

Always required even if pre-registered.  Makes the request really
explicit about what the client intends to have happen without relying
on magic.


> - "MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner": Should this be =
followed with "...and seek their approval of the authorization request" or =
similar? =A0(This whole thing doesn't seem testable since it's outside the =
view of the protocol, so I'm wondering if uppercase MUST is warranted.)

I'll rely on Eran's editing pass to correct my must/MUST usage. :)

Could make seeking approval more defined, though the next sentence
begins with "If the resource owner approves the authorization
request".


> - oauth_error_reason: Does "user_denied" mean "the user denied the reques=
t"? =A0Since the spec holds out the (slim) possibility of the resource owne=
r not being an end-user, should this be "resource_owner_denied" or "request=
_denied" or something?

Changed to "owner_denied".


> - I'm thinking oauth_error_reason is where UMA could define an extension =
that gives an error like "claims_required". =A0I need to sort this out with=
 my gang, but provide it here as food for thought. =A0Should we be defining=
 our own parameter instead (and if so, should this spec say something about=
 cases where this is done by others)? =A0Alternatively, should this spec al=
low for extended error codes in some formal fashion?

Error codes are coming up quite a bit.  In general you should rely on
HTTP error responses, but there are cases where they're not specific
enough.  I'd really appreciate a list of error reasons that
implementors would like to see in the protocol.  A combined list will
help make it happen.  Seems like we should start a thread about this.


> - "The server must retain the scope...": I *think* this means the authori=
zation server, given that it's the one issuing the token, so this should be=
 explicitly stated. =A0Keep in mind that UMA has reason to keep the kinds o=
f servers architecturally separate, which means we needed to build a way fo=
r an UMA host (effectively an OAuth protected resource server) to be able t=
o correlate the client's desired scope (as retained by the authorization se=
rver and baked into the issued token somehow, such that it can be validated=
 when presented by the client) and the actual type of access attempted by t=
he client. =A0Actually, I think OAuth has this need too, so perhaps UMA isn=
't all that different.

Yes, the authorization server is what's meant.  Changed five times.


> 2.2. Web Client Flow
>
> - s/a mobile device/on a mobile device/

Thx.


> - "the client is downloaded to the resource owner's user-agent": I *think=
* I can make sense of this, but the order just seems weird and backwards. :=
-) =A0Is the client, in fact, functioning as an HTTP user-agent itself? =A0=
Or is the client downloaded to the user's physical device (in which a separ=
ate user-agent is colocated)?

Both.


> - "SHOULD verify that the callback URI provided ... is valid": Why not MU=
ST? =A0It seems eminently doable.

Changed to MUST given that callback URL verification is one of the few
ways to protect this flow.



> 2.3. Device Flow
>
> - "The client MAY both poll and have...": Cleaner to say "The client MUST=
 either poll or have an interface element, or both."

Changed.


> 2.4. Username and Password Flow
>
> - "The client MUST discard the resource owner's username...": This is obv=
iously very desirable, but seems untestable. =A0Is the uppercase MUST warra=
nted?

Lowercased.


> - "The authorization server ... MAY verify that the client is authorized =
to use this flow": Why and how would this MAY work? =A0I'm not quite unders=
tanding the goal here.

Idea is that this flow will probably not be offerred to any client.  I
think Raffi is working on some text around making this flow seem
scarier already.  The goal is to discourage it's use given that the
other flows do a better job of protecting user security.


> 2.5. Client Identifier and Secret Flow
>
> - "This flow is suitable when the client is also the resource owner": I t=
hink this was supposed to be the "two-legged"/"autonomous-client" solution,=
 but this phrase throws that into doubt for me. =A0What was the intent here=
? =A0Note that UMA (like a lot of others) is interested in solving automate=
d self-registration of an autonomous client at an authorization server. =A0=
(In case it's of interest, we've been trying to sort out the legal implicat=
ions of parties who are *not* the resource owner seeking authorized access;=
 this is where our "claims_required" stuff comes in. =A0Sometimes the clien=
t represents "itself", or rather a company or org acting on its own behalf;=
 sometimes it represents a person different from the resource owner; etc. =
=A0See our Lexicon at http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/L=
exicon.)

You're right.  Can you help reword please?


> - Probably this is an effect of needing more time for study, but why does=
 this profile not use oauth_error_code like the others do, relying only on =
a 401?

See earlier reply on error codes.  Happy to add some if they're well define=
d.


> 3. Refreshing an Access Token
>
> - "The authorization server MUST verify that the resource owner...": This=
 seems untestable. =A0Is the uppercase MUST warranted?

Will let Eran fix.


> - "the protected resource MUST NOT allow the user of the corresponding ac=
cess token without its secret": This is a case where "[protected resource] =
server" would work way better than "protected resource", as resources don't=
 allow or disallow actions; they just exist.

hmm, does read a bit better in most cases.  Means changing the
definition as well.  What do others thing?


> 4.1.2. Client Calls Protected Resource Using URL Query Parameter
>
> - "Prior to making a request": Just FYI, UMA makes use of a key stage pri=
or to a client making an access-token-bearing request; the client (UMA requ=
ester) can hit the resource out of the blue, and in this way learns the rel=
evant access token request endpoint from the protected resource server (UMA=
 host).

Sure, don't see this spec as limiting that.


> - "the following examples use the HTTP GET method": Should the wording he=
re and in the next section ("The client constructs an HTTP 'POST'...") be r=
ationalized to be more similar?

Hoping Eran cleans this up a bit more.


> Look forward to discussing more tomorrow,

Definitely, looking forward to it!

Thanks again!

--David

>
> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Eve
>
> On 19 Mar 2010, at 6:28 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>
>> As I mentioned a few weeks ago [1], I started working on editing the fir=
st draft of OAuth 2.0 over the past two weeks. =A0While I realize that it's=
 6pm Friday (sorry about that), I hope to have a solid discussion about it =
at Monday's meeting. =A0You can find the current draft of it =96 plus all o=
f the document history =96 on my public GitHub account a thttp://github.com=
/daveman692/OAuth-2.0. =A0Eran will be doing an initial editing pass before=
 Monday and then spend more time with it next week.
>>
>> I've attached both a HTML and TXT copy to this email and plan to officia=
lly submit it as an Internet Draft.
>>
>> The following are highlighted changes from draft-hardt-oauth-01:
>> =A0 1. =A0A Web Client flow designed for use within JavaScript. =A0It al=
so
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 supports the use cases of the rich app profile so that they'=
re
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 not two separate flows.
>> =A0 2. =A0A new device flows which is based on the Netflix/Tivo flow (TV
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 shows you a code that you type in on your computer).
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01346.=
html
>> =A0 3. =A0Remove captchas from the username/password flow. =A0They haven=
't
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 been successfully implemented within this context and create
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 complexity especially when we use other signals to detect
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 compromised accounts.
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01293.=
html
>> =A0 4. =A0Don't allow bearer tokens without either SSL and/or signatures=
.
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 While some providers may offer this ability, they should be =
out
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 of spec for doing so though technically it won't break the f=
lows.
>> =A0 5. =A0Abstract the refresh token flow out of each profile into its o=
wn
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 section. =A0Support the ability to request access token secr=
ets
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 when refreshing.
>> =A0 6. =A0Support signatures for making API requests but not for getting
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 access tokens. =A0If you want to use signatures, you'll get =
an
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 access token and then make a refresh call where you ask for =
a
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 token secret. =A0This causes the auth server to mark the tok=
en as
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 no longer being valid as a bearer token via SSL. =A0This
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 performance tradeoff seems realistic given many use cases fo=
cus
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 on high-volume API transactions and thus the one additional
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 request at the onset should be noise. =A0The signature mecha=
nism is
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 currently from OAuth 1.0.
>>
>> Obviously I couldn't have made so much progress so quickly if it weren't=
 for WRAP and I hope that 2.0 both addresses the WRAP use cases as well as =
those we all have been discussing here. =A0I hope that I haven't missed any=
one who contributed to prior work and am happy to add other authors if I ha=
ve (and they wish to be added)!
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --David
>>
>> [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01225.html
>>
>
> Eve Maler
> eve@xmlgrrl.com
> http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Sun Mar 21 18:12:03 2010
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On 21 Mar 2010, at 1:43 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> The goal of the, "the authorization server advertises (such as via =
documentation) the URIs of the following three endpoints" wording was to =
allow for a discovery process that is defined separately from this spec. =
 Is that unclear?  Have other words to propose?

So perhaps this wants to be a thin spec that can be combined with the =
OAuth core spec, if there's general interest in it.  (In the UMA spec, =
we were already in the position of making up some XRD to describe a =
couple of WRAP endpoints, along with UMA endpoints and metadata.  It =
would be nice to have a canonical version of the former, at the least.)

>=20
> Eve, thanks for the detailed feedback!  Future email coming with =
commits or comments for each one.

Hopefully sometime before the actual meeting tomorrow, I'll respond with =
spec text ideas where you -- very reasonably :-) -- asked me to supply =
some.

	Eve

>=20
> --David
>=20
> On Mar 21, 2010, at 12:53 PM, John Panzer wrote:
>=20
>> +1 to ensuring that dynamic introduction is possible.  I see a lot of
>> discussions that end up saying that this or that can be spec'd in the
>> server docs and the client hard coded to the docs; this is fine for
>> some features but not for very general ones that everybody needs to
>> use.

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Sun Mar 21 20:26:01 2010
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Selected thoughts in response:

On 21 Mar 2010, at 3:51 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> Thanks!  Comments inline and updated the repo
> =
(http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/3193098ff45168dd0a654563344=
28b20215f848a).
>=20
> On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 12:03 PM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
>> David, great stuff -- thanks for putting this together!  Here are a =
few comments and questions from a quick read on the plane down to =
Anaheim, in spec order (the weight/priority therefore varies widely).
>>=20
>> Abstract
>>=20
>> - "delegate": The use of this word seems like it's different from how =
it's been used in the past, e.g. in "user delegation".  It's not a big =
deal, but possibly confusing.
>=20
> Rephrased a bit, but someone should just rewrite the abstract to begin =
with.

I can stab at this by Friday, if someone else doesn't get there first...

>> - It would be helpful to give really concrete examples/use cases of =
all of the profiles in the intro, so people can determine from this =
single place which profiles interest them.
>=20
> Each flow starts with one or two sentences trying to describe when
> they should be used.  I'm perfectly willing to admin that they might
> not be complete.  Happy to accept text from anyone! (Same goes for the
> intro.)

Another item I may get a chance to play with by the end of the week.

>> - I'm thinking oauth_error_reason is where UMA could define an =
extension that gives an error like "claims_required".  I need to sort =
this out with my gang, but provide it here as food for thought.  Should =
we be defining our own parameter instead (and if so, should this spec =
say something about cases where this is done by others)?  Alternatively, =
should this spec allow for extended error codes in some formal fashion?
>=20
> Error codes are coming up quite a bit.  In general you should rely on
> HTTP error responses, but there are cases where they're not specific
> enough.  I'd really appreciate a list of error reasons that
> implementors would like to see in the protocol.  A combined list will
> help make it happen.  Seems like we should start a thread about this.

I'll raise the question of the claims_required code at the UMA meeting =
on Thursday, and feed back any input.

>=20
>> 2.5. Client Identifier and Secret Flow
>>=20
>> - "This flow is suitable when the client is also the resource owner": =
I think this was supposed to be the "two-legged"/"autonomous-client" =
solution, but this phrase throws that into doubt for me.  What was the =
intent here?  Note that UMA (like a lot of others) is interested in =
solving automated self-registration of an autonomous client at an =
authorization server.  (In case it's of interest, we've been trying to =
sort out the legal implications of parties who are *not* the resource =
owner seeking authorized access; this is where our "claims_required" =
stuff comes in.  Sometimes the client represents "itself", or rather a =
company or org acting on its own behalf; sometimes it represents a =
person different from the resource owner; etc.  See our Lexicon at =
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Lexicon.)
>=20
> You're right.  Can you help reword please?

How about simply: "This flow is suitable when the client acts =
autonomously in seeking access and is thus not accessing protected =
resources within the context of a given end-user."

>=20
>> - "the protected resource MUST NOT allow the user of the =
corresponding access token without its secret": This is a case where =
"[protected resource] server" would work way better than "protected =
resource", as resources don't allow or disallow actions; they just =
exist.
>=20
> hmm, does read a bit better in most cases.  Means changing the
> definition as well.  What do others thing?

(I think it's all hanging together nicely now, but I'm biased. :-)  Note =
that there are still some instances of "protected resource" that now =
want to be "server" -- I see one in the first sentence of 4.1.1, and =
this probably happens all over section 4.

A final new comment: The spec says nothing at all about how a token gets =
validated, which may be fine, but given that several different means of =
token validation have been discussed (here and on the WRAP list of =
late), should something explicit be said that puts the validation method =
out of scope for this spec?

	Eve

	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


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On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 8:26 PM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
> Selected thoughts in response:
>
> On 21 Mar 2010, at 3:51 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>
>> Thanks! =A0Comments inline and updated the repo
>> (http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/3193098ff45168dd0a6545633=
4428b20215f848a).
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 12:03 PM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
>>> David, great stuff -- thanks for putting this together! =A0Here are a f=
ew comments and questions from a quick read on the plane down to Anaheim, i=
n spec order (the weight/priority therefore varies widely).
>>>
>>> Abstract
>>>
>>> - "delegate": The use of this word seems like it's different from how i=
t's been used in the past, e.g. in "user delegation". =A0It's not a big dea=
l, but possibly confusing.
>>
>> Rephrased a bit, but someone should just rewrite the abstract to begin w=
ith.
>
> I can stab at this by Friday, if someone else doesn't get there first...

Awesome!


>>> - It would be helpful to give really concrete examples/use cases of all=
 of the profiles in the intro, so people can determine from this single pla=
ce which profiles interest them.
>>
>> Each flow starts with one or two sentences trying to describe when
>> they should be used. =A0I'm perfectly willing to admin that they might
>> not be complete. =A0Happy to accept text from anyone! (Same goes for the
>> intro.)
>
> Another item I may get a chance to play with by the end of the week.
>
>>> - I'm thinking oauth_error_reason is where UMA could define an extensio=
n that gives an error like "claims_required". =A0I need to sort this out wi=
th my gang, but provide it here as food for thought. =A0Should we be defini=
ng our own parameter instead (and if so, should this spec say something abo=
ut cases where this is done by others)? =A0Alternatively, should this spec =
allow for extended error codes in some formal fashion?
>>
>> Error codes are coming up quite a bit. =A0In general you should rely on
>> HTTP error responses, but there are cases where they're not specific
>> enough. =A0I'd really appreciate a list of error reasons that
>> implementors would like to see in the protocol. =A0A combined list will
>> help make it happen. =A0Seems like we should start a thread about this.
>
> I'll raise the question of the claims_required code at the UMA meeting on=
 Thursday, and feed back any input.
>
>>
>>> 2.5. Client Identifier and Secret Flow
>>>
>>> - "This flow is suitable when the client is also the resource owner": I=
 think this was supposed to be the "two-legged"/"autonomous-client" solutio=
n, but this phrase throws that into doubt for me. =A0What was the intent he=
re? =A0Note that UMA (like a lot of others) is interested in solving automa=
ted self-registration of an autonomous client at an authorization server. =
=A0(In case it's of interest, we've been trying to sort out the legal impli=
cations of parties who are *not* the resource owner seeking authorized acce=
ss; this is where our "claims_required" stuff comes in. =A0Sometimes the cl=
ient represents "itself", or rather a company or org acting on its own beha=
lf; sometimes it represents a person different from the resource owner; etc=
. =A0See our Lexicon at http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma=
/Lexicon.)
>>
>> You're right. =A0Can you help reword please?
>
> How about simply: "This flow is suitable when the client acts autonomousl=
y in seeking access and is thus not accessing protected resources within th=
e context of a given end-user."

Done, thanks!


>>> - "the protected resource MUST NOT allow the user of the corresponding =
access token without its secret": This is a case where "[protected resource=
] server" would work way better than "protected resource", as resources don=
't allow or disallow actions; they just exist.
>>
>> hmm, does read a bit better in most cases. =A0Means changing the
>> definition as well. =A0What do others thing?
>
> (I think it's all hanging together nicely now, but I'm biased. :-) =A0Not=
e that there are still some instances of "protected resource" that now want=
 to be "server" -- I see one in the first sentence of 4.1.1, and this proba=
bly happens all over section 4.
>
> A final new comment: The spec says nothing at all about how a token gets =
validated, which may be fine, but given that several different means of tok=
en validation have been discussed (here and on the WRAP list of late), shou=
ld something explicit be said that puts the validation method out of scope =
for this spec?

I think that this should remain out of scope.  As far as OAuth is
concerned the token should be opaque and up to authorization servers
and protected resource servers to choose what goes into each token.

--David


>
> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Eve
>
> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Eve
>
> Eve Maler
> eve@xmlgrrl.com
> http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog
>
>

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From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 23:11:34 +1100
Thread-Topic: OAuth 2.0: client_secret, state
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0: client_secret, state
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Few responses inline.

On Mar 22, 2010, at 5:11 AM, Manger, James H wrote:

> 1. CLIENT SECRET
> Client authentication needs to be independent of OAuth.
> The Web Server Flow sends oauth_client_secret to the access token request=
 endpoint along with other oauth_ parameters. This is a poor design.
>=20
> Consider, for instance, a service that authenticates clients with TLS cli=
ent certs. Such clients don't have a shared secret to put in the oauth_clie=
nt_secret parameter so they cannot perform protocol in this OAuth 2 draft.
> Even if client certs are rare, the issue is that there is no reason why c=
lient certs should prevent OAuth 2 from working.
>=20
> Servers that can authenticate clients are likely to offer them various AP=
Is in addition to the OAuth get-a-token calls. The same client authenticati=
on mechanism used for those calls should be reused for the get-a-token call=
s.
>=20
> I suggest dropping the oauth_client_secret, perhaps adding text such as:
> "Servers that require clients to be pre-registered may require this clien=
t request to be authenticated."
>=20

It would be great to support client certificates as a means to authenticate=
 OAuth applications. However, that should be a new flow, as it has differen=
t security characteristics.

<snip>

> 4. The Username and Password Flow has oauth_client_secret in the example =
but not in the expected list of parameters.

Mistake. It should not have client secret. This flow also could benefit fro=
m client certs, if available, but again, that is a new flow definition.

> 5. Just call it TLS (not TLS/SSL).

Many people are familiar with SSL, not TLS, and so this clarifies for those=
 readers.


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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 10:52:16 -0700
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0: client_secret, state
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Thanks for the feedback!  Inline...

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 5:11 AM, Manger, James H
<James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
> Thanks for writing this draft for OAuth 2.0, David.
> A couple of comments.
>
> 1. CLIENT SECRET
> Client authentication needs to be independent of OAuth.
> The Web Server Flow sends oauth_client_secret to the access token request=
 endpoint along with other oauth_ parameters. This is a poor design.
>
> Consider, for instance, a service that authenticates clients with TLS cli=
ent certs. Such clients don't have a shared secret to put in the oauth_clie=
nt_secret parameter so they cannot perform protocol in this OAuth 2 draft.
> Even if client certs are rare, the issue is that there is no reason why c=
lient certs should prevent OAuth 2 from working.
>
> Servers that can authenticate clients are likely to offer them various AP=
Is in addition to the OAuth get-a-token calls. The same client authenticati=
on mechanism used for those calls should be reused for the get-a-token call=
s.
>
> I suggest dropping the oauth_client_secret, perhaps adding text such as:
> "Servers that require clients to be pre-registered may require this clien=
t request to be authenticated."

Agreed with Luke.  This should be a new flow if you're using TLS client cer=
ts.


> 2. STATE
> OAuth has various parameter that are used to carry state for another part=
y in a message, which is helpful for building scalable systems. OAuth shoul=
d avoid duplicating these fields or defining their semantics when they are =
opaque to the party carrying them. This will keep the protocol simpler, wit=
hout losing any functionality.
>
> oauth_client_state is unnecessary as it is always accompanied by oauth_ca=
llback_url that can encode the state directly. The examples could include, =
say, ...callback_url=3Dhttp://client.example.com/cb%3Fstate=3DFSR63fs&oauth=
_mode=3D... to reflect likely cases. It is still simple to compare the call=
back to a pre-register value if required (eg compare suffix, or compare ign=
oring additional query params).

Has there been any discussion of the oauth_client_state parameter on
the list?  I don't really remember it.


> oauth_scope is unnecessary as it is server-specific and can be encoded di=
rectly in the server-specific URIs. A client with no server-specific knowle=
dge has no way of using oauth_scope, which is a sign it is better omitted f=
rom the spec and left to specific servers when describing their access/auth=
z URIs. I have no problems with a service saying its user authz URI is, say=
, http://example.com/authz?scope=3D{all|blog}.

Scope is something that we've seen used by many OAuth 1.0 providers so
adding a consistant parameter to represent it makes sense.  There's
still not alignment on what individual scopes actually mean, but
hopefully we'll get there (outside of this spec).


> And a few minor issues:
>
> 3. If you want to return error params in the body of a 401 the important =
feature is setting Content-Type to application/x-www-form-urlencoded. This =
isn't mentioned in the text or example.

hmm, I'll double check but I think it's mentioned in the flows which
contain explicit error parameters.  There's an entire other debate
about if it's too difficult to parse form encoded parameters in a HTTP
response (versus a request where they normally are).  I've also been
asking folks to start documenting the error conditions they'd like to
see represented.


> 4. The Username and Password Flow has oauth_client_secret in the example =
but not in the expected list of parameters.

Fixed, thanks!


> 5. Just call it TLS (not TLS/SSL).

+1 to what Luke said.  SSL means something to far more people than TLS does=
.

>
>
> --
> James Manger
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From recordond@gmail.com  Mon Mar 22 10:56:32 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] What error codes do you need?
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In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
(like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
throughout protocol responses.

Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
should be easy enough to create a new page on.

Thanks,
--David

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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 13:26:48 -0700
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From: Chris Messina <chris.messina@gmail.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What error codes do you need?
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We've had this page on the wiki for some time... perhaps it could be update=
d
to actually offer all the appropriate error codes (including those from
HTTP) that are relevant?

http://wiki.oauth.net/ErrorCases

Chris

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:56 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>wrote=
:

> In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
> the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
> (like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
> they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
> HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
> someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
> throughout protocol responses.
>
> Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
> should be easy enough to create a new page on.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>



--=20
Chris Messina
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We&#39;ve had this page on the wiki for some time... perhaps it could be up=
dated to actually offer all the appropriate error codes (including those fr=
om HTTP) that are relevant?<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://wiki.oauth=
.net/ErrorCases">http://wiki.oauth.net/ErrorCases</a></div>
<div><br></div><div>Chris<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 22,=
 2010 at 10:56 AM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:r=
ecordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex;">
In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout<br>
the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes<br>
(like 1.0a does). =A0I&#39;ve heard the feedback from multiple people that<=
br>
they&#39;d like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in<br>
HTTP. =A0I&#39;d like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that<br=
>
someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed<br>
throughout protocol responses.<br>
<br>
Is someone willing to take the lead on this? =A0<a href=3D"http://wiki.oaut=
h.net/" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/</a><br>
should be easy enough to create a new page on.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
--David<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Chris Messina<br>Open W=
eb Advocate, Google<br><br>Personal: <a href=3D"http://factoryjoe.com">http=
://factoryjoe.com</a><br>Follow me on Buzz: <a href=3D"http://buzz.google.c=
om/chrismessina">http://buzz.google.com/chrismessina</a> <br>
...or Twitter: <a href=3D"http://twitter.com/chrismessina">http://twitter.c=
om/chrismessina</a> <br><br>This email is: =A0 [ ] shareable =A0 =A0[X] ask=
 first =A0 [ ] private<br>
</div>

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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 14:23:12 -0700
Thread-Topic: A token use case
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I'd like to describe a token-related use case that, right now, is how some =
people are using parts of OAuth 1.0. I think it's a real use case and I'm w=
ondering how the proposed OAuth 2.0 would handle it. (I'm on the IETF call =
too and it is very quiet.)

We have seen APIs out there that require that the "application" or device b=
e authenticated, but not necessarily the individual user. This happens in m=
obile apps, for instance -- there is a requirement to identify which mobile=
 app, version, platform, etc, is making API calls. However, the data being =
retrieved is not terribly sensitive and does not require user-level authent=
ication.

The standard way to handle this in the API world today is by using the "API=
 key" pattern -- a unique identifier is handed to every application, buried=
 in the code somewhere, and used on every API call.

Some users of APIs want a layer of security in between a simple API key (a =
bearer token) and full OAuth-based user authentication. They do this today =
using the OAuth 1.0 "consumer key" -- they bury a consumer key and secret i=
nside the mobile device, and use the OAuth 1.0 signature mechanism to sign =
each request using the key and secret. This gives them a reasonable amount =
of assurance that requests are coming from a particular version of the mobi=
le app, while not requiring full user authentication. (Some people call thi=
s "one-legged OAuth.")

Furthermore, some existing OAuth 1.0-based APIs -- or at least the Netflix =
API -- use different levels of authentication for different calls, dependin=
g on the sensitivity of the data involved. To use OAuth 1.0a terminology, c=
ertain calls require a "consumer key only," others must be signed using the=
 consumer key and secret, and others must be signed by a consumer key and a=
ccess token.

Eran's proposal from a while ago to split OAuth into "how to get a token" a=
nd "how to use a token" handled this nicely because customers involved in t=
his kind of use case could select only the "how to use a token" part of the=
 spec when they planned to use only a small number of tokens and distribute=
 them manually. It seems like the current OAuth 2.0 proposal is a little di=
fferent. I'd like to make sure that this use case still works in the final =
specs.


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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>I'd like to describe a token-related use case that, ri=
ght
now, is how some people are using parts of OAuth 1.0. I think it's a real u=
se
case and I'm wondering how the proposed OAuth 2.0 would handle it. (I'm on =
the
IETF call too and it is very quiet.)<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>We have seen APIs out there that require that the
&quot;application&quot; or device be authenticated, but not necessarily the
individual user. This happens in mobile apps, for instance -- there is a re=
quirement
to identify which mobile app, version, platform, etc, is making API calls. =
However,
the data being retrieved is not terribly sensitive and does not require
user-level authentication.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>The standard way to handle this in the API world today=
 is by
using the &quot;API key&quot; pattern -- a unique identifier is handed to e=
very
application, buried in the code somewhere, and used on every API call.<o:p>=
</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Some users of APIs want a layer of security in between=
 a
simple API key (a bearer token) and full OAuth-based user authentication. T=
hey
do this today using the OAuth 1.0 &quot;consumer key&quot; -- they bury a
consumer key and secret inside the mobile device, and use the OAuth 1.0
signature mechanism to sign each request using the key and secret. This giv=
es
them a reasonable amount of assurance that requests are coming from a
particular version of the mobile app, while not requiring full user
authentication. (Some people call this &quot;one-legged OAuth.&quot;)<o:p><=
/o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Furthermore, some existing OAuth 1.0-based APIs -- or =
at
least the Netflix API -- use different levels of authentication for differe=
nt
calls, depending on the sensitivity of the data involved. To use OAuth 1.0a=
 terminology,
certain calls require a &quot;consumer key only,&quot; others must be signe=
d
using the consumer key and secret, and others must be signed by a consumer =
key
and access token.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Eran's proposal from a while ago to split OAuth into
&quot;how to get a token&quot; and &quot;how to use a token&quot; handled t=
his
nicely because customers involved in this kind of use case could select onl=
y the
&quot;how to use a token&quot; part of the spec when they planned to use on=
ly a
small number of tokens and distribute them manually. It seems like the curr=
ent
OAuth 2.0 proposal is a little different. I'd like to make sure that this u=
se
case still works in the final specs.<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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From recordond@gmail.com  Mon Mar 22 14:38:40 2010
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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 14:38:50 -0700
Message-ID: <fd6741651003221438v2f561eb1l6aaec5def610ea0f@mail.gmail.com>
From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: Greg Brail <gbrail@sonoasystems.com>
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Cc: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A token use case
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Hey Greg,
I think that the Client Identifier and Secret flow should address
this.  It definitely needs to be called out better.

--David

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 2:23 PM, Greg Brail <gbrail@sonoasystems.com> wrote:
> I'd like to describe a token-related use case that, right now, is how some
> people are using parts of OAuth 1.0. I think it's a real use case and I'm
> wondering how the proposed OAuth 2.0 would handle it. (I'm on the IETF call
> too and it is very quiet.)
>
>
>
> We have seen APIs out there that require that the "application" or device be
> authenticated, but not necessarily the individual user. This happens in
> mobile apps, for instance -- there is a requirement to identify which mobile
> app, version, platform, etc, is making API calls. However, the data being
> retrieved is not terribly sensitive and does not require user-level
> authentication.
>
>
>
> The standard way to handle this in the API world today is by using the "API
> key" pattern -- a unique identifier is handed to every application, buried
> in the code somewhere, and used on every API call.
>
>
>
> Some users of APIs want a layer of security in between a simple API key (a
> bearer token) and full OAuth-based user authentication. They do this today
> using the OAuth 1.0 "consumer key" -- they bury a consumer key and secret
> inside the mobile device, and use the OAuth 1.0 signature mechanism to sign
> each request using the key and secret. This gives them a reasonable amount
> of assurance that requests are coming from a particular version of the
> mobile app, while not requiring full user authentication. (Some people call
> this "one-legged OAuth.")
>
>
>
> Furthermore, some existing OAuth 1.0-based APIs -- or at least the Netflix
> API -- use different levels of authentication for different calls, depending
> on the sensitivity of the data involved. To use OAuth 1.0a terminology,
> certain calls require a "consumer key only," others must be signed using the
> consumer key and secret, and others must be signed by a consumer key and
> access token.
>
>
>
> Eran's proposal from a while ago to split OAuth into "how to get a token"
> and "how to use a token" handled this nicely because customers involved in
> this kind of use case could select only the "how to use a token" part of the
> spec when they planned to use only a small number of tokens and distribute
> them manually. It seems like the current OAuth 2.0 proposal is a little
> different. I'd like to make sure that this use case still works in the final
> specs.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

From onyxraven@gmail.com  Mon Mar 22 15:02:11 2010
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From: Justin Hart <onyxraven@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 16:02:05 -0600
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What error codes do you need?
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Was there early discussion that had much of the work in the ProblemReportin=
g
extension included for 2.0?

http://wiki.oauth.net/ProblemReporting

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 2:26 PM, Chris Messina <chris.messina@gmail.com>wro=
te:

> We've had this page on the wiki for some time... perhaps it could be
> updated to actually offer all the appropriate error codes (including thos=
e
> from HTTP) that are relevant?
>
> http://wiki.oauth.net/ErrorCases
>
> Chris
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:56 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>wro=
te:
>
>> In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
>> the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
>> (like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
>> they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
>> HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
>> someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
>> throughout protocol responses.
>>
>> Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
>> should be easy enough to create a new page on.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --David
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Chris Messina
> Open Web Advocate, Google
>
> Personal: http://factoryjoe.com
> Follow me on Buzz: http://buzz.google.com/chrismessina
> ...or Twitter: http://twitter.com/chrismessina
>
> This email is:   [ ] shareable    [X] ask first   [ ] private
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

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Was there early discussion that had much of the work in the ProblemReportin=
g extension included for 2.0?<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://wiki.oau=
th.net/ProblemReporting">http://wiki.oauth.net/ProblemReporting</a><br><br>

<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 2:26 PM, Chris Messina <=
span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:chris.messina@gmail.com">chris.messi=
na@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

We&#39;ve had this page on the wiki for some time... perhaps it could be up=
dated to actually offer all the appropriate error codes (including those fr=
om HTTP) that are relevant?<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://wiki.oauth=
.net/ErrorCases" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/ErrorCases</a></di=
v>


<div><br></div><div>Chris<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:56 AM, David Recordon <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rec=
ordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout<br>
the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes<br>
(like 1.0a does). =A0I&#39;ve heard the feedback from multiple people that<=
br>
they&#39;d like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in<br>
HTTP. =A0I&#39;d like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that<br=
>
someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed<br>
throughout protocol responses.<br>
<br>
Is someone willing to take the lead on this? =A0<a href=3D"http://wiki.oaut=
h.net/" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/</a><br>
should be easy enough to create a new page on.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
--David<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br></div></div>-- <br>Chris Messi=
na<br>Open Web Advocate, Google<br><br>Personal: <a href=3D"http://factoryj=
oe.com" target=3D"_blank">http://factoryjoe.com</a><br>Follow me on Buzz: <=
a href=3D"http://buzz.google.com/chrismessina" target=3D"_blank">http://buz=
z.google.com/chrismessina</a> <br>


...or Twitter: <a href=3D"http://twitter.com/chrismessina" target=3D"_blank=
">http://twitter.com/chrismessina</a> <br><br>This email is: =A0 [ ] sharea=
ble =A0 =A0[X] ask first =A0 [ ] private<br>
</div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From esjewett@gmail.com  Mon Mar 22 15:03:17 2010
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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 18:03:35 -0400
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From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 6:21 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>
> The gadget tells the container *where* to send the request. =A0So if
> OpenSocial gadgets supported PLAINTEXT, a malicious gadget author, or
> a malicious user of a gadget (they are pure javascript) could tell the
> container "please send a request to
> https://www.example.com/log_my_secret".
>
> And the container would then leak the secret to www.example.com.

I've got to be missing something in the OpenSocial specification, but
in my mind the container *must* be keeping track of which secrets
belong to which domain, even for the signing case. Signing a request
to a random domain with a random secret isn't going to work, so the
application must be taking requests from gadgets and doing some
matching to secrets based on the URL. This matching (done correctly -
a big "if") should preclude leaking secrets.

In any case, this is probably neither here nor there. I agree with
your assessment of the two main interesting Open Social use cases.
Especially the idea that it is an example of a type of trusted
containers that can protect secrets from other applications or mediate
for an application in a not-as-highly-trusted environment.

Ethan

From lindner@inuus.com  Mon Mar 22 15:41:50 2010
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To: Justin Hart <onyxraven@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=000e0cd72db6fc667a04826b67a1
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What error codes do you need?
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+1 to the problem reporting codes.  We've found them very useful at
LinkedIn.

I'd also like to see throttling error codes, since many APIs support this
concept.


