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From: Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net>
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2020 23:59:15 +1000
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To: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Cc: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] third party applications
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Thank everyone for your feedback.

So the abstract could look like this:

The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a*n* *third-party*
application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in RFC 6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.


And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this
framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.



On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:

> I agree. While the original motivations for OAuth were to support
> third-party apps, it's proven to be useful in many other kinds of
> situations as well, even when it's a "first-party" app but the OAuth server
> is operated by a different organization than the APIs. I don't think the
> abstract needs any qualification on this and would only confuse people
> further. Any clarifications of which situations are appropriate for using
> OAuth could be explored in a different section in the spec.
>
> Aaron Parecki
>
> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=
> 40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> I agree. OAuth works for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well.
>>
>> > On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net> wrote:
>> >
>> > Hi,
>> >
>> > Can "third-party" term be removed from the specification?
>> >
>> > The standard and associated best practices apply to other applications
>> that act on behalf of a resource owner, too (internal, "first-party" and
>> etc).
>> >
>> > Regards,
>> >
>> > Dima
>> >
>> > The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a third-party
>> >
>> >    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>> >    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>> >    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>> >    third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>> >    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>> >    Framework described in
>> > RFC 6749.
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > OAuth mailing list
>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thank everyone for your feedback.<div><br></div><div>So th=
e abstract could look like this:</div><div><br><div><pre style=3D"white-spa=
ce:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a<b>n</b><strike> <b>third-=
party</b>
</strike>   application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either=
 on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749" t=
arget=3D"_blank">RFC 6749</a>.</pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font=
-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D=
"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1em"><br></span></pre><pre style=3D=
"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:=
rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1em">And =
an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this framewor=
k works well and scenarios when it doesn&#39;t.</span></pre><pre style=3D"w=
hite-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rg=
b(0,0,0)"><br></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin=
-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div></div></pre></div></div><=
/div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">O=
n Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37 AM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@pa=
recki.com">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I agree. While the original mo=
tivations for OAuth were to support third-party apps, it&#39;s proven to be=
 useful in many other kinds of situations as well, even when it&#39;s a &qu=
ot;first-party&quot; app but the OAuth server is operated by a different or=
ganization than the APIs. I don&#39;t think the abstract needs any qualific=
ation on this and would only confuse people further. Any clarifications of =
which situations are appropriate for using OAuth could be explored in a dif=
ferent section in the spec.<div><br></div><div>Aaron Parecki</div></div><br=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, A=
ug 28, 2020 at 3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:=
40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc=
.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">I agree. OAuth works for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well. <br=
>
<br>
&gt; On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dima@p=
ostnikov.net" target=3D"_blank">dima@postnikov.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Hi,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Can &quot;third-party&quot; term be removed from the specification?<br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The standard and associated best practices apply to other applications=
 that act on behalf of a resource owner, too (internal, &quot;first-party&q=
uot; and etc).<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Dima<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a third-party<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, =
either on<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval i=
nteraction<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by al=
lowing the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 third-party application to obtain access on its own behal=
f.=C2=A0 This<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Author=
ization<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Framework described in <br>
&gt; RFC 6749.<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000064c37c05ae40ed8a--


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] third party applications
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Hello Dima,

Not exactly.

Change :

    or by allowing the third-party application

into:

or by allowing the application


Denis

> Thank everyone for your feedback.
>
> So the abstract could look like this:
>
> The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a*n**third-party*     application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>     behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>     between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>     third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>     specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>     Framework described inRFC 6749  <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.
> And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this 
> framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.
>
> On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com 
> <mailto:aaron@parecki.com>> wrote:
>
>     I agree. While the original motivations for OAuth were to support
>     third-party apps, it's proven to be useful in many other kinds of
>     situations as well, even when it's a "first-party" app but the
>     OAuth server is operated by a different organization than the
>     APIs. I don't think the abstract needs any qualification on this
>     and would only confuse people further. Any clarifications of which
>     situations are appropriate for using OAuth could be explored in a
>     different section in the spec.
>
>     Aaron Parecki
>
>     On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt
>     <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org
>     <mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>
>         I agree. OAuth works for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well.
>
>         > On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov
>         <dima@postnikov.net <mailto:dima@postnikov.net>> wrote:
>         >
>         > Hi,
>         >
>         > Can "third-party" term be removed from the specification?
>         >
>         > The standard and associated best practices apply to other
>         applications that act on behalf of a resource owner, too
>         (internal, "first-party" and etc).
>         >
>         > Regards,
>         >
>         > Dima
>         >
>         > The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a third-party
>         >
>         >    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service,
>         either on
>         >    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval
>         interaction
>         >    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by
>         allowing the
>         >    third-party application to obtain access on its own
>         behalf.  This
>         >    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0
>         Authorization
>         >    Framework described in
>         > RFC 6749.
>         > _______________________________________________
>         > OAuth mailing list
>         > OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>         > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         OAuth mailing list
>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth



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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Hello Dima,</font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Not exactly. <br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Change :<br>
      </font>
      <blockquote>
        <pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face="Arial">or by allowing the </font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">third-party</font> application</font></pre>
      </blockquote>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">into:</font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">
      <pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face="Arial">
</font><font face="Arial">        or by allowing the application</font></pre>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Denis</font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAEMK1ubU0tD37yz0mKuOOP5n5uQ5pjLdLgY1OJWHGNh-iGcScw@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">Thank everyone for your feedback.
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>So the abstract could look like this:</div>
        <div><br>
          <div>
            <pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a<b>n</b><strike> <b>third-party</b>
</strike>   application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">RFC 6749</a>.</pre>
            <pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1em">
</span></pre>
            <pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1em">And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.</span></pre>
            <pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
</pre>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37
          AM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href="mailto:aaron@parecki.com"
            moz-do-not-send="true">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir="ltr">I agree. While the original motivations for
            OAuth were to support third-party apps, it's proven to be
            useful in many other kinds of situations as well, even when
            it's a "first-party" app but the OAuth server is operated by
            a different organization than the APIs. I don't think the
            abstract needs any qualification on this and would only
            confuse people further. Any clarifications of which
            situations are appropriate for using OAuth could be explored
            in a different section in the spec.
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Aaron Parecki</div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at
              3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;torsten=<a
                href="mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org"
                target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
              0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
              rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I agree. OAuth works
              for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well. <br>
              <br>
              &gt; On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov &lt;<a
                href="mailto:dima@postnikov.net" target="_blank"
                moz-do-not-send="true">dima@postnikov.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Hi,<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Can "third-party" term be removed from the
              specification?<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; The standard and associated best practices apply to
              other applications that act on behalf of a resource owner,
              too (internal, "first-party" and etc).<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Regards,<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Dima<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a
              third-party<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt;    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP
              service, either on<br>
              &gt;    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an
              approval interaction<br>
              &gt;    between the resource owner and the HTTP service,
              or by allowing the<br>
              &gt;    third-party application to obtain access on its
              own behalf.  This<br>
              &gt;    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0
              Authorization<br>
              &gt;    Framework described in <br>
              &gt; RFC 6749.<br>
              &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
              &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
              &gt; <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
              &gt; <a
                href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
              <br>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              OAuth mailing list<br>
              <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
              <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
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Here is my proposal for the new section:

2.4. redirect_uri Management

The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth =
2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the =
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means to early detect =
attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, it makes client management more complex =
since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client =
policy.

This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses =
pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.

Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also =
useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and =
policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates =
containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could =
interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need =
for an additional registration step.

> On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here =
and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a =
dedicated section for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain =
exactly how and why to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In =
addition, I think we want to discuss that the AS might have its own =
restrictions on which redirect URIs an authenticated client might be =
able to use. For example, registering a client with a Redirect URI =
prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at runtime. All of =
these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting its =
authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policies =
should apply.
>=20
> =E2=80=94 Justin
>=20
>> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>   =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and =
authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the ability to =
authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=99=
m not positive of the intent.=20
>>>=20
>>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is =
authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, =
response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request =
authorization is confusing wording. I think your working is less =
confusing and still allows for the intent.=20
>>>=20
>>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he =
originally wrote the text in question.=20
>>=20
>> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>   =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the =
clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or pattern of =
allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to know =
what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to =
(erroneously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to =
check any other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. =
It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, =
but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that =
regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
>>>=20
>>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest, =
I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the =
draft would be better off without it.=20
>>>=20
>>=20
>> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as way =
to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the =
allowed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at =
registration time (might be manually).
>>=20
>> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking =
to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue =
with letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will =
give the client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the =
fly) and makes client management much easier since redirect URIs are the =
most volatile part of a client policy.=20
>>=20
>> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client =
identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of =
OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The =
(technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS =
compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain =
the permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation =
allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t =
contain OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any =
financial institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, =
to accept and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
>>=20
>> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
>> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential. =
Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication =
means then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the =
text of the regulation.=20
>> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the =
recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
>>=20
>> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.=20
>>=20
>> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand =
this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. =
What about moving it into a special section "redirect_uri management=E2=80=
=9D?
>>=20
>>>=20
>>=20
>=20


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From: Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 10:19:58 +1000
Message-ID: <CAEMK1ubKn73gfM34yswmuAHzmOneXF9aRQ7uRnJ3DnNz56nZLA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] third party applications
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Good point Denis, thanks

The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a*n* *third-party*
application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   *third-party* application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in RFC 6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.


And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this
framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.


On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 12:57 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:

> Hello Dima,
>
> Not exactly.
>
> Change :
>
> or by allowing the third-party application
>
> into:
>
>         or by allowing the application
>
>
> Denis
>
> Thank everyone for your feedback.
>
> So the abstract could look like this:
>
> The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a*n* *third-party*   application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>    third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>    Framework described in RFC 6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.
>
>  And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.
>
>
> On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>
>> I agree. While the original motivations for OAuth were to support
>> third-party apps, it's proven to be useful in many other kinds of
>> situations as well, even when it's a "first-party" app but the OAuth server
>> is operated by a different organization than the APIs. I don't think the
>> abstract needs any qualification on this and would only confuse people
>> further. Any clarifications of which situations are appropriate for using
>> OAuth could be explored in a different section in the spec.
>>
>> Aaron Parecki
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=
>> 40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I agree. OAuth works for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well.
>>>
>>> > On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > Hi,
>>> >
>>> > Can "third-party" term be removed from the specification?
>>> >
>>> > The standard and associated best practices apply to other applications
>>> that act on behalf of a resource owner, too (internal, "first-party" and
>>> etc).
>>> >
>>> > Regards,
>>> >
>>> > Dima
>>> >
>>> > The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a third-party
>>> >
>>> >    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>>> >    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>>> >    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>>> >    third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>>> >    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>>> >    Framework described in
>>> > RFC 6749.
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Good point Denis, thanks<div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"=
white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:r=
gb(0,0,0)">The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a<b>n</b><strike> =
<b>third-party</b>
</strike><span class=3D"gmail-im" style=3D"color:rgb(80,0,80)">   applicati=
on to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   <b><strike>third-party</strike></b> application to obtain access on its =
own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749" t=
arget=3D"_blank">RFC 6749</a>.</span></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wr=
ap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1em"><br></span></pre><pre s=
tyle=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1e=
m">And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this f=
ramework works well and scenarios when it doesn&#39;t.</span></pre></div></=
div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On=
 Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 12:57 AM Denis &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.ietf@free.f=
r">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Hello Dima,</font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Not exactly. <br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Change :<br>
      </font>
      <blockquote>
        <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;mar=
gin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"Arial">or by allowing the </=
font><font face=3D"Arial"><font face=3D"Arial">third-party</font> applicati=
on</font></pre>
      </blockquote>
    </div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">into:</font></div>
    <div>
      <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margi=
n-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"Arial">
</font><font face=3D"Arial">        or by allowing the application</font></=
pre>
    </div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Denis</font></div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">Thank everyone for your feedback.
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>So the abstract could look like this:</div>
        <div><br>
          <div>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework =
enables a<b>n</b><strike> <b>third-party</b>
</strike>   application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either=
 on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749" t=
arget=3D"_blank">RFC 6749</a>.</pre>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:1em">
</span></pre>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:1em">And an additional section is required to describe scen=
arios where this framework works well and scenarios when it doesn&#39;t.</s=
pan></pre>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"></pre>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37
          AM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=
=3D"_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"ltr">I agree. While the original motivations for
            OAuth were to support third-party apps, it&#39;s proven to be
            useful in many other kinds of situations as well, even when
            it&#39;s a &quot;first-party&quot; app but the OAuth server is =
operated by
            a different organization than the APIs. I don&#39;t think the
            abstract needs any qualification on this and would only
            confuse people further. Any clarifications of which
            situations are appropriate for using OAuth could be explored
            in a different section in the spec.
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Aaron Parecki</div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at
              3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:4=
0lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.=
ietf.org</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I agree. OAut=
h works
              for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well. <br>
              <br>
              &gt; On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:dima@postnikov.net" target=3D"_blank">dima@postnikov.net</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Hi,<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Can &quot;third-party&quot; term be removed from the
              specification?<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; The standard and associated best practices apply to
              other applications that act on behalf of a resource owner,
              too (internal, &quot;first-party&quot; and etc).<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Regards,<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Dima<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a
              third-party<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 application to obtain limited access to an =
HTTP
              service, either on<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating=
 an
              approval interaction<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 between the resource owner and the HTTP ser=
vice,
              or by allowing the<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 third-party application to obtain access on=
 its
              own behalf.=C2=A0 This<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 specification replaces and obsoletes the OA=
uth 2.0
              Authorization<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Framework described in <br>
              &gt; RFC 6749.<br>
              &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
              &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
              &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
              &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
oauth</a><br>
              <br>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              OAuth mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@iet=
f.org</a><br>
              <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 12:05:49 +0900
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
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Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a client
can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only when all
the following conditions are satisfied.

1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section
3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that
confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect
URIs.)
3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Section
3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section
5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)

In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749
authorization-code-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an
arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used,
existing specifications require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm not
sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri Management" is going to introduce rules
that conflict with existing specifications, it is better to list the
conflicts explicitly in the section.

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki


On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D
40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Here is my proposal for the new section:
>
> 2.4. redirect_uri Management
>
> The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth
> 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_ur=
i
> parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a
> particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonat=
e
> a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, i=
t
> makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically
> the most volatile part of a client policy.
>
> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses
> pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befor=
e
> the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with t=
he
> legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri value=
s
> not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more
> flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes
> client management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply
> restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI
> prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>
> Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also
> useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and
> policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates
> containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could
> interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need fo=
r
> an additional registration step.
>
> > On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
> >
> > I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here an=
d
> it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicated sec=
tion for
> redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and why to
> relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want to
> discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URI=
s
> an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a
> client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to
> vary at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client i=
s
> presenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine
> which policies should apply.
> >
> > =E2=80=94 Justin
> >
> >> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>   =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and
> authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the ability to
> authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=
=99m not positive of
> the intent.
> >>>
> >>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is
> authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes,
> response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization
> is confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still
> allows for the intent.
> >>>
> >>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he
> originally wrote the text in question.
> >>
> >> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>   =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the clien=
tID is managed
> externally, the association with a set or pattern of allowed redirect URI=
s
> is still important, and the AS will need to know what that is. I think th=
is
> example could lead an AS developer to (erroneously and dangerously)
> conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check any other values in a requ=
est,
> including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg does=
n=E2=80=99t
> alleviate that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change=
 things in
> that regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
> >>>
> >>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest,
> I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the dra=
ft
> would be better off without it.
> >>>
> >>
> >> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as way
> to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allowed
> redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration ti=
me
> (might be manually).
> >>
> >> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking to
> the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue with le=
tting the client
> set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the client more
> flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client
> management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile part of =
a
> client policy.
> >>
> >> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client
> identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of
> OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The
> (technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS
> compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain t=
he
> permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation
> allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t=
 contain
> OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial
> institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept
> and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
> >>
> >> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
> >> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential.
> Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication mean=
s
> then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of t=
he
> regulation.
> >> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the
> recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
> >>
> >> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
> >>
> >> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand t=
his
> potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. What abou=
t
> moving it into a special section "redirect_uri management=E2=80=9D?
> >>
> >>>
> >>
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--00000000000057ad9c05ae4bea3a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.=
0 and FAPI), a client can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without register=
ing it only when all the following conditions are satisfied.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>1. The client type of the client is &quot;confidential&quot;. (R=
FC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs=
.)</div><div>2. The flow is not &quot;implicit&quot;. (RFC 6749 Section 3.1=
.2.2 requires that confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type r=
egister redirect URIs.)</div><div>3. The authorization request is not an OI=
DC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match=
 a pre-registered one.)</div><div>4. The authorization request is not a FAP=
I request. (FAPI Part 1 Section 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs =
be pre-registered.)</div><div><br></div><div>In short, under existing speci=
fications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-code-flow requests from confidential=
 clients can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once =
OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifications require pre-registration of r=
edirect URIs. I&#39;m not sure but if PAR&#39;s &quot;redirect_uri Manageme=
nt&quot; is going to introduce rules that conflict with existing specificat=
ions, it is better to list the conflicts explicitly in the section.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Best Regards,</div><div>Takahiko Kawasaki</div><div><br><=
/div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_a=
ttr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf=
.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex">Here is my proposal for the new section:<br>
<br>
2.4. redirect_uri Management<br>
<br>
The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.=
1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri pa=
rameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a parti=
cular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonate a cli=
ent and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes=
 client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically the mos=
t volatile part of a client policy.<br>
<br>
This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses pu=
shed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before th=
e authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the l=
egit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values n=
ot previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexib=
ility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client =
management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restrict=
ion on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or=
 allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.<br>
<br>
Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also use=
ful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policie=
s are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containin=
g client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with=
 an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional=
 registration step.<br>
<br>
&gt; On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher=
@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here a=
nd it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicated se=
ction for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and w=
hy to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want t=
o discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URI=
s an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a =
client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to va=
ry at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client is pr=
esenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine whic=
h policies should apply.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =E2=80=94 Justin<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=B66: Does the AS really have &quot;the ability=
 to authenticate and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here =
is &quot;the ability to authenticate clients and validate client requests=
=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client i=
s authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, r=
esponse type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization is=
 confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still allows=
 for the intent. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;ll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I th=
ink he originally wrote the text in question. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate&quot; is f=
ine. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. =
Even if the clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or p=
attern of allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to=
 know what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to (err=
oneously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check an=
y other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s=
 important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, but removal of=
 DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that regard. Suggest removi=
ng example or reworking paragraph.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;m going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to =
be honest, I&#39;m not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thi=
nking the draft would be better off without it. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as =
way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allow=
ed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration t=
ime (might be manually).<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talkin=
g to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue with=
 letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the =
client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and mak=
es client management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile =
part of a client policy. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client=
 identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of OAut=
h). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The (technica=
l) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS compliant C=
A in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain the permission=
s (access to account information and/or payment initiation allowed) and the=
 identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t contain OAuth pol=
icy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial institution=
 in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept and process c=
alls from any licensed PSD2 clients.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:<br>
&gt;&gt; a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credenti=
al. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication me=
ans then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of=
 the regulation. <br>
&gt;&gt; b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the re=
commended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; PAR is a clean way to solve that problem. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other ha=
nd this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. Wha=
t about moving it into a special section &quot;redirect_uri management=E2=
=80=9D?<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000057ad9c05ae4bea3a--


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+1 to drop the "third party", there are valid first party use-cases.

On the subject, in first party cases the access may not be all that
"limited", I wonder if it should read more genericly "an application to
obtain access to an HTTP service"?

On Tue, Sep 1, 2020 at 5:20 PM Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net> wrote:

> Good point Denis, thanks
>
> The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a*n* *third-party*   application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>    *third-party* application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>    Framework described in RFC 6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.
>
>
> And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 12:57 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:
>
>> Hello Dima,
>>
>> Not exactly.
>>
>> Change :
>>
>> or by allowing the third-party application
>>
>> into:
>>
>>         or by allowing the application
>>
>>
>> Denis
>>
>> Thank everyone for your feedback.
>>
>> So the abstract could look like this:
>>
>> The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a*n* *third-party*   application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>>    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>>    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>>    third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>>    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>>    Framework described in RFC 6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.
>>
>>  And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I agree. While the original motivations for OAuth were to support
>>> third-party apps, it's proven to be useful in many other kinds of
>>> situations as well, even when it's a "first-party" app but the OAuth server
>>> is operated by a different organization than the APIs. I don't think the
>>> abstract needs any qualification on this and would only confuse people
>>> further. Any clarifications of which situations are appropriate for using
>>> OAuth could be explored in a different section in the spec.
>>>
>>> Aaron Parecki
>>>
>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=
>>> 40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I agree. OAuth works for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well.
>>>>
>>>> > On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > Hi,
>>>> >
>>>> > Can "third-party" term be removed from the specification?
>>>> >
>>>> > The standard and associated best practices apply to other
>>>> applications that act on behalf of a resource owner, too (internal,
>>>> "first-party" and etc).
>>>> >
>>>> > Regards,
>>>> >
>>>> > Dima
>>>> >
>>>> > The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a third-party
>>>> >
>>>> >    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>>>> >    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>>>> >    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>>>> >    third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>>>> >    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>>>> >    Framework described in
>>>> > RFC 6749.
>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--00000000000005c6fd05ae4ca639
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">+1 to drop the &quot;third party&quot;, there are valid fi=
rst party use-cases.<b>=C2=A0</b><div><br></div><div>On the subject, in fir=
st party cases the access may not be all that &quot;limited&quot;, I wonder=
 if it should read more genericly &quot;an application to obtain access to =
an HTTP service&quot;?</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 1, 2020 at 5:20 PM Dima Postnikov=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dima@postnikov.net">dima@postnikov.net</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"lt=
r">Good point Denis, thanks<div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"white-space:pr=
e-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">The=
 OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a<b>n</b><strike> <b>third-party=
</b>
</strike><span style=3D"color:rgb(80,0,80)">   application to obtain limite=
d access to an HTTP service, either on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   <b><strike>third-party</strike></b> application to obtain access on its =
own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749" t=
arget=3D"_blank">RFC 6749</a>.</span></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wr=
ap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1em"><br></span></pre><pre s=
tyle=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1e=
m">And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this f=
ramework works well and scenarios when it doesn&#39;t.</span></pre></div></=
div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On=
 Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 12:57 AM Denis &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.ietf@free.f=
r" target=3D"_blank">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Hello Dima,</font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Not exactly. <br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Change :<br>
      </font>
      <blockquote>
        <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;mar=
gin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"Arial">or by allowing the </=
font><font face=3D"Arial"><font face=3D"Arial">third-party</font> applicati=
on</font></pre>
      </blockquote>
    </div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">into:</font></div>
    <div>
      <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margi=
n-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"Arial">
</font><font face=3D"Arial">        or by allowing the application</font></=
pre>
    </div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div><font face=3D"Arial">Denis</font></div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">Thank everyone for your feedback.
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>So the abstract could look like this:</div>
        <div><br>
          <div>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework =
enables a<b>n</b><strike> <b>third-party</b>
</strike>   application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either=
 on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749" t=
arget=3D"_blank">RFC 6749</a>.</pre>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:1em">
</span></pre>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:1em">And an additional section is required to describe scen=
arios where this framework works well and scenarios when it doesn&#39;t.</s=
pan></pre>
            <pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px=
;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"></pre>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37
          AM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=
=3D"_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"ltr">I agree. While the original motivations for
            OAuth were to support third-party apps, it&#39;s proven to be
            useful in many other kinds of situations as well, even when
            it&#39;s a &quot;first-party&quot; app but the OAuth server is =
operated by
            a different organization than the APIs. I don&#39;t think the
            abstract needs any qualification on this and would only
            confuse people further. Any clarifications of which
            situations are appropriate for using OAuth could be explored
            in a different section in the spec.
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Aaron Parecki</div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at
              3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:4=
0lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.=
ietf.org</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I agree. OAut=
h works
              for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well. <br>
              <br>
              &gt; On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:dima@postnikov.net" target=3D"_blank">dima@postnikov.net</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Hi,<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Can &quot;third-party&quot; term be removed from the
              specification?<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; The standard and associated best practices apply to
              other applications that act on behalf of a resource owner,
              too (internal, &quot;first-party&quot; and etc).<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Regards,<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; Dima<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt; The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a
              third-party<br>
              &gt; <br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 application to obtain limited access to an =
HTTP
              service, either on<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating=
 an
              approval interaction<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 between the resource owner and the HTTP ser=
vice,
              or by allowing the<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 third-party application to obtain access on=
 its
              own behalf.=C2=A0 This<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 specification replaces and obsoletes the OA=
uth 2.0
              Authorization<br>
              &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Framework described in <br>
              &gt; RFC 6749.<br>
              &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
              &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
              &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
              &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
oauth</a><br>
              <br>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              OAuth mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@iet=
f.org</a><br>
              <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?
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Hi Ben,

This new thread, i.e."Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?" is used to 
discuss one of the topics raised in:
Last Call: <draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt> (JWT 
Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed Standard

Only the text relevant to this topic has been left.

The text that has been discussed and polished would perfectly fit into 
the Privacy Consideration section from RFC 7662.

Here it is again:

    Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets
    the AS know when the client is accessing the RS, which can also
    indicate when the user is using the client. If this implication is
    not acceptable, implementers can use other means to carry access
    token data, e.g. directly transferring the data needed by the RS
    within the access token.

Privacy considerations sections do not change the protocol but only 
provide some warnings. Warning the implementers is fine,
but warning the users and the clients should also be considered.

Thanks to your observations, I noticed that the sentence "thecall 
described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided"
is not appropriate.So I propose an additional text which is relevant for 
the users:

    Token introspection is an optional feature primarily intended for
    clients that are unable to support structured access tokens,
    including their validation. However, the use of this call allows an
    AS to track where and exactly when clients or users have indeed
    presented an issued access token to a RS.

    Some users or clients may be concerned that such a feature allows
    the AS to accurately trace them. If no Token introspection endpoint
    is published by an AS,
    users and clients can be confident that such tracing cannot happen.
    On the contrary, when an introspection_endpoint is published by an
    AS [RFC8414],
    users and clients have no way to know whether the RS will be allowed
    to use it, nor whether it will effectively use it.If these
    implications are not acceptable,
    users or clients should not use an AS that publishes an
    introspection_endpoint.

Denis

> Hi all,
>
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 09:58:11AM +0200, Denis wrote:
>> The last text that has been proposed on the list about this thread is
>> the following:
>>
>> Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets the AS know when the client is accessing the RS,
>> which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this implication is not acceptable, implementers can use
>> other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring the data needed by the RS within the access token.
>>
>> The concerns of the implementers have nothing to do with the concerns of
>> the Users. Such a text proposal has nothing to do with a "User consent".
>>
>> *Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662*
>>
>> Mike Jones wrote:
>>
>> I agree with Dick’s observation about the privacy implications of using
>> an Introspection Endpoint. That’s why it’s preferable to not use one at all
>>         and instead directly have the Resource understand the Access
>> Token. One way of doing this is the JWT Access Token spec. There are
>> plenty of others.
>>
>> I fully agree.
>>
>> RFC 7662 should have incorporated a more detailed content such as:
>>
>>        In OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the contents of tokens are opaque to
>> clients. However, the contents of tokens is not intended to be opaque to
>> RSs.
>>        Token introspection is an OPTIONAL feature of an AS described in
>> OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] intended for clients that are unable
>>        to support structured access tokens including their validation.
>> The use of this call allows an AS to track where and when its clients
>> have indeed
>>        presented an issued access token. As soon as the RS knows the
>> format of the access token, e.g. using structured token formats such as
>>        JWT [RFC7519], and is able to validate its security features, the
>> call described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided,
>> otherwise
>>        the AS will know exactly when the introspection call has been made
>> and thus be able to make sure which client has attempted perform an access
>>        to that RS and at which instant of time. As soon as this call is
>> supported by an AS, the client or the user have no way to prevent the RS
>> to use it.
>>
>> It might be useful to add it, e.g. using an RFC Errata.
> I do not believe this would be an appropriate usage of an Errata Report --
> it changes the meaning of the RFC away from what the WG intended at the
> time of publication.
>
> Use of tokens that are just opaque DB handles (along with some form of
> introspection) is desirable when a prominent threat is leakage of token
> contents from the browser.  We have had numerous discussions over the years
> of various ways in which information can leak from the browser, including
> history APIs, malicious javascript, and more.  While these threats are not
> always applicable in all deployment models, they are still present, just as
> the threats that you propose we defend against are not always of concern in
> all deployment models.  AFAICT, given the technologies currently available,
> there is not one universal solution that will address all concerns, and
> deployments will have to make a trade-off.  I think we need to acknowledge
> that there are different deployment models and that (for example) giving
> the user visibility into the token contents is not always desired, given
> the other risks that the current mechanisms for providing that visibility
> open up.
>
> -Ben
>
> P.S. your usage of the phrase "the User and his client" (below) suggests
> that you are still picturing the client as being local to the user, as is
> the case for, e.g., a TLS client or an IMAP client.  This is not the
> original model for an OAuth, where the client can just as well be a
> headless server in a cloud somewhere.
>


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p><font face="Arial">Hi Ben,</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">This new thread, i.e."</font><font
        face="Arial">Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?" is used to
        discuss one of the topics raised in: <br>
        Last Call:
        &lt;draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt&gt; (JWT
        Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed Standard</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Only the text relevant to this topic has been
        left.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">The text that has been discussed and polished
        would perfectly fit into the Privacy Consideration section from
        RFC 7662.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Here it is again:</font></p>
    <blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""><font face="Arial">Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets the AS know when the client is accessing the RS, 
which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this implication is not acceptable, implementers can use 
other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring the data needed by the RS within the access token.</font></pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p>P<font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">rivacy considerations
          sections do not change the protocol but only provide some
          warnings. Warning the implementers is fine, <br>
          but warning the users and the clients should also be
          considered.</font></font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Thanks to your observations, I noticed that
        the sentence "</font><font face="Arial">the</font><font
        face="Arial"> call described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662]
        should be avoided" <br>
        is not appropriate.</font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">
          So I propose an additional text which is relevant for the
          users:</font></font></p>
    <blockquote>
      <pre><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA" lang="EN-US">Token introspection is an optional feature primarily intended for clients that are unable to support structured access tokens, including their validation. 
However, the use of this call allows an AS to track where and exactly when clients or users have indeed presented an issued access token to a RS. </span>
<span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA" lang="EN-US"></span></pre>
      <span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US">Some users or clients may be concerned that such a
        feature allows the AS to accurately trace them. If no Token
        introspection endpoint is published by an AS, </span><span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US"><br>
        users and clients can be confident that such tracing cannot
        happen. On the contrary, when an i</span><span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
          lang="EN-US">ntrospection_</span></span><span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
          lang="EN-US">endpoint is published by an AS</span> [RFC8414],
        <br>
        users and clients have </span><span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US">no way to know whether the RS
        will be allowed to use it, nor whether it will effectively use
        it.</span><font face="Arial"> If these implications are not
        acceptable, <br>
        users or clients should not use an AS that publishes </font><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US">an i</span><span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
          lang="EN-US">ntrospection_</span></span><span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
        lang="EN-US"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
          lang="EN-US">endpoint.</span></span><br>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <w:WordDocument>
  <w:View>Normal</w:View>
  <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
  <w:HyphenationZone>21</w:HyphenationZone>
  <w:DoNotOptimizeForBrowser/>
 </w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--></font></font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Denis</font></p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:20200831224753.GP16914@kduck.mit.edu">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Hi all,

On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 09:58:11AM +0200, Denis wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">The last text that has been proposed on the list about this thread is 
the following:

Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets the AS know when the client is accessing the RS, 
which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this implication is not acceptable, implementers can use 
other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring the data needed by the RS within the access token.

The concerns of the implementers have nothing to do with the concerns of 
the Users. Such a text proposal has nothing to do with a "User consent".

*Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662*

Mike Jones wrote:

I agree with Dick’s observation about the privacy implications of using 
an Introspection Endpoint. That’s why it’s preferable to not use one at all
       and instead directly have the Resource understand the Access 
Token. One way of doing this is the JWT Access Token spec. There are 
plenty of others.

I fully agree.

RFC 7662 should have incorporated a more detailed content such as:

      In OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the contents of tokens are opaque to 
clients. However, the contents of tokens is not intended to be opaque to 
RSs.
      Token introspection is an OPTIONAL feature of an AS described in 
OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] intended for clients that are unable
      to support structured access tokens including their validation. 
The use of this call allows an AS to track where and when its clients 
have indeed
      presented an issued access token. As soon as the RS knows the 
format of the access token, e.g. using structured token formats such as
      JWT [RFC7519], and is able to validate its security features, the 
call described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided, 
otherwise
      the AS will know exactly when the introspection call has been made 
and thus be able to make sure which client has attempted perform an access
      to that RS and at which instant of time. As soon as this call is 
supported by an AS, the client or the user have no way to prevent the RS 
to use it.

It might be useful to add it, e.g. using an RFC Errata.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
I do not believe this would be an appropriate usage of an Errata Report --
it changes the meaning of the RFC away from what the WG intended at the
time of publication.

Use of tokens that are just opaque DB handles (along with some form of
introspection) is desirable when a prominent threat is leakage of token
contents from the browser.  We have had numerous discussions over the years
of various ways in which information can leak from the browser, including
history APIs, malicious javascript, and more.  While these threats are not
always applicable in all deployment models, they are still present, just as
the threats that you propose we defend against are not always of concern in
all deployment models.  AFAICT, given the technologies currently available,
there is not one universal solution that will address all concerns, and
deployments will have to make a trade-off.  I think we need to acknowledge
that there are different deployment models and that (for example) giving
the user visibility into the token contents is not always desired, given
the other risks that the current mechanisms for providing that visibility
open up.

-Ben

P.S. your usage of the phrase "the User and his client" (below) suggests
that you are still picturing the client as being local to the user, as is
the case for, e.g., a TLS client or an IMAP client.  This is not the
original model for an OAuth, where the client can just as well be a
headless server in a cloud somewhere.

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------2960049F0F56B3468227F368--


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> On 2. Sep 2020, at 05:58, William Denniss =
<wdenniss=3D40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> +1 to drop the "third party", there are valid first party use-cases.=20=

>=20
> On the subject, in first party cases the access may not be all that =
"limited", I wonder if it should read more genericly "an application to =
obtain access to an HTTP service"?

I suggest to stick with =E2=80=9Climited=E2=80=9D since privilege =
restriction is always a good idea.=20

>=20
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2020 at 5:20 PM Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net> =
wrote:
> Good point Denis, thanks
>=20
> The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables an third-party
>    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
>    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
>   =20
> third-party
>  application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>    Framework described in=20
> RFC 6749.
>=20
> And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where this =
framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.
>=20
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 12:57 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:
> Hello Dima,
>=20
> Not exactly.=20
>=20
> Change :
>  or by allowing the third-party application
> into:
>=20
>         or by allowing the application
>=20
> Denis
>=20
>> Thank everyone for your feedback.
>>=20
>> So the abstract could look like this:
>>=20
>> The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables an third-party
>>    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
>>    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval =
interaction
>>    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing =
the
>>    third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
>>    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>>    Framework described in=20
>> RFC 6749.
>>=20
>> And an additional section is required to describe scenarios where =
this framework works well and scenarios when it doesn't.
>>=20
>> On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 2:37 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> =
wrote:
>> I agree. While the original motivations for OAuth were to support =
third-party apps, it's proven to be useful in many other kinds of =
situations as well, even when it's a "first-party" app but the OAuth =
server is operated by a different organization than the APIs. I don't =
think the abstract needs any qualification on this and would only =
confuse people further. Any clarifications of which situations are =
appropriate for using OAuth could be explored in a different section in =
the spec.
>>=20
>> Aaron Parecki
>>=20
>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 3:02 AM Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten=3D40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>> I agree. OAuth works for 3rd as well as 1st parties as well.=20
>>=20
>> > On 28. Aug 2020, at 05:26, Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net> =
wrote:
>> >=20
>> > Hi,
>> >=20
>> > Can "third-party" term be removed from the specification?
>> >=20
>> > The standard and associated best practices apply to other =
applications that act on behalf of a resource owner, too (internal, =
"first-party" and etc).
>> >=20
>> > Regards,
>> >=20
>> > Dima
>> >=20
>> > The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a third-party
>> >=20
>> >    application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either =
on
>> >    behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval =
interaction
>> >    between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing =
the
>> >    third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.  =
This
>> >    specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>> >    Framework described in=20
>> > RFC 6749.
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > OAuth mailing list
>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>>=20
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
References: <CH2PR00MB0678DA2BC7234C2AC1CE784DF5541@CH2PR00MB0678.namprd00.prod.outlook.com> <412A63AD-DDE1-4BFE-8234-5A721A0ED88D@lodderstedt.net> <D68FCD40-7365-446A-9F64-2BB59C11B7AE@mit.edu> <CAD9ie-uqeM5jwQKuvO+X4NC5oXZkoLrRu1NWC2rrE4CD=ypa+g@mail.gmail.com> <08D01F36-367B-4F23-9602-9C2A2AE49DA3@mit.edu> <CAD9ie-s+MmtFHRNzym74cHBcBxu-yKCSH+r898TJ_dtmPDMK2Q@mail.gmail.com> <65a7f2c0-c7e3-5c67-1be6-1dfb2b77779e@free.fr> <20200831224753.GP16914@kduck.mit.edu> <34dcadf9-521f-60ba-a28c-3faab4428254@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?
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I=E2=80=99m not sure that adding this amount of text to the privacy =
considerations section is appropriate for an errata. If we wanted to do =
this, I believe we=E2=80=99d need to do a new revision of 7662.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On Sep 2, 2020, at 4:39 AM, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:
>=20
> Hi Ben,
>=20
> This new thread, i.e."Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?" is used to =
discuss one of the topics raised in:=20
> Last Call: <draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt> (JWT =
Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed Standard
>=20
> Only the text relevant to this topic has been left.
>=20
> The text that has been discussed and polished would perfectly fit into =
the Privacy Consideration section from RFC 7662.
>=20
> Here it is again:
>=20
> Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets =
the AS know when the client is accessing the RS,=20
> which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this =
implication is not acceptable, implementers can use=20
> other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring the =
data needed by the RS within the access token.
> Privacy considerations sections do not change the protocol but only =
provide some warnings. Warning the implementers is fine,=20
> but warning the users and the clients should also be considered.
>=20
> Thanks to your observations, I noticed that the sentence "the call =
described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided"=20
> is not appropriate. So I propose an additional text which is relevant =
for the users:
>=20
> Token introspection is an optional feature primarily intended for =
clients that are unable to support structured access tokens, including =
their validation.=20
> However, the use of this call allows an AS to track where and exactly =
when clients or users have indeed presented an issued access token to a =
RS.=20
> Some users or clients may be concerned that such a feature allows the =
AS to accurately trace them. If no Token introspection endpoint is =
published by an AS,=20
> users and clients can be confident that such tracing cannot happen. On =
the contrary, when an introspection_endpoint is published by an AS =
[RFC8414],=20
> users and clients have no way to know whether the RS will be allowed =
to use it, nor whether it will effectively use it. If these implications =
are not acceptable,=20
> users or clients should not use an AS that publishes an =
introspection_endpoint.
> Denis
>=20
>> Hi all,
>>=20
>> On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 09:58:11AM +0200, Denis wrote:
>>> The last text that has been proposed on the list about this thread =
is=20
>>> the following:
>>>=20
>>> Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets =
the AS know when the client is accessing the RS,=20
>>> which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this =
implication is not acceptable, implementers can use=20
>>> other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring =
the data needed by the RS within the access token.
>>>=20
>>> The concerns of the implementers have nothing to do with the =
concerns of=20
>>> the Users. Such a text proposal has nothing to do with a "User =
consent".
>>>=20
>>> *Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662*
>>>=20
>>> Mike Jones wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I agree with Dick=E2=80=99s observation about the privacy =
implications of using=20
>>> an Introspection Endpoint. That=E2=80=99s why it=E2=80=99s =
preferable to not use one at all
>>>        and instead directly have the Resource understand the Access=20=

>>> Token. One way of doing this is the JWT Access Token spec. There are=20=

>>> plenty of others.
>>>=20
>>> I fully agree.
>>>=20
>>> RFC 7662 should have incorporated a more detailed content such as:
>>>=20
>>>       In OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the contents of tokens are opaque to=20=

>>> clients. However, the contents of tokens is not intended to be =
opaque to=20
>>> RSs.
>>>       Token introspection is an OPTIONAL feature of an AS described =
in=20
>>> OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] intended for clients that are unable
>>>       to support structured access tokens including their =
validation.=20
>>> The use of this call allows an AS to track where and when its =
clients=20
>>> have indeed
>>>       presented an issued access token. As soon as the RS knows the=20=

>>> format of the access token, e.g. using structured token formats such =
as
>>>       JWT [RFC7519], and is able to validate its security features, =
the=20
>>> call described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided,=20=

>>> otherwise
>>>       the AS will know exactly when the introspection call has been =
made=20
>>> and thus be able to make sure which client has attempted perform an =
access
>>>       to that RS and at which instant of time. As soon as this call =
is=20
>>> supported by an AS, the client or the user have no way to prevent =
the RS=20
>>> to use it.
>>>=20
>>> It might be useful to add it, e.g. using an RFC Errata.
>> I do not believe this would be an appropriate usage of an Errata =
Report --
>> it changes the meaning of the RFC away from what the WG intended at =
the
>> time of publication.
>>=20
>> Use of tokens that are just opaque DB handles (along with some form =
of
>> introspection) is desirable when a prominent threat is leakage of =
token
>> contents from the browser.  We have had numerous discussions over the =
years
>> of various ways in which information can leak from the browser, =
including
>> history APIs, malicious javascript, and more.  While these threats =
are not
>> always applicable in all deployment models, they are still present, =
just as
>> the threats that you propose we defend against are not always of =
concern in
>> all deployment models.  AFAICT, given the technologies currently =
available,
>> there is not one universal solution that will address all concerns, =
and
>> deployments will have to make a trade-off.  I think we need to =
acknowledge
>> that there are different deployment models and that (for example) =
giving
>> the user visibility into the token contents is not always desired, =
given
>> the other risks that the current mechanisms for providing that =
visibility
>> open up.
>>=20
>> -Ben
>>=20
>> P.S. your usage of the phrase "the User and his client" (below) =
suggests
>> that you are still picturing the client as being local to the user, =
as is
>> the case for, e.g., a TLS client or an IMAP client.  This is not the
>> original model for an OAuth, where the client can just as well be a
>> headless server in a cloud somewhere.
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">I=E2=80=
=99m not sure that adding this amount of text to the privacy =
considerations section is appropriate for an errata. If we wanted to do =
this, I believe we=E2=80=99d need to do a new revision of 7662.<div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 =
Justin<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Sep 2, 2020, at 4:39 AM, Denis &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr" class=3D"">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D"">
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D"">
 =20
  <div class=3D""><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D"">Hi =
Ben,</font></p><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D"">This new =
thread, i.e."</font><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D"">Towards an RFC =
Errata to RFC 7662 ?" is used to
        discuss one of the topics raised in: <br class=3D"">
        Last Call:
        &lt;draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt&gt; (JWT
        Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed =
Standard</font></p><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D"">Only =
the text relevant to this topic has been
        left.</font></p><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D"">The =
text that has been discussed and polished
        would perfectly fit into the Privacy Consideration section from
        RFC 7662.</font></p><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" =
class=3D"">Here it is again:</font></p>
    <blockquote class=3D"">
      <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" wrap=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" =
class=3D"">Implementers should be aware that a token introspection =
request lets the AS know when the client is accessing the RS,=20
which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this =
implication is not acceptable, implementers can use=20
other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring the =
data needed by the RS within the access token.</font></pre>
    </blockquote><p class=3D"">P<font face=3D"Arial" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Arial" class=3D"">rivacy considerations
          sections do not change the protocol but only provide some
          warnings. Warning the implementers is fine, <br class=3D"">
          but warning the users and the clients should also be
          considered.</font></font></p><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" =
class=3D"">Thanks to your observations, I noticed that
        the sentence "</font><font face=3D"Arial" =
class=3D"">the</font><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D""> call described in =
OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662]
        should be avoided" <br class=3D"">
        is not appropriate.</font><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Arial" class=3D"">
          So I propose an additional text which is relevant for the
          users:</font></font></p>
    <blockquote class=3D"">
      <pre class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:
AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">Token introspection is an optional =
feature primarily intended for clients that are unable to support =
structured access tokens, including their validation.=20
However, the use of this call allows an AS to track where and exactly =
when clients or users have indeed presented an issued access token to a =
RS. </span>
<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:=

&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:
AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""></span></pre>
      <span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">Some users or clients may be =
concerned that such a
        feature allows the AS to accurately trace them. If no Token
        introspection endpoint is published by an AS, </span><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><br class=3D"">
        users and clients can be confident that such tracing cannot
        happen. On the contrary, when an i</span><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">ntrospection_</span></span><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">endpoint is published by an =
AS</span> [RFC8414],
        <br class=3D"">
        users and clients have </span><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">no way to know whether the RS
        will be allowed to use it, nor whether it will effectively use
        it.</span><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D""> If these implications =
are not
        acceptable, <br class=3D"">
        users or clients should not use an AS that publishes =
</font><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">an i</span><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">ntrospection_</span></span><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New
=
Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langu=
age:AR-SA" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">endpoint.</span></span><br =
class=3D"">
    </blockquote><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Arial" class=3D""><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <w:WordDocument>
  <w:View>Normal</w:View>
  <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
  <w:HyphenationZone>21</w:HyphenationZone>
  <w:DoNotOptimizeForBrowser/>
 </w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--></font></font></p><p class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" =
class=3D"">Denis</font></p>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" =
cite=3D"mid:20200831224753.GP16914@kduck.mit.edu" class=3D"">
      <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" wrap=3D"">Hi all,

On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 09:58:11AM +0200, Denis wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
        <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" wrap=3D"">The last text that has =
been proposed on the list about this thread is=20
the following:

Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets the =
AS know when the client is accessing the RS,=20
which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this =
implication is not acceptable, implementers can use=20
other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring the =
data needed by the RS within the access token.

The concerns of the implementers have nothing to do with the concerns of=20=

the Users. Such a text proposal has nothing to do with a "User consent".

*Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662*

Mike Jones wrote:

I agree with Dick=E2=80=99s observation about the privacy implications =
of using=20
an Introspection Endpoint. That=E2=80=99s why it=E2=80=99s preferable to =
not use one at all
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and instead directly have the Resource =
understand the Access=20
Token. One way of doing this is the JWT Access Token spec. There are=20
plenty of others.

I fully agree.

RFC 7662 should have incorporated a more detailed content such as:

 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the contents of tokens =
are opaque to=20
clients. However, the contents of tokens is not intended to be opaque to=20=

RSs.
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Token introspection is an OPTIONAL feature of =
an AS described in=20
OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] intended for clients that are unable
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to support structured access tokens including =
their validation.=20
The use of this call allows an AS to track where and when its clients=20
have indeed
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; presented an issued access token. As soon as =
the RS knows the=20
format of the access token, e.g. using structured token formats such as
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; JWT [RFC7519], and is able to validate its =
security features, the=20
call described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided,=20
otherwise
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the AS will know exactly when the =
introspection call has been made=20
and thus be able to make sure which client has attempted perform an =
access
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to that RS and at which instant of time. As =
soon as this call is=20
supported by an AS, the client or the user have no way to prevent the RS=20=

to use it.

It might be useful to add it, e.g. using an RFC Errata.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" wrap=3D"">I do not believe this would =
be an appropriate usage of an Errata Report --
it changes the meaning of the RFC away from what the WG intended at the
time of publication.

Use of tokens that are just opaque DB handles (along with some form of
introspection) is desirable when a prominent threat is leakage of token
contents from the browser.  We have had numerous discussions over the =
years
of various ways in which information can leak from the browser, =
including
history APIs, malicious javascript, and more.  While these threats are =
not
always applicable in all deployment models, they are still present, just =
as
the threats that you propose we defend against are not always of concern =
in
all deployment models.  AFAICT, given the technologies currently =
available,
there is not one universal solution that will address all concerns, and
deployments will have to make a trade-off.  I think we need to =
acknowledge
that there are different deployment models and that (for example) giving
the user visibility into the token contents is not always desired, given
the other risks that the current mechanisms for providing that =
visibility
open up.

-Ben

P.S. your usage of the phrase "the User and his client" (below) suggests
that you are still picturing the client as being local to the user, as =
is
the case for, e.g., a TLS client or an IMAP client.  This is not the
original model for an OAuth, where the client can just as well be a
headless server in a cloud somewhere.

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br class=3D"">
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">OAuth =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 10:09:21 -0400
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Cc: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
To: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
References: <7C0FD285-F677-4501-B2FB-9431A59855F6@mit.edu> <CA+k3eCRsBTvdhyzBOETxWLd6PJ61B2W4yY5QHv196amDFq7gnQ@mail.gmail.com> <B86967B1-3FA1-4ADA-BF9B-D34C693617C7@lodderstedt.net> <03845E0A-3563-4FF5-A3F9-318A1C928B89@mit.edu> <61CD8CC7-D16F-4D2A-A43E-2C80DC5B565A@lodderstedt.net> <CAHdPCmMxxXx-sc2wRSV4JXG4m6zqGwK+J_UgWdBh7jipqXA5fQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
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The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the =
stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. =
This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. =
That said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to =
Torsten=E2=80=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t hurt:

2.4. Management of redirect_uri

While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered =
redirect_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its =
own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client =
at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri =
parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a =
particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to =
impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As =
a downside, it makes client management more complex since the redirect =
URI is typically the most volatile part of a client policy.

This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses =
pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.

I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside =
of here. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem =
to fit, to me. It=E2=80=99s not the end of the world if it stays here =
though as it=E2=80=99s a decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy".

The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful =
in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies =
are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates =
containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could =
interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need =
for an additional registration step.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a =
client can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only =
when all the following conditions are satisfied.
>=20
> 1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section =
3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
> 2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that =
confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect =
URIs.)
> 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 =
Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
> 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 =
Section 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)
>=20
> In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 =
authorization-code-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an =
arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is =
used, existing specifications require pre-registration of redirect URIs. =
I'm not sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri Management" is going to =
introduce rules that conflict with existing specifications, it is better =
to list the conflicts explicitly in the section.
>=20
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten=3D40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org =
<mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
> Here is my proposal for the new section:
>=20
> 2.4. redirect_uri Management
>=20
> The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as =
OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the =
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means to early detect =
attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, it makes client management more complex =
since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client =
policy.
>=20
> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client =
uses pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.
>=20
> Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is =
also useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials =
and policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client =
certifiates containing client permissions. Such an externally managed =
client could interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party =
without the need for an additional registration step.
>=20
> > On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu =
<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> >=20
> > I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here =
and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a =
dedicated section for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain =
exactly how and why to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In =
addition, I think we want to discuss that the AS might have its own =
restrictions on which redirect URIs an authenticated client might be =
able to use. For example, registering a client with a Redirect URI =
prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at runtime. All of =
these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting its =
authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policies =
should apply.
> >=20
> > =E2=80=94 Justin
> >=20
> >> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten@lodderstedt.net <mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
> >>=20
> >>=20
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>>   =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate =
and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the =
ability to authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, =
but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent.=20
> >>>=20
> >>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is =
authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, =
response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request =
authorization is confusing wording. I think your working is less =
confusing and still allows for the intent.=20
> >>>=20
> >>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he =
originally wrote the text in question.=20
> >>=20
> >> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.=20=

> >>=20
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>>   =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the =
clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or pattern of =
allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to know =
what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to =
(erroneously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to =
check any other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. =
It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, =
but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that =
regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
> >>>=20
> >>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be =
honest, I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards =
thinking the draft would be better off without it.=20
> >>>=20
> >>=20
> >> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as =
way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the =
allowed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at =
registration time (might be manually).
> >>=20
> >> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking =
to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue =
with letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will =
give the client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the =
fly) and makes client management much easier since redirect URIs are the =
most volatile part of a client policy.=20
> >>=20
> >> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client =
identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of =
OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The =
(technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS =
compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain =
the permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation =
allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t =
contain OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any =
financial institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, =
to accept and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
> >>=20
> >> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
> >> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as =
credential. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client =
authentication means then an initial access token. Beside that, it would =
violate the text of the regulation.=20
> >> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the =
recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
> >>=20
> >> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.=20
> >>=20
> >> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other =
hand this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at =
all. What about moving it into a special section "redirect_uri =
management=E2=80=9D?
> >>=20
> >>>=20
> >>=20
> >=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">The =
real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the =
stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. =
This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. =
That said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to =
Torsten=E2=80=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t hurt:<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; =
padding: 0px;" class=3D""><div class=3D"">2.4. Management =
of&nbsp;redirect_uri<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">While OAuth 2.0 =
[RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri values in =
certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own matching semantics =
to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the authorization =
endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as =
well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match =
the redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means to early detect =
attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, it makes client management more complex =
since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client =
policy.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">This requirement MAY be relaxed by =
the AS if a confidential client uses pushed authorization requests since =
the AS authenticates the client before the authorization process starts =
and that way ensures it interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY =
allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values not previously =
registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. =
to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client =
management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply =
restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain =
URI prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></blockquote>I also feel like this =
paragraph belongs in a different section outside of here. I=E2=80=99m =
not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to fit, to me. It=E2=80=99=
s not the end of the world if it stays here though as it=E2=80=99s a =
decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy".<br class=3D""><blockquote =
style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">The aibility to set up transaction specific =
redirect URIs is also useful in situations where client ids and =
correspoding credentials and policies are managed by a trusted 3rd =
party, e.g. via client certifiates containing client permissions. Such =
an externally managed client could interact with an AS trusting the =
respective 3rd party without the need for an additional registration =
step.</div></blockquote><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 Justin<br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:taka@authlete.com" class=3D"">taka@authlete.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Under existing =
specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a client can choose =
an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only when all the =
following conditions are satisfied.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">1. The client type of the client is =
"confidential". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that public clients =
register redirect URIs.)</div><div class=3D"">2. The flow is not =
"implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that confidential clients =
utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect URIs.)</div><div =
class=3D"">3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC =
Core 1.0 Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a =
pre-registered one.)</div><div class=3D"">4. The authorization request =
is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that =
redirect URIs be pre-registered.)</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In short, under existing =
specifications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-code-flow requests from =
confidential clients can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without =
registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifications =
require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm not sure but if PAR's =
"redirect_uri Management" is going to introduce rules that conflict with =
existing specifications, it is better to list the conflicts explicitly =
in the section.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Best Regards,</div><div class=3D"">Takahiko =
Kawasaki</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt =
&lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org" =
class=3D"">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Here is my proposal for the new =
section:<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
2.4. redirect_uri Management<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth =
2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the =
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means to early detect =
attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, it makes client management more complex =
since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client =
policy.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses =
pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also =
useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and =
policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates =
containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could =
interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need =
for an additional registration step.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&gt; On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"">
&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt; I completely agree with the utility of the function in question =
here and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a =
dedicated section for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain =
exactly how and why to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In =
addition, I think we want to discuss that the AS might have its own =
restrictions on which redirect URIs an authenticated client might be =
able to use. For example, registering a client with a Redirect URI =
prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at runtime. All of =
these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting its =
authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policies =
should apply.<br class=3D"">
&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt; =E2=80=94 Justin<br class=3D"">
&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp; &nbsp;=C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability =
to authenticate and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean =
here is "the ability to authenticate clients and validate client =
requests=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent. <br =
class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a =
client is authorized to make a particular authorization request =
(specific scopes, response type, etc.). But checking authorization to =
request authorization is confusing wording. I think your working is less =
confusing and still allows for the intent. <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I =
think he originally wrote the text in question. <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is =
fine. <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp; &nbsp;=C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this =
example. Even if the clientID is managed externally, the association =
with a set or pattern of allowed redirect URIs is still important, and =
the AS will need to know what that is. I think this example could lead =
an AS developer to (erroneously and dangerously) conclude that they =
don=E2=80=99t have to check any other values in a request, including =
scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t=
 alleviate that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really =
change things in that regard. Suggest removing example or reworking =
paragraph.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to =
be honest, I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards =
thinking the draft would be better off without it. <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves =
as way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the =
allowed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at =
registration time (might be manually).<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is =
talking to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an =
issue with letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This =
will give the client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on =
the fly) and makes client management much easier since redirect URIs are =
the most volatile part of a client policy. <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where =
client identities are managed by external entities (even without any =
idea of OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka =
PSD2). The (technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted =
by an eIDAS compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those =
certificates contain the permissions (access to account information =
and/or payment initiation allowed) and the identity (member state =
specific). But they don=E2=80=99t contain OAuth policy values. =
Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial institution in the =
EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept and process calls =
from any licensed PSD2 clients.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:<br =
class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as =
credential. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client =
authentication means then an initial access token. Beside that, it would =
violate the text of the regulation. <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the =
recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; PAR is a clean way to solve that problem. <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other =
hand this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at =
all. What about moving it into a special section "redirect_uri =
management=E2=80=9D?<br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt; <br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></div></body></html>=

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From: Jeff Craig <jeffcraig@google.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 09:32:52 -0500
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To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: William Denniss <wdenniss=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] third party applications
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On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:53 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D
40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> > On 2. Sep 2020, at 05:58, William Denniss <wdenniss=3D
> 40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> > On the subject, in first party cases the access may not be all that
> "limited", I wonder if it should read more genericly "an application to
> obtain access to an HTTP service"?
>
> I suggest to stick with =E2=80=9Climited=E2=80=9D since privilege restric=
tion is always a
> good idea.
>

I'm inclined to agree, scopes are a key part of the OAuth model, and while
nothing precludes a "full account access" scope, I do think that the idea
of privilege restriction is worth infusing the document with.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:53 AM Torsten Lodder=
stedt &lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org">40l=
odderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; On 2. Sep 2020, at 05:58, William Denniss &lt;wdenniss=3D<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40google.com@dmarc.ietf=
.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; On the subject, in first party cases the access may not be all that &q=
uot;limited&quot;, I wonder if it should read more genericly &quot;an appli=
cation to obtain access to an HTTP service&quot;?<br>
<br>
I suggest to stick with =E2=80=9Climited=E2=80=9D since privilege restricti=
on is always a good idea. <br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m incl=
ined to agree, scopes are a key part of the OAuth model, and while nothing =
precludes a &quot;full account access&quot; scope, I do think that the idea=
 of privilege restriction is worth infusing the document with.</div></div><=
/div>

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From: Dima Postnikov <dima@postnikov.net>
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 01:05:07 +1000
Message-ID: <CAEMK1uaU=vLQYQAS2J9tj5Cf3=sYSRR7O-Q0iS65FaCjqWk9AA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Jeff Craig <jeffcraig=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>,  William Denniss <wdenniss=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] third party applications
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I agree, "limited access" makes sense. I am happy to create a PR, if requir=
ed.


Current wording is:


The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables a*n* *third-party*
application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   *third-party* application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in RFC 6749 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.


On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 12:33 AM Jeff Craig <jeffcraig=3D
40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:53 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D
> 40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> > On 2. Sep 2020, at 05:58, William Denniss <wdenniss=3D
>> 40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>> > On the subject, in first party cases the access may not be all that
>> "limited", I wonder if it should read more genericly "an application to
>> obtain access to an HTTP service"?
>>
>> I suggest to stick with =E2=80=9Climited=E2=80=9D since privilege restri=
ction is always a
>> good idea.
>>
>
> I'm inclined to agree, scopes are a key part of the OAuth model, and whil=
e
> nothing precludes a "full account access" scope, I do think that the idea
> of privilege restriction is worth infusing the document with.
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;margin-to=
p:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif">=
I agree, &quot;limited access&quot; makes sense. I am happy to create a PR,=
 if required.</font></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;=
margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"arial, san=
s-serif"><br></font></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:1em;=
margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"arial, san=
s-serif">Current wording is:</font></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap=
;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font fac=
e=3D"arial, sans-serif"><br></font></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap=
;font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">The OAuth=
 2.1 authorization framework enables a<b>n</b><strike> <b>third-party</b>
</strike><span style=3D"color:rgb(80,0,80)">   application to obtain limite=
d access to an HTTP service, either on
   behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction
   between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the
   <b><strike>third-party</strike></b> application to obtain access on its =
own behalf.  This
   specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework described in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749" t=
arget=3D"_blank">RFC 6749</a>.</span></pre></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 12:33 AM =
Jeff Craig &lt;jeffcraig=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org">4=
0google.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020=
 at 8:53 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40lodderste=
dt.net@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</=
a>&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; On 2. Sep 2020, at 05:58, William Denniss &lt;wdenniss=3D<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40google.com@dmarc.ietf=
.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; On the subject, in first party cases the access may not be all that &q=
uot;limited&quot;, I wonder if it should read more genericly &quot;an appli=
cation to obtain access to an HTTP service&quot;?<br>
<br>
I suggest to stick with =E2=80=9Climited=E2=80=9D since privilege restricti=
on is always a good idea. <br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m incl=
ined to agree, scopes are a key part of the OAuth model, and while nothing =
precludes a &quot;full account access&quot; scope, I do think that the idea=
 of privilege restriction is worth infusing the document with.</div></div><=
/div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 13:41:35 -0600
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Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,

I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo cleanup
and minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below. I
had a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but don't
have a better location to suggest so am just leaving it.

2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs

While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri
values in certain circumstances, or for the authorization server to apply
its own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the
client at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1]
require an authorization server exactly match the redirect_uri parameter
against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a particular
client. This is a means for early detection of client impersonation
attempts and prevents token leakage and open redirection. As a downside,
this can make client management more cumbersome since the redirect URI is
typically the most volatile part of a client policy.

The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization server
for a confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the
authorization server authenticates the client before the authorization
process starts and thus ensures it is interacting with the legitimate
client. The authorization server MAY allow such clients to specify
redirect_uri values that were not previously registered with the
authorization server. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to
mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization server at runtime) and
can simplify client management. It is at the discretion of the
authorization server to apply restrictions on supplied redirect_uri values,
e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow
only a query parameter to vary at runtime.

The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in
situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and policies are
managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certificates containing
client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with
an authorization server trusting the respective 3rd party without the need
for an additional registration step.

On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the
> stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own.
> This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. Th=
at
> said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to Torsten=E2=80=
=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t
> hurt:
>
> 2.4. Management of redirect_uri
>
> While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri
> values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own matching
> semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the
> authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP
> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-=
1]
> require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri parameter against the se=
t
> of redirect URIs previously established for a particular client. This is =
a
> means to early detect attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token
> leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes client management
> more complex since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part o=
f
> a client policy.
>
> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses
> pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befor=
e
> the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with t=
he
> legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri value=
s
> not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more
> flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes
> client management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply
> restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI
> prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>
> I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside of
> here. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to fi=
t, to me. It=E2=80=99s not
> the end of the world if it stays here though as it=E2=80=99s a decent vie=
w on the
> =E2=80=9Cwhy".
>
>
> The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful
> in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies
> are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containin=
g
> client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with
> an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additiona=
l
> registration step.
>
>
>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>
> On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> wrote:
>
> Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a clien=
t
> can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only when all
> the following conditions are satisfied.
>
> 1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section
> 3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
> 2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that
> confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect
> URIs.)
> 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0
> Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
> 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section
> 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)
>
> In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749
> authorization-code-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an
> arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used,
> existing specifications require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm no=
t
> sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri Management" is going to introduce rules
> that conflict with existing specifications, it is better to list the
> conflicts explicitly in the section.
>
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D
> 40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Here is my proposal for the new section:
>>
>> 2.4. redirect_uri Management
>>
>> The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth
>> 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_u=
ri
>> parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a
>> particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersona=
te
>> a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, =
it
>> makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically
>> the most volatile part of a client policy.
>>
>> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses
>> pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befo=
re
>> the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with =
the
>> legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri valu=
es
>> not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more
>> flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and make=
s
>> client management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to appl=
y
>> restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain UR=
I
>> prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>>
>> Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also
>> useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and
>> policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates
>> containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could
>> interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need f=
or
>> an additional registration step.
>>
>> > On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>> >
>> > I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here
>> and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicate=
d section
>> for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and why =
to
>> relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want to
>> discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect UR=
Is
>> an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a
>> client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to
>> vary at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client =
is
>> presenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine
>> which policies should apply.
>> >
>> > =E2=80=94 Justin
>> >
>> >> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
>> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>   =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and
>> authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the ability to
>> authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=
=99m not positive of
>> the intent.
>> >>>
>> >>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is
>> authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes,
>> response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorizatio=
n
>> is confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still
>> allows for the intent.
>> >>>
>> >>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he
>> originally wrote the text in question.
>> >>
>> >> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>   =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the clie=
ntID is
>> managed externally, the association with a set or pattern of allowed
>> redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to know what that
>> is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to (erroneously and
>> dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check any other va=
lues in a
>> request, including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s important that D=
ynReg
>> doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=
=99t really change
>> things in that regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
>> >>>
>> >>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest,
>> I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the dr=
aft
>> would be better off without it.
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as way
>> to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allowe=
d
>> redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration t=
ime
>> (might be manually).
>> >>
>> >> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking t=
o
>> the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue with l=
etting the client
>> set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the client more
>> flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client
>> management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile part of=
 a
>> client policy.
>> >>
>> >> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client
>> identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of
>> OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The
>> (technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS
>> compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain =
the
>> permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation
>> allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99=
t contain
>> OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial
>> institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept
>> and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
>> >>
>> >> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
>> >> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential.
>> Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication mea=
ns
>> then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of =
the
>> regulation.
>> >> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the
>> recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
>> >>
>> >> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
>> >>
>> >> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand =
this
>> potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. What abo=
ut
>> moving it into a special section "redirect_uri management=E2=80=9D?
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,</div><div><br></div=
><div>I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo cle=
anup and minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below=
. I had a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but d=
on&#39;t have a better location to suggest so am just leaving it. <br></div=
><div><br></div><div style=3D"margin-left:40px">2.4. Management of Client R=
edirect URIs<br><br>While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows=20
clients to use unregistered redirect_uri values in certain=20
circumstances, or for the authorization server to apply its own matching se=
mantics to the=20
redirect_uri value presented by the client at the authorization=20
endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]=20
as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization server =
exactly=20
match the redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs=20
previously established for a particular client. This is a means for early
 detection of client impersonation attempts and prevents token leakage and=
=20
open redirection. As a downside, this can make client management more cumbe=
rsome
 since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client=20
policy.<br><br>The exact=20
matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization server for a=20
confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the authoriza=
tion server
authenticates the client before the authorization process starts and thus e=
nsures it is interacting with the legitimate client. The authorization serv=
er MAY allow=20
such clients to specify redirect_uri values that were not previously regist=
ered=20
with the authorization server.  This will give the client more flexibility =
(e.g. to mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization server at runt=
ime) and can simplify client management. It is at the discretion of the aut=
horization server to apply restrictions on supplied
redirect_uri values, e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain UR=
I prefix or=20
allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.</div><div style=3D"margin-=
left:40px"><br></div><div style=3D"margin-left:40px">The ability to set up =
transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in situations where clien=
t ids and corresponding credentials and policies are managed by a trusted 3=
rd party, e.g. via client certificates containing client permissions. Such =
an externally managed client could interact with an authorization server tr=
usting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional registra=
tion step.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>The real con=
flict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the stricter matchi=
ng semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. This section woul=
d be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. That said, I think ad=
ding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to Torsten=E2=80=99s text wouldn=
=E2=80=99t hurt:<div><br></div><blockquote style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 40px=
;border:medium none;padding:0px"><div>2.4. Management of=C2=A0redirect_uri<=
br><br>While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirec=
t_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own match=
ing semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the auth=
orization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]=
 as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match=
 the redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously est=
ablished for a particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts =
to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As =
a downside, it makes client management more complex since the redirect URI =
is typically the most volatile part of a client policy.<br><br>This require=
ment MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses pushed authoriz=
ation requests since the AS authenticates the client before the authorizati=
on process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the legit client. =
The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values not previously=
 registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. t=
o mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client management mu=
ch easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redire=
ct_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a=
 query parameter to vary at runtime.<br><br></div></blockquote>I also feel =
like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside of here. I=E2=80=
=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to fit, to me. It=E2=
=80=99s not the end of the world if it stays here though as it=E2=80=99s a =
decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy&quot;.<br><blockquote style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 40px;border:medium none;padding:0px"><div><br>The aibility to set up=
 transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in situations where clie=
nt ids and correspoding credentials and policies are managed by a trusted 3=
rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing client permissions. Such a=
n externally managed client could interact with an AS trusting the respecti=
ve 3rd party without the need for an additional registration step.</div></b=
lockquote><div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin<br><div><br><bloc=
kquote type=3D"cite"><div>On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:taka@authlete.com" target=3D"_blank">taka@authlete.com<=
/a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Under existing specifica=
tions (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a client can choose an arbitrary =
redirect_uri without registering it only when all the following conditions =
are satisfied.</div><div><br></div><div>1. The client type of the client is=
 &quot;confidential&quot;. (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that public c=
lients register redirect URIs.)</div><div>2. The flow is not &quot;implicit=
&quot;. (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that confidential clients utiliz=
ing the implicit grant type register redirect URIs.)</div><div>3. The autho=
rization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Section 3.1.2.1 req=
uires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)</div><div>4. The autho=
rization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section 5.2.2 Clause 8=
 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)</div><div><br></div><div>I=
n short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-code-fl=
ow requests from confidential clients can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri =
without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifications =
require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I&#39;m not sure but if PAR&#39;=
s &quot;redirect_uri Management&quot; is going to introduce rules that conf=
lict with existing specifications, it is better to list the conflicts expli=
citly in the section.</div><div><br></div><div>Best Regards,</div><div>Taka=
hiko Kawasaki</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lo=
dderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Here is my proposal for =
the new section:<br>
<br>
2.4. redirect_uri Management<br>
<br>
The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.=
1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri pa=
rameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a parti=
cular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonate a cli=
ent and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes=
 client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically the mos=
t volatile part of a client policy.<br>
<br>
This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses pu=
shed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before th=
e authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the l=
egit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values n=
ot previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexib=
ility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client =
management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restrict=
ion on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or=
 allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.<br>
<br>
Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also use=
ful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policie=
s are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containin=
g client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with=
 an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional=
 registration step.<br>
<br>
&gt; On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher=
@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here a=
nd it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicated se=
ction for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and w=
hy to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want t=
o discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URI=
s an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a =
client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to va=
ry at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client is pr=
esenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine whic=
h policies should apply.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =E2=80=94 Justin<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=B66: Does the AS really have &quot;the ability=
 to authenticate and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here =
is &quot;the ability to authenticate clients and validate client requests=
=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client i=
s authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, r=
esponse type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization is=
 confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still allows=
 for the intent. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;ll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I th=
ink he originally wrote the text in question. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate&quot; is f=
ine. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. =
Even if the clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or p=
attern of allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to=
 know what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to (err=
oneously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check an=
y other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s=
 important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, but removal of=
 DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that regard. Suggest removi=
ng example or reworking paragraph.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;m going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to =
be honest, I&#39;m not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thi=
nking the draft would be better off without it. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as =
way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allow=
ed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration t=
ime (might be manually).<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talkin=
g to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue with=
 letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the =
client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and mak=
es client management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile =
part of a client policy. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client=
 identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of OAut=
h). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The (technica=
l) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS compliant C=
A in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain the permission=
s (access to account information and/or payment initiation allowed) and the=
 identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t contain OAuth pol=
icy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial institution=
 in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept and process c=
alls from any licensed PSD2 clients.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:<br>
&gt;&gt; a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credenti=
al. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication me=
ans then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of=
 the regulation. <br>
&gt;&gt; b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the re=
commended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; PAR is a clean way to solve that problem. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other ha=
nd this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. Wha=
t about moving it into a special section &quot;redirect_uri management=E2=
=80=9D?<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></blockquote></div>

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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
CC: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
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Nice work, Brian. Looks good to me!=20
________________________________________
From: Brian Campbell [bcampbell@pingidentity.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:41 PM
To: Justin Richer
Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki; Torsten Lodderstedt; oauth
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR

Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,

I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo cleanup a=
nd minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below. I ha=
d a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but don't h=
ave a better location to suggest so am just leaving it.

