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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 May 2021 16:46:57 -0400
Message-ID: <CADNypP_P=bdtSHmX0aM4eK4yw+8n9HYnnS6ERVdOC_x7U3spZw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/TYzDxhybOjfcP_VklRfSxmD5qA8>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
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All,

We have not seen any comments on this document.
Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate that
you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.

Regards,
 Rifaat & Hannes


On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> the latest version of the security BCP references
> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.
>
> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>
> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns with
> the current draft version.
>
> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully
> finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>
> Best regards,
> Karsten
>
> --
> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
> Senior IT Security Consultant
> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, =
Security Training
>
> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts o=
f mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post =
on single sign-on:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-yo=
ur-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
>
> Hackmanit GmbH
> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
> 44789 Bochum
>
> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>We have not seen any comments on t=
his document.</div><div>Can you please review the document and provide feed=
back, or indicate that you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.=
</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div=
><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de">karsten.meyerz=
uselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</font></font></=
p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the latest version of
          the security BCP references draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
          as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There have not been any
          concerns with the first WG draft version so far:
          <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-=
auth-resp/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-o=
auth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br>
        </font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would like to ask the
          WG if there are any comments on or concerns with the current
          draft version.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise I hope we can
          move forward with the next steps and hopefully finish the
          draft before/with the security BCP.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best regards,<br>
          Karsten</font></font></p>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.d=
e</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of =
mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on=
 single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oaut=
h-client-against-mix-up-attacks" target=3D"_blank">https://www.hackmanit.de=
/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From nobody Mon May  3 05:59:54 2021
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP
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Hi Rifaat,

If you=E2=80=99d like to keep the current mondays-at-noon-ET schedule I =
can support that. Any Monday this month would work for me, and I=E2=80=99v=
e reached out to Annabelle so hopefully she can join as well. I don=E2=80=99=
t know if I=E2=80=99d be able to have the rewrite of the OAuth PoP draft =
in hand by any of those dates, but the concept is straightforward enough =
to discuss with or without a draft.

Thanks,
 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On Apr 29, 2021, at 2:51 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef =
<rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi Justin,
>=20
> Thanks for the update on this,
> We would be happy to schedule an interim meeting to discuss this.=20
> Do you have a date in mind?
>=20
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 11:34 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu =
<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> Many of you will remember an old draft that I was the editor of that =
defined OAuth proof of possession methods using HTTP Message Signing. =
When writing that draft I invented my own scheme because there wasn=E2=80=99=
t an existing HTTP message signature standard that was robust enough for =
our use cases. I=E2=80=99m happy to say that the landscape has changed: =
Annabelle Backman and I have been working in the HTTP Working Group on =
HTTP Message Signatures, a general-purpose HTTP signing draft with a lot =
of power and a lot of flexibility. There=E2=80=99s even a relatively =
straightforward way to map JOSE-defined signature algorithms into this =
(even though, to be clear, it is not JOSE-based). The current draft is =
here:
>=20
> =
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.h=
tml =
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.=
html>
>=20
> This draft has gone through a lot of change in the last few months, =
but we, the editors, believe that it=E2=80=99s at a fairly stable place =
in terms of the core functioning of the protocol now. It=E2=80=99s not =
finished yet, but we think that any changes that come from here will be =
smaller in scope, more of a cleanup and clarification than the deep =
invasive surgery that has happened up until now.
>=20
> One of the things about this draft is that, on its own, it is not =
sufficient for a security protocol. By design it needs some additional =
details on where to get key materials, how to negotiate algorithms, what =
fields need to be covered by the signature, etc. I am proposing that we =
in the OAuth WG replace the long-since-expired OAuth PoP working group =
draft with a new document based on HTTP Message Signatures. I believe =
that this document can be relatively short and to the point, given that =
much of the mechanics would be defined in the HTTP draft. If this is =
something we would like to do in the WG, I am volunteering to write the =
updated draft.
>=20
> I also want to be very clear that I still believe that this lives =
beside DPoP, and that DPoP should continue even as we pick this back up. =
In fact, I think that this work would take some pressure off of DPoP and =
allow it to be the streamlined point solution that it was originally =
intended to be.
>=20
> If the chairs would like, I would also be happy to discuss this at an =
interim meeting.
>=20
>  =E2=80=94 Justin
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
Rifaat,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If you=E2=80=99=
d like to keep the current mondays-at-noon-ET schedule I can support =
that. Any Monday this month would work for me, and I=E2=80=99ve reached =
out to Annabelle so hopefully she can join as well. I don=E2=80=99t know =
if I=E2=80=99d be able to have the rewrite of the OAuth PoP draft in =
hand by any of those dates, but the concept is straightforward enough to =
discuss with or without a draft.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=
=94 Justin<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Apr 29, 2021, at 2:51 PM, Rifaat =
Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hi =
Justin,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thanks for =
the update on this,</div><div class=3D"">We would be happy to schedule =
an interim meeting to discuss this.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D"">Do you =
have a date in mind?<br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Regards,</div><div =
class=3D"">&nbsp;Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""></div></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""></div></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr =
29, 2021 at 11:34 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" =
class=3D"">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: =
break-word;" class=3D"">Many of you will remember an old draft that I =
was the editor of that defined OAuth proof of possession methods using =
HTTP Message Signing. When writing that draft I invented my own scheme =
because there wasn=E2=80=99t an existing HTTP message signature standard =
that was robust enough for our use cases. I=E2=80=99m happy to say that =
the landscape has changed: Annabelle Backman and I have been working in =
the HTTP Working Group on HTTP Message Signatures, a general-purpose =
HTTP signing draft with a lot of power and a lot of flexibility. =
There=E2=80=99s even a relatively straightforward way to map =
JOSE-defined signature algorithms into this (even though, to be clear, =
it is not JOSE-based). The current draft is here:<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatu=
res-04.html" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-sign=
atures-04.html</a></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">This draft has gone through a lot of change in the last few =
months, but we, the editors, believe that it=E2=80=99s at a fairly =
stable place in terms of the core functioning of the protocol now. =
It=E2=80=99s not finished yet, but we think that any changes that come =
from here will be smaller in scope, more of a cleanup and clarification =
than the deep invasive surgery that has happened up until now.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">One of the things about =
this draft is that, on its own, it is not sufficient for a security =
protocol. By design it needs some additional details on where to get key =
materials, how to negotiate algorithms, what fields need to be covered =
by the signature, etc. I am proposing that we in the OAuth WG replace =
the long-since-expired OAuth PoP working group draft with a new document =
based on HTTP Message Signatures. I believe that this document can be =
relatively short and to the point, given that much of the mechanics =
would be defined in the HTTP draft. If this is something we would like =
to do in the WG, I am volunteering to write the updated draft.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I also want to be very =
clear that I still believe that this lives beside DPoP, and that DPoP =
should continue even as we pick this back up. In fact, I think that this =
work would take some pressure off of DPoP and allow it to be the =
streamlined point solution that it was originally intended to =
be.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If the =
chairs would like, I would also be happy to discuss this at an interim =
meeting.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 =
Justin</div></div>_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">
OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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All,

This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/

Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.

Regards,
 Rifaat & Hannes

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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>To=
ken Mediating and Session Information Backend for Frontend</b> as a WG docu=
ment:<br><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-=
tmi-bff/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</=
a><br><br>Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by <b>May 17th<=
/b>.<br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div>

--000000000000e6609005c1741421--


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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 07:39:53 -0700
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I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
=E1=90=A7

On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> All,
>
> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>
> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acrony=
m.</div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D=
"" style=3D"width:0px;max-height:0px;overflow:hidden" src=3D"https://mailfo=
ogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzero=
content&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"><font color=3D"#ff=
ffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shek=
h-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x"><div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b=
>Token Mediating and Session Information Backend for Frontend</b> as a WG d=
ocument:<br><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oaut=
h2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-berto=
cci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br><br>Please, provide your feedback on the mailing=
 list by <b>May 17th</b>.<br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br><=
/div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 08:03:06 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's common in
the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the
least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name of the
draft.

Aaron




On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:

> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
> =E1=90=A7
>
> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.co=
m>
> wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>
>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>
>> Regards,
>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
--=20
---
Aaron Parecki
https://aaronparecki.com

--000000000000bf140b05c18260fb
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<div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#39;m also fine with the BFF acrony=
m since it&#39;s common in the software development world already. If anyth=
ing, the TMI acronym is the least strong of the two as it&#39;s missing a l=
etter from the full name of the draft.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><di=
v dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br=
></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; w=
rote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supp=
ortive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.</div><div hspace=3D"streak=
-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width:0px;max-hei=
ght:0px;overflow:hidden" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3Da=
ZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7=
363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</f=
ont></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_at=
tr">On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Token Medi=
ating and Session Information Backend for Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br=
><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/=
" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-=
tmi-bff/</a><br><br>Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by <b=
>May 17th</b>.<br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" =
data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>---</div>Aaron Par=
ecki<div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blank">https://aar=
onparecki.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div>

--000000000000bf140b05c18260fb--


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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 08:25:36 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is what the document calls
Full BFF -- so what many readers will assume is BFF is not what the
document is referring to.
=E1=90=A7

On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:

> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's common
> in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym i=
s
> the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name o=
f
> the draft.
>
> Aaron
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>> =E1=90=A7
>>
>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> All,
>>>
>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>
>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> --
> ---
> Aaron Parecki
> https://aaronparecki.com
>
>

--000000000000c0f4ef05c182b2a1
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<div dir=3D"ltr">My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is what the=
 document calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will assume is BFF is not =
what the document is referring to.</div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" styl=
e=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width:0px;max-height:0px;overfl=
ow:hidden" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdE=
BnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D9335c13d-4f91-4815-ac17-=
41c29a932c91"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Ma=
y 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com"=
>aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#39;m also fine w=
ith the BFF acronym since it&#39;s common in the software development world=
 already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong of the two as it=
&#39;s missing a letter from the full name of the draft.</div><div dir=3D"a=
uto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><di=
v dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at =
7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_b=
lank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am con=
cerned with the BFF acronym.</div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"m=
ax-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow=
: hidden;" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdE=
BnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-=
771ee086d1bc"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Ma=
y 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf=
@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">All,<=
br><br>This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Token Mediating and Sess=
ion Information Backend for Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br><a href=3D"ht=
tps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_b=
lank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><b=
r><br>Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by <b>May 17th</b>.=
<br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>---<=
/div>Aaron Parecki<div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://aaronparecki.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div>

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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Se=C3=A1n_Kelleher?= <sean@trustap.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 16:27:48 +0100
Message-ID: <CAPLh0AME6QbiEOj5uJdyVaNxGaVYLhm7gtgCZj36zVmxO=+DJQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Cc: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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Hi all,

I'd like to hear others' take on Brock Allen's prior comment on the
document:

5) For me personally in all the consulting I've done helping customers use
> OIDC/OAuth over the past 7 years (since OIDC was released) I've never see=
n
> anyone trying to do it this way. I do believe that some people try this
> style, but I wonder if it's just because they don't know any better (so
> lacking guidance) or is it really because they're actively trying to
> mitigate the reverse proxy hop performance issue? If it's the former, the=
n
> I don't agree that it makes sense to formalize a less secure approach whe=
n
> they simply need better guidance (which arguably is the "full BFF"
> approach), and thus the motivation for the document is slightly weakened
> (IMO).


I don't have as much exposure to the way lots of different groups are
implementing OAuth2/OIDC but I agree that this approach is novel for me,
and I'd be interested to hear others' thoughts on that aspect before the
document is adopted.

Apologies if this is the wrong place to voice such a concern. I would still
be very much interested in a discourse about the relative security and
positives/negatives of this approach regardless of the outcome.

Kind regards,

Se=C3=A1n.

On Tue, 4 May 2021 at 16:03, Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:

> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's common
> in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym i=
s
> the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name o=
f
> the draft.
>
> Aaron
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>> =E1=90=A7
>>
>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> All,
>>>
>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>
>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> --
> ---
> Aaron Parecki
> https://aaronparecki.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi all,</div><div><br></div>I&#39;d like to hear othe=
rs&#39; take on Brock Allen&#39;s prior comment on the document:<div><br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">5) For me personally =
in all the consulting I&#39;ve done helping customers use OIDC/OAuth over t=
he past 7 years (since OIDC was released) I&#39;ve never seen anyone trying=
 to do it this way. I do believe that some people try this style, but I won=
der if it&#39;s just because they don&#39;t know any better (so lacking gui=
dance) or is it really because they&#39;re actively trying to mitigate the =
reverse proxy hop performance issue? If it&#39;s the former, then I don&#39=
;t agree that it makes sense to formalize a less secure approach when they =
simply need better guidance (which arguably is the &quot;full BFF&quot; app=
roach), and thus the motivation for the document is slightly weakened (IMO)=
.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t have as much exposure to the =
way lots of different groups are implementing OAuth2/OIDC but I agree that =
this approach is novel for me, and I&#39;d be interested to hear others&#39=
; thoughts on that aspect before the document is adopted.<br></div><div><br=
></div><div>Apologies if this is the wrong place to voice such a concern. I=
 would still be very much interested in a discourse about the relative secu=
rity and positives/negatives of this approach regardless of the outcome.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Kind=C2=A0regards,</div><div><br></div><div>Se=C3=A1=
n.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmai=
l_attr">On Tue, 4 May 2021 at 16:03, Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aa=
ron@parecki.com">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#=
39;m also fine with the BFF acronym since it&#39;s common in the software d=
evelopment world already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong =
of the two as it&#39;s missing a letter from the full name of the draft.</d=
iv><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div><div dir=3D"aut=
o"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue,=
 May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supporti=
ve -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.</div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-=
mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-heigh=
t: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=
=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b1=
76-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=
=A7</font></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gm=
ail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0p=
x 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Toke=
n Mediating and Session Information Backend for Frontend</b> as a WG docume=
nt:<br><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tm=
i-bff/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-o=
auth2-tmi-bff/</a><br><br>Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list=
 by <b>May 17th</b>.<br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>---<=
/div>Aaron Parecki<div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://aaronparecki.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 08:32:20 -0700
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To: =?UTF-8?Q?Se=C3=A1n_Kelleher?= <sean@trustap.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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I have made up my own implementations that follow the pattern in the
document.

It keeps the security in the server, and allows the app to call the API
directly rather than through a backend proxy, which impacts latency and CX.
=E1=90=A7

On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:27 AM Se=C3=A1n Kelleher <sean@trustap.com> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> I'd like to hear others' take on Brock Allen's prior comment on the
> document:
>
> 5) For me personally in all the consulting I've done helping customers us=
e
>> OIDC/OAuth over the past 7 years (since OIDC was released) I've never se=
en
>> anyone trying to do it this way. I do believe that some people try this
>> style, but I wonder if it's just because they don't know any better (so
>> lacking guidance) or is it really because they're actively trying to
>> mitigate the reverse proxy hop performance issue? If it's the former, th=
en
>> I don't agree that it makes sense to formalize a less secure approach wh=
en
>> they simply need better guidance (which arguably is the "full BFF"
>> approach), and thus the motivation for the document is slightly weakened
>> (IMO).
>
>
> I don't have as much exposure to the way lots of different groups are
> implementing OAuth2/OIDC but I agree that this approach is novel for me,
> and I'd be interested to hear others' thoughts on that aspect before the
> document is adopted.
>
> Apologies if this is the wrong place to voice such a concern. I would
> still be very much interested in a discourse about the relative security
> and positives/negatives of this approach regardless of the outcome.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Se=C3=A1n.
>
> On Tue, 4 May 2021 at 16:03, Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>
>> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's common
>> in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym =
is
>> the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name =
of
>> the draft.
>>
>> Aaron
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>>> =E1=90=A7
>>>
>>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> All,
>>>>
>>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>>
>>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> --
>> ---
>> Aaron Parecki
>> https://aaronparecki.com
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

--000000000000f486aa05c182caa4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I have made up my own implementations that follow the patt=
ern in the document.=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>It keeps the security in the =
server, and allows the app to call the API directly rather than through a b=
ackend proxy, which impacts latency and CX.</div></div><div hspace=3D"strea=
k-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width:0px;max-he=
ight:0px;overflow:hidden" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3D=
aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D33ff414f-=
32ea-427d-a8db-38bf862aeefa"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</=
font></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_a=
ttr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:27 AM Se=C3=A1n Kelleher &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:sean@trustap.com">sean@trustap.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi all,</div><div=
><br></div>I&#39;d like to hear others&#39; take on Brock Allen&#39;s prior=
 comment on the document:<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pad=
ding-left:1ex">5) For me personally in all the consulting I&#39;ve done hel=
ping customers use OIDC/OAuth over the past 7 years (since OIDC was release=
d) I&#39;ve never seen anyone trying to do it this way. I do believe that s=
ome people try this style, but I wonder if it&#39;s just because they don&#=
39;t know any better (so lacking guidance) or is it really because they&#39=
;re actively trying to mitigate the reverse proxy hop performance issue? If=
 it&#39;s the former, then I don&#39;t agree that it makes sense to formali=
ze a less secure approach when they simply need better guidance (which argu=
ably is the &quot;full BFF&quot; approach), and thus the motivation for the=
 document is slightly weakened (IMO).</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don=
&#39;t have as much exposure to the way lots of different groups are implem=
enting OAuth2/OIDC but I agree that this approach is novel for me, and I&#3=
9;d be interested to hear others&#39; thoughts on that aspect before the do=
cument is adopted.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Apologies if this is the wr=
ong place to voice such a concern. I would still be very much interested in=
 a discourse about the relative security and positives/negatives of this ap=
proach regardless of the outcome.</div><div><br></div><div>Kind=C2=A0regard=
s,</div><div><br></div><div>Se=C3=A1n.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, 4 May 2021 at 16:03, Aa=
ron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=3D"_blank">aaro=
n@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#39;m also fine with t=
he BFF acronym since it&#39;s common in the software development world alre=
ady. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong of the two as it&#39;=
s missing a letter from the full name of the draft.</div><div dir=3D"auto">=
<br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 =
AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am concerne=
d with the BFF acronym.</div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-he=
ight:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hid=
den;" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWF=
pbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee=
086d1bc"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, =
2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmai=
l.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><b=
r>This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Token Mediating and Session I=
nformation Backend for Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br><a href=3D"https:/=
/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_blank"=
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br><br=
>Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by <b>May 17th</b>.<br><=
br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>---<=
/div>Aaron Parecki<div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://aaronparecki.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000f486aa05c182caa4--


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To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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+1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA's so TMI-BFF is a 
badly branded name that will add confusion.

- Jim

On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:
> My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is what the document 
> calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will assume is BFF is not what 
> the document is referring to.
> ᐧ
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com 
> <mailto:aaron@parecki.com>> wrote:
>
>     I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's
>     common in the software development world already. If anything, the
>     TMI acronym is the least strong of the two as it's missing a
>     letter from the full name of the draft.
>
>     Aaron
>
>
>
>
>     On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com
>     <mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>         I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>         ᐧ
>
>         On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
>         <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>             All,
>
>             This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and
>             Session Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>             https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>             <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/>
>
>             Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May
>             17th*.
>
>             Regards,
>              Rifaat & Hannes
>             _______________________________________________
>             OAuth mailing list
>             OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>             https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>             <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         OAuth mailing list
>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>         <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>
>     -- 
>     ---
>     Aaron Parecki
>     https://aaronparecki.com <https://aaronparecki.com>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

-- 
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
https://www.manicode.com


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>+1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA's so TMI-BFF
      is a badly branded name that will add confusion.</p>
    <p>- Jim<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAD9ie-uBK8yhXY1a8nW1Q=62guk_hjJv8WCzzSKrn3MiwWKVqQ@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is
        what the document calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will
        assume is BFF is not what the document is referring to.</div>
      <div hspace="streak-pt-mark" style="max-height:1px"><img alt=""
          style="width:0px;max-height:0px;overflow:hidden"
src="https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=zerocontent&amp;guid=9335c13d-4f91-4815-ac17-41c29a932c91"
          moz-do-not-send="true"><font size="1" color="#ffffff">ᐧ</font></div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM
          Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href="mailto:aaron@parecki.com"
            moz-do-not-send="true">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir="auto">I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF
            acronym since it's common in the software development world
            already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong of
            the two as it's missing a letter from the full name of the
            draft.</div>
          <div dir="auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir="auto">Aaron</div>
          <div dir="auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir="auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir="auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div><br>
            <div class="gmail_quote">
              <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at
                7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a
                  href="mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target="_blank"
                  moz-do-not-send="true">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
                0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                <div dir="ltr">I'm supportive -- but am concerned with
                  the BFF acronym.</div>
                <div hspace="streak-pt-mark" style="max-height:1px"><img
                    alt="" style="width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow:
                    hidden;"
src="https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=zerocontent&amp;guid=7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"
                    moz-do-not-send="true"><font size="1"
                    color="#ffffff">ᐧ</font></div>
                <br>
                <div class="gmail_quote">
                  <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021
                    at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a
                      href="mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com"
                      target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                    wrote:<br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px
                    0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                    rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                    <div dir="ltr">All,<br>
                      <br>
                      This is a call for adoption for the <b>Token
                        Mediating and Session Information Backend for
                        Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br>
                      <a
                        href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list
                      by <b>May 17th</b>.<br>
                      <br>
                      Regards,<br>
                       Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________<br>
                    OAuth mailing list<br>
                    <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                      moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                    <a
                      href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                      rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
                      moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
                _______________________________________________<br>
                OAuth mailing list<br>
                <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                  moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                  rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
                  moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          <div dir="ltr">
            <div dir="ltr">
              <div>---</div>
              Aaron Parecki
              <div><a href="https://aaronparecki.com" target="_blank"
                  moz-do-not-send="true">https://aaronparecki.com</a></div>
              <div><br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.manicode.com">https://www.manicode.com</a></pre>
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In-Reply-To: <09226cd8-8880-4906-f745-98780d0d1bef@manicode.com>
From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 14:03:10 -0700
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To: Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>
Cc: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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Okay, I have come around to this idea and agree that we shouldn't use "BFF"
to refer to this pattern. The only reason I am continuing the discussion in
this thread is that if we agree we should avoid the term BFF for this
draft, I would like to see it renamed before it is adopted, to avoid any
confusion at the start.

Aaron


On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:28 AM Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com> wrote:

> +1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA's so TMI-BFF is a
> badly branded name that will add confusion.
>
> - Jim
> On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:
>
> My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is what the document calls
> Full BFF -- so what many readers will assume is BFF is not what the
> document is referring to.
> =E1=90=A7
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>
>> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's common
>> in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym =
is
>> the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name =
of
>> the draft.
>>
>> Aaron
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>>> =E1=90=A7
>>>
>>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> All,
>>>>
>>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>>
>>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> --
>> ---
>> Aaron Parecki
>> https://aaronparecki.com
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th
>
> --
> Jim Manico
> Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com
>
>

--000000000000834d6605c1876896
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Okay, I have come around to this idea and agree that we sh=
ouldn&#39;t use &quot;BFF&quot; to refer to this pattern. The only reason I=
 am continuing the discussion in this thread is that if we agree we should =
avoid the term BFF for this draft, I would like to see it renamed before it=
 is adopted, to avoid any confusion at the start.<div><br></div><div>Aaron<=
/div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" c=
lass=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:28 AM Jim Manico &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:jim@manicode.com">jim@manicode.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>+1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA&#39;s so TMI-BFF
      is a badly branded name that will add confusion.</p>
    <p>- Jim<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is
        what the document calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will
        assume is BFF is not what the document is referring to.</div>
      <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D""=
 style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"https://ma=
ilfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3D=
zerocontent&amp;guid=3D9335c13d-4f91-4815-ac17-41c29a932c91"><font size=3D"=
1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 A=
M
          Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=3D"=
_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#39;m also fine with the =
BFF
            acronym since it&#39;s common in the software development world
            already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong of
            the two as it&#39;s missing a letter from the full name of the
            draft.</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div><br>
            <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
              <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at
                7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am concerned wit=
h
                  the BFF acronym.</div>
                <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><im=
g alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"=
https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&a=
mp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"><fon=
t size=3D"1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
                <br>
                <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                  <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021
                    at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rif=
aat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                    wrote:<br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                    <div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br>
                      <br>
                      This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Token
                        Mediating and Session Information Backend for
                        Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br>
                      <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ber=
tocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list
                      by <b>May 17th</b>.<br>
                      <br>
                      Regards,<br>
                      =C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________<br>
                    OAuth mailing list<br>
                    <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAu=
th@ietf.org</a><br>
                    <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
/oauth</a><br>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
                _______________________________________________<br>
                OAuth mailing list<br>
                <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@i=
etf.org</a><br>
                <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          <div dir=3D"ltr">
            <div dir=3D"ltr">
              <div>---</div>
              Aaron Parecki
              <div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://aaronparecki.com</a></div>
              <div><br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
<a href=3D"https://www.manicode.com" target=3D"_blank">https://www.manicode=
.com</a></pre>
  </div>

</blockquote></div>

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From: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 23:18:44 +0200
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To: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Cc: Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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+1 for adoption, I'm impartial to the name

Hans.

On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 11:03 PM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:

> Okay, I have come around to this idea and agree that we shouldn't use
> "BFF" to refer to this pattern. The only reason I am continuing the
> discussion in this thread is that if we agree we should avoid the term BF=
F
> for this draft, I would like to see it renamed before it is adopted, to
> avoid any confusion at the start.
>
> Aaron
>
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:28 AM Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com> wrote:
>
>> +1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA's so TMI-BFF is a
>> badly branded name that will add confusion.
>>
>> - Jim
>> On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:
>>
>> My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is what the document call=
s
>> Full BFF -- so what many readers will assume is BFF is not what the
>> document is referring to.
>> =E1=90=A7
>>
>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's commo=
n
>>> in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym=
 is
>>> the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name=
 of
>>> the draft.
>>>
>>> Aaron
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>>>> =E1=90=A7
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>>>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> All,
>>>>>
>>>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>>>
>>>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> --
>>> ---
>>> Aaron Parecki
>>> https://aaronparecki.com
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oa=
uth
>>
>> --
>> Jim Manico
>> Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com
>>
>> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>


--=20
hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu
ZmartZone IAM - www.zmartzone.eu

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<div dir=3D"ltr">+1 for adoption, I&#39;m=C2=A0impartial to the name<br><di=
v><br></div><div>Hans.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 11:03 PM Aaron Parecki=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
>Okay, I have come around to this idea and agree that we shouldn&#39;t use =
&quot;BFF&quot; to refer to this pattern. The only reason I am continuing t=
he discussion in this thread is that if we agree we should avoid the term B=
FF for this draft, I would like to see it renamed before it is adopted, to =
avoid any confusion at the start.<div><br></div><div>Aaron</div><div><br></=
div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_at=
tr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:28 AM Jim Manico &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jim@ma=
nicode.com" target=3D"_blank">jim@manicode.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>+1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA&#39;s so TMI-BFF
      is a badly branded name that will add confusion.</p>
    <p>- Jim<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is
        what the document calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will
        assume is BFF is not what the document is referring to.</div>
      <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D""=
 style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"https://ma=
ilfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3D=
zerocontent&amp;guid=3D9335c13d-4f91-4815-ac17-41c29a932c91"><font size=3D"=
1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 A=
M
          Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=3D"=
_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#39;m also fine with the =
BFF
            acronym since it&#39;s common in the software development world
            already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong of
            the two as it&#39;s missing a letter from the full name of the
            draft.</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div><br>
            <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
              <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at
                7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am concerned wit=
h
                  the BFF acronym.</div>
                <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><im=
g alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"=
https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&a=
mp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"><fon=
t size=3D"1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
                <br>
                <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                  <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021
                    at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rif=
aat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                    wrote:<br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                    <div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br>
                      <br>
                      This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Token
                        Mediating and Session Information Backend for
                        Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br>
                      <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ber=
tocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list
                      by <b>May 17th</b>.<br>
                      <br>
                      Regards,<br>
                      =C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________<br>
                    OAuth mailing list<br>
                    <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAu=
th@ietf.org</a><br>
                    <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
/oauth</a><br>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
                _______________________________________________<br>
                OAuth mailing list<br>
                <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@i=
etf.org</a><br>
                <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          <div dir=3D"ltr">
            <div dir=3D"ltr">
              <div>---</div>
              Aaron Parecki
              <div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://aaronparecki.com</a></div>
              <div><br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
<a href=3D"https://www.manicode.com" target=3D"_blank">https://www.manicode=
.com</a></pre>
  </div>

</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:small"><a href=3D"mailto:hans.zandbelt@zma=
rtzone.eu" target=3D"_blank">hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu</a></div><div style=
=3D"font-size:small">ZmartZone IAM - <a href=3D"http://www.zmartzone.eu" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.zmartzone.eu</a><br></div></div></div></div></div></div=
>

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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 07:54:09 -0400
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP
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Would this coming Monday, May 10th @ 12:00 pm ET, work for you?

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 8:59 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> Hi Rifaat,
>
> If you=E2=80=99d like to keep the current mondays-at-noon-ET schedule I c=
an
> support that. Any Monday this month would work for me, and I=E2=80=99ve r=
eached out
> to Annabelle so hopefully she can join as well. I don=E2=80=99t know if I=
=E2=80=99d be able
> to have the rewrite of the OAuth PoP draft in hand by any of those dates,
> but the concept is straightforward enough to discuss with or without a
> draft.
>
> Thanks,
>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>
> On Apr 29, 2021, at 2:51 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Justin,
>
> Thanks for the update on this,
> We would be happy to schedule an interim meeting to discuss this.
> Do you have a date in mind?
>
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 11:34 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> Many of you will remember an old draft that I was the editor of that
>> defined OAuth proof of possession methods using HTTP Message Signing. Wh=
en
>> writing that draft I invented my own scheme because there wasn=E2=80=99t=
 an
>> existing HTTP message signature standard that was robust enough for our =
use
>> cases. I=E2=80=99m happy to say that the landscape has changed: Annabell=
e Backman
>> and I have been working in the HTTP Working Group on HTTP Message
>> Signatures, a general-purpose HTTP signing draft with a lot of power and=
 a
>> lot of flexibility. There=E2=80=99s even a relatively straightforward wa=
y to map
>> JOSE-defined signature algorithms into this (even though, to be clear, i=
t
>> is not JOSE-based). The current draft is here:
>>
>>
>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04=
.html
>>
>> This draft has gone through a lot of change in the last few months, but
>> we, the editors, believe that it=E2=80=99s at a fairly stable place in t=
erms of the
>> core functioning of the protocol now. It=E2=80=99s not finished yet, but=
 we think
>> that any changes that come from here will be smaller in scope, more of a
>> cleanup and clarification than the deep invasive surgery that has happen=
ed
>> up until now.
>>
>> One of the things about this draft is that, on its own, it is not
>> sufficient for a security protocol. By design it needs some additional
>> details on where to get key materials, how to negotiate algorithms, what
>> fields need to be covered by the signature, etc. I am proposing that we =
in
>> the OAuth WG replace the long-since-expired OAuth PoP working group draf=
t
>> with a new document based on HTTP Message Signatures. I believe that thi=
s
>> document can be relatively short and to the point, given that much of th=
e
>> mechanics would be defined in the HTTP draft. If this is something we wo=
uld
>> like to do in the WG, I am volunteering to write the updated draft.
>>
>> I also want to be very clear that I still believe that this lives beside
>> DPoP, and that DPoP should continue even as we pick this back up. In fac=
t,
>> I think that this work would take some pressure off of DPoP and allow it=
 to
>> be the streamlined point solution that it was originally intended to be.
>>
>> If the chairs would like, I would also be happy to discuss this at an
>> interim meeting.
>>
>>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
>

--000000000000ed303e05c193dadc
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Would this coming Monday, May 10th @ 12:00 pm ET, work for=
 you?<div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0Rifaat</div><div><br></di=
v></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr=
">On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 8:59 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jriche=
r@mit.edu">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;">Hi Rifa=
at,<div><br></div><div>If you=E2=80=99d like to keep the current mondays-at=
-noon-ET schedule I can support that. Any Monday this month would work for =
me, and I=E2=80=99ve reached out to Annabelle so hopefully she can join as =
well. I don=E2=80=99t know if I=E2=80=99d be able to have the rewrite of th=
e OAuth PoP draft in hand by any of those dates, but the concept is straigh=
tforward enough to discuss with or without a draft.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>Thanks,</div><div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin<br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><div>On Apr 29, 2021, at 2:51 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Justin,<div=
><br></div><div>Thanks for the update on this,</div><div>We would be happy =
to schedule an interim meeting to discuss this.=C2=A0</div><div>Do you have=
 a date in mind?<br></div><div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=
=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div></div></div>=
</div><div><div></div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at=
 11:34 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_b=
lank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex"><div>Many of you will remember an old draft that I was=
 the editor of that defined OAuth proof of possession methods using HTTP Me=
ssage Signing. When writing that draft I invented my own scheme because the=
re wasn=E2=80=99t an existing HTTP message signature standard that was robu=
st enough for our use cases. I=E2=80=99m happy to say that the landscape ha=
s changed: Annabelle Backman and I have been working in the HTTP Working Gr=
oup on HTTP Message Signatures, a general-purpose HTTP signing draft with a=
 lot of power and a lot of flexibility. There=E2=80=99s even a relatively s=
traightforward way to map JOSE-defined signature algorithms into this (even=
 though, to be clear, it is not JOSE-based). The current draft is here:<div=
><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpb=
is-message-signatures-04.html" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/archi=
ve/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html</a></div><div><br></div=
><div>This draft has gone through a lot of change in the last few months, b=
ut we, the editors, believe that it=E2=80=99s at a fairly stable place in t=
erms of the core functioning of the protocol now. It=E2=80=99s not finished=
 yet, but we think that any changes that come from here will be smaller in =
scope, more of a cleanup and clarification than the deep invasive surgery t=
hat has happened up until now.</div><div><br></div><div>One of the things a=
bout this draft is that, on its own, it is not sufficient for a security pr=
otocol. By design it needs some additional details on where to get key mate=
rials, how to negotiate algorithms, what fields need to be covered by the s=
ignature, etc. I am proposing that we in the OAuth WG replace the long-sinc=
e-expired OAuth PoP working group draft with a new document based on HTTP M=
essage Signatures. I believe that this document can be relatively short and=
 to the point, given that much of the mechanics would be defined in the HTT=
P draft. If this is something we would like to do in the WG, I am volunteer=
ing to write the updated draft.</div><div><br></div><div>I also want to be =
very clear that I still believe that this lives beside DPoP, and that DPoP =
should continue even as we pick this back up. In fact, I think that this wo=
rk would take some pressure off of DPoP and allow it to be the streamlined =
point solution that it was originally intended to be.</div><div><br></div><=
div>If the chairs would like, I would also be happy to discuss this at an i=
nterim meeting.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin</div></div>=
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></blockquote></div>

--000000000000ed303e05c193dadc--


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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 08:09:07 -0400
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/AQ8u7HcOjWp7z5CvDdCPmmywYg0>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP
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I have requested a session for this coming Monday, May 10th @ 12:00 pm ET.
An announcement should be coming soon.

Regards,
 Rifaat

On Wed, May 5, 2021 at 7:54 AM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Would this coming Monday, May 10th @ 12:00 pm ET, work for you?
>
> Regards,
>  Rifaat
>
>
> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 8:59 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> Hi Rifaat,
>>
>> If you=E2=80=99d like to keep the current mondays-at-noon-ET schedule I =
can
>> support that. Any Monday this month would work for me, and I=E2=80=99ve =
reached out
>> to Annabelle so hopefully she can join as well. I don=E2=80=99t know if =
I=E2=80=99d be able
>> to have the rewrite of the OAuth PoP draft in hand by any of those dates=
,
>> but the concept is straightforward enough to discuss with or without a
>> draft.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>>
>> On Apr 29, 2021, at 2:51 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com=
>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Justin,
>>
>> Thanks for the update on this,
>> We would be happy to schedule an interim meeting to discuss this.
>> Do you have a date in mind?
>>
>> Regards,
>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 11:34 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Many of you will remember an old draft that I was the editor of that
>>> defined OAuth proof of possession methods using HTTP Message Signing. W=
hen
>>> writing that draft I invented my own scheme because there wasn=E2=80=99=
t an
>>> existing HTTP message signature standard that was robust enough for our=
 use
>>> cases. I=E2=80=99m happy to say that the landscape has changed: Annabel=
le Backman
>>> and I have been working in the HTTP Working Group on HTTP Message
>>> Signatures, a general-purpose HTTP signing draft with a lot of power an=
d a
>>> lot of flexibility. There=E2=80=99s even a relatively straightforward w=
ay to map
>>> JOSE-defined signature algorithms into this (even though, to be clear, =
it
>>> is not JOSE-based). The current draft is here:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-0=
4.html
>>>
>>> This draft has gone through a lot of change in the last few months, but
>>> we, the editors, believe that it=E2=80=99s at a fairly stable place in =
terms of the
>>> core functioning of the protocol now. It=E2=80=99s not finished yet, bu=
t we think
>>> that any changes that come from here will be smaller in scope, more of =
a
>>> cleanup and clarification than the deep invasive surgery that has happe=
ned
>>> up until now.
>>>
>>> One of the things about this draft is that, on its own, it is not
>>> sufficient for a security protocol. By design it needs some additional
>>> details on where to get key materials, how to negotiate algorithms, wha=
t
>>> fields need to be covered by the signature, etc. I am proposing that we=
 in
>>> the OAuth WG replace the long-since-expired OAuth PoP working group dra=
ft
>>> with a new document based on HTTP Message Signatures. I believe that th=
is
>>> document can be relatively short and to the point, given that much of t=
he
>>> mechanics would be defined in the HTTP draft. If this is something we w=
ould
>>> like to do in the WG, I am volunteering to write the updated draft.
>>>
>>> I also want to be very clear that I still believe that this lives besid=
e
>>> DPoP, and that DPoP should continue even as we pick this back up. In fa=
ct,
>>> I think that this work would take some pressure off of DPoP and allow i=
t to
>>> be the streamlined point solution that it was originally intended to be=
.
>>>
>>> If the chairs would like, I would also be happy to discuss this at an
>>> interim meeting.
>>>
>>>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>>

--0000000000006fcc5705c1941033
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I have requested a session for this coming Monday, May 10t=
h=C2=A0@ 12:00 pm ET.=C2=A0<div>An announcement should be coming soon.</div=
><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0Rifaat</div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 5, 20=
21 at 7:54 AM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.=
com">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Would this coming Monday, May =
10th @ 12:00 pm ET, work for you?<div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=
=A0Rifaat</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 8:59 AM Justin Richer =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><di=
v>Hi Rifaat,<div><br></div><div>If you=E2=80=99d like to keep the current m=
ondays-at-noon-ET schedule I can support that. Any Monday this month would =
work for me, and I=E2=80=99ve reached out to Annabelle so hopefully she can=
 join as well. I don=E2=80=99t know if I=E2=80=99d be able to have the rewr=
ite of the OAuth PoP draft in hand by any of those dates, but the concept i=
s straightforward enough to discuss with or without a draft.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>Thanks,</div><div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin<br><div><br><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite"><div>On Apr 29, 2021, at 2:51 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gma=
il.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Ju=
stin,<div><br></div><div>Thanks for the update on this,</div><div>We would =
be happy to schedule an interim meeting to discuss this.=C2=A0</div><div>Do=
 you have a date in mind?<br></div><div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><=
div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div></div=
></div></div><div><div></div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 29, =
2021 at 11:34 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" targe=
t=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>Many of you will remember an old draft tha=
t I was the editor of that defined OAuth proof of possession methods using =
HTTP Message Signing. When writing that draft I invented my own scheme beca=
use there wasn=E2=80=99t an existing HTTP message signature standard that w=
as robust enough for our use cases. I=E2=80=99m happy to say that the lands=
cape has changed: Annabelle Backman and I have been working in the HTTP Wor=
king Group on HTTP Message Signatures, a general-purpose HTTP signing draft=
 with a lot of power and a lot of flexibility. There=E2=80=99s even a relat=
ively straightforward way to map JOSE-defined signature algorithms into thi=
s (even though, to be clear, it is not JOSE-based). The current draft is he=
re:<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-iet=
f-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.or=
g/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html</a></div><div><b=
r></div><div>This draft has gone through a lot of change in the last few mo=
nths, but we, the editors, believe that it=E2=80=99s at a fairly stable pla=
ce in terms of the core functioning of the protocol now. It=E2=80=99s not f=
inished yet, but we think that any changes that come from here will be smal=
ler in scope, more of a cleanup and clarification than the deep invasive su=
rgery that has happened up until now.</div><div><br></div><div>One of the t=
hings about this draft is that, on its own, it is not sufficient for a secu=
rity protocol. By design it needs some additional details on where to get k=
ey materials, how to negotiate algorithms, what fields need to be covered b=
y the signature, etc. I am proposing that we in the OAuth WG replace the lo=
ng-since-expired OAuth PoP working group draft with a new document based on=
 HTTP Message Signatures. I believe that this document can be relatively sh=
ort and to the point, given that much of the mechanics would be defined in =
the HTTP draft. If this is something we would like to do in the WG, I am vo=
lunteering to write the updated draft.</div><div><br></div><div>I also want=
 to be very clear that I still believe that this lives beside DPoP, and tha=
t DPoP should continue even as we pick this back up. In fact, I think that =
this work would take some pressure off of DPoP and allow it to be the strea=
mlined point solution that it was originally intended to be.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>If the chairs would like, I would also be happy to discuss this =
at an interim meeting.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin</div=
></div>_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