On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 3:02 PM, Justin Hart <onyxraven@gmail.com> wrote:

> Was there early discussion that had much of the work in the
> ProblemReporting extension included for 2.0?
>
> http://wiki.oauth.net/ProblemReporting
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 2:26 PM, Chris Messina <chris.messina@gmail.com>w=
rote:
>
>> We've had this page on the wiki for some time... perhaps it could be
>> updated to actually offer all the appropriate error codes (including tho=
se
>> from HTTP) that are relevant?
>>
>> http://wiki.oauth.net/ErrorCases
>>
>> Chris
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:56 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>wr=
ote:
>>
>>> In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
>>> the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
>>> (like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
>>> they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
>>> HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
>>> someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
>>> throughout protocol responses.
>>>
>>> Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
>>> should be easy enough to create a new page on.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> --David
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Chris Messina
>> Open Web Advocate, Google
>>
>> Personal: http://factoryjoe.com
>> Follow me on Buzz: http://buzz.google.com/chrismessina
>> ...or Twitter: http://twitter.com/chrismessina
>>
>> This email is:   [ ] shareable    [X] ask first   [ ] private
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

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+1 to the problem reporting codes. =A0We&#39;ve found them very useful at L=
inkedIn.<div><br></div><div>I&#39;d also like to see throttling error codes=
, since many APIs support this concept.</div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote">
On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 3:02 PM, Justin Hart <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:onyxraven@gmail.com">onyxraven@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
r><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Was there early discussion that had much of the work in the ProblemReportin=
g extension included for 2.0?<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://wiki.oau=
th.net/ProblemReporting" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/ProblemRep=
orting</a><div>
<div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br><br>

<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 2:26 PM, Chris Messina <=
span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:chris.messina@gmail.com" target=3D"_=
blank">chris.messina@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">


We&#39;ve had this page on the wiki for some time... perhaps it could be up=
dated to actually offer all the appropriate error codes (including those fr=
om HTTP) that are relevant?<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://wiki.oauth=
.net/ErrorCases" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/ErrorCases</a></di=
v>



<div><br></div><div>Chris<div><div></div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote">On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:56 AM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">recordond@gmail.=
com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout<br>
the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes<br>
(like 1.0a does). =A0I&#39;ve heard the feedback from multiple people that<=
br>
they&#39;d like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in<br>
HTTP. =A0I&#39;d like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that<br=
>
someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed<br>
throughout protocol responses.<br>
<br>
Is someone willing to take the lead on this? =A0<a href=3D"http://wiki.oaut=
h.net/" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/</a><br>
should be easy enough to create a new page on.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
--David<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br></div></div>-- <br>Chris Messi=
na<br>Open Web Advocate, Google<br><br>Personal: <a href=3D"http://factoryj=
oe.com" target=3D"_blank">http://factoryjoe.com</a><br>Follow me on Buzz: <=
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To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Mon Mar 22 16:00:44 2010
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] What are the OAuth design principles?
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Since the discussion in the "OAuth after-party" seemed to warrant =
bringing it up, I mentioned the UMA design principles/requirements =
document.  You can find it here:

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Requirements

The discussion is around "Why can't Kerberos just be used for your use =
cases?"  The UMA principles might be able to inform how the OAuth WG =
makes its case for why Kerberos doesn't suffice.  (If we discover it =
does, hey, our work here is done. :-)

	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From atom@yahoo-inc.com  Mon Mar 22 16:22:34 2010
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From: Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0: client_secret, state
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Hi All -

Regarding the client secret - one of the design goals for OAuth-WRAP was to
cleanly separate the AuthZ server from the Protected Resource. The Protected
Resource should only have to know how to validate Access Tokens issued by
its AuthZ server.

The HMAC-SHA1 signature method defined in 4.2.1.1 of the Oauth 2.0 spec
violates this principle because it requires the protected resource to have
the client secret in order to validate the signature. Distributing the
client secret to all Protected Resources can have negative security and
performance implications.

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01396.html#compute_sig

I recommend removing the client secret from the signature calculation, and
instead using only the Access Token secret.

Allen





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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] What are the OAuth design principles?
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My design principles would be the following as we already have protocols th=
at solve many complex usecases =20

1. Simple programming model
3. Reduce deployment barriers=20
2. Limited or no client side code (works with a browser)
3. Replace username/password scenarios=20
4. No client side key distribution nightmares   =20

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of E=
ve Maler
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2010 4:01 PM
To: OAuth WG
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] What are the OAuth design principles?

Since the discussion in the "OAuth after-party" seemed to warrant bringing =
it up, I mentioned the UMA design principles/requirements document.  You ca=
n find it here:

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Requirements

The discussion is around "Why can't Kerberos just be used for your use case=
s?"  The UMA principles might be able to inform how the OAuth WG makes its =
case for why Kerberos doesn't suffice.  (If we discover it does, hey, our w=
ork here is done. :-)

	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From recordond@gmail.com  Mon Mar 22 18:50:18 2010
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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 18:50:33 -0700
Message-ID: <fd6741651003221850ubccc590t5abb3ab42d5a22e6@mail.gmail.com>
From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0: client_secret, state
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Hey Allen,
Thanks for the feedback! I'm planning to remove the client secret from
the signature mechanism as I heard this from someone else as well.

--David

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 4:20 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> Hi All -
>
> Regarding the client secret - one of the design goals for OAuth-WRAP was to
> cleanly separate the AuthZ server from the Protected Resource. The Protected
> Resource should only have to know how to validate Access Tokens issued by
> its AuthZ server.
>
> The HMAC-SHA1 signature method defined in 4.2.1.1 of the Oauth 2.0 spec
> violates this principle because it requires the protected resource to have
> the client secret in order to validate the signature. Distributing the
> client secret to all Protected Resources can have negative security and
> performance implications.
>
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01396.html#compute_sig
>
> I recommend removing the client secret from the signature calculation, and
> instead using only the Access Token secret.
>
> Allen
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From rbarnes@bbn.com  Mon Mar 22 22:02:34 2010
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In case it's helpful, BCP 56 / RFC 3205 provides recommendations for =20
using HTTP as a substrate for other protocols:
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56>
... in particular with respect to status codes:
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8>

It's worth thinking about how that document applies to OAuth, since =20
the goal here isn't really necessariliy to use HTTP as a substrate, =20
but rather to extend HTTP in certain ways.

--Richard



On Mar 22, 2010, at 10:56 AM, David Recordon wrote:

> In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
> the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
> (like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
> they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
> HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
> someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
> throughout protocol responses.
>
> Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
> should be easy enough to create a new page on.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From rbarnes@bbn.com  Mon Mar 22 22:20:16 2010
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Actually, Brian and I discussed this very topic at some length after  
the OAuth after-party today.  If you think about it, it is impossible  
to completely separate the Authz Server (AS) from the Protected  
Resource (PR) -- in all of the possible cases, the AS needs to be able  
to pass secure messages to the PR, in one form or another.

In the signing cases, this is obvious: The AS needs to provide the PR  
with a key to validate signatures (either a MAC key or a public key).   
However, it remains true even for bearer tokens, since the AS needs to  
communicate to the PR which tokens are valid tokens.  This  
communication needs to be secure, so that tokens can't be spoofed.

In either case (signing or bearer), secured validation information has  
to get passed from the AS to the PR.  Based on the phrase "validate  
Access Tokens", it sounds like you're already acknowledging that the  
token can have internal structure that constitutes a secure message  
from the AS (e.g., if token == request-uri + signature).  But even  
that assumes that the AS and the PR share a key pair (symmetric or  
asymmetric).

If you make the same two assumptions -- shared keys and structured  
tokens -- then the signing cases can also work via the token: You can  
just encrypt the validation key (MAC key or public key) with the  
shared key and put it in the token.

So from the perspective of the need for a relationship between AS and  
PR, there is absolutely no difference between the "bearer token" and  
"signing" use cases.

--Richard



On Mar 22, 2010, at 4:20 PM, Allen Tom wrote:

> Hi All -
>
> Regarding the client secret - one of the design goals for OAuth-WRAP  
> was to
> cleanly separate the AuthZ server from the Protected Resource. The  
> Protected
> Resource should only have to know how to validate Access Tokens  
> issued by
> its AuthZ server.
>
> The HMAC-SHA1 signature method defined in 4.2.1.1 of the Oauth 2.0  
> spec
> violates this principle because it requires the protected resource  
> to have
> the client secret in order to validate the signature. Distributing the
> client secret to all Protected Resources can have negative security  
> and
> performance implications.
>
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg01396.html#compute_sig
>
> I recommend removing the client secret from the signature  
> calculation, and
> instead using only the Access Token secret.
>
> Allen
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From cmortimore@salesforce.com  Tue Mar 23 01:09:54 2010
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From: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 01:09:59 -0700
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KzEgZm9yIGFzc2VydGlvbiBwcm9maWxlLiBXYXMgdGhlcmUgYW55IHJlYXNvbiB3aHkgaXQgd2Fz
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From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar 23 04:50:38 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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+1 for assertion support

what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user =20
credentials (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers =20
tokens)

regards,
Torsten.

Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:

> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>
> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>> Just getting a chance to review this =E2=80=93 I apologize for not =
getting=20
>>  this
> before the meeting started.
>
>> We=E2=80=99d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar =
to sec=20
>> tion 5.2
> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe
> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this =20
> ( wrap_SAML )
> in Azure.
>
>
> Mark McGloin
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What error codes do you need?
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--001636c5971b24c03404827aab4e
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That's an interesting and informative RFC, but it recommends using the 500
response code for all errors (unless I'm misreading).  Errors due to
incorrect input should be 4xx.

On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:02 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:

> In case it's helpful, BCP 56 / RFC 3205 provides recommendations for usin=
g
> HTTP as a substrate for other protocols:
>
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56>
> ... in particular with respect to status codes:
>
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8>
>
> It's worth thinking about how that document applies to OAuth, since the
> goal here isn't really necessariliy to use HTTP as a substrate, but rathe=
r
> to extend HTTP in certain ways.
>
> --Richard
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 22, 2010, at 10:56 AM, David Recordon wrote:
>
>  In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
>> the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
>> (like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
>> they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
>> HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
>> someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
>> throughout protocol responses.
>>
>> Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
>> should be easy enough to create a new page on.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --David
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--001636c5971b24c03404827aab4e
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That&#39;s an interesting and informative RFC, but it recommends using the =
500 response code for all errors (unless I&#39;m misreading). =A0Errors due=
 to incorrect input should be 4xx.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon=
, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:02 PM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">In case it&#39;s helpful, BCP 56 / RFC 3205=
 provides recommendations for using HTTP as a substrate for other protocols=
:<div class=3D"im">

<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56</a>&gt;<br></div>
... in particular with respect to status codes:<div class=3D"im"><br>
&lt;<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8</a>&gt;<br>
<br></div>
It&#39;s worth thinking about how that document applies to OAuth, since the=
 goal here isn&#39;t really necessariliy to use HTTP as a substrate, but ra=
ther to extend HTTP in certain ways.<br><font color=3D"#888888">
<br>
--Richard</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Mar 22, 2010, at 10:56 AM, David Recordon wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout<br>
the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes<br>
(like 1.0a does). =A0I&#39;ve heard the feedback from multiple people that<=
br>
they&#39;d like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in<br>
HTTP. =A0I&#39;d like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that<br=
>
someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed<br>
throughout protocol responses.<br>
<br>
Is someone willing to take the lead on this? =A0<a href=3D"http://wiki.oaut=
h.net/" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/</a><br>
should be easy enough to create a new page on.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
--David<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br>

--001636c5971b24c03404827aab4e--

From rbarnes@bbn.com  Tue Mar 23 10:10:28 2010
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Well, the relevant part says "200 or 500"; the basic message is that =20
if your HTTP-using application has an error, but the HTTP was OK, then =20=

you shouldn't have an HTTP-layer error.  So for instance, in the =20
GEOPRIV HELD protocol [1], every request returns 200 unless the HTTP =20
is screwed up, and there's an <errorResponse> element that provides =20
application-layer codes and explanations.

Again, this model might not make sense for OAuth, since OAuth is more =20=

tied into the HTTP layer than layered on top of it.  You could =20
probably make a case for using 401/403 in this space, and maybe for =20
some new codes.

--Richard

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery




On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:54 AM, John Panzer wrote:

> That's an interesting and informative RFC, but it recommends using =20
> the 500 response code for all errors (unless I'm misreading).  =20
> Errors due to incorrect input should be 4xx.
>
> On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:02 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> =20
> wrote:
> In case it's helpful, BCP 56 / RFC 3205 provides recommendations for =20=

> using HTTP as a substrate for other protocols:
>
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56>
> ... in particular with respect to status codes:
>
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8>
>
> It's worth thinking about how that document applies to OAuth, since =20=

> the goal here isn't really necessariliy to use HTTP as a substrate, =20=

> but rather to extend HTTP in certain ways.
>
> --Richard
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 22, 2010, at 10:56 AM, David Recordon wrote:
>
> In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
> the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
> (like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
> they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
> HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
> someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
> throughout protocol responses.
>
> Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
> should be easy enough to create a new page on.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>


From jpanzer@google.com  Tue Mar 23 10:18:16 2010
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From: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 10:18:08 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What error codes do you need?
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Ah, ok.  I disagree with this as blanket recommendation though it can make
sense in some cases.

Agreed that OAuth is more of a plug-in for HTTP than a separate protocol
layered on top.

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:09 AM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:

> Well, the relevant part says "200 or 500"; the basic message is that if
> your HTTP-using application has an error, but the HTTP was OK, then you
> shouldn't have an HTTP-layer error.  So for instance, in the GEOPRIV HELD
> protocol [1], every request returns 200 unless the HTTP is screwed up, an=
d
> there's an <errorResponse> element that provides application-layer codes =
and
> explanations.
>
> Again, this model might not make sense for OAuth, since OAuth is more tie=
d
> into the HTTP layer than layered on top of it.  You could probably make a
> case for using 401/403 in this space, and maybe for some new codes.
>
> --Richard
>
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:54 AM, John Panzer wrote:
>
>  That's an interesting and informative RFC, but it recommends using the 5=
00
>> response code for all errors (unless I'm misreading).  Errors due to
>> incorrect input should be 4xx.
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:02 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote=
:
>> In case it's helpful, BCP 56 / RFC 3205 provides recommendations for usi=
ng
>> HTTP as a substrate for other protocols:
>>
>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56>
>> ... in particular with respect to status codes:
>>
>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8>
>>
>> It's worth thinking about how that document applies to OAuth, since the
>> goal here isn't really necessariliy to use HTTP as a substrate, but rath=
er
>> to extend HTTP in certain ways.
>>
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mar 22, 2010, at 10:56 AM, David Recordon wrote:
>>
>> In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout
>> the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes
>> (like 1.0a does).  I've heard the feedback from multiple people that
>> they'd like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in
>> HTTP.  I'd like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that
>> someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed
>> throughout protocol responses.
>>
>> Is someone willing to take the lead on this?  http://wiki.oauth.net/
>> should be easy enough to create a new page on.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --David
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>

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Ah, ok. =A0I disagree with this as blanket recommendation though it can mak=
e sense in some cases.<div><br></div><div>Agreed that OAuth is more of a pl=
ug-in for HTTP than a separate protocol layered on top.<br><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:09 AM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

Well, the relevant part says &quot;200 or 500&quot;; the basic message is t=
hat if your HTTP-using application has an error, but the HTTP was OK, then =
you shouldn&#39;t have an HTTP-layer error. =A0So for instance, in the GEOP=
RIV HELD protocol [1], every request returns 200 unless the HTTP is screwed=
 up, and there&#39;s an &lt;errorResponse&gt; element that provides applica=
tion-layer codes and explanations.<br>


<br>
Again, this model might not make sense for OAuth, since OAuth is more tied =
into the HTTP layer than layered on top of it. =A0You could probably make a=
 case for using 401/403 in this space, and maybe for some new codes.<br>


<br>
--Richard<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-=
delivery" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-geopriv-h=
ttp-location-delivery</a><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:54 AM, John Panzer wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
That&#39;s an interesting and informative RFC, but it recommends using the =
500 response code for all errors (unless I&#39;m misreading). =A0Errors due=
 to incorrect input should be 4xx.<br>
<br>
On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 10:02 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rbar=
nes@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">rbarnes@bbn.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
In case it&#39;s helpful, BCP 56 / RFC 3205 provides recommendations for us=
ing HTTP as a substrate for other protocols:<br>
<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56</a>&gt;<br>
... in particular with respect to status codes:<br>
<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp56#section-8</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
It&#39;s worth thinking about how that document applies to OAuth, since the=
 goal here isn&#39;t really necessariliy to use HTTP as a substrate, but ra=
ther to extend HTTP in certain ways.<br>
<br>
--Richard<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Mar 22, 2010, at 10:56 AM, David Recordon wrote:<br>
<br>
In drafting OAuth 2.0 I removed a lot of the error codes throughout<br>
the flows and in this draft encouraged people to use HTTP status codes<br>
(like 1.0a does). =A0I&#39;ve heard the feedback from multiple people that<=
br>
they&#39;d like more specific error codes than what can be expressed in<br>
HTTP. =A0I&#39;d like to use this thread =96 or ideally a wiki page that<br=
>
someone creates =96 to build consensus around the error codes needed<br>
throughout protocol responses.<br>
<br>
Is someone willing to take the lead on this? =A0<a href=3D"http://wiki.oaut=
h.net/" target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.oauth.net/</a><br>
should be easy enough to create a new page on.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
--David<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001636c5a39d86da9004827b0072--

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From: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 10:25:23 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 6:12 PM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:

> On 21 Mar 2010, at 1:43 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>
> > The goal of the, "the authorization server advertises (such as via
> documentation) the URIs of the following three endpoints" wording was to
> allow for a discovery process that is defined separately from this spec.  Is
> that unclear?  Have other words to propose?
>
> So perhaps this wants to be a thin spec that can be combined with the OAuth
> core spec, if there's general interest in it.  (In the UMA spec, we were
> already in the position of making up some XRD to describe a couple of WRAP
> endpoints, along with UMA endpoints and metadata.  It would be nice to have
> a canonical version of the former, at the least.)
>

So,

Minimally, perhaps the spec should say "advertises (such as via
documentation or discovery process beyond the scope of this document) the
URIs of the following three endpoints..."  just to give people a heads up
that there may be external auto-discovery happening.

Beyond that, it might be nice to see if there could be a separate, svelte
auth discovery document of some sort, even if not part of the core spec.
 Even something UMA-specific could serve as a good example for others.

My main worry is that SPs might start to think that they can do all kinds of
arbitrary things in their documentation to find the endpoints (register here
to generate the endpoints for your app, etc.) and thus go down a path that
means they can't ever participate in auto-discovery.  Which is a fine path
if they explicitly decide they don't care about auto-discovery and interop,
but a poor path if they just didn't see the signs about the quicksand and
alligators and non-interoperability.

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On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 6:12 PM, Eve Maler <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:eve@xmlgrrl.com">eve@xmlgrrl.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

<div class=3D"im">On 21 Mar 2010, at 1:43 PM, David Recordon wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; The goal of the, &quot;the authorization server advertises (such as vi=
a documentation) the URIs of the following three endpoints&quot; wording wa=
s to allow for a discovery process that is defined separately from this spe=
c. =A0Is that unclear? =A0Have other words to propose?<br>


<br>
</div>So perhaps this wants to be a thin spec that can be combined with the=
 OAuth core spec, if there&#39;s general interest in it. =A0(In the UMA spe=
c, we were already in the position of making up some XRD to describe a coup=
le of WRAP endpoints, along with UMA endpoints and metadata. =A0It would be=
 nice to have a canonical version of the former, at the least.)<br>

</blockquote><div><br></div><div>So,</div><div><br></div><div>Minimally, pe=
rhaps the spec should say &quot;advertises (such as via documentation or di=
scovery process beyond the scope of this document) the URIs of the followin=
g three endpoints...&quot; =A0just to give people a heads up that there may=
 be external auto-discovery happening.</div>

<div><br></div><div>Beyond that, it might be nice to see if there could be =
a separate, svelte auth discovery document of some sort, even if not part o=
f the core spec. =A0Even something UMA-specific could serve as a good examp=
le for others.</div>

<div><br></div><div>My main worry is that SPs might start to think that the=
y can do all kinds of arbitrary things in their documentation to find the e=
ndpoints (register here to generate the endpoints for your app, etc.) and t=
hus go down a path that means they can&#39;t ever participate in auto-disco=
very. =A0Which is a fine path if they explicitly decide they don&#39;t care=
 about auto-discovery and interop, but a poor path if they just didn&#39;t =
see the signs about the quicksand and alligators and non-interoperability.<=
/div>

</div><br>

--001636ed68367985ce04827b1a77--

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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 10:44:50 -0700
Message-ID: <fd6741651003231044m549c87b1h4d361383c001986f@mail.gmail.com>
From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Thanks John; incorporated your wording.
http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/4c93341a85c70c0954945be636a8d=
ce359fccb0f

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:25 AM, John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 6:12 PM, Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 21 Mar 2010, at 1:43 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>>
>> > The goal of the, "the authorization server advertises (such as via
>> > documentation) the URIs of the following three endpoints" wording was =
to
>> > allow for a discovery process that is defined separately from this spe=
c. =A0Is
>> > that unclear? =A0Have other words to propose?
>>
>> So perhaps this wants to be a thin spec that can be combined with the
>> OAuth core spec, if there's general interest in it. =A0(In the UMA spec,=
 we
>> were already in the position of making up some XRD to describe a couple =
of
>> WRAP endpoints, along with UMA endpoints and metadata. =A0It would be ni=
ce to
>> have a canonical version of the former, at the least.)
>
> So,
> Minimally, perhaps the spec should say "advertises (such as via
> documentation or discovery process beyond the scope of this document) the
> URIs of the following three endpoints..." =A0just to give people a heads =
up
> that there may be external auto-discovery happening.
> Beyond that, it might be nice to see if there could be a separate, svelte
> auth discovery document of some sort, even if not part of the core spec.
> =A0Even something UMA-specific could serve as a good example for others.
> My main worry is that SPs might start to think that they can do all kinds=
 of
> arbitrary things in their documentation to find the endpoints (register h=
ere
> to generate the endpoints for your app, etc.) and thus go down a path tha=
t
> means they can't ever participate in auto-discovery. =A0Which is a fine p=
ath
> if they explicitly decide they don't care about auto-discovery and intero=
p,
> but a poor path if they just didn't see the signs about the quicksand and
> alligators and non-interoperability.
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

From recordond@gmail.com  Tue Mar 23 10:58:35 2010
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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 10:47:59 -0700
Message-ID: <fd6741651003231047s419db471x98098a2e46aab168@mail.gmail.com>
From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>,  Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Hey Chuck,
Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I
really appreciate it.

I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
it on the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our
default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
this one.  It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
all need the SAML profile.  Chuck, I'll merge your wording in.  Want
to be listed as an author?

We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
individual documents.

Thanks,
--David

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> +1 for assertion support
>
> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credentials
> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>
>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>
>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>
>>> Just getting a chance to review this =96 I apologize for not getting th=
is
>>
>> before the meeting started.
>>
>>> We=92d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to sectio=
n
>>> 5.2
>>
>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01. =A0 We have strong customer use-cases for an
>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe
>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wrap_SAML=
 )
>> in Azure.
>>
>>
>> Mark McGloin
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar 23 11:15:01 2010
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Hi David,

I have a couple of questions/comments:

§2 - The flows use shared secrets for client authentication only. What 
about adding support for public-key-based signatures for that purpose as 
an alternative? That's one of the use cases on 
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy

§2.4 - Looks like a POST-Request in combination with a password-based 
user authentication. What about using a standard BASIC Authorization 
Header instead of oauth_username and oauth_password? In that way, 
existing code for BASIC-Authentication can easily be ported to OAUTH.

§3
- Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing 
access tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use 
(possess) a secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to 
refresh tokens? I would suggest to simply remove this parameter.

- Why is the refresh method the only way to obtain token secrets? This 
forces every client needing a token secret to perform two calls (and get 
a useless access token in the first call). I would suggest to add the 
parameter oauth_want_secret to all flows in §2.

- "If an access token secret is included in the response, the protected 
resource MUST NOT allow the use of the corresponding access token 
without its secret .... " Why is that neccessary?

- response value oauth_signature_methods: Why is it the obligation of an 
autorization server to know the signature methods a protected resource 
supports? IMHO this is a question of the protocol between client and 
protected resource and the client should pass in to the request the 
desired signature method. In that way the authorization server is able 
to create adequate secret.

§4.1 Why do you want to enforce such a strong coupling between bearer 
tokens and TLS per spec? I would recommend to split protocol definition 
and security considerations as in RFC2617. There, BASIC authentication 
is defined without any references to transport security mechanisms and 
the relevant considerations/recommandations are discussed in the 
security consideration section. IMHO this would simplify the 
specification because bearer token requests and requests w/ access 
tokens + signature would just be variant of the same protocol definition.

§4.2.2 The WWW-Authenticate header does not give the client any hint 
what signature methods to use. How shall the client that information obtain?

regards,
Torsten.






From paul.madsen@gmail.com  Tue Mar 23 11:17:21 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Separate from the Client trading a SAML assertion for an Access Token as 
in this flow, we are interested in defining how a Client might use SAML 
SSO messages to get an Access Token (comparable to OpenID/OAuth hybrid).

Anybody else interested?

paul

On 3/23/2010 1:47 PM, David Recordon wrote:
> Hey Chuck,
> Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I
> really appreciate it.
>
> I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
> it on the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our
> default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
> removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
> this one.  It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
> all need the SAML profile.  Chuck, I'll merge your wording in.  Want
> to be listed as an author?
>
> We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
> core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
> individual documents.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> <torsten@lodderstedt.net>  wrote:
>    
>> +1 for assertion support
>>
>> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credentials
>> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin<mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>>
>>      
>>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>>
>>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>        
>>>> Just getting a chance to review this – I apologize for not getting this
>>>>          
>>> before the meeting started.
>>>
>>>        
>>>> We’d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to section
>>>> 5.2
>>>>          
>>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
>>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I>believe
>>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wrap_SAML )
>>> in Azure.
>>>
>>>
>>> Mark McGloin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>        
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>      
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>    

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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 19:17:53 +0100
From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Hi David,

would it simplify the specification if there would be a generic workflow 
in section 2 which defines the parameters that are common to all flows?

regards,
Torsten.
> Hey Chuck,
> Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I
> really appreciate it.
>
> I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
> it on the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our
> default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
> removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
> this one.  It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
> all need the SAML profile.  Chuck, I'll merge your wording in.  Want
> to be listed as an author?
>
> We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
> core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
> individual documents.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> <torsten@lodderstedt.net>  wrote:
>    
>> +1 for assertion support
>>
>> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credentials
>> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin<mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>>
>>      
>>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>>
>>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>        
>>>> Just getting a chance to review this – I apologize for not getting this
>>>>          
>>> before the meeting started.
>>>
>>>        
>>>> We’d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to section
>>>> 5.2
>>>>          
>>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
>>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I>believe
>>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wrap_SAML )
>>> in Azure.
>>>
>>>
>>> Mark McGloin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>        
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>      



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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 11:30:08 -0700
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To: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Understanding how OpenSocial uses OAuth 1.0a
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On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 3:03 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> In any case, this is probably neither here nor there. I agree with
> your assessment of the two main interesting Open Social use cases.
> Especially the idea that it is an example of a type of trusted
> containers that can protect secrets from other applications or mediate
> for an application in a not-as-highly-trusted environment.

Cool.  I'll reply off-list with the gnarly details of opensocial.

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Hi Richard,

>From a security perspective, it might be undesirable to distribute the
client secret to all potential protected resources that a client might want
to access.

In many ways, distributing the client secret to all PRs is undesirable in
the same way that it's undesirable to distribute the user's password to all
PRs. Even if the client secret is encrypted into the Access Token, it has to
be extracted by the PR to verify the signature (at least using the current
version of the Oauth 2.0 spec).

If the client secret is distributed to the PR, the PR would be able to
impersonate the client. (Unlike Oauth 1.0, the PR and the AuthZ server are
separate entities)

Admittedly, with Oauth-WRAP, the PR would still have a client's access
token, however, the access token could be scoped to be only valid for the
PR, so a PR might not be able to impersonate the client by replaying the
access token, and also the Access Token has a limited lifetime.

Hope that helps to clarify things,
Allen


On 3/22/10 10:19 PM, "Richard Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:


> 
> If you make the same two assumptions -- shared keys and structured
> tokens -- then the signing cases can also work via the token: You can
> just encrypt the validation key (MAC key or public key) with the
> shared key and put it in the token.
> 
> So from the perspective of the need for a relationship between AS and
> PR, there is absolutely no difference between the "bearer token" and
> "signing" use cases.
> 
> --Richard
>


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The other related use case here is the Google Apps marketplace model for
sitewide app auth:

http://code.google.com/apis/accounts/docs/OAuth.html#GoogleAppsOAuth

http://www.google.com/support/a/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=162105



On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 3:03 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 6:21 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > The gadget tells the container *where* to send the request.  So if
> > OpenSocial gadgets supported PLAINTEXT, a malicious gadget author, or
> > a malicious user of a gadget (they are pure javascript) could tell the
> > container "please send a request to
> > https://www.example.com/log_my_secret".
> >
> > And the container would then leak the secret to www.example.com.
>
> I've got to be missing something in the OpenSocial specification, but
> in my mind the container *must* be keeping track of which secrets
> belong to which domain, even for the signing case. Signing a request
> to a random domain with a random secret isn't going to work, so the
> application must be taking requests from gadgets and doing some
> matching to secrets based on the URL. This matching (done correctly -
> a big "if") should preclude leaking secrets.
>
> In any case, this is probably neither here nor there. I agree with
> your assessment of the two main interesting Open Social use cases.
> Especially the idea that it is an example of a type of trusted
> containers that can protect secrets from other applications or mediate
> for an application in a not-as-highly-trusted environment.
>
> Ethan
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--00163630f445c5575004827c3844
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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The other related use case here is the Google Apps marketplace model for si=
tewide app auth:<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://code.google.com/apis/=
accounts/docs/OAuth.html#GoogleAppsOAuth">http://code.google.com/apis/accou=
nts/docs/OAuth.html#GoogleAppsOAuth</a></div>
<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://www.google.com/support/a/bin/answer.p=
y?hl=3Den&amp;answer=3D162105">http://www.google.com/support/a/bin/answer.p=
y?hl=3Den&amp;answer=3D162105</a></div><div><br></div><div><br><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote">
On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 3:03 PM, Ethan Jewett <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 6:21 PM, Brian Eaton &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:beaton@google.com">beaton@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The gadget tells the container *where* to send the request. =C2=A0So i=
f<br>
&gt; OpenSocial gadgets supported PLAINTEXT, a malicious gadget author, or<=
br>
&gt; a malicious user of a gadget (they are pure javascript) could tell the=
<br>
&gt; container &quot;please send a request to<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.example.com/log_my_secret" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.example.com/log_my_secret</a>&quot;.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; And the container would then leak the secret to <a href=3D"http://www.=
example.com" target=3D"_blank">www.example.com</a>.<br>
<br>
</div>I&#39;ve got to be missing something in the OpenSocial specification,=
 but<br>
in my mind the container *must* be keeping track of which secrets<br>
belong to which domain, even for the signing case. Signing a request<br>
to a random domain with a random secret isn&#39;t going to work, so the<br>
application must be taking requests from gadgets and doing some<br>
matching to secrets based on the URL. This matching (done correctly -<br>
a big &quot;if&quot;) should preclude leaking secrets.<br>
<br>
In any case, this is probably neither here nor there. I agree with<br>
your assessment of the two main interesting Open Social use cases.<br>
Especially the idea that it is an example of a type of trusted<br>
containers that can protect secrets from other applications or mediate<br>
for an application in a not-as-highly-trusted environment.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Ethan<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">__________________________________=
_____________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--00163630f445c5575004827c3844--

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar 23 11:58:21 2010
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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David: perhaps if you asked the list about features before dropping
them we would not all have to argue with you about why to put them
back in. Frankly I was surprised that you did not circulate the draft
to me as editor of WRAP.

WG Chairs: Is this draft now the draft that the WG is working on and
is David now the editor for the WG?

-- Dick

On 2010-03-23, at 10:47 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hey Chuck,
> Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I
> really appreciate it.
>
> I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
> it on the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our
> default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
> removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
> this one.  It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
> all need the SAML profile.  Chuck, I'll merge your wording in.  Want
> to be listed as an author?
>
> We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
> core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
> individual documents.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> <torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>> +1 for assertion support
>>
>> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user
>> credentials
>> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin
>> <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>>
>>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>>
>>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Just getting a chance to review this =96 I apologize for not get
>>>> ting this
>>>
>>> before the meeting started.
>>>
>>>> We=92d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to
>>>>  section
>>>> 5.2
>>>
>>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for
>>> an
>>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I
>>> >believe
>>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this
>>> ( wrap_SAML )
>>> in Azure.
>>>
>>>
>>> Mark McGloin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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Inline and thanks for the feedback!

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 11:14 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> I have a couple of questions/comments:
>
> =A72 - The flows use shared secrets for client authentication only. What =
about
> adding support for public-key-based signatures for that purpose as an
> alternative? That's one of the use cases on
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy

I think it's reasonable to design a flow which uses public-keys to
authenticate the client for an access token. You'd probably do
something like this for the device flow if you actually want to
authenticate the device as TPM is becoming more prevalent.  Including
the secret over SSL keeps the protocol simpler for developers.


> =A72.4 - Looks like a POST-Request in combination with a password-based u=
ser
> authentication. What about using a standard BASIC Authorization Header
> instead of oauth_username and oauth_password? In that way, existing code =
for
> BASIC-Authentication can easily be ported to OAUTH.

You're the first to mention that AFAIK. I'd be interested in if it
would be useful to service providers like Twitter who already use
basic and digest auth.  My guess is that just including the username
and password as parameters is actually simpler given that you'll be
building this in an authorization flow.  Most sites which use
basic/digest for API authentication are doing so to actually make API
requests so they'll need to write new code to support OAuth in the
first place.


> =A73
> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing access
> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use (possess) =
a
> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh tokens? I
> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.

It shouldn't be required.  Fixed!
http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83dcfec=
0127a11fe00


> - Why is the refresh method the only way to obtain token secrets? This
> forces every client needing a token secret to perform two calls (and get =
a
> useless access token in the first call). I would suggest to add the
> parameter oauth_want_secret to all flows in =A72.

Protocol simplicity. Signatures are meant to be used in advanced cases
and should not distract 95% of developers who will never touch them.
The main use cases for signatures is based around performance in
extremely high volume API interactions. Thus one extra HTTP request at
the start should pale in comparison to the number of API requests
which will actually be made using that secret.


> - "If an access token secret is included in the response, the protected
> resource MUST NOT allow the use of the corresponding access token without
> its secret .... " Why is that neccessary?

When acting as a bearer token the access token is all powerful and
must be kept secret between the client and servers. In the signature
flow (if you're not also using SSL) then the access token is sent over
the wire. Thus a MITM could get the access token and make SSL requests
without this requirement.


> - response value oauth_signature_methods: Why is it the obligation of an
> autorization server to know the signature methods a protected resource
> supports? IMHO this is a question of the protocol between client and
> protected resource and the client should pass in to the request the desir=
ed
> signature method. In that way the authorization server is able to create
> adequate secret.

hmm. I guess the protected resource(s) always knows about the
authorization server though it's conceivable that the authorization
server doesn't know about every protected resource. This seems far
simpler than the client needing to negotiate the signature mechanism
with each protected resource. Is there someone developing a deployment
where the drafted model (from 1.0a) doesn't work?


> =A74.1 Why do you want to enforce such a strong coupling between bearer t=
okens
> and TLS per spec? I would recommend to split protocol definition and
> security considerations as in RFC2617. There, BASIC authentication is
> defined without any references to transport security mechanisms and the
> relevant considerations/recommandations are discussed in the security
> consideration section. IMHO this would simplify the specification because
> bearer token requests and requests w/ access tokens + signature would jus=
t
> be variant of the same protocol definition.

I think this comes out of making the spec really easy to implement.
The style of the spec is very much designed for implementors writing
code as they're reading.


> =A74.2.2 The WWW-Authenticate header does not give the client any hint wh=
at
> signature methods to use. How shall the client that information obtain?

Right now it's obtained via the signature methods parameter. Is there
an easy way to add it in this 401 response?

Thanks!
--David

> regards,
> Torsten.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From cmortimore@salesforce.com  Tue Mar 23 12:05:18 2010
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From: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>
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--_000_C7CE5F0328E6cmortimoresalesforcecom_
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No worries - I figured it would be easier to push for it's inclusion if the=
 work were minimal.

We will definitely need to implement this style of profile, as will many ot=
hers, so it's essential it ends in some spec.   Personally I'd rather see a=
 relatively thin spec that includes the critical profiles, rather than core=
 + profile + bindings + etc like SAML.   However I'm open to any approach t=
hat get's the profile included.

I'd be happy to be listed as an author, but it's more important that whomev=
er authored the original assertion profile get listed/credit.   Not sure if=
 that was Dick or one of the other authors...perhaps they can chime in.

-cmort



On 3/23/10 10:47 AM, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

Hey Chuck,
Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I
really appreciate it.

I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
it on the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our
default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
this one.  It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
all need the SAML profile.  Chuck, I'll merge your wording in.  Want
to be listed as an author?

We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
individual documents.