2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs

While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri v=
alues in certain circumstances, or for the authorization server to apply it=
s own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client =
at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-secur=
ity-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authoriza=
tion server exactly match the redirect_uri parameter against the set of red=
irect URIs previously established for a particular client. This is a means =
for early detection of client impersonation attempts and prevents token lea=
kage and open redirection. As a downside, this can make client management m=
ore cumbersome since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part o=
f a client policy.

The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization server f=
or a confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the auth=
orization server authenticates the client before the authorization process =
starts and thus ensures it is interacting with the legitimate client. The a=
uthorization server MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values t=
hat were not previously registered with the authorization server. This will=
 give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint distinct redirect URI value=
s per authorization server at runtime) and can simplify client management. =
It is at the discretion of the authorization server to apply restrictions o=
n supplied redirect_uri values, e.g. the authorization server MAY require a=
 certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.

The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in =
situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and policies are =
managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certificates containing cli=
ent permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with an a=
uthorization server trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for =
an additional registration step.

On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jriche=
r@mit.edu>> wrote:
The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the str=
icter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. This =
section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. That said=
, I think adding some of Taka=92s observations to Torsten=92s text wouldn=
=92t hurt:

2.4. Management of redirect_uri

While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri v=
alues in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own matching sem=
antics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the authorizati=
on endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as wel=
l as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the re=
direct_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously establishe=
d for a particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impe=
rsonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downs=
ide, it makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is typi=
cally the most volatile part of a client policy.

This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses pus=
hed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before the=
 authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the le=
git client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values no=
t previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibi=
lity (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client m=
anagement much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restricti=
on on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or =
allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.

I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside of h=
ere. I=92m not sure where, but it doesn=92t quite seem to fit, to me. It=92=
s not the end of the world if it stays here though as it=92s a decent view =
on the =93why".

The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in=
 situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies are =
managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing clie=
nt permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with an AS=
 trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional regis=
tration step.

 =97 Justin

On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com<mailto:ta=
ka@authlete.com>> wrote:

Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a client =
can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only when all t=
he following conditions are satisfied.

1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2=
.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that conf=
idential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect URIs.)
3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Section=
 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section 5.=
2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)

In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-code-f=
low requests from confidential clients can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri=
 without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifications=
 require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm not sure but if PAR's "redi=
rect_uri Management" is going to introduce rules that conflict with existin=
g specifications, it is better to list the conflicts explicitly in the sect=
ion.

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki


On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D40lodderstedt=
.net@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
Here is my proposal for the new section:

2.4. redirect_uri Management

The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.=
1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri pa=
rameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a parti=
cular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonate a cli=
ent and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes=
 client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically the mos=
t volatile part of a client policy.

This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses pu=
shed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before th=
e authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the l=
egit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values n=
ot previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexib=
ility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client =
management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restrict=
ion on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or=
 allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.

Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also use=
ful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policie=
s are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containin=
g client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with=
 an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional=
 registration step.

> On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jricher@=
mit.edu>> wrote:
>
> I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here and =
it needs to be included. I=92m in favor of creating a dedicated section for=
 redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and why to rel=
ax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want to discuss=
 that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URIs an auth=
enticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a client wi=
th a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at run=
time. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting =
its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policie=
s should apply.
>
> =97 Justin
>
>> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.ne=
t<mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   =B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and author=
ize clients=94? I think what we mean here is "the ability to authenticate c=
lients and validate client requests=94, but I=92m not positive of the inten=
t.
>>>
>>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is authori=
zed to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, response t=
ype, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization is confusin=
g wording. I think your working is less confusing and still allows for the =
intent.
>>>
>>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he origin=
ally wrote the text in question.
>>
>> that was the original intent. I think =93validate" is fine.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   =B67: I=92m not sure I buy this example. Even if the clientID is mana=
ged externally, the association with a set or pattern of allowed redirect U=
RIs is still important, and the AS will need to know what that is. I think =
this example could lead an AS developer to (erroneously and dangerously) co=
nclude that they don=92t have to check any other values in a request, inclu=
ding scope and redirect URI. It=92s important that DynReg doesn=92t allevia=
te that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn=92t really change things in that=
 regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
>>>
>>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest, I'=
m not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the draft w=
ould be better off without it.
>>>
>>
>> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as way to=
 make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allowed red=
irect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration time (m=
ight be manually).
>>
>> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking to t=
he legit client. That=92s why I don=92t see an issue with letting the clien=
t set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the client more flexib=
ility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client manageme=
nt much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile part of a client p=
olicy.
>>
>> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client ident=
ities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of OAuth). A =
prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The (technical) ide=
ntity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS compliant CA in a=
 special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain the permissions (acc=
ess to account information and/or payment initiation allowed) and the ident=
ity (member state specific). But they don=92t contain OAuth policy values. =
Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial institution in the EU t=
o at runtime, without any registration, to accept and process calls from an=
y licensed PSD2 clients.
>>
>> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
>> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential. Un=
fortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication means th=
en an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of the r=
egulation.
>> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the recommen=
ded approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
>>
>> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
>>
>> I don=92t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand this pote=
ntial of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. What about movi=
ng it into a special section "redirect_uri management=94?
>>
>>>
>>
>

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From: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
CC: "last-call@ietf.org" <last-call@ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?
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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
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Thanks Brian!

I suggest to put a Note: in front of the last paragraph to indicate it is ad=
ditional infomercial.

WDYT?

> Am 03.09.2020 um 02:29 schrieb Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>:
>=20
> =EF=BB=BFNice work, Brian. Looks good to me!=20
> ________________________________________
> From: Brian Campbell [bcampbell@pingidentity.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:41 PM
> To: Justin Richer
> Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki; Torsten Lodderstedt; oauth
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
>=20
> Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,
>=20
> I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo cleanup a=
nd minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below. I had=
 a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but don't hav=
e a better location to suggest so am just leaving it.
>=20
> 2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs
>=20
> While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri v=
alues in certain circumstances, or for the authorization server to apply its=
 own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at=
 the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security=
-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization=
 server exactly match the redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect=
 URIs previously established for a particular client. This is a means for ea=
rly detection of client impersonation attempts and prevents token leakage an=
d open redirection. As a downside, this can make client management more cumb=
ersome since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a clien=
t policy.
>=20
> The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization server f=
or a confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the autho=
rization server authenticates the client before the authorization process st=
arts and thus ensures it is interacting with the legitimate client. The auth=
orization server MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values that w=
ere not previously registered with the authorization server. This will give t=
he client more flexibility (e.g. to mint distinct redirect URI values per au=
thorization server at runtime) and can simplify client management. It is at t=
he discretion of the authorization server to apply restrictions on supplied r=
edirect_uri values, e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain URI p=
refix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>=20
> The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in=
 situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and policies are m=
anaged by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certificates containing clien=
t permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with an auth=
orization server trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an a=
dditional registration step.
>=20
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jrich=
er@mit.edu>> wrote:
> The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the st=
ricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. This s=
ection would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. That said, I=
 think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to Torsten=E2=80=99s text w=
ouldn=E2=80=99t hurt:
>=20
> 2.4. Management of redirect_uri
>=20
> While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri v=
alues in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own matching sema=
ntics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the authorization=
 endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well a=
s OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redire=
ct_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for=
 a particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonat=
e a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it=
 makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically th=
e most volatile part of a client policy.
>=20
> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses pu=
shed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before the=
 authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the leg=
it client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values not p=
reviously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibility=
 (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client manage=
ment much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restriction on r=
edirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow on=
ly a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>=20
> I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside of h=
ere. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to fit, t=
o me. It=E2=80=99s not the end of the world if it stays here though as it=E2=
=80=99s a decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy".
>=20
> The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful i=
n situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies are m=
anaged by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing client=
 permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with an AS tr=
usting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional registrat=
ion step.
>=20
> =E2=80=94 Justin
>=20
> On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com<mailto:t=
aka@authlete.com>> wrote:
>=20
> Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a client=
 can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only when all t=
he following conditions are satisfied.
>=20
> 1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.=
2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
> 2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that con=
fidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect URIs.)=

> 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Sectio=
n 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
> 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section 5=
.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)
>=20
> In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-code-=
flow requests from confidential clients can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri=
 without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifications r=
equire pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm not sure but if PAR's "redirec=
t_uri Management" is going to introduce rules that conflict with existing sp=
ecifications, it is better to list the conflicts explicitly in the section.
>=20
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D40loddersted=
t.net@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
> Here is my proposal for the new section:
>=20
> 2.4. redirect_uri Management
>=20
> The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2=
.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri pa=
rameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a partic=
ular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonate a clien=
t and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes cl=
ient management more complex since the redirect URI is typically the most vo=
latile part of a client policy.
>=20
> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses p=
ushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before th=
e authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the le=
git client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values not=
 previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibili=
ty (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client mana=
gement much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restriction o=
n redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow=
 only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>=20
> Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also us=
eful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policie=
s are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing=
 client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with a=
n AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional re=
gistration step.
>=20
>> On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jricher@=
mit.edu>> wrote:
>>=20
>> I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here and i=
t needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicated section=
 for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and why to r=
elax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want to discus=
s that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URIs an auth=
enticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a client wit=
h a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at runti=
me. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting its=
 authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policies sh=
ould apply.
>>=20
>> =E2=80=94 Justin
>>=20
>>>> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.n=
et<mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>  =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and auth=
orize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the ability to authent=
icate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=99m not pos=
itive of the intent.
>>>>=20
>>>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is authori=
zed to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, response ty=
pe, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization is confusing w=
ording. I think your working is less confusing and still allows for the inte=
nt.
>>>>=20
>>>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he origin=
ally wrote the text in question.
>>>=20
>>> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.
>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>  =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the clientID=
 is managed externally, the association with a set or pattern of allowed red=
irect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to know what that is. I t=
hink this example could lead an AS developer to (erroneously and dangerously=
) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check any other values in a reque=
st, including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg doe=
sn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t rea=
lly change things in that regard. Suggest removing example or reworking para=
graph.
>>>>=20
>>>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest, I'=
m not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the draft wo=
uld be better off without it.
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as way to=
 make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allowed redi=
rect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration time (mig=
ht be manually).
>>>=20
>>> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking to t=
he legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue with lettin=
g the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the client m=
ore flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client=
 management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile part of a c=
lient policy.
>>>=20
>>> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client ident=
ities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of OAuth). A p=
rominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The (technical) ident=
ity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS compliant CA in a sp=
ecial X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain the permissions (access t=
o account information and/or payment initiation allowed) and the identity (m=
ember state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t contain OAuth policy values. N=
evertheless, the regulation requires any financial institution in the EU to a=
t runtime, without any registration, to accept and process calls from any li=
censed PSD2 clients.
>>>=20
>>> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
>>> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential. Un=
fortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication means the=
n an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of the reg=
ulation.
>>> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the recommen=
ded approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
>>>=20
>>> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
>>>=20
>>> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand thi=
s potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. What about=
 moving it into a special section "redirect_uri management=E2=80=9D?
>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20
>=20
> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged=
 material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, di=
stribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.  If you have rece=
ived this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-=
mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your computer. Tha=
nk you.

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References: <19d4b2ae7e2c456a82b41803f10017c4@oc11expo18.exchange.mit.edu> <19D00FD1-88BF-465B-8A11-FE5388AFDA6E@lodderstedt.net>
In-Reply-To: <19D00FD1-88BF-465B-8A11-FE5388AFDA6E@lodderstedt.net>
From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 05:33:37 -0600
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To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
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Do you mean just putting the "Note:" back in front of it? WFM.



On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 12:11 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.ne=
t>
wrote:

> Thanks Brian!
>
> I suggest to put a Note: in front of the last paragraph to indicate it is
> additional infomercial.
>
> WDYT?
>
> > Am 03.09.2020 um 02:29 schrieb Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>:
> >
> > =EF=BB=BFNice work, Brian. Looks good to me!
> > ________________________________________
> > From: Brian Campbell [bcampbell@pingidentity.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:41 PM
> > To: Justin Richer
> > Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki; Torsten Lodderstedt; oauth
> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
> >
> > Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,
> >
> > I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo
> cleanup and minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal
> below. I had a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fittin=
g
> but don't have a better location to suggest so am just leaving it.
> >
> > 2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs
> >
> > While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered
> redirect_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the authorization
> server to apply its own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value
> presented by the client at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security
> BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1
> [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization server exactly match the
> redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously
> established for a particular client. This is a means for early detection =
of
> client impersonation attempts and prevents token leakage and open
> redirection. As a downside, this can make client management more cumberso=
me
> since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client
> policy.
> >
> > The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization
> server for a confidential client using pushed authorization requests sinc=
e
> the authorization server authenticates the client before the authorizatio=
n
> process starts and thus ensures it is interacting with the legitimate
> client. The authorization server MAY allow such clients to specify
> redirect_uri values that were not previously registered with the
> authorization server. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to
> mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization server at runtime) an=
d
> can simplify client management. It is at the discretion of the
> authorization server to apply restrictions on supplied redirect_uri value=
s,
> e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow
> only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
> >
> > The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful
> in situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and policies
> are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certificates containi=
ng
> client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with
> an authorization server trusting the respective 3rd party without the nee=
d
> for an additional registration step.
> >
> > On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:
> jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> > The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the
> stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own.
> This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. Th=
at
> said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to Torsten=E2=80=
=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t
> hurt:
> >
> > 2.4. Management of redirect_uri
> >
> > While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered
> redirect_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its
> own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client =
at
> the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP
> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-=
1]
> require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri parameter against the se=
t
> of redirect URIs previously established for a particular client. This is =
a
> means to early detect attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token
> leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes client management
> more complex since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part o=
f
> a client policy.
> >
> > This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses
> pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befor=
e
> the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with t=
he
> legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri value=
s
> not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more
> flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes
> client management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply
> restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI
> prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
> >
> > I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside
> of here. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to=
 fit, to me. It=E2=80=99s
> not the end of the world if it stays here though as it=E2=80=99s a decent=
 view on
> the =E2=80=9Cwhy".
> >
> > The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also usefu=
l
> in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies
> are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containin=
g
> client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with
> an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additiona=
l
> registration step.
> >
> > =E2=80=94 Justin
> >
> > On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com
> <mailto:taka@authlete.com>> wrote:
> >
> > Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a
> client can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only
> when all the following conditions are satisfied.
> >
> > 1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section
> 3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
> > 2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that
> confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect
> URIs.)
> > 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0
> Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
> > 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Sectio=
n
> 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)
> >
> > In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749
> authorization-code-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an
> arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used,
> existing specifications require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm no=
t
> sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri Management" is going to introduce rules
> that conflict with existing specifications, it is better to list the
> conflicts explicitly in the section.
> >
> > Best Regards,
> > Takahiko Kawasaki
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D
> 40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>=
>
> wrote:
> > Here is my proposal for the new section:
> >
> > 2.4. redirect_uri Management
> >
> > The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAut=
h
> 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_ur=
i
> parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a
> particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonat=
e
> a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, i=
t
> makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically
> the most volatile part of a client policy.
> >
> > This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client use=
s
> pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befor=
e
> the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with t=
he
> legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri value=
s
> not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more
> flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes
> client management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply
> restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI
> prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
> >
> > Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also
> useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and
> policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates
> containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could
> interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need fo=
r
> an additional registration step.
> >
> >> On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:
> jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> >>
> >> I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here
> and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicated=
 section
> for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and why t=
o
> relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want to
> discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URI=
s
> an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a
> client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to
> vary at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client i=
s
> presenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine
> which policies should apply.
> >>
> >> =E2=80=94 Justin
> >>
> >>>> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net<mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>  =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and
> authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the ability to
> authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=
=99m not positive of
> the intent.
> >>>>
> >>>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is
> authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes,
> response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization
> is confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still
> allows for the intent.
> >>>>
> >>>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he
> originally wrote the text in question.
> >>>
> >>> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>  =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the clien=
tID is managed
> externally, the association with a set or pattern of allowed redirect URI=
s
> is still important, and the AS will need to know what that is. I think th=
is
> example could lead an AS developer to (erroneously and dangerously)
> conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check any other values in a requ=
est,
> including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg does=
n=E2=80=99t
> alleviate that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change=
 things in
> that regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
> >>>>
> >>>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest,
> I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the dra=
ft
> would be better off without it.
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as way
> to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allowed
> redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration ti=
me
> (might be manually).
> >>>
> >>> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking t=
o
> the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue with le=
tting the client
> set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the client more
> flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client
> management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile part of =
a
> client policy.
> >>>
> >>> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client
> identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of
> OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The
> (technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS
> compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain t=
he
> permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation
> allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t=
 contain
> OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial
> institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept
> and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
> >>>
> >>> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
> >>> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential.
> Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication mean=
s
> then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of t=
he
> regulation.
> >>> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the
> recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
> >>>
> >>> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
> >>>
> >>> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand =
this
> potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. What abou=
t
> moving it into a special section "redirect_uri management=E2=80=9D?
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> >
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>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Do you mean just putting the &quot;Note:&quot; back i=
n front of it? WFM. <br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Sep 3, =
2020 at 12:11 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderst=
edt.net">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Thanks Brian!<br>
<br>
I suggest to put a Note: in front of the last paragraph to indicate it is a=
dditional infomercial.<br>
<br>
WDYT?<br>
<br>
&gt; Am 03.09.2020 um 02:29 schrieb Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jri=
cher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt;:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =EF=BB=BFNice work, Brian. Looks good to me! <br>
&gt; ________________________________________<br>
&gt; From: Brian Campbell [<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:41 PM<br>
&gt; To: Justin Richer<br>
&gt; Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki; Torsten Lodderstedt; oauth<br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo clea=
nup and minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below.=
 I had a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but do=
n&#39;t have a better location to suggest so am just leaving it.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_=
uri values in certain circumstances, or for the authorization server to app=
ly its own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the cl=
ient at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-=
security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an auth=
orization server exactly match the redirect_uri parameter against the set o=
f redirect URIs previously established for a particular client. This is a m=
eans for early detection of client impersonation attempts and prevents toke=
n leakage and open redirection. As a downside, this can make client managem=
ent more cumbersome since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile p=
art of a client policy.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization ser=
ver for a confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the=
 authorization server authenticates the client before the authorization pro=
cess starts and thus ensures it is interacting with the legitimate client. =
The authorization server MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri val=
ues that were not previously registered with the authorization server. This=
 will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint distinct redirect URI =
values per authorization server at runtime) and can simplify client managem=
ent. It is at the discretion of the authorization server to apply restricti=
ons on supplied redirect_uri values, e.g. the authorization server MAY requ=
ire a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime=
.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also usefu=
l in situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and policies=
 are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certificates containin=
g client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with=
 an authorization server trusting the respective 3rd party without the need=
 for an additional registration step.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jri=
cher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<=
br>
&gt; The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt th=
e stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. =
This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. That=
 said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to Torsten=E2=80=
=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t hurt:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 2.4. Management of redirect_uri<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_=
uri values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own matchin=
g semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the author=
ization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] a=
s well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match t=
he redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously estab=
lished for a particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to=
 impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a =
downside, it makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is=
 typically the most volatile part of a client policy.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client use=
s pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befor=
e the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with t=
he legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri valu=
es not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more fl=
exibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes cli=
ent management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply rest=
riction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefi=
x or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside=
 of here. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to =
fit, to me. It=E2=80=99s not the end of the world if it stays here though a=
s it=E2=80=99s a decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy&quot;.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also usef=
ul in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies=
 are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing=
 client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with =
an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional =
registration step.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =E2=80=94 Justin<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:t=
aka@authlete.com" target=3D"_blank">taka@authlete.com</a>&lt;mailto:<a href=
=3D"mailto:taka@authlete.com" target=3D"_blank">taka@authlete.com</a>&gt;&g=
t; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a cl=
ient can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only when =
all the following conditions are satisfied.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 1. The client type of the client is &quot;confidential&quot;. (RFC 674=
9 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)<br>
&gt; 2. The flow is not &quot;implicit&quot;. (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 req=
uires that confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register =
redirect URIs.)<br>
&gt; 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Se=
ction 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)<br>
&gt; 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Secti=
on 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-c=
ode-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an arbitrary redirec=
t_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifica=
tions require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I&#39;m not sure but if PA=
R&#39;s &quot;redirect_uri Management&quot; is going to introduce rules tha=
t conflict with existing specifications, it is better to list the conflicts=
 explicitly in the section.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Best Regards,<br>
&gt; Takahiko Kawasaki<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40lodderst=
edt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dm=
arc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;&gt=
; wrote:<br>
&gt; Here is my proposal for the new section:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 2.4. redirect_uri Management<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAu=
th 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_u=
ri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a =
particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonate =
a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it =
makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically th=
e most volatile part of a client policy.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client us=
es pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befo=
re the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with =
the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri val=
ues not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more f=
lexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes cl=
ient management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply res=
triction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI pref=
ix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is als=
o useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and po=
licies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates cont=
aining client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact=
 with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an addit=
ional registration step.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jri=
cher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<=
br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I completely agree with the utility of the function in question he=
re and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicate=
d section for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how a=
nd why to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we wa=
nt to discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect=
 URIs an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registerin=
g a client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter t=
o vary at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client i=
s presenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine =
which policies should apply.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; =E2=80=94 Justin<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodderstedt=
.net</a>&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_bl=
ank">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=B66: Does the AS really have &quot;the ability t=
o authenticate and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is=
 &quot;the ability to authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=
=80=9D, but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a clie=
nt is authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scope=
s, response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorizatio=
n is confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still al=
lows for the intent.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;ll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as =
I think he originally wrote the text in question.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate&quot; =
is fine.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Ev=
en if the clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or pat=
tern of allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to k=
now what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to (erron=
eously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check any =
other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s i=
mportant that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, but removal of D=
ynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that regard. Suggest removing=
 example or reworking paragraph.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;m going to have to defer to Torsten on this because,=
 to be honest, I&#39;m not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards=
 thinking the draft would be better off without it.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves=
 as way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the a=
llowed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registrati=
on time (might be manually).<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is ta=
lking to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue =
with letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give =
the client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and=
 makes client management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volat=
ile part of a client policy.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where cl=
ient identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of =
OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The (tech=
nical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS complia=
nt CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain the permis=
sions (access to account information and/or payment initiation allowed) and=
 the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t contain OAuth=
 policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial institu=
tion in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept and proce=
ss calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as cred=
ential. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authenticatio=
n means then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the tex=
t of the regulation.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is th=
e recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the othe=
r hand this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all.=
 What about moving it into a special section &quot;redirect_uri management=
=E2=80=9D?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>=
&lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privil=
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e, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.=C2=A0 If yo=
u have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immed=
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</blockquote></div>

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Looks really good to me, thanks Brian.

On Wed, 2 Sep 2020 at 21:42, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,
>
> I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo cleanup
> and minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below. I
> had a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but don=
't
> have a better location to suggest so am just leaving it.
>
> 2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs
>
> While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri
> values in certain circumstances, or for the authorization server to apply
> its own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the
> client at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP
> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-=
1]
> require an authorization server exactly match the redirect_uri parameter
> against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a particular
> client. This is a means for early detection of client impersonation
> attempts and prevents token leakage and open redirection. As a downside,
> this can make client management more cumbersome since the redirect URI is
> typically the most volatile part of a client policy.
>
> The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization server
> for a confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the
> authorization server authenticates the client before the authorization
> process starts and thus ensures it is interacting with the legitimate
> client. The authorization server MAY allow such clients to specify
> redirect_uri values that were not previously registered with the
> authorization server. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to
> mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization server at runtime) an=
d
> can simplify client management. It is at the discretion of the
> authorization server to apply restrictions on supplied redirect_uri value=
s,
> e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow
> only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>
> The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful i=
n
> situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and policies ar=
e
> managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certificates containing
> client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with
> an authorization server trusting the respective 3rd party without the nee=
d
> for an additional registration step.
>
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the
>> stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own.
>> This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. T=
hat
>> said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to Torsten=E2=
=80=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t
>> hurt:
>>
>> 2.4. Management of redirect_uri
>>
>> While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_ur=
i
>> values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own matching
>> semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the
>> authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP
>> [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2=
-1]
>> require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri parameter against the s=
et
>> of redirect URIs previously established for a particular client. This is=
 a
>> means to early detect attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token
>> leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes client management
>> more complex since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part =
of
>> a client policy.
>>
>> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses
>> pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client befo=
re
>> the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with =
the
>> legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri valu=
es
>> not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more
>> flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and make=
s
>> client management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to appl=
y
>> restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain UR=
I
>> prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>>
>> I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside o=
f
>> here. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to f=
it, to me. It=E2=80=99s not
>> the end of the world if it stays here though as it=E2=80=99s a decent vi=
ew on the
>> =E2=80=9Cwhy".
>>
>>
>> The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful
>> in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies
>> are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containi=
ng
>> client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact wit=
h
>> an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an addition=
al
>> registration step.
>>
>>
>>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>>
>> On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> wrote=
:
>>
>> Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a
>> client can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only
>> when all the following conditions are satisfied.
>>
>> 1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section
>> 3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
>> 2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that
>> confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect
>> URIs.)
>> 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0
>> Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
>> 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section
>> 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)
>>
>> In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749
>> authorization-code-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an
>> arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used=
,
>> existing specifications require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm n=
ot
>> sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri Management" is going to introduce rules
>> that conflict with existing specifications, it is better to list the
>> conflicts explicitly in the section.
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Takahiko Kawasaki
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=3D
>> 40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Here is my proposal for the new section:
>>>
>>> 2.4. redirect_uri Management
>>>
>>> The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAut=
h
>>> 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_=
uri
>>> parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a
>>> particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to imperson=
ate
>>> a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside,=
 it
>>> makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is typicall=
y
>>> the most volatile part of a client policy.
>>>
>>> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client use=
s
>>> pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client bef=
ore
>>> the authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with=
 the
>>> legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri val=
ues
>>> not previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more
>>> flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and mak=
es
>>> client management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to app=
ly
>>> restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain U=
RI
>>> prefix or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>>>
>>> Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also
>>> useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and
>>> policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiate=
s
>>> containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could
>>> interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need =
for
>>> an additional registration step.
>>>
>>> > On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here
>>> and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicat=
ed section
>>> for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and why=
 to
>>> relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want to
>>> discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect U=
RIs
>>> an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering =
a
>>> client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter t=
o
>>> vary at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client=
 is
>>> presenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determin=
e
>>> which policies should apply.
>>> >
>>> > =E2=80=94 Justin
>>> >
>>> >> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <
>>> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>   =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and
>>> authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the ability t=
o
>>> authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=
=99m not positive of
>>> the intent.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is
>>> authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes,
>>> response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorizati=
on
>>> is confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still
>>> allows for the intent.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he
>>> originally wrote the text in question.
>>> >>
>>> >> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.
>>> >>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>   =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the cli=
entID is
>>> managed externally, the association with a set or pattern of allowed
>>> redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to know what tha=
t
>>> is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to (erroneously and
>>> dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check any other v=
alues in a
>>> request, including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s important that =
DynReg
>>> doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=
=99t really change
>>> things in that regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest=
,
>>> I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the d=
raft
>>> would be better off without it.
>>> >>>
>>> >>
>>> >> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as wa=
y
>>> to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allow=
ed
>>> redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration =
time
>>> (might be manually).
>>> >>
>>> >> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking
>>> to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue wi=
th letting the
>>> client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the client mo=
re
>>> flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes clien=
t
>>> management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile part o=
f a
>>> client policy.
>>> >>
>>> >> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client
>>> identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of
>>> OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The
>>> (technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDA=
S
>>> compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain=
 the
>>> permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation
>>> allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=
=99t contain
>>> OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financia=
l
>>> institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accep=
t
>>> and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
>>> >>
>>> >> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
>>> >> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential=
.
>>> Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication me=
ans
>>> then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of=
 the
>>> regulation.
>>> >> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the
>>> recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
>>> >>
>>> >> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
>>> >>
>>> >> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand=
 this
>>> potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. What ab=
out
>>> moving it into a special section "redirect_uri management=E2=80=9D?
>>> >>
>>> >>>
>>> >>
>>> >
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:trebuche=
t ms,sans-serif">Looks really good to me, thanks Brian.</div></div><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, 2 Sep =
2020 at 21:42, Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingident=
ity.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
div>Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,</div><div><br></div><div>I took the r=
evised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo cleanup and minor adj=
ustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below. I had a similar =
feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but don&#39;t have a be=
tter location to suggest so am just leaving it. <br></div><div><br></div><d=
iv style=3D"margin-left:40px">2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs<br><b=
r>While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows=20
clients to use unregistered redirect_uri values in certain=20
circumstances, or for the authorization server to apply its own matching se=
mantics to the=20
redirect_uri value presented by the client at the authorization=20
endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]=20
as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization server =
exactly=20
match the redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs=20
previously established for a particular client. This is a means for early
 detection of client impersonation attempts and prevents token leakage and=
=20
open redirection. As a downside, this can make client management more cumbe=
rsome
 since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client=20
policy.<br><br>The exact=20
matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization server for a=20
confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the authoriza=
tion server
authenticates the client before the authorization process starts and thus e=
nsures it is interacting with the legitimate client. The authorization serv=
er MAY allow=20
such clients to specify redirect_uri values that were not previously regist=
ered=20
with the authorization server.  This will give the client more flexibility =
(e.g. to mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization server at runt=
ime) and can simplify client management. It is at the discretion of the aut=
horization server to apply restrictions on supplied
redirect_uri values, e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain UR=
I prefix or=20
allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.</div><div style=3D"margin-=
left:40px"><br></div><div style=3D"margin-left:40px">The ability to set up =
transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in situations where clien=
t ids and corresponding credentials and policies are managed by a trusted 3=
rd party, e.g. via client certificates containing client permissions. Such =
an externally managed client could interact with an authorization server tr=
usting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional registra=
tion step.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>The real con=
flict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the stricter matchi=
ng semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. This section woul=
d be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. That said, I think ad=
ding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to Torsten=E2=80=99s text wouldn=
=E2=80=99t hurt:<div><br></div><blockquote style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 40px=
;border:medium none;padding:0px"><div>2.4. Management of=C2=A0redirect_uri<=
br><br>While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirec=
t_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own match=
ing semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the auth=
orization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]=
 as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match=
 the redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously est=
ablished for a particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts =
to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As =
a downside, it makes client management more complex since the redirect URI =
is typically the most volatile part of a client policy.<br><br>This require=
ment MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses pushed authoriz=
ation requests since the AS authenticates the client before the authorizati=
on process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the legit client. =
The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values not previously=
 registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. t=
o mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client management mu=
ch easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redire=
ct_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a=
 query parameter to vary at runtime.<br><br></div></blockquote>I also feel =
like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside of here. I=E2=80=
=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem to fit, to me. It=E2=
=80=99s not the end of the world if it stays here though as it=E2=80=99s a =
decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy&quot;.<br><blockquote style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 40px;border:medium none;padding:0px"><div><br>The aibility to set up=
 transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in situations where clie=
nt ids and correspoding credentials and policies are managed by a trusted 3=
rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing client permissions. Such a=
n externally managed client could interact with an AS trusting the respecti=
ve 3rd party without the need for an additional registration step.</div></b=
lockquote><div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin<br><div><br><bloc=
kquote type=3D"cite"><div>On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:taka@authlete.com" target=3D"_blank">taka@authlete.com<=
/a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Under existing specifica=
tions (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a client can choose an arbitrary =
redirect_uri without registering it only when all the following conditions =
are satisfied.</div><div><br></div><div>1. The client type of the client is=
 &quot;confidential&quot;. (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that public c=
lients register redirect URIs.)</div><div>2. The flow is not &quot;implicit=
&quot;. (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that confidential clients utiliz=
ing the implicit grant type register redirect URIs.)</div><div>3. The autho=
rization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Section 3.1.2.1 req=
uires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)</div><div>4. The autho=
rization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section 5.2.2 Clause 8=
 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)</div><div><br></div><div>I=
n short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-code-fl=
ow requests from confidential clients can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri =
without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifications =
require pre-registration of redirect URIs. I&#39;m not sure but if PAR&#39;=
s &quot;redirect_uri Management&quot; is going to introduce rules that conf=
lict with existing specifications, it is better to list the conflicts expli=
citly in the section.</div><div><br></div><div>Best Regards,</div><div>Taka=
hiko Kawasaki</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lo=
dderstedt &lt;torsten=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank">40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Here is my proposal for =
the new section:<br>
<br>
2.4. redirect_uri Management<br>
<br>
The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.=
1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri pa=
rameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a parti=
cular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonate a cli=
ent and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes=
 client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically the mos=
t volatile part of a client policy.<br>
<br>
This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses pu=
shed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before th=
e authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the l=
egit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values n=
ot previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexib=
ility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client =
management much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restrict=
ion on redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or=
 allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.<br>
<br>
Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also use=
ful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policie=
s are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containin=
g client permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with=
 an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional=
 registration step.<br>
<br>
&gt; On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher=
@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here a=
nd it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a dedicated se=
ction for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and w=
hy to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want t=
o discuss that the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URI=
s an authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a =
client with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to va=
ry at runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client is pr=
esenting its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine whic=
h policies should apply.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =E2=80=94 Justin<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=B66: Does the AS really have &quot;the ability=
 to authenticate and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here =
is &quot;the ability to authenticate clients and validate client requests=
=E2=80=9D, but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client i=
s authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, r=
esponse type, etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization is=
 confusing wording. I think your working is less confusing and still allows=
 for the intent. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;ll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I th=
ink he originally wrote the text in question. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate&quot; is f=
ine. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. =
Even if the clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or p=
attern of allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to=
 know what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to (err=
oneously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to check an=
y other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. It=E2=80=99s=
 important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, but removal of=
 DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that regard. Suggest removi=
ng example or reworking paragraph.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I&#39;m going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to =
be honest, I&#39;m not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thi=
nking the draft would be better off without it. <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as =
way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allow=
ed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration t=
ime (might be manually).<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talkin=
g to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an issue with=
 letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the =
client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and mak=
es client management much easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile =
part of a client policy. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client=
 identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of OAut=
h). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The (technica=
l) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS compliant C=
A in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain the permission=
s (access to account information and/or payment initiation allowed) and the=
 identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t contain OAuth pol=
icy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial institution=
 in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept and process c=
alls from any licensed PSD2 clients.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:<br>
&gt;&gt; a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credenti=
al. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication me=
ans then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of=
 the regulation. <br>
&gt;&gt; b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the re=
commended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; PAR is a clean way to solve that problem. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other ha=
nd this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. Wha=
t about moving it into a special section &quot;redirect_uri management=E2=
=80=9D?<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></blockquote></div>

<br>
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</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
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ve Tonge</div><div style=3D"font-size:0.8125em;line-height:1.4">CTO</div><d=
iv style=3D"font-size:0.8125em;line-height:1.4;margin:0px"><a href=3D"http:=
//www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fmoneyhubenterprise.com%2F&amp;sa=3DD&=
amp;sntz=3D1&amp;usg=3DAFQjCNGUnR5opJv5S1uZOVg8aISwPKAv3A" style=3D"color:r=
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px"></div><div style=3D"letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:11px;line-height:15.925px"><br></span></div><div style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(97,97,97);font-family:&quot;Open Sans&quot;;letter-spacing:normal"=
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h is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (&quot;FCA=
&quot;).=C2=A0Moneyhub Financial Technology is entered on the Financial Ser=
vices Register=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:l=
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org.uk/register</a>. M</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family=
:lato,&quot;open sans&quot;,arial,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;f=
ont-size:10.5px">oneyhub</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,51);font-fami=
ly:lato,&quot;open sans&quot;,arial,sans-serif;background-color:transparent=
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<br>
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-weight:bold"><font face=3D"Arial" color=3D"#80=
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nduct Authority (&quot;FCA&quot;). Moneyhub Financial Technology is entered=
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n></a>. Moneyhub Financial Technology is registered in England &amp; Wales,=
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yes.

> On 3. Sep 2020, at 13:33, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Do you mean just putting the "Note:" back in front of it? WFM.=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 12:11 AM Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> Thanks Brian!
>=20
> I suggest to put a Note: in front of the last paragraph to indicate it =
is additional infomercial.
>=20
> WDYT?
>=20
> > Am 03.09.2020 um 02:29 schrieb Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>:
> >=20
> > =EF=BB=BFNice work, Brian. Looks good to me!=20
> > ________________________________________
> > From: Brian Campbell [bcampbell@pingidentity.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:41 PM
> > To: Justin Richer
> > Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki; Torsten Lodderstedt; oauth
> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
> >=20
> > Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,
> >=20
> > I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo =
cleanup and minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal =
below. I had a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really =
fitting but don't have a better location to suggest so am just leaving =
it.
> >=20
> > 2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs
> >=20
> > While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered =
redirect_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the authorization =
server to apply its own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value =
presented by the client at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth =
Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization server exactly match the =
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means for early detection =
of client impersonation attempts and prevents token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, this can make client management more =
cumbersome since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of =
a client policy.
> >=20
> > The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization =
server for a confidential client using pushed authorization requests =
since the authorization server authenticates the client before the =
authorization process starts and thus ensures it is interacting with the =
legitimate client. The authorization server MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values that were not previously registered with the =
authorization server. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. =
to mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization server at =
runtime) and can simplify client management. It is at the discretion of =
the authorization server to apply restrictions on supplied redirect_uri =
values, e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain URI prefix =
or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
> >=20
> > The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also =
useful in situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and =
policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client =
certificates containing client permissions. Such an externally managed =
client could interact with an authorization server trusting the =
respective 3rd party without the need for an additional registration =
step.
> >=20
> > On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer =
<jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> > The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt =
the stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its =
own. This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each =
other. That said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to =
Torsten=E2=80=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t hurt:
> >=20
> > 2.4. Management of redirect_uri
> >=20
> > While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered =
redirect_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its =
own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client =
at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri =
parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a =
particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to =
impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As =
a downside, it makes client management more complex since the redirect =
URI is typically the most volatile part of a client policy.
> >=20
> > This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client =
uses pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.
> >=20
> > I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section =
outside of here. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t =
quite seem to fit, to me. It=E2=80=99s not the end of the world if it =
stays here though as it=E2=80=99s a decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy".
> >=20
> > The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also =
useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and =
policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates =
containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could =
interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need =
for an additional registration step.
> >=20
> > =E2=80=94 Justin
> >=20
> > On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki =
<taka@authlete.com<mailto:taka@authlete.com>> wrote:
> >=20
> > Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a =
client can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only =
when all the following conditions are satisfied.
> >=20
> > 1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 =
Section 3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
> > 2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires =
that confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register =
redirect URIs.)
> > 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 =
Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
> > 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 =
Section 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)
> >=20
> > In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 =
authorization-code-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an =
arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is =
used, existing specifications require pre-registration of redirect URIs. =
I'm not sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri Management" is going to =
introduce rules that conflict with existing specifications, it is better =
to list the conflicts explicitly in the section.
> >=20
> > Best Regards,
> > Takahiko Kawasaki
> >=20
> >=20
> > On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten=3D40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40lodderstedt.net@dmarc=
.ietf.org>> wrote:
> > Here is my proposal for the new section:
> >=20
> > 2.4. redirect_uri Management
> >=20
> > The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as =
OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the =
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means to early detect =
attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, it makes client management more complex =
since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client =
policy.
> >=20
> > This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client =
uses pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.
> >=20
> > Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is =
also useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials =
and policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client =
certifiates containing client permissions. Such an externally managed =
client could interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party =
without the need for an additional registration step.
> >=20
> >> On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer =
<jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> >>=20
> >> I completely agree with the utility of the function in question =
here and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a =
dedicated section for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain =
exactly how and why to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In =
addition, I think we want to discuss that the AS might have its own =
restrictions on which redirect URIs an authenticated client might be =
able to use. For example, registering a client with a Redirect URI =
prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at runtime. All of =
these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting its =
authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policies =
should apply.
> >>=20
> >> =E2=80=94 Justin
> >>=20
> >>>> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten@lodderstedt.net<mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>  =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate =
and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the =
ability to authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, =
but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent.
> >>>>=20
> >>>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is =
authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, =
response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request =
authorization is confusing wording. I think your working is less =
confusing and still allows for the intent.
> >>>>=20
> >>>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he =
originally wrote the text in question.
> >>>=20
> >>> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.
> >>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>>  =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the =
clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or pattern of =
allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to know =
what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to =
(erroneously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to =
check any other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. =
It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, =
but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that =
regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
> >>>>=20
> >>>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be =
honest, I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards =
thinking the draft would be better off without it.
> >>>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as =
way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the =
allowed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at =
registration time (might be manually).
> >>>=20
> >>> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is =
talking to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an =
issue with letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This =
will give the client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on =
the fly) and makes client management much easier since redirect URIs are =
the most volatile part of a client policy.
> >>>=20
> >>> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client =
identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of =
OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The =
(technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS =
compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain =
the permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation =
allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t =
contain OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any =
financial institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, =
to accept and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
> >>>=20
> >>> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
> >>> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as =
credential. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client =
authentication means then an initial access token. Beside that, it would =
violate the text of the regulation.
> >>> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the =
recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
> >>>=20
> >>> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
> >>>=20
> >>> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other =
hand this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at =
all. What about moving it into a special section "redirect_uri =
management=E2=80=9D?
> >>>=20
> >>>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>=20
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >=20
> >=20
> > CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and =
privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any =
review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly =
prohibited.  If you have received this communication in error, please =
notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any =
file attachments from your computer. Thank you.
>=20
> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and =
privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any =
review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly =
prohibited.  If you have received this communication in error, please =
notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any =
file attachments from your computer. Thank you.


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Thanks to all. I incorporated the text into the upcoming next revision =
of the draft.=20

> On 3. Sep 2020, at 14:14, Dave Tonge <dave.tonge@momentumft.co.uk> =
wrote:
>=20
> Looks really good to me, thanks Brian.
>=20
> On Wed, 2 Sep 2020 at 21:42, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell=3D40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,
>=20
> I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo =
cleanup and minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal =
below. I had a similar feeling about the last paragraph not really =
fitting but don't have a better location to suggest so am just leaving =
it.=20
>=20
> 2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs
>=20
> While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered =
redirect_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the authorization =
server to apply its own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value =
presented by the client at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth =
Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization server exactly match the =
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means for early detection =
of client impersonation attempts and prevents token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, this can make client management more =
cumbersome since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of =
a client policy.
>=20
> The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization =
server for a confidential client using pushed authorization requests =
since the authorization server authenticates the client before the =
authorization process starts and thus ensures it is interacting with the =
legitimate client. The authorization server MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values that were not previously registered with the =
authorization server. This will give the client more flexibility (e.g. =
to mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization server at =
runtime) and can simplify client management. It is at the discretion of =
the authorization server to apply restrictions on supplied redirect_uri =
values, e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain URI prefix =
or allow only a query parameter to vary at runtime.
>=20
> The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also =
useful in situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and =
policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client =
certificates containing client permissions. Such an externally managed =
client could interact with an authorization server trusting the =
respective 3rd party without the need for an additional registration =
step.
>=20
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
> The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt =
the stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its =
own. This section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each =
other. That said, I think adding some of Taka=E2=80=99s observations to =
Torsten=E2=80=99s text wouldn=E2=80=99t hurt:
>=20
> 2.4. Management of redirect_uri
>=20
> While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered =
redirect_uri values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its =
own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client =
at the authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 =
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri =
parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a =
particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to =
impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As =
a downside, it makes client management more complex since the redirect =
URI is typically the most volatile part of a client policy.
>=20
> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client =
uses pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.
>=20
> I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside =
of here. I=E2=80=99m not sure where, but it doesn=E2=80=99t quite seem =
to fit, to me. It=E2=80=99s not the end of the world if it stays here =
though as it=E2=80=99s a decent view on the =E2=80=9Cwhy".
>=20
> The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also =
useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and =
policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates =
containing client permissions. Such an externally managed client could =
interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party without the need =
for an additional registration step.
>=20
>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>=20
>> On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>> Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a =
client can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only =
when all the following conditions are satisfied.
>>=20
>> 1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section =
3.1.2.2 requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
>> 2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires =
that confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register =
redirect URIs.)
>> 3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 =
Section 3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
>> 4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 =
Section 5.2.2 Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)
>>=20
>> In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 =
authorization-code-flow requests from confidential clients can choose an =
arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is =
used, existing specifications require pre-registration of redirect URIs. =
I'm not sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri Management" is going to =
introduce rules that conflict with existing specifications, it is better =
to list the conflicts explicitly in the section.
>>=20
>> Best Regards,
>> Takahiko Kawasaki
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten=3D40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>> Here is my proposal for the new section:
>>=20
>> 2.4. redirect_uri Management
>>=20
>> The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as =
OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the =
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously =
established for a particular client. This is a means to early detect =
attempts to impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open =
redirection. As a downside, it makes client management more complex =
since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client =
policy.
>>=20
>> This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client =
uses pushed authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client =
before the authorization process starts and that way ensures it =
interacts with the legit client. The AS MAY allow such clients to =
specify redirect_uri values not previously registered with the AS. This =
will give the client more flexibility (e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect =
URIs on the fly) and makes client management much easier. It is at the =
discretion of the AS to apply restriction on redirect_uri values, e.g. =
the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a query parameter =
to vary at runtime.
>>=20
>> Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is =
also useful in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials =
and policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client =
certifiates containing client permissions. Such an externally managed =
client could interact with an AS trusting the respective 3rd party =
without the need for an additional registration step.
>>=20
>> > On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>> >=20
>> > I completely agree with the utility of the function in question =
here and it needs to be included. I=E2=80=99m in favor of creating a =
dedicated section for redirect_uri management, so that we can explain =
exactly how and why to relax the requirement from core OAuth. In =
addition, I think we want to discuss that the AS might have its own =
restrictions on which redirect URIs an authenticated client might be =
able to use. For example, registering a client with a Redirect URI =
prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at runtime. All of =
these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting its =
authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policies =
should apply.
>> >=20
>> > =E2=80=94 Justin
>> >=20
>> >> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt =
<torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>> >>=20
>> >>=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>>   =C2=B66: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate =
and authorize clients=E2=80=9D? I think what we mean here is "the =
ability to authenticate clients and validate client requests=E2=80=9D, =
but I=E2=80=99m not positive of the intent.=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is =
authorized to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, =
response type, etc.). But checking authorization to request =
authorization is confusing wording. I think your working is less =
confusing and still allows for the intent.=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he =
originally wrote the text in question.=20
>> >>=20
>> >> that was the original intent. I think =E2=80=9Cvalidate" is fine.=20=

>> >>=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>>   =C2=B67: I=E2=80=99m not sure I buy this example. Even if the =
clientID is managed externally, the association with a set or pattern of =
allowed redirect URIs is still important, and the AS will need to know =
what that is. I think this example could lead an AS developer to =
(erroneously and dangerously) conclude that they don=E2=80=99t have to =
check any other values in a request, including scope and redirect URI. =
It=E2=80=99s important that DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t alleviate that issue, =
but removal of DynReg doesn=E2=80=99t really change things in that =
regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
>> >>>=20
>> >>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be =
honest, I'm not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards =
thinking the draft would be better off without it.=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>=20
>> >> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as =
way to make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the =
allowed redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at =
registration time (might be manually).
>> >>=20
>> >> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is =
talking to the legit client. That=E2=80=99s why I don=E2=80=99t see an =
issue with letting the client set a per transaction redirect_uri. This =
will give the client more flexibility (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on =
the fly) and makes client management much easier since redirect URIs are =
the most volatile part of a client policy.=20
>> >>=20
>> >> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client =
identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of =
OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The =
(technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS =
compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain =
the permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation =
allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don=E2=80=99t =
contain OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any =
financial institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, =
to accept and process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
>> >>=20
>> >> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
>> >> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as =
credential. Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client =
authentication means then an initial access token. Beside that, it would =
violate the text of the regulation.=20
>> >> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the =
recommended approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
>> >>=20
>> >> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.=20
>> >>=20
>> >> I don=E2=80=99t want this text to cause confusing. On the other =
hand this potential of PAR is way too important to not mention it at =
all. What about moving it into a special section "redirect_uri =
management=E2=80=9D?
>> >>=20
>> >>>=20
>> >>=20
>> >=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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From: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
References: <101390f1-0d6e-e5fe-861b-4d7e9b7816dd@danielfett.de> <7877fdc2-eeb0-18dd-5a89-ecb30800eacf@danielfett.de> <CA+k3eCQg33wXpe+vo7by6fPJsBmdJnd378RSEGwApCBxCgPnPw@mail.gmail.com> <MN2PR00MB06866084FF95C4956A76B472F59B0@MN2PR00MB0686.namprd00.prod.outlook.com> <cf52ffac-1542-2e90-9017-50af154765a8@hackmanit.de> <6E29CD61-6F80-4A8B-A6D9-6A616532FDB6@lodderstedt.net>
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Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2020 15:07:49 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: Mix-Up Revisited
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I am fairly new to this working group (and the IETF in general), so I
will probably need some guidance, but I would be happy to help better
defining mix-up preventions. I will start to work on an ID.

Best regards,
Karsten

On 29.08.2020 14:34, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
>> On 11. Aug 2020, at 08:20, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzu=
selhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I think we all agree that proper countermeasures of mix-up attacks sho=
uld definitely be part of the BCP and 2.1 due to the severe impact succes=
sful mix-up attacks have.
>> Theoretically speaking every client which supports multiple AS is pote=
ntially vulnerable to mix-up attacks. While in practice it might seem unl=
ikely it is possible that one of the honest AS the client supports gets c=
ompromised and can be utilized for a mix-up attack.=20
>>
>> In a previous thread of last November (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/ar=
ch/msg/oauth/A7F5xSEa8DdfxHKWHW3Mqol_a4A/) I discussed why =E2=80=9Cuse d=
istinct redirect URIs for each AS=E2=80=9D is not an effective countermea=
sure against mix-up attacks (if dynamic client registration is used). I w=
ould argue that this is especially important for mobile applications, SPA=
s, and other native applications because it is very common for them to us=
e dynamic client registration. Many iOS applications now must support mul=
tiple AS since Apple forces the support for =E2=80=9CSign in with Apple=E2=
=80=9D if any single sign-on provider is supported. This policy makes mix=
-up attacks applicable.
>>
>> I fully agree with Daniel, Brian, and Mike that it is important to def=
ine and register the =E2=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D parameter properly to ensure t=
hat both clients and AS understand and use it in the correct way. I under=
stand that OAuth 2.1 is not meant to introduce and define new parameters =
but I strongly suggest that the =E2=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D parameter should be=
 introduced and defined elsewhere so that it can be natively included in =
2.1. In other words the =E2=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D parameter should be integra=
ted in 2.1 the same way PKCE is: the initial definition of the parameter(=
s) is in another document (RFC 7636 in the case of PKCE) and then include=
d in 2.1.
>>
>> What do you think would be the best place to define and register the =E2=
=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D parameter? Would it be worthwhile to reactivate and up=
date =E2=80=9Cdraft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation=E2=80=9D?
> That=E2=80=99s a decision of the authors. Alternatively, a new small dr=
aft (referring to the BCP=E2=80=99s attack description) should do the job=
 as well. Mind to write an ID? :-)
>
>> Best regards,
>>
>> Karsten
>>
>>
>>
>> On 18.06.2020 22:49, Mike Jones wrote:
>>> I support documenting the use of the issuer to mitigate mix-up attack=
s.  Note that while issuer was first defined by OpenID Connect, it became=
 art of OAuth 2.0 in RFC 8414 - OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata.
>>> =20
>>>                                                        -- Mike
>>> =20
>>> From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Brian Campbell
>>> Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2020 1:32 PM
>>> To: Daniel Fett <fett@danielfett.de>
>>> Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
>>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up Revisited
>>> =20
>>> In my (probably simplistic) understanding of things, the root underly=
ing issue that allows for mix-up in its variations is the lack of anythin=
g identifying the AS in the authorization response. Following from that, =
introducing and using an `iss` authorization response parameter has alway=
s seemed like the most straightforward approach for mitigating the issue =
(which was part of the draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation but other param=
eters were also included and, for reasons I'm not sure about, interest in=
 that work faded in favor of telling clients to use per AS redirect URIs)=
 . Though for the `iss` authorization response parameter to be effective,=
 all parties involved need to know about it and act on it. So I think it'=
d need to be something more than a passing recommendation in the BCP. It =
should be defined, registered, explained, etc.. Actually introducing a ne=
w parameter is maybe going beyond the expected scope of the BCP (or 2.1).=
 But maybe that's ok, if we're at least more intentional about it.=20
>>> =20
>>> On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 7:53 AM Daniel Fett <fett@danielfett.de> wrote=
:
>>> Hi all,
>>> I was wondering if we should move towards introducing and (more expli=
citly) recommending the iss parameter in the security BCP, for the reason=
s laid out below and in the article (which is now athttps://danielfett.de=
/2020/05/04/mix-up-revisited/).
>>> =20
>>> Any thoughts on this?
>>> =20
>>> -Daniel
>>> =20
>>> Am 04.05.20 um 19:34 schrieb Daniel Fett:
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> to make substantiated recommendations for FAPI 2.0, the security cons=
iderations for PAR, and the security BCP, I did another analysis on the t=
hreats that arise from mix-up attacks. I was interested in particular in =
two questions:
>>>
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Does PAR help preventing mix-up attacks?
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Do we need JARM to prevent mix-up attacks?
>>> I wrote down several attack variants and configurations in the follow=
ing document: https://danielfett.github.io/notes/oauth/Mix-Up%20Revisited=
=2Ehtml
>>>
>>> The key takeaways are:
>>>
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 The security BCP needs to make clear that per-AS redirect =
URIs are only sufficient if OAuth Metadata is not used to resolve multipl=
e issuers. Otherwise, per-Issuer redirect URIs or the iss parameter MUST =
be used.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 PAR-enabled authorization servers can protect the integrit=
y better and protect against Mix-Up Attacks better if they ONLY accept PA=
R requests.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 We should emphasize the importance of the iss parameter (o=
r issuer) in the authorization response. Maybe introduce this parameter i=
n the security BCP or another document?
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Sender-constrained access tokens help against mix-up attac=
ks when the access token is targeted.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Sender-constraining the authorization code (PAR + PAR-DPoP=
?) might be worth looking into.
>>> I would like to hear your thoughts!
>>>
>>> -Daniel
>>>
>>> =20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>> =20
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privi=
leged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review,=
 use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited..  If y=
ou have received this communication in error, please notify the sender im=
mediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from =
your computer. Thank you.
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> --=20
>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>> IT Security Consultant
>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>> Web:=09
>> https://hackmanit.de
>>  | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>>
>> Unsere n=C3=A4chste Live Online-Schulung zur Sicherheit von OAuth und =
OpenID Connect am 24.09 + 25.09:
>>
>> https://hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/109-live-online-schulung-single-sig=
n-on-sicherheit-oauth-openid-connect-am-24-und-25-09-2020
>>
>>
>> Hackmanit GmbH
>> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>> 44789 Bochum
>>
>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Jura=
j Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, =
Security Training

Unsere n=C3=A4chste Live Online-Schulung zur Sicherheit von OAuth und Ope=
nID Connect am 24.09 + 25.09:
https://hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/109-live-online-schulung-single-sign-o=
n-sicherheit-oauth-openid-connect-am-24-und-25-09-2020

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz


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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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To: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: Mix-Up Revisited
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Great! Just drop me an email if you need support.

> On 4. Sep 2020, at 15:07, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen =
<karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>=20
> I am fairly new to this working group (and the IETF in general), so I =
will probably need some guidance, but I would be happy to help better =
defining mix-up preventions. I will start to work on an ID.
>=20
> Best regards,
> Karsten
>=20
> On 29.08.2020 14:34, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
>>> On 11. Aug 2020, at 08:20, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen =
<karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
>>>  wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Hi all,
>>>=20
>>> I think we all agree that proper countermeasures of mix-up attacks =
should definitely be part of the BCP and 2.1 due to the severe impact =
successful mix-up attacks have.
>>> Theoretically speaking every client which supports multiple AS is =
potentially vulnerable to mix-up attacks. While in practice it might =
seem unlikely it is possible that one of the honest AS the client =
supports gets compromised and can be utilized for a mix-up attack.=20
>>>=20
>>> In a previous thread of last November (
>>> =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/A7F5xSEa8DdfxHKWHW3Mqol_a4A/
>>> ) I discussed why =E2=80=9Cuse distinct redirect URIs for each AS=E2=80=
=9D is not an effective countermeasure against mix-up attacks (if =
dynamic client registration is used). I would argue that this is =
especially important for mobile applications, SPAs, and other native =
applications because it is very common for them to use dynamic client =
registration. Many iOS applications now must support multiple AS since =
Apple forces the support for =E2=80=9CSign in with Apple=E2=80=9D if any =
single sign-on provider is supported. This policy makes mix-up attacks =
applicable.
>>>=20
>>> I fully agree with Daniel, Brian, and Mike that it is important to =
define and register the =E2=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D parameter properly to =
ensure that both clients and AS understand and use it in the correct =
way. I understand that OAuth 2.1 is not meant to introduce and define =
new parameters but I strongly suggest that the =E2=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D =
parameter should be introduced and defined elsewhere so that it can be =
natively included in 2.1. In other words the =E2=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D =
parameter should be integrated in 2.1 the same way PKCE is: the initial =
definition of the parameter(s) is in another document (RFC 7636 in the =
case of PKCE) and then included in 2.1.
>>>=20
>>> What do you think would be the best place to define and register the =
=E2=80=9Ciss=E2=80=9D parameter? Would it be worthwhile to reactivate =
and update =E2=80=9Cdraft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation=E2=80=9D?
>>>=20
>> That=E2=80=99s a decision of the authors. Alternatively, a new small =
draft (referring to the BCP=E2=80=99s attack description) should do the =
job as well. Mind to write an ID? :-)
>>=20
>>=20
>>> Best regards,
>>>=20
>>> Karsten
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On 18.06.2020 22:49, Mike Jones wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> I support documenting the use of the issuer to mitigate mix-up =
attacks.  Note that while issuer was first defined by OpenID Connect, it =
became art of OAuth 2.0 in RFC 8414 - OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server =
Metadata.
>>>> =20
>>>>                                                        -- Mike
>>>> =20
>>>> From: OAuth=20
>>>> <oauth-bounces@ietf.org>
>>>>  On Behalf Of Brian Campbell
>>>> Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2020 1:32 PM
>>>> To: Daniel Fett=20
>>>> <fett@danielfett.de>
>>>>=20
>>>> Cc: oauth=20
>>>> <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>=20
>>>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up Revisited
>>>> =20
>>>> In my (probably simplistic) understanding of things, the root =
underlying issue that allows for mix-up in its variations is the lack of =
anything identifying the AS in the authorization response. Following =
from that, introducing and using an `iss` authorization response =
parameter has always seemed like the most straightforward approach for =
mitigating the issue (which was part of the =
draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation but other parameters were also =
included and, for reasons I'm not sure about, interest in that work =
faded in favor of telling clients to use per AS redirect URIs) . Though =
for the `iss` authorization response parameter to be effective, all =
parties involved need to know about it and act on it. So I think it'd =
need to be something more than a passing recommendation in the BCP. It =
should be defined, registered, explained, etc.. Actually introducing a =
new parameter is maybe going beyond the expected scope of the BCP (or =
2.1). But maybe that's ok, if we're at least more intentional about it.=20=

>>>> =20
>>>> On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 7:53 AM Daniel Fett=20
>>>> <fett@danielfett.de>
>>>>  wrote:
>>>> Hi all,
>>>> I was wondering if we should move towards introducing and (more =
explicitly) recommending the iss parameter in the security BCP, for the =
reasons laid out below and in the article (which is now =
athttps://danielfett.de/2020/05/04/mix-up-revisited/).
>>>> =20
>>>> Any thoughts on this?
>>>> =20
>>>> -Daniel
>>>> =20
>>>> Am 04.05.20 um 19:34 schrieb Daniel Fett:
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>=20
>>>> to make substantiated recommendations for FAPI 2.0, the security =
considerations for PAR, and the security BCP, I did another analysis on =
the threats that arise from mix-up attacks. I was interested in =
particular in two questions:
>>>>=20
>>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Does PAR help preventing mix-up attacks?
>>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Do we need JARM to prevent mix-up attacks?
>>>> I wrote down several attack variants and configurations in the =
following document:=20
>>>> https://danielfett.github.io/notes/oauth/Mix-Up%20Revisited.html
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> The key takeaways are:
>>>>=20
>>>> 	=E2=80=A2 The security BCP needs to make clear that per-AS =
redirect URIs are only sufficient if OAuth Metadata is not used to =
resolve multiple issuers. Otherwise, per-Issuer redirect URIs or the iss =
parameter MUST be used.
>>>> 	=E2=80=A2 PAR-enabled authorization servers can protect the =
integrity better and protect against Mix-Up Attacks better if they ONLY =
accept PAR requests.
>>>> 	=E2=80=A2 We should emphasize the importance of the iss =
parameter (or issuer) in the authorization response. Maybe introduce =
this parameter in the security BCP or another document?
>>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Sender-constrained access tokens help against mix-up =
attacks when the access token is targeted.
>>>> 	=E2=80=A2 Sender-constraining the authorization code (PAR + =
PAR-DPoP?) might be worth looking into.
>>>> I would like to hear your thoughts!
>>>>=20
>>>> -Daniel
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>=20
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>=20
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and =
privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any =
review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly =
prohibited..  If you have received this communication in error, please =
notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any =
file attachments from your computer. Thank you.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>> --=20
>>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>> IT Security Consultant
>>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>>> Web:=09
>>>=20
>>> https://hackmanit.de
>>>=20
>>>  | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>>>=20
>>> Unsere n=C3=A4chste Live Online-Schulung zur Sicherheit von OAuth =
und OpenID Connect am 24.09 + 25.09:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> =
https://hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/109-live-online-schulung-single-sign-on=
-sicherheit-oauth-openid-connect-am-24-und-25-09-2020
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Hackmanit GmbH
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>>>=20
>>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>>> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. =
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>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>=20
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> --=20
> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
> IT Security Consultant
> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
> Web:=09
> https://hackmanit.de
>  | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>=20
> Unsere n=C3=A4chste Live Online-Schulung zur Sicherheit von OAuth und =
OpenID Connect am 24.09 + 25.09:
>=20
> =
https://hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/109-live-online-schulung-single-sign-on=
-sicherheit-oauth-openid-connect-am-24-und-25-09-2020
>=20
>=20
> Hackmanit GmbH
> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
> 44789 Bochum
>=20
> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. =
Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>=20


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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2020 10:44:54 -0400
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There is no meeting this Monday, September 7, because of a holiday in
Canada and the US.

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 7:03 AM Web Authorization Protocol Working Group
<messenger=40webex.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

>
> Web Authorization Protocol Working Group invites you to join this Webex
> meeting.
>
> Meeting number (access code): 643 148 548
> Meeting password: BWsAF9rT
>
> Occurs every 2 week(s) on Monday effective Monday, August 24, 2020 from
> 6:00 PM to 6:30 PM, (UTC+02:00) Amsterdam, Berlin, Bern, Rome, Stockholm,
> Vienna
> 6:00 pm  |  (UTC+02:00) Amsterdam, Berlin, Bern, Rome, Stockholm,
> Vienna  |  30 mins
>
> Join meeting
> <https://ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=m8bb90851328c48ff85e6507f1c6cdeb3>
>
> *Tap to join from a mobile device (attendees only)*
> +1-650-479-3208,,643148548## <%2B1-650-479-3208,,*01*643148548%23%23*01*>
> Call-in toll number (US/Canada)
>
> *Join by phone*
> 1-650-479-3208 Call-in toll number (US/Canada)
>
>
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> Need help? Go to http://help.webex.com
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> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000ca216805aea62550
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<div dir=3D"ltr">There is no meeting this Monday, September 7, because of a=
 holiday in Canada and the US.<div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0=
Rifaat</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D=
"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 7:03 AM Web Authorizatio=
n Protocol Working Group &lt;messenger=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40webex.com@dmar=
c.ietf.org">40webex.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">

<table bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" style=3D"padding:0px;margin:0px;border:0px;width=
:100%" align=3D"left">
	<tbody><tr style=3D"height:28px"><td>=C2=A0</td></tr>
	<tr>
		<td align=3D"left" style=3D"padding:0px 20px;margin:0px">
		=09


<table>
       <tbody><tr>
           <td style=3D"height:22px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Arial;font=
-size:16px;font-weight:bold;line-height:22px">
                Web Authorization Protocol Working Group invites you to joi=
n this Webex meeting.
                	           </td>
      </tr>
</tbody></table>


<table><tbody><tr style=3D"line-height:20px"><td style=3D"height:20px">=C2=
=A0</td></tr></tbody></table>

    <table style=3D"width:auto">
        <tbody><tr>
            <td style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:16px;=
line-height:22px">
                Meeting number (access code): 643 148 548
            </td>
        </tr>
    </tbody></table>
    <table style=3D"width:auto">
        <tbody><tr>
            <td style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:16px;=
line-height:22px">Meeting password: BWsAF9rT</td>
        </tr>
    </tbody></table>
<table><tbody><tr style=3D"line-height:20px"><td style=3D"height:20px">=C2=
=A0</td></tr></tbody></table>

    <table width=3D"100%">
        <tbody><tr style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(102,102,102);font-family:A=
rial;font-size:14px;line-height:22px">
            <td style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(102,102,102);font-family:Aria=
l;font-size:14px;line-height:22px">Occurs every 2 week(s) on Monday effecti=
ve Monday, August 24, 2020 from 6:00 PM to 6:30 PM, (UTC+02:00) Amsterdam, =
Berlin, Bern, Rome, Stockholm, Vienna
            </td>
        </tr>
        <tr style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(102,102,102);font-family:Arial;fo=
nt-size:14px;line-height:22px">
            <td style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(102,102,102);font-family:Aria=
l;font-size:14px;line-height:22px">6:00 pm=C2=A0=C2=A0|=C2=A0=C2=A0(UTC+02:=
00) Amsterdam, Berlin, Bern, Rome, Stockholm, Vienna=C2=A0=C2=A0|=C2=A0=C2=
=A030 mins
            </td>
        </tr>
    </tbody></table>

 <font size=3D"2" color=3D"#FF0000" style=3D"font-family:Arial"></font>

   =20

			<table style=3D"padding-bottom:4px;font-family:Arial"><tbody><tr style=
=3D"line-height:20px"><td style=3D"height:20px">=C2=A0</td></tr></tbody></t=
able>
			<table style=3D"width:auto"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"width:auto"><table b=
order=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" style=3D"background-color:r=
gb(67,169,66);border:0px solid rgb(67,169,66);border-radius:20px;width:auto=
;min-width:160px"><tbody><tr><td align=3D"center" style=3D"padding:10px 36p=
x;font-family:Arial"><a href=3D"https://ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=3Dm8=
bb90851328c48ff85e6507f1c6cdeb3" style=3D"color:rgb(255,255,255);font-size:=
20px;text-decoration:none" target=3D"_blank">Join meeting</a></td></tr></tb=
ody></table></td></tr></tbody></table>
			<table><tbody><tr style=3D"line-height:48px"><td style=3D"height:48px">=
=C2=A0</td></tr></tbody></table>


	<table><tbody><tr><td style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Arial;font-siz=
e:12px;font-weight:bold;line-height:24px"><b>Tap to join from a mobile devi=
ce (attendees only)</b></td></tr><tr style=3D"margin:0px"><td style=3D"font=
-family:Arial;font-size:14px;line-height:24px"><a href=3D"tel:%2B1-650-479-=
3208,,*01*643148548%23%23*01*" style=3D"color:rgb(0,175,249);text-decoratio=
n:none;font-family:Arial;font-size:14px;line-height:24px" target=3D"_blank"=
>+1-650-479-3208,,643148548##</a> Call-in toll number (US/Canada)</td></tr>=
<tr style=3D"line-height:24px"><td style=3D"height:24px">=C2=A0</td></tr></=
tbody></table><table><tbody><tr><td style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:A=
rial;font-size:12px;font-weight:bold;line-height:24px"><b>Join by phone</b>=
</td></tr><tr style=3D"margin:0px"><td style=3D"color:rgb(51,51,51);font-fa=
mily:Arial;font-size:14px;line-height:24px">1-650-479-3208=C2=A0<span style=
=3D"color:rgb(51,51,51)">Call-in toll number (US/Canada)</span></td></tr><t=
r style=3D"margin:0px"><td style=3D"font-family:Arial;font-size:14px;line-h=
eight:24px"></td></tr></tbody></table><table cellpadding=3D"0" cellspacing=
=3D"0"><tbody><tr style=3D"line-height:28px"><td style=3D"height:28px">=C2=
=A0</td></tr></tbody></table>
=09
   =20

	<table><tbody><tr style=3D"line-height:20px"><td style=3D"height:20px">=C2=
=A0</td></tr></tbody></table>
=09

			<table style=3D"width:100%" align=3D"left">
                <tbody><tr style=3D"height:72px"><td>=C2=A0</td></tr>
				<tr>
					<td style=3D"height:24px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Arial;font-size:=
14px;line-height:24px">Need help? Go to <a href=3D"http://help.webex.com" s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(4,159,217);text-decoration:none" target=3D"_blank">http:/=
/help.webex.com</a>
					</td>
				</tr>
                <tr style=3D"height:44px"><td>=C2=A0</td></tr>
			</tbody></table>
		</td>
	</tr>
</tbody></table>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000ca216805aea62550--


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Hi Victorio, Hi all,

I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. R=
eading through the draft I have a few minor suggestions:

Section 2:

I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs complying =
with the requirements described in this section."

Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see t=
erminology section).

Section 2.1

s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
(same replacement in Section 4)

s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is an access token./This =
specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.

Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as in Se=
ction 2.2.

Section 2.2

s/""aud"/"aud"

2.2.1

s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   aut=
h_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr,=
 amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].


s/Please see/See

s/For example:/For example,

Section 4

You write:

"Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Meta=
data [RFC8414] ... "

Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives me the=
 impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"


s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security implication=
s./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security implications.

This sentence sounds strange to me:
"
   When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],
   resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

How about:
"
   Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just rep=
eating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?


You write:

"
If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
   the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them
   in combination with any other contextual information available to
   determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.
"

Include a reference to the authorization claims section


s/ For more
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For mo=
re
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].


You write:

"
   Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
   for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
   safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
"

The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe what fo=
llows afterwards in the text.

You write:

"
The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
   the access token
"

This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interoperabili=
ty. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the following would work=
:

"
   Authorization server and the resource server
   might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
   switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the
   client relying on the ability to read the access token content would
   break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access toke=
ns
   are treated opaque by clients.

   Administrators of authorization servers should also take into account th=
at
   the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever client
   access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
   given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps
   to prevent it.
"


You wrote:

"

   In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
   user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
   without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply
   access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken
   to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting
   the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
   sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
   access tokens.
"

The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would sugge=
st to delete
the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence to the=
 previous paragraph.

You wrote:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
   level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign
   "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
   situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
"

The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy. Wh=
at you are
talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal=
 with such
privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.

Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something like=
:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be
   populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
   assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly, if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
"


Section 7.2

s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
/   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.


References

RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

RFC 7644 is an unused reference:

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
              September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.

The same is true for RFC 3986:

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.