--0000000000006fcc5705c1941033--


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Date: Wed, 05 May 2021 12:28:42 +0000
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Invitation: OAuth Interim Meeting - HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP @ Mon May 10, 2021 12pm - 1pm (EDT) (oauth@ietf.org)
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<span itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/InformAction"><span style=3D"=
display:none" itemprop=3D"about" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/Pe=
rson"><meta itemprop=3D"description" content=3D"Invitation from rifaat.s.ie=
tf@gmail.com"/></span><span itemprop=3D"object" itemscope itemtype=3D"http:=
//schema.org/Event"><div style=3D""><table cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D=
"8" border=3D"0" summary=3D"" style=3D"width:100%;font-family:Arial,Sans-se=
rif;border:1px Solid #ccc;border-width:1px 2px 2px 1px;background-color:#ff=
f;"><tr><td><meta itemprop=3D"eventStatus" content=3D"http://schema.org/Eve=
ntScheduled"/><h4 style=3D"padding:6px 0;margin:0 0 4px 0;font-family:Arial=
,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:1.4;border:1px Solid #fff;background=
:#fff;color:#090;font-weight:normal"><strong>You have been invited to the f=
ollowing event.</strong></h4><div style=3D"padding:2px"><span itemprop=3D"p=
ublisher" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/Organization"><meta itemp=
rop=3D"name" content=3D"Google Calendar"/></span><meta itemprop=3D"eventId/=
googleCalendar" content=3D"6h9fcpqhhn7rg8aa1j3ucmonlg"/><h3 style=3D"paddin=
g:0 0 6px 0;margin:0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-weigh=
t:bold;color:#222"><span itemprop=3D"name">OAuth Interim Meeting - HTTP Mes=
sage Signing and OAuth PoP</span></h3><table style=3D"display:inline-table"=
 cellpadding=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" border=3D"0" summary=3D"Event details"=
><tr><td style=3D"padding:0 1em 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-si=
ze:13px;color:#888;white-space:nowrap;width:90px" valign=3D"top"><div><i st=
yle=3D"font-style:normal">When</i></div></td><td style=3D"padding-bottom:10=
px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign=3D"top"><=
div style=3D"text-indent:-1px"><time itemprop=3D"startDate" datetime=3D"202=
10510T160000Z"></time><time itemprop=3D"endDate" datetime=3D"20210510T17000=
0Z"></time>Mon May 10, 2021 12pm =E2=80=93 1pm <span style=3D"color:#888">E=
astern Time - Toronto</span></div></td></tr><tr><td style=3D"padding:0 1em =
10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#888;white-space:n=
owrap;width:90px" valign=3D"top"><div><i style=3D"font-style:normal">Where<=
/i></div></td><td style=3D"padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif=
;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign=3D"top"><div style=3D"text-indent:-1px">=
<span itemprop=3D"location" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/Place">=
<span itemprop=3D"name" class=3D"notranslate">https://meetings.conf.meetech=
o.com/interim/?short=3D5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-d16b07a271fc</span><span dir=
=3D"ltr"> (<a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fmeetings=
.conf.meetecho.com%2Finterim%2F%3Fshort%3D5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-d16b07a27=
1fc&amp;sa=3DD&amp;ust=3D1620649722361000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw2j7wqqhtiZwD4Vyqp=
LbSYX" style=3D"color:#20c;white-space:nowrap" target=3D"_blank" itemprop=
=3D"map">map</a>)</span></span></div></td></tr><tr><td style=3D"padding:0 1=
em 4px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#888;white-space=
:nowrap;width:90px" valign=3D"top"><div><i style=3D"font-style:normal">Join=
ing info</i></div></td><td style=3D"padding-bottom:4px;font-family:Arial,Sa=
ns-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign=3D"top"><div style=3D"text-inden=
t:-1px">Join with Google Meet</div></td></tr><tr><td style=3D"padding:0 1em=
 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#888;white-space:=
nowrap;width:90px"></td><td style=3D"padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Arial,=
Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign=3D"top"><div style=3D"text-ind=
ent:-1px"><div style=3D"text-indent:-1px"><span itemprop=3D"potentialaction=
" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/JoinAction"><span itemprop=3D"nam=
e" content=3D"meet.google.com/umr-fmer-mqu"><span itemprop=3D"target" items=
cope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/EntryPoint"><span itemprop=3D"url" conte=
nt=3D"https://meet.google.com/umr-fmer-mqu?hs=3D224"><span itemprop=3D"http=
Method" content=3D"GET"><a href=3D"https://meet.google.com/umr-fmer-mqu?hs=
=3D224" style=3D"color:#20c;white-space:nowrap" target=3D"_blank">meet.goog=
le.com/umr-fmer-mqu</a></span></span></span></span></span> </div></div></td=
></tr><tr><td style=3D"padding:0 1em 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:13px;color:#888;white-space:nowrap;width:90px" valign=3D"top"><div>=
<i style=3D"font-style:normal">Calendar</i></div></td><td style=3D"padding-=
bottom:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign=
=3D"top"><div style=3D"text-indent:-1px">oauth@ietf.org</div></td></tr><tr>=
<td style=3D"padding:0 1em 10px 0;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13=
px;color:#888;white-space:nowrap;width:90px" valign=3D"top"><div><i style=
=3D"font-style:normal">Who</i></div></td><td style=3D"padding-bottom:10px;f=
ont-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222" valign=3D"top"><tabl=
e cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0"><tr><td style=3D"padding-right:10px;f=
ont-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222;width:10px"><div styl=
e=3D"text-indent:-1px"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier New,monospace">&#=
x2022;</span></div></td><td style=3D"padding-right:10px;font-family:Arial,S=
ans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222"><div style=3D"text-indent:-1px"><div><=
div style=3D"margin:0 0 0.3em 0"><span itemprop=3D"attendee" itemscope item=
type=3D"http://schema.org/Person"><span itemprop=3D"name" class=3D"notransl=
ate">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</span><meta itemprop=3D"email" content=3D"rifa=
at.s.ietf@gmail.com"/></span><span itemprop=3D"organizer" itemscope itemtyp=
e=3D"http://schema.org/Person"><meta itemprop=3D"name" content=3D"rifaat.s.=
ietf@gmail.com"/><meta itemprop=3D"email" content=3D"rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.co=
m"/></span><span style=3D"font-size:11px;color:#888"> - organizer</span></d=
iv></div></div></td></tr><tr><td style=3D"padding-right:10px;font-family:Ar=
ial,Sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#222;width:10px"><div style=3D"text-ind=
ent:-1px"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier New,monospace">&#x2022;</span>=
</div></td><td style=3D"padding-right:10px;font-family:Arial,Sans-serif;fon=
t-size:13px;color:#222"><div style=3D"text-indent:-1px"><div><div style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0.3em 0"><span itemprop=3D"attendee" itemscope itemtype=3D"http:=
//schema.org/Person"><span itemprop=3D"name" class=3D"notranslate">oauth@ie=
tf.org</span><meta itemprop=3D"email" content=3D"oauth@ietf.org"/></span></=
div></div></div></td></tr></table></td></tr></table><div style=3D"float:rig=
ht;font-weight:bold;font-size:13px"> <a href=3D"https://calendar.google.com=
/calendar/event?action=3DVIEW&amp;eid=3DNmg5ZmNwcWhobjdyZzhhYTFqM3VjbW9ubGc=
gb2F1dGhAaWV0Zi5vcmc&amp;tok=3DMjMjcmlmYWF0LnMuaWV0ZkBnbWFpbC5jb20yNDJkOGM3=
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p;hl=3Den&amp;es=3D0" style=3D"color:#20c;white-space:nowrap" itemprop=3D"u=
rl">more details &raquo;</a><br></div></div><p style=3D"color:#222;font-siz=
e:13px;margin:0"><span style=3D"color:#888">Going (oauth@ietf.org)?&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;</span><wbr><strong><span itemprop=3D"potentialaction" itemscope =
itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/RsvpAction"><meta itemprop=3D"attendance" con=
tent=3D"http://schema.org/RsvpAttendance/Yes"/><span itemprop=3D"handler" i=
temscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/HttpActionHandler"><link itemprop=3D=
"method" href=3D"http://schema.org/HttpRequestMethod/GET"/><a href=3D"https=
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M5OGUz&amp;ctz=3DAmerica%2FToronto&amp;hl=3Den&amp;es=3D0" style=3D"color:#=
20c;white-space:nowrap" itemprop=3D"url">Yes</a></span></span><span style=
=3D"margin:0 0.4em;font-weight:normal"> - </span><span itemprop=3D"potentia=
laction" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/RsvpAction"><meta itemprop=
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temprop=3D"handler" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/HttpActionHandl=
er"><link itemprop=3D"method" href=3D"http://schema.org/HttpRequestMethod/G=
ET"/><a href=3D"https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=3DRESPOND=
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pan></span><span style=3D"margin:0 0.4em;font-weight:normal"> - </span><spa=
n itemprop=3D"potentialaction" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.org/Rsvp=
Action"><meta itemprop=3D"attendance" content=3D"http://schema.org/RsvpAtte=
ndance/No"/><span itemprop=3D"handler" itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema.=
org/HttpActionHandler"><link itemprop=3D"method" href=3D"http://schema.org/=
HttpRequestMethod/GET"/><a href=3D"https://calendar.google.com/calendar/eve=
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https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=3DVIEW&amp;eid=3DNmg5ZmNw=
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d style=3D"background-color:#f6f6f6;color:#888;border-top:1px Solid #ccc;fo=
nt-family:Arial,Sans-serif;font-size:11px"><p>Invitation from <a href=3D"ht=
tps://calendar.google.com/calendar/" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"">Google Ca=
lendar</a></p><p>You are receiving this courtesy email at the account oauth=
@ietf.org because you are an attendee of this event.</p><p>To stop receivin=
g future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can =
sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and c=
ontrol your notification settings for your entire calendar.</p><p>Forwardin=
g this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organ=
izer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their o=
wn invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. <a href=3D"https://support.go=
ogle.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding">Learn More</a>.</p></td></tr></t=
able></div></span></span>
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From nobody Wed May  5 06:36:06 2021
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) WG Virtual Meeting: 2021-05-10
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The Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) WG will hold
a virtual interim meeting on 2021-05-10 from 12:00 to 13:00 America/Toronto (16:00 to 17:00 UTC).

Agenda:
HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html


Information about remote participation:
https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-d16b07a271fc


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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 10:06:14 -0400
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Cc: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) WG Virtual Meeting: 2021-05-10
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--00000000000044121205c195b382
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Note that we will be using *Meetecho*, instead of WebEX.

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Wed, May 5, 2021 at 9:36 AM IESG Secretary <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
wrote:

> The Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) WG will hold
> a virtual interim meeting on 2021-05-10 from 12:00 to 13:00
> America/Toronto (16:00 to 17:00 UTC).
>
> Agenda:
> HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP
>
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html
>
>
> Information about remote participation:
>
> https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-d16b07a271fc
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
>

--00000000000044121205c195b382
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Note that we will be using <b>Meetecho</b>, instead of Web=
EX.<div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0Rifaat</div><div><br></div>=
</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">=
On Wed, May 5, 2021 at 9:36 AM IESG Secretary &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:iesg-se=
cretary@ietf.org">iesg-secretary@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The Web Authorization Protocol (oa=
uth) WG will hold<br>
a virtual interim meeting on 2021-05-10 from 12:00 to 13:00 America/Toronto=
 (16:00 to 17:00 UTC).<br>
<br>
Agenda:<br>
HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signa=
tures-04.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/ar=
chive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Information about remote participation:<br>
<a href=3D"https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=3D5a866db0-190=
6-4cf4-853e-d16b07a271fc" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://meet=
ings.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=3D5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-d16b07a271f=
c</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
IETF-Announce mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:IETF-Announce@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IETF-Announce@i=
etf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announ=
ce</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000044121205c195b382--


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"Re:" is ok.)

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From: TEDDY VETETO <teddyveteto1973@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 7 May 2021 14:10:19 -0500
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Digest, Vol 151, Issue 8
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If more info is needed contact me

On Fri, May 7, 2021, 2:03 PM <oauth-request@ietf.org wrote:

> Send OAuth mailing list submissions to
>         oauth@ietf.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>         oauth-request@ietf.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>         oauth-owner@ietf.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of OAuth digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. (no subject) (TEDDY VETETO)
>    2. "Re:" is ok.) (TEDDY VETETO)
>    3. "Re:" is ok.) (TEDDY VETETO)
>    4. "Re:" is ok.) (TEDDY VETETO)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 22:00:03 -0500
> From: TEDDY VETETO <teddyveteto1973@gmail.com>
> To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] (no subject)
> Message-ID:
>         <CAGRvtjQu5D7T06vF+p=
> zTCAxn_v5byKS4uuesuX4rkpsjH0uEw@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> "Re:" is ok.)
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/attachments/20210506/fba2f9f3/attachment.htm
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 20:30:47 -0700
> From: TEDDY VETETO <teddyveteto1973@gmail.com>
> To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] "Re:" is ok.)
> Message-ID:
>         <
> CAGRvtjTZrvS6sBFroG5sEm0R-QFARO6_W0hGk8wds7ZXPMBRug@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
>
> -------------- next part --------------
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> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 20:16:13 -0700
> From: TEDDY VETETO <teddyveteto1973@gmail.com>
> To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] "Re:" is ok.)
> Message-ID:
>         <CAGRvtjTxeAtuQQxZXvOCay8M2DtXdnj3p=
> z+6im5X_v2GMjEEQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
>
> -------------- next part --------------
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> URL: <
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/attachments/20210506/81353f91/attachment.htm
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 20:14:01 -0700
> From: TEDDY VETETO <teddyveteto1973@gmail.com>
> To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] "Re:" is ok.)
> Message-ID:
>         <
> CAGRvtjT9DJFV44WUaAUOy3NhjeP4H_07FyGu8f1ksFUngv89AQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
>
> -------------- next part --------------
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> URL: <
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/attachments/20210506/c9d9c7a6/attachment.htm
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of OAuth Digest, Vol 151, Issue 8
> *************************************
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">If more info is needed contact me</div><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, May 7, 2021, 2:03 PM  &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org">oauth-request@ietf.org</a> wrote:<br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Send OAuth mailing list submissions to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_bl=
ank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a><br>
<br>
To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinf=
o/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.o=
rg/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
or, via email, send a message with subject or body &#39;help&#39; to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth-request@ietf.org</a><br>
<br>
You can reach the person managing the list at<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:oauth-owner@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth-owner@ietf.org</a><br>
<br>
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific<br>
than &quot;Re: Contents of OAuth digest...&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
Today&#39;s Topics:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A01. (no subject) (TEDDY VETETO)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A02. &quot;Re:&quot; is ok.) (TEDDY VETETO)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A03. &quot;Re:&quot; is ok.) (TEDDY VETETO)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A04. &quot;Re:&quot; is ok.) (TEDDY VETETO)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 22:00:03 -0500<br>
From: TEDDY VETETO &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:teddyveteto1973@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">teddyveteto1973@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietfa.amsl.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer">oauth@ietfa.amsl.com</a><br>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] (no subject)<br>
Message-ID:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;CAGRvtjQu5D7T06vF+p=3D<a href=3D"mailto:zTC=
Axn_v5byKS4uuesuX4rkpsjH0uEw@mail.gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noref=
errer">zTCAxn_v5byKS4uuesuX4rkpsjH0uEw@mail.gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D&quot;utf-8&quot;<br>
<br>
&quot;Re:&quot; is ok.)<br>
-------------- next part --------------<br>
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=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/attachments/2021=
0506/fba2f9f3/attachment.htm</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 2<br>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 20:30:47 -0700<br>
From: TEDDY VETETO &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:teddyveteto1973@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">teddyveteto1973@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietfa.amsl.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer">oauth@ietfa.amsl.com</a><br>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] &quot;Re:&quot; is ok.)<br>
Message-ID:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:CAGRvtjTZrvS6sBFroG5sEm0R=
-QFARO6_W0hGk8wds7ZXPMBRug@mail.gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"norefer=
rer">CAGRvtjTZrvS6sBFroG5sEm0R-QFARO6_W0hGk8wds7ZXPMBRug@mail.gmail.com</a>=
&gt;<br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D&quot;utf-8&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
-------------- next part --------------<br>
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...<br>
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=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/attachments/2021=
0506/1352d2d8/attachment.htm</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 3<br>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 20:16:13 -0700<br>
From: TEDDY VETETO &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:teddyveteto1973@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">teddyveteto1973@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietfa.amsl.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer">oauth@ietfa.amsl.com</a><br>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] &quot;Re:&quot; is ok.)<br>
Message-ID:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;CAGRvtjTxeAtuQQxZXvOCay8M2DtXdnj3p=3D<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:z%2B6im5X_v2GMjEEQ@mail.gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nor=
eferrer">z+6im5X_v2GMjEEQ@mail.gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D&quot;utf-8&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
-------------- next part --------------<br>
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=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/attachments/2021=
0506/81353f91/attachment.htm</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 4<br>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 20:14:01 -0700<br>
From: TEDDY VETETO &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:teddyveteto1973@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">teddyveteto1973@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietfa.amsl.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer">oauth@ietfa.amsl.com</a><br>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] &quot;Re:&quot; is ok.)<br>
Message-ID:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:CAGRvtjT9DJFV44WUaAUOy3Nh=
jeP4H_07FyGu8f1ksFUngv89AQ@mail.gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"norefer=
rer">CAGRvtjT9DJFV44WUaAUOy3NhjeP4H_07FyGu8f1ksFUngv89AQ@mail.gmail.com</a>=
&gt;<br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D&quot;utf-8&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
-------------- next part --------------<br>
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0506/c9d9c7a6/attachment.htm</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Subject: Digest Footer<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
End of OAuth Digest, Vol 151, Issue 8<br>
*************************************<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000088aaab05c1c22e57--


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Date: Sat, 8 May 2021 15:15:09 -0400
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth WG Interim Meeting - HTTP Message Signing
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All,

The OAuth WG interim meeting this Monday *May 10th *at* 12:00pm ET *is to
discuss the *HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP.*
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html

The following link has a link to the slides, and will be used to captures
notes and attendees:
https://codimd.ietf.org/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth?both

Meetecho:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html

Regards,
 Rifaat & Hannes

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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>The OAuth WG interim meeting this Monday <b>Ma=
y 10th </b>at<b> 12:00pm ET=C2=A0</b>is to discuss the <b>HTTP Message Sign=
ing and OAuth PoP.</b><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-=
ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/dr=
aft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html</a><br><br>The following link h=
as a link to the slides, and will be used to captures notes and attendees:<=
div><a href=3D"https://codimd.ietf.org/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oau=
th?both">https://codimd.ietf.org/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth?bot=
h</a></div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><div>Meetecho:<br><a href=3D"https://www.ie=
tf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html">https://ww=
w.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html</a><br>=
<br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div></div>

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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 8 May 2021 17:19:45 -0400
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth WG Interim Meeting - HTTP Message Signing
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Here is the meetecho link:
https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-d16b07a271fc



On Sat, May 8, 2021 at 3:15 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> All,
>
> The OAuth WG interim meeting this Monday *May 10th *at* 12:00pm ET *is to
> discuss the *HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP.*
>
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html
>
> The following link has a link to the slides, and will be used to captures
> notes and attendees:
> https://codimd.ietf.org/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth?both
>
> Meetecho:
>
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html
>
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Here is the meetecho link:<div><a href=3D"https://meetings=
.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=3D5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-d16b07a271fc">h=
ttps://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=3D5a866db0-1906-4cf4-853e-=
d16b07a271fc</a><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 8, 2021=
 at 3:15 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.co=
m">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>The OAuth WG interim=
 meeting this Monday <b>May 10th </b>at<b> 12:00pm ET=C2=A0</b>is to discus=
s the <b>HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP.</b><br><a href=3D"https://www.=
ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-sign=
atures-04.html</a><br><br>The following link has a link to the slides, and =
will be used to captures notes and attendees:<div><a href=3D"https://codimd=
.ietf.org/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth?both" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://codimd.ietf.org/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth?both</a></div>=
<div>=C2=A0<br></div><div>Meetecho:<br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/arch=
ive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html<=
/a><br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div></div>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
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Hi,

I have read the document and have no concerns.

As an editorial feedback, I would suggest to drop =E2=80=9E If implemented c=
orrectly,=E2=80=9C in the abstract since this apparently is a prerequisite f=
or all kinds of security controls ;-)

best regards,
Torsten.

> Am 01.05.2021 um 22:47 schrieb Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com=
>:
>=20
> =EF=BB=BF
> All,
>=20
> We have not seen any comments on this document.
> Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate that y=
ou have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>=20
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
>=20
>=20
>> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyer=
zuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>=20
>> the latest version of the security BCP references draft-ietf-oauth-iss-au=
th-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.
>>=20
>> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far: h=
ttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>=20
>> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns with t=
he current draft version.
>>=20
>> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully fi=
nish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>>=20
>> Best regards,
>> Karsten
>>=20
>> --=20
>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>> Senior IT Security Consultant
>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing,=
 Security Training
>>=20
>> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts o=
f mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post o=
n single sign-on:
>> https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-=
against-mix-up-attacks
>>=20
>> Hackmanit GmbH
>> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>> 44789 Bochum
>>=20
>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth=
&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1620506842000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3dG-hH8lliyL13KAjSOY=
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,</div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">I have read the document and have no concerns.</d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">As an editorial feedback, I w=
ould suggest to drop =E2=80=9E<span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); c=
olor: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: &quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 14px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-col=
or: rgb(255, 255, 255);">&nbsp;If implemented correctly,=E2=80=9C in the abs=
tract since this apparently is a prerequisite for all kinds of security cont=
rols ;-)</span></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34=
, 34); color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: &quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial, He=
lvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; backgr=
ound-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><span sty=
le=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: &qu=
ot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; -webkit-t=
ext-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">best regards,<=
/span></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); co=
lor: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: &quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial, Helvetica, s=
ans-serif; font-size: 14px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color=
: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Torsten.</span></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite">Am 01.05.2021 um 22:47 schrieb Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;rifaat.=
s.ietf@gmail.com&gt;:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>We have not=
 seen any comments on this document.</div><div>Can you please review the doc=
ument and provide feedback, or indicate that you have reviewed the document a=
nd have no concerns.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>&nbsp;Rifaa=
t &amp; Hannes</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Me=
yer zu Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de=
">karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</font></font></p=
>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the latest version of
          the security BCP references draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
          as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There have not been any
          concerns with the first WG draft version so far:
          <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://datatracker.ietf=
.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1=
620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw2UMWEyCo2Pur0xsLToomRw" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br>
        </font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would like to ask the
          WG if there are any comments on or concerns with the current
          draft version.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise I hope we can
          move forward with the next steps and hopefully finish the
          draft before/with the security BCP.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best regards,<br>
          Karsten</font></font></p>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://hackmanit.de&amp;=
source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw2LYSz_YVb6u2-=
vMiiFfv-Q" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.de</a> | IT Security Consulti=
ng, Penetration Testing, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of m=
ix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on s=
ingle sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-e=
n/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks&amp;source=3Dg=
mail-imap&amp;ust=3D1620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3J8qLMKy4wtbRsGbZ5s_Zd"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-yo=
ur-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somo=
rovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listi=
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tf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
<span>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>OAuth m=
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Hi,

I read the document, have no concerns, and support it.

Christian

On 01.05.21 22:46, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
> All,
>=20
> We have not seen any comments on this document.
> Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate th=
at
> you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>=20
> Regards,
>   Rifaat & Hannes
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
> karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>=20
>> Hi all,
>>
>> the latest version of the security BCP references
>> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attac=
ks.
>>
>> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so fa=
r:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>
>> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns wi=
th
>> the current draft version.
>>
>> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully=

>> finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Karsten
>>
>> --
>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>> Senior IT Security Consultant
>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testin=
g, Security Training
>>
>> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impact=
s of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog =
post on single sign-on:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-pro=
tect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
>>
>> Hackmanit GmbH
>> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>> 44789 Bochum
>>
>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Jura=
j Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>=20

--=20
Dr.-Ing. Christian Mainka
Horst G=C3=B6rtz Institute for IT-Security
Chair for Network and Data Security
Ruhr University Bochum, Germany

Universit=C3=A4tsstr. 150, ID 2/463
D-44801 Bochum, Germany

Telefon: +49 (0) 234 / 32-26796
Fax: +49 (0) 234 / 32-14347
https://nds.rub.de/chair/people/cmainka/
@CheariX


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To: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>, rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com
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From: Vladislav Mladenov <vladislav.mladenov@rub.de>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
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From: Vladislav Mladenov <vladislav.mladenov@rub.de>
To: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>,
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Hi all,

I reviewed the document and have no objections. I think we can move
forward with the next steps.

Best regards
Vladislav Mladenov


Am 09.05.21 um 12:11 schrieb Torsten Lodderstedt:
> Hi,
>
> I have read the document and have no concerns.
>
> As an editorial feedback, I would suggest to drop =E2=80=9E=C2=A0If imp=
lemented
> correctly,=E2=80=9C in the abstract since this apparently is a prerequi=
site
> for all kinds of security controls ;-)
>
> best regards,
> Torsten.
>
>> Am 01.05.2021 um 22:47 schrieb Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
>> <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>:
>>
>> =EF=BB=BF
>> All,
>>
>> We have not seen any comments on this document.
>> Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate
>> that you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>>
>> Regards,
>> =C2=A0Rifaat & Hannes
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>> <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de
>> <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>> wrote:
>>
>>     Hi all,
>>
>>     the latest version of the security BCP references
>>     draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up
>>     attacks.
>>
>>     There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version
>>     so far:
>>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>     <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1620506842000000=
&usg=3DAOvVaw2UMWEyCo2Pur0xsLToomRw>
>>
>>     I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
>>     concerns with the current draft version.
>>
>>     Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and
>>     hopefully finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>>
>>     Best regards,
>>     Karsten
>>
>>     --=20
>>     Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>     Senior IT Security Consultant
>>     Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>>     Web:	https://hackmanit.de <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://=
hackmanit.de&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1620506842000000&usg=3DAOvVaw2LYSz=
_YVb6u2-vMiiFfv-Q> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Securit=
y Training
>>
>>     Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe im=
pacts of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest b=
log post on single sign-on:
>>     https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-=
client-against-mix-up-attacks <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www=
=2Ehackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-m=
ix-up-attacks&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1620506842000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3J8q=
LMKy4wtbRsGbZ5s_Zd>
>>
>>     Hackmanit GmbH
>>     Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>>     44789 Bochum
>>
>>     Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>>     Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. =
Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     OAuth mailing list
>>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>     <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listi=
nfo/oauth&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1620506842000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3dG-hH8l=
liyL13KAjSOYwA>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/o=
auth&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1620506842000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3dG-hH8lliyL1=
3KAjSOYwA
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

--=20
Dr.-Ing. Vladislav Mladenov

Horst G=C3=B6rtz Institute for IT-Security=20
Chair for Network and Data Security=20
Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany

Universit=C3=A4tsstr. 150, ID 2/457
D-44801 Bochum, Germany
http:// www.nds.rub.de

Phone: (+49) (0)234 / 32 - 26742
Fax: (+49) (0)234 / 32 - 14347


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF=
-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    Hi all,<br>
    <br>
    I reviewed the document and have no objections. I think we can move
    forward with the next steps.<br>
    <br>
    Best regards<br>
    Vladislav Mladenov<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">Am 09.05.21 um 12:11 schrieb Torsten
      Lodderstedt:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"
      cite=3D"mid:E1D9094D-649F-49C5-8000-A2BFE5FB74A6@lodderstedt.net">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DU=
TF-8">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,</div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
      </div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr">I have read the document and have no concerns.</di=
v>
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
      </div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr">As an editorial feedback, I would suggest to drop =
=E2=80=9E<span
          style=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: rgb(34, 34, 34);
          font-family: &quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial, Helvetica,
          sans-serif; font-size: 14px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
          background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">=C2=A0If implemented
          correctly,=E2=80=9C in the abstract since this apparently is a
          prerequisite for all kinds of security controls ;-)</span></div=
>
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color=
:
          rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: &quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial,
          Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;
          -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgb(255,
          255, 255);"><br>
        </span></div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color=
:
          rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: &quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial,
          Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;
          -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgb(255,
          255, 255);">best regards,</span></div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color=
:
          rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: &quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial,
          Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;
          -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgb(255,
          255, 255);">Torsten.</span></div>
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        <blockquote type=3D"cite">Am 01.05.2021 um 22:47 schrieb Rifaat
          Shekh-Yusef <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href=3D"mailto:r=
ifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com">&lt;rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com&gt;</a>:<br>
          <br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <blockquote type=3D"cite">
        <div dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF
          <div dir=3D"ltr">All,
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>We have not seen any comments on this document.</div>
            <div>Can you please review the document and provide
              feedback, or indicate that you have reviewed the document
              and have no concerns.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Regards,</div>
            <div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at=

              3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a
                href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de"
                moz-do-not-send=3D"true">karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackman=
it.de</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=

              0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
              rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</=
font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the lates=
t
                      version of the security BCP references
                      draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a
                      countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p=
>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There hav=
e
                      not been any concerns with the first WG draft
                      version so far: <a
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D16205068=
42000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw2UMWEyCo2Pur0xsLToomRw"
                        target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https:=
//datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br>
                    </font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would l=
ike
                      to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
                      concerns with the current draft version.</font></fo=
nt></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise=
 I
                      hope we can move forward with the next steps and
                      hopefully finish the draft before/with the
                      security BCP.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best
                      regards,<br>
                      Karsten</font></font></p>
                <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://hackmanit.de&amp;s=
ource=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw2LYSz_YVb6u=
2-vMiiFfv-Q" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://hackmanit=
=2Ede</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Trainin=
g

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts o=
f mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog pos=
t on single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.hackmanit.de/en/blo=
g-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks&amp;sour=
ce=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3J8qLMKy4wtbRs=
GbZ5s_Zd" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://www.hackmani=
t.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attac=
ks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
              </div>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              OAuth mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"
                moz-do-not-send=3D"true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
              <a
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listi=
nfo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAO=
vVaw3dG-hH8lliyL13KAjSOYwA"
                rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"t=
rue">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
          <span>_______________________________________________</span><br=
>
          <span>OAuth mailing list</span><br>
          <span><a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:OAut=
h@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a></span><br>
          <span><a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.go=
ogle.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth&amp;source=3D=
gmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3dG-hH8lliyL13KAjSO=
YwA">https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1620506842000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVa=
w3dG-hH8lliyL13KAjSOYwA</a></span><br>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <fieldset class=3D"mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" wrap=3D"">____________________________=
___________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a>
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l=
istinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <pre class=3D"moz-signature" cols=3D"72">--=20
Dr.-Ing. Vladislav Mladenov

Horst G=C3=B6rtz Institute for IT-Security=20
Chair for Network and Data Security=20
Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany

Universit=C3=A4tsstr. 150, ID 2/457
D-44801 Bochum, Germany
http:// <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"http://www.nds.rub.=
de">www.nds.rub.de</a>

Phone: (+49) (0)234 / 32 - 26742
Fax: (+49) (0)234 / 32 - 14347

</pre>
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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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To: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
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I have also read it and it looks good to me. It might be worth explicitly d=
iscussing how it relates to the older draft [1] (that we implemented at the=
 time). That older draft also included a client_id parameter in the respons=
e, so it would be good to clarify if that is actually needed to prevent the=
 attack or not.

[1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigati=
on-01 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitiga=
tion-01>=20

Kind regards,

Neil

> On 15 Apr 2021, at 08:04, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselh=
ausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
> the latest version of the security BCP references draft-ietf-oauth-iss-au=
th-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.
>=20
> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far: =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/ <https://d=
atatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/>
> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns with =
the current draft version.
>=20
> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully fi=
nish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>=20
> Best regards,
> Karsten
>=20
> --=20
> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
> Senior IT Security Consultant
> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
> Web:	https://hackmanit.de <https://hackmanit.de/> | IT Security Consultin=
g, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>=20
> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts o=
f mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post =
on single sign-on:
> https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-=
against-mix-up-attacks <https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-prot=
ect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks>
>=20
> Hackmanit GmbH
> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
> 44789 Bochum
>=20
> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


--=20
ForgeRock values your Privacy <https://www.forgerock.com/your-privacy>

--Apple-Mail=_3167FA58-077B-4E35-BFBE-A5C22F0F09A6
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">I have also read it and it=
 looks good to me. It might be worth explicitly discussing how it relates t=
o the older draft [1] (that we implemented at the time). That older draft a=
lso included a client_id parameter in the response, so it would be good to =
clarify if that is actually needed to prevent the attack or not.<div class=
=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">[1]:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://dat=
atracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01" class=3D"=
">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-=
01</a>&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Kind=
 regards,</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Neil<br=
 class=3D"">
<div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On=
 15 Apr 2021, at 08:04, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ka=
rsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de" class=3D"">karsten.meyerzuselhausen@ha=
ckmanit.de</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div=
 class=3D"">
 =20

    <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF-8=
" class=3D"">
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" class=3D""><p class=3D""><font =
size=3D"-1" class=3D""><font face=3D"Nunito Sans" class=3D"">Hi all,</font>=
</font></p><p class=3D""><font size=3D"-1" class=3D""><font face=3D"Nunito =
Sans" class=3D"">the latest version of
          the security BCP references draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
          as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p><p class=
=3D""><font size=3D"-1" class=3D""><font face=3D"Nunito Sans" class=3D"">Th=
ere have not been any
          concerns with the first WG draft version so far:
          <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://datatracker.ie=
tf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/do=
c/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br class=3D"">
        </font></font></p><p class=3D""><font size=3D"-1" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Nunito Sans" class=3D"">I would like to ask the
          WG if there are any comments on or concerns with the current
          draft version.</font></font></p><p class=3D""><font size=3D"-1" c=
lass=3D""><font face=3D"Nunito Sans" class=3D"">Otherwise I hope we can
          move forward with the next steps and hopefully finish the
          draft before/with the security BCP.</font></font></p><p class=3D"=
"><font size=3D"-1" class=3D""><font face=3D"Nunito Sans" class=3D"">Best r=
egards,<br class=3D"">
          Karsten</font></font></p>
    <pre class=3D"moz-signature" cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://hackmanit.de/">http=
s://hackmanit.de</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Securit=
y Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of =
mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on=
 single sign-on:
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog=
-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks">https://ww=
w.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-=
up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">OAuth mailing=
 list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" class=3D"">OAuth@ietf=
.org</a><br class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br class=
=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>
<br>
<span style=3D"color:rgb(23,43,77);font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystem=
Font,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,Roboto,Oxygen,Ubuntu,&quot;Fira Sans&quot;,&quot;=
Droid Sans&quot;,&quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;,sans-serif;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255)"><font size=3D"1">ForgeRock values your <a href=3D"https://ww=
w.forgerock.com/your-privacy" target=3D"_blank">Privacy</a></font></span>
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Hi Neil,

I'm not sure - maybe others can chime in here as well - if a discussion
relating to an expired previous draft is something one would expect in
the spec.

For the record, the client_id does not provide any additional security.
The key to mitigating Mix-Up is that the "honest AS" ensures that the
code issued at its token endpoint is sent to the honest IdP's token
endpoint, and not to the attacker IdP's token endpoint. This is ensured
by the iss parameter. The client_id would maybe be relevant if the
honest AS sends different issuer values for different client_ids - I
have not heard of such a constellation. I'm not sure why the client_id
was included in the previous draft.

-Daniel


Am 10.05.21 um 14:57 schrieb Neil Madden:
> I have also read it and it looks good to me. It might be worth
> explicitly discussing how it relates to the older draft [1] (that we
> implemented at the time). That older draft also included a client_id
> parameter in the response, so it would be good to clarify if that is
> actually needed to prevent the attack or not.
>
> [1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01> 
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Neil
>
>> On 15 Apr 2021, at 08:04, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>> <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de
>> <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> the latest version of the security BCP references
>> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.
>>
>> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so
>> far: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>
>> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns
>> with the current draft version.
>>
>> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and
>> hopefully finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Karsten
>>
>> -- 
>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>> Senior IT Security Consultant
>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>>
>> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on single sign-on:
>> https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
>>
>> Hackmanit GmbH
>> Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>> 44789 Bochum
>>
>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>> Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> ForgeRock values your Privacy <https://www.forgerock.com/your-privacy>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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https://danielfett.de


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Neil,</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">I'm not sure - maybe others can chime
      in here as well - if a discussion relating to an expired previous
      draft is something one would expect in the spec. <br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">For the record, the client_id does not
      provide any additional security. The key to mitigating Mix-Up is
      that the "honest AS" ensures that the code issued at its token
      endpoint is sent to the honest IdP's token endpoint, and not to
      the attacker IdP's token endpoint. This is ensured by the iss
      parameter. The client_id would maybe be relevant if the honest AS
      sends different issuer values for different client_ids - I have
      not heard of such a constellation. I'm not sure why the client_id
      was included in the previous draft.</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">-Daniel</div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Am 10.05.21 um 14:57 schrieb Neil
      Madden:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:E43CA16C-CB38-4E9E-9ADD-295ECBA38ED9@forgerock.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      I have also read it and it looks good to me. It might be worth
      explicitly discussing how it relates to the older draft [1] (that
      we implemented at the time). That older draft also included a
      client_id parameter in the response, so it would be good to
      clarify if that is actually needed to prevent the attack or not.
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">[1]: <a
href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01"
          class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01</a> </div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">Kind regards,</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">Neil<br class="">
        <div><br class="">
          <blockquote type="cite" class="">
            <div class="">On 15 Apr 2021, at 08:04, Karsten Meyer zu
              Selhausen &lt;<a
                href="mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de"
                class="" moz-do-not-send="true">karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt;
              wrote:</div>
            <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class="">
              <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
                charset=UTF-8" class="">
              <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
                <p class=""><font class="" size="-1"><font class=""
                      face="Nunito Sans">Hi all,</font></font></p>
                <p class=""><font class="" size="-1"><font class=""
                      face="Nunito Sans">the latest version of the
                      security BCP references
                      draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a
                      countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p>
                <p class=""><font class="" size="-1"><font class=""
                      face="Nunito Sans">There have not been any
                      concerns with the first WG draft version so far: <a
                        class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
                        href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br
                        class="">
                    </font></font></p>
                <p class=""><font class="" size="-1"><font class=""
                      face="Nunito Sans">I would like to ask the WG if
                      there are any comments on or concerns with the
                      current draft version.</font></font></p>
                <p class=""><font class="" size="-1"><font class=""
                      face="Nunito Sans">Otherwise I hope we can move
                      forward with the next steps and hopefully finish
                      the draft before/with the security BCP.</font></font></p>
                <p class=""><font class="" size="-1"><font class=""
                      face="Nunito Sans">Best regards,<br class="">
                      Karsten</font></font></p>
                <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://hackmanit.de/" moz-do-not-send="true">https://hackmanit.de</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on single sign-on:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
              </div>
              _______________________________________________<br
                class="">
              OAuth mailing list<br class="">
              <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" class=""
                moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class="">
              <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class="">
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br class="">
      </div>
      <br>
      <span
style="color:rgb(23,43,77);font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,&quot;Segoe
        UI&quot;,Roboto,Oxygen,Ubuntu,&quot;Fira Sans&quot;,&quot;Droid
        Sans&quot;,&quot;Helvetica
        Neue&quot;,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><font
          size="1">ForgeRock values your <a
            href="https://www.forgerock.com/your-privacy"
            target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Privacy</a></font></span>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://danielfett.de">https://danielfett.de</a></pre>
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FWIW, I did align the capitalization in the title, "Token Mediating and
session Information Backend For Frontend" to match the accrom. Somewhat
weak justification, I know, but I was going for the branding effect with
something memorable and (hopefully) funny.

On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 9:03 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:

> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's common
> in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym i=
s
> the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name o=
f
> the draft.
>
> Aaron
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>> =E1=90=A7
>>
>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> All,
>>>
>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>
>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> --
> ---
> Aaron Parecki
> https://aaronparecki.com
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>FWIW, I did align the capitalization in the title, &q=
uot;Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend&quot; to m=
atch the accrom. Somewhat weak justification, I know, but I was going for t=
he branding effect with something memorable and (hopefully) funny.=C2=A0 <b=
r></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmai=
l_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 9:03 AM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
aaron@parecki.com" target=3D"_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">I s=
upport adoption. I&#39;m also fine with the BFF acronym since it&#39;s comm=
on in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym =
is the least strong of the two as it&#39;s missing a letter from the full n=
ame of the draft.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Aaron<=
/div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"au=
to"><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D=
"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:dick.hardt@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrot=
e:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"l=
tr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.</div><div =
hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"w=
idth: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.ap=
pspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent=
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"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"=
ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.=
ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>This is a call for adoption for =
the=C2=A0<b>Token Mediating and Session Information Backend for Frontend</b=
> as a WG document:<br><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-be=
rtocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/=
draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br><br>Please, provide your feedback on =
the mailing list by <b>May 17th</b>.<br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; =
Hannes<br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
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</blockquote></div>
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</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>---<=
/div>Aaron Parecki<div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blan=
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From marcin.szewczyk@wodny.org  Tue May 11 05:57:13 2021
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Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 14:57:03 +0200
From: Marcin Szewczyk <marcin.szewczyk@wodny.org>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Reasoning behind OAuth 2.0 PKCE
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Hi,

I am reading RFC 7636 (Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public
Clients) to understand how it mitigates the problem of intercepting
authorization code on the device itself and not in internet transit.

I fail to understand reasoning behind the following paragraphs:

1. Introduction, 4b. (rephrased):

    the attacker observes both requests and responses to/from the
    authorization endpoint, not using MitM but http log of the OS
    leaking information (I presume URLs with parameters that ought to be
    secret)

1. Introduction, last paragraph:

> The authorization code obtained is then sent to the token endpoint
> with the "code verifier", and the server compares it with the
> previously received request code so that it can perform the proof of
> possession of the "code verifier" by the client. This works as the
> mitigation since the attacker would not know this one-time key, since
> it is sent over TLS and cannot be intercepted.

I do not understand the remark about TLS here as TLS alone does not
prevent the attack because the HTTP connection itself is not the source
of the leak. It is even stated explicitly that it is not about MitM. I
thought PKCE is all about TLS not being enough and leaking information
in the OS. Without TLS at every step (in general) the whole scheme seems
to fall apart.

If as mentioned in paragraph 4b. the source of the leak is the HTTP log
of Authorization Request: why would not the attacker know the code
verifier as well if Access Token Requests were logged too?

Is it assumed that Authorization Request is more susceptible to attack
than Access Token Request because it is more probable that log will
contain query parameters but not entity-body (request contents transfer
methods respectively)?

BTW, it may be impossible for the attacker to do a classic MitM but
maybe the attacker could crash the legitimate application just after one
gets the Access Token Request in log or just try to win the race or
maybe replay Access Token Request?

Additionally RFC 6750 (OAuth 2.0: Bearer Token Usage) allows sending
bearer access tokens in URI query parameter so these URIs in log would
pose danger as well. I suppose that is one of the reasons OAuth 2.0
Security Best Current Practice[1] discourages this method.