Thanks,
--David

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> +1 for assertion support
>
> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credentials
> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>
>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>
>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>
>>> Just getting a chance to review this - I apologize for not getting this
>>
>> before the meeting started.
>>
>>> We'd like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to section
>>> 5.2
>>
>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe
>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wrap_SAML=
 )
>> in Azure.
>>
>>
>> Mark McGloin
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>


--_000_C7CE5F0328E6cmortimoresalesforcecom_
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Lucida Grande"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>No worries &#82=
11; I figured it would be easier to push for it&#8217;s inclusion if the wo=
rk were minimal. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
<BR>
We will definitely need to implement this style of profile, as will many ot=
hers, so it&#8217;s essential it ends in some spec. &nbsp;&nbsp;Personally =
I&#8217;d rather see a relatively thin spec that includes the critical prof=
iles, rather than core + profile + bindings + etc like SAML. &nbsp;&nbsp;Ho=
wever I&#8217;m open to any approach that get&#8217;s the profile included.=
<BR>
<BR>
I&#8217;d be happy to be listed as an author, but it&#8217;s more important=
 that whomever authored the original assertion profile get listed/credit. &=
nbsp;&nbsp;Not sure if that was Dick or one of the other authors...perhaps =
they can chime in.<BR>
<BR>
-cmort<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 3/23/10 10:47 AM, &quot;David Recordon&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"recordond@gm=
ail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Lucida Grande"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-=
size:11pt'>Hey Chuck,<BR>
Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft! &nbsp;I<BR>
really appreciate it.<BR>
<BR>
I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for<BR>
it on the mailing list(s) the past two months. &nbsp;I think that our<BR>
default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so<BR>
removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like<BR>
this one. &nbsp;It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM<=
BR>
all need the SAML profile. &nbsp;Chuck, I'll merge your wording in. &nbsp;W=
ant<BR>
to be listed as an author?<BR>
<BR>
We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the<BR>
core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in<BR>
individual documents.<BR>
<BR>
Thanks,<BR>
--David<BR>
<BR>
On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt<BR>
&lt;<a href=3D"torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt; wro=
te:<BR>
&gt; +1 for assertion support<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credenti=
als<BR>
&gt; (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; regards,<BR>
&gt; Torsten.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin &lt;<a href=3D"mark.mcgloi=
n@ie.ibm.com">mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com</a>&gt;:<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?=
<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Just getting a chance to review this &#8211; I apologize for n=
ot getting this<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; before the meeting started.<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; We&#8217;d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, simi=
lar to section<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; 5.2<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; from draft-hardt-oauth-01. =A0 We have strong customer use-cases f=
or an<BR>
&gt;&gt; assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I &gt;b=
elieve<BR>
&gt;&gt; Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wra=
p_SAML )<BR>
&gt;&gt; in Azure.<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; Mark McGloin<BR>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://ww=
w.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
</BODY>
</HTML>


--_000_C7CE5F0328E6cmortimoresalesforcecom_--

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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 12:10:27 -0700
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:05 PM, Chuck Mortimore
<cmortimore@salesforce.com> wrote:
> No worries - I figured it would be easier to push for it's inclusion if the
> work were minimal.

Yeah, definitely!


> We will definitely need to implement this style of profile, as will many
> others, so it's essential it ends in some spec.   Personally I'd rather see
> a relatively thin spec that includes the critical profiles, rather than core
> + profile + bindings + etc like SAML.   However I'm open to any approach
> that get's the profile included.

I'd like to pull the username/password and SAML flows into their own
documents.  I don't think that we want to propagate the usage of the
password anti-pattern and while I'm hearing clearly that the SAML flow
is needed, I don't think it will be used by the majority of deployers.

We should develop both of these flows at the same time as the core
spec so that they all go together.


> I'd be happy to be listed as an author, but it's more important that
> whomever authored the original assertion profile get listed/credit.   Not
> sure if that was Dick or one of the other authors...perhaps they can chime
> in.

Sure. I'd rather make sure everyone gets credit and then we can work
out what the spec says at the end.  OAuth 1.0 lists almost twenty
contributors.  I tried to be extremely humble in my acknowledgments
section especially given that I hadn't spoken to every WRAP author.

> This (early) draft was written pretty quickly and is heavily based on
> The OAuth 1.0 Protocol [draft-hammer-oauth-10], OAuth WRAP
> [draft-hardt-oauth-01] and further discussion on the IETF OAuth
> Working Group mailing list. Those authors and editors include Allen
> Tom (Yahoo!), Brian Eaton (Google), Dick Hardt, Eran Hammer-Lahav
> (Yahoo!) and Yaron Goland (Microsoft).

--David

>
> -cmort
>
>
>
> On 3/23/10 10:47 AM, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hey Chuck,
> Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I
> really appreciate it.
>
> I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
> it on the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our
> default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
> removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
> this one.  It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
> all need the SAML profile.  Chuck, I'll merge your wording in.  Want
> to be listed as an author?
>
> We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
> core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
> individual documents.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> <torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>> +1 for assertion support
>>
>> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credentials
>> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>>
>>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>>
>>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Just getting a chance to review this - I apologize for not getting this
>>>
>>> before the meeting started.
>>>
>>>> We'd like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to section
>>>> 5.2
>>>
>>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
>>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe
>>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wrap_SAML
>>> )
>>> in Azure.
>>>
>>>
>>> Mark McGloin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>

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On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> David: perhaps if you asked the list about features before dropping
> them we would not all have to argue with you about why to put them
> back in.

My goal by removing some of the non-obvious things was to encourage
the discussion which has now started! Many of the design decisions
that went into WRAP haven't entirely been shared in public. Since one
of our major goals is developer simplicity it's reasonable to start
with less and justify everything that's being added.  As the working
group has seen, I'm really willing to add things back in once the
reasoning has been explained (error codes, SAML flow, etc).


> Frankly I was surprised that you did not circulate the draft
> to me as editor of WRAP.

I focused on getting feedback from consumer web deployers of OAuth 1.0
(Twitter and Digg) who haven't participated in these discussions yet
as they're extremely important to technology adoption.  I also spoke
to Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! as they were the three companies who
developed WRAP together.  I'm sorry if I rubbed you the wrong way, but
until this IETF meeting I didn't know that you were planning to deploy
OAuth 2.0 as you were no longer working for Microsoft.  This shouldn't
prevent us from working together on making OAuth 2.0 rock. :)


> WG Chairs: Is this draft now the draft that the WG is working on and
> is David now the editor for the WG?
>
> -- Dick
>
> On 2010-03-23, at 10:47 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hey Chuck,
>> Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft! =A0I
>> really appreciate it.
>>
>> I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
>> it on the mailing list(s) the past two months. =A0I think that our
>> default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
>> removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
>> this one. =A0It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
>> all need the SAML profile. =A0Chuck, I'll merge your wording in. =A0Want
>> to be listed as an author?
>>
>> We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
>> core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
>> individual documents.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --David
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
>> <torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>>> +1 for assertion support
>>>
>>> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user
>>> credentials
>>> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>>>
>>> regards,
>>> Torsten.
>>>
>>> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin
>>> <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>>>
>>>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>>>
>>>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Just getting a chance to review this =96 I apologize for not get
>>>>> ting this
>>>>
>>>> before the meeting started.
>>>>
>>>>> We=92d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to
>>>>> =A0section
>>>>> 5.2
>>>>
>>>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01. =A0 We have strong customer use-cases for
>>>> an
>>>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I
>>>> >believe
>>>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this
>>>> ( wrap_SAML )
>>>> in Azure.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Mark McGloin
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 12:19:42 -0700
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Missed it, included now!
http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/099c51025d33e9a9350468c3e5748=
2785d9826e8

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:09 PM, Chuck Mortimore
<cmortimore@salesforce.com> wrote:
> By the way, did you see my little note at the end? =A0=A0It was kind of b=
uried.
>
>
> I think the oauth_mode param is missing from your initial POST examples i=
n
> 2.4 and 2.5
>
> -cmort
>
>
> On 3/23/10 10:47 AM, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hey Chuck,
> Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft! =A0I
> really appreciate it.
>
> I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
> it on the mailing list(s) the past two months. =A0I think that our
> default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
> removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
> this one. =A0It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
> all need the SAML profile. =A0Chuck, I'll merge your wording in. =A0Want
> to be listed as an author?
>
> We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
> core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
> individual documents.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> <torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>> +1 for assertion support
>>
>> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credential=
s
>> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>>
>>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>>
>>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Just getting a chance to review this =96 I apologize for not getting t=
his
>>>
>>> before the meeting started.
>>>
>>>> We=92d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to secti=
on
>>>> 5.2
>>>
>>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01. =A0 We have strong customer use-cases for an
>>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe
>>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wrap_SAM=
L
>>> )
>>> in Azure.
>>>
>>>
>>> Mark McGloin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>

From rbarnes@bbn.com  Tue Mar 23 13:28:39 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0: client_secret, state
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Allen,

Right, the PR needs to have the client's access token so that it knows  
which access tokens to accept.  The AS issues the access token, so in  
order for the PR to know the access token, the AS need to send a  
secure message to the PR saying that "this access token is OK".  This  
communication can happen either directly or indirectly:
-- Direct: AS tells PR which access tokens are valid
-- Indirect: AS signs access token

Either way, the PR has to be able to authenticate messages from the  
AS, so it has to have a public key or shared key for the AS.  That  
same key could be used to communicate keys to validate signatures from  
clients (access token secrets).

So disallowing signatures actually doesn't save you anything in terms  
of the crypto that the PR and AS need.

--Richard



On Mar 23, 2010, at 11:42 AM, Allen Tom wrote:

> Hi Richard,
>
> From a security perspective, it might be undesirable to distribute the
> client secret to all potential protected resources that a client  
> might want
> to access.
>
> In many ways, distributing the client secret to all PRs is  
> undesirable in
> the same way that it's undesirable to distribute the user's password  
> to all
> PRs. Even if the client secret is encrypted into the Access Token,  
> it has to
> be extracted by the PR to verify the signature (at least using the  
> current
> version of the Oauth 2.0 spec).
>
> If the client secret is distributed to the PR, the PR would be able to
> impersonate the client. (Unlike Oauth 1.0, the PR and the AuthZ  
> server are
> separate entities)
>
> Admittedly, with Oauth-WRAP, the PR would still have a client's access
> token, however, the access token could be scoped to be only valid  
> for the
> PR, so a PR might not be able to impersonate the client by replaying  
> the
> access token, and also the Access Token has a limited lifetime.
>
> Hope that helps to clarify things,
> Allen
>
>
> On 3/22/10 10:19 PM, "Richard Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:
>
>
>>
>> If you make the same two assumptions -- shared keys and structured
>> tokens -- then the signing cases can also work via the token: You can
>> just encrypt the validation key (MAC key or public key) with the
>> shared key and put it in the token.
>>
>> So from the perspective of the need for a relationship between AS and
>> PR, there is absolutely no difference between the "bearer token" and
>> "signing" use cases.
>>
>> --Richard
>>
>


From cmortimore@salesforce.com  Tue Mar 23 17:15:23 2010
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From: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
To: Paul Madsen <paul.madsen@gmail.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 17:15:33 -0700
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Outside the scope of what this WG should be tackling in the core spec IMO, =
but I'd be interested in working on a profile.   There is a lot of this use=
-case being done in an ad-hoc manner on my platform.

-cmort


On 3/23/10 11:17 AM, "Paul Madsen" <paul.madsen@gmail.com> wrote:

Separate from the Client trading a SAML assertion for an Access Token as
in this flow, we are interested in defining how a Client might use SAML
SSO messages to get an Access Token (comparable to OpenID/OAuth hybrid).

Anybody else interested?

paul

On 3/23/2010 1:47 PM, David Recordon wrote:
> Hey Chuck,
> Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I
> really appreciate it.
>
> I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for
> it on the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our
> default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so
> removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like
> this one.  It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM
> all need the SAML profile.  Chuck, I'll merge your wording in.  Want
> to be listed as an author?
>
> We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the
> core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in
> individual documents.
>
> Thanks,
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> <torsten@lodderstedt.net>  wrote:
>
>> +1 for assertion support
>>
>> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user credential=
s
>> (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)
>>
>> regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin<mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>>
>>
>>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>>
>>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>
>>>> Just getting a chance to review this - I apologize for not getting thi=
s
>>>>
>>> before the meeting started.
>>>
>>>
>>>> We'd like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to section
>>>> 5.2
>>>>
>>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
>>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I>believe
>>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this ( wrap_SAM=
L )
>>> in Azure.
>>>
>>>
>>> Mark McGloin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Lucida Grande"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>Outside the sco=
pe of what this WG should be tackling in the core spec IMO, but I&#8217;d b=
e interested in working on a profile. &nbsp;&nbsp;There is a lot of this us=
e-case being done in an ad-hoc manner on my platform.<BR>
<BR>
-cmort<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 3/23/10 11:17 AM, &quot;Paul Madsen&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"paul.madsen@gma=
il.com">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Lucida Grande"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-=
size:11pt'>Separate from the Client trading a SAML assertion for an Access =
Token as<BR>
in this flow, we are interested in defining how a Client might use SAML<BR>
SSO messages to get an Access Token (comparable to OpenID/OAuth hybrid).<BR=
>
<BR>
Anybody else interested?<BR>
<BR>
paul<BR>
<BR>
On 3/23/2010 1:47 PM, David Recordon wrote:<BR>
&gt; Hey Chuck,<BR>
&gt; Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft! &nbsp;I=
<BR>
&gt; really appreciate it.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for<B=
R>
&gt; it on the mailing list(s) the past two months. &nbsp;I think that our<=
BR>
&gt; default should be making the spec as short and simple as possible so<B=
R>
&gt; removed a few things from WRAP in order to start conversations like<BR=
>
&gt; this one. &nbsp;It's now clear that Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and=
 IBM<BR>
&gt; all need the SAML profile. &nbsp;Chuck, I'll merge your wording in. &n=
bsp;Want<BR>
&gt; to be listed as an author?<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the<BR=
>
&gt; core spec versus which should be developed at the same time but in<BR>
&gt; individual documents.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; Thanks,<BR>
&gt; --David<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt<BR>
&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt=
; &nbsp;wrote:<BR>
&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt;&gt; +1 for assertion support<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user cred=
entials<BR>
&gt;&gt; (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers tokens)<B=
R>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; regards,<BR>
&gt;&gt; Torsten.<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin&lt;<a href=3D"mark.mcg=
loin@ie.ibm.com">mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com</a>&gt;:<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was drop=
ped?<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Just getting a chance to review this &#8211; I apologize f=
or not getting this<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; before the meeting started.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; We&#8217;d like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, =
similar to section<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 5.2<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; from draft-hardt-oauth-01. &nbsp;&nbsp;We have strong customer=
 use-cases for an<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I&g=
t;believe<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this (=
 wrap_SAML )<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; in Azure.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Mark McGloin<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https:=
//www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://ww=
w.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
OAuth mailing list<BR>
<a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.or=
g/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
</BODY>
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On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:01 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>> =A73
>> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing acces=
s
>> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use (possess)=
 a
>> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh tokens? =
I
>> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.
>
> It shouldn't be required. =A0Fixed!
> http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83dcf=
ec0127a11fe00

It was required in WRAP because is lets you recover if a client web
server that holds many refresh tokens is compromised.  You rotate the
client secret, and then the attacker loses access to user data.

Please add it back. =3D)

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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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What about clients which don't have access to the client secret? For
example, rich desktop applications and devices.

Seems like if the client secret is optional then a server can enforce
in policy what type of clients must pass it in.

--David

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 5:56 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:01 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wr=
ote:
>>> =A73
>>> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing acce=
ss
>>> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use (possess=
) a
>>> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh tokens?=
 I
>>> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.
>>
>> It shouldn't be required. =A0Fixed!
>> http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83dc=
fec0127a11fe00
>
> It was required in WRAP because is lets you recover if a client web
> server that holds many refresh tokens is compromised. =A0You rotate the
> client secret, and then the attacker loses access to user data.
>
> Please add it back. =3D)
>

From recordond@gmail.com  Tue Mar 23 18:59:48 2010
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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 19:00:04 -0700
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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And I realize that this issue was created because WRAP describes a
different refresh token flow for each profile whereas this draft
combines them all together. I think it's important to realize that
implementors will want to write one refresh_token(identifier,
refresh_token, secret?) function and expect it to work for each flow.

The language I used today was that the client secret should be
included if the client has access to it.

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 6:51 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote=
:
> What about clients which don't have access to the client secret? For
> example, rich desktop applications and devices.
>
> Seems like if the client secret is optional then a server can enforce
> in policy what type of clients must pass it in.
>
> --David
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 5:56 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:01 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> w=
rote:
>>>> =A73
>>>> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing acc=
ess
>>>> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use (posses=
s) a
>>>> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh tokens=
? I
>>>> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.
>>>
>>> It shouldn't be required. =A0Fixed!
>>> http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83d=
cfec0127a11fe00
>>
>> It was required in WRAP because is lets you recover if a client web
>> server that holds many refresh tokens is compromised. =A0You rotate the
>> client secret, and then the attacker loses access to user data.
>>
>> Please add it back. =3D)
>>
>

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar 23 21:42:36 2010
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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On 2010-03-23, at 12:05 PM, Chuck Mortimore wrote:

> No worries =96 I figured it would be easier to push for it=92s =
inclusion if the work were minimal.   =20
>=20
> We will definitely need to implement this style of profile, as will =
many others, so it=92s essential it ends in some spec.   Personally I=92d =
rather see a relatively thin spec that includes the critical profiles, =
rather than core + profile + bindings + etc like SAML.   However I=92m =
open to any approach that get=92s the profile included.
>=20
> I=92d be happy to be listed as an author, but it=92s more important =
that whomever authored the original assertion profile get listed/credit. =
  Not sure if that was Dick or one of the other authors...perhaps they =
can chime in.

It was me, but David was not interested in getting my feedback let alone =
list me as an author prior to publication.


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><br><div><div>On 2010-03-23, at 12:05 PM, Chuck Mortimore =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div>
<font face=3D"Lucida Grande"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">No worries =96=
 I figured it would be easier to push for it=92s inclusion if the work =
were minimal. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>
<br>
We will definitely need to implement this style of profile, as will many =
others, so it=92s essential it ends in some spec. &nbsp;&nbsp;Personally =
I=92d rather see a relatively thin spec that includes the critical =
profiles, rather than core + profile + bindings + etc like SAML. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;However I=92m open to any approach that get=92s the profile =
included.<br>
<br>
I=92d be happy to be listed as an author, but it=92s more important that =
whomever authored the original assertion profile get listed/credit. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;Not sure if that was Dick or one of the other =
authors...perhaps they can chime =
in.</span></font></div></blockquote><br></div><div>It was me, but David =
was not interested in getting my feedback let alone list me as an author =
prior to publication.</div><br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail-8--959205484--

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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On 2010-03-23, at 12:10 PM, David Recordon wrote:
> I'd like to pull the username/password and SAML flows into their own
> documents.  I don't think that we want to propagate the usage of the
> password anti-pattern and while I'm hearing clearly that the SAML flow
> is needed, I don't think it will be used by the majority of deployers.
>=20
> We should develop both of these flows at the same time as the core
> spec so that they all go together.

Why is that? Many people don't think signatures should be there, but =
they are.
What would you save, a page or two? If layed out properly, a reader can=20=


By keeping all profiles in one document, someone easily understands the =
different applications of the technology, and when a different use case =
comes up, they know it is available rather than having to look at a =
different document.

-- Dick


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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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On 2010-03-23, at 12:16 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 11:58 AM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>> David: perhaps if you asked the list about features before dropping
>> them we would not all have to argue with you about why to put them
>> back in.
>=20
> My goal by removing some of the non-obvious things was to encourage
> the discussion which has now started! Many of the design decisions
> that went into WRAP haven't entirely been shared in public. Since one
> of our major goals is developer simplicity it's reasonable to start
> with less and justify everything that's being added.  As the working
> group has seen, I'm really willing to add things back in once the
> reasoning has been explained (error codes, SAML flow, etc).

If you wanted to discuss, you could have posted questions about WRAP. I =
have promptly answered any questions people had. There are numerous =
changes in the spec where you just did not like the answer I gave you in =
the past.

>=20
>=20
>> Frankly I was surprised that you did not circulate the draft
>> to me as editor of WRAP.
>=20
> I focused on getting feedback from consumer web deployers of OAuth 1.0
> (Twitter and Digg) who haven't participated in these discussions yet
> as they're extremely important to technology adoption.  I also spoke
> to Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! as they were the three companies who
> developed WRAP together.  I'm sorry if I rubbed you the wrong way, but
> until this IETF meeting I didn't know that you were planning to deploy
> OAuth 2.0 as you were no longer working for Microsoft.  This shouldn't
> prevent us from working together on making OAuth 2.0 rock. :)

Hard to work with you when you just drop a whole bunch of changes and =
don't discuss them or ask for explanations.
I've been actively participating on the IETF list and on the calls. Not =
sure why I need to be working somewhere for my expertise and opinion to =
count. This is the IETF after all, and I was the editor of WRAP, so if =
you were going to incorporate WRAP, then it would seem logical to have =
included me. And given I have seen you in person numerous times in the =
last few weeks, it is not like you forgot I existed. Yes, I am miffed.




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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>,  "Mark Mcgloin" <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>
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I don't think that Microsoft ever indicated that we need the SAML flows.

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of D=
avid Recordon
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 10:48 AM
To: Torsten Lodderstedt; Chuck Mortimore; Mark Mcgloin
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

Hey Chuck,
Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I really ap=
preciate it.

I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for it on =
the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our default should b=
e making the spec as short and simple as possible so removed a few things f=
rom WRAP in order to start conversations like this one.  It's now clear tha=
t Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM all need the SAML profile.  Chuck,=
 I'll merge your wording in.  Want to be listed as an author?

We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the core sp=
ec versus which should be developed at the same time but in individual docu=
ments.

Thanks,
--David

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.n=
et> wrote:
> +1 for assertion support
>
> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user=20
> credentials (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers=20
> tokens)
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>
>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>
>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>
>>> Just getting a chance to review this - I apologize for not getting=20
>>> this
>>
>> before the meeting started.
>>
>>> We'd like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to=20
>>> section
>>> 5.2
>>
>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01. =A0 We have strong customer use-cases for an=
=20
>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe=20
>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this (=20
>> wrap_SAML ) in Azure.
>>
>>
>> Mark McGloin
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
_______________________________________________
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David

Although you stated you were taking WRAP and adding signatures, I found =
many other differences between the specs. I'm baffled at why you =
essentially started from scratch on this document rather than taking =
WRAP and adding the device profile and signatures.=20

Per your previous email:

	My goal by removing some of the non-obvious things was to =
encourage
	the discussion which has now started

Here are numerous discussion points on your draft. I look forward to a =
response on each one.

-- Dick

1.2.1 The security and risk profile of a JavaScript or other RIA is =
different from a Rich App. The user can easily be fooled to run a RIA, =
but in general must be actively involved installed a Rich App. A RIA has =
an identity mechanism (URL it came from). Combining these makes it =
tougher to analyse the security issues and requires prohibits taking =
advantage of one context.

1.2.3 Google has been using captchas in their flows for some time. I'd =
like to hear from Google and others that have deployed captchas here =
that they do NOT want it as an option before it is removed.

1.2.4 I think this is a security consideration, not a specification =
MUST. Many use cases are fine moving cookies in the clear where the =
cookie.

1.2.5 All refresh token requests are not the same. I see that I =
mistakenly dropped a feature in draft-hardt-oauth-01. In 5.4.8 of WRAP =
0.9.7.1 the refresh request also includes the client identifier and =
client secret. This enables a catastrophic loss of refresh tokens at a =
PR to be recovered by changing the client secret and not requiring the =
client to have to reacquire authorization from the user.

1.2.6 How is an AS supposed to mark an Access Token as no longer being =
valid? Are you implying that there is a Access Token revocation =
mechanism? I did not see where the spec discusses the invalidation of an =
Access Token. Did I miss it somewhere?

Other changes from WRAP that were not highlighted.

A) The User Delegation profiles were put in a separate section from the =
autonomous client flows to highlight to readers the difference in the =
flows. Your draft merges them which could be confusing. It was often =
confusing to readers of WRAP previously.

B) Change from using profile to flow. Personally I think flow is better. =
Would be interested to hear others thoughts.

C) Placement of Acquiring an Access Token prior to Accessing a Protected =
Resource. Most new readers will be Client or PR developers. What they =
care about is accessing a PR. Once they see that they need an Access =
Token to access a PR, they then understand they need to get an Access =
Token. They then can jump to the profile/flow that is relevant for them.

(D) The Parameter Considerations section was removed. We had found this =
section useful to collect common information about parameters.

1.3 Terminology

1.3 access token: why is this a now a unique identifier? the deployed =
usage of Access Tokens in WRAP is that this is a token, not an =
identifier. This was a significant feature in WRAP, that the Access =
Tokens are claims, not identifiers. This is also why the Access Token =
size could be larger.=20

1.3 client: what do you mean by "OAuth-authenticated request"?
=20
1.3 refresh token:. why does the refresh token need to be unique? can =
the AS hand the same one out to a client later on or does it need to =
track which ones it has handed out?

1.3 server: Why is server defined when we have protected resource? I =
don't understand the difference.

1.3.1 Why is this a subsection of Terminology? I find the use of the =
term server here very confusing. Is the PR a different machine? The =
Authorization Server? Why does the client discover them from the server?

1.3.1 255 character Access Token length recommendation. This was a joke =
right? There was a discussion of this on the list and no one was =
agreeing with Facebook reps on limiting the Access Token. Since it is a =
recommendation, people can go over, so what is the point? The real limit =
is what can be included in HTTP headers or in a query string, not the =
size of a MySQL record.

1.3.1 URL safe characters. What is the basis for this requirement? Many =
existing systems will likely have other non URL safe chars in their =
existing Access Tokens. You are now creating  Microsoft's deployed =
Simple Web Tokens that are used in WRAP are not URL safe.

1.3.1 Why is the Access Token length and character set in a section =
entitled Endpoints? Why did you drop Parameter Considerations? That =
section would have been the logical place to have included information =
such as this.

2 "five core flows" ... this implies any other flow is inferior. Why are =
they core? Per comment above, in WRAP we found it useful to separate the =
user delegation flows from the autonmous client flows.

2 "Common scenarios involve the resource owner delegating to a client to =
act on their behalf, adding another party (the resource owner) to the =
protocol."  Which protocol is the resource owner being added to?

"Unlike the others, Client Identifier and Secret flow (Client Identifier =
and Secret Flow) is intended for a client acting on behalf of itself and =
not a separate resource owner. For example, when a client is accessing =
non-private data or modifying data about itself."  This is a much =
narrower use case than what motivated the Client Account and Password =
Profile. draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 5.1 was motivated for autonomous =
clients calling an API. The data is likely private and not about itself.

2.1 In contrast to 1.3.1 where the endpoint is obtained from the server, =
now the client obtains it from the authorization server. Which is it?

2.1 there are a number of steps here. Would be useful to break into =
separate sections similar to draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 to guide =
discussion.

2.1 are there any checks the AS needs to do wrt. the initial request =
such as check the callback URL?

2.1 "The way in which the server handles the user authorization request =
(such as via cookies), including whether it uses a secure channel such =
as TLS/SSL is beyond the scope of this specification. However, the =
server MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner. If the =
resource owner approves the authorization request, the authorization =
server MUST generate a verification code and associate it with the =
client identifier and callback URI. "
Why MUST the AS generate a verification code? I would hope the AS would =
also do some checking on the parameters from the client such as matching =
the client identifier with the callback URL.

2.1 "If the request is authorized, the access token is included in the =
HTTP response body using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content =
type as defined by [W3C.REC=E2=80=91html40=E2=80=9119980424] (Ragget, =
D., Ed., Le Hors, A., Ed., and I. Jacobs, Ed., =E2=80=9CHTML 4.0 =
Specification,=E2=80=9D .) with a 200 status code (OK)."

What steps does the AS do to authorize the request?=20

2.1 "The authorization server must retain the scope, duration, and other =
attributes approved by the resource owner, and enforce these =
restrictions when receiving a client request made with the tokens =
issued."

What is this sentence doing in this section? How is the AS to enforce =
these restrictions? Why is the client making requests to the =
authorization server?

2.1 "oauth_error_reason
Value must be one of "callback_url_mismatch" or =
"expired_verification_code" (case sensitive)."
What if it is a different error such as invalid client secret or client =
identifier? What if the oauth_mode is not supported?

2.1     HTTP/1.1 401 Authorization Required
    WWW-Authenticate: OAuth realm=3D"example"

    oauth_error_reason=3Dexpired_verification_code
Where did the WWW-Authenticate header suddenly come from? Where do these =
values of realm come from? This is an example, but I don't see where =
including this header was specified.

2.2 As mentioned above, the security considerations for a RIA and Rich =
App are not the same.

2.2 Once again, this is a long section and breaking it up into steps =
would make it easier to refer to a step.

Why does a Rich App now have to have a callback URL? How does the Rich =
App get the verification code? draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 captured a =
number of best practices for how a Rich App can get the verification =
code.=20

2.3 oauth_verification_rate_limit: What is an AS supposed to do if a =
Client calls more often?

2.4 "This flow is used when the authorization server generally trusts =
the client to temporarily collect the end-user's username and password =
and it is impossible to use one of the other authorization flows." what =
determines "generally trust" from other trust situations?

2.4 "The authorization server MUST verify that the resource owner's =
credentials are accurate and MAY verify that the client is authorized to =
use this flow."
Why is verifying the client is authorized to use this flow a MAY rather =
than MUST?=20

2.5 Why was this renamed to Client Identifier and Secret Flow? In =
draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 we specifically called it an Account Name and =
Password flow to avoid confusion with how client identifier and client =
secret are used in other parts of the protocol. As noted in the =
introduction above, this is a common use case. It seems that the terms =
secret and password are being used interchangeably, which is confusing.

3. See 1.2.5 for why it makes sense to have different refresh flows

3. Having a new parameter to get a secret looks like a hack. We have the =
oauth_mode parameter, make it another mode.

3. How is the AS supposed to know which PR the client is going to talk =
to? How does it know what signature methods are supported by the PR?

4.1.1 why does is the parameter name oauth_access_token rather than just =
access_token? It is in the context of an OAuth authentication.

4.1.1. "The protected resource MAY include further details about why the =
request was rejected in the response body or headers."  this sounds like =
a vague way of providing additional error information. Seems it would =
make sense to standardize best practices here.

4.2 Why does the client not sign requests to the AS if it has a client =
secret to sign requests with? Signing is much better than including a =
secret in a call.

4.2 Why refer to [draft=E2=80=91hammer=E2=80=91oauth=E2=80=9110] =
(Hammer-Lahav, E., Ed., =E2=80=9CThe OAuth 1.0 Protocol,=E2=80=9D  for =
the computing the signature string. Could you not copy that text over =
here? Are you anticipating there will be a separate spec for computing =
the signature?

4.2.1.1 Lots of TODOs here. I thought that OAuth 1.0A had this all =
figured out. Why are there TODOs???

Examples??? Where are the examples??? Do you not plan to have examples? =
Is it coming? WRAP had a couple of good examples IMHO. Not sure why you =
would not want to use those.