Ciao
Hannes

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Victorio, Hi all, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth=
-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I have a few minor suggesti=
ons:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would delete this sentence &quot;JWT access tokens=
 are regular JWTs complying with the requirements described in this section=
.&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on t=
he previous page (see terminology section).
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">(same replacement in Section 4)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; This specification registers the &quo=
t;application/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is an access token./This specification registers the &quot;applicat=
ion/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is a JWT access token.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Use capitalized &quot;Section&quot; when a section n=
umber is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.2<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&quot;&quot;aud&quot;/&quot;aud&quot;<o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2.2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined=
 in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as =
defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined =
in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as de=
fined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see/See <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/For example:/For example, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2=
.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... &quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Are you sure you mean &quot;implement&quot; and not =
&quot;use&quot;? The paragraph gives me the impression that you talk about =
&quot;ASs using RFC 8414&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance =
on security implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on secu=
rity implications.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This sentence sounds strange to me: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 =
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource servers receiving a JWT access=
 token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">How about: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource servers receiving a JWT access=
 token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the=
 steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting=
 them?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the JWT access token includes authorization claim=
s as described in<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the authorization claims section, the r=
esource server SHOULD use them<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; in combination with any other contextua=
l information available to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; determine whether the current call shou=
ld be authorized or rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Include a reference to the authorization claims sect=
ion<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; details on cross-JWT confusion please r=
efer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; details on cross-JWT confusion please r=
efer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Authorization servers should not rely o=
n the use of different keys<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens an=
d JWT tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; safeguard against the consequences of l=
eaking specific keys.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The phrase &quot;leaking keys&quot; is probably not =
the best term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in =
terms of interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like t=
he following would work:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Authorization server and the resou=
rce server<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; might decide to change token format at =
any time (for example by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; switching from this profile to opaque t=
okens). Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; client relying on the ability to read t=
he access token content would<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 f=
ramework assumes that access tokens
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;are treated opaque by clients. <o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators of authorization servers=
 should also take into account that
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the content of an access token is =
visible to the client. Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access to the access token content pres=
ents privacy issues for a<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; given scenario, the authorization serve=
r should take explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; to prevent it.&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; In scenarios in which JWT access tokens=
 are accessible to the end<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; user, it should be evaluated whether th=
e information can be accessed<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; without privacy violations (for example=
, if an end user would simply<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access his or her own personal informat=
ion) or if steps must be taken<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; to enforce confidentiality.&nbsp; Possi=
ble measures include: encrypting<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token, encrypting the sensit=
ive claims, omitting the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; sensitive claims or not using this prof=
ile, falling back on opaque<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The first sentence is a repetition of the previous p=
aragraph. I would suggest to delete<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the=
 second sentence to the previous paragraph.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; This profile mandates the presence of t=
he &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making it possible for re=
source servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; information for performing tasks such a=
s correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; requests with data stored locally for t=
he authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the ability to correlate reque=
sts might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are sce=
narios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlatio=
n to preserve the desired<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; level of privacy.&nbsp; Authorization s=
ervers should choose how to assign<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;sub&quot; values according to the=
 level of privacy required by each<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; situation.&nbsp; For instance: if a sol=
ution requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal activities across multiple re=
source servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization server should ensure that=
 JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource servers have distinc=
t &quot;sub&quot; values tht cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the event of resource ser=
vers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly: if<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires preventing a resour=
ce server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resourc=
e itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different &quot;su=
b&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client=
 should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource se=
rver, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different &quo=
t;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation betwe=
en distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The above paragraph suggests that there are differen=
t levels of privacy. What you are
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">talking about in the text is unlinkability and ident=
ification. Ways to deal with such
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 69=
73. <o:p>
</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the para=
graph to something like:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; This profile mandates the presence of t=
he &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making it possible for re=
source servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; information for correlating incoming<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; requests with data stored locally for t=
he authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the ability to correlate reque=
sts might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are sce=
narios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlatio=
n. The &quot;sub&quot; claim should be
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;populated by the authorization ser=
vers according to a privacy impact
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;assessment. For instance, if a sol=
ution requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal activities across multiple re=
source servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization server should ensure that=
 JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource servers have distinc=
t &quot;sub&quot; values that cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the event of resource ser=
vers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly, if<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires preventing a resour=
ce server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resourc=
e itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different &quot;su=
b&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client=
 should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource se=
rver, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different &quo=
t;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation betwe=
en distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 7.2<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this speci=
fication refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;gro=
ups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; express authorization information in JW=
T access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification =
refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;gro=
ups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; express authorization information in JW=
T access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">References<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference: <o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC7519]&nbsp; Jones, M., Bradley, J.,=
 and N. Sakimura, &quot;JSON Web Token<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (JWT)&quot;, RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May=
 2015,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519&gt;.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7644 is an unused reference: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC7644]&nbsp; Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle,=
 K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and C. Mortimore, &quot;System for Cross-domain =
Identity<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span lang=3D"FR">Management: Protocol&quot;, RF=
C 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>September 2015, &lt;htt=
ps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644&gt;.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The same is true for RFC 3986: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC3986]&nbsp; Berners-Lee, T., Fieldi=
ng, R., and L. Masinter, &quot;Uniform<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;,=
 STD 66,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986&gt;.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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Thread-Topic: Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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Hi all,

In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter is
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in the=
ory.

For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wi=
th
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it =
can
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.

The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share t=
he
storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the AS a=
nd RS
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7=
).

If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify whic=
h key
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to=
 send
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
parameter to specify the key.

Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but=
 I'm
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the l=
atest
draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same DP=
oP
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases
where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would allow
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.

I'd like to hear your opinions about it.


[*1]: https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-48070=
1746
[*2]: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2Q=
Rc/


Best regards,
Toshio Ito

-------------
Toshio Ito
Research and Development Center
Toshiba Corporation


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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 23:23:18 +0900
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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--00000000000042a8d505aece14a3
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

To enable each "instance" of a client application to use a key pair which
is dedicated to the instance, the public key needs to be included in the
DPoP proof. On the other hand, in the scenario you described, all instances
of the client application have to share one key pair. If client application
instances don't have to share one key pair, it's better.

Illustrated DPoP (OAuth Access Token Security Enhancement)
https://medium.com/@darutk/illustrated-dpop-oauth-access-token-security-enhancement-801680d761ff

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 6:29 PM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter is
> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in
> theory.
>
> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered
> with
> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it
> can
> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.
> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>
> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share
> the
> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the AS
> and RS
> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to
> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section
> 7).
>
> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify
> which key
> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need
> to send
> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
> parameter to specify the key.
>
> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1],
> but I'm
> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the
> latest
> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same
> DPoP
> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases
> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would allow
> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>
> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>
>
> [*1]:
> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746
> [*2]:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/
>
>
> Best regards,
> Toshio Ito
>
> -------------
> Toshio Ito
> Research and Development Center
> Toshiba Corporation
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">To enable each &quot;instance&quot; of a client applicatio=
n to use a key pair which is dedicated to the instance, the public key need=
s to be included in the DPoP proof. On the other hand, in the scenario you =
described, all instances of the client application have to share one key pa=
ir. If client application instances don&#39;t have to share one key pair, i=
t&#39;s better.<br><br>Illustrated DPoP (OAuth Access Token Security Enhanc=
ement)<br><a href=3D"https://medium.com/@darutk/illustrated-dpop-oauth-acce=
ss-token-security-enhancement-801680d761ff">https://medium.com/@darutk/illu=
strated-dpop-oauth-access-token-security-enhancement-801680d761ff</a><br><b=
r>Best Regards,<br>Takahiko Kawasaki<br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 6:29 PM &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp">toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi al=
l,<br>
<br>
In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the &quot;jwk&quot; header para=
meter is<br>
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where &quot;jwk&quot; is not necess=
ary in theory.<br>
<br>
For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the<br>
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wi=
th<br>
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it =
can<br>
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.=
<br>
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
<br>
The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share t=
he<br>
storage for clients&#39; public keys. Things are a little difficult if the =
AS and RS<br>
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to=
<br>
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7=
).<br>
<br>
If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify whic=
h key<br>
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to=
 send<br>
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use &quot;kid&quot; =
header<br>
parameter to specify the key.<br>
<br>
Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but=
 I&#39;m<br>
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the l=
atest<br>
draft about the &quot;jwk&quot; header parameter [*2]. I agree with using t=
he same DPoP<br>
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases=
<br>
where we can omit &quot;jwk&quot; in BOTH requests. Making &quot;jwk&quot; =
OPTIONAL would allow<br>
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
<br>
<br>
[*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issueco=
mment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/da=
nielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
[*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UI=
CcZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
<br>
-------------<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
Research and Development Center<br>
Toshiba Corporation<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Hi Hannes,

Two comments between the lines.

> Hi Victorio, Hi all,
>
> I am doing my shepherd write-up for 
> draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I have 
> a few minor suggestions:
>
> Section 2:
>
> I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs 
> complying with the requirements described in this section."
>
> Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page 
> (see terminology section).
>
> Section 2.1
>
> s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
>
> (same replacement in Section 4)
>
> s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
>
>    which can be used to indicate that the content is an access 
> token./This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
>
>    which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.
>
> Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as 
> in Section 2.2.
>
> Section 2.2
>
> s/""aud"/"aud"
>
> 2.2.1
>
> s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of 
> [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of 
> [OpenID.Core].
>
> s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   
> acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
> s/Please see/See
>
> s/For example:/For example,
>
> Section 4
>
> You write:
>
> "Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server 
> Metadata [RFC8414] ... "
>
> Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives 
> me the impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"
>
> s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security 
> implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security 
> implications.
>
> This sentence sounds strange to me:
>
> "
>
>    When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],
>
>    resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
>
>    following manner.
>
> "
>
> How about:
>
> "
>
>    Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
>
>    following manner.
>
> "
>
> Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you 
> just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?
>
> You write:
>
> "
>
> If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
>
>    the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them
>
>    in combination with any other contextual information available to
>
>    determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.
>
> "
>
> Include a reference to the authorization claims section
>
> s/ For more
>
>    details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ 
> For more
>
>    details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of 
> [RFC8725].
>
> You write:
>
> "
>
>    Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
>
>    for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
>
>    safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
>
> "
>
> The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe 
> what follows afterwards in the text.
>
> You write:
>
> "
>
> The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
>
>    the access token
>
> "
>
> This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of 
> interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the 
> following would work:
>
> "
>
>    Authorization server and the resource server
>
>    might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
>
>    switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the
>
>    client relying on the ability to read the access token content would
>
>    break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access 
> tokens
>
>    are treated opaque by clients.
>
>    Administrators of authorization servers should also take into 
> account that
>
>    the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever 
> client
>
>    access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
>
>    given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps
>
>    to prevent it.
>
> "
>
>
/In the general case, /the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access 
tokens are treated as opaque by clients.
However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case: since the 
client gets back an access token conformant to _this_ RFC, then it knows
exactly its detailed structure. The argument about "changing the token 
format at any time" does not apply. In this case, the client is quite sure
that it would be able to understand most of its content (at least all 
the standard claims). The above text proposal would need to be reconsidered.

Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access token to the client 
is odd when an access token contains claims about a human-user :
these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually allowed to 
have access to his own personal data.

Encryption is nice in theory but complicated in practice, since a key 
management system must put in place. Whenever possible, it should be 
avoided.

BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How 
can a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to this 
profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance of an 
access token
compliant to this profile ?

Another comment follows.

> You wrote:
>
> "
>
>    In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
>
>    user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
>
>    without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply
>
>    access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken
>
>    to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting
>
>    the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
>
>    sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
>
>    access tokens.
>
> "
>
> The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would 
> suggest to delete
>
> the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence 
> to the previous paragraph.
>
> You wrote:
>
> "
>
>    This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>
>    access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
>
>    information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
>
>    requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>
>    Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>
>    design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
>
>    server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
>
>    level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign
>
>    "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
>
>    situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking
>
>    principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>    authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
>
>    different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be
>
>    correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if
>
>    a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
>
>    principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>
>    server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>
>    token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>
>    token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>
>    resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>
>    call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>
> "
>
> The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of 
> privacy. What you are
>
> talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to 
> deal with such
>
> privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
>
> Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something 
> like:
>
> "
>
>    This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>
>    access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
>
>    information for correlating incoming
>
>    requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>
>    Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>
>    design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
>
>    server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be
>
>    populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
>
>    assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking
>
>    principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>    authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
>
>    different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
>
>    correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.
>
While the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim in this 
context is not compatible with the definition of the "sub" claim
as defined in RFC 7519:

      4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim

         The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
         subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally statements
         about the subject. *The subject value MUST either be scoped to be**
**        locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally 
unique.*
         The processing of this claim is generally application 
specific.  The
         "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
         value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.

There are two options and two options only:

    "locally unique in the context of the issuer" means that it is the
    same for all RSs.
    "globally unique" means that it is the same not only for all the RSs
    but also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth (e.g. an
    email address).


>     Similarly, if
>
>    a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
>
>    principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>
>    server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>
>    token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>
>    token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>
>    resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>
>    call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>
The proposed text describes two different cases where the sub claim is 
either unique for an AS/RS pair orunique for each access token.

These two cases are not included in the definition found in RFC 7519.

In the general case, an identifier can be:

 1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for all RSs),
 2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but also for
    servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
 3. unique for an AS/RS pair, or
 4. unique for each access token.

I see different ways to solve this problem:

    1° Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and (unfortunately) remove
    these possibilities.
    2° Define two new claims which would support the two cases where the
    sub claim would be either unique for an AS/RS pair orunique for one
    access token.
    3° Define four new claims which would support the four above cases.

Denis

> "
>
> Section 7.2
>
> s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>
>    attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
>
>    express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
> /   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>
>    attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
>
>    express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
> References
>
> RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:
>
>    [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
>
>               (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
>
> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
>
> RFC 7644 is an unused reference:
>
>    [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
>
>               and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
>
> Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
>
> September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
>
> The same is true for RFC 3986:
>
>    [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
>
>               Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
>
>               RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
>
> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are 
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended 
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>
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Hannes,</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Two comments between the lines.<br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Victorio, Hi all, <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">I am doing my shepherd write-up for
          draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the
          draft I have a few minor suggestions:
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Section 2: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">I would delete this sentence "JWT access
          tokens are regular JWTs complying with the requirements
          described in this section."<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Reason: You pretty much make the same
          statement on the previous page (see terminology section).
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Section 2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric
          cryptography<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">(same replacement in Section 4)<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/   This specification registers the
          "application/at+jwt" media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   which can be used to indicate that the
          content is an access token./This specification registers the
          "application/at+jwt" media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   which can be used to indicate that the
          content is a JWT access token.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Use capitalized "Section" when a section
          number is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.  
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Section 2.2<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/""aud"/"aud"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">2.2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in
          section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as
          defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in
          section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined
          in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/Please see/See <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/For example:/For example, <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Section 4<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"Authorization servers SHOULD implement
          OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... "<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Are you sure you mean "implement" and not
          "use"? The paragraph gives me the impression that you talk
          about "ASs using RFC 8414"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/Please see section Section 5 for further
          guidance on security implications./Please see Section 5 for
          further guidance on security implications.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">This sentence sounds strange to me: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0
          Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   resource servers receiving a JWT access
          token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">How about: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   Resource servers receiving a JWT access
          token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then
          list the steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750
          or are you augmenting them?
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">If the JWT access token includes
          authorization claims as described in<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   the authorization claims section, the
          resource server SHOULD use them<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   in combination with any other contextual
          information available to<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   determine whether the current call
          should be authorized or rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Include a reference to the authorization
          claims section<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   details on cross-JWT confusion please
          refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   details on cross-JWT confusion please
          refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   Authorization servers should not rely on
          the use of different keys<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and
          JWT tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   safeguard against the consequences of
          leaking specific keys.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not
          the best term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">You write:<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   the access token<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">This RFC 2119 language is not really
          enforceable in terms of interoperability. Maybe you could
          rephrase a bit. Something like the following would work:<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"   <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   Authorization server and the resource
          server<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   might decide to change token format at
          any time (for example by<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   switching from this profile to opaque
          tokens). Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   client relying on the ability to read
          the access token content would<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0
          framework assumes that access tokens
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   are treated opaque by clients. <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   Administrators of authorization servers
          should also take into account that
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   the content of an access token is
          visible to the client. Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   access to the access token content
          presents privacy issues for a<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   given scenario, the authorization server
          should take explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   to prevent it.   <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <o:p> <br>
        </o:p></div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"> <i>In the general case, </i></font>the
        OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens are treated as
        opaque by clients. <br>
        However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case:
        since the client gets back an access token conformant to <u>this</u>
        RFC, then it knows <br>
        exactly its detailed structure. The argument about "changing the
        token format at any time" does not apply. In this case, the
        client is quite sure <br>
        that it would be able to understand most of its content (at
        least all the standard claims). The above text proposal would
        need to be reconsidered.<br>
        <br>
        Hiding </font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font
            face="Arial">(by encrypting it) </font></font>the content
        of the access token to the client is odd </font><font
        face="Arial">when an access token contains claims about a
        human-user : <br>
        these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually
        allowed to have access to his own personal data.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Encryption is nice in theory but complicated
        in practice, since a key management system must put in place.
        Whenever possible, it should be avoided.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC
        have not been answered: How can a client request an access token
        compliant to this profile ? <br>
        Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to
        this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the
        issuance of an access token <br>
        compliant to this profile ?<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Another comment follows.<br>
        <br>
      </font></p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371667F70B227C3EFA4C3ECAFA290@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   In scenarios in which JWT access tokens
          are accessible to the end<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   user, it should be evaluated whether the
          information can be accessed<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   without privacy violations (for example,
          if an end user would simply<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   access his or her own personal
          information) or if steps must be taken<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   to enforce confidentiality.  Possible
          measures include: encrypting<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   the access token, encrypting the
          sensitive claims, omitting the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   sensitive claims or not using this
          profile, falling back on opaque<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The first sentence is a repetition of the
          previous paragraph. I would suggest to delete<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">the first sentence in this paragraph and to
          move the second sentence to the previous paragraph.
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   This profile mandates the presence of
          the "sub" claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   access token, making it possible for
          resource servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   information for performing tasks such as
          correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   requests with data stored locally for
          the authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   Although the ability to correlate
          requests might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   design in many scenarios, there are
          scenarios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   server might want to prevent correlation
          to preserve the desired<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   level of privacy.  Authorization servers
          should choose how to assign<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   "sub" values according to the level of
          privacy required by each<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   situation.  For instance: if a solution
          requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   principal activities across multiple
          resource servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   authorization server should ensure that
          JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   different resource servers have distinct
          "sub" values tht cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   correlated in the event of resource
          servers collusion.  Similarly: if<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   a solution requires preventing a
          resource server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   principal's activity within the resource
          itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   server should assign different "sub"
          values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   token issued.  In turn, the client
          should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   token for every call to the resource
          server, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   resource server receives different "sub"
          and "jti" values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   call, thus preventing correlation
          between distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The above paragraph suggests that there are
          different levels of privacy. What you are
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">talking about in the text is unlinkability
          and identification. Ways to deal with such
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">privacy threats are described in Section 6
          of RFC 6973. <o:p>
          </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase
          the paragraph to something like:<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   This profile mandates the presence of
          the "sub" claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   access token, making it possible for
          resource servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   information for correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   requests with data stored locally for
          the authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   Although the ability to correlate
          requests might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   design in many scenarios, there are
          scenarios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   server might want to prevent
          correlation. The "sub" claim should be
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   populated by the authorization servers
          according to a privacy impact
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   assessment. For instance, if a solution
          requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   principal activities across multiple
          resource servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   authorization server should ensure that
          JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   different resource servers have distinct
          "sub" values that cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   correlated in the event of resource
          servers collusion.  </p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">While the idea is really nice, the use of the
        "sub" claim in this context is not compatible with the
        definition of the "sub" claim <br>
        as defined in RFC 7519:<br>
        <br>
             4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim<br>
                <br>
                The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that
        is the <br>
                subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally
        statements<br>
                about the subject.  <b>The subject value MUST either be
          scoped to be</b><b><br>
        </b><b>        locally unique in the context of the issuer or be
          globally unique.</b><br>
                The processing of this claim is generally application
        specific.  The<br>
                "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a
        StringOrURI<br>
                value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">There are two options and two options only:<br>
      </font></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p><font face="Arial">"locally unique in the context of the
          issuer" means that it is the same for all RSs.<br>
          "globally unique" means that it is the same not only for all
          the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with
          OAuth (e.g. an email address).</font><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371667F70B227C3EFA4C3ECAFA290@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">    Similarly, if<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   a solution requires preventing a
          resource server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   principal's activity within the resource
          itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   server should assign different "sub"
          values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   token issued.  In turn, the client
          should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   token for every call to the resource
          server, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   resource server receives different "sub"
          and "jti" values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   call, thus preventing correlation
          between distinct requests.</p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">The proposed text describes two different
        cases where the sub claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair or</font><font
        face="Arial"> unique for each access token.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">These two cases are not included in the
        definition found in RFC 7519. <br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">In the general case, an identifier can be: </font>
    </p>
    <ol>
      <li><font face="Arial">locally unique in the context of the issuer
          (i.e. the same for all RSs),</font></li>
      <li><font face="Arial">globally unique (i.e. the same not only for
          all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with
          OAuth),</font></li>
      <li><font face="Arial">unique for an AS/RS pair, or<br>
        </font> </li>
      <li><font face="Arial">unique for each access token.</font></li>
    </ol>
    <font face="Arial">
    </font>
    <p><font face="Arial">I see different ways to solve this problem:</font></p>
    <font face="Arial">
    </font>
    <blockquote>
      <p><font face="Arial">1° Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and
          (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.<br>
          2° Define two new claims which would support the two cases
          where the sub claim would be either </font><font face="Arial"><font
            face="Arial">unique for an AS/RS pair or</font><font
            face="Arial"> unique for one access token</font>.<br>
        </font><font face="Arial">3° Define four new claims which would
          support the four above cases</font><font face="Arial">.</font><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">Denis</font></p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371667F70B227C3EFA4C3ECAFA290@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">"<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Section 7.2<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this
          specification refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   attributes "roles", "groups",
          "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   express authorization information in JWT
          access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">/   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification
          refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   attributes "roles", "groups",
          "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   express authorization information in JWT
          access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">    <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">  <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">References<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and
          N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI
          10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">             
          <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519&gt;</a>.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">RFC 7644 is an unused reference: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K.,
          Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">              and C. Mortimore, "System for
          Cross-domain Identity<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">              <span lang="FR">Management:
            Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="FR">              </span>September
          2015,
          <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644&gt;</a>.         
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The same is true for RFC 3986: <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding,
          R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">              Resource Identifier (URI):
          Generic Syntax", STD 66,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">              RFC 3986, DOI
          10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">             
          <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986&gt;</a>.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
      </div>
      IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments
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      not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any
      purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank
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      <br>
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      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
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Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 09:26:06 -0700
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Denis


The objective of this document is to standardize the token the AS shares
with the RS. It is not to standardize how the client can read the token.
Just because the user is using the client, that does not mean the user
wants the client to see any claims about themselves. Letting the client see
the contents of the token may be a privacy violation.

client !=3D user
=E1=90=A7

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:

> Hi Hannes,
>
> Two comments between the lines.
>
> Hi Victorio, Hi all,
>
>
>
> I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07.
> Reading through the draft I have a few minor suggestions:
>
>
>
> Section 2:
>
>
>
> I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs complyin=
g
> with the requirements described in this section."
>
>
>
> Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see
> terminology section).
>
>
>
> Section 2.1
>
>
>
> s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
>
> (same replacement in Section 4)
>
>
>
> s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
>
>    which can be used to indicate that the content is an access token./Thi=
s
> specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
>
>    which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.
>
>
>
> Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as in
> Section 2.2.
>
>
>
> Section 2.2
>
>
>
> s/""aud"/"aud"
>
>
>
> 2.2.1
>
>
>
> s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./
> auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
> s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./
> acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
>
>
>
>
> s/Please see/See
>
>
>
> s/For example:/For example,
>
>
>
> Section 4
>
>
>
> You write:
>
>
>
> "Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server
> Metadata [RFC8414] ... "
>
>
>
> Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives me
> the impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"
>
>
>
>
>
> s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security
> implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security
> implications.
>
>
>
> This sentence sounds strange to me:
>
> "
>
>    When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],
>
>    resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
>
>    following manner.
>
> "
>
>
>
> How about:
>
> "
>
>    Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
>
>    following manner.
>
> "
>
>
>
> Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just
> repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?
>
>
>
>
>
> You write:
>
>
>
> "
>
> If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
>
>    the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them
>
>    in combination with any other contextual information available to
>
>    determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.
>
> "
>
>
>
> Include a reference to the authorization claims section
>
>
>
>
>
> s/ For more
>
>    details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For
> more
>
>    details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725=
].
>
>
>
>
>
> You write:
>
>
>
> "
>
>    Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
>
>    for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
>
>    safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
>
> "
>
>
>
> The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe what
> follows afterwards in the text.
>
>
>
> You write:
>
>
>
> "
>
> The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
>
>    the access token
>
> "
>
>
>
> This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of
> interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the
> following would work:
>
>
>
> "
>
>    Authorization server and the resource server
>
>    might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
>
>    switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the
>
>    client relying on the ability to read the access token content would
>
>    break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access
> tokens
>
>    are treated opaque by clients.
>
>
>
>    Administrators of authorization servers should also take into account
> that
>
>    the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever clie=
nt
>
>    access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
>
>    given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps
>
>    to prevent it.
>
> "
>
> *In the general case, *the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens
> are treated as opaque by clients.
> However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case: since the
> client gets back an access token conformant to *this* RFC, then it knows
> exactly its detailed structure. The argument about "changing the token
> format at any time" does not apply. In this case, the client is quite sur=
e
> that it would be able to understand most of its content (at least all the
> standard claims). The above text proposal would need to be reconsidered.
>
> Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access token to the client
> is odd when an access token contains claims about a human-user :
> these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually allowed to
> have access to his own personal data.
>
> Encryption is nice in theory but complicated in practice, since a key
> management system must put in place. Whenever possible, it should be
> avoided.
>
> BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How ca=
n
> a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
> Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to this
> profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance of an
> access token
> compliant to this profile ?
>
> Another comment follows.
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> "
>
>
>
>    In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
>
>    user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
>
>    without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply
>
>    access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken
>
>    to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting
>
>    the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
>
>    sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
>
>    access tokens.
>
> "
>
>
>
> The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would
> suggest to delete
>
> the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence to
> the previous paragraph.
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> "
>
>    This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>
>    access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
>
>    information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
>
>    requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>
>    Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>
>    design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
>
>    server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
>
>    level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign
>
>    "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
>
>    situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking
>
>    principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>    authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
>
>    different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be
>
>    correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if
>
>    a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
>
>    principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>
>    server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>
>    token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>
>    token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>
>    resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>
>    call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>
> "
>
>
>
> The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy.
> What you are
>
> talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to
> deal with such
>
> privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
>
>
>
> Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something
> like:
>
>
>
> "
>
>    This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>
>    access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
>
>    information for correlating incoming
>
>    requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>
>    Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>
>    design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
>
>    server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be
>
>    populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
>
>    assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking
>
>    principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>    authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
>
>    different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
>
>    correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.
>
> While the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim in this context
> is not compatible with the definition of the "sub" claim
> as defined in RFC 7519:
>
>      4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim
>
>         The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
>         subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally statements
>         about the subject.  *The subject value MUST either be scoped to
> be*
> *        locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally
> unique.*
>         The processing of this claim is generally application specific.
> The
>         "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
>         value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.
>
> There are two options and two options only:
>
> "locally unique in the context of the issuer" means that it is the same
> for all RSs.
> "globally unique" means that it is the same not only for all the RSs but
> also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth (e.g. an email addres=
s).
>
>
>     Similarly, if
>
>    a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
>
>    principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>
>    server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>
>    token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>
>    token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>
>    resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>
>    call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>
> The proposed text describes two different cases where the sub claim is
> either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for each access token.
>
> These two cases are not included in the definition found in RFC 7519.
>
> In the general case, an identifier can be:
>
>    1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for all
>    RSs),
>    2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but also
>    for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
>    3. unique for an AS/RS pair, or
>    4. unique for each access token.
>
> I see different ways to solve this problem:
>
> 1=C2=B0 Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and (unfortunately) remove th=
ese
> possibilities.
> 2=C2=B0 Define two new claims which would support the two cases where the=
 sub
> claim would be either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for one access
> token.
> 3=C2=B0 Define four new claims which would support the four above cases.
>
> Denis
>
> "
>
>
>
>
>
> Section 7.2
>
>
>
> s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>
>    attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
>
>    express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
> /   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>
>    attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
>
>    express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
>
>
>
>
> References
>
>
>
> RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:
>
>
>
>    [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
>
>               (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
>
>               <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>
> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
>
>
>
> RFC 7644 is an unused reference:
>
>
>
>    [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
>
>               and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
>
>               Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
>
>               September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>
> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
>
>
>
> The same is true for RFC 3986:
>
>
>
>    [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
>
>               Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
>
>               RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
>
>               <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>
> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
>
>
>
>
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy th=
e
> information in any medium. Thank you.
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000eb33de05aecfccd2
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Denis<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The objective of t=
his document is to standardize the token the AS shares with the RS. It is n=
ot to standardize how the client can read the token. Just because the user =
is using the client, that does not mean the user wants the client to see an=
y claims about themselves. Letting the client see the contents of the token=
 may be a privacy violation.</div><div><br></div><div><div>client !=3D user=
</div><div></div></div></div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-he=
ight:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width:0px;max-height:0px;overflow:hidden" =
src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb=
20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D35a35f01-76f0-48d5-a962-2a19b1b35c7=
0"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 =
at 9:10 AM Denis &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr">denis.ietf@free.=
fr</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <div>Hi Hannes,</div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <div>Two comments between the lines.<br>
    </div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
     =20
     =20
      <div>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Victorio, Hi all, <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">I am doing my shepherd write-up for
          draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the
          draft I have a few minor suggestions:
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2: <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would delete this sentence &quot;JWT acces=
s
          tokens are regular JWTs complying with the requirements
          described in this section.&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Reason: You pretty much make the same
          statement on the previous page (see terminology section).
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.1<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric
          cryptography<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">(same replacement in Section 4)<u></u><u></u=
></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/=C2=A0=C2=A0 This specification registers =
the
          &quot;application/at+jwt&quot; media type,<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 which can be used to indicate t=
hat the
          content is an access token./This specification registers the
          &quot;application/at+jwt&quot; media type,<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 which can be used to indicate t=
hat the
          content is a JWT access token.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Use capitalized &quot;Section&quot; when a s=
ection
          number is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.=C2=A0=C2=A0
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.2<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&quot;&quot;aud&quot;/&quot;aud&quot;<u></=
u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">2.2.1<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/=C2=A0=C2=A0 auth_time=C2=A0 OPTIONAL - as=
 defined in
          section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./=C2=A0=C2=A0 auth_time=C2=A0 OPTIONAL=
 - as
          defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/=C2=A0=C2=A0 acr, amr=C2=A0 OPTIONAL - as =
defined in
          section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./=C2=A0=C2=A0 acr, amr=C2=A0 OPTIONAL =
- as defined
          in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see/See <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/For example:/For example, <u></u><u></u></=
p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;Authorization servers SHOULD implement
          OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... &quot;<u></=
u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Are you sure you mean &quot;implement&quot; =
and not
          &quot;use&quot;? The paragraph gives me the impression that you t=
alk
          about &quot;ASs using RFC 8414&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see section Section 5 for further
          guidance on security implications./Please see Section 5 for
          further guidance on security implications.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">This sentence sounds strange to me: <u></u><=
u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 When invoked as described in OA=
uth 2.0
          Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 resource servers receiving a JW=
T access
          token MUST validate it in the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 following manner.<u></u><u></u>=
</p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">How about: <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 Resource servers receiving a JW=
T access
          token MUST validate it in the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 following manner.<u></u><u></u>=
</p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then
          list the steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750
          or are you augmenting them?
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the JWT access token includes
          authorization claims as described in<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 the authorization claims sectio=
n, the
          resource server SHOULD use them<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 in combination with any other c=
ontextual
          information available to<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 determine whether the current c=
all
          should be authorized or rejected.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Include a reference to the authorization
          claims section<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/ For more<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 details on cross-JWT confusion =
please
          refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 details on cross-JWT confusion =
please
          refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 Authorization servers should no=
t rely on
          the use of different keys<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 for signing OpenID Connect ID T=
okens and
          JWT tokens as a method to<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 safeguard against the consequen=
ces of
          leaking specific keys.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">The phrase &quot;leaking keys&quot; is proba=
bly not
          the best term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write:<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">The client MUST NOT inspect the content of<u=
></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 the access token<u></u><u></u><=
/p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">This RFC 2119 language is not really
          enforceable in terms of interoperability. Maybe you could
          rephrase a bit. Something like the following would work:<u></u><u=
></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;=C2=A0=C2=A0 <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Authorization server and t=
he resource
          server<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 might decide to change token fo=
rmat at
          any time (for example by<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 switching from this profile to =
opaque
          tokens). Hence, any logic in the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 client relying on the ability t=
o read
          the access token content would<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 break without recourse. The OAu=
th 2.0
          framework assumes that access tokens
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0are treated opaque by clie=
nts. <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 Administrators of authorization=
 servers
          should also take into account that
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0the content of an access t=
oken is
          visible to the client. Whenever client<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 access to the access token cont=
ent
          presents privacy issues for a<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 given scenario, the authorizati=
on server
          should take explicit steps<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 to prevent it.=C2=A0=C2=A0 <u><=
/u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <u></u> <br>
        <u></u></div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial"><font face=3D"Arial"> <i>In the general case, <=
/i></font>the
        OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens are treated as
        opaque by clients. <br>
        However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case:
        since the client gets back an access token conformant to <u>this</u=
>
        RFC, then it knows <br>
        exactly its detailed structure. The argument about &quot;changing t=
he
        token format at any time&quot; does not apply. In this case, the
        client is quite sure <br>
        that it would be able to understand most of its content (at
        least all the standard claims). The above text proposal would
        need to be reconsidered.<br>
        <br>
        Hiding </font><font face=3D"Arial"><font face=3D"Arial"><font face=
=3D"Arial">(by encrypting it) </font></font>the content
        of the access token to the client is odd </font><font face=3D"Arial=
">when an access token contains claims about a
        human-user : <br>
        these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually
        allowed to have access to his own personal data.</font></p>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">Encryption is nice in theory but complicated
        in practice, since a key management system must put in place.
        Whenever possible, it should be avoided.</font></p>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC
        have not been answered: How can a client request an access token
        compliant to this profile ? <br>
        Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to
        this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the
        issuance of an access token <br>
        compliant to this profile ?<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">Another comment follows.<br>
        <br>
      </font></p>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 In scenarios in which JWT acces=
s tokens
          are accessible to the end<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 user, it should be evaluated wh=
ether the
          information can be accessed<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 without privacy violations (for=
 example,
          if an end user would simply<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 access his or her own personal
          information) or if steps must be taken<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 to enforce confidentiality.=C2=
=A0 Possible
          measures include: encrypting<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 the access token, encrypting th=
e
          sensitive claims, omitting the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 sensitive claims or not using t=
his
          profile, falling back on opaque<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 access tokens.<u></u><u></u></p=
>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">The first sentence is a repetition of the
          previous paragraph. I would suggest to delete<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">the first sentence in this paragraph and to
          move the second sentence to the previous paragraph.
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 This profile mandates the prese=
nce of
          the &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 access token, making it possibl=
e for
          resource servers to rely on that<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 information for performing task=
s such as
          correlating incoming<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 requests with data stored local=
ly for
          the authenticated principal.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 Although the ability to correla=
te
          requests might be required by<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 design in many scenarios, there=
 are
          scenarios where the authorization<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 server might want to prevent co=
rrelation
          to preserve the desired<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 level of privacy.=C2=A0 Authori=
zation servers
          should choose how to assign<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;sub&quot; values accordin=
g to the level of
          privacy required by each<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 situation.=C2=A0 For instance: =
if a solution
          requires preventing tracking<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 principal activities across mul=
tiple
          resource servers, the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 authorization server should ens=
ure that
          JWT access tokens meant for<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 different resource servers have=
 distinct
          &quot;sub&quot; values tht cannot be<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 correlated in the event of reso=
urce
          servers collusion.=C2=A0 Similarly: if<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 a solution requires preventing =
a
          resource server from correlating the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 principal&#39;s activity within=
 the resource
          itself, the authorization<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 server should assign different =
&quot;sub&quot;
          values for every JWT access<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 token issued.=C2=A0 In turn, th=
e client
          should obtain a new JWT access<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 token for every call to the res=
ource
          server, to ensure that the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 resource server receives differ=
ent &quot;sub&quot;
          and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 call, thus preventing correlati=
on
          between distinct requests.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">The above paragraph suggests that there are
          different levels of privacy. What you are
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">talking about in the text is unlinkability
          and identification. Ways to deal with such
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">privacy threats are described in Section 6
          of RFC 6973. <u></u>
          <u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase
          the paragraph to something like:<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 This profile mandates the prese=
nce of
          the &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 access token, making it possibl=
e for
          resource servers to rely on that<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 information for correlating inc=
oming<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 requests with data stored local=
ly for
          the authenticated principal.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 Although the ability to correla=
te
          requests might be required by<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 design in many scenarios, there=
 are
          scenarios where the authorization<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 server might want to prevent
          correlation. The &quot;sub&quot; claim should be
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0populated by the authoriza=
tion servers
          according to a privacy impact
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0assessment. For instance, =
if a solution
          requires preventing tracking<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 principal activities across mul=
tiple
          resource servers, the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 authorization server should ens=
ure that
          JWT access tokens meant for<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 different resource servers have=
 distinct
          &quot;sub&quot; values that cannot be<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 correlated in the event of reso=
urce
          servers collusion.=C2=A0 </p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">While the idea is really nice, the use of the
        &quot;sub&quot; claim in this context is not compatible with the
        definition of the &quot;sub&quot; claim <br>
        as defined in RFC 7519:<br>
        <br>
        =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 4.1.2.=C2=A0 &quot;sub&quot; (Subject) Cla=
im<br>
        =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <br>
        =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 The &quot;sub&quot; (sub=
ject) claim identifies the principal that
        is the <br>
        =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 subject of the JWT.=C2=A0 The claims in=
 a JWT are normally
        statements<br>
        =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 about the subject.=C2=A0=
 <b>The subject value MUST either be
          scoped to be</b><b><br>
        </b><b>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 locally unique in=
 the context of the issuer or be
          globally unique.</b><br>
        =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 The processing of this c=
laim is generally application
        specific.=C2=A0 The<br>
        =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;sub&quot; value is=
 a case-sensitive string containing a
        StringOrURI<br>
        =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 value.=C2=A0 Use of this=
 claim is OPTIONAL.<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">There are two options and two options only:<br>
      </font></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p><font face=3D"Arial">&quot;locally unique in the context of the
          issuer&quot; means that it is the same for all RSs.<br>
          &quot;globally unique&quot; means that it is the same not only fo=
r all
          the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with
          OAuth (e.g. an email address).</font><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Similarly, if<u></u><u></=
u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 a solution requires preventing =
a
          resource server from correlating the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 principal&#39;s activity within=
 the resource
          itself, the authorization<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 server should assign different =
&quot;sub&quot;
          values for every JWT access<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 token issued.=C2=A0 In turn, th=
e client
          should obtain a new JWT access<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 token for every call to the res=
ource
          server, to ensure that the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 resource server receives differ=
ent &quot;sub&quot;
          and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 call, thus preventing correlati=
on
          between distinct requests.</p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">The proposed text describes two different
        cases where the sub claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair or</fo=
nt><font face=3D"Arial"> unique for each access token.</font></p>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">These two cases are not included in the
        definition found in RFC 7519. <br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">In the general case, an identifier can be:=C2=
=A0</font>
    </p>
    <ol>
      <li><font face=3D"Arial">locally unique in the context of the issuer
          (i.e. the same for all RSs),</font></li>
      <li><font face=3D"Arial">globally unique (i.e. the same not only for
          all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with
          OAuth),</font></li>
      <li><font face=3D"Arial">unique for an AS/RS pair, or<br>
        </font> </li>
      <li><font face=3D"Arial">unique for each access token.</font></li>
    </ol>
    <font face=3D"Arial">
    </font>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">I see different ways to solve this problem:</fo=
nt></p>
    <font face=3D"Arial">
    </font>
    <blockquote>
      <p><font face=3D"Arial">1=C2=B0 Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 a=
nd
          (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.<br>
          2=C2=B0 Define two new claims which would support the two cases
          where the sub claim would be either </font><font face=3D"Arial"><=
font face=3D"Arial">unique for an AS/RS pair or</font><font face=3D"Arial">=
 unique for one access token</font>.<br>
        </font><font face=3D"Arial">3=C2=B0 Define four new claims which wo=
uld
          support the four above cases</font><font face=3D"Arial">.</font><=
br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face=3D"Arial">Denis</font></p>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 7.2<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/=C2=A0=C2=A0 Section Section 2.2.3.1 of th=
is
          specification refers to the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &=
quot;groups&quot;,
          &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<u></u><u></u></p=
>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 express authorization informati=
on in JWT
          access tokens.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">/=C2=A0=C2=A0 Section 2.2.3.1 of this specif=
ication
          refers to the<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &=
quot;groups&quot;,
          &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<u></u><u></u></p=
>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 express authorization informati=
on in JWT
          access tokens.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">References<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference: <u=
></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 [RFC7519]=C2=A0 Jones, M., Brad=
ley, J., and
          N. Sakimura, &quot;JSON Web Token<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 (JWT)&quot;, RFC 7519, DOI
          10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
          <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519" target=3D"_bl=
ank">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519&gt;</a>.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0 <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7644 is an unused reference: <u></u><u><=
/u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 [RFC7644]=C2=A0 Hunt, P., Ed., =
Grizzle, K.,
          Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 and C. Mortimore, &quot;System for
          Cross-domain Identity<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <span lang=3D"FR">Management:
            Protocol&quot;, RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,<u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 </span>September
          2015,
          <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644" target=3D"_bl=
ank">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644&gt;</a>.=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
          <u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">The same is true for RFC 3986: <u></u><u></u=
></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0 [RFC3986]=C2=A0 Berners-Lee, T.=
, Fielding,
          R., and L. Masinter, &quot;Uniform<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Resource Identifier (URI):
          Generic Syntax&quot;, STD 66,<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 RFC 3986, DOI
          10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
          <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986" target=3D"_bl=
ank">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986&gt;</a>.<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<u></u><u></u></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
      </div>
      IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments
      are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the
      intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do
      not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any
      purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank
      you.
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
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</blockquote></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 16:45:19 -0600
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To: toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be knowable
to the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk" header in the
DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in such cases
would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such
optionality would add complexity to implementations and deployments (and
that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperability and
even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access token
includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the key with the
proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rather than
thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get the key to the AS.
As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structure for
requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have public
key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as a driving
use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh tokens for
public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account for
both.

Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could
flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs
with different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under one
approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize
consistency and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has led
to how it's currently defined, which is to always include the key in the
proof and bind to a hash of the key in the access token.


On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter is
> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in
> theory.
>
> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered
> with
> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, i=
t
> can
> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proo=
f.
> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>
> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share
> the
> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the AS
> and RS
> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have =
to
> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section
> 7).
>
> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify
> which key
> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need
> to send
> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
> parameter to specify the key.
>
> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1],
> but I'm
> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the
> latest
> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same
> DPoP
> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cas=
es
> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would all=
ow
> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>
> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>
>
> [*1]:
> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746
> [*2]:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/
>
>
> Best regards,
> Toshio Ito
>
> -------------
> Toshio Ito
> Research and Development Center
> Toshiba Corporation
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the k=
ey might be knowable to the server via some other means, which makes the &q=
uot;jwk&quot; header in the DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while om=
itting the key in such cases would reduce the size of some messages (the DP=
oP proof anyway), such optionality would add complexity to implementations =
and deployments (and that kind of complexity can and often does degrade int=
eroperability and even security). How, for example, would a client know if =
the access token includes the public key and thus whether or not to include=
 the key with the proof? Sure the access token could always include the key=
 (rather than thumbprint) but then there&#39;s the question of how to get t=
he key to the AS. As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Pro=
of structure for requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients=
 that have public key(s) registered and some that won&#39;t (maybe a lot th=
at won&#39;t as a driving use case for many for this is key binding access =
and refresh tokens for public clients). The protocol defined by the draft n=
eeds to account for both. <br></div><div><br></div><div>Ultimately there ar=
e a number of different ways the necessary data could flow through the vari=
ous protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs with different approach=
es and/or trying to accommodate variations under one approach. The approach=
 the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize consistency and simplicity a=
s much as is possible. And that ethos has led to how it&#39;s currently def=
ined, which is to always include the key in the proof and bind to a hash of=
 the key in the access token. <br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 =
at 3:29 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp">toshio9.ito@tos=
hiba.co.jp</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the &quot;jwk&quot; header para=
meter is<br>
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where &quot;jwk&quot; is not necess=
ary in theory.<br>
<br>
For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the<br>
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wi=
th<br>
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it =
can<br>
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.=
<br>
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
<br>
The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share t=
he<br>
storage for clients&#39; public keys. Things are a little difficult if the =
AS and RS<br>
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to=
<br>
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7=
).<br>
<br>
If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify whic=
h key<br>
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to=
 send<br>
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use &quot;kid&quot; =
header<br>
parameter to specify the key.<br>
<br>
Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but=
 I&#39;m<br>
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the l=
atest<br>
draft about the &quot;jwk&quot; header parameter [*2]. I agree with using t=
he same DPoP<br>
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases=
<br>
where we can omit &quot;jwk&quot; in BOTH requests. Making &quot;jwk&quot; =
OPTIONAL would allow<br>
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
<br>
<br>
[*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issueco=
mment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/da=
nielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
[*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UI=
CcZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
<br>
-------------<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
Research and Development Center<br>
Toshiba Corporation<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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+1

On 9/8/2020 7:45 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be
> knowable to the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk"
> header in the DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting
> the key in such cases would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP
> proof anyway), such optionality would add complexity to
> implementations and deployments (and that kind of complexity can and
> often does degrade interoperability and even security). How, for
> example, would a client know if the access token includes the public
> key and thus whether or not to include the key with the proof? Sure
> the access token could always include the key (rather than thumbprint)
> but then there's the question of how to get the key to the AS. As well
> as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structure for
> requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have
> public key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't
> as a driving use case for many for this is key binding access and
> refresh tokens for public clients). The protocol defined by the draft
> needs to account for both.
>
> Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data
> could flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some
> tradeoffs with different approaches and/or trying to accommodate
> variations under one approach. The approach the draft has taken thus
> far is to prioritize consistency and simplicity as much as is
> possible. And that ethos has led to how it's currently defined, which
> is to always include the key in the proof and bind to a hash of the
> key in the access token.
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp
> <mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp>> wrote:
>
>     Hi all,
>
>     In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header
>     parameter is
>     REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not
>     necessary in theory.
>
>     For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
>     Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also
>     registered with
>     the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token
>     endpoint, it can
>     just use the public key registered for the client to verify the
>     DPoP Proof.
>     There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>
>     The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and
>     RS share the
>     storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if
>     the AS and RS
>     are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection
>     result have to
>     include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in
>     section 7).
>
>     If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to
>     specify which key
>     it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no
>     absolute need to send
>     the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid"
>     header
>     parameter to specify the key.
>
>     Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26
>     [*1], but I'm
>     not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment
>     on the latest
>     draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using
>     the same DPoP
>     Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are
>     some cases
>     where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL
>     would allow
>     those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>
>     I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>
>
>     [*1]:
>     https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746
>     [*2]:
>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/
>
>
>     Best regards,
>     Toshio Ito
>
>     -------------
>     Toshio Ito
>     Research and Development Center
>     Toshiba Corporation
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     OAuth mailing list
>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> /CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly
> prohibited.  If you have received this communication in error, please
> notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any
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    <p>+1<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/8/2020 7:45 PM, Brian Campbell
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+k3eCRffzry_+GVieOcWs0RHqwo_XGgMTwx4LOCZFPioD_xdw@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key
          might be knowable to the server via some other means, which
          makes the "jwk" header in the DPoP proof not strictly
          necessary. And while omitting the key in such cases would
          reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such
          optionality would add complexity to implementations and
          deployments (and that kind of complexity can and often does
          degrade interoperability and even security). How, for example,
          would a client know if the access token includes the public
          key and thus whether or not to include the key with the proof?
          Sure the access token could always include the key (rather
          than thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get
          the key to the AS. As well as the stated desire to utilize the
          same DPoP Proof structure for requests to both the AS and RS.
          There will be some clients that have public key(s) registered
          and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as a driving use
          case for many for this is key binding access and refresh
          tokens for public clients). The protocol defined by the draft
          needs to account for both. <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Ultimately there are a number of different ways the
          necessary data could flow through the various protocol
          elements. And there are some tradeoffs with different
          approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under one
          approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to
          prioritize consistency and simplicity as much as is possible.
          And that ethos has led to how it's currently defined, which is
          to always include the key in the proof and bind to a hash of
          the key in the access token. <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM
          &lt;<a href="mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp"
            moz-do-not-send="true">toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi
          all,<br>
          <br>
          In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header
          parameter is<br>
          REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not
          necessary in theory.<br>
          <br>
          For example, consider a case where the client is registered
          with the<br>
          Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also
          registered with<br>
          the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token
          endpoint, it can<br>
          just use the public key registered for the client to verify
          the DPoP Proof.<br>
          There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
          <br>
          The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS
          and RS share the<br>
          storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little
          difficult if the AS and RS<br>
          are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection
          result have to<br>
          include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described
          in section 7).<br>
          <br>
          If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to
          specify which key<br>
          it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no
          absolute need to send<br>
          the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use
          "kid" header<br>
          parameter to specify the key.<br>
          <br>
          Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue
          #26 [*1], but I'm<br>
          not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a
          comment on the latest<br>
          draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with
          using the same DPoP<br>
          Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there
          are some cases<br>
          where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk"
          OPTIONAL would allow<br>
          those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
          <br>
          I'd like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
          <br>
          <br>
          [*1]: <a
href="https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
          [*2]: <a
href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
          <br>
          <br>
          Best regards,<br>
          Toshio Ito<br>
          <br>
          -------------<br>
          Toshio Ito<br>
          Research and Development Center<br>
          Toshiba Corporation<br>
          <br>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
          <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <i
style="margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:baseline;background:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system-ui,-apple-system,system-ui,&quot;Segoe
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      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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+1

KISS
=E1=90=A7

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:55 PM John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> +1
> On 9/8/2020 7:45 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
>
> Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be knowable
> to the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk" header in the
> DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in such cas=
es
> would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such
> optionality would add complexity to implementations and deployments (and
> that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperability and
> even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access token
> includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the key with t=
he
> proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rather than
> thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get the key to the AS=
.
> As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structure for
> requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have publ=
ic
> key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as a drivin=
g
> use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh tokens for
> public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account for
> both.
>
> Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could
> flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs
> with different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under o=
ne
> approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize
> consistency and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has led
> to how it's currently defined, which is to always include the key in the
> proof and bind to a hash of the key in the access token.
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter i=
s
>> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in
>> theory.
>>
>> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
>> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered
>> with
>> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint,
>> it can
>> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP
>> Proof.
>> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>>
>> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS shar=
e
>> the
>> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the A=
S
>> and RS
>> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have
>> to
>> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in sectio=
n
>> 7).
>>
>> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify
>> which key
>> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need
>> to send
>> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
>> parameter to specify the key.
>>
>> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1],
>> but I'm
>> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on th=
e
>> latest
>> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same
>> DPoP
>> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some
>> cases
>> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would
>> allow
>> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>>
>> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>>
>>
>> [*1]:
>> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-48070174=
6
>> [*2]:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/
>>
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Toshio Ito
>>
>> -------------
>> Toshio Ito
>> Research and Development Center
>> Toshiba Corporation
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
r
> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fro=
m
> your computer. Thank you.*
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th
>
> _______________________________________________
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> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">+1<br><div><br></div><div>KISS</div></div><div hspace=3D"s=
treak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width:0px;ma=
x-height:0px;overflow:hidden" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sende=
r=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D32936=
64e-fbf7-44a5-9b82-00b4bba47407"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=
=A7</font></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gm=
ail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:55 PM John Bradley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px soli=
d rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>+1<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 9/8/2020 7:45 PM, Brian Campbell
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div>Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key
          might be knowable to the server via some other means, which
          makes the &quot;jwk&quot; header in the DPoP proof not strictly
          necessary. And while omitting the key in such cases would
          reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such
          optionality would add complexity to implementations and
          deployments (and that kind of complexity can and often does
          degrade interoperability and even security). How, for example,
          would a client know if the access token includes the public
          key and thus whether or not to include the key with the proof?
          Sure the access token could always include the key (rather
          than thumbprint) but then there&#39;s the question of how to get
          the key to the AS. As well as the stated desire to utilize the
          same DPoP Proof structure for requests to both the AS and RS.
          There will be some clients that have public key(s) registered
          and some that won&#39;t (maybe a lot that won&#39;t as a driving =
use
          case for many for this is key binding access and refresh
          tokens for public clients). The protocol defined by the draft
          needs to account for both. <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Ultimately there are a number of different ways the
          necessary data could flow through the various protocol
          elements. And there are some tradeoffs with different
          approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under one
          approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to
          prioritize consistency and simplicity as much as is possible.
          And that ethos has led to how it&#39;s currently defined, which i=
s
          to always include the key in the proof and bind to a hash of
          the key in the access token. <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 A=
M
          &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp" target=3D"_blank=
">toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi
          all,<br>
          <br>
          In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the &quot;jwk&quot; h=
eader
          parameter is<br>
          REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where &quot;jwk&quot; is =
not
          necessary in theory.<br>
          <br>
          For example, consider a case where the client is registered
          with the<br>
          Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also
          registered with<br>
          the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token
          endpoint, it can<br>
          just use the public key registered for the client to verify
          the DPoP Proof.<br>
          There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
          <br>
          The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS
          and RS share the<br>
          storage for clients&#39; public keys. Things are a little
          difficult if the AS and RS<br>
          are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection
          result have to<br>
          include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described
          in section 7).<br>
          <br>
          If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to
          specify which key<br>
          it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no
          absolute need to send<br>
          the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use
          &quot;kid&quot; header<br>
          parameter to specify the key.<br>
          <br>
          Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue
          #26 [*1], but I&#39;m<br>
          not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a
          comment on the latest<br>
          draft about the &quot;jwk&quot; header parameter [*2]. I agree wi=
th
          using the same DPoP<br>
          Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there
          are some cases<br>
          where we can omit &quot;jwk&quot; in BOTH requests. Making &quot;=
jwk&quot;
          OPTIONAL would allow<br>
          those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
          <br>
          I&#39;d like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
          <br>
          <br>
          [*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/=
26#issuecomment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://git=
hub.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
          [*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smws=
ONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mail=
archive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
          <br>
          <br>
          Best regards,<br>
          Toshio Ito<br>
          <br>
          -------------<br>
          Toshio Ito<br>
          Research and Development Center<br>
          Toshiba Corporation<br>
          <br>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.or=
g</a><br>
          <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>=
<br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <i><span><font size=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY
            NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged
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      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
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</pre>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
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Thanks Hannes!

I will go thru the comments and update accordingly by EoW.

 

From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: Monday, September 7, 2020 11:30 PM
To: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07

 

Hi Victorio, Hi all, 

 

I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07.
Reading through the draft I have a few minor suggestions: 

 

Section 2: 

 

I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs complying
with the requirements described in this section."

 

Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see
terminology section). 

 

Section 2.1

 

s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography

(same replacement in Section 4)

 

s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,

   which can be used to indicate that the content is an access token./This
specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,

   which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.

 

Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as in
Section 2.2.   

 

Section 2.2

 

s/""aud"/"aud"

 

2.2.1

 

s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./
auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].

s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr,
amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].

 

 

s/Please see/See 

 

s/For example:/For example, 

 

Section 4

 

You write: 

 

"Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server
Metadata [RFC8414] ... "

 

Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives me the
impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"

 

 

s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security
implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security
implications.

 

This sentence sounds strange to me: 

"

   When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],

   resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the

   following manner.

"

 

How about: 

"

   Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the

   following manner.

"

 

Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just
repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them? 

 

 

You write: 

 

"

If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in

   the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them

   in combination with any other contextual information available to

   determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.

"

 

Include a reference to the authorization claims section

 

 

s/ For more

   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For
more

   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].

   

   

You write: 

 

"

   Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys

   for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to

   safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.

"

 

The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe what
follows afterwards in the text. 

 

You write:

 

"

The client MUST NOT inspect the content of

   the access token

"

 

This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of
interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the
following would work:

 

"   

   Authorization server and the resource server

   might decide to change token format at any time (for example by

   switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the

   client relying on the ability to read the access token content would

   break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access
tokens 

   are treated opaque by clients. 

 

   Administrators of authorization servers should also take into account
that 

   the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever client

   access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a

   given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps

   to prevent it.   

"

 

 

You wrote: 

 

"

 

   In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end

   user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed

   without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply

   access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken

   to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting

   the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the

   sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque

   access tokens.

"

 

The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would
suggest to delete

the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence to the
previous paragraph. 

 

You wrote: 

 

"

   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT

   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that

   information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming

   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.

   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by

   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization

   server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired

   level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign

   "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each

   situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking

   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the

   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for

   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be

   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if

   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the

   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization

   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access

   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access

   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the

   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every

   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.

"

 

The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy.
What you are 

talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal
with such 

privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973. 

 

Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something like:

 

"

   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT

   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that

   information for correlating incoming

   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.

   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by

   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization

   server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be 

   populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact 

   assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking

   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the

   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for

   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be

   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly, if

   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the

   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization

   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access

   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access

   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the

   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every

   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.

"

 

 

Section 7.2

 

s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the

   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to

   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.

/   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the

   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to

   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.

     

  

References

 

RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference: 

 

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token

              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,

              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

          

RFC 7644 is an unused reference: 

 

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,

              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity

              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,

              September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.


 

The same is true for RFC 3986: 

 

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform

              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,

              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,

              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

 

 

Ciao

Hannes

 

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link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div class=3DWordSection1><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks Hannes!<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
will go thru the comments and update accordingly by =
EoW.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> OAuth =
&lt;oauth-bounces@ietf.org&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b>Hannes =
Tschofenig<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, September 7, 2020 11:30 =
PM<br><b>To:</b> oauth@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] =
draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Victorio, =
Hi all, <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>I am doing my shepherd write-up for =
draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I have a =
few minor suggestions: <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Section 2: =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>I would delete this sentence &quot;JWT access tokens =
are regular JWTs complying with the requirements described in this =
section.&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Reason: You =
pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see =
terminology section). <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Section =
2.1<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric =
cryptography<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>(same replacement in =
Section 4)<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>s/&nbsp;&nbsp; This specification registers the =
&quot;application/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is an access token./This specification registers the =
&quot;application/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is a JWT access token.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Use =
capitalized &quot;Section&quot; when a section number is indicated, such =
as in Section 2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Section =
2.2<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>s/&quot;&quot;aud&quot;/&quot;aud&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>2.2.1<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>s/&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined =
in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - =
as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>s/&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined in =
section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as =
defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>s/Please =
see/See <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>s/For example:/For example, <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Section =
4<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>You write: <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 =
Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... &quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Are you sure =
you mean &quot;implement&quot; and not &quot;use&quot;? The paragraph =
gives me the impression that you talk about &quot;ASs using RFC =
8414&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>s/Please see =
section Section 5 for further guidance on security implications./Please =
see Section 5 for further guidance on security =
implications.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>This sentence sounds strange to me: <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage =
[RFC6750],<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; resource =
servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in =
the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; following =
manner.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>How about: =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource servers receiving a JWT access =
token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; following manner.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Question: If =
you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just repeating the =
steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them? <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>You write: =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>If the JWT =
access token includes authorization claims as described =
in<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; the authorization =
claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; in combination with any other contextual =
information available to<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
determine whether the current call should be authorized or =
rejected.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Include a =
reference to the authorization claims section<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>s/ For =
more<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; details on =
cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For =
more<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; details on =
cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of =
[RFC8725].<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>You write: <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different =
keys<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; for signing OpenID =
Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; safeguard against the consequences of =
leaking specific keys.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The phrase =
&quot;leaking keys&quot; is probably not the best term to describe what =
follows afterwards in the text. <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>You =
write:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The client =
MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>This RFC =
2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interoperability. =
Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the following would =
work:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Authorization server and the =
resource server<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; might =
decide to change token format at any time (for example =
by<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; switching from this =
profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; client relying on the ability to read the =
access token content would<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 =
framework assumes that access tokens <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;are treated opaque by clients. =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators of authorization servers =
should also take into account that <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the content of an access token is =
visible to the client. Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; access to the access token content =
presents privacy issues for a<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; given scenario, the authorization server =
should take explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; to prevent it.&nbsp;&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>You wrote: =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the =
end<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; user, it should be =
evaluated whether the information can be accessed<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; without privacy violations (for example, =
if an end user would simply<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; access his or her own personal =
information) or if steps must be taken<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; to enforce confidentiality.&nbsp; =
Possible measures include: encrypting<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token, encrypting the =
sensitive claims, omitting the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; sensitive claims or not using this =
profile, falling back on opaque<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The first =
sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would suggest to =
delete<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>the first sentence in this =
paragraph and to move the second sentence to the previous paragraph. =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
This profile mandates the presence of the &quot;sub&quot; claim in every =
JWT<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making =
it possible for resource servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; information for performing tasks such as =
correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
requests with data stored locally for the authenticated =
principal.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the =
ability to correlate requests might be required by<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are =
scenarios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlation =
to preserve the desired<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
level of privacy.&nbsp; Authorization servers should choose how to =
assign<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;sub&quot; =
values according to the level of privacy required by =
each<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; situation.&nbsp; =
For instance: if a solution requires preventing =
tracking<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; principal =
activities across multiple resource servers, the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization server should ensure that =
JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource servers have distinct =
&quot;sub&quot; values tht cannot be<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the event of resource =
servers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly: if<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires preventing a resource =
server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resource =
itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different =
&quot;sub&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client =
should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource =
server, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different =
&quot;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation between =
distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The above =
paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy. What you =
are <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>talking about in the text is =
unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal with such =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>privacy threats are described in =
Section 6 of RFC 6973. <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hence, I =
would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something =
like:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
This profile mandates the presence of the &quot;sub&quot; claim in every =
JWT<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making =
it possible for resource servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; information for correlating =
incoming<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; requests with =
data stored locally for the authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the ability to correlate =
requests might be required by<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are =
scenarios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlation. =
The &quot;sub&quot; claim should be <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;populated by the authorization =
servers according to a privacy impact <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;assessment. For instance, if a =
solution requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; principal activities across multiple =
resource servers, the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant =
for<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource =
servers have distinct &quot;sub&quot; values that cannot =
be<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the =
event of resource servers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly, =
if<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires =
preventing a resource server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resource =
itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different =
&quot;sub&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client =
should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource =
server, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different =
&quot;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation between =
distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Section =
7.2<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>s/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this =
specification refers to the<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes &quot;roles&quot;, =
&quot;groups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] =
to<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; express authorization =
information in JWT access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification =
refers to the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes =
&quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined =
in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; express =
authorization information in JWT access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>References<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>RFC 7519 has =
to be a normative reference: <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
[RFC7519]&nbsp; Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, &quot;JSON Web =
Token<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (JWT)&quot;, RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May =
2015,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">https://www.rfc-editor.o=
rg/info/rfc7519</a>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>RFC 7644 is an unused reference: =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC7644]&nbsp; Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, =
K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and C. Mortimore, &quot;System for Cross-domain =
Identity<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span lang=3DFR>Management: Protocol&quot;, RFC =
7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DFR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>September 2015, &lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644">https://www.rfc-editor.o=
rg/info/rfc7644</a>&gt;.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>The same is true for RFC 3986: <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
[RFC3986]&nbsp; Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, =
&quot;Uniform<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;, =
STD 66,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January =
2005,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.o=
rg/info/rfc3986</a>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Ciao<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Hannes<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>IMPORTANT =
NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential =
and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, =
please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to =
any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the =
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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Cc: toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 07:42:59 +0100
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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I disagree with this rationale, I=E2=80=99m afraid. I don=E2=80=99t think th=
e simplicity gain for the client is really very great and I think we will re=
gret this decision.

Most importantly, including the JWK directly in the proof token increases th=
e likelihood that somebody will just validate the signature using that key a=
nd fail to check that it matches the hash in the AT. We=E2=80=99ve already s=
een at least one vendor make exactly this kind of mistake in the past [1]. L=
etting the proof tell you the key to use to verify the proof is another exam=
ple of Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle [2] - trusting the messa=
ge before you=E2=80=99ve authenticated it.=20

Moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT/introspection response reduces t=
he chances of these kind of mistakes.=20

As a bonus it also has efficiency gains because the size of the DPoP proof i=
s reduced - potentially by a lot for RSA keys. Although the JWK still has to=
 be communicated to the RS, this can be more efficient because:
- For token introspection, in many deployments the introspection request wil=
l be within a datacenter and so over a high-bandwidth low-latency network. T=
his is usually not the case for the DPoP proof, which may be over a poor mob=
ile connection.=20
- For embedded directly in a JWT access token, the JWK will be in the claims=
 rather than the header and so can at least be compressed. (Albeit not by mu=
ch, because public keys don=E2=80=99t compress well, but the rest of the AT w=
ill and that can compensate a little for the extra bulk).=20

[1]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114
[2]: https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html

=E2=80=94 Neil

>> On 8 Sep 2020, at 23:46, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D40pingidentity.com@d=
marc.ietf.org> wrote:
> =EF=BB=BF
> Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be knowable t=
o the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk" header in the DPoP p=
roof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in such cases would r=
educe the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such optionality wo=
uld add complexity to implementations and deployments (and that kind of comp=
lexity can and often does degrade interoperability and even security). How, f=
or example, would a client know if the access token includes the public key a=
nd thus whether or not to include the key with the proof? Sure the access to=
ken could always include the key (rather than thumbprint) but then there's t=
he question of how to get the key to the AS. As well as the stated desire to=
 utilize the same DPoP Proof structure for requests to both the AS and RS. T=
here will be some clients that have public key(s) registered and some that w=
on't (maybe a lot that won't as a driving use case for many for this is key b=
inding access and refresh tokens for public clients). The protocol defined b=
y the draft needs to account for both.=20
>=20
> Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could f=
low through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs with=
 different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under one appr=
oach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize consistency=
 and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has led to how it's c=
urrently defined, which is to always include the key in the proof and bind t=
o a hash of the key in the access token.=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>=20
>> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter is=

>> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in t=
heory.
>>=20
>> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
>> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered w=
ith
>> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, i=
t can
>> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proo=
f.
>> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>>=20
>> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share=
 the
>> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the AS=
 and RS
>> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have t=
o
>> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section=
 7).
>>=20
>> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify wh=
ich key
>> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need t=
o send
>> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
>> parameter to specify the key.
>>=20
>> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], b=
ut I'm
>> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the=
 latest
>> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same D=
PoP
>> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cas=
es
>> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would all=
ow
>> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>>=20
>> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>>=20
>>=20
>> [*1]: https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480=
701746
>> [*2]: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv=
2QRc/
>>=20
>>=20
>> Best regards,
>> Toshio Ito
>>=20
>> -------------
>> Toshio Ito
>> Research and Development Center
>> Toshiba Corporation
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20
> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged=
 material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, di=
stribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.  If you have rece=
ived this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-=
mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your computer. Tha=
nk you._______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr"><meta http-equiv=3D"conten=
t-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8"><div dir=3D"ltr">I disagree w=
ith this rationale, I=E2=80=99m afraid. I don=E2=80=99t think the simplicity=
 gain for the client is really very great and I think we will regret this de=
cision.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Most importantly, i=
ncluding the JWK directly in the proof token increases the likelihood that s=
omebody will just validate the signature using that key and fail to check th=
at it matches the hash in the AT. We=E2=80=99ve already seen at least one ve=
ndor make exactly this kind of mistake in the past [1]. Letting the proof te=
ll you the key to use to verify the proof is another example of Moxie=E2=80=99=
s Cryptographic Doom Principle [2] - trusting the message before you=E2=80=99=
ve authenticated it.&nbsp;</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
Moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT/introspection response reduces t=
he chances of these kind of mistakes.&nbsp;</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr">As a bonus it also has efficiency gains because the size of=
 the DPoP proof is reduced - potentially by a lot for RSA keys. Although the=
 JWK still has to be communicated to the RS, this can be more efficient beca=
use:</div><div dir=3D"ltr">- For token introspection, in many deployments th=
e introspection request will be within a datacenter and so over a high-bandw=
idth low-latency network. This is usually not the case for the DPoP proof, w=
hich may be over a poor mobile connection.&nbsp;</div><div dir=3D"ltr">- For=
 embedded directly in a JWT access token, the JWK will be in the claims rath=
er than the header and so can at least be compressed. (Albeit not by much, b=
ecause public keys don=E2=80=99t compress well, but the rest of the AT will a=
nd that can compensate a little for the extra bulk).&nbsp;</div><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">[1]:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://nvd.nist.gov/vu=
ln/detail/CVE-2018-0114">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114</a><=
/div><div dir=3D"ltr">[2]:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-=
cryptographic-doom-principle.html">https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptogr=
aphic-doom-principle.html</a></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"lt=
r">=E2=80=94 Neil</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On 8 S=
ep 2020, at 23:46, Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D40pingidentity.com@dmarc.i=
etf.org&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Indeed there are cases, as you poi=
nt out, where the key might be knowable to the server via some other means, w=
hich makes the "jwk" header in the DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And wh=
ile omitting the key in such cases would reduce the size of some messages (t=
he DPoP proof anyway), such optionality would add complexity to implementati=
ons and deployments (and that kind of complexity can and often does degrade i=
nteroperability and even security). How, for example, would a client know if=
 the access token includes the public key and thus whether or not to include=
 the key with the proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (=
rather than thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get the key t=
o the AS. As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof struct=
ure for requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have=
 public key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as a d=
riving use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh tokens f=
or public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account for b=
oth. <br></div><div><br></div><div>Ultimately there are a number of differen=
t ways the necessary data could flow through the various protocol elements. A=
nd there are some tradeoffs with different approaches and/or trying to accom=
modate variations under one approach. The approach the draft has taken thus f=
ar is to prioritize consistency and simplicity as much as is possible. And t=
hat ethos has led to how it's currently defined, which is to always include t=
he key in the proof and bind to a hash of the key in the access token. <br><=
/div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tosh=
io9.ito@toshiba.co.jp">toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter is<br=
>
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in theo=
ry.<br>
<br>
For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the<br>
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wit=
h<br>
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it c=
an<br>
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.<=
br>
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
<br>
The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share th=
e<br>
storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the AS an=
d RS<br>
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to<=
br>
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7)=
.<br>
<br>
If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify which=
 key<br>
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to s=
end<br>
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header<br>
parameter to specify the key.<br>
<br>
Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but I=
'm<br>
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the la=
test<br>
draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same DPo=
P<br>
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases<=
br>
where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would allow<=
br>
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
<br>
I'd like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
<br>
<br>
[*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecom=
ment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/dani=
elfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
[*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UIC=
cZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf=
.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
<br>
-------------<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
Research and Development Center<br>
Toshiba Corporation<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
<i style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:bas=
eline;background:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system-ui=
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-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Ca=
ntarell,&quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;,Arial,sans-serif;font-weight:600"><font s=
ize=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and pr=
ivileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review,=
 use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.&nbsp; If y=
ou have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immed=
iately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your c=
omputer. Thank you.</font></span></i><span>_________________________________=
______________</span><br><span>OAuth mailing list</span><br><span>OAuth@ietf=
.org</span><br><span>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</span><br><=
/div></blockquote></div></body></html>=

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From: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 08:53:03 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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+1 for keeping it simple. The design itself promotes unique-per-instance
keys, not pre-registration.