[1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics



The archive seems to contain mainly "internal" WG's discussions but
maybe it is acceptable to ask the question here. I am sorry if it is
not. I did not find a better place to ask.

-- 
Marcin Szewczyk
http://wodny.org


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From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 06:17:41 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Reasoning behind OAuth 2.0 PKCE
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--000000000000b37f0a05c20db8b4
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> If as mentioned in paragraph 4b. the source of the leak is the HTTP log
> of Authorization Request: why would not the attacker know the code
> verifier as well if Access Token Requests were logged too?

You're on the right track here. It's all about where the attacker is
sitting in the connection. PKCE isn't attempting to solve anything if there
is an attacker able observe the requests at the AS. It's about whether
there's an attacker between the client and AS.

The reason PKCE works here is that the PKCE code verifier never leaves the
client until the very last stage of exchanging the authorization code in an
HTTPS request directly to the token endpoint. That connection is assumed to
be secure since it is an HTTPS POST request. The attack PKCE prevents is
when the authorization code might be intercepted in the redirect from the
AS to the client, since that is *NOT* an HTTP/HTTPS request from the AS to
the client. That request is an HTTP redirect from the AS to the user agent,
and the user agent takes the authorization code and delivers it to the
client.

This distinction is the "front channel" vs "back channel". It comes up a
lot in the implicit flow discussions as well. I have some videos about the
implicit flow and general OAuth security that talk about this difference:

https://oauth.net/videos/

Hope this helps!

Aaron


On Tue, May 11, 2021 at 5:59 AM Marcin Szewczyk <marcin.szewczyk@wodny.org>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I am reading RFC 7636 (Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public
> Clients) to understand how it mitigates the problem of intercepting
> authorization code on the device itself and not in internet transit.
>
> I fail to understand reasoning behind the following paragraphs:
>
> 1. Introduction, 4b. (rephrased):
>
>     the attacker observes both requests and responses to/from the
>     authorization endpoint, not using MitM but http log of the OS
>     leaking information (I presume URLs with parameters that ought to be
>     secret)
>
> 1. Introduction, last paragraph:
>
> > The authorization code obtained is then sent to the token endpoint
> > with the "code verifier", and the server compares it with the
> > previously received request code so that it can perform the proof of
> > possession of the "code verifier" by the client. This works as the
> > mitigation since the attacker would not know this one-time key, since
> > it is sent over TLS and cannot be intercepted.
>
> I do not understand the remark about TLS here as TLS alone does not
> prevent the attack because the HTTP connection itself is not the source
> of the leak. It is even stated explicitly that it is not about MitM. I
> thought PKCE is all about TLS not being enough and leaking information
> in the OS. Without TLS at every step (in general) the whole scheme seems
> to fall apart.
>
> If as mentioned in paragraph 4b. the source of the leak is the HTTP log
> of Authorization Request: why would not the attacker know the code
> verifier as well if Access Token Requests were logged too?
>
> Is it assumed that Authorization Request is more susceptible to attack
> than Access Token Request because it is more probable that log will
> contain query parameters but not entity-body (request contents transfer
> methods respectively)?
>
> BTW, it may be impossible for the attacker to do a classic MitM but
> maybe the attacker could crash the legitimate application just after one
> gets the Access Token Request in log or just try to win the race or
> maybe replay Access Token Request?
>
> Additionally RFC 6750 (OAuth 2.0: Bearer Token Usage) allows sending
> bearer access tokens in URI query parameter so these URIs in log would
> pose danger as well. I suppose that is one of the reasons OAuth 2.0
> Security Best Current Practice[1] discourages this method.
>
> [1]:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics
>
>
>
> The archive seems to contain mainly "internal" WG's discussions but
> maybe it is acceptable to ask the question here. I am sorry if it is
> not. I did not find a better place to ask.
>
> --
> Marcin Szewczyk
> http://wodny.org
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000b37f0a05c20db8b4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt; If as mentioned in paragraph 4b. the source of the le=
ak is the HTTP log<br>&gt; of Authorization Request: why would not the atta=
cker know the code<br>&gt; verifier as well if Access Token Requests were l=
ogged too?<div><br></div><div>You&#39;re on the right track here. It&#39;s =
all about where the attacker is sitting in the connection. PKCE isn&#39;t a=
ttempting to solve anything if there is an attacker able observe the reques=
ts at the AS. It&#39;s about whether there&#39;s an attacker between the cl=
ient and AS.</div><div><br></div><div>The reason PKCE works here is that th=
e PKCE code verifier never leaves the client until the very last stage of e=
xchanging the authorization code in an HTTPS request directly to the token =
endpoint. That connection is assumed to be secure since it is an HTTPS POST=
 request. The attack PKCE prevents is when the authorization code might be =
intercepted in the redirect from the AS to the client, since that is *NOT* =
an HTTP/HTTPS request from the AS to the client. That request is an HTTP re=
direct from the AS to the user agent, and the user agent takes the authoriz=
ation code and delivers it to the client.</div><div><br></div><div>This dis=
tinction is the &quot;front channel&quot; vs &quot;back channel&quot;. It c=
omes up a lot in the implicit flow discussions as well. I have some videos =
about the implicit flow and general OAuth security that talk about this dif=
ference:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://oauth.net/videos/">htt=
ps://oauth.net/videos/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Hope this helps!</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Aaron</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 11, 2021 at 5:=
59 AM Marcin Szewczyk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:marcin.szewczyk@wodny.org">marc=
in.szewczyk@wodny.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
<br>
I am reading RFC 7636 (Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public<br>
Clients) to understand how it mitigates the problem of intercepting<br>
authorization code on the device itself and not in internet transit.<br>
<br>
I fail to understand reasoning behind the following paragraphs:<br>
<br>
1. Introduction, 4b. (rephrased):<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the attacker observes both requests and responses to/from the=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 authorization endpoint, not using MitM but http log of the OS=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 leaking information (I presume URLs with parameters that ough=
t to be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 secret)<br>
<br>
1. Introduction, last paragraph:<br>
<br>
&gt; The authorization code obtained is then sent to the token endpoint<br>
&gt; with the &quot;code verifier&quot;, and the server compares it with th=
e<br>
&gt; previously received request code so that it can perform the proof of<b=
r>
&gt; possession of the &quot;code verifier&quot; by the client. This works =
as the<br>
&gt; mitigation since the attacker would not know this one-time key, since<=
br>
&gt; it is sent over TLS and cannot be intercepted.<br>
<br>
I do not understand the remark about TLS here as TLS alone does not<br>
prevent the attack because the HTTP connection itself is not the source<br>
of the leak. It is even stated explicitly that it is not about MitM. I<br>
thought PKCE is all about TLS not being enough and leaking information<br>
in the OS. Without TLS at every step (in general) the whole scheme seems<br=
>
to fall apart.<br>
<br>
If as mentioned in paragraph 4b. the source of the leak is the HTTP log<br>
of Authorization Request: why would not the attacker know the code<br>
verifier as well if Access Token Requests were logged too?<br>
<br>
Is it assumed that Authorization Request is more susceptible to attack<br>
than Access Token Request because it is more probable that log will<br>
contain query parameters but not entity-body (request contents transfer<br>
methods respectively)?<br>
<br>
BTW, it may be impossible for the attacker to do a classic MitM but<br>
maybe the attacker could crash the legitimate application just after one<br=
>
gets the Access Token Request in log or just try to win the race or<br>
maybe replay Access Token Request?<br>
<br>
Additionally RFC 6750 (OAuth 2.0: Bearer Token Usage) allows sending<br>
bearer access tokens in URI query parameter so these URIs in log would<br>
pose danger as well. I suppose that is one of the reasons OAuth 2.0<br>
Security Best Current Practice[1] discourages this method.<br>
<br>
[1]: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-secu=
rity-topics" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.=
org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
The archive seems to contain mainly &quot;internal&quot; WG&#39;s discussio=
ns but<br>
maybe it is acceptable to ask the question here. I am sorry if it is<br>
not. I did not find a better place to ask.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Marcin Szewczyk<br>
<a href=3D"http://wodny.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http://wo=
dny.org</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 14:23:42 -0400
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To: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/9cuyit0T8DZ_qEgv5kT-UbY7SDk>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth WG Interim Meeting - HTTP Message Signing
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All,

The following link has a recording of the meeting, the attendee list, and
some actions.
https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth

Unfortunately, we forgot to ask for a note-taker, so we do not have minutes.

Regards,
 Rifaat & Hannes

On Sat, May 8, 2021 at 3:15 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> All,
>
> The OAuth WG interim meeting this Monday *May 10th *at* 12:00pm ET *is to
> discuss the *HTTP Message Signing and OAuth PoP.*
>
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html
>
> The following link has a link to the slides, and will be used to captures
> notes and attendees:
> https://codimd.ietf.org/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth?both
>
> Meetecho:
>
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html
>
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
>

--00000000000021968a05c211ffdc
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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>The following=C2=A0link has a reco=
rding=C2=A0of the meeting, the attendee list, and some actions.=C2=A0</div>=
<div><a href=3D"https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-=
oauth">https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth</a>=
<br></div><div><br></div><div>Unfortunately, we forgot to ask for a note-ta=
ker, so we do not have minutes.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div=
>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 8, 2021 at 3:15 PM Rifaat Shekh=
-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br><br>The OAuth WG interim meeting this Monday <b>=
May 10th </b>at<b> 12:00pm ET=C2=A0</b>is to discuss the <b>HTTP Message Si=
gning and OAuth PoP.</b><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draf=
t-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ie=
tf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html</a><br><br>=
The following link has a link to the slides, and will be used to captures n=
otes and attendees:<div><a href=3D"https://codimd.ietf.org/notes-ietf-inter=
im-2021-oauth-10-oauth?both" target=3D"_blank">https://codimd.ietf.org/note=
s-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-10-oauth?both</a></div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><div>=
Meetecho:<br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-=
message-signatures-04.html" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/archive/=
id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html</a><br><br>Regards,<br>=C2=
=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br></div></div>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000021968a05c211ffdc--


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From: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Robert Wilton's Discuss on draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-10: (with DISCUSS)
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--------------ms090606070901060004060002
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Hi all,


In preparation for a new v11 of the draft the language regarding the=20
adherence to privacy regulations was updated along the lines of Roman's=20
suggestion (thanks for that!):


"""

The token introspection response can be used to transfer personal=20
identifiable information (PII) from the AS to the RS. The AS MUST=20
conform to legal and jurisdictional constraints for the data transfer=20
before any data is released to a particular RS. The details and=20
determining of these constraints varies by jurisdiction and is outside=20
the scope of this document.

"""


The diff for this edit is here:

https://github.com/oauthstuff/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response=
/commit/48911a1afff9f3120773a157c4e14cbf3aa9f3de#diff-c4d976e7848e055731f=
69102bf2d6e4e7cf7d997efc1f202eb3b940d44746274


The current doc:

https://github.com/oauthstuff/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response=
/blob/master/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response.xml


Vladimir

Vladimir Dzhuvinov

On 04/02/2021 16:40, Roman Danyliw wrote:
> Hi! Rob!
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Robert Wilton via
>> Datatracker
>> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2021 6:20 AM
>> To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
>> Cc: oauth-chairs@ietf.org; draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-
>> response@ietf.org; oauth@ietf.org
>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Robert Wilton's Discuss on draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-
>> introspection-response-10: (with DISCUSS)
>>
>> Robert Wilton has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-10: Discuss
>>
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all =
email
>> addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this intr=
oductory
>> paragraph, however.)
>>
>>
>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.h=
tml
>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>
>>
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-re=
sponse/
>>
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------=

>> DISCUSS:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------=

>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Thank you for this document.
>>
>> I have a  couple of process related questions regarding the legal aspe=
cts
>> considered in chapter 9 on privacy that I would like to discuss with t=
he other
>> ADs on the telechat (hence raising it as a Discuss).
>>
>> My two questions are:
>>
>> (1) Is it appropriate for an RFC to specifying requirements relating t=
o legal
>> issues and laws?  Note, I think that the guidance that is provides is =
really
>> helpful and should be included in the document, but I'm a bit concerne=
d as to
>> whether a standards track RFC should be stating formal
>> requirements/constraints related to enforcing legal requirements rathe=
r that
>> providing non-normative guidance.
>>
>> (2) Related to the first question, if the IESG believes believes that =
providing
>> such requirements is okay, a further question is whether using RFC 211=
9
>> language is appropriate, or whether this should use regular English?
>>
>> An example from section 9:
>>
>>     The AS MUST ensure a
>>     legal basis exists for the data transfer before any data is releas=
ed
>>     to a particular RS.  The way the legal basis is established might
>>     vary among jurisdictions and MUST consider the legal entities
>>     involved.
> I can see your point.  I believe this language is here to make a very s=
trong statement on the needed for operational policies that conform to th=
e variety of privacy laws which often governs some of this data.
>
> I'll let the authors/co-chairs comment.  To start the discussion, let m=
e propose rough text that dilutes the legal mandate a bit but tries to ke=
ep the spirit of the intent.
>
> NEW
> The AS MUST conform to jurisdictional constraints for the data transfer=
 before any data is released to a particular RS.  These constraints will =
vary by jurisdictions; and their details and determining which apply to t=
his release to RSs is outside the scope of this document.
>
> Regards,
> Roman
>
>


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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 13:00:35 -0600
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To: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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While I admit to being somewhat partial to the acronym, it's not for any
sound technical or informational reason. To be honest, before I became
enamored with my own perceived cleverness of TMI-BFF, I also thought the
use of "BFF" in the context of the draft wasn't quite appropriate.

At this point, I propose that Vittorio and I step back and rework the draft
a bit and then resume the call for adoption after we spin a new revision.
We'll eliminate the problematic use of BFF and address some of the more
straightforward feedback from the interim.



On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 3:03 PM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:

> Okay, I have come around to this idea and agree that we shouldn't use
> "BFF" to refer to this pattern. The only reason I am continuing the
> discussion in this thread is that if we agree we should avoid the term BF=
F
> for this draft, I would like to see it renamed before it is adopted, to
> avoid any confusion at the start.
>
> Aaron
>
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:28 AM Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com> wrote:
>
>> +1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA's so TMI-BFF is a
>> badly branded name that will add confusion.
>>
>> - Jim
>> On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:
>>
>> My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is what the document call=
s
>> Full BFF -- so what many readers will assume is BFF is not what the
>> document is referring to.
>> =E1=90=A7
>>
>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's commo=
n
>>> in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI acronym=
 is
>>> the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from the full name=
 of
>>> the draft.
>>>
>>> Aaron
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>>>> =E1=90=A7
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>>>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> All,
>>>>>
>>>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>>>
>>>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> --
>>> ---
>>> Aaron Parecki
>>> https://aaronparecki.com
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oa=
uth
>>
>> --
>> Jim Manico
>> Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com
>>
>> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>While I admit to being somewhat partial to the acrony=
m, it&#39;s not for any sound technical or informational reason. To be hone=
st, before I became enamored with my own perceived cleverness of TMI-BFF, I=
 also thought  the use of &quot;BFF&quot; in the context of the draft wasn&=
#39;t quite appropriate. <br></div><div><br></div><div>At this point, I pro=
pose that Vittorio and I step back and rework the draft a bit and then resu=
me the call for adoption after we spin a new revision. We&#39;ll eliminate =
the problematic use of BFF and address some of the more straightforward fee=
dback from the interim. <br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May=
 4, 2021 at 3:03 PM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" =
target=3D"_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Okay, I have come aroun=
d to this idea and agree that we shouldn&#39;t use &quot;BFF&quot; to refer=
 to this pattern. The only reason I am continuing the discussion in this th=
read is that if we agree we should avoid the term BFF for this draft, I wou=
ld like to see it renamed before it is adopted, to avoid any confusion at t=
he start.<div><br></div><div>Aaron</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 =
at 10:28 AM Jim Manico &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jim@manicode.com" target=3D"_b=
lank">jim@manicode.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,2=
04);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>+1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA&#39;s so TMI-BFF
      is a badly branded name that will add confusion.</p>
    <p>- Jim<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is
        what the document calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will
        assume is BFF is not what the document is referring to.</div>
      <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D""=
 style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"https://ma=
ilfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3D=
zerocontent&amp;guid=3D9335c13d-4f91-4815-ac17-41c29a932c91"><font size=3D"=
1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 A=
M
          Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=3D"=
_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#39;m also fine with the =
BFF
            acronym since it&#39;s common in the software development world
            already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong of
            the two as it&#39;s missing a letter from the full name of the
            draft.</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div><br>
            <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
              <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at
                7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am concerned wit=
h
                  the BFF acronym.</div>
                <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><im=
g alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"=
https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&a=
mp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"><fon=
t size=3D"1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
                <br>
                <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                  <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021
                    at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rif=
aat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                    wrote:<br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                    <div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br>
                      <br>
                      This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Token
                        Mediating and Session Information Backend for
                        Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br>
                      <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ber=
tocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list
                      by <b>May 17th</b>.<br>
                      <br>
                      Regards,<br>
                      =C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________<br>
                    OAuth mailing list<br>
                    <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAu=
th@ietf.org</a><br>
                    <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
/oauth</a><br>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
                _______________________________________________<br>
                OAuth mailing list<br>
                <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@i=
etf.org</a><br>
                <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          <div dir=3D"ltr">
            <div dir=3D"ltr">
              <div>---</div>
              Aaron Parecki
              <div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://aaronparecki.com</a></div>
              <div><br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
<a href=3D"https://www.manicode.com" target=3D"_blank">https://www.manicode=
.com</a></pre>
  </div>

</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 15:14:17 -0400
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Cc: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - TMI BFF
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Thanks, Brian!

I agree that this is the best course of action at this point.

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 3:02 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> While I admit to being somewhat partial to the acronym, it's not for any
> sound technical or informational reason. To be honest, before I became
> enamored with my own perceived cleverness of TMI-BFF, I also thought the
> use of "BFF" in the context of the draft wasn't quite appropriate.
>
> At this point, I propose that Vittorio and I step back and rework the
> draft a bit and then resume the call for adoption after we spin a new
> revision. We'll eliminate the problematic use of BFF and address some of
> the more straightforward feedback from the interim.
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 3:03 PM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>
>> Okay, I have come around to this idea and agree that we shouldn't use
>> "BFF" to refer to this pattern. The only reason I am continuing the
>> discussion in this thread is that if we agree we should avoid the term B=
FF
>> for this draft, I would like to see it renamed before it is adopted, to
>> avoid any confusion at the start.
>>
>> Aaron
>>
>>
>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:28 AM Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com> wrote:
>>
>>> +1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA's so TMI-BFF is a
>>> badly branded name that will add confusion.
>>>
>>> - Jim
>>> On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:
>>>
>>> My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is what the document
>>> calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will assume is BFF is not what t=
he
>>> document is referring to.
>>> =E1=90=A7
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I support adoption. I'm also fine with the BFF acronym since it's
>>>> common in the software development world already. If anything, the TMI
>>>> acronym is the least strong of the two as it's missing a letter from t=
he
>>>> full name of the draft.
>>>>
>>>> Aaron
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 7:40 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote=
:
>>>>
>>>>> I'm supportive -- but am concerned with the BFF acronym.
>>>>> =E1=90=A7
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <
>>>>> rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> All,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is a call for adoption for the *Token Mediating and Session
>>>>>> Information Backend for Frontend* as a WG document:
>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list by *May 17th*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ---
>>>> Aaron Parecki
>>>> https://aaronparecki.com
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/o=
auth
>>>
>>> --
>>> Jim Manico
>>> Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
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> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fro=
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> your computer. Thank you.*_______________________________________________
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks, Brian!<div><br></div><div>I agree that this is the=
 best course of action at this point.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</di=
v><div>=C2=A0Rifaat</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 3:02 PM Bri=
an Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf=
.org">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>While I admit =
to being somewhat partial to the acronym, it&#39;s not for any sound techni=
cal or informational reason. To be honest, before I became enamored with my=
 own perceived cleverness of TMI-BFF, I also thought  the use of &quot;BFF&=
quot; in the context of the draft wasn&#39;t quite appropriate. <br></div><=
div><br></div><div>At this point, I propose that Vittorio and I step back a=
nd rework the draft a bit and then resume the call for adoption after we sp=
in a new revision. We&#39;ll eliminate the problematic use of BFF and addre=
ss some of the more straightforward feedback from the interim. <br></div><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 3:03 PM Aaron Parecki =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=3D"_blank">aaron@parecki.co=
m</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"=
><div dir=3D"ltr">Okay, I have come around to this idea and agree that we s=
houldn&#39;t use &quot;BFF&quot; to refer to this pattern. The only reason =
I am continuing the discussion in this thread is that if we agree we should=
 avoid the term BFF for this draft, I would like to see it renamed before i=
t is adopted, to avoid any confusion at the start.<div><br></div><div>Aaron=
</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:28 AM Jim Manico &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:jim@manicode.com" target=3D"_blank">jim@manicode.com</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>+1 Mr. Hardt. BFF aims to avoid access tokens in UA&#39;s so TMI-BFF
      is a badly branded name that will add confusion.</p>
    <p>- Jim<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 5/4/21 11:25 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">My concern with BFF is that the common meaning is
        what the document calls Full BFF -- so what many readers will
        assume is BFF is not what the document is referring to.</div>
      <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D""=
 style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"https://ma=
ilfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3D=
zerocontent&amp;guid=3D9335c13d-4f91-4815-ac17-41c29a932c91"><font size=3D"=
1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 8:03 A=
M
          Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com" target=3D"=
_blank">aaron@parecki.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"auto">I support adoption. I&#39;m also fine with the =
BFF
            acronym since it&#39;s common in the software development world
            already. If anything, the TMI acronym is the least strong of
            the two as it&#39;s missing a letter from the full name of the
            draft.</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto">Aaron</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div><br>
            <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
              <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 4, 2021 at
                7:40 AM Dick Hardt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">dick.hardt@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m supportive -- but am concerned wit=
h
                  the BFF acronym.</div>
                <div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" style=3D"max-height:1px"><im=
g alt=3D"" style=3D"width: 0px; max-height: 0px; overflow: hidden;" src=3D"=
https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&a=
mp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3D7ba9b176-7363-4952-8cd1-771ee086d1bc"><fon=
t size=3D"1" color=3D"#ffffff">=E1=90=A7</font></div>
                <br>
                <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                  <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 3, 2021
                    at 3:00 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rif=
aat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                    wrote:<br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                    <div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br>
                      <br>
                      This is a call for adoption for the=C2=A0<b>Token
                        Mediating and Session Information Backend for
                        Frontend</b> as a WG document:<br>
                      <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ber=
tocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list
                      by <b>May 17th</b>.<br>
                      <br>
                      Regards,<br>
                      =C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________<br>
                    OAuth mailing list<br>
                    <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAu=
th@ietf.org</a><br>
                    <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
/oauth</a><br>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
                _______________________________________________<br>
                OAuth mailing list<br>
                <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@i=
etf.org</a><br>
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=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          <div dir=3D"ltr">
            <div dir=3D"ltr">
              <div>---</div>
              Aaron Parecki
              <div><a href=3D"https://aaronparecki.com" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://aaronparecki.com</a></div>
              <div><br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
<a href=3D"https://www.manicode.com" target=3D"_blank">https://www.manicode=
.com</a></pre>
  </div>

</blockquote></div>
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From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: AD Review of draft-ietf-oauth-par-07
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Hi!

I performed my AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-par-07.  Thanks for the effort=
 to produce this document.  See my feedback below:

** Section 1.1.  Per the first POST example, please provide a bit more text=
 to explain the presence of the Authorization header.

** Section 2.1.  Per step #1, "Authenticate the client in the same way as a=
t the token endpoint." Would it be appropriate to cite Section 2.3.1 of RFC=
6749 as the reference for "the same way"?

** Section 2.1. Typo.  s/the the/the/

** Section 2.2.  "The format of the "request_uri" value is at the discretio=
n of the authorization server ...", it would be helpful to remind implement=
ers (via reference) that the constraints of Section 10.10 of RFC6749 apply.

   The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing access
   tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner
   passwords, and client credentials.

   The probability of an attacker guessing generated tokens (and other
   credentials not intended for handling by end-users) MUST be less than
   or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-160).

** Section 2.2.  "The string representation of a UUID as a URN per [RFC4122=
] is also an option for authorization servers to construct "request_uri" va=
lues" suggests that a UUID could be used as the "cryptographically strong p=
seudorandom algorithm such that it is computationally infeasible to predict=
 or guess a valid value" for the random part of the request_uri.  However, =
a few bits of the 128-bit UUID are in fact not random.  Hence, this UUID co=
nstruct would seem to violate the guidance of Section 10.10 of RFC6749 note=
d above.  Likewise, the Section 10.2 of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34 referenc=
ed in Security Considerations also suggest 128-bits.

** Section 2.4.  This section relaxes exact matching of the redirect_uri sp=
ecified in the current text of the security BCP and OAuth 2.1.  Not relevan=
t to this document, but would it make sense to acknowledge this relaxation =
in the BCP or caveat language about strict requirements in the v2.1 draft?

** Section 6.  Typo. s/reqired/required/

** Section 7.5.  Per "Clients SHOULD make use of PKCE, a unique "state" par=
ameter, or the OIDC "nonce" parameter" are good advice.  Can the text provi=
de references to each of these.

** Section 8.  Wouldn't some of the privacy considerations of draft-ietf-oa=
uth-jwsreq-34/Section 11 apply?

Thanks,
Roman


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Thanks for the review Roman! Responses from me are inline below. And I'll
endeavor to get a new draft published soon that addresses your feedback.


On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 1:17 PM Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote:

> Hi!
>
> I performed my AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-par-07.  Thanks for the
> effort to produce this document.  See my feedback below:
>
> ** Section 1.1.  Per the first POST example, please provide a bit more
> text to explain the presence of the Authorization header.
>

Makes sense and will do.



>
> ** Section 2.1.  Per step #1, "Authenticate the client in the same way as
> at the token endpoint." Would it be appropriate to cite Section 2.3.1 of
> RFC6749 as the reference for "the same way"?
>

I think a reference here would be good but Section 2.3 of RFC6749 is
probably more appropriate as any of the defined/supported client
authentication methods (e.g., RFC8705 or RFC7523) could be used. It's not
limited to client password/secret, which is what Section 2.3.1 of RFC6749
is about.



>
> ** Section 2.1. Typo.  s/the the/the/
>

Doh! Will fix.



>
> ** Section 2.2.  "The format of the "request_uri" value is at the
> discretion of the authorization server ...", it would be helpful to remin=
d
> implementers (via reference) that the constraints of Section 10.10 of
> RFC6749 apply.
>
>    The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing access
>    tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner
>    passwords, and client credentials.
>
>    The probability of an attacker guessing generated tokens (and other
>    credentials not intended for handling by end-users) MUST be less than
>    or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-160).
>

I'll add that reference around the current text saying it has to be
"computationally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value".



> ** Section 2.2.  "The string representation of a UUID as a URN per
> [RFC4122] is also an option for authorization servers to construct
> "request_uri" values" suggests that a UUID could be used as the
> "cryptographically strong pseudorandom algorithm such that it is
> computationally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value" for the
> random part of the request_uri.  However, a few bits of the 128-bit UUID
> are in fact not random.  Hence, this UUID construct would seem to violate
> the guidance of Section 10.10 of RFC6749 noted above.  Likewise, the
> Section 10.2 of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34 referenced in Security
> Considerations also suggest 128-bits.
>

Good catch, if not a touch pedantic :)  Honestly, my thinking was that
creating UUIDs is made pretty easy in a lot of environments and that the
not-quite-128-bits from a UUID was probably good enough for the purpose.
But you are right and, under a strict reading, this amounts to the PAR
draft suggesting something that is in violation of a normative MUST in
RFC6749. I think the best path forward is that the sentence that suggests
UUIDs should just be removed.



> ** Section 2.4.  This section relaxes exact matching of the redirect_uri
> specified in the current text of the security BCP and OAuth 2.1.  Not
> relevant to this document, but would it make sense to acknowledge this
> relaxation in the BCP or caveat language about strict requirements in the
> v2.1 draft?
>

Yeah, it might make sense to do so perhaps along with some rationale or
explanation about the conditions that make relaxation acceptable.



> ** Section 6.  Typo. s/reqired/required/
>

Ugh. Will fix. And thanks.



> ** Section 7.5.  Per "Clients SHOULD make use of PKCE, a unique "state"
> parameter, or the OIDC "nonce" parameter" are good advice.  Can the text
> provide references to each of these.
>

Yup, I can add references for those.



> ** Section 8.  Wouldn't some of the privacy considerations of
> draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34/Section 11 apply?
>

I read through that section again and honestly don't see anything that is
applicable or isn't already constrained or made irrelevant by the specifics
of the PAR draft. Please let me know if you think I'm overlooking something
though.


Thanks,
> Roman
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the review Roman! Responses fr=
om me are inline below. And I&#39;ll endeavor to get a new draft published =
soon that addresses your feedback. <br></div><div dir=3D"ltr"> <br></div><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, =
May 14, 2021 at 1:17 PM Roman Danyliw &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rdd@cert.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">rdd@cert.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi!<br>
<br>
I performed my AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-par-07.=C2=A0 Thanks for the e=
ffort to produce this document.=C2=A0 See my feedback below:<br>
<br>
** Section 1.1.=C2=A0 Per the first POST example, please provide a bit more=
 text to explain the presence of the Authorization header.<br></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>Makes sense and will do. <br></div><div><br></div><div>=
=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.1.=C2=A0 Per step #1, &quot;Authenticate the client in the sam=
e way as at the token endpoint.&quot; Would it be appropriate to cite Secti=
on 2.3.1 of RFC6749 as the reference for &quot;the same way&quot;?<br></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>I think a reference here would be good but Sect=
ion 2.3 of RFC6749 is probably more appropriate as any of the defined/suppo=
rted client authentication methods (e.g., RFC8705 or RFC7523) could be used=
. It&#39;s not limited to client password/secret, which is what Section 2.3=
.1 of RFC6749 is about.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.1. Typo.=C2=A0 s/the the/the/<br></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>Doh! Will fix. <br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.2.=C2=A0 &quot;The format of the &quot;request_uri&quot; value=
 is at the discretion of the authorization server ...&quot;, it would be he=
lpful to remind implementers (via reference) that the constraints of Sectio=
n 10.10 of RFC6749 apply.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing =
access<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0passwords, and client credentials.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The probability of an attacker guessing generated tokens (and =
other<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0credentials not intended for handling by end-users) MUST be le=
ss than<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-1=
60).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ll add that reference around=
 the current text saying it has to be &quot;computationally infeasible to p=
redict or guess a valid value&quot;. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.2.=C2=A0 &quot;The string representation of a UUID as a URN pe=
r [RFC4122] is also an option for authorization servers to construct &quot;=
request_uri&quot; values&quot; suggests that a UUID could be used as the &q=
uot;cryptographically strong pseudorandom algorithm such that it is computa=
tionally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value&quot; for the random =
part of the request_uri.=C2=A0 However, a few bits of the 128-bit UUID are =
in fact not random.=C2=A0 Hence, this UUID construct would seem to violate =
the guidance of Section 10.10 of RFC6749 noted above.=C2=A0 Likewise, the S=
ection 10.2 of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34 referenced in Security Considerat=
ions also suggest 128-bits.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Good catch,=
 if not a touch pedantic :)=C2=A0 Honestly, my thinking was that creating U=
UIDs is made pretty easy in a lot of environments and that the not-quite-12=
8-bits from a UUID was probably good enough for the purpose. But you are ri=
ght and, under a strict reading, this amounts to the PAR draft suggesting s=
omething that is in violation of a normative MUST in RFC6749. I think the b=
est path forward is that the sentence that suggests UUIDs should just be re=
moved. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.4.=C2=A0 This section relaxes exact matching of the redirect_u=
ri specified in the current text of the security BCP and OAuth 2.1.=C2=A0 N=
ot relevant to this document, but would it make sense to acknowledge this r=
elaxation in the BCP or caveat language about strict requirements in the v2=
.1 draft?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yeah, it might make sense to =
do so perhaps along with some rationale or explanation about the conditions=
 that make relaxation acceptable.=C2=A0 <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 6.=C2=A0 Typo. s/reqired/required/<br></blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>Ugh. Will fix. And thanks. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 7.5.=C2=A0 Per &quot;Clients SHOULD make use of PKCE, a unique &=
quot;state&quot; parameter, or the OIDC &quot;nonce&quot; parameter&quot; a=
re good advice.=C2=A0 Can the text provide references to each of these.<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yup, I can add references for those.<br></=
div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);p=
adding-left:1ex">
** Section 8.=C2=A0 Wouldn&#39;t some of the privacy considerations of draf=
t-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34/Section 11 apply?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>I read through that section again and honestly don&#39;t see anything tha=
t is applicable or isn&#39;t already constrained or made irrelevant by the =
specifics of the PAR draft. Please let me know if you think I&#39;m overloo=
king something though. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Thanks,<br>
Roman<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

<br>
<i style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:ba=
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
        Authors         : Torsten Lodderstedt
                          Brian Campbell
                          Nat Sakimura
                          Dave Tonge
                          Filip Skokan
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-par-08.txt
	Pages           : 23
	Date            : 2021-05-14

Abstract:
   This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
   which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
   authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
   request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
   reference to the data in a subsequent call to the authorization
   endpoint.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-par-08.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-par-08


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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I went ahead and pushed an -08 that hopefully addresses all your feedback
and suggestions.

https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-oauth-par-08

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/





On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 2:55 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
wrote:

> Thanks for the review Roman! Responses from me are inline below. And I'll
> endeavor to get a new draft published soon that addresses your feedback.
>
>
> On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 1:17 PM Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi!
>>
>> I performed my AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-par-07.  Thanks for the
>> effort to produce this document.  See my feedback below:
>>
>> ** Section 1.1.  Per the first POST example, please provide a bit more
>> text to explain the presence of the Authorization header.
>>
>
> Makes sense and will do.
>
>
>
>>
>> ** Section 2.1.  Per step #1, "Authenticate the client in the same way a=
s
>> at the token endpoint." Would it be appropriate to cite Section 2.3.1 of
>> RFC6749 as the reference for "the same way"?
>>
>
> I think a reference here would be good but Section 2.3 of RFC6749 is
> probably more appropriate as any of the defined/supported client
> authentication methods (e.g., RFC8705 or RFC7523) could be used. It's not
> limited to client password/secret, which is what Section 2.3.1 of RFC6749
> is about.
>
>
>
>>
>> ** Section 2.1. Typo.  s/the the/the/
>>
>
> Doh! Will fix.
>
>
>
>>
>> ** Section 2.2.  "The format of the "request_uri" value is at the
>> discretion of the authorization server ...", it would be helpful to remi=
nd
>> implementers (via reference) that the constraints of Section 10.10 of
>> RFC6749 apply.
>>
>>    The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing access
>>    tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner
>>    passwords, and client credentials.
>>
>>    The probability of an attacker guessing generated tokens (and other
>>    credentials not intended for handling by end-users) MUST be less than
>>    or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-160).
>>
>
> I'll add that reference around the current text saying it has to be
> "computationally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value".
>
>
>
>> ** Section 2.2.  "The string representation of a UUID as a URN per
>> [RFC4122] is also an option for authorization servers to construct
>> "request_uri" values" suggests that a UUID could be used as the
>> "cryptographically strong pseudorandom algorithm such that it is
>> computationally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value" for the
>> random part of the request_uri.  However, a few bits of the 128-bit UUID
>> are in fact not random.  Hence, this UUID construct would seem to violat=
e
>> the guidance of Section 10.10 of RFC6749 noted above.  Likewise, the
>> Section 10.2 of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34 referenced in Security
>> Considerations also suggest 128-bits.
>>
>
> Good catch, if not a touch pedantic :)  Honestly, my thinking was that
> creating UUIDs is made pretty easy in a lot of environments and that the
> not-quite-128-bits from a UUID was probably good enough for the purpose.
> But you are right and, under a strict reading, this amounts to the PAR
> draft suggesting something that is in violation of a normative MUST in
> RFC6749. I think the best path forward is that the sentence that suggests
> UUIDs should just be removed.
>
>
>
>> ** Section 2.4.  This section relaxes exact matching of the redirect_uri
>> specified in the current text of the security BCP and OAuth 2.1.  Not
>> relevant to this document, but would it make sense to acknowledge this
>> relaxation in the BCP or caveat language about strict requirements in th=
e
>> v2.1 draft?
>>
>
> Yeah, it might make sense to do so perhaps along with some rationale or
> explanation about the conditions that make relaxation acceptable.
>
>
>
>> ** Section 6.  Typo. s/reqired/required/
>>
>
> Ugh. Will fix. And thanks.
>
>
>
>> ** Section 7.5.  Per "Clients SHOULD make use of PKCE, a unique "state"
>> parameter, or the OIDC "nonce" parameter" are good advice.  Can the text
>> provide references to each of these.
>>
>
> Yup, I can add references for those.
>
>
>
>> ** Section 8.  Wouldn't some of the privacy considerations of
>> draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34/Section 11 apply?
>>
>
> I read through that section again and honestly don't see anything that is
> applicable or isn't already constrained or made irrelevant by the specifi=
cs
> of the PAR draft. Please let me know if you think I'm overlooking somethi=
ng
> though.
>
>
> Thanks,
>> Roman
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I went ahead and pushed an -08 that hopefully address=
es all your feedback and suggestions. <br></div><div><br></div><div><a href=
=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-oauth-par-08" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-oauth-par-08</a></di=
v><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-iet=
f-oauth-par/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/</a></d=
iv><div><br></div><div> <br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, May=
 14, 2021 at 2:55 PM Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingide=
ntity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the review Roman! Responses from me are inline bel=
ow. And I&#39;ll endeavor to get a new draft published soon that addresses =
your feedback. <br></div><div dir=3D"ltr"> <br></div><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 1:17=
 PM Roman Danyliw &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rdd@cert.org" target=3D"_blank">rdd=
@cert.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">Hi!<br>
<br>
I performed my AD review of draft-ietf-oauth-par-07.=C2=A0 Thanks for the e=
ffort to produce this document.=C2=A0 See my feedback below:<br>
<br>
** Section 1.1.=C2=A0 Per the first POST example, please provide a bit more=
 text to explain the presence of the Authorization header.<br></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>Makes sense and will do. <br></div><div><br></div><div>=
=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.1.=C2=A0 Per step #1, &quot;Authenticate the client in the sam=
e way as at the token endpoint.&quot; Would it be appropriate to cite Secti=
on 2.3.1 of RFC6749 as the reference for &quot;the same way&quot;?<br></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>I think a reference here would be good but Sect=
ion 2.3 of RFC6749 is probably more appropriate as any of the defined/suppo=
rted client authentication methods (e.g., RFC8705 or RFC7523) could be used=
. It&#39;s not limited to client password/secret, which is what Section 2.3=
.1 of RFC6749 is about.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.1. Typo.=C2=A0 s/the the/the/<br></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>Doh! Will fix. <br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.2.=C2=A0 &quot;The format of the &quot;request_uri&quot; value=
 is at the discretion of the authorization server ...&quot;, it would be he=
lpful to remind implementers (via reference) that the constraints of Sectio=
n 10.10 of RFC6749 apply.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing =
access<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0passwords, and client credentials.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The probability of an attacker guessing generated tokens (and =
other<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0credentials not intended for handling by end-users) MUST be le=
ss than<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-1=
60).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ll add that reference around=
 the current text saying it has to be &quot;computationally infeasible to p=
redict or guess a valid value&quot;. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.2.=C2=A0 &quot;The string representation of a UUID as a URN pe=
r [RFC4122] is also an option for authorization servers to construct &quot;=
request_uri&quot; values&quot; suggests that a UUID could be used as the &q=
uot;cryptographically strong pseudorandom algorithm such that it is computa=
tionally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value&quot; for the random =
part of the request_uri.=C2=A0 However, a few bits of the 128-bit UUID are =
in fact not random.=C2=A0 Hence, this UUID construct would seem to violate =
the guidance of Section 10.10 of RFC6749 noted above.=C2=A0 Likewise, the S=
ection 10.2 of draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34 referenced in Security Considerat=
ions also suggest 128-bits.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Good catch,=
 if not a touch pedantic :)=C2=A0 Honestly, my thinking was that creating U=
UIDs is made pretty easy in a lot of environments and that the not-quite-12=
8-bits from a UUID was probably good enough for the purpose. But you are ri=
ght and, under a strict reading, this amounts to the PAR draft suggesting s=
omething that is in violation of a normative MUST in RFC6749. I think the b=
est path forward is that the sentence that suggests UUIDs should just be re=
moved. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 2.4.=C2=A0 This section relaxes exact matching of the redirect_u=
ri specified in the current text of the security BCP and OAuth 2.1.=C2=A0 N=
ot relevant to this document, but would it make sense to acknowledge this r=
elaxation in the BCP or caveat language about strict requirements in the v2=
.1 draft?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yeah, it might make sense to =
do so perhaps along with some rationale or explanation about the conditions=
 that make relaxation acceptable.=C2=A0 <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 6.=C2=A0 Typo. s/reqired/required/<br></blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>Ugh. Will fix. And thanks. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
** Section 7.5.=C2=A0 Per &quot;Clients SHOULD make use of PKCE, a unique &=
quot;state&quot; parameter, or the OIDC &quot;nonce&quot; parameter&quot; a=
re good advice.=C2=A0 Can the text provide references to each of these.<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yup, I can add references for those.<br></=
div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);p=
adding-left:1ex">
** Section 8.=C2=A0 Wouldn&#39;t some of the privacy considerations of draf=
t-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34/Section 11 apply?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>I read through that section again and honestly don&#39;t see anything tha=
t is applicable or isn&#39;t already constrained or made irrelevant by the =
specifics of the PAR draft. Please let me know if you think I&#39;m overloo=
king something though. <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Thanks,<br>
Roman<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>
</blockquote></div>

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Perhaps this draft could be marked as replacing
draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation (I think the chairs have the tools to do
that) so that the datatracker somewhat reflects the history?

Some discussion in the draft itself might be helpful to a subset of readers
interested or knowledgeable about the history.  But I suspect that it'd
just be noise for the majority of readers.