=20






--Apple-Mail-9--957677059
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	charset=utf-8

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>David</div><div><br></div><div>Although you stated you were =
taking WRAP and adding signatures, I found many other differences =
between the specs. I'm baffled at why you essentially started from =
scratch on this document rather than taking WRAP and adding the device =
profile and signatures.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Per your previous =
email:</div><div><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>My goal by removing some of the =
non-obvious things was to encourage<br><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>the discussion which has now =
started</div><div><br></div><div>Here are numerous discussion points on =
your draft. I look forward to a response on each =
one.</div><div><br></div><div>-- Dick</div><div><br></div>1.2.1 The =
security and risk profile of a JavaScript or other RIA is different from =
a Rich App. The user can easily be fooled to run a RIA, but in general =
must be actively involved installed a Rich App. A RIA has an identity =
mechanism (URL it came from). Combining these makes it tougher to =
analyse the security issues and requires prohibits taking advantage of =
one context.<div><br></div><div>1.2.3 Google has been using captchas in =
their flows for some time. I'd like to hear from Google and others that =
have deployed captchas here that they do NOT want it as an option before =
it is removed.</div><div><br></div><div>1.2.4 I think this is a security =
consideration, not a specification MUST. Many use cases are fine moving =
cookies in the clear where the cookie.</div><div><br></div><div>1.2.5 =
All refresh token requests are not the same. I see that I mistakenly =
dropped a feature in draft-hardt-oauth-01. In 5.4.8 of WRAP 0.9.7.1 the =
refresh request also includes the client identifier and client secret. =
This enables a catastrophic loss of refresh tokens at a PR to be =
recovered by changing the client secret and not requiring the client to =
have to reacquire authorization from the =
user.</div><div><br></div><div>1.2.6 How is an AS supposed to mark an =
Access Token as no longer being valid? Are you implying that there is a =
Access Token revocation mechanism? I did not see where the spec =
discusses the invalidation of an Access Token. Did I miss it =
somewhere?</div><div><br></div><div>Other changes from WRAP that were =
not highlighted.</div><div><br></div><div>A) The User Delegation =
profiles were put in a separate section from the autonomous client flows =
to highlight to readers the difference in the flows. Your draft merges =
them which could be confusing. It was often confusing to readers of WRAP =
previously.</div><div><br></div><div>B) Change from using profile to =
flow. Personally I think flow is better. Would be interested to hear =
others thoughts.</div><div><br></div><div>C) Placement of Acquiring an =
Access Token prior to Accessing a Protected Resource. Most new readers =
will be Client or PR developers. What they care about is accessing a PR. =
Once they see that they need an Access Token to access a PR, they then =
understand they need to get an Access Token. They then can jump to the =
profile/flow that is relevant for them.</div><div><br></div><div>(D) The =
Parameter Considerations section was removed. We had found this section =
useful to collect common information about =
parameters.</div><div><br></div><div>1.3 =
Terminology</div><div><br></div><div>1.3 access token: why is this a now =
a unique identifier? the deployed usage of Access Tokens in WRAP is that =
this is a token, not an identifier. This was a significant feature in =
WRAP, that the Access Tokens are claims, not identifiers. This is also =
why the Access Token size could be =
larger.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>1.3 client: what do you mean by =
"OAuth-authenticated request"?</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>1.3 refresh =
token:. why does the refresh token need to be unique? can the AS hand =
the same one out to a client later on or does it need to track which =
ones it has handed out?</div><div><br></div><div><div>1.3 server: Why is =
server defined when we have protected resource? I don't understand the =
difference.</div><div><br></div></div><div>1.3.1 Why is this a =
subsection of Terminology? I find the use of the term server here very =
confusing. Is the PR a different machine? The Authorization Server? Why =
does the client discover them from the =
server?</div><div><br></div><div>1.3.1 255 character Access Token length =
recommendation. This was a joke right? There was a discussion of this on =
the list and no one was agreeing with Facebook reps on limiting the =
Access Token. Since it is a recommendation, people can go over, so what =
is the point? The real limit is what can be included in HTTP headers or =
in a query string, not the size of a MySQL =
record.</div><div><br></div><div>1.3.1 URL safe characters. What is the =
basis for this requirement? Many existing systems will likely have other =
non URL safe chars in their existing Access Tokens. You are now creating =
&nbsp;Microsoft's deployed Simple Web Tokens that are used in WRAP are =
not URL safe.</div><div><br></div><div>1.3.1 Why is the Access Token =
length and character set in a section entitled Endpoints? Why did you =
drop Parameter Considerations? That section would have been the logical =
place to have included information such as =
this.</div><div><br></div><div>2 "five core flows" ... this implies any =
other flow is inferior. Why are they core? Per comment above, in WRAP we =
found it useful to separate the user delegation flows from the autonmous =
client flows.</div><div><br></div><div>2 "Common scenarios involve the =
resource owner delegating to a client to
act on their behalf, adding another party (the resource owner) to the
protocol." &nbsp;Which protocol is the resource owner being added =
to?</div><div><br></div><div>"Unlike the others, <a class=3D"info" =
href=3D"file:///Users/dch/Library/Mail%20Downloads/OAuth2-1.html#client_pr=
ofile">Client Identifier and Secret flow<span> (</span><span =
class=3D"info">Client Identifier and Secret =
Flow</span><span>)</span></a>
is intended for a client acting on behalf of itself and not a separate
resource owner. For example, when a client is accessing non-private
data or modifying data about itself." &nbsp;This is a much narrower use =
case than what motivated the Client Account and Password Profile. =
draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 5.1 was motivated for autonomous clients =
calling an API. The data is likely private and not about =
itself.</div><div><br></div><div>2.1 In contrast to 1.3.1 where the =
endpoint is obtained from the server, now the client obtains it from the =
authorization server. Which is it?</div><div><br></div><div>2.1 there =
are a number of steps here. Would be useful to break into separate =
sections similar to&nbsp;draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 to guide =
discussion.</div><div><br></div><div>2.1 are there any checks the AS =
needs to do wrt. the initial request such as check the callback =
URL?</div><div><br></div><div>2.1 "The way in which the server handles =
the user authorization request
(such as via cookies), including whether it uses a secure channel such
as TLS/SSL is beyond the scope of this specification. However, the
server MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner. If the
resource owner approves the authorization request, the authorization
server MUST generate a verification code and associate it with the
client identifier and callback URI.
"</div><div>Why MUST the AS generate a verification code? I would hope =
the AS would also do some checking on the parameters from the client =
such as matching the client identifier with the callback =
URL.</div><div><br></div><div>2.1 "If the request is authorized, the =
access token is included in the HTTP
response body using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content
type as defined by <a class=3D"info" =
href=3D"file:///Users/dch/Library/Mail%20Downloads/OAuth2-1.html#W3C.REC-h=
tml40-19980424">[W3C.REC=E2=80=91html40=E2=80=9119980424]<span> =
(</span><span class=3D"info">Ragget, D., Ed., Le Hors, A., Ed., and I. =
Jacobs, Ed., =E2=80=9CHTML 4.0 Specification,=E2=80=9D =
.</span><span>)</span></a> with a 200 status code =
(OK)."</div><div><br></div><div>What steps does the AS do to authorize =
the request?&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><div>2.1 "The authorization =
server must retain the scope, duration, and other attributes approved by =
the resource owner, and enforce these restrictions when receiving a =
client request made with the tokens =
issued."</div><div><br></div><div>What is this sentence doing in this =
section? How is the AS to enforce these restrictions? Why is the client =
making requests to the authorization =
server?</div></div><div><br></div><div>2.1 =
"oauth_error_reason</div><div><blockquote class=3D"text"><dl>
<dd>Value must be one of "callback_url_mismatch" or =
"expired_verification_code" (case =
sensitive)."</dd></dl></blockquote></div><div>What if it is a different =
error such as invalid client secret or client identifier? What if the =
oauth_mode is not supported?</div><div><br></div><div>2.1&nbsp;<span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: monospace; white-space: =
pre; ">    HTTP/1.1 401 Authorization Required</span></div><pre>    =
WWW-Authenticate: OAuth realm=3D"example"

    oauth_error_reason=3Dexpired_verification_code</pre><div>Where did =
the WWW-Authenticate header suddenly come from? Where do these values of =
realm come from? This is an example, but I don't see where including =
this header was specified.</div><div><br></div><div>2.2 As mentioned =
above, the security considerations for a RIA and Rich App are not the =
same.</div><div><br></div><div>2.2 Once again, this is a long section =
and breaking it up into steps would make it easier to refer to a =
step.</div><div><br></div><div>Why does a Rich App now have to have a =
callback URL? How does the Rich App get the verification code? =
draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 captured a number of best practices for how a =
Rich App can get the verification =
code.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>2.3&nbsp;oauth_verification_rate_limi=
t: What is an AS supposed to do if a Client calls more =
often?</div><div><br></div><div>2.4 "This flow is used when the =
authorization server generally trusts the
client to temporarily collect the end-user's username and password and
it is impossible to use one of the other authorization flows." what =
determines "generally trust" from other trust =
situations?</div><div><br></div><div>2.4 "The authorization server MUST =
verify that the resource owner's
credentials are accurate and MAY verify that the client is authorized
to use this flow."</div><div>Why is verifying the client is authorized =
to use this flow a MAY rather than =
MUST?&nbsp;<br><div><br></div><div>2.5 Why was this renamed to Client =
Identifier and Secret Flow? In&nbsp;draft-hardt-oauth-wrap-01 we =
specifically called it an Account Name and Password flow to avoid =
confusion with how client identifier and client secret are used in other =
parts of the protocol. As noted in the introduction above, this is a =
common use case. It seems that the terms secret and password are being =
used interchangeably, which is confusing.</div><div><br></div><div>3. =
See 1.2.5 for why it makes sense to have different refresh =
flows</div><div><br></div><div>3. Having a new parameter to get a secret =
looks like a hack. We have the oauth_mode parameter, make it another =
mode.</div><div><br></div><div>3. How is the AS supposed to know which =
PR the client is going to talk to? How does it know what signature =
methods are supported by the PR?</div><div><br></div><div>4.1.1 why does =
is the parameter name oauth_access_token rather than just access_token? =
It is in the context of an OAuth =
authentication.</div><div><br></div><div>4.1.1. "The protected resource =
MAY include further details about why the request was rejected in the =
response body or headers." &nbsp;this sounds like a vague way of =
providing additional error information. Seems it would make sense to =
standardize best practices here.</div><div><br></div><div>4.2 Why does =
the client not sign requests to the AS if it has a client secret to sign =
requests with? Signing is much better than including a secret in a =
call.</div><div><br></div><div>4.2 Why refer to&nbsp;<a class=3D"info" =
href=3D"file:///Users/dch/Library/Mail%20Downloads/OAuth2-1.html#draft-ham=
mer-oauth-10">[draft=E2=80=91hammer=E2=80=91oauth=E2=80=9110]</a><span><a =
class=3D"info" =
href=3D"file:///Users/dch/Library/Mail%20Downloads/OAuth2-1.html#draft-ham=
mer-oauth-10"> (</a></span><span class=3D"info"><a class=3D"info" =
href=3D"file:///Users/dch/Library/Mail%20Downloads/OAuth2-1.html#draft-ham=
mer-oauth-10">Hammer-Lahav, E., Ed., =E2=80=9CThe OAuth 1.0 =
Protocol,=E2=80=9D&nbsp;</a>&nbsp;for the computing the signature =
string. Could you not copy that text over here? Are you anticipating =
there will be a separate spec for computing the =
signature?</span></div><div><br></div><div>4.2.1.1 Lots of TODOs here. I =
thought that OAuth 1.0A had this all figured out. Why are there =
TODOs???</div><div><br></div><div>Examples??? Where are the examples??? =
Do you not plan to have examples? Is it coming? WRAP had a couple of =
good examples IMHO. Not sure why you would not want to use =
those.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>&nbsp;<br><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div=
></body></html>=

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From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar 23 22:26:31 2010
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Microsoft recently offered to sponsor me to work on OAuth. For the past =
few months I have participated in the WG on my own time, but I am now =
able to devote a significant amount of time to this WG.

I'd be happy to work on merging client signature support with WRAP. My =
preference would be to start with that draft rather than =
draft-recordon-oauth2 given all the capabilities that David decided to =
drop. Alternatively I will continue to provide criticism and author =
chunks of text if David is willing to include them in =
draft-recordon-oauth2.

At the IETF post meeting this week,  there was discussion of working on =
both draft-hardt-oauth and draft-recordon-oauth2.  David's draft has =
garnered much discussion, much of it comments on what was dropped from =
WRAP. Similarly, if draft-hardt-oauth was revised to include signatures, =
it likely would also generate discussion. Seems like a waste for the WG =
to be providing comments on two documents.

I'm unsure of the correct process: is it the chairs, the editor or a WG =
consensus call to decide where to start.=20


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That was one of the reasons why the refresh was repeated. Unfortunately =
I dropped the secret mistakenly when I ported over to RFC format. See my =
comments on draft-recordon-oauth2 for details.

On 2010-03-23, at 6:51 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> What about clients which don't have access to the client secret? For
> example, rich desktop applications and devices.
>=20
> Seems like if the client secret is optional then a server can enforce
> in policy what type of clients must pass it in.
>=20
> --David
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 5:56 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> =
wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:01 PM, David Recordon =
<recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> =A73
>>>> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing =
access
>>>> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use =
(possess) a
>>>> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh =
tokens? I
>>>> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.
>>>=20
>>> It shouldn't be required.  Fixed!
>>> =
http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83dcfe=
c0127a11fe00
>>=20
>> It was required in WRAP because is lets you recover if a client web
>> server that holds many refresh tokens is compromised.  You rotate the
>> client secret, and then the attacker loses access to user data.
>>=20
>> Please add it back. =3D)
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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On 2010-03-23, at 9:52 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:

>> My goal by removing some of the non-obvious things was to encourage
>> the discussion which has now started! Many of the design decisions
>> that went into WRAP haven't entirely been shared in public

Would you care to share the design decisions behind the choices you made =
in draft-recordon-oauth2 ?


From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar 23 23:17:32 2010
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Hi Brian,

thanks for the clarification. Should the WG document this kind of 
security design decisions somewhere?

regards,
Torsten.
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:01 PM, David Recordon<recordond@gmail.com>  wrote:
>    
>>> §3
>>> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing access
>>> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use (possess) a
>>> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh tokens? I
>>> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.
>>>        
>> It shouldn't be required.  Fixed!
>> http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83dcfec0127a11fe00
>>      
> It was required in WRAP because is lets you recover if a client web
> server that holds many refresh tokens is compromised.  You rotate the
> client secret, and then the attacker loses access to user data.
>
> Please add it back. =)
>    



From cmortimore@salesforce.com  Wed Mar 24 09:10:18 2010
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From: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
To: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>
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Agreed - I think that stems from my original note...sorry if it accidentall=
y put words in your mouth.   I do believe that the original flow was author=
ed by Dick when he was at Microsoft, and it's my understanding that you've =
actually similar pushed code; I've at least seen fairly detailed informatio=
n indicating it can be used for integration of ADFS and Azure.

Is Microsoft interested in the flow?    I have lot's of mutual Microsoft cu=
stomers that ask me to support the pattern; I really hope that you see the =
same and are getting behind this.

-cmort
________________________________________
From: Anthony Nadalin [tonynad@microsoft.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 9:53 PM
To: David Recordon; Torsten Lodderstedt; Chuck Mortimore; Mark Mcgloin
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: RE: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

I don't think that Microsoft ever indicated that we need the SAML flows.

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of D=
avid Recordon
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 10:48 AM
To: Torsten Lodderstedt; Chuck Mortimore; Mark Mcgloin
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

Hey Chuck,
Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I really ap=
preciate it.

I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for it on =
the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our default should b=
e making the spec as short and simple as possible so removed a few things f=
rom WRAP in order to start conversations like this one.  It's now clear tha=
t Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM all need the SAML profile.  Chuck,=
 I'll merge your wording in.  Want to be listed as an author?

We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the core sp=
ec versus which should be developed at the same time but in individual docu=
ments.

Thanks,
--David

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.n=
et> wrote:
> +1 for assertion support
>
> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user
> credentials (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers
> tokens)
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>
>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>
>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>
>>> Just getting a chance to review this - I apologize for not getting
>>> this
>>
>> before the meeting started.
>>
>>> We'd like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to
>>> section
>>> 5.2
>>
>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe
>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this (
>> wrap_SAML ) in Azure.
>>
>>
>> Mark McGloin
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
_______________________________________________
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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
To: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, "Mark Mcgloin" <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>
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Yes the flows are interesting and we would be willing to work on them

-----Original Message-----
From: Chuck Mortimore [mailto:cmortimore@salesforce.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 9:11 AM
To: Anthony Nadalin; David Recordon; Torsten Lodderstedt; Mark Mcgloin
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: RE: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

Agreed - I think that stems from my original note...sorry if it accidentall=
y put words in your mouth.   I do believe that the original flow was author=
ed by Dick when he was at Microsoft, and it's my understanding that you've =
actually similar pushed code; I've at least seen fairly detailed informatio=
n indicating it can be used for integration of ADFS and Azure.

Is Microsoft interested in the flow?    I have lot's of mutual Microsoft cu=
stomers that ask me to support the pattern; I really hope that you see the =
same and are getting behind this.

-cmort
________________________________________
From: Anthony Nadalin [tonynad@microsoft.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 9:53 PM
To: David Recordon; Torsten Lodderstedt; Chuck Mortimore; Mark Mcgloin
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: RE: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

I don't think that Microsoft ever indicated that we need the SAML flows.

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of D=
avid Recordon
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 10:48 AM
To: Torsten Lodderstedt; Chuck Mortimore; Mark Mcgloin
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

Hey Chuck,
Thanks for rewriting the SAML flow into the style of my draft!  I really ap=
preciate it.

I originally dropped the SAML flow because I hadn't seen support for it on =
the mailing list(s) the past two months.  I think that our default should b=
e making the spec as short and simple as possible so removed a few things f=
rom WRAP in order to start conversations like this one.  It's now clear tha=
t Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, and IBM all need the SAML profile.  Chuck,=
 I'll merge your wording in.  Want to be listed as an author?

We're also going to need to figure out which flows should be in the core sp=
ec versus which should be developed at the same time but in individual docu=
ments.

Thanks,
--David

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:50 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.n=
et> wrote:
> +1 for assertion support
>
> what about enhancing the flow #2.4 to accept any kind of user=20
> credentials (username/password, SAML assertions, other authz servers
> tokens)
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 23.03.2010 um 12:42 schrieb Mark Mcgloin <mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com>:
>
>> +1 for assertion profile. Was there any reason why it was dropped?
>>
>> On 3/23/10, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>>>
>>> Just getting a chance to review this - I apologize for not getting=20
>>> this
>>
>> before the meeting started.
>>
>>> We'd like to see some form of an Assertion Profile, similar to=20
>>> section
>>> 5.2
>>
>> from draft-hardt-oauth-01.   We have strong customer use-cases for an
>> assertion based flow, specifically SAML bearer tokens, and I >believe=20
>> Microsoft may have already shipped a minor variation on this (=20
>> wrap_SAML ) in Azure.
>>
>>
>> Mark McGloin
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth



From hans@granqvist.com  Wed Mar 24 09:54:35 2010
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Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 09:54:51 -0700
Message-ID: <c47f68be1003240954u56067426mb475ac0f5fb96284@mail.gmail.com>
From: Hans Granqvist <hans@granqvist.com>
To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 9:44 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> By keeping all profiles in one document, someone easily understands the different applications of the technology, and when a different use case comes up, they know it is available rather than having to look at a different document.

Yes. One doc rules since the spec + its delta changes are immediately obvious.

Multiple docs lead to unnecessary restating of facts, potential
redefinitions of terms, versioning and feature creep clashes, visual
hiding of complexity, scopes, etc. + you never know if you have the
whole set of docs. Think WS-*.

-Hans

From romeda@gmail.com  Wed Mar 24 10:11:14 2010
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Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 17:11:09 +0000
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps
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<chair hat>

Hi all,

Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while
there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft that
incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth
1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to
see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
solutions something to base their work on.

To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the next week.

That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap
between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.

Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meeting
(virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.

Blaine and Hannes.

</chair hat>

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Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 10:25:22 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] new sponsorship, time available for WG
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On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:18 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> Microsoft recently offered to sponsor me to work on OAuth. For the past
> few months I have participated in the WG on my own time, but I am now
> able to devote a significant amount of time to this WG.

Sweet.

> At the IETF post meeting this week, =A0there was discussion of working
> on both draft-hardt-oauth and draft-recordon-oauth2. =A0David's draft
> has garnered much discussion, much of it comments on what was
> dropped from WRAP. Similarly, if draft-hardt-oauth was revised to
> include signatures, it likely would also generate discussion. Seems
> like a waste for the WG to be providing comments on two documents.

So there is a bunch of good stuff in both documents.

What I like from David's draft:
- device profile
- adding oauth_mode
- single refresh token workflow (though as David points out in another
thread, this needs tweaking.)

What I like from WRAP:
- a whole bunch of profiles and use cases that got dropped from David's dra=
ft.

I don't think the OAuth 1.0 signature scheme is a good choice for
OAuth 2, but we talked in person at IETF about some alternatives.
Dick and I both have opinions on what we think it should look like,
I'm hoping Dick will write it up soon.

I'm going to write up some security considerations (I think Richard
Barnes is interested, too), based mostly on the WRAP draft, plus some
of the profiles from the OAuth2 draft.

So short-term we are probably going to end up with more documents
rather than fewer.  I think the discussion is going really well and
I'm happy to have so many people participating.

Cheers,
Brian

From leifj@mnt.se  Wed Mar 24 10:32:37 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What are the OAuth design principles?
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On 03/23/2010 12:00 AM, Eve Maler wrote:
> Since the discussion in the "OAuth after-party" seemed to warrant bringing it up, I mentioned the UMA design principles/requirements document.  You can find it here:
>
> http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Requirements
>
> The discussion is around "Why can't Kerberos just be used for your use cases?"  The UMA principles might be able to inform how the OAuth WG makes its case for why Kerberos doesn't suffice.  (If we discover it does, hey, our work here is done. :-)

There are two threads here

- why Kerberos _as such_ does or does not work for the use-cases
- what experiences from 3rd party schemes such as Kerberos or STS are 
valuable for OAuth.

Being long-time Kerberos-fanboy I still say that one of those threads
are interesting and the other isn't.

I think its much more valuable to talk about how to distill experience
from Kerberos (etc) which are applicable to the design of OAuth.

	Cheers Leif



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On 24 Mar 2010, at 9:54 AM, Hans Granqvist wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 9:44 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>> ...
>> By keeping all profiles in one document, someone easily understands =
the different applications of the technology, and when a different use =
case comes up, they know it is available rather than having to look at a =
different document.
>=20
> Yes. One doc rules since the spec + its delta changes are immediately =
obvious.
>=20
> Multiple docs lead to unnecessary restating of facts, potential
> redefinitions of terms, versioning and feature creep clashes, visual
> hiding of complexity, scopes, etc. + you never know if you have the
> whole set of docs. Think WS-*.

On reflection, I agree (having contributed to the SAML =
proliferation-of-specs problem).  Any profiles that meet some threshold =
of interest -- say, more than one party asking for it -- and that are =
known prior to final publication would be good to include in one =
package.  There are editing, review, and approval overhead costs for =
every separate spec that this group itself publishes.  But it should =
also be clear how others can produce spinoff profile specs.  SAML =
offered guidelines for people writing third-party profiles and =
extensions, and a lighter-weight version of this might be nice to have =
on record if there's any complexity to it.

	Eve

Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog=

From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Wed Mar 24 11:08:16 2010
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From: Eve Maler <eve@xmlgrrl.com>
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I might be interested too; agree that it's not core to this group.

	Eve

On 23 Mar 2010, at 5:15 PM, Chuck Mortimore wrote:

> Outside the scope of what this WG should be tackling in the core spec =
IMO, but I=92d be interested in working on a profile.   There is a lot =
of this use-case being done in an ad-hoc manner on my platform.
>=20
> -cmort
>=20
>=20
> On 3/23/10 11:17 AM, "Paul Madsen" <paul.madsen@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Separate from the Client trading a SAML assertion for an Access Token =
as
> in this flow, we are interested in defining how a Client might use =
SAML
> SSO messages to get an Access Token (comparable to OpenID/OAuth =
hybrid).
>=20
> Anybody else interested?
>=20
> paul


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>I might be interested too; agree that it's not core to this =
group.</div><div><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Eve</div><br><div><div>On 23 Mar =
2010, at 5:15 PM, Chuck Mortimore wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>
<font face=3D"Lucida Grande"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">Outside the =
scope of what this WG should be tackling in the core spec IMO, but I=92d =
be interested in working on a profile. &nbsp;&nbsp;There is a lot of =
this use-case being done in an ad-hoc manner on my platform.<br>
<br>
-cmort<br>
<br>
<br>
On 3/23/10 11:17 AM, "Paul Madsen" &lt;<a =
href=3D"x-msg://321/paul.madsen@gmail.com">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
<br>
</span></font><blockquote><font face=3D"Lucida Grande"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt">Separate from the Client trading a SAML =
assertion for an Access Token as<br>
in this flow, we are interested in defining how a Client might use =
SAML<br>
SSO messages to get an Access Token (comparable to OpenID/OAuth =
hybrid).<br>
<br>
Anybody else interested?<br>
<br>
paul<br></span></font></blockquote></div></blockquote></div><div><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style: =
normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: =
auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Courier; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: =
auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">Eve Maler</div><div><a =
href=3D"mailto:eve@xmlgrrl.com">eve@xmlgrrl.com</a></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog">http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog</a></div>=
</span></span>
</div>
<br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail-243--910882223--

From eran@hueniverse.com  Wed Mar 24 11:53:33 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 11:53:54 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] new sponsorship, time available for WG
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I would suggest that people don't spend time on editorial and formatting of=
 their proposed text. Just post either documents or snippets and I will inc=
orporate them into the spec as soon as possible. I have the next 4 weeks se=
t aside for making significant progress on this document.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Brian Eaton
> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 10:25 AM
> To: Dick Hardt
> Cc: OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] new sponsorship, time available for WG
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:18 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote=
:
> > Microsoft recently offered to sponsor me to work on OAuth. For the
> > past few months I have participated in the WG on my own time, but I am
> > now able to devote a significant amount of time to this WG.
>=20
> Sweet.
>=20
> > At the IETF post meeting this week, =A0there was discussion of working
> > on both draft-hardt-oauth and draft-recordon-oauth2. =A0David's draft
> > has garnered much discussion, much of it comments on what was dropped
> > from WRAP. Similarly, if draft-hardt-oauth was revised to include
> > signatures, it likely would also generate discussion. Seems like a
> > waste for the WG to be providing comments on two documents.
>=20
> So there is a bunch of good stuff in both documents.
>=20
> What I like from David's draft:
> - device profile
> - adding oauth_mode
> - single refresh token workflow (though as David points out in another
> thread, this needs tweaking.)
>=20
> What I like from WRAP:
> - a whole bunch of profiles and use cases that got dropped from David's
> draft.
>=20
> I don't think the OAuth 1.0 signature scheme is a good choice for OAuth 2=
,
> but we talked in person at IETF about some alternatives.
> Dick and I both have opinions on what we think it should look like, I'm h=
oping
> Dick will write it up soon.
>=20
> I'm going to write up some security considerations (I think Richard Barne=
s is
> interested, too), based mostly on the WRAP draft, plus some of the profil=
es
> from the OAuth2 draft.
>=20
> So short-term we are probably going to end up with more documents rather
> than fewer.  I think the discussion is going really well and I'm happy to=
 have
> so many people participating.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Brian
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Wed Mar 24 15:04:25 2010
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] new sponsorship, time available for WG
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WIll do. Glad to hear you have a bunch of time on your hands.

On 2010-03-24, at 11:53 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:

> I would suggest that people don't spend time on editorial and =
formatting of their proposed text. Just post either documents or =
snippets and I will incorporate them into the spec as soon as possible. =
I have the next 4 weeks set aside for making significant progress on =
this document.
>=20
> EHL
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On =
Behalf
>> Of Brian Eaton
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2010 10:25 AM
>> To: Dick Hardt
>> Cc: OAuth WG
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] new sponsorship, time available for WG
>>=20
>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:18 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>> Microsoft recently offered to sponsor me to work on OAuth. For the
>>> past few months I have participated in the WG on my own time, but I =
am
>>> now able to devote a significant amount of time to this WG.
>>=20
>> Sweet.
>>=20
>>> At the IETF post meeting this week,  there was discussion of working
>>> on both draft-hardt-oauth and draft-recordon-oauth2.  David's draft
>>> has garnered much discussion, much of it comments on what was =
dropped
>>> from WRAP. Similarly, if draft-hardt-oauth was revised to include
>>> signatures, it likely would also generate discussion. Seems like a
>>> waste for the WG to be providing comments on two documents.
>>=20
>> So there is a bunch of good stuff in both documents.
>>=20
>> What I like from David's draft:
>> - device profile
>> - adding oauth_mode
>> - single refresh token workflow (though as David points out in =
another
>> thread, this needs tweaking.)
>>=20
>> What I like from WRAP:
>> - a whole bunch of profiles and use cases that got dropped from =
David's
>> draft.
>>=20
>> I don't think the OAuth 1.0 signature scheme is a good choice for =
OAuth 2,
>> but we talked in person at IETF about some alternatives.
>> Dick and I both have opinions on what we think it should look like, =
I'm hoping
>> Dick will write it up soon.
>>=20
>> I'm going to write up some security considerations (I think Richard =
Barnes is
>> interested, too), based mostly on the WRAP draft, plus some of the =
profiles
>> from the OAuth2 draft.
>>=20
>> So short-term we are probably going to end up with more documents =
rather
>> than fewer.  I think the discussion is going really well and I'm =
happy to have
>> so many people participating.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> Brian
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From lindner@inuus.com  Wed Mar 24 16:21:10 2010
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To: Blaine Cook <romeda@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps
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<hat roles=3D"lurker,enduser">

Here at LinkedIn we've been following the OAuth developments and we're =
all happy to see progress being made on 2.0.  =46rom our side we'd love =
to see standardization of a number of defacto standards we use in our =
implementation.  Specifically the following:

* OAuth Problem Reporting  -- If we had not implemented this we would =
probably had half as many devs on our platform.  It's that important and =
I'll contribute what I can on this.
* Responses for throttled responses.  Right now we return a 403 and add =
some descriptive info that the dev ignores :)
* Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)
* Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using =
xoauth_authorize_url)
* Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.
* Explicit token invalidation endpoints
* Signaling the client when a user 'declines/cancels' an authz request.

I'll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.

In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.

</hat>

On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:

> <chair hat>
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while
> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft that
> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth
> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to
> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
> solutions something to base their work on.
>=20
> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the =
next week.
>=20
> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap
> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
>=20
> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meeting
> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
>=20
> Blaine and Hannes.
>=20
> </chair hat>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From lshepard@facebook.com  Wed Mar 24 17:15:41 2010
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From: Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com>
To: Paul Lindner <lindner@inuus.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 17:15:50 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps
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Hey Paul,

I was just curious, what do you mean by OAuth Problem Reporting and clock s=
ynchronization? I'm not familiar with those.

On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:

> <hat roles=3D"lurker,enduser">
>=20
> Here at LinkedIn we've been following the OAuth developments and we're al=
l happy to see progress being made on 2.0.  From our side we'd love to see =
standardization of a number of defacto standards we use in our implementati=
on.  Specifically the following:
>=20
> * OAuth Problem Reporting  -- If we had not implemented this we would pro=
bably had half as many devs on our platform.  It's that important and I'll =
contribute what I can on this.
> * Responses for throttled responses.  Right now we return a 403 and add s=
ome descriptive info that the dev ignores :)
> * Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)
> * Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using xoauth_a=
uthorize_url)
> * Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.
> * Explicit token invalidation endpoints
> * Signaling the client when a user 'declines/cancels' an authz request.
>=20
> I'll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.
>=20
> In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.
>=20
> </hat>
>=20
> On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>=20
>> <chair hat>
>>=20
>> Hi all,
>>=20
>> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while
>> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
>> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft that
>> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth
>> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to
>> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
>> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
>> solutions something to base their work on.
>>=20
>> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the nex=
t week.
>>=20
>> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
>> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
>> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap
>> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
>> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
>> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
>>=20
>> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meeting
>> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
>> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
>>=20
>> Blaine and Hannes.
>>=20
>> </chair hat>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From lindner@inuus.com  Wed Mar 24 18:26:34 2010
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--00504502b672fa2de5048295f05d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they are
rejected.   OAuth Problem
Reporting<http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting>includes a
mechanism to send the server's concept of 'now' to the client:

The parameter named *oauth_acceptable_timestamps* consists of two numbers in
decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamps
acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender will currently accept
an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first number and not greater
than the second number.

With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate
localized time to the server's (reliable) time.

We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagined.

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 5:15 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> wrote:

> Hey Paul,
>
> I was just curious, what do you mean by OAuth Problem Reporting and clock
> synchronization? I'm not familiar with those.
>
> On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:
>
> > <hat roles="lurker,enduser">
> >
> > Here at LinkedIn we've been following the OAuth developments and we're
> all happy to see progress being made on 2.0.  From our side we'd love to see
> standardization of a number of defacto standards we use in our
> implementation.  Specifically the following:
> >
> > * OAuth Problem Reporting  -- If we had not implemented this we would
> probably had half as many devs on our platform.  It's that important and
> I'll contribute what I can on this.
> > * Responses for throttled responses.  Right now we return a 403 and add
> some descriptive info that the dev ignores :)
> > * Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)
> > * Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using
> xoauth_authorize_url)
> > * Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.
> > * Explicit token invalidation endpoints
> > * Signaling the client when a user 'declines/cancels' an authz request.
> >
> > I'll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.
> >
> > In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.
> >
> > </hat>
> >
> > On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:
> >
> >> <chair hat>
> >>
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while
> >> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
> >> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft that
> >> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth
> >> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to
> >> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
> >> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
> >> solutions something to base their work on.
> >>
> >> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the
> next week.
> >>
> >> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
> >> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
> >> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap
> >> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
> >> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
> >> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
> >>
> >> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meeting
> >> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
> >> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
> >>
> >> Blaine and Hannes.
> >>
> >> </chair hat>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

--00504502b672fa2de5048295f05d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they are=
 rejected. =A0 <a href=3D"http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting">OAuth =
Problem Reporting</a> includes a mechanism to send the server&#39;s concept=
 of &#39;now&#39; to the client:<div>
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"webkit-indent-blockquote" style=3D"margin: 0=
 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><span class=3D"Apple-style-spa=
n" style=3D"font-family: &#39;Segoe UI&#39;, &#39;Lucida Grande&#39;, Arial=
; font-size: 13px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); line-height: 19px; "><p style=3D=
"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.2em; margin-left: 0px=
; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: =
0px; border-top-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0=
px; border-left-width: 0px; border-style: initial; border-color: initial; f=
ont-weight: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-size: 13px; font-family: inh=
erit; vertical-align: baseline; line-height: 1.5em; color: rgb(18, 18, 18);=
 ">
The parameter named=A0<code style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; ma=
rgin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; p=
adding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; border-top-width: 0px; border-right-=
width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-style:=
 initial; border-color: initial; font-weight: inherit; font-style: inherit;=
 font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;courier new&#39;, monospace !important;=
 vertical-align: baseline; "><b>oauth_acceptable_timestamps</b></code>=A0co=
nsists of two numbers in decimal notation, separated by &#39;-&#39; (hyphen=
). It&#39;s the range of timestamps acceptable to the sender. That is, it m=
eans the sender will currently accept an oauth_timestamp that&#39;s not les=
s than the first number and not greater than the second number.</p>
</span></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#=
39;Segoe UI&#39;, &#39;Lucida Grande&#39;, Arial; font-size: 13px; color: r=
gb(68, 68, 68); line-height: 19px; "><div><br></div></span></div></blockquo=
te>
With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate localiz=
ed time to the server&#39;s (reliable) time.<div><br></div><div>We&#39;ve f=
ound that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagined.<br>
<div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 5:15 PM, L=
uke Shepard <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lshepard@facebook.com">=
lshepard@facebook.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x;">
Hey Paul,<br>
<br>
I was just curious, what do you mean by OAuth Problem Reporting and clock s=
ynchronization? I&#39;m not familiar with those.<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; &lt;hat roles=3D&quot;lurker,enduser&quot;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Here at LinkedIn we&#39;ve been following the OAuth developments and w=
e&#39;re all happy to see progress being made on 2.0. =A0From our side we&#=
39;d love to see standardization of a number of defacto standards we use in=
 our implementation. =A0Specifically the following:<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; * OAuth Problem Reporting =A0-- If we had not implemented this we woul=
d probably had half as many devs on our platform. =A0It&#39;s that importan=
t and I&#39;ll contribute what I can on this.<br>
&gt; * Responses for throttled responses. =A0Right now we return a 403 and =
add some descriptive info that the dev ignores :)<br>
&gt; * Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)<br>
&gt; * Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using xoaut=
h_authorize_url)<br>
&gt; * Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.<br>
&gt; * Explicit token invalidation endpoints<br>
&gt; * Signaling the client when a user &#39;declines/cancels&#39; an authz=
 request.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &lt;/hat&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;chair hat&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hi all,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and whi=
le<br>
&gt;&gt; there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like th=
e<br>
&gt;&gt; next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft =
that<br>
&gt;&gt; incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAu=
th<br>
&gt;&gt; 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I&#39;d =
like to<br>
&gt;&gt; see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offe=
r<br>
&gt;&gt; the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable<br=
>
&gt;&gt; solutions something to base their work on.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; To that end, we&#39;d like to see Eran take up the editing work ov=
er the next week.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from=
<br>
&gt;&gt; WRAP that were removed in David&#39;s great start at a unified spe=
c.<br>
&gt;&gt; Dick&#39;s contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling =
the gap<br>
&gt;&gt; between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches=
,<br>
&gt;&gt; and we&#39;d like to see that work be properly credited and evalua=
ted<br>
&gt;&gt; along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG mee=
ting<br>
&gt;&gt; (virtual or otherwise), we&#39;ll have a new RFC-style document th=
at<br>
&gt;&gt; satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Blaine and Hannes.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;/chair hat&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--00504502b672fa2de5048295f05d--

From recordond@gmail.com  Wed Mar 24 19:13:10 2010
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From: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps
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I'm certainly supportive of this approach; Eran has shown that he's a
good editor. :)

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook <romeda@gmail.com> wrote:
> <chair hat>
>
> Hi all,
>
> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while
> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft that
> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth
> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to
> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
> solutions something to base their work on.
>
> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the next week.
>
> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap
> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
>
> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meeting
> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
>
> Blaine and Hannes.
>
> </chair hat>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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From: Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com>
To: Paul Lindner <lindner@inuus.com>, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com>
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> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

--B_3352303865_1559494
Content-type: text/plain;
	charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable

In our experience at Yahoo, we=B9ve found that many clients don=B9t have the
right time. You=B9d think that NTP would have solved this by now, but it
hasn=B9t for a surprising number of clients.

Are timestamps really necessary in Oauth 2.0? In OAuth 1.0a, timestamps are
included in the signature to protect against replay attacks. This is not
really necessary in Oauth 2.0 since signatures are optional when SSL is
used.

Allen


On 3/24/10 6:26 PM, "Paul Lindner" <lindner@inuus.com> wrote:

> Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they a=
re
> rejected. =A0 OAuth Problem Reporting
> <http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting>  includes a mechanism to send=
 the
> server's concept of 'now' to the client:
>=20
>> The parameter named=A0oauth_acceptable_timestamps=A0consists of two numbers =
in
>> decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamp=
s
>> acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender will currently ac=
cept
>> an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first number and not greater=
 than
>> the second number.
>>=20
>>=20
> With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate local=
ized
> time to the server's (reliable) time.
>=20
> We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagin=
ed.
>=20


--B_3352303865_1559494
Content-type: text/html;
	charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable

<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt=
'>In our experience at Yahoo, we&#8217;ve found that many clients don&#8217;=
t have the right time. You&#8217;d think that NTP would have solved this by =
now, but it hasn&#8217;t for a surprising number of clients.<BR>
<BR>
Are timestamps really necessary in Oauth 2.0? In OAuth 1.0a, timestamps are=
 included in the signature to protect against replay attacks. This is not re=
ally necessary in Oauth 2.0 since signatures are optional when SSL is used.<=
BR>
<BR>
Allen<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 3/24/10 6:26 PM, &quot;Paul Lindner&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"lindner@inuus.com=
">lindner@inuus.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock m=
akes an OAuth call they are rejected. =A0 OAuth Problem Reporting &lt;<a href=3D=
"http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting">http://oauth.pbworks.com/Problem=
Reporting</a>&gt; &nbsp;includes a mechanism to send the server's concept of=
 'now' to the client:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><=
FONT SIZE=3D"2"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:10pt'>The parameter named=A0</SPAN></FONT=
></FONT><FONT SIZE=3D"2"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:10pt'><FONT FACE=3D"Consolas, Co=
urier New, Courier"><B>oauth_acceptable_timestamps</B></FONT><FONT FACE=3D"Cal=
ibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial">=A0consists of two numbers in decimal notatio=
n, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamps acceptable to the=
 sender. That is, it means the sender will currently accept an oauth_timesta=
mp that's not less than the first number and not greater than the second num=
ber.<BR>
</FONT></SPAN></FONT><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN =
STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'><BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial">=
<SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>With that data a client can maintain a time ske=
w value to translate localized time to the server's (reliable) time.<BR>
<BR>
We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagined=
.<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
</BODY>
</HTML>


--B_3352303865_1559494--


From brent@facebook.com  Wed Mar 24 20:18:43 2010
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From: Brent Goldman <brent@facebook.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 20:18:22 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps
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I am also supportive of this approach.