S pozdravem,
*Filip Skokan*


On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 00:46, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=
40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be knowable
> to the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk" header in the
> DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in such cases
> would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such
> optionality would add complexity to implementations and deployments (and
> that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperability and
> even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access token
> includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the key with the
> proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rather than
> thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get the key to the AS.
> As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structure for
> requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have public
> key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as a driving
> use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh tokens for
> public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account for
> both.
>
> Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could
> flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs
> with different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under one
> approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize
> consistency and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has led
> to how it's currently defined, which is to always include the key in the
> proof and bind to a hash of the key in the access token.
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter is
>> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in
>> theory.
>>
>> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
>> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered
>> with
>> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint,
>> it can
>> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP
>> Proof.
>> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>>
>> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share
>> the
>> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the AS
>> and RS
>> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have
>> to
>> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section
>> 7).
>>
>> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify
>> which key
>> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need
>> to send
>> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
>> parameter to specify the key.
>>
>> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1],
>> but I'm
>> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the
>> latest
>> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same
>> DPoP
>> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some
>> cases
>> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would
>> allow
>> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>>
>> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>>
>>
>> [*1]:
>> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746
>> [*2]:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/
>>
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Toshio Ito
>>
>> -------------
>> Toshio Ito
>> Research and Development Center
>> Toshiba Corporation
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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<div dir=3D"ltr">+1 for keeping it simple. The design itself=C2=A0promotes =
unique-per-instance keys, not pre-registration.<div><br><div><div><div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">S=
 pozdravem,<br><b>Filip Skokan</b></div></div><br></div></div></div></div><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed,=
 9 Sep 2020 at 00:46, Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pi=
ngidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div>Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be=
 knowable to the server via some other means, which makes the &quot;jwk&quo=
t; header in the DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the =
key in such cases would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof an=
yway), such optionality would add complexity to implementations and deploym=
ents (and that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperabili=
ty and even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access =
token includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the key wi=
th the proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rather th=
an thumbprint) but then there&#39;s the question of how to get the key to t=
he AS. As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structur=
e for requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have =
public key(s) registered and some that won&#39;t (maybe a lot that won&#39;=
t as a driving use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh=
 tokens for public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to acc=
ount for both. <br></div><div><br></div><div>Ultimately there are a number =
of different ways the necessary data could flow through the various protoco=
l elements. And there are some tradeoffs with different approaches and/or t=
rying to accommodate variations under one approach. The approach the draft =
has taken thus far is to prioritize consistency and simplicity as much as i=
s possible. And that ethos has led to how it&#39;s currently defined, which=
 is to always include the key in the proof and bind to a hash of the key in=
 the access token. <br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp" target=3D"_blank">toshio9.=
ito@toshiba.co.jp</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);p=
adding-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the &quot;jwk&quot; header para=
meter is<br>
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where &quot;jwk&quot; is not necess=
ary in theory.<br>
<br>
For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the<br>
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wi=
th<br>
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it =
can<br>
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.=
<br>
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
<br>
The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share t=
he<br>
storage for clients&#39; public keys. Things are a little difficult if the =
AS and RS<br>
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to=
<br>
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7=
).<br>
<br>
If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify whic=
h key<br>
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to=
 send<br>
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use &quot;kid&quot; =
header<br>
parameter to specify the key.<br>
<br>
Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but=
 I&#39;m<br>
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the l=
atest<br>
draft about the &quot;jwk&quot; header parameter [*2]. I agree with using t=
he same DPoP<br>
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases=
<br>
where we can omit &quot;jwk&quot; in BOTH requests. Making &quot;jwk&quot; =
OPTIONAL would allow<br>
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
<br>
<br>
[*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issueco=
mment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/da=
nielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
[*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UI=
CcZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
<br>
-------------<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
Research and Development Center<br>
Toshiba Corporation<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
<i style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:ba=
seline;background:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system-=
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ts from your computer. Thank you.</font></span></i>________________________=
_______________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
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</blockquote></div>

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Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/1FHJeOeuATVf95fmQyMJUnKD3AI>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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From: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Hi Dick and Hannes,

1)  While reading RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out that 
there are more than two flavours of the "sub" claim.
      This draft is introducing two new other favours of the semantics 
of the "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519.
      When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot be changed 
... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519
      which would be a clean way to proceed.

2) The argument about "changing the token format at any time" does not 
apply in the context of this future RFC.
     This sentence should be either removed or modified  This means that 
the following sentence which is a derivative
     of this sentence should also be either removed or modified:

    Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
    access token content would break without recourse.

3) The following questions have still not been answered:

    Some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How
    can a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
    Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to this
    profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance
    of an access token compliant to this profile ?

Denis

> Denis
>
>
> The objective of this document is to standardize the token the AS 
> shares with the RS. It is not to standardize how the client can read 
> the token. Just because the user is using the client, that does not 
> mean the user wants the client to see any claims about themselves. 
> Letting the client see the contents of the token may be a privacy 
> violation.
>
> client != user
> ᐧ
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr 
> <mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr>> wrote:
>
>     Hi Hannes,
>
>     Two comments between the lines.
>
>>     Hi Victorio, Hi all,
>>
>>     I am doing my shepherd write-up for
>>     draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I
>>     have a few minor suggestions:
>>
>>     Section 2:
>>
>>     I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs
>>     complying with the requirements described in this section."
>>
>>     Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous
>>     page (see terminology section).
>>
>>     Section 2.1
>>
>>     s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
>>
>>     (same replacement in Section 4)
>>
>>     s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media
>>     type,
>>
>>        which can be used to indicate that the content is an access
>>     token./This specification registers the "application/at+jwt"
>>     media type,
>>
>>        which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access
>>     token.
>>
>>     Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated,
>>     such as in Section 2.2.
>>
>>     Section 2.2
>>
>>     s/""aud"/"aud"
>>
>>     2.2.1
>>
>>     s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
>>     [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of
>>     [OpenID.Core].
>>
>>     s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
>>     [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of
>>     [OpenID.Core].
>>
>>     s/Please see/See
>>
>>     s/For example:/For example,
>>
>>     Section 4
>>
>>     You write:
>>
>>     "Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization
>>     Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... "
>>
>>     Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph
>>     gives me the impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"
>>
>>     s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security
>>     implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on
>>     security implications.
>>
>>     This sentence sounds strange to me:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>        When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
>>     [RFC6750],
>>
>>        resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it
>>     in the
>>
>>        following manner.
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     How about:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>        Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it
>>     in the
>>
>>        following manner.
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are
>>     you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting
>>     them?
>>
>>     You write:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
>>
>>        the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD
>>     use them
>>
>>        in combination with any other contextual information available to
>>
>>        determine whether the current call should be authorized or
>>     rejected.
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     Include a reference to the authorization claims section
>>
>>     s/ For more
>>
>>        details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of
>>     [RFC8725]./ For more
>>
>>        details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of
>>     [RFC8725].
>>
>>     You write:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>        Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
>>
>>        for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
>>
>>        safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to
>>     describe what follows afterwards in the text.
>>
>>     You write:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
>>
>>        the access token
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of
>>     interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like
>>     the following would work:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>        Authorization server and the resource server
>>
>>        might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
>>
>>        switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any
>>     logic in the
>>
>>        client relying on the ability to read the access token content
>>     would
>>
>>        break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that
>>     access tokens
>>
>>        are treated opaque by clients.
>>
>>        Administrators of authorization servers should also take into
>>     account that
>>
>>        the content of an access token is visible to the client.
>>     Whenever client
>>
>>        access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
>>
>>        given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit
>>     steps
>>
>>        to prevent it.
>>
>>     "
>>
>>
>     /In the general case, /the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access
>     tokens are treated as opaque by clients.
>     However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case:
>     since the client gets back an access token conformant to _this_
>     RFC, then it knows
>     exactly its detailed structure. The argument about "changing the
>     token format at any time" does not apply. In this case, the client
>     is quite sure
>     that it would be able to understand most of its content (at least
>     all the standard claims). The above text proposal would need to be
>     reconsidered.
>
>     Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access token to the
>     client is odd when an access token contains claims about a
>     human-user :
>     these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually
>     allowed to have access to his own personal data.
>
>     Encryption is nice in theory but complicated in practice, since a
>     key management system must put in place. Whenever possible, it
>     should be avoided.
>
>     BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered:
>     How can a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
>     Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to
>     this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the
>     issuance of an access token
>     compliant to this profile ?
>
>     Another comment follows.
>
>>     You wrote:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>        In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
>>
>>        user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be
>>     accessed
>>
>>        without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would
>>     simply
>>
>>        access his or her own personal information) or if steps must
>>     be taken
>>
>>        to enforce confidentiality. Possible measures include: encrypting
>>
>>        the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
>>
>>        sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
>>
>>        access tokens.
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I
>>     would suggest to delete
>>
>>     the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second
>>     sentence to the previous paragraph.
>>
>>     You wrote:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>        This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>>
>>        access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely
>>     on that
>>
>>        information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
>>
>>        requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>>
>>        Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>>
>>        design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the
>>     authorization
>>
>>        server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
>>
>>        level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to
>>     assign
>>
>>        "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
>>
>>        situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing
>>     tracking
>>
>>        principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>>
>>        authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens
>>     meant for
>>
>>        different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht
>>     cannot be
>>
>>        correlated in the event of resource servers collusion. 
>>     Similarly: if
>>
>>        a solution requires preventing a resource server from
>>     correlating the
>>
>>        principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>>
>>        server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>>
>>        token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>>
>>        token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>>
>>        resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>>
>>        call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>>
>>     "
>>
>>     The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of
>>     privacy. What you are
>>
>>     talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification.
>>     Ways to deal with such
>>
>>     privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
>>
>>     Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to
>>     something like:
>>
>>     "
>>
>>        This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>>
>>        access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely
>>     on that
>>
>>        information for correlating incoming
>>
>>        requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>>
>>        Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>>
>>        design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the
>>     authorization
>>
>>        server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim
>>     should be
>>
>>        populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy
>>     impact
>>
>>        assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing
>>     tracking
>>
>>        principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>>
>>        authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens
>>     meant for
>>
>>        different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that
>>     cannot be
>>
>>        correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.
>>
>     While the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim in this
>     context is not compatible with the definition of the "sub" claim
>     as defined in RFC 7519:
>
>          4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim
>
>             The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is
>     the
>             subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally
>     statements
>             about the subject. *The subject value MUST either be
>     scoped to be**
>     **        locally unique in the context of the issuer or be
>     globally unique.*
>             The processing of this claim is generally application
>     specific.  The
>             "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a
>     StringOrURI
>             value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.
>
>     There are two options and two options only:
>
>         "locally unique in the context of the issuer" means that it is
>         the same for all RSs.
>         "globally unique" means that it is the same not only for all
>         the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with
>         OAuth (e.g. an email address).
>
>
>>         Similarly, if
>>
>>        a solution requires preventing a resource server from
>>     correlating the
>>
>>        principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>>
>>        server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>>
>>        token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>>
>>        token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>>
>>        resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>>
>>        call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>>
>     The proposed text describes two different cases where the sub
>     claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair orunique for each access
>     token.
>
>     These two cases are not included in the definition found in RFC 7519.
>
>     In the general case, an identifier can be:
>
>      1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for
>         all RSs),
>      2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but
>         also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
>      3. unique for an AS/RS pair, or
>      4. unique for each access token.
>
>     I see different ways to solve this problem:
>
>         1° Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and (unfortunately)
>         remove these possibilities.
>         2° Define two new claims which would support the two cases
>         where the sub claim would be either unique for an AS/RS pair
>         orunique for one access token.
>         3° Define four new claims which would support the four above
>         cases.
>
>     Denis
>
>>     "
>>
>>     Section 7.2
>>
>>     s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>>
>>        attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in
>>     [RFC7643] to
>>
>>        express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>>
>>     /   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>>
>>        attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in
>>     [RFC7643] to
>>
>>        express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>>
>>     References
>>
>>     RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:
>>
>>        [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
>>     Token
>>
>>                   (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
>>
>>     <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>
>>     <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
>>
>>     RFC 7644 is an unused reference:
>>
>>        [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
>>
>>                   and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
>>
>>     Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
>>
>>     September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>
>>     <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
>>
>>     The same is true for RFC 3986:
>>
>>        [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter,
>>     "Uniform
>>
>>                   Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
>>
>>                   RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
>>
>>     <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>
>>     <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
>>
>>     Ciao
>>
>>     Hannes
>>
>>     IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments
>>     are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the
>>     intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do
>>     not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any
>>     purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     OAuth mailing list
>>     OAuth@ietf.org  <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     OAuth mailing list
>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Hi Dick and Hannes,<br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">1)  While reading
        RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out that there are
        more than two flavours of the "sub" claim. </font><br>
      <font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">     This draft is
          introducing two new other favours of the semantics of the
          "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519. <br>
               When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot be
          changed ... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519 <br>
               which would be a clean way to proceed.</font></font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
      <font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">2) The argument about
          "changing the token format at any time" does not apply in the
          context of this future RFC.<br>
              This sentence </font></font><font face="Arial"><font
          face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">should be
              either removed or modified</font></font>  This means that
          the following sentence which is a derivative <br>
              of this sentence should also be either removed or
          modified: <br>
        </font></font></div>
    <blockquote>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">Hence,
            any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
            access token content would break without recourse.<br>
          </font></font></div>
    </blockquote>
    <font face="Arial">3) The following questions have still not been
      answered:</font>
    <blockquote>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Some questions
          raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How can a
          client request an access token compliant to this profile ? <br>
          Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant
          to this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for
          the issuance <br>
          of an access token compliant to this profile ?</font></div>
    </blockquote>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Denis</font><br>
    </div>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAD9ie-t4r5Uwzr7FOsedFSsGGMQ0H+9psMZ1LAr=ctB-L=LGNg@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">Denis
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>The objective of this document is to standardize the token
          the AS shares with the RS. It is not to standardize how the
          client can read the token. Just because the user is using the
          client, that does not mean the user wants the client to see
          any claims about themselves. Letting the client see the
          contents of the token may be a privacy violation.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>
          <div>client != user</div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div hspace="streak-pt-mark" style="max-height:1px"><img alt=""
          style="width:0px;max-height:0px;overflow:hidden"
src="https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=zerocontent&amp;guid=35a35f01-76f0-48d5-a962-2a19b1b35c70"
          moz-do-not-send="true"><font size="1" color="#ffffff">ᐧ</font></div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM
          Denis &lt;<a href="mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr"
            moz-do-not-send="true">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div>
            <div>Hi Hannes,</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Two comments between the lines.<br>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Victorio, Hi all, </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">I am doing my shepherd write-up for
                  draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through
                  the draft I have a few minor suggestions: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Section 2: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">I would delete this sentence "JWT
                  access tokens are regular JWTs complying with the
                  requirements described in this section."</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Reason: You pretty much make the
                  same statement on the previous page (see terminology
                  section). </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Section 2.1</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric
                  cryptography</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">(same replacement in Section 4)</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/   This specification registers
                  the "application/at+jwt" media type,</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   which can be used to indicate
                  that the content is an access token./This
                  specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media
                  type,</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   which can be used to indicate
                  that the content is a JWT access token.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Use capitalized "Section" when a
                  section number is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.  
                </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Section 2.2</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/""aud"/"aud"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">2.2.1</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as
                  defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time 
                  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as
                  defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr 
                  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/Please see/See </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/For example:/For example, </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Section 4</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">You write: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"Authorization servers SHOULD
                  implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata
                  [RFC8414] ... "</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Are you sure you mean "implement"
                  and not "use"? The paragraph gives me the impression
                  that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/Please see section Section 5 for
                  further guidance on security implications./Please see
                  Section 5 for further guidance on security
                  implications.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">This sentence sounds strange to me:
                </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   When invoked as described in
                  OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   resource servers receiving a JWT
                  access token MUST validate it in the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   following manner.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">How about: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   Resource servers receiving a JWT
                  access token MUST validate it in the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   following manner.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750
                  and then list the steps are you just repeating the
                  steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them? </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">You write: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">If the JWT access token includes
                  authorization claims as described in</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   the authorization claims
                  section, the resource server SHOULD use them</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   in combination with any other
                  contextual information available to</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   determine whether the current
                  call should be authorized or rejected.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Include a reference to the
                  authorization claims section</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/ For more</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   details on cross-JWT confusion
                  please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   details on cross-JWT confusion
                  please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">You write: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   Authorization servers should not
                  rely on the use of different keys</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   for signing OpenID Connect ID
                  Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   safeguard against the
                  consequences of leaking specific keys.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">The phrase "leaking keys" is
                  probably not the best term to describe what follows
                  afterwards in the text. </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">You write:</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">The client MUST NOT inspect the
                  content of</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   the access token</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">This RFC 2119 language is not
                  really enforceable in terms of interoperability. Maybe
                  you could rephrase a bit. Something like the following
                  would work:</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"   </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   Authorization server and the
                  resource server</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   might decide to change token
                  format at any time (for example by</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   switching from this profile to
                  opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   client relying on the ability to
                  read the access token content would</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   break without recourse. The
                  OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   are treated opaque by clients. </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   Administrators of authorization
                  servers should also take into account that </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   the content of an access token
                  is visible to the client. Whenever client</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   access to the access token
                  content presents privacy issues for a</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   given scenario, the
                  authorization server should take explicit steps</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   to prevent it.   </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <br>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <p><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"> <i>In the general
                    case, </i></font>the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes
                that access tokens are treated as opaque by clients. <br>
                However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general
                case: since the client gets back an access token
                conformant to <u>this</u> RFC, then it knows <br>
                exactly its detailed structure. The argument about
                "changing the token format at any time" does not apply.
                In this case, the client is quite sure <br>
                that it would be able to understand most of its content
                (at least all the standard claims). The above text
                proposal would need to be reconsidered.<br>
                <br>
                Hiding </font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font
                    face="Arial">(by encrypting it) </font></font>the
                content of the access token to the client is odd </font><font
                face="Arial">when an access token contains claims about
                a human-user : <br>
                these claims are personal data and the human-user is
                usually allowed to have access to his own personal data.</font></p>
            <p><font face="Arial">Encryption is nice in theory but
                complicated in practice, since a key management system
                must put in place. Whenever possible, it should be
                avoided.</font></p>
            <p><font face="Arial">BTW, some questions raised during the
                WGLC have not been answered: How can a client request an
                access token compliant to this profile ? <br>
                Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token
                compliant to this profile ? How can the AS know that it
                got a call for the issuance of an access token <br>
                compliant to this profile ?<br>
              </font></p>
            <p><font face="Arial">Another comment follows.<br>
                <br>
              </font></p>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">You wrote: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   In scenarios in which JWT access
                  tokens are accessible to the end</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   user, it should be evaluated
                  whether the information can be accessed</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   without privacy violations (for
                  example, if an end user would simply</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   access his or her own personal
                  information) or if steps must be taken</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   to enforce confidentiality. 
                  Possible measures include: encrypting</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   the access token, encrypting the
                  sensitive claims, omitting the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   sensitive claims or not using
                  this profile, falling back on opaque</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   access tokens.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">The first sentence is a repetition
                  of the previous paragraph. I would suggest to delete</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">the first sentence in this
                  paragraph and to move the second sentence to the
                  previous paragraph. </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">You wrote: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   This profile mandates the
                  presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   access token, making it possible
                  for resource servers to rely on that</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   information for performing tasks
                  such as correlating incoming</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   requests with data stored
                  locally for the authenticated principal.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   Although the ability to
                  correlate requests might be required by</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   design in many scenarios, there
                  are scenarios where the authorization</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   server might want to prevent
                  correlation to preserve the desired</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   level of privacy.  Authorization
                  servers should choose how to assign</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   "sub" values according to the
                  level of privacy required by each</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   situation.  For instance: if a
                  solution requires preventing tracking</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   principal activities across
                  multiple resource servers, the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   authorization server should
                  ensure that JWT access tokens meant for</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   different resource servers have
                  distinct "sub" values tht cannot be</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   correlated in the event of
                  resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   a solution requires preventing a
                  resource server from correlating the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   principal's activity within the
                  resource itself, the authorization</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   server should assign different
                  "sub" values for every JWT access</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   token issued.  In turn, the
                  client should obtain a new JWT access</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   token for every call to the
                  resource server, to ensure that the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   resource server receives
                  different "sub" and "jti" values at every</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   call, thus preventing
                  correlation between distinct requests.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">The above paragraph suggests that
                  there are different levels of privacy. What you are </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">talking about in the text is
                  unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal with
                  such </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">privacy threats are described in
                  Section 6 of RFC 6973. </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Hence, I would suggest to slightly
                  rephrase the paragraph to something like:</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   This profile mandates the
                  presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   access token, making it possible
                  for resource servers to rely on that</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   information for correlating
                  incoming</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   requests with data stored
                  locally for the authenticated principal.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   Although the ability to
                  correlate requests might be required by</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   design in many scenarios, there
                  are scenarios where the authorization</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   server might want to prevent
                  correlation. The "sub" claim should be </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   populated by the authorization
                  servers according to a privacy impact </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   assessment. For instance, if a
                  solution requires preventing tracking</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   principal activities across
                  multiple resource servers, the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   authorization server should
                  ensure that JWT access tokens meant for</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   different resource servers have
                  distinct "sub" values that cannot be</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   correlated in the event of
                  resource servers collusion.  </p>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <p><font face="Arial">While the idea is really nice, the use
                of the "sub" claim in this context is not compatible
                with the definition of the "sub" claim <br>
                as defined in RFC 7519:<br>
                <br>
                     4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim<br>
                        <br>
                        The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the
                principal that is the <br>
                        subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are
                normally statements<br>
                        about the subject.  <b>The subject value MUST
                  either be scoped to be</b><b><br>
                </b><b>        locally unique in the context of the
                  issuer or be globally unique.</b><br>
                        The processing of this claim is generally
                application specific.  The<br>
                        "sub" value is a case-sensitive string
                containing a StringOrURI<br>
                        value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.<br>
              </font></p>
            <p><font face="Arial">There are two options and two options
                only:<br>
              </font></p>
            <blockquote>
              <p><font face="Arial">"locally unique in the context of
                  the issuer" means that it is the same for all RSs.<br>
                  "globally unique" means that it is the same not only
                  for all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing
                  to do with OAuth (e.g. an email address).</font><br>
              </p>
            </blockquote>
            <br>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">    Similarly, if</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   a solution requires preventing a
                  resource server from correlating the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   principal's activity within the
                  resource itself, the authorization</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   server should assign different
                  "sub" values for every JWT access</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   token issued.  In turn, the
                  client should obtain a new JWT access</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   token for every call to the
                  resource server, to ensure that the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   resource server receives
                  different "sub" and "jti" values at every</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   call, thus preventing
                  correlation between distinct requests.</p>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <p><font face="Arial">The proposed text describes two
                different cases where the sub claim is either unique for
                an AS/RS pair or</font><font face="Arial"> unique for
                each access token.</font></p>
            <p><font face="Arial">These two cases are not included in
                the definition found in RFC 7519. <br>
              </font></p>
            <p><font face="Arial">In the general case, an identifier can
                be: </font> </p>
            <ol>
              <li><font face="Arial">locally unique in the context of
                  the issuer (i.e. the same for all RSs),</font></li>
              <li><font face="Arial">globally unique (i.e. the same not
                  only for all the RSs but also for servers that have
                  nothing to do with OAuth),</font></li>
              <li><font face="Arial">unique for an AS/RS pair, or<br>
                </font> </li>
              <li><font face="Arial">unique for each access token.</font></li>
            </ol>
            <font face="Arial"> </font>
            <p><font face="Arial">I see different ways to solve this
                problem:</font></p>
            <font face="Arial"> </font>
            <blockquote>
              <p><font face="Arial">1° Stick to the definition of RFC
                  7519 and (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.<br>
                  2° Define two new claims which would support the two
                  cases where the sub claim would be either </font><font
                  face="Arial"><font face="Arial">unique for an AS/RS
                    pair or</font><font face="Arial"> unique for one
                    access token</font>.<br>
                </font><font face="Arial">3° Define four new claims
                  which would support the four above cases</font><font
                  face="Arial">.</font><br>
              </p>
            </blockquote>
            <p><font face="Arial">Denis</font></p>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">"</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Section 7.2</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of
                  this specification refers to the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   attributes "roles", "groups",
                  "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   express authorization
                  information in JWT access tokens.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">/   Section 2.2.3.1 of this
                  specification refers to the</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   attributes "roles", "groups",
                  "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   express authorization
                  information in JWT access tokens.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">    </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">  </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">References</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">RFC 7519 has to be a normative
                  reference: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley,
                  J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI
                  10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">              <a
                    href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519"
                    target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519&gt;</a>.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">          </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">RFC 7644 is an unused reference: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed.,
                  Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">              and C. Mortimore,
                  "System for Cross-domain Identity</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">              <span lang="FR">Management:
                    Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,</span></p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="FR">              </span>September
                  2015, <a
                    href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644"
                    target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644&gt;</a>.         
                </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">The same is true for RFC 3986: </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T.,
                  Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">              Resource Identifier
                  (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">              RFC 3986, DOI
                  10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">              <a
                    href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986"
                    target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986&gt;</a>.</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Ciao</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">Hannes</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
              </div>
              IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any
              attachments are confidential and may also be privileged.
              If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the
              sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any
              other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the
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              <fieldset></fieldset>
              <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
            </blockquote>
            <p><br>
            </p>
          </div>
          _______________________________________________<br>
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          <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
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    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

--------------E013848F0F4504CEE2043647--


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-29.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)
        Authors         : Nat Sakimura
                          John Bradley
                          Michael B. Jones
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-29.txt
	Pages           : 35
	Date            : 2020-09-09

Abstract:
   The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
   query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
   parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
   user agents such as web browsers.  While it is easy to implement, it
   means that (a) the communication through the user agents is not
   integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
   the source of the communication is not authenticated.  Because of
   these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
   forward.

   This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
   JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed
   with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and encrypted with JSON Web Encryption
   (JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication and
   confidentiality property of the Authorization Request is attained.
   The request can be sent by value or by reference.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-29
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-29

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-29


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/WNwR9-AqA5OV7bwCriLPFP3FoRs>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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From: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Hannes,

Since you are planning to write a shepherd write-up, please do not omit 
to mention the last three points mentioned in my previous email:

1)  While reading RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out that 
there are more than two flavours of the "sub" claim.
      This draft is introducing two new other favours of the semantics 
of the "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519.
      When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot be changed 
... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519
      which would be a clean way to proceed.

2) The argument about "changing the token format at any time" does not 
apply in the context of this future RFC.
     This sentence should be either removed or modified  This means that 
the following sentence which is a derivative
     of this sentence should also be either removed or modified:

    Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
    access token content would break without recourse.

3) The following questions have still not been answered:

    Some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How
    can a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
    Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to this
    profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance
    of an access token compliant to this profile ?

Denis

> We have gone through this discussion before. This document does not change the underlying assumptions of the OAuth 2.0 framework. In that framework the client is neither supposed to look at the access token content nor does it request the claims to comply to a specific profile.
>
> I am planning to add a note about this disagreement into the shepherd write-up. I don’t think there is more that can be done given that there is no support in this group for changing the architectural assumptions of OAuth 2.0.
>
> I believe that this is a topic should be brought to the Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol (gnap) working group instead.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2020 6:26 PM
> To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
> Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>; oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
>
> Denis
>
>
> The objective of this document is to standardize the token the AS shares with the RS. It is not to standardize how the client can read the token. Just because the user is using the client, that does not mean the user wants the client to see any claims about themselves. Letting the client see the contents of the token may be a privacy violation.
>
> client != user
> ᐧ
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM Denis <mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:
> Hi Hannes,
>
> Two comments between the lines.
>
> Hi Victorio, Hi all,
>
> I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I have a few minor suggestions:
>
> Section 2:
>
> I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs complying with the requirements described in this section."
>
> Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see terminology section).
>
> Section 2.1
>
> s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
> (same replacement in Section 4)
>
> s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
>     which can be used to indicate that the content is an access token./This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
>     which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.
>
> Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.
>
> Section 2.2
>
> s/""aud"/"aud"
>
> 2.2.1
>
> s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
> s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
>
> s/Please see/See
>
> s/For example:/For example,
>
> Section 4
>
> You write:
>
> "Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ..."
>
> Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives me the impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"
>
>
> s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security implications.
>
> This sentence sounds strange to me:
> "
>     When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],
>     resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
>     following manner.
> "
>
> How about:
> "
>     Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
>     following manner.
> "
>
> Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?
>
>
> You write:
>
> "
> If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
>     the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them
>     in combination with any other contextual information available to
>     determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.
> "
>
> Include a reference to the authorization claims section
>
>
> s/ For more
>     details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more
>     details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].
>
>
> You write:
>
> "
>     Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
>     for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
>     safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
> "
>
> The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.
>
> You write:
>
> "
> The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
>     the access token
> "
>
> This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the following would work:
>
> "
>     Authorization server and the resource server
>     might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
>     switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the
>     client relying on the ability to read the access token content would
>     break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens
>     are treated opaque by clients.
>
>     Administrators of authorization servers should also take into account that
>     the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever client
>     access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
>     given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps
>     to prevent it.
> "
>
> In the general case, the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens are treated as opaque by clients.
> However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case: since the client gets back an access token conformant to this RFC, then it knows
> exactly its detailed structure. The argument about "changing the token format at any time" does not apply. In this case, the client is quite sure
> that it would be able to understand most of its content (at least all the standard claims). The above text proposal would need to be reconsidered.
>
> Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access token to the client is odd when an access token contains claims about a human-user :
> these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually allowed to have access to his own personal data.
> Encryption is nice in theory but complicated in practice, since a key management system must put in place. Whenever possible, it should be avoided.
> BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How can a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
> Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance of an access token
> compliant to this profile ?
> Another comment follows.
> You wrote:
>
> "
>
>     In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
>     user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
>     without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply
>     access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken
>     to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting
>     the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
>     sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
>     access tokens.
> "
>
> The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would suggest to delete
> the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence to the previous paragraph.
>
> You wrote:
>
> "
>     This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>     access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
>     information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
>     requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>     Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>     design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
>     server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
>     level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign
>     "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
>     situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking
>     principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>     authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
>     different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be
>     correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if
>     a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
>     principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>     server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>     token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>     token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>     resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>     call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
> "
>
> The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy. What you are
> talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal with such
> privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
>
> Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something like:
>
> "
>     This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
>     access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
>     information for correlating incoming
>     requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
>     Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
>     design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
>     server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be
>     populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
>     assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking
>     principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>     authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
>     different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
>     correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.
> While the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim in this context is not compatible with the definition of the "sub" claim
> as defined in RFC 7519:
>
>       4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim
>
>          The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
>          subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally statements
>          about the subject.  The subject value MUST either be scoped to be
>          locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally unique.
>          The processing of this claim is generally application specific.  The
>          "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
>          value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.
> There are two options and two options only:
> "locally unique in the context of the issuer" means that it is the same for all RSs.
> "globally unique" means that it is the same not only for all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth (e.g. an email address).
>
>
>      Similarly, if
>     a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
>     principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
>     server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
>     token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
>     token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
>     resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
>     call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
> The proposed text describes two different cases where the sub claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for each access token.
> These two cases are not included in the definition found in RFC 7519.
> In the general case, an identifier can be:
> 1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for all RSs),
> 2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
> 3. unique for an AS/RS pair, or
> 4. unique for each access token.
> I see different ways to solve this problem:
> 1° Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.
> 2° Define two new claims which would support the two cases where the sub claim would be either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for one access token.
> 3° Define four new claims which would support the four above cases.
> Denis
> "
>
>
> Section 7.2
>
> s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>     attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
>     express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
> /   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>     attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
>     express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
>
> References
>
> RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:
>
>     [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
>                (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
>                https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519.
>
> RFC 7644 is an unused reference:
>
>     [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
>                and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
>                Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
>                September 2015, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644.
>
> The same is true for RFC 3986:
>
>     [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
>                Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
>                RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
>                https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986.
>
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hannes,</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Since you are planning to write a
      shepherd write-up, please do not omit to mention the last three
      points mentioned in my previous email:</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">1)  While reading
          RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out that there are
          more than two flavours of the "sub" claim. </font><br>
        <font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">     This draft is
            introducing two new other favours of the semantics of the
            "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519. <br>
                 When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot
            be changed ... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519 <br>
                 which would be a clean way to proceed.</font></font></div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
        <font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">2) The argument about
            "changing the token format at any time" does not apply in
            the context of this future RFC.<br>
                This sentence </font></font><font face="Arial"><font
            face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">should be
                either removed or modified</font></font>  This means
            that the following sentence which is a derivative <br>
                of this sentence should also be either removed or
            modified: <br>
          </font></font></div>
      <blockquote>
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial"><font
              face="Arial">Hence, any logic in the client relying on the
              ability to read the access token content would break
              without recourse.<br>
            </font></font></div>
      </blockquote>
      <font face="Arial">3) The following questions have still not been
        answered:</font>
      <blockquote>
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Some questions
            raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How can a
            client request an access token compliant to this profile ? <br>
            Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant
            to this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for
            the issuance <br>
            of an access token compliant to this profile ?</font></div>
      </blockquote>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Denis</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371658940DB12BD1E5DE339BFA260@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">We have gone through this discussion before. This document does not change the underlying assumptions of the OAuth 2.0 framework. In that framework the client is neither supposed to look at the access token content nor does it request the claims to comply to a specific profile.

I am planning to add a note about this disagreement into the shepherd write-up. I don’t think there is more that can be done given that there is no support in this group for changing the architectural assumptions of OAuth 2.0.

I believe that this is a topic should be brought to the Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol (gnap) working group instead.

Ciao
Hannes

From: Dick Hardt <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">&lt;dick.hardt@gmail.com&gt;</a>
Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2020 6:26 PM
To: Denis <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr">&lt;denis.ietf@free.fr&gt;</a>
Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com">&lt;Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com&gt;</a>; <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:oauth@ietf.org">oauth@ietf.org</a>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07

Denis


The objective of this document is to standardize the token the AS shares with the RS. It is not to standardize how the client can read the token. Just because the user is using the client, that does not mean the user wants the client to see any claims about themselves. Letting the client see the contents of the token may be a privacy violation.

client != user
ᐧ

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM Denis <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr">&lt;mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr&gt;</a> wrote:
Hi Hannes,

Two comments between the lines.

Hi Victorio, Hi all,

I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I have a few minor suggestions:

Section 2:

I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs complying with the requirements described in this section."

Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see terminology section).

Section 2.1

s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
(same replacement in Section 4)

s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is an access token./This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.

Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.

Section 2.2

s/""aud"/"aud"

2.2.1

s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].


s/Please see/See

s/For example:/For example,

Section 4

You write:

"Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... "

Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives me the impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"


s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security implications.

This sentence sounds strange to me:
"
   When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],
   resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

How about:
"
   Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?


You write:

"
If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
   the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them
   in combination with any other contextual information available to
   determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.
"

Include a reference to the authorization claims section


s/ For more
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].


You write:

"
   Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
   for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
   safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
"

The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.

You write:

"
The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
   the access token
"

This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the following would work:

"
   Authorization server and the resource server
   might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
   switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the
   client relying on the ability to read the access token content would
   break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens
   are treated opaque by clients.

   Administrators of authorization servers should also take into account that
   the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever client
   access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
   given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps
   to prevent it.
"

In the general case, the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens are treated as opaque by clients.
However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case: since the client gets back an access token conformant to this RFC, then it knows
exactly its detailed structure. The argument about "changing the token format at any time" does not apply. In this case, the client is quite sure
that it would be able to understand most of its content (at least all the standard claims). The above text proposal would need to be reconsidered.

Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access token to the client is odd when an access token contains claims about a human-user :
these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually allowed to have access to his own personal data.
Encryption is nice in theory but complicated in practice, since a key management system must put in place. Whenever possible, it should be avoided.
BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How can a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance of an access token
compliant to this profile ?
Another comment follows.
You wrote:

"

   In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
   user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
   without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply
   access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken
   to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting
   the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
   sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
   access tokens.
"

The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would suggest to delete
the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence to the previous paragraph.

You wrote:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
   level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign
   "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
   situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
"

The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy. What you are
talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal with such
privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.

Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something like:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be
   populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
   assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.
While the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim in this context is not compatible with the definition of the "sub" claim
as defined in RFC 7519:

     4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim

        The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
        subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally statements
        about the subject.  The subject value MUST either be scoped to be
        locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally unique.
        The processing of this claim is generally application specific.  The
        "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
        value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.
There are two options and two options only:
"locally unique in the context of the issuer" means that it is the same for all RSs.
"globally unique" means that it is the same not only for all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth (e.g. an email address).


    Similarly, if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
The proposed text describes two different cases where the sub claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for each access token.
These two cases are not included in the definition found in RFC 7519.
In the general case, an identifier can be:
1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for all RSs),
2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
3. unique for an AS/RS pair, or
4. unique for each access token.
I see different ways to solve this problem:
1° Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.
2° Define two new claims which would support the two cases where the sub claim would be either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for one access token.
3° Define four new claims which would support the four above cases.
Denis
"


Section 7.2

s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
/   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.


References

RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519</a>.

RFC 7644 is an unused reference:

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
              September 2015, <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644</a>.

The same is true for RFC 3986:

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>.


Ciao
Hannes

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Remove my email

On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 5:58 AM Tricia Dalton <triciadalton86@gmail.com>
wrote:

> 18b47345e3e8895f3662160c8819768222595852
> Remove my email
> _______________________________________________
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-- 

Regards,

*Deepak Tiwari|* Software Engineer
Intigate Technologies Pvt. Ltd. | www.intigate.co.in
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Sector-63
Noida (U.P.) 201301

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"color:rgb(49,49,49);word-spacing:1px">Remov=
e my email=C2=A0</span>=C2=A0=C2=A0<br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
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t:1ex"><span style=3D"word-spacing:1px;border-color:rgb(49,49,49);color:rgb=
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egards,</span><br></p><p style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136);font-size:12.8px">=
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ize:12.8px"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif=
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ont-family:Verdana,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Intigate Technologies P=
vt. Ltd. |=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,32,96)"><a href=3D"http:/=
/www.intigate.co.in/" title=3D"blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blo" style=3D"color:rgb(17,85,204)" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,32,96)">www.intigate.co=
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From nobody Thu Sep 10 02:40:58 2020
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From: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Hi Hannes,

Thank you for responses. See below.

> Hi Denis,
>
> Hi Dick and Hannes,
>
> 1)  While reading RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out that 
> there are more than two flavours of the "sub" claim.
> This draft is introducing two new other favours of the semantics of 
> the "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519.
>      When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot be changed 
> ... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519
>      which would be a clean way to proceed.
>
> [Hannes] What do you mean by “flavours” of the subject claim?
>
[Denis] RFC 7519 states: The subject value MUST *either *be scoped to be 
locally unique in the context of the issuer *or *be globally unique.

This makes two flavours: *either *locally unique in the context of the 
issuer *or *globally unique.

When reading the current text, in addition to these two flavours, two 
additional flavours (3) and (4) are discovered
which makes a total of four flavours:

 1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for all RSs),
 2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but also for
    servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
 3. unique for an AS/RS pair, and
 4. unique for every access token.

>
> 2) The argument about "changing the token format at any time" does not 
> apply in the context of this future RFC.
>     This sentence should be either removed or modified This means that 
> the following sentence which is a derivative
>     of this sentence should also be either removed or modified:
>
>     Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
>     access token content would break without recourse.
>
>     [Hannes] The OAuth 2.0 architecture allows the authorization
>     server and the resource server to agree on whatever token format
>     they want.
>     They can pass the information by value or by reference (which may
>     then require token introspection or an equivalent mechanism).
>     This document does not change anything concern this.
>
>     Imagine a third party implementing an OAuth 2.0 Client. If they
>     make assumptions about the ability to parse the content of the
>     token, we create a brittle system.
>
>     For this reason, the sentence "changing the token format at any
>     time" is correct.
>
>     I hope this makes sense.
>
[Denis] I do not dispute the sentence you proposed "The OAuth 2.0 
framework assumes that access tokens are treated opaque by clients"
which replaces the previous sentence which was: "The client MUST NOT 
inspect the content of the access token".

The two sentences prior to it are:

    Authorization server and the resource server might decide to change
    token format at any time (for example by switching from this profile
    to opaque tokens).
    Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
    access token content would break without recourse.

Once having read your last three responses, I would propose the 
following small change in the second sentence:/
/

    Authorization server and the resource server might decide to change
    token format at any time (for example by switching from this profile
    to opaque tokens).
    Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
    access token content /at an instant of time might /break /later on/
    without recourse.

> 3) The following questions have still not been answered:
>
>     Some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered: How
>     can a client request an access token compliant to this profile ?
>
>     [Hannes] The client cannot request the authorization server to use
>     a specific token format. Since the client is not going to look at
>     the access token content why would it even care.
>
[Denis] While reading all of your three last responses, I now understand 
the point.

>
>     Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant to
>     this profile ?
>
>     [Hannes] There no parameters defined so that the client can ask
>     for an access token format that is compliant to this profile.
>
OK.
>
>     How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance of an
>     access token compliant to this profile ?
>
>     [Hannes] The AS only gets a request for an access token and the AS
>     needs to decide what format to use, like it did in the past.
>     Nothing changed.
>
Your response does help to understand. Section 3 is stating:

    An authorization server /can /issue a JWT access token in response 
to any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and
    subsequent extensions meant to result in an access token.

I believe, it would be worthwhile to add a sentence, just after this 
sentence, with the following text:

    When an authorization server decides to issue a JWT access token 
compliant to this profile, then the following requirements apply.
    (...)

Denis
>
>     Ciao
>
>     Hannes
>
> Denis
>
>
>
>     Denis
>
>     The objective of this document is to standardize the token the AS
>     shares with the RS. It is not to standardize how the client can
>     read the token. Just because the user is using the client, that
>     does not mean the user wants the client to see any claims about
>     themselves. Letting the client see the contents of the token may
>     be a privacy violation.
>
>     client != user
>
>     ᐧ
>
>     On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr
>     <mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr>> wrote:
>
>         Hi Hannes,
>
>         Two comments between the lines.
>
>             Hi Victorio, Hi all,
>
>             I am doing my shepherd write-up for
>             draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the
>             draft I have a few minor suggestions:
>
>             Section 2:
>
>             I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are
>             regular JWTs complying with the requirements described in
>             this section."
>
>             Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the
>             previous page (see terminology section).
>
>             Section 2.1
>
>             s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
>
>             (same replacement in Section 4)
>
>             s/ This specification registers the "application/at+jwt"
>             media type,
>
>             which can be used to indicate that the content is an
>             access token./This specification registers the
>             "application/at+jwt" media type,
>
>             which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT
>             access token.
>
>             Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is
>             indicated, such as in Section 2.2.
>
>             Section 2.2
>
>             s/""aud"/"aud"
>
>             2.2.1
>
>             s/ auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
>             [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in
>             Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
>             s/ acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
>             [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in
>             Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
>             s/Please see/See
>
>             s/For example:/For example,
>
>             Section 4
>
>             You write:
>
>             "Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0
>             Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... "
>
>             Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The
>             paragraph gives me the impression that you talk about "ASs
>             using RFC 8414"
>
>             s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on
>             security implications./Please see Section 5 for further
>             guidance on security implications.
>
>             This sentence sounds strange to me:
>
>             "
>
>             When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
>             [RFC6750],
>
>             resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST
>             validate it in the
>
>             following manner.
>
>             "
>
>             How about:
>
>             "
>
>             Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST
>             validate it in the
>
>             following manner.
>
>             "
>
>             Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps
>             are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you
>             augmenting them?
>
>             You write:
>
>             "
>
>             If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as
>             described in
>
>             the authorization claims section, the resource server
>             SHOULD use them
>
>             in combination with any other contextual information
>             available to
>
>             determine whether the current call should be authorized or
>             rejected.
>
>             "
>
>             Include a reference to the authorization claims section
>
>             s/ For more
>
>             details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of
>             [RFC8725]./ For more
>
>             details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8
>             of [RFC8725].
>
>             You write:
>
>             "
>
>             Authorization servers should not rely on the use of
>             different keys
>
>             for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a
>             method to
>
>             safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
>
>             "
>
>             The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to
>             describe what follows afterwards in the text.
>
>             You write:
>
>             "
>
>             The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
>
>             the access token
>
>             "
>
>             This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms
>             of interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit.
>             Something like the following would work:
>
>             "
>
>                Authorization server and the resource server
>
>             might decide to change token format at any time (for
>             example by
>
>             switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any
>             logic in the
>
>             client relying on the ability to read the access token
>             content would
>
>             break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes
>             that access tokens
>
>                are treated opaque by clients.
>
>             Administrators of authorization servers should also take
>             into account that
>
>                the content of an access token is visible to the
>             client. Whenever client
>
>             access to the access token content presents privacy issues
>             for a
>
>             given scenario, the authorization server should take
>             explicit steps
>
>             to prevent it.
>
>             "
>
>         /In the general case, /the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that
>         access tokens are treated as opaque by clients.
>         However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general case:
>         since the client gets back an access token conformant to
>         _this_ RFC, then it knows
>         exactly its detailed structure. The argument about "changing
>         the token format at any time" does not apply. In this case,
>         the client is quite sure
>         that it would be able to understand most of its content (at
>         least all the standard claims). The above text proposal would
>         need to be reconsidered.
>
>         Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access token to
>         the client is odd when an access token contains claims about a
>         human-user :
>         these claims are personal data and the human-user is usually
>         allowed to have access to his own personal data.
>
>         Encryption is nice in theory but complicated in practice,
>         since a key management system must put in place. Whenever
>         possible, it should be avoided.
>
>         BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC have not been
>         answered: How can a client request an access token compliant
>         to this profile ?
>         Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant
>         to this profile ? How can the AS know that it got a call for
>         the issuance of an access token
>         compliant to this profile ?
>
>         Another comment follows.
>
>             You wrote:
>
>             "
>
>             In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to
>             the end
>
>             user, it should be evaluated whether the information can
>             be accessed
>
>             without privacy violations (for example, if an end user
>             would simply
>
>             access his or her own personal information) or if steps
>             must be taken
>
>             to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include:
>             encrypting
>
>             the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims,
>             omitting the
>
>             sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back
>             on opaque
>
>             access tokens.
>
>             "
>
>             The first sentence is a repetition of the previous
>             paragraph. I would suggest to delete
>
>             the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the
>             second sentence to the previous paragraph.
>
>             You wrote:
>
>             "
>
>             This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in
>             every JWT
>
>             access token, making it possible for resource servers to
>             rely on that
>
>             information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
>
>             requests with data stored locally for the authenticated
>             principal.
>
>             Although the ability to correlate requests might be
>             required by
>
>             design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the
>             authorization
>
>             server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the
>             desired
>
>             level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how
>             to assign
>
>             "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by
>             each
>
>             situation.  For instance: if a solution requires
>             preventing tracking
>
>             principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>             authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens
>             meant for
>
>             different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht
>             cannot be
>
>             correlated in the event of resource servers collusion. 
>             Similarly: if
>
>             a solution requires preventing a resource server from
>             correlating the
>
>             principal's activity within the resource itself, the
>             authorization
>
>             server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT
>             access
>
>             token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT
>             access
>
>             token for every call to the resource server, to ensure
>             that the
>
>             resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values
>             at every
>
>             call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>
>             "
>
>             The above paragraph suggests that there are different
>             levels of privacy. What you are
>
>             talking about in the text is unlinkability and
>             identification. Ways to deal with such
>
>             privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
>
>             Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph
>             to something like:
>
>             "
>
>             This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in
>             every JWT
>
>             access token, making it possible for resource servers to
>             rely on that
>
>             information for correlating incoming
>
>             requests with data stored locally for the authenticated
>             principal.
>
>             Although the ability to correlate requests might be
>             required by
>
>             design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the
>             authorization
>
>             server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim
>             should be
>
>                populated by the authorization servers according to a
>             privacy impact
>
>                assessment. For instance, if a solution requires
>             preventing tracking
>
>             principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>             authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens
>             meant for
>
>             different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that
>             cannot be
>
>             correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.
>
>         While the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim in
>         this context is not compatible with the definition of the
>         "sub" claim
>         as defined in RFC 7519:
>
>              4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim
>
>                 The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal
>         that is the
>                 subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally
>         statements
>                 about the subject. *The subject value MUST either be
>         scoped to be
>                 locally unique in the context of the issuer or be
>         globally unique.*
>                 The processing of this claim is generally application
>         specific.  The
>                 "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a
>         StringOrURI
>                 value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.
>
>         There are two options and two options only:
>
>             "locally unique in the context of the issuer" means that
>             it is the same for all RSs.
>             "globally unique" means that it is the same not only for
>             all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do
>             with OAuth (e.g. an email address).
>
>
>
>             Similarly, if
>
>             a solution requires preventing a resource server from
>             correlating the
>
>             principal's activity within the resource itself, the
>             authorization
>
>             server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT
>             access
>
>             token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT
>             access
>
>             token for every call to the resource server, to ensure
>             that the
>
>             resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values
>             at every
>
>             call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
>
>         The proposed text describes two different cases where the sub
>         claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for each
>         access token.
>
>         These two cases are not included in the definition found in
>         RFC 7519.
>
>         In the general case, an identifier can be:
>
>          1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same
>             for all RSs),
>          2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs
>             but also for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
>          3. unique for an AS/RS pair, or
>          4. unique for each access token.
>
>         I see different ways to solve this problem:
>
>             1° Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and (unfortunately)
>             remove these possibilities.
>             2° Define two new claims which would support the two cases
>             where the sub claim would be either unique for an AS/RS
>             pair or unique for one access token.
>             3° Define four new claims which would support the four
>             above cases.
>
>         Denis
>
>             "
>
>             Section 7.2
>
>             s/ Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>
>             attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in
>             [RFC7643] to
>
>             express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
>             / Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>
>             attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in
>             [RFC7643] to
>
>             express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
>             References
>
>             RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:
>
>             [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON
>             Web Token
>
>             (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
>
>             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>
>             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
>
>             RFC 7644 is an unused reference:
>
>             [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M.,
>             Wahlstroem, E.,
>
>             and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
>
>             Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
>
>             September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>
>             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
>
>             The same is true for RFC 3986:
>
>             [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter,
>             "Uniform
>
>             Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
>
>             RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
>
>             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>
>             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
>
>             Ciao
>
>             Hannes
>
>             IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any
>             attachments are confidential and may also be privileged.
>             If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the
>             sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any
>             other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the
>             information in any medium. Thank you.
>
>             _______________________________________________
>
>             OAuth mailing list
>
>             OAuth@ietf.org  <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>
>             https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         OAuth mailing list
>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are 
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended 
> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose 
> the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or 
> copy the information in any medium. Thank you. 



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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Hannes,</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Thank you for responses. See below.<br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371612EB171DE3BB1166072BFA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Denis, <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
              style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Hi Dick
              and Hannes,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        </div>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
              style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">1)  While
              reading RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out that
              there are more than two flavours of the "sub" claim.
            </span><br>
            <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">    
              This draft is introducing two new other favours of the
              semantics of the "sub" claim which are not present in RFC
              7519.
              <br>
                   When an element has been defined, its semantics
              cannot be changed ... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519
              <br>
                   which would be a clean way to proceed.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal">[Hannes] What do you mean by “flavours”
            of the subject claim?</p>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">[Denis] RFC 7519 states: The subject value
        MUST <b>either </b>be scoped to be locally unique in the
        context of the issuer <b>or </b>be globally unique.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">This makes two flavours: <b>either </b>locally
        unique in the context of the issuer <b>or </b>globally unique.<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">When reading the current text, in addition to
        these two flavours, two additional flavours (3) and (4) are
        discovered <br>
        which makes a total of four flavours:<br>
      </font></p>
    <ol>
      <li><font face="Arial">locally unique in the context of the issuer
          (i.e. the same for all RSs),</font></li>
      <li><font face="Arial">globally unique (i.e. the same not only for
          all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with
          OAuth),</font></li>
      <li><font face="Arial">unique for an AS/RS pair, and</font></li>
      <li><font face="Arial">unique for every access token.</font></li>
    </ol>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371612EB171DE3BB1166072BFA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
            <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">2)
              The argument about "changing the token format at any time"
              does not apply in the context of this future RFC.<br>
                  This sentence should be either removed or modified 
              This means that the following sentence which is a
              derivative
              <br>
                  of this sentence should also be either removed or
              modified: </span><o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Hence,
                any logic in the client relying on the ability to read
                the access token content would break without recourse.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">[Hannes] The OAuth 2.0 architecture
              allows the authorization server and the resource server to
              agree on whatever token format they want. <br>
              They can pass the information by value or by reference
              (which may then require token introspection or an
              equivalent mechanism). <br>
              This document does not change anything concern this.
              <o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">Imagine a third party implementing an
              OAuth 2.0 Client. If they make assumptions about the
              ability to parse the content of the token, we create a
              brittle system.<o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">For this reason, the sentence "changing
              the token format at any time" is correct.
              <o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">I hope this makes sense. </p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">[Denis] I do not dispute the sentence you
        proposed "The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens are
        treated opaque by clients"<br>
        which replaces the previous sentence which was: "The client MUST
        NOT inspect the content of the access token". <br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">The two sentences prior to it are: <br>
      </font></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p><font face="Arial">Authorization server and the resource server
          might decide to change token format at any time (for example
          by switching from this profile to opaque tokens). <br>
          Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read
          the access token content would break without recourse. <br>
        </font></p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">Once having read your last three responses, I
        would propose the following small change in the second sentence:</font><font
        face="Arial"><i><font face="Arial"><br>
          </font>
        </i></font></p>
    <blockquote>
      <p><font face="Arial">Authorization server and the resource server
          might decide to change token format at any time (for example
          by switching from this profile to opaque tokens). <br>
          Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read
          the access token content <i>at an instant of time might </i>break
          <i>later on</i> without recourse.</font><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371612EB171DE3BB1166072BFA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">3) The
            following questions have still not been answered:</span>
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Some
                questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered:
                How can a client request an access token compliant to
                this profile ?
                <o:p></o:p></span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in">[Hannes]
              The client cannot request the authorization server to use
              a specific token format. Since the client is not going to
              look at the access token content why would it even care.
            </p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">[Denis] While reading all of your three last
        responses, I now understand the point.</font><font face="Arial">
      </font><br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371612EB171DE3BB1166072BFA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in"><o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><br>
                Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token
                compliant to this profile ? <o:p>
                </o:p></span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in">[Hannes]
              There no parameters defined so that the client can ask for
              an access token format that is compliant to this profile.
            </p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <font face="Arial">OK.</font>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371612EB171DE3BB1166072BFA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in"><o:p></o:p></p>
            <o:p> </o:p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">How can
                the AS know that it got a call for the issuance
                of an access token compliant to this profile ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">[Hannes] The AS only gets a request for
              an access token and the AS needs to decide what format to
              use, like it did in the past. Nothing changed.
            </p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">Your response does help to understand. Section
        3 is stating:</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">   An authorization server <i>can </i>issue
        a JWT access token in response to any authorization grant
        defined by [RFC6749] and <br>
           subsequent extensions meant to result in an access token.<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">I believe, it would be worthwhile to add a
        sentence, just after this sentence, with the following text:</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">   When an </font><font face="Arial"><font
          face="Arial">authorization server decides to issue </font></font><font
        face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">a JWT access
            token compliant to this profile, then the following
            requirements </font>apply. <br>
             (...)</font></font></p>
    <font face="Arial">Denis</font>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB371612EB171DE3BB1166072BFA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
              style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Denis</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
          <br>
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal">Denis <o:p></o:p></p>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">The objective of this document is to
                standardize the token the AS shares with the RS. It is
                not to standardize how the client can read the token.
                Just because the user is using the client, that does not
                mean the user wants the client to see any claims about
                themselves. Letting the client see the contents of the
                token may be a privacy violation.<o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">client != user<o:p></o:p></p>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><img
                style="width:.0104in;height:.0104in" id="_x0000_i1025"
src="https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=zerocontent&amp;guid=35a35f01-76f0-48d5-a962-2a19b1b35c70"
                moz-do-not-send="true" width="1" height="1"><span
style="font-size:7.5pt;font-family:&quot;Gadugi&quot;,sans-serif;color:white">ᐧ</span><o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          <div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM Denis
                &lt;<a href="mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr"
                  moz-do-not-send="true">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt;
                wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
            <blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC
              1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in
              6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
              <div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Hannes,<o:p></o:p></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal">Two comments between the lines.<o:p></o:p></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
                </div>
                <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Hi
                      Victorio, Hi all,
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">I
                      am doing my shepherd write-up for
                      draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading
                      through the draft I have a few minor suggestions:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                      2:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">I
                      would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are
                      regular JWTs complying with the requirements
                      described in this section."<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Reason:
                      You pretty much make the same statement on the
                      previous page (see terminology section).
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                      2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/asymmetric
                      algorithms/asymmetric cryptography<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">(same
                      replacement in Section 4)<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                      This specification registers the
                      "application/at+jwt" media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      which can be used to indicate that the content is
                      an access token./This specification registers the
                      "application/at+jwt" media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      which can be used to indicate that the content is
                      a JWT access token.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Use
                      capitalized "Section" when a section number is
                      indicated, such as in Section 2.2.  
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                      2.2<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/""aud"/"aud"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">2.2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                      auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
                      [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined
                      in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                      acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
                      [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined
                      in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/Please
                      see/See
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/For
                      example:/For example,
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                      4<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                      write:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"Authorization
                      servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization
                      Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... "<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Are
                      you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The
                      paragraph gives me the impression that you talk
                      about "ASs using RFC 8414"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/Please
                      see section Section 5 for further guidance on
                      security implications./Please see Section 5 for
                      further guidance on security implications.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">This
                      sentence sounds strange to me:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer
                      Token Usage [RFC6750],<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST
                      validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">How
                      about:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST
                      validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Question:
                      If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps
                      are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or
                      are you augmenting them?
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                      write:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">If
                      the JWT access token includes authorization claims
                      as described in<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      the authorization claims section, the resource
                      server SHOULD use them<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      in combination with any other contextual
                      information available to<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      determine whether the current call should be
                      authorized or rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Include
                      a reference to the authorization claims section<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/
                      For more<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8
                      of [RFC8725]./ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to
                      Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                      write:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      Authorization servers should not rely on the use
                      of different keys<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT
                      tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      safeguard against the consequences of leaking
                      specific keys.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                      phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best
                      term to describe what follows afterwards in the
                      text.
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                      write:<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                      client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      the access token<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">This
                      RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in
                      terms of interoperability. Maybe you could
                      rephrase a bit. Something like the following would
                      work:<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"  
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   Authorization
                      server and the resource server<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      might decide to change token format at any time
                      (for example by<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      switching from this profile to opaque tokens).
                      Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      client relying on the ability to read the access
                      token content would<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework
                      assumes that access tokens
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   are
                      treated opaque by clients.
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      Administrators of authorization servers should
                      also take into account that
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   the
                      content of an access token is visible to the
                      client. Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      access to the access token content presents
                      privacy issues for a<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      given scenario, the authorization server should
                      take explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      to prevent it.  
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <p><i><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">In
                      the general case, </span></i><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">the
                    OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens are
                    treated as opaque by clients.
                    <br>
                    However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the
                    general case: since the client gets back an access
                    token conformant to
                    <u>this</u> RFC, then it knows <br>
                    exactly its detailed structure. The argument about
                    "changing the token format at any time" does not
                    apply. In this case, the client is quite sure
                    <br>
                    that it would be able to understand most of its
                    content (at least all the standard claims). The
                    above text proposal would need to be reconsidered.<br>
                    <br>
                    Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access
                    token to the client is odd when an access token
                    contains claims about a human-user :
                    <br>
                    these claims are personal data and the human-user is
                    usually allowed to have access to his own personal
                    data.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Encryption
                    is nice in theory but complicated in practice, since
                    a key management system must put in place. Whenever
                    possible, it should be avoided.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">BTW,
                    some questions raised during the WGLC have not been
                    answered: How can a client request an access token
                    compliant to this profile ?
                    <br>
                    Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token
                    compliant to this profile ? How can the AS know that
                    it got a call for the issuance of an access token
                    <br>
                    compliant to this profile ?</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <p style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Another
                    comment follows.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                      wrote:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are
                      accessible to the end<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      user, it should be evaluated whether the
                      information can be accessed<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      without privacy violations (for example, if an end
                      user would simply<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      access his or her own personal information) or if
                      steps must be taken<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures
                      include: encrypting<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims,
                      omitting the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      sensitive claims or not using this profile,
                      falling back on opaque<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                      first sentence is a repetition of the previous
                      paragraph. I would suggest to delete<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">the
                      first sentence in this paragraph and to move the
                      second sentence to the previous paragraph.
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                      wrote:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      This profile mandates the presence of the "sub"
                      claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      access token, making it possible for resource
                      servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      information for performing tasks such as
                      correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      requests with data stored locally for the
                      authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      Although the ability to correlate requests might
                      be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      design in many scenarios, there are scenarios
                      where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      server might want to prevent correlation to
                      preserve the desired<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      level of privacy.  Authorization servers should
                      choose how to assign<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      "sub" values according to the level of privacy
                      required by each<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      situation.  For instance: if a solution requires
                      preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      principal activities across multiple resource
                      servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      authorization server should ensure that JWT access
                      tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      different resource servers have distinct "sub"
                      values tht cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      correlated in the event of resource servers
                      collusion.  Similarly: if<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      a solution requires preventing a resource server
                      from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      principal's activity within the resource itself,
                      the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      server should assign different "sub" values for
                      every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a
                      new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      token for every call to the resource server, to
                      ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      resource server receives different "sub" and "jti"
                      values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      call, thus preventing correlation between distinct
                      requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                      above paragraph suggests that there are different
                      levels of privacy. What you are
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">talking
                      about in the text is unlinkability and
                      identification. Ways to deal with such
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">privacy
                      threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Hence,
                      I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph
                      to something like:<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      This profile mandates the presence of the "sub"
                      claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      access token, making it possible for resource
                      servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      information for correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      requests with data stored locally for the
                      authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      Although the ability to correlate requests might
                      be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      design in many scenarios, there are scenarios
                      where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      server might want to prevent correlation. The
                      "sub" claim should be
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   populated
                      by the authorization servers according to a
                      privacy impact
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   assessment.
                      For instance, if a solution requires preventing
                      tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      principal activities across multiple resource
                      servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      authorization server should ensure that JWT access
                      tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      different resource servers have distinct "sub"
                      values that cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      correlated in the event of resource servers
                      collusion. 
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">While
                    the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim
                    in this context is not compatible with the
                    definition of the "sub" claim
                    <br>
                    as defined in RFC 7519:<br>
                    <br>
                         4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim<br>
                            <br>
                            The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the
                    principal that is the <br>
                            subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are
                    normally statements<br>
                            about the subject.  <b>The subject value
                      MUST either be scoped to be<br>
                              locally unique in the context of the
                      issuer or be globally unique.</b><br>
                            The processing of this claim is generally
                    application specific.  The<br>
                            "sub" value is a case-sensitive string
                    containing a StringOrURI<br>
                            value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">There
                    are two options and two options only:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">"locally
                      unique in the context of the issuer" means that it
                      is the same for all RSs.<br>
                      "globally unique" means that it is the same not
                      only for all the RSs but also for servers that
                      have nothing to do with OAuth (e.g. an email
                      address).</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                </blockquote>
                <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                  <br>
                  <o:p></o:p></p>
                <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   
                      Similarly, if<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      a solution requires preventing a resource server
                      from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      principal's activity within the resource itself,
                      the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      server should assign different "sub" values for
                      every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a
                      new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      token for every call to the resource server, to
                      ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      resource server receives different "sub" and "jti"
                      values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      call, thus preventing correlation between distinct
                      requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">The
                    proposed text describes two different cases where
                    the sub claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair or
                    unique for each access token.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">These
                    two cases are not included in the definition found
                    in RFC 7519.
                  </span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">In
                    the general case, an identifier can be: </span>
                  <o:p></o:p></p>
                <ol type="1" start="1">
                  <li class="MsoNormal"
                    style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l0
                    level1 lfo1">
                    <span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">locally
                      unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same
                      for all RSs),</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                  <li class="MsoNormal"
                    style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l0
                    level1 lfo1">
                    <span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">globally
                      unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but
                      also for servers that have nothing to do with
                      OAuth),</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                  <li class="MsoNormal"
                    style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l0
                    level1 lfo1">
                    <span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">unique
                      for an AS/RS pair, or</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                  <li class="MsoNormal"
                    style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l0
                    level1 lfo1">
                    <span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">unique
                      for each access token.</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                </ol>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">I
                    see different ways to solve this problem:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">1°
                      Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and
                      (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.<br>
                      2° Define two new claims which would support the
                      two cases where the sub claim would be either
                      unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for one access
                      token.<br>
                      3° Define four new claims which would support the
                      four above cases.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                </blockquote>
                <p><span
                    style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Denis</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                      7.2<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                      Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification
                      refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements"
                      defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      express authorization information in JWT access
                      tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">/  
                      Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to
                      the<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements"
                      defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      express authorization information in JWT access
                      tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">References<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">RFC
                      7519 has to be a normative reference:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N.
                      Sakimura, "JSON Web Token<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                      (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                      <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519&gt;</a>.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">         
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">RFC
                      7644 is an unused reference:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M.,
                      Wahlstroem, E.,<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                      and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain
                      Identity<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                      <span lang="FR">Management: Protocol", RFC 7644,
                        DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"><span
                        lang="FR">             
                      </span>September 2015, <a
                        href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">
                        &lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644&gt;</a>.         
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                      same is true for RFC 3986:
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                      [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L.
                      Masinter, "Uniform<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                      Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD
                      66,<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                      RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                      <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986&gt;</a>.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal">IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of
                    this email and any attachments are confidential and
                    may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
                    recipient, please notify the sender immediately and
                    do not disclose the contents to any other person,
                    use it for any purpose, or store or copy the
                    information in any medium. Thank you.
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <o:p></o:p></p>
                  <pre>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:p></pre>
                  <pre>OAuth mailing list<o:p></o:p></pre>
                  <pre><a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
                  <pre><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
                </blockquote>
                <p><o:p> </o:p></p>
              </div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
                OAuth mailing list<br>
                <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                  moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                  target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></p>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <p><o:p> </o:p></p>
      </div>
      IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments
      are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the
      intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do
      not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any
      purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank
      you.
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

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To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
CC: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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From: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Hi Hannes,

All my concerns about the fact that the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that 
access tokens are treated opaque by clients are now solved.

Thanks !

> Hi Denis,
>
> Thanks for the clarifications regarding the uniqueness properties of 
> the values that go into the subject claim.
>
> Looking at draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07 I don’t see where the 
> draft introduces these two new flavors.
>
The text is as follows in section 6:

    Authorization servers should choose how to assign "sub" values 
according to the level of privacy required by each
    situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking 
principal activities across multiple resource servers,
    the authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant 
for different resource servers have distinct "sub"
    values *tht *cannot be correlated in the event of resource servers 
collusion.

Note the typo:  tht  -- > that

This is the flavor n° 3.

   Similarly: if a solution requires preventing a resource server from 
correlating the principal’s activity within the resource itself,
   the authorization server should assign different "sub" values for 
every JWT access  token issued.

This is the flavor n°4.