On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 7:26 AM Daniel Fett <fett@danielfett.de> wrote:

> Hi Neil,
>
> I'm not sure - maybe others can chime in here as well - if a discussion
> relating to an expired previous draft is something one would expect in th=
e
> spec.
>
> For the record, the client_id does not provide any additional security.
> The key to mitigating Mix-Up is that the "honest AS" ensures that the cod=
e
> issued at its token endpoint is sent to the honest IdP's token endpoint,
> and not to the attacker IdP's token endpoint. This is ensured by the iss
> parameter. The client_id would maybe be relevant if the honest AS sends
> different issuer values for different client_ids - I have not heard of su=
ch
> a constellation. I'm not sure why the client_id was included in the
> previous draft.
>
> -Daniel
>
>
> Am 10.05.21 um 14:57 schrieb Neil Madden:
>
> I have also read it and it looks good to me. It might be worth explicitly
> discussing how it relates to the older draft [1] (that we implemented at
> the time). That older draft also included a client_id parameter in the
> response, so it would be good to clarify if that is actually needed to
> prevent the attack or not.
>
> [1]:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-=
01
>
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Neil
>
> On 15 Apr 2021, at 08:04, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
> karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> the latest version of the security BCP references
> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.
>
> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>
> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns with
> the current draft version.
>
> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully
> finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>
> Best regards,
> Karsten
>
> --
> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
> Senior IT Security Consultant
> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, =
Security Training
>
> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts o=
f mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post =
on single sign-on:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-yo=
ur-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
>
> Hackmanit GmbH
> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
> 44789 Bochum
>
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>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
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>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th
>
>
> -- https://danielfett.de
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Perhaps this draft could be marked as replacing draft=
-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation (I think the chairs have the tools to do that=
) so that the datatracker somewhat reflects the history? <br></div><div><br=
></div><div>Some discussion in the draft itself might be helpful to a subse=
t of readers interested or knowledgeable about the history.=C2=A0 But I sus=
pect that it&#39;d just be noise for the majority of readers. <br></div></d=
iv><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On =
Mon, May 10, 2021 at 7:26 AM Daniel Fett &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fett@danielf=
ett.de">fett@danielfett.de</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <div>Hi Neil,</div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <div>I&#39;m not sure - maybe others can chime
      in here as well - if a discussion relating to an expired previous
      draft is something one would expect in the spec. <br>
    </div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <div>For the record, the client_id does not
      provide any additional security. The key to mitigating Mix-Up is
      that the &quot;honest AS&quot; ensures that the code issued at its to=
ken
      endpoint is sent to the honest IdP&#39;s token endpoint, and not to
      the attacker IdP&#39;s token endpoint. This is ensured by the iss
      parameter. The client_id would maybe be relevant if the honest AS
      sends different issuer values for different client_ids - I have
      not heard of such a constellation. I&#39;m not sure why the client_id
      was included in the previous draft.</div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <div>-Daniel</div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <div>Am 10.05.21 um 14:57 schrieb Neil
      Madden:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      I have also read it and it looks good to me. It might be worth
      explicitly discussing how it relates to the older draft [1] (that
      we implemented at the time). That older draft also included a
      client_id parameter in the response, so it would be good to
      clarify if that is actually needed to prevent the attack or not.
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>[1]:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft=
-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.iet=
f.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01</a>=C2=A0</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Kind regards,</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Neil<br>
        <div><br>
          <blockquote type=3D"cite">
            <div>On 15 Apr 2021, at 08:04, Karsten Meyer zu
              Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hack=
manit.de" target=3D"_blank">karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt;
              wrote:</div>
            <br>
            <div>
             =20
              <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</fo=
nt></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the latest =
version of the
                      security BCP references
                      draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a
                      countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There have =
not been any
                      concerns with the first WG draft version so far: <a h=
ref=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-=
resp/</a><br>
                    </font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would lik=
e to ask the WG if
                      there are any comments on or concerns with the
                      current draft version.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise I=
 hope we can move
                      forward with the next steps and hopefully finish
                      the draft before/with the security BCP.</font></font>=
</p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best regard=
s,<br>
                      Karsten</font></font></p>
                <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de/" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.=
de</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of =
mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on=
 single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oaut=
h-client-against-mix-up-attacks" target=3D"_blank">https://www.hackmanit.de=
/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
              </div>
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t=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
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          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br>
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      <br>
      <span><font size=3D"1">ForgeRock values your <a href=3D"https://www.f=
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</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
<a href=3D"https://danielfett.de" target=3D"_blank">https://danielfett.de</=
a></pre>
  </div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 16:35:00 -0600
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Overall it looks pretty good to me.
One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec 2.4 that
talks about JARM:

'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)"
[JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization
response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.
However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that provides the same
protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4.'

JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just wraps up
all the authorization response parameters as claims in a JWT which is
itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss
authorization response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim of
the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim value that
JARM is already including.

On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> All,
>
> We have not seen any comments on this document.
> Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate that
> you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>
> Regards,
>  Rifaat & Hannes
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
> karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> the latest version of the security BCP references
>> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks=
.
>>
>> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>
>> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns with
>> the current draft version.
>>
>> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully
>> finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Karsten
>>
>> --
>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>> Senior IT Security Consultant
>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing,=
 Security Training
>>
>> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts =
of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post=
 on single sign-on:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-y=
our-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
>>
>> Hackmanit GmbH
>> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>> 44789 Bochum
>>
>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj =
Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Overall it looks pretty good to me. <br></div><div>On=
e little nit is that I don&#39;t love this text from the end of sec 2.4 tha=
t talks about JARM: <br></div><div><br></div><div style=3D"margin-left:40px=
">&#39;Note: The &quot;JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.=
0 (JARM)&quot; [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the autho=
rization response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when JARM =
is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that provides the sam=
e protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4.&#39; <br></div=
><div><br></div><div>JARM doesn&#39;t exactly forbid additional parameters =
but rather just wraps up all the authorization response parameters as claim=
s in a JWT which is itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. =
So really the iss authorization response parameter of this draft is still s=
ent as a claim of the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss c=
laim value that JARM is already including. <br></div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 1, 2021 =
at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com=
">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>We have n=
ot seen any comments on this document.</div><div>Can you please review the =
document and provide feedback, or indicate that you have reviewed the docum=
ent and have no concerns.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=
=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM =
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@h=
ackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</font></font></=
p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the latest version of
          the security BCP references draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
          as a countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There have not been any
          concerns with the first WG draft version so far:
          <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-=
auth-resp/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-o=
auth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br>
        </font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would like to ask the
          WG if there are any comments on or concerns with the current
          draft version.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise I hope we can
          move forward with the next steps and hopefully finish the
          draft before/with the security BCP.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best regards,<br>
          Karsten</font></font></p>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.d=
e</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of =
mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on=
 single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oaut=
h-client-against-mix-up-attacks" target=3D"_blank">https://www.hackmanit.de=
/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
  </div>

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target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
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From: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 17:35:29 +0200
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To: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>,  Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/6lfqd3n8O196a3Om9HxVfCFLLQk>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone

This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April
26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion.

I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or
discovery. HTML <meta> Tags <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>.

These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.

<meta name="oauth-bff-token" content="/api/bff-token">
> <meta name="oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content="/api/bff-sessioninfo">


The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these defined
meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I think this
could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't require any
upfront external requests.

For the SDK this is as simple as

var bffTokenPath =
> document.querySelector('meta[name="oauth-bff-token"]').content;


If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) I
think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery
document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternative
solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the
javascript SDK would know to use.

As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
single root client discovery document) might not always be available for
control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.

Best,
*Filip Skokan*

--0000000000005b17e405c2601e3c
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div><div><br></div><=
div>This is a followup=C2=A0to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting o=
n April 26th where I mentioned I&#39;d bring this to the list for discussio=
n.</div><div><br></div><div>I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoi=
nt locations and/or discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3schools.com/tags/ta=
g_meta.asp" target=3D"_blank">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>These would be in the returned page HTML&#39;s=C2=A0head tag, e.g.<=
/div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font=
 face=3D"monospace">&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot; content=3D&=
quot;/api/bff-token&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-sessioninf=
o&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-sessioninfo&quot;&gt;</font></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>The javascript SDK handing=C2=A0TMI BFF would know to lo=
ok for these defined meta tags to source the location of the different endp=
oints. I think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it d=
oesn&#39;t require any upfront external requests.</div><div><br></div><div>=
For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace">var bffTokenPath =3D d=
ocument.querySelector(&#39;meta[name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot;]&#39;).c=
ontent;</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If this was the only mechani=
sm defined by the document (to be bashed) I think it can save the group a l=
ot of time defining a client discovery document which would be otherwise ne=
eded. If discovery as an alternative solution is indeed inevitable, it can =
be a second in line mechanism the javascript SDK would know to use.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoint=
s (or even a single root client discovery document) might not always be ava=
ilable for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, =
on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</div><div><br></di=
v><div><div dir=3D"ltr" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Best,<br><b>Fili=
p Skokan</b></div></div></div>

--0000000000005b17e405c2601e3c--


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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 08:41:09 -0700
Message-ID: <CAD9ie-u95erk60FXXYq3+SEJYLsoW5VzM8KBeqGkwZwM7TySaw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>,  Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/GqZZm6ku0yO7B10huSyNfMLc1z0>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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As I said in the meeting, I think this is an interesting idea that is worth
exploring.

I don=E2=80=99t think we need to resolve this for WG adoption of the docume=
nt.

On Sat, May 15, 2021 at 8:36 AM Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>
> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April
> 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion.
>
> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or
> discovery. HTML <meta> Tags <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>=
.
>
> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>
> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" content=3D"/api/bff-token">
>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo">
>
>
> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these defined
> meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I think this
> could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't require any
> upfront external requests.
>
> For the SDK this is as simple as
>
> var bffTokenPath =3D
>> document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>
>
> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) I
> think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery
> document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternative
> solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the
> javascript SDK would know to use.
>
> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
> single root client discovery document) might not always be available for
> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>
> Best,
> *Filip Skokan*
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--0000000000001ae16705c2603122
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<div dir=3D"auto">As I said in the meeting, I think this is an interesting =
idea that is worth exploring.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"=
auto">I don=E2=80=99t think we need to resolve this for WG adoption of the =
document.</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 15, 2021 at 8:36 AM Filip Skokan &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com">panva.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(2=
04,204,204)"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div><di=
v><br></div><div>This is a followup=C2=A0to my feedback in the TMI BFF inte=
rim meeting on April 26th where I mentioned I&#39;d bring this to the list =
for discussion.</div><div><br></div><div>I proposed an alternative to using=
 fixed endpoint locations and/or discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3school=
s.com/tags/tag_meta.asp" target=3D"_blank">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div=
><div><br></div><div>These would be in the returned page HTML&#39;s=C2=A0he=
ad tag, e.g.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><font face=3D"monospace" =
style=3D"font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)">&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oaut=
h-bff-token&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-token&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=
=3D&quot;oauth-bff-sessioninfo&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-sessioninfo&q=
uot;&gt;</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The javascript SDK handing=
=C2=A0TMI BFF would know to look for these defined meta tags to source the =
location of the different endpoints. I think this could be the primary plac=
e an SDK would look at as it doesn&#39;t require any upfront external reque=
sts.</div><div><br></div><div>For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div><b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left=
-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><font face=3D"monospace" style=3D"font-family:mono=
space;color:rgb(0,0,0)">var bffTokenPath =3D document.querySelector(&#39;me=
ta[name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot;]&#39;).content;</font></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (t=
o be bashed) I think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client =
discovery document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alte=
rnative solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism=
 the javascript SDK would know to use.</div><div><br></div><div>As discusse=
d in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a single root clie=
nt discovery document) might not always be available for control to the web=
page depending on where and how it is hosted, on the other hand the HTML it=
 serves always, I hope, is.</div><div><br></div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" data-=
smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Best,<br><b>Filip Skokan</b></div></div></div=
>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--0000000000001ae16705c2603122--


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To: oauth@ietf.org
References: <CALAqi_8B7fv9j8CnqLt_wFKDbYLjmFci3jjeBz7EKpqKXu+Atw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Evert Pot <me@evertpot.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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On 2021-05-15 11:35 a.m., Filip Skokan wrote:
> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>
> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on 
> April 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion.
>
> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or 
> discovery. HTML <meta> Tags <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>.
>
> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>
>     <meta name="oauth-bff-token" content="/api/bff-token">
>     <meta name="oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content="/api/bff-sessioninfo">
>
>
> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these 
> defined meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I 
> think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it 
> doesn't require any upfront external requests.
>
> For the SDK this is as simple as
>
>     var bffTokenPath =
>     document.querySelector('meta[name="oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>
>
> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) 
> I think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client 
> discovery document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an 
> alternative solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line 
> mechanism the javascript SDK would know to use.
>
> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a 
> single root client discovery document) might not always be available 
> for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on 
> the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.

A more appropriate HTML tag might be the <link> tag.

You would just need to register a link relationship in the IANA registry:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link-relations.xhtml


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2021-05-15 11:35 a.m., Filip Skokan
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CALAqi_8B7fv9j8CnqLt_wFKDbYLjmFci3jjeBz7EKpqKXu+Atw@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim
          meeting on April 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the
          list for discussion.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations
          and/or discovery. <a
            href="https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp"
            target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">HTML &lt;meta&gt;
            Tags</a>.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font
            face="monospace">&lt;meta name="oauth-bff-token"
            content="/api/bff-token"&gt;<br>
            &lt;meta name="oauth-bff-sessioninfo"
            content="/api/bff-sessioninfo"&gt;</font></blockquote>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for
          these defined meta tags to source the location of the
          different endpoints. I think this could be the primary place
          an SDK would look at as it doesn't require any upfront
          external requests.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>For the SDK this is as simple as</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font
            face="monospace">var bffTokenPath =
            document.querySelector('meta[name="oauth-bff-token"]').content;</font></blockquote>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to
          be bashed) I think it can save the group a lot of time
          defining a client discovery document which would be otherwise
          needed. If discovery as an alternative solution is indeed
          inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the
          javascript SDK would know to use.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints
          (or even a single root client discovery document) might not
          always be available for control to the webpage depending on
          where and how it is hosted, on the other hand the HTML it
          serves always, I hope, is.</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p>A more appropriate HTML tag might be the &lt;link&gt; tag.</p>
    <p>You would just need to register a link relationship in the IANA
      registry:</p>
    <p><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link-relations.xhtml">https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link-relations.xhtml</a><br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

--------------2053813E01455681F044BDEC--


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests
        Authors         : Torsten Lodderstedt
                          Justin Richer
                          Brian Campbell
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.txt
	Pages           : 43
	Date            : 2021-05-15

Abstract:
   This document specifies a new parameter "authorization_details" that
   is used to carry fine grained authorization data in the OAuth
   authorization request.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-rar/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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--Apple-Mail=_3DEF3C06-5F76-4F94-A03D-5AA573701A8D
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Hi all,=20

we just published a new revision of RAR.=20

Here is the list of changes:

added authorization_details token request parameter and discussion on =
authorization details comparison =
<applewebdata://30912556-046C-4631-BD78-8327C169D767#section-appendix.b-3.=
1.1>
added privileges field to authorization details (to align with GNAP) =
<applewebdata://30912556-046C-4631-BD78-8327C169D767#section-appendix.b-3.=
2.1>
added IANA text and changed metadata parameter names =
<applewebdata://30912556-046C-4631-BD78-8327C169D767#section-appendix.b-3.=
3.1>
added text about use of machine-readable type schemas, e.g JSON Schema =
<applewebdata://30912556-046C-4631-BD78-8327C169D767#section-appendix.b-3.=
4.1>
added text on how authorization details are determined for access token =
issued with token response =
<applewebdata://30912556-046C-4631-BD78-8327C169D767#section-appendix.b-3.=
5.1>
added token error response and further error conditions to authorization =
error response


Please give us feedback.=20

The draft is now feature complete from the perspective of the authors. =
So we are aiming at asking the chairs to start WGLC.=20

best regards,
Torsten.=20

> Anfang der weitergeleiteten Nachricht:
>=20
> Von: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Betreff: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.txt
> Datum: 15. Mai 2021 um 20:34:13 MESZ
> An: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Justin Richer =
<ietf@justin.richer.org>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
>=20
>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Torsten Lodderstedt and posted to =
the
> IETF repository.
>=20
> Name:		draft-ietf-oauth-rar
> Revision:	05
> Title:		OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests
> Document date:	2021-05-15
> Group:		oauth
> Pages:		43
> URL:            =
https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-=
oauth-rar-05.txt&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1621708455000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3A=
D80Xsr4FKahwS02BL42V
> Status:         =
https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf=
-oauth-rar/&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1621708455000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0QU88gw=
ZS5gDXDrwsKl1Qh
> Html:           =
https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-=
oauth-rar-05.html&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1621708455000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3=
WCjco3EC1DVEPNMPDls7g
> Htmlized:       =
https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oaut=
h-rar-05&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1621708455000000&usg=3DAOvVaw16dhK0NC7i=
MgY_bSGklxXQ
> Diff:           =
https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2%3Ddraft-i=
etf-oauth-rar-05&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1621708455000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3d=
63udnBD3g9cpudz-8SFi
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies a new parameter "authorization_details" that
>   is used to carry fine grained authorization data in the OAuth
>   authorization request.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat
>=20
>=20


--Apple-Mail=_3DEF3C06-5F76-4F94-A03D-5AA573701A8D
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
all,&nbsp;<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">we just =
published a new revision of RAR.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Here is the list of changes:</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><ul style=3D"padding: =
0px; margin: 0px 0px 1em 2em; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: =
&quot;Noto Sans&quot;, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; orphans: 2; widows: 2; background-color: =
rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial;" class=3D""><li =
id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.1" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0.25em;" =
class=3D""><p id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.1.1" style=3D"padding: 0px; =
margin: 0px 0px 1em;" class=3D"">added&nbsp;<code =
style=3D"background-color: rgb(249, 249, 249); font-family: &quot;Roboto =
Mono&quot;, monospace; font-size: 13.3px;" =
class=3D"">authorization_details</code>&nbsp;token request parameter and =
discussion on authorization details comparison<a =
href=3D"#section-appendix.b-3.1.1" class=3D"pilcrow" =
style=3D"text-decoration: none; z-index: 2; color: rgb(102, 102, 102); =
visibility: hidden; user-select: none;"></a></p></li><li =
id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.2" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0.25em;" =
class=3D""><p id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.2.1" style=3D"padding: 0px; =
margin: 0px 0px 1em;" class=3D"">added&nbsp;<code =
style=3D"background-color: rgb(249, 249, 249); font-family: &quot;Roboto =
Mono&quot;, monospace; font-size: 13.3px;" =
class=3D"">privileges</code>&nbsp;field to authorization details (to =
align with GNAP)<a href=3D"#section-appendix.b-3.2.1" class=3D"pilcrow" =
style=3D"text-decoration: none; z-index: 2; color: rgb(102, 102, 102); =
visibility: hidden; user-select: none;"></a></p></li><li =
id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.3" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0.25em;" =
class=3D""><p id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.3.1" style=3D"padding: 0px; =
margin: 0px 0px 1em;" class=3D"">added IANA text and changed metadata =
parameter names<a href=3D"#section-appendix.b-3.3.1" class=3D"pilcrow" =
style=3D"text-decoration: none; z-index: 2; color: rgb(102, 102, 102); =
visibility: hidden; user-select: none;"></a></p></li><li =
id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.4" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0.25em;" =
class=3D""><p id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.4.1" style=3D"padding: 0px; =
margin: 0px 0px 1em;" class=3D"">added text about use of =
machine-readable type schemas, e.g JSON Schema<a =
href=3D"#section-appendix.b-3.4.1" class=3D"pilcrow" =
style=3D"text-decoration: none; z-index: 2; color: rgb(102, 102, 102); =
visibility: hidden; user-select: none;"></a></p></li><li =
id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.5" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0.25em;" =
class=3D""><p id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.5.1" style=3D"padding: 0px; =
margin: 0px 0px 1em;" class=3D"">added text on how authorization details =
are determined for access token issued with token response<a =
href=3D"#section-appendix.b-3.5.1" class=3D"pilcrow" =
style=3D"text-decoration: none; z-index: 2; color: rgb(102, 102, 102); =
visibility: hidden; user-select: none;"></a></p></li><li =
id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.6" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0.25em;" =
class=3D""><p id=3D"section-appendix.b-3.6.1" style=3D"padding: 0px; =
margin: 0px 0px 1em;" class=3D"">added token error response and further =
error conditions to authorization error response</p></li></ul><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Please give us =
feedback.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">The draft is now feature complete from the perspective of the =
authors. So we are aiming at asking the chairs to start =
WGLC.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>best =
regards,</div><div>Torsten.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Anfang der weitergeleiteten =
Nachricht:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Von: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a><br class=3D""></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Betreff: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">New Version =
Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.txt</b><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Datum: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">15. Mai 2021 um 20:34:13 =
MESZ<br class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; =
margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">An: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" =
class=3D"">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt;, Justin Richer &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf@justin.richer.org" =
class=3D"">ietf@justin.richer.org</a>&gt;, Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net" =
class=3D"">torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt;<br class=3D""></span></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">A new version =
of I-D, draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.txt<br class=3D"">has been successfully =
submitted by Torsten Lodderstedt and posted to the<br class=3D"">IETF =
repository.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Name:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>draft-ietf-oauth-rar<br class=3D"">Revision:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>05<br =
class=3D"">Title:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">=
	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests<br class=3D"">Document =
date:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>2021-05-15<br class=3D"">Group:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>oauth<br class=3D"">Pages:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>43<br =
class=3D"">URL: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/dra=
ft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.txt&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D162170845500000=
0&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3AD80Xsr4FKahwS02BL42V" =
class=3D"">https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/=
draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.txt&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D162170845500=
0000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3AD80Xsr4FKahwS02BL42V</a><br class=3D"">Status: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dr=
aft-ietf-oauth-rar/&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1621708455000000&amp=
;usg=3DAOvVaw0QU88gwZS5gDXDrwsKl1Qh" =
class=3D"">https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc=
/draft-ietf-oauth-rar/&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1621708455000000&=
amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0QU88gwZS5gDXDrwsKl1Qh</a><br class=3D"">Html: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/dra=
ft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.html&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D16217084550000=
00&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3WCjco3EC1DVEPNMPDls7g" =
class=3D"">https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/=
draft-ietf-oauth-rar-05.html&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D16217084550=
00000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3WCjco3EC1DVEPNMPDls7g</a><br class=3D"">Htmlized: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-i=
etf-oauth-rar-05&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1621708455000000&amp;us=
g=3DAOvVaw16dhK0NC7iMgY_bSGklxXQ" =
class=3D"">https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/draf=
t-ietf-oauth-rar-05&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1621708455000000&amp=
;usg=3DAOvVaw16dhK0NC7iMgY_bSGklxXQ</a><br class=3D"">Diff: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2%3=
Ddraft-ietf-oauth-rar-05&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D162170845500000=
0&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3d63udnBD3g9cpudz-8SFi" =
class=3D"">https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url=
2%3Ddraft-ietf-oauth-rar-05&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D162170845500=
0000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3d63udnBD3g9cpudz-8SFi</a><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Abstract:<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;This document specifies =
a new parameter "authorization_details" that<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;is used to carry fine grained authorization data in the =
OAuth<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;authorization request.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Please note that =
it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission<br =
class=3D"">until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org" class=3D"">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">The IETF Secretariat<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_3DEF3C06-5F76-4F94-A03D-5AA573701A8D--


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Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels =
really off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I =
have doubts about using HTML elements for this purpose.

As far as I understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for modern =
frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the =
index.html in these applications is likely to conflict with their =
development paradigms. It would be much easier to add these variables to =
the environment file, so you can differentiate between dev and prod when =
necessary.

Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of =
trouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, but =
I might be wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag =
as well). However, using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for =
server-side rendering, where these DOM APIs are typically not available =
(e.g., =
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom-=
serverside).

Kind regards

Philippe

=E2=80=94
Pragmatic Web Security
Security for developers
https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/


> On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>=20
> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on =
April 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion.
>=20
> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or =
discovery. HTML <meta> Tags =
<https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>.
>=20
> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>=20
> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" content=3D"/api/bff-token">
> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo">
>=20
> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these =
defined meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I =
think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't =
require any upfront external requests.
>=20
> For the SDK this is as simple as
>=20
> var bffTokenPath =3D =
document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>=20
> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) =
I think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery =
document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternative =
solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the =
javascript SDK would know to use.
>=20
> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a =
single root client discovery document) might not always be available for =
control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the =
other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>=20
> Best,
> Filip Skokan
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


--Apple-Mail=_3461B756-B7CB-46F9-B1A7-145189B29C0C
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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this =
feels really off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but =
I have doubts about using HTML elements for this purpose.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As far as I understand, =
this mechanism is supposed to be used for modern frontends (Angular, =
React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the index.html in these =
applications is likely to conflict with their development paradigms. It =
would be much easier to add these variables to the environment file, so =
you can differentiate between dev and prod when necessary.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Additionally, querying =
the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of trouble. I don=E2=80=99t =
think that injection is that big of a risk, but I might be wrong (I=E2=80=99=
m sure someone said that about the base tag as well). However, using DOM =
APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side rendering, where =
these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g., <a =
href=3D"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-acc=
ess-dom-serverside" =
class=3D"">https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-=
access-dom-serverside</a>).</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div=
 class=3D"">Kind regards</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Philippe</div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div dir=3D"auto" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: =
space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;">=E2=80=94<br class=3D""><b class=3D"">Pragmatic Web =
Security</b><br class=3D""><i class=3D"">Security for developers</i><br =
class=3D""><a href=3D"https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/" =
class=3D"">https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/</a><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div>
</div>
<div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Skokan &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com" class=3D"">panva.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Hello Vittorio, Brian, =
everyone</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">This =
is a followup&nbsp;to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on =
April 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for =
discussion.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I =
proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or =
discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">These would be in the =
returned page HTML's&nbsp;head tag, e.g.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace" =
class=3D"">&lt;meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" =
content=3D"/api/bff-token"&gt;<br class=3D"">&lt;meta =
name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" =
content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo"&gt;</font></blockquote><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The javascript SDK =
handing&nbsp;TMI BFF would know to look for these defined meta tags to =
source the location of the different endpoints. I think this could be =
the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't require any upfront =
external requests.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace" class=3D"">var=
 bffTokenPath =3D =
document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;</font></=
blockquote><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If this =
was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) I think it =
can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery document =
which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternative solution =
is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the =
javascript SDK would know to use.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As discussed in the interim, a well =
known set of endpoints (or even a single root client discovery document) =
might not always be available for control to the webpage depending on =
where and how it is hosted, on the other hand the HTML it serves always, =
I hope, is.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature" class=3D"">Best,<br =
class=3D""><b class=3D"">Filip Skokan</b></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">OAuth =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Sun, 16 May 2021 10:04:00 +0200
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To: Philippe De Ryck <philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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I agree, missing context for this:

As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
single root client discovery document) might not always be available for
control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.

Wouldn't this only be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn't you just define
the configuration in javascript, like everything else?

Also, is it required or something that can be added later?

On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck <
philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com> wrote:

> Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels really
> off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I have doubts
> about using HTML elements for this purpose.
>
> As far as I understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for modern
> frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the ind=
ex.html in
> these applications is likely to conflict with their development paradigms=
.
> It would be much easier to add these variables to the environment file, s=
o
> you can differentiate between dev and prod when necessary.
>
> Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of
> trouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, but =
I might be
> wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as well). Ho=
wever,
> using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side rendering,
> where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g.,
> https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom=
-serverside
> ).
>
> Kind regards
>
> Philippe
>
> =E2=80=94
> *Pragmatic Web Security*
> *Security for developers*
> https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/
>
>
> On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>
> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April
> 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion.
>
> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or
> discovery. HTML <meta> Tags <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>=
.
>
> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>
> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" content=3D"/api/bff-token">
>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo">
>
>
> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these defined
> meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I think this
> could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't require any
> upfront external requests.
>
> For the SDK this is as simple as
>
> var bffTokenPath =3D
>> document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>
>
> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) I
> think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery
> document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternative
> solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the
> javascript SDK would know to use.
>
> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
> single root client discovery document) might not always be available for
> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>
> Best,
> *Filip Skokan*
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">I agree, missing context for this:<div dir=3D"auto"><br><=
div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">As=
 discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a single =
root client discovery document) might not always be available for control t=
o the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the other hand th=
e HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</span><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><spa=
n style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div d=
ir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Wouldn&#39;t this only b=
e used as input to a SDK, why wouldn&#39;t you just define the configuratio=
n in javascript, like everything else?</span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span =
style=3D"font-family:sans-serif"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Also, is it required or something that can =
be added later?</span></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De R=
yck &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com">philippe@pragm=
aticwebsecurity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div>Witho=
ut having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels really off to=
 me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I have doubts about u=
sing HTML elements for this purpose.</div><div><br></div><div>As far as I u=
nderstand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for modern frontends (Angu=
lar, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the index.html in these =
applications is likely to conflict with their development paradigms. It wou=
ld be much easier to add these variables to the environment file, so you ca=
n differentiate between dev and prod when necessary.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of tr=
ouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, but I mi=
ght be wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as well=
). However, using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side r=
endering, where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g., <a href=
=3D"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-d=
om-serverside" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://stackoverflow.c=
om/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom-serverside</a>).</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Kind regards</div><div><br></div><div>Philippe</div><br><=
div>
<div dir=3D"auto" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-spac=
e"><div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:no=
rmal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norma=
l;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">=E2=80=94<br><b>Pragmatic Web Secu=
rity</b><br><i>Security for developers</i><br><a href=3D"https://pragmaticw=
ebsecurity.com/" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://pragmaticwebs=
ecurity.com/</a><br><br></div></div>
</div>
<div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Sko=
kan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer">panva.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div><div><br></div><div>This is a follo=
wup=C2=A0to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April 26th where =
I mentioned I&#39;d bring this to the list for discussion.</div><div><br></=
div><div>I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or=
 discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div><div><br></=
div><div>These would be in the returned page HTML&#39;s=C2=A0head tag, e.g.=
</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><fon=
t face=3D"monospace">&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot; content=3D=
&quot;/api/bff-token&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-sessionin=
fo&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-sessioninfo&quot;&gt;</font></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>The javascript SDK handing=C2=A0TMI BFF would know to l=
ook for these defined meta tags to source the location of the different end=
points. I think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it =
doesn&#39;t require any upfront external requests.</div><div><br></div><div=
>For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace">var bffTokenPath =3D =
document.querySelector(&#39;meta[name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot;]&#39;).=
content;</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If this was the only mechan=
ism defined by the document (to be bashed) I think it can save the group a =
lot of time defining a client discovery document which would be otherwise n=
eeded. If discovery as an alternative solution is indeed inevitable, it can=
 be a second in line mechanism the javascript SDK would know to use.</div><=
div><br></div><div>As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoin=
ts (or even a single root client discovery document) might not always be av=
ailable for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted,=
 on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div><div dir=3D"ltr" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Best,<br><b>Fil=
ip Skokan</b></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a=
 href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">OAuth@=
ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" tar=
get=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br></div></blockquote></div><br></div>______________________________=
_________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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Am 15.05.2021 um 17:57 schrieb Evert Pot:
> ...
> A more appropriate HTML tag might be the <link> tag.
>
> You would just need to register a link relationship in the IANA registry=
:
>
> https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link-relations.xhtml
> ...

And that way, it could be sent in a Link response header field as well.

Best regards, Julian


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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 14:03:30 -0600
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To: Warren Parad <wparad=40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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The interim discussion can be found here
https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discussion
but the general context, as I understand it, is that there's a desire to
have the location of the two application endpoints be conveyed to the
frontend in a defined way that avoids out-of-band configuration and also
doesn't infringe on the application namespace. The current draft places the
two endpoints directly in .well-known but a number of folks have stated
reasons that's less than ideal or even unworkable in many common
deployments. Moving to a single static document in .well-known that lists
the endpoint locations is one alternative approach. This thread suggests a
different alternative of placing the locations in HTML meta/link tags or
link headers returned with the application's main html page.


On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> I agree, missing context for this:
>
> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
> single root client discovery document) might not always be available for
> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>
> Wouldn't this only be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn't you just defin=
e
> the configuration in javascript, like everything else?
>
> Also, is it required or something that can be added later?
>
> On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck <
> philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com> wrote:
>
>> Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels reall=
y
>> off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I have doubt=
s
>> about using HTML elements for this purpose.
>>
>> As far as I understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for modern
>> frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the in=
dex.html in
>> these applications is likely to conflict with their development paradigm=
s.
>> It would be much easier to add these variables to the environment file, =
so
>> you can differentiate between dev and prod when necessary.
>>
>> Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of
>> trouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, but=
 I might be
>> wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as well). H=
owever,
>> using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side rendering,
>> where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g.,
>> https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-do=
m-serverside
>> ).
>>
>> Kind regards
>>
>> Philippe
>>
>> =E2=80=94
>> *Pragmatic Web Security*
>> *Security for developers*
>> https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/
>>
>>
>> On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>>
>> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on Apri=
l
>> 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion.
>>
>> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or
>> discovery. HTML <meta> Tags <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp=
>
>> .
>>
>> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>>
>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" content=3D"/api/bff-token">
>>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo">
>>
>>
>> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these defined
>> meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I think thi=
s
>> could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't require an=
y
>> upfront external requests.
>>
>> For the SDK this is as simple as
>>
>> var bffTokenPath =3D
>>> document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>>
>>
>> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) I
>> think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery
>> document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternative
>> solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the
>> javascript SDK would know to use.
>>
>> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
>> single root client discovery document) might not always be available for
>> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
>> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>>
>> Best,
>> *Filip Skokan*
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The interim discussion can be found=C2=A0here <a href=
=3D"https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discus=
sion">https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Disc=
ussion</a> but the general context, as I understand it, is that there&#39;s=
 a desire to have the location of the two application endpoints be conveyed=
 to the frontend in a defined way that avoids out-of-band configuration and=
 also doesn&#39;t infringe on the application namespace. The current draft =
places the two endpoints directly in .well-known but a number of folks have=
 stated reasons that&#39;s less than ideal or even unworkable in many commo=
n deployments. Moving to a single static document in .well-known that lists=
 the endpoint locations is one alternative approach. This thread suggests a=
 different alternative of placing the locations in HTML meta/link tags or l=
ink headers returned with the application&#39;s main html page. <br></div><=
div><br></div><div> </div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"=
ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Parad &lt;=
wparad=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40=
rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">I agree, missing context for this=
:<div dir=3D"auto"><br><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-se=
rif;font-size:12.8px">As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endp=
oints (or even a single root client discovery document) might not always be=
 available for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is host=
ed, on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</span><br></di=
v><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"=
><br></span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">=
Wouldn&#39;t this only be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn&#39;t you just=
 define the configuration in javascript, like everything else?</span></div>=
<div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif"><br></span></div><=
div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Also, is it require=
d or something that can be added later?</span></div></div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 16, 2=
021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:philippe@pragmaticwebsecu=
rity.com" target=3D"_blank">philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div>With=
out having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels really off t=
o me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I have doubts about =
using HTML elements for this purpose.</div><div><br></div><div>As far as I =
understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for modern frontends (Ang=
ular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the index.html in these=
 applications is likely to conflict with their development paradigms. It wo=
uld be much easier to add these variables to the environment file, so you c=
an differentiate between dev and prod when necessary.</div><div><br></div><=
div>Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of t=
rouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, but I m=
ight be wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as wel=
l). However, using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side =
rendering, where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g., <a href=
=3D"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-d=
om-serverside" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://stackoverflow.c=
om/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom-serverside</a>).</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Kind regards</div><div><br></div><div>Philippe</div><br><=
div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font=
-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;le=
tter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wh=
ite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">=E2=80=94<br><b>Pra=
gmatic Web Security</b><br><i>Security for developers</i><br><a href=3D"htt=
ps://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//pragmaticwebsecurity.com/</a><br><br></div></div>
</div>
<div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Sko=
kan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"=
_blank">panva.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div><div><br></div><div>This is a follo=
wup=C2=A0to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April 26th where =
I mentioned I&#39;d bring this to the list for discussion.</div><div><br></=
div><div>I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or=
 discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>These would be in the returned page HTML&#39;s=C2=A0head tag, e.g.<=
/div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font=
 face=3D"monospace">&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot; content=3D&=
quot;/api/bff-token&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-sessioninf=
o&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-sessioninfo&quot;&gt;</font></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>The javascript SDK handing=C2=A0TMI BFF would know to lo=
ok for these defined meta tags to source the location of the different endp=
oints. I think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it d=
oesn&#39;t require any upfront external requests.</div><div><br></div><div>=
For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace">var bffTokenPath =3D d=
ocument.querySelector(&#39;meta[name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot;]&#39;).c=
ontent;</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If this was the only mechani=
sm defined by the document (to be bashed) I think it can save the group a l=
ot of time defining a client discovery document which would be otherwise ne=
eded. If discovery as an alternative solution is indeed inevitable, it can =
be a second in line mechanism the javascript SDK would know to use.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoint=
s (or even a single root client discovery document) might not always be ava=
ilable for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, =
on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</div><div><br></di=
v><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Best,<br><b>Filip Skokan</b></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a=
 href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@=
ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br></div></blockquote></div><br></div>______________________________=
_________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 22:52:48 +0200
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Philippe De Ryck <philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com>,  Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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I can't follow the discussion. So I'm still missing why the endpoints would
need to be listed anywhere. Isn't the developer of the html page, the same
developer that will configure the HTTP request to go to the backend?

Warren Parad

Founder, CTO
Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
Authress <https://authress.io/>.


On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 10:04 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> The interim discussion can be found here
> https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discussi=
on
> but the general context, as I understand it, is that there's a desire to
> have the location of the two application endpoints be conveyed to the
> frontend in a defined way that avoids out-of-band configuration and also
> doesn't infringe on the application namespace. The current draft places t=
he
> two endpoints directly in .well-known but a number of folks have stated
> reasons that's less than ideal or even unworkable in many common
> deployments. Moving to a single static document in .well-known that lists
> the endpoint locations is one alternative approach. This thread suggests =
a
> different alternative of placing the locations in HTML meta/link tags or
> link headers returned with the application's main html page.
>
>
> On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
> 40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> I agree, missing context for this:
>>
>> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
>> single root client discovery document) might not always be available for
>> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
>> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>>
>> Wouldn't this only be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn't you just
>> define the configuration in javascript, like everything else?
>>
>> Also, is it required or something that can be added later?
>>
>> On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck <
>> philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels
>>> really off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I ha=
ve
>>> doubts about using HTML elements for this purpose.
>>>
>>> As far as I understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for moder=
n
>>> frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the i=
ndex.html in
>>> these applications is likely to conflict with their development paradig=
ms.
>>> It would be much easier to add these variables to the environment file,=
 so
>>> you can differentiate between dev and prod when necessary.
>>>
>>> Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of
>>> trouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, bu=
t I might be
>>> wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as well). =
However,
>>> using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side rendering=
,
>>> where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g.,
>>> https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-d=
om-serverside
>>> ).
>>>
>>> Kind regards
>>>
>>> Philippe
>>>
>>> =E2=80=94
>>> *Pragmatic Web Security*
>>> *Security for developers*
>>> https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/
>>>
>>>
>>> On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>>>
>>> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on
>>> April 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion.
>>>
>>> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or
>>> discovery. HTML <meta> Tags
>>> <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>.
>>>
>>> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>>>
>>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" content=3D"/api/bff-token">
>>>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo">
>>>
>>>
>>> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these defined
>>> meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I think th=
is
>>> could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't require a=
ny
>>> upfront external requests.
>>>
>>> For the SDK this is as simple as
>>>
>>> var bffTokenPath =3D
>>>> document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>>>
>>>
>>> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) I
>>> think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery
>>> document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternativ=
e
>>> solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism the
>>> javascript SDK would know to use.
>>>
>>> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
>>> single root client discovery document) might not always be available fo=
r
>>> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
>>> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> *Filip Skokan*
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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--0000000000005a2d5805c28cc768
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I can&#39;t follow the discussion. So I&#39;m still missin=
g why the endpoints would need to be listed anywhere. Isn&#39;t the develop=
er of the html page, the same developer that will configure the HTTP reques=
t to go to the backend?<div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><t=
able style=3D"border:none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D=
"214"><col width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td sty=
le=3D"border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #cccccc 1pt;border-b=
ottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;vertical-align:top;pad=
ding:5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1=
.2;border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:=
solid #ffffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bot=
tom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);b=
ackground-color:transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><=
span style=3D"border:none;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;=
height:34px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKD=
N1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs=
6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"199" height=3D"34" s=
tyle=3D"margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D=
"border-left:solid #cccccc 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-bottom=
:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;vertical-align:top;padding:=
5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;bo=
rder-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid=
 #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;=
vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-righ=
t:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-b=
ottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333=
px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr></tbody></=
table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user data with IAM auth=
orization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://authress.i=
o/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank">Authress</a><span style=
=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May =
17, 2021 at 10:04 PM Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pin=
gidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div>The interim discussion can be found=C2=A0here <a href=3D"https://=
codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discussion" target=
=3D"_blank">https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oaut=
h#Discussion</a> but the general context, as I understand it, is that there=
&#39;s a desire to have the location of the two application endpoints be co=
nveyed to the frontend in a defined way that avoids out-of-band configurati=
on and also doesn&#39;t infringe on the application namespace. The current =
draft places the two endpoints directly in .well-known but a number of folk=
s have stated reasons that&#39;s less than ideal or even unworkable in many=
 common deployments. Moving to a single static document in .well-known that=
 lists the endpoint locations is one alternative approach. This thread sugg=
ests a different alternative of placing the locations in HTML meta/link tag=
s or link headers returned with the application&#39;s main html page. <br><=
/div><div><br></div><div> </div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Para=
d &lt;wparad=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">I agree, missing context fo=
r this:<div dir=3D"auto"><br><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:s=
ans-serif;font-size:12.8px">As discussed in the interim, a well known set o=
f endpoints (or even a single root client discovery document) might not alw=
ays be available for control to the webpage depending on where and how it i=
s hosted, on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</span><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-s=
erif">Wouldn&#39;t this only be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn&#39;t yo=
u just define the configuration in javascript, like everything else?</span>=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif"><br></span><=
/div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Also, is it r=
equired or something that can be added later?</span></div></div></div><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May=
 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:philippe@pragmaticw=
ebsecurity.com" target=3D"_blank">philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><di=
v>Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels really=
 off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I have doubts =
about using HTML elements for this purpose.</div><div><br></div><div>As far=
 as I understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for modern frontend=
s (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables to the index.html in=
 these applications is likely to conflict with their development paradigms.=
 It would be much easier to add these variables to the environment file, so=
 you can differentiate between dev and prod when necessary.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lo=
t of trouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, b=
ut I might be wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag =
as well). However, using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server=
-side rendering, where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g., <a=
 href=3D"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-acc=
ess-dom-serverside" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://stackoverf=
low.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom-serverside</a>).</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Kind regards</div><div><br></div><div>Philippe</div>=
<br><div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font=
-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;le=
tter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wh=
ite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">=E2=80=94<br><b>Pra=
gmatic Web Security</b><br><i>Security for developers</i><br><a href=3D"htt=
ps://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//pragmaticwebsecurity.com/</a><br><br></div></div>
</div>
<div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Sko=
kan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"=
_blank">panva.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div><div><br></div><div>This is a follo=
wup=C2=A0to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April 26th where =
I mentioned I&#39;d bring this to the list for discussion.</div><div><br></=
div><div>I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or=
 discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>These would be in the returned page HTML&#39;s=C2=A0head tag, e.g.<=
/div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font=
 face=3D"monospace">&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot; content=3D&=
quot;/api/bff-token&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-sessioninf=
o&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-sessioninfo&quot;&gt;</font></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>The javascript SDK handing=C2=A0TMI BFF would know to lo=
ok for these defined meta tags to source the location of the different endp=
oints. I think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it d=
oesn&#39;t require any upfront external requests.</div><div><br></div><div>=
For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace">var bffTokenPath =3D d=
ocument.querySelector(&#39;meta[name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot;]&#39;).c=
ontent;</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If this was the only mechani=
sm defined by the document (to be bashed) I think it can save the group a l=
ot of time defining a client discovery document which would be otherwise ne=
eded. If discovery as an alternative solution is indeed inevitable, it can =
be a second in line mechanism the javascript SDK would know to use.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoint=
s (or even a single root client discovery document) might not always be ava=
ilable for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, =
on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</div><div><br></di=
v><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Best,<br><b>Filip Skokan</b></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a=
 href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@=
ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br></div></blockquote></div><br></div>______________________________=
_________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
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</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
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<br>
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Not exactly. The thinking is by standardizing these endpoints in some way,
it would allow client library developers to write generic libraries that
can work with any backend.