On Mar 24, 2010, at 7:13 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> I'm certainly supportive of this approach; Eran has shown that he's a
> good editor. :)
>=20
> On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook <romeda@gmail.com> wrote:
>> <chair hat>
>>=20
>> Hi all,
>>=20
>> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while
>> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
>> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft that
>> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth
>> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to
>> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
>> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
>> solutions something to base their work on.
>>=20
>> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the nex=
t week.
>>=20
>> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
>> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
>> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap
>> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
>> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
>> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
>>=20
>> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meeting
>> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
>> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
>>=20
>> Blaine and Hannes.
>>=20
>> </chair hat>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From hans@granqvist.com  Wed Mar 24 20:20:46 2010
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Paul, I really like your problem reporting mechanism. Although
diminishing, problems
with time synch and general OAuth are still prevalent with our Netflix
developers.

Hans




On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 6:26 PM, Paul Lindner <lindner@inuus.com> wrote:
> Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they a=
re
> rejected. =A0 OAuth Problem Reporting includes a mechanism to send the
> server's concept of 'now' to the client:
>
> The parameter named=A0oauth_acceptable_timestamps=A0consists of two numbe=
rs in
> decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamps
> acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender will currently acc=
ept
> an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first number and not greater
> than the second number.
>
> With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate
> localized time to the server's (reliable) time.
> We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagin=
ed.
>
> On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 5:15 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> wro=
te:
>>
>> Hey Paul,
>>
>> I was just curious, what do you mean by OAuth Problem Reporting and cloc=
k
>> synchronization? I'm not familiar with those.
>>
>> On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:
>>
>> > <hat roles=3D"lurker,enduser">
>> >
>> > Here at LinkedIn we've been following the OAuth developments and we're
>> > all happy to see progress being made on 2.0. =A0From our side we'd lov=
e to see
>> > standardization of a number of defacto standards we use in our
>> > implementation. =A0Specifically the following:
>> >
>> > * OAuth Problem Reporting =A0-- If we had not implemented this we woul=
d
>> > probably had half as many devs on our platform. =A0It's that important=
 and
>> > I'll contribute what I can on this.
>> > * Responses for throttled responses. =A0Right now we return a 403 and =
add
>> > some descriptive info that the dev ignores :)
>> > * Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)
>> > * Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using
>> > xoauth_authorize_url)
>> > * Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.
>> > * Explicit token invalidation endpoints
>> > * Signaling the client when a user 'declines/cancels' an authz request=
.
>> >
>> > I'll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.
>> >
>> > In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.
>> >
>> > </hat>
>> >
>> > On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>> >
>> >> <chair hat>
>> >>
>> >> Hi all,
>> >>
>> >> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while
>> >> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
>> >> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft tha=
t
>> >> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth
>> >> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to
>> >> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
>> >> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
>> >> solutions something to base their work on.
>> >>
>> >> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the
>> >> next week.
>> >>
>> >> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
>> >> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
>> >> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap
>> >> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
>> >> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
>> >> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
>> >>
>> >> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meetin=
g
>> >> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
>> >> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
>> >>
>> >> Blaine and Hannes.
>> >>
>> >> </chair hat>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > OAuth mailing list
>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

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To: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 21:46:08 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps
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This is probably a stupid question, but why do we need accurate timestamps?=
 Why is it not sufficient to use a monotonically increasing call_id to prev=
ent replay attacks? (this is how the Facebook sig algorithm works)

On Mar 24, 2010, at 9:28 PM, Raffi Krikorian wrote:

but timestamps are still necessary in the signature method?

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 7:31 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com<mailto:atom@=
yahoo-inc.com>> wrote:
In our experience at Yahoo, we=92ve found that many clients don=92t have th=
e right time. You=92d think that NTP would have solved this by now, but it =
hasn=92t for a surprising number of clients.

Are timestamps really necessary in Oauth 2.0? In OAuth 1.0a, timestamps are=
 included in the signature to protect against replay attacks. This is not r=
eally necessary in Oauth 2.0 since signatures are optional when SSL is used=
.

Allen


On 3/24/10 6:26 PM, "Paul Lindner" <lindner@inuus.com<http://lindner@inuus.=
com/>> wrote:

Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they are=
 rejected.   OAuth Problem Reporting <http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemRepor=
ting>  includes a mechanism to send the server's concept of 'now' to the cl=
ient:

The parameter named oauth_acceptable_timestamps consists of two numbers in =
decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamps a=
cceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender will currently accept=
 an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first number and not greater t=
han the second number.


With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate localiz=
ed time to the server's (reliable) time.

We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagined=
.


_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth




--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi


--_000_8EF2BEF79709496BB1F7A0E7EF97157Efacebookcom_
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode:=
 space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">This is probably a stupid =
question, but why do we need accurate timestamps? Why is it not sufficient =
to use a monotonically increasing call_id to prevent replay attacks? (this =
is how the Facebook sig algorithm works)<div><br><div><div>On Mar 24, 2010,=
 at 9:28 PM, Raffi Krikorian wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-new=
line"><blockquote type=3D"cite">but timestamps are still necessary in the s=
ignature method?<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at =
7:31 PM, Allen Tom <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:atom@yahoo-inc.c=
om">atom@yahoo-inc.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">



<div>
<font face=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><span style=3D"font-size:=
11pt">In our experience at Yahoo, we=92ve found that many clients don=92t h=
ave the right time. You=92d think that NTP would have solved this by now, b=
ut it hasn=92t for a surprising number of clients.<br>


<br>
Are timestamps really necessary in Oauth 2.0? In OAuth 1.0a, timestamps are=
 included in the signature to protect against replay attacks. This is not r=
eally necessary in Oauth 2.0 since signatures are optional when SSL is used=
.<br>


<br>
Allen<br>
<br>
<br>
On 3/24/10 6:26 PM, "Paul Lindner" &lt;<a href=3D"http://lindner@inuus.com/=
" target=3D"_blank">lindner@inuus.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
</span></font><blockquote><font face=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"=
><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">Right now if a client with an inaccurate cl=
ock makes an OAuth call they are rejected. &nbsp; OAuth Problem Reporting &=
lt;<a href=3D"http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting" target=3D"_blank">=
http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting</a>&gt; &nbsp;includes a mechanis=
m to send the server's concept of 'now' to the client:<br>


<br>
</span></font><div class=3D"im"><blockquote><font face=3D"Calibri, Verdana,=
 Helvetica, Arial"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt">The para=
meter named&nbsp;</span></font></font><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-=
size:10pt"><font face=3D"Consolas, Courier New, Courier"><b>oauth_acceptabl=
e_timestamps</b></font><font face=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial">&n=
bsp;consists of two numbers in decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen).=
 It's the range of timestamps acceptable to the sender. That is, it means t=
he sender will currently accept an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the=
 first number and not greater than the second number.<br>


</font></span></font><font face=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:11pt"><br>
<br>
</span></font></blockquote><font face=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial=
"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">With that data a client can maintain a tim=
e skew value to translate localized time to the server's (reliable) time.<b=
r>


<br>
We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagined=
.<br>
<br>
</span></font></div></blockquote>
</div>


<br>_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>=
Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitte=
r.com/raffi</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 9:46 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> wrote=
:
> This is probably a stupid question, but why do we need accurate timestamp=
s?
> Why is it not sufficient to use a monotonically increasing call_id to
> prevent replay attacks? (this is how the Facebook sig algorithm works)

Monotonically increasing counters don't scale well in distributed
systems.  It is rapidly changing state that needs to be synchronously
replicated across lots of clients and servers.

(Wow, I hadn't realized that FB requires call_id to monotonically
increase.  I may have to eat my words about this not scaling well. =3D)

Bearer tokens eliminate the need for timestamps - authorization
servers and protected resources need roughly synchronized clocks, but
clients don't need to worry about it.

Challenge-response protocols eliminate the need for timestamps, but
add an extra round trip.

The OAuth 1.0 extension to report server-side time basically makes the
protocol fall back on challenge-response.   Folks who really can't
live with bearer tokens should probably use this approach.

Cheers,
Brian



> On Mar 24, 2010, at 9:28 PM, Raffi Krikorian wrote:
>
> but timestamps are still necessary in the signature method?
>
> On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 7:31 PM, Allen Tom <atom@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
>>
>> In our experience at Yahoo, we=92ve found that many clients don=92t have=
 the
>> right time. You=92d think that NTP would have solved this by now, but it
>> hasn=92t for a surprising number of clients.
>>
>> Are timestamps really necessary in Oauth 2.0? In OAuth 1.0a, timestamps
>> are included in the signature to protect against replay attacks. This is=
 not
>> really necessary in Oauth 2.0 since signatures are optional when SSL is
>> used.
>>
>> Allen
>>
>>
>> On 3/24/10 6:26 PM, "Paul Lindner" <lindner@inuus.com> wrote:
>>
>> Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they
>> are rejected. =A0 OAuth Problem Reporting
>> <http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting> =A0includes a mechanism to s=
end
>> the server's concept of 'now' to the client:
>>
>> The parameter named=A0oauth_acceptable_timestamps=A0consists of two numb=
ers in
>> decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamp=
s
>> acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender will currently ac=
cept
>> an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first number and not greater
>> than the second number.
>>
>>
>> With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate
>> localized time to the server's (reliable) time.
>>
>> We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have
>> imagined.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

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Just curious - why can't the client check the Date header?

Subbu


On Mar 24, 2010, at 6:26 PM, Paul Lindner <lindner@inuus.com> wrote:

> Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call  
> they are rejected.   OAuth Problem Reporting includes a mechanism to  
> send the server's concept of 'now' to the client:
>
> The parameter named oauth_acceptable_timestamps consists of two  
> numbers in decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the  
> range of timestamps acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the  
> sender will currently accept an oauth_timestamp that's not less than  
> the first number and not greater than the second number.
>
>
> With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate  
> localized time to the server's (reliable) time.
>
> We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have  
> imagined.
>
> On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 5:15 PM, Luke Shepard  
> <lshepard@facebook.com> wrote:
> Hey Paul,
>
> I was just curious, what do you mean by OAuth Problem Reporting and  
> clock synchronization? I'm not familiar with those.
>
> On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:
>
> > <hat roles="lurker,enduser">
> >
> > Here at LinkedIn we've been following the OAuth developments and  
> we're all happy to see progress being made on 2.0.  From our side  
> we'd love to see standardization of a number of defacto standards we  
> use in our implementation.  Specifically the following:
> >
> > * OAuth Problem Reporting  -- If we had not implemented this we  
> would probably had half as many devs on our platform.  It's that  
> important and I'll contribute what I can on this.
> > * Responses for throttled responses.  Right now we return a 403  
> and add some descriptive info that the dev ignores :)
> > * Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)
> > * Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using  
> xoauth_authorize_url)
> > * Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.
> > * Explicit token invalidation endpoints
> > * Signaling the client when a user 'declines/cancels' an authz  
> request.
> >
> > I'll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.
> >
> > In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.
> >
> > </hat>
> >
> > On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:
> >
> >> <chair hat>
> >>
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and  
> while
> >> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the
> >> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft  
> that
> >> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and  
> OAuth
> >> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd  
> like to
> >> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer
> >> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
> >> solutions something to base their work on.
> >>
> >> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over  
> the next week.
> >>
> >> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
> >> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
> >> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the  
> gap
> >> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,
> >> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
> >> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
> >>
> >> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG  
> meeting
> >> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
> >> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
> >>
> >> Blaine and Hannes.
> >>
> >> </chair hat>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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<html><body bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div>Just curious - why can't the client check the Date header?</div><div><br></div><div>Subbu<div><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div></div><div><br>On Mar 24, 2010, at 6:26 PM, Paul Lindner &lt;<a href="mailto:lindner@inuus.com">lindner@inuus.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><div></div><blockquote type="cite"><div>Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they are rejected. &nbsp; <a href="http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting">OAuth Problem Reporting</a> includes a mechanism to send the server's concept of 'now' to the client:<div>
<br></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Segoe UI', 'Lucida Grande', Arial; font-size: 13px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); line-height: 19px; "><p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.2em; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; border-top-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-style: initial; border-color: initial; font-weight: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-size: 13px; font-family: inherit; vertical-align: baseline; line-height: 1.5em; color: rgb(18, 18, 18); ">
The parameter named&nbsp;<code style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; border-top-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-style: initial; border-color: initial; font-weight: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-size: 13px; font-family: 'courier new', monospace !important; vertical-align: baseline; "><b>oauth_acceptable_timestamps</b></code>&nbsp;consists of two numbers in decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamps acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender will currently accept an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first number and not greater than the second number.</p>
</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Segoe UI', 'Lucida Grande', Arial; font-size: 13px; color: rgb(68, 68, 68); line-height: 19px; "><div><br></div></span></div></blockquote>
With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate localized time to the server's (reliable) time.<div><br></div><div>We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagined.<br>
<div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 5:15 PM, Luke Shepard <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:lshepard@facebook.com"><a href="mailto:lshepard@facebook.com">lshepard@facebook.com</a></a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Hey Paul,<br>
<br>
I was just curious, what do you mean by OAuth Problem Reporting and clock synchronization? I'm not familiar with those.<br>
<div><div></div><div class="h5"><br>
On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; &lt;hat roles="lurker,enduser"&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Here at LinkedIn we've been following the OAuth developments and we're all happy to see progress being made on 2.0. &nbsp;From our side we'd love to see standardization of a number of defacto standards we use in our implementation. &nbsp;Specifically the following:<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; * OAuth Problem Reporting &nbsp;-- If we had not implemented this we would probably had half as many devs on our platform. &nbsp;It's that important and I'll contribute what I can on this.<br>
&gt; * Responses for throttled responses. &nbsp;Right now we return a 403 and add some descriptive info that the dev ignores :)<br>
&gt; * Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)<br>
&gt; * Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using xoauth_authorize_url)<br>
&gt; * Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.<br>
&gt; * Explicit token invalidation endpoints<br>
&gt; * Signaling the client when a user 'declines/cancels' an authz request.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I'll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &lt;/hat&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;chair hat&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hi all,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and while<br>
&gt;&gt; there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like the<br>
&gt;&gt; next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft that<br>
&gt;&gt; incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and OAuth<br>
&gt;&gt; 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like to<br>
&gt;&gt; see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to offer<br>
&gt;&gt; the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable<br>
&gt;&gt; solutions something to base their work on.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over the next week.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from<br>
&gt;&gt; WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.<br>
&gt;&gt; Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the gap<br>
&gt;&gt; between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token approaches,<br>
&gt;&gt; and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated<br>
&gt;&gt; along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG meeting<br>
&gt;&gt; (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that<br>
&gt;&gt; satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Blaine and Hannes.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;/chair hat&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org"><a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a></a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank"><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a></a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org"><a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a></a><br>
&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank"><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a></a><br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>
</div></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><div><span>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>OAuth mailing list</span><br><span><a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a></span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>
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On Mar 25, 2010, at 9:09 AM, Subbu Allamaraju wrote:

> Just curious - why can't the client check the Date header?

It can. Once it got a failed response from the first call.

Regards,

- johnk

>=20
> Subbu
>=20
>=20
> On Mar 24, 2010, at 6:26 PM, Paul Lindner <lindner@inuus.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call =
they are rejected.   OAuth Problem Reporting includes a mechanism to =
send the server's concept of 'now' to the client:
>>=20
>> The parameter named oauth_acceptable_timestamps consists of two =
numbers in decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range =
of timestamps acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender =
will currently accept an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first =
number and not greater than the second number.
>>=20
>>=20
>> With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate =
localized time to the server's (reliable) time.
>>=20
>> We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have =
imagined.
>>=20
>> On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 5:15 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> =
wrote:
>> Hey Paul,
>>=20
>> I was just curious, what do you mean by OAuth Problem Reporting and =
clock synchronization? I'm not familiar with those.
>>=20
>> On Mar 24, 2010, at 4:12 PM, Paul Lindner wrote:
>>=20
>> > <hat roles=3D"lurker,enduser">
>> >
>> > Here at LinkedIn we've been following the OAuth developments and =
we're all happy to see progress being made on 2.0.  =46rom our side we'd =
love to see standardization of a number of defacto standards we use in =
our implementation.  Specifically the following:
>> >
>> > * OAuth Problem Reporting  -- If we had not implemented this we =
would probably had half as many devs on our platform.  It's that =
important and I'll contribute what I can on this.
>> > * Responses for throttled responses.  Right now we return a 403 and =
add some descriptive info that the dev ignores :)
>> > * Clock synchronization (covered by problem reporting somewhat..)
>> > * Signaling the correct authz URL to the client (currently using =
xoauth_authorize_url)
>> > * Signaling the expiry time of the token to the client.
>> > * Explicit token invalidation endpoints
>> > * Signaling the client when a user 'declines/cancels' an authz =
request.
>> >
>> > I'll try to contribute to the process as my limited time allows.
>> >
>> > In any case, congrats for moving forward on this.
>> >
>> > </hat>
>> >
>> > On Mar 24, 2010, at 10:11 AM, Blaine Cook wrote:
>> >
>> >> <chair hat>
>> >>
>> >> Hi all,
>> >>
>> >> Hannes and I have discussed the results of the WG meeting, and =
while
>> >> there was a lot of good discussion that happened, it seems like =
the
>> >> next step for the WG is to buckle down and produce a stable draft =
that
>> >> incorporates all the various proposals, in particular WRAP and =
OAuth
>> >> 1.0a. David has done an excellent job with his draft, and I'd like =
to
>> >> see us follow through on that work quickly and effectively to =
offer
>> >> the various organizations who are looking to ship interoperable
>> >> solutions something to base their work on.
>> >>
>> >> To that end, we'd like to see Eran take up the editing work over =
the next week.
>> >>
>> >> That work should be premised on re-incorporating the features from
>> >> WRAP that were removed in David's great start at a unified spec.
>> >> Dick's contributions have been invaluable towards reconciling the =
gap
>> >> between HMAC-based approaches and expiring bearer token =
approaches,
>> >> and we'd like to see that work be properly credited and evaluated
>> >> along with all of the other aspects of OAuth 1.0a and WRAP.
>> >>
>> >> Our hope is that soon, certainly well before the next OAuth WG =
meeting
>> >> (virtual or otherwise), we'll have a new RFC-style document that
>> >> satisfies the needs of everyone in the community.
>> >>
>> >> Blaine and Hannes.
>> >>
>> >> </chair hat>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > OAuth mailing list
>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 6:09 AM, Subbu Allamaraju <subbu@subbu.org> wrote:
> Just curious - why can't the client check the Date header?

Yes, that works, but lots of clients don't realize it is possible.

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Next Steps
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On 2010-03-25, at 9:55 AM, Brian Eaton wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 6:09 AM, Subbu Allamaraju <subbu@subbu.org> wrote:
>> Just curious - why can't the client check the Date header?
> 
> Yes, that works, but lots of clients don't realize it is possible.

Do all clients have access to it?


From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Mar 25 11:03:53 2010
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Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2010 11:03:51 -0700
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] new co-chair
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<hat type=3D'AD'/>

As you know, I have been named co-director of the Applications Area and
therefore cannot continue serving as co-chair of the OAuth WG. Lisa
Dusseault (outgoing AD) and I (incoming AD) decided that the best way to
ensure continuity would be to promote Hannes Tschofenig from technical
advisor to co-chair. I'd like to thank Hannes for taking on this role,
and I look forward to working with him, Blaine, and the rest of the
group to make this effort a success (yes, I will remain quite involved
in the WG as area director!).

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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From eve@xmlgrrl.com  Thu Mar 25 11:29:56 2010
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Thanks -- and best wishes in their new/old/continuing roles -- to all of =
Peter, Hannes, and Blaine!

	Eve

On 25 Mar 2010, at 11:03 AM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:

> <hat type=3D'AD'/>
>=20
> As you know, I have been named co-director of the Applications Area =
and
> therefore cannot continue serving as co-chair of the OAuth WG. Lisa
> Dusseault (outgoing AD) and I (incoming AD) decided that the best way =
to
> ensure continuity would be to promote Hannes Tschofenig from technical
> advisor to co-chair. I'd like to thank Hannes for taking on this role,
> and I look forward to working with him, Blaine, and the rest of the
> group to make this effort a success (yes, I will remain quite involved
> in the WG as area director!).
>=20
> Peter
>=20
> --=20
> Peter Saint-Andre
> https://stpeter.im/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


Eve Maler
eve@xmlgrrl.com
http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog


From mscurtescu@google.com  Thu Mar 25 15:23:49 2010
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From: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2010 18:23:29 -0400
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To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0: client_secret, state
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On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 1:52 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote=
:
> On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 5:11 AM, Manger, James H
> <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:
>> 2. STATE
>> OAuth has various parameter that are used to carry state for another par=
ty in a message, which is helpful for building scalable systems. OAuth shou=
ld avoid duplicating these fields or defining their semantics when they are=
 opaque to the party carrying them. This will keep the protocol simpler, wi=
thout losing any functionality.
>>
>> oauth_client_state is unnecessary as it is always accompanied by oauth_c=
allback_url that can encode the state directly. The examples could include,=
 say, ...callback_url=3Dhttp://client.example.com/cb%3Fstate=3DFSR63fs&oaut=
h_mode=3D... to reflect likely cases. It is still simple to compare the cal=
lback to a pre-register value if required (eg compare suffix, or compare ig=
noring additional query params).
>
> Has there been any discussion of the oauth_client_state parameter on
> the list? =A0I don't really remember it.

Not sure if this was discussed or not, but I think client state can be
really useful. Yes, client state can be added to the callback URL, but
this makes validating this URL against a registered callback URL more
difficult. This ties in with the fact that the validation of these
URLs is not specified.

It is easy to imagine an Authorization Server that does strict
validation of callback URLs, in which case the only way to pass client
state through is with this extra parameter.

Marius

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On Mar 25, 2010, at 9:55 AM, Brian Eaton wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 6:09 AM, Subbu Allamaraju <subbu@subbu.org> =
wrote:
>> Just curious - why can't the client check the Date header?
>=20
> Yes, that works, but lots of clients don't realize it is possible.

In other words, this is part of HTTP, and should not have to be =
specified in layered protocols like OAuth.

Regards,
Subbu=

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A single client could generate multiple requests simultaneously, and have
them show up out of order.

Allen

On 3/24/10 10:06 PM, "Brian Eaton" <beaton@google.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 9:46 PM, Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com> wrote:
>> This is probably a stupid question, but why do we need accurate timestamps?
>> Why is it not sufficient to use a monotonically increasing call_id to
>> prevent replay attacks? (this is how the Facebook sig algorithm works)
> 
> Monotonically increasing counters don't scale well in distributed
> systems.  It is rapidly changing state that needs to be synchronously
> replicated across lots of clients and servers.


From esjewett@gmail.com  Thu Mar 25 19:53:43 2010
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Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the bearer
token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret? The
provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the client
is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the token and
keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the clear using a
signing method. I believe that this is the approach taken in OAuth
1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.

Ethan

On Thu, Mar 11, 2010 at 1:58 AM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote=
:
> Has anyone else put some thought into what secrets are used within the
> signature algorithm for OAuth 2.0?
>
> OAuth 1.0 combines the client secret and the token secret with an
> ampersand in the middle. =A0WRAP doesn't support signatures and relies
> on the fact that access tokens should remain secret via SSL or are
> extremely short lived and thus lower risk.
>
> Here are the options as far as I'm aware (without making changes to
> WRAP's assumptions):
>
> 1) Sign using the client secret. =A0Doesn't work because the access
> token would be sent over the wire in plaintext and some servers will
> make them long lived in 2.0.
>
> 2) Issue an access token secret if an optional parameter is specified
> by the client during the authorization profile request(s). =A0Doesn't
> work for the same reason as #1 assuming that the same access token can
> be used via SSL.
>
> 3) Instead of adding an optional parameter to each authorization
> profile, have the client immediately refresh the access token and
> support an optional parameter to request an access token secret. =A0This
> lessons the impact of supporting signatures on most implementors when
> reading the spec and given that most signature use cases have longer
> lived tokens, the overhead of the extra HTTP request should be
> infrequent compared to the number of protected resource requests
> you'll make with it. =A0Doesn't work for the same reason as #1 assuming
> that the same access token can be used via SSL.
>
> While I'm not a crypto expert, it seems impossible to treat the same
> access token as potentially public when using signatures but secret
> when using SSL. =A0I believe that authorization servers will need to
> keep track of the access tokens that the client has requested a secret
> for and from that point on only allow the use of that particular
> access token 1) via signatures or 2) via SSL when the access token
> secret is passed in as well.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Thanks,
> --David
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com> wrote:
> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the bearer
> token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret? The
> provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the client
> is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the token and
> keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the clear using a
> signing method. I believe that this is the approach taken in OAuth
> 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.

Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
possession tokens rarely look the same.

From eran@hueniverse.com  Thu Mar 25 21:51:15 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2010 21:51:45 -0700
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I agree.

Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear semantic=
s. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties should reflect=
 it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and bandwidt=
h with secrets.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Brian Eaton
> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> To: Ethan Jewett
> Cc: OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>=20
> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the bearer
> > token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret? The
> > provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the client
> > is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the token and
> > keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the clear using a
> > signing method. I believe that this is the approach taken in OAuth
> > 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
>=20
> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of possession
> tokens rarely look the same.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Fri Mar 26 00:42:26 2010
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An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1) 
Is it the authorization server because it knows what tokens and 
signature algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or 
is it the client?  I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected 
resources with multiple endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different 
token types. So it would be the task of the client to decide which way 
is better suited for its use case.
> I agree.
>
> Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties should reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and bandwidth with secrets.
>
> EHL
>
>    
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>> Of Brian Eaton
>> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
>> To: Ethan Jewett
>> Cc: OAuth WG
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>      
>>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the bearer
>>> token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret? The
>>> provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the client
>>> is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the token and
>>> keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the clear using a
>>> signing method. I believe that this is the approach taken in OAuth
>>> 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
>>>        
>> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of possession
>> tokens rarely look the same.
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>      
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    



From eran@hueniverse.com  Fri Mar 26 08:09:01 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 08:09:19 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's decisi=
on. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued, not w=
hen using it to access a resource.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net]
> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>=20
> An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1) I=
s it
> the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
> algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the c=
lient?
> I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with multipl=
e
> endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it would =
be
> the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its use c=
ase.
> > I agree.
> >
> > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
> semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties shou=
ld
> reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and
> bandwidth with secrets.
> >
> > EHL
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> >> To: Ethan Jewett
> >> Cc: OAuth WG
> >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> >>
> >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
> >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
> >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
> >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
> >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
> >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
> >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
> >>>
> >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
>=20


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--00163630f40f9c5c5d0482b5c29c
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i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what
its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make
the choice.  of course, it could be possibly be the server's decision
whether to support signatures or not.

by "when the token is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a secret
token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it #3 -- where
during the "refresh" you could say "please give me a secret with this token,
and then make this token impossible to use in a non-signature way".

On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wrote:

> The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's
> decision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued,
> not when using it to access a resource.
>
> EHL
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net]
> > Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
> > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> > Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> >
> > An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1)
> Is it
> > the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
> > algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the
> client?
> > I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with
> multiple
> > endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it would
> be
> > the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its use
> case.
> > > I agree.
> > >
> > > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
> > semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties
> should
> > reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and
> > bandwidth with secrets.
> > >
> > > EHL
> > >
> > >
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> > >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> > >> To: Ethan Jewett
> > >> Cc: OAuth WG
> > >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> > >>
> > >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
> > >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
> > >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
> > >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
> > >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
> > >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
> > >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
> > >>>
> > >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> > >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> OAuth mailing list
> > >> OAuth@ietf.org
> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >>
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OAuth mailing list
> > > OAuth@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>



-- 
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--00163630f40f9c5c5d0482b5c29c
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i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what=
 its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make =
the choice. =A0of course, it could be possibly be the server&#39;s decision=
 whether to support signatures or not.<div>

<br></div><div>by &quot;when the token is issued&quot;, do you mean that du=
ring each &quot;flow&quot; a secret token could be issued, or (using record=
on&#39;s notes above) is it #3 -- where during the &quot;refresh&quot; you =
could say &quot;please give me a secret with this token, and then make this=
 token impossible to use in a non-signature way&quot;.<br>

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer=
-Lahav <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hu=
eniverse.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server&#39;s de=
cision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued, n=
ot when using it to access a resource.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
EHL<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@loddersted=
t.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM<br>
&gt; To: Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>
&gt; Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG<br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1=
) Is it<br>
&gt; the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature<br=
>
&gt; algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it th=
e client?<br>
&gt; I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with mult=
iple<br>
&gt; endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it wou=
ld be<br>
&gt; the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its us=
e case.<br>
&gt; &gt; I agree.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clea=
r<br>
&gt; semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties s=
hould<br>
&gt; reflect it. If a server doesn&#39;t require signatures, why waste stor=
age and<br>
&gt; bandwidth with secrets.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; EHL<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces=
@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounc=
es@ietf.org</a>] On<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Behalf Of Brian Eaton<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; To: Ethan Jewett<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Cc: OAuth WG<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signat=
ures<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and hav=
e the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the toke=
n secret?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; The provider would always issue a token and a token secre=
t. If the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; client is not interested in signing methods, it can disca=
rd the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sen=
t in the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the =
approach<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address t=
his concern.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of<=
br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; possession tokens rarely look the same.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D=
"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Raffi Kriko=
rian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http:=
//twitter.com/raffi</a><br>
</div>

--00163630f40f9c5c5d0482b5c29c--

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i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what
its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make
the choice.  of course, it could be possibly be the server's decision
whether to support signatures or not.

by "when the token is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a secret
token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it #3 -- where
during the "refresh" you could say "please give me a secret with this token,
and then make this token impossible to use in a non-signature way".

On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wrote:

> The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's
> decision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued,
> not when using it to access a resource.
>
> EHL
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net]
> > Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
> > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> > Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> >
> > An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1)
> Is it
> > the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
> > algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the
> client?
> > I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with
> multiple
> > endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it would
> be
> > the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its use
> case.
> > > I agree.
> > >
> > > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
> > semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties
> should
> > reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and
> > bandwidth with secrets.
> > >
> > > EHL
> > >
> > >
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> > >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> > >> To: Ethan Jewett
> > >> Cc: OAuth WG
> > >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> > >>
> > >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
> > >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
> > >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
> > >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
> > >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
> > >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
> > >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
> > >>>
> > >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> > >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> OAuth mailing list
> > >> OAuth@ietf.org
> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >>
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OAuth mailing list
> > > OAuth@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>



-- 
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--00163630f40f9c5c5d0482b5c29c
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what=
 its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make =
the choice. =A0of course, it could be possibly be the server&#39;s decision=
 whether to support signatures or not.<div>

<br></div><div>by &quot;when the token is issued&quot;, do you mean that du=
ring each &quot;flow&quot; a secret token could be issued, or (using record=
on&#39;s notes above) is it #3 -- where during the &quot;refresh&quot; you =
could say &quot;please give me a secret with this token, and then make this=
 token impossible to use in a non-signature way&quot;.<br>

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer=
-Lahav <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hu=
eniverse.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server&#39;s de=
cision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued, n=
ot when using it to access a resource.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
EHL<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@loddersted=
t.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM<br>
&gt; To: Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>
&gt; Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG<br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1=
) Is it<br>
&gt; the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature<br=
>
&gt; algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it th=
e client?<br>
&gt; I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with mult=
iple<br>
&gt; endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it wou=
ld be<br>
&gt; the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its us=
e case.<br>
&gt; &gt; I agree.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clea=
r<br>
&gt; semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties s=
hould<br>
&gt; reflect it. If a server doesn&#39;t require signatures, why waste stor=
age and<br>
&gt; bandwidth with secrets.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; EHL<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces=
@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounc=
es@ietf.org</a>] On<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Behalf Of Brian Eaton<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; To: Ethan Jewett<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Cc: OAuth WG<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signat=
ures<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and hav=
e the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the toke=
n secret?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; The provider would always issue a token and a token secre=
t. If the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; client is not interested in signing methods, it can disca=
rd the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sen=
t in the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the =
approach<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address t=
his concern.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of<=
br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; possession tokens rarely look the same.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D=
"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Raffi Kriko=
rian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http:=
//twitter.com/raffi</a><br>
</div>

--00163630f40f9c5c5d0482b5c29c--

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From: Ethan Jewett <esjewett@gmail.com>
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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I agree with that approach, but in this case (where I read that we are
effectively binding tokens to resource access methods) I think we need
some indications during the delegation flow as far as what method the
token is meant to be used with. Possibly a parameter
oauth_token_method when a client requests an access, and then the same
parameter in the server response to indicate what token type the
server opted to provide.

We would probably also need at least a SHOULD in the resource access
part of the spec recommending that servers invalidate tokens that are
used with the wrong resource access method, as this could publicize
secrets that are vital to the security of a different method.

That is all assuming that I am understanding the suggestion.

Ethan

On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 9:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
> The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's decision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued, not when using it to access a resource.
>
> EHL
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net]
>> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
>> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
>> Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>>
>> An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1) Is it
>> the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
>> algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the client?
>> I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with multiple
>> endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it would be
>> the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its use case.
>> > I agree.
>> >
>> > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
>> semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties should
>> reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and
>> bandwidth with secrets.
>> >
>> > EHL
>> >
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On
>> >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
>> >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
>> >> To: Ethan Jewett
>> >> Cc: OAuth WG
>> >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com>
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
>> >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
>> >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
>> >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
>> >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
>> >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
>> >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
>> >>>
>> >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
>> >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >>
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > OAuth mailing list
>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >
>>
>
>

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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 08:41:53 -0700
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When a token is issued, that's when a secret should be provided if the toke=
n is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provide=
d either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don't have a strong =
feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point).

I don't think a token should be "upgraded" from bearer to a secret-enabled =
using the refresh process.