Denis

> Additional comments below:
>
> *From:* Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 10, 2020 11:41 AM
> *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
> *Cc:* Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>; oauth@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
>
> Hi Hannes,
>
> Thank you for responses. See below.
>
>     Hi Denis,
>
>     Hi Dick and Hannes,
>
>     1) While reading RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out
>     that there are more than two flavours of the "sub" claim.
>     This draft is introducing two new other favours of the semantics
>     of the "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519.
>          When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot be
>     changed ... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519
>          which would be a clean way to proceed.
>
>     [Hannes] What do you mean by “flavours” of the subject claim?
>
> [Denis] RFC 7519 states: The subject value MUST *either *be scoped to 
> be locally unique in the context of the issuer *or * be globally unique.
>
> This makes two flavours: *either *locally unique in the context of the 
> issuer *or *globally unique.
>
> When reading the current text, in addition to these two flavours, two 
> additional flavours (3) and (4) are discovered
> which makes a total of four flavours:
>
>  1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for all
>     RSs),
>  2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but also
>     for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),
>  3. unique for an AS/RS pair, and
>  4. unique for every access token.
>
>
>     2) The argument about "changing the token format at any time" does
>     not apply in the context of this future RFC.
>         This sentence should be either removed or modified This means
>     that the following sentence which is a derivative
>         of this sentence should also be either removed or modified:
>
>         Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read
>         the access token content would break without recourse.
>
>         [Hannes] The OAuth 2.0 architecture allows the authorization
>         server and the resource server to agree on whatever token
>         format they want.
>         They can pass the information by value or by reference (which
>         may then require token introspection or an equivalent mechanism).
>         This document does not change anything concern this.
>
>         Imagine a third party implementing an OAuth 2.0 Client. If
>         they make assumptions about the ability to parse the content
>         of the token, we create a brittle system.
>
>         For this reason, the sentence "changing the token format at
>         any time" is correct.
>
>         I hope this makes sense.
>
> [Denis] I do not dispute the sentence you proposed "The OAuth 2.0 
> framework assumes that access tokens are treated opaque by clients"
> which replaces the previous sentence which was: "The client MUST NOT 
> inspect the content of the access token".
>
> The two sentences prior to it are:
>
>     Authorization server and the resource server might decide to
>     change token format at any time (for example by switching from
>     this profile to opaque tokens).
>     Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
>     access token content would break without recourse.
>
> Once having read your last three responses, I would propose the 
> following small change in the second sentence:
>
>     Authorization server and the resource server might decide to
>     change token format at any time (for example by switching from
>     this profile to opaque tokens).
>     Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to read the
>     access token content /at an instant of time might /break /later
>     on/ without recourse.
>
>         You may have noticed that I proposed to change the RFC 2119
>         language in the text. I changed my original proposal to make
>         it more clear (see red text).
>
>         "
>
>            Authorization server and the resource server
>
>         might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
>
>         switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any
>         logic in the
>
>            client software relying on the ability to read the access
>         token content may
>
>            break since the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens
>
>            are treated opaque by clients.
>
>         Administrators of authorization servers should also take into
>         account that
>
>            the content of an access token is visible to the client.
>         Whenever client
>
>         access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
>
>         given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit
>         steps
>
>         to prevent it.
>
>         "
>
>     3) The following questions have still not been answered:
>
>         Some questions raised during the WGLC have not been answered:
>         How can a client request an access token compliant to this
>         profile ?
>
>         [Hannes] The client cannot request the authorization server to
>         use a specific token format. Since the client is not going to
>         look at the access token content why would it even care.
>
> [Denis] While reading all of your three last responses, I now 
> understand the point.
>
>
>         Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token compliant
>         to this profile ?
>
>         [Hannes] There no parameters defined so that the client can
>         ask for an access token format that is compliant to this profile.
>
> OK.
>
>         How can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance of an
>         access token compliant to this profile ?
>
>         [Hannes] The AS only gets a request for an access token and
>         the AS needs to decide what format to use, like it did in the
>         past. Nothing changed.
>
> Your response does help to understand. Section 3 is stating:
>
>    An authorization server /can /issue a JWT access token in response 
> to any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and
>    subsequent extensions meant to result in an access token.
>
> I believe, it would be worthwhile to add a sentence, just after this 
> sentence, with the following text:
>
> When an authorization server decides to issue a JWT access token 
> compliant to this profile, then the following requirements apply.
>    (...)
>
> [Hannes] That’s fine for me because this is what the intended effect 
> of the spec is.
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
> Denis
>
>         Ciao
>
>         Hannes
>
>     Denis
>
>
>
>
>         Denis
>
>         The objective of this document is to standardize the token the
>         AS shares with the RS. It is not to standardize how the client
>         can read the token. Just because the user is using the client,
>         that does not mean the user wants the client to see any claims
>         about themselves. Letting the client see the contents of the
>         token may be a privacy violation.
>
>         client != user
>
>         ᐧ
>
>         On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr
>         <mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr>> wrote:
>
>             Hi Hannes,
>
>             Two comments between the lines.
>
>                 Hi Victorio, Hi all,
>
>                 I am doing my shepherd write-up for
>                 draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through
>                 the draft I have a few minor suggestions:
>
>                 Section 2:
>
>                 I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are
>                 regular JWTs complying with the requirements described
>                 in this section."
>
>                 Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the
>                 previous page (see terminology section).
>
>                 Section 2.1
>
>                 s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
>
>                 (same replacement in Section 4)
>
>                 s/ This specification registers the
>                 "application/at+jwt" media type,
>
>                 which can be used to indicate that the content is an
>                 access token./This specification registers the
>                 "application/at+jwt" media type,
>
>                 which can be used to indicate that the content is a
>                 JWT access token.
>
>                 Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is
>                 indicated, such as in Section 2.2.
>
>                 Section 2.2
>
>                 s/""aud"/"aud"
>
>                 2.2.1
>
>                 s/ auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
>                 [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in
>                 Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
>                 s/ acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
>                 [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in
>                 Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
>
>                 s/Please see/See
>
>                 s/For example:/For example,
>
>                 Section 4
>
>                 You write:
>
>                 "Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0
>                 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... "
>
>                 Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The
>                 paragraph gives me the impression that you talk about
>                 "ASs using RFC 8414"
>
>                 s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on
>                 security implications./Please see Section 5 for
>                 further guidance on security implications.
>
>                 This sentence sounds strange to me:
>
>                 "
>
>                 When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
>                 Usage [RFC6750],
>
>                 resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST
>                 validate it in the
>
>                 following manner.
>
>                 "
>
>                 How about:
>
>                 "
>
>                 Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST
>                 validate it in the
>
>                 following manner.
>
>                 "
>
>                 Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the
>                 steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750
>                 or are you augmenting them?
>
>                 You write:
>
>                 "
>
>                 If the JWT access token includes authorization claims
>                 as described in
>
>                 the authorization claims section, the resource server
>                 SHOULD use them
>
>                 in combination with any other contextual information
>                 available to
>
>                 determine whether the current call should be
>                 authorized or rejected.
>
>                 "
>
>                 Include a reference to the authorization claims section
>
>                 s/ For more
>
>                 details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of
>                 [RFC8725]./ For more
>
>                 details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section
>                 2.8 of [RFC8725].
>
>                 You write:
>
>                 "
>
>                 Authorization servers should not rely on the use of
>                 different keys
>
>                 for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as
>                 a method to
>
>                 safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific
>                 keys.
>
>                 "
>
>                 The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best
>                 term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.
>
>                 You write:
>
>                 "
>
>                 The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
>
>                 the access token
>
>                 "
>
>                 This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in
>                 terms of interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a
>                 bit. Something like the following would work:
>
>                 "
>
>                    Authorization server and the resource server
>
>                 might decide to change token format at any time (for
>                 example by
>
>                 switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence,
>                 any logic in the
>
>                 client relying on the ability to read the access token
>                 content would
>
>                 break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework
>                 assumes that access tokens
>
>                    are treated opaque by clients.
>
>                 Administrators of authorization servers should also
>                 take into account that
>
>                    the content of an access token is visible to the
>                 client. Whenever client
>
>                 access to the access token content presents privacy
>                 issues for a
>
>                 given scenario, the authorization server should take
>                 explicit steps
>
>                 to prevent it.
>
>                 "
>
>             /In the general case, /the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes
>             that access tokens are treated as opaque by clients.
>             However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the general
>             case: since the client gets back an access token
>             conformant to _this_ RFC, then it knows
>             exactly its detailed structure. The argument about
>             "changing the token format at any time" does not apply. In
>             this case, the client is quite sure
>             that it would be able to understand most of its content
>             (at least all the standard claims). The above text
>             proposal would need to be reconsidered.
>
>             Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the access token
>             to the client is odd when an access token contains claims
>             about a human-user :
>             these claims are personal data and the human-user is
>             usually allowed to have access to his own personal data.
>
>             Encryption is nice in theory but complicated in practice,
>             since a key management system must put in place. Whenever
>             possible, it should be avoided.
>
>             BTW, some questions raised during the WGLC have not been
>             answered: How can a client request an access token
>             compliant to this profile ?
>             Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token
>             compliant to this profile ? How can the AS know that it
>             got a call for the issuance of an access token
>             compliant to this profile ?
>
>             Another comment follows.
>
>                 You wrote:
>
>                 "
>
>                 In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible
>                 to the end
>
>                 user, it should be evaluated whether the information
>                 can be accessed
>
>                 without privacy violations (for example, if an end
>                 user would simply
>
>                 access his or her own personal information) or if
>                 steps must be taken
>
>                 to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures
>                 include: encrypting
>
>                 the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims,
>                 omitting the
>
>                 sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling
>                 back on opaque
>
>                 access tokens.
>
>                 "
>
>                 The first sentence is a repetition of the previous
>                 paragraph. I would suggest to delete
>
>                 the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the
>                 second sentence to the previous paragraph.
>
>                 You wrote:
>
>                 "
>
>                 This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim
>                 in every JWT
>
>                 access token, making it possible for resource servers
>                 to rely on that
>
>                 information for performing tasks such as correlating
>                 incoming
>
>                 requests with data stored locally for the
>                 authenticated principal.
>
>                 Although the ability to correlate requests might be
>                 required by
>
>                 design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where
>                 the authorization
>
>                 server might want to prevent correlation to preserve
>                 the desired
>
>                 level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose
>                 how to assign
>
>                 "sub" values according to the level of privacy
>                 required by each
>
>                 situation.  For instance: if a solution requires
>                 preventing tracking
>
>                 principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>                 authorization server should ensure that JWT access
>                 tokens meant for
>
>                 different resource servers have distinct "sub" values
>                 tht cannot be
>
>                 correlated in the event of resource servers
>                 collusion.  Similarly: if
>
>                 a solution requires preventing a resource server from
>                 correlating the
>
>                 principal's activity within the resource itself, the
>                 authorization
>
>                 server should assign different "sub" values for every
>                 JWT access
>
>                 token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new
>                 JWT access
>
>                 token for every call to the resource server, to ensure
>                 that the
>
>                 resource server receives different "sub" and "jti"
>                 values at every
>
>                 call, thus preventing correlation between distinct
>                 requests.
>
>                 "
>
>                 The above paragraph suggests that there are different
>                 levels of privacy. What you are
>
>                 talking about in the text is unlinkability and
>                 identification. Ways to deal with such
>
>                 privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
>
>                 Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the
>                 paragraph to something like:
>
>                 "
>
>                 This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim
>                 in every JWT
>
>                 access token, making it possible for resource servers
>                 to rely on that
>
>                 information for correlating incoming
>
>                 requests with data stored locally for the
>                 authenticated principal.
>
>                 Although the ability to correlate requests might be
>                 required by
>
>                 design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where
>                 the authorization
>
>                 server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub"
>                 claim should be
>
>                    populated by the authorization servers according to
>                 a privacy impact
>
>                    assessment. For instance, if a solution requires
>                 preventing tracking
>
>                 principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
>
>                 authorization server should ensure that JWT access
>                 tokens meant for
>
>                 different resource servers have distinct "sub" values
>                 that cannot be
>
>                 correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.
>
>             While the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub" claim
>             in this context is not compatible with the definition of
>             the "sub" claim
>             as defined in RFC 7519:
>
>                  4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim
>
>                     The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal
>             that is the
>                     subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are
>             normally statements
>                     about the subject. *The subject value MUST either
>             be scoped to be
>                     locally unique in the context of the issuer or be
>             globally unique.*
>                     The processing of this claim is generally
>             application specific.  The
>                     "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing
>             a StringOrURI
>                     value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.
>
>             There are two options and two options only:
>
>                 "locally unique in the context of the issuer" means
>                 that it is the same for all RSs.
>                 "globally unique" means that it is the same not only
>                 for all the RSs but also for servers that have nothing
>                 to do with OAuth (e.g. an email address).
>
>
>
>
>                 Similarly, if
>
>                 a solution requires preventing a resource server from
>                 correlating the
>
>                 principal's activity within the resource itself, the
>                 authorization
>
>                 server should assign different "sub" values for every
>                 JWT access
>
>                 token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new
>                 JWT access
>
>                 token for every call to the resource server, to ensure
>                 that the
>
>                 resource server receives different "sub" and "jti"
>                 values at every
>
>                 call, thus preventing correlation between distinct
>                 requests.
>
>             The proposed text describes two different cases where the
>             sub claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for
>             each access token.
>
>             These two cases are not included in the definition found
>             in RFC 7519.
>
>             In the general case, an identifier can be:
>
>              1. locally unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the
>                 same for all RSs),
>              2. globally unique (i.e. the same not only for all the
>                 RSs but also for servers that have nothing to do with
>                 OAuth),
>              3. unique for an AS/RS pair, or
>              4. unique for each access token.
>
>             I see different ways to solve this problem:
>
>                 1° Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and
>                 (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.
>                 2° Define two new claims which would support the two
>                 cases where the sub claim would be either unique for
>                 an AS/RS pair or unique for one access token.
>                 3° Define four new claims which would support the four
>                 above cases.
>
>             Denis
>
>                 "
>
>                 Section 7.2
>
>                 s/ Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification
>                 refers to the
>
>                 attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined
>                 in [RFC7643] to
>
>                 express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
>                 / Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
>
>                 attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined
>                 in [RFC7643] to
>
>                 express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
>
>                 References
>
>                 RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:
>
>                 [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura,
>                 "JSON Web Token
>
>                 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
>
>                 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>
>                 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
>
>                 RFC 7644 is an unused reference:
>
>                 [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M.,
>                 Wahlstroem, E.,
>
>                 and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
>
>                 Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
>
>                 September 2015,
>                 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>
>                 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
>
>                 The same is true for RFC 3986:
>
>                 [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L.
>                 Masinter, "Uniform
>
>                 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
>
>                 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
>
>                 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>
>                 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
>
>                 Ciao
>
>                 Hannes
>
>                 IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any
>                 attachments are confidential and may also be
>                 privileged. If you are not the intended recipient,
>                 please notify the sender immediately and do not
>                 disclose the contents to any other person, use it for
>                 any purpose, or store or copy the information in any
>                 medium. Thank you.
>
>
>                 _______________________________________________
>
>                 OAuth mailing list
>
>                 OAuth@ietf.org  <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>
>                 https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>             _______________________________________________
>             OAuth mailing list
>             OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>             https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>     IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments
>     are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the
>     intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do
>     not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any
>     purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are 
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended 
> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose 
> the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or 
> copy the information in any medium. Thank you. 



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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">Hi Hannes,</font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial"><br>
      </font></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font face="Arial">All my concerns
        about the fact that the OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access
        tokens are treated opaque by clients are now solved. <br>
        <br>
        Thanks !<br>
        <br>
      </font></div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB3716B9F5C298A8F681358DD0FA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Denis, <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Thanks for the clarifications regarding the
          uniqueness properties of the values that go into the subject
          claim.
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Looking at
          draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07 I don’t see where the
          draft introduces these two new flavors.</p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><font face="Arial">The text is as follows in section 6:<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">   Authorization servers should choose how to
        assign "sub" values according to the level of privacy required
        by each<br>
           situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing
        tracking principal activities across multiple resource servers,
        <br>
           the authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens
        meant for different resource servers have distinct "sub" <br>
           values <b>tht </b>cannot be correlated in the event of
        resource servers collusion.  <br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Note the typo:  tht  -- &gt; that <br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">This is the flavor n° 3.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">  Similarly: if a solution requires preventing
        a resource server from correlating the principal’s activity
        within the resource itself, <br>
          the authorization server should assign different "sub" values
        for every JWT access  token issued. <br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">This is the flavor n°4.<br>
      </font></p>
    <p><font face="Arial">Denis</font></p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR08MB3716B9F5C298A8F681358DD0FA270@AM0PR08MB3716.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">
          </span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Additional comments below:<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <div>
          <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
            1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
            <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Denis
              <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr">&lt;denis.ietf@free.fr&gt;</a> <br>
              <b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 10, 2020 11:41 AM<br>
              <b>To:</b> Hannes Tschofenig
              <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com">&lt;Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com&gt;</a><br>
              <b>Cc:</b> Dick Hardt <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">&lt;dick.hardt@gmail.com&gt;</a>;
              <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:oauth@ietf.org">oauth@ietf.org</a><br>
              <b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG]
              draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07<o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Hannes,<o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        </div>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal">Thank you for responses. See below.<o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        </div>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Denis, <o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Hi Dick
                and Hannes,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">1) 
                While reading RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure
                out that there are more than two flavours of the "sub"
                claim.
              </span><br>
              <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">    
                This draft is introducing two new other favours of the
                semantics of the "sub" claim which are not present in
                RFC 7519.
                <br>
                     When an element has been defined, its semantics
                cannot be changed ... unless making an Errata to RFC
                7519
                <br>
                     which would be a clean way to proceed.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal">[Hannes] What do you mean by “flavours”
              of the subject claim?<o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">[Denis]
            RFC 7519 states: The subject value MUST
            <b>either </b>be scoped to be locally unique in the context
            of the issuer <b>or </b>
            be globally unique.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">This
            makes two flavours: <b>either
            </b>locally unique in the context of the issuer <b>or </b>globally
            unique.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">When
            reading the current text, in addition to these two flavours,
            two additional flavours (3) and (4) are discovered
            <br>
            which makes a total of four flavours:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <ol type="1" start="1">
          <li class="MsoNormal"
            style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l1
            level1 lfo1">
            <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">locally
              unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the same for all
              RSs),</span><o:p></o:p></li>
          <li class="MsoNormal"
            style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l1
            level1 lfo1">
            <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">globally
              unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs but also
              for servers that have nothing to do with OAuth),</span><o:p></o:p></li>
          <li class="MsoNormal"
            style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l1
            level1 lfo1">
            <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">unique
              for an AS/RS pair, and</span><o:p></o:p></li>
          <li class="MsoNormal"
            style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l1
            level1 lfo1">
            <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">unique
              for every access token.</span><o:p></o:p></li>
        </ol>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
              <span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">2)
                The argument about "changing the token format at any
                time" does not apply in the context of this future RFC.<br>
                    This sentence should be either removed or modified 
                This means that the following sentence which is a
                derivative
                <br>
                    of this sentence should also be either removed or
                modified: </span><o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                  style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Hence,
                  any logic in the client relying on the ability to read
                  the access token content would break without recourse.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">[Hannes] The OAuth 2.0 architecture
                allows the authorization server and the resource server
                to agree on whatever token format they want.
                <br>
                They can pass the information by value or by reference
                (which may then require token introspection or an
                equivalent mechanism).
                <br>
                This document does not change anything concern this. <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">Imagine a third party implementing an
                OAuth 2.0 Client. If they make assumptions about the
                ability to parse the content of the token, we create a
                brittle system.<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">For this reason, the sentence
                "changing the token format at any time" is correct.
                <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">I hope this makes sense. <o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </blockquote>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">[Denis]
            I do not dispute the sentence you proposed "The OAuth 2.0
            framework assumes that access tokens are treated opaque by
            clients"<br>
            which replaces the previous sentence which was: "The client
            MUST NOT inspect the content of the access token".
          </span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">The
            two sentences prior to it are:
          </span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Authorization
              server and the resource server might decide to change
              token format at any time (for example by switching from
              this profile to opaque tokens).
              <br>
              Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to
              read the access token content would break without
              recourse.
            </span><o:p></o:p></p>
        </blockquote>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Once
            having read your last three responses, I would propose the
            following small change in the second sentence:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Authorization
              server and the resource server might decide to change
              token format at any time (for example by switching from
              this profile to opaque tokens).
              <br>
              Hence, any logic in the client relying on the ability to
              read the access token content
              <i>at an instant of time might </i>break <i>later on</i>
              without recourse.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        </blockquote>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">You may have noticed that I proposed
                to change the RFC 2119 language in the text. I changed
                my original proposal to make it more clear (see red
                text).
                <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"  
                <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   Authorization
                server and the resource server<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                might decide to change token format at any time (for
                example by<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                switching from this profile to opaque tokens).
                <span style="color:red">Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"><span
                  style="color:red">   client software relying on the
                  ability to read the access token content may<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"><span
                  style="color:red">   break since the OAuth 2.0
                  framework assumes that access tokens
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"><span
                  style="color:red">   are treated opaque by clients.
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                Administrators of authorization servers should also take
                into account that
                <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   the
                content of an access token is visible to the client.
                Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                access to the access token content presents privacy
                issues for a<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                given scenario, the authorization server should take
                explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                to prevent it.  
                <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
                style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
              style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">3) The
              following questions have still not been answered:</span>
            <o:p></o:p></p>
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                  style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Some
                  questions raised during the WGLC have not been
                  answered: How can a client request an access token
                  compliant to this profile ?
                </span><o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in">[Hannes]
                The client cannot request the authorization server to
                use a specific token format. Since the client is not
                going to look at the access token content why would it
                even care.
                <o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </blockquote>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">[Denis]
            While reading all of your three last responses, I now
            understand the point.
          </span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                  style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><br>
                  Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token
                  compliant to this profile ? </span>
                <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;margin-left:0in">[Hannes]
                There no parameters defined so that the client can ask
                for an access token format that is compliant to this
                profile.
                <o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </blockquote>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">OK.</span>
          <o:p>
          </o:p></p>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">  <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                  style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">How
                  can the AS know that it got a call for the issuance of
                  an access token compliant to this profile ?</span><o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">[Hannes] The AS only gets a request
                for an access token and the AS needs to decide what
                format to use, like it did in the past. Nothing changed.
                <o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </blockquote>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Your
            response does help to understand. Section 3 is stating:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">   An
            authorization server <i>can
            </i>issue a JWT access token in response to any
            authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and
            <br>
               subsequent extensions meant to result in an access token.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">I
            believe, it would be worthwhile to add a sentence, just
            after this sentence, with the following text:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><span style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">  
            When an authorization server decides to issue a JWT access
            token compliant to this profile, then the following
            requirements apply.
            <br>
               (...)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p>[Hannes] That’s fine for me because this is what the intended
          effect of the spec is.
          <o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p>Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p>Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Denis</span>
          <o:p>
          </o:p></p>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span
                style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Denis</span><o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
            <br>
            <br>
            <o:p></o:p></p>
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">Denis <o:p></o:p></p>
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              </div>
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              </div>
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">The objective of this document is
                  to standardize the token the AS shares with the RS. It
                  is not to standardize how the client can read the
                  token. Just because the user is using the client, that
                  does not mean the user wants the client to see any
                  claims about themselves. Letting the client see the
                  contents of the token may be a privacy violation.<o:p></o:p></p>
              </div>
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
              </div>
              <div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal">client != user<o:p></o:p></p>
                </div>
              </div>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><img
                  style="width:.0104in;height:.0104in" id="_x0000_i1025"
src="https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=zerocontent&amp;guid=35a35f01-76f0-48d5-a962-2a19b1b35c70"
                  moz-do-not-send="true" width="1" height="1"><span
style="font-size:7.5pt;font-family:&quot;Gadugi&quot;,sans-serif;color:white">ᐧ</span><o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
            <div>
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:10 AM
                  Denis &lt;<a href="mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr"
                    moz-do-not-send="true">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt;
                  wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
              </div>
              <blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC
                1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in
6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal">Hi Hannes,<o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal">Two comments between the lines.<o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote
                    style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Hi
                        Victorio, Hi all,
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">I
                        am doing my shepherd write-up for
                        draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. Reading
                        through the draft I have a few minor
                        suggestions:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                        2:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">I
                        would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens
                        are regular JWTs complying with the requirements
                        described in this section."<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Reason:
                        You pretty much make the same statement on the
                        previous page (see terminology section).
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                        2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/asymmetric
                        algorithms/asymmetric cryptography<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">(same
                        replacement in Section 4)<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                        This specification registers the
                        "application/at+jwt" media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        which can be used to indicate that the content
                        is an access token./This specification registers
                        the "application/at+jwt" media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        which can be used to indicate that the content
                        is a JWT access token.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Use
                        capitalized "Section" when a section number is
                        indicated, such as in Section 2.2.  
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                        2.2<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/""aud"/"aud"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">2.2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                        auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
                        [OpenID.Core]./   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as
                        defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                        acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of
                        [OpenID.Core]./   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as
                        defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/Please
                        see/See
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/For
                        example:/For example,
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                        4<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                        write:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"Authorization
                        servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization
                        Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... "<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Are
                        you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The
                        paragraph gives me the impression that you talk
                        about "ASs using RFC 8414"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/Please
                        see section Section 5 for further guidance on
                        security implications./Please see Section 5 for
                        further guidance on security implications.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">This
                        sentence sounds strange to me:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer
                        Token Usage [RFC6750],<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        resource servers receiving a JWT access token
                        MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">How
                        about:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        Resource servers receiving a JWT access token
                        MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Question:
                        If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps
                        are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750
                        or are you augmenting them?
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                        write:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">If
                        the JWT access token includes authorization
                        claims as described in<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        the authorization claims section, the resource
                        server SHOULD use them<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        in combination with any other contextual
                        information available to<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        determine whether the current call should be
                        authorized or rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Include
                        a reference to the authorization claims section<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/
                        For more<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to
                        2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to
                        Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                        write:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        Authorization servers should not rely on the use
                        of different keys<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT
                        tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        safeguard against the consequences of leaking
                        specific keys.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                        phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best
                        term to describe what follows afterwards in the
                        text.
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                        write:<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                        client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        the access token<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">This
                        RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in
                        terms of interoperability. Maybe you could
                        rephrase a bit. Something like the following
                        would work:<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"  
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   Authorization
                        server and the resource server<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        might decide to change token format at any time
                        (for example by<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        switching from this profile to opaque tokens).
                        Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        client relying on the ability to read the access
                        token content would<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework
                        assumes that access tokens
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   are
                        treated opaque by clients.
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        Administrators of authorization servers should
                        also take into account that
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   the
                        content of an access token is visible to the
                        client. Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        access to the access token content presents
                        privacy issues for a<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        given scenario, the authorization server should
                        take explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        to prevent it.  
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                  <p><i><span
                        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">In
                        the general case, </span></i><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">the
                      OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access tokens are
                      treated as opaque by clients.
                      <br>
                      However, with this coming RFC, we are not in the
                      general case: since the client gets back an access
                      token conformant to
                      <u>this</u> RFC, then it knows <br>
                      exactly its detailed structure. The argument about
                      "changing the token format at any time" does not
                      apply. In this case, the client is quite sure
                      <br>
                      that it would be able to understand most of its
                      content (at least all the standard claims). The
                      above text proposal would need to be reconsidered.<br>
                      <br>
                      Hiding (by encrypting it) the content of the
                      access token to the client is odd when an access
                      token contains claims about a human-user :
                      <br>
                      these claims are personal data and the human-user
                      is usually allowed to have access to his own
                      personal data.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Encryption
                      is nice in theory but complicated in practice,
                      since a key management system must put in place.
                      Whenever possible, it should be avoided.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">BTW,
                      some questions raised during the WGLC have not
                      been answered: How can a client request an access
                      token compliant to this profile ?
                      <br>
                      Which parameter(s) allow it to ask an access token
                      compliant to this profile ? How can the AS know
                      that it got a call for the issuance of an access
                      token
                      <br>
                      compliant to this profile ?</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <p style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Another
                      comment follows.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <blockquote
                    style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                        wrote:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are
                        accessible to the end<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        user, it should be evaluated whether the
                        information can be accessed<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        without privacy violations (for example, if an
                        end user would simply<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        access his or her own personal information) or
                        if steps must be taken<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures
                        include: encrypting<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        the access token, encrypting the sensitive
                        claims, omitting the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        sensitive claims or not using this profile,
                        falling back on opaque<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                        first sentence is a repetition of the previous
                        paragraph. I would suggest to delete<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">the
                        first sentence in this paragraph and to move the
                        second sentence to the previous paragraph.
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">You
                        wrote:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        This profile mandates the presence of the "sub"
                        claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        access token, making it possible for resource
                        servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        information for performing tasks such as
                        correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        requests with data stored locally for the
                        authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        Although the ability to correlate requests might
                        be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        design in many scenarios, there are scenarios
                        where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        server might want to prevent correlation to
                        preserve the desired<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        level of privacy.  Authorization servers should
                        choose how to assign<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        "sub" values according to the level of privacy
                        required by each<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        situation.  For instance: if a solution requires
                        preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        principal activities across multiple resource
                        servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        authorization server should ensure that JWT
                        access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        different resource servers have distinct "sub"
                        values tht cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        correlated in the event of resource servers
                        collusion.  Similarly: if<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        a solution requires preventing a resource server
                        from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        principal's activity within the resource itself,
                        the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        server should assign different "sub" values for
                        every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain
                        a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        token for every call to the resource server, to
                        ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        resource server receives different "sub" and
                        "jti" values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        call, thus preventing correlation between
                        distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                        above paragraph suggests that there are
                        different levels of privacy. What you are
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">talking
                        about in the text is unlinkability and
                        identification. Ways to deal with such
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">privacy
                        threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Hence,
                        I would suggest to slightly rephrase the
                        paragraph to something like:<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        This profile mandates the presence of the "sub"
                        claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        access token, making it possible for resource
                        servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        information for correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        requests with data stored locally for the
                        authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        Although the ability to correlate requests might
                        be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        design in many scenarios, there are scenarios
                        where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        server might want to prevent correlation. The
                        "sub" claim should be
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   populated
                        by the authorization servers according to a
                        privacy impact
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   assessment.
                        For instance, if a solution requires preventing
                        tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        principal activities across multiple resource
                        servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        authorization server should ensure that JWT
                        access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        different resource servers have distinct "sub"
                        values that cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        correlated in the event of resource servers
                        collusion. 
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">While
                      the idea is really nice, the use of the "sub"
                      claim in this context is not compatible with the
                      definition of the "sub" claim
                      <br>
                      as defined in RFC 7519:<br>
                      <br>
                           4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim<br>
                              <br>
                              The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the
                      principal that is the <br>
                              subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT
                      are normally statements<br>
                              about the subject.  <b>The subject value
                        MUST either be scoped to be<br>
                                locally unique in the context of the
                        issuer or be globally unique.</b><br>
                              The processing of this claim is generally
                      application specific.  The<br>
                              "sub" value is a case-sensitive string
                      containing a StringOrURI<br>
                              value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">There
                      are two options and two options only:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <blockquote
                    style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                    <p><span
                        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">"locally
                        unique in the context of the issuer" means that
                        it is the same for all RSs.<br>
                        "globally unique" means that it is the same not
                        only for all the RSs but also for servers that
                        have nothing to do with OAuth (e.g. an email
                        address).</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  </blockquote>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <o:p></o:p></p>
                  <blockquote
                    style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   
                        Similarly, if<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        a solution requires preventing a resource server
                        from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        principal's activity within the resource itself,
                        the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        server should assign different "sub" values for
                        every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain
                        a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        token for every call to the resource server, to
                        ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        resource server receives different "sub" and
                        "jti" values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        call, thus preventing correlation between
                        distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">The
                      proposed text describes two different cases where
                      the sub claim is either unique for an AS/RS pair
                      or unique for each access token.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">These
                      two cases are not included in the definition found
                      in RFC 7519.
                    </span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">In
                      the general case, an identifier can be: </span>
                    <o:p></o:p></p>
                  <ol type="1" start="1">
                    <li class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l2
                      level1 lfo4">
                      <span
                        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">locally
                        unique in the context of the issuer (i.e. the
                        same for all RSs),</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                    <li class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l2
                      level1 lfo4">
                      <span
                        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">globally
                        unique (i.e. the same not only for all the RSs
                        but also for servers that have nothing to do
                        with OAuth),</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                    <li class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l2
                      level1 lfo4">
                      <span
                        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">unique
                        for an AS/RS pair, or</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                    <li class="MsoNormal"
                      style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l2
                      level1 lfo4">
                      <span
                        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">unique
                        for each access token.</span><o:p></o:p></li>
                  </ol>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">I
                      see different ways to solve this problem:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <blockquote
                    style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                    <p><span
                        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">1°
                        Stick to the definition of RFC 7519 and
                        (unfortunately) remove these possibilities.<br>
                        2° Define two new claims which would support the
                        two cases where the sub claim would be either
                        unique for an AS/RS pair or unique for one
                        access token.<br>
                        3° Define four new claims which would support
                        the four above cases.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  </blockquote>
                  <p><span
                      style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Denis</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                  <blockquote
                    style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">"<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Section
                        7.2<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">s/  
                        Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification
                        refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements"
                        defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        express authorization information in JWT access
                        tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">/  
                        Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to
                        the<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements"
                        defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        express authorization information in JWT access
                        tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">   
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">References<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">RFC
                        7519 has to be a normative reference:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N.
                        Sakimura, "JSON Web Token<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                        (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May
                        2015,<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                        <a
                          href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519"
                          target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519&gt;</a>.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">         
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">RFC
                        7644 is an unused reference:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari,
                        M., Wahlstroem, E.,<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                        and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain
                        Identity<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                        <span lang="FR">Management: Protocol", RFC 7644,
                          DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"><span
                          lang="FR">             
                        </span>September 2015, <a
                          href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644"
                          target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">
&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644&gt;</a>.          <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">The
                        same is true for RFC 3986:
                        <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">  
                        [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L.
                        Masinter, "Uniform<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                        Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD
                        66,<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                        RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">             
                        <a
                          href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986"
                          target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986&gt;</a>.<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"
                        style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto"> <o:p></o:p></p>
                    </div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal">IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents
                      of this email and any attachments are confidential
                      and may also be privileged. If you are not the
                      intended recipient, please notify the sender
                      immediately and do not disclose the contents to
                      any other person, use it for any purpose, or store
                      or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      <o:p></o:p></p>
                    <pre>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:p></pre>
                    <pre>OAuth mailing list<o:p></o:p></pre>
                    <pre><a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
                    <pre><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
                  </blockquote>
                  <p> <o:p></o:p></p>
                </div>
                <p class="MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
                  OAuth mailing list<br>
                  <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                    moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                  <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                    target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></p>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
          <p> <o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal">IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this
            email and any attachments are confidential and may also be
            privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please
            notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
            contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or
            store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
            <o:p></o:p></p>
        </blockquote>
        <p><o:p> </o:p></p>
      </div>
      IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments
      are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the
      intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do
      not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any
      purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank
      you.
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)
        Authors         : Nat Sakimura
                          John Bradley
                          Michael B. Jones
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt
	Pages           : 35
	Date            : 2020-09-10

Abstract:
   The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
   query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
   parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
   user agents such as web browsers.  While it is easy to implement, it
   means that (a) the communication through the user agents is not
   integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
   the source of the communication is not authenticated.  Because of
   these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
   forward.

   This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
   JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed
   with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and encrypted with JSON Web Encryption
   (JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication and
   confidentiality property of the Authorization Request is attained.
   The request can be sent by value or by reference.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens
        Author          : Vittorio Bertocci
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08.txt
	Pages           : 19
	Date            : 2020-09-14

Abstract:
   This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access
   tokens in JSON web token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to
   issue and consume access tokens in interoperable manner.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Thank you Hannes for the thorough review, and thanks in advance for the wri=
teup!

I applied most of the changes you suggested, and submitted a new draft.
Comments on questions and suggestions I didn=92t understand below:


  *   Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you ju=
st repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?
6750 doesn=92t offer an explicit list of validation steps, given the format=
 agnostic approach followed by Core, tho some can be inferred here and ther=
e. The validation steps defined here are closer to the ones OIDC core lists=
 for id_token validation, but aren=92t exactly the same- besides the typ he=
ader step and aud value considerations, which are unique to this spec, the =
discussion led to some other important differences from the OIDC list (no o=
rdering in the steps, no auth_time, acr, azp considerations etc) that warra=
nt listing the validation steps explicitly.


  *   The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe w=
hat follows afterwards in the text.
Can you expand on what aspect makes the term misaligned with the following =
text? The main difference seems to be that later on the verb used is =93com=
promise=94, but that=92s more due to the fact that there=92s an active agen=
t in the sentence (the attacker) while the preceding phrase lacks one. If I=
 were to use =93compromise=94 instead of leak I=92d need to make it passive=
, which seems a bit weird. I am happy to change it, but I wanted to underst=
and the point better first.


  *   This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interope=
rability.
I=92d like to understand this better. The thing I am trying to express here=
 is an absolute prohibition, as stated by 2119. The fact that it is unenfor=
ceable and potentially inconsequential doesn=92t make it acceptable, hence =
the language seems to be appropriate.
       I didn=92t take out the MUST NOT yet as we clarify the point further=
. I did however apply all your edits to that section, as they do make thing=
s clearer. Thanks!


  *   The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would=
 suggest to delete the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the sec=
ond sentence to the previous paragraph
The second sentence isn=92t really a repetition IMO- rather, it is a specia=
lization. Whereas the first paragraph talks about the client, the sentence =
you singled out talks about the end user. Those are closely correlated, but=
 not the same. There are scenarios where the end user doesn=92t have access=
 to the tokens, but the client app does.




From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes=
.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Date: Monday, September 7, 2020 at 23:29
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07

Hi Victorio, Hi all,

I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. R=
eading through the draft I have a few minor suggestions:

Section 2:

I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs complying =
with the requirements described in this section."

Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see t=
erminology section).

Section 2.1

s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
(same replacement in Section 4)

s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is an access token./This =
specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.

Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as in Se=
ction 2.2.

Section 2.2

s/""aud"/"aud"

2.2.1

s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   aut=
h_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr,=
 amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].


s/Please see/See

s/For example:/For example,

Section 4

You write:

"Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Meta=
data [RFC8414] ... "

Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives me the=
 impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"


s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security implication=
s./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security implications.

This sentence sounds strange to me:
"
   When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],
   resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

How about:
"
   Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just rep=
eating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?


You write:

"
If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
   the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them
   in combination with any other contextual information available to
   determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.
"

Include a reference to the authorization claims section


s/ For more
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For mo=
re
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].


You write:

"
   Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
   for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
   safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
"

The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe what fo=
llows afterwards in the text.

You write:

"
The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
   the access token
"

This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interoperabili=
ty. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the following would work=
:

"
   Authorization server and the resource server
   might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
   switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the
   client relying on the ability to read the access token content would
   break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access toke=
ns
   are treated opaque by clients.

   Administrators of authorization servers should also take into account th=
at
   the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever client
   access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
   given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps
   to prevent it.
"


You wrote:

"

   In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
   user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
   without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply
   access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken
   to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting
   the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
   sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
   access tokens.
"

The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would sugge=
st to delete
the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence to the=
 previous paragraph.

You wrote:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
   level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign
   "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
   situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
"

The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy. Wh=
at you are
talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal=
 with such
privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.

Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something like=
:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be
   populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
   assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly, if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
"


Section 7.2

s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
/   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.


References

RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

RFC 7644 is an unused reference:

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
              September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.

The same is true for RFC 3986:

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.


Ciao
Hannes

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thank you Hannes for the thorough review, and thanks=
 in advance for the writeup!<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I applied most of the changes you suggested, and sub=
mitted a new draft.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Comments on questions and suggestions I didn=92t und=
erstand below:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you ju=
st repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?
<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">6750 doesn=92t offer an =
explicit list of validation steps, given the format agnostic approach follo=
wed by Core, tho some can be inferred here and there. The validation steps =
defined here are closer to the ones OIDC
 core lists for id_token validation, but aren=92t exactly the same- besides=
 the typ header step and aud value considerations, which are unique to this=
 spec, the discussion led to some other important differences from the OIDC=
 list (no ordering in the steps, no
 auth_time, acr, azp considerations etc) that warrant listing the validatio=
n steps explicitly.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">The phrase &quot;leaking keys&quot; is probably not the best term to =
describe what follows afterwards in the text.
<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">Can you expand on what a=
spect makes the term misaligned with the following text? The main differenc=
e seems to be that later on the verb used is =93compromise=94, but that=92s=
 more due to the fact that there=92s an active
 agent in the sentence (the attacker) while the preceding phrase lacks one.=
 If I were to use =93compromise=94 instead of leak I=92d need to make it pa=
ssive, which seems a bit weird. I am happy to change it, but I wanted to un=
derstand the point better first.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interope=
rability.<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">I=92d like to understand=
 this better. The thing I am trying to express here is an absolute prohibit=
ion, as stated by 2119. The fact that it is unenforceable and potentially i=
nconsequential doesn=92t make it acceptable,
 hence the language seems to be appropriate.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; I didn=92t take=
 out the MUST NOT yet as we clarify the point further. I did however apply =
all your edits to that section, as they do make things clearer. Thanks!<o:p=
></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would=
 suggest to delete the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the sec=
ond sentence to the previous paragraph<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">The second sentence isn=
=92t really a repetition IMO- rather, it is a specialization. Whereas the f=
irst paragraph talks about the client, the sentence you singled out talks a=
bout the end user. Those are closely correlated,
 but not the same. There are scenarios where the end user doesn=92t have ac=
cess to the tokens, but the client app does.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">From=
: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;oauth-b=
ounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Hannes Tschofenig &lt;Hannes.Tschofenig@ar=
m.com&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Monday, September 7, 2020 at 23:29<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;oauth@ietf.org&quot; &lt;oauth@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Victorio, Hi all, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth=
-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I have a few minor suggesti=
ons:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would delete this sentence &quot;JWT access tokens=
 are regular JWTs complying with the requirements described in this section=
.&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on t=
he previous page (see terminology section).
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">(same replacement in Section 4)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; This specification registers the &quo=
t;application/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is an access token./This specification registers the &quot;applicat=
ion/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is a JWT access token.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Use capitalized &quot;Section&quot; when a section n=
umber is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.2<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&quot;&quot;aud&quot;/&quot;aud&quot;<o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2.2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined=
 in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as =
defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined =
in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as de=
fined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see/See <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/For example:/For example, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2=
.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... &quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Are you sure you mean &quot;implement&quot; and not =
&quot;use&quot;? The paragraph gives me the impression that you talk about =
&quot;ASs using RFC 8414&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance =
on security implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on secu=
rity implications.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This sentence sounds strange to me: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 =
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource servers receiving a JWT access=
 token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">How about: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource servers receiving a JWT access=
 token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the=
 steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting=
 them?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the JWT access token includes authorization claim=
s as described in<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the authorization claims section, the r=
esource server SHOULD use them<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; in combination with any other contextua=
l information available to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; determine whether the current call shou=
ld be authorized or rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Include a reference to the authorization claims sect=
ion<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; details on cross-JWT confusion please r=
efer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; details on cross-JWT confusion please r=
efer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Authorization servers should not rely o=
n the use of different keys<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens an=
d JWT tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; safeguard against the consequences of l=
eaking specific keys.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The phrase &quot;leaking keys&quot; is probably not =
the best term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in =
terms of interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like t=
he following would work:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Authorization server and the resou=
rce server<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; might decide to change token format at =
any time (for example by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; switching from this profile to opaque t=
okens). Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; client relying on the ability to read t=
he access token content would<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 f=
ramework assumes that access tokens
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;are treated opaque by clients. <o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators of authorization servers=
 should also take into account that
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the content of an access token is =
visible to the client. Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access to the access token content pres=
ents privacy issues for a<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; given scenario, the authorization serve=
r should take explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; to prevent it.&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; In scenarios in which JWT access tokens=
 are accessible to the end<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; user, it should be evaluated whether th=
e information can be accessed<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; without privacy violations (for example=
, if an end user would simply<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access his or her own personal informat=
ion) or if steps must be taken<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; to enforce confidentiality.&nbsp; Possi=
ble measures include: encrypting<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token, encrypting the sensit=
ive claims, omitting the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; sensitive claims or not using this prof=
ile, falling back on opaque<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The first sentence is a repetition of the previous p=
aragraph. I would suggest to delete<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the=
 second sentence to the previous paragraph.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; This profile mandates the presence of t=
he &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making it possible for re=
source servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; information for performing tasks such a=
s correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; requests with data stored locally for t=
he authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the ability to correlate reque=
sts might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are sce=
narios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlatio=
n to preserve the desired<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; level of privacy.&nbsp; Authorization s=
ervers should choose how to assign<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;sub&quot; values according to the=
 level of privacy required by each<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; situation.&nbsp; For instance: if a sol=
ution requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal activities across multiple re=
source servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization server should ensure that=
 JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource servers have distinc=
t &quot;sub&quot; values tht cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the event of resource ser=
vers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly: if<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires preventing a resour=
ce server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resourc=
e itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different &quot;su=
b&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client=
 should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource se=
rver, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different &quo=
t;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation betwe=
en distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The above paragraph suggests that there are differen=
t levels of privacy. What you are
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">talking about in the text is unlinkability and ident=
ification. Ways to deal with such
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 69=
73. <o:p>
</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the para=
graph to something like:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; This profile mandates the presence of t=
he &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making it possible for re=
source servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; information for correlating incoming<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; requests with data stored locally for t=
he authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the ability to correlate reque=
sts might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are sce=
narios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlatio=
n. The &quot;sub&quot; claim should be
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;populated by the authorization ser=
vers according to a privacy impact
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;assessment. For instance, if a sol=
ution requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal activities across multiple re=
source servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization server should ensure that=
 JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource servers have distinc=
t &quot;sub&quot; values that cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the event of resource ser=
vers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly, if<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires preventing a resour=
ce server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resourc=
e itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different &quot;su=
b&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client=
 should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource se=
rver, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different &quo=
t;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation betwe=
en distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 7.2<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this speci=
fication refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;gro=
ups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; express authorization information in JW=
T access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification =
refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;gro=
ups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; express authorization information in JW=
T access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">References<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference: <o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC7519]&nbsp; Jones, M., Bradley, J.,=
 and N. Sakimura, &quot;JSON Web Token<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (JWT)&quot;, RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May=
 2015,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519&gt;.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7644 is an unused reference: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC7644]&nbsp; Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle,=
 K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and C. Mortimore, &quot;System for Cross-domain =
Identity<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span lang=3D"FR">Management: Protocol&quot;, RF=
C 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>September 2015, &lt;htt=
ps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644&gt;.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The same is true for RFC 3986: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC3986]&nbsp; Berners-Lee, T., Fieldi=
ng, R., and L. Masinter, &quot;Uniform<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;,=
 STD 66,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986&gt;.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any=
 attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not th=
e intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not discl=
ose the contents to any other person,
 use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Th=
ank you.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2020 16:15:36 -0600
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To: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
Cc: toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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Sorry for the slow reply to this one, Neil. It's gotten me thinking a bit
and it took some time to gather my thoughts and attempt to articulate them.

It is true that, as defined in the current -01 draft, there is the
additional step for the RS to check that the proof key matches the hash in
the AT. But I think that equating it to "exactly" that kind of
CVE-2018-0114 mistake or Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle is a
significant mischaracterization. The DPoP proof message and its signature
are used to establish that the sender holds the corresponding private key.
Then binding tokens to that key or checking such bindings can be done.
That's quite different from checking the signature/integrity of a message
against a trusted key before relying on the content of the message, which
is what CVE-2018-0114 and erroneously trusting the key is about. I'm
admittedly a little touchy about this because I tried to speak up about the
potential problems with blindly trusting the jwk header back in the days of
developing the JOSE specs. And have even joked more recently that the DPoP
proof finally uncovered a legitimate use for it. So with all that said, I
don't think it rises to the level of doom. And the step of checking the
binding of the token to the proof key is pretty fundamental. It's
conceptually the same as how the AT binding is done with MTLS / RFC 8705
and the expired/defunct draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding. That doesn't make
it right per se but there's some precedent for the general approach.
Following that conceptual precedent was part of the motivation for the
current approach - not so much as simplicity for the client but simplicity
in the form of consistency in the protocol definition itself. But maybe
that motivation was too much so as the hash based cnf binding is kinda
necessary in those that are doing the key proof at or closer to the
transport layer but DPoP has all the stuff at the same layer so could do it
differently. Putting the jwk in the cnf of the AT would eliminate the
possibility of resource servers forgetting to check the binding. Of course
there are still mistakes that could be made but removing even the
possibility of that particular one is compelling.

The efficiency gains you mention are dependent on circumstance and not
always applicable, as you've kinda alluded to. The many variations of
deployment options (e.g., reference vs self-contained tokens, introspection
vs. local validation and either with various caching strategies, location
of entities and communication path between them) make quantifying it rather
difficult and circumstantially dependent. However, moving the jwk from the
DPoP proof to the AT (by value or reference) would reduce the overall
amount of data that is conveyed across the two items from a jwk and its
hash to just the jwk. That's not a huge gain but it is more than nothing.
It would also eliminate the need to codify a hash function for the jwk
thumbprint, which admittedly would be rather nice.

I guess that's a lot of words to try and kinda defend the current approach
while also admitting that I'm coming around to seeing the light in your
suggestion.

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:43 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
wrote:

> I disagree with this rationale, I=E2=80=99m afraid. I don=E2=80=99t think=
 the simplicity
> gain for the client is really very great and I think we will regret this
> decision.
>
> Most importantly, including the JWK directly in the proof token increases
> the likelihood that somebody will just validate the signature using that
> key and fail to check that it matches the hash in the AT. We=E2=80=99ve a=
lready
> seen at least one vendor make exactly this kind of mistake in the past [1=
].
> Letting the proof tell you the key to use to verify the proof is another
> example of Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle [2] - trusting th=
e message
> before you=E2=80=99ve authenticated it.
>
> Moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT/introspection response
> reduces the chances of these kind of mistakes.
>
> As a bonus it also has efficiency gains because the size of the DPoP proo=
f
> is reduced - potentially by a lot for RSA keys. Although the JWK still ha=
s
> to be communicated to the RS, this can be more efficient because:
> - For token introspection, in many deployments the introspection request
> will be within a datacenter and so over a high-bandwidth low-latency
> network. This is usually not the case for the DPoP proof, which may be ov=
er
> a poor mobile connection.
> - For embedded directly in a JWT access token, the JWK will be in the
> claims rather than the header and so can at least be compressed. (Albeit
> not by much, because public keys don=E2=80=99t compress well, but the res=
t of the
> AT will and that can compensate a little for the extra bulk).
>
> [1]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114
> [2]: https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html
>
> =E2=80=94 Neil
>
> On 8 Sep 2020, at 23:46, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> =EF=BB=BF
> Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be knowable
> to the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk" header in the
> DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in such cas=
es
> would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such
> optionality would add complexity to implementations and deployments (and
> that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperability and
> even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access token
> includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the key with t=
he
> proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rather than
> thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get the key to the AS=
.
> As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structure for
> requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have publ=
ic
> key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as a drivin=
g
> use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh tokens for
> public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account for
> both.
>
> Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could
> flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs
> with different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under o=
ne
> approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize
> consistency and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has led
> to how it's currently defined, which is to always include the key in the
> proof and bind to a hash of the key in the access token.
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter i=
s
>> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in
>> theory.
>>
>> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
>> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered
>> with
>> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint,
>> it can
>> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP
>> Proof.
>> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>>
>> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS shar=
e
>> the
>> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the A=
S
>> and RS
>> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have
>> to
>> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in sectio=
n
>> 7).
>>
>> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify
>> which key
>> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need
>> to send
>> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
>> parameter to specify the key.
>>
>> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1],
>> but I'm
>> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on th=
e
>> latest
>> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the same
>> DPoP
>> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some
>> cases
>> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would
>> allow
>> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>>
>> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>>
>>
>> [*1]:
>> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-48070174=
6
>> [*2]:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/
>>
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Toshio Ito
>>
>> -------------
>> Toshio Ito
>> Research and Development Center
>> Toshiba Corporation
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Sorry for the slow reply to this one, Neil. It&#39;s =
gotten me thinking a bit and it took some time to gather my thoughts and at=
tempt to articulate them.<br></div><div><br></div><div>It is true that, as =
defined in the current -01 draft, there is the additional step for the RS t=
o check that the proof key matches the hash in the AT. But I think that equ=
ating it to &quot;exactly&quot; that kind of CVE-2018-0114 mistake or Moxie=
=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle is a significant mischaracterizatio=
n. The DPoP proof message and its signature are used to establish that the =
sender holds the corresponding private key. Then binding tokens to that key=
 or checking such bindings can be done. That&#39;s quite different from che=
cking the signature/integrity of a message against a trusted key before rel=
ying on the content of the message, which is what CVE-2018-0114 and erroneo=
usly trusting the key is about. I&#39;m admittedly a little touchy about th=
is because I tried to speak up about the potential problems with blindly tr=
usting the jwk header back in the days of developing the JOSE specs. And ha=
ve even joked more recently that the DPoP proof finally uncovered a legitim=
ate use for it. So with all that said, I don&#39;t think it rises to the le=
vel of doom. And the step of checking the binding of the token to the proof=
 key is pretty fundamental. It&#39;s conceptually the same as how the AT bi=
nding is done with MTLS / RFC 8705 and the expired/defunct draft-ietf-oauth=
-token-binding. That doesn&#39;t make it right per se but there&#39;s some =
precedent for the general approach. Following that conceptual precedent was=
 part of the motivation for the current approach - not so much as simplicit=
y for the client but simplicity in the form of consistency in the protocol =
definition itself. But maybe that motivation was too much so as the hash ba=
sed cnf binding is kinda necessary in those that are doing the key proof at=
 or closer to the transport layer but DPoP has all the stuff at the same la=
yer so could do it differently. Putting the jwk in the cnf of the AT would =
eliminate the possibility of resource servers forgetting to check the bindi=
ng. Of course there are still mistakes that could be made but removing even=
 the possibility of that particular one is compelling. <br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>The efficiency gains you mention are dependent on circumstance an=
d not always applicable, as you&#39;ve kinda alluded to. The many variation=
s of deployment options (e.g., reference vs self-contained tokens, introspe=
ction vs. local validation and either with various caching strategies, loca=
tion of entities and communication path between them) make quantifying it r=
ather difficult and circumstantially dependent. However, moving the jwk fro=
m the DPoP proof to the AT (by value or reference) would reduce the overall=
 amount of data that is conveyed across the two items from a jwk and its ha=
sh to just the jwk. That&#39;s not a huge gain but it is more than nothing.=
 It would also eliminate the need to codify a hash function for the jwk thu=
mbprint, which  admittedly would be rather nice.</div><div><br></div><div>I=
 guess that&#39;s a lot of words to try and kinda defend the current approa=
ch while also admitting that I&#39;m coming around to seeing the light in y=
our suggestion. <br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"=
ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:43 AM Neil Madden &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:neil.madden@forgerock.com" target=3D"_blank">neil.madden@f=
orgerock.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I disagree =
with this rationale, I=E2=80=99m afraid. I don=E2=80=99t think the simplici=
ty gain for the client is really very great and I think we will regret this=
 decision.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Most importantl=
y, including the JWK directly in the proof token increases the likelihood t=
hat somebody will just validate the signature using that key and fail to ch=
eck that it matches the hash in the AT. We=E2=80=99ve already seen at least=
 one vendor make exactly this kind of mistake in the past [1]. Letting the =
proof tell you the key to use to verify the proof is another example of Mox=
ie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle [2] - trusting the message before=
 you=E2=80=99ve authenticated it.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">Moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT/introspection re=
sponse reduces the chances of these kind of mistakes.=C2=A0</div><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">As a bonus it also has efficiency gains=
 because the size of the DPoP proof is reduced - potentially by a lot for R=
SA keys. Although the JWK still has to be communicated to the RS, this can =
be more efficient because:</div><div dir=3D"ltr">- For token introspection,=
 in many deployments the introspection request will be within a datacenter =
and so over a high-bandwidth low-latency network. This is usually not the c=
ase for the DPoP proof, which may be over a poor mobile connection.=C2=A0</=
div><div dir=3D"ltr">- For embedded directly in a JWT access token, the JWK=
 will be in the claims rather than the header and so can at least be compre=
ssed. (Albeit not by much, because public keys don=E2=80=99t compress well,=
 but the rest of the AT will and that can compensate a little for the extra=
 bulk).=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">[1]:=C2=A0<a=
 href=3D"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114" target=3D"_blank">=
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114</a></div><div dir=3D"ltr">[2=
]:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-prin=
ciple.html" target=3D"_blank">https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographi=
c-doom-principle.html</a></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
=E2=80=94 Neil</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On 8 Sep=
 2020, at 23:46, Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingide=
ntity.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Indeed there are cases, as you p=
oint out, where the key might be knowable to the server via some other mean=
s, which makes the &quot;jwk&quot; header in the DPoP proof not strictly ne=
cessary. And while omitting the key in such cases would reduce the size of =
some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such optionality would add complexit=
y to implementations and deployments (and that kind of complexity can and o=
ften does degrade interoperability and even security). How, for example, wo=
uld a client know if the access token includes the public key and thus whet=
her or not to include the key with the proof? Sure the access token could a=
lways include the key (rather than thumbprint) but then there&#39;s the que=
stion of how to get the key to the AS. As well as the stated desire to util=
ize the same DPoP Proof structure for requests to both the AS and RS. There=
 will be some clients that have public key(s) registered and some that won&=
#39;t (maybe a lot that won&#39;t as a driving use case for many for this i=
s key binding access and refresh tokens for public clients). The protocol d=
efined by the draft needs to account for both. <br></div><div><br></div><di=
v>Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could =
flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs wi=
th different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under one a=
pproach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize consist=
ency and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has led to how i=
t&#39;s currently defined, which is to always include the key in the proof =
and bind to a hash of the key in the access token. <br></div><div><br></div=
></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr"=
>On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.c=
o.jp" target=3D"_blank">toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the &quot;jwk&quot; header para=
meter is<br>
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where &quot;jwk&quot; is not necess=
ary in theory.<br>
<br>
For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the<br>
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wi=
th<br>
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it =
can<br>
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.=
<br>
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
<br>
The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share t=
he<br>
storage for clients&#39; public keys. Things are a little difficult if the =
AS and RS<br>
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to=
<br>
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7=
).<br>
<br>
If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify whic=
h key<br>
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to=
 send<br>
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use &quot;kid&quot; =
header<br>
parameter to specify the key.<br>
<br>
Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but=
 I&#39;m<br>
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the l=
atest<br>
draft about the &quot;jwk&quot; header parameter [*2]. I agree with using t=
he same DPoP<br>
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases=
<br>
where we can omit &quot;jwk&quot; in BOTH requests. Making &quot;jwk&quot; =
OPTIONAL would allow<br>
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
<br>
<br>
[*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issueco=
mment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/da=
nielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
[*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UI=
CcZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
<br>
-------------<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
Research and Development Center<br>
Toshiba Corporation<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
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</blockquote></div>

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Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2020 15:51:06 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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That was a lot of words Brian. What is the "tl;dr:"? (I read it, but I'm
not sure where you landed given your last sentence)
=E1=90=A7

On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 3:16 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Sorry for the slow reply to this one, Neil. It's gotten me thinking a bit
> and it took some time to gather my thoughts and attempt to articulate the=
m.
>
> It is true that, as defined in the current -01 draft, there is the
> additional step for the RS to check that the proof key matches the hash i=
n
> the AT. But I think that equating it to "exactly" that kind of
> CVE-2018-0114 mistake or Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle is =
a
> significant mischaracterization. The DPoP proof message and its signature
> are used to establish that the sender holds the corresponding private key=
.
> Then binding tokens to that key or checking such bindings can be done.
> That's quite different from checking the signature/integrity of a message
> against a trusted key before relying on the content of the message, which
> is what CVE-2018-0114 and erroneously trusting the key is about. I'm
> admittedly a little touchy about this because I tried to speak up about t=
he
> potential problems with blindly trusting the jwk header back in the days =
of
> developing the JOSE specs. And have even joked more recently that the DPo=
P
> proof finally uncovered a legitimate use for it. So with all that said, I
> don't think it rises to the level of doom. And the step of checking the
> binding of the token to the proof key is pretty fundamental. It's
> conceptually the same as how the AT binding is done with MTLS / RFC 8705
> and the expired/defunct draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding. That doesn't make
> it right per se but there's some precedent for the general approach.
> Following that conceptual precedent was part of the motivation for the
> current approach - not so much as simplicity for the client but simplicit=
y
> in the form of consistency in the protocol definition itself. But maybe
> that motivation was too much so as the hash based cnf binding is kinda
> necessary in those that are doing the key proof at or closer to the
> transport layer but DPoP has all the stuff at the same layer so could do =
it
> differently. Putting the jwk in the cnf of the AT would eliminate the
> possibility of resource servers forgetting to check the binding. Of cours=
e
> there are still mistakes that could be made but removing even the
> possibility of that particular one is compelling.
>
> The efficiency gains you mention are dependent on circumstance and not
> always applicable, as you've kinda alluded to. The many variations of
> deployment options (e.g., reference vs self-contained tokens, introspecti=
on
> vs. local validation and either with various caching strategies, location
> of entities and communication path between them) make quantifying it rath=
er
> difficult and circumstantially dependent. However, moving the jwk from th=
e
> DPoP proof to the AT (by value or reference) would reduce the overall
> amount of data that is conveyed across the two items from a jwk and its
> hash to just the jwk. That's not a huge gain but it is more than nothing.
> It would also eliminate the need to codify a hash function for the jwk
> thumbprint, which admittedly would be rather nice.
>
> I guess that's a lot of words to try and kinda defend the current approac=
h
> while also admitting that I'm coming around to seeing the light in your
> suggestion.
>
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:43 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
> wrote:
>
>> I disagree with this rationale, I=E2=80=99m afraid. I don=E2=80=99t thin=
k the simplicity
>> gain for the client is really very great and I think we will regret this
>> decision.
>>
>> Most importantly, including the JWK directly in the proof token increase=
s
>> the likelihood that somebody will just validate the signature using that
>> key and fail to check that it matches the hash in the AT. We=E2=80=99ve =
already
>> seen at least one vendor make exactly this kind of mistake in the past [=
1].
>> Letting the proof tell you the key to use to verify the proof is another
>> example of Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle [2] - trusting t=
he message
>> before you=E2=80=99ve authenticated it.
>>
>> Moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT/introspection response
>> reduces the chances of these kind of mistakes.
>>
>> As a bonus it also has efficiency gains because the size of the DPoP
>> proof is reduced - potentially by a lot for RSA keys. Although the JWK
>> still has to be communicated to the RS, this can be more efficient becau=
se:
>> - For token introspection, in many deployments the introspection request
>> will be within a datacenter and so over a high-bandwidth low-latency
>> network. This is usually not the case for the DPoP proof, which may be o=
ver
>> a poor mobile connection.
>> - For embedded directly in a JWT access token, the JWK will be in the
>> claims rather than the header and so can at least be compressed. (Albeit
>> not by much, because public keys don=E2=80=99t compress well, but the re=
st of the
>> AT will and that can compensate a little for the extra bulk).
>>
>> [1]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114
>> [2]: https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html
>>
>> =E2=80=94 Neil
>>
>> On 8 Sep 2020, at 23:46, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
>> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>> =EF=BB=BF
>> Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be knowabl=
e
>> to the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk" header in the
>> DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in such ca=
ses
>> would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such
>> optionality would add complexity to implementations and deployments (and
>> that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperability and
>> even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access toke=
n
>> includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the key with =
the
>> proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rather than
>> thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get the key to the A=
S.
>> As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structure fo=
r
>> requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have pub=
lic
>> key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as a drivi=
ng
>> use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh tokens for
>> public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account for
>> both.
>>
>> Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could
>> flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs
>> with different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under =
one
>> approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize
>> consistency and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has le=
d
>> to how it's currently defined, which is to always include the key in the
>> proof and bind to a hash of the key in the access token.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter =
is
>>> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary in
>>> theory.
>>>
>>> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
>>> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registere=
d
>>> with
>>> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint,
>>> it can
>>> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP
>>> Proof.
>>> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>>>
>>> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS
>>> share the
>>> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the
>>> AS and RS
>>> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result hav=
e
>>> to
>>> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in
>>> section 7).
>>>
>>> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify
>>> which key
>>> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute nee=
d
>>> to send
>>> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" header
>>> parameter to specify the key.
>>>
>>> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1],
>>> but I'm
>>> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on
>>> the latest
>>> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the sam=
e
>>> DPoP
>>> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some
>>> cases
>>> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would
>>> allow
>>> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>>>
>>> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>>>
>>>
>>> [*1]:
>>> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-4807017=
46
>>> [*2]:
>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc=
/
>>>
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Toshio Ito
>>>
>>> -------------
>>> Toshio Ito
>>> Research and Development Center
>>> Toshiba Corporation
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
>> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited=
.
>> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the send=
er
>> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fr=
om
>> your computer. Thank you.*______________________________________________=
_
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
r
> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fro=
m
> your computer. Thank you.*_______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000abf39705af61fe82
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">That was a lot of words Brian. What is the &quot;tl;dr:&qu=
ot;? (I read it, but I&#39;m not sure where you landed given your last sent=
ence)</div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=
=3D"" style=3D"width:0px;max-height:0px;overflow:hidden" src=3D"https://mai=
lfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dz=
erocontent&amp;guid=3Da390a771-ce9f-4db4-bd6d-eace2092c70d"><font color=3D"=
#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 3:16 PM Brian C=
ampbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org=
">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Sorry for the slow=
 reply to this one, Neil. It&#39;s gotten me thinking a bit and it took som=
e time to gather my thoughts and attempt to articulate them.<br></div><div>=
<br></div><div>It is true that, as defined in the current -01 draft, there =
is the additional step for the RS to check that the proof key matches the h=
ash in the AT. But I think that equating it to &quot;exactly&quot; that kin=
d of CVE-2018-0114 mistake or Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle =
is a significant mischaracterization. The DPoP proof message and its signat=
ure are used to establish that the sender holds the corresponding private k=
ey. Then binding tokens to that key or checking such bindings can be done. =
That&#39;s quite different from checking the signature/integrity of a messa=
ge against a trusted key before relying on the content of the message, whic=
h is what CVE-2018-0114 and erroneously trusting the key is about. I&#39;m =
admittedly a little touchy about this because I tried to speak up about the=
 potential problems with blindly trusting the jwk header back in the days o=
f developing the JOSE specs. And have even joked more recently that the DPo=
P proof finally uncovered a legitimate use for it. So with all that said, I=
 don&#39;t think it rises to the level of doom. And the step of checking th=
e binding of the token to the proof key is pretty fundamental. It&#39;s con=
ceptually the same as how the AT binding is done with MTLS / RFC 8705 and t=
he expired/defunct draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding. That doesn&#39;t make it=
 right per se but there&#39;s some precedent for the general approach. Foll=
owing that conceptual precedent was part of the motivation for the current =
approach - not so much as simplicity for the client but simplicity in the f=
orm of consistency in the protocol definition itself. But maybe that motiva=
tion was too much so as the hash based cnf binding is kinda necessary in th=
ose that are doing the key proof at or closer to the transport layer but DP=
oP has all the stuff at the same layer so could do it differently. Putting =
the jwk in the cnf of the AT would eliminate the possibility of resource se=
rvers forgetting to check the binding. Of course there are still mistakes t=
hat could be made but removing even the possibility of that particular one =
is compelling. <br></div><div><br></div><div>The efficiency gains you menti=
on are dependent on circumstance and not always applicable, as you&#39;ve k=
inda alluded to. The many variations of deployment options (e.g., reference=
 vs self-contained tokens, introspection vs. local validation and either wi=
th various caching strategies, location of entities and communication path =
between them) make quantifying it rather difficult and circumstantially dep=
endent. However, moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT (by value or =
reference) would reduce the overall amount of data that is conveyed across =
the two items from a jwk and its hash to just the jwk. That&#39;s not a hug=
e gain but it is more than nothing. It would also eliminate the need to cod=
ify a hash function for the jwk thumbprint, which  admittedly would be rath=
er nice.</div><div><br></div><div>I guess that&#39;s a lot of words to try =
and kinda defend the current approach while also admitting that I&#39;m com=
ing around to seeing the light in your suggestion. <br></div></div><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 9,=
 2020 at 12:43 AM Neil Madden &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:neil.madden@forgerock.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">neil.madden@forgerock.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I disagree with this rationale, I=E2=80=99m afrai=
d. I don=E2=80=99t think the simplicity gain for the client is really very =
great and I think we will regret this decision.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><=
/div><div dir=3D"ltr">Most importantly, including the JWK directly in the p=
roof token increases the likelihood that somebody will just validate the si=
gnature using that key and fail to check that it matches the hash in the AT=
. We=E2=80=99ve already seen at least one vendor make exactly this kind of =
mistake in the past [1]. Letting the proof tell you the key to use to verif=
y the proof is another example of Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Princi=
ple [2] - trusting the message before you=E2=80=99ve authenticated it.=C2=
=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Moving the jwk from th=
e DPoP proof to the AT/introspection response reduces the chances of these =
kind of mistakes.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">As=
 a bonus it also has efficiency gains because the size of the DPoP proof is=
 reduced - potentially by a lot for RSA keys. Although the JWK still has to=
 be communicated to the RS, this can be more efficient because:</div><div d=
ir=3D"ltr">- For token introspection, in many deployments the introspection=
 request will be within a datacenter and so over a high-bandwidth low-laten=
cy network. This is usually not the case for the DPoP proof, which may be o=
ver a poor mobile connection.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr">- For embedded di=
rectly in a JWT access token, the JWK will be in the claims rather than the=
 header and so can at least be compressed. (Albeit not by much, because pub=
lic keys don=E2=80=99t compress well, but the rest of the AT will and that =
can compensate a little for the extra bulk).=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"ltr">[1]:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/det=
ail/CVE-2018-0114" target=3D"_blank">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2=
018-0114</a></div><div dir=3D"ltr">[2]:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://moxie.org/2=
011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html" target=3D"_blank">https://=
moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html</a></div><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=E2=80=94 Neil</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On 8 Sep 2020, at 23:46, Brian Campbell &lt;bc=
ampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_b=
lank">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote>=
</div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div>Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be knowa=
ble to the server via some other means, which makes the &quot;jwk&quot; hea=
der in the DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in=
 such cases would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anyway),=
 such optionality would add complexity to implementations and deployments (=
and that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperability and=
 even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access token =
includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the key with the=
 proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rather than thu=
mbprint) but then there&#39;s the question of how to get the key to the AS.=
 As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structure for =
requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that have public=
 key(s) registered and some that won&#39;t (maybe a lot that won&#39;t as a=
 driving use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh token=
s for public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account f=
or both. <br></div><div><br></div><div>Ultimately there are a number of dif=
ferent ways the necessary data could flow through the various protocol elem=
ents. And there are some tradeoffs with different approaches and/or trying =
to accommodate variations under one approach. The approach the draft has ta=
ken thus far is to prioritize consistency and simplicity as much as is poss=
ible. And that ethos has led to how it&#39;s currently defined, which is to=
 always include the key in the proof and bind to a hash of the key in the a=
ccess token. <br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp" target=3D"_blank">toshio9.ito@to=
shiba.co.jp</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the &quot;jwk&quot; header para=
meter is<br>
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where &quot;jwk&quot; is not necess=
ary in theory.<br>
<br>
For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the<br>
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wi=
th<br>
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it =
can<br>
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.=
<br>
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
<br>
The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share t=
he<br>
storage for clients&#39; public keys. Things are a little difficult if the =
AS and RS<br>
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to=
<br>
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7=
).<br>
<br>
If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify whic=
h key<br>
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to=
 send<br>
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use &quot;kid&quot; =
header<br>
parameter to specify the key.<br>
<br>
Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but=
 I&#39;m<br>
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the l=
atest<br>
draft about the &quot;jwk&quot; header parameter [*2]. I agree with using t=
he same DPoP<br>
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases=
<br>
where we can omit &quot;jwk&quot; in BOTH requests. Making &quot;jwk&quot; =
OPTIONAL would allow<br>
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
<br>
<br>
[*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issueco=
mment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/da=
nielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
[*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UI=
CcZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
<br>
-------------<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
Research and Development Center<br>
Toshiba Corporation<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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erif;font-weight:600"><font size=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email m=
ay contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the int=
ended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others i=
s strictly prohibited.=C2=A0 If you have received this communication in err=
or, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message a=
nd any file attachments from your computer. Thank you.</font></span></i><sp=
an>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>OAuth ma=
iling list</span><br><span><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">OAuth@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail=
man/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
/oauth</a></span><br></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div>

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seline;background:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system-=
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><font size=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidenti=
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ny review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited=
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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2020 17:13:08 -0600
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To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Omit "jwk" (or use "kid" instead) in DPoP Proof?
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The tl;dr is that I believe Neil's suggestion is of sufficient merit to
warrant seriously considering making the change.

That was more words than it needed to be too. But maybe clarifies.