On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 1:53 PM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> I can't follow the discussion. So I'm still missing why the endpoints
> would need to be listed anywhere. Isn't the developer of the html page, t=
he
> same developer that will configure the HTTP request to go to the backend?
>
> Warren Parad
>
> Founder, CTO
> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>
>
> On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 10:04 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> The interim discussion can be found here
>> https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discuss=
ion
>> but the general context, as I understand it, is that there's a desire to
>> have the location of the two application endpoints be conveyed to the
>> frontend in a defined way that avoids out-of-band configuration and also
>> doesn't infringe on the application namespace. The current draft places =
the
>> two endpoints directly in .well-known but a number of folks have stated
>> reasons that's less than ideal or even unworkable in many common
>> deployments. Moving to a single static document in .well-known that list=
s
>> the endpoint locations is one alternative approach. This thread suggests=
 a
>> different alternative of placing the locations in HTML meta/link tags or
>> link headers returned with the application's main html page.
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
>> 40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I agree, missing context for this:
>>>
>>> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
>>> single root client discovery document) might not always be available fo=
r
>>> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
>>> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>>>
>>> Wouldn't this only be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn't you just
>>> define the configuration in javascript, like everything else?
>>>
>>> Also, is it required or something that can be added later?
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck <
>>> philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels
>>>> really off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I h=
ave
>>>> doubts about using HTML elements for this purpose.
>>>>
>>>> As far as I understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for
>>>> modern frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables =
to the
>>>> index.html in these applications is likely to conflict with their
>>>> development paradigms. It would be much easier to add these variables =
to
>>>> the environment file, so you can differentiate between dev and prod wh=
en
>>>> necessary.
>>>>
>>>> Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of
>>>> trouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, b=
ut I might be
>>>> wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as well).=
 However,
>>>> using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side renderin=
g,
>>>> where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g.,
>>>> https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-=
dom-serverside
>>>> ).
>>>>
>>>> Kind regards
>>>>
>>>> Philippe
>>>>
>>>> =E2=80=94
>>>> *Pragmatic Web Security*
>>>> *Security for developers*
>>>> https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>>>>
>>>> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on
>>>> April 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussion=
.
>>>>
>>>> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or
>>>> discovery. HTML <meta> Tags
>>>> <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>.
>>>>
>>>> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>>>>
>>>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" content=3D"/api/bff-token">
>>>>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo"=
>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these define=
d
>>>> meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. I think t=
his
>>>> could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it doesn't require =
any
>>>> upfront external requests.
>>>>
>>>> For the SDK this is as simple as
>>>>
>>>> var bffTokenPath =3D
>>>>> document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed) =
I
>>>> think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discovery
>>>> document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternati=
ve
>>>> solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism th=
e
>>>> javascript SDK would know to use.
>>>>
>>>> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
>>>> single root client discovery document) might not always be available f=
or
>>>> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
>>>> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>> *Filip Skokan*
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
>> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited=
.
>> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the send=
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>> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fr=
om
>> your computer. Thank you.*
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Not exactly. The thinking is by standardizing these endpoi=
nts in some way, it would allow client library developers to write generic =
libraries that can work with any backend.<div><br></div></div><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 17, 202=
1 at 1:53 PM Warren Parad &lt;wparad=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40rhosys.ch@dmarc.=
ietf.org">40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I can&#39;t follow the=
 discussion. So I&#39;m still missing why the endpoints would need to be li=
sted anywhere. Isn&#39;t the developer of the html page, the same developer=
 that will configure the HTTP request to go to the backend?<div><br clear=
=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:none=
;border-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110">=
</colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;bo=
rder-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204) rgb(255,255=
,255) rgb(255,255,255);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p d=
ir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;bor=
der-color:rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D=
"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transpa=
rent;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:no=
ne;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:34px"><img src=
=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZO=
sW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hju=
Im9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"199" height=3D"34" style=3D"margin-left: =
0px; margin-top: 0px;"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"border-width:1pt=
;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,=
255,255) rgb(204,204,204);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><=
p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,25=
5);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-top:1pt solid rgb(255,255=
,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-=
family:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;vertica=
l-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr=
" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-ri=
ght:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);mar=
gin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=
=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p=
></td></tr></tbody></table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your us=
er data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=
=3D"https://authress.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank">Aut=
hress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></div></div></div><b=
r></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmai=
l_attr">On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 10:04 PM Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a =
href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40pingi=
dentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The interim discussion can =
be found=C2=A0here <a href=3D"https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-=
2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discussion" target=3D"_blank">https://codimd.ietf.org/s=
/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discussion</a> but the general cont=
ext, as I understand it, is that there&#39;s a desire to have the location =
of the two application endpoints be conveyed to the frontend in a defined w=
ay that avoids out-of-band configuration and also doesn&#39;t infringe on t=
he application namespace. The current draft places the two endpoints direct=
ly in .well-known but a number of folks have stated reasons that&#39;s less=
 than ideal or even unworkable in many common deployments. Moving to a sing=
le static document in .well-known that lists the endpoint locations is one =
alternative approach. This thread suggests a different alternative of placi=
ng the locations in HTML meta/link tags or link headers returned with the a=
pplication&#39;s main html page. <br></div><div><br></div><div> </div></div=
><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Su=
n, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Parad &lt;wparad=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40rh=
osys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div di=
r=3D"auto">I agree, missing context for this:<div dir=3D"auto"><br><div dir=
=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">As discus=
sed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a single root cl=
ient discovery document) might not always be available for control to the w=
ebpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the other hand the HTML =
it serves always, I hope, is.</span><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=
=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"a=
uto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Wouldn&#39;t this only be used =
as input to a SDK, why wouldn&#39;t you just define the configuration in ja=
vascript, like everything else?</span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=
=3D"font-family:sans-serif"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=
=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Also, is it required or something that can be a=
dded later?</span></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com" target=3D"_blank">=
philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div>Without having the full context =
of the interim meeting, this feels really off to me. I see the need for mak=
ing this configurable, but I have doubts about using HTML elements for this=
 purpose.</div><div><br></div><div>As far as I understand, this mechanism i=
s supposed to be used for modern frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Hav=
ing to add variables to the index.html in these applications is likely to c=
onflict with their development paradigms. It would be much easier to add th=
ese variables to the environment file, so you can differentiate between dev=
 and prod when necessary.</div><div><br></div><div>Additionally, querying t=
he DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of trouble. I don=E2=80=99t thin=
k that injection is that big of a risk, but I might be wrong (I=E2=80=99m s=
ure someone said that about the base tag as well). However, using DOM APIs =
like this will cause headaches for server-side rendering, where these DOM A=
PIs are typically not available (e.g., <a href=3D"https://stackoverflow.com=
/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom-serverside" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-ther=
e-a-way-to-access-dom-serverside</a>).</div><div><br></div><div>Kind regard=
s</div><div><br></div><div>Philippe</div><br><div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font=
-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;le=
tter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wh=
ite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">=E2=80=94<br><b>Pra=
gmatic Web Security</b><br><i>Security for developers</i><br><a href=3D"htt=
ps://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//pragmaticwebsecurity.com/</a><br><br></div></div>
</div>
<div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Sko=
kan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"=
_blank">panva.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div><div><br></div><div>This is a follo=
wup=C2=A0to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April 26th where =
I mentioned I&#39;d bring this to the list for discussion.</div><div><br></=
div><div>I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or=
 discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>These would be in the returned page HTML&#39;s=C2=A0head tag, e.g.<=
/div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font=
 face=3D"monospace">&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot; content=3D&=
quot;/api/bff-token&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-sessioninf=
o&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-sessioninfo&quot;&gt;</font></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>The javascript SDK handing=C2=A0TMI BFF would know to lo=
ok for these defined meta tags to source the location of the different endp=
oints. I think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it d=
oesn&#39;t require any upfront external requests.</div><div><br></div><div>=
For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace">var bffTokenPath =3D d=
ocument.querySelector(&#39;meta[name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot;]&#39;).c=
ontent;</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If this was the only mechani=
sm defined by the document (to be bashed) I think it can save the group a l=
ot of time defining a client discovery document which would be otherwise ne=
eded. If discovery as an alternative solution is indeed inevitable, it can =
be a second in line mechanism the javascript SDK would know to use.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoint=
s (or even a single root client discovery document) might not always be ava=
ilable for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, =
on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</div><div><br></di=
v><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Best,<br><b>Filip Skokan</b></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a=
 href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@=
ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br></div></blockquote></div><br></div>______________________________=
_________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAut=
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</blockquote></div>
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target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
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<br>
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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 23:04:52 +0200
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To: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Cc: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>,  Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] TMI BFF - html meta tags over/alternative to discovery
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Huh, why? It sounds like you are saying we want:

[image: image.png]

Just so that the SDK developer can write in their code:
document.getElementById...

They can already write a library that works with any backend by providing
these urls as input into the SDK. Not to mention input into the SDK is a
sane place to put the urls. You'd have to justify that putting the
configuration into the input of the SDK is actually non-obvious. But I
haven't seen that discussion yet.

Warren Parad

Founder, CTO
Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
Authress <https://authress.io/>.


On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 10:56 PM Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> wrote:

> Not exactly. The thinking is by standardizing these endpoints in some way=
,
> it would allow client library developers to write generic libraries that
> can work with any backend.
>
>
> On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 1:53 PM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
> 40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> I can't follow the discussion. So I'm still missing why the endpoints
>> would need to be listed anywhere. Isn't the developer of the html page, =
the
>> same developer that will configure the HTTP request to go to the backend=
?
>>
>> Warren Parad
>>
>> Founder, CTO
>> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
>> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 10:04 PM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
>> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> The interim discussion can be found here
>>> https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discus=
sion
>>> but the general context, as I understand it, is that there's a desire t=
o
>>> have the location of the two application endpoints be conveyed to the
>>> frontend in a defined way that avoids out-of-band configuration and als=
o
>>> doesn't infringe on the application namespace. The current draft places=
 the
>>> two endpoints directly in .well-known but a number of folks have stated
>>> reasons that's less than ideal or even unworkable in many common
>>> deployments. Moving to a single static document in .well-known that lis=
ts
>>> the endpoint locations is one alternative approach. This thread suggest=
s a
>>> different alternative of placing the locations in HTML meta/link tags o=
r
>>> link headers returned with the application's main html page.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
>>> 40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I agree, missing context for this:
>>>>
>>>> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
>>>> single root client discovery document) might not always be available f=
or
>>>> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the
>>>> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>>>>
>>>> Wouldn't this only be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn't you just
>>>> define the configuration in javascript, like everything else?
>>>>
>>>> Also, is it required or something that can be added later?
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe De Ryck <
>>>> philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Without having the full context of the interim meeting, this feels
>>>>> really off to me. I see the need for making this configurable, but I =
have
>>>>> doubts about using HTML elements for this purpose.
>>>>>
>>>>> As far as I understand, this mechanism is supposed to be used for
>>>>> modern frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=A6). Having to add variables=
 to the
>>>>> index.html in these applications is likely to conflict with their
>>>>> development paradigms. It would be much easier to add these variables=
 to
>>>>> the environment file, so you can differentiate between dev and prod w=
hen
>>>>> necessary.
>>>>>
>>>>> Additionally, querying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of
>>>>> trouble. I don=E2=80=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, =
but I might be
>>>>> wrong (I=E2=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as well)=
. However,
>>>>> using DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side renderi=
ng,
>>>>> where these DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g.,
>>>>> https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access=
-dom-serverside
>>>>> ).
>>>>>
>>>>> Kind regards
>>>>>
>>>>> Philippe
>>>>>
>>>>> =E2=80=94
>>>>> *Pragmatic Web Security*
>>>>> *Security for developers*
>>>>> https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone
>>>>>
>>>>> This is a followup to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on
>>>>> April 26th where I mentioned I'd bring this to the list for discussio=
n.
>>>>>
>>>>> I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or
>>>>> discovery. HTML <meta> Tags
>>>>> <https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp>.
>>>>>
>>>>> These would be in the returned page HTML's head tag, e.g.
>>>>>
>>>>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-token" content=3D"/api/bff-token">
>>>>>> <meta name=3D"oauth-bff-sessioninfo" content=3D"/api/bff-sessioninfo=
">
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The javascript SDK handing TMI BFF would know to look for these
>>>>> defined meta tags to source the location of the different endpoints. =
I
>>>>> think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it does=
n't
>>>>> require any upfront external requests.
>>>>>
>>>>> For the SDK this is as simple as
>>>>>
>>>>> var bffTokenPath =3D
>>>>>> document.querySelector('meta[name=3D"oauth-bff-token"]').content;
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If this was the only mechanism defined by the document (to be bashed)
>>>>> I think it can save the group a lot of time defining a client discove=
ry
>>>>> document which would be otherwise needed. If discovery as an alternat=
ive
>>>>> solution is indeed inevitable, it can be a second in line mechanism t=
he
>>>>> javascript SDK would know to use.
>>>>>
>>>>> As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a
>>>>> single root client discovery document) might not always be available =
for
>>>>> control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on th=
e
>>>>> other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> *Filip Skokan*
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>
>>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
>>> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibite=
d.
>>> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sen=
der
>>> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments f=
rom
>>> your computer. Thank you.*
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Huh, why? It sounds like you are saying we want:</div=
><div><br></div><div><img src=3D"cid:ii_kot3fnnf0" alt=3D"image.png" width=
=3D"562" height=3D"419"><br></div><div><br></div><div>Just so that the SDK =
developer can write in their code: document.getElementById...</div><div><br=
></div><div>They can already write a library that works with any backend by=
 providing these urls as input into the SDK. Not to mention input into the =
SDK is a sane place to put the urls. You&#39;d have to justify that putting=
 the configuration into the input of the SDK is actually non-obvious. But I=
 haven&#39;t seen that discussion yet.</div><div><br></div><div><div><div d=
ir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgro=
up><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"hei=
ght:0pt"><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(=
255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255);vertical-al=
ign:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.=
2;border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255);margin-=
top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;=
color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white=
-space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:none;display:inline-block;overflow:h=
idden;width:199px;height:34px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.co=
m/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPY=
dBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"19=
9" height=3D"34" style=3D"margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"></span></span=
></p></td><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb=
(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204);vertical-a=
lign:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1=
.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,25=
5,255);border-top:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0=
pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;background-co=
lor:transparent;font-weight:700;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-le=
ft:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);borde=
r-bottom:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font=
 face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white-space:p=
re-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr></tbody></table><span styl=
e=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a s=
ervice. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://authress.io/" style=3D"fon=
t-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-sm=
all">.</span><br></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 10:56 =
PM Aaron Parecki &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aaron@parecki.com">aaron@parecki.com=
</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
<div dir=3D"ltr">Not exactly. The thinking is by standardizing these endpoi=
nts in some way, it would allow client library developers to write generic =
libraries that can work with any backend.<div><br></div></div><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 17, 202=
1 at 1:53 PM Warren Parad &lt;wparad=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40rhosys.ch@dmarc.=
ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I ca=
n&#39;t follow the discussion. So I&#39;m still missing why the endpoints w=
ould need to be listed anywhere. Isn&#39;t the developer of the html page, =
the same developer that will configure the HTTP request to go to the backen=
d?<div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table styl=
e=3D"border:none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><co=
l width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"bor=
der-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,=
204) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overf=
low:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-width:1pt;border=
-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt=
"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgrou=
nd-color:transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span st=
yle=3D"border:none;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:=
34px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevx=
YuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1f=
YsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"199" height=3D"34" style=3D=
"margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"bo=
rder-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255=
,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;over=
flow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid =
rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-top:1pt sol=
id rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:11pt;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weig=
ht:700;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p=
><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,=
255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(25=
5,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif=
"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</sp=
an></font></p></td></tr></tbody></table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">S=
ecure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</=
span><a href=3D"https://authress.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" target=3D=
"_blank">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></div></=
div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" c=
lass=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 10:04 PM Brian Campbell &lt;bca=
mpbell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_bl=
ank">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The interim dis=
cussion can be found=C2=A0here <a href=3D"https://codimd.ietf.org/s/notes-i=
etf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discussion" target=3D"_blank">https://codim=
d.ietf.org/s/notes-ietf-interim-2021-oauth-09-oauth#Discussion</a> but the =
general context, as I understand it, is that there&#39;s a desire to have t=
he location of the two application endpoints be conveyed to the frontend in=
 a defined way that avoids out-of-band configuration and also doesn&#39;t i=
nfringe on the application namespace. The current draft places the two endp=
oints directly in .well-known but a number of folks have stated reasons tha=
t&#39;s less than ideal or even unworkable in many common deployments. Movi=
ng to a single static document in .well-known that lists the endpoint locat=
ions is one alternative approach. This thread suggests a different alternat=
ive of placing the locations in HTML meta/link tags or link headers returne=
d with the application&#39;s main html page. <br></div><div><br></div><div>=
 </div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail=
_attr">On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 2:04 AM Warren Parad &lt;wparad=3D<a href=3D=
"mailto:40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40rhosys.ch@dmarc.iet=
f.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">I agree, missing context for this:<div dir=3D"auto">=
<br><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8p=
x">As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoints (or even a si=
ngle root client discovery document) might not always be available for cont=
rol to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, on the other ha=
nd the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</span><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"=
><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><=
div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Wouldn&#39;t this o=
nly be used as input to a SDK, why wouldn&#39;t you just define the configu=
ration in javascript, like everything else?</span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><=
span style=3D"font-family:sans-serif"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><s=
pan style=3D"font-family:sans-serif">Also, is it required or something that=
 can be added later?</span></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 16, 2021, 09:26 Philippe=
 De Ryck &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com" target=3D=
"_blank">philippe@pragmaticwebsecurity.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div>Without having the full=
 context of the interim meeting, this feels really off to me. I see the nee=
d for making this configurable, but I have doubts about using HTML elements=
 for this purpose.</div><div><br></div><div>As far as I understand, this me=
chanism is supposed to be used for modern frontends (Angular, React, =E2=80=
=A6). Having to add variables to the index.html in these applications is li=
kely to conflict with their development paradigms. It would be much easier =
to add these variables to the environment file, so you can differentiate be=
tween dev and prod when necessary.</div><div><br></div><div>Additionally, q=
uerying the DOM for API endpoints sounds like a lot of trouble. I don=E2=80=
=99t think that injection is that big of a risk, but I might be wrong (I=E2=
=80=99m sure someone said that about the base tag as well). However, using =
DOM APIs like this will cause headaches for server-side rendering, where th=
ese DOM APIs are typically not available (e.g., <a href=3D"https://stackove=
rflow.com/questions/62896223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom-serverside" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62896=
223/is-there-a-way-to-access-dom-serverside</a>).</div><div><br></div><div>=
Kind regards</div><div><br></div><div>Philippe</div><br><div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font=
-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;le=
tter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wh=
ite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">=E2=80=94<br><b>Pra=
gmatic Web Security</b><br><i>Security for developers</i><br><a href=3D"htt=
ps://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//pragmaticwebsecurity.com/</a><br><br></div></div>
</div>
<div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On 15 May 2021, at 17:35, Filip Sko=
kan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:panva.ip@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"=
_blank">panva.ip@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv>Hello Vittorio, Brian, everyone</div><div><br></div><div>This is a follo=
wup=C2=A0to my feedback in the TMI BFF interim meeting on April 26th where =
I mentioned I&#39;d bring this to the list for discussion.</div><div><br></=
div><div>I proposed an alternative to using fixed endpoint locations and/or=
 discovery. <a href=3D"https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_meta.asp" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">HTML &lt;meta&gt; Tags</a>.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>These would be in the returned page HTML&#39;s=C2=A0head tag, e.g.<=
/div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font=
 face=3D"monospace">&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot; content=3D&=
quot;/api/bff-token&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-sessioninf=
o&quot; content=3D&quot;/api/bff-sessioninfo&quot;&gt;</font></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>The javascript SDK handing=C2=A0TMI BFF would know to lo=
ok for these defined meta tags to source the location of the different endp=
oints. I think this could be the primary place an SDK would look at as it d=
oesn&#39;t require any upfront external requests.</div><div><br></div><div>=
For the SDK this is as simple as</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font face=3D"monospace">var bffTokenPath =3D d=
ocument.querySelector(&#39;meta[name=3D&quot;oauth-bff-token&quot;]&#39;).c=
ontent;</font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If this was the only mechani=
sm defined by the document (to be bashed) I think it can save the group a l=
ot of time defining a client discovery document which would be otherwise ne=
eded. If discovery as an alternative solution is indeed inevitable, it can =
be a second in line mechanism the javascript SDK would know to use.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>As discussed in the interim, a well known set of endpoint=
s (or even a single root client discovery document) might not always be ava=
ilable for control to the webpage depending on where and how it is hosted, =
on the other hand the HTML it serves always, I hope, is.</div><div><br></di=
v><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Best,<br><b>Filip Skokan</b></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a=
 href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@=
ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br></div></blockquote></div><br></div>______________________________=
_________________<br>
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</blockquote></div>
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</blockquote></div>

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
        Authors         : Aaron Parecki
                          David Waite
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-08.txt
	Pages           : 21
	Date            : 2021-05-17

Abstract:
   This specification details the security considerations and best
   practices that must be taken into account when developing browser-
   based applications that use OAuth 2.0.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-08
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-08

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-08


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>,
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Hi Brian,

thank you for your feedback.

I agree that the language is too strong here. What do you think about=20
this new note?

> Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0=20
> (JARM)" [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization=20
> response parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that=20
> provides the same protection if it is validated as described in=20
> Section 2.4. Therefore, an additional iss authorization response=20
> parameter as defined by this document MUST NOT be used when JARM is use=
d.

Best regards,
Karsten

On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Overall it looks pretty good to me.
> One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec 2.4=20
> that talks about JARM:
>
> 'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0=20
> (JARM)" [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the=20
> authorization response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used=20
> when JARM is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that=20
> provides the same protection if it is validated as described in=20
> Section 2.4.'
>
> JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just=20
> wraps up all the authorization response parameters as claims in a JWT=20
> which is itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So=20
> really the iss authorization response parameter of this draft is still =

> sent as a claim of the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the =

> iss claim value that JARM is already including.
>
> On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef=20
> <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     All,
>
>     We have not seen any comments on this document.
>     Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or
>     indicate that you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>
>     Regards,
>     =C2=A0Rifaat & Hannes
>
>
>     On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>     <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de
>     <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>> wrote:
>
>         Hi all,
>
>         the latest version of the security BCP references
>         draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to
>         mix-up attacks.
>
>         There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft
>         version so far:
>         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp=
/
>         <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-res=
p/>
>
>         I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
>         concerns with the current draft version.
>
>         Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and
>         hopefully finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>
>         Best regards,
>         Karsten
>
>         --=20
>         Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>         Senior IT Security Consultant
>         Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>         Web:	https://hackmanit.de  <https://hackmanit.de>  | IT Securit=
y Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>
>         Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe=
 impacts of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our lates=
t blog post on single sign-on:
>         https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oau=
th-client-against-mix-up-attacks  <https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/13=
2-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks>
>
>         Hackmanit GmbH
>         Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>         44789 Bochum
>
>         Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>         Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. D=
r. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         OAuth mailing list
>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>         <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     OAuth mailing list
>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>
>
> /CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and=20
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any =

> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly=20
> prohibited.=C2=A0 If you have received this communication in error, ple=
ase=20
> notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any =

> file attachments from your computer. Thank you./=20

--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, =
Security Training

M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On o=
der den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Single Sig=
n-On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30=
 Uhr!
https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-sing=
le-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz


--------------544B35442C86EAA9A291BACF
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF=
-8">
  </head>
  <body text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi Brian,</font></fon=
t></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">thank you for your
          feedback.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I agree that the
          language is too strong here. What do you think about this new
          note?<br>
        </font></font></p>
    <p>
      <blockquote type=3D"cite">Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization
        Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)" [JARM] defines a mechanism
        that conveys all authorization response parameters in a JWT.
        This JWT contains an iss claim that provides the same protection
        if it is validated as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an
        additional iss
        authorization response parameter as defined by this document
        MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.</blockquote>
    </p>
    <p>Best regards,<br>
      Karsten<br>
    </p>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"
cite=3D"mid:CA+k3eCQboyohxe=3Du8wxtA9RyVhy=3DE4sMDkdsn76x3Xk19asVMA@mail.=
gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DU=
TF-8">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div>Overall it looks pretty good to me. <br>
        </div>
        <div>One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end
          of sec 2.4 that talks about JARM: <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div style=3D"margin-left:40px">'Note: The "JWT Secured
          Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)" [JARM]
          forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization
          response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when
          JARM is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss claim
          that provides the same protection if it is validated as
          described in Section 2.4.' <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but
          rather just wraps up all the authorization response parameters
          as claims in a JWT which is itself sent as a single
          form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss authorization
          response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim of
          the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim
          value that JARM is already including. <br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47=
 PM
          Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a
            href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" moz-do-not-send=3D"tr=
ue">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=

          <div dir=3D"ltr">All,
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>We have not seen any comments on this document.</div>
            <div>Can you please review the document and provide
              feedback, or indicate that you have reviewed the document
              and have no concerns.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Regards,</div>
            <div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at=

              3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a
                href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de"
                target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">karsten.meyerz=
uselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=

              0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
              rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</=
font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the lates=
t
                      version of the security BCP references
                      draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a
                      countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p=
>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There hav=
e
                      not been any concerns with the first WG draft
                      version so far: <a
                        href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ie=
tf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/"
                        target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https:=
//datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br>
                    </font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would l=
ike
                      to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
                      concerns with the current draft version.</font></fo=
nt></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise=
 I
                      hope we can move forward with the next steps and
                      hopefully finish the draft before/with the
                      security BCP.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best
                      regards,<br>
                      Karsten</font></font></p>
                <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D=
"true">https://hackmanit.de</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Tes=
ting, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts o=
f mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog pos=
t on single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oa=
uth-client-against-mix-up-attacks" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"t=
rue">https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-cl=
ient-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
              </div>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              OAuth mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"
                moz-do-not-send=3D"true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
              <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"t=
rue">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"
            moz-do-not-send=3D"true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
          <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
            rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true"=
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <i
style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:bas=
eline;background:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system=
-ui,-apple-system,system-ui,&quot;Segoe
        UI&quot;,Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,&quot;Helvetica
        Neue&quot;,Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(85,85,85)"><span
style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:bas=
eline;background:transparent;font-family:proxima-nova-zendesk,system-ui,-=
apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,&quot;Segoe
          UI&quot;,Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,&quot;Helvetica
          Neue&quot;,Arial,sans-serif;font-weight:600"><font size=3D"2">C=
ONFIDENTIALITY
            NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged
            material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
            review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is
            strictly prohibited.=C2=A0 If you have received this
            communication in error, please notify the sender immediately
            by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments
            from your computer. Thank you.</font></span></i>
    </blockquote>
    <pre class=3D"moz-signature" cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://hackmanit.de">htt=
ps://hackmanit.de</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Secu=
rity Training

M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On o=
der den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Single Sig=
n-On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30=
 Uhr!
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/de/sc=
hulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-co=
nnect">https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-=
in-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
  </body>
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From: Takahiko Kawasaki <taka@authlete.com>
Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 18:28:40 +0900
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
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Hi Karsten,

I've read the specification and implemented it. I think that the
specification is good enough for implementers. Actually, the latest version
of my company's product supports the specification and has already been
rolled out. The release note of the version mentions the specification. If
you are interested, please visit the page:

https://www.authlete.com/developers/relnotes/2.2.2/#oauth-2-0-authorization=
-server-issuer-identifier-in-authorization-response

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki


On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 3:45 PM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:

> Hi Brian,
>
> thank you for your feedback.
>
> I agree that the language is too strong here. What do you think about thi=
s
> new note?
>
> Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)"
> [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization response
> parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that provides the sam=
e
> protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an
> additional iss authorization response parameter as defined by this docume=
nt
> MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.
>
> Best regards,
> Karsten
> On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote:
>
> Overall it looks pretty good to me.
> One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec 2.4 tha=
t
> talks about JARM:
>
> 'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)"
> [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization
> response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when JARM is used=
.
> However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that provides the same
> protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4.'
>
> JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just wraps u=
p
> all the authorization response parameters as claims in a JWT which is
> itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss
> authorization response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim o=
f
> the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim value that
> JARM is already including.
>
> On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.co=
m>
> wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> We have not seen any comments on this document.
>> Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate tha=
t
>> you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>>
>> Regards,
>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
>> karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> the latest version of the security BCP references
>>> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attack=
s.
>>>
>>> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far=
:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>>
>>> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns wit=
h
>>> the current draft version.
>>>
>>> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully
>>> finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Karsten
>>>
>>> --
>>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>> Senior IT Security Consultant
>>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>>> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing=
, Security Training
>>>
>>> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts=
 of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog pos=
t on single sign-on:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-=
your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
>>>
>>> Hackmanit GmbH
>>> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>>> 44789 Bochum
>>>
>>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>>> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj=
 Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
r
> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fro=
m
> your computer. Thank you.*
>
> --
> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
> Senior IT Security Consultant
> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, =
Security Training
>
> M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On o=
der den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
> Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Single Sig=
n-On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30 U=
hr!https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-sin=
gle-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect
>
> Hackmanit GmbH
> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
> 44789 Bochum
>
> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Karsten,<div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve read the specifica=
tion and implemented it. I think that the specification is good enough for =
implementers. Actually, the latest version of my company&#39;s product supp=
orts the specification and has already been rolled out. The release note of=
 the version mentions the specification. If you are interested, please visi=
t the page:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.authlete.com/de=
velopers/relnotes/2.2.2/#oauth-2-0-authorization-server-issuer-identifier-i=
n-authorization-response">https://www.authlete.com/developers/relnotes/2.2.=
2/#oauth-2-0-authorization-server-issuer-identifier-in-authorization-respon=
se</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Best Regards,<br></div><div>Takahiko Ka=
wasaki</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D=
"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 3:45 PM Karsten Meyer zu=
 Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de">kar=
sten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi Brian,</font></font>=
</p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">thank you for your
          feedback.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I agree that the
          language is too strong here. What do you think about this new
          note?<br>
        </font></font></p>
    <p>
      </p><blockquote type=3D"cite">Note: The &quot;JWT Secured Authorizati=
on
        Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)&quot; [JARM] defines a mechanism
        that conveys all authorization response parameters in a JWT.
        This JWT contains an iss claim that provides the same protection
        if it is validated as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an
        additional iss
        authorization response parameter as defined by this document
        MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.</blockquote>
    <p></p>
    <p>Best regards,<br>
      Karsten<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div>Overall it looks pretty good to me. <br>
        </div>
        <div>One little nit is that I don&#39;t love this text from the end
          of sec 2.4 that talks about JARM: <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div style=3D"margin-left:40px">&#39;Note: The &quot;JWT Secured
          Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)&quot; [JARM]
          forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization
          response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when
          JARM is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss claim
          that provides the same protection if it is validated as
          described in Section 2.4.&#39; <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>JARM doesn&#39;t exactly forbid additional parameters but
          rather just wraps up all the authorization response parameters
          as claims in a JWT which is itself sent as a single
          form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss authorization
          response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim of
          the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim
          value that JARM is already including. <br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 P=
M
          Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"ltr">All,
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>We have not seen any comments on this document.</div>
            <div>Can you please review the document and provide
              feedback, or indicate that you have reviewed the document
              and have no concerns.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Regards,</div>
            <div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at
              3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kars=
ten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">karsten.meyerzuselhaus=
en@hackmanit.de</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</fo=
nt></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the latest
                      version of the security BCP references
                      draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a
                      countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There have
                      not been any concerns with the first WG draft
                      version so far: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatrack=
er.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br>
                    </font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would lik=
e
                      to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
                      concerns with the current draft version.</font></font=
></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise I
                      hope we can move forward with the next steps and
                      hopefully finish the draft before/with the
                      security BCP.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best
                      regards,<br>
                      Karsten</font></font></p>
                <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.d=
e</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of =
mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on=
 single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oaut=
h-client-against-mix-up-attacks" target=3D"_blank">https://www.hackmanit.de=
/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
              </div>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              OAuth mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@iet=
f.org</a><br>
              <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.or=
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          <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>=
<br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <i><span><font size=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY
            NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged
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    </blockquote>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.d=
e</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On ode=
r den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Single Sign-=
On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30 Uhr=
!
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrun=
g-in-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect" target=3D"_blank">https://www=
.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-single-sign-on-oa=
uth-und-openid-connect</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Save the Date: May 25-26, Federation and Browsers Workshop
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All,

Take a look at the following email from Heather regarding the Browsers
Workshop.

Regards,
 Rifaat


The *WebID* project in the *W3C Web Incubator Community Group (WICG)* would
like to invite you to participate in a workshop on
*May 25 & 26 from 10:00-13:00 PDT* dedicated to understanding the
implications of federation on the web in the face of privacy-preserving
changes to eliminate inappropriate user tracking. To date, discussions
about aspects of tracking, including eliminating third-party cookies,
evolving the use of link decoration, potential protocol-level changes, and
so on, are happening in several locations. Given the location of
expertise on each of those specific areas, that is entirely understandable.
What we are hoping to accomplish with this workshop is to bring
all the communities grappling with the impact of browser changes on
federated identity together to establish a common understanding of the
challenges.

Day one will focus on presentations from browsers and large-scale IdP
operators. Each IdP operator will have around 15 minutes to offer their
perspective with 5 minutes to allow for clarification questions from
participants. Day two will focus on questions and discussion topics that
came
out of day one.

The connection details, agenda, and notes for the day are in the WICG WebID
GitHub repository
<https://github.com/WICG/WebID/blob/main/meetings/2021/25-26_May_2021.md>,
and participation requires joining the WICG
and accepting the W3C=E2=80=99s Community Contributor=E2=80=99s Agreement
<https://www.w3.org/community/about/process/cla/>. There is no cost to the
workshop or WICG membership. We hope you can attend!

--000000000000c5070105c2c71e1a
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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>Take a look at the following email=
 from Heather regarding=C2=A0the Browsers Workshop.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0Rifaat</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><=
span style=3D"background-color:transparent"><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif=
" style=3D"">The <b>WebID</b> project in the <b>W3C Web Incubator Community=
 Group (WICG)</b> would like to invite you to participate in a workshop on=
=C2=A0</font></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color:transparent"=
><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif"><b>May 25 &amp; 26 from 10:00-13:00 PDT</=
b> dedicated to understanding the implications of federation on the web in =
the face of privacy-preserving=C2=A0</font></span></div><div><span style=3D=
"background-color:transparent"><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif">changes to =
eliminate inappropriate user tracking. To date, discussions about aspects o=
f tracking, including eliminating third-party cookies,=C2=A0</font></span><=
/div><div><span style=3D"background-color:transparent"><font face=3D"arial,=
 sans-serif">evolving the use of link decoration, potential protocol-level =
changes, and so on, are happening in several locations. Given the location =
of=C2=A0</font></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color:transparen=
t"><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif">expertise on each of those specific are=
as, that is entirely understandable. What we are hoping to accomplish with =
this workshop is to bring=C2=A0</font></span></div><div><span style=3D"back=
ground-color:transparent"><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif">all the communit=
ies grappling with the impact of browser changes on federated identity toge=
ther to establish a common understanding of the=C2=A0</font></span></div><d=
iv><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif"><span style=3D"background-color:transpa=
rent">challenges.</span><br><span style=3D"background-color:transparent"><b=
r></span></font></div><div><span style=3D"background-color:transparent"><fo=
nt face=3D"arial, sans-serif">Day one will focus on presentations from brow=
sers and large-scale IdP operators. Each IdP operator will have around 15 m=
inutes to offer their=C2=A0</font></span></div><div><span style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:transparent"><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif">perspective with 5 m=
inutes to allow for clarification questions from participants. Day two will=
 focus on questions and discussion topics that came=C2=A0</font></span></di=
v><div><span style=3D"background-color:transparent"><font face=3D"arial, sa=
ns-serif">out of day one.</font></span></div><div><font face=3D"arial, sans=
-serif"><br><span style=3D"background-color:transparent">The connection det=
ails, agenda, and notes for the day are in the=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https=
://github.com/WICG/WebID/blob/main/meetings/2021/25-26_May_2021.md" target=
=3D"_blank" style=3D"background-color:transparent">WICG WebID GitHub reposi=
tory</a><span style=3D"background-color:transparent">, and participation re=
quires joining the WICG=C2=A0</span></font></div><div><font face=3D"arial, =
sans-serif"><span style=3D"background-color:transparent">and accepting the =
W3C=E2=80=99s=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://www.w3.org/community/about/pro=
cess/cla/" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"background-color:transparent">Communi=
ty Contributor=E2=80=99s Agreement</a><span style=3D"background-color:trans=
parent">. There is no cost to the workshop or WICG membership. We hope you =
can attend!</span></font><br></div></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 20 May 2021 15:00:23 -0600
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To: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
Cc: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
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Thanks Karsten,

That's moving in the right direction. But I think the last sentence is
still too strong and maybe prone to misunderstanding given it's not 100%
obvious in the JARM case what exactly constitutes an authorization response
parameter.

I'd say the last sentence could just be dropped altogether. Or maybe
changed to something like this, "Therefore, an additional iss parameter
outside the JWT is unneeded when JARM is used."