EHL

From: Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
Cc: Torsten Lodderstedt; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures

i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what=
 its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make =
the choice.  of course, it could be possibly be the server's decision wheth=
er to support signatures or not.

by "when the token is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a secret=
 token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it #3 -- where=
 during the "refresh" you could say "please give me a secret with this toke=
n, and then make this token impossible to use in a non-signature way".
On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com<mai=
lto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's decisi=
on. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued, not w=
hen using it to access a resource.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net<mailto:torsten@=
lodderstedt.net>]
> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
> An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1) I=
s it
> the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
> algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the c=
lient?
> I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with multipl=
e
> endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it would =
be
> the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its use c=
ase.
> > I agree.
> >
> > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
> semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties shou=
ld
> reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and
> bandwidth with secrets.
> >
> > EHL
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:oa=
uth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>] On
> >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> >> To: Ethan Jewett
> >> Cc: OAuth WG
> >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> >>
> >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com<mailt=
o:esjewett@gmail.com>>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
> >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
> >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
> >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
> >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
> >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
> >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
> >>>
> >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
>

_______________________________________________
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--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
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<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=
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<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>When a to=
ken is issued, that&#8217;s when a secret should be provided if the token i=
s to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provided e=
ither with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don&#8217;t have a stro=
ng feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point)=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I don&#8217;t think a token should be &#822=
0;upgraded&#8221; from bearer to a secret-enabled using the refresh process=
. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0p=
t;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>EHL<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";colo=
r:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-lef=
t:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:non=
e;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'=
>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans=
-serif"'> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Frida=
y, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM<br><b>To:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav<br><b>Cc:</b> Tor=
sten Lodderstedt; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG=
] Thinking about our secrets for signatures<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>i concur t=
hat it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what its acces=
s requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make the choice=
. &nbsp;of course, it could be possibly be the server's decision whether to=
 support signatures or not.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt=
'>by &quot;when the token is issued&quot;, do you mean that during each &qu=
ot;flow&quot; a secret token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes ab=
ove) is it #3 -- where during the &quot;refresh&quot; you could say &quot;p=
lease give me a secret with this token, and then make this token impossible=
 to use in a non-signature way&quot;.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al>On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal>The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is th=
e server's decision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token=
 is issued, not when using it to access a resource.<br><span style=3D'color=
:#888888'><br>EHL</span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>&=
gt; -----Original Message-----<br>&gt; From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:<a=
 href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>]<br>&g=
t; Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM<br>&gt; To: Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>&=
gt; Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG<br>&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG]=
 Thinking about our secrets for signatures<br>&gt;<br>&gt; An interesting q=
uestion is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1) Is it<br>&gt; the a=
uthorization server because it knows what tokens and signature<br>&gt; algo=
rithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the client?=
<br>&gt; I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with =
multiple<br>&gt; endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token type=
s. So it would be<br>&gt; the task of the client to decide which way is bet=
ter suited for its use case.<br>&gt; &gt; I agree.<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt=
; Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear<br>&gt=
; semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties shou=
ld<br>&gt; reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste st=
orage and<br>&gt; bandwidth with secrets.<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt; EHL<br>=
&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>&gt; =
&gt;&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf=
.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ie=
tf.org</a>] On<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Behalf Of Brian Eaton<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Sent=
: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; To: Ethan Jewett<br>&gt=
; &gt;&gt; Cc: OAuth WG<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking a=
bout our secrets for signatures<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; On Thu, M=
ar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:esjewett@gmail.co=
m">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; wrote:<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>&=
gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have=
 the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; bearer token method (over SSL of course) include =
the token secret?<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; The provider would always issue a to=
ken and a token secret. If the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; client is not intereste=
d in signing methods, it can discard the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; token and kee=
p the token secret. This secret is never sent in the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; c=
lear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach<br>&gt; &g=
t;&gt;&gt; taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this con=
cern.<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Well thought-out bearer tokens =
and well thought-out proof of<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; possession tokens rarely loo=
k the same.<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; ______________________________________________=
_<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OA=
uth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailm=
an/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>&gt; &gt; _______________________=
________________________<br>&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt; &gt; <a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;<br><br>______________=
_________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailt=
o:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mai=
lman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinf=
o/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><br cl=
ear=3Dall><br>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D=
"http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o:p></o:p></p></div=
></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DAADEP3PW5EX1MB01E_--

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Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 08:41:53 -0700
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When a token is issued, that's when a secret should be provided if the toke=
n is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provide=
d either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don't have a strong =
feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point).

I don't think a token should be "upgraded" from bearer to a secret-enabled =
using the refresh process.

EHL

From: Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
Cc: Torsten Lodderstedt; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures

i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what=
 its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make =
the choice.  of course, it could be possibly be the server's decision wheth=
er to support signatures or not.

by "when the token is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a secret=
 token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it #3 -- where=
 during the "refresh" you could say "please give me a secret with this toke=
n, and then make this token impossible to use in a non-signature way".
On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com<mai=
lto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's decisi=
on. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is issued, not w=
hen using it to access a resource.

EHL

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net<mailto:torsten@=
lodderstedt.net>]
> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
> An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1) I=
s it
> the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
> algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the c=
lient?
> I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with multipl=
e
> endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it would =
be
> the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its use c=
ase.
> > I agree.
> >
> > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
> semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties shou=
ld
> reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste storage and
> bandwidth with secrets.
> >
> > EHL
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:oa=
uth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>] On
> >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> >> To: Ethan Jewett
> >> Cc: OAuth WG
> >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> >>
> >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com<mailt=
o:esjewett@gmail.com>>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
> >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
> >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
> >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
> >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
> >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
> >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this concern.
> >>>
> >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
>

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth



--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

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<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>When a to=
ken is issued, that&#8217;s when a secret should be provided if the token i=
s to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provided e=
ither with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don&#8217;t have a stro=
ng feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point)=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I don&#8217;t think a token should be &#822=
0;upgraded&#8221; from bearer to a secret-enabled using the refresh process=
. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0p=
t;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>EHL<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";colo=
r:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-lef=
t:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:non=
e;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'=
>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans=
-serif"'> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Frida=
y, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM<br><b>To:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav<br><b>Cc:</b> Tor=
sten Lodderstedt; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG=
] Thinking about our secrets for signatures<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>i concur t=
hat it should be the client that decides -- the client knows what its acces=
s requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to better make the choice=
. &nbsp;of course, it could be possibly be the server's decision whether to=
 support signatures or not.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt=
'>by &quot;when the token is issued&quot;, do you mean that during each &qu=
ot;flow&quot; a secret token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes ab=
ove) is it #3 -- where during the &quot;refresh&quot; you could say &quot;p=
lease give me a secret with this token, and then make this token impossible=
 to use in a non-signature way&quot;.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al>On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal>The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is th=
e server's decision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token=
 is issued, not when using it to access a resource.<br><span style=3D'color=
:#888888'><br>EHL</span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>&=
gt; -----Original Message-----<br>&gt; From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:<a=
 href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>]<br>&g=
t; Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM<br>&gt; To: Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>&=
gt; Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG<br>&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG]=
 Thinking about our secrets for signatures<br>&gt;<br>&gt; An interesting q=
uestion is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 1) Is it<br>&gt; the a=
uthorization server because it knows what tokens and signature<br>&gt; algo=
rithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it the client?=
<br>&gt; I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with =
multiple<br>&gt; endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token type=
s. So it would be<br>&gt; the task of the client to decide which way is bet=
ter suited for its use case.<br>&gt; &gt; I agree.<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt=
; Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear<br>&gt=
; semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties shou=
ld<br>&gt; reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste st=
orage and<br>&gt; bandwidth with secrets.<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt; EHL<br>=
&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>&gt; =
&gt;&gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf=
.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ie=
tf.org</a>] On<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Behalf Of Brian Eaton<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Sent=
: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; To: Ethan Jewett<br>&gt=
; &gt;&gt; Cc: OAuth WG<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking a=
bout our secrets for signatures<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; On Thu, M=
ar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:esjewett@gmail.co=
m">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; wrote:<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>&=
gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have=
 the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; bearer token method (over SSL of course) include =
the token secret?<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; The provider would always issue a to=
ken and a token secret. If the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; client is not intereste=
d in signing methods, it can discard the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; token and kee=
p the token secret. This secret is never sent in the<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; c=
lear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach<br>&gt; &g=
t;&gt;&gt; taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this con=
cern.<br>&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; Well thought-out bearer tokens =
and well thought-out proof of<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; possession tokens rarely loo=
k the same.<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; ______________________________________________=
_<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OA=
uth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailm=
an/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>&gt; &gt; _______________________=
________________________<br>&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt; &gt; <a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;<br><br>______________=
_________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailt=
o:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mai=
lman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinf=
o/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><br cl=
ear=3Dall><br>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D=
"http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o:p></o:p></p></div=
></div></div></body></html>=

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> When a token is issued, that's when a secret should be provided if the 
> token is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can 
> be provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don't 
> have a strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric 
> secrets at this point).
>
> I don't think a token should be "upgraded" from bearer to a 
> secret-enabled using the refresh process.
>
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type 
should be constant in authz and refreshment process.

I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods 
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask 
the authorization server for a specific token type incl. 
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request 
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret.
>
> EHL
>
> *From:* Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM
> *To:* Eran Hammer-Lahav
> *Cc:* Torsten Lodderstedt; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
> i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows 
> what its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to 
> better make the choice.  of course, it could be possibly be the 
> server's decision whether to support signatures or not.
>
> by "when the token is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a 
> secret token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it 
> #3 -- where during the "refresh" you could say "please give me a 
> secret with this token, and then make this token impossible to use in 
> a non-signature way".
>
> On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav 
> <eran@hueniverse.com <mailto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
>
> The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's 
> decision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is 
> issued, not when using it to access a resource.
>
> EHL
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net 
> <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>]
> > Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
> > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> > Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> >
> > An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 
> 1) Is it
> > the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
> > algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it 
> the client?
> > I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with 
> multiple
> > endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it 
> would be
> > the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its 
> use case.
> > > I agree.
> > >
> > > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
> > semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties 
> should
> > reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste 
> storage and
> > bandwidth with secrets.
> > >
> > > EHL
> > >
> > >
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org> 
> [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>] On
> > >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> > >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> > >> To: Ethan Jewett
> > >> Cc: OAuth WG
> > >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> > >>
> > >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com 
> <mailto:esjewett@gmail.com>>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
> > >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
> > >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
> > >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
> > >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
> > >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
> > >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this 
> concern.
> > >>>
> > >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> > >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> OAuth mailing list
> > >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >>
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OAuth mailing list
> > > OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>


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  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">When
a token is issued, that&#8217;s when a secret should be provided if the token
is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be
provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don&#8217;t
have a strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets
at this point).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">I
don&#8217;t think a token should be &#8220;upgraded&#8221; from bearer to a
secret-enabled using the refresh process. </span></p>
  </div>
</blockquote>
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type
should be constant in authz and refreshment process. <br>
<br>
I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can
ask the authorization server for a specific token type incl.
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret. <br>
<blockquote
 cite="mid:90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DAADE@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET"
 type="cite">
  <div class="WordSection1">
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">EHL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
  <div
 style="border-style: none none none solid; border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color blue; border-width: medium medium medium 1.5pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 4pt;">
  <div>
  <div
 style="border-style: solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color; border-width: 1pt medium medium; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
  <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;">From:</span></b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;"> Raffi
Krikorian [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:raffi@twitter.com">mailto:raffi@twitter.com</a>] <br>
  <b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM<br>
  <b>To:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>
  <b>Cc:</b> Torsten Lodderstedt; <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com">OAuth@core3.amsl.com</a>; WG<br>
  <b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for
signatures<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal">i concur that it should be the client that
decides -- the client knows what its access requirements are, and can
(possibly) be trusted to better make the choice. &nbsp;of course, it could
be possibly be the server's decision whether to support signatures or
not.<o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
  </div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">by "when the token
is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a secret token could be
issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it #3 -- where during the
"refresh" you could say "please give me a secret with this token, and
then make this token impossible to use in a non-signature way".<o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal">On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran
Hammer-Lahav &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal">The client can ask for a specific token type,
but it is the server's decision. Either way, that decision should
happen when the token is issued, not when using it to access a resource.<br>
  <span style="color: rgb(136, 136, 136);"><br>
EHL</span><o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM<br>
&gt; To: Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>
&gt; Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG<br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to
issue? 1) Is it<br>
&gt; the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature<br>
&gt; algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is
it the client?<br>
&gt; I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with
multiple<br>
&gt; endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it
would be<br>
&gt; the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for
its use case.<br>
&gt; &gt; I agree.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with
clear<br>
&gt; semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its
properties should<br>
&gt; reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste
storage and<br>
&gt; bandwidth with secrets.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; EHL<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>
[mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
On<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Behalf Of Brian Eaton<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; To: Ethan Jewett<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Cc: OAuth WG<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for
signatures<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett&lt;<a
 moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and
have the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the
token secret?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; The provider would always issue a token and a token
secret. If the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; client is not interested in signing methods, it can
discard the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; token and keep the token secret. This secret is never
sent in the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; clear using a signing method. I believe that this is
the approach<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should
address this concern.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof
of<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; possession tokens rarely look the same.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
  <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
  <br clear="all">
  <br>
-- <br>
Raffi Krikorian<br>
Twitter Platform Team<br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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> When a token is issued, that's when a secret should be provided if the 
> token is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can 
> be provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don't 
> have a strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric 
> secrets at this point).
>
> I don't think a token should be "upgraded" from bearer to a 
> secret-enabled using the refresh process.
>
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type 
should be constant in authz and refreshment process.

I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods 
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask 
the authorization server for a specific token type incl. 
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request 
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret.
>
> EHL
>
> *From:* Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM
> *To:* Eran Hammer-Lahav
> *Cc:* Torsten Lodderstedt; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
> i concur that it should be the client that decides -- the client knows 
> what its access requirements are, and can (possibly) be trusted to 
> better make the choice.  of course, it could be possibly be the 
> server's decision whether to support signatures or not.
>
> by "when the token is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a 
> secret token could be issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it 
> #3 -- where during the "refresh" you could say "please give me a 
> secret with this token, and then make this token impossible to use in 
> a non-signature way".
>
> On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav 
> <eran@hueniverse.com <mailto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
>
> The client can ask for a specific token type, but it is the server's 
> decision. Either way, that decision should happen when the token is 
> issued, not when using it to access a resource.
>
> EHL
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net 
> <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>]
> > Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM
> > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
> > Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG
> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> >
> > An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to issue? 
> 1) Is it
> > the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature
> > algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is it 
> the client?
> > I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with 
> multiple
> > endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it 
> would be
> > the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for its 
> use case.
> > > I agree.
> > >
> > > Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with clear
> > semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its properties 
> should
> > reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste 
> storage and
> > bandwidth with secrets.
> > >
> > > EHL
> > >
> > >
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org> 
> [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>] On
> > >> Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> > >> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM
> > >> To: Ethan Jewett
> > >> Cc: OAuth WG
> > >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
> > >>
> > >> On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett<esjewett@gmail.com 
> <mailto:esjewett@gmail.com>>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and have the
> > >>> bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the token secret?
> > >>> The provider would always issue a token and a token secret. If the
> > >>> client is not interested in signing methods, it can discard the
> > >>> token and keep the token secret. This secret is never sent in the
> > >>> clear using a signing method. I believe that this is the approach
> > >>> taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should address this 
> concern.
> > >>>
> > >> Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof of
> > >> possession tokens rarely look the same.
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> OAuth mailing list
> > >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >>
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OAuth mailing list
> > > OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>


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  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">When
a token is issued, that&#8217;s when a secret should be provided if the token
is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be
provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don&#8217;t
have a strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets
at this point).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">I
don&#8217;t think a token should be &#8220;upgraded&#8221; from bearer to a
secret-enabled using the refresh process. </span></p>
  </div>
</blockquote>
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type
should be constant in authz and refreshment process. <br>
<br>
I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can
ask the authorization server for a specific token type incl.
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret. <br>
<blockquote
 cite="mid:90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DAADE@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET"
 type="cite">
  <div class="WordSection1">
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">EHL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
  <div
 style="border-style: none none none solid; border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color blue; border-width: medium medium medium 1.5pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 4pt;">
  <div>
  <div
 style="border-style: solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color; border-width: 1pt medium medium; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
  <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;">From:</span></b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;"> Raffi
Krikorian [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:raffi@twitter.com">mailto:raffi@twitter.com</a>] <br>
  <b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 2010 8:24 AM<br>
  <b>To:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>
  <b>Cc:</b> Torsten Lodderstedt; <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com">OAuth@core3.amsl.com</a>; WG<br>
  <b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for
signatures<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal">i concur that it should be the client that
decides -- the client knows what its access requirements are, and can
(possibly) be trusted to better make the choice. &nbsp;of course, it could
be possibly be the server's decision whether to support signatures or
not.<o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
  </div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt;">by "when the token
is issued", do you mean that during each "flow" a secret token could be
issued, or (using recordon's notes above) is it #3 -- where during the
"refresh" you could say "please give me a secret with this token, and
then make this token impossible to use in a non-signature way".<o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal">On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Eran
Hammer-Lahav &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal">The client can ask for a specific token type,
but it is the server's decision. Either way, that decision should
happen when the token is issued, not when using it to access a resource.<br>
  <span style="color: rgb(136, 136, 136);"><br>
EHL</span><o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 12:43 AM<br>
&gt; To: Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>
&gt; Cc: Brian Eaton; Ethan Jewett; OAuth WG<br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; An interesting question is, who decides what kind of token to
issue? 1) Is it<br>
&gt; the authorization server because it knows what tokens and signature<br>
&gt; algorithms are used by the targeted protected resource? 2) Or is
it the client?<br>
&gt; I would tend to #2 because I can imagine protected resources with
multiple<br>
&gt; endpoints (e.g. http and https) using different token types. So it
would be<br>
&gt; the task of the client to decide which way is better suited for
its use case.<br>
&gt; &gt; I agree.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Authorization servers should issue credentials (tokens) with
clear<br>
&gt; semantics. If a token is to be used with a signature, its
properties should<br>
&gt; reflect it. If a server doesn't require signatures, why waste
storage and<br>
&gt; bandwidth with secrets.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; EHL<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>
[mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
On<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Behalf Of Brian Eaton<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2010 8:50 PM<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; To: Ethan Jewett<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Cc: OAuth WG<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for
signatures<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 7:54 PM, Ethan Jewett&lt;<a
 moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:esjewett@gmail.com">esjewett@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Possibly this is a silly question, but why not #2 and
have the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; bearer token method (over SSL of course) include the
token secret?<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; The provider would always issue a token and a token
secret. If the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; client is not interested in signing methods, it can
discard the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; token and keep the token secret. This secret is never
sent in the<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; clear using a signing method. I believe that this is
the approach<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; taken in OAuth 1.0a and it seems like it should
address this concern.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Well thought-out bearer tokens and well thought-out proof
of<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; possession tokens rarely look the same.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
  <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
  <br clear="all">
  <br>
-- <br>
Raffi Krikorian<br>
Twitter Platform Team<br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>

--------------080402070604080903060801--


From raffi@twitter.com  Fri Mar 26 10:45:46 2010
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References: <fd6741651003102358k151206c7u49fd40a875489868@mail.gmail.com>  <68f4a0e81003251954i3a480fd0pcf3b0bc51b7d3a14@mail.gmail.com>  <daf5b9571003252050m421cb846rb6d14849c4257105@mail.gmail.com>  <90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DA9EC@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET> <4BAC6566.6090600@lodderstedt.net> <90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DAABF@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET> <82c33f601003260824s4055d416xbf580a9ef831210a@mail.gmail.com>  <90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DAADE@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET> <4BACEF4A.3010609@lodderstedt.net>
From: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 10:45:49 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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>
> When a token is issued, that=92s when a secret should be provided if the
> token is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be
> provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don=92t hav=
e a
> strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this
> point).
>
>
>
> I don=92t think a token should be =93upgraded=94 from bearer to a secret-=
enabled
> using the refresh process.
>
> I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type
> should be constant in authz and refreshment process.
>
> I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods (e.g=
.
> by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask the
> authorization server for a specific token type incl. signature-method and
> the authorization server may refuse such a request if it is unable to
> provide an appropriate token type/secret.
>

sure - so at the first request time, you can request.  it is still possible
to upgrade and download the token time during refresh (switch from non
signature to signature based on the refresh)?

--=20
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--00163628497a0c9a770482b7bdbf
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<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div bgcolor=3D"=
#ffffff" text=3D"#000000"><div class=3D"im"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;color:rgb(31, 73, 125)">When
a token is issued, that=92s when a secret should be provided if the token
is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be
provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don=92t
have a strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets
at this point).</span></p>
  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;color:rgb(31, 73, 12=
5)">=A0</span></p>
  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;color:rgb(31, 73, 12=
5)">I
don=92t think a token should be =93upgraded=94 from bearer to a
secret-enabled using the refresh process. </span></p>
  </div>
</blockquote></div>
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type
should be constant in authz and refreshment process. <br>
<br>
I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can
ask the authorization server for a specific token type incl.
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret.=A0</div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>sure - so at the first request time, you can req=
uest. =A0it is still possible to upgrade and download the token time during=
 refresh (switch from non signature to signature based on the refresh)?</di=
v>

<div>=A0</div></div>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a h=
ref=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><br>

--00163628497a0c9a770482b7bdbf--

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References: <fd6741651003102358k151206c7u49fd40a875489868@mail.gmail.com>  <68f4a0e81003251954i3a480fd0pcf3b0bc51b7d3a14@mail.gmail.com>  <daf5b9571003252050m421cb846rb6d14849c4257105@mail.gmail.com>  <90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DA9EC@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET> <4BAC6566.6090600@lodderstedt.net> <90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DAABF@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET> <82c33f601003260824s4055d416xbf580a9ef831210a@mail.gmail.com>  <90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DAADE@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET> <4BACEF4A.3010609@lodderstedt.net>
From: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 10:45:49 -0700
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Cc: "OAuth@core3.amsl.com" <OAuth@core3.amsl.com>, WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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--00163628497a0c9a770482b7bdbf
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

>
> When a token is issued, that=92s when a secret should be provided if the
> token is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be
> provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don=92t hav=
e a
> strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this
> point).
>
>
>
> I don=92t think a token should be =93upgraded=94 from bearer to a secret-=
enabled
> using the refresh process.
>
> I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type
> should be constant in authz and refreshment process.
>
> I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods (e.g=
.
> by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask the
> authorization server for a specific token type incl. signature-method and
> the authorization server may refuse such a request if it is unable to
> provide an appropriate token type/secret.
>

sure - so at the first request time, you can request.  it is still possible
to upgrade and download the token time during refresh (switch from non
signature to signature based on the refresh)?

--=20
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--00163628497a0c9a770482b7bdbf
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div bgcolor=3D"=
#ffffff" text=3D"#000000"><div class=3D"im"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">

<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;color:rgb(31, 73, 125)">When
a token is issued, that=92s when a secret should be provided if the token
is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be
provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don=92t
have a strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets
at this point).</span></p>
  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;color:rgb(31, 73, 12=
5)">=A0</span></p>
  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;color:rgb(31, 73, 12=
5)">I
don=92t think a token should be =93upgraded=94 from bearer to a
secret-enabled using the refresh process. </span></p>
  </div>
</blockquote></div>
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type
should be constant in authz and refreshment process. <br>
<br>
I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can
ask the authorization server for a specific token type incl.
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret.=A0</div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>sure - so at the first request time, you can req=
uest. =A0it is still possible to upgrade and download the token time during=
 refresh (switch from non signature to signature based on the refresh)?</di=
v>

<div>=A0</div></div>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a h=
ref=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><br>

--00163628497a0c9a770482b7bdbf--

From gffletch@aol.com  Fri Mar 26 10:57:33 2010
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Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 13:57:49 -0400
From: George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com>
Organization: AOL LLC
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re-scoping OAuth access tokens
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Hi,

One of the features of the existing OAuth Session Extension is a method 
by which a client can request additional authorizations/scopes to those 
it's already been granted by the user, and receive a single access token 
that embodies the intersection of the approved scopes.

An example use case is as follows...

1. Alice visits a new site (http://hikingsite.example.com) and logs in
2. The site has integrated a widget that allows Alice to see her 
buddylist so she can keep track of her friends while exploring the site
3. Alice needs to give consent for http://hikingsite.example.com to 
access her buddylist (normal web delegation flow)
     -- this consent just gives the site access to Alice's buddylist
4. At some point later, Alice sees a great trail she'd like to hike with 
one of her friends online and wants to send Bob an IM
5. Now the site needs permission to send an IM on Alice's behalf to Bob 
with a link to the trail

In the current OAuth draft spec, how does http://hikingsite.example.com 
increase it's scope for Alice at Alice's IM provider so that it can both 
read (the buddy list) and write (send IMs)?

It seems to me that the AS needs to remember the 
user:scope:client:protecte_resource mapping so that it knows what the 
user has consented to, and then allow the user to revoke that consent at 
sometime in the future.

It also seems to me that the client has to remember which scopes it's 
asked for based on user:scope:protected_resource.

It it sufficient for the client to just start a new web server flow and 
specify a new scope parameter that includes both "read buddylist" and 
"send IM"? The AS would then show Alice that she'd already approved 
"read buddylist" and just needed to approve "send IM"? This requires the 
client to keep track of all scopes requested for a given 
user:protected_resource.

Another option might be to just allow the client to pass in the 
refresh_token (as that likely has the scoped embedded/associated with 
it). In this case the client could just ask for the new scope it wanted.

Thoughts?  Anyone else have a need for dynamic re-scoping?

Thanks,
George

P.S. This flow is deployedas part of the AOL IM APIs. However, when 
dynamically adding an authorization, we only show the user what their 
being asked to consent to, not what they've done in the past.


--------------060801000708040808010905
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>

<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Hi,<br>
<br>
One of the features of the existing OAuth Session Extension is a method
by which a client can request additional authorizations/scopes to those
it's already been granted by the user, and receive a single access
token that embodies the intersection of the approved scopes.<br>
<br>
An example use case is as follows...<br>
<br>
1. Alice visits a new site (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://hikingsite.example.com">http://hikingsite.example.com</a>) and logs in<br>
2. The site has integrated a widget that allows Alice to see her
buddylist so she can keep track of her friends while exploring the site<br>
3. Alice needs to give consent for <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://hikingsite.example.com">http://hikingsite.example.com</a> to
access her buddylist (normal web delegation flow)<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- this consent just gives the site access to Alice's buddylist<br>
4. At some point later, Alice sees a great trail she'd like to hike
with one of her friends online and wants to send Bob an IM<br>
5. Now the site needs permission to send an IM on Alice's behalf to Bob
with a link to the trail<br>
<br>
In the current OAuth draft spec, how does <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://hikingsite.example.com">http://hikingsite.example.com</a>
increase it's scope for Alice at Alice's IM provider so that it can
both read (the buddy list) and write (send IMs)?<br>
<br>
It seems to me that the AS needs to remember the
user:scope:client:protecte_resource mapping so that it knows what the
user has consented to, and then allow the user to revoke that consent
at sometime in the future.<br>
<br>
It also seems to me that the client has to remember which scopes it's
asked for based on user:scope:protected_resource.<br>
<br>
It it sufficient for the client to just start a new web server flow and
specify a new scope parameter that includes both "read buddylist" and
"send IM"? The AS would then show Alice that she'd already approved
"read buddylist" and just needed to approve "send IM"? This requires
the client to keep track of all scopes requested for a given
user:protected_resource.<br>
<br>
Another option might be to just allow the client to pass in the
refresh_token (as that likely has the scoped embedded/associated with
it). In this case the client could just ask for the new scope it wanted.<br>
<br>
Thoughts?&nbsp; Anyone else have a need for dynamic re-scoping?<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
George<br>
<br>
P.S. This flow is deployedas part of the AOL IM APIs. However, when
dynamically adding an authorization, we only show the user what their
being asked to consent to, not what they've done in the past.<br>
</font><br>
</body>
</html>

--------------060801000708040808010905--

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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 11:46:45 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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Why do you need to change the cryptographic properties of a token during re=
fresh?

EHL

From: Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM
To: Torsten Lodderstedt
Cc: Eran Hammer-Lahav; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures

When a token is issued, that's when a secret should be provided if the toke=
n is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provide=
d either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don't have a strong =
feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point).

I don't think a token should be "upgraded" from bearer to a secret-enabled =
using the refresh process.
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type shou=
ld be constant in authz and refreshment process.

I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods (e.g. =
by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask the auth=
orization server for a specific token type incl. signature-method and the a=
uthorization server may refuse such a request if it is unable to provide an=
 appropriate token type/secret.

sure - so at the first request time, you can request.  it is still possible=
 to upgrade and download the token time during refresh (switch from non sig=
nature to signature based on the refresh)?

--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--_000_90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DABBEP3PW5EX1MB01E_
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<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=
=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"><meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Micros=
oft Word 14 (filtered medium)"><style><!--
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<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Why do yo=
u need to change the cryptographic properties of a token during refresh?<o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;fon=
t-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>EHL<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F=
497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-left:sol=
id blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;bor=
der-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From=
:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-seri=
f"'> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, Ma=
rch 26, 2010 10:46 AM<br><b>To:</b> Torsten Lodderstedt<br><b>Cc:</b> Eran =
Hammer-Lahav; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Th=
inking about our secrets for signatures<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><blockquote style=3D'border:no=
ne;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.=
8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margi=
n-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;=
mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=
When a token is issued, that&#8217;s when a secret should be provided if th=
e token is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be p=
rovided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don&#8217;t ha=
ve a strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at th=
is point).</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-to=
p-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;colo=
r:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-ma=
rgin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0=
pt;color:#1F497D'>I don&#8217;t think a token should be &#8220;upgraded&#82=
21; from bearer to a secret-enabled using the refresh process. </span><o:p>=
</o:p></p></div></blockquote></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I agree. Independen=
t of who actually decides the token type, this type should be constant in a=
uthz and refreshment process. <br><br>I think the resource endpoint should =
advertise the supported methods (e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-P=
arameter), the client can ask the authorization server for a specific token=
 type incl. signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a=
 request if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret.&nbsp;=
<o:p></o:p></p></div></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>sure - so at the first request time, =
you can request. &nbsp;it is still possible to upgrade and download the tok=
en time during refresh (switch from non signature to signature based on the=
 refresh)?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p><=
/p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platf=
orm Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</=
a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DABBEP3PW5EX1MB01E_--

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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--00163630f57906ce9f0482b8a3ca
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i believe in normal operation an application will choose once, and be done
-- they will either signal that they want to use tokens under SSL, or use
signatures.  the only concern i have is if an application decides at a late=
r
date that they would like to use a signature mechanism (or visa versa) they
they should have an upgrade path (otherwise they would have to deprecate
their tokens and re-authorize their users?).  its a (albeit remote)
possibility for web based operations, and i doubt that we'll ever see a
native application doing that.

On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wr=
ote:

> Why do you need to change the cryptographic properties of a token during
> refresh?
>
>
>
> EHL
>
>
>
> *From:* Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM
> *To:* Torsten Lodderstedt
> *Cc:* Eran Hammer-Lahav; OAuth@core3.amsl.com; WG
>
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
>
>
> When a token is issued, that=92s when a secret should be provided if the
> token is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be
> provided either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don=92t hav=
e a
> strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this
> point).
>
>
>
> I don=92t think a token should be =93upgraded=94 from bearer to a secret-=
enabled
> using the refresh process.
>
> I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type
> should be constant in authz and refreshment process.
>
> I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods (e.g=
.
> by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask the
> authorization server for a specific token type incl. signature-method and
> the authorization server may refuse such a request if it is unable to
> provide an appropriate token type/secret.
>
>
>
> sure - so at the first request time, you can request.  it is still possib=
le
> to upgrade and download the token time during refresh (switch from non
> signature to signature based on the refresh)?
>
>
>
> --
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>



--=20
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--00163630f57906ce9f0482b8a3ca
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

i believe in normal operation an application will choose once, and be done =
-- they will either signal that they want to use tokens under SSL, or use s=
ignatures. =A0the only concern i have is if an application decides at a lat=
er date that they would like to use a signature mechanism (or visa versa) t=
hey they should have an upgrade path (otherwise they would have to deprecat=
e their tokens and re-authorize their users?). =A0its a (albeit=A0remote) p=
ossibility for web based operations, and i doubt that we&#39;ll ever see a =
native application doing that.<div>

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran Hamme=
r-Lahav <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@h=
ueniverse.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">Why do you need to chang=
e the cryptographic properties of a token during refresh?</span></p><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal">

<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">=A0</span></p><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">EHL</span></p><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">=A0</span>=
</p><div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 4.0pt">

<div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt=
 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Fr=
om:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:<a =
href=3D"mailto:raffi@twitter.com" target=3D"_blank">raffi@twitter.com</a>] =
<br>

<b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM<br><b>To:</b> Torsten Lodderst=
edt<br><b>Cc:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com=
" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@core3.amsl.com</a>; WG</span></p><div class=3D"im=
">

<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signature=
s</div><p></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0</p><div><blockquote st=
yle=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0p=
t;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">

<div><div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt"><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">When a=
 token is issued, that=92s when a secret should be provided if the token is=
 to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provided ei=
ther with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don=92t have a strong fe=
eling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point).</sp=
an></p>

<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">=A0</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">I don=92t think a token should be =93=
upgraded=94 from bearer to a secret-enabled using the refresh process. </sp=
an></p>

</div></div></div></blockquote></div><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token t=
ype, this type should be constant in authz and refreshment process. <br><br=
>

I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods (e.g. =
by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask the auth=
orization server for a specific token type incl. signature-method and the a=
uthorization server may refuse such a request if it is unable to provide an=
 appropriate token type/secret.=A0</p>

</div></div></div></blockquote><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal">=A0</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">sure - so at the=
 first request time, you can request. =A0it is still possible to upgrade an=
d download the token time during refresh (switch from non signature to sign=
ature based on the refresh)?</p>

</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0</p></div></div></div></div><div><div>=
</div><div class=3D"h5"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Tw=
itter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi" target=3D"_blan=
k">http://twitter.com/raffi</a></p>

</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>=
-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitte=
r.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><br>
</div>

--00163630f57906ce9f0482b8a3ca--

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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 11:55:45 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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It boils down to whatever parameter we add to request a token type being al=
so available when refreshing a token. I am not sure there is a real justifi=
cation for that, but I can go either way.

Anyone else with use cases for this?

EHL

From: Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 11:50 AM
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
Cc: WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures

i believe in normal operation an application will choose once, and be done =
-- they will either signal that they want to use tokens under SSL, or use s=
ignatures.  the only concern i have is if an application decides at a later=
 date that they would like to use a signature mechanism (or visa versa) the=
y they should have an upgrade path (otherwise they would have to deprecate =
their tokens and re-authorize their users?).  its a (albeit remote) possibi=
lity for web based operations, and i doubt that we'll ever see a native app=
lication doing that.

On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com<ma=
ilto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
Why do you need to change the cryptographic properties of a token during re=
fresh?

EHL

From: Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com<mailto:raffi@twitter.com>]
Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM
To: Torsten Lodderstedt
Cc: Eran Hammer-Lahav; OAuth@core3.amsl.com<mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com>; W=
G

Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures

When a token is issued, that's when a secret should be provided if the toke=
n is to be used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provide=
d either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don't have a strong =
feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point).

I don't think a token should be "upgraded" from bearer to a secret-enabled =
using the refresh process.
I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this type shou=
ld be constant in authz and refreshment process.

I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods (e.g. =
by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can ask the auth=
orization server for a specific token type incl. signature-method and the a=
uthorization server may refuse such a request if it is unable to provide an=
 appropriate token type/secret.

sure - so at the first request time, you can request.  it is still possible=
 to upgrade and download the token time during refresh (switch from non sig=
nature to signature based on the refresh)?