On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 4:51 PM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:

> That was a lot of words Brian. What is the "tl;dr:"? (I read it, but I'm
> not sure where you landed given your last sentence)
> =E1=90=A7
>
> On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 3:16 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Sorry for the slow reply to this one, Neil. It's gotten me thinking a bi=
t
>> and it took some time to gather my thoughts and attempt to articulate th=
em.
>>
>> It is true that, as defined in the current -01 draft, there is the
>> additional step for the RS to check that the proof key matches the hash =
in
>> the AT. But I think that equating it to "exactly" that kind of
>> CVE-2018-0114 mistake or Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle is=
 a
>> significant mischaracterization. The DPoP proof message and its signatur=
e
>> are used to establish that the sender holds the corresponding private ke=
y.
>> Then binding tokens to that key or checking such bindings can be done.
>> That's quite different from checking the signature/integrity of a messag=
e
>> against a trusted key before relying on the content of the message, whic=
h
>> is what CVE-2018-0114 and erroneously trusting the key is about. I'm
>> admittedly a little touchy about this because I tried to speak up about =
the
>> potential problems with blindly trusting the jwk header back in the days=
 of
>> developing the JOSE specs. And have even joked more recently that the DP=
oP
>> proof finally uncovered a legitimate use for it. So with all that said, =
I
>> don't think it rises to the level of doom. And the step of checking the
>> binding of the token to the proof key is pretty fundamental. It's
>> conceptually the same as how the AT binding is done with MTLS / RFC 8705
>> and the expired/defunct draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding. That doesn't mak=
e
>> it right per se but there's some precedent for the general approach.
>> Following that conceptual precedent was part of the motivation for the
>> current approach - not so much as simplicity for the client but simplici=
ty
>> in the form of consistency in the protocol definition itself. But maybe
>> that motivation was too much so as the hash based cnf binding is kinda
>> necessary in those that are doing the key proof at or closer to the
>> transport layer but DPoP has all the stuff at the same layer so could do=
 it
>> differently. Putting the jwk in the cnf of the AT would eliminate the
>> possibility of resource servers forgetting to check the binding. Of cour=
se
>> there are still mistakes that could be made but removing even the
>> possibility of that particular one is compelling.
>>
>> The efficiency gains you mention are dependent on circumstance and not
>> always applicable, as you've kinda alluded to. The many variations of
>> deployment options (e.g., reference vs self-contained tokens, introspect=
ion
>> vs. local validation and either with various caching strategies, locatio=
n
>> of entities and communication path between them) make quantifying it rat=
her
>> difficult and circumstantially dependent. However, moving the jwk from t=
he
>> DPoP proof to the AT (by value or reference) would reduce the overall
>> amount of data that is conveyed across the two items from a jwk and its
>> hash to just the jwk. That's not a huge gain but it is more than nothing=
.
>> It would also eliminate the need to codify a hash function for the jwk
>> thumbprint, which admittedly would be rather nice.
>>
>> I guess that's a lot of words to try and kinda defend the current
>> approach while also admitting that I'm coming around to seeing the light=
 in
>> your suggestion.
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:43 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I disagree with this rationale, I=E2=80=99m afraid. I don=E2=80=99t thi=
nk the simplicity
>>> gain for the client is really very great and I think we will regret thi=
s
>>> decision.
>>>
>>> Most importantly, including the JWK directly in the proof token
>>> increases the likelihood that somebody will just validate the signature
>>> using that key and fail to check that it matches the hash in the AT. We=
=E2=80=99ve
>>> already seen at least one vendor make exactly this kind of mistake in t=
he
>>> past [1]. Letting the proof tell you the key to use to verify the proof=
 is
>>> another example of Moxie=E2=80=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle [2] - t=
rusting the
>>> message before you=E2=80=99ve authenticated it.
>>>
>>> Moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT/introspection response
>>> reduces the chances of these kind of mistakes.
>>>
>>> As a bonus it also has efficiency gains because the size of the DPoP
>>> proof is reduced - potentially by a lot for RSA keys. Although the JWK
>>> still has to be communicated to the RS, this can be more efficient beca=
use:
>>> - For token introspection, in many deployments the introspection reques=
t
>>> will be within a datacenter and so over a high-bandwidth low-latency
>>> network. This is usually not the case for the DPoP proof, which may be =
over
>>> a poor mobile connection.
>>> - For embedded directly in a JWT access token, the JWK will be in the
>>> claims rather than the header and so can at least be compressed. (Albei=
t
>>> not by much, because public keys don=E2=80=99t compress well, but the r=
est of the
>>> AT will and that can compensate a little for the extra bulk).
>>>
>>> [1]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114
>>> [2]: https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle.html
>>>
>>> =E2=80=94 Neil
>>>
>>> On 8 Sep 2020, at 23:46, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
>>> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> =EF=BB=BF
>>> Indeed there are cases, as you point out, where the key might be
>>> knowable to the server via some other means, which makes the "jwk" head=
er
>>> in the DPoP proof not strictly necessary. And while omitting the key in
>>> such cases would reduce the size of some messages (the DPoP proof anywa=
y),
>>> such optionality would add complexity to implementations and deployment=
s
>>> (and that kind of complexity can and often does degrade interoperabilit=
y
>>> and even security). How, for example, would a client know if the access
>>> token includes the public key and thus whether or not to include the ke=
y
>>> with the proof? Sure the access token could always include the key (rat=
her
>>> than thumbprint) but then there's the question of how to get the key to=
 the
>>> AS. As well as the stated desire to utilize the same DPoP Proof structu=
re
>>> for requests to both the AS and RS. There will be some clients that hav=
e
>>> public key(s) registered and some that won't (maybe a lot that won't as=
 a
>>> driving use case for many for this is key binding access and refresh to=
kens
>>> for public clients). The protocol defined by the draft needs to account=
 for
>>> both.
>>>
>>> Ultimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data coul=
d
>>> flow through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoff=
s
>>> with different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under=
 one
>>> approach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize
>>> consistency and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has l=
ed
>>> to how it's currently defined, which is to always include the key in th=
e
>>> proof and bind to a hash of the key in the access token.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM <toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the "jwk" header parameter
>>>> is
>>>> REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where "jwk" is not necessary i=
n
>>>> theory.
>>>>
>>>> For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the
>>>> Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also
>>>> registered with
>>>> the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint=
,
>>>> it can
>>>> just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP
>>>> Proof.
>>>> There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.
>>>>
>>>> The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS
>>>> share the
>>>> storage for clients' public keys. Things are a little difficult if the
>>>> AS and RS
>>>> are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result
>>>> have to
>>>> include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in
>>>> section 7).
>>>>
>>>> If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify
>>>> which key
>>>> it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute
>>>> need to send
>>>> the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use "kid" heade=
r
>>>> parameter to specify the key.
>>>>
>>>> Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1]=
,
>>>> but I'm
>>>> not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on
>>>> the latest
>>>> draft about the "jwk" header parameter [*2]. I agree with using the
>>>> same DPoP
>>>> Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some
>>>> cases
>>>> where we can omit "jwk" in BOTH requests. Making "jwk" OPTIONAL would
>>>> allow
>>>> those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.
>>>>
>>>> I'd like to hear your opinions about it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> [*1]:
>>>> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701=
746
>>>> [*2]:
>>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QR=
c/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best regards,
>>>> Toshio Ito
>>>>
>>>> -------------
>>>> Toshio Ito
>>>> Research and Development Center
>>>> Toshiba Corporation
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>
>>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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d.
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rom
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>>>
>>>
>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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>>
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The tl;dr is that I believe Neil&#39;s suggestion is =
of sufficient merit to warrant seriously considering making the change. <br=
></div><div><br></div><div>That was more words than it needed to be too. Bu=
t maybe clarifies. <br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 4:51 PM Dick Hardt &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">That was a lot of words Brian. What is the &quot;tl;d=
r:&quot;? (I read it, but I&#39;m not sure where you landed given your last=
 sentence)</div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><im=
g alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"=
https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&a=
mp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3Da390a771-ce9f-4db4-bd6d-eace2092c70d"><fon=
t size=3D"1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 3:16=
 PM Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dma=
rc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div>Sorry for the slow reply to this one, Neil. It&#39;s gotten me t=
hinking a bit and it took some time to gather my thoughts and attempt to ar=
ticulate them.<br></div><div><br></div><div>It is true that, as defined in =
the current -01 draft, there is the additional step for the RS to check tha=
t the proof key matches the hash in the AT. But I think that equating it to=
 &quot;exactly&quot; that kind of CVE-2018-0114 mistake or Moxie=E2=80=99s =
Cryptographic Doom Principle is a significant mischaracterization. The DPoP=
 proof message and its signature are used to establish that the sender hold=
s the corresponding private key. Then binding tokens to that key or checkin=
g such bindings can be done. That&#39;s quite different from checking the s=
ignature/integrity of a message against a trusted key before relying on the=
 content of the message, which is what CVE-2018-0114 and erroneously trusti=
ng the key is about. I&#39;m admittedly a little touchy about this because =
I tried to speak up about the potential problems with blindly trusting the =
jwk header back in the days of developing the JOSE specs. And have even jok=
ed more recently that the DPoP proof finally uncovered a legitimate use for=
 it. So with all that said, I don&#39;t think it rises to the level of doom=
. And the step of checking the binding of the token to the proof key is pre=
tty fundamental. It&#39;s conceptually the same as how the AT binding is do=
ne with MTLS / RFC 8705 and the expired/defunct draft-ietf-oauth-token-bind=
ing. That doesn&#39;t make it right per se but there&#39;s some precedent f=
or the general approach. Following that conceptual precedent was part of th=
e motivation for the current approach - not so much as simplicity for the c=
lient but simplicity in the form of consistency in the protocol definition =
itself. But maybe that motivation was too much so as the hash based cnf bin=
ding is kinda necessary in those that are doing the key proof at or closer =
to the transport layer but DPoP has all the stuff at the same layer so coul=
d do it differently. Putting the jwk in the cnf of the AT would eliminate t=
he possibility of resource servers forgetting to check the binding. Of cour=
se there are still mistakes that could be made but removing even the possib=
ility of that particular one is compelling. <br></div><div><br></div><div>T=
he efficiency gains you mention are dependent on circumstance and not alway=
s applicable, as you&#39;ve kinda alluded to. The many variations of deploy=
ment options (e.g., reference vs self-contained tokens, introspection vs. l=
ocal validation and either with various caching strategies, location of ent=
ities and communication path between them) make quantifying it rather diffi=
cult and circumstantially dependent. However, moving the jwk from the DPoP =
proof to the AT (by value or reference) would reduce the overall amount of =
data that is conveyed across the two items from a jwk and its hash to just =
the jwk. That&#39;s not a huge gain but it is more than nothing. It would a=
lso eliminate the need to codify a hash function for the jwk thumbprint, wh=
ich  admittedly would be rather nice.</div><div><br></div><div>I guess that=
&#39;s a lot of words to try and kinda defend the current approach while al=
so admitting that I&#39;m coming around to seeing the light in your suggest=
ion. <br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:43 AM Neil Madden &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:neil.madden@forgerock.com" target=3D"_blank">neil.madden@forgerock.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I disagree with this =
rationale, I=E2=80=99m afraid. I don=E2=80=99t think the simplicity gain fo=
r the client is really very great and I think we will regret this decision.=
</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Most importantly, includi=
ng the JWK directly in the proof token increases the likelihood that somebo=
dy will just validate the signature using that key and fail to check that i=
t matches the hash in the AT. We=E2=80=99ve already seen at least one vendo=
r make exactly this kind of mistake in the past [1]. Letting the proof tell=
 you the key to use to verify the proof is another example of Moxie=E2=80=
=99s Cryptographic Doom Principle [2] - trusting the message before you=E2=
=80=99ve authenticated it.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"ltr">Moving the jwk from the DPoP proof to the AT/introspection respons=
e reduces the chances of these kind of mistakes.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">As a bonus it also has efficiency gains becaus=
e the size of the DPoP proof is reduced - potentially by a lot for RSA keys=
. Although the JWK still has to be communicated to the RS, this can be more=
 efficient because:</div><div dir=3D"ltr">- For token introspection, in man=
y deployments the introspection request will be within a datacenter and so =
over a high-bandwidth low-latency network. This is usually not the case for=
 the DPoP proof, which may be over a poor mobile connection.=C2=A0</div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">- For embedded directly in a JWT access token, the JWK will b=
e in the claims rather than the header and so can at least be compressed. (=
Albeit not by much, because public keys don=E2=80=99t compress well, but th=
e rest of the AT will and that can compensate a little for the extra bulk).=
=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">[1]:=C2=A0<a href=
=3D"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114" target=3D"_blank">https=
://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0114</a></div><div dir=3D"ltr">[2]:=C2=
=A0<a href=3D"https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doom-principle=
.html" target=3D"_blank">https://moxie.org/2011/12/13/the-cryptographic-doo=
m-principle.html</a></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">=E2=
=80=94 Neil</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On 8 Sep 20=
20, at 23:46, Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidenti=
ty.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Indeed there are cases, as you poin=
t out, where the key might be knowable to the server via some other means, =
which makes the &quot;jwk&quot; header in the DPoP proof not strictly neces=
sary. And while omitting the key in such cases would reduce the size of som=
e messages (the DPoP proof anyway), such optionality would add complexity t=
o implementations and deployments (and that kind of complexity can and ofte=
n does degrade interoperability and even security). How, for example, would=
 a client know if the access token includes the public key and thus whether=
 or not to include the key with the proof? Sure the access token could alwa=
ys include the key (rather than thumbprint) but then there&#39;s the questi=
on of how to get the key to the AS. As well as the stated desire to utilize=
 the same DPoP Proof structure for requests to both the AS and RS. There wi=
ll be some clients that have public key(s) registered and some that won&#39=
;t (maybe a lot that won&#39;t as a driving use case for many for this is k=
ey binding access and refresh tokens for public clients). The protocol defi=
ned by the draft needs to account for both. <br></div><div><br></div><div>U=
ltimately there are a number of different ways the necessary data could flo=
w through the various protocol elements. And there are some tradeoffs with =
different approaches and/or trying to accommodate variations under one appr=
oach. The approach the draft has taken thus far is to prioritize consistenc=
y and simplicity as much as is possible. And that ethos has led to how it&#=
39;s currently defined, which is to always include the key in the proof and=
 bind to a hash of the key in the access token. <br></div><div><br></div></=
div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On=
 Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:29 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.j=
p" target=3D"_blank">toshio9.ito@toshiba.co.jp</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
In section 4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, the &quot;jwk&quot; header para=
meter is<br>
REQUIRED. However, there are some cases where &quot;jwk&quot; is not necess=
ary in theory.<br>
<br>
For example, consider a case where the client is registered with the<br>
Authorization Server, and its one and only public key is also registered wi=
th<br>
the AS. In that case, when the AS receives a request on Token endpoint, it =
can<br>
just use the public key registered for the client to verify the DPoP Proof.=
<br>
There is no need to send the public key in DPoP Proof.<br>
<br>
The same goes for requests to the Resource Server, if the AS and RS share t=
he<br>
storage for clients&#39; public keys. Things are a little difficult if the =
AS and RS<br>
are separate. Probably the Access Token or its introspection result have to=
<br>
include the public key (instead of its thumbprint as described in section 7=
).<br>
<br>
If the client registers multiple keys with the AS, it needs to specify whic=
h key<br>
it uses to sign the DPoP Proof. However, there is still no absolute need to=
 send<br>
the whole key in DPoP Proof. Instead, the client could use &quot;kid&quot; =
header<br>
parameter to specify the key.<br>
<br>
Daniel Fett once mentioned the above case in the GitHub issue #26 [*1], but=
 I&#39;m<br>
not sure what happened to the discussion. There was also a comment on the l=
atest<br>
draft about the &quot;jwk&quot; header parameter [*2]. I agree with using t=
he same DPoP<br>
Proof structure for requests to AS and RS, but I think there are some cases=
<br>
where we can omit &quot;jwk&quot; in BOTH requests. Making &quot;jwk&quot; =
OPTIONAL would allow<br>
those cases to reduce some messaging overhead.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d like to hear your opinions about it.<br>
<br>
<br>
[*1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issueco=
mment-480701746" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/da=
nielfett/draft-dpop/issues/26#issuecomment-480701746</a><br>
[*2]: <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UI=
CcZMzb8Yv2QRc/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/oauth/smwsONA6c4H2UICcZMzb8Yv2QRc/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
<br>
-------------<br>
Toshio Ito<br>
Research and Development Center<br>
Toshiba Corporation<br>
<br>
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Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 17:21:27 -0400
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
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I took a look at Section 2.2.3.1: Claims for Authorization Outside of
Delegation Scenarios (
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1)
and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the "roles", "groups",
and "entitlements" claims will be.

Will the "roles" claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs, or links),
an array of the "roles" objects from the SCIM User schema (pages 66-67 of
RFC 7643), or something else?

Will the "groups" claim be an array of strings (group names, IDs, or
links), an array of the "groups" objects from the SCIM User schema (pages
63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (pages 69-70 of
RFC 7643), or something else?

Will the "entitlements" claim be an array of strings (entitlement names,
IDs, or links), an array of the "entitlements" objects from the SCIM User
schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?

Sincerely,

Logan Widick

--0000000000006daad705af74daf9
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<div dir=3D"auto"><p dir=3D"ltr">I took a look at Section <a href=3D"http:/=
/2.2.3.1">2.2.3.1</a>: Claims for Authorization Outside of Delegation Scena=
rios (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-=
jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access=
-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1</a>) and I do not understand what exactly the=
 formats of the &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlemen=
ts&quot; claims will be. </p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Will the &quot;roles&quot; claim be an array of strings (rol=
e names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;roles&quot; objects from the=
 SCIM User schema (pages 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Will the &quot;groups&quot; claim be an array of strings (gr=
oup names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;groups&quot; objects from =
the SCIM User schema (pages 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group sche=
ma objects (pages 69-70 of RFC 7643), or something else?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Will the &quot;entitlements&quot; claim be an array of strin=
gs (entitlement names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;entitlements&q=
uot; objects from the SCIM User schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or someth=
ing else? </p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Sincerely,</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Logan Widick<br>
</p></div>

--0000000000006daad705af74daf9--


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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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--_000_AM0PR08MB37162DC4E0C7B79FA1686E93FA3E0AM0PR08MB3716eurp_
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Hi Vittorio,

Thanks for the draft update.

Responses to  your questions are below:

From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2020 8:59 AM
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>; oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07

Thank you Hannes for the thorough review, and thanks in advance for the wri=
teup!

I applied most of the changes you suggested, and submitted a new draft.
Comments on questions and suggestions I didn't understand below:


  *   Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you ju=
st repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?
6750 doesn't offer an explicit list of validation steps, given the format a=
gnostic approach followed by Core, tho some can be inferred here and there.=
 The validation steps defined here are closer to the ones OIDC core lists f=
or id_token validation, but aren't exactly the same- besides the typ header=
 step and aud value considerations, which are unique to this spec, the disc=
ussion led to some other important differences from the OIDC list (no order=
ing in the steps, no auth_time, acr, azp considerations etc) that warrant l=
isting the validation steps explicitly.

[Hannes] Thanks. This answers my question. No further action needed on this=
 issue.


  *   The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe w=
hat follows afterwards in the text.
Can you expand on what aspect makes the term misaligned with the following =
text? The main difference seems to be that later on the verb used is "compr=
omise", but that's more due to the fact that there's an active agent in the=
 sentence (the attacker) while the preceding phrase lacks one. If I were to=
 use "compromise" instead of leak I'd need to make it passive, which seems =
a bit weird. I am happy to change it, but I wanted to understand the point =
better first.

Here is the entire paragraph:

"
   Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
   for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
   safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.  Given
   that resource servers have no way of knowing what key should be used
   to validate JWT access tokens in particular, they have to accept
   signatures performed with any of the keys published in AS metadata or
   OpenID Connect discovery: consequently, an attacker just needs to
   compromise any key among the ones published to be able to generate
   and sign JWTs that will be accepted as valid by the resource server.
"

Let us consider two cases here, namely the symmetric key case and the asymm=
etric key case.

In both cases it is common practice to use different keys for different pur=
poses. In this case we are even talking about the use of keys for different=
 recipients. ID Tokens are created by the AS for use by the OAuth Client wh=
ile access tokens are consumed by the resource server.

For the symmetric key case, one of the two parties can leak the key. Who do=
 you assume leaks the key here?
For the asymmetric key case, leaking the public key does not have a securit=
y impact. Are you concerned that the private key is compromised on the AS? =
There is, however, additionally the question about the compromise of the tr=
ust anchor.


You are saying that resource servers have no way of knowing what key to use=
 to validate the access token. This is not correct because there is a dedic=
ated field for that purpose: From RFC 7515:

"The "kid" (key ID) Header Parameter is a hint indicating which key was use=
d to secure the JWS."

Why is this statement true "they have to accept signatures performed with a=
ny of the keys published in AS metadata or OpenID Connect discovery"

In general, it is bad if the private key got compromised. This will allow a=
n adversary to create access tokens. The question is therefore: if this hap=
pens, how can you revoke the keys.
Using different keys for different purposes with different recipients is a =
common practice.




  *   This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interope=
rability.
I'd like to understand this better. The thing I am trying to express here i=
s an absolute prohibition, as stated by 2119. The fact that it is unenforce=
able and potentially inconsequential doesn't make it acceptable, hence the =
language seems to be appropriate.
       I didn't take out the MUST NOT yet as we clarify the point further. =
I did however apply all your edits to that section, as they do make things =
clearer. Thanks!

Here is the sentence again:

"
The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
   the access token
"

I fully understand that you are trying to prohibit the OAuth client to look=
 at the access token.
Normally, RFC 2119 language is used to inform how implementations should be=
have. This behavior can then be tested. How do you want to test whether a c=
lient did or did not look at the token as an outside observer?

I am not as passionate about this paragraph as others in the group because =
I have a pragmatic approach: it will not make a difference whether the MUST=
 NOT is capitalized or not.



  *   The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would=
 suggest to delete the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the sec=
ond sentence to the previous paragraph
The second sentence isn't really a repetition IMO- rather, it is a speciali=
zation. Whereas the first paragraph talks about the client, the sentence yo=
u singled out talks about the end user. Those are closely correlated, but n=
ot the same. There are scenarios where the end user doesn't have access to =
the tokens, but the client app does.

You are right. I would restructure the paragraphs as follows:



   As JWT access tokens carry information by value, it now becomes

   possible for requestors and receivers clients and potentially

   even end users to directly peek inside the

   token claims collection.



   The client MUST NOT inspect the content of

   the access token: the authorization server and the resource server

   might decide to change token format at any time (for example by

   switching from this profile to opaque tokens) hence any logic in the

   client relying on the ability to read the access token content would

   break without recourse.  The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access

   tokens are treated as opaque by clients.  Administrators of

   authorization servers should also take into account that the content

   of an access token is visible to the client.  Whenever client access

   to the access token content presents privacy issues for a given

   scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps to

   prevent it.



   In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end

   user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed

   without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply

   access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken

   to enforce confidentiality.



   Possible measures to prevent leakage of information to clients and end

   Users include: encrypting the access token, encrypting the sensitive

   claims, omitting the sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling

   back on opaque access tokens.

The reason for the restructuring is the following:


  *   The counter-measures are applicable to end users and clients looking =
at the tokens - not just end users.
  *   The first sentence talks about clients and end users and not just abo=
ut clients.

I hope this makes sense.

Ciao
Hannes

From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>> on beha=
lf of Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com<mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig=
@arm.com>>
Date: Monday, September 7, 2020 at 23:29
To: "oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>" <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ie=
tf.org>>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07

Hi Victorio, Hi all,

I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07. R=
eading through the draft I have a few minor suggestions:

Section 2:

I would delete this sentence "JWT access tokens are regular JWTs complying =
with the requirements described in this section."

Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on the previous page (see t=
erminology section).

Section 2.1

s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography
(same replacement in Section 4)

s/   This specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is an access token./This =
specification registers the "application/at+jwt" media type,
   which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT access token.

Use capitalized "Section" when a section number is indicated, such as in Se=
ction 2.2.

Section 2.2

s/""aud"/"aud"

2.2.1

s/   auth_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   aut=
h_time  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].
s/   acr, amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./   acr,=
 amr  OPTIONAL - as defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].


s/Please see/See

s/For example:/For example,

Section 4

You write:

"Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Meta=
data [RFC8414] ... "

Are you sure you mean "implement" and not "use"? The paragraph gives me the=
 impression that you talk about "ASs using RFC 8414"


s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance on security implication=
s./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on security implications.

This sentence sounds strange to me:
"
   When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],
   resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

How about:
"
   Resource servers receiving a JWT access token MUST validate it in the
   following manner.
"

Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you just rep=
eating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?


You write:

"
If the JWT access token includes authorization claims as described in
   the authorization claims section, the resource server SHOULD use them
   in combination with any other contextual information available to
   determine whether the current call should be authorized or rejected.
"

Include a reference to the authorization claims section


s/ For more
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For mo=
re
   details on cross-JWT confusion please refer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].


You write:

"
   Authorization servers should not rely on the use of different keys
   for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT tokens as a method to
   safeguard against the consequences of leaking specific keys.
"

The phrase "leaking keys" is probably not the best term to describe what fo=
llows afterwards in the text.

You write:

"
The client MUST NOT inspect the content of
   the access token
"

This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interoperabili=
ty. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like the following would work=
:

"
   Authorization server and the resource server
   might decide to change token format at any time (for example by
   switching from this profile to opaque tokens). Hence, any logic in the
   client relying on the ability to read the access token content would
   break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 framework assumes that access toke=
ns
   are treated opaque by clients.

   Administrators of authorization servers should also take into account th=
at
   the content of an access token is visible to the client. Whenever client
   access to the access token content presents privacy issues for a
   given scenario, the authorization server should take explicit steps
   to prevent it.
"


You wrote:

"

   In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to the end
   user, it should be evaluated whether the information can be accessed
   without privacy violations (for example, if an end user would simply
   access his or her own personal information) or if steps must be taken
   to enforce confidentiality.  Possible measures include: encrypting
   the access token, encrypting the sensitive claims, omitting the
   sensitive claims or not using this profile, falling back on opaque
   access tokens.
"

The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would sugge=
st to delete
the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the second sentence to the=
 previous paragraph.

You wrote:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for performing tasks such as correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation to preserve the desired
   level of privacy.  Authorization servers should choose how to assign
   "sub" values according to the level of privacy required by each
   situation.  For instance: if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values tht cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly: if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
"

The above paragraph suggests that there are different levels of privacy. Wh=
at you are
talking about in the text is unlinkability and identification. Ways to deal=
 with such
privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 6973.

Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the paragraph to something like=
:

"
   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT
   access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
   information for correlating incoming
   requests with data stored locally for the authenticated principal.
   Although the ability to correlate requests might be required by
   design in many scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization
   server might want to prevent correlation. The "sub" claim should be
   populated by the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
   assessment. For instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking
   principal activities across multiple resource servers, the
   authorization server should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for
   different resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
   correlated in the event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly, if
   a solution requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
   principal's activity within the resource itself, the authorization
   server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
   token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access
   token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
   resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every
   call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.
"


Section 7.2

s/   Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.
/   Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification refers to the
   attributes "roles", "groups", "entitlements" defined in [RFC7643] to
   express authorization information in JWT access tokens.


References

RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference:

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

RFC 7644 is an unused reference:

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
              September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.

The same is true for RFC 3986:

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.


Ciao
Hannes

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
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IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Vittorio, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for the draft update. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Responses to&nbsp; your questions are below: <o:p></=
o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Vittorio Bertocci &lt;vittorio.bertocci=
@auth0.com&gt;
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, September 15, 2020 8:59 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Hannes Tschofenig &lt;Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com&gt;; oauth@ietf.=
org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thank you Hannes for the thorough review, and thanks=
 in advance for the writeup!<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I applied most of the changes you suggested, and sub=
mitted a new draft.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Comments on questions and suggestions I didn&#8217;t=
 understand below:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo3">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the steps are you ju=
st repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting them?
<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">6750 doesn&#8217;t offer=
 an explicit list of validation steps, given the format agnostic approach f=
ollowed by Core, tho some can be inferred here and there. The validation st=
eps defined here are closer to the ones OIDC
 core lists for id_token validation, but aren&#8217;t exactly the same- bes=
ides the typ header step and aud value considerations, which are unique to =
this spec, the discussion led to some other important differences from the =
OIDC list (no ordering in the steps, no
 auth_time, acr, azp considerations etc) that warrant listing the validatio=
n steps explicitly.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">[Hannes] Thanks. This answers my question. No furthe=
r action needed on this issue.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo3">The phrase &quot;leaking keys&quot; is probably not the best term to =
describe what follows afterwards in the text.
<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">Can you expand on what a=
spect makes the term misaligned with the following text? The main differenc=
e seems to be that later on the verb used is &#8220;compromise&#8221;, but =
that&#8217;s more due to the fact that there&#8217;s an active
 agent in the sentence (the attacker) while the preceding phrase lacks one.=
 If I were to use &#8220;compromise&#8221; instead of leak I&#8217;d need t=
o make it passive, which seems a bit weird. I am happy to change it, but I =
wanted to understand the point better first.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Here is the entire paragraph:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&#8220;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; Authorization servers should not rely on the =
use of different keys<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens and JWT =
tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; safeguard against the consequences of leaking=
 specific keys.&nbsp; Given<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; that resource servers have no way of knowing =
what key should be used<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; to validate JWT access tokens in particular, =
they have to accept<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; signatures performed with any of the keys pub=
lished in AS metadata or<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; OpenID Connect discovery: consequently, an at=
tacker just needs to<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; compromise any key among the ones published t=
o be able to generate<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; and sign JWTs that will be accepted as valid =
by the resource server.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&#8220;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Let us consider two cases here, namely the symmetric=
 key case and the asymmetric key case.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">In both cases it is common practice to use different=
 keys for different purposes. In this case we are even talking about the us=
e of keys for different recipients. ID Tokens are created by the AS for use=
 by the OAuth Client while access
 tokens are consumed by the resource server. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">For the symmetric key case, one of the two parties c=
an leak the key. Who do you assume leaks the key here?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">For the asymmetric key case, leaking the public key =
does not have a security impact. Are you concerned that the private key is =
compromised on the AS? There is, however, additionally the question about t=
he compromise of the trust anchor.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<pre><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-s=
erif">You are saying that resource servers have no way of knowing what key =
to use to validate the access token. This is not correct because there is a=
 dedicated field for that purpose: From RFC 7515: <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
<pre>&#8220;The &quot;kid&quot; (key ID) Header Parameter is a hint indicat=
ing which key was used to secure the JWS.&#8221;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Why is this statement true &#8220;<span style=3D"fon=
t-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">they have to accept sign=
atures performed with any of the keys published in AS metadata or OpenID Co=
nnect discovery&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">In general, it is bad if the private key got comprom=
ised. This will allow an adversary to create access tokens. The question is=
 therefore: if this happens, how can you revoke the keys.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Using different keys for different purposes with dif=
ferent recipients is a common practice.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo3">This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in terms of interope=
rability.<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">I&#8217;d like to unders=
tand this better. The thing I am trying to express here is an absolute proh=
ibition, as stated by 2119. The fact that it is unenforceable and potential=
ly inconsequential doesn&#8217;t make it acceptable,
 hence the language seems to be appropriate.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; I didn&#8217;t =
take out the MUST NOT yet as we clarify the point further. I did however ap=
ply all your edits to that section, as they do make things clearer. Thanks!=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Here is the sentence again: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I fully understand that you are trying to prohibit t=
he OAuth client to look at the access token.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Normally, RFC 2119 language is used to inform how im=
plementations should behave. This behavior can then be tested. How do you w=
ant to test whether a client did or did not look at the token as an outside=
 observer?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I am not as passionate about this paragraph as other=
s in the group because I have a pragmatic approach: it will not make a diff=
erence whether the MUST NOT is capitalized or not.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 =
lfo3">The first sentence is a repetition of the previous paragraph. I would=
 suggest to delete the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the sec=
ond sentence to the previous paragraph<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in">The second sentence isn&=
#8217;t really a repetition IMO- rather, it is a specialization. Whereas th=
e first paragraph talks about the client, the sentence you singled out talk=
s about the end user. Those are closely correlated,
 but not the same. There are scenarios where the end user doesn&#8217;t hav=
e access to the tokens, but the client app does.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.25in"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You are right. I would restructure the paragraphs as=
 follows:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; As JWT access tokens carry information by value, it now b=
ecomes<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; possible for <s>requestors and receivers</s> clients and =
potentially <o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;even end users to directly peek inside the<o:p></o:p=
></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; token claims collection.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; The client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p></pr=
e>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token: the authorization server and the resour=
ce server<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; might decide to change token format at any time (for exam=
ple by<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; switching from this profile to opaque tokens) hence any l=
ogic in the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; client relying on the ability to read the access token co=
ntent would<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; break without recourse.&nbsp; The OAuth 2.0 framework ass=
umes that access<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; tokens are treated as opaque by clients.&nbsp; Administra=
tors of<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization servers should also take into account that =
the content<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; of an access token is visible to the client.&nbsp; Whenev=
er client access<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; to the access token content presents privacy issues for a=
 given<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; scenario, the authorization server should take explicit s=
teps to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; prevent it.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; In scenarios in which JWT access tokens are accessible to=
 the end<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; user, it should be evaluated whether the information can =
be accessed<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; without privacy violations (for example, if an end user w=
ould simply<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; access his or her own personal information) or if steps m=
ust be taken<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; to enforce confidentiality.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; Possible measures to prevent leakage of information to cl=
ients and end <o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Users include: encrypting the access token, encrypti=
ng the sensitive <o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;claims, omitting the sensitive claims or not using t=
his profile, falling <o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;back on opaque access tokens.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The reason for the restructuring is the following: <=
o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo8">The counter-measures are applicable to end users and clients looking =
at the tokens &#8211; not just end users.
<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso=
-list:l0 level1 lfo8">The first sentence talks about clients and end users =
and not just about clients.
<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I hope this makes sense. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">From=
: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf=
 of Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com">Hann=
es.Tschofenig@arm.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Monday, September 7, 2020 at 23:29<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org">oauth@ietf.org</a>&quot;=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Victorio, Hi all, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I am doing my shepherd write-up for draft-ietf-oauth=
-access-token-jwt-07. Reading through the draft I have a few minor suggesti=
ons:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would delete this sentence &quot;JWT access tokens=
 are regular JWTs complying with the requirements described in this section=
.&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Reason: You pretty much make the same statement on t=
he previous page (see terminology section).
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/asymmetric algorithms/asymmetric cryptography<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">(same replacement in Section 4)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; This specification registers the &quo=
t;application/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is an access token./This specification registers the &quot;applicat=
ion/at+jwt&quot; media type,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; which can be used to indicate that the =
content is a JWT access token.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Use capitalized &quot;Section&quot; when a section n=
umber is indicated, such as in Section 2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 2.2<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&quot;&quot;aud&quot;/&quot;aud&quot;<o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2.2.1<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined=
 in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; auth_time&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as =
defined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as defined =
in section 2 of [OpenID.Core]./&nbsp;&nbsp; acr, amr&nbsp; OPTIONAL - as de=
fined in Section 2 of [OpenID.Core].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see/See <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/For example:/For example, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 4<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;Authorization servers SHOULD implement OAuth 2=
.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] ... &quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Are you sure you mean &quot;implement&quot; and not =
&quot;use&quot;? The paragraph gives me the impression that you talk about =
&quot;ASs using RFC 8414&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/Please see section Section 5 for further guidance =
on security implications./Please see Section 5 for further guidance on secu=
rity implications.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This sentence sounds strange to me: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; When invoked as described in OAuth 2.0 =
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750],<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource servers receiving a JWT access=
 token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">How about: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource servers receiving a JWT access=
 token MUST validate it in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; following manner.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Question: If you refer to RFC 6750 and then list the=
 steps are you just repeating the steps from RFC 6750 or are you augmenting=
 them?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the JWT access token includes authorization claim=
s as described in<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the authorization claims section, the r=
esource server SHOULD use them<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; in combination with any other contextua=
l information available to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; determine whether the current call shou=
ld be authorized or rejected.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Include a reference to the authorization claims sect=
ion<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; details on cross-JWT confusion please r=
efer to 2.8 of [RFC8725]./ For more<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; details on cross-JWT confusion please r=
efer to Section 2.8 of [RFC8725].<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Authorization servers should not rely o=
n the use of different keys<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; for signing OpenID Connect ID Tokens an=
d JWT tokens as a method to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; safeguard against the consequences of l=
eaking specific keys.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The phrase &quot;leaking keys&quot; is probably not =
the best term to describe what follows afterwards in the text.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You write:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The client MUST NOT inspect the content of<o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This RFC 2119 language is not really enforceable in =
terms of interoperability. Maybe you could rephrase a bit. Something like t=
he following would work:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Authorization server and the resou=
rce server<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; might decide to change token format at =
any time (for example by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; switching from this profile to opaque t=
okens). Hence, any logic in the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; client relying on the ability to read t=
he access token content would<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; break without recourse. The OAuth 2.0 f=
ramework assumes that access tokens
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;are treated opaque by clients. <o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Administrators of authorization servers=
 should also take into account that
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the content of an access token is =
visible to the client. Whenever client<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access to the access token content pres=
ents privacy issues for a<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; given scenario, the authorization serve=
r should take explicit steps<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; to prevent it.&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; In scenarios in which JWT access tokens=
 are accessible to the end<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; user, it should be evaluated whether th=
e information can be accessed<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; without privacy violations (for example=
, if an end user would simply<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access his or her own personal informat=
ion) or if steps must be taken<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; to enforce confidentiality.&nbsp; Possi=
ble measures include: encrypting<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; the access token, encrypting the sensit=
ive claims, omitting the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; sensitive claims or not using this prof=
ile, falling back on opaque<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The first sentence is a repetition of the previous p=
aragraph. I would suggest to delete<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">the first sentence in this paragraph and to move the=
 second sentence to the previous paragraph.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You wrote: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; This profile mandates the presence of t=
he &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making it possible for re=
source servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; information for performing tasks such a=
s correlating incoming<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; requests with data stored locally for t=
he authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the ability to correlate reque=
sts might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are sce=
narios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlatio=
n to preserve the desired<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; level of privacy.&nbsp; Authorization s=
ervers should choose how to assign<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;sub&quot; values according to the=
 level of privacy required by each<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; situation.&nbsp; For instance: if a sol=
ution requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal activities across multiple re=
source servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization server should ensure that=
 JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource servers have distinc=
t &quot;sub&quot; values tht cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the event of resource ser=
vers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly: if<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires preventing a resour=
ce server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resourc=
e itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different &quot;su=
b&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client=
 should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource se=
rver, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different &quo=
t;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation betwe=
en distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The above paragraph suggests that there are differen=
t levels of privacy. What you are
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">talking about in the text is unlinkability and ident=
ification. Ways to deal with such
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">privacy threats are described in Section 6 of RFC 69=
73. <o:p>
</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hence, I would suggest to slightly rephrase the para=
graph to something like:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; This profile mandates the presence of t=
he &quot;sub&quot; claim in every JWT<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; access token, making it possible for re=
source servers to rely on that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; information for correlating incoming<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; requests with data stored locally for t=
he authenticated principal.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the ability to correlate reque=
sts might be required by<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; design in many scenarios, there are sce=
narios where the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server might want to prevent correlatio=
n. The &quot;sub&quot; claim should be
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;populated by the authorization ser=
vers according to a privacy impact
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;assessment. For instance, if a sol=
ution requires preventing tracking<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal activities across multiple re=
source servers, the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; authorization server should ensure that=
 JWT access tokens meant for<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; different resource servers have distinc=
t &quot;sub&quot; values that cannot be<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; correlated in the event of resource ser=
vers collusion.&nbsp; Similarly, if<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; a solution requires preventing a resour=
ce server from correlating the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; principal's activity within the resourc=
e itself, the authorization<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; server should assign different &quot;su=
b&quot; values for every JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token issued.&nbsp; In turn, the client=
 should obtain a new JWT access<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; token for every call to the resource se=
rver, to ensure that the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; resource server receives different &quo=
t;sub&quot; and &quot;jti&quot; values at every<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; call, thus preventing correlation betwe=
en distinct requests.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&quot;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Section 7.2<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">s/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section Section 2.2.3.1 of this speci=
fication refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;gro=
ups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; express authorization information in JW=
T access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">/&nbsp;&nbsp; Section 2.2.3.1 of this specification =
refers to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; attributes &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;gro=
ups&quot;, &quot;entitlements&quot; defined in [RFC7643] to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; express authorization information in JW=
T access tokens.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">References<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7519 has to be a normative reference: <o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC7519]&nbsp; Jones, M., Bradley, J.,=
 and N. Sakimura, &quot;JSON Web Token<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (JWT)&quot;, RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May=
 2015,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;<a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/r=
fc7519">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519</a>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 7644 is an unused reference: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC7644]&nbsp; Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle,=
 K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and C. Mortimore, &quot;System for Cross-domain =
Identity<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span lang=3D"FR">Management: Protocol&quot;, RF=
C 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>September 2015, &lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644">https://www.rfc-editor.org=
/info/rfc7644</a>&gt;.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The same is true for RFC 3986: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC3986]&nbsp; Berners-Lee, T., Fieldi=
ng, R., and L. Masinter, &quot;Uniform<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;,=
 STD 66,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,<o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;<a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/r=
fc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any=
 attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not th=
e intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not discl=
ose the contents to any other person,
 use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Th=
ank you.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
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--_000_AM0PR08MB37162DC4E0C7B79FA1686E93FA3E0AM0PR08MB3716eurp_--


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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/LGH_nLA3DXrWWw2enG2o_14LOpQ>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens: IPR Confirmation
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Hi Vittorio,

I am working on the shepherd writeup for the "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile =
for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens" specification:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08

One item in the template requires me to indicate whether each document auth=
or has confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for =
full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been=
 filed.

Could you please confirm?

Ciao
Hannes

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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any medium. Thank you.


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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>, Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
Thread-Topic: Shepherd writeup for the JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens -- Information about Implementations
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/skElkbcferE7HxcXIQ1ZN-UUTD8>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Shepherd writeup for the JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens -- Information about Implementations
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Hi Vittorio, Hi all,

I am working on the shepherd writeup for <draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt=
> and you can find the latest version here:
https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-wri=
teups/Writeup_OAuth_JWT-Profile-for-AccessTokens.txt

I am in need for information about implementations that are conformant to t=
his specification. This information would be listed in this write-up, as ba=
ckground information to the IESG.

Ciao
Hannes

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.


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From: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Shepherd writeup for the JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens -- Information about Implementations
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Hi Hannes,=20

Node.js project oidc-provider (https://github.com/panva/node-oidc-provider) h=
as an option to issue Access Tokens conform to this profile.=20

Best,=20
Filip

Odesl=C3=A1no z iPhonu

> 17. 9. 2020 v 14:56, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>:
>=20
> =EF=BB=BFHi Vittorio, Hi all,
>=20
> I am working on the shepherd writeup for <draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jw=
t> and you can find the latest version here:
> https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-wr=
iteups/Writeup_OAuth_JWT-Profile-for-AccessTokens.txt
>=20
> I am in need for information about implementations that are conformant to t=
his specification. This information would be listed in this write-up, as bac=
kground information to the IESG.
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confi=
dential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any o=
ther person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any=
 medium. Thank you.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div>Hi Hannes,&nbsp;</div><div><br></div>N=
ode.js project oidc-provider (<a href=3D"https://github.com/panva/node-oidc-=
provider">https://github.com/panva/node-oidc-provider</a>) has an option to i=
ssue Access Tokens conform to this profile.&nbsp;<div><br></div><div>Best,&n=
bsp;</div><div>Filip<br><br><div dir=3D"ltr">Odesl=C3=A1no z&nbsp;iPhonu</di=
v><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">17. 9. 2020 v&nbsp;14:56, H=
annes Tschofenig &lt;Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com&gt;:<br><br></blockquote></di=
v><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<span>Hi Vittorio, Hi a=
ll,</span><br><span></span><br><span>I am working on the shepherd writeup fo=
r &lt;draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt&gt; and you can find the latest vers=
ion here:</span><br><span>https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids=
/blob/master/shepherd-writeups/Writeup_OAuth_JWT-Profile-for-AccessTokens.tx=
t</span><br><span></span><br><span>I am in need for information about implem=
entations that are conformant to this specification. This information would b=
e listed in this write-up, as background information to the IESG.</span><br>=
<span></span><br><span>Ciao</span><br><span>Hannes</span><br><span></span><b=
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Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 19:33:03 -0400
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Shepherd writeup for the JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens -- Information about Implementations
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Hello,

Le 20-09-17 à 08 h 55, Hannes Tschofenig a écrit :
> 
> I am in need for information about implementations that are conformant to this specification. This information would be listed in this write-up, as background information to the IESG.
> 
Glewlwyd's OIDC plugin implements the specification "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens - draft 05".

https://github.com/babelouest/glewlwyd/blob/master/docs/OIDC.md#access-token-format

https://github.com/babelouest/glewlwyd

/Nicolas


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
        Authors         : Torsten Lodderstedt
                          Brian Campbell
                          Nat Sakimura
                          Dave Tonge
                          Filip Skokan
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt
	Pages           : 21
	Date            : 2020-09-18

Abstract:
   This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
   which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
   authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
   request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
   reference to the data in a subsequent call to the authorization
   endpoint.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/

There is also a HTML versions available at:
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-par-04


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
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--0000000000000db36905af9684f6
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The -04 revision of the PAR draft has updates and edits that endeavor to
address the feedback received during the (somewhat) recently completed WGLC
process. Thanks to everyone who provided feedback and participated in the
related discussions.



---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:20 AM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt
To: Dave Tonge <dave@tonge.org>, Nat Sakimura <nat@sakimura.org>, Torsten
Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>,
Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt
has been successfully submitted by Brian Campbell and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-ietf-oauth-par
Revision:       04
Title:          OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
Document date:  2020-09-18
Group:          oauth
Pages:          21
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/
Html:           https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.html
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-oauth-par-04

Abstract:
   This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
   which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
   authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
   request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
   reference to the data in a subsequent call to the authorization
   endpoint.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The -04 revision of the PAR draft has updates and edi=
ts that endeavor to address the feedback received during the (somewhat) rec=
ently completed WGLC process. Thanks to everyone who provided feedback and =
participated in the related discussions.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
><div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_a=
ttr">---------- Forwarded message ---------<br>From: <span dir=3D"auto">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">internet-dra=
fts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span><br>Date: Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:20 AM<br>Subjec=
t: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt<br>To: Dave Ton=
ge &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dave@tonge.org" target=3D"_blank">dave@tonge.org</=
a>&gt;, Nat Sakimura &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nat@sakimura.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">nat@sakimura.org</a>&gt;, Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tor=
sten@lodderstedt.net" target=3D"_blank">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;, Fi=
lip Skokan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">panv=
a.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt;, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@ping=
identity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;<br></div=
><br><br><br>
A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt<br>
has been successfully submitted by Brian Campbell and posted to the<br>
IETF repository.<br>
<br>
Name:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-ietf-oauth-par<br>
Revision:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A004<br>
Title:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Req=
uests<br>
Document date:=C2=A0 2020-09-18<br>
Group:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 oauth<br>
Pages:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 21<br>
URL:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.o=
rg/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.txt</a><br>
Status:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.iet=
f.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https=
://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/</a><br>
Html:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.o=
rg/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04.html</a><br>
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-ietf-oauth-par-04" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par-04</a><br>
Diff:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.o=
rg/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-oauth-par-04" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-oauth-par-04</a><br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoin=
t,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0authorization request to the authorization server via a direct=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0request and provides them with a request URI that is used as<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0reference to the data in a subsequent call to the authorizatio=
n<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0endpoint.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
The IETF Secretariat<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div></div></div>

<br>
<i style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:ba=
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span style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:=
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--0000000000000db36905af9684f6--


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Last Call: <draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt> (The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the Web Authorization Protocol WG
(oauth) to consider the following document: - 'The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: JWT Secured Authorization
   Request (JAR)'
  <draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt> as Proposed Standard

This document is being brought back for a second IETF Last Call to confirm 
consensus on changes made in response to multiple IESG Reviews in 2017 and 2019.

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-02. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
   query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
   parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
   user agents such as web browsers.  While it is easy to implement, it
   means that (a) the communication through the user agents is not
   integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
   the source of the communication is not authenticated.  Because of
   these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
   forward.

   This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
   JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed
   with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and encrypted with JSON Web Encryption
   (JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication and
   confidentiality property of the Authorization Request is attained.
   The request can be sent by value or by reference.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.






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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens
        Author          : Vittorio Bertocci
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09.txt
	Pages           : 19
	Date            : 2020-09-18

Abstract:
   This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access
   tokens in JSON web token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to
   issue and consume access tokens in interoperable manner.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07
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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
To: Logan Widick <logan.widick@gmail.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
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Hi Logan,
Thanks for the note.
The intent would be to present that information in the same way you would w=
hen querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims; hence groups would be a list =
of values representing  what groups the subject belongs to, rather than a l=
ist of full group definitions (with all the other members belonging to them=
, for example) which would go beyond the intended use of the information (s=
upplying authorization information about the subject).
I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=92t want to duplicate SCI=
M guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the options products have to imple=
ment this.  If you think this is too vague, we can try to be more specific.

From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Logan Widick <logan.widic=
k@gmail.com>
Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question


I took a look at Section 2.2.3.1<http://2.2.3.1>: Claims for Authorization =
Outside of Delegation Scenarios (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oau=
th-access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1) and I do not understand what exactl=
y the formats of the "roles", "groups", and "entitlements" claims will be.

Will the "roles" claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs, or links), =
an array of the "roles" objects from the SCIM User schema (pages 66-67 of R=
FC 7643), or something else?

Will the "groups" claim be an array of strings (group names, IDs, or links)=
, an array of the "groups" objects from the SCIM User schema (pages 63-64 o=
f RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (pages 69-70 of RFC 7643=
), or something else?

Will the "entitlements" claim be an array of strings (entitlement names, ID=
s, or links), an array of the "entitlements" objects from the SCIM User sch=
ema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?

Sincerely,

Logan Widick

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Logan,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for the note.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The intent would be to present that information in t=
he same way you would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded in claims; =
hence groups would be a list of values representing &nbsp;what groups the s=
ubject belongs to, rather than a list of full
 group definitions (with all the other members belonging to them, for examp=
le) which would go beyond the intended use of the information (supplying au=
thorization information about the subject).
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=92=
t want to duplicate SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the options=
 products have to implement this. &nbsp;If you think this is too vague, we =
can try to be more specific.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">From=
: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;oauth-b=
ounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Logan Widick &lt;logan.widick@gmail.com&gt=
;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;oauth@ietf.org&quot; &lt;oauth@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>I took a look at Section <a href=3D"http://2.2.3.1">2.2.3.1</a>: Claims =
for Authorization Outside of Delegation Scenarios (<a href=3D"https://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1">https:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1<=
/a>)
 and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the &quot;roles&quot;,=
 &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; claims will be.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Will the &quot;roles&quot; claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs=
, or links), an array of the &quot;roles&quot; objects from the SCIM User s=
chema (pages 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Will the &quot;groups&quot; claim be an array of strings (group names, I=
Ds, or links), an array of the &quot;groups&quot; objects from the SCIM Use=
r schema (pages 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (=
pages 69-70 of RFC 7643), or something else?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Will the &quot;entitlements&quot; claim be an array of strings (entitlem=
ent names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;entitlements&quot; objects=
 from the SCIM User schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Sincerely,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Logan Widick<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@arm.com>,  Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Shepherd writeup for the JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens -- Information about Implementations
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IdentityServer is.

https://github.com/IdentityServer

Cheers
=E2=80=94=E2=80=94=E2=80=94
Dominick Baier

On 17. September 2020 at 14:56:01, Hannes Tschofenig (
hannes.tschofenig@arm.com) wrote:

Hi Vittorio, Hi all,

I am working on the shepherd writeup for
<draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt> and you can find the latest version
here:
https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-wri=
teups/Writeup_OAuth_JWT-Profile-for-AccessTokens.txt

I am in need for information about implementations that are conformant to
this specification. This information would be listed in this write-up, as
background information to the IESG.

Ciao
Hannes

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<html><head><style>body{font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13px}</style>=
</head><body><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13px">Iden=
tityServer is.</div><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13p=
x"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13px"><a h=
ref=3D"https://github.com/IdentityServer">https://github.com/IdentityServer=
</a></div><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13px"><br></d=
iv><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13px">Cheers=C2=A0</=
div> <div class=3D"gmail_signature">=E2=80=94=E2=80=94=E2=80=94<div>Dominic=
k Baier</div></div> <br><p class=3D"airmail_on">On 17. September 2020 at 14=
:56:01, Hannes Tschofenig (<a href=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@arm.com">han=
nes.tschofenig@arm.com</a>) wrote:</p> <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"c=
lean_bq"><span><div><div></div><div>Hi Vittorio, Hi all,
<br>
<br>I am working on the shepherd writeup for &lt;draft-ietf-oauth-access-to=
ken-jwt&gt; and you can find the latest version here:
<br><a href=3D"https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/mast=
er/shepherd-writeups/Writeup_OAuth_JWT-Profile-for-AccessTokens.txt">https:=
//github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-writeups/=
Writeup_OAuth_JWT-Profile-for-AccessTokens.txt</a>
<br>
<br>I am in need for information about implementations that are conformant =
to this specification. This information would be listed in this write-up, a=
s background information to the IESG.
<br>
<br>Ciao
<br>Hannes
<br>
<br>IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are co=
nfidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipien=
t, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to=
 any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information=
 in any medium. Thank you.
<br>
<br>_______________________________________________
<br>OAuth mailing list
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<br></div></div></span></blockquote></body></html>

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From nobody Sat Sep 19 15:06:37 2020
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Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2020 15:06:27 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?
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Hi Denis,

On Wed, Sep 02, 2020 at 10:39:07AM +0200, Denis wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> This new thread, i.e."Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662 ?" is used to 
> discuss one of the topics raised in:
> Last Call: <draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt> (JWT 
> Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed Standard
> 
> Only the text relevant to this topic has been left.

Thank you for starting a new thread.  My apologies for taking so long to
reply to it; I have not been entirely healthy for a couple weeks and many
things have been left behind.

I do agree with Justin that a document update is the best way to
incorporate this kind of considerations -- with the caveat that generally
Roman, as responsible AD for the WG, would be processing errata reports
against the OAuth specs, if I was to be processing these proposals I would
probably have to mark them as "Hold for Document Update" due to the need to
ensure that they reflect WG consensus.  One further note inline...

> The text that has been discussed and polished would perfectly fit into 
> the Privacy Consideration section from RFC 7662.
> 
> Here it is again:
> 
>     Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets
>     the AS know when the client is accessing the RS, which can also
>     indicate when the user is using the client. If this implication is
>     not acceptable, implementers can use other means to carry access
>     token data, e.g. directly transferring the data needed by the RS
>     within the access token.
> 
> Privacy considerations sections do not change the protocol but only 
> provide some warnings. Warning the implementers is fine,
> but warning the users and the clients should also be considered.
> 
> Thanks to your observations, I noticed that the sentence "thecall 
> described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided"
> is not appropriate.So I propose an additional text which is relevant for 
> the users:
> 
>     Token introspection is an optional feature primarily intended for
>     clients that are unable to support structured access tokens,
>     including their validation. However, the use of this call allows an
>     AS to track where and exactly when clients or users have indeed
>     presented an issued access token to a RS.
> 
>     Some users or clients may be concerned that such a feature allows
>     the AS to accurately trace them. If no Token introspection endpoint
>     is published by an AS,
>     users and clients can be confident that such tracing cannot happen.

I don't think that users and clients can be confident about this; AFAIK
out-of-band configuration of an introspection endpoint is possible.

-Ben

>     On the contrary, when an introspection_endpoint is published by an
>     AS [RFC8414],
>     users and clients have no way to know whether the RS will be allowed
>     to use it, nor whether it will effectively use it.If these
>     implications are not acceptable,
>     users or clients should not use an AS that publishes an
>     introspection_endpoint.
> 
> Denis
> 
> > Hi all,
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 09:58:11AM +0200, Denis wrote:
> >> The last text that has been proposed on the list about this thread is
> >> the following:
> >>
> >> Implementers should be aware that a token introspection request lets the AS know when the client is accessing the RS,
> >> which can also indicate when the user is using the client.  If this implication is not acceptable, implementers can use
> >> other means to carry access token data, e.g. directly transferring the data needed by the RS within the access token.
> >>
> >> The concerns of the implementers have nothing to do with the concerns of
> >> the Users. Such a text proposal has nothing to do with a "User consent".
> >>
> >> *Towards an RFC Errata to RFC 7662*
> >>
> >> Mike Jones wrote:
> >>
> >> I agree with Dick’s observation about the privacy implications of using
> >> an Introspection Endpoint. That’s why it’s preferable to not use one at all
> >>         and instead directly have the Resource understand the Access
> >> Token. One way of doing this is the JWT Access Token spec. There are
> >> plenty of others.
> >>
> >> I fully agree.
> >>
> >> RFC 7662 should have incorporated a more detailed content such as:
> >>
> >>        In OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the contents of tokens are opaque to
> >> clients. However, the contents of tokens is not intended to be opaque to
> >> RSs.
> >>        Token introspection is an OPTIONAL feature of an AS described in
> >> OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] intended for clients that are unable
> >>        to support structured access tokens including their validation.
> >> The use of this call allows an AS to track where and when its clients
> >> have indeed
> >>        presented an issued access token. As soon as the RS knows the
> >> format of the access token, e.g. using structured token formats such as
> >>        JWT [RFC7519], and is able to validate its security features, the
> >> call described in OAuth Introspection [RFC 7662] should be avoided,
> >> otherwise
> >>        the AS will know exactly when the introspection call has been made
> >> and thus be able to make sure which client has attempted perform an access
> >>        to that RS and at which instant of time. As soon as this call is
> >> supported by an AS, the client or the user have no way to prevent the RS
> >> to use it.
> >>
> >> It might be useful to add it, e.g. using an RFC Errata.
> > I do not believe this would be an appropriate usage of an Errata Report --
> > it changes the meaning of the RFC away from what the WG intended at the
> > time of publication.
> >
> > Use of tokens that are just opaque DB handles (along with some form of
> > introspection) is desirable when a prominent threat is leakage of token
> > contents from the browser.  We have had numerous discussions over the years
> > of various ways in which information can leak from the browser, including
> > history APIs, malicious javascript, and more.  While these threats are not
> > always applicable in all deployment models, they are still present, just as
> > the threats that you propose we defend against are not always of concern in
> > all deployment models.  AFAICT, given the technologies currently available,
> > there is not one universal solution that will address all concerns, and
> > deployments will have to make a trade-off.  I think we need to acknowledge
> > that there are different deployment models and that (for example) giving
> > the user visibility into the token contents is not always desired, given
> > the other risks that the current mechanisms for providing that visibility
> > open up.
> >
> > -Ben
> >
> > P.S. your usage of the phrase "the User and his client" (below) suggests
> > that you are still picturing the client as being local to the user, as is
> > the case for, e.g., a TLS client or an IMAP client.  This is not the
> > original model for an OAuth, where the client can just as well be a
> > headless server in a cloud somewhere.
> >
> 


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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: New podcast on identity specifications
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] New podcast on identity specifications
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Dear all,
This is an informal mail to inform you that there=92s a new podcast<http://=
identityunlocked.com/>, identityunlocked.com<http://identityunlocked.com/>,=
 dedicated to inform and explain new identity specs developments for develo=
pers.
You can find a more detailed explanation of the podcast=92s goals in https:=
//auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/, but the TL;DR=
 is that the spec themselves aren=92t all that easy to read for the non-ini=
tiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during the discussions leading to =
the spec but rarely surface in a usable form to the people who don=92t part=
icipate in discussions.
The first episode<https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episod=
e-1/>, featuring Brian Campbell discussing MTLS & DPoP, should give you an =
idea of what season 1 of the show will look like.
The full list of the first run is available here<https://auth0.com/blog/aut=
h0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-podcast-for-developers/>. Of 6 e=
pisodes, 3 of them are about specifications coming out of this WG- and all =
guests are actively involved in the IETF.
My main goals sharing this info here are

  *   Letting you know that the podcast exists, so that you can make use of=
 it if you so choose (e.g. referring people to it if they need to better un=
derstand something covered in an episode)
  *   Soliciting proposals for new episodes: topics you believe are current=
ly underserved, topics you are often asked about, topics you would like to =
be interviewed about on the show
  *   Growing the show=92s subscriber base. I was able to get backing from =
my company to produce a podcast that has exactly ZERO product pitches and i=
s purely about identity specs promotion, on the gamble that the topic does =
have an audience finding it useful. So far the reception has been great, an=
d we need to keep it up if we want to have a season 2.

I hope you=92ll find the initiative useful!
Cheers,
V.

--_000_MWHPR19MB150106AF452F2C06009E0239AE3A0MWHPR19MB1501namp_
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Dear all,<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">This is an informal=
 mail to inform you that there=92s a new
<a href=3D"http://identityunlocked.com/">podcast</a>, <a href=3D"http://ide=
ntityunlocked.com/">
identityunlocked.com</a>, dedicated to inform and explain new identity spec=
s developments for developers.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">You can find a more=
 detailed explanation of the podcast=92s goals in
</span><a href=3D"https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-de=
velopers/">https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developer=
s/</a><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">, but the TL;DR is that the spec the=
mselves aren=92t all that easy to read
 for the non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during the discuss=
ions leading to the spec but rarely surface in a usable form to the people =
who don=92t participate in discussions.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The <a href=3D"http=
s://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/">
first episode</a>, featuring Brian Campbell discussing MTLS &amp; DPoP, sho=
uld give you an idea of what season 1 of the show will look like.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The full list of th=
e first run is available
<a href=3D"https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-iden=
tity-podcast-for-developers/">
here</a>. Of 6 episodes, 3 of them are about specifications coming out of t=
his WG- and all guests are actively involved in the IETF.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">My main goals shari=
ng this info here are<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Letting you know that the podcast=
 exists</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">, so that you can make u=
se of it if you so choose (e.g. referring
 people to it if they need to better understand something covered in an epi=
sode)<o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-=
left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Solic=
iting proposals for new episodes</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"=
>: topics you believe are currently underserved, topics you are often
 asked about, topics you would like to be interviewed about on the show<o:p=
></o:p></span></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;=
mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Growing the sh=
ow=92s subscriber base</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">. I was a=
ble to get backing from my company to produce a podcast that
 has exactly ZERO product pitches and is purely about identity specs promot=
ion, on the gamble that the topic does have an audience finding it useful. =
So far the reception has been great, and we need to keep it up if we want t=
o have a season 2. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">I hope you=92ll fin=
d the initiative useful!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Cheers,<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">V.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_MWHPR19MB150106AF452F2C06009E0239AE3A0MWHPR19MB1501namp_--


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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Updated shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/O-zgsnQHgN4jL9xEHeh9z1DKENk>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Updated shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09
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Hi all,

I updated the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09 and=
 included the links to the implementations distributed on the list. I am su=
re there are more.

While updating the shepherd writeup I noticed that the draft contains a JWT=
 in a style that does not match the format described in RFC 7519.

I was wondering whether we should actually replicate the example in a way s=
imilar to Section 6.1 of RFC 7519 (which shows an unsecured JWT) or, even b=
etter, a digitally signed JWT.

Here is the snippet from the draft:

   {"typ":"at+JWT","alg":"RS256","kid":"RjEwOwOA"}
   {
     "iss": "https://authorization-server.example.com/",
     "sub": " 5ba552d67",
     "aud":   "https://rs.example.com/",
     "exp": 1544645174,
     "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3_",
     "scope": "openid profile reademail"
   }


                       Figure 2: A JWT Access Token

What do you think?

Ciao
Hannes

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi all, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I updated the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-=
access-token-jwt-09 and included the links to the implementations distribut=
ed on the list. I am sure there are more.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">While updating the shepherd writeup I noticed that t=
he draft contains a JWT in a style that does not match the format described=
 in RFC 7519.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I was wondering whether we should actually replicate=
 the example in a way similar to Section 6.1 of RFC 7519 (which shows an un=
secured JWT) or, even better, a digitally signed JWT.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Here is the snippet from the draft: <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;typ&quot;:&quot;at+JWT&quot;,&quot;alg=
&quot;:&quot;RS256&quot;,&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;RjEwOwOA&quot;}<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;iss&quot;: &quot;https://au=
thorization-server.example.com/&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;sub&quot;: &quot; 5ba552d67=
&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;aud&quot;:&nbsp;&nbsp; &quo=
t;https://rs.example.com/&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;exp&quot;: 1544645174,<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;client_id&quot;: &quot;s6Bh=
dRkqt3_&quot;,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;scope&quot;: &quot;openid p=
rofile reademail&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
Figure 2: A JWT Access Token<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">What do you think? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
</html>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 09:34:55 -0600
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Updated shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09
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I believe the intent of that example was to show the unencoded header and
body content of the JWT. So perhaps all that's needed is to adjust the text
that introduces the example and the figure title or caption or whatever
it's called to reflect that?

On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 4:58 AM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.co=
m>
wrote:

> Hi all,
>
>
>
> I updated the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09
> and included the links to the implementations distributed on the list. I =
am
> sure there are more.
>
>
>
> While updating the shepherd writeup I noticed that the draft contains a
> JWT in a style that does not match the format described in RFC 7519.
>
>
>
> I was wondering whether we should actually replicate the example in a way
> similar to Section 6.1 of RFC 7519 (which shows an unsecured JWT) or, eve=
n
> better, a digitally signed JWT.
>
>
>
> Here is the snippet from the draft:
>
>
>
>    {"typ":"at+JWT","alg":"RS256","kid":"RjEwOwOA"}
>
>    {
>
>      "iss": "https://authorization-server.example.com/",
>
>      "sub": " 5ba552d67",
>
>      "aud":   "https://rs.example.com/",
>
>      "exp": 1544645174,
>
>      "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3_",
>
>      "scope": "openid profile reademail"
>
>    }
>
>
>
>
>
>                        Figure 2: A JWT Access Token
>
>
>
> What do you think?
>
>
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
>
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--000000000000346c2405afd499b0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I believe the intent of that example was to show the unenc=
oded header and body content of the JWT. So perhaps all that&#39;s needed i=
s to adjust the text that introduces the example and the figure title or ca=
ption or whatever it&#39;s called to reflect that? <br></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 21, 2020=
 at 4:58 AM Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi all, <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I updated the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-=
access-token-jwt-09 and included the links to the implementations distribut=
ed on the list. I am sure there are more.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">While updating the shepherd writeup I noticed that t=
he draft contains a JWT in a style that does not match the format described=
 in RFC 7519.
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I was wondering whether we should actually replicate=
 the example in a way similar to Section 6.1 of RFC 7519 (which shows an un=
secured JWT) or, even better, a digitally signed JWT.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Here is the snippet from the draft: <u></u><u></u></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0 {&quot;typ&quot;:&quot;at+JWT&quot;,&quot;alg&q=
uot;:&quot;RS256&quot;,&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;RjEwOwOA&quot;}<u></u><u></u><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0 {<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;iss&quot;: &quot;<a href=3D"h=
ttps://authorization-server.example.com/" target=3D"_blank">https://authori=
zation-server.example.com/</a>&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;sub&quot;: &quot; 5ba552d67&q=
uot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;aud&quot;:=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;=
<a href=3D"https://rs.example.com/" target=3D"_blank">https://rs.example.co=
m/</a>&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;exp&quot;: 1544645174,<u></u>=
<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;client_id&quot;: &quot;s6BhdR=
kqt3_&quot;,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;scope&quot;: &quot;openid pro=
file reademail&quot;<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0 }<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Cour=
ier New&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Fi=
gure 2: A JWT Access Token<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">What do you think? <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
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</blockquote></div>

<br>
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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:12:08 +0900
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] [JAR] scope parameter outside request object of OIDC request
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If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to relax the
requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a request object)
from mandatory to optional, should we relax the following requirement of
`scope` request parameter stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?

----------
Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object value, a scope
parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax
containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0
logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
----------

Otherwise, an authorization request like "client_id=...&request(_uri)=..."
fails if the request object represents an OIDC request. An authorization
request has to look like "client_id=...&request(_uri)=...&scope=openid"
(`scope` including `openid` has to be given) even if the authorization
server conforms to JAR and allows omission of `response_type` request
parameter.

I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because it affects
implementations. Has this been discussed yet?

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki
Authlete, Inc.

--000000000000ef47c005afd5f36b
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<div dir=3D"ltr">If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to rel=
ax the requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a request =
object) from mandatory to optional, should we relax the following requireme=
nt of `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?<b=
r><br>----------<br>Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Obj=
ect value, a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 requ=
est syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying =
OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.<br>----------<br><b=
r>Otherwise, an authorization request like &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;reques=
t(_uri)=3D...&quot; fails if the request object represents an OIDC request.=
 An authorization request has to look like &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;reques=
t(_uri)=3D...&amp;scope=3Dopenid&quot; (`scope` including `openid` has to b=
e given) even if the authorization server conforms to JAR and allows omissi=
on of `response_type` request parameter.<br><br>I think that implementers w=
ant to know consensus on this because it affects implementations. Has this =
been discussed yet?<br><br>Best Regards,<br>Takahiko Kawasaki<br>Authlete, =
Inc.<br></div>

--000000000000ef47c005afd5f36b--


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Implementation Status of "JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)"
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Hi all

Because some procedural issues I have to update the shepherd writeup of the=
 JAR document and I wanted to verify whether the implementations listed in =
https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-wri=
teups/Writeup_OAuth_JAR.txt (copied below) are still inline with the latest=
 version of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30 (given t=
he changes the document has gone through*).

----- List of implementations -----

As part of the OpenID Foundation certification program the following

implementations of OpenID Connect Core indicate support for this

functionality:

* CZ.NIC mojeID,

* Thierry Habart's SimpleIdentitySever v.2.0.0,

* Roland Hedberg's pyoidc 0.7.7,

* Peercraft ApS's Peercarft,

* MIT's MITREidConnect,

* Gluue Server 2.3,

* Filip Skokan's node-oidc pre supports.


Authlete (https://www.authlete.com/), a commerical, closed source

server implementation, has also implemented this specification and

is offering it.


There is an open source implementation from NRI in PHP and Scala.

NRI's Open Source PHP: https://bitbucket.org/PEOFIAMP/phpoidc

-----

Ciao
Hannes

PS: List of changes from the current draft to the one when I wrote my sheph=
erd writeup:
http://tools.ietf.org//rfcdiff?url1=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-=
oauth-jwsreq-09.txt&url2=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsre=
q-30.txt

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi all<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Because some procedural issues I have to update the =
shepherd writeup of the JAR document and I wanted to verify whether the imp=
lementations listed in
<a href=3D"https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/s=
hepherd-writeups/Writeup_OAuth_JAR.txt">
https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-wri=
teups/Writeup_OAuth_JAR.txt</a> (copied below) are still inline with the la=
test version of
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30">https://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30</a> (given the changes the d=
ocument has gone through*).
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">----- List of implementations -----<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As part of the OpenID Foundation certification progr=
am the following
<o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">implementations of OpenID Connect Core indicate supp=
ort for this
<o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">functionality: <o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* CZ.NIC mojeID, <o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Thierry Habart's SimpleIdentitySever v.2.0.0, <o:p=
></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Roland Hedberg's pyoidc 0.7.7, <o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Peercraft ApS's Peercarft, <o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* MIT's MITREidConnect, <o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Gluue Server 2.3, <o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Filip Skokan's node-oidc pre supports. <o:p></o:p>=
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Authlete (https://www.authlete.com/), a commerical, =
closed source
<o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">server implementation, has also implemented this spe=
cification and
<o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">is offering it. <o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">There is an open source implementation from NRI in P=
HP and Scala.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">NRI's Open Source PHP: https://bitbucket.org/PEOFIAM=
P/phpoidc
<o:p></o:p></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">----- <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">PS: List of changes from the current draft to the on=
e when I wrote my shepherd writeup:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org//rfcdiff?url1=3Dhtt=
ps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-09.txt&amp;url2=3Dhttps://to=
ols.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt">http://tools.ietf.org//rfcd=
iff?url1=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-09.txt&amp;url=
2=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt</a><o:p></o:p>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "nat@nat.consulting" <nat@nat.consulting>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
CC: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR): IPR Confirmation
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Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:22:04 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/I9icO3pNItDJ_5Jb_U_8gHdN7Ik>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR): IPR Confirmation
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Hi Mike, Nat, John,

I am updating the shepherd writeup for the "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Fra=
mework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)" specification, see https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt, and given the changes I =
need your IPR confirmation again. (Mike joined as co-author later and hence=
 I need his confirmation anyway.)

One item in the template requires me to indicate whether each document auth=
or has confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for =
full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been=
 filed.

Could you please confirm?

Ciao
Hannes


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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 13:33:00 -0600
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To: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Logan Widick <logan.widick@gmail.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
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At some point I'm going to be among the lucky few who will be asked to
review the JWT claims registration request. One of the criteria to consider
is "whether the registration description is clear" and Logan's questions
suggest that perhaps the descriptions of these claims are not sufficiently
clear. My assumption was that the claim value for "roles", "groups" and
"entitlements" was going to be an array of strings. Trying to validate my
assumption, I went looking at the text in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-2.=
2.3.1
and
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.=
2
and followed the reference to
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2 and, honestly, it wasn't
particularly clear to me. Maybe it's my lack of familiarity with the
details of SCIM and the language of RFC 7643. But I think that, for the
sake of clarity and interoperability, some additional specificity is
needed.

Side note: the "Section 2.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]" references in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.=
2.1
are problmatic (there is no such section in this document) and probably
should be to 2.2.3.1.