On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 12:45 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:

> Hi Brian,
>
> thank you for your feedback.
>
> I agree that the language is too strong here. What do you think about thi=
s
> new note?
>
> Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)"
> [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization response
> parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that provides the sam=
e
> protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an
> additional iss authorization response parameter as defined by this docume=
nt
> MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.
>
> Best regards,
> Karsten
> On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote:
>
> Overall it looks pretty good to me.
> One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec 2.4 tha=
t
> talks about JARM:
>
> 'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)"
> [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization
> response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when JARM is used=
.
> However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that provides the same
> protection if it is validated as described in Section 2.4.'
>
> JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just wraps u=
p
> all the authorization response parameters as claims in a JWT which is
> itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss
> authorization response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim o=
f
> the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim value that
> JARM is already including.
>
> On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.co=
m>
> wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> We have not seen any comments on this document.
>> Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or indicate tha=
t
>> you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>>
>> Regards,
>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <
>> karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> the latest version of the security BCP references
>>> draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to mix-up attack=
s.
>>>
>>> There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft version so far=
:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>>
>>> I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or concerns wit=
h
>>> the current draft version.
>>>
>>> Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and hopefully
>>> finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Karsten
>>>
>>> --
>>> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>> Senior IT Security Consultant
>>> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>>> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing=
, Security Training
>>>
>>> Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts=
 of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog pos=
t on single sign-on:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-=
your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks
>>>
>>> Hackmanit GmbH
>>> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>>> 44789 Bochum
>>>
>>> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>>> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj=
 Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
r
> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fro=
m
> your computer. Thank you.*
>
> --
> Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
> Senior IT Security Consultant
> Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
> Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, =
Security Training
>
> M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On o=
der den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
> Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Single Sig=
n-On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30 U=
hr!https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-sin=
gle-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect
>
> Hackmanit GmbH
> Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
> 44789 Bochum
>
> Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
> Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>
>

--=20
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ave=20
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=20
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Thanks Karsten, <br></div><div><br></div><div>That&#3=
9;s moving in the right direction. But I think the last sentence is still t=
oo strong and maybe prone to misunderstanding given it&#39;s not 100% obvio=
us in the JARM case what exactly constitutes an authorization response para=
meter. <br></div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;d say the last sentence could ju=
st be dropped altogether. Or maybe changed to something like this, &quot;Th=
erefore, an
        additional iss
        parameter outside the JWT is unneeded when JARM is used.&quot;=C2=
=A0 </div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"l=
tr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 12:45 AM Karsten Meyer zu =
Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de">kars=
ten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi Brian,</font></font>=
</p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">thank you for your
          feedback.</font></font></p>
    <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I agree that the
          language is too strong here. What do you think about this new
          note?<br>
        </font></font></p>
    <p>
      </p><blockquote type=3D"cite">Note: The &quot;JWT Secured Authorizati=
on
        Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)&quot; [JARM] defines a mechanism
        that conveys all authorization response parameters in a JWT.
        This JWT contains an iss claim that provides the same protection
        if it is validated as described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an
        additional iss
        authorization response parameter as defined by this document
        MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.</blockquote>
    <p></p>
    <p>Best regards,<br>
      Karsten<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div>Overall it looks pretty good to me. <br>
        </div>
        <div>One little nit is that I don&#39;t love this text from the end
          of sec 2.4 that talks about JARM: <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div style=3D"margin-left:40px">&#39;Note: The &quot;JWT Secured
          Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)&quot; [JARM]
          forbids the use of additional parameters in the authorization
          response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used when
          JARM is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss claim
          that provides the same protection if it is validated as
          described in Section 2.4.&#39; <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>JARM doesn&#39;t exactly forbid additional parameters but
          rather just wraps up all the authorization response parameters
          as claims in a JWT which is itself sent as a single
          form/query/fragment parameter. So really the iss authorization
          response parameter of this draft is still sent as a claim of
          the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the iss claim
          value that JARM is already including. <br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 P=
M
          Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"ltr">All,
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>We have not seen any comments on this document.</div>
            <div>Can you please review the document and provide
              feedback, or indicate that you have reviewed the document
              and have no concerns.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Regards,</div>
            <div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at
              3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kars=
ten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">karsten.meyerzuselhaus=
en@hackmanit.de</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
              <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi all,</fo=
nt></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">the latest
                      version of the security BCP references
                      draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a
                      countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">There have
                      not been any concerns with the first WG draft
                      version so far: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatrack=
er.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br>
                    </font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I would lik=
e
                      to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
                      concerns with the current draft version.</font></font=
></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Otherwise I
                      hope we can move forward with the next steps and
                      hopefully finish the draft before/with the
                      security BCP.</font></font></p>
                <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Best
                      regards,<br>
                      Karsten</font></font></p>
                <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.d=
e</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts of =
mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog post on=
 single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oaut=
h-client-against-mix-up-attacks" target=3D"_blank">https://www.hackmanit.de=
/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
              </div>
              _______________________________________________<br>
              OAuth mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@iet=
f.org</a><br>
              <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.or=
g</a><br>
          <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>=
<br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <i><span><font size=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY
            NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged
            material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
            review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is
            strictly prohibited.=C2=A0 If you have received this
            communication in error, please notify the sender immediately
            by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments
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    </blockquote>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank">https://hackmanit.d=
e</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On ode=
r den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Single Sign-=
On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30 Uhr=
!
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrun=
g-in-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect" target=3D"_blank">https://www=
.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-single-sign-on-oa=
uth-und-openid-connect</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Som=
orovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
  </div>

</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
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The spec is fine, we've had it implemented for some time now and support =

its publication.

+1 to Brian's comment. I suppose it suffices to say the iss parameter is =

redundant when JARM is used as JARM provides the same countermeasure. I=20
found the normative text about what JARM allows or disallows (or have=20
text that reads like normative) problematic, the JARM spec should remain =

the place for this.

Thanks for this work Karsten. Also my thanks to Daniel.

Vladimir

On 21/05/2021 00:00, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Thanks Karsten,
>
> That's moving in the right direction. But I think the last sentence is =

> still too strong and maybe prone to misunderstanding given it's not=20
> 100% obvious in the JARM case what exactly constitutes an=20
> authorization response parameter.
>
> I'd say the last sentence could just be dropped altogether. Or maybe=20
> changed to something like this, "Therefore, an additional iss=20
> parameter outside the JWT is unneeded when JARM is used."
>
>
> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 12:45 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen=20
> <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de=20
> <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>> wrote:
>
>     Hi Brian,
>
>     thank you for your feedback.
>
>     I agree that the language is too strong here. What do you think
>     about this new note?
>
>>     Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0
>>     (JARM)" [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization
>>     response parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that
>>     provides the same protection if it is validated as described in
>>     Section 2.4. Therefore, an additional iss authorization response
>>     parameter as defined by this document MUST NOT be used when JARM
>>     is used.
>
>     Best regards,
>     Karsten
>
>     On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote:
>>     Overall it looks pretty good to me.
>>     One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec
>>     2.4 that talks about JARM:
>>
>>     'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0
>>     (JARM)" [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the
>>     authorization response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be
>>     used when JARM is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss
>>     claim that provides the same protection if it is validated as
>>     described in Section 2.4.'
>>
>>     JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just
>>     wraps up all the authorization response parameters as claims in a
>>     JWT which is itself sent as a single form/query/fragment
>>     parameter. So really the iss authorization response parameter of
>>     this draft is still sent as a claim of the JARM JWT. It just
>>     happens to be the same as the iss claim value that JARM is
>>     already including.
>>
>>     On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
>>     <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>         All,
>>
>>         We have not seen any comments on this document.
>>         Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or
>>         indicate that you have reviewed the document and have no
>>         concerns.
>>
>>         Regards,
>>         =C2=A0Rifaat & Hannes
>>
>>
>>         On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>         <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de
>>         <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>> wrote:
>>
>>             Hi all,
>>
>>             the latest version of the security BCP references
>>             draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to
>>             mix-up attacks.
>>
>>             There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft
>>             version so far:
>>             https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth=
-resp/
>>             <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-aut=
h-resp/>
>>
>>             I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on
>>             or concerns with the current draft version.
>>
>>             Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps
>>             and hopefully finish the draft before/with the security BC=
P.
>>
>>             Best regards,
>>             Karsten
>>
>>             --=20
>>             Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>             Senior IT Security Consultant
>>             Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>>             Web:	https://hackmanit.de  <https://hackmanit.de>  | IT Se=
curity Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>>
>>             Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the s=
evere impacts of mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our =
latest blog post on single sign-on:
>>             https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-you=
r-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks  <https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-=
en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks>
>>
>>             Hackmanit GmbH
>>             Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>>             44789 Bochum
>>
>>             Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>>             Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Pr=
of. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>>
>>             _______________________________________________
>>             OAuth mailing list
>>             OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>             https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>             <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>
>>         _______________________________________________
>>         OAuth mailing list
>>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>         <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>
>>
>>     /CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>>     privileged material for the sole use of the intended
>>     recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by
>>     others is strictly prohibited.=C2=A0 If you have received this
>>     communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by
>>     e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your
>>     computer. Thank you./=20
>
>     --=20
>     Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>     Senior IT Security Consultant
>     Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>     Web:	https://hackmanit.de  <https://hackmanit.de>  | IT Security Co=
nsulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>
>     M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sig=
n-On oder den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
>     Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Sing=
le Sign-On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 -=
 14:30 Uhr!
>     https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-i=
n-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-connect  <https://www.hackmanit.de/de/s=
chulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehrung-in-single-sign-on-oauth-und-openid-c=
onnect>
>
>     Hackmanit GmbH
>     Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
>     44789 Bochum
>
>     Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
>     Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. J=
uraj Somorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz
>
>
> /CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and=20
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any =

> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly=20
> prohibited.=C2=A0 If you have received this communication in error, ple=
ase=20
> notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any =

> file attachments from your computer. Thank you./
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF=
-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>The spec is fine, we've had it implemented for some time now and
      support its publication.</p>
    <p>+1 to Brian's comment. I suppose it suffices to say the iss
      parameter is redundant when JARM is used as JARM provides the same
      countermeasure. I found the normative text about what JARM allows
      or disallows (or have text that reads like normative) problematic,
      the JARM spec should remain the place for this.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Thanks for this work Karsten. Also my thanks to Daniel.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Vladimir<br>
    </p>
    <pre class=3D"moz-signature" cols=3D"72">
</pre>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 21/05/2021 00:00, Brian Campbell
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"
cite=3D"mid:CA+k3eCSAxMwdFNUtZazo_TPa1Mc624n4AJdqcT7sEh3JxUaeEA@mail.gmai=
l.com">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DU=
TF-8">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div>Thanks Karsten, <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>That's moving in the right direction. But I think the last
          sentence is still too strong and maybe prone to
          misunderstanding given it's not 100% obvious in the JARM case
          what exactly constitutes an authorization response parameter.
          <br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>I'd say the last sentence could just be dropped altogether.
          Or maybe changed to something like this, "Therefore, an
          additional iss parameter outside the JWT is unneeded when JARM
          is used."=C2=A0 </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 12:=
45
          AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a
            href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de"
            moz-do-not-send=3D"true">karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.d=
e</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=

          <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">Hi Brian,</fo=
nt></font></p>
            <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">thank you for=

                  your feedback.</font></font></p>
            <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I agree that =
the
                  language is too strong here. What do you think about
                  this new note?<br>
                </font></font></p>
            <p> </p>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">Note: The "JWT Secured Authorizatio=
n
              Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)" [JARM] defines a
              mechanism that conveys all authorization response
              parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that
              provides the same protection if it is validated as
              described in Section 2.4. Therefore, an additional iss
              authorization response parameter as defined by this
              document MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.</blockquote>
            <p>Best regards,<br>
              Karsten<br>
            </p>
            <div>On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type=3D"cite">
              <div dir=3D"ltr">
                <div>Overall it looks pretty good to me. <br>
                </div>
                <div>One little nit is that I don't love this text from
                  the end of sec 2.4 that talks about JARM: <br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"margin-left:40px">'Note: The "JWT Secured
                  Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)"
                  [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the
                  authorization response. Therefore, the iss parameter
                  MUST NOT be used when JARM is used. However, JARM
                  responses contain an iss claim that provides the same
                  protection if it is validated as described in Section
                  2.4.' <br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters
                  but rather just wraps up all the authorization
                  response parameters as claims in a JWT which is itself
                  sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So
                  really the iss authorization response parameter of
                  this draft is still sent as a claim of the JARM JWT.
                  It just happens to be the same as the iss claim value
                  that JARM is already including. <br>
                </div>
              </div>
              <br>
              <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, May 1, 2021=
 at
                  2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef &lt;<a
                    href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com"
                    target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">rifaat.s.i=
etf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                  wrote:<br>
                </div>
                <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=

                  0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                  rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                  <div dir=3D"ltr">All,
                    <div><br>
                    </div>
                    <div>We have not seen any comments on this document.<=
/div>
                    <div>Can you please review the document and provide
                      feedback, or indicate that you have reviewed the
                      document and have no concerns.</div>
                    <div><br>
                    </div>
                    <div>Regards,</div>
                    <div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div>
                    <div><br>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                  <br>
                  <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                    <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 15,=

                      2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen &lt;<a
href=3D"mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank"
                        moz-do-not-send=3D"true">karsten.meyerzuselhausen=
@hackmanit.de</a>&gt;
                      wrote:<br>
                    </div>
                    <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=

                      0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                      rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">H=
i
                              all,</font></font></p>
                        <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">t=
he
                              latest version of the security BCP
                              references
                              draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a
                              countermeasures to mix-up attacks.</font></=
font></p>
                        <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">T=
here
                              have not been any concerns with the first
                              WG draft version so far: <a
                                href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/=
draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/"
                                target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true=
">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/</a><br=
>
                            </font></font></p>
                        <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">I=

                              would like to ask the WG if there are any
                              comments on or concerns with the current
                              draft version.</font></font></p>
                        <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">O=
therwise
                              I hope we can move forward with the next
                              steps and hopefully finish the draft
                              before/with the security BCP.</font></font>=
</p>
                        <p><font size=3D"-1"><font face=3D"Nunito Sans">B=
est
                              regards,<br>
                              Karsten</font></font></p>
                        <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D=
"true">https://hackmanit.de</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Tes=
ting, Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect client vulnerable to the severe impacts o=
f mix-up attacks? Learn how to protect your client in our latest blog pos=
t on single sign-on:
<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oa=
uth-client-against-mix-up-attacks" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"t=
rue">https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-cl=
ient-against-mix-up-attacks</a>

Hackmanit GmbH
Universit=C3=A4tsstra=C3=9Fe 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer: Prof. Dr. J=C3=B6rg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj S=
omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
                      </div>
                      _______________________________________________<br>=

                      OAuth mailing list<br>
                      <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=

                        moz-do-not-send=3D"true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                      <a
                        href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th"
                        rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"
                        moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://www.ietf.org/mai=
lman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
                    </blockquote>
                  </div>
                  _______________________________________________<br>
                  OAuth mailing list<br>
                  <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"
                    moz-do-not-send=3D"true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                  <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"=

                    rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"
                    moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
              <br>
              <i><span><font size=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This emai=
l
                    may contain confidential and privileged material for
                    the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
                    review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is
                    strictly prohibited.=C2=A0 If you have received this
                    communication in error, please notify the sender
                    immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any
                    file attachments from your computer. Thank you.</font=
></span></i>
            </blockquote>
            <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	<a href=3D"https://hackmanit.de" target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D=
"true">https://hackmanit.de</a> | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Tes=
ting, Security Training

M=C3=B6chten Sie sich f=C3=BCr ein Projekt mit dem Thema Single Sign-On o=
der den Standards OAuth und OpenID Connect vertraut machen?
Dann melden Sie sich jetzt an f=C3=BCr Ihre Einf=C3=BChrung in Single Sig=
n-On, OAuth und OpenID Connect am Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, von 10:00 - 14:30=
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<a href=3D"https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-einfuehr=
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not-send=3D"true">https://www.hackmanit.de/de/schulungen/uebersicht/139-e=
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omorovsky, Dr. Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz</pre>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
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      <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" wrap=3D"">____________________________=
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens
        Author          : Vittorio Bertocci
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-13.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2021-05-25

Abstract:
   This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access
   tokens in JSON web token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to
   issue and consume access tokens in an interoperable manner.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-13

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-13


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Hi,

In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts with:

(A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
         user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client includes
         its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
         redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
         user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).

(B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
         the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
         grants or denies the client's access request.


 From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the client 
(e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request 
URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects 
the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It 
then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and 
posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization 
Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback 
URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization 
Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between 
the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token 
exchange).

1. Basically correct so far?

Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but 
still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web 
server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the 
Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the 
user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is 
equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the 
previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So 
basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed - 
instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is 
first the request (from client)  and then redirect.

So the questions are:

2. Is this compliant with the RFC?

3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC's 
flow, it may still be secure...)

4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or 
attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?

5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on 
all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization 
Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2 
flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?

Thanks,

Amichai




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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Hi,

> Am 25.05.2021 um 16:59 schrieb A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net>:
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts =
with:
>=20
> (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>         user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client includes
>         its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>         redirection URI to which the authorization server will send =
the
>         user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>=20
> (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>         the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>         grants or denies the client's access request.
>=20
>=20
> =46rom this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the =
client (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization =
Request URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it =
redirects the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP =
request. It then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with =
HTML and posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the =
Authorization Response which redirects the user agent back to the =
client's callback URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the =
Authorization Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct =
communications between the client and Authorization Server up to this =
point (before the token exchange).
>=20
> 1. Basically correct so far?

yep.=20

>=20
> Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but =
still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web =
server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the =
Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the =
user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is =
equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the =
previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So =
basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed - =
instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is =
first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>=20
> So the questions are:
>=20
> 2. Is this compliant with the RFC?

I don=E2=80=99t think so.=20

>=20
> 3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the =
RFC's flow, it may still be secure...)

Difficult to access without further details. Beside this, I see the =
service provider as being responsible to ensuring it is secure.=20

>=20
> 4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or =
attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>=20
> 5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on =
all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization =
Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2 =
flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?

I kind of understand the rationale. Sending the authorisation request to =
the AS first (using mTLS) allows the AS to check the client=E2=80=99s =
identity and permissions before the user interaction starts. With a =
standard redirect (without signed request objects), the AS never knows =
whether request really comes from the legit client. This is determined =
once the code is exchanged at the token endpoint (rather late in the =
process).=20

Fo this and other reasons, the OAuth WG has specified the Pushed =
Authorization Requests =
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par) extension =
that works similarly. We indeed have done a security analysis of this =
draft.=20

BTW: the communication between user agent and authorisation server is =
still not protected with mTLS in the solution you described ;-).

best regards,
Torsten. =20

>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Amichai
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> =
https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth=
&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1622559602000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3uYa4JD_Cmmp4TyaTR=
0UqL


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From: Sascha Preibisch <saschapreibisch@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 08:28:56 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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--000000000000d6027d05c3292f85
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hello Amichai!

There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your web
browser. For example:

- This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, get a
session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the authorization
server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par. I have also
made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are seeing on your
web server: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k

- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the authorization
endpoint

I hope this helps,
Sascha

On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts with:
>
> (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>          user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client includes
>          its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>          redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
>          user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>
> (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>          the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>          grants or denies the client's access request.
>
>
>  From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the client
> (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request
> URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects
> the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It
> then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and
> posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization
> Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback
> URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization
> Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between
> the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token
> exchange).
>
> 1. Basically correct so far?
>
> Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but
> still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web
> server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the
> Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the
> user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is
> equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
> previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
> basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed -
> instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is
> first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>
> So the questions are:
>
> 2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>
> 3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC's
> flow, it may still be secure...)
>
> 4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or
> attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>
> 5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on
> all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
> Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2
> flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Amichai
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000d6027d05c3292f85
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hello Amichai!<div><br><=
/div><div>There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your=
 web browser. For example:</div><div><br></div><div>- This RFC suggests sen=
ding a request to the authorization server, get a session specific URL back=
 which can be forwarded to the authorization server via the browser. This i=
s OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request): =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatr=
acker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par">https://datatracker.ietf.org/=
doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>. I have also made a video about this flow=
, maybe it matches what you are seeing on your web server:=C2=A0<a href=3D"=
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k">https://www.youtube.com/watc=
h?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>- In addition RFC 6749 a=
lso allows a client to POST to the authorization endpoint</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>I hope this helps,</div><div>Sascha</div></div></div></div><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May=
 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net">ami=
chai2@amichais.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style=
:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
<br>
In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts with:<br>
<br>
(A)=C2=A0 The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner&#39=
;s<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 user-agent to the authoriz=
ation endpoint.=C2=A0 The client includes<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 its client identifier, req=
uested scope, local state, and a<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 redirection URI to which t=
he authorization server will send the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 user-agent back once acces=
s is granted (or denied).<br>
<br>
(B)=C2=A0 The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via<br=
>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the user-agent) and establ=
ishes whether the resource owner<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 grants or denies the clien=
t&#39;s access request.<br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0From this, and most explanation I&#39;ve seen, I understand that the =
client <br>
(e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request <br>
URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects <br=
>
the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It <br>
then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and <br>
posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization <br>
Response which redirects the user agent back to the client&#39;s callback <=
br>
URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization <br>
Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between <br>
the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token <br>
exchange).<br>
<br>
1. Basically correct so far?<br>
<br>
Now, I&#39;ve encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but <=
br>
still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web <br>
server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the <br>
Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the <br>
user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is <br>
equivalent to one from the middle of the &#39;back and forth&#39; in the <b=
r>
previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So <br>
basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed - <b=
r>
instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is <br>
first the request (from client)=C2=A0 and then redirect.<br>
<br>
So the questions are:<br>
<br>
2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br>
<br>
3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC&#39;=
s <br>
flow, it may still be secure...)<br>
<br>
4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or <br>
attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?<br>
<br>
5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on <br>
all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization <br>
Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2 <br>
flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Amichai<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000d6027d05c3292f85--


From nobody Tue May 25 12:50:19 2021
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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On 5/25/21 6:25 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
> Hi,
>
>> Am 25.05.2021 um 16:59 schrieb A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net>:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts with:
>>
>> (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>>          user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client includes
>>          its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>>          redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
>>          user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>>
>> (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>>          the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>>          grants or denies the client's access request.
>>
>>
>>  From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the client (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token exchange).
>>
>> 1. Basically correct so far?
> yep.
Good, so I pass the sanity check :-)
>
>> Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed - instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>>
>> So the questions are:
>>
>> 2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
> I don’t think so.
Important to know.
>
>> 3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC's flow, it may still be secure...)
> Difficult to access without further details. Beside this, I see the service provider as being responsible to ensuring it is secure.

"Trust but verify"... I'd like to understand this flow and its 
consequences, which is why I'm asking the pros on this list. It may be 
all good, but it smells funny, and is different from all others I've 
seen, so I'd like to be sure. The provider is not specifically a 
security service... just a resource server (in the RFC's terms) that to 
the best of my knowledge added an off-the-shelf OAUTH2 server from a 
well known vendor, but decided to only allow access to it (including the 
Authorization Endpoint) with MTLS. Which in turn forces our hand (as a 
client web server) to send the request from our server in place of the 
user agent, and pass back the URL from the Location header we receive in 
the returned redirect response back down to the user agent. We're not 
supposed to follow the redirect ourselves but just pass it down to the 
user agent (which in itself feels a bit hackish, not sure if that's 
valid processing for an HTTP redirect response).

>
>> 4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?

Are there any new attacks that can occur in this setup? Since the 
Authorization Request and Authorization Response are not in the same TLS 
and HTTP session as in the 'normal' flow, but occur on two different 
machines/sessions? With a new kind of redirect in between? Or for any 
other reason, is this more vulnerable?

At the very least, is it correct to assume this requires separate 
research because it is not fully covered by the analysis of the standard 
OAUTH2 protocol? i.e. the security of such a flow should be considered 
'unknown' rather than 'as secure as the normal flow'? Or can I assume it 
is just as secure?

>>
>> 5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2 flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
> I kind of understand the rationale. Sending the authorisation request to the AS first (using mTLS) allows the AS to check the client’s identity and permissions before the user interaction starts. With a standard redirect (without signed request objects), the AS never knows whether request really comes from the legit client. This is determined once the code is exchanged at the token endpoint (rather late in the process).
Is this just an optimization or an actual security weakness in the 
standard OAUTH2 flow?
>
> Fo this and other reasons, the OAuth WG has specified the Pushed Authorization Requests (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par) extension that works similarly. We indeed have done a security analysis of this draft.
I haven't heard of this before, but what they're doing does not sound 
like this, I think (I haven't read it fully, but watched the video from 
the other response to this thread). There's no separate par endpoint, no 
JSON response, and the user agent is not redirected to make the 
Authorization Request with par-specific params, to the best of my 
knowledge. It's more like just the regular OAUTH2 flow, just started off 
with a request sent from the client instead of from the user agent.
>
> BTW: the communication between user agent and authorisation server is still not protected with mTLS in the solution you described ;-).

Exactly. I'm still unsure what problem the mTLS here is trying to solve, 
if any :-)

If it can be shown that there is a problem with this flow, or at least 
unknown security consequences, perhaps I can convince them to remove 
this requirement and just do normal OAUTH2.

>
> best regards,
> Torsten.
>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Amichai
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth&source=gmail-imap&ust=1622559602000000&usg=AOvVaw3uYa4JD_Cmmp4TyaTR0UqL


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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	charset=utf-8

One point, the client doesn=E2=80=99t POST to the authorization =
endpoint, the resource owner=E2=80=99s browser is supposed to POST to =
the authorization endpoint =E2=80=94 it=E2=80=99s an important =
distinction. And in the wild, this is really rare to see in use.

As written, this is not compliant with OAuth2. I agree that this sounds =
a lot like PAR, except for the fact that the URL getting sent back =
sounds like it=E2=80=99s used directly as the redirect. Where PAR sends =
back a URI to be tacked onto the authorization endpoint as a parameter, =
this is sending back the full URL to send the browser to. In this way, =
it sounds more like GNAP=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Credirect=E2=80=9D =
interaction start method, which follows that pattern.=20

=
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name=
-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur =
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#nam=
e-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur>

GNAP uses this pattern for both greater security and greater flexibility =
in this step =E2=80=94 In my opinion it=E2=80=99s basically what PAR =
would have been if we hadn=E2=80=99t started with the parameterized =
authorization endpoint.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha Preibisch =
<saschapreibisch@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hello Amichai!
>=20
> There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your web =
browser. For example:
>=20
> - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, get =
a session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the authorization =
server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization =
Request):  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par>. I have =
also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are seeing =
on your web server: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k =
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k>
>=20
> - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the =
authorization endpoint
>=20
> I hope this helps,
> Sascha
>=20
> On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net =
<mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
> Hi,
>=20
> In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts =
with:
>=20
> (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>          user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client =
includes
>          its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>          redirection URI to which the authorization server will send =
the
>          user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>=20
> (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>          the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>          grants or denies the client's access request.
>=20
>=20
>  =46rom this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the =
client=20
> (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request=20=

> URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it =
redirects=20
> the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It=20=

> then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and=20=

> posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization=20=

> Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback=20=

> URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization=20=

> Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between=20=

> the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token=20=

> exchange).
>=20
> 1. Basically correct so far?
>=20
> Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but=20=

> still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web=20
> server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the=20=

> Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the=20=

> user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is=20
> equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the=20
> previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So=20
> basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed =
-=20
> instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is=20=

> first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>=20
> So the questions are:
>=20
> 2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>=20
> 3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the =
RFC's=20
> flow, it may still be secure...)
>=20
> 4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or=20
> attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>=20
> 5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on=20=

> all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization=20
> Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2=20=

> flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Amichai
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
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--Apple-Mail=_51249339-2270-43FE-BE8D-9324DDBCADCB
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">One =
point, the client doesn=E2=80=99t POST to the authorization endpoint, =
the resource owner=E2=80=99s browser is supposed to POST to the =
authorization endpoint =E2=80=94 it=E2=80=99s an important distinction. =
And in the wild, this is really rare to see in use.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As written, this is not compliant with =
OAuth2. I agree that this sounds a lot like PAR, except for the fact =
that the URL getting sent back sounds like it=E2=80=99s used directly as =
the redirect. Where PAR sends back a URI to be tacked onto the =
authorization endpoint as a parameter, this is sending back the full URL =
to send the browser to. In this way, it sounds more like GNAP=E2=80=99s =
=E2=80=9Credirect=E2=80=9D interaction start method, which follows that =
pattern.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.h=
tml#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-0=
5.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur</a></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">GNAP uses this pattern for both greater =
security and greater flexibility in this step =E2=80=94 In my opinion =
it=E2=80=99s basically what PAR would have been if we hadn=E2=80=99t =
started with the parameterized authorization endpoint.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 =
Justin</div><div class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha =
Preibisch &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">saschapreibisch@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hello Amichai!<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">There could be several reasons why you =
see that behaviour in your web browser. For example:</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">- This RFC suggests =
sending a request to the authorization server, get a session specific =
URL back which can be forwarded to the authorization server via the =
browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request): &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>.=
 I have also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are =
seeing on your web server:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k" =
class=3D"">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k</a><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">- =
In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the authorization =
endpoint</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I =
hope this helps,</div><div class=3D"">Sascha</div></div></div></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" =
class=3D"">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(=
204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts =
with:<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
(A)&nbsp; The client initiates the flow by directing the resource =
owner's<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; user-agent to the =
authorization endpoint.&nbsp; The client includes<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; its client identifier, =
requested scope, local state, and a<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; redirection URI to =
which the authorization server will send the<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; user-agent back once =
access is granted (or denied).<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
(B)&nbsp; The authorization server authenticates the resource owner =
(via<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the user-agent) and =
establishes whether the resource owner<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; grants or denies the =
client's access request.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;=46rom this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the =
client <br class=3D"">
(e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request =
<br class=3D"">
URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects =
<br class=3D"">
the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It <br =
class=3D"">
then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and =
<br class=3D"">
posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization =
<br class=3D"">
Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback =
<br class=3D"">
URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization <br =
class=3D"">
Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between =
<br class=3D"">
the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token =
<br class=3D"">
exchange).<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
1. Basically correct so far?<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but =
<br class=3D"">
still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web <br =
class=3D"">
server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the =
<br class=3D"">
Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the <br =
class=3D"">
user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is <br =
class=3D"">
equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the <br =
class=3D"">
previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So <br =
class=3D"">
basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed - =
<br class=3D"">
instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is =
<br class=3D"">
first the request (from client)&nbsp; and then redirect.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
So the questions are:<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC's =
<br class=3D"">
flow, it may still be secure...)<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or <br =
class=3D"">
attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?<br =
class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on =
<br class=3D"">
all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization <br =
class=3D"">
Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2 =
<br class=3D"">
flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?<br =
class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Thanks,<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Amichai<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">OAuth =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Hi Sacha,

Thanks for the links and video!

However I don't think this is what they're doing. There's no par 
endpoint, no JSON response (just a redirect with a Location header, that 
instead of following, the client is supposed to pass through to the user 
agent), etc. It seems more like a regular OAUTH2 flow, just with the 
initial request coming out of the client instead of the user agent, 
without any of the specifics of the par mentioned in the video.

btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization request can be sent by 
the client? In the quote I made below from 4.1, as well as e.g. 4.2.1, 
it seems pretty explicit that it's the user agent that makes the actual 
HTTP request (Authorization Request with all its params etc), after 
being redirected to it from the client, no? I don't see much wiggle room 
there to allow for the client to be sending it itself...

Amichai

On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:
> Hello Amichai!
>
> There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your web 
> browser. For example:
>
> - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, get 
> a session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the 
> authorization server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed 
> Authorization Request): 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par 
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par>. I have 
> also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are 
> seeing on your web server: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k>
>
> - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the 
> authorization endpoint
>
> I hope this helps,
> Sascha
>
> On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net 
> <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>
>     Hi,
>
>     In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts
>     with:
>
>     (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>              user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client
>     includes
>              its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>              redirection URI to which the authorization server will
>     send the
>              user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>
>     (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>              the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>              grants or denies the client's access request.
>
>
>      From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the
>     client
>     (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request
>     URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it
>     redirects
>     the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It
>     then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and
>     posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization
>     Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback
>     URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization
>     Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between
>     the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the
>     token
>     exchange).
>
>     1. Basically correct so far?
>
>     Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but
>     still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web
>     server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the
>     Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the
>     user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is
>     equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
>     previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
>     basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are
>     reversed -
>     instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent),
>     there is
>     first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>
>     So the questions are:
>
>     2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>
>     3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the
>     RFC's
>     flow, it may still be secure...)
>
>     4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or
>     attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>
>     5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on
>     all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
>     Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the
>     OAUTH2
>     flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>
>     Thanks,
>
>     Amichai
>
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     OAuth mailing list
>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>

--------------0DCCCC539C1270E44619F497
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Hi Sacha,</p>
    <p>Thanks for the links and video!</p>
    <p>However I don't think this is what they're doing. There's no par
      endpoint, no JSON response (just a redirect with a Location
      header, that instead of following, the client is supposed to pass
      through to the user agent), etc. It seems more like a regular
      OAUTH2 flow, just with the initial request coming out of the
      client instead of the user agent, without any of the specifics of
      the par mentioned in the video.</p>
    <p>btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization request can be
      sent by the client? In the quote I made below from 4.1, as well as
      e.g. 4.2.1, it seems pretty explicit that it's the user agent that
      makes the actual HTTP request (Authorization Request with all its
      params etc), after being redirected to it from the client, no? I
      don't see much wiggle room there to allow for the client to be
      sending it itself...</p>
    <p>Amichai<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAP=vD9sq72MKuw37voGE-0FAHpDXS-QsaRDHK04d3jFuNunyHA@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div dir="ltr">
          <div dir="ltr">Hello Amichai!
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>There could be several reasons why you see that
              behaviour in your web browser. For example:</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>- This RFC suggests sending a request to the
              authorization server, get a session specific URL back
              which can be forwarded to the authorization server via the
              browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):
               <a
                href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par"
                moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>.
              I have also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches
              what you are seeing on your web server: <a
                href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k"
                moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k</a><br>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to
              the authorization endpoint</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>I hope this helps,</div>
            <div>Sascha</div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00,
          A. Rothman &lt;<a href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net"
            moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
          <br>
          In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow
          starts with:<br>
          <br>
          (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource
          owner's<br>
                   user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client
          includes<br>
                   its client identifier, requested scope, local state,
          and a<br>
                   redirection URI to which the authorization server
          will send the<br>
                   user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).<br>
          <br>
          (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner
          (via<br>
                   the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource
          owner<br>
                   grants or denies the client's access request.<br>
          <br>
          <br>
           From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that
          the client <br>
          (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization
          Request <br>
          URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it
          redirects <br>
          the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP
          request. It <br>
          then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with
          HTML and <br>
          posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the
          Authorization <br>
          Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's
          callback <br>
          URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the
          Authorization <br>
          Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications
          between <br>
          the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before
          the token <br>
          exchange).<br>
          <br>
          1. Basically correct so far?<br>
          <br>
          Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly
          differently (but <br>
          still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client
          (my web <br>
          server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly
          to the <br>
          Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and
          redirect the <br>
          user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this
          URL is <br>
          equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in
          the <br>
          previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
          <br>
          basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are
          reversed - <br>
          instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent),
          there is <br>
          first the request (from client)  and then redirect.<br>
          <br>
          So the questions are:<br>
          <br>
          2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br>
          <br>
          3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with
          the RFC's <br>
          flow, it may still be secure...)<br>
          <br>
          4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities
          or <br>
          attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original
          flow?<br>
          <br>
          5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using
          MTLS on <br>
          all Authentication Server endpoints, including the
          Authorization <br>
          Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is
          the OAUTH2 <br>
          flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization
          Endpoint?<br>
          <br>
          Thanks,<br>
          <br>
          Amichai<br>
          <br>
          <br>
          <br>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
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From: "A. Rothman" <amichai2@amichais.net>
Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 23:21:18 +0300
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Justin,

Thanks for the clear answer. The distinction you make is indeed exactly 
the point I was asking about.

So I got the first answer, which is that it is not compliant.

Now the follow-up question is whether it is known to be any more or less 
secure than the normal flow, or simply unknown until further analysis is 
done, or dependent on their specific implementation in some way - 
although afaik they use an off-the-shelf standard OAUTH2 server, just 
expect it to be accessed from the client instead of from the user agent, 
due to their added mTLS requirement on the entire server (including the 
Authorization endpoint).

I'm still not sure what the motive is behind the mTLS requirement, 
though it's possible it just sounded like a good idea at the time to 
make it 'more secure', without realizing there are consequences (like 
being non-compliant with OAUTH2 and/or opening new potential attack 
vectors, if that's also the case - still trying to figure that one out). 
Is there any flaw in OAUTH2 that would require such mTLS on this 
endpoint? Is it worth the risks involved in deviating from the normal flow?

Thanks,

Amichai

On 5/25/21 10:54 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
> One point, the client doesn’t POST to the authorization endpoint, the 
> resource owner’s browser is supposed to POST to the authorization 
> endpoint — it’s an important distinction. And in the wild, this is 
> really rare to see in use.
>
> As written, this is not compliant with OAuth2. I agree that this 
> sounds a lot like PAR, except for the fact that the URL getting sent 
> back sounds like it’s used directly as the redirect. Where PAR sends 
> back a URI to be tacked onto the authorization endpoint as a 
> parameter, this is sending back the full URL to send the browser to. 
> In this way, it sounds more like GNAP’s “redirect” interaction start 
> method, which follows that pattern.
>
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur 
> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur>
>
> GNAP uses this pattern for both greater security and greater 
> flexibility in this step — In my opinion it’s basically what PAR would 
> have been if we hadn’t started with the parameterized authorization 
> endpoint.
>
>  — Justin
>
>> On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha Preibisch 
>> <saschapreibisch@gmail.com <mailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> Hello Amichai!
>>
>> There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your web 
>> browser. For example:
>>
>> - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, 
>> get a session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the 
>> authorization server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed 
>> Authorization Request): 
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par 
>> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par>. I have 
>> also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are 
>> seeing on your web server: 
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k 
>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k>
>>
>> - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the 
>> authorization endpoint
>>
>> I hope this helps,
>> Sascha
>>
>> On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net 
>> <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>>
>>     Hi,
>>
>>     In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts
>>     with:
>>
>>     (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>>              user-agent to the authorization endpoint. The client
>>     includes
>>              its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>>              redirection URI to which the authorization server will
>>     send the
>>              user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>>
>>     (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>>              the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>>              grants or denies the client's access request.
>>
>>
>>      From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the
>>     client
>>     (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization
>>     Request
>>     URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it
>>     redirects
>>     the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It
>>     then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML
>>     and
>>     posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the
>>     Authorization
>>     Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's
>>     callback
>>     URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization
>>     Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications
>>     between
>>     the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the
>>     token
>>     exchange).
>>
>>     1. Basically correct so far?
>>
>>     Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently
>>     (but
>>     still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web
>>     server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to
>>     the
>>     Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the
>>     user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is
>>     equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
>>     previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
>>     basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are
>>     reversed -
>>     instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent),
>>     there is
>>     first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>>
>>     So the questions are:
>>
>>     2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>>
>>     3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with
>>     the RFC's
>>     flow, it may still be secure...)
>>
>>     4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or
>>     attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>>
>>     5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using
>>     MTLS on
>>     all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
>>     Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the
>>     OAUTH2
>>     flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>>
>>     Thanks,
>>
>>     Amichai
>>
>>
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     OAuth mailing list
>>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Justin,</p>
    <p>Thanks for the clear answer. The distinction you make is indeed
      exactly the point I was asking about.</p>
    <p>So I got the first answer, which is that it is not compliant.</p>
    <p>Now the follow-up question is whether it is known to be any more
      or less secure than the normal flow, or simply unknown until
      further analysis is done, or dependent on their specific
      implementation in some way - although afaik they use an
      off-the-shelf standard OAUTH2 server, just expect it to be
      accessed from the client instead of from the user agent, due to
      their added mTLS requirement on the entire server (including the
      Authorization endpoint).</p>
    <p>I'm still not sure what the motive is behind the mTLS
      requirement, though it's possible it just sounded like a good idea
      at the time to make it 'more secure', without realizing there are
      consequences (like being non-compliant with OAUTH2 and/or opening
      new potential attack vectors, if that's also the case - still
      trying to figure that one out). Is there any flaw in OAUTH2 that
      would require such mTLS on this endpoint? Is it worth the risks
      involved in deviating from the normal flow?<br>
    </p>
    <p>Thanks,</p>
    <p>Amichai<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/25/21 10:54 PM, Justin Richer
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:357FECAE-9884-4A73-90FA-3F2FC44A0D1C@mit.edu">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      One point, the client doesn’t POST to the authorization endpoint,
      the resource owner’s browser is supposed to POST to the
      authorization endpoint — it’s an important distinction. And in the
      wild, this is really rare to see in use.
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">As written, this is not compliant with OAuth2. I
        agree that this sounds a lot like PAR, except for the fact that
        the URL getting sent back sounds like it’s used directly as the
        redirect. Where PAR sends back a URI to be tacked onto the
        authorization endpoint as a parameter, this is sending back the
        full URL to send the browser to. In this way, it sounds more
        like GNAP’s “redirect” interaction start method, which follows
        that pattern. </div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class=""><a
href="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur"
          class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur</a></div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">GNAP uses this pattern for both greater security and
        greater flexibility in this step — In my opinion it’s basically
        what PAR would have been if we hadn’t started with the
        parameterized authorization endpoint.</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class=""> — Justin</div>
      <div class="">
        <div><br class="">
          <blockquote type="cite" class="">
            <div class="">On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha Preibisch
              &lt;<a href="mailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com" class=""
                moz-do-not-send="true">saschapreibisch@gmail.com</a>&gt;
              wrote:</div>
            <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class="">
              <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
                charset=UTF-8" class="">
              <div dir="ltr" class="">
                <div dir="ltr" class="">
                  <div dir="ltr" class="">Hello Amichai!
                    <div class=""><br class="">
                    </div>
                    <div class="">There could be several reasons why you
                      see that behaviour in your web browser. For
                      example:</div>
                    <div class=""><br class="">
                    </div>
                    <div class="">- This RFC suggests sending a request
                      to the authorization server, get a session
                      specific URL back which can be forwarded to the
                      authorization server via the browser. This is
                      OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):  <a
                        href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par"
                        class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>.
                      I have also made a video about this flow, maybe it
                      matches what you are seeing on your web server: <a
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k" class=""
                        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k</a><br
                        class="">
                    </div>
                    <div class=""><br class="">
                    </div>
                    <div class="">- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a
                      client to POST to the authorization endpoint</div>
                    <div class=""><br class="">
                    </div>
                    <div class="">I hope this helps,</div>
                    <div class="">Sascha</div>
                  </div>
                </div>
              </div>
              <br class="">
              <div class="gmail_quote">
                <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May 2021 at
                  08:00, A. Rothman &lt;<a
                    href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" class=""
                    moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
                  wrote:<br class="">
                </div>
                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px
                  0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br
                    class="">
                  <br class="">
                  In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant
                  flow starts with:<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the
                  resource owner's<br class="">
                           user-agent to the authorization endpoint. 
                  The client includes<br class="">
                           its client identifier, requested scope, local
                  state, and a<br class="">
                           redirection URI to which the authorization
                  server will send the<br class="">
                           user-agent back once access is granted (or
                  denied).<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  (B)  The authorization server authenticates the
                  resource owner (via<br class="">
                           the user-agent) and establishes whether the
                  resource owner<br class="">
                           grants or denies the client's access request.<br
                    class="">
                  <br class="">
                  <br class="">
                   From this, and most explanation I've seen, I
                  understand that the client <br class="">
                  (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the
                  Authorization Request <br class="">
                  URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization
                  Server, it redirects <br class="">
                  the user agent which is the one actually making the
                  HTTP request. It <br class="">
                  then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server
                  (with HTML and <br class="">
                  posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives
                  the Authorization <br class="">
                  Response which redirects the user agent back to the
                  client's callback <br class="">
                  URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the
                  Authorization <br class="">
                  Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct
                  communications between <br class="">
                  the client and Authorization Server up to this point
                  (before the token <br class="">
                  exchange).<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  1. Basically correct so far?<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly
                  differently (but <br class="">
                  still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the
                  client (my web <br class="">
                  server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request
                  directly to the <br class="">
                  Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL,
                  and redirect the <br class="">
                  user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose
                  this URL is <br class="">
                  equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and
                  forth' in the <br class="">
                  previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the
                  same. So <br class="">
                  basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP
                  request are reversed - <br class="">
                  instead of first redirect and then request (from user
                  agent), there is <br class="">
                  first the request (from client)  and then redirect.<br
                    class="">
                  <br class="">
                  So the questions are:<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly
                  compliant with the RFC's <br class="">
                  flow, it may still be secure...)<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  4. If it is less secure, what are the possible
                  vulnerabilities or <br class="">
                  attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the
                  original flow?<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  5. They claim the change is made because they insist
                  on using MTLS on <br class="">
                  all Authentication Server endpoints, including the
                  Authorization <br class="">
                  Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security,
                  or is the OAUTH2 <br class="">
                  flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization
                  Endpoint?<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  Thanks,<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  Amichai<br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  <br class="">
                  _______________________________________________<br
                    class="">
                  OAuth mailing list<br class="">
                  <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                    class="" moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br
                    class="">
                  <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                    rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" class=""
                    moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br
                    class="">
                </blockquote>
              </div>
              _______________________________________________<br
                class="">
              OAuth mailing list<br class="">
              <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" class=""
                moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class="">
              <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class="">
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br class="">
      </div>
    </blockquote>
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From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
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Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] AD Review of draft-ietf-oauth-par-07
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Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 20:58:00 +0000
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The IESG has received a request from the Web Authorization Protocol WG
(oauth) to consider the following document: - 'OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization
Requests'
  <draft-ietf-oauth-par-08.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
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Abstract


   This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
   which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
   authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
   request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
   reference to the data in a subsequent call to the authorization
   endpoint.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.