--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi



--
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>It boils =
down to whatever parameter we add to request a token type being also availa=
ble when refreshing a token. I am not sure there is a real justification fo=
r that, but I can go either way.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1=
F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Anyone else =
with use cases for this?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>EHL<o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'=
border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><d=
iv style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0i=
n 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font=
-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com] =
<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 2010 11:50 AM<br><b>To:</b> Eran Hammer-=
Lahav<br><b>Cc:</b> WG<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our=
 secrets for signatures<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>i believe in normal operation =
an application will choose once, and be done -- they will either signal tha=
t they want to use tokens under SSL, or use signatures. &nbsp;the only conc=
ern i have is if an application decides at a later date that they would lik=
e to use a signature mechanism (or visa versa) they they should have an upg=
rade path (otherwise they would have to deprecate their tokens and re-autho=
rize their users?). &nbsp;its a (albeit&nbsp;remote) possibility for web ba=
sed operations, and i doubt that we'll ever see a native application doing =
that.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:=
p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto=
;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'=
>Why do you need to change the cryptographic properties of a token during r=
efresh?</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-a=
lt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#=
1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margi=
n-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;=
color:#1F497D'>EHL</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-m=
argin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.=
0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><div style=3D'border:none;bo=
rder-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'bo=
rder:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>=
<b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt'> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:raffi@twitter.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">raffi@twitter.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 20=
10 10:46 AM<br><b>To:</b> Torsten Lodderstedt<br><b>Cc:</b> Eran Hammer-Lah=
av; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@core3.a=
msl.com</a>; WG</span><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><b>Subje=
ct:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures<o:p></o:p>=
</p></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto=
;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><div><blockquote style=3D=
'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;marg=
in-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><=
div><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>=
<span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>When a token is issued, that=
&#8217;s when a secret should be provided if the token is to be used with a=
 signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provided either with the toke=
n or at the resource endpoint (I don&#8217;t have a strong feeling since we=
 are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point).</span><o:p></o:p>=
</p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-mar=
gin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;<=
/span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;=
mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=
I don&#8217;t think a token should be &#8220;upgraded&#8221; from bearer to=
 a secret-enabled using the refresh process. </span><o:p></o:p></p></div></=
div></div></blockquote></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-ma=
rgin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>I agree. Independent of who a=
ctually decides the token type, this type should be constant in authz and r=
efreshment process. <br><br>I think the resource endpoint should advertise =
the supported methods (e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter),=
 the client can ask the authorization server for a specific token type incl=
. signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request i=
f it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p=
></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal sty=
le=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-ma=
rgin-bottom-alt:auto'>sure - so at the first request time, you can request.=
 &nbsp;it is still possible to upgrade and download the token time during r=
efresh (switch from non signature to signature based on the refresh)?<o:p><=
/o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;m=
so-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div><di=
v><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bot=
tom-alt:auto'>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D=
"http://twitter.com/raffi" target=3D"_blank">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o=
:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><=
br clear=3Dall><br>-- <br>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a hr=
ef=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o:p></o:p></p>=
</div></div></div></body></html>=

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I remember one scenario in the discussion "why signatures" in the 
context of pro/con HTTPS.

In this scenario, "normal" requests would be performed over HTTPS with 
bearer tokens, which is easy to implement and secure. But some requests 
(e.g. download large video files), where the penalty for encrypting the 
whole traffic would be to high, would be performed over a HTTP 
connection (probably with a signed  request).

Would that be a conclusive example for different cryptographical 
properties for access tokens based on the same refresh token?

regards,
Torsten.
> i believe in normal operation an application will choose once, and be 
> done -- they will either signal that they want to use tokens under 
> SSL, or use signatures.  the only concern i have is if an application 
> decides at a later date that they would like to use a signature 
> mechanism (or visa versa) they they should have an upgrade path 
> (otherwise they would have to deprecate their tokens and re-authorize 
> their users?).  its a (albeit remote) possibility for web based 
> operations, and i doubt that we'll ever see a native application doing 
> that.
>
> On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav 
> <eran@hueniverse.com <mailto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
>
>     Why do you need to change the cryptographic properties of a token
>     during refresh?
>
>     EHL
>
>     *From:* Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com
>     <mailto:raffi@twitter.com>]
>     *Sent:* Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM
>     *To:* Torsten Lodderstedt
>     *Cc:* Eran Hammer-Lahav; OAuth@core3.amsl.com
>     <mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com>; WG
>
>
>     *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
>             When a token is issued, that’s when a secret should be
>             provided if the token is to be used with a signature. The
>             specific mac algorithm can be provided either with the
>             token or at the resource endpoint (I don’t have a strong
>             feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets
>             at this point).
>
>             I don’t think a token should be “upgraded” from bearer to
>             a secret-enabled using the refresh process.
>
>         I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type,
>         this type should be constant in authz and refreshment process.
>
>         I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported
>         methods (e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter),
>         the client can ask the authorization server for a specific
>         token type incl. signature-method and the authorization server
>         may refuse such a request if it is unable to provide an
>         appropriate token type/secret.
>
>     sure - so at the first request time, you can request.  it is still
>     possible to upgrade and download the token time during refresh
>     (switch from non signature to signature based on the refresh)?
>
>     -- 
>     Raffi Krikorian
>     Twitter Platform Team
>     http://twitter.com/raffi
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    


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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
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 http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
I remember one scenario in the discussion "why signatures" in the
context of pro/con HTTPS.<br>
<br>
In this scenario, "normal" requests would be performed over HTTPS with
bearer tokens, which is easy to implement and secure. But some requests
(e.g. download large video files), where the penalty for encrypting the
whole traffic would be to high, would be performed over a HTTP
connection (probably with a signed  request). <br>
<br>
Would that be a conclusive example for different cryptographical
properties for access tokens based on the same refresh token?<br>
<br>
regards,<br>
Torsten.<br>
<blockquote
 cite="mid:82c33f601003261150x26f14170s20c0207626bbe321@mail.gmail.com"
 type="cite">i believe in normal operation an application will choose
once, and be done -- they will either signal that they want to use
tokens under SSL, or use signatures.  the only concern i have is if an
application decides at a later date that they would like to use a
signature mechanism (or visa versa) they they should have an upgrade
path (otherwise they would have to deprecate their tokens and
re-authorize their users?).  its a (albeit remote) possibility for web
based operations, and i doubt that we'll ever see a native application
doing that.
  <div><br>
  <div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran
Hammer-Lahav <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt;</span>
wrote:<br>
  <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
 style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
    <div link="blue" vlink="purple" lang="EN-US">
    <div>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">Why do you need to
change the cryptographic properties of a token during refresh?</span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"> </span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">EHL</span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"> </span></p>
    <div
 style="border-style: none none none solid; border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color blue; border-width: medium medium medium 1.5pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 4pt;">
    <div>
    <div
 style="border-style: solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color; border-width: 1pt medium medium; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size: 10pt;">From:</span></b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt;"> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:<a
 moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:raffi@twitter.com" target="_blank">raffi@twitter.com</a>]
    <br>
    <b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM<br>
    <b>To:</b> Torsten Lodderstedt<br>
    <b>Cc:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com" target="_blank">OAuth@core3.amsl.com</a>;
WG</span></p>
    <div class="im"><br>
    <b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for
signatures</div>
    </div>
    </div>
    <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
    <div>
    <blockquote
 style="border-style: none none none solid; border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color rgb(204, 204, 204); border-width: medium medium medium 1pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 6pt; margin-left: 4.8pt; margin-right: 0in;">
      <div>
      <div>
      <blockquote style="margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt;">
        <div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">When a token is
issued, that’s when a secret should be provided if the token is to be
used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provided
either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don’t have a
strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at
this point).</span></p>
        <div>
        <div class="h5">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"> </span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">I don’t think a
token should be “upgraded” from bearer to a secret-enabled using the
refresh process. </span></p>
        </div>
        </div>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      </div>
      <div>
      <div class="h5">
      <p class="MsoNormal">I agree. Independent of who actually decides
the token type, this type should be constant in authz and refreshment
process. <br>
      <br>
I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can
ask the authorization server for a specific token type incl.
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret. </p>
      </div>
      </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <div>
    <div class="h5">
    <div>
    <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
    </div>
    <div>
    <p class="MsoNormal">sure - so at the first request time, you can
request.  it is still possible to upgrade and download the token time
during refresh (switch from non signature to signature based on the
refresh)?</p>
    </div>
    <div>
    <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
    <div>
    <div class="h5">
    <p class="MsoNormal">-- <br>
Raffi Krikorian<br>
Twitter Platform Team<br>
    <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://twitter.com/raffi"
 target="_blank">http://twitter.com/raffi</a></p>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
  </blockquote>
  </div>
  <br>
  <br clear="all">
  <br>
-- <br>
Raffi Krikorian<br>
Twitter Platform Team<br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><br>
  </div>
  <pre wrap="">
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>

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From: "Davis, Peter" <Peter.Davis@neustar.biz>
To: Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 15:21:25 -0400
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On Mar 26, 2010, at 13:50 PM, Raffi Krikorian wrote:

> if an application decides at a later date that they would like to use a s=
ignature mechanism (or visa versa) they they should have an upgrade path (o=
therwise they would have to deprecate their tokens and re-authorize their u=
sers?)


Why is this not simply a new token request (rather than a change token from=
 a to b)?  Does the use case require changing the token without the user be=
ing present?  In which case, i think you would be asking for a new security=
 context without the users involvement, which might be an error, IMV.

=3Dpeterd

Peter Davis: Neustar, Inc.
Sr. Director & Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff
45980 Center Oak Plaza Sterling, VA 20166
[T] +1 571 434 5516 [E] peter.davis@neustar.biz [W] http://www.neustar.biz/=
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
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So I think that there are two different issues here in regards to 
up/down grading an access token.

1. Token re-use:
     Does it make sense to use the same access token for a while as a 
bearer and then switch to signing? My personal belief is no.

2. Token exchange:
     Can tokens be exchanged without the user having to re-authorize. I 
think the answer here is yes.

Given the example of using Bearer+SSL for most transactions and 
Signing+HTTP for large file downloads, why can't the client present the 
existing Bearer token, refresh_token and maybe something else to the AS 
and have the AS send back a new access token + secret to use for the 
large file download. All scoping would remain the same.

That way we don't mix token uses, but it's possible to seamlessly 
exchange one set for another so the user doesn't have to re-authorize 
the tokens.

Thanks,
George

On 3/26/10 2:55 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:
>
> It boils down to whatever parameter we add to request a token type 
> being also available when refreshing a token. I am not sure there is a 
> real justification for that, but I can go either way.
>
> Anyone else with use cases for this?
>
> EHL
>
> *From:* Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com]
> *Sent:* Friday, March 26, 2010 11:50 AM
> *To:* Eran Hammer-Lahav
> *Cc:* WG
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
> i believe in normal operation an application will choose once, and be 
> done -- they will either signal that they want to use tokens under 
> SSL, or use signatures.  the only concern i have is if an application 
> decides at a later date that they would like to use a signature 
> mechanism (or visa versa) they they should have an upgrade path 
> (otherwise they would have to deprecate their tokens and re-authorize 
> their users?).  its a (albeit remote) possibility for web based 
> operations, and i doubt that we'll ever see a native application doing 
> that.
>
> On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav 
> <eran@hueniverse.com <mailto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
>
> Why do you need to change the cryptographic properties of a token 
> during refresh?
>
> EHL
>
> *From:* Raffi Krikorian [mailto:raffi@twitter.com 
> <mailto:raffi@twitter.com>]
> *Sent:* Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM
> *To:* Torsten Lodderstedt
> *Cc:* Eran Hammer-Lahav; OAuth@core3.amsl.com 
> <mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com>; WG
>
>
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for signatures
>
>         When a token is issued, that’s when a secret should be
>         provided if the token is to be used with a signature. The
>         specific mac algorithm can be provided either with the token
>         or at the resource endpoint (I don’t have a strong feeling
>         since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at this point).
>
>         I don’t think a token should be “upgraded” from bearer to a
>         secret-enabled using the refresh process.
>
>     I agree. Independent of who actually decides the token type, this
>     type should be constant in authz and refreshment process.
>
>     I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported
>     methods (e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the
>     client can ask the authorization server for a specific token type
>     incl. signature-method and the authorization server may refuse
>     such a request if it is unable to provide an appropriate token
>     type/secret.
>
> sure - so at the first request time, you can request.  it is still 
> possible to upgrade and download the token time during refresh (switch 
> from non signature to signature based on the refresh)?
>
> -- 
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>
> =
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    


--------------080703070008070405040908
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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">So I think that there are two
different issues here in regards to up/down grading an access token.<br>
<br>
1. Token re-use:<br>
    Does it make sense to use the same access token for a while as a
bearer and then switch to signing? My personal belief is no.<br>
<br>
2. Token exchange:<br>
    Can tokens be exchanged without the user having to re-authorize. I
think the answer here is yes.<br>
<br>
Given the example of using Bearer+SSL for most transactions and
Signing+HTTP for large file downloads, why can't the client present the
existing Bearer token, refresh_token and maybe something else to the AS
and have the AS send back a new access token + secret to use for the
large file download. All scoping would remain the same.<br>
<br>
That way we don't mix token uses, but it's possible to seamlessly
exchange one set for another so the user doesn't have to re-authorize
the tokens.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
George<br>
</font><br>
On 3/26/10 2:55 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:
<blockquote
 cite="mid:90C41DD21FB7C64BB94121FBBC2E723438E20DABC4@P3PW5EX1MB01.EX1.SECURESERVER.NET"
 type="cite">
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  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">It
boils down to whatever parameter we add to request a token type being
also available when refreshing a token. I am not sure there is a real
justification for that, but I can go either way.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">Anyone
else with use cases for this?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">EHL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
  <div
 style="border-style: none none none solid; border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color blue; border-width: medium medium medium 1.5pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 4pt;">
  <div>
  <div
 style="border-style: solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color; border-width: 1pt medium medium; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
  <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;">From:</span></b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;"> Raffi
Krikorian [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:raffi@twitter.com">mailto:raffi@twitter.com</a>] <br>
  <b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 2010 11:50 AM<br>
  <b>To:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav<br>
  <b>Cc:</b> WG<br>
  <b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for
signatures<o:p></o:p></span></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal">i believe in normal operation an application
will choose once, and be done -- they will either signal that they want
to use tokens under SSL, or use signatures.  the only concern i have is
if an application decides at a later date that they would like to use a
signature mechanism (or visa versa) they they should have an upgrade
path (otherwise they would have to deprecate their tokens and
re-authorize their users?).  its a (albeit remote) possibility for web
based operations, and i doubt that we'll ever see a native application
doing that.<o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal">On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 11:46 AM, Eran
Hammer-Lahav &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">Why do you need to
change the cryptographic properties of a token during refresh?</span><o:p></o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">EHL</span><o:p></o:p></p>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
  <div
 style="border-style: none none none solid; border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color blue; border-width: medium medium medium 1.5pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 4pt;">
  <div>
  <div
 style="border-style: solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color; border-width: 1pt medium medium; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><b><span style="font-size: 10pt;">From:</span></b><span
 style="font-size: 10pt;"> Raffi Krikorian [mailto:<a
 moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:raffi@twitter.com" target="_blank">raffi@twitter.com</a>]
  <br>
  <b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 26, 2010 10:46 AM<br>
  <b>To:</b> Torsten Lodderstedt<br>
  <b>Cc:</b> Eran Hammer-Lahav; <a moz-do-not-send="true"
 href="mailto:OAuth@core3.amsl.com" target="_blank">OAuth@core3.amsl.com</a>;
WG</span><o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
  <b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Thinking about our secrets for
signatures<o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""> <o:p></o:p></p>
  <div>
  <blockquote
 style="border-style: none none none solid; border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color rgb(204, 204, 204); border-width: medium medium medium 1pt; margin: 5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt; padding: 0in 0in 0in 6pt;">
    <div>
    <div>
    <blockquote style="margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt;">
      <div>
      <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">When a token is
issued, that’s when a secret should be provided if the token is to be
used with a signature. The specific mac algorithm can be provided
either with the token or at the resource endpoint (I don’t have a
strong feeling since we are only talking about symmetric secrets at
this point).</span><o:p></o:p></p>
      <div>
      <div>
      <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
      <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">I don’t think a
token should be “upgraded” from bearer to a secret-enabled using the
refresh process. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
      </div>
      </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    </div>
    <div>
    <div>
    <p class="MsoNormal" style="">I agree. Independent of who actually
decides the token type, this type should be constant in authz and
refreshment process. <br>
    <br>
I think the resource endpoint should advertise the supported methods
(e.g. by way of a WWW-Authenticate-Header-Parameter), the client can
ask the authorization server for a specific token type incl.
signature-method and the authorization server may refuse such a request
if it is unable to provide an appropriate token type/secret. <o:p></o:p></p>
    </div>
    </div>
    </div>
  </blockquote>
  <div>
  <div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""> <o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style="">sure - so at the first request time,
you can request.  it is still possible to upgrade and download the
token time during refresh (switch from non signature to signature based
on the refresh)?<o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style=""> <o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  <div>
  <div>
  <p class="MsoNormal" style="">-- <br>
Raffi Krikorian<br>
Twitter Platform Team<br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://twitter.com/raffi"
 target="_blank">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
  <br clear="all">
  <br>
-- <br>
Raffi Krikorian<br>
Twitter Platform Team<br>
  <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://twitter.com/raffi">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><o:p></o:p></p>
  </div>
  </div>
  </div>
=
  <pre wrap="">
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
  </pre>
</blockquote>
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From beaton@google.com  Tue Mar 30 11:34:32 2010
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] two username/password profiles
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Still working on security considerations.  I'm comparing these two
profiles based on passwords:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-5.1
   - this is probably used by automated tasks.
   - the password can be assumed to be high-entropy, since no one
needs to remember it.
   - why is this profile returning a refresh token?  AFAICT, it is not
useful.  When the access token expires, the client can use the client
password to get a new one.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-6.1
   - this is probably used by installed applications
   - the password is low-entropy, it belongs to a human being.
   - this profile *should* return a refresh token, because otherwise
the installed application needs to save the password in order to get
long-lived access to user data.

Thoughts?

Cheers,
Brian

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This must be an editing error.

Version 0.9.7.2 of the spec requires exactly the other way around, the
correct way: Client Account and Password (5.1) does not return a
refresh token, and Username and Password (5.3) requires a refresh
token to be returned.

Marius



On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 2:34 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> Still working on security considerations. =A0I'm comparing these two
> profiles based on passwords:
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-5.1
> =A0 - this is probably used by automated tasks.
> =A0 - the password can be assumed to be high-entropy, since no one
> needs to remember it.
> =A0 - why is this profile returning a refresh token? =A0AFAICT, it is not
> useful. =A0When the access token expires, the client can use the client
> password to get a new one.
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-6.1
> =A0 - this is probably used by installed applications
> =A0 - the password is low-entropy, it belongs to a human being.
> =A0 - this profile *should* return a refresh token, because otherwise
> the installed application needs to save the password in order to get
> long-lived access to user data.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Cheers,
> Brian
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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From: Justin Smith <justinsm@microsoft.com>
To: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] two username/password profiles
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+1

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of M=
arius Scurtescu
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 12:07 PM
To: Brian Eaton
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] two username/password profiles

This must be an editing error.

Version 0.9.7.2 of the spec requires exactly the other way around, the
correct way: Client Account and Password (5.1) does not return a
refresh token, and Username and Password (5.3) requires a refresh
token to be returned.

Marius



On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 2:34 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> Still working on security considerations. =A0I'm comparing these two
> profiles based on passwords:
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-5.1
> =A0 - this is probably used by automated tasks.
> =A0 - the password can be assumed to be high-entropy, since no one
> needs to remember it.
> =A0 - why is this profile returning a refresh token? =A0AFAICT, it is not
> useful. =A0When the access token expires, the client can use the client
> password to get a new one.
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-6.1
> =A0 - this is probably used by installed applications
> =A0 - the password is low-entropy, it belongs to a human being.
> =A0 - this profile *should* return a refresh token, because otherwise
> the installed application needs to save the password in order to get
> long-lived access to user data.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Cheers,
> Brian
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From dick.hardt@gmail.com  Tue Mar 30 12:38:34 2010
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] two username/password profiles
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my bad, Marius is correct

On 2010-03-30, at 12:07 PM, Marius Scurtescu wrote:

> This must be an editing error.
> 
> Version 0.9.7.2 of the spec requires exactly the other way around, the
> correct way: Client Account and Password (5.1) does not return a
> refresh token, and Username and Password (5.3) requires a refresh
> token to be returned.
> 
> Marius
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 2:34 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
>> Still working on security considerations.  I'm comparing these two
>> profiles based on passwords:
>> 
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-5.1
>>   - this is probably used by automated tasks.
>>   - the password can be assumed to be high-entropy, since no one
>> needs to remember it.
>>   - why is this profile returning a refresh token?  AFAICT, it is not
>> useful.  When the access token expires, the client can use the client
>> password to get a new one.
>> 
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-oauth-01#section-6.1
>>   - this is probably used by installed applications
>>   - the password is low-entropy, it belongs to a human being.
>>   - this profile *should* return a refresh token, because otherwise
>> the installed application needs to save the password in order to get
>> long-lived access to user data.
>> 
>> Thoughts?
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> Brian
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> 
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From davidrecordon@facebook.com  Tue Mar 30 13:54:28 2010
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From: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 13:54:52 -0700
Thread-Topic: A display parameter for user authorization requests
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation standpoint =
is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the Authorization Serv=
er if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile experience, o=
r no user interface for the times when a user is being sent through an auth=
orization flow.  We're thinking that an additional "display" parameter woul=
d be useful within the Web Client and Web Server flows.  Values would inclu=
de none, page, popup, and mobile.

none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server should r=
eturn an immediate response either as an error or an access token if the us=
er has already authorized the Client and has a current session.

popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization Server's user =
authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating size seems reasonabl=
e to exclude from scope for now.

page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the Author=
ization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be unneeded.)

mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.

Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will automati=
cally work using the standard OAuth redirect, but developers can override i=
t and it's needed in the Web Client flow.

--David=

From mscurtescu@google.com  Tue Mar 30 14:34:24 2010
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Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 17:34:24 -0400
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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I think it makes sense, but can this be an extension as opposed to be
added to core?

A related parameter IMO (could be part of the same extension) would be
l10n, in what language should the Authorization Server interact with
the user. OpenID I think has a similar extension.

Marius


On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 4:54 PM, David Recordon
<davidrecordon@facebook.com> wrote:
> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation standpoin=
t is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the Authorization Se=
rver if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile experience,=
 or no user interface for the times when a user is being sent through an au=
thorization flow. =A0We're thinking that an additional "display" parameter =
would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server flows. =A0Values would=
 include none, page, popup, and mobile.
>
> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server should=
 return an immediate response either as an error or an access token if the =
user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
>
> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization Server's use=
r authorization flow within a popup window. =A0Negotiating size seems reaso=
nable to exclude from scope for now.
>
> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the Auth=
orization Server. =A0(This is probably the default and could be unneeded.)
>
> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
>
> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will automa=
tically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but developers can override=
 it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
>
> --David

From rbarnes@bbn.com  Tue Mar 30 15:06:42 2010
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From: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
To: David Recordon <davidrecordon@facebook.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these  
things take on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for  
a virtual world system (see VWRAP)?

Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the  
Client that send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the  
Client control how the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe,  
popup, etc...

Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs  
that result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?   
You're already assuming that the application developer knows which of  
these options he wants.

--Richard



On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation  
> standpoint is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the  
> Authorization Server if they're looking for a popup, full page  
> redirect, mobile experience, or no user interface for the times when  
> a user is being sent through an authorization flow.  We're thinking  
> that an additional "display" parameter would be useful within the  
> Web Client and Web Server flows.  Values would include none, page,  
> popup, and mobile.
>
> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server  
> should return an immediate response either as an error or an access  
> token if the user has already authorized the Client and has a  
> current session.
>
> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization  
> Server's user authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating  
> size seems reasonable to exclude from scope for now.
>
> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the  
> Authorization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be  
> unneeded.)
>
> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
>
> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will  
> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but developers  
> can override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
>
> --David
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:
> This seems rather application-specific. =A0What semantics do these things=
 take
> on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual world
> system (see VWRAP)?
>
> Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the Client t=
hat
> send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client control ho=
w
> the authorization page is displayed? =A0In an iframe, popup, etc...

Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
presenting any UI in the first request.


> Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs that
> result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)? =A0You're alr=
eady
> assuming that the application developer knows which of these options he
> wants.

There are a few ways to go about it:
1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web Server f=
lows
2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
either the Web Client or Web Server flow
4) an optional parameter like in this proposal

I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
confusing to developers.

--David

> --Richard
>
>
>
> On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>
>> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation standpoi=
nt
>> is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the Authorization
>> Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile
>> experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is being sent
>> through an authorization flow. =A0We're thinking that an additional "dis=
play"
>> parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server flows.
>> =A0Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.
>>
>> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server shoul=
d
>> return an immediate response either as an error or an access token if th=
e
>> user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
>>
>> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization Server's us=
er
>> authorization flow within a popup window. =A0Negotiating size seems reas=
onable
>> to exclude from scope for now.
>>
>> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the
>> Authorization Server. =A0(This is probably the default and could be unne=
eded.)
>>
>> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
>>
>> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
>> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but developers can
>> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
>>
>> --David
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From raffi@twitter.com  Tue Mar 30 15:22:57 2010
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--001636aa2c1828706004830c13e4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

i like having an optional hint / parameter which would hint to the server
which type of response the client wants back.  whether or not this needs to
be "core" or an "extension", however, is a valid question.

twitter is actually facing the same issue that david mentions, and have
implemented something similar to what is detailed here.

On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:16 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:
> > This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these things
> take
> > on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual world
> > system (see VWRAP)?
> >
> > Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the Client
> that
> > send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client control
> how
> > the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe, popup, etc...
>
> Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
> will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
> popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
> case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
> response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
> presenting any UI in the first request.
>
>
> > Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs that
> > result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?  You're
> already
> > assuming that the application developer knows which of these options he
> > wants.
>
> There are a few ways to go about it:
> 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web Server
> flows
> 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
> 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
> either the Web Client or Web Server flow
> 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal
>
> I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
> coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
> confusing to developers.
>
> --David
>
> > --Richard
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:
> >
> >> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation
> standpoint
> >> is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the Authorization
> >> Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile
> >> experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is being sent
> >> through an authorization flow.  We're thinking that an additional
> "display"
> >> parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server flows.
> >>  Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.
> >>
> >> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server
> should
> >> return an immediate response either as an error or an access token if
> the
> >> user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
> >>
> >> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization Server's
> user
> >> authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating size seems
> reasonable
> >> to exclude from scope for now.
> >>
> >> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the
> >> Authorization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be
> unneeded.)
> >>
> >> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
> >>
> >> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
> >> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but developers can
> >> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
> >>
> >> --David
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>



-- 
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--001636aa2c1828706004830c13e4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

i like having an optional hint / parameter which would hint to the server w=
hich type of response the client wants back. =A0whether or not this needs t=
o be &quot;core&quot; or an &quot;extension&quot;, however, is a valid ques=
tion.<div>

<br></div><div>twitter is actually facing the same issue that david mention=
s, and have implemented something similar to what is detailed here.<br><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:16 PM, David Recordon =
<span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:recordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3=
:07 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<br>


&gt; This seems rather application-specific. =A0What semantics do these thi=
ngs take<br>
&gt; on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual wo=
rld<br>
&gt; system (see VWRAP)?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Also, maybe I&#39;m misunderstanding things here, but since it&#39;s t=
he Client that<br>
&gt; send the browser to the authorization page, doesn&#39;t the Client con=
trol how<br>
&gt; the authorization page is displayed? =A0In an iframe, popup, etc...<br=
>
<br>
</div>Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page<br=
>
will fit in whatever constraints they&#39;re choosing. =A0This might be a<b=
r>
popup window but could also be a full page redirect. =A0There&#39;s also th=
e<br>
case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate<br>
response of yes/no (ala OpenID&#39;s checkid_immediate mode) versus<br>
presenting any UI in the first request.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
&gt; Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs th=
at<br>
&gt; result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)? =A0You&#39=
;re already<br>
&gt; assuming that the application developer knows which of these options h=
e<br>
&gt; wants.<br>
<br>
</div>There are a few ways to go about it:<br>
1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web Server f=
lows<br>
2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows<br>
3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with<br>
either the Web Client or Web Server flow<br>
4) an optional parameter like in this proposal<br>
<br>
I&#39;d rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard<br>
coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more<br>
confusing to developers.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--David<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; One of the challenges we&#39;re running into from an implementatio=
n standpoint<br>
&gt;&gt; is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the Authoriza=
tion<br>
&gt;&gt; Server if they&#39;re looking for a popup, full page redirect, mob=
ile<br>
&gt;&gt; experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is bein=
g sent<br>
&gt;&gt; through an authorization flow. =A0We&#39;re thinking that an addit=
ional &quot;display&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt; parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server flo=
ws.<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server=
 should<br>
&gt;&gt; return an immediate response either as an error or an access token=
 if the<br>
&gt;&gt; user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization Serve=
r&#39;s user<br>
&gt;&gt; authorization flow within a popup window. =A0Negotiating size seem=
s reasonable<br>
&gt;&gt; to exclude from scope for now.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; page - The Client is redirecting the user&#39;s browser to a page =
on the<br>
&gt;&gt; Authorization Server. =A0(This is probably the default and could b=
e unneeded.)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page=
.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will=
<br>
&gt;&gt; automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but develope=
rs can<br>
&gt;&gt; override it and it&#39;s needed in the Web Client flow.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; --David<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Raffi Kriko=
rian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http:=
//twitter.com/raffi</a><br>
</div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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Sounds like something best outlined in a best-practices doc or extension -
there are going to be a lot of different implementation specific things here
I think.

We're not doing it right now, but Photobucket will be doing some light user
agent detection, with a hint option, for this sort of interaction.

On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 4:22 PM, Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com> wrote:

> i like having an optional hint / parameter which would hint to the server
> which type of response the client wants back.  whether or not this needs to
> be "core" or an "extension", however, is a valid question.
>
> twitter is actually facing the same issue that david mentions, and have
> implemented something similar to what is detailed here.
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:16 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:
>> > This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these things
>> take
>> > on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual
>> world
>> > system (see VWRAP)?
>> >
>> > Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the Client
>> that
>> > send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client control
>> how
>> > the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe, popup, etc...
>>
>> Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
>> will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
>> popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
>> case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
>> response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
>> presenting any UI in the first request.
>>
>>
>> > Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs that
>> > result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?  You're
>> already
>> > assuming that the application developer knows which of these options he
>> > wants.
>>
>> There are a few ways to go about it:
>> 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web Server
>> flows
>> 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
>> 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
>> either the Web Client or Web Server flow
>> 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal
>>
>> I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
>> coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
>> confusing to developers.
>>
>> --David
>>
>> > --Richard
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>> >
>> >> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation
>> standpoint
>> >> is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the Authorization
>> >> Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile
>> >> experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is being
>> sent
>> >> through an authorization flow.  We're thinking that an additional
>> "display"
>> >> parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server flows.
>> >>  Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.
>> >>
>> >> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server
>> should
>> >> return an immediate response either as an error or an access token if
>> the
>> >> user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
>> >>
>> >> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization Server's
>> user
>> >> authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating size seems
>> reasonable
>> >> to exclude from scope for now.
>> >>
>> >> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the
>> >> Authorization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be
>> unneeded.)
>> >>
>> >> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
>> >>
>> >> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
>> >> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but developers
>> can
>> >> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
>> >>
>> >> --David
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > OAuth mailing list
>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Raffi Krikorian
> Twitter Platform Team
> http://twitter.com/raffi
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

--000e0cd70c3a6a536004830c53c2
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Sounds like something best outlined in a best-practices doc or extension - =
there are going to be a lot of different implementation specific things her=
e I think.<div><br></div><div>We&#39;re not doing it right now, but Photobu=
cket will be doing some light user agent detection, with a hint option, for=
 this sort of interaction.<br>

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 4:22 PM, Raffi Kriko=
rian <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:raffi@twitter.com">raffi@twitt=
er.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

i like having an optional hint / parameter which would hint to the server w=
hich type of response the client wants back. =A0whether or not this needs t=
o be &quot;core&quot; or an &quot;extension&quot;, however, is a valid ques=
tion.<div>



<br></div><div>twitter is actually facing the same issue that david mention=
s, and have implemented something similar to what is detailed here.<div><di=
v></div><div class=3D"h5"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 30=
, 2010 at 3:16 PM, David Recordon <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:r=
ecordond@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wr=
ote:<br>



<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richar=
d Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">rbarnes@b=
bn.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>




&gt; This seems rather application-specific. =A0What semantics do these thi=
ngs take<br>
&gt; on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual wo=
rld<br>
&gt; system (see VWRAP)?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Also, maybe I&#39;m misunderstanding things here, but since it&#39;s t=
he Client that<br>
&gt; send the browser to the authorization page, doesn&#39;t the Client con=
trol how<br>
&gt; the authorization page is displayed? =A0In an iframe, popup, etc...<br=
>
<br>
</div>Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page<br=
>
will fit in whatever constraints they&#39;re choosing. =A0This might be a<b=
r>
popup window but could also be a full page redirect. =A0There&#39;s also th=
e<br>
case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate<br>
response of yes/no (ala OpenID&#39;s checkid_immediate mode) versus<br>
presenting any UI in the first request.<br>
<div><br>
<br>
&gt; Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs th=
at<br>
&gt; result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)? =A0You&#39=
;re already<br>
&gt; assuming that the application developer knows which of these options h=
e<br>
&gt; wants.<br>
<br>
</div>There are a few ways to go about it:<br>
1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web Server f=
lows<br>
2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows<br>
3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with<br>
either the Web Client or Web Server flow<br>
4) an optional parameter like in this proposal<br>
<br>
I&#39;d rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard<br>
coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more<br>
confusing to developers.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--David<br>
</font><div><div></div><div><br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; One of the challenges we&#39;re running into from an implementatio=
n standpoint<br>
&gt;&gt; is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the Authoriza=
tion<br>
&gt;&gt; Server if they&#39;re looking for a popup, full page redirect, mob=
ile<br>
&gt;&gt; experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is bein=
g sent<br>
&gt;&gt; through an authorization flow. =A0We&#39;re thinking that an addit=
ional &quot;display&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt; parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server flo=
ws.<br>
&gt;&gt; =A0Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server=
 should<br>
&gt;&gt; return an immediate response either as an error or an access token=
 if the<br>
&gt;&gt; user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization Serve=
r&#39;s user<br>
&gt;&gt; authorization flow within a popup window. =A0Negotiating size seem=
s reasonable<br>
&gt;&gt; to exclude from scope for now.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; page - The Client is redirecting the user&#39;s browser to a page =
on the<br>
&gt;&gt; Authorization Server. =A0(This is probably the default and could b=
e unneeded.)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page=
.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will=
<br>
&gt;&gt; automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but develope=
rs can<br>
&gt;&gt; override it and it&#39;s needed in the Web Client flow.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; --David<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org=
</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br></div></div>-- <br=
>Raffi Krikorian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/=
raffi" target=3D"_blank">http://twitter.com/raffi</a><br>
</div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--000e0cd70c3a6a536004830c53c2--

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Tue Mar 30 15:42:51 2010
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On 3/30/10 4:16 PM, David Recordon wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote=
:
>> This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these thing=
s take
>> on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual wo=
rld
>> system (see VWRAP)?
>>
>> Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the Clien=
t that
>> send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client control=
 how
>> the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe, popup, etc...
>=20
> Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
> will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
> popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
> case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
> response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
> presenting any UI in the first request.
>=20
>=20
>> Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs th=
at
>> result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?  You're al=
ready
>> assuming that the application developer knows which of these options h=
e
>> wants.
>=20
> There are a few ways to go about it:
> 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web Serv=
er flows
> 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
> 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
> either the Web Client or Web Server flow
> 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal
>=20
> I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
> coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
> confusing to developers.

I agree that defining multiple but essentially similar flows is a bad
idea. This seems like a good opportunity for defining an extension,
mostly because many IETF folks would probably prefer a separation
between meaning and presentation. But personally I'm willing to be
convinced otherwise. :)

Peter

--=20
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/




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--------------ms090906080609030908040508--

From rbarnes@bbn.com  Tue Mar 30 15:50:33 2010
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From: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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I guess I'm one of those IETF folks that likes to separate content  
from presentation :)

In any case, it seems like there's some agreement here that display  
parameters are something that should be optional / extension.  That's  
fine with me.

It sounds, though, like maybe what you want is a way to describe  
criteria?  (Rather than a set of tokens)  E.g., if you just passed in  
the x/y dimensions of the space that the authorization server would  
have available to it, then the server could customize the UI to that  
space.  Would that be enough for the use cases you have in mind?