On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=3D
40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi Logan,
>
> Thanks for the note.
>
> The intent would be to present that information in the same way you would
> when querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims; hence groups would be a li=
st
> of values representing  what groups the subject belongs to, rather than a
> list of full group definitions (with all the other members belonging to
> them, for example) which would go beyond the intended use of the
> information (supplying authorization information about the subject).
>
> I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=80=99t want to dupli=
cate SCIM
> guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the options products have to
> implement this.  If you think this is too vague, we can try to be more
> specific.
>
>
>
> *From: *OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Logan Widick <
> logan.widick@gmail.com>
> *Date: *Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21
> *To: *"oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
>
>
>
> I took a look at Section 2.2.3.1: Claims for Authorization Outside of
> Delegation Scenarios (
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section-=
2.2.3.1)
> and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the "roles", "groups"=
,
> and "entitlements" claims will be.
>
> Will the "roles" claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs, or links)=
,
> an array of the "roles" objects from the SCIM User schema (pages 66-67 of
> RFC 7643), or something else?
>
> Will the "groups" claim be an array of strings (group names, IDs, or
> links), an array of the "groups" objects from the SCIM User schema (pages
> 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (pages 69-70 of
> RFC 7643), or something else?
>
> Will the "entitlements" claim be an array of strings (entitlement names,
> IDs, or links), an array of the "entitlements" objects from the SCIM User
> schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Logan Widick
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>At some point I&#39;m going to be among the lucky few=
 who will be asked to review the JWT claims registration request. One of th=
e criteria to consider is &quot;whether the registration description is cle=
ar&quot; and Logan&#39;s questions suggest that perhaps the descriptions of=
 these claims are not sufficiently clear. My assumption was that the claim =
value for &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot; and &quot;entitlements&quot=
; was going to be an array of strings. Trying to validate my assumption, I =
went looking at the text in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ie=
tf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-2.2.3.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/d=
raft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-2.2.3.1</a> and <a href=3D"http=
s://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2">h=
ttps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2=
</a> and followed the reference to <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/r=
fc7643#section-4.1.2">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2</a>=
 and, honestly, it wasn&#39;t particularly clear to me. Maybe it&#39;s my l=
ack of familiarity with the details of SCIM and the language of RFC 7643. B=
ut I think that, for the sake of clarity and interoperability, some additio=
nal specificity is needed.=C2=A0 <br></div><div><br></div><div>Side note: t=
he &quot;Section 2.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]&quot; references in <a h=
ref=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#sec=
tion-7.2.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-0=
9#section-7.2.1</a> are problmatic (there is no such section in this docume=
nt) and probably should be to 2.2.3.1.=C2=A0 <br></div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Sep 18, 2020=
 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci &lt;vittorio.bertocci=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40a=
uth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&g=
t; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Logan,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for the note.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The intent would be to present that information in t=
he same way you would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded in claims; =
hence groups would be a list of values representing =C2=A0what groups the s=
ubject belongs to, rather than a list of full
 group definitions (with all the other members belonging to them, for examp=
le) which would go beyond the intended use of the information (supplying au=
thorization information about the subject).
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=
=80=99t want to duplicate SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the o=
ptions products have to implement this.=C2=A0 If you think this is too vagu=
e, we can try to be more specific.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border-color:rgb(181,196,223) currentcolor currentcolor;borde=
r-style:solid none none;border-width:1pt medium medium;padding:3pt 0in 0in"=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">From: =
</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>=
&gt; on behalf of Logan Widick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:logan.widick@gmail.com=
" target=3D"_blank">logan.widick@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">oauth@=
ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">=
oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>I took a look at Section <a href=3D"http://2.2.3.1" target=3D"_blank">2.=
2.3.1</a>: Claims for Authorization Outside of Delegation Scenarios (<a hre=
f=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#secti=
on-2.2.3.1" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-=
access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1</a>)
 and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the &quot;roles&quot;,=
 &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; claims will be.
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;roles&quot; claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs=
, or links), an array of the &quot;roles&quot; objects from the SCIM User s=
chema (pages 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;groups&quot; claim be an array of strings (group names, I=
Ds, or links), an array of the &quot;groups&quot; objects from the SCIM Use=
r schema (pages 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (=
pages 69-70 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;entitlements&quot; claim be an array of strings (entitlem=
ent names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;entitlements&quot; objects=
 from the SCIM User schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Sincerely,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Logan Widick<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
<i style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:ba=
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Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 23:59:24 +0300
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [JAR] scope parameter outside request object of OIDC request
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Hi Taka,

On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
> If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to relax the
> requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a request
> object) from mandatory to optional, should we relax the following
> requirement of `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC Core 1.0
> Section 6.1, too?
>
> ----------
> Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object value, a
> scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request
> syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying
> OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
> ----------
>
> Otherwise, an authorization request like
> "client_id=3D...&request(_uri)=3D..." fails if the request object
> represents an OIDC request. An authorization request has to look like
> "client_id=3D...&request(_uri)=3D...&scope=3Dopenid" (`scope` including=

> `openid` has to be given) even if the authorization server conforms to
> JAR and allows omission of `response_type` request parameter.

The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR compliant
server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own style of request /
request_uri parameter handling insofar as to not reject other query
params (such as scope, etc). The difference is that according to JAR
their values cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But what can be
reasonably done is to detect scope=3Dopenid as you say and then switch to=

OIDC style request object behavior.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5

>    The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object
>    duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
>    compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting thi=
s
>    specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
>    object.

The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen that the
request objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.

In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected parameters.

In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.


>
> I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because it
> affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?
>
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
> Authlete, Inc.


Vladimir


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF=
-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Hi Taka,<br>
    </p>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki=

      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"
cite=3D"mid:CAHdPCmOPwqbemgKsEALA0OvP+6z58N5eNA9WA_AsvDESNhE1kg@mail.gmai=
l.com">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DU=
TF-8">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request=
)
        to relax the requirement of `response_type` request parameter
        (outside a request object) from mandatory to optional, should we
        relax the following requirement of `scope` request parameter
        stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?<br>
        <br>
        ----------<br>
        Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object
        value, a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth
        2.0 request syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate
        to the underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect
        request.<br>
        ----------<br>
        <br>
        Otherwise, an authorization request like
        "client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D..." fails if the request
        object represents an OIDC request. An authorization request has
        to look like
        "client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&amp;scope=3Dopenid" (`sc=
ope`
        including `openid` has to be given) even if the authorization
        server conforms to JAR and allows omission of `response_type`
        request parameter.<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p>The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR
      compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own
      style of request / request_uri parameter handling insofar as to
      not reject other query params (such as scope, etc). The difference
      is that according to JAR their values cannot be used or merged (as
      in OIDC). But what can be reasonably done is to detect
      scope=3Dopenid as you say and then switch to OIDC style request
      object behavior.</p>
    <p><a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/=
html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5">https://tools.ietf.org/html/dr=
aft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5</a><br>
    </p>
    <p>
      <blockquote type=3D"cite">
        <pre class=3D"newpage">   The client MAY send the parameters incl=
uded in the request object
   duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
   compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
   specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
   object.</pre>
      </blockquote>
    </p>
    <p>The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen that
      the request objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.</p>
    <p>In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected
      parameters.</p>
    <p>In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"
cite=3D"mid:CAHdPCmOPwqbemgKsEALA0OvP+6z58N5eNA9WA_AsvDESNhE1kg@mail.gmai=
l.com">
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because
        it affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?<br>
        <br>
        Best Regards,<br>
        Takahiko Kawasaki<br>
        Authlete, Inc.</div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Vladimir<br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Shepherd writeup for the JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens -- Information about Implementations
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A conforming implementation and looking forward to the final spec :)

https://connect2id.com/products/server/docs/datasheet#access-token-encodi=
ng-jwt

On 17/09/2020 15:55, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Hi Vittorio, Hi all,
>
> I am working on the shepherd writeup for <draft-ietf-oauth-access-token=
-jwt> and you can find the latest version here:
> https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd=
-writeups/Writeup_OAuth_JWT-Profile-for-AccessTokens.txt
>
> I am in need for information about implementations that are conformant =
to this specification. This information would be listed in this write-up,=
 as background information to the IESG.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are co=
nfidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipi=
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s to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the infor=
mation in any medium. Thank you.
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth



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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New podcast on identity specifications
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The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two specs are alike,
how they differ and which particular type of app they are meant to serve.=


I'm saying this as a person who is generally allergic to technical
podcasts :)

Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a podcast link at
the top, where the authors discuss it in simple, honest and non-speccy
terms, because that's often how people are best able to perceive the
spirit and subtleties of some technical or spec work.

Vladimir

On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio Bertocci wrote:
>
> Dear all,
>
> This is an informal mail to inform you that there=92s a new podcast
> <http://identityunlocked.com/>, identityunlocked.com
> <http://identityunlocked.com/>, dedicated to inform and explain new
> identity specs developments for developers.
>
> You can find a more detailed explanation of the podcast=92s goals in
> https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/,
> but the TL;DR is that the spec themselves aren=92t all that easy to rea=
d
> for the non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during the
> discussions leading to the spec but rarely surface in a usable form to
> the people who don=92t participate in discussions.
>
> The first episode
> <https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/>,
> featuring Brian Campbell discussing MTLS & DPoP, should give you an
> idea of what season 1 of the show will look like.
>
> The full list of the first run is available here
> <https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-p=
odcast-for-developers/>.
> Of 6 episodes, 3 of them are about specifications coming out of this
> WG- and all guests are actively involved in the IETF.
>
> My main goals sharing this info here are
>
>   * *Letting you know that the podcast exists*, so that you can make
>     use of it if you so choose (e.g. referring people to it if they
>     need to better understand something covered in an episode)
>   * *Soliciting proposals for new episodes*: topics you believe are
>     currently underserved, topics you are often asked about, topics
>     you would like to be interviewed about on the show
>   * *Growing the show=92s subscriber base*. I was able to get backing
>     from my company to produce a podcast that has exactly ZERO product
>     pitches and is purely about identity specs promotion, on the
>     gamble that the topic does have an audience finding it useful. So
>     far the reception has been great, and we need to keep it up if we
>     want to have a season 2. =A0
>
> =A0
>
> I hope you=92ll find the initiative useful!
>
> Cheers,
>
> V.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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    <p>The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two specs are
      alike, how they differ and which particular type of app they are
      meant to serve.<br>
    </p>
    <p>I'm saying this as a person who is generally allergic to
      technical podcasts :)</p>
    <p>Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a podcast
      link at the top, where the authors discuss it in simple, honest
      and non-speccy terms, because that's often how people are best
      able to perceive the spirit and subtleties of some technical or
      spec work.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Vladimir<br>
    </p>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio Bertocci=

      wrote:<br>
    </div>
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        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Dear all,=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">This is a=
n
            informal mail to inform you that there=92s a new
            <a href=3D"http://identityunlocked.com/"
              moz-do-not-send=3D"true">podcast</a>, <a
              href=3D"http://identityunlocked.com/" moz-do-not-send=3D"tr=
ue">
              identityunlocked.com</a>, dedicated to inform and explain
            new identity specs developments for developers.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">You can f=
ind
            a more detailed explanation of the podcast=92s goals in
          </span><a
href=3D"https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers=
/"
            moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlo=
cked-a-podcast-for-developers/</a><span
            style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">, but the TL;DR is that the spec
            themselves aren=92t all that easy to read for the
            non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during the
            discussions leading to the spec but rarely surface in a
            usable form to the people who don=92t participate in
            discussions.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The <a
              href=3D"https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-=
episode-1/"
              moz-do-not-send=3D"true">
              first episode</a>, featuring Brian Campbell discussing
            MTLS &amp; DPoP, should give you an idea of what season 1 of
            the show will look like.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The full
            list of the first run is available
            <a
href=3D"https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-ident=
ity-podcast-for-developers/"
              moz-do-not-send=3D"true">
              here</a>. Of 6 episodes, 3 of them are about
            specifications coming out of this WG- and all guests are
            actively involved in the IETF.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">My main
            goals sharing this info here are<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
          <li class=3D"MsoListParagraph"
            style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span
                style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Letting you know that the
                podcast exists</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"=
>,
              so that you can make use of it if you so choose (e.g.
              referring people to it if they need to better understand
              something covered in an episode)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
          <li class=3D"MsoListParagraph"
            style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span
                style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Soliciting proposals for new
                episodes</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">:
              topics you believe are currently underserved, topics you
              are often asked about, topics you would like to be
              interviewed about on the show<o:p></o:p></span></li>
          <li class=3D"MsoListParagraph"
            style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span
                style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Growing the show=92s subscribe=
r
                base</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">. I was
              able to get backing from my company to produce a podcast
              that has exactly ZERO product pitches and is purely about
              identity specs promotion, on the gamble that the topic
              does have an audience finding it useful. So far the
              reception has been great, and we need to keep it up if we
              want to have a season 2. =A0<o:p></o:p></span></li>
        </ul>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><o:p>=A0<=
/o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">I hope
            you=92ll find the initiative useful!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Cheers,<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">V.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class=3D"mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" wrap=3D"">____________________________=
___________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a>
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l=
istinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre class=3D"moz-signature" cols=3D"72">
</pre>
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--------------ms060506080804080402020909--


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From: Logan Widick <logan.widick@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:09:23 -0400
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Cc: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
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If I understand "The intent would be to present that information in the
same way you would when querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims" correctly=
,
the "roles", "groups", and "entitlements" claims are the same types as the
"roles", "groups", and "entitlements" attributes of the User resource
schema (pages 24-25 of RFC 7643 for the text; pages 63-67 of RFC 7643 for
the schema)? In the schema the attributes are all "complex" (object) type
and "multivalued" (array of), although the text for some of these
attributes has some "No vocabulary or syntax..." remarks.

If that understanding is correct, it might be a good idea to replace the
references to "RFC 7643", "Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643", and "RFC 7643,
Section 4.1.2" with something more specific like "the ____ attribute(s) of
the User resource schema from Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643".

On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 15:33 Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
wrote:

> At some point I'm going to be among the lucky few who will be asked to
> review the JWT claims registration request. One of the criteria to consid=
er
> is "whether the registration description is clear" and Logan's questions
> suggest that perhaps the descriptions of these claims are not sufficientl=
y
> clear. My assumption was that the claim value for "roles", "groups" and
> "entitlements" was going to be an array of strings. Trying to validate my
> assumption, I went looking at the text in
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-=
2.2.3.1
> and
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-=
7.2
> and followed the reference to
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2 and, honestly, it
> wasn't particularly clear to me. Maybe it's my lack of familiarity with t=
he
> details of SCIM and the language of RFC 7643. But I think that, for the
> sake of clarity and interoperability, some additional specificity is
> needed.
>
> Side note: the "Section 2.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]" references in
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-=
7.2.1
> are problmatic (there is no such section in this document) and probably
> should be to 2.2.3.1.
>
> On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=3D
> 40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Logan,
>>
>> Thanks for the note.
>>
>> The intent would be to present that information in the same way you woul=
d
>> when querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims; hence groups would be a l=
ist
>> of values representing  what groups the subject belongs to, rather than =
a
>> list of full group definitions (with all the other members belonging to
>> them, for example) which would go beyond the intended use of the
>> information (supplying authorization information about the subject).
>>
>> I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=80=99t want to dupl=
icate
>> SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the options products have to
>> implement this.  If you think this is too vague, we can try to be more
>> specific.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From: *OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Logan Widick <
>> logan.widick@gmail.com>
>> *Date: *Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21
>> *To: *"oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
>> *Subject: *[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
>>
>>
>>
>> I took a look at Section 2.2.3.1: Claims for Authorization Outside of
>> Delegation Scenarios (
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section=
-2.2.3.1)
>> and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the "roles", "groups=
",
>> and "entitlements" claims will be.
>>
>> Will the "roles" claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs, or
>> links), an array of the "roles" objects from the SCIM User schema (pages
>> 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?
>>
>> Will the "groups" claim be an array of strings (group names, IDs, or
>> links), an array of the "groups" objects from the SCIM User schema (page=
s
>> 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (pages 69-70 o=
f
>> RFC 7643), or something else?
>>
>> Will the "entitlements" claim be an array of strings (entitlement names,
>> IDs, or links), an array of the "entitlements" objects from the SCIM Use=
r
>> schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
>>
>> Sincerely,
>>
>> Logan Widick
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
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--0000000000005b941105afdd75aa
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto"><div>If I understand &quot;<span style=3D"font-family:san=
s-serif">The intent would be to present that information in the same way yo=
u would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded in claims&quot;=C2=A0</sp=
an>correctly, the &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlem=
ents&quot; claims are the same types as the &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups=
&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; attributes of the User resource schema=
 (pages 24-25 of RFC 7643 for the text; pages 63-67 of RFC 7643 for the sch=
ema)? In the schema the attributes are all &quot;complex&quot; (object) typ=
e and &quot;multivalued&quot; (array of), although the text for some of the=
se attributes has some &quot;No vocabulary or syntax...&quot; remarks.</div=
><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">If that understanding is cor=
rect, it might be a good idea to replace the references to &quot;RFC 7643&q=
uot;, &quot;Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643&quot;, and &quot;RFC 7643, Section 4.=
1.2&quot; with something more specific like &quot;the ____ attribute(s) of =
the User resource schema from Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643&quot;.</div><div di=
r=3D"auto"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr" cla=
ss=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 15:33 Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrot=
e:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>At some po=
int I&#39;m going to be among the lucky few who will be asked to review the=
 JWT claims registration request. One of the criteria to consider is &quot;=
whether the registration description is clear&quot; and Logan&#39;s questio=
ns suggest that perhaps the descriptions of these claims are not sufficient=
ly clear. My assumption was that the claim value for &quot;roles&quot;, &qu=
ot;groups&quot; and &quot;entitlements&quot; was going to be an array of st=
rings. Trying to validate my assumption, I went looking at the text in <a h=
ref=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#sec=
tion-2.2.3.1" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-2.2.3.1</a> and <a href=3D=
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7=
.2" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-=
ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2</a> and followed the reference t=
o <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2" target=3D"_=
blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2=
</a> and, honestly, it wasn&#39;t particularly clear to me. Maybe it&#39;s =
my lack of familiarity with the details of SCIM and the language of RFC 764=
3. But I think that, for the sake of clarity and interoperability, some add=
itional specificity is needed.=C2=A0 <br></div><div><br></div><div>Side not=
e: the &quot;Section 2.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]&quot; references in =
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09=
#section-7.2.1" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://tools.ietf.org=
/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2.1</a> are problmatic=
 (there is no such section in this document) and probably should be to 2.2.=
3.1.=C2=A0 <br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci &lt;=
vittorio.bertocci=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D=
"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Logan,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for the note.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The intent would be to present that information in t=
he same way you would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded in claims; =
hence groups would be a list of values representing =C2=A0what groups the s=
ubject belongs to, rather than a list of full
 group definitions (with all the other members belonging to them, for examp=
le) which would go beyond the intended use of the information (supplying au=
thorization information about the subject).
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=
=80=99t want to duplicate SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the o=
ptions products have to implement this.=C2=A0 If you think this is too vagu=
e, we can try to be more specific.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border-color:rgb(181,196,223) currentcolor currentcolor;borde=
r-style:solid none none;border-width:1pt medium medium;padding:3pt 0in 0in"=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">From: =
</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth-b=
ounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Logan Widick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:log=
an.widick@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">logan.widick@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D=
"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>I took a look at Section <a href=3D"http://2.2.3.1" target=3D"_blank" re=
l=3D"noreferrer">2.2.3.1</a>: Claims for Authorization Outside of Delegatio=
n Scenarios (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access=
-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1</=
a>)
 and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the &quot;roles&quot;,=
 &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; claims will be.
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;roles&quot; claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs=
, or links), an array of the &quot;roles&quot; objects from the SCIM User s=
chema (pages 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;groups&quot; claim be an array of strings (group names, I=
Ds, or links), an array of the &quot;groups&quot; objects from the SCIM Use=
r schema (pages 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (=
pages 69-70 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;entitlements&quot; claim be an array of strings (entitlem=
ent names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;entitlements&quot; objects=
 from the SCIM User schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Sincerely,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Logan Widick<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
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h@ietf.org</a><br>
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oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:26:21 -0300
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR): IPR Confirmation
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I know of no IPR, and make the required contributions again.

On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 4:22 PM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
wrote:

> Hi Mike, Nat, John,
>
> I am updating the shepherd writeup for the "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
> Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)" specification, see
> https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt, and given the
> changes I need your IPR confirmation again. (Mike joined as co-author later
> and hence I need his confirmation anyway.)
>
> One item in the template requires me to indicate whether each document
> author has confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required
> for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already
> been filed.
>
> Could you please confirm?
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
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> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the
> information in any medium. Thank you.
>

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<div dir=3D"auto"><div>I know of no IPR, and make the required contribution=
s again.=C2=A0<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"=
gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 4:22 PM Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com">Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Mike, Nat, John,<br>
<br>
I am updating the shepherd writeup for the &quot;The OAuth 2.0 Authorizatio=
n Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)&quot; specification, s=
ee <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt" rel=
=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/id/draf=
t-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt</a>, and given the changes I need your IPR confi=
rmation again. (Mike joined as co-author later and hence I need his confirm=
ation anyway.)<br>
<br>
One item in the template requires me to indicate whether each document auth=
or has confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for =
full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been=
 filed.<br>
<br>
Could you please confirm?<br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
<br>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.<br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Implementation Status of "JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)"
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Also IdentityServer implements JAR

https://github.com/IdentityServer

=E2=80=94=E2=80=94=E2=80=94
Dominick Baier

On 21. September 2020 at 21:22:17, Hannes Tschofenig (
hannes.tschofenig@arm.com) wrote:

Hi all



Because some procedural issues I have to update the shepherd writeup of the
JAR document and I wanted to verify whether the implementations listed in
https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-wri=
teups/Writeup_OAuth_JAR.txt
(copied below) are still inline with the latest version of
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30 (given the changes
the document has gone through*).



----- List of implementations -----



As part of the OpenID Foundation certification program the following



implementations of OpenID Connect Core indicate support for this



functionality:



* CZ.NIC mojeID,



* Thierry Habart's SimpleIdentitySever v.2.0.0,



* Roland Hedberg's pyoidc 0.7.7,



* Peercraft ApS's Peercarft,



* MIT's MITREidConnect,



* Gluue Server 2.3,



* Filip Skokan's node-oidc pre supports.





Authlete (https://www.authlete.com/), a commerical, closed source



server implementation, has also implemented this specification and



is offering it.





There is an open source implementation from NRI in PHP and Scala.



NRI's Open Source PHP: https://bitbucket.org/PEOFIAMP/phpoidc



-----



Ciao

Hannes



PS: List of changes from the current draft to the one when I wrote my
shepherd writeup:

http://tools.ietf.org//rfcdiff?url1=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-=
oauth-jwsreq-09.txt&url2=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsre=
q-30.txt


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_______________________________________________
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<html><head><style>body{font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13px}</style>=
</head><body><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font-size:13px">Also=
 IdentityServer implements JAR</div><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Ari=
al;font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica,Arial;font=
-size:13px"><a href=3D"https://github.com/IdentityServer">https://github.co=
m/IdentityServer</a></div> <br> <div class=3D"gmail_signature">=E2=80=94=E2=
=80=94=E2=80=94<div>Dominick Baier</div></div> <br><p class=3D"airmail_on">=
On 21. September 2020 at 21:22:17, Hannes Tschofenig (<a href=3D"mailto:han=
nes.tschofenig@arm.com">hannes.tschofenig@arm.com</a>) wrote:</p> <blockquo=
te type=3D"cite" class=3D"clean_bq"><span><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563=
C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div></div><div>






<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi all</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Because some procedural issues I have to update the =
shepherd writeup of the JAR document and I wanted to verify whether the imp=
lementations listed in
<a href=3D"https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/s=
hepherd-writeups/Writeup_OAuth_JAR.txt">
https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/blob/master/shepherd-wri=
teups/Writeup_OAuth_JAR.txt</a> (copied below) are still inline with the la=
test version of
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30">https://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30</a> (given the changes the d=
ocument has gone through*).
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">----- List of implementations -----</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As part of the OpenID Foundation certification progr=
am the following
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">implementations of OpenID Connect Core indicate supp=
ort for this
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">functionality: </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* CZ.NIC mojeID, </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Thierry Habart&#39;s SimpleIdentitySever v.2.0.0, =
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Roland Hedberg&#39;s pyoidc 0.7.7, </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Peercraft ApS&#39;s Peercarft, </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* MIT&#39;s MITREidConnect, </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Gluue Server 2.3, </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">* Filip Skokan&#39;s node-oidc pre supports. </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Authlete (<a href=3D"https://www.authlete.com/">http=
s://www.authlete.com/</a>), a commerical, closed source
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">server implementation, has also implemented this spe=
cification and
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">is offering it. </p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">There is an open source implementation from NRI in P=
HP and Scala.
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"display:none">=C2=A0</span></p>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">NRI&#39;s Open Source PHP: <a href=3D"https://bitbuc=
ket.org/PEOFIAMP/phpoidc">https://bitbucket.org/PEOFIAMP/phpoidc</a>
</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style=3D"padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">----- </p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ciao</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hannes</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">PS: List of changes from the current draft to the on=
e when I wrote my shepherd writeup:
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org//rfcdiff?url1=3Dhtt=
ps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-09.txt&amp;url2=3Dhttps://to=
ols.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt">http://tools.ietf.org//rfcd=
iff?url1=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-09.txt&amp;url=
2=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30.txt</a></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.


_______________________________________________
<br>OAuth mailing list
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<br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.iet=
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From: Deepak Tiwari <deepak.tiwari@intigate.in>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 11:59:55 +0530
Message-ID: <CADCNZN8QYvGk5zuGDVO+ugyz5d20OhaCFuCcRQi5VEN3OTaP4A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Logan Widick <logan.widick@gmail.com>
Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>,  Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
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Please remove my email from the conversation

On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 7:39 AM Logan Widick <logan.widick@gmail.com> wrote=
:

> If I understand "The intent would be to present that information in the
> same way you would when querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims" correct=
ly,
> the "roles", "groups", and "entitlements" claims are the same types as th=
e
> "roles", "groups", and "entitlements" attributes of the User resource
> schema (pages 24-25 of RFC 7643 for the text; pages 63-67 of RFC 7643 for
> the schema)? In the schema the attributes are all "complex" (object) type
> and "multivalued" (array of), although the text for some of these
> attributes has some "No vocabulary or syntax..." remarks.
>
> If that understanding is correct, it might be a good idea to replace the
> references to "RFC 7643", "Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643", and "RFC 7643,
> Section 4.1.2" with something more specific like "the ____ attribute(s) o=
f
> the User resource schema from Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643".
>
> On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 15:33 Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
>
>> At some point I'm going to be among the lucky few who will be asked to
>> review the JWT claims registration request. One of the criteria to consi=
der
>> is "whether the registration description is clear" and Logan's questions
>> suggest that perhaps the descriptions of these claims are not sufficient=
ly
>> clear. My assumption was that the claim value for "roles", "groups" and
>> "entitlements" was going to be an array of strings. Trying to validate m=
y
>> assumption, I went looking at the text in
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section=
-2.2.3.1
>> and
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section=
-7.2
>> and followed the reference to
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2 and, honestly, it
>> wasn't particularly clear to me. Maybe it's my lack of familiarity with =
the
>> details of SCIM and the language of RFC 7643. But I think that, for the
>> sake of clarity and interoperability, some additional specificity is
>> needed.
>>
>> Side note: the "Section 2.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]" references in
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section=
-7.2.1
>> are problmatic (there is no such section in this document) and probably
>> should be to 2.2.3.1.
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=3D
>> 40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Logan,
>>>
>>> Thanks for the note.
>>>
>>> The intent would be to present that information in the same way you
>>> would when querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims; hence groups would=
 be
>>> a list of values representing  what groups the subject belongs to, rath=
er
>>> than a list of full group definitions (with all the other members belon=
ging
>>> to them, for example) which would go beyond the intended use of the
>>> information (supplying authorization information about the subject).
>>>
>>> I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=80=99t want to dup=
licate
>>> SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the options products have t=
o
>>> implement this.  If you think this is too vague, we can try to be more
>>> specific.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From: *OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Logan Widick <
>>> logan.widick@gmail.com>
>>> *Date: *Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21
>>> *To: *"oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
>>> *Subject: *[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I took a look at Section 2.2.3.1: Claims for Authorization Outside of
>>> Delegation Scenarios (
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#sectio=
n-2.2.3.1)
>>> and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the "roles", "group=
s",
>>> and "entitlements" claims will be.
>>>
>>> Will the "roles" claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs, or
>>> links), an array of the "roles" objects from the SCIM User schema (page=
s
>>> 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?
>>>
>>> Will the "groups" claim be an array of strings (group names, IDs, or
>>> links), an array of the "groups" objects from the SCIM User schema (pag=
es
>>> 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (pages 69-70 =
of
>>> RFC 7643), or something else?
>>>
>>> Will the "entitlements" claim be an array of strings (entitlement names=
,
>>> IDs, or links), an array of the "entitlements" objects from the SCIM Us=
er
>>> schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
>>>
>>> Sincerely,
>>>
>>> Logan Widick
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
>> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited=
.
>> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the send=
er
>> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fr=
om
>> your computer. Thank you.*
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>


--=20

Regards,

*Deepak Tiwari|* Software Engineer
Intigate Technologies Pvt. Ltd. | www.intigate.co.in
Ist Floor, A-119
Sector-63
Noida (U.P.) 201301

--000000000000e52e6605afe107c7
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Please remove my email from the conversation</div><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 22=
, 2020 at 7:39 AM Logan Widick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:logan.widick@gmail.com=
">logan.widick@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div>If I understand &quot;<span =
style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">The intent would be to present that inform=
ation in the same way you would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded i=
n claims&quot;=C2=A0</span>correctly, the &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&q=
uot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; claims are the same types as the &quot;r=
oles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; attributes of =
the User resource schema (pages 24-25 of RFC 7643 for the text; pages 63-67=
 of RFC 7643 for the schema)? In the schema the attributes are all &quot;co=
mplex&quot; (object) type and &quot;multivalued&quot; (array of), although =
the text for some of these attributes has some &quot;No vocabulary or synta=
x...&quot; remarks.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">If t=
hat understanding is correct, it might be a good idea to replace the refere=
nces to &quot;RFC 7643&quot;, &quot;Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643&quot;, and &q=
uot;RFC 7643, Section 4.1.2&quot; with something more specific like &quot;t=
he ____ attribute(s) of the User resource schema from Section 4.1.2 of RFC =
7643&quot;.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote" dir=3D"au=
to"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 15:33 Brian=
 Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>At some point I&#39;m go=
ing to be among the lucky few who will be asked to review the JWT claims re=
gistration request. One of the criteria to consider is &quot;whether the re=
gistration description is clear&quot; and Logan&#39;s questions suggest tha=
t perhaps the descriptions of these claims are not sufficiently clear. My a=
ssumption was that the claim value for &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot=
; and &quot;entitlements&quot; was going to be an array of strings. Trying =
to validate my assumption, I went looking at the text in <a href=3D"https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-2.2.3.1" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf=
-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-2.2.3.1</a> and <a href=3D"https://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2" rel=3D"nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-acc=
ess-token-jwt-09#section-7.2</a> and followed the reference to <a href=3D"h=
ttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2</a> and, hone=
stly, it wasn&#39;t particularly clear to me. Maybe it&#39;s my lack of fam=
iliarity with the details of SCIM and the language of RFC 7643. But I think=
 that, for the sake of clarity and interoperability, some additional specif=
icity is needed.=C2=A0 <br></div><div><br></div><div>Side note: the &quot;S=
ection 2.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]&quot; references in <a href=3D"htt=
ps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2.1=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ie=
tf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2.1</a> are problmatic (there is no =
such section in this document) and probably should be to 2.2.3.1.=C2=A0 <br=
></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail=
_attr">On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci &lt;vittorio.berto=
cci=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Logan,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for the note.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The intent would be to present that information in t=
he same way you would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded in claims; =
hence groups would be a list of values representing =C2=A0what groups the s=
ubject belongs to, rather than a list of full
 group definitions (with all the other members belonging to them, for examp=
le) which would go beyond the intended use of the information (supplying au=
thorization information about the subject).
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=
=80=99t want to duplicate SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the o=
ptions products have to implement this.=C2=A0 If you think this is too vagu=
e, we can try to be more specific.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border-color:rgb(181,196,223) currentcolor currentcolor;borde=
r-style:solid none none;border-width:1pt medium medium;padding:3pt 0in 0in"=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">From: =
</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-b=
ounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Logan Widick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:log=
an.widick@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">logan.widick@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>I took a look at Section <a href=3D"http://2.2.3.1" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">2.2.3.1</a>: Claims for Authorization Outside of Delegatio=
n Scenarios (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access=
-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1</=
a>)
 and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the &quot;roles&quot;,=
 &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; claims will be.
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;roles&quot; claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs=
, or links), an array of the &quot;roles&quot; objects from the SCIM User s=
chema (pages 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;groups&quot; claim be an array of strings (group names, I=
Ds, or links), an array of the &quot;groups&quot; objects from the SCIM Use=
r schema (pages 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (=
pages 69-70 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;entitlements&quot; claim be an array of strings (entitlem=
ent names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;entitlements&quot; objects=
 from the SCIM User schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Sincerely,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Logan Widick<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
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oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
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_______________________________________________<br>
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target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><p style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136);font-size:12.8px"><span sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125);font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:10pt">R=
egards,</span><br></p><p style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136);font-size:12.8px">=
<span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif=
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ize:12.8px"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif=
;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Deepak Tiwari|</span></b><span style=3D"color:rgb(31=
,73,125)">=C2=A0Software Engineer<br></span><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;f=
ont-family:Verdana,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Intigate Technologies P=
vt. Ltd. |=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,32,96)"><a href=3D"http:/=
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blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blo" style=3D"color:rgb(17,85,204)" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"font-s=
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From: Guilherme Kun <guilhermek@sgsistemas.com.br>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 09:22:18 -0300
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To: Deepak Tiwari <deepak.tiwari@intigate.in>
Cc: Logan Widick <logan.widick@gmail.com>,  Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
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Please remove my email from the conversation

Em ter., 22 de set. de 2020 =C3=A0s 03:25, Deepak Tiwari <
deepak.tiwari@intigate.in> escreveu:

> Please remove my email from the conversation
>
> On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 7:39 AM Logan Widick <logan.widick@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> If I understand "The intent would be to present that information in the
>> same way you would when querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims" correc=
tly,
>> the "roles", "groups", and "entitlements" claims are the same types as t=
he
>> "roles", "groups", and "entitlements" attributes of the User resource
>> schema (pages 24-25 of RFC 7643 for the text; pages 63-67 of RFC 7643 fo=
r
>> the schema)? In the schema the attributes are all "complex" (object) typ=
e
>> and "multivalued" (array of), although the text for some of these
>> attributes has some "No vocabulary or syntax..." remarks.
>>
>> If that understanding is correct, it might be a good idea to replace the
>> references to "RFC 7643", "Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643", and "RFC 7643,
>> Section 4.1.2" with something more specific like "the ____ attribute(s) =
of
>> the User resource schema from Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643".
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 15:33 Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> At some point I'm going to be among the lucky few who will be asked to
>>> review the JWT claims registration request. One of the criteria to cons=
ider
>>> is "whether the registration description is clear" and Logan's question=
s
>>> suggest that perhaps the descriptions of these claims are not sufficien=
tly
>>> clear. My assumption was that the claim value for "roles", "groups" and
>>> "entitlements" was going to be an array of strings. Trying to validate =
my
>>> assumption, I went looking at the text in
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#sectio=
n-2.2.3.1
>>> and
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#sectio=
n-7.2
>>> and followed the reference to
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2 and, honestly, it
>>> wasn't particularly clear to me. Maybe it's my lack of familiarity with=
 the
>>> details of SCIM and the language of RFC 7643. But I think that, for the
>>> sake of clarity and interoperability, some additional specificity is
>>> needed.
>>>
>>> Side note: the "Section 2.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]" references i=
n
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#sectio=
n-7.2.1
>>> are problmatic (there is no such section in this document) and probably
>>> should be to 2.2.3.1.
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=3D
>>> 40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Logan,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for the note.
>>>>
>>>> The intent would be to present that information in the same way you
>>>> would when querying a users/<id>, encoded in claims; hence groups woul=
d be
>>>> a list of values representing  what groups the subject belongs to, rat=
her
>>>> than a list of full group definitions (with all the other members belo=
nging
>>>> to them, for example) which would go beyond the intended use of the
>>>> information (supplying authorization information about the subject).
>>>>
>>>> I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=80=99t want to du=
plicate
>>>> SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the options products have =
to
>>>> implement this.  If you think this is too vague, we can try to be more
>>>> specific.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From: *OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Logan Widick <
>>>> logan.widick@gmail.com>
>>>> *Date: *Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21
>>>> *To: *"oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>> *Subject: *[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I took a look at Section 2.2.3.1: Claims for Authorization Outside of
>>>> Delegation Scenarios (
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#secti=
on-2.2.3.1)
>>>> and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the "roles", "grou=
ps",
>>>> and "entitlements" claims will be.
>>>>
>>>> Will the "roles" claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs, or
>>>> links), an array of the "roles" objects from the SCIM User schema (pag=
es
>>>> 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?
>>>>
>>>> Will the "groups" claim be an array of strings (group names, IDs, or
>>>> links), an array of the "groups" objects from the SCIM User schema (pa=
ges
>>>> 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (pages 69-70=
 of
>>>> RFC 7643), or something else?
>>>>
>>>> Will the "entitlements" claim be an array of strings (entitlement
>>>> names, IDs, or links), an array of the "entitlements" objects from the=
 SCIM
>>>> User schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
>>>>
>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>
>>>> Logan Widick
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>
>>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
>>> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibite=
d.
>>> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sen=
der
>>> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments f=
rom
>>> your computer. Thank you.*
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>
> --
>
> Regards,
>
> *Deepak Tiwari|* Software Engineer
> Intigate Technologies Pvt. Ltd. | www.intigate.co.in
> Ist Floor, A-119
> Sector-63
> Noida (U.P.) 201301
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>


--=20
Att.
Guilherme Ap. Sona Kun - Desenvolvimento

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Please remove my email from the conversation<br></div><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">Em ter., 2=
2 de set. de 2020 =C3=A0s 03:25, Deepak Tiwari &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:deepak=
.tiwari@intigate.in">deepak.tiwari@intigate.in</a>&gt; escreveu:<br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Please re=
move my email from the conversation</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 7:39 AM Logan Wi=
dick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:logan.widick@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">logan.=
widick@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div>If I understand &quot;<span style=3D=
"font-family:sans-serif">The intent would be to present that information in=
 the same way you would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded in claims=
&quot;=C2=A0</span>correctly, the &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot;, an=
d &quot;entitlements&quot; claims are the same types as the &quot;roles&quo=
t;, &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; attributes of the User=
 resource schema (pages 24-25 of RFC 7643 for the text; pages 63-67 of RFC =
7643 for the schema)? In the schema the attributes are all &quot;complex&qu=
ot; (object) type and &quot;multivalued&quot; (array of), although the text=
 for some of these attributes has some &quot;No vocabulary or syntax...&quo=
t; remarks.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">If that unde=
rstanding is correct, it might be a good idea to replace the references to =
&quot;RFC 7643&quot;, &quot;Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643&quot;, and &quot;RFC =
7643, Section 4.1.2&quot; with something more specific like &quot;the ____ =
attribute(s) of the User resource schema from Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7643&quo=
t;.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 15:33 Brian Campbel=
l &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcamp=
bell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>At some point I&#39;m going to b=
e among the lucky few who will be asked to review the JWT claims registrati=
on request. One of the criteria to consider is &quot;whether the registrati=
on description is clear&quot; and Logan&#39;s questions suggest that perhap=
s the descriptions of these claims are not sufficiently clear. My assumptio=
n was that the claim value for &quot;roles&quot;, &quot;groups&quot; and &q=
uot;entitlements&quot; was going to be an array of strings. Trying to valid=
ate my assumption, I went looking at the text in <a href=3D"https://tools.i=
etf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-2.2.3.1" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-a=
ccess-token-jwt-09#section-2.2.3.1</a> and <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.or=
g/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-toke=
n-jwt-09#section-7.2</a> and followed the reference to <a href=3D"https://t=
ools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-4.1.2</a> and, honestly, it=
 wasn&#39;t particularly clear to me. Maybe it&#39;s my lack of familiarity=
 with the details of SCIM and the language of RFC 7643. But I think that, f=
or the sake of clarity and interoperability, some additional specificity is=
 needed.=C2=A0 <br></div><div><br></div><div>Side note: the &quot;Section 2=
.2.2.1 of [[this specification]]&quot; references in <a href=3D"https://too=
ls.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2.1" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth=
-access-token-jwt-09#section-7.2.1</a> are problmatic (there is no such sec=
tion in this document) and probably should be to 2.2.3.1.=C2=A0 <br></div><=
/div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">O=
n Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:28 PM Vittorio Bertocci &lt;vittorio.bertocci=3D<a=
 href=3D"mailto:40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_b=
lank">40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Logan,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for the note.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The intent would be to present that information in t=
he same way you would when querying a users/&lt;id&gt;, encoded in claims; =
hence groups would be a list of values representing =C2=A0what groups the s=
ubject belongs to, rather than a list of full
 group definitions (with all the other members belonging to them, for examp=
le) which would go beyond the intended use of the information (supplying au=
thorization information about the subject).
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I tried to keep the language high level as I didn=E2=
=80=99t want to duplicate SCIM guidance, or inadvertently narrow down the o=
ptions products have to implement this.=C2=A0 If you think this is too vagu=
e, we can try to be more specific.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border-color:rgb(181,196,223) currentcolor currentcolor;borde=
r-style:solid none none;border-width:1pt medium medium;padding:3pt 0in 0in"=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">From: =
</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-b=
ounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Logan Widick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:log=
an.widick@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">logan.widick@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, September 16, 2020 at 14:21<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08 question<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>I took a look at Section <a href=3D"http://2.2.3.1" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">2.2.3.1</a>: Claims for Authorization Outside of Delegatio=
n Scenarios (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access=
-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-08#section-2.2.3.1</=
a>)
 and I do not understand what exactly the formats of the &quot;roles&quot;,=
 &quot;groups&quot;, and &quot;entitlements&quot; claims will be.
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;roles&quot; claim be an array of strings (role names, IDs=
, or links), an array of the &quot;roles&quot; objects from the SCIM User s=
chema (pages 66-67 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;groups&quot; claim be an array of strings (group names, I=
Ds, or links), an array of the &quot;groups&quot; objects from the SCIM Use=
r schema (pages 63-64 of RFC 7643), an array of SCIM Group schema objects (=
pages 69-70 of RFC 7643), or something else?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Will the &quot;entitlements&quot; claim be an array of strings (entitlem=
ent names, IDs, or links), an array of the &quot;entitlements&quot; objects=
 from the SCIM User schema (pages 65-66 of RFC 7643), or something else?
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Sincerely,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Logan Widick<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

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><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
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seline;background:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system-=
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_______________________________________________<br>
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target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><p style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(136,136,136);font-size:12.8px"><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)=
;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:10pt">Regards,</span><br></p><p s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136);font-size:12.8px"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
2pt;font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></s=
pan></p><p style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136);font-size:12.8px"><b><span style=
=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Dee=
pak Tiwari|</span></b><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)">=C2=A0Software E=
ngineer<br></span><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-se=
rif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Intigate Technologies Pvt. Ltd. |=C2=A0</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(0,32,96)"><a href=3D"http://www.intigate.co.in/" titl=
e=3D"blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blocked::http://www.intigate.co.in/
http://www.intigate.co.in/
blo" style=3D"color:rgb(17,85,204)" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,32,96)">www.intigate.co=
.in</span></a></span><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,sans=
-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><br>Ist Floor, A-119<br>Sector-63<br>Noida (U.=
P.) 201301</span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div>
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</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Att.=
<div>Guilherme Ap. Sona Kun - Desenvolvimento<img src=3D"https://docs.googl=
e.com/uc?export=3Ddownload&amp;id=3D0B3VZ2IRecpzdcTdfUWtlOUZEOG8&amp;revid=
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h=3D"835"></div></div></div></div></div></div>

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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
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Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Updated shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Updated shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09
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Thanks to both! I agree this can use more clarity.
I am modifying the figure as in the following, adopting a style closer to 6=
.1 of 7519 and providing a more descriptive caption.

Header:

   {"typ":"at+JWT","alg":"RS256","kid":"RjEwOwOA"}

Claims:

   {
     "iss": "https://authorization-server.example.com/",
     "sub": " 5ba552d67",
     "aud":   "https://rs.example.com/",
     "exp": 1544645174,
     "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3_",
     "scope": "openid profile reademail"
   }


                       Figure 2: The Header and JWT Claims Set of a JWT Acc=
ess Token



From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Brian Campbell <bcampbell=
=3D40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Date: Monday, September 21, 2020 at 08:36
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Cc: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Updated shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-acces=
s-token-jwt-09

I believe the intent of that example was to show the unencoded header and b=
ody content of the JWT. So perhaps all that's needed is to adjust the text =
that introduces the example and the figure title or caption or whatever it'=
s called to reflect that?

On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 4:58 AM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.co=
m<mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>> wrote:
Hi all,

I updated the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-09 and=
 included the links to the implementations distributed on the list. I am su=
re there are more.

While updating the shepherd writeup I noticed that the draft contains a JWT=
 in a style that does not match the format described in RFC 7519.

I was wondering whether we should actually replicate the example in a way s=
imilar to Section 6.1 of RFC 7519 (which shows an unsecured JWT) or, even b=
etter, a digitally signed JWT.

Here is the snippet from the draft:

   {"typ":"at+JWT","alg":"RS256","kid":"RjEwOwOA"}
   {
     "iss": "https://authorization-server.example.com/",
     "sub": " 5ba552d67",
     "aud":   "https://rs.example.com/",
     "exp": 1544645174,
     "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3_",
     "scope": "openid profile reademail"
   }


                       Figure 2: A JWT Access Token

What do you think?

Ciao
Hannes

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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks to both! I agree this can use more clarity.<o=
:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I am modifying the figure as in the following, adopt=
ing a style closer to 6.1 of 7519 and providing a more descriptive caption.=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:black">Header:<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&=
nbsp;</span></span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;typ&quot;:&quot;at+JWT&quot;,&quot;alg&quot;:&quo=
t;RS256&quot;,&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;RjEwOwOA&quot;}</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">Claims:<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><spa=
n style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp; {</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;iss&quot;: &quot;<a href=3D"https://au=
thorization-server.example.com/" title=3D"https://authorization-server.exam=
ple.com/">https://authorization-server.example.com/</a>&quot;,</span><span =
style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;sub&quot;: &quot; 5ba552d67&quot;,</sp=
an><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;aud&quot;:&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;<a href=
=3D"https://rs.example.com/" title=3D"https://rs.example.com/">https://rs.e=
xample.com/</a>&quot;,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;exp&quot;: 1544645174,</span><span sty=
le=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;client_id&quot;: &quot;s6BhdRkqt3_&quo=
t;,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;scope&quot;: &quot;openid profile read=
email&quot;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-variant-caps=
: normal;orphans: auto;text-align:start;widows: auto;-webkit-text-size-adju=
st: auto;-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;word-spacing:0px">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:b=
lack">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Figure 2: T=
he Header and JWT Claims Set of a JWT Access Token</span><span style=3D"col=
or:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">From=
: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">OAuth &lt;oauth-b=
ounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D40pingident=
ity.com@dmarc.ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Monday, September 21, 2020 at 08:36<br>
<b>To: </b>Hannes Tschofenig &lt;Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc: </b>&quot;oauth@ietf.org&quot; &lt;oauth@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [OAUTH-WG] Updated shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oaut=
h-access-token-jwt-09<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I believe the intent of that example was to show the=
 unencoded header and body content of the JWT. So perhaps all that's needed=
 is to adjust the text that introduces the example and the figure title or =
caption or whatever it's called to
 reflect that? <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 4:58 AM Hannes Tschofenig &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com" target=3D"_blank">Hannes.Tsc=
hofenig@arm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Hi all,
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">I updated the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-j=
wt-09 and included the links to the implementations distributed on the list=
. I am sure there are more.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">While updating the shepherd writeup I noticed that the draft conta=
ins a JWT in a style that does not match the format described in RFC 7519.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">I was wondering whether we should actually replicate the example i=
n a way similar to Section 6.1 of RFC 7519 (which shows an unsecured JWT) o=
r, even better, a digitally signed JWT.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Here is the snippet from the draft:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp; {&quot;typ&quot;:&quot;at+JWT&quot;,&quot;alg&quot;:&quot;R=
S256&quot;,&quot;kid&quot;:&quot;RjEwOwOA&quot;}</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp; {</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;iss&quot;: &quot;<a href=3D"https://autho=
rization-server.example.com/" target=3D"_blank">https://authorization-serve=
r.example.com/</a>&quot;,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;sub&quot;: &quot; 5ba552d67&quot;,</span>=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;aud&quot;:&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;<a href=3D"h=
ttps://rs.example.com/" target=3D"_blank">https://rs.example.com/</a>&quot;=
,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;exp&quot;: 1544645174,</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;client_id&quot;: &quot;s6BhdRkqt3_&quot;,=
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;scope&quot;: &quot;openid profile readema=
il&quot;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Figure 2: A JW=
T Access Token</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">What do you think?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Ciao<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Hannes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any=
 attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not th=
e intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not discl=
ose the contents to any other person,
 use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Th=
ank you.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<b><i><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;color:#555555;border:none windowtext =
1.0pt;padding:0in">CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confident=
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Any review, use, distribution or disclosure
 by others is strictly prohibited.&nbsp; If you have received this communic=
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From nobody Wed Sep 23 00:27:32 2020
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens
        Author          : Vittorio Bertocci
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2020-09-23

Abstract:
   This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access
   tokens in JSON web token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to
   issue and consume access tokens in interoperable manner.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
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From: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New podcast on identity specifications
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Hello Brian and Vittorio,

I have two observations:

  * draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 which is the last version expired on 5
    September 2020,
  * the podcast as well as draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 omit to mention the
    client/user collaborative attack against which
    draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 is ineffective.


Denis

PS. The podcast is a nice effort but is far too long (29:37).
>
> The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two specs are alike, 
> how they differ and which particular type of app they are meant to serve.
>
> I'm saying this as a person who is generally allergic to technical 
> podcasts :)
>
> Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a podcast link 
> at the top, where the authors discuss it in simple, honest and 
> non-speccy terms, because that's often how people are best able to 
> perceive the spirit and subtleties of some technical or spec work.
>
> Vladimir
>
> On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio Bertocci wrote:
>>
>> Dear all,
>>
>> This is an informal mail to inform you that there’s a new podcast 
>> <http://identityunlocked.com/>, identityunlocked.com 
>> <http://identityunlocked.com/>, dedicated to inform and explain new 
>> identity specs developments for developers.
>>
>> You can find a more detailed explanation of the podcast’s goals in 
>> https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/, 
>> but the TL;DR is that the spec themselves aren’t all that easy to 
>> read for the non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during 
>> the discussions leading to the spec but rarely surface in a usable 
>> form to the people who don’t participate in discussions.
>>
>> The first episode 
>> <https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/>, 
>> featuring Brian Campbell discussing MTLS & DPoP, should give you an 
>> idea of what season 1 of the show will look like.
>>
>> The full list of the first run is available here 
>> <https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-podcast-for-developers/>. 
>> Of 6 episodes, 3 of them are about specifications coming out of this 
>> WG- and all guests are actively involved in the IETF.
>>
>> My main goals sharing this info here are
>>
>>   * *Letting you know that the podcast exists*, so that you can make
>>     use of it if you so choose (e.g. referring people to it if they
>>     need to better understand something covered in an episode)
>>   * *Soliciting proposals for new episodes*: topics you believe are
>>     currently underserved, topics you are often asked about, topics
>>     you would like to be interviewed about on the show
>>   * *Growing the show’s subscriber base*. I was able to get backing
>>     from my company to produce a podcast that has exactly ZERO
>>     product pitches and is purely about identity specs promotion, on
>>     the gamble that the topic does have an audience finding it
>>     useful. So far the reception has been great, and we need to keep
>>     it up if we want to have a season 2.
>>
>> I hope you’ll find the initiative useful!
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> V.
>>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">
      <p>Hello Brian and Vittorio,</p>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">I have two observations:</div>
      <ul>
        <li>draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 which is the last version expired
          on 5 September 2020,</li>
        <li>the podcast as well as draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 omit to
          mention the client/user collaborative attack against which
          draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 is ineffective.</li>
      </ul>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
        Denis</div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
      </div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">PS. The podcast is a nice effort but
        is far too long (29:37).</div>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:8dbb18c5-803e-b5a9-02b0-1152bd6ec7ed@connect2id.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <p>The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two specs are
        alike, how they differ and which particular type of app they are
        meant to serve.<br>
      </p>
      <p>I'm saying this as a person who is generally allergic to
        technical podcasts :)</p>
      <p>Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a podcast
        link at the top, where the authors discuss it in simple, honest
        and non-speccy terms, because that's often how people are best
        able to perceive the spirit and subtleties of some technical or
        spec work.<br>
      </p>
      <p>Vladimir<br>
      </p>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio
        Bertocci wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type="cite"
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        <div class="WordSection1">
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">Dear all,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">This is an
              informal mail to inform you that there’s a new <a
                href="http://identityunlocked.com/"
                moz-do-not-send="true">podcast</a>, <a
                href="http://identityunlocked.com/"
                moz-do-not-send="true"> identityunlocked.com</a>,
              dedicated to inform and explain new identity specs
              developments for developers.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">You can
              find a more detailed explanation of the podcast’s goals in
            </span><a
href="https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/"
              moz-do-not-send="true">https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/</a><span
              style="font-size:11.0pt">, but the TL;DR is that the spec
              themselves aren’t all that easy to read for the
              non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during the
              discussions leading to the spec but rarely surface in a
              usable form to the people who don’t participate in
              discussions.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">The <a
                href="https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/"
                moz-do-not-send="true"> first episode</a>, featuring
              Brian Campbell discussing MTLS &amp; DPoP, should give you
              an idea of what season 1 of the show will look like.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">The full
              list of the first run is available <a
href="https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-podcast-for-developers/"
                moz-do-not-send="true"> here</a>. Of 6 episodes, 3 of
              them are about specifications coming out of this WG- and
              all guests are actively involved in the IETF.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">My main
              goals sharing this info here are<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc">
            <li class="MsoListParagraph"
              style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span
                  style="font-size:11.0pt">Letting you know that the
                  podcast exists</span></b><span
                style="font-size:11.0pt">, so that you can make use of
                it if you so choose (e.g. referring people to it if they
                need to better understand something covered in an
                episode)<o:p></o:p></span></li>
            <li class="MsoListParagraph"
              style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span
                  style="font-size:11.0pt">Soliciting proposals for new
                  episodes</span></b><span style="font-size:11.0pt">:
                topics you believe are currently underserved, topics you
                are often asked about, topics you would like to be
                interviewed about on the show<o:p></o:p></span></li>
            <li class="MsoListParagraph"
              style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><b><span
                  style="font-size:11.0pt">Growing the show’s subscriber
                  base</span></b><span style="font-size:11.0pt">. I was
                able to get backing from my company to produce a podcast
                that has exactly ZERO product pitches and is purely
                about identity specs promotion, on the gamble that the
                topic does have an audience finding it useful. So far
                the reception has been great, and we need to keep it up
                if we want to have a season 2.  <o:p></o:p></span></li>
          </ul>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">I hope
              you’ll find the initiative useful!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">V.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
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Hello Vittorio,

I have three comments numbered 1, 2 and 3.

*Comment 1:**
*

Section 3 states:

    3.  Requesting a JWT Access Token

        An authorization server can issue a JWT access token in response
    to any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and subsequent
        extensions meant to result in an access token.

        If the request includes a "resource" parameter (as defined in
    [RFC8707]), the resulting JWT access token "aud" claim SHOULD have
        the same value as the "resource" parameter in the request.

I had a discussion I had on the mailing list with Hannes on September 10:

    [Denis] I believe, it would be worthwhile to add a sentence, just
    after this sentence, with the following text:

      When an authorization server decides to issue a JWT access token
    compliant to this profile, then the following requirements apply.
        (...)

    [Hannes] That’s fine for me because this is what the intended effect
    of the spec is.

This portion of text from section 3 should be changed into:

    3.  Requesting a JWT Access Token

        An authorization server can issue a JWT access token in response
    to    any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and subsequent
        extensions meant to result in an access token.

    *When an authorization server decides to issue a JWT access token
    compliant to this profile, then the following requirements apply. *

        If the request includes a "resource" parameter (as defined in
    [RFC8707]), the resulting JWT access token "aud" claim SHOULD have
        the same value as the "resource" parameter in the request.

*Comment 2:**
*

Section 6 states:

6.  Privacy Considerations

        As JWT access tokens carry information by value, it now becomes
    possible for clients and potentially even end users to directly peek
        inside the token claims collection.

        The client *MUST NOT* inspect the content of the access token:
    the authorization server and the resource server might decide to change
        token format at any time (for example by switching from this
    profile to opaque tokens) hence any logic in the client relying on the
        ability to read the access token content would break without
    recourse.

RFC 2119 defines the meaning of MUST NOT or SHOULD NOT:

    2. *MUST NOT*   This phrase, or the phrase "SHALL NOT", mean that
    the definition is an absolute prohibition of the specification.

    (...)

    4. *SHOULD NOT*   This phrase, or the phrase "NOT RECOMMENDED" mean
    that  there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the
        particular behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the full 
    implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed 
    before implementing
        any behavior described with this label.

The first sentence of section 6 recognizes that it is technically 
possible for clients and potentially even end users to directly peek 
inside the token claims collection.
There may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the 
particular behavior is acceptable or even useful, but there is no 
assurance that this can be done
since the authorization server and the resource server might decide to 
change the token format at any time.

The sentence :

    The client *MUST NOT* inspect the content of the access token:

should be changed into:

    The client *SHOULD **NOT* inspect the content of the access token:

*Comment 3:**
*

Section 6 also state:

   This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT 
access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on that
    information for correlating incoming requests with data stored 
locally for the authenticated principal.  Although the ability to
    correlate requests might be required by design in many scenarios, 
there are scenarios where the authorization server might want to
    prevent correlation.  The "sub" claim should be populated by the 
authorization servers according to a privacy impact assessment.  For
    instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking principal 
activities across multiple resource servers, the authorization server
    should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for different resource 
servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be correlated in the
    event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly, if a solution 
requires preventing a resource server from correlating the
    principal’s activity within the resource itself, the authorization 
server should assign different "sub" values for every JWT access
    token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT access 
token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that the
    resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at every 
call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.

As already mentioned on this mailing list, the above sentences would 
modify the semantics of the "sub" claim.

      While reading RFC 7519, no reader may be able to figure out that 
there are more than two flavours of the "sub" claim.
      This draft would be introducing two new other favours of the 
semantics of the "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519.
      When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot be changed 
... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519  which would be
      a clean way to proceed.

RFC 7519 defines the sub claim in the following way:

    4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim

        The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
    subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally statements
        about the subject. *The subject value MUST either be scoped to
    be locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally unique.*
        The processing of this claim is generally application specific. 
    The "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
        value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.

Change into:

    This profile mandates the presence of the "sub" claim in every JWT 
access token, making it possible for resource servers to rely on
    that information for correlating incoming requests with data stored  
locally for the authenticated principal. The "sub" claim is scoped
    to be either locally unique in the context of the issuer or be 
globally unique (see section 4.1.2 from RFC 7519).

    When the "sub" claim is scoped to be locally unique in the context 
of the issuer,  in the event of resource servers collusion, it can be 
used to correlate principals.

   When the "sub" claim is scoped to be globally unique, in the event of 
resource servers collusion, it can be used to correlate principals not 
only between resource servers
   but it can also be used to correlate principals between resource 
servers and other servers that do not implement this protocol but are 
using the same globally unique identifiers.

Denis

> Thanks Brian, Logan.
>
> On clarity. I tweaked that section and produced a new draft (-10).
> Details:
>
>   * Formally, the fact that we are referring to the User entity should
>     be unambiguous. 4.1.2 is a subsection of 4.1, which is titled
>     "User Resource Schema”.
>     However as a frequent critic of the excessive cyclomatic
>     complexity of the specs, I am making myself guilty of precisely
>     the same sin 😊 your suggestion can save the reader the need to
>     follow and parse the reference to understand the situation, hence
>     it’s a good improvement to clarity.
>   * For what concerns the actual format of the claims. The groups
>     entity actually appears as non-normative example in
>     https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-8.2; I can make an
>     explicit reference to that and make things a bit more discoverable.
>   * For roles and entitlements, things are murkier.
>     Before embarking in this endeavor I too had the expectation that
>     this would be a flat list of strings, but digging a bit in
>     existing implementations it turns out that’s not necessarily the
>     case. For example, Slack SCIM represents individual roles as two
>     possible forms { “value”:<name>, “primary”; <bool>}|  {
>     “value”:<name>}, whereas databricks uses{ “value”:<name>}; WSO2
>     uses{ “value”:<name>, “type”; <enum>}.
>     So for those two I don’t think we can do better than the current
>     statement about SCIM not supplying a vocabulary for them.
>   * I had some issues w the references where the section links were
>     turned into local links, as it happened in the past. That should
>     be fixed too.
>   * I applied the “” notation to the attributes, given that we are
>     turning them into claims it seems clearer to sue the same
>     typographic concention.
>
>   * side note… <nonexistent section reference>
>
> Excellent point, fixed.
>

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<html>
  <head>

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hello Vittorio,</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">I have three comments numbered 1, 2 and
      3.</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><b>Comment 1:</b><b><br>
      </b></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Section 3 states:</div>
    <blockquote>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">3.  Requesting a JWT Access Token<br>
        <br>
           An authorization server can issue a JWT access token in
        response to any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and
        subsequent<br>
           extensions meant to result in an access token.</div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
      </div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">   If the request includes a
        "resource" parameter (as defined in [RFC8707]), the resulting
        JWT access token "aud" claim SHOULD have<br>
           the same value as the "resource" parameter in the request.<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">I had a discussion I had on the mailing
      list with Hannes on September 10:</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">
      <blockquote>[Denis] I believe, it would be worthwhile to add a
        sentence, just after this sentence, with the following text:<br>
        <br>
         When an authorization server decides to issue a JWT access
        token compliant to this profile, then the following requirements
        apply.<br>
           (...)<br>
        <br>
        [Hannes] That’s fine for me because this is what the intended
        effect of the spec is.<br>
      </blockquote>
      This portion of text from section 3 should be changed into:</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">
      <blockquote>
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix">3.  Requesting a JWT Access Token<br>
          <br>
             An authorization server can issue a JWT access token in
          response to    any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749]
          and subsequent<br>
             extensions meant to result in an access token.</div>
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
        </div>
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix">   <b>When an authorization server
            decides to issue a JWT access token compliant to this
            profile, then the following requirements apply. </b><br>
        </div>
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
        </div>
        <div class="moz-cite-prefix">   If the request includes a
          "resource" parameter (as defined in [RFC8707]), the resulting
          JWT access token "aud" claim SHOULD have<br>
             the same value as the "resource" parameter in the request.<br>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <b>Comment 2:</b><b><br>
      </b></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
      </div>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Section 6 states:</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">6.  Privacy Considerations<br>
      <blockquote>   As JWT access tokens carry information by value, it
        now becomes possible for clients and potentially even end users
        to directly peek<br>
           inside the token claims collection.<br>
        <br>
           The client <b>MUST NOT</b> inspect the content of the access
        token: the authorization server and the resource server might
        decide to change<br>
           token format at any time (for example by switching from this
        profile to opaque tokens) hence any logic in the client relying
        on the<br>
           ability to read the access token content would break without
        recourse. <br>
      </blockquote>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">RFC 2119 defines the meaning of MUST
      NOT or SHOULD NOT:</div>
    <blockquote>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">2. <b>MUST NOT</b>   This phrase, or
        the phrase "SHALL NOT", mean that the definition is an absolute
        prohibition of the specification.<br>
        <br>
        (...)<br>
        <br>
        4. <b>SHOULD NOT</b>   This phrase, or the phrase "NOT
        RECOMMENDED" mean that  there may exist valid reasons in
        particular circumstances when the<br>
           particular behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the
        full  implications should be understood and the case carefully
        weighed  before implementing <br>
           any behavior described with this label.</div>
    </blockquote>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">The first sentence of section 6
      recognizes that it is technically possible for clients and
      potentially even end users to directly peek inside the token
      claims collection.<br>
      There may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the
      particular behavior is acceptable or even useful, but there is no
      assurance that this can be done <br>
      since the authorization server and the resource server might
      decide to change the token format at any time.</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">The sentence : <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">The client <b>MUST NOT</b> inspect
        the content of the access token:</div>
    </blockquote>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">should be changed into:</div>
    <blockquote>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">The client <b>SHOULD </b><b>NOT</b>
        inspect the content of the access token:</div>
    </blockquote>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><b>Comment 3:</b><b><br>
        </b></div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
      </div>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Section 6 also state:</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">  This profile mandates the presence of
      the "sub" claim in every JWT access token, making it possible for
      resource servers to rely on that<br>
         information for correlating incoming requests with data stored 
      locally for the authenticated principal.  Although the ability to<br>
         correlate requests might be required by design in many
      scenarios, there are scenarios where the authorization server
      might want to<br>
         prevent correlation.  The "sub" claim should be populated by
      the authorization servers according to a privacy impact
      assessment.  For<br>
         instance, if a solution requires preventing tracking principal
      activities across multiple resource servers, the authorization
      server<br>
         should ensure that JWT access tokens meant for different
      resource servers have distinct "sub" values that cannot be
      correlated in the<br>
         event of resource servers collusion.  Similarly, if a solution
      requires preventing a resource server from correlating the<br>
         principal’s activity within the resource itself, the
      authorization server should assign different "sub" values for
      every JWT access<br>
         token issued.  In turn, the client should obtain a new JWT
      access token for every call to the resource server, to ensure that
      the<br>
         resource server receives different "sub" and "jti" values at
      every call, thus preventing correlation between distinct requests.<br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">As already mentioned on this mailing
      list, the above sentences would modify the semantics of the "sub"
      claim.</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">     While reading RFC 7519, no reader
      may be able to figure out that there are more than two flavours of
      the "sub" claim.<br>
           This draft would be introducing two new other favours of the
      semantics of the "sub" claim which are not present in RFC 7519.<br>
           When an element has been defined, its semantics cannot be
      changed ... unless making an Errata to RFC 7519  which would be <br>
           a clean way to proceed.</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">RFC 7519 defines the sub claim in the
      following way:</div>
    <blockquote>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">4.1.2.  "sub" (Subject) Claim<br>
        <br>
           The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is
        the subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally
        statements<br>
           about the subject.  <b>The subject value MUST either be
          scoped to be locally unique in the context of the issuer or be
          globally unique.</b><br>
           The processing of this claim is generally application
        specific.  The "sub" value is a case-sensitive string containing
        a StringOrURI<br>
           value.  Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Change into:</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">   This profile mandates the presence
      of the "sub" claim in every JWT access token, making it possible
      for resource servers to rely on <br>
         that information for correlating incoming requests with data
      stored  locally for the authenticated principal. The "sub" claim
      is scoped <br>
         to be either locally unique in the context of the issuer or be
      globally unique (see section 4.1.2 from RFC 7519). <br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">   When the "sub" claim is scoped to be
      locally unique in the context of the issuer,  in the event of
      resource servers collusion, it can be used to correlate
      principals. <br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">  When the "sub" claim is scoped to be
      globally unique, in the event of resource servers collusion, it
      can be used to correlate principals not only between resource
      servers</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">  but it can also be used to correlate
      principals between resource servers and other servers that do not
      implement this protocol but are using the same globally unique
      identifiers.</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Denis</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:MWHPR19MB1501B27E048AE9ED1642876FAE380@MWHPR19MB1501.namprd19.prod.outlook.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">Thanks Brian, Logan.</p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">On clarity. I tweaked that section and
          produced a new draft (-10). <br>
          Details:</p>
        <ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc">
          <li class="MsoListParagraph"
            style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2">Formally,
            the fact that we are referring to the User entity should be
            unambiguous. 4.1.2 is a subsection of 4.1, which is titled
            "User Resource Schema”.<br>
            However as a frequent critic of the excessive cyclomatic
            complexity of the specs, I am making myself guilty of
            precisely the same sin <span style="font-family:&quot;Apple
              Color Emoji&quot;">😊</span> your suggestion can save the
            reader the need to follow and parse the reference to
            understand the situation, hence it’s a good improvement to
            clarity.</li>
          <li class="MsoListParagraph"
            style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2">For what
            concerns the actual format of the claims. The <span
              style="font-family:Courier">groups</span> entity actually
            appears as non-normative example in <a
              href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-8.2">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7643#section-8.2</a>;
            I can make an explicit reference to that and make things a
            bit more discoverable. </li>
          <li class="MsoListParagraph"
            style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2">For <span
              style="font-family:Courier"> roles</span> and <span
              style="font-family:Courier">entitlements</span>, things
            are murkier.  <br>
            Before embarking in this endeavor I too had the expectation
            that this would be a flat list of strings, but digging a bit
            in existing implementations it turns out that’s not
            necessarily the case. For example, Slack SCIM represents
            individual roles as two possible <span
              style="font-family:Courier">forms { “value”:&lt;name&gt;,
              “primary”; &lt;bool&gt;}|  { “value”:&lt;name&gt;}</span>,
            whereas databricks uses<span style="font-family:Courier"> {
              “value”:&lt;name&gt;}</span>; WSO2 uses<span
              style="font-family:Courier"> { “value”:&lt;name&gt;,
              “type”; &lt;enum&gt;}</span>. <br>
            So for those two I don’t think we can do better than the
            current statement about SCIM not supplying a vocabulary for
            them.</li>
          <li class="MsoListParagraph"
            style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2">I had some
            issues w the references where the section links were turned
            into local links, as it happened in the past. That should be
            fixed too.</li>
          <li class="MsoListParagraph"
            style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2">I applied
            the “” notation to the attributes, given that we are turning
            them into claims it seems clearer to sue the same
            typographic concention. <br>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc">
          <li class="MsoListParagraph"
            style="margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1">side note…
            &lt;nonexistent section reference&gt;</li>
        </ul>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Excellent point, fixed. <br>
        </p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 20:58:27 +0900
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [JAR] scope parameter outside request object of OIDC request
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Hi Vladimir,

Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is "`scope` request
parameter must exist outside the request object even if JAR applies if the
authorization request is an OIDC request". I'm on the fence on this topic
and just wondered whether those who had wanted to remove `response_type`
outside the request object (although doing it was a breaking change) would
want to remove `scope` outside the request object too with the same
motivation (although I don't remember well what was the motivation). JAR
dares to drop `response_type`, so it would not be surprising to see that
JAR dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) too.

OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows omission of the
parameter if the parameter is included in the request object.

If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:

OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but JAR allows
omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the request
object.

In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has modified OIDC
Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed to go so far as that point,
I would say it is difficult to find a convincing reason not to allow
omission of `scope`.

AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are required to
exist outside a request object even if they are included in the request
object are `client_id`, `response_type` and `scope`. Because `client_id` is
mandatory in JAR (it has become mandatory after long discussion),
discussion for the parameter is not needed. Because the community has
already reached consensus that `response_type` can be omitted, discussion
for the parameter is not needed, either. What I've brought here is
discussion for `scope`, hopefully the last parameter that is affected by
JAR.

Again, I'm on the fence on this topic. However, because logical conclusion
(at least of mine) is that JAR should allow omission of `scope` (it also
should be noted that JAR's basic rule prohibits referring to request
parameters outside a request object), I want to see explicit consensus if
`scope` (including `openid`) outside a request object is still required
even after JAR is enabled.

In short, my question is "Should `scope` be omitted?" I guess that the
conclusion will affect the official conformance suite.

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki
Authlete, Inc.