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	charset=utf-8

It=E2=80=99s different, and I think in this specific case it=E2=80=99s =
more likely to be less secure because of a lot of other red flags that =
I=E2=80=99m seeing around this description.

One, requiring MTLS on all endpoints without thinking through what that =
actually means for developers. This is going to force developers to come =
up with weird workarounds that you don=E2=80=99t anticipate instead of =
building things into the protocol with good expectations and boundaries. =
I can only guess to motivations, but it feels strongly like =E2=80=9CTLS =
is good, MTLS must be better=E2=80=9D style security architecture =
decisions, which are almost always wrong.

Two, they=E2=80=99re asking you to break HTTP norms by reading a =
Location header and passing it to another party instead of following it =
as the HTTP spec says to do. Assuming that this location header points =
to something that isn=E2=80=99t protected by MTLS, you have to wonder =
why they want to put MTLS over the authorization endpoint in the first =
place if you=E2=80=99re chucking someone over to a non-MTLS endpoint =
after that. It=E2=80=99s a weird decision.

Three, there is not a flaw in OAuth that MTLS on this endpoint would =
fix. There are plenty of known downsides and holes in the authorization =
endpoint, thus the invention of PAR and GNAP as mentioned earlier in the =
thread, but neither of these require MTLS and both make use of a =
specific message on an endpoint that=E2=80=99s not the authorization =
endpoint.

Ultimately, it=E2=80=99s the attitude that bothers me more than the =
specifics here. It might be =E2=80=9Csecure=E2=80=9D in its design, but =
it=E2=80=99s asking people to do something different from what=E2=80=99s =
specified elsewhere and it hasn=E2=80=99t received any scrutiny from a =
wide community like the PAR and GNAP specs have (and continue to have, =
as neither is fully final yet). They=E2=80=99re doing things off-book to =
workaround problems that they=E2=80=99ve created by trying to be =E2=80=9C=
more secure=E2=80=9D, the end result of which is more than likely going =
to make things less secure overall.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On May 25, 2021, at 4:21 PM, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:
>=20
> Justin,
>=20
> Thanks for the clear answer. The distinction you make is indeed =
exactly the point I was asking about.
>=20
> So I got the first answer, which is that it is not compliant.
>=20
> Now the follow-up question is whether it is known to be any more or =
less secure than the normal flow, or simply unknown until further =
analysis is done, or dependent on their specific implementation in some =
way - although afaik they use an off-the-shelf standard OAUTH2 server, =
just expect it to be accessed from the client instead of from the user =
agent, due to their added mTLS requirement on the entire server =
(including the Authorization endpoint).
>=20
> I'm still not sure what the motive is behind the mTLS requirement, =
though it's possible it just sounded like a good idea at the time to =
make it 'more secure', without realizing there are consequences (like =
being non-compliant with OAUTH2 and/or opening new potential attack =
vectors, if that's also the case - still trying to figure that one out). =
Is there any flaw in OAUTH2 that would require such mTLS on this =
endpoint? Is it worth the risks involved in deviating from the normal =
flow?
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Amichai
>=20
> On 5/25/21 10:54 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
>> One point, the client doesn=E2=80=99t POST to the authorization =
endpoint, the resource owner=E2=80=99s browser is supposed to POST to =
the authorization endpoint =E2=80=94 it=E2=80=99s an important =
distinction. And in the wild, this is really rare to see in use.
>>=20
>> As written, this is not compliant with OAuth2. I agree that this =
sounds a lot like PAR, except for the fact that the URL getting sent =
back sounds like it=E2=80=99s used directly as the redirect. Where PAR =
sends back a URI to be tacked onto the authorization endpoint as a =
parameter, this is sending back the full URL to send the browser to. In =
this way, it sounds more like GNAP=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Credirect=E2=80=9D =
interaction start method, which follows that pattern.=20
>>=20
>> =
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name=
-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur =
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#nam=
e-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur>
>>=20
>> GNAP uses this pattern for both greater security and greater =
flexibility in this step =E2=80=94 In my opinion it=E2=80=99s basically =
what PAR would have been if we hadn=E2=80=99t started with the =
parameterized authorization endpoint.
>>=20
>>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>>=20
>>> On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha Preibisch =
<saschapreibisch@gmail.com <mailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Hello Amichai!
>>>=20
>>> There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your =
web browser. For example:
>>>=20
>>> - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, =
get a session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the =
authorization server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed =
Authorization Request):  =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par>. I have =
also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are seeing =
on your web server: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k =
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k>
>>>=20
>>> - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the =
authorization endpoint
>>>=20
>>> I hope this helps,
>>> Sascha
>>>=20
>>> On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net =
<mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>=20
>>> In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts =
with:
>>>=20
>>> (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>>>          user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client =
includes
>>>          its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>>>          redirection URI to which the authorization server will send =
the
>>>          user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>>>=20
>>> (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>>>          the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>>>          grants or denies the client's access request.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>  =46rom this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the =
client=20
>>> (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization =
Request=20
>>> URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it =
redirects=20
>>> the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It=20=

>>> then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML =
and=20
>>> posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the =
Authorization=20
>>> Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's =
callback=20
>>> URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization=20=

>>> Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications =
between=20
>>> the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the =
token=20
>>> exchange).
>>>=20
>>> 1. Basically correct so far?
>>>=20
>>> Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently =
(but=20
>>> still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web=20=

>>> server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to =
the=20
>>> Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the=20=

>>> user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is=20=

>>> equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the=20
>>> previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So=20
>>> basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are =
reversed -=20
>>> instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there =
is=20
>>> first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>>>=20
>>> So the questions are:
>>>=20
>>> 2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>>>=20
>>> 3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the =
RFC's=20
>>> flow, it may still be secure...)
>>>=20
>>> 4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or=20
>>> attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>>>=20
>>> 5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS =
on=20
>>> all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization=20
>>> Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the =
OAUTH2=20
>>> flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>>=20
>>> Amichai
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>=20


--Apple-Mail=_CD19939C-1E31-4A4B-BFCE-DCAC760A5DD1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">It=E2=80=99s different, and I think in this specific case =
it=E2=80=99s more likely to be less secure because of a lot of other red =
flags that I=E2=80=99m seeing around this description.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">One, requiring MTLS on all endpoints =
without thinking through what that actually means for developers. This =
is going to force developers to come up with weird workarounds that you =
don=E2=80=99t anticipate instead of building things into the protocol =
with good expectations and boundaries. I can only guess to motivations, =
but it feels strongly like =E2=80=9CTLS is good, MTLS must be better=E2=80=
=9D style security architecture decisions, which are almost always =
wrong.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Two, =
they=E2=80=99re asking you to break HTTP norms by reading a Location =
header and passing it to another party instead of following it as the =
HTTP spec says to do. Assuming that this location header points to =
something that isn=E2=80=99t protected by MTLS, you have to wonder why =
they want to put MTLS over the authorization endpoint in the first place =
if you=E2=80=99re chucking someone over to a non-MTLS endpoint after =
that. It=E2=80=99s a weird decision.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Three, there is not a flaw in OAuth =
that MTLS on this endpoint would fix. There are plenty of known =
downsides and holes in the authorization endpoint, thus the invention of =
PAR and GNAP as mentioned earlier in the thread, but neither of these =
require MTLS and both make use of a specific message on an endpoint =
that=E2=80=99s not the authorization endpoint.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Ultimately, it=E2=80=99s the attitude =
that bothers me more than the specifics here. It might be =E2=80=9Csecure=E2=
=80=9D in its design, but it=E2=80=99s asking people to do something =
different from what=E2=80=99s specified elsewhere and it hasn=E2=80=99t =
received any scrutiny from a wide community like the PAR and GNAP specs =
have (and continue to have, as neither is fully final yet). They=E2=80=99r=
e doing things off-book to workaround problems that they=E2=80=99ve =
created by trying to be =E2=80=9Cmore secure=E2=80=9D, the end result of =
which is more than likely going to make things less secure =
overall.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 Justin<br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On May =
25, 2021, at 4:21 PM, A. Rothman &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" =
class=3D"">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D"">
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D"">
 =20
  <div class=3D""><p class=3D"">Justin,</p><p class=3D"">Thanks for the =
clear answer. The distinction you make is indeed
      exactly the point I was asking about.</p><p class=3D"">So I got =
the first answer, which is that it is not compliant.</p><p class=3D"">Now =
the follow-up question is whether it is known to be any more
      or less secure than the normal flow, or simply unknown until
      further analysis is done, or dependent on their specific
      implementation in some way - although afaik they use an
      off-the-shelf standard OAUTH2 server, just expect it to be
      accessed from the client instead of from the user agent, due to
      their added mTLS requirement on the entire server (including the
      Authorization endpoint).</p><p class=3D"">I'm still not sure what =
the motive is behind the mTLS
      requirement, though it's possible it just sounded like a good idea
      at the time to make it 'more secure', without realizing there are
      consequences (like being non-compliant with OAUTH2 and/or opening
      new potential attack vectors, if that's also the case - still
      trying to figure that one out). Is there any flaw in OAUTH2 that
      would require such mTLS on this endpoint? Is it worth the risks
      involved in deviating from the normal flow?<br class=3D"">
    </p><p class=3D"">Thanks,</p><p class=3D"">Amichai<br class=3D"">
    </p>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 5/25/21 10:54 PM, Justin Richer
      wrote:<br class=3D"">
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" =
cite=3D"mid:357FECAE-9884-4A73-90FA-3F2FC44A0D1C@mit.edu" class=3D"">
     =20
      One point, the client doesn=E2=80=99t POST to the authorization =
endpoint,
      the resource owner=E2=80=99s browser is supposed to POST to the
      authorization endpoint =E2=80=94 it=E2=80=99s an important =
distinction. And in the
      wild, this is really rare to see in use.
      <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
      </div>
      <div class=3D"">As written, this is not compliant with OAuth2. I
        agree that this sounds a lot like PAR, except for the fact that
        the URL getting sent back sounds like it=E2=80=99s used directly =
as the
        redirect. Where PAR sends back a URI to be tacked onto the
        authorization endpoint as a parameter, this is sending back the
        full URL to send the browser to. In this way, it sounds more
        like GNAP=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Credirect=E2=80=9D interaction start =
method, which follows
        that pattern.&nbsp;</div>
      <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
      </div>
      <div class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.h=
tml#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-c=
ore-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur</a></div>
      <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
      </div>
      <div class=3D"">GNAP uses this pattern for both greater security =
and
        greater flexibility in this step =E2=80=94 In my opinion it=E2=80=99=
s basically
        what PAR would have been if we hadn=E2=80=99t started with the
        parameterized authorization endpoint.</div>
      <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
      </div>
      <div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 Justin</div>
      <div class=3D"">
        <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
          <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
            <div class=3D"">On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha =
Preibisch
              &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">saschapreibisch@gmail.com</a>&gt;
              wrote:</div>
            <br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class=3D"">
             =20
              <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
                <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
                  <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hello Amichai!
                    <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
                    </div>
                    <div class=3D"">There could be several reasons why =
you
                      see that behaviour in your web browser. For
                      example:</div>
                    <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
                    </div>
                    <div class=3D"">- This RFC suggests sending a =
request
                      to the authorization server, get a session
                      specific URL back which can be forwarded to the
                      authorization server via the browser. This is
                      OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request): &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par" =
class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-=
oauth-par</a>.
                      I have also made a video about this flow, maybe it
                      matches what you are seeing on your web =
server:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k" =
class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k</a>=
<br class=3D"">
                    </div>
                    <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
                    </div>
                    <div class=3D"">- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a
                      client to POST to the authorization endpoint</div>
                    <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
                    </div>
                    <div class=3D"">I hope this helps,</div>
                    <div class=3D"">Sascha</div>
                  </div>
                </div>
              </div>
              <br class=3D"">
              <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May =
2021 at
                  08:00, A. Rothman &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
                  wrote:<br class=3D"">
                </div>
                <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px
                  0px
=
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(=
204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant
                  flow starts with:<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  (A)&nbsp; The client initiates the flow by directing =
the
                  resource owner's<br class=3D"">
                  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
user-agent to the authorization endpoint.&nbsp;
                  The client includes<br class=3D"">
                  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; its =
client identifier, requested scope, local
                  state, and a<br class=3D"">
                  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
redirection URI to which the authorization
                  server will send the<br class=3D"">
                  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
user-agent back once access is granted (or
                  denied).<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  (B)&nbsp; The authorization server authenticates the
                  resource owner (via<br class=3D"">
                  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the =
user-agent) and establishes whether the
                  resource owner<br class=3D"">
                  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
grants or denies the client's access request.<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  &nbsp;=46rom this, and most explanation I've seen, I
                  understand that the client <br class=3D"">
                  (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the
                  Authorization Request <br class=3D"">
                  URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization
                  Server, it redirects <br class=3D"">
                  the user agent which is the one actually making the
                  HTTP request. It <br class=3D"">
                  then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server
                  (with HTML and <br class=3D"">
                  posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives
                  the Authorization <br class=3D"">
                  Response which redirects the user agent back to the
                  client's callback <br class=3D"">
                  URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the
                  Authorization <br class=3D"">
                  Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct
                  communications between <br class=3D"">
                  the client and Authorization Server up to this point
                  (before the token <br class=3D"">
                  exchange).<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  1. Basically correct so far?<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly
                  differently (but <br class=3D"">
                  still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the
                  client (my web <br class=3D"">
                  server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request
                  directly to the <br class=3D"">
                  Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL,
                  and redirect the <br class=3D"">
                  user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose
                  this URL is <br class=3D"">
                  equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and
                  forth' in the <br class=3D"">
                  previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the
                  same. So <br class=3D"">
                  basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP
                  request are reversed - <br class=3D"">
                  instead of first redirect and then request (from user
                  agent), there is <br class=3D"">
                  first the request (from client)&nbsp; and then =
redirect.<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  So the questions are:<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly
                  compliant with the RFC's <br class=3D"">
                  flow, it may still be secure...)<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  4. If it is less secure, what are the possible
                  vulnerabilities or <br class=3D"">
                  attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the
                  original flow?<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  5. They claim the change is made because they insist
                  on using MTLS on <br class=3D"">
                  all Authentication Server endpoints, including the
                  Authorization <br class=3D"">
                  Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security,
                  or is the OAUTH2 <br class=3D"">
                  flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization
                  Endpoint?<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  Thanks,<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  Amichai<br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  <br class=3D"">
                  _______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">
                  OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">
                  <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
                  <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><b=
r class=3D"">
                </blockquote>
              </div>
              _______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">
              OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">
              <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
              <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class=3D"">
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br class=3D"">
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Justin,

Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts about 
this better than I could have :-)

I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll have to 
double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss anything, but as I 
understand it, that's more or less it.

btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific problem 
either - if I understood correctly, it still ends with the user agent 
sending an Authorization Request to the AS, just with PAR-specific 
parameters instead of the usual ones... if so, and if the endpoint is 
still required to use mTLS, thus needs to be sent by the client... it 
would just be kicking the can down the road and violating the PAR spec 
instead.

Thanks again for your time and explanations,

Amichai

On 5/26/21 1:21 AM, Justin Richer wrote:
> It’s different, and I think in this specific case it’s more likely to 
> be less secure because of a lot of other red flags that I’m seeing 
> around this description.
>
> One, requiring MTLS on all endpoints without thinking through what 
> that actually means for developers. This is going to force developers 
> to come up with weird workarounds that you don’t anticipate instead of 
> building things into the protocol with good expectations and 
> boundaries. I can only guess to motivations, but it feels strongly 
> like “TLS is good, MTLS must be better” style security architecture 
> decisions, which are almost always wrong.
>
> Two, they’re asking you to break HTTP norms by reading a Location 
> header and passing it to another party instead of following it as the 
> HTTP spec says to do. Assuming that this location header points to 
> something that isn’t protected by MTLS, you have to wonder why they 
> want to put MTLS over the authorization endpoint in the first place if 
> you’re chucking someone over to a non-MTLS endpoint after that. It’s a 
> weird decision.
>
> Three, there is not a flaw in OAuth that MTLS on this endpoint would 
> fix. There are plenty of known downsides and holes in the 
> authorization endpoint, thus the invention of PAR and GNAP as 
> mentioned earlier in the thread, but neither of these require MTLS and 
> both make use of a specific message on an endpoint that’s not the 
> authorization endpoint.
>
> Ultimately, it’s the attitude that bothers me more than the specifics 
> here. It might be “secure” in its design, but it’s asking people to do 
> something different from what’s specified elsewhere and it hasn’t 
> received any scrutiny from a wide community like the PAR and GNAP 
> specs have (and continue to have, as neither is fully final yet). 
> They’re doing things off-book to workaround problems that they’ve 
> created by trying to be “more secure”, the end result of which is more 
> than likely going to make things less secure overall.
>
>  — Justin
>
>> On May 25, 2021, at 4:21 PM, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net 
>> <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>>
>> Justin,
>>
>> Thanks for the clear answer. The distinction you make is indeed 
>> exactly the point I was asking about.
>>
>> So I got the first answer, which is that it is not compliant.
>>
>> Now the follow-up question is whether it is known to be any more or 
>> less secure than the normal flow, or simply unknown until further 
>> analysis is done, or dependent on their specific implementation in 
>> some way - although afaik they use an off-the-shelf standard OAUTH2 
>> server, just expect it to be accessed from the client instead of from 
>> the user agent, due to their added mTLS requirement on the entire 
>> server (including the Authorization endpoint).
>>
>> I'm still not sure what the motive is behind the mTLS requirement, 
>> though it's possible it just sounded like a good idea at the time to 
>> make it 'more secure', without realizing there are consequences (like 
>> being non-compliant with OAUTH2 and/or opening new potential attack 
>> vectors, if that's also the case - still trying to figure that one 
>> out). Is there any flaw in OAUTH2 that would require such mTLS on 
>> this endpoint? Is it worth the risks involved in deviating from the 
>> normal flow?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Amichai
>>
>> On 5/25/21 10:54 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
>>> One point, the client doesn’t POST to the authorization endpoint, 
>>> the resource owner’s browser is supposed to POST to the 
>>> authorization endpoint — it’s an important distinction. And in the 
>>> wild, this is really rare to see in use.
>>>
>>> As written, this is not compliant with OAuth2. I agree that this 
>>> sounds a lot like PAR, except for the fact that the URL getting sent 
>>> back sounds like it’s used directly as the redirect. Where PAR sends 
>>> back a URI to be tacked onto the authorization endpoint as a 
>>> parameter, this is sending back the full URL to send the browser to. 
>>> In this way, it sounds more like GNAP’s “redirect” interaction start 
>>> method, which follows that pattern.
>>>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur 
>>> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur>
>>>
>>> GNAP uses this pattern for both greater security and greater 
>>> flexibility in this step — In my opinion it’s basically what PAR 
>>> would have been if we hadn’t started with the parameterized 
>>> authorization endpoint.
>>>
>>>  — Justin
>>>
>>>> On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha Preibisch 
>>>> <saschapreibisch@gmail.com <mailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hello Amichai!
>>>>
>>>> There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your 
>>>> web browser. For example:
>>>>
>>>> - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, 
>>>> get a session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the 
>>>> authorization server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed 
>>>> Authorization Request): 
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par 
>>>> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par>. I 
>>>> have also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you 
>>>> are seeing on your web server: 
>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k 
>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k>
>>>>
>>>> - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the 
>>>> authorization endpoint
>>>>
>>>> I hope this helps,
>>>> Sascha
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net 
>>>> <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>     Hi,
>>>>
>>>>     In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow
>>>>     starts with:
>>>>
>>>>     (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource
>>>>     owner's
>>>>              user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client
>>>>     includes
>>>>              its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>>>>              redirection URI to which the authorization server will
>>>>     send the
>>>>              user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>>>>
>>>>     (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>>>>              the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>>>>              grants or denies the client's access request.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>      From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that
>>>>     the client
>>>>     (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization
>>>>     Request
>>>>     URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it
>>>>     redirects
>>>>     the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP
>>>>     request. It
>>>>     then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with
>>>>     HTML and
>>>>     posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the
>>>>     Authorization
>>>>     Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's
>>>>     callback
>>>>     URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the
>>>>     Authorization
>>>>     Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications
>>>>     between
>>>>     the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before
>>>>     the token
>>>>     exchange).
>>>>
>>>>     1. Basically correct so far?
>>>>
>>>>     Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly
>>>>     differently (but
>>>>     still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my
>>>>     web
>>>>     server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly
>>>>     to the
>>>>     Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and
>>>>     redirect the
>>>>     user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is
>>>>     equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
>>>>     previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
>>>>     basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are
>>>>     reversed -
>>>>     instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent),
>>>>     there is
>>>>     first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>>>>
>>>>     So the questions are:
>>>>
>>>>     2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>>>>
>>>>     3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with
>>>>     the RFC's
>>>>     flow, it may still be secure...)
>>>>
>>>>     4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or
>>>>     attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>>>>
>>>>     5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using
>>>>     MTLS on
>>>>     all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
>>>>     Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the
>>>>     OAUTH2
>>>>     flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>>>>
>>>>     Thanks,
>>>>
>>>>     Amichai
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>>     OAuth mailing list
>>>>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>

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    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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    <p>Justin,<br>
    </p>
    <p>Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts
      about this better than I could have :-)</p>
    <p>I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll have
      to double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss anything,
      but as I understand it, that's more or less it.</p>
    <p>btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific
      problem either - if I understood correctly, it still ends with the
      user agent sending an Authorization Request to the AS, just with
      PAR-specific parameters instead of the usual ones... if so, and if
      the endpoint is still required to use mTLS, thus needs to be sent
      by the client... it would just be kicking the can down the road
      and violating the PAR spec instead.</p>
    <p>Thanks again for your time and explanations,</p>
    <p>Amichai<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/26/21 1:21 AM, Justin Richer
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:2D8470ED-E192-464A-AE7C-7F69736BA66F@mit.edu">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      It’s different, and I think in this specific case it’s more likely
      to be less secure because of a lot of other red flags that I’m
      seeing around this description.
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">One, requiring MTLS on all endpoints without
        thinking through what that actually means for developers. This
        is going to force developers to come up with weird workarounds
        that you don’t anticipate instead of building things into the
        protocol with good expectations and boundaries. I can only guess
        to motivations, but it feels strongly like “TLS is good, MTLS
        must be better” style security architecture decisions, which are
        almost always wrong.</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">Two, they’re asking you to break HTTP norms by
        reading a Location header and passing it to another party
        instead of following it as the HTTP spec says to do. Assuming
        that this location header points to something that isn’t
        protected by MTLS, you have to wonder why they want to put MTLS
        over the authorization endpoint in the first place if you’re
        chucking someone over to a non-MTLS endpoint after that. It’s a
        weird decision.</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">Three, there is not a flaw in OAuth that MTLS on
        this endpoint would fix. There are plenty of known downsides and
        holes in the authorization endpoint, thus the invention of PAR
        and GNAP as mentioned earlier in the thread, but neither of
        these require MTLS and both make use of a specific message on an
        endpoint that’s not the authorization endpoint.</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">Ultimately, it’s the attitude that bothers me more
        than the specifics here. It might be “secure” in its design, but
        it’s asking people to do something different from what’s
        specified elsewhere and it hasn’t received any scrutiny from a
        wide community like the PAR and GNAP specs have (and continue to
        have, as neither is fully final yet). They’re doing things
        off-book to workaround problems that they’ve created by trying
        to be “more secure”, the end result of which is more than likely
        going to make things less secure overall.</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class=""> — Justin<br class="">
        <div><br class="">
          <blockquote type="cite" class="">
            <div class="">On May 25, 2021, at 4:21 PM, A. Rothman &lt;<a
                href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" class=""
                moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
              wrote:</div>
            <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class="">
              <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
                charset=UTF-8" class="">
              <div class="">
                <p class="">Justin,</p>
                <p class="">Thanks for the clear answer. The distinction
                  you make is indeed exactly the point I was asking
                  about.</p>
                <p class="">So I got the first answer, which is that it
                  is not compliant.</p>
                <p class="">Now the follow-up question is whether it is
                  known to be any more or less secure than the normal
                  flow, or simply unknown until further analysis is
                  done, or dependent on their specific implementation in
                  some way - although afaik they use an off-the-shelf
                  standard OAUTH2 server, just expect it to be accessed
                  from the client instead of from the user agent, due to
                  their added mTLS requirement on the entire server
                  (including the Authorization endpoint).</p>
                <p class="">I'm still not sure what the motive is behind
                  the mTLS requirement, though it's possible it just
                  sounded like a good idea at the time to make it 'more
                  secure', without realizing there are consequences
                  (like being non-compliant with OAUTH2 and/or opening
                  new potential attack vectors, if that's also the case
                  - still trying to figure that one out). Is there any
                  flaw in OAUTH2 that would require such mTLS on this
                  endpoint? Is it worth the risks involved in deviating
                  from the normal flow?<br class="">
                </p>
                <p class="">Thanks,</p>
                <p class="">Amichai<br class="">
                </p>
                <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/25/21 10:54 PM, Justin
                  Richer wrote:<br class="">
                </div>
                <blockquote type="cite"
                  cite="mid:357FECAE-9884-4A73-90FA-3F2FC44A0D1C@mit.edu"
                  class=""> One point, the client doesn’t POST to the
                  authorization endpoint, the resource owner’s browser
                  is supposed to POST to the authorization endpoint —
                  it’s an important distinction. And in the wild, this
                  is really rare to see in use.
                  <div class=""><br class="">
                  </div>
                  <div class="">As written, this is not compliant with
                    OAuth2. I agree that this sounds a lot like PAR,
                    except for the fact that the URL getting sent back
                    sounds like it’s used directly as the redirect.
                    Where PAR sends back a URI to be tacked onto the
                    authorization endpoint as a parameter, this is
                    sending back the full URL to send the browser to. In
                    this way, it sounds more like GNAP’s “redirect”
                    interaction start method, which follows that
                    pattern. </div>
                  <div class=""><br class="">
                  </div>
                  <div class=""><a
href="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur"
                      class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur</a></div>
                  <div class=""><br class="">
                  </div>
                  <div class="">GNAP uses this pattern for both greater
                    security and greater flexibility in this step — In
                    my opinion it’s basically what PAR would have been
                    if we hadn’t started with the parameterized
                    authorization endpoint.</div>
                  <div class=""><br class="">
                  </div>
                  <div class=""> — Justin</div>
                  <div class="">
                    <div class=""><br class="">
                      <blockquote type="cite" class="">
                        <div class="">On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM,
                          Sascha Preibisch &lt;<a
                            href="mailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com"
                            class="" moz-do-not-send="true">saschapreibisch@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                          wrote:</div>
                        <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
                        <div class="">
                          <div dir="ltr" class="">
                            <div dir="ltr" class="">
                              <div dir="ltr" class="">Hello Amichai!
                                <div class=""><br class="">
                                </div>
                                <div class="">There could be several
                                  reasons why you see that behaviour in
                                  your web browser. For example:</div>
                                <div class=""><br class="">
                                </div>
                                <div class="">- This RFC suggests
                                  sending a request to the authorization
                                  server, get a session specific URL
                                  back which can be forwarded to the
                                  authorization server via the browser.
                                  This is OAuth PAR (Pushed
                                  Authorization Request):  <a
                                    href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par"
                                    class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>.
                                  I have also made a video about this
                                  flow, maybe it matches what you are
                                  seeing on your web server: <a
                                    href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k"
                                    class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k</a><br
                                    class="">
                                </div>
                                <div class=""><br class="">
                                </div>
                                <div class="">- In addition RFC 6749
                                  also allows a client to POST to the
                                  authorization endpoint</div>
                                <div class=""><br class="">
                                </div>
                                <div class="">I hope this helps,</div>
                                <div class="">Sascha</div>
                              </div>
                            </div>
                          </div>
                          <br class="">
                          <div class="gmail_quote">
                            <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, 25
                              May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman &lt;<a
                                href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net"
                                class="" moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
                              wrote:<br class="">
                            </div>
                            <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                              style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br
                                class="">
                              <br class="">
                              In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization
                              Code Grant flow starts with:<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              (A)  The client initiates the flow by
                              directing the resource owner's<br class="">
                                       user-agent to the authorization
                              endpoint.  The client includes<br class="">
                                       its client identifier, requested
                              scope, local state, and a<br class="">
                                       redirection URI to which the
                              authorization server will send the<br
                                class="">
                                       user-agent back once access is
                              granted (or denied).<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              (B)  The authorization server
                              authenticates the resource owner (via<br
                                class="">
                                       the user-agent) and establishes
                              whether the resource owner<br class="">
                                       grants or denies the client's
                              access request.<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              <br class="">
                               From this, and most explanation I've
                              seen, I understand that the client <br
                                class="">
                              (e.g. my web server) is supposed to
                              prepare the Authorization Request <br
                                class="">
                              URL but instead of sending it to the
                              Authorization Server, it redirects <br
                                class="">
                              the user agent which is the one actually
                              making the HTTP request. It <br class="">
                              then goes back and forth with the
                              Authorization Server (with HTML and <br
                                class="">
                              posting forms and whatnot), and eventually
                              receives the Authorization <br class="">
                              Response which redirects the user agent
                              back to the client's callback <br
                                class="">
                              URL with the included code parameter. So
                              as far as the Authorization <br class="">
                              Request/Response flow goes, there is no
                              direct communications between <br
                                class="">
                              the client and Authorization Server up to
                              this point (before the token <br class="">
                              exchange).<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              1. Basically correct so far?<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              Now, I've encountered a provider that
                              works slightly differently (but <br
                                class="">
                              still with the Authorization Code Grant
                              scheme): the client (my web <br class="">
                              server) is supposed to send the
                              Authorization Request directly to the <br
                                class="">
                              Authorization Server, then receive some
                              opaque URL, and redirect the <br class="">
                              user agent to there to continue the
                              process. I suppose this URL is <br
                                class="">
                              equivalent to one from the middle of the
                              'back and forth' in the <br class="">
                              previous scenario. The rest of the flow
                              continues the same. So <br class="">
                              basically, the initial redirect response
                              and HTTP request are reversed - <br
                                class="">
                              instead of first redirect and then request
                              (from user agent), there is <br class="">
                              first the request (from client)  and then
                              redirect.<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              So the questions are:<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br
                                class="">
                              <br class="">
                              3. Is it any less secure? (even if not
                              strictly compliant with the RFC's <br
                                class="">
                              flow, it may still be secure...)<br
                                class="">
                              <br class="">
                              4. If it is less secure, what are the
                              possible vulnerabilities or <br class="">
                              attacks made possible here that are
                              mitigated in the original flow?<br
                                class="">
                              <br class="">
                              5. They claim the change is made because
                              they insist on using MTLS on <br class="">
                              all Authentication Server endpoints,
                              including the Authorization <br class="">
                              Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it
                              add security, or is the OAUTH2 <br
                                class="">
                              flow just as secure without MTLS on the
                              Authorization Endpoint?<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              Thanks,<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              Amichai<br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              <br class="">
                              <br class="">
_______________________________________________<br class="">
                              OAuth mailing list<br class="">
                              <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org"
                                target="_blank" class=""
                                moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br
                                class="">
                              <a
                                href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                                rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
                                class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br
                                class="">
                            </blockquote>
                          </div>
_______________________________________________<br class="">
                          OAuth mailing list<br class="">
                          <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" class=""
                            moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br
                            class="">
                          <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
                            href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                            moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br
                            class="">
                        </div>
                      </blockquote>
                    </div>
                    <br class="">
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br class="">
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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I'm actually wondering if we should add discussion about not putting mtls o=
n the authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron et al, thoughts?=20

-Justin
________________________________________
From: A. Rothman [amichai2@amichais.net]
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM
To: Justin Richer
Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?

Justin,

Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts about this=
 better than I could have :-)

I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll have to double-=
check the details to make sure I didn't miss anything, but as I understand =
it, that's more or less it.

btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific problem either =
- if I understood correctly, it still ends with the user agent sending an A=
uthorization Request to the AS, just with PAR-specific parameters instead o=
f the usual ones... if so, and if the endpoint is still required to use mTL=
S, thus needs to be sent by the client... it would just be kicking the can =
down the road and violating the PAR spec instead.

Thanks again for your time and explanations,

Amichai

On 5/26/21 1:21 AM, Justin Richer wrote:
It=92s different, and I think in this specific case it=92s more likely to b=
e less secure because of a lot of other red flags that I=92m seeing around =
this description.

One, requiring MTLS on all endpoints without thinking through what that act=
ually means for developers. This is going to force developers to come up wi=
th weird workarounds that you don=92t anticipate instead of building things=
 into the protocol with good expectations and boundaries. I can only guess =
to motivations, but it feels strongly like =93TLS is good, MTLS must be bet=
ter=94 style security architecture decisions, which are almost always wrong=
.

Two, they=92re asking you to break HTTP norms by reading a Location header =
and passing it to another party instead of following it as the HTTP spec sa=
ys to do. Assuming that this location header points to something that isn=
=92t protected by MTLS, you have to wonder why they want to put MTLS over t=
he authorization endpoint in the first place if you=92re chucking someone o=
ver to a non-MTLS endpoint after that. It=92s a weird decision.

Three, there is not a flaw in OAuth that MTLS on this endpoint would fix. T=
here are plenty of known downsides and holes in the authorization endpoint,=
 thus the invention of PAR and GNAP as mentioned earlier in the thread, but=
 neither of these require MTLS and both make use of a specific message on a=
n endpoint that=92s not the authorization endpoint.

Ultimately, it=92s the attitude that bothers me more than the specifics her=
e. It might be =93secure=94 in its design, but it=92s asking people to do s=
omething different from what=92s specified elsewhere and it hasn=92t receiv=
ed any scrutiny from a wide community like the PAR and GNAP specs have (and=
 continue to have, as neither is fully final yet). They=92re doing things o=
ff-book to workaround problems that they=92ve created by trying to be =93mo=
re secure=94, the end result of which is more than likely going to make thi=
ngs less secure overall.

 =97 Justin

On May 25, 2021, at 4:21 PM, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net<mailto:amich=
ai2@amichais.net>> wrote:


Justin,

Thanks for the clear answer. The distinction you make is indeed exactly the=
 point I was asking about.

So I got the first answer, which is that it is not compliant.

Now the follow-up question is whether it is known to be any more or less se=
cure than the normal flow, or simply unknown until further analysis is done=
, or dependent on their specific implementation in some way - although afai=
k they use an off-the-shelf standard OAUTH2 server, just expect it to be ac=
cessed from the client instead of from the user agent, due to their added m=
TLS requirement on the entire server (including the Authorization endpoint)=
.

I'm still not sure what the motive is behind the mTLS requirement, though i=
t's possible it just sounded like a good idea at the time to make it 'more =
secure', without realizing there are consequences (like being non-compliant=
 with OAUTH2 and/or opening new potential attack vectors, if that's also th=
e case - still trying to figure that one out). Is there any flaw in OAUTH2 =
that would require such mTLS on this endpoint? Is it worth the risks involv=
ed in deviating from the normal flow?

Thanks,

Amichai

On 5/25/21 10:54 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
One point, the client doesn=92t POST to the authorization endpoint, the res=
ource owner=92s browser is supposed to POST to the authorization endpoint =
=97 it=92s an important distinction. And in the wild, this is really rare t=
o see in use.

As written, this is not compliant with OAuth2. I agree that this sounds a l=
ot like PAR, except for the fact that the URL getting sent back sounds like=
 it=92s used directly as the redirect. Where PAR sends back a URI to be tac=
ked onto the authorization endpoint as a parameter, this is sending back th=
e full URL to send the browser to. In this way, it sounds more like GNAP=92=
s =93redirect=94 interaction start method, which follows that pattern.

https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-05.html#name-=
redirect-to-an-arbitrary-ur

GNAP uses this pattern for both greater security and greater flexibility in=
 this step =97 In my opinion it=92s basically what PAR would have been if w=
e hadn=92t started with the parameterized authorization endpoint.

 =97 Justin

On May 25, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Sascha Preibisch <saschapreibisch@gmail.com<m=
ailto:saschapreibisch@gmail.com>> wrote:

Hello Amichai!

There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your web brows=
er. For example:

- This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, get a se=
ssion specific URL back which can be forwarded to the authorization server =
via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):  https:/=
/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par. I have also made a vid=
eo about this flow, maybe it matches what you are seeing on your web server=
: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k

- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the authorization en=
dpoint

I hope this helps,
Sascha

On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net<mailto:amic=
hai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
Hi,

In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts with:

(A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
         user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client includes
         its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
         redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
         user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).

(B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
         the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
         grants or denies the client's access request.


 From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the client
(e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request
URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects
the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It
then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and
posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization
Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback
URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization
Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between
the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token
exchange).

1. Basically correct so far?

Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but
still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web
server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the
Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the
user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is
equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed -
instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is
first the request (from client)  and then redirect.

So the questions are:

2. Is this compliant with the RFC?

3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC's
flow, it may still be secure...)

4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or
attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?

5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on
all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2
flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?

Thanks,

Amichai



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From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 16:43:14 -0700
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Honestly it didn't even occur to me that someone would try this, since the
entire point of the authorization endpoint is that it's the thing the
user's browser talks to. Adding MTLS just means you're going to have to
send the user to some other endpoint instead, which is then effectively
acting as the authorization endpoint anyway. So yeah I could see adding
some language around the authorization endpoint needing to be accessible by
the user agent without MTLS or other funny stuff.

PAR also fits in nicely in that case since the PAR endpoint could be
protected with MTLS since it *is* intended to only be accessible from the
OAuth client.