--Richard




On Mar 30, 2010, at 6:16 PM, David Recordon wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>  
> wrote:
>> This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these  
>> things take
>> on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual  
>> world
>> system (see VWRAP)?
>>
>> Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the  
>> Client that
>> send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client  
>> control how
>> the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe, popup, etc...
>
> Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
> will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
> popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
> case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
> response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
> presenting any UI in the first request.
>
>
>> Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs  
>> that
>> result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?  You're  
>> already
>> assuming that the application developer knows which of these  
>> options he
>> wants.
>
> There are a few ways to go about it:
> 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web  
> Server flows
> 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
> 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
> either the Web Client or Web Server flow
> 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal
>
> I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
> coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
> confusing to developers.
>
> --David
>
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>>
>>> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation  
>>> standpoint
>>> is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the  
>>> Authorization
>>> Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile
>>> experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is  
>>> being sent
>>> through an authorization flow.  We're thinking that an additional  
>>> "display"
>>> parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server  
>>> flows.
>>>  Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.
>>>
>>> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server  
>>> should
>>> return an immediate response either as an error or an access token  
>>> if the
>>> user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
>>>
>>> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization  
>>> Server's user
>>> authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating size seems  
>>> reasonable
>>> to exclude from scope for now.
>>>
>>> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the
>>> Authorization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be  
>>> unneeded.)
>>>
>>> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
>>>
>>> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
>>> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but  
>>> developers can
>>> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
>>>
>>> --David
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>


From eran@hueniverse.com  Tue Mar 30 17:22:17 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 17:22:01 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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This should be implemented using a parameter with some level of =20
discovery  to find out the options supported by the server.

As for where this belongs (extension, etc), I say write it and we'll =20
figure it out later. It will be part of core more based on the =20
libraries and companies that adopt it than what the core spec says.

EHL

On Mar 30, 2010, at 18:16, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> =20
> wrote:
>> This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these =20
>> things take
>> on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual =20
>> world
>> system (see VWRAP)?
>>
>> Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the =20
>> Client that
>> send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client =20
>> control how
>> the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe, popup, etc...
>
> Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
> will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
> popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
> case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
> response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
> presenting any UI in the first request.
>
>
>> Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs =20
>> that
>> result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?  You're =20
>> already
>> assuming that the application developer knows which of these =20
>> options he
>> wants.
>
> There are a few ways to go about it:
> 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web =20
> Server flows
> 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
> 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
> either the Web Client or Web Server flow
> 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal
>
> I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
> coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
> confusing to developers.
>
> --David
>
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>>
>>> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation =20
>>> standpoint
>>> is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the =20
>>> Authorization
>>> Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile
>>> experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is =20
>>> being sent
>>> through an authorization flow.  We're thinking that an additional =20
>>> "display"
>>> parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server =20
>>> flows.
>>>  Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.
>>>
>>> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server =20
>>> should
>>> return an immediate response either as an error or an access token =20
>>> if the
>>> user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
>>>
>>> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization =20
>>> Server's user
>>> authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating size seems =20
>>> reasonable
>>> to exclude from scope for now.
>>>
>>> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the
>>> Authorization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be =20
>>> unneeded.)
>>>
>>> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
>>>
>>> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
>>> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but =20
>>> developers can
>>> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
>>>
>>> --David
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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why does a client need to discover what the server supports?  presumably the
client would already know given that they are integrating with it?  it could
simply be documented somewhere (just looking for a way for this not to
snowball into something complicated).

On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wrote:

> This should be implemented using a parameter with some level of
> discovery  to find out the options supported by the server.
>
> As for where this belongs (extension, etc), I say write it and we'll
> figure it out later. It will be part of core more based on the
> libraries and companies that adopt it than what the core spec says.
>
> EHL
>
> On Mar 30, 2010, at 18:16, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
> > wrote:
> >> This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these
> >> things take
> >> on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual
> >> world
> >> system (see VWRAP)?
> >>
> >> Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the
> >> Client that
> >> send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client
> >> control how
> >> the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe, popup, etc...
> >
> > Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
> > will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
> > popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
> > case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
> > response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
> > presenting any UI in the first request.
> >
> >
> >> Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs
> >> that
> >> result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?  You're
> >> already
> >> assuming that the application developer knows which of these
> >> options he
> >> wants.
> >
> > There are a few ways to go about it:
> > 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web
> > Server flows
> > 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
> > 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
> > either the Web Client or Web Server flow
> > 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal
> >
> > I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
> > coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
> > confusing to developers.
> >
> > --David
> >
> >> --Richard
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:
> >>
> >>> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation
> >>> standpoint
> >>> is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the
> >>> Authorization
> >>> Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile
> >>> experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is
> >>> being sent
> >>> through an authorization flow.  We're thinking that an additional
> >>> "display"
> >>> parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server
> >>> flows.
> >>>  Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.
> >>>
> >>> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server
> >>> should
> >>> return an immediate response either as an error or an access token
> >>> if the
> >>> user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
> >>>
> >>> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization
> >>> Server's user
> >>> authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating size seems
> >>> reasonable
> >>> to exclude from scope for now.
> >>>
> >>> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the
> >>> Authorization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be
> >>> unneeded.)
> >>>
> >>> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
> >>>
> >>> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
> >>> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but
> >>> developers can
> >>> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
> >>>
> >>> --David
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> OAuth mailing list
> >>> OAuth@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>



-- 
Raffi Krikorian
Twitter Platform Team
http://twitter.com/raffi

--00163630f7a3a3b7b204830dca45
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

why does a client need to discover what the server supports? =A0presumably =
the client would already know given that they are integrating with it? =A0i=
t could simply be documented somewhere (just looking for a way for this not=
 to snowball into something complicated).<br>

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:22 PM, Eran Hammer=
-Lahav <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hu=
eniverse.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

This should be implemented using a parameter with some level of<br>
discovery =A0to find out the options supported by the server.<br>
<br>
As for where this belongs (extension, etc), I say write it and we&#39;ll<br=
>
figure it out later. It will be part of core more based on the<br>
libraries and companies that adopt it than what the core spec says.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
EHL<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Mar 30, 2010, at 18:16, &quot;David Recordon&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:recordond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
rbarnes@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; This seems rather application-specific. =A0What semantics do these=
<br>
&gt;&gt; things take<br>
&gt;&gt; on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtua=
l<br>
&gt;&gt; world<br>
&gt;&gt; system (see VWRAP)?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Also, maybe I&#39;m misunderstanding things here, but since it&#39=
;s the<br>
&gt;&gt; Client that<br>
&gt;&gt; send the browser to the authorization page, doesn&#39;t the Client=
<br>
&gt;&gt; control how<br>
&gt;&gt; the authorization page is displayed? =A0In an iframe, popup, etc..=
.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page<br>
&gt; will fit in whatever constraints they&#39;re choosing. =A0This might b=
e a<br>
&gt; popup window but could also be a full page redirect. =A0There&#39;s al=
so the<br>
&gt; case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate<b=
r>
&gt; response of yes/no (ala OpenID&#39;s checkid_immediate mode) versus<br=
>
&gt; presenting any UI in the first request.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URI=
s<br>
&gt;&gt; that<br>
&gt;&gt; result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)? =A0You=
&#39;re<br>
&gt;&gt; already<br>
&gt;&gt; assuming that the application developer knows which of these<br>
&gt;&gt; options he<br>
&gt;&gt; wants.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There are a few ways to go about it:<br>
&gt; 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web<br>
&gt; Server flows<br>
&gt; 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows<=
br>
&gt; 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with<br>
&gt; either the Web Client or Web Server flow<br>
&gt; 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;d rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard<=
br>
&gt; coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more<br>
&gt; confusing to developers.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --David<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; --Richard<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; One of the challenges we&#39;re running into from an implement=
ation<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; standpoint<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Authorization<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Server if they&#39;re looking for a popup, full page redirect,=
 mobile<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is<=
br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; being sent<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; through an authorization flow. =A0We&#39;re thinking that an a=
dditional<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;display&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; flows.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Se=
rver<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; should<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; return an immediate response either as an error or an access t=
oken<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; if the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; user has already authorized the Client and has a current sessi=
on.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Server&#39;s user<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization flow within a popup window. =A0Negotiating size =
seems<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; reasonable<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; to exclude from scope for now.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; page - The Client is redirecting the user&#39;s browser to a p=
age on the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Authorization Server. =A0(This is probably the default and cou=
ld be<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; unneeded.)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full =
page.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it =
will<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; developers can<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; override it and it&#39;s needed in the Web Client flow.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; --David<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Raffi Kriko=
rian<br>Twitter Platform Team<br><a href=3D"http://twitter.com/raffi">http:=
//twitter.com/raffi</a><br>

--00163630f7a3a3b7b204830dca45--

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On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com> wrote:
> why does a client need to discover what the server supports? presumably the
> client would already know given that they are integrating with it?

+1.

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From: Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
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So I doubt that the client always knows what the server supports, the serve=
r should be open in allowing all parties to find out what is supported

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of B=
rian Eaton
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 5:44 PM
To: Raffi Krikorian
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests

On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com> wrote:
> why does a client need to discover what the server supports?=20
> presumably the client would already know given that they are integrating =
with it?

+1.
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Aren't these independent issues?

Regardless how the client figures what the server supports (discovery
or hard code configuration) it must have a way to tell the
Authorization Server its preferences when it sends the user over.

Marius



On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 8:50 PM, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com> wrote:
> So I doubt that the client always knows what the server supports, the server should be open in allowing all parties to find out what is supported
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Brian Eaton
> Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 5:44 PM
> To: Raffi Krikorian
> Cc: OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
>
> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com> wrote:
>> why does a client need to discover what the server supports?
>> presumably the client would already know given that they are integrating with it?
>
> +1.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
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From eran@hueniverse.com  Tue Mar 30 18:27:19 2010
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--_000_C7D7F2FD31998eranhueniversecom_
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Because the server can deploy support for new devices after the client is r=
eleased and deployed. Wouldn't it be better if the client didn't need a new=
 release to take advantage of something as trivial as asking the server for=
 a better interface?

EHL


On 3/30/10 5:25 PM, "Raffi Krikorian" <raffi@twitter.com> wrote:

why does a client need to discover what the server supports?  presumably th=
e client would already know given that they are integrating with it?  it co=
uld simply be documented somewhere (just looking for a way for this not to =
snowball into something complicated).

On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wr=
ote:
This should be implemented using a parameter with some level of
discovery  to find out the options supported by the server.

As for where this belongs (extension, etc), I say write it and we'll
figure it out later. It will be part of core more based on the
libraries and companies that adopt it than what the core spec says.

EHL

On Mar 30, 2010, at 18:16, "David Recordon" <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
> wrote:
>> This seems rather application-specific.  What semantics do these
>> things take
>> on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtual
>> world
>> system (see VWRAP)?
>>
>> Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the
>> Client that
>> send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client
>> control how
>> the authorization page is displayed?  In an iframe, popup, etc...
>
> Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page
> will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing.  This might be a
> popup window but could also be a full page redirect.  There's also the
> case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate
> response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus
> presenting any UI in the first request.
>
>
>> Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URIs
>> that
>> result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)?  You're
>> already
>> assuming that the application developer knows which of these
>> options he
>> wants.
>
> There are a few ways to go about it:
> 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web
> Server flows
> 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows
> 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with
> either the Web Client or Web Server flow
> 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal
>
> I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard
> coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more
> confusing to developers.
>
> --David
>
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:
>>
>>> One of the challenges we're running into from an implementation
>>> standpoint
>>> is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the
>>> Authorization
>>> Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mobile
>>> experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is
>>> being sent
>>> through an authorization flow.  We're thinking that an additional
>>> "display"
>>> parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server
>>> flows.
>>>  Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.
>>>
>>> none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Server
>>> should
>>> return an immediate response either as an error or an access token
>>> if the
>>> user has already authorized the Client and has a current session.
>>>
>>> popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization
>>> Server's user
>>> authorization flow within a popup window.  Negotiating size seems
>>> reasonable
>>> to exclude from scope for now.
>>>
>>> page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page on the
>>> Authorization Server.  (This is probably the default and could be
>>> unneeded.)
>>>
>>> mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full page.
>>>
>>> Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it will
>>> automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but
>>> developers can
>>> override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.
>>>
>>> --David
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
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<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
11pt'>Because the server can deploy support for new devices after the clien=
t is released and deployed. Wouldn&#8217;t it be better if the client didn&=
#8217;t need a new release to take advantage of something as trivial as ask=
ing the server for a better interface?<BR>
<BR>
EHL<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 3/30/10 5:25 PM, &quot;Raffi Krikorian&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"raffi@twitte=
r.com">raffi@twitter.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"=
><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>why does a client need to discover what the=
 server supports? =A0presumably the client would already know given that th=
ey are integrating with it? =A0it could simply be documented somewhere (jus=
t looking for a way for this not to snowball into something complicated).<B=
R>
<BR>
On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav &lt;<a href=3D"eran@huen=
iverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"=
><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>This should be implemented using a paramete=
r with some level of<BR>
discovery =A0to find out the options supported by the server.<BR>
<BR>
As for where this belongs (extension, etc), I say write it and we'll<BR>
figure it out later. It will be part of core more based on the<BR>
libraries and companies that adopt it than what the core spec says.<BR>
<FONT COLOR=3D"#888888"><BR>
EHL<BR>
</FONT><BR>
On Mar 30, 2010, at 18:16, &quot;David Recordon&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"record=
ond@gmail.com">recordond@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
&gt; On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 3:07 PM, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"rbarnes=
@bbn.com">rbarnes@bbn.com</a>&gt;<BR>
&gt; wrote:<BR>
&gt;&gt; This seems rather application-specific. =A0What semantics do these=
<BR>
&gt;&gt; things take<BR>
&gt;&gt; on when HTTP is just being used as a transport, e.g., for a virtua=
l<BR>
&gt;&gt; world<BR>
&gt;&gt; system (see VWRAP)?<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; Also, maybe I'm misunderstanding things here, but since it's the<B=
R>
&gt;&gt; Client that<BR>
&gt;&gt; send the browser to the authorization page, doesn't the Client<BR>
&gt;&gt; control how<BR>
&gt;&gt; the authorization page is displayed? =A0In an iframe, popup, etc..=
.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; Yes, but the Client needs to make sure that the authorization page<BR>
&gt; will fit in whatever constraints they're choosing. =A0This might be a<=
BR>
&gt; popup window but could also be a full page redirect. =A0There's also t=
he<BR>
&gt; case in the Web Client flow where the Client just wants an immediate<B=
R>
&gt; response of yes/no (ala OpenID's checkid_immediate mode) versus<BR>
&gt; presenting any UI in the first request.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; Perhaps what you want here is a set of different authorization URI=
s<BR>
&gt;&gt; that<BR>
&gt;&gt; result in different appearances (e.g., desktop vs. mobile)? =A0You=
're<BR>
&gt;&gt; already<BR>
&gt;&gt; assuming that the application developer knows which of these<BR>
&gt;&gt; options he<BR>
&gt;&gt; wants.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; There are a few ways to go about it:<BR>
&gt; 1) different mainly duplicative versions of the Web Client and Web<BR>
&gt; Server flows<BR>
&gt; 2) multiple modes within the existing Web Client and Web Server flows<=
BR>
&gt; 3) different user authorization endpoints which can be used with<BR>
&gt; either the Web Client or Web Server flow<BR>
&gt; 4) an optional parameter like in this proposal<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; I'd rather have this be something more dynamic than multiple hard<BR>
&gt; coded user authorization URLs and duplicating flows seems more<BR>
&gt; confusing to developers.<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; --David<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; --Richard<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 30, 2010, at 4:54 PM, David Recordon wrote:<BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; One of the challenges we're running into from an implementatio=
n<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; standpoint<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is having the ability for a Client developer to tell the<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Authorization<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Server if they're looking for a popup, full page redirect, mob=
ile<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; experience, or no user interface for the times when a user is<=
BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; being sent<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; through an authorization flow. =A0We're thinking that an addit=
ional<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;display&quot;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; parameter would be useful within the Web Client and Web Server=
<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; flows.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0Values would include none, page, popup, and mobile.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; none - Mainly for the Web Client profile. The Authorization Se=
rver<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; should<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; return an immediate response either as an error or an access t=
oken<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; if the<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; user has already authorized the Client and has a current sessi=
on.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; popup - The Client is intending to display the Authorization<B=
R>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Server's user<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization flow within a popup window. =A0Negotiating size =
seems<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; reasonable<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; to exclude from scope for now.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; page - The Client is redirecting the user's browser to a page =
on the<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Authorization Server. =A0(This is probably the default and cou=
ld be<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; unneeded.)<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; mobile - Force a mobile experience instead of the normal full =
page.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Most Clients will never need to use this parameter because it =
will<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; automatically work using the standard OAuth redirect, but<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; developers can<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; override it and it's needed in the Web Client flow.<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; --David<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https:=
//www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://ww=
w.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;&gt;<BR>
&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
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</SPAN></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial=
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<BR>
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From eran@hueniverse.com  Tue Mar 30 18:33:32 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 18:33:46 -0700
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization requests
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They are, but thinking about interop for both parts is the same work. Once =
you figure out what the client might need, you figure out what the server m=
ay support. At that point discovery is as simple as giving these different =
options names and putting this information somewhere.

I am not saying a spec must cover both, but it is worth thinking about it a=
t the same time. For example, a decision about allowing requesting custom s=
ize popup vs. fixed popup options vs. pre-defined categories, all require d=
ifferent discovery needs. If the feature allows the client to say "I want a=
 400x500 popup", you just need to say "popups are supported". But if you wa=
nt just allow full browser or popup (of fixed sizes), and do not require a =
server to support all of them, you need to express what is supported.

Given the wide range of UI options, without either mandating everything or =
discovery, this feature offers little interop value (which means little rea=
son to write as a standard).

EHL


On 3/30/10 5:58 PM, "Marius Scurtescu" <mscurtescu@google.com> wrote:

Aren't these independent issues?

Regardless how the client figures what the server supports (discovery
or hard code configuration) it must have a way to tell the
Authorization Server its preferences when it sends the user over.

Marius



On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 8:50 PM, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad@microsoft.com> wr=
ote:
> So I doubt that the client always knows what the server supports, the ser=
ver should be open in allowing all parties to find out what is supported
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Brian Eaton
> Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 5:44 PM
> To: Raffi Krikorian
> Cc: OAuth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization reques=
ts
>
> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Raffi Krikorian <raffi@twitter.com> wrot=
e:
>> why does a client need to discover what the server supports?
>> presumably the client would already know given that they are integrating=
 with it?
>
> +1.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
_______________________________________________
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<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
11pt'>They are, but thinking about interop for both parts is the same work.=
 Once you figure out what the client might need, you figure out what the se=
rver may support. At that point discovery is as simple as giving these diff=
erent options names and putting this information somewhere.<BR>
<BR>
I am not saying a spec must cover both, but it is worth thinking about it a=
t the same time. For example, a decision about allowing requesting custom s=
ize popup vs. fixed popup options vs. pre-defined categories, all require d=
ifferent discovery needs. If the feature allows the client to say &#8220;I =
want a 400x500 popup&#8221;, you just need to say &#8220;popups are support=
ed&#8221;. But if you want just allow full browser or popup (of fixed sizes=
), and do not require a server to support all of them, you need to express =
what is supported.<BR>
<BR>
Given the wide range of UI options, without either mandating everything or =
discovery, this feature offers little interop value (which means little rea=
son to write as a standard).<BR>
<BR>
EHL<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 3/30/10 5:58 PM, &quot;Marius Scurtescu&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mscurtescu@=
google.com">mscurtescu@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"=
><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'>Aren't these independent issues?<BR>
<BR>
Regardless how the client figures what the server supports (discovery<BR>
or hard code configuration) it must have a way to tell the<BR>
Authorization Server its preferences when it sends the user over.<BR>
<BR>
Marius<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 8:50 PM, Anthony Nadalin &lt;<a href=3D"tonynad@mic=
rosoft.com">tonynad@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
&gt; So I doubt that the client always knows what the server supports, the =
server should be open in allowing all parties to find out what is supported=
<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<BR>
&gt; From: <a href=3D"oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<=
a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>]=
 On Behalf Of Brian Eaton<BR>
&gt; Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 5:44 PM<BR>
&gt; To: Raffi Krikorian<BR>
&gt; Cc: OAuth WG<BR>
&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A display parameter for user authorization req=
uests<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Raffi Krikorian &lt;<a href=3D"raffi@=
twitter.com">raffi@twitter.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
&gt;&gt; why does a client need to discover what the server supports?<BR>
&gt;&gt; presumably the client would already know given that they are integ=
rating with it?<BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; +1.<BR>
&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;<BR>
&gt; _______________________________________________<BR>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
&gt;<BR>
_______________________________________________<BR>
OAuth mailing list<BR>
<a href=3D"OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><BR>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.or=
g/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><BR>
<BR>
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 21:20:40 -0700
Thread-Topic: Limiting signed requests to use the Authorization request header
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the Authorization request header
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Since we have consensus that using signed requests is a more advance use
case and will be used by more experienced developer, I would like to sugges=
t
we limit sending signed request parameters to the Authorization header (no
URI query parameters or form-encoded body).

This will not change the ability to send the oauth_token parameter in the
query or body when using bearer tokens (as well as in the header). It will
only apply to sending signed requests.

The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter
"invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything
else is limited to the header.

Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case.

EHL


From beaton@google.com  Tue Mar 30 21:25:32 2010
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On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 9:20 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
> The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter
> "invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything
> else is limited to the header.

Why would oauth_token ever hit the URI or body in a signed request?

> Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case.

I am a fan.  +1.

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the Authorization request header
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Sounds reasonable. If you're computing signatures then you certainly
can set an authorization header.


On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 9:25 PM, Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 9:20 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> =
wrote:
>> The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter
>> "invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything
>> else is limited to the header.
>
> Why would oauth_token ever hit the URI or body in a signed request?
>
>> Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case.
>
> I am a fan. =A0+1.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

From eran@hueniverse.com  Tue Mar 30 21:43:00 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
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On 3/30/10 9:25 PM, "Brian Eaton" <beaton@google.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 9:20 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
> wrote:
>> The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter
>> "invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything
>> else is limited to the header.
>=20
> Why would oauth_token ever hit the URI or body in a signed request?

It wouldn't. I meant in the entire spec (i.e. Bearer tokens).

EHL


From email@pbryan.net  Tue Mar 30 22:06:38 2010
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+1

-----Original Message-----
From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the Authorization
request header
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 21:20:40 -0700

Since we have consensus that using signed requests is a more advance use
case and will be used by more experienced developer, I would like to suggest
we limit sending signed request parameters to the Authorization header (no
URI query parameters or form-encoded body).

This will not change the ability to send the oauth_token parameter in the
query or body when using bearer tokens (as well as in the header). It will
only apply to sending signed requests.

The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter
"invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything
else is limited to the header.

Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case.

EHL

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth



From torsten@lodderstedt.net  Tue Mar 30 22:13:00 2010
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+1

generally, why do we need other ways than headers for sending the 
authorization data? HTTP basic/digest authentication only use headers

> +1
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Eran Hammer-Lahav<eran@hueniverse.com>
> To: OAuth WG<oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the Authorization
> request header
> Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 21:20:40 -0700
>
> Since we have consensus that using signed requests is a more advance use
> case and will be used by more experienced developer, I would like to suggest
> we limit sending signed request parameters to the Authorization header (no
> URI query parameters or form-encoded body).
>
> This will not change the ability to send the oauth_token parameter in the
> query or body when using bearer tokens (as well as in the header). It will
> only apply to sending signed requests.
>
> The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter
> "invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything
> else is limited to the header.
>
> Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case.
>
> EHL
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>    



From jonathan_moore@comcast.com  Wed Mar 31 04:24:49 2010
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What about a use case where the signature will be generated by one =
component but the request will be redeemed by another?

For example, suppose there is a cross-domain JSONP call that requires =
authorization; in this case, I might have my client side code hit *my* =
origin server, obtain a signed URL, and then redeem it by hitting the =
JSONP resource. This has scaling advantages over having my origin proxy =
an OAuth request, and doesn't require me to have keys located on the =
client; I can keep them safely in my data centers.

In this case, sending a "ready to redeem" signed request using the query =
parameter mechanism simplifies the client-side code. Furthermore, in =
this use case (cross-domain script inclusion), the client doesn't have =
the means to set the Authorization header (it can only include a =
<script> element with a URL).

A similar use case would be if you wanted to provide signed redirects =
(similarly useful for cross-domain functionality); browsers aren't going =
to modify the redirect URL they get back, or add an Authorization header =
to it.

Jon
........
Jon Moore
Comcast Interactive Media



-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of Eran Hammer-Lahav
Sent: Wed 3/31/2010 12:20 AM
To: OAuth WG
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the =
Authorizationrequest header
=20
Since we have consensus that using signed requests is a more advance use
case and will be used by more experienced developer, I would like to =
suggest
we limit sending signed request parameters to the Authorization header =
(no
URI query parameters or form-encoded body).

This will not change the ability to send the oauth_token parameter in =
the
query or body when using bearer tokens (as well as in the header). It =
will
only apply to sending signed requests.

The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter
"invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything
else is limited to the header.

Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case.

EHL

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


From eran@hueniverse.com  Wed Mar 31 18:22:01 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2010 18:22:29 -0700
Thread-Topic: Draft progress update
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I'm making good progress working off David's draft and bringing text from
WRAP into it, as well as from OAuth 1.0a, and my token auth proposal. So fa=
r
it is largely in line with David's proposal and the majority of changes are
purely editorial.

The only significant change I have made (which is of course open to debate)
is renaming all the authorization flows parameters. I dropped the oauth_
prefix (no real need since these are purely OAuth endpoints, not protected
resources), and made most of the parameter names shorter. I am not done so
they are not consistent yet.

You can follow my progress (changes every few hours) at:

http://github.com/theRazorBlade/draft-ietf-oauth/raw/master/draft-ietf-oaut=
h
.txt

Please feel free to comment on anything you like or dislike. I will publish
the whole thing as an I-D once it is feature complete for the WG to discuss
before we promote this to a WG draft.

I hope to be done with the initial draft by middle of next week (I'll be
flying most of Fri-Sat so no progress over the weekend).

EHL


From mscurtescu@google.com  Wed Mar 31 20:37:39 2010
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On Wed, Mar 31, 2010 at 6:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
> The only significant change I have made (which is of course open to debate)
> is renaming all the authorization flows parameters. I dropped the oauth_
> prefix (no real need since these are purely OAuth endpoints, not protected
> resources), and made most of the parameter names shorter. I am not done so
> they are not consistent yet.

Having a common prefix for all parameters is quite important IMO. It
allows parties
to define and pass additional, non-standard, parameters. Also, quite
often parameters
are added to existing URLs, and a prefix helps prevent collisions.


Marius

From eran@hueniverse.com  Wed Mar 31 21:17:05 2010
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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: Marius Scurtescu <mscurtescu@google.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2010 21:17:32 -0700
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Hey Marius,

On 3/31/10 8:37 PM, "Marius Scurtescu" <mscurtescu@google.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Mar 31, 2010 at 6:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
> wrote:
>> The only significant change I have made (which is of course open to deba=
te)
>> is renaming all the authorization flows parameters. I dropped the oauth_
>> prefix (no real need since these are purely OAuth endpoints, not protect=
ed
>> resources), and made most of the parameter names shorter. I am not done =
so
>> they are not consistent yet.
>=20
> Having a common prefix for all parameters is quite important IMO. It
> allows parties
> to define and pass additional, non-standard, parameters.

Non-standard parameter hurt interoperability. The question is whether the
right approach is to add a prefix to the protocol parameters or to the
extension parameters (such as x_), or none.

What prevents a custom parameter to collide with a standard extension not
supported by the server or someone else's custom parameter? If we are
serious about parameter collision (which I doubt given past sentiments on
registries etc.), we should require all parameters to register unless they
have some special custom prefix.

In other word, adding the oauth_ prefix to the core parameters doesn't
really accomplish much, other than making requests longer. In the past,
people wanted to define extension parameters starting with oauth_ and we
didn't really reach consensus on whether to allow it or not. Then we played
with xoauth_ for a while, then went back and just allowed oauth_ for
extensions.

If we keep the oauth_ prefix, do we also require a registry for extensions?
Do we define another prefix? Do we create a registry for extension prefixes=
?
This gets bad really fast.

> Also, quite
> often parameters
> are added to existing URLs, and a prefix helps prevent collisions.

Extension parameters should never conflict with core parameter because we
know all the core parameters before we write custom ones...

This is only for the OAuth-specific endpoint (authorization endpoint), not
the protected resource endpoint in which we will still use oauth_token (the
only parameter added to protected resource requests).

What do you think?

EHL


From lshepard@facebook.com  Wed Mar 31 22:30:18 2010
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From: Luke Shepard <lshepard@facebook.com>
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At first, I had the same first reaction as Marius, but after reading this t=
hread, I agree with Eran. Two observations:

1/ OAuth endpoints are usually already namespaced as "oauth" - if there are=
 other endpoints that accept custom parameters, they can be defined elsewhe=
re. For example:

https://www.google.com/accounts/OAuthAuthorizeToken
https://api.login.yahoo.com/oauth/v2/request_auth
http://twitter.com/oauth/authorize

2/ We should fight to keep URLs short and leave out redundant information w=
here possible. We should leave out redundant information where possible.

Here are two sample URLs. The first is 12% shorter than the second.

http://facebook.com/oauth/authorize?mode=3Dweb_callback_access_request&clie=
nt_id=3D123456789&callback=3Dhttp://facebook.com/oauth/callback
http://facebook.com/oauth/authorize?oauth_mode=3Dweb_callback_access_reques=
t&oauth_client_id=3D123456789&oauth_callback=3Dhttp://facebook.com/oauth/ca=
llback



On Mar 31, 2010, at 9:17 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:

Hey Marius,

On 3/31/10 8:37 PM, "Marius Scurtescu" <mscurtescu@google.com<mailto:mscurt=
escu@google.com>> wrote:

On Wed, Mar 31, 2010 at 6:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com<mai=
lto:eran@hueniverse.com>>
wrote:
The only significant change I have made (which is of course open to debate)
is renaming all the authorization flows parameters. I dropped the oauth_
prefix (no real need since these are purely OAuth endpoints, not protected
resources), and made most of the parameter names shorter. I am not done so
they are not consistent yet.

Having a common prefix for all parameters is quite important IMO. It
allows parties
to define and pass additional, non-standard, parameters.

Non-standard parameter hurt interoperability. The question is whether the
right approach is to add a prefix to the protocol parameters or to the
extension parameters (such as x_), or none.

What prevents a custom parameter to collide with a standard extension not
supported by the server or someone else's custom parameter? If we are
serious about parameter collision (which I doubt given past sentiments on
registries etc.), we should require all parameters to register unless they
have some special custom prefix.

In other word, adding the oauth_ prefix to the core parameters doesn't
really accomplish much, other than making requests longer. In the past,
people wanted to define extension parameters starting with oauth_ and we
didn't really reach consensus on whether to allow it or not. Then we played
with xoauth_ for a while, then went back and just allowed oauth_ for
extensions.

If we keep the oauth_ prefix, do we also require a registry for extensions?
Do we define another prefix? Do we create a registry for extension prefixes=
?
This gets bad really fast.

Also, quite
often parameters
are added to existing URLs, and a prefix helps prevent collisions.

Extension parameters should never conflict with core parameter because we
know all the core parameters before we write custom ones...

This is only for the OAuth-specific endpoint (authorization endpoint), not
the protected resource endpoint in which we will still use oauth_token (the
only parameter added to protected resource requests).

What do you think?

EHL

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode:=
 space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">At first, I had the same f=
irst reaction as Marius, but after reading this thread, I agree with Eran. =
Two observations:<div><br></div><div>1/ OAuth endpoints are usually already=
 namespaced as "oauth" - if there are other endpoints that accept custom pa=
rameters, they can be defined elsewhere. For example:</div><div><br></div><=
div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 112, 0); font-f=
amily: monospace, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 16px; ">=
<a href=3D"https://www.google.com/accounts/OAuthAuthorizeToken">https://www=
.google.com/accounts/OAuthAuthorizeToken</a><br>https://api.login.yahoo.com=
/oauth/v2/request_auth<br>http://twitter.com/oauth/authorize<br></span></di=
v><div><br></div><div>2/ We should fight to keep URLs short and leave out r=
edundant information where possible. We should leave out redundant informat=
ion where possible.</div><div><br></div><div>Here are two sample URLs. The =
first is 12% shorter than the second.</div><div><br></div><div><font class=
=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"#007000" face=3D"monospace, Arial, sans-seri=
f" size=3D"3"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 13px; li=
ne-height: 16px;"><a href=3D"http://facebook.com/oauth/authorize?">http://f=
acebook.com/oauth/authorize?</a>mode=3Dweb_callback_access_request&amp;clie=
nt_id=3D123456789&amp;callback=3Dhttp://facebook.com/oauth/callback<br>http=
://facebook.com/oauth/authorize?oauth_mode=3Dweb_callback_access_request&am=
p;oauth_client_id=3D123456789&amp;oauth_callback=3Dhttp://facebook.com/oaut=
h/callback<br><br></span></font></div><div><div><br></div><div><font class=
=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"#666666" face=3D"monospace, helvetica, clean=
, sans-serif" size=3D"3"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-siz=
e: 13px; line-height: 13px; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"#00=
7000" face=3D"monospace, Arial, sans-serif"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span=
" style=3D"line-height: 16px;"><br></span></font></span></font></div></div>=
<div><div><div>On Mar 31, 2010, at 9:17 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:</div><=
br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>Hey M=
arius,<br><br>On 3/31/10 8:37 PM, "Marius Scurtescu" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
mscurtescu@google.com">mscurtescu@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br><blockqu=
ote type=3D"cite">On Wed, Mar 31, 2010 at 6:22 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:eran@hueniverse.com">eran@hueniverse.com</a>&gt;<br></block=
quote><blockquote type=3D"cite">wrote:<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">The only significant change I have made (wh=
ich is of course open to debate)<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">is renaming all the authorization fl=
ows parameters. I dropped the oauth_<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquo=
te type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">prefix (no real need since these=
 are purely OAuth endpoints, not protected<br></blockquote></blockquote><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">resources), and made most =
of the parameter names shorter. I am not done so<br></blockquote></blockquo=
te><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">they are not consist=
ent yet.<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><br></block=
quote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Having a common prefix for all parameters i=
s quite important IMO. It<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">allows =
parties<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">to define and pass additi=
onal, non-standard, parameters.<br></blockquote><br>Non-standard parameter =
hurt interoperability. The question is whether the<br>right approach is to =
add a prefix to the protocol parameters or to the<br>extension parameters (=
such as x_), or none.<br><br>What prevents a custom parameter to collide wi=
th a standard extension not<br>supported by the server or someone else's cu=
stom parameter? If we are<br>serious about parameter collision (which I dou=
bt given past sentiments on<br>registries etc.), we should require all para=
meters to register unless they<br>have some special custom prefix.<br><br>I=
n other word, adding the oauth_ prefix to the core parameters doesn't<br>re=
ally accomplish much, other than making requests longer. In the past,<br>pe=
ople wanted to define extension parameters starting with oauth_ and we<br>d=
idn't really reach consensus on whether to allow it or not. Then we played<=
br>with xoauth_ for a while, then went back and just allowed oauth_ for<br>=
extensions.<br><br>If we keep the oauth_ prefix, do we also require a regis=
try for extensions?<br>Do we define another prefix? Do we create a registry=
 for extension prefixes?<br>This gets bad really fast.<br><br><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite">Also, quite<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">often pa=
rameters<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">are added to existing UR=
Ls, and a prefix helps prevent collisions.<br></blockquote><br>Extension pa=
rameters should never conflict with core parameter because we<br>know all t=
he core parameters before we write custom ones...<br><br>This is only for t=
he OAuth-specific endpoint (authorization endpoint), not<br>the protected r=
esource endpoint in which we will still use oauth_token (the<br>only parame=
ter added to protected resource requests).<br><br>What do you think?<br><br=
>EHL<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>OAuth mailin=
g list<br><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br></div></blockquote></div><br></div></=
body></html>=

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