On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
wrote:

> Hi Taka,
> On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>
> If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to relax the
> requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a request object)
> from mandatory to optional, should we relax the following requirement of
> `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?
>
> ----------
> Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object value, a scope
> parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax
> containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0
> logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
> ----------
>
> Otherwise, an authorization request like "client_id=...&request(_uri)=..."
> fails if the request object represents an OIDC request. An authorization
> request has to look like "client_id=...&request(_uri)=...&scope=openid"
> (`scope` including `openid` has to be given) even if the authorization
> server conforms to JAR and allows omission of `response_type` request
> parameter.
>
> The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR compliant
> server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own style of request /
> request_uri parameter handling insofar as to not reject other query params
> (such as scope, etc). The difference is that according to JAR their values
> cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But what can be reasonably done is
> to detect scope=openid as you say and then switch to OIDC style request
> object behavior.
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5
>
>    The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object
>    duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
>    compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
>    specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
>    object.
>
> The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen that the request
> objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.
>
> In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected parameters.
>
> In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.
>
>
>
> I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because it
> affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?
>
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
> Authlete, Inc.
>
>
> Vladimir
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000e134ab05aff9cda6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Vladimir,<div><br></div><div>Thank you for your reply. =
It sounds that your opinion is &quot;`scope` request parameter must exist o=
utside the request object even if JAR applies if the authorization request =
is an OIDC request&quot;. I&#39;m on the fence on this topic and just wonde=
red whether those who had wanted to remove `response_type` outside the requ=
est object (although doing it was a breaking change) would want to remove `=
scope` outside the request object too with the same motivation (although I =
don&#39;t remember well what was the motivation). JAR dares to drop `respon=
se_type`, so it would not be surprising to see that JAR dares to drop `scop=
e` (including `openid`) too.</div><div><br></div><div>OIDC Core 1.0 require=
s `response_type`, but JAR allows omission of the parameter if the paramete=
r is included in the request object.</div><div><br></div><div>If we applied=
 the same logic, we would be able to state:</div><div><br></div><div>OIDC C=
ore 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but JAR allows omission of t=
he parameter if the parameter is included in the request object.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has m=
odified OIDC Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed to go so far as=
 that point, I would say it is difficult to find a convincing reason not to=
 allow omission of `scope`.</div><div><br></div><div>AFAIK, in the context =
of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are required to exist outside a request o=
bject even if they are included in the request object are `client_id`, `res=
ponse_type` and `scope`. Because `client_id` is mandatory in JAR (it has be=
come mandatory after long=C2=A0discussion), discussion for the parameter is=
 not needed. Because the community has already reached consensus that `resp=
onse_type` can be omitted, discussion for the parameter is not needed, eith=
er. What I&#39;ve brought here is discussion for `scope`, hopefully the las=
t parameter that is affected by JAR.</div><div><br></div><div>Again, I&#39;=
m on the fence on=C2=A0this topic. However, because logical conclusion (at =
least of mine) is that JAR should allow omission of `scope` (it also should=
 be noted that JAR&#39;s basic rule prohibits referring to request paramete=
rs outside a request object), I want to see explicit consensus if `scope` (=
including `openid`) outside a request object is still required even after J=
AR is enabled.</div><div><br></div><div>In short, my question is &quot;Shou=
ld `scope` be omitted?&quot; I guess that the conclusion will affect the of=
ficial conformance suite.</div><div><br></div><div>Best Regards,</div><div>=
Takahiko Kawasaki</div><div>Authlete, Inc.</div><div><br></div><div><br></d=
iv></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_att=
r">On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:vladimir@connect2id.com" target=3D"_blank">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>Hi Taka,<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request)
        to relax the requirement of `response_type` request parameter
        (outside a request object) from mandatory to optional, should we
        relax the following requirement of `scope` request parameter
        stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?<br>
        <br>
        ----------<br>
        Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object
        value, a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth
        2.0 request syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate
        to the underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect
        request.<br>
        ----------<br>
        <br>
        Otherwise, an authorization request like
        &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&quot; fails if the re=
quest
        object represents an OIDC request. An authorization request has
        to look like
        &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&amp;scope=3Dopenid&qu=
ot; (`scope`
        including `openid` has to be given) even if the authorization
        server conforms to JAR and allows omission of `response_type`
        request parameter.<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p>The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR
      compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own
      style of request / request_uri parameter handling insofar as to
      not reject other query params (such as scope, etc). The difference
      is that according to JAR their values cannot be used or merged (as
      in OIDC). But what can be reasonably done is to detect
      scope=3Dopenid as you say and then switch to OIDC style request
      object behavior.</p>
    <p><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#se=
ction-5" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jws=
req-30#section-5</a><br>
    </p>
    <p>
      </p><blockquote type=3D"cite">
        <pre>   The client MAY send the parameters included in the request =
object
   duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
   compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
   specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
   object.</pre>
      </blockquote>
    <p></p>
    <p>The confusion between the two specs clears when it&#39;s seen that
      the request objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.</p>
    <p>In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected
      parameters.</p>
    <p>In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because
        it affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?<br>
        <br>
        Best Regards,<br>
        Takahiko Kawasaki<br>
        Authlete, Inc.</div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Vladimir<br>
    </p>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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To: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
References: <CAHdPCmOPwqbemgKsEALA0OvP+6z58N5eNA9WA_AsvDESNhE1kg@mail.gmail.com> <2cd8bfd1-f491-0086-979f-0527ccf16281@connect2id.com> <CAHdPCmPmABt6PyupuGZaofwp+jKy7aVEvUO488NdDzVFsD18BA@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [JAR] scope parameter outside request object of OIDC request
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In my opinion, all parameters should be able to be passed inside the =
request object, including `scope`.=20

We couldn=E2=80=99t do that kind of thing in OIDC because that would be =
a breaking change to existing requirements in OAuth 2. JAR is taking the =
step of overriding those requirements, and so it should do so with all =
parameters.

There are a lot of things in OIDC that are a little wonky like this, =
where the general solution turned out to be slightly different than the =
tightly fit solution that OIDC pioneered. Discovery and issuer URLs are =
another notable example beyond this one.

In my view, OIDC should be updated to redefine its behavior in light of =
the family of new general purpose protocol extensions, including JAR. =
This could probably be done in a way that an IdP could support both the =
=E2=80=9Cclassic=E2=80=9D way of doing request objects as well as the =
=E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D way, but likely for different clients. In which =
case, I think the behavior switch would be similar to what Vladimir =
describes.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On Sep 23, 2020, at 7:58 AM, Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Hi Vladimir,
>=20
> Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is "`scope` =
request parameter must exist outside the request object even if JAR =
applies if the authorization request is an OIDC request". I'm on the =
fence on this topic and just wondered whether those who had wanted to =
remove `response_type` outside the request object (although doing it was =
a breaking change) would want to remove `scope` outside the request =
object too with the same motivation (although I don't remember well what =
was the motivation). JAR dares to drop `response_type`, so it would not =
be surprising to see that JAR dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) =
too.
>=20
> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows omission of the =
parameter if the parameter is included in the request object.
>=20
> If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:
>=20
> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but JAR allows =
omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the request =
object.
>=20
> In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has modified =
OIDC Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed to go so far as that =
point, I would say it is difficult to find a convincing reason not to =
allow omission of `scope`.
>=20
> AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are required =
to exist outside a request object even if they are included in the =
request object are `client_id`, `response_type` and `scope`. Because =
`client_id` is mandatory in JAR (it has become mandatory after long =
discussion), discussion for the parameter is not needed. Because the =
community has already reached consensus that `response_type` can be =
omitted, discussion for the parameter is not needed, either. What I've =
brought here is discussion for `scope`, hopefully the last parameter =
that is affected by JAR.
>=20
> Again, I'm on the fence on this topic. However, because logical =
conclusion (at least of mine) is that JAR should allow omission of =
`scope` (it also should be noted that JAR's basic rule prohibits =
referring to request parameters outside a request object), I want to see =
explicit consensus if `scope` (including `openid`) outside a request =
object is still required even after JAR is enabled.
>=20
> In short, my question is "Should `scope` be omitted?" I guess that the =
conclusion will affect the official conformance suite.
>=20
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
> Authlete, Inc.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov =
<vladimir@connect2id.com <mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com>> wrote:
> Hi Taka,
>=20
> On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>> If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to relax the =
requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a request =
object) from mandatory to optional, should we relax the following =
requirement of `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section =
6.1, too?
>>=20
>> ----------
>> Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object value, a =
scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax =
containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth =
2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
>> ----------
>>=20
>> Otherwise, an authorization request like =
"client_id=3D...&request(_uri)=3D..." fails if the request object =
represents an OIDC request. An authorization request has to look like =
"client_id=3D...&request(_uri)=3D...&scope=3Dopenid" (`scope` including =
`openid` has to be given) even if the authorization server conforms to =
JAR and allows omission of `response_type` request parameter.
> The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR =
compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own style of =
request / request_uri parameter handling insofar as to not reject other =
query params (such as scope, etc). The difference is that according to =
JAR their values cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But what can be =
reasonably done is to detect scope=3Dopenid as you say and then switch =
to OIDC style request object behavior.
>=20
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5 =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5>
>=20
>>    The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object
>>    duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
>>    compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting =
this
>>    specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
>>    object.
>=20
> The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen that the =
request objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.
>=20
> In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected parameters.
>=20
> In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>>=20
>> I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because it =
affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?
>>=20
>> Best Regards,
>> Takahiko Kawasaki
>> Authlete, Inc.
>=20
> Vladimir
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">In =
my opinion, all parameters should be able to be passed inside the =
request object, including `scope`.&nbsp;<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">We couldn=E2=80=99t do that kind of =
thing in OIDC because that would be a breaking change to existing =
requirements in OAuth 2. JAR is taking the step of overriding those =
requirements, and so it should do so with all parameters.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">There are a lot of =
things in OIDC that are a little wonky like this, where the general =
solution turned out to be slightly different than the tightly fit =
solution that OIDC pioneered. Discovery and issuer URLs are another =
notable example beyond this one.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In my view, OIDC should be updated to =
redefine its behavior in light of the family of new general purpose =
protocol extensions, including JAR. This could probably be done in a way =
that an IdP could support both the =E2=80=9Cclassic=E2=80=9D way of =
doing request objects as well as the =E2=80=9Cnew=E2=80=9D way, but =
likely for different clients. In which case, I think the behavior switch =
would be similar to what Vladimir describes.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 Justin<br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Sep 23, 2020, at 7:58 AM, Takahiko Kawasaki &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:taka@authlete.com" class=3D"">taka@authlete.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hi Vladimir,<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thank you for your reply. It sounds =
that your opinion is "`scope` request parameter must exist outside the =
request object even if JAR applies if the authorization request is an =
OIDC request". I'm on the fence on this topic and just wondered whether =
those who had wanted to remove `response_type` outside the request =
object (although doing it was a breaking change) would want to remove =
`scope` outside the request object too with the same motivation =
(although I don't remember well what was the motivation). JAR dares to =
drop `response_type`, so it would not be surprising to see that JAR =
dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) too.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, =
but JAR allows omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in =
the request object.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">If we applied the same logic, we would be able to =
state:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">OIDC =
Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but JAR allows omission =
of the parameter if the parameter is included in the request =
object.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In =
terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has modified OIDC =
Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed to go so far as that =
point, I would say it is difficult to find a convincing reason not to =
allow omission of `scope`.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are =
required to exist outside a request object even if they are included in =
the request object are `client_id`, `response_type` and `scope`. Because =
`client_id` is mandatory in JAR (it has become mandatory after =
long&nbsp;discussion), discussion for the parameter is not needed. =
Because the community has already reached consensus that `response_type` =
can be omitted, discussion for the parameter is not needed, either. What =
I've brought here is discussion for `scope`, hopefully the last =
parameter that is affected by JAR.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Again, I'm on the fence on&nbsp;this =
topic. However, because logical conclusion (at least of mine) is that =
JAR should allow omission of `scope` (it also should be noted that JAR's =
basic rule prohibits referring to request parameters outside a request =
object), I want to see explicit consensus if `scope` (including =
`openid`) outside a request object is still required even after JAR is =
enabled.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In =
short, my question is "Should `scope` be omitted?" I guess that the =
conclusion will affect the official conformance suite.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Best Regards,</div><div =
class=3D"">Takahiko Kawasaki</div><div class=3D"">Authlete, =
Inc.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59 AM =
Vladimir Dzhuvinov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div class=3D""><p class=3D"">Hi Taka,<br class=3D"">
    </p>
    <div class=3D"">On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki
      wrote:<br class=3D"">
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">If we allow JAR (JWT Secured =
Authorization Request)
        to relax the requirement of `response_type` request parameter
        (outside a request object) from mandatory to optional, should we
        relax the following requirement of `scope` request parameter
        stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?<br class=3D"">
        <br class=3D"">
        ----------<br class=3D"">
        Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object
        value, a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth
        2.0 request syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate
        to the underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect
        request.<br class=3D"">
        ----------<br class=3D"">
        <br class=3D"">
        Otherwise, an authorization request like
        "client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D..." fails if the request
        object represents an OIDC request. An authorization request has
        to look like
        "client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&amp;scope=3Dopenid" =
(`scope`
        including `openid` has to be given) even if the authorization
        server conforms to JAR and allows omission of `response_type`
        request parameter.<br class=3D"">
      </div>
    </blockquote><p class=3D"">The bottom of section 5 has normative =
text which allows a JAR
      compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own
      style of request / request_uri parameter handling insofar as to
      not reject other query params (such as scope, etc). The difference
      is that according to JAR their values cannot be used or merged (as
      in OIDC). But what can be reasonably done is to detect
      scope=3Dopenid as you say and then switch to OIDC style request
      object behavior.</p><p class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5" =
target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-=
5</a><br class=3D"">
    </p><div class=3D"">
      <br class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
        <pre class=3D"">   The client MAY send the parameters included =
in the request object
   duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
   compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
   specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
   object.</pre>
      </blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><p class=3D"">The confusion =
between the two specs clears when it's seen that
      the request objects in OIDC and JAR have different =
objectives.</p><p class=3D"">In OIDC the objective is to enable securing =
of selected
      parameters.</p><p class=3D"">In JAR the objective is to secure the =
entire authz request.<br class=3D"">
    </p><p class=3D""><br class=3D"">
    </p>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
      <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><br class=3D"">
        I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because
        it affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?<br =
class=3D"">
        <br class=3D"">
        Best Regards,<br class=3D"">
        Takahiko Kawasaki<br class=3D"">
        Authlete, Inc.</div>
    </blockquote><p class=3D""><br class=3D"">
    </p><p class=3D"">Vladimir<br class=3D"">
    </p>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">OAuth =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 16:39:57 -0600
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To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
Cc: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>,  Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New podcast on identity specifications
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Hello Denis,

The most recent version of the DPoP draft is not draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04
but rather draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, which doesn't expire until November. I
realize that the naming and versioning conventions of IETF documents are a
bit esoteric and can lend themselves to such mistakes. But someone who
insists on making unhelpful criticism of said documents should probably be
more mindful of such details.

This WG (and it's not the only WG where this has happened) has repeatedly
confirmed the rough consensus that these so-called collaboration attacks
are not something that DPoP, or any of the other documents you've said the
same about, is expected to address. Nor that there is even reason enough to
think that readers need to be told so. Your personal enthusiasm for the
topic does not change that and doesn't change the fundamental nature of how
OAuth works.

I am sorry to hear that you felt the podcast was too long. I can certainly
empathize with feeling like one's time has been wasted.




On Wed, Sep 23, 2020 at 3:38 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:

> Hello Brian and Vittorio,
> I have two observations:
>
>    - draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 which is the last version expired on 5
>    September 2020,
>    - the podcast as well as draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 omit to mention the
>    client/user collaborative attack against which draft-fett-oauth-dpop-0=
4 is
>    ineffective.
>
>
> Denis
>
> PS. The podcast is a nice effort but is far too long (29:37).
>
> The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two specs are alike, ho=
w
> they differ and which particular type of app they are meant to serve.
>
> I'm saying this as a person who is generally allergic to technical
> podcasts :)
>
> Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a podcast link at
> the top, where the authors discuss it in simple, honest and non-speccy
> terms, because that's often how people are best able to perceive the spir=
it
> and subtleties of some technical or spec work.
>
> Vladimir
> On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio Bertocci wrote:
>
> Dear all,
>
> This is an informal mail to inform you that there=E2=80=99s a new podcast
> <http://identityunlocked.com/>, identityunlocked.com, dedicated to inform
> and explain new identity specs developments for developers.
>
> You can find a more detailed explanation of the podcast=E2=80=99s goals i=
n
> https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/, but
> the TL;DR is that the spec themselves aren=E2=80=99t all that easy to rea=
d for the
> non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during the discussions
> leading to the spec but rarely surface in a usable form to the people who
> don=E2=80=99t participate in discussions.
>
> The first episode
> <https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/>,
> featuring Brian Campbell discussing MTLS & DPoP, should give you an idea =
of
> what season 1 of the show will look like.
>
> The full list of the first run is available here
> <https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-pod=
cast-for-developers/>.
> Of 6 episodes, 3 of them are about specifications coming out of this WG-
> and all guests are actively involved in the IETF.
>
> My main goals sharing this info here are
>
>    - *Letting you know that the podcast exists*, so that you can make use
>    of it if you so choose (e.g. referring people to it if they need to be=
tter
>    understand something covered in an episode)
>    - *Soliciting proposals for new episodes*: topics you believe are
>    currently underserved, topics you are often asked about, topics you wo=
uld
>    like to be interviewed about on the show
>    - *Growing the show=E2=80=99s subscriber base*. I was able to get back=
ing from
>    my company to produce a podcast that has exactly ZERO product pitches =
and
>    is purely about identity specs promotion, on the gamble that the topic=
 does
>    have an audience finding it useful. So far the reception has been grea=
t,
>    and we need to keep it up if we want to have a season 2.
>
>
>
> I hope you=E2=80=99ll find the initiative useful!
>
> Cheers,
>
> V.
>
>
>

--=20
_CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged=
=20
material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use,=20
distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.=C2=A0 If you h=
ave=20
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello Denis, <br></div><div><br></div><div>The most r=
ecent version of the DPoP draft is not draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 but rather =
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, which doesn&#39;t expire until November. I realiz=
e that the naming and versioning conventions of IETF documents  are a bit e=
soteric and can lend themselves to such mistakes. But someone who insists o=
n making unhelpful criticism of said documents should probably be more mind=
ful of such details. <br></div><div><br></div><div>This WG (and it&#39;s no=
t the only WG where this has happened) has repeatedly confirmed the rough c=
onsensus that these so-called collaboration<span> attacks are not something=
 that DPoP, or any of the other documents you&#39;ve said the same about, i=
s expected to address. Nor that there is even reason enough to think that r=
eaders need to be told so. Your personal enthusiasm for the topic does not =
change that and doesn&#39;t change the fundamental nature of how OAuth work=
s. <br></span></div><div><span><br></span></div><div><span>I am sorry to he=
ar that you felt the podcast was too long. I can certainly empathize with f=
eeling like one&#39;s time has been wasted. <br></span></div><div><span><br=
></span></div><div><span><br></span></div><div> <br></div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 23, 2=
020 at 3:38 AM Denis &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr" target=3D"_b=
lank">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <div>
      <p>Hello Brian and Vittorio,</p>
      <div>I have two observations:</div>
      <ul>
        <li>draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 which is the last version expired
          on 5 September 2020,</li>
        <li>the podcast as well as draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 omit to
          mention the client/user collaborative attack against which
          draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 is ineffective.</li>
      </ul>
      <div><br>
        Denis</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>PS. The podcast is a nice effort but
        is far too long (29:37).</div>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <p>The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two specs are
        alike, how they differ and which particular type of app they are
        meant to serve.<br>
      </p>
      <p>I&#39;m saying this as a person who is generally allergic to
        technical podcasts :)</p>
      <p>Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a podcast
        link at the top, where the authors discuss it in simple, honest
        and non-speccy terms, because that&#39;s often how people are best
        able to perceive the spirit and subtleties of some technical or
        spec work.<br>
      </p>
      <p>Vladimir<br>
      </p>
      <div>On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio
        Bertocci wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type=3D"cite">
       =20
       =20
       =20
        <div>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">Dear all,<u=
></u><u></u></span></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">This is an
              informal mail to inform you that there=E2=80=99s a new <a hre=
f=3D"http://identityunlocked.com/" target=3D"_blank">podcast</a>, <a href=
=3D"http://identityunlocked.com/" target=3D"_blank"> identityunlocked.com</=
a>,
              dedicated to inform and explain new identity specs
              developments for developers.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">You can
              find a more detailed explanation of the podcast=E2=80=99s goa=
ls in
            </span><a href=3D"https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-po=
dcast-for-developers/" target=3D"_blank">https://auth0.com/blog/identity-un=
locked-a-podcast-for-developers/</a><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">, but th=
e TL;DR is that the spec
              themselves aren=E2=80=99t all that easy to read for the
              non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges during the
              discussions leading to the spec but rarely surface in a
              usable form to the people who don=E2=80=99t participate in
              discussions.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">The <a href=
=3D"https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/" target=
=3D"_blank"> first episode</a>, featuring
              Brian Campbell discussing MTLS &amp; DPoP, should give you
              an idea of what season 1 of the show will look like.<u></u><u=
></u></span></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">The full
              list of the first run is available <a href=3D"https://auth0.c=
om/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-podcast-for-developer=
s/" target=3D"_blank"> here</a>. Of 6 episodes, 3 of
              them are about specifications coming out of this WG- and
              all guests are actively involved in the IETF.<u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">My main
              goals sharing this info here are<u></u><u></u></span></p>
          <ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
            <li style=3D"margin-left:0in"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"=
>Letting you know that the
                  podcast exists</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">,=
 so that you can make use of
                it if you so choose (e.g. referring people to it if they
                need to better understand something covered in an
                episode)<u></u><u></u></span></li>
            <li style=3D"margin-left:0in"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"=
>Soliciting proposals for new
                  episodes</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">:
                topics you believe are currently underserved, topics you
                are often asked about, topics you would like to be
                interviewed about on the show<u></u><u></u></span></li>
            <li style=3D"margin-left:0in"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"=
>Growing the show=E2=80=99s subscriber
                  base</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">. I was
                able to get backing from my company to produce a podcast
                that has exactly ZERO product pitches and is purely
                about identity specs promotion, on the gamble that the
                topic does have an audience finding it useful. So far
                the reception has been great, and we need to keep it up
                if we want to have a season 2. =C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span><=
/li>
          </ul>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">I hope
              you=E2=80=99ll find the initiative useful!<u></u><u></u></spa=
n></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">Cheers,<u><=
/u><u></u></span></p>
          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">V.<u></u><u=
></u></span></p>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

</blockquote></div>

<br>
<i style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:ba=
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New podcast on identity specifications
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Hello  Brian,

The text was not mentioning explicitly draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01. While 
re-reading the text, it only appears in a link.

I am NOT arguing that collaborationattacks are something that DPoP is 
expected to address.
I am arguing that DPoP should mention in its Security Considerations 
section that collaborationattacks are something that DPoP does not address.

At the moment, section 9 (Security Considerations) of 
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01 is not conformant to RFC 3552 (Guidelines for 
Writing RFC Text
on Security Considerations), since section 5 from RFC 3552 states:

    Authors MUST describe

       1.   which attacks are out of scope (and why!)
       2.   which attacks are in-scope
             2.1  and the protocol is susceptible to
             2.2  and the protocol protects against

Denis


> Hello Denis,
>
> The most recent version of the DPoP draft is not 
> draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 but rather draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01, which 
> doesn't expire until November. I realize that the naming and 
> versioning conventions of IETF documents are a bit esoteric and can 
> lend themselves to such mistakes. But someone who insists on making 
> unhelpful criticism of said documents should probably be more mindful 
> of such details.
>
> This WG (and it's not the only WG where this has happened) has 
> repeatedly confirmed the rough consensus that these so-called 
> collaborationattacks are not something that DPoP, or any of the other 
> documents you've said the same about, is expected to address. Nor that 
> there is even reason enough to think that readers need to be told so. 
> Your personal enthusiasm for the topic does not change that and 
> doesn't change the fundamental nature of how OAuth works.
>
> I am sorry to hear that you felt the podcast was too long. I can 
> certainly empathize with feeling like one's time has been wasted.
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 23, 2020 at 3:38 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr 
> <mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr>> wrote:
>
>     Hello Brian and Vittorio,
>
>     I have two observations:
>
>       * draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 which is the last version expired on
>         5 September 2020,
>       * the podcast as well as draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 omit to
>         mention the client/user collaborative attack against which
>         draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 is ineffective.
>
>
>     Denis
>
>     PS. The podcast is a nice effort but is far too long (29:37).
>>
>>     The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two specs are
>>     alike, how they differ and which particular type of app they are
>>     meant to serve.
>>
>>     I'm saying this as a person who is generally allergic to
>>     technical podcasts :)
>>
>>     Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a podcast
>>     link at the top, where the authors discuss it in simple, honest
>>     and non-speccy terms, because that's often how people are best
>>     able to perceive the spirit and subtleties of some technical or
>>     spec work.
>>
>>     Vladimir
>>
>>     On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio Bertocci wrote:
>>>
>>>     Dear all,
>>>
>>>     This is an informal mail to inform you that there’s a new
>>>     podcast <http://identityunlocked.com/>, identityunlocked.com
>>>     <http://identityunlocked.com/>, dedicated to inform and explain
>>>     new identity specs developments for developers.
>>>
>>>     You can find a more detailed explanation of the podcast’s goals
>>>     in
>>>     https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/,
>>>     but the TL;DR is that the spec themselves aren’t all that easy
>>>     to read for the non-initiated, and a lot of useful info emerges
>>>     during the discussions leading to the spec but rarely surface in
>>>     a usable form to the people who don’t participate in discussions.
>>>
>>>     The first episode
>>>     <https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/>,
>>>     featuring Brian Campbell discussing MTLS & DPoP, should give you
>>>     an idea of what season 1 of the show will look like.
>>>
>>>     The full list of the first run is available here
>>>     <https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-podcast-for-developers/>.
>>>     Of 6 episodes, 3 of them are about specifications coming out of
>>>     this WG- and all guests are actively involved in the IETF.
>>>
>>>     My main goals sharing this info here are
>>>
>>>       * *Letting you know that the podcast exists*, so that you can
>>>         make use of it if you so choose (e.g. referring people to it
>>>         if they need to better understand something covered in an
>>>         episode)
>>>       * *Soliciting proposals for new episodes*: topics you believe
>>>         are currently underserved, topics you are often asked about,
>>>         topics you would like to be interviewed about on the show
>>>       * *Growing the show’s subscriber base*. I was able to get
>>>         backing from my company to produce a podcast that has
>>>         exactly ZERO product pitches and is purely about identity
>>>         specs promotion, on the gamble that the topic does have an
>>>         audience finding it useful. So far the reception has been
>>>         great, and we need to keep it up if we want to have a season 2.
>>>
>>>     I hope you’ll find the initiative useful!
>>>
>>>     Cheers,
>>>
>>>     V.
>>>
>
>
> /CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and 
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any 
> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly 
> prohibited.  If you have received this communication in error, please 
> notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any 
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--------------2858BF6EA96DBC86395251AC
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hello  Brian,</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">The text was not mentioning explicitly
      draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01. While re-reading the text, it only
      appears in a link.</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">I am NOT arguing that collaboration<span>
        attacks are something that DPoP is expected to address.<br>
        I am arguing that DPoP should mention in its Security
        Considerations section that </span>collaboration<span> attacks
        are something that DPoP does not address.</span></div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">At the moment, section 9 (Security
      Considerations) of draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01 is not conformant to
      RFC 3552 (Guidelines for Writing RFC Text <br>
      on Security Considerations), since section 5 from RFC 3552 states:</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">   Authors MUST describe<br>
      <br>
            1.   which attacks are out of scope (and why!)<br>
            2.   which attacks are in-scope<br>
                  2.1  and the protocol is susceptible to<br>
                  2.2  and the protocol protects against</div>
    <p>Denis</p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+k3eCTyvZRHMiXqgkrJk1bf3SoTe84APKrtiNRZ0Ty1jCQwzA@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>Hello Denis, <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>The most recent version of the DPoP draft is not
          draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 but rather draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01,
          which doesn't expire until November. I realize that the naming
          and versioning conventions of IETF documents are a bit
          esoteric and can lend themselves to such mistakes. But someone
          who insists on making unhelpful criticism of said documents
          should probably be more mindful of such details. <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>This WG (and it's not the only WG where this has happened)
          has repeatedly confirmed the rough consensus that these
          so-called collaboration<span> attacks are not something that
            DPoP, or any of the other documents you've said the same
            about, is expected to address. Nor that there is even reason
            enough to think that readers need to be told so. Your
            personal enthusiasm for the topic does not change that and
            doesn't change the fundamental nature of how OAuth works. <br>
          </span></div>
        <div><span><br>
          </span></div>
        <div><span>I am sorry to hear that you felt the podcast was too
            long. I can certainly empathize with feeling like one's time
            has been wasted. <br>
          </span></div>
        <div><span><br>
          </span></div>
        <div><span><br>
          </span></div>
        <div> <br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 23, 2020 at 3:38
          AM Denis &lt;<a href="mailto:denis.ietf@free.fr"
            target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">denis.ietf@free.fr</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div>
            <div>
              <p>Hello Brian and Vittorio,</p>
              <div>I have two observations:</div>
              <ul>
                <li>draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 which is the last version
                  expired on 5 September 2020,</li>
                <li>the podcast as well as draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 omit
                  to mention the client/user collaborative attack
                  against which draft-fett-oauth-dpop-04 is ineffective.</li>
              </ul>
              <div><br>
                Denis</div>
              <div><br>
              </div>
              <div>PS. The podcast is a nice effort but is far too long
                (29:37).</div>
            </div>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <p>The mTLS vs DPoP was good in articulating how the two
                specs are alike, how they differ and which particular
                type of app they are meant to serve.<br>
              </p>
              <p>I'm saying this as a person who is generally allergic
                to technical podcasts :)</p>
              <p>Maybe every RFC that comes out of this WG should have a
                podcast link at the top, where the authors discuss it in
                simple, honest and non-speccy terms, because that's
                often how people are best able to perceive the spirit
                and subtleties of some technical or spec work.<br>
              </p>
              <p>Vladimir<br>
              </p>
              <div>On 21/09/2020 09:40, Vittorio Bertocci wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote type="cite">
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Dear
                      all,</span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">This
                      is an informal mail to inform you that there’s a
                      new <a href="http://identityunlocked.com/"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">podcast</a>,
                      <a href="http://identityunlocked.com/"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">
                        identityunlocked.com</a>, dedicated to inform
                      and explain new identity specs developments for
                      developers.</span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">You
                      can find a more detailed explanation of the
                      podcast’s goals in </span><a
href="https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/"
                      target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-a-podcast-for-developers/</a><span
                      style="font-size:11pt">, but the TL;DR is that the
                      spec themselves aren’t all that easy to read for
                      the non-initiated, and a lot of useful info
                      emerges during the discussions leading to the spec
                      but rarely surface in a usable form to the people
                      who don’t participate in discussions.</span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">The
                      <a
                        href="https://auth0.com/blog/identity-unlocked-explained-episode-1/"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"> first
                        episode</a>, featuring Brian Campbell discussing
                      MTLS &amp; DPoP, should give you an idea of what
                      season 1 of the show will look like.</span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">The
                      full list of the first run is available <a
href="https://auth0.com/blog/auth0-launches-identity-unlocked-the-identity-podcast-for-developers/"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"> here</a>.
                      Of 6 episodes, 3 of them are about specifications
                      coming out of this WG- and all guests are actively
                      involved in the IETF.</span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">My
                      main goals sharing this info here are</span></p>
                  <ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc">
                    <li style="margin-left:0in"><b><span
                          style="font-size:11pt">Letting you know that
                          the podcast exists</span></b><span
                        style="font-size:11pt">, so that you can make
                        use of it if you so choose (e.g. referring
                        people to it if they need to better understand
                        something covered in an episode)</span></li>
                    <li style="margin-left:0in"><b><span
                          style="font-size:11pt">Soliciting proposals
                          for new episodes</span></b><span
                        style="font-size:11pt">: topics you believe are
                        currently underserved, topics you are often
                        asked about, topics you would like to be
                        interviewed about on the show</span></li>
                    <li style="margin-left:0in"><b><span
                          style="font-size:11pt">Growing the show’s
                          subscriber base</span></b><span
                        style="font-size:11pt">. I was able to get
                        backing from my company to produce a podcast
                        that has exactly ZERO product pitches and is
                        purely about identity specs promotion, on the
                        gamble that the topic does have an audience
                        finding it useful. So far the reception has been
                        great, and we need to keep it up if we want to
                        have a season 2.  </span></li>
                  </ul>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"> </span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">I
                      hope you’ll find the initiative useful!</span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Cheers,</span></p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">V.</span></p>
                </div>
              </blockquote>
            </blockquote>
            <br>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <i
style="margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:baseline;background:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system-ui,-apple-system,system-ui,&quot;Segoe
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            NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [JAR] scope parameter outside request object of OIDC request
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Hi Taka,

Speaking of the OIDC Core 1.0 conformance tests, IMO those should not
change with the publication of JAR.

Speaking of the FAPI 1.0 tests, those already require all request
parameters to be JWT-secured, which makes the requests also JAR
compliant: all parameters are found in the JWT, with scope (as complete
scope or minimally required scope=3Dopenid), response_type, client_id and=

redirect_uri also having a copy outside the JWT, as query parameters.
Thus the request is OIDC as well as JAR compliant.

If I had an RP I would always construct OIDC auth requests like that, to
make sure they comply with OIDC as well as the new JAR spec (and will
not have issues with servers which implement both specs but are not able
to "switch" behavior for some reason).

Vladimir

On 23/09/2020 14:58, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
> Hi Vladimir,
>
> Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is "`scope`
> request parameter must exist outside the request object even if JAR
> applies if the authorization request is an OIDC request". I'm on the
> fence on this topic and just wondered whether those who had wanted to
> remove `response_type` outside the request object (although doing it
> was a breaking change) would want to remove `scope` outside the
> request object too with the same motivation (although I don't remember
> well what was the motivation). JAR dares to drop `response_type`, so
> it would not be surprising to see that JAR dares to drop `scope`
> (including `openid`) too.
>
> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows omission of the
> parameter if the parameter is included in the request object.
>
> If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:
>
> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but JAR allows
> omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the request
> object.
>
> In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has modified
> OIDC Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed to go so far as
> that point, I would say it is difficult to find a convincing reason
> not to allow omission of `scope`.
>
> AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are required
> to exist outside a request object even if they are included in the
> request object are `client_id`, `response_type` and `scope`. Because
> `client_id` is mandatory in JAR (it has become mandatory after
> long=C2=A0discussion), discussion for the parameter is not needed. Beca=
use
> the community has already reached consensus that `response_type` can
> be omitted, discussion for the parameter is not needed, either. What
> I've brought here is discussion for `scope`, hopefully the last
> parameter that is affected by JAR.
>
> Again, I'm on the fence on=C2=A0this topic. However, because logical
> conclusion (at least of mine) is that JAR should allow omission of
> `scope` (it also should be noted that JAR's basic rule prohibits
> referring to request parameters outside a request object), I want to
> see explicit consensus if `scope` (including `openid`) outside a
> request object is still required even after JAR is enabled.
>
> In short, my question is "Should `scope` be omitted?" I guess that the
> conclusion will affect the official conformance suite.
>
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
> Authlete, Inc.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov
> <vladimir@connect2id.com <mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com>> wrote:
>
>     Hi Taka,
>
>     On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>>     If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to relax the
>>     requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a
>>     request object) from mandatory to optional, should we relax the
>>     following requirement of `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC
>>     Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?
>>
>>     ----------
>>     Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object value,
>>     a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0
>>     request syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate to
>>     the underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect
>>     request.
>>     ----------
>>
>>     Otherwise, an authorization request like
>>     "client_id=3D...&request(_uri)=3D..." fails if the request object
>>     represents an OIDC request. An authorization request has to look
>>     like "client_id=3D...&request(_uri)=3D...&scope=3Dopenid" (`scope`=

>>     including `openid` has to be given) even if the authorization
>>     server conforms to JAR and allows omission of `response_type`
>>     request parameter.
>
>     The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR
>     compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own
>     style of request / request_uri parameter handling insofar as to
>     not reject other query params (such as scope, etc). The difference
>     is that according to JAR their values cannot be used or merged (as
>     in OIDC). But what can be reasonably done is to detect
>     scope=3Dopenid as you say and then switch to OIDC style request
>     object behavior.
>
>     https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5
>
>>        The client MAY send the parameters included in the request obje=
ct
>>        duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
>>        compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supportin=
g this
>>        specification MUST only use the parameters included in the requ=
est
>>        object.
>
>     The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen that the
>     request objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.
>
>     In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected parameters.=

>
>     In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.
>
>
>>
>>     I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because
>>     it affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?
>>
>>     Best Regards,
>>     Takahiko Kawasaki
>>     Authlete, Inc.
>
>
>     Vladimir
>


--------------15B4413C8C9FFF1FDE739376
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF=
-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Hi Taka,</p>
    <p>Speaking of the OIDC Core 1.0 conformance tests, IMO those should
      not change with the publication of JAR.</p>
    <p>Speaking of the FAPI 1.0 tests, those already require all request
      parameters to be JWT-secured, which makes the requests also JAR
      compliant: all parameters are found in the JWT, with scope (as
      complete scope or minimally required scope=3Dopenid), response_type=
,
      client_id and redirect_uri also having a copy outside the JWT, as
      query parameters. Thus the request is OIDC as well as JAR
      compliant.<br>
    </p>
    <p>If I had an RP I would always construct OIDC auth requests like
      that, to make sure they comply with OIDC as well as the new JAR
      spec (and will not have issues with servers which implement both
      specs but are not able to "switch" behavior for some reason).<br>
    </p>
    <p>Vladimir<br>
    </p>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 23/09/2020 14:58, Takahiko Kawasaki=

      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"
cite=3D"mid:CAHdPCmPmABt6PyupuGZaofwp+jKy7aVEvUO488NdDzVFsD18BA@mail.gmai=
l.com">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DU=
TF-8">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Vladimir,
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is
          "`scope` request parameter must exist outside the request
          object even if JAR applies if the authorization request is an
          OIDC request". I'm on the fence on this topic and just
          wondered whether those who had wanted to remove
          `response_type` outside the request object (although doing it
          was a breaking change) would want to remove `scope` outside
          the request object too with the same motivation (although I
          don't remember well what was the motivation). JAR dares to
          drop `response_type`, so it would not be surprising to see
          that JAR dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) too.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows
          omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the
          request object.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:</di=
v>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but
          JAR allows omission of the parameter if the parameter is
          included in the request object.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has
          modified OIDC Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed
          to go so far as that point, I would say it is difficult to
          find a convincing reason not to allow omission of `scope`.</div=
>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are
          required to exist outside a request object even if they are
          included in the request object are `client_id`,
          `response_type` and `scope`. Because `client_id` is mandatory
          in JAR (it has become mandatory after long=C2=A0discussion),
          discussion for the parameter is not needed. Because the
          community has already reached consensus that `response_type`
          can be omitted, discussion for the parameter is not needed,
          either. What I've brought here is discussion for `scope`,
          hopefully the last parameter that is affected by JAR.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Again, I'm on the fence on=C2=A0this topic. However, because=

          logical conclusion (at least of mine) is that JAR should allow
          omission of `scope` (it also should be noted that JAR's basic
          rule prohibits referring to request parameters outside a
          request object), I want to see explicit consensus if `scope`
          (including `openid`) outside a request object is still
          required even after JAR is enabled.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>In short, my question is "Should `scope` be omitted?" I
          guess that the conclusion will affect the official conformance
          suite.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Best Regards,</div>
        <div>Takahiko Kawasaki</div>
        <div>Authlete, Inc.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:5=
9
          AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov &lt;<a
            href=3D"mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com" target=3D"_blank"
            moz-do-not-send=3D"true">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=

          <div>
            <p>Hi Taka,<br>
            </p>
            <div>On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <div dir=3D"ltr">If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization=

                Request) to relax the requirement of `response_type`
                request parameter (outside a request object) from
                mandatory to optional, should we relax the following
                requirement of `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC
                Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?<br>
                <br>
                ----------<br>
                Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request
                Object value, a scope parameter MUST always be passed
                using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the openid
                scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0
                logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.<br>
                ----------<br>
                <br>
                Otherwise, an authorization request like
                "client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D..." fails if the
                request object represents an OIDC request. An
                authorization request has to look like
                "client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&amp;scope=3Dopen=
id"
                (`scope` including `openid` has to be given) even if the
                authorization server conforms to JAR and allows omission
                of `response_type` request parameter.<br>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <p>The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a
              JAR compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec
              with its own style of request / request_uri parameter
              handling insofar as to not reject other query params (such
              as scope, etc). The difference is that according to JAR
              their values cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But
              what can be reasonably done is to detect scope=3Dopenid as
              you say and then switch to OIDC style request object
              behavior.</p>
            <p><a
                href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsr=
eq-30#section-5"
                target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://tools.=
ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5</a><br>
            </p>
            <p> </p>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <pre>   The client MAY send the parameters included in the =
request object
   duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
   compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
   specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
   object.</pre>
            </blockquote>
            <p>The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen
              that the request objects in OIDC and JAR have different
              objectives.</p>
            <p>In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected
              parameters.</p>
            <p>In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz
              request.<br>
            </p>
            <p><br>
            </p>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
                I think that implementers want to know consensus on this
                because it affects implementations. Has this been
                discussed yet?<br>
                <br>
                Best Regards,<br>
                Takahiko Kawasaki<br>
                Authlete, Inc.</div>
            </blockquote>
            <p><br>
            </p>
            <p>Vladimir</p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 23:07:50 +0900
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To: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [JAR] scope parameter outside request object of OIDC request
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--00000000000063db0805b00fbaf1
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Hi Vladimir,

Just FYI. To be exact, FAPI (version 1) Part 1 (Read-Only) does not require
all request parameters be put duplicately in a request object. It is FAPI
(version 1) Part 2 (Read-Write) (Section 5.2.2
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-part-2-ID2.html#authorization-server>
Clause 10) that has the requirement. In the context of FAPI Part 1, a
request object does not have to be used. One more note is that parameters
inside a request object and parameters outside a request object are merged
(as they are in OIDC Core 1.0) when the authorization request is being made
for FAPI Read-Only APIs (not for FAPI Read-Write APIs).

Taka


On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 7:14 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
wrote:

> Hi Taka,
>
> Speaking of the OIDC Core 1.0 conformance tests, IMO those should not
> change with the publication of JAR.
>
> Speaking of the FAPI 1.0 tests, those already require all request
> parameters to be JWT-secured, which makes the requests also JAR compliant:
> all parameters are found in the JWT, with scope (as complete scope or
> minimally required scope=openid), response_type, client_id and redirect_uri
> also having a copy outside the JWT, as query parameters. Thus the request
> is OIDC as well as JAR compliant.
>
> If I had an RP I would always construct OIDC auth requests like that, to
> make sure they comply with OIDC as well as the new JAR spec (and will not
> have issues with servers which implement both specs but are not able to
> "switch" behavior for some reason).
>
> Vladimir
> On 23/09/2020 14:58, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>
> Hi Vladimir,
>
> Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is "`scope` request
> parameter must exist outside the request object even if JAR applies if the
> authorization request is an OIDC request". I'm on the fence on this topic
> and just wondered whether those who had wanted to remove `response_type`
> outside the request object (although doing it was a breaking change) would
> want to remove `scope` outside the request object too with the same
> motivation (although I don't remember well what was the motivation). JAR
> dares to drop `response_type`, so it would not be surprising to see that
> JAR dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) too.
>
> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows omission of the
> parameter if the parameter is included in the request object.
>
> If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:
>
> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but JAR allows
> omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the request
> object.
>
> In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has modified OIDC
> Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed to go so far as that point,
> I would say it is difficult to find a convincing reason not to allow
> omission of `scope`.
>
> AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are required to
> exist outside a request object even if they are included in the request
> object are `client_id`, `response_type` and `scope`. Because `client_id` is
> mandatory in JAR (it has become mandatory after long discussion),
> discussion for the parameter is not needed. Because the community has
> already reached consensus that `response_type` can be omitted, discussion
> for the parameter is not needed, either. What I've brought here is
> discussion for `scope`, hopefully the last parameter that is affected by
> JAR.
>
> Again, I'm on the fence on this topic. However, because logical conclusion
> (at least of mine) is that JAR should allow omission of `scope` (it also
> should be noted that JAR's basic rule prohibits referring to request
> parameters outside a request object), I want to see explicit consensus if
> `scope` (including `openid`) outside a request object is still required
> even after JAR is enabled.
>
> In short, my question is "Should `scope` be omitted?" I guess that the
> conclusion will affect the official conformance suite.
>
> Best Regards,
> Takahiko Kawasaki
> Authlete, Inc.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <
> vladimir@connect2id.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Taka,
>> On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>>
>> If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to relax the
>> requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a request object)
>> from mandatory to optional, should we relax the following requirement of
>> `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?
>>
>> ----------
>> Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object value, a scope
>> parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax
>> containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0
>> logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
>> ----------
>>
>> Otherwise, an authorization request like
>> "client_id=...&request(_uri)=..." fails if the request object represents an
>> OIDC request. An authorization request has to look like
>> "client_id=...&request(_uri)=...&scope=openid" (`scope` including `openid`
>> has to be given) even if the authorization server conforms to JAR and
>> allows omission of `response_type` request parameter.
>>
>> The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR compliant
>> server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own style of request /
>> request_uri parameter handling insofar as to not reject other query params
>> (such as scope, etc). The difference is that according to JAR their values
>> cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But what can be reasonably done is
>> to detect scope=openid as you say and then switch to OIDC style request
>> object behavior.
>>
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5
>>
>>    The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object
>>    duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
>>    compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
>>    specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
>>    object.
>>
>> The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen that the
>> request objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.
>>
>> In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected parameters.
>>
>> In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.
>>
>>
>>
>> I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because it
>> affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Takahiko Kawasaki
>> Authlete, Inc.
>>
>>
>> Vladimir
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--00000000000063db0805b00fbaf1
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Vladimir,<div><br></div><div>Just FYI. To be exact, FAP=
I (version 1) Part 1 (Read-Only) does not require all request parameters be=
 put duplicately in a request object. It is FAPI (version 1) Part 2 (Read-W=
rite) (<a href=3D"https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-part-2-ID2.=
html#authorization-server">Section 5.2.2</a> Clause 10) that has the requir=
ement. In the context of FAPI Part 1, a request object does not have to be =
used. One more note is that parameters inside a request object and paramete=
rs outside a request object are merged (as they are in OIDC Core 1.0) when =
the authorization request is being made for FAPI Read-Only APIs (not for FA=
PI Read-Write APIs).</div><div><br></div><div>Taka</div><div><br></div></di=
v><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On T=
hu, Sep 24, 2020 at 7:14 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:vladim=
ir@connect2id.com">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>Hi Taka,</p>
    <p>Speaking of the OIDC Core 1.0 conformance tests, IMO those should
      not change with the publication of JAR.</p>
    <p>Speaking of the FAPI 1.0 tests, those already require all request
      parameters to be JWT-secured, which makes the requests also JAR
      compliant: all parameters are found in the JWT, with scope (as
      complete scope or minimally required scope=3Dopenid), response_type,
      client_id and redirect_uri also having a copy outside the JWT, as
      query parameters. Thus the request is OIDC as well as JAR
      compliant.<br>
    </p>
    <p>If I had an RP I would always construct OIDC auth requests like
      that, to make sure they comply with OIDC as well as the new JAR
      spec (and will not have issues with servers which implement both
      specs but are not able to &quot;switch&quot; behavior for some reason=
).<br>
    </p>
    <p>Vladimir<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 23/09/2020 14:58, Takahiko Kawasaki
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Vladimir,
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is
          &quot;`scope` request parameter must exist outside the request
          object even if JAR applies if the authorization request is an
          OIDC request&quot;. I&#39;m on the fence on this topic and just
          wondered whether those who had wanted to remove
          `response_type` outside the request object (although doing it
          was a breaking change) would want to remove `scope` outside
          the request object too with the same motivation (although I
          don&#39;t remember well what was the motivation). JAR dares to
          drop `response_type`, so it would not be surprising to see
          that JAR dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) too.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows
          omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the
          request object.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but
          JAR allows omission of the parameter if the parameter is
          included in the request object.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has
          modified OIDC Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed
          to go so far as that point, I would say it is difficult to
          find a convincing reason not to allow omission of `scope`.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are
          required to exist outside a request object even if they are
          included in the request object are `client_id`,
          `response_type` and `scope`. Because `client_id` is mandatory
          in JAR (it has become mandatory after long=C2=A0discussion),
          discussion for the parameter is not needed. Because the
          community has already reached consensus that `response_type`
          can be omitted, discussion for the parameter is not needed,
          either. What I&#39;ve brought here is discussion for `scope`,
          hopefully the last parameter that is affected by JAR.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Again, I&#39;m on the fence on=C2=A0this topic. However, becau=
se
          logical conclusion (at least of mine) is that JAR should allow
          omission of `scope` (it also should be noted that JAR&#39;s basic
          rule prohibits referring to request parameters outside a
          request object), I want to see explicit consensus if `scope`
          (including `openid`) outside a request object is still
          required even after JAR is enabled.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>In short, my question is &quot;Should `scope` be omitted?&quot=
; I
          guess that the conclusion will affect the official conformance
          suite.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Best Regards,</div>
        <div>Takahiko Kawasaki</div>
        <div>Authlete, Inc.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59
          AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:vladimir@connect2id.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div>
            <p>Hi Taka,<br>
            </p>
            <div>On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <div dir=3D"ltr">If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization
                Request) to relax the requirement of `response_type`
                request parameter (outside a request object) from
                mandatory to optional, should we relax the following
                requirement of `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC
                Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?<br>
                <br>
                ----------<br>
                Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request
                Object value, a scope parameter MUST always be passed
                using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the openid
                scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0
                logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.<br>
                ----------<br>
                <br>
                Otherwise, an authorization request like
                &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&quot; fails i=
f the
                request object represents an OIDC request. An
                authorization request has to look like
                &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&amp;scope=3Do=
penid&quot;
                (`scope` including `openid` has to be given) even if the
                authorization server conforms to JAR and allows omission
                of `response_type` request parameter.<br>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <p>The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a
              JAR compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec
              with its own style of request / request_uri parameter
              handling insofar as to not reject other query params (such
              as scope, etc). The difference is that according to JAR
              their values cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But
              what can be reasonably done is to detect scope=3Dopenid as
              you say and then switch to OIDC style request object
              behavior.</p>
            <p><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsr=
eq-30#section-5" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-o=
auth-jwsreq-30#section-5</a><br>
            </p>
            <p> </p>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <pre>   The client MAY send the parameters included in the re=
quest object
   duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
   compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
   specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
   object.</pre>
            </blockquote>
            <p>The confusion between the two specs clears when it&#39;s see=
n
              that the request objects in OIDC and JAR have different
              objectives.</p>
            <p>In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected
              parameters.</p>
            <p>In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz
              request.<br>
            </p>
            <p><br>
            </p>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
                I think that implementers want to know consensus on this
                because it affects implementations. Has this been
                discussed yet?<br>
                <br>
                Best Regards,<br>
                Takahiko Kawasaki<br>
                Authlete, Inc.</div>
            </blockquote>
            <p><br>
            </p>
            <p>Vladimir</p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000063db0805b00fbaf1--


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Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at

<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2020-09-24
IETF LC End Date: 2020-10-02
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat

Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard

Major issues: N/A

Minor issues: N/A

Nits/editorial comments:  N/A




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From: Yakov Shafranovich <yakov@nightwatchcybersecurity.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 10:04:03 -0400
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Clarification on validation of the "x5c" parameter in JWKS
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Hi,

I am trying to reconcile the security guidance provided by RFC 7517
and RFC 8725. My question is how to validate a key received from a
JWKS endpoint if it contains a "x5c" parameter. In RFC 8725, section
3.8 it states:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725.html#name-validate-issuer-and-subject

"When a JWT contains an "iss" (issuer) claim, the application MUST
validate that the cryptographic keys used for the cryptographic
operations in the JWT belong to the issuer. If they do not, the
application MUST reject the JWT.

The means of determining the keys owned by an issuer is
application-specific. As one example, OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]
issuer values are "https" URLs that reference a JSON metadata document
that contains a "jwks_uri" value that is an "https" URL from which the
issuer's keys are retrieved as a JWK Set [RFC7517]. This same
mechanism is used by [RFC8414]. Other applications may use different
means of binding keys to issuers."

However, RFC 7517, section 9.1 states:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517#section-9

"For instance, the creator of a JWK can include a PKIX certificate in
the JWK's "x5c" member.  If the application validates the certificate
and verifies that the JWK corresponds to the subject public key in the
certificate, then the JWK can be associated with the attributes in the
certificate, such as the subject name, subject alternative   names,
extended key usages, and its signature chain."

My confusion is due to the fact that there are two certificates that
are in play here:
- Certificate A: used to secure the TLS connection for the JWKS endpoint
- Certificate B: used within the "x5c" attribute of the key within JWKS

The two examples in RFC 8725 seem to imply that it is sufficient to
validate the subject name of "certificate A" against the  "jwks_uri"
then trust the key material. However, in RFC 7517, it seems that
"certificate B" needs to be validated as well but it doesn't say how
to verify that "the JWK corresponds to the subject public key in the
certificate".

Thank you


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From: Watson Ladd via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/X6Bpd7jQvLvQ_LUScXe0T3jNZPA>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30
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Reviewer: Watson Ladd
Review result: Serious Issues

I generated this review of this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written with the intent of improving security requirements and
considerations in IETF drafts.  Comments not addressed in last call may be
included in AD reviews during the IESG review.  Document editors and WG chairs
should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

Two minor issues: On page 4, "This offers an additional degree of privacy
protection." should be reworded. I don't think it makes sense in context, where
authenticity was discussed.

It took me a while to understand what the by reference method is: maybe the
intro should say via URL instead of by reference.

And now for the thorny isssues with this draft. Signatures and encryption are
different. And encrypting a signed blob doesn't mean the signer encrypted it.
Then there are a plethora of methods specified in the draft  to authenticate
the blob, which will give different results in maliciously constructed
examples. The security considerations section should discuss what the encrypted
vs signed choices give in the way of security, and it doesn't. This makes me
worry.

Looking at the cited reference for attacks, I see the fix is to include
information about which IPD was used by the RP. But the draft before us doesn't
mandate that. It's not clear than how the cited attack is prevented by the
draft. Saying that the communication through the user-agent is subject to
manipulation, and this prevents it, ignores that the attacker in that position
sees a lot more. The user-agent as resource owner modifying the requested
resources is a very funny sort of attack: can't they do what they want with the
resources since they control the access?

Key management is ignored. This is a very important issue, especially
considering the potential problems with the reuse of JWT. I'd like to see a
recommendation that keys be separated by intended uses, rather than limiting
particular fields in an ad-hoc manner.

Then we have section 11. What section 11 introduces is an entire new dramatis
personae, the Trust Framework Provider, with no prior discussion of what it is
or a reference to where it is defined and a good number of statements about how
it works that aren't really  clear what they mean from the document to me.

My biggest concern is that these issues are signs that the problem this draft
is trying to solve and the mechanisms to solve it haven't been analyzed as
thoroughly as they should have been. Without that sort of thorough analysis
it's not certain that the mechanisms actually solve the problem and it's not
clear what the recommendations to implementors have to be to preserve those
properties.

Obviously this draft has had a long and tortured history with multiple reviews,
 and what I'm suggesting needs to happen is a lot of work. But it's essential
in any security protocol to do this analysis and be clear about what is, and
what is not, protected by the protocol.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd



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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2020 21:45:56 +0900
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30
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>And now for the thorny isssues with this draft. Signatures and encryption
are different. And encrypting a signed blob doesn't mean the signer
encrypted it.

Who encrypts data doesn't matter. Especially, when the encryption algorithm
is asymmetric, anyone who has a "public" key, which anyone can get, can
encrypt data. What matters is who can decrypt the encrypted data. It is
only the party who has the corresponding "private" key that can decrypt the
encrypted data.

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki

On Sat, Sep 26, 2020 at 9:47 AM Watson Ladd via Datatracker <
noreply@ietf.org> wrote:

> Reviewer: Watson Ladd
> Review result: Serious Issues
>
> I generated this review of this document as part of the security
> directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
> These
> comments were written with the intent of improving security requirements
> and
> considerations in IETF drafts.  Comments not addressed in last call may be
> included in AD reviews during the IESG review.  Document editors and WG
> chairs
> should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.
>
> Two minor issues: On page 4, "This offers an additional degree of privacy
> protection." should be reworded. I don't think it makes sense in context,
> where
> authenticity was discussed.
>
> It took me a while to understand what the by reference method is: maybe the
> intro should say via URL instead of by reference.
>
> And now for the thorny isssues with this draft. Signatures and encryption
> are
> different. And encrypting a signed blob doesn't mean the signer encrypted
> it.
> Then there are a plethora of methods specified in the draft  to
> authenticate
> the blob, which will give different results in maliciously constructed
> examples. The security considerations section should discuss what the
> encrypted
> vs signed choices give in the way of security, and it doesn't. This makes
> me
> worry.
>
> Looking at the cited reference for attacks, I see the fix is to include
> information about which IPD was used by the RP. But the draft before us
> doesn't
> mandate that. It's not clear than how the cited attack is prevented by the
> draft. Saying that the communication through the user-agent is subject to
> manipulation, and this prevents it, ignores that the attacker in that
> position
> sees a lot more. The user-agent as resource owner modifying the requested
> resources is a very funny sort of attack: can't they do what they want
> with the
> resources since they control the access?
>
> Key management is ignored. This is a very important issue, especially
> considering the potential problems with the reuse of JWT. I'd like to see a
> recommendation that keys be separated by intended uses, rather than
> limiting
> particular fields in an ad-hoc manner.
>
> Then we have section 11. What section 11 introduces is an entire new
> dramatis
> personae, the Trust Framework Provider, with no prior discussion of what
> it is
> or a reference to where it is defined and a good number of statements
> about how
> it works that aren't really  clear what they mean from the document to me.
>
> My biggest concern is that these issues are signs that the problem this
> draft
> is trying to solve and the mechanisms to solve it haven't been analyzed as
> thoroughly as they should have been. Without that sort of thorough analysis
> it's not certain that the mechanisms actually solve the problem and it's
> not
> clear what the recommendations to implementors have to be to preserve those
> properties.
>
> Obviously this draft has had a long and tortured history with multiple
> reviews,
>  and what I'm suggesting needs to happen is a lot of work. But it's
> essential
> in any security protocol to do this analysis and be clear about what is,
> and
> what is not, protected by the protocol.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--00000000000029f12905b036d10f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;And now for the thorny isssues with this draft. Signat=
ures and encryption are different. And encrypting a signed blob doesn&#39;t=
 mean the signer encrypted it.<br><div><br></div><div>Who encrypts data doe=
sn&#39;t matter. Especially, when the encryption algorithm is asymmetric, a=
nyone who has a &quot;public&quot; key, which anyone can get, can encrypt d=
ata. What matters is who can decrypt the encrypted data. It is only the par=
ty who has the corresponding &quot;private&quot; key that can decrypt the e=
ncrypted data.</div><div><br></div><div>Best Regards,</div><div>Takahiko Ka=
wasaki</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"=
gmail_attr">On Sat, Sep 26, 2020 at 9:47 AM Watson Ladd via Datatracker &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:noreply@ietf.org">noreply@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Reviewer: Watson Ladd<=
br>
Review result: Serious Issues<br>
<br>
I generated this review of this document as part of the security directorat=
e&#39;s<br>
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.=C2=
=A0 These<br>
comments were written with the intent of improving security requirements an=
d<br>
considerations in IETF drafts.=C2=A0 Comments not addressed in last call ma=
y be<br>
included in AD reviews during the IESG review.=C2=A0 Document editors and W=
G chairs<br>
should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.<br>
<br>
Two minor issues: On page 4, &quot;This offers an additional degree of priv=
acy<br>
protection.&quot; should be reworded. I don&#39;t think it makes sense in c=
ontext, where<br>
authenticity was discussed.<br>
<br>
It took me a while to understand what the by reference method is: maybe the=
<br>
intro should say via URL instead of by reference.<br>
<br>
And now for the thorny isssues with this draft. Signatures and encryption a=
re<br>
different. And encrypting a signed blob doesn&#39;t mean the signer encrypt=
ed it.<br>
Then there are a plethora of methods specified in the draft=C2=A0 to authen=
ticate<br>
the blob, which will give different results in maliciously constructed<br>
examples. The security considerations section should discuss what the encry=
pted<br>
vs signed choices give in the way of security, and it doesn&#39;t. This mak=
es me<br>
worry.<br>
<br>
Looking at the cited reference for attacks, I see the fix is to include<br>
information about which IPD was used by the RP. But the draft before us doe=
sn&#39;t<br>
mandate that. It&#39;s not clear than how the cited attack is prevented by =
the<br>
draft. Saying that the communication through the user-agent is subject to<b=
r>
manipulation, and this prevents it, ignores that the attacker in that posit=
ion<br>
sees a lot more. The user-agent as resource owner modifying the requested<b=
r>
resources is a very funny sort of attack: can&#39;t they do what they want =
with the<br>
resources since they control the access?<br>
<br>
Key management is ignored. This is a very important issue, especially<br>
considering the potential problems with the reuse of JWT. I&#39;d like to s=
ee a<br>
recommendation that keys be separated by intended uses, rather than limitin=
g<br>
particular fields in an ad-hoc manner.<br>
<br>
Then we have section 11. What section 11 introduces is an entire new dramat=
is<br>
personae, the Trust Framework Provider, with no prior discussion of what it=
 is<br>
or a reference to where it is defined and a good number of statements about=
 how<br>
it works that aren&#39;t really=C2=A0 clear what they mean from the documen=
t to me.<br>
<br>
My biggest concern is that these issues are signs that the problem this dra=
ft<br>
is trying to solve and the mechanisms to solve it haven&#39;t been analyzed=
 as<br>
thoroughly as they should have been. Without that sort of thorough analysis=
<br>
it&#39;s not certain that the mechanisms actually solve the problem and it&=
#39;s not<br>
clear what the recommendations to implementors have to be to preserve those=
<br>
properties.<br>
<br>
Obviously this draft has had a long and tortured history with multiple revi=
ews,<br>
=C2=A0and what I&#39;m suggesting needs to happen is a lot of work. But it&=
#39;s essential<br>
in any security protocol to do this analysis and be clear about what is, an=
d<br>
what is not, protected by the protocol.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
Watson Ladd<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000029f12905b036d10f--


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] oauth - Not having a session at IETF 109
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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 14:21:25 +0900
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [JAR] scope parameter outside request object of OIDC request
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So, my suggestion is "When JAR compatible behaviors are employed, AS
implementations should not require that an OIDC request come with `scope`
query/form parameter when the request uses a request object." (NOTE: "an
OIDC request" implies that the request object contains `scope` including
`openid`.)

Any thoughts?

Taka

On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 11:07 PM Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
wrote:

> Hi Vladimir,
>
> Just FYI. To be exact, FAPI (version 1) Part 1 (Read-Only) does not
> require all request parameters be put duplicately in a request object. It
> is FAPI (version 1) Part 2 (Read-Write) (Section 5.2.2
> <https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-part-2-ID2.html#authorization-server>
> Clause 10) that has the requirement. In the context of FAPI Part 1, a
> request object does not have to be used. One more note is that parameters
> inside a request object and parameters outside a request object are merged
> (as they are in OIDC Core 1.0) when the authorization request is being made
> for FAPI Read-Only APIs (not for FAPI Read-Write APIs).
>
> Taka
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 7:14 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <
> vladimir@connect2id.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Taka,
>>
>> Speaking of the OIDC Core 1.0 conformance tests, IMO those should not
>> change with the publication of JAR.
>>
>> Speaking of the FAPI 1.0 tests, those already require all request
>> parameters to be JWT-secured, which makes the requests also JAR compliant:
>> all parameters are found in the JWT, with scope (as complete scope or
>> minimally required scope=openid), response_type, client_id and redirect_uri
>> also having a copy outside the JWT, as query parameters. Thus the request
>> is OIDC as well as JAR compliant.
>>
>> If I had an RP I would always construct OIDC auth requests like that, to
>> make sure they comply with OIDC as well as the new JAR spec (and will not
>> have issues with servers which implement both specs but are not able to
>> "switch" behavior for some reason).
>>
>> Vladimir
>> On 23/09/2020 14:58, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>>
>> Hi Vladimir,
>>
>> Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is "`scope` request
>> parameter must exist outside the request object even if JAR applies if the
>> authorization request is an OIDC request". I'm on the fence on this topic
>> and just wondered whether those who had wanted to remove `response_type`
>> outside the request object (although doing it was a breaking change) would
>> want to remove `scope` outside the request object too with the same
>> motivation (although I don't remember well what was the motivation). JAR
>> dares to drop `response_type`, so it would not be surprising to see that
>> JAR dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) too.
>>
>> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows omission of the
>> parameter if the parameter is included in the request object.
>>
>> If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:
>>
>> OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but JAR allows
>> omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the request
>> object.
>>
>> In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has modified OIDC
>> Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed to go so far as that point,
>> I would say it is difficult to find a convincing reason not to allow
>> omission of `scope`.
>>
>> AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are required to
>> exist outside a request object even if they are included in the request
>> object are `client_id`, `response_type` and `scope`. Because `client_id` is
>> mandatory in JAR (it has become mandatory after long discussion),
>> discussion for the parameter is not needed. Because the community has
>> already reached consensus that `response_type` can be omitted, discussion
>> for the parameter is not needed, either. What I've brought here is
>> discussion for `scope`, hopefully the last parameter that is affected by
>> JAR.
>>
>> Again, I'm on the fence on this topic. However, because logical
>> conclusion (at least of mine) is that JAR should allow omission of `scope`
>> (it also should be noted that JAR's basic rule prohibits referring to
>> request parameters outside a request object), I want to see explicit
>> consensus if `scope` (including `openid`) outside a request object is still
>> required even after JAR is enabled.
>>
>> In short, my question is "Should `scope` be omitted?" I guess that the
>> conclusion will affect the official conformance suite.
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Takahiko Kawasaki
>> Authlete, Inc.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov <
>> vladimir@connect2id.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Taka,
>>> On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>>>
>>> If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization Request) to relax the
>>> requirement of `response_type` request parameter (outside a request object)
>>> from mandatory to optional, should we relax the following requirement of
>>> `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?
>>>
>>> ----------
>>> Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object value, a
>>> scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax
>>> containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0
>>> logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
>>> ----------
>>>
>>> Otherwise, an authorization request like
>>> "client_id=...&request(_uri)=..." fails if the request object represents an
>>> OIDC request. An authorization request has to look like
>>> "client_id=...&request(_uri)=...&scope=openid" (`scope` including `openid`
>>> has to be given) even if the authorization server conforms to JAR and
>>> allows omission of `response_type` request parameter.
>>>
>>> The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a JAR compliant
>>> server to also comply with the OIDC spec with its own style of request /
>>> request_uri parameter handling insofar as to not reject other query params
>>> (such as scope, etc). The difference is that according to JAR their values
>>> cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But what can be reasonably done is
>>> to detect scope=openid as you say and then switch to OIDC style request
>>> object behavior.
>>>
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-30#section-5
>>>
>>>    The client MAY send the parameters included in the request object
>>>    duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
>>>    compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
>>>    specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
>>>    object.
>>>
>>> The confusion between the two specs clears when it's seen that the
>>> request objects in OIDC and JAR have different objectives.
>>>
>>> In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected parameters.
>>>
>>> In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz request.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that implementers want to know consensus on this because it
>>> affects implementations. Has this been discussed yet?
>>>
>>> Best Regards,
>>> Takahiko Kawasaki
>>> Authlete, Inc.
>>>
>>>
>>> Vladimir
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">So, my suggestion is &quot;When JAR compa=
tible behaviors are employed, AS implementations should not require that an=
 OIDC request come with `scope` query/form parameter when the request uses =
a request object.&quot; (NOTE: &quot;an OIDC request&quot; implies that the=
 request object contains `scope` including `openid`.)<br><br>Any thoughts?<=
br></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div>Taka</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 11:07 =
PM Takahiko Kawasaki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:taka@authlete.com">taka@authlete=
.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Vladimir,<div><br></div><div>Just FYI. To be exact,=
 FAPI (version 1) Part 1 (Read-Only) does not require all request parameter=
s be put duplicately in a request object. It is FAPI (version 1) Part 2 (Re=
ad-Write) (<a href=3D"https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-part-2-=
ID2.html#authorization-server" target=3D"_blank">Section 5.2.2</a> Clause 1=
0) that has the requirement. In the context of FAPI Part 1, a request objec=
t does not have to be used. One more note is that parameters inside a reque=
st object and parameters outside a request object are merged (as they are i=
n OIDC Core 1.0) when the authorization request is being made for FAPI Read=
-Only APIs (not for FAPI Read-Write APIs).</div><div><br></div><div>Taka</d=
iv><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cla=
ss=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 7:14 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com" target=3D"_blank">vladimir@connect=
2id.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>Hi Taka,</p>
    <p>Speaking of the OIDC Core 1.0 conformance tests, IMO those should
      not change with the publication of JAR.</p>
    <p>Speaking of the FAPI 1.0 tests, those already require all request
      parameters to be JWT-secured, which makes the requests also JAR
      compliant: all parameters are found in the JWT, with scope (as
      complete scope or minimally required scope=3Dopenid), response_type,
      client_id and redirect_uri also having a copy outside the JWT, as
      query parameters. Thus the request is OIDC as well as JAR
      compliant.<br>
    </p>
    <p>If I had an RP I would always construct OIDC auth requests like
      that, to make sure they comply with OIDC as well as the new JAR
      spec (and will not have issues with servers which implement both
      specs but are not able to &quot;switch&quot; behavior for some reason=
).<br>
    </p>
    <p>Vladimir<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 23/09/2020 14:58, Takahiko Kawasaki
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Vladimir,
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Thank you for your reply. It sounds that your opinion is
          &quot;`scope` request parameter must exist outside the request
          object even if JAR applies if the authorization request is an
          OIDC request&quot;. I&#39;m on the fence on this topic and just
          wondered whether those who had wanted to remove
          `response_type` outside the request object (although doing it
          was a breaking change) would want to remove `scope` outside
          the request object too with the same motivation (although I
          don&#39;t remember well what was the motivation). JAR dares to
          drop `response_type`, so it would not be surprising to see
          that JAR dares to drop `scope` (including `openid`) too.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>OIDC Core 1.0 requires `response_type`, but JAR allows
          omission of the parameter if the parameter is included in the
          request object.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>If we applied the same logic, we would be able to state:</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>OIDC Core 1.0 requires `scope` (including `openid`), but
          JAR allows omission of the parameter if the parameter is
          included in the request object.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>In terms of `response_type`, practically speaking, JAR has
          modified OIDC Core 1.0. Because JAR has already been allowed
          to go so far as that point, I would say it is difficult to
          find a convincing reason not to allow omission of `scope`.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>AFAIK, in the context of OIDC Core 1.0, parameters that are
          required to exist outside a request object even if they are
          included in the request object are `client_id`,
          `response_type` and `scope`. Because `client_id` is mandatory
          in JAR (it has become mandatory after long=C2=A0discussion),
          discussion for the parameter is not needed. Because the
          community has already reached consensus that `response_type`
          can be omitted, discussion for the parameter is not needed,
          either. What I&#39;ve brought here is discussion for `scope`,
          hopefully the last parameter that is affected by JAR.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Again, I&#39;m on the fence on=C2=A0this topic. However, becau=
se
          logical conclusion (at least of mine) is that JAR should allow
          omission of `scope` (it also should be noted that JAR&#39;s basic
          rule prohibits referring to request parameters outside a
          request object), I want to see explicit consensus if `scope`
          (including `openid`) outside a request object is still
          required even after JAR is enabled.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>In short, my question is &quot;Should `scope` be omitted?&quot=
; I
          guess that the conclusion will affect the official conformance
          suite.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Best Regards,</div>
        <div>Takahiko Kawasaki</div>
        <div>Authlete, Inc.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 5:59
          AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:vladimir@connect2id.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div>
            <p>Hi Taka,<br>
            </p>
            <div>On 21/09/2020 20:12, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <div dir=3D"ltr">If we allow JAR (JWT Secured Authorization
                Request) to relax the requirement of `response_type`
                request parameter (outside a request object) from
                mandatory to optional, should we relax the following
                requirement of `scope` request parameter stated in OIDC
                Core 1.0 Section 6.1, too?<br>
                <br>
                ----------<br>
                Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request
                Object value, a scope parameter MUST always be passed
                using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the openid
                scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0
                logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.<br>
                ----------<br>
                <br>
                Otherwise, an authorization request like
                &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&quot; fails i=
f the
                request object represents an OIDC request. An
                authorization request has to look like
                &quot;client_id=3D...&amp;request(_uri)=3D...&amp;scope=3Do=
penid&quot;
                (`scope` including `openid` has to be given) even if the
                authorization server conforms to JAR and allows omission
                of `response_type` request parameter.<br>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <p>The bottom of section 5 has normative text which allows a
              JAR compliant server to also comply with the OIDC spec
              with its own style of request / request_uri parameter
              handling insofar as to not reject other query params (such
              as scope, etc). The difference is that according to JAR
              their values cannot be used or merged (as in OIDC). But
              what can be reasonably done is to detect scope=3Dopenid as
              you say and then switch to OIDC style request object
              behavior.</p>
            <p><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsr=
eq-30#section-5" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-o=
auth-jwsreq-30#section-5</a><br>
            </p>
            <p> </p>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <pre>   The client MAY send the parameters included in the re=
quest object
   duplicated in the query parameters as well for the backward
   compatibility etc.  However, the authorization server supporting this
   specification MUST only use the parameters included in the request
   object.</pre>
            </blockquote>
            <p>The confusion between the two specs clears when it&#39;s see=
n
              that the request objects in OIDC and JAR have different
              objectives.</p>
            <p>In OIDC the objective is to enable securing of selected
              parameters.</p>
            <p>In JAR the objective is to secure the entire authz
              request.<br>
            </p>
            <p><br>
            </p>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
                I think that implementers want to know consensus on this
                because it affects implementations. Has this been
                discussed yet?<br>
                <br>
                Best Regards,<br>
                Takahiko Kawasaki<br>
                Authlete, Inc.</div>
            </blockquote>
            <p><br>
            </p>
            <p>Vladimir</p>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

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</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div></div>

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