Aaron

On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 4:38 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> I'm actually wondering if we should add discussion about not putting mtls
> on the authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron et al, thoughts?
>
> -Justin
> ________________________________________
> From: A. Rothman [amichai2@amichais.net]
> Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM
> To: Justin Richer
> Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
>
> Justin,
>
> Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts about
> this better than I could have :-)
>
> I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll have to
> double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss anything, but as I
> understand it, that's more or less it.
>
> btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific problem either
> - if I understood correctly, it still ends with the user agent sending an
> Authorization Request to the AS, just with PAR-specific parameters instead
> of the usual ones... if so, and if the endpoint is still required to use
> mTLS, thus needs to be sent by the client... it would just be kicking the
> can down the road and violating the PAR spec instead.
>
> Thanks again for your time and explanations,
>
> Amichai
>
>

--000000000000a085c505c3301730
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Honestly it didn&#39;t even occur to me t=
hat someone would try this, since the entire point of the authorization end=
point is that it&#39;s the thing the user&#39;s browser talks to. Adding MT=
LS just means you&#39;re going to have to send the user to some other endpo=
int instead, which is then effectively acting as the authorization endpoint=
 anyway. So yeah I could see adding some language around the authorization=
=C2=A0endpoint needing to be accessible by the user agent without MTLS or o=
ther funny stuff.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div>PAR also fits in nic=
ely in that case since the PAR endpoint could be protected with MTLS since =
it *is* intended to only be accessible from the OAuth client.</div><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"gmail_attr">Aaron</div><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_attr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On T=
ue, May 25, 2021 at 4:38 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit=
.edu">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">I&#39;m actually wondering if we should add discussion=
 about not putting mtls on the authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron=
 et al, thoughts? <br>
<br>
-Justin<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: A. Rothman [<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" target=3D"_blank=
">amichai2@amichais.net</a>]<br>
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM<br>
To: Justin Richer<br>
Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG<br>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?<br>
<br>
Justin,<br>
<br>
Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts about this=
 better than I could have :-)<br>
<br>
I just hope I wasn&#39;t &#39;leading the witness&#39; too much... I&#39;ll=
 have to double-check the details to make sure I didn&#39;t miss anything, =
but as I understand it, that&#39;s more or less it.<br>
<br>
btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn&#39;t solve this specific problem eit=
her - if I understood correctly, it still ends with the user agent sending =
an Authorization Request to the AS, just with PAR-specific parameters inste=
ad of the usual ones... if so, and if the endpoint is still required to use=
 mTLS, thus needs to be sent by the client... it would just be kicking the =
can down the road and violating the PAR spec instead.<br>
<br>
Thanks again for your time and explanations,<br>
<br>
Amichai<br><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000a085c505c3301730--


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From: Sascha Preibisch <saschapreibisch@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 18:15:35 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Amichai,

I know POST won't be seen often, but the /authorize endpoint may still
accept POST as described here:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1

I hope this helps,
Sascha


On Tue., May 25, 2021, 13:00 A. Rothman, <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:

> Hi Sacha,
>
> Thanks for the links and video!
>
> However I don't think this is what they're doing. There's no par endpoint,
> no JSON response (just a redirect with a Location header, that instead of
> following, the client is supposed to pass through to the user agent), etc.
> It seems more like a regular OAUTH2 flow, just with the initial request
> coming out of the client instead of the user agent, without any of the
> specifics of the par mentioned in the video.
>
> btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization request can be sent by the
> client? In the quote I made below from 4.1, as well as e.g. 4.2.1, it seems
> pretty explicit that it's the user agent that makes the actual HTTP request
> (Authorization Request with all its params etc), after being redirected to
> it from the client, no? I don't see much wiggle room there to allow for the
> client to be sending it itself...
>
> Amichai
> On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:
>
> Hello Amichai!
>
> There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your web
> browser. For example:
>
> - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, get a
> session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the authorization
> server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par. I have also
> made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are seeing on your
> web server: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k
>
> - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the authorization
> endpoint
>
> I hope this helps,
> Sascha
>
> On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts with:
>>
>> (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>>          user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client includes
>>          its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>>          redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
>>          user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>>
>> (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>>          the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>>          grants or denies the client's access request.
>>
>>
>>  From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the client
>> (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request
>> URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects
>> the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It
>> then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and
>> posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization
>> Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback
>> URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization
>> Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between
>> the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token
>> exchange).
>>
>> 1. Basically correct so far?
>>
>> Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but
>> still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web
>> server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the
>> Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the
>> user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is
>> equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
>> previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
>> basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed -
>> instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is
>> first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>>
>> So the questions are:
>>
>> 2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>>
>> 3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC's
>> flow, it may still be secure...)
>>
>> 4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or
>> attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>>
>> 5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on
>> all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
>> Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2
>> flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Amichai
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

--000000000000279fc405c3316210
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto"><div>Amichai,</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"auto">I know POST won&#39;t be seen often, but the /authorize endpoint =
may still accept POST as described here:<div dir=3D"auto"><a href=3D"https:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6=
749#section-3.1</a><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">=
I hope this helps,</div><div dir=3D"auto">Sascha</div><br><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue., M=
ay 25, 2021, 13:00 A. Rothman, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net"=
>amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>Hi Sacha,</p>
    <p>Thanks for the links and video!</p>
    <p>However I don&#39;t think this is what they&#39;re doing. There&#39;=
s no par
      endpoint, no JSON response (just a redirect with a Location
      header, that instead of following, the client is supposed to pass
      through to the user agent), etc. It seems more like a regular
      OAUTH2 flow, just with the initial request coming out of the
      client instead of the user agent, without any of the specifics of
      the par mentioned in the video.</p>
    <p>btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization request can be
      sent by the client? In the quote I made below from 4.1, as well as
      e.g. 4.2.1, it seems pretty explicit that it&#39;s the user agent tha=
t
      makes the actual HTTP request (Authorization Request with all its
      params etc), after being redirected to it from the client, no? I
      don&#39;t see much wiggle room there to allow for the client to be
      sending it itself...</p>
    <p>Amichai<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div dir=3D"ltr">
          <div dir=3D"ltr">Hello Amichai!
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>There could be several reasons why you see that
              behaviour in your web browser. For example:</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>- This RFC suggests sending a request to the
              authorization server, get a session specific URL back
              which can be forwarded to the authorization server via the
              browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):
              =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-=
ietf-oauth-par" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://datatracker.ie=
tf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>.
              I have also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches
              what you are seeing on your web server:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https=
://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferr=
er">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k</a><br>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to
              the authorization endpoint</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>I hope this helps,</div>
            <div>Sascha</div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00,
          A. Rothman &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" target=3D=
"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
          <br>
          In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow
          starts with:<br>
          <br>
          (A)=C2=A0 The client initiates the flow by directing the resource
          owner&#39;s<br>
          =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 user-agent to th=
e authorization endpoint.=C2=A0 The client
          includes<br>
          =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 its client ident=
ifier, requested scope, local state,
          and a<br>
          =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 redirection URI =
to which the authorization server
          will send the<br>
          =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 user-agent back =
once access is granted (or denied).<br>
          <br>
          (B)=C2=A0 The authorization server authenticates the resource own=
er
          (via<br>
          =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the user-agent) =
and establishes whether the resource
          owner<br>
          =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 grants or denies=
 the client&#39;s access request.<br>
          <br>
          <br>
          =C2=A0From this, and most explanation I&#39;ve seen, I understand=
 that
          the client <br>
          (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization
          Request <br>
          URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it
          redirects <br>
          the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP
          request. It <br>
          then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with
          HTML and <br>
          posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the
          Authorization <br>
          Response which redirects the user agent back to the client&#39;s
          callback <br>
          URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the
          Authorization <br>
          Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications
          between <br>
          the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before
          the token <br>
          exchange).<br>
          <br>
          1. Basically correct so far?<br>
          <br>
          Now, I&#39;ve encountered a provider that works slightly
          differently (but <br>
          still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client
          (my web <br>
          server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly
          to the <br>
          Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and
          redirect the <br>
          user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this
          URL is <br>
          equivalent to one from the middle of the &#39;back and forth&#39;=
 in
          the <br>
          previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
          <br>
          basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are
          reversed - <br>
          instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent),
          there is <br>
          first the request (from client)=C2=A0 and then redirect.<br>
          <br>
          So the questions are:<br>
          <br>
          2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br>
          <br>
          3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with
          the RFC&#39;s <br>
          flow, it may still be secure...)<br>
          <br>
          4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities
          or <br>
          attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original
          flow?<br>
          <br>
          5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using
          MTLS on <br>
          all Authentication Server endpoints, including the
          Authorization <br>
          Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is
          the OAUTH2 <br>
          flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization
          Endpoint?<br>
          <br>
          Thanks,<br>
          <br>
          Amichai<br>
          <br>
          <br>
          <br>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
          <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"no=
referrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinf=
o/oauth</a><br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

</blockquote></div></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Oh, I see what you mean... however as Justin clarified, the discussion 
here is not about GET vs POST, but rather about user agent vs client 
making the request. The former distinction doesn't really matter in this 
case, whereas in the latter distinction the client option seems to be 
breaking the spec (only the user agent should send it).

Amichai

On 5/26/21 4:15 AM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:
> Amichai,
>
> I know POST won't be seen often, but the /authorize endpoint may still 
> accept POST as described here:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1>
>
> I hope this helps,
> Sascha
>
>
> On Tue., May 25, 2021, 13:00 A. Rothman, <amichai2@amichais.net 
> <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>
>     Hi Sacha,
>
>     Thanks for the links and video!
>
>     However I don't think this is what they're doing. There's no par
>     endpoint, no JSON response (just a redirect with a Location
>     header, that instead of following, the client is supposed to pass
>     through to the user agent), etc. It seems more like a regular
>     OAUTH2 flow, just with the initial request coming out of the
>     client instead of the user agent, without any of the specifics of
>     the par mentioned in the video.
>
>     btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization request can be sent
>     by the client? In the quote I made below from 4.1, as well as e.g.
>     4.2.1, it seems pretty explicit that it's the user agent that
>     makes the actual HTTP request (Authorization Request with all its
>     params etc), after being redirected to it from the client, no? I
>     don't see much wiggle room there to allow for the client to be
>     sending it itself...
>
>     Amichai
>
>     On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:
>>     Hello Amichai!
>>
>>     There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your
>>     web browser. For example:
>>
>>     - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization
>>     server, get a session specific URL back which can be forwarded to
>>     the authorization server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR
>>     (Pushed Authorization Request):
>>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par
>>     <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par>. I
>>     have also made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you
>>     are seeing on your web server:
>>     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k
>>     <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k>
>>
>>     - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the
>>     authorization endpoint
>>
>>     I hope this helps,
>>     Sascha
>>
>>     On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net
>>     <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>>
>>         Hi,
>>
>>         In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow
>>         starts with:
>>
>>         (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource
>>         owner's
>>                  user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The
>>         client includes
>>                  its client identifier, requested scope, local state,
>>         and a
>>                  redirection URI to which the authorization server
>>         will send the
>>                  user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>>
>>         (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource
>>         owner (via
>>                  the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource
>>         owner
>>                  grants or denies the client's access request.
>>
>>
>>          From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that
>>         the client
>>         (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization
>>         Request
>>         URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it
>>         redirects
>>         the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP
>>         request. It
>>         then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with
>>         HTML and
>>         posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the
>>         Authorization
>>         Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's
>>         callback
>>         URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the
>>         Authorization
>>         Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications
>>         between
>>         the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before
>>         the token
>>         exchange).
>>
>>         1. Basically correct so far?
>>
>>         Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly
>>         differently (but
>>         still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client
>>         (my web
>>         server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request
>>         directly to the
>>         Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and
>>         redirect the
>>         user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this
>>         URL is
>>         equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
>>         previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
>>         basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are
>>         reversed -
>>         instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent),
>>         there is
>>         first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>>
>>         So the questions are:
>>
>>         2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>>
>>         3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant
>>         with the RFC's
>>         flow, it may still be secure...)
>>
>>         4. If it is less secure, what are the possible
>>         vulnerabilities or
>>         attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original
>>         flow?
>>
>>         5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using
>>         MTLS on
>>         all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
>>         Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is
>>         the OAUTH2
>>         flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>>
>>         Thanks,
>>
>>         Amichai
>>
>>
>>
>>         _______________________________________________
>>         OAuth mailing list
>>         OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>         <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>

--------------9E52F2DF5EF2236B3562FC1E
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Oh, I see what you mean... however as Justin clarified, the
      discussion here is not about GET vs POST, but rather about user
      agent vs client making the request. The former distinction doesn't
      really matter in this case, whereas in the latter distinction the
      client option seems to be breaking the spec (only the user agent
      should send it).</p>
    <p>Amichai<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/26/21 4:15 AM, Sascha Preibisch
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAP=vD9uEAQ8W19Gg61mUXdZHyZimibMPx9q=DKWincpoG9NVUQ@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="auto">
        <div>Amichai,</div>
        <div dir="auto"><br>
        </div>
        <div dir="auto">I know POST won't be seen often, but the
          /authorize endpoint may still accept POST as described here:
          <div dir="auto"><a
              href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1"
              moz-do-not-send="true">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1</a><br>
          </div>
          <div dir="auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir="auto">I hope this helps,</div>
          <div dir="auto">Sascha</div>
          <br>
          <br>
          <div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto">
            <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue., May 25, 2021,
              13:00 A. Rothman, &lt;<a
                href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net"
                moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div>
                <p>Hi Sacha,</p>
                <p>Thanks for the links and video!</p>
                <p>However I don't think this is what they're doing.
                  There's no par endpoint, no JSON response (just a
                  redirect with a Location header, that instead of
                  following, the client is supposed to pass through to
                  the user agent), etc. It seems more like a regular
                  OAUTH2 flow, just with the initial request coming out
                  of the client instead of the user agent, without any
                  of the specifics of the par mentioned in the video.</p>
                <p>btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization
                  request can be sent by the client? In the quote I made
                  below from 4.1, as well as e.g. 4.2.1, it seems pretty
                  explicit that it's the user agent that makes the
                  actual HTTP request (Authorization Request with all
                  its params etc), after being redirected to it from the
                  client, no? I don't see much wiggle room there to
                  allow for the client to be sending it itself...</p>
                <p>Amichai<br>
                </p>
                <div>On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:<br>
                </div>
                <blockquote type="cite">
                  <div dir="ltr">
                    <div dir="ltr">
                      <div dir="ltr">Hello Amichai!
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>There could be several reasons why you see
                          that behaviour in your web browser. For
                          example:</div>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>- This RFC suggests sending a request to
                          the authorization server, get a session
                          specific URL back which can be forwarded to
                          the authorization server via the browser. This
                          is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):  <a
href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par"
                            target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
                            moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>.
                          I have also made a video about this flow,
                          maybe it matches what you are seeing on your
                          web server: <a
                            href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k"
                            target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
                            moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k</a><br>
                        </div>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client
                          to POST to the authorization endpoint</div>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>I hope this helps,</div>
                        <div>Sascha</div>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                  <br>
                  <div class="gmail_quote">
                    <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May
                      2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman &lt;<a
                        href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net"
                        target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
                      wrote:<br>
                    </div>
                    <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
                      0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
                      <br>
                      In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code
                      Grant flow starts with:<br>
                      <br>
                      (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing
                      the resource owner's<br>
                               user-agent to the authorization
                      endpoint.  The client includes<br>
                               its client identifier, requested scope,
                      local state, and a<br>
                               redirection URI to which the
                      authorization server will send the<br>
                               user-agent back once access is granted
                      (or denied).<br>
                      <br>
                      (B)  The authorization server authenticates the
                      resource owner (via<br>
                               the user-agent) and establishes whether
                      the resource owner<br>
                               grants or denies the client's access
                      request.<br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                       From this, and most explanation I've seen, I
                      understand that the client <br>
                      (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the
                      Authorization Request <br>
                      URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization
                      Server, it redirects <br>
                      the user agent which is the one actually making
                      the HTTP request. It <br>
                      then goes back and forth with the Authorization
                      Server (with HTML and <br>
                      posting forms and whatnot), and eventually
                      receives the Authorization <br>
                      Response which redirects the user agent back to
                      the client's callback <br>
                      URL with the included code parameter. So as far as
                      the Authorization <br>
                      Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct
                      communications between <br>
                      the client and Authorization Server up to this
                      point (before the token <br>
                      exchange).<br>
                      <br>
                      1. Basically correct so far?<br>
                      <br>
                      Now, I've encountered a provider that works
                      slightly differently (but <br>
                      still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme):
                      the client (my web <br>
                      server) is supposed to send the Authorization
                      Request directly to the <br>
                      Authorization Server, then receive some opaque
                      URL, and redirect the <br>
                      user agent to there to continue the process. I
                      suppose this URL is <br>
                      equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and
                      forth' in the <br>
                      previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues
                      the same. So <br>
                      basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP
                      request are reversed - <br>
                      instead of first redirect and then request (from
                      user agent), there is <br>
                      first the request (from client)  and then
                      redirect.<br>
                      <br>
                      So the questions are:<br>
                      <br>
                      2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br>
                      <br>
                      3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly
                      compliant with the RFC's <br>
                      flow, it may still be secure...)<br>
                      <br>
                      4. If it is less secure, what are the possible
                      vulnerabilities or <br>
                      attacks made possible here that are mitigated in
                      the original flow?<br>
                      <br>
                      5. They claim the change is made because they
                      insist on using MTLS on <br>
                      all Authentication Server endpoints, including the
                      Authorization <br>
                      Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add
                      security, or is the OAUTH2 <br>
                      flow just as secure without MTLS on the
                      Authorization Endpoint?<br>
                      <br>
                      Thanks,<br>
                      <br>
                      Amichai<br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      _______________________________________________<br>
                      OAuth mailing list<br>
                      <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                        rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                      <a
                        href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                        rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
                    </blockquote>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

--------------9E52F2DF5EF2236B3562FC1E--


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Yes, I understand. I just wanted to clarify how I came up with ssying POST
is an option.
Regards,
Sascha


On Tue., May 25, 2021, 22:17 A. Rothman, <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:

> Oh, I see what you mean... however as Justin clarified, the discussion
> here is not about GET vs POST, but rather about user agent vs client making
> the request. The former distinction doesn't really matter in this case,
> whereas in the latter distinction the client option seems to be breaking
> the spec (only the user agent should send it).
>
> Amichai
> On 5/26/21 4:15 AM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:
>
> Amichai,
>
> I know POST won't be seen often, but the /authorize endpoint may still
> accept POST as described here:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1
>
> I hope this helps,
> Sascha
>
>
> On Tue., May 25, 2021, 13:00 A. Rothman, <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:
>
>> Hi Sacha,
>>
>> Thanks for the links and video!
>>
>> However I don't think this is what they're doing. There's no par
>> endpoint, no JSON response (just a redirect with a Location header, that
>> instead of following, the client is supposed to pass through to the user
>> agent), etc. It seems more like a regular OAUTH2 flow, just with the
>> initial request coming out of the client instead of the user agent, without
>> any of the specifics of the par mentioned in the video.
>>
>> btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization request can be sent by the
>> client? In the quote I made below from 4.1, as well as e.g. 4.2.1, it seems
>> pretty explicit that it's the user agent that makes the actual HTTP request
>> (Authorization Request with all its params etc), after being redirected to
>> it from the client, no? I don't see much wiggle room there to allow for the
>> client to be sending it itself...
>>
>> Amichai
>> On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:
>>
>> Hello Amichai!
>>
>> There could be several reasons why you see that behaviour in your web
>> browser. For example:
>>
>> - This RFC suggests sending a request to the authorization server, get a
>> session specific URL back which can be forwarded to the authorization
>> server via the browser. This is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request):
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par. I have also
>> made a video about this flow, maybe it matches what you are seeing on your
>> web server: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE11HJRCL-k
>>
>> - In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client to POST to the authorization
>> endpoint
>>
>> I hope this helps,
>> Sascha
>>
>> On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code Grant flow starts with:
>>>
>>> (A)  The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
>>>          user-agent to the authorization endpoint.  The client includes
>>>          its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
>>>          redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
>>>          user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
>>>
>>> (B)  The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
>>>          the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
>>>          grants or denies the client's access request.
>>>
>>>
>>>  From this, and most explanation I've seen, I understand that the client
>>> (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the Authorization Request
>>> URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization Server, it redirects
>>> the user agent which is the one actually making the HTTP request. It
>>> then goes back and forth with the Authorization Server (with HTML and
>>> posting forms and whatnot), and eventually receives the Authorization
>>> Response which redirects the user agent back to the client's callback
>>> URL with the included code parameter. So as far as the Authorization
>>> Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct communications between
>>> the client and Authorization Server up to this point (before the token
>>> exchange).
>>>
>>> 1. Basically correct so far?
>>>
>>> Now, I've encountered a provider that works slightly differently (but
>>> still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme): the client (my web
>>> server) is supposed to send the Authorization Request directly to the
>>> Authorization Server, then receive some opaque URL, and redirect the
>>> user agent to there to continue the process. I suppose this URL is
>>> equivalent to one from the middle of the 'back and forth' in the
>>> previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues the same. So
>>> basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP request are reversed -
>>> instead of first redirect and then request (from user agent), there is
>>> first the request (from client)  and then redirect.
>>>
>>> So the questions are:
>>>
>>> 2. Is this compliant with the RFC?
>>>
>>> 3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly compliant with the RFC's
>>> flow, it may still be secure...)
>>>
>>> 4. If it is less secure, what are the possible vulnerabilities or
>>> attacks made possible here that are mitigated in the original flow?
>>>
>>> 5. They claim the change is made because they insist on using MTLS on
>>> all Authentication Server endpoints, including the Authorization
>>> Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add security, or is the OAUTH2
>>> flow just as secure without MTLS on the Authorization Endpoint?
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Amichai
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>

--0000000000005efadd05c3350f30
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">Yes, I understand. I just wanted to clarify how I came up=
 with ssying POST is an option.<div dir=3D"auto">Regards,</div><div dir=3D"=
auto">Sascha</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue., May 25, 2021, 22:17 =
A. Rothman, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net">amichai2@amichais.=
net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>Oh, I see what you mean... however as Justin clarified, the
      discussion here is not about GET vs POST, but rather about user
      agent vs client making the request. The former distinction doesn&#39;=
t
      really matter in this case, whereas in the latter distinction the
      client option seems to be breaking the spec (only the user agent
      should send it).</p>
    <p>Amichai<br>
    </p>
    <div>On 5/26/21 4:15 AM, Sascha Preibisch
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"auto">
        <div>Amichai,</div>
        <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
        </div>
        <div dir=3D"auto">I know POST won&#39;t be seen often, but the
          /authorize endpoint may still accept POST as described here:
          <div dir=3D"auto"><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#=
section-3.1" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://tools.ietf.org/ht=
ml/rfc6749#section-3.1</a><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"auto">I hope this helps,</div>
          <div dir=3D"auto">Sascha</div>
          <br>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue., May 25, 2021,
              13:00 A. Rothman, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net=
" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div>
                <p>Hi Sacha,</p>
                <p>Thanks for the links and video!</p>
                <p>However I don&#39;t think this is what they&#39;re doing=
.
                  There&#39;s no par endpoint, no JSON response (just a
                  redirect with a Location header, that instead of
                  following, the client is supposed to pass through to
                  the user agent), etc. It seems more like a regular
                  OAUTH2 flow, just with the initial request coming out
                  of the client instead of the user agent, without any
                  of the specifics of the par mentioned in the video.</p>
                <p>btw, where does RFC 6749 say the authorization
                  request can be sent by the client? In the quote I made
                  below from 4.1, as well as e.g. 4.2.1, it seems pretty
                  explicit that it&#39;s the user agent that makes the
                  actual HTTP request (Authorization Request with all
                  its params etc), after being redirected to it from the
                  client, no? I don&#39;t see much wiggle room there to
                  allow for the client to be sending it itself...</p>
                <p>Amichai<br>
                </p>
                <div>On 5/25/21 6:28 PM, Sascha Preibisch wrote:<br>
                </div>
                <blockquote type=3D"cite">
                  <div dir=3D"ltr">
                    <div dir=3D"ltr">
                      <div dir=3D"ltr">Hello Amichai!
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>There could be several reasons why you see
                          that behaviour in your web browser. For
                          example:</div>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>- This RFC suggests sending a request to
                          the authorization server, get a session
                          specific URL back which can be forwarded to
                          the authorization server via the browser. This
                          is OAuth PAR (Pushed Authorization Request): =C2=
=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par" r=
el=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org=
/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-par</a>.
                          I have also made a video about this flow,
                          maybe it matches what you are seeing on your
                          web server:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.youtube.c=
om/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DfE11HJRCL-k</a><br>
                        </div>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>- In addition RFC 6749 also allows a client
                          to POST to the authorization endpoint</div>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div>I hope this helps,</div>
                        <div>Sascha</div>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                  <br>
                  <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
                    <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, 25 May
                      2021 at 08:00, A. Rothman &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:amich=
ai2@amichais.net" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">amichai2@=
amichais.net</a>&gt;
                      wrote:<br>
                    </div>
                    <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-colo=
r:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
                      <br>
                      In RFC 6749 section 4.1, the Authorization Code
                      Grant flow starts with:<br>
                      <br>
                      (A)=C2=A0 The client initiates the flow by directing
                      the resource owner&#39;s<br>
                      =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 user=
-agent to the authorization
                      endpoint.=C2=A0 The client includes<br>
                      =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 its =
client identifier, requested scope,
                      local state, and a<br>
                      =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 redi=
rection URI to which the
                      authorization server will send the<br>
                      =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 user=
-agent back once access is granted
                      (or denied).<br>
                      <br>
                      (B)=C2=A0 The authorization server authenticates the
                      resource owner (via<br>
                      =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the =
user-agent) and establishes whether
                      the resource owner<br>
                      =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 gran=
ts or denies the client&#39;s access
                      request.<br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      =C2=A0From this, and most explanation I&#39;ve seen, =
I
                      understand that the client <br>
                      (e.g. my web server) is supposed to prepare the
                      Authorization Request <br>
                      URL but instead of sending it to the Authorization
                      Server, it redirects <br>
                      the user agent which is the one actually making
                      the HTTP request. It <br>
                      then goes back and forth with the Authorization
                      Server (with HTML and <br>
                      posting forms and whatnot), and eventually
                      receives the Authorization <br>
                      Response which redirects the user agent back to
                      the client&#39;s callback <br>
                      URL with the included code parameter. So as far as
                      the Authorization <br>
                      Request/Response flow goes, there is no direct
                      communications between <br>
                      the client and Authorization Server up to this
                      point (before the token <br>
                      exchange).<br>
                      <br>
                      1. Basically correct so far?<br>
                      <br>
                      Now, I&#39;ve encountered a provider that works
                      slightly differently (but <br>
                      still with the Authorization Code Grant scheme):
                      the client (my web <br>
                      server) is supposed to send the Authorization
                      Request directly to the <br>
                      Authorization Server, then receive some opaque
                      URL, and redirect the <br>
                      user agent to there to continue the process. I
                      suppose this URL is <br>
                      equivalent to one from the middle of the &#39;back an=
d
                      forth&#39; in the <br>
                      previous scenario. The rest of the flow continues
                      the same. So <br>
                      basically, the initial redirect response and HTTP
                      request are reversed - <br>
                      instead of first redirect and then request (from
                      user agent), there is <br>
                      first the request (from client)=C2=A0 and then
                      redirect.<br>
                      <br>
                      So the questions are:<br>
                      <br>
                      2. Is this compliant with the RFC?<br>
                      <br>
                      3. Is it any less secure? (even if not strictly
                      compliant with the RFC&#39;s <br>
                      flow, it may still be secure...)<br>
                      <br>
                      4. If it is less secure, what are the possible
                      vulnerabilities or <br>
                      attacks made possible here that are mitigated in
                      the original flow?<br>
                      <br>
                      5. They claim the change is made because they
                      insist on using MTLS on <br>
                      all Authentication Server endpoints, including the
                      Authorization <br>
                      Endpoint. Does this make sense? Does it add
                      security, or is the OAUTH2 <br>
                      flow just as secure without MTLS on the
                      Authorization Endpoint?<br>
                      <br>
                      Thanks,<br>
                      <br>
                      Amichai<br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      _______________________________________________<br>
                      OAuth mailing list<br>
                      <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                      <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oaut=
h" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.i=
etf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
                    </blockquote>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

</blockquote></div>

--0000000000005efadd05c3350f30--


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Maybe also worth mentioning something in RFC 8705, being the "OAuth 
MTLS" spec, along with the main OAuth 2.1 spec... I don't know how 
you'll arrange the RFCs next time around :-)

On 5/26/21 2:43 AM, Aaron Parecki wrote:
> Honestly it didn't even occur to me that someone would try this, since 
> the entire point of the authorization endpoint is that it's the thing 
> the user's browser talks to. Adding MTLS just means you're going to 
> have to send the user to some other endpoint instead, which is then 
> effectively acting as the authorization endpoint anyway. So yeah I 
> could see adding some language around the authorization endpoint 
> needing to be accessible by the user agent without MTLS or other funny 
> stuff.
>
> PAR also fits in nicely in that case since the PAR endpoint could be 
> protected with MTLS since it *is* intended to only be accessible from 
> the OAuth client.
>
> Aaron
>
> On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 4:38 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu 
> <mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
>
>     I'm actually wondering if we should add discussion about not
>     putting mtls on the authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron
>     et al, thoughts?
>
>     -Justin
>     ________________________________________
>     From: A. Rothman [amichai2@amichais.net
>     <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>]
>     Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM
>     To: Justin Richer
>     Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG
>     Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
>
>     Justin,
>
>     Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts
>     about this better than I could have :-)
>
>     I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll have
>     to double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss anything,
>     but as I understand it, that's more or less it.
>
>     btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific
>     problem either - if I understood correctly, it still ends with the
>     user agent sending an Authorization Request to the AS, just with
>     PAR-specific parameters instead of the usual ones... if so, and if
>     the endpoint is still required to use mTLS, thus needs to be sent
>     by the client... it would just be kicking the can down the road
>     and violating the PAR spec instead.
>
>     Thanks again for your time and explanations,
>
>     Amichai
>

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    <p>Maybe also worth mentioning something in RFC 8705, being the
      "OAuth MTLS" spec, along with the main OAuth 2.1 spec... I don't
      know how you'll arrange the RFCs next time around :-)<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/26/21 2:43 AM, Aaron Parecki
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAGBSGjr4zKh4AffHVTDriAiP-_o3K-aF4YYEZvJrULwV-Fmp+Q@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div dir="ltr">Honestly it didn't even occur to me that someone
          would try this, since the entire point of the authorization
          endpoint is that it's the thing the user's browser talks to.
          Adding MTLS just means you're going to have to send the user
          to some other endpoint instead, which is then effectively
          acting as the authorization endpoint anyway. So yeah I could
          see adding some language around the authorization endpoint
          needing to be accessible by the user agent without MTLS or
          other funny stuff.</div>
        <div dir="ltr"><br>
        </div>
        <div>PAR also fits in nicely in that case since the PAR endpoint
          could be protected with MTLS since it *is* intended to only be
          accessible from the OAuth client.</div>
        <br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">
          <div class="gmail_attr">Aaron</div>
          <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
          </div>
          <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 4:38
            PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href="mailto:jricher@mit.edu"
              moz-do-not-send="true">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
          </div>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
            0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
            rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I'm actually wondering if
            we should add discussion about not putting mtls on the
            authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron et al,
            thoughts? <br>
            <br>
            -Justin<br>
            ________________________________________<br>
            From: A. Rothman [<a href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net"
              target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>]<br>
            Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM<br>
            To: Justin Richer<br>
            Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG<br>
            Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization
            Request?<br>
            <br>
            Justin,<br>
            <br>
            Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own
            thoughts about this better than I could have :-)<br>
            <br>
            I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll
            have to double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss
            anything, but as I understand it, that's more or less it.<br>
            <br>
            btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific
            problem either - if I understood correctly, it still ends
            with the user agent sending an Authorization Request to the
            AS, just with PAR-specific parameters instead of the usual
            ones... if so, and if the endpoint is still required to use
            mTLS, thus needs to be sent by the client... it would just
            be kicking the can down the road and violating the PAR spec
            instead.<br>
            <br>
            Thanks again for your time and explanations,<br>
            <br>
            Amichai<br>
            <br>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
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All,

The NomCom is looking for volunteers:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/T_WVH96pH-5QVTRqd0yTT1TaPaU/

Please, consider volunteering for this important committee to help select
the next IETF leadership team.

Regards,
 Rifaat & Hannes

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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>The NomCom is looking for voluntee=
rs:</div><div><a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announc=
e/T_WVH96pH-5QVTRqd0yTT1TaPaU/" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.=
org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/T_WVH96pH-5QVTRqd0yTT1TaPaU/</a><br></div><div><=
br></div><div>Please, consider volunteering for this important committee to=
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s,</div><div>=C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes</div></div>

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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So the text of RFC8705 is fixed, it could eventually be updated and =
obsoleted by another RFC, but that would take a new effort from the WG =
to consider it worthwhile. Not likely to happen for an implementation =
note like this, unfortunately. But OAuth 2.1 is meant to account for all =
of the different extensions and profiles of OAuth that are already out =
there, so it=E2=80=99s a really good place to discuss that kind of =
thing.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On May 27, 2021, at 3:13 AM, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net> wrote:
>=20
> Maybe also worth mentioning something in RFC 8705, being the "OAuth =
MTLS" spec, along with the main OAuth 2.1 spec... I don't know how =
you'll arrange the RFCs next time around :-)
>=20
> On 5/26/21 2:43 AM, Aaron Parecki wrote:
>> Honestly it didn't even occur to me that someone would try this, =
since the entire point of the authorization endpoint is that it's the =
thing the user's browser talks to. Adding MTLS just means you're going =
to have to send the user to some other endpoint instead, which is then =
effectively acting as the authorization endpoint anyway. So yeah I could =
see adding some language around the authorization endpoint needing to be =
accessible by the user agent without MTLS or other funny stuff.
>>=20
>> PAR also fits in nicely in that case since the PAR endpoint could be =
protected with MTLS since it *is* intended to only be accessible from =
the OAuth client.
>>=20
>> Aaron
>>=20
>> On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 4:38 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu =
<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
>> I'm actually wondering if we should add discussion about not putting =
mtls on the authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron et al, =
thoughts?=20
>>=20
>> -Justin
>> ________________________________________
>> From: A. Rothman [amichai2@amichais.net =
<mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>]
>> Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM
>> To: Justin Richer
>> Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
>>=20
>> Justin,
>>=20
>> Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts =
about this better than I could have :-)
>>=20
>> I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll have to =
double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss anything, but as I =
understand it, that's more or less it.
>>=20
>> btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific problem =
either - if I understood correctly, it still ends with the user agent =
sending an Authorization Request to the AS, just with PAR-specific =
parameters instead of the usual ones... if so, and if the endpoint is =
still required to use mTLS, thus needs to be sent by the client... it =
would just be kicking the can down the road and violating the PAR spec =
instead.
>>=20
>> Thanks again for your time and explanations,
>>=20
>> Amichai
>>=20


--Apple-Mail=_5C6A6D42-3363-430F-A6A2-07739E9837E6
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">So =
the text of RFC8705 is fixed, it could eventually be updated and =
obsoleted by another RFC, but that would take a new effort from the WG =
to consider it worthwhile. Not likely to happen for an implementation =
note like this, unfortunately. But OAuth 2.1 is meant to account for all =
of the different extensions and profiles of OAuth that are already out =
there, so it=E2=80=99s a really good place to discuss that kind of =
thing.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94=
 Justin<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On May 27, 2021, at 3:13 AM, A. Rothman =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" =
class=3D"">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D"">
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D"">
 =20
  <div class=3D""><p class=3D"">Maybe also worth mentioning something in =
RFC 8705, being the
      "OAuth MTLS" spec, along with the main OAuth 2.1 spec... I don't
      know how you'll arrange the RFCs next time around :-)<br class=3D"">=

    </p>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 5/26/21 2:43 AM, Aaron Parecki
      wrote:<br class=3D"">
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" =
cite=3D"mid:CAGBSGjr4zKh4AffHVTDriAiP-_o3K-aF4YYEZvJrULwV-Fmp+Q@mail.gmail=
.com" class=3D"">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Honestly it didn't even occur to me =
that someone
          would try this, since the entire point of the authorization
          endpoint is that it's the thing the user's browser talks to.
          Adding MTLS just means you're going to have to send the user
          to some other endpoint instead, which is then effectively
          acting as the authorization endpoint anyway. So yeah I could
          see adding some language around the =
authorization&nbsp;endpoint
          needing to be accessible by the user agent without MTLS or
          other funny stuff.</div>
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><br class=3D"">
        </div>
        <div class=3D"">PAR also fits in nicely in that case since the =
PAR endpoint
          could be protected with MTLS since it *is* intended to only be
          accessible from the OAuth client.</div>
        <br class=3D"">
        <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
          <div class=3D"gmail_attr">Aaron</div>
          <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr"><br class=3D"">
          </div>
          <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 25, 2021 at =
4:38
            PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true" class=3D"">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D"">
          </div>
          <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px
            0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
            rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I'm actually wondering if
            we should add discussion about not putting mtls on the
            authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron et al,
            thoughts? <br class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
            -Justin<br class=3D"">
            ________________________________________<br class=3D"">
            From: A. Rothman [<a href=3D"mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" =
target=3D"_blank" moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
class=3D"">amichai2@amichais.net</a>]<br class=3D"">
            Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM<br class=3D"">
            To: Justin Richer<br class=3D"">
            Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG<br class=3D"">
            Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization
            Request?<br class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
            Justin,<br class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
            Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own
            thoughts about this better than I could have :-)<br =
class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
            I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll
            have to double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss
            anything, but as I understand it, that's more or less it.<br =
class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
            btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific
            problem either - if I understood correctly, it still ends
            with the user agent sending an Authorization Request to the
            AS, just with PAR-specific parameters instead of the usual
            ones... if so, and if the endpoint is still required to use
            mTLS, thus needs to be sent by the client... it would just
            be kicking the can down the road and violating the PAR spec
            instead.<br class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
            Thanks again for your time and explanations,<br class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
            Amichai<br class=3D"">
            <br class=3D"">
          </blockquote>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
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Yeah, I just meant it could naturally fit also in the next iteration of 
RFC8705, if/when it is superseded. In the main spec would obviously be 
great :-)

Thanks!

Amichai

On 5/28/21 9:21 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
> So the text of RFC8705 is fixed, it could eventually be updated and 
> obsoleted by another RFC, but that would take a new effort from the WG 
> to consider it worthwhile. Not likely to happen for an implementation 
> note like this, unfortunately. But OAuth 2.1 is meant to account for 
> all of the different extensions and profiles of OAuth that are already 
> out there, so it’s a really good place to discuss that kind of thing.
>
>  — Justin
>
>> On May 27, 2021, at 3:13 AM, A. Rothman <amichai2@amichais.net 
>> <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>> wrote:
>>
>> Maybe also worth mentioning something in RFC 8705, being the "OAuth 
>> MTLS" spec, along with the main OAuth 2.1 spec... I don't know how 
>> you'll arrange the RFCs next time around :-)
>>
>> On 5/26/21 2:43 AM, Aaron Parecki wrote:
>>> Honestly it didn't even occur to me that someone would try this, 
>>> since the entire point of the authorization endpoint is that it's 
>>> the thing the user's browser talks to. Adding MTLS just means you're 
>>> going to have to send the user to some other endpoint instead, which 
>>> is then effectively acting as the authorization endpoint anyway. So 
>>> yeah I could see adding some language around the 
>>> authorization endpoint needing to be accessible by the user agent 
>>> without MTLS or other funny stuff.
>>>
>>> PAR also fits in nicely in that case since the PAR endpoint could be 
>>> protected with MTLS since it *is* intended to only be accessible 
>>> from the OAuth client.
>>>
>>> Aaron
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 4:38 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu 
>>> <mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     I'm actually wondering if we should add discussion about not
>>>     putting mtls on the authorisation endpoint into OAuth 2.1. Aaron
>>>     et al, thoughts?
>>>
>>>     -Justin
>>>     ________________________________________
>>>     From: A. Rothman [amichai2@amichais.net
>>>     <mailto:amichai2@amichais.net>]
>>>     Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM
>>>     To: Justin Richer
>>>     Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG
>>>     Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the Authorization Request?
>>>
>>>     Justin,
>>>
>>>     Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up my own thoughts
>>>     about this better than I could have :-)
>>>
>>>     I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too much... I'll have
>>>     to double-check the details to make sure I didn't miss anything,
>>>     but as I understand it, that's more or less it.
>>>
>>>     btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve this specific
>>>     problem either - if I understood correctly, it still ends with
>>>     the user agent sending an Authorization Request to the AS, just
>>>     with PAR-specific parameters instead of the usual ones... if so,
>>>     and if the endpoint is still required to use mTLS, thus needs to
>>>     be sent by the client... it would just be kicking the can down
>>>     the road and violating the PAR spec instead.
>>>
>>>     Thanks again for your time and explanations,
>>>
>>>     Amichai
>>>
>

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    <p>Yeah, I just meant it could naturally fit also in the next
      iteration of RFC8705, if/when it is superseded. In the main spec
      would obviously be great :-)<br>
    </p>
    <p>Thanks!</p>
    <p>Amichai<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/28/21 9:21 PM, Justin Richer
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:ED67EEDD-2DF2-42A5-BB70-2C9FE7DD9ECA@mit.edu">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      So the text of RFC8705 is fixed, it could eventually be updated
      and obsoleted by another RFC, but that would take a new effort
      from the WG to consider it worthwhile. Not likely to happen for an
      implementation note like this, unfortunately. But OAuth 2.1 is
      meant to account for all of the different extensions and profiles
      of OAuth that are already out there, so it’s a really good place
      to discuss that kind of thing.
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class=""> — Justin<br class="">
        <div><br class="">
          <blockquote type="cite" class="">
            <div class="">On May 27, 2021, at 3:13 AM, A. Rothman &lt;<a
                href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net" class=""
                moz-do-not-send="true">amichai2@amichais.net</a>&gt;
              wrote:</div>
            <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class="">
              <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
                charset=UTF-8" class="">
              <div class="">
                <p class="">Maybe also worth mentioning something in RFC
                  8705, being the "OAuth MTLS" spec, along with the main
                  OAuth 2.1 spec... I don't know how you'll arrange the
                  RFCs next time around :-)<br class="">
                </p>
                <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/26/21 2:43 AM, Aaron
                  Parecki wrote:<br class="">
                </div>
                <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAGBSGjr4zKh4AffHVTDriAiP-_o3K-aF4YYEZvJrULwV-Fmp+Q@mail.gmail.com"
                  class="">
                  <div dir="ltr" class="">
                    <div dir="ltr" class="">Honestly it didn't even
                      occur to me that someone would try this, since the
                      entire point of the authorization endpoint is that
                      it's the thing the user's browser talks to. Adding
                      MTLS just means you're going to have to send the
                      user to some other endpoint instead, which is then
                      effectively acting as the authorization endpoint
                      anyway. So yeah I could see adding some language
                      around the authorization endpoint needing to be
                      accessible by the user agent without MTLS or other
                      funny stuff.</div>
                    <div dir="ltr" class=""><br class="">
                    </div>
                    <div class="">PAR also fits in nicely in that case
                      since the PAR endpoint could be protected with
                      MTLS since it *is* intended to only be accessible
                      from the OAuth client.</div>
                    <br class="">
                    <div class="gmail_quote">
                      <div class="gmail_attr">Aaron</div>
                      <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br class="">
                      </div>
                      <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, May 25,
                        2021 at 4:38 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a
                          href="mailto:jricher@mit.edu"
                          moz-do-not-send="true" class="">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt;
                        wrote:<br class="">
                      </div>
                      <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
                        0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                        rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I'm actually
                        wondering if we should add discussion about not
                        putting mtls on the authorisation endpoint into
                        OAuth 2.1. Aaron et al, thoughts? <br class="">
                        <br class="">
                        -Justin<br class="">
                        ________________________________________<br
                          class="">
                        From: A. Rothman [<a
                          href="mailto:amichai2@amichais.net"
                          target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
                          class="">amichai2@amichais.net</a>]<br
                          class="">
                        Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 7:03 PM<br class="">
                        To: Justin Richer<br class="">
                        Cc: Sascha Preibisch; IETF oauth WG<br class="">
                        Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Can a client send the
                        Authorization Request?<br class="">
                        <br class="">
                        Justin,<br class="">
                        <br class="">
                        Thanks for this analysis. It pretty much sums up
                        my own thoughts about this better than I could
                        have :-)<br class="">
                        <br class="">
                        I just hope I wasn't 'leading the witness' too
                        much... I'll have to double-check the details to
                        make sure I didn't miss anything, but as I
                        understand it, that's more or less it.<br
                          class="">
                        <br class="">
                        btw it occurred to me that PAR wouldn't solve
                        this specific problem either - if I understood
                        correctly, it still ends with the user agent
                        sending an Authorization Request to the AS, just
                        with PAR-specific parameters instead of the
                        usual ones... if so, and if the endpoint is
                        still required to use mTLS, thus needs to be
                        sent by the client... it would just be kicking
                        the can down the road and violating the PAR spec
                        instead.<br class="">
                        <br class="">
                        Thanks again for your time and explanations,<br
                          class="">
                        <br class="">
                        Amichai<br class="">
                        <br class="">
                      </blockquote>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br class="">
      </div>
    </blockquote>